[Senate Hearing 107-685]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
S. Hrg. 107-685
INCREASING OUR NONPROLIFERATION EFFORTS IN THE FORMER SOVIET UNION
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HEARING
BEFORE THE
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS
UNITED STATES SENATE
ONE HUNDRED SEVENTH CONGRESS
SECOND SESSION
__________
APRIL 23, 2002
__________
Printed for the use of the Committee on Foreign Relations
Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.access.gpo.gov/congress/
senate
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COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS
JOSEPH R. BIDEN, Jr., Delaware, Chairman
PAUL S. SARBANES, Maryland JESSE HELMS, North Carolina
CHRISTOPHER J. DODD, Connecticut RICHARD G. LUGAR, Indiana
JOHN F. KERRY, Massachusetts CHUCK HAGEL, Nebraska
RUSSELL D. FEINGOLD, Wisconsin GORDON H. SMITH, Oregon
PAUL D. WELLSTONE, Minnesota BILL FRIST, Tennessee
BARBARA BOXER, California LINCOLN D. CHAFEE, Rhode Island
ROBERT G. TORRICELLI, New Jersey GEORGE ALLEN, Virginia
BILL NELSON, Florida SAM BROWNBACK, Kansas
JOHN D. ROCKEFELLER IV, West MICHAEL B. ENZI, Wyoming
Virginia
(ii)
C O N T E N T S
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Page
Biden, Hon. Joseph R., Jr., U.S. Senator from Delaware, prepared
statement...................................................... 2
Cohen, Hon. William S., former Secretary of Defense, chairman,
and chief executive officer of the Cohen Group, Washington, DC. 12
Prepared statement........................................... 16
Enzi, Hon. Mike, U.S. Senator from Wyoming, prepared statement
and informational letter....................................... 9
Hecker, Dr. Siegfried S., senior fellow, Los Alamos National
Laboratory, Los Alamos, NM..................................... 33
Prepared statement........................................... 36
Helms, Hon. Jesse, U.S. Senator from North Carolina, prepared
statement...................................................... 6
Letter to Secretary of State Colin Powell, dated April 18,
2002....................................................... 7
Menges, Dr. Constantine C., senior fellow, The Hudson Institute,
Washington, DC................................................. 43
Prepared statement........................................... 48
Article from the Washington Post, July 29, 2002, entitled
``Russia, China and What's Really on the Table''........... 55
(iii)
INCREASING OUR NONPROLIFERATION EFFORTS IN THE FORMER SOVIET UNION
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TUESDAY, APRIL 23, 2002
U.S. Senate,
Committee on Foreign Relations,
Washington, DC.
The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 10:27 a.m., in
room SD-419, Dirksen Senate Office Building, the Hon. Joseph R.
Biden, Jr. (chairman of the committee), presiding.
Present: Senators Biden, Bill Nelson, Lugar and Enzi.
The Chairman. The committee will please come to order.
Over the past 2 years, the Committee on Foreign Relations
has held a series of hearings outlining the threat posed by
weapons of mass destruction to U.S. national security. We have
listened to witnesses testify on a broad array of threats from
the hypothetical smallpox attack on the United States to the
potential dangers posed by dirty bomb and improvised nuclear
devices.
We have also held two closed hearings for the Senate as a
whole, on the last two subjects. In the course of these
hearings, one simple fact has stood out: That is, there are
many sources for weapons of mass destruction. And it can take
years to obtain or build them. But there is one place that has
it all, and that place is Russia. It is far from our only
problem. But when we talk about confronting the
nonproliferation challenges head on, we have to look at Russia.
When the Soviet Union collapsed, a massive military
infrastructure geared toward a global confrontation lost its
purpose overnight. Huge stockpiles of nuclear weapons and
fissile material, poisonous chemical munitions, and illegally
produced biological pathogens were no longer needed. As the
culture of centralized control withered away in the newly
democratic Russia, the security and safeguards for weapons
storage facilities and laboratories began to weaken. Weapons
scientists, who had devoted their careers to the Soviet state,
were left to drift and forced to moonlight to make a living.
To the lasting credit of two of my colleagues, Senators
Nunn and Lugar, and aided and abetted by our former Secretary
before us when he was here in the Senate, Senator Cohen, they
recognized the threat posed by a collapsing superpower with
thousands of nuclear weapons. They led the way in creating a
set of programs known as the Cooperative Threat Reduction to
help Russia and other states in the former Soviet Union secure
and destroy nuclear warheads, missile launchers, and other
strategic delivery systems.
In 1996, they were joined by Senator Pete Domenici in
establishing the lab-to-lab programs under the Department of
Energy to secure Russia's nuclear materials and help its
weapons scientists find socially useful concerns--or careers, I
should say.
Next month we will celebrate the 10th anniversary of the
Nunn-Lugar programs. And as we mark that occasion, we have to
face the sobering reality that much more has to be done. Let us
take a quick look at what still exists. As a matter of fact, in
the interest of time, we will not take a quick look, except to
suggest just a couple of broad things.
Approximately 1,000 metric tons of excess highly enriched
uranium, enough to produce 20,000 nuclear weapons, remains;
approximately 160,000 tons of excess weapons grade plutonium;
approximately 40,000 tons of declared chemical weapons. And,
according to a recent Carnegie Endowment study, a population of
120,000 scientists and skilled personnel in Russia's nuclear
cities, where 58 percent of them were surveyed, are forced to
moonlight at second jobs. And 14 percent have indicated a
desire to work abroad.
A little more than a year ago, this committee heard from
former Senator Baker and former White House counsel Lloyd
Cutler as they presented findings on the Blue Ribbon Task Force
on U.S. Nuclear Nonproliferation Programs in the former Soviet
Union. I risk making myself hoarse by repeating it, but the
primary finding is this, and I quote, and I will end with this,
``The most urgent unmet national security threat to the United
States today is the danger that weapons of mass destruction or
weapons useable material in Russia could be stolen and sold to
terrorists or hostile nations and used against American troops
abroad or citizens at home.''
I say to my colleagues: We are fortunate today to have a
very, very first-rate set of witnesses, none whom we know
better or have greater respect for than our first witness, the
distinguished former Senator from Maine and former Secretary of
Defense.
In 1974, Time magazine singled out Bill as one of America's
200 future leaders. Others were in that list, but few proved
Time magazine to be as correct as Bill Cohen did.
I welcome you, Mr. Secretary. Thank you for being here. And
it is really very good to see you. The floor is yours.
[The prepared statement of Senator Biden follows:]
Prepared Statement of Senator Joseph R. Biden, Jr.
Over the past two years, the Committee on Foreign Relations has
held a series of hearings outlining the threat posed by weapons of mass
destruction (WMD) to U.S. national security. We have listened to
witnesses testify on a broad array of threats, from a hypothetical
smallpox attack on the United States to the potential dangers posed by
``dirty bombs'' and improvised nuclear devices.
In the course of these hearings, one simple fact has stood out.
There are many sources for weapons of mass destruction, and it can take
years to obtain or build them. But there's one place that has it all.
That place is Russia. It's far from our only problem, but when we talk
about confronting the nonproliferation challenge head on, we must begin
with Russia.
When the Soviet Union collapsed, a massive military infrastructure
geared toward a global confrontation lost its purpose overnight. Huge
stockpiles of nuclear weapons and fissile materials, poisonous chemical
munitions, and illegally-produced biological pathogens were no longer
needed. As the culture of centralized control withered away in a newly
democratic Russia, the security and safeguards for weapons storage
facilities and laboratories began to weaken. Weapons scientists, who
had devoted their careers to the Soviet state, were left adrift and
forced to moonlight to make a living.
To the lasting credit of two of my colleagues, Senators Sam Nunn
and Dick Lugar immediately recognized the threat posed by a collapsing
superpower with thousands of nuclear weapons. They led the way in
creating a set of programs known as Cooperative Threat Reduction to
help Russia and the other states of the former Soviet Union secure and
destroy nuclear warheads, missile launchers and other strategic
delivery systems. In 1996, they were joined by Senator Pete Domenici in
establishing lab-to-lab programs under the Department of Energy to
secure Russian nuclear materials and help its weapons scientists find
socially useful careers.
Next month, we will celebrate the tenth anniversary of the Nunn-
Lugar programs. As we mark that occasion, we must also face the
sobering reality that much remains to be done. Let's take a quick look
at what still exists in Russia today, a decade after the Soviet Union
fell:
Approximately 1000 metric tons of excess highly enriched
uranium, enough to produce roughly 20,000 nuclear weapons.
Approximately 160 metric tons of excess weapons grade
plutonium.
Approximately 40,000 metric tons of declared chemical
weapons.
According to a recent Carnegie Endowment study, a population
of 120,000 scientists and skilled personnel in the Russian
nuclear cities where 58% of those surveyed are forced to
moonlight at second jobs and 14% have indicated a desire to
work abroad.
A little more than a year ago, this Committee heard from Senator
Howard Baker and former White House counsel Lloyd Cutler as they
presented the findings of a blue ribbon task force on U.S. nuclear
nonproliferation programs in the former Soviet Union. I risk making
myself hoarse, but let me once again repeat their primary finding:
The most urgent unmet national security threat to the United
States today is the danger that weapons of mass destruction or
weapons-usable material in Russia could be stolen and sold to
terrorists or hostile nation states and used against American
troops abroad or citizens at home.
To address this critical threat, the Baker-Cutler report had called
for the United States to spend $30 billion over the next eight to ten
years to secure and/or neutralize all nuclear weapons-usable material
located in Russia and to prevent the outflow of Russian scientific
expertise necessary for weapons of mass destruction.
And that is why I decided to call this hearing today. Working with
my colleagues, I plan to make a strong push during this session for
expanded funding for U.S. nonproliferation assistance to Russia. Before
we do that, however, we need to focus any increased funding on specific
objectives. Simply throwing money at the problem is not a solution.
I know that Secretary Cohen and our other witnesses will have their
own creative proposals to share with the Committee. I would also like
to solicit their thoughts on the following ideas, which have emerged
during the past year:
(1) Accelerating the pace of the Materials Protection,
Control, and Accounting program so that we will not have to
wait until the end of the decade before all Russian fissile
material is stored at securely guarded facilities. As of 2001,
comprehensive security upgrades had been completed at only 37
out of 95 nuclear sites in the former Soviet Union. Expanding
the MPC&A program will allow us to implement comprehensive
upgrades at more Russian sites.
(2) Expanding the scope and the pace of the 1993 Highly
Enriched Uranium (HEU) Purchase Agreement so that the United
States purchases processed nuclear fuel from additional Russian
stocks of highly enriched uranium. Today, Russia is obligated
to down blend 500 metric tons of HEU, or approximately 30
metric tons per year, for eventual sale in the United States to
commercial nuclear reactors. There is no reason why we cannot
double that total amount to 1000 metric tons to further reduce
a proliferation risk. After all, one metric ton of HEU is
sufficient to produce approximately 20 nuclear weapons.
(3) Providing greater financial assistance to jump-start the
destruction of Russian chemical weapons under the Chemical
Weapons Convention. Russia has declared approximately 40,000
metric tons of chemical weapons at seven storage sites across
the country. I applaud the Administration's request for a
significant increase in the FY 2003 budget request for these
efforts, but we may need to do more. We also need to pressure
our European allies, in particular, to step up to the plate
with further support for this effort.
(4) Expanding programs like the International Science and
Technology Centers and Bio Redirect to provide more Russian
weapons scientists with greater opportunities for collaborative
projects with Western counterparts. I have suggested that we
should organize Russian biological scientists into a public
health corps to clean up dangerous former test sites, develop
and produce new vaccines, and defeat multi-drug resistant
tuberculosis and other diseases.
Apart from new proposals, we should also consider new funding
mechanisms. Senator Lugar and I have worked to develop the authority
for the President to offer ``debt-for-nonproliferation'' swaps to the
Russian Federation. In exchange for our forgiveness of part or all of
the Russia's official Soviet-era debt obligations to the United States,
Russia would in turn use these proceeds for mutually agreed
nonproliferation programs. It is our hope that a U.S. offer along these
lines will encourage similar initiatives on the part of our European
allies, who carry the vast majority of Russian debt.
Let me clarify one issue. When I refer to Russia as having one-stop
shopping for weapons of mass destruction, I do not mean to slander the
Russian government or the Russian people. Frankly, I think we have been
very lucky that the overwhelming majority of Russian scientists and
military officers are real patriots and recognize the perils of
cooperating with foreign governments and terrorist groups. Given the
economic misery and porous security in Russia over the past decade, we
should all be grateful that large-scale defections of materials or
personnel to foreign nations have not occurred. With our help and
assistance, the Russians are mounting a noble effort to keep a tight
noose on weapons of mass destruction. Both we and they can do more,
however, and al-Qaeda's efforts are a reminder that we must do more.
At the same time, I am glad the Administration is engaged in a
frank dialogue with Russia on the need to curb its cooperation with
Iran in the nuclear and missile fields, which do raise serious
proliferation concerns. That conversation must continue, and I am
hopeful the United States and Russia can reach some initial
understandings before next month's meetings between the two Presidents.
Our first witness today will be the Honorable William S. Cohen, the
former Secretary of Defense and a former member of this body for
eighteen years. In 1974, Time Magazine singled out Bill as one of
``America's 200 Future Leaders.'' I think the past quarter of a century
has borne out the wisdom of that prediction. As Secretary of Defense in
the last Administration, Bill was among the first to recognize the
likelihood of a potential terrorist attack against the U.S. homeland
involving a nuclear, chemical, or biological weapon. He has worked with
Russian leaders on the implementation of Nunn-Lugar programs. I look
forward to his insights on how we can move to the next level of
cooperation.
Dr. Siegfried ``Sig'' Hecker, a Senior Fellow at the Los Alamos
National Laboratory, and Dr. Constantine Menges, a Senior Fellow at the
Hudson Institute, will appear on our second panel. Dr. Hecker served as
Director of the Los Alamos lab from 1985 to 1997 and participated in
some of the initial ``lab-to-lab'' exchanges between the United States
and Russia during the early 1990s. Last summer, Dr. Hecker published an
article on ``An Integrated Strategy for Nuclear Cooperation with
Russia'' and offered a number of intriguing proposals. I hope that Dr.
Hecker will expand on these proposals and give us a sense of which
ideas deserve immediate action in the next year. Dr. Constantine Menges
has previously served as a Professor at the George Washington
University, where he directed the Program on Transitions to Democracy
and initiated a project on U.S. relations with Russia. He has also
served on the National Security Council and as a National Intelligence
Officer.
With that, I turn to our ranking member for today, Senator Lugar.
The Chairman. Excuse me. Let me yield to the Senator from
Indiana for a statement.
Senator Lugar. Well, thank you very much, Mr. Chairman, for
your comments about Cooperative Threat Reduction.
I join the witnesses that we saw last year, Senator Baker
and Lloyd Cutler, believing that the No. 1 national security
threat facing our country is the proliferation of weapons of
mass destruction and their means of delivery.
The problem we face today is not just terrorism. It is the
nexus between terrorists and these weapons of mass destruction.
There is little doubt that Osama bin Laden and al-Qaeda would
have used those weapons of mass destruction on September 11, if
they had possessed them. It is equally clear that they made an
effort to obtain them.
Victory in this war must be defined not only in terms of
destroying terrorist cells in this or that country. We must
also undertake the ambitious goal of comprehensively preventing
the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. For many
years, I and others have promoted the concept of a multi-layer
defense. And this first layer of defense must target the most
likely source of proliferation, namely, as you pointed out, Mr.
Chairman, the former Soviet Union.
Efforts to prevent the leakage of weapons of mass
destruction from falling into the hands of rogue nations and
terrorist groups are cheaper and more effective than responses
after transfer. Nevertheless, we must also prepare for the
leakage of these dangers and their possible use against
American targets. This requires us to prepare to interdict
weapons and materials abroad and at our borders and respond to
an attack here at home through consequence management efforts.
Finally, I believe a complete defense must include missile
defenses. I have spent considerable time over the last decade
working to advance this multi-layer defense. In 1991, with
former Senator Sam Nunn of Georgia, we introduced the Nunn-
Lugar Cooperative Threat Reduction legislation. The program was
designed to assist the states of the former Soviet Union in
dismantling weapons of mass destruction and establishing
verifiable safeguards against their proliferation.
For more than 10 years, Nunn-Lugar has been the country's
principal response to disintegration of the custodial system
guarding the Soviet weapons legacy. Nunn-Lugar has also been
used to upgrade the security surrounding dangerous substances
and to provide civilian employment to tens of thousands of
Russian weapons scientists. Unfortunately, complete Russian
accountability and transparency in the chemical and biological
arena has been lacking. And this has resulted in the
administration's request for a waiver for a certification
requirement that Russia is committed to arms control goals.
This has led to a freeze on new dismantlements and
nonproliferation projects in Russia. This is a dangerous
situation. I am hopeful the Congress will quickly respond by
granting this waiver on the supplemental appropriation bill.
But we must also be clear with Russia that full transparency
and accountability must be forthcoming with respect to former
Soviet stockpiles of weapons of mass destruction.
Last month I introduced legislation to permit and
facilitate the Secretary of Defense's use of Nunn-Lugar
expertise and resources when nonproliferation threats around
the world are identified. Beyond the former Soviet Union, Nunn-
Lugar-styled programs aimed at weapons and dismantlement and
counter proliferation do not exist. The ability to apply the
Nunn-Lugar model to states outside the former Soviet Union
would provide the United States with another tool to confront
the threats associated with weapons of mass destruction.
My bill is designed to empower the administration to
respond to both emergency proliferation risks and less urgent
cooperative opportunities to further nonproliferation goals.
The precise replication of the Nunn-Lugar program will not be
possible ever.
And clearly, many states will continue to avoid
accountability. When nations resist, other options must be
explored. When governments continue to contribute to weapons of
mass destruction threats facing the United States, we must be
prepared to apply diplomatic and economic power, as well as
military force.
The experience of Nunn-Lugar in Russia has demonstrated the
threat of weapons of mass destruction can lead to extraordinary
outcomes based on mutual interest. No one would have predicted
in the 1980's that American contractors and DOD officials would
be on the ground in Russia destroying thousands of strategic
systems. And if we were to protect ourselves during this
incredibly dangerous period, we must create new
nonproliferation partners and aggressively pursue any
nonproliferation opportunities that appear.
I believe increasing the administration's flexibility in
dealing with these threats is the first step down that road.
And I can think, as you have pointed out, Mr. Chairman, of no
better witness to those efforts the United States has been
implementing in the former Soviet Union than former Secretary
of Defense Bill Cohen.
Secretary Cohen was personally engaged in these efforts
throughout his tenure at the Pentagon. He is a great leader,
and I want personally to thank him for his leadership of these
vitally important programs. And I join you in looking forward
to his testimony.
The Chairman. Thank you. And before we begin, I will ask
unanimous consent that an opening statement by Senator Helms be
put in the record at this point, as well as a letter, he has
asked to be put in the record, a letter he sent to Secretary of
State Powell.
[The prepared statement of Senator Helms and letter
follow:]
Prepared Statement of Senator Jesse Helms
Mr. Chairman, I appreciate your scheduling this important hearing
today; and I appreciate the distinguished witnesses for agreeing to
come and assist in our evaluating the significant matter of U.S.
nonproliferation assistance to Russia.
President Bush has taken many steps during the past year in moving
the United States toward a new relationship with Russia, and thereby
beyond the legacy resulting from the confrontation with the Soviet
Union during the Cold War.
Since the first Cooperative Threat Reduction project began the
dismantling of Russia's excess nuclear infrastructure nearly a decade
ago, there have been numerous successes--missiles destroyed, bombers
dismantled, submarines disassembled, and nuclear warheads downloaded
and safeguarded.
But the success of the Cooperative Threat Reduction program spurred
expansion into broader areas that, while significant, have been
nonetheless difficult to verify, such as securing nuclear materials,
eliminating chemical and biological weapons, and stemming the flow of
scientific expertise out of the former Soviet Union.
While all of the Cooperative Threat Reduction programs have
experienced fraud, waste, and abuse, these newer initiatives also ran
into a Russian bureaucracy that has consistently denied the United
States access to essential information, and in doing so gave little
confidence in the Russians' commitment to reducing the threat of
proliferation.
The President has decided--and rightly so--that he cannot certify
to Congress that Russia is committed to complying with its relevant
arms control agreements, particularly the Biological Weapons Convention
and the Chemical Weapons Convention.
While I happen to believe that nonproliferation assistance programs
in Russia can benefit U.S. national security interests, we cannot
direct our energies toward preventing potential proliferation while
turning a blind eye to the actual proliferation that is ongoing. I am
referring specifically to Russia's continued nuclear and ballistic
missile assistance to Iran.
According to the most recent National Intelligence Estimate, Iran
is likely to possess an ICBM by mid-decade, and could potentially have
a nuclear weapon by the end of the decade. This is a chilling prospect.
At the same time, Russia is providing Iran with advanced
conventional weaponry that could help Teheran sink U.S. warships and
shoot down allied planes in the Persian Gulf. Because of Russian aid,
Iran will soon present a clear and direct threat to the United States
and to our friends and interests in the region.
Russian proliferation to Iran is a must among the central issues of
the upcoming meeting in Moscow between Mr. Bush and Mr. Putin. I have
recently written a letter to Secretary Powell--which I ask to appear in
the record of this meeting today. The letter urges the administration
to put the issue of Russian proliferation to Iran at the top of the
agenda.
I look forward to hearing today's witnesses' on these matters, as
to how we might take action to rectify them.
United States Senate,
Committee on Foreign Relations,
Washington, DC, April 18, 2002.
The Honorable Colin L. Powell
Secretary of State
Washington, DC, 20520
Dear Mr. Secretary:
With the May Summit between Presidents Bush and Putin rapidly
approaching, I do hope that this meeting will provide the opportunities
to outline a firm and coherent strategy to stop the proliferation of
missile technology, nuclear materials and expertise being sent by
Russia to Iran.
Additionally, Moscow's reluctance to full compliance with its arms
control commitments (such as the Biological and Chemical Weapons
Conventions) raises serious doubts about not only its attitude
regarding long-term U.S.-Russian relations, but its intentions as well.
I am confident that you are greatly concerned, as am I, about the
Intelligence Community reports regarding illicit transfers to Iran
continuing--if not increasing--despite protests from our government and
contrary statements by senior Russian officials. I'm confident that you
saw the National Intelligence Estimate that, unless Russian assistance
is curtailed, Iran could attempt to launch an ICBM in the next few
years.
A similar estimate can be applied to the Iranian nuclear weapons
program, which also is benefitting from Russian assistance (albeit
under the cover of peaceful nuclear cooperation).
Mr. Secretary, I fear that unless all Russian assistance is
stopped, Iran will present a clear and direct threat to the United
States (as well as to our friends and interests in the region) through
the combination of long-range missiles and nuclear warheads.
Moreover, ongoing reports by the Intelligence Community and
independent experts, coupled with the Administration's decision not to
certify that Russia is complying with its arms control commitments,
gives me great concern about the extent of Russia's biological and
chemical weapons (BW and CW) research efforts, production facilities,
and stockpiles.
Needless to say, I applaud the Administration's wise decisions (1)
to withdraw from the ABM Treaty and (2) to restructure our nuclear
forces. I also support the President's desire for a new relationship
with Russia, so essential to America's security in the 21st Century.
However, it makes no sense to build missile defenses and more flexible
strategic forces on one hand, while ignoring the sources of the threats
we are trying to deter and defend against on the other.
Similarly, it makes no sense for the United States to fund threat
reduction programs helping Russia meet her international obligations if
Moscow continues to pursue illicit WMD programs with freed-up Russian
funds. Russian proliferation to Iran, and its dangerous BW and CW
programs, must be central issues at the upcoming summit in Moscow, and
integral to any agreement reached between our two countries.
As the United States begins to forge this new relationship with
Russia, our resolve and commitment to these issues through sound
policies and strategies employing the full-range of diplomatic and
economic tools at our disposal irrespective of political exigencies is
essential.
Mr. Secretary, a note and/or a telephone call from you should be
most helpful.
Kindest personal regards.
Sincerely,
Jesse Helms
The Chairman. Did you want to make a brief comment?
Senator Enzi. May I?
The Chairman. Please.
Senator Enzi. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I would ask that a
full copy of my statement be made a part of the record----
The Chairman. It will be.
Senator Enzi [continuing]. As well as a letter, an
informational letter, that I handed out.
I am pleased that you called this hearing. The
proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, as well as the
unauthorized sharing of weapons-grade technologies are
significant threats to national security. As you know, I
recently visited Russia to discuss export controls and
nonproliferation. The main objective of my trip was to have a
new U.S./Russia working group that would expand legislative
cooperation between our countries, in order to better control
weapons of mass destruction technology.
Growing up during the cold war, if anybody would have told
me that at some point in my life I would sit down across the
table from Russians and talk about cooperation, I would not
have believed it. I have done that. We have a letter of
agreement.
The main points of the letter are the ones with the bullets
on them: Improvement of export control legislation and its
implementation and enforcement in both countries; facilitation
and reinforcement of the spirit of cooperation between Russia
and U.S. legislators following the events of September 11,
2001; creation of an atmosphere of mutual trust and
understanding between the Russian and U.S. legislators crucial
for joint resolution international security problems.
And the letter is not only signed by me, but it is also
signed by Vladimir Melnikov, who is the Chairman of the
Committee on Defense and Security of the Federation Council,
and Nikolay Kovalev, who is the Deputy Chairman of the
Committee on Security of the State Duma. So I was able to meet
with both the Duma and the Federation, I had some great
discussions and I learned a lot.
We went through our export control legislation, looked at
the final pieces of the export control legislation they are
putting together, which are not final pieces, but for them they
are final pieces. There is a lot of work that needs to be done.
If we sell items that have dual use technologies and we keep
them out of the hands of bad actors, but the Russians do not,
we do not have security. And they recognize that.
Of course, the way the Russians put it is that if they have
technologies that they keep out of the hands of bad actors, but
we sell, the world is not safe either.
We also talked about deemed exports. And I was fascinated
to learn that they have 20 closed cities over there. These
closed cities house 30,000 nuclear physicists, engineers, and
scientists, who are not allowed to leave those cities. And for
us to visit or anyone else to visit those cities, you have to
apply at least 2 months in advance for a visa, and it has to
fit into a 2-year plan of visitations to those places.
But they have 30,000 engineers that are interested in
getting into the new economy. And there are countries around
the world with their hands outstretched to receive these
nuclear armament engineers to do work for them. And it presents
a tremendous challenge for us and the Russians to make sure
that those people, the people, do not fall into the wrong
hands, let alone the weapons, let alone the weapons technology
and all of the parts that go with that. I found that to be one
of the most scary things that I ran into over there.
I also sat down and visited with some small businessmen,
small businessmen that could be employing some of those same
people. But I have to tell you: Russia has a long way to go yet
for free enterprise. But I think that as fascinated as I was in
talking with the Russians, these people were pretty fascinated
to be talking to a Western capitalist about free enterprise.
The Chairman. From Wyoming.
Senator Enzi. Yes, from Wyoming.
And small business over there, I think, hold some of the
answers to these closed cities, but the answers include some of
the need for export controls. We also talked about some of the
inventions they are working on, one of which is a floating
nuclear reactor that would be put at Vladivostok. And if you
think about the tsunamis and typhoons that could hit that and
some of the dangers that could be prevalent in it, we have a
lot of things that we need to talk about. But I am glad that we
established some realm of cooperation there.
I would like for my full statement to be in the record.
The Chairman. The entire statement will be placed in the
record.
[The prepared statement of Senator Enzi and informational
letter follow:]
Prepared Statement of Senator Michael B. Enzi
Mr. Chairman, I am very pleased you called this hearing. The
proliferation of weapons of mass destruction as well as the
unauthorized sharing of weapons-grade technologies are significant
threats to our national security. As you may know, I recently visited
Russia to discuss export controls and nonproliferation. I believe
today's hearing is timely and an important issue for the Committee to
address. As we all know, nonproliferation is not a new issue and
neither are the threats posed by unsafe and unsecure nuclear
technologies.
The main objective of my trip was to form a U.S.-Russia working
group that would expand legislative cooperation between our countries
in order to better control the transfer of weapons of mass destruction
technology.
I am pleased to share with everyone on the Committee a copy of the
agreement signed by the Chairman of Russia's Federation Council
Committee on Defense and Security and the Deputy Chairman of the State
Duma Committee on Security. It is my hope that our agreement to form a
joint working group will help maintain an open dialogue between our
countries. As you will note in the agreement, Russian officials do
recognize the threat posed to international security by terrorism and
the need for more effective export control regulations.
I believe if both the United States and Russia produce an item that
can be detrimental and aid proliferation and only one of the countries
restricts its sale, countries who are bad actors can wind up with
dangerous items. I have been working on the reauthorization of the
Export Administration Act (EAA) which would modernize our export
controls. Russia recently adopted its own export control law to
regulate the transfer of certain technologies. Russian officials,
however, have had problems implementing and enforcing many aspects of
their export controls legislation. With EAA pending in the U.S. House
of Representatives and Russians unable to implement their legislation,
it is imperative that the United States enact its own legislation and
work with Russia to control the export of items designed for civilian
use, but which can have military applications.
While in Russia, I traveled with a highly intelligent professor
from the University of Georgia in Athens, Mr. Igor Khripunov. Mr.
Khripunov is an expert in international trade and security. When
discussing the status of the military and related technologies, Mr.
Khripunov points out that, ``This desperate situation is caused not
only by underfunding and economic dislocation, but also by lack of
motivation and moral values that were supposed to replace the communist
ideology.'' The situation faced by Russia after the fall of the Soviet
Union, combined with the low moral values of those seemingly in charge
of Russia's military technologies, led to a very dangerous status for
nuclear safety and security.
While I am very pleased that Russian legislators see the need to
deal with export controls, cooperation in this one area will not
address all of the threats posed by weapons of mass destruction. The
threats come in a variety of areas and threaten international safety
and security in a number of ways.
One such threat is the lack of qualified people to handle nuclear
technologies. Each year, both the United States and Russia have fewer
and fewer nuclear engineering schools. This leaves both our countries
with fewer and fewer experts who can help us address the permanent
threats created by having nuclear technologies. We need to have people
highly educated in nuclear engineering to work on the safety of the
nuclear facilities and the security of the nation. In the United
States, we can begin developing programs where students receive funding
for school in exchange for working for the U.S. Department of Energy or
the National Security Council. We have the opportunity and the ability
to create and re-enforce an educated group of experts whose knowledge
and experience will help protect our nation.
In Russia, the continued isolation of the so-called ``closed
cities'' creates another security threat. Scientists and experts in
these cities do not currently have opportunities to advance their
ideas. By offering these experts a business opportunity, their
knowledge can be utilized to achieve better economic possibilities.
Small business development should be brought to these Russian cities to
encourage the scientists to use their ideas to enhance their personal
economic status and their families' well being. It would also prevent
the experts from seeking employment or support from a party that should
not have access to their knowledge.
This brings up another significant threat to international
security: the sharing of highly sensitive nuclear information and
machinery with nations who pose a threat to international stability.
Our view on many countries differ from the Russian view. Based on our
cloudy history, we cannot be surprised. We cannot, however, sit back
and allow dangerous technologies to be shared with adversarial nations.
Again, only by working with our Russian counterparts to encourage
Russian scientists to remain in Russia and not share information with
rogue nations, can we help ensure the technologies will not be given
away.
As non-proliferation is discussed, we must also address recent
missile-defense related issues. To address the threats of the 21st
century, we need a new concept of deterrence that includes both
offensive and defensive forces. Today, the list of countries with
weapons of mass destruction and ballistic missiles includes some of the
world's least responsible nations. These nations seek weapons of mass
destruction to intimidate their neighbors and to keep the United States
and other responsible nations from helping allies and friends in
strategic parts of the world. When rogue nations such as these gain
access to this kind of technology, it illustrates just how important it
is for us to protect our nation and our troops abroad. In the less
predictable world of the 21st century, our challenge is to deter
multiple potential adversaries not only from using weapons of mass
destruction, but to dissuade them from acquiring weapons of mass
destruction and missiles in the first place.
I believe that the limited national missile defense system that the
United States is contemplating is not aimed at the Russian offensive
capability. The U.S. has been willing to provide Russia with
information about what our thinking is, what our development prospects
have been for missile defense, and also to engage them in cooperative
kinds of activities, because in many respects, the threats that the
United States is concerned about from rogue states are threats that are
likewise faced by Russia.
I support President Bush's willingness to work with Russia to craft
a new strategic framework that reflects our nations' common interests
and cooperation. I believe the new strategic framework should be
premised on openness, mutual confidence, and real opportunities for
cooperation, including the area of missile defense. This framework
should allow both countries to share information so that each nation
can improve its early warning capability and its capability to defend
its people and territory. Furthermore, the framework should focus on
cooperation to strengthen and enlarge bilateral and multilateral non-
and counterproliferation measures.
I believe these missile defense capabilities are not an alternative
or substitute for traditional deterrence, but rather an essential means
to enhance deterrence against the new threats of today, not those of
the past.
While much press has been given to missiles and military
technology, some threats to international security can come from
seemingly domestic areas, like energy. As we all know, the energy
debate in the United States has been highly contentious. Representing a
state like Wyoming with many natural resources, I was very curious
about Russia's energy future. Coal, which is a staple of Wyoming's
economy, has been a substantial part of Russia's energy resources.
While the United States considers technologies like clean coal, I was
shocked when the Russian representatives informed me of the
possibilities of how to address Russia's future energy needs. In areas
like Vladivostok, they are considering using floating reactors! Imagine
the safety and security issues of such a energy source. The reactors
would literally float in the dock of Vladivostok.
This example is a prime reason the United States must remain
actively involved with our Russian counterparts on the issue of non-
proliferation. If the Russian government can find no way, other than
floating nuclear reactors, to address its energy needs, the United
States and the international community must be prepared to help.
The United States had been involved in Russia attempting to halt
the dissemination and proliferation of nuclear knowledge. There is,
however, much more to be done. In their Annual Report to Congress, the
National Intelligence Council noted, ``Through Cooperative Threat
Reduction Program and the U.S. Department of Energy's Material
Protection, Control, and Accounting Program, the United States
continues to assist Russia in improving security at nuclear
facilities.'' Unfortunately, upon my return from Russia, I found out
that all new program funding from the United States is being held until
certification of Russia's compliance with the Cooperative Threat
Reduction Program. While I understand the need for cooperation
certification and I applaud the State Department for doing its job, I
do not think this is the appropriate time to send this message to the
Russian government. According to the State Department, Congress passed
the legislation for the Cooperative Threat Reduction Program without
including a presidential waiver. I hope my colleagues will support the
presidential waiver included in the President's fiscal year 2002
emergency supplemental appropriations legislation. I also hope
President Bush and the State Department will take all available steps
and find a way to certify Russia's cooperation as soon as possible.
As President Bush prepares to travel to Moscow in May, I know non-
proliferation will be an issue high on the agenda. It is my hope that
as a legislative body, we can continue to support the President's
efforts while also addressing the threats of proliferation with our
Russian counterparts. Thank you, once again, Mr. Chairman, for your
willingness to discuss this threat to our national safety and
international security.
Senator Michael Enzi,
United States Senate,
Moscow, April 5, 2002.
Informational Letter
The Russian and U.S. parties recognize the grave threat to
humankind posed by militant religious extremists, nationalistic
terrorist organizations, and criminal groups seeking to obtain weapons
of mass destruction (WMD). Of particular concern to the modern world is
the emergence of international terrorism. One of the key elements in
combating this threat is effective export controls in conjunction with
international cooperation and enhancement to the existing WMD
nonproliferation regimes.
The meetings conducted between Vladimir Melnikov, Chairman of the
Committee on Defense and Security of the Federation Council, Nikolay
Kovalev, Deputy Chairman of the Committee on Security of the State Duma
(Russian Federal Assembly), and U.S. Senator Michael Enzi, point to a
similarity in the positions of the two countries on a range of issues
regarding WMD nonproliferation, export controls, and strengthening
international stability.
As a result of the exchange of opinions, the parties have reached
an understanding of the need to pursue further discussions among
representatives of both countries' legislative bodies involving, if
necessary, representatives of the executive branch, non-governmental
organizations, and industry, regarding the following:
Improvement of export control legislation and its
implementation and enforcement in both countries;
Facilitation and reinforcement of the spirit of cooperation
between the Russian and U.S. legislators following the events
of September 11, 2001;
Creation of an atmosphere of mutual trust and understanding
between the Russian and U.S. legislators, crucial for joint
resolution international security problems.
In accordance with the above, the parties consider strengthening
and enhancing ties between the legislators of the Russian Federation
and the United States of America, and participation of representatives
of the executive branch and nongovernmental organizations to be long-
warranted and urgent, and agree on joint meetings and negotiations
seeking positive solutions in combating international terrorism and WMD
proliferation, as well as in cooperation for the development of
legislative and normative mechanisms for advanced technology transfers.
Vladimir Melnikov, Chairman,
Committee on Defense and Security,
Federation Council.
Nikolay Kovalev, Deputy Chairman,
Committee on Security,
State Duma.
Michael Enzi,
United States Senator.
The Chairman. And I must say to you, Senator, I am really
personally enthused with your interest and passion in this and
your work. And I thank you for it.
Bill.
STATEMENT OF HON. WILLIAM S. COHEN, FORMER SECRETARY OF
DEFENSE, CHAIRMAN AND CHIEF EXECUTIVE OFFICER OF THE COHEN
GROUP, WASHINGTON, DC
Mr. Cohen. Mr. Chairman, first of all, thank you for
inviting me to testify, Senator Lugar, Senator Enzi. I regret
that Senator Helms is not here, because I wanted----
The Chairman. He sincerely wanted to be here, but he is
unable.
Mr. Cohen. I know that to be the case. I had hoped to see
him.
This is the first time I have had a chance to testify
before this committee since leaving public office myself. It
may be the last opportunity I will have before he enters the
private world with me.
But I wanted to say, at least for the record, how much I
enjoyed my service with Senator Helms, both as a Senator but
also when serving as Secretary of Defense. I know that most
people in this body understand that he is a man of great
tenacity. What many may not understand is that he is also a man
of great gentility. And I think he has treated this institution
with the reverence it certainly deserves.
And I know that everyone who has ever served with him would
understand what contribution he has made, even though we did
not always agree, for example. He always deferred to each and
every one of us with great consideration for our roles and our
rights.
And I can tell you, as one of his colleagues, I used to
have that spinal shiver whenever he stood up on the floor and
said, ``This Senator sends an amendment to the desk and asks
for its immediate consideration.'' We never quite knew what it
was going to be, but we knew it would be strongly debated.
In any event, Mr. Chairman, again I thank you.
I would like to say also something else for the record
about the Chairman. His devotion to this issue is not something
of mere passing concern. Along with Senator Lugar, I would
indicate that Joe Biden goes back a very long way. And I cite a
personal experience, which I have not discussed before. And it
goes back to 1984, when I worked with Senator Nunn when I was a
member of the Senate Armed Services Committee and helped
develop something called the Guaranteed Nuclear Build-down.
I published an article, along with Senator Nunn, in the
Washington Post. President Reagan endorsed the concept
immediately. And then I set off to go to Moscow to try and
persuade the Soviet counterparts, so to speak, that this was
the way in which we should proceed into the future as far as
modernizing our nuclear forces while reducing the levels that
we had in our respective inventories.
I did not really want to go alone, because it would look as
if it was simply a Reagan Republican initiative that would be
immediately rejected by the Russians--or the Soviets, I should
say. I went to Senator Biden. And even though he had a
commitment in Wilmington, Delaware, within 24 hours, he
immediately agreed to fly to Moscow overnight, attend the
meetings just so he could represent to the Soviet
representatives that this was not a partisan issue, that this
was an issue that affected certainly our countries, but most
certainly our respective parties.
After flying all night to go to that meeting, he turned
around and kept his commitment to his constituents in Delaware.
And it is something, Mr. Chairman, that has stayed with me
in terms of your long-standing devotion to this issue. So when
you called to invite me to testify, I would never hesitate.
All of you have already summarized the need for my
testimony. Frankly, I would submit it for the record and try to
summarize it very quickly, because I know that you have a vote
scheduled, I believe, at 11:15. And I will try to just
summarize them and----
The Chairman. But you know the Senate. That could be two.
Mr. Cohen. It could. And there could be back-to-back
amendments, and we would never get back.
So I will try to summarize. I know you have several witness
to follow me.
On the Cooperative Threat Reduction Program, I think it is
perhaps the premier issue that we have to address today. The
levels of nuclear, biological, and chemical weapons available
throughout the world, but most particularly in the former
Soviet Union, are truly staggering.
And when you think about one of the initial successes of
the Nunn-Lugar legislation, the fact that nuclear weapons were
eliminated from three former Soviet republics, in Belarus, in
Ukraine, in Kazakhstan, it is naturally assumed that, taken as
a given, this was an inevitable result of the breakdown of the
Soviet Union. It was not. And it was Nunn-Lugar who led the
effort in eliminating these weapons from these three countries.
And I have laid out in my testimony the option of thinking
about what the world would look like if that had not occurred.
And I will not take the time here this morning to elaborate on
it. But I think all of us would understand that the world might
be somewhat different, and there might be greater tensions were
it not for Nunn-Lugar and the impetus it gave to eliminating as
much of the nuclear stockpile as we could under those
circumstances.
You pointed out the numbers are pretty clear, Mr. Chairman,
500 air launch cruise missiles, 400 ICBMs, 300 submarine launch
ballistic missiles, 200 nuclear tunnel tests, and 100 long-
range bombers. Those are very significant numbers. But there is
a lot more that needs to be done. And I think September 11 has
focused our attention on this with greater and greater
intensity.
Al-Qaeda is dedicated to acquiring weapons of mass
destruction. Osama bin Laden has made that very clear. As you
know, during my tenure in the Clinton administration, we
launched an attack upon some terrorist camps in Afghanistan
back in 1998. We killed a number of terrorists. We missed Osama
bin Laden.
We also hit a facility, the Shifa facility, in Khartoum.
And I know that there were a number who questioned the
advisability of that. But there was no doubt in my mind and no
doubt in the minds of other policymakers that Osama bin Laden
was dedicated then, as he is now, to acquiring chemical,
biological, indeed even nuclear, materials. And so we struck
that plant, as well as the striking of the terrorist camps at
that time.
And I think that since that date it has become even more
imperative that we intensify our efforts to reduce the amount
of nuclear, chemical, and biological materials that would be
available to these terrorist groups, because they know that the
fastest route to acquiring them is not to develop them
indigenously and not necessarily to link up in some kind of a
partnership with a country, but basically to buy them or steal
them.
And you have material in the former Soviet Union. You have
as much as 1,000 metric tons of highly enriched uranium. You
have anywhere from 150 to 200 metric tons of plutonium. And it
is a fairly frightening prospect, when you think about the
levels of security, or lack thereof, in the former Soviet
Union, when these materials might be easily obtained by al-
Qaeda or by other terrorist groups.
And if you read the Washington Post this morning, you will
see that there is a discussion on one of the more recent people
who have been apprehended that that is indeed what they have in
mind, is to explode a radiation bomb, as such, and to kill as
many Americans as they possibly can through the use of that
kind of device. So it is important that we continue the
Cooperative Threat Reduction Program.
I also think it is important that we not link it to other
issues. And I know, as one who has served in this body, how
important human rights, the human rights issue, is. But the
first human right in my judgment is that we have a right to
life. And the second one is that we have the right to expect
that we live in liberty.
But the notion that we would tie this particular program
inextricably to the human rights issue or a failure on the part
of Russia to live up to our standards to an exacting degree, I
think puts us in a position of jeopardizing the continuation of
the lives of thousands, if not millions, of people.
So I would hope that we would not tie the Cooperative
Threat Reduction Program inextricably to our insistence on
human rights. We still should insist upon human rights whenever
we can, but that should not be the dispositive issue when you
are dealing with something of mass casualties on a fairly wide
basis, and perhaps even globally.
No. 2, we should try to keep the program as flexible as
possible, to give the Secretary of Defense as much flexibility
as you can consistent with maintaining proper oversight
responsibilities.
I know, Senator Enzi, you come from a background in which
you look at numbers. And you have a very scrutinizing eye in
terms of the disposition of assets and so forth. We should look
very carefully at how these funds are used.
But I think the need for greater flexibility is also in
order. And there were many times when I was serving as
Secretary of Defense that I felt the constraints legislatively
placed upon the discretion actually imposed greater hardship
and put us more in jeopardy by not having that kind of
flexibility.
I think other approaches that have been suggested, such as
debt forgiveness, also is very important, again looking at ways
in which we can be as creative as possible to encourage the
Russians to help dispose of those materials or to secure them.
And the use, as Senator Lugar has proposed, even beyond
Russia--there may be circumstances in which there are other
countries where these nuclear materials or chemicals or
biologicals may be present. And the Secretary of Defense would
need some flexibility in responding to an emergency type of
situation and then, of course, responding to Congress, again in
its oversight capacity.
Mr. Chairman, let me conclude by simply pointing out that
the clock is ticking. This is not an overly dramatic statement,
certainly, by me. I could go back and point to some fiction
writing, you know, ``one minute before midnight.'' It is 1
minute before midnight, if you think in terms of historically
and the universal clock, and it is ticking.
We do not have a lot of time in which to reduce the nature
of the threat that is out there. And every moment that we
hesitate, every moment that we fail to do whatever we can to
reduce the amount of nuclear materials, chemical, biological,
in existence, we come closer to that kind of armageddon that we
all want to avoid.
We know that there are groups that we do not know about who
have great ambitions and grave intentions. And I think
September 11 taught us that a known enemy can hit us in
unexpected ways. But the apocalyptic cult Aum Shinrikyo and the
American terrorist, Timothy McVeigh, they taught us that
totally unknown enemies can be lurking in our midst, pursuing
evil on a massive scale.
And one of the most striking things about the Aum Shinrikyo
is that it built an international network of financing and
technical experts in Japan, in Russia, in the United States,
and elsewhere. They raised over $1 billion, and they pursued
nuclear, biological, and chemical weapons. And yet we only
became aware of the group after the second chemical attack.
So those who seek to harm us on a massive basis, they know
that the quickest route, once again, is to gain a capability
lying in the disorder and even the poverty or destitution that
still characterizes much of the Russian establishment
responsible for securing those nuclear weapons and that
material that is biological and chemical.
And this makes it incumbent on us to spare no effort to
stop them. And we do not have a moment to lose, Mr. Chairman.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Cohen follows:]
Prepared Statement of Hon. William S. Cohen, former Secretary of
Defense, Chairman and Chief Executive Officer, The Cohen Group
This is the first time I have appeared before this committee since
leaving office, and it will probably be the last time I do so before
Senator Helms joins me as a private citizen. Senator Helms has had a
remarkable career. Few people have exercised the powers of a Senator
with greater influence on U.S. policy for the things in which he
believed. The world knows well that he has been tenacious. But few
outside this institution have appreciated that even more than
tenacious, he has been gracious. While we have not always agreed with
each other on substance, he has always been a gentleman of civility who
has respected his colleagues and the important role of this
institution.
After he retires from this body, many who share his views will miss
him for his passionate and effective advocacy of his beliefs. Others
who have differing views will miss him for agility and wit in debate.
But all of us who have had the opportunity to call him ``my dear
colleague'' will miss his personal warmth and gentlemanly spirit that
he displayed to us day in and day out when we served together.
I appreciate the opportunity to appear before you to discuss what
is perhaps the premier national security issue facing our country: as
President Bush and Senator Lugar have put it, keeping the world's most
dangerous weapons out of the hands of the world's most dangerous
people.
While our counter-proliferation and counter-terrorism efforts have
many facets, a key one has been the Nunn-Lugar Cooperative Threat
Reduction program.
History will view the CTR program as one of the most successful
defense programs our Nation has ever undertaken.
It has facilitated the complete denuclearization of Belarus,
Ukraine, and Kazakhstan, something that is frequently noted but almost
universally under-appreciated because it is taken as a given, an
inevitability. But it was not inevitable. At the time, there were
voices in those countries, and even prominent voices in the U.S.,
calling for those countries to retain the nuclear arsenals on their
soil.
Imagine what the world would be like if Mr. Lukasheriko were in
possession of a small nuclear arsenal. Or that, in the wake of the
Indian and Pakistani nuclear tests, Kazakhstan had decided that it
needed to maintain and modernize a nuclear force. Or that the periodic
bouts of political and economic tension between Moscow and Kiev had
occurred in the shadow of nuclear tensions.
Would the world be a safer place? Would our efforts to stem the
proliferation of weapons of mass destruction have been enhanced or
undermined? Would Russia's internal political situation have developed
with greater or lesser trouble than has been the case, with extreme
nationalism an ever stronger force?
I think the answer is in each case is that American security
interests would be worse off, possibly much worse.
And all of this is beyond the straightforward calculation that the
CTR program has helped to destroy:
nearly 500 nuclear ALCMs;
over 400 ICBMs;
nearly 300 SLBMs;
nearly 200 nuclear test tunnels; and
nearly 100 long-range bombers.
As a result of this unprecedented destruction of nuclear delivery
vehicles, thousands of nuclear weapons that had been aimed at America
have been deactivatated.
And programs are moving forward to securely store both nuclear
weapons and fissile materials, as well as reduce the risk that
scientists and others with technical expertise in nuclear, biological
and chemical weapons are not enticed to sell their skills to those
seeking such weapons.
The importance of this last point has been highlighted by September
11. We have known for some time that terrorist groups, including al
Qaeda, have been seeking WMD capabilities.
I and my colleagues who served in the Clinton Administration
discussed this at length when we attacked a terrorist leadership
meeting in Afghanistan, killing a number of terrorist operatives and
very nearly killing Usama bin Laden, and destroyed the al Shifa
facility in Khartoum, which we believe had links to both Usama bin
Laden and to the Iraqi chemical weapons program. Not everyone listened.
But such wishful thinking is not possible after September 11 and
after American troops found al Qaeda documents confirming their desire
for such weapons.
Enemies of the United States, both countries and terrorist groups,
are working hard to lay their hands on weapons of mass destruction, and
particularly in the case of terrorist groups there is no doubt that
they would use them. Those pursuing these weapons know that the fastest
route to obtaining them is to acquire weapons or weapon materials from
the enormous stockpiles that still sit in Russia and other countries of
the former Soviet Union, or to hire technical experts from the former
Soviet Union, large numbers of whom continue to struggle to care for
their families and face great temptation to sell their talents to the
highest bidder.
In this sense, ensuring a flexible, well-funded CTR program is
among the most important responses we can make to the tragedy of
September 11.
Before I am accused of being a member of the choir, let me note
that I have not been an uncritical supporter of the Nunn-Lugar program.
In fact, a few of you may recall that the original Nunn-Lugar program
was rejected in the Senate Armed Services Committee when it was first
proposed in 1991, and that I was among those opposing the original
version at that time.
One reason was that it would have provided job training and housing
benefits to Soviet officers at a time when such benefits were not being
provided to American military personnel being released from service in
the biggest U.S. military drawdown since Vietnam. Another reason was
that I felt there were inadequate assurances that U.S. assistance to
the Russian nuclear weapons establishment would not simply serve to
subsidize ongoing Russian nuclear weapon programs.
After revising the proposal to address these concerns, we adopted
the Nunn-Lugar CTR legislation.
do not link ctr to other issues
I still believe care is needed to assure ourselves that our CTR
assistance is being used to reduce the threat, and well-drafted
legislative conditions can contribute to that. At the same time, we
should recognize that so long as the CTR program is fulfilling its
mission of reducing the threat of weapons of mass destruction, then
they are in our national interest--and we only harm ourselves if we
condition CTR assistance on Russian behavior in other areas.
While Russian behavior on human rights, Russian actions in
Chechnya, Russian debt repayment and many other issues merit our
attention, it would be contrary to our own interests to withhold CTR
assistance if Russian behavior in these other areas falls short of what
we would like.
A fundamental fact is that CTR is a U.S. defense program, it is not
foreign aid. That is why the Defense Department has supported funding
much of it within the ``050'' budget function for national defense. It
is why the Bush Administration, after a careful review of the program,
has wholeheartedly endorsed it.
the need for flexible authorities
Similarly, while Congress has the responsibility to oversee how
these funds are spent, excessive restrictions can interfere with the
effectiveness of the program, and in doing so may pose a threat to our
security.
Secretary Rumsfeld has complained about the limited flexibility the
Secretary of Defense has in managing defense programs due to legislated
constraints. I am not unsympathetic to his concern. There were
certainly times when I would have liked greater flexibility to deal
with emergency situations.
All too often, DOD leaders find themselves forced to combine funds
from scattered small pots of money to meet critical national security
requirements, sometimes to the anxiety of department lawyers.
DOD has repeatedly sought greater flexibility in managing the CTR
program and for various counter-terrorism efforts. I would urge the
Armed Services Committees and Congress to give favorable consideration
to such proposals, while safeguarding the Senate's understandable
concern that these funds not be diverted to other purposes.
Also, I would urge support for Senator Lugar's legislation to
expand the scope of the CTR program to activities in countries outside
the former Soviet Union when the Secretary of Defense believes it
appropriate. This would be especially valuable in urgent situations
requiring immediate action, where it might be difficult to cobble
together the necessary authority and funding in time. But it also would
be useful in less urgent situations.
One of the things that has become apparent in recent years is the
invalidity of the old proliferation model of either indigenous
development or direct sale from one country to another. Instead, just
as development and supply chains of legitimate industry have
globalized, so have they for WMD and missile proliferation.
A missile program in a rogue state, for example, might involve a
complex web of technical assistance and missile equipment coming from
several countries, both former Soviet and non-Soviet countries, all
aiding an indigenous development effort in exchange for cash, access to
missile test data to support the suppliers own missile programs, or
even reciprocal assistance on WMD weapon programs.
We should seize any opportunity to punch holes in this complex
supply chain, whether the opportunity presents itself in former Soviet
countries or elsewhere. And so I strongly encourage you to act upon
Senator Lugar's bill and, in doing so, provide as much flexibility as
possible to the Administration without compromising your oversight
responsibilities.
Finally, I would urge an open mind to other, perhaps more
controversial, approaches intended to enhance the security of Russian
nuclear weapons and nuclear material and other WMD. Senator Biden, with
Senator Lugar, has proposed a structure to forgive debt if it resulted
in greater funding for such material security efforts. The Russian
Energy Ministry, the Clinton Administration and others worked on a
concept in which Russia would establish an international spent nuclear
fuel repository provided that the revenues would fund efforts to
protect nuclear weapon material.
While I am not in a position to discuss such ideas in detail, I
believe that we should not rule out anything out of hand if it could be
structured in such a manner as to significantly increase the safety and
security of WMD materials.
conclusion
The CTR program represents a race against the clock, but a rather
peculiar one in which we do not know all the players or the rules by
which they are playing and we do not know how much time remains before
someone who wishes us ill obtains WMD capabilities. But what we do know
is that there are enemies of America diligently seeking to acquire
nuclear, radiological, chemical and biological weapons and that they
would not hesitate to use such weapons on the American people.
We know that Usama bin Laden and al Qaeda have actively sought such
capabilities and have threatened to use them if they acquire them.
We know that there are other extremist Islamist terrorist groups
hostile to the U.S. that will seek to fill the void as al Qaeda is
dismantled.
We know that others, whether we call them ``rogue countries'' or
``states of concern,'' have pursued such capabilities for decades, and
in some cases, are willing to sell any capability they may have to the
most attractive bidder.
And we know that there are groups we do not know about with great
ambitions and grave intentions. September 11 taught us that a known
enemy could hit us in an unexpected way. But the apocalyptic cult Aum
Shinrikyo and American terrorist Timothy McVeigh taught us that totally
unknown enemies can be lurking in our midst pursuing evil on a massive
scale. One of the most striking things about Aum Shinrikyo is that it
built an international network of financing and technical experts in
Japan, Russia, the U.S. and elsewhere that raised over a billion
dollars and pursued nuclear, biological and chemical weapons, and yet
we became aware of the group only after its second chemical attack.
Those who seek us harm on a massive scale know that the quickest
route to gaining such a capability lies in the disorder and destitution
that still characterizes much of the Russian establishment responsible
for securing nuclear weapons and material, biological weapons and
agents, and chemical weapons and agents. And this makes it incumbent on
us to spare no effort to stop them.
The Chairman. Thank you very much, Mr. Secretary.
We will go just 5 minutes, a shot back and forth, in case
you have to leave. And interrupt, Dick, if you have any add-ons
to what I ask.
Let me address the first question first. And that is the
argument that has been used against Nunn-Lugar, or expansion of
Nunn-Lugar types of initiatives, which is basically to say that
with the cooperation of the Russians we are going to go to them
and pay to have them eliminate and/or stop doing something that
is bad, that is against our interest. And the argument used in
plain language is: They will take that money that they would
have had to use for that and use it for something else that is
fungible.
And there has been an argument made, and it was raised by
you, concerned by you, initially back in 1991, I guess it was.
Mr. Cohen. Right.
The Chairman. What would they do, if we give x number of
dollars to help them destroy alchems or whatever else? Would
they just take that money and go ahead and invest it in another
program, or would they invest it in programs for other
countries?
Now, most of that has sort of dissipated in the sense that
there has sort of been an emerging notion that, ``Look, if
there is x number of ICBMs aimed at the United States, then my
choice is I get to destroy them, and that money may be taken to
build a short-range weapon; I am still better off, I mean, in
the worst case scenario.''
But what is your sense now about whether or not the money
that we invest as a Nation in threat reduction in Russia is, in
effect, creating an opportunity for the Russians to then spend,
even though we can account for that money being spent for that
purpose, they will take money they would have had to spend to
build a chainlink fence around a chemical weapons site or put
bars on a window or whatever, and they will do something
against our interest with it?
Would you speak to me a little bit about your thinking
after having been Secretary of Defense?
Mr. Cohen. The fact is that they could take the money they
otherwise would spend for security and spend it on other items.
For example, if we contribute this amount of money to the CTR
program, you could argue that they would then turn around and
build other types of military capabilities, or they might use
it to help pay for housing, which was not included in the CTR
program, or for various retirement benefits, et cetera.
I think the answer to the question is: We have an entirely
different relationship with Russia today than we had back in
1991 and really until the past year, since September 11.
Everything has changed, if you look at the world after
September 11. I mean, Senator Enzi pointed out it is
astonishing that he would think that he would be able to sit
down across from Russians after what he went through in growing
up as a child. All of us, I think, could make that same
statement.
But the fact is that since September 11, you have seen a
geopolitical shift that is perhaps unmatched in historical
terms with us having a relationship with Russia, with Russia
saying ``You can put bases without our objection into
Tajikistan, Uzbekistan. We will work with you on this anti-
terrorist campaign.''
A lot has changed, for their own self-interest, to be sure.
They have a self-interest in aligning themselves in this war
against terror, because they are also the potential victims.
They have been victims.
In fact, I was in Moscow when one of the apartment
buildings was blown up. And I went on television, state-wide
television, so to speak, in Russia the day after it happened to
say that we should join with Russia in combating terrorism,
because they were at risk and we were at risk.
So September 11 has changed that. Now you have the
potential for the same nuclear materials ending up in the hands
of people who will threaten Russia just as much as they will
threaten us. So there is a different dynamic at work today.
Do we always have to be on guard? Yes. Do we always have to
insist that certain standards be met and that we have certain
measurements that we can make; and is there a possibility it
could be used for other things? The answer is yes. But to the
extent that we establish a relationship with Russia, to the
extent that groups, Senator Lugar, Senator Enzi, yourself and
others, continue to ``engage'' the Russians, we have a much
greater chance of working together cooperatively to reduce the
mutual threat than if we sit back and say, ``Well, yes, they
could use it for this, and we are only easing their burden.''
But the fact is, as long as those piles of nuclear
materials are out there and as long as al-Qaeda and other
groups are seeking to get their hands on it, we are all in
danger.
The Chairman. Well, let me conclude by saying to you: I do
not think any of us in 1991, myself included, thought that in
the year 2002 the estimate for the Russian military budget, the
entire Russian military budget, would be $5 billion. I mean,
you know, think of that. Their entire estimated budget, and
assume we are off by 150 percent, is $30 billion.
I would respectfully suggest to those who worry about
fungibles, there is nothing to fund you out there. These boys
are in real trouble. If we spend $200 million on cooperative
threat reduction, it is not like they have $200 million to go
spend on anything else. We are talking about an incredibly,
incredibly limited budget here. And I think----
Mr. Cohen. Mr. Chairman, the great irony is that during the
cold war, we feared Russian strength. In the post-cold war, we
fear their weakness.
The Chairman. I think we are right on both scores.
Mr. Cohen. Yes.
The Chairman. And by the way, I have been here too long,
because I was just handed a note. I am getting prophetic. The
11:30 vote has been moved to 2:30.
Mr. Cohen. Well, in that case, I will read my entire
statement.
The Chairman. I am sure it is not because I said it.
Senator Lugar. It is, though.
The Chairman. Senator Lugar.
Senator Lugar. It is because you said it, Mr. Chairman.
The Chairman. It is bad news for you. You are going to have
to stay a little longer, Bill.
Senator Lugar. Secretary Cohen, I want to continue with the
chairman's thoughts about the fungibility issue, because,
really, this is the major attack upon cooperative threat
reduction sort of year-in, year-out. Someone has a new
discovery that somehow the Russians are using our money for
unintended purposes.
As you know the cooperation we have enjoyed with Russia is
totally counter-intuitive. Would you have guessed a decade ago
that Russian military leaders would invite American contractors
and military into nuclear facilities, leaving aside the
chemical and the biological, to discuss dismantling of their
weapons. Now one of the reasons they did so, is because of
concerns they had about safety and security of their own
forces.
If accidents were to occur, a lot of Russians would die as
opposed to anybody else that the weapons might be intentionally
used upon.
The sheer expertise and expense of dismantling these
weapons and then storing the fissile material are very, very
difficult propositions. As the chairman has pointed out, they
reside in a country that was near bankruptcy. Now even at this
point--and the figure that I got in preparation for the hearing
was that the Russian military budget is now the equivalent of
$7.5 billion in the current year.
But it may be, as the chairman suggested, the higher
figure. But nevertheless, we are talking about $7.5 billion or
this higher figure as compared to our budget of roughly $390
billion. Most Americans have never quite grasped the enormity
of that difference. But that is why it is important to point
out.
And I would say that, as we proceed with our war on
terrorism, we should be concerned that every chemical facility
have a fence around it; and not only a fence, but some
reasonable security. And so are the Russians.
But the Russians raise the question, ``How are we going to
pay for it? We have officers that have pensions that are not
getting paid, hundreds of thousands of them. We have all kinds
of dependencies from the past that are totally unfunded. And we
have political problems with our citizens in a democracy. Now
you have a problem worrying about the al-Qaeda coming in and
taking out chemical weapons, but we have a problem just simply
of keeping our government alive.'' And it is a serious problem.
Now there could be those in the Congress or the
administration that would say, ``Well, that is their tough
luck. After all, if they cannot protect those weapons at
Shchuchye, where, as you know, two million chemical weapons are
lying on shelves in old buildings, guarded by systems provided
by the United States. Hopefully, we are on the threshold of
destroying some of those before somebody carts them away.
Unfortunately in order to get to that point, we had to
convince some of our countrymen that it is a good idea to
destroy them and that we ought to spend some money doing that,
and enlist the Norwegians and the British and the Canadians and
the Germans, as we have been doing. And they have been pledging
to provide assistance and cooperation with the United States.
One of the problems we face is that one day our country is
very excited about the possibilities of being attacked, and al-
Qaeda might appropriate some of these weapons and kill a lot of
Americans right here in the United States. But on other days,
we are quibbling as to whether we ought to give the Russians $5
million to put a fence around a chemical weapons plant where
all the stuff was created. It may not yet be in Iraq or Iran
right now, but the Russians do have it now and we must do what
we can to eliminate the threat before it proliferates.
I believe the No. 1 national security threat facing the
United States is the nexus of terrorism and weapons of mass
destruction. As a result, we must go after the weapons very
vigorously, while we have, a relationship that is qualitatively
different with President Putin and with others and Mr. Pak, who
now heads the chemical situation, yearning for assistance. I
have taken Mr. Pak to breakfast with members of our own House
of Representatives to try to at least illuminate what is
possible if our two countries cooperate.
Now having said that we had a good hearing with Howard
Baker and Lloyd Cutler. They provided a good timetable and a
cost. I think $30 billion was the sum that they recommended
over 10 years to respond to this treat.
But this did not necessarily excite anybody to begin doing
these things. That is one purpose of this hearing.
And I applaud the chairman again. And I applaud him for
having you and the distinguished witnesses that will follow,
because we need to have revival meetings to appreciate that
this is still a dangerous world. All of this is still out there
and really requires persistence.
So, you have answered my question. You said at the initial
stages of the Armed Services Committee in 1991 you raised some
of these questions. The debate on the floor of the Senate, all
kinds of stipulations were put on Nunn-Lugar as to how to stop
the spending, and pretty well succeeded for a while. It was
quite a while before this got on track.
And you will recall from your own experience there were
some years it was cumbersome; we were following the money so
closely to make sure not a dollar got lost that none of it got
spent. The appropriation ran out. They took it off the table,
and we are back at it again.
So I appreciate very much your testimony. I do not have a
question. I just have applause for you and for the chairman for
getting this revival meeting going again, which I think is
timely.
Mr. Cohen. Let me respond to your non-question. First of
all, this notion, this argument that is being made, this--even
before I am before this committee, this is not a foreign aid
program. This is a national defense program. This is not
charity. We are taking action to reduce the threat to the
American people.
Now a few years ago, I went on one of the television
programs and held up a 5-pound bag of sugar and----
The Chairman. It had dramatic impact.
Mr. Cohen [continuing]. I tried to point out that if you
took just 5 pounds of anthrax, and you distributed it during a
day in which the wind conditions were right, with the right
kind of dispersal mechanism, you could wipe out a large
percentage of the city the size of Washington, DC. There are
hundreds of tons of anthrax in existence.
Now imagine if bin Laden or an al-Qaeda or Islamic jihad or
others acquire pounds, if not tons, of anthrax and have it
distributed, once again, either through the mail or some other
mechanism. How long was the Senate shut down last year with
just a small amount of anthrax? Now let us assume that it is
distributed on a very wide basis with multiple terrorist
actions taking place across this country. How long would that
shut down so many of our operations?
So this is not charity, and it is not foreign aid. It is
national defense. And so to those who argue that we are simply
giving money away when the Russians should be doing it, the
fact is that they do not have the capacity right now.
And I will make another argument. I am not trying to--I
always try to look at this through the eyes of the opponent, so
to speak. But if you were a Russian general today, and you
said, ``Well, let me think about this. The United States has a
budget of $390 billion, roughly. NATO has been enlarged by
three. It might be enlarged by five, six, possibly eight or
nine other members. We are now talking about the Baltics being
included in NATO membership, not to mention the southern tier
of Europe. The United States has embarked on a national missile
defense program. There are bases in the central Caucus, in
Georgia, Uzbekistan, Tajikistan, and elsewhere,'' well, I would
have some question about the U.S. intentions at this point.
So are there elements inside the Russian military who are
very concerned about the United States still? And the answer is
yes. How do we overcome that, or do we need to overcome that?
Now we can try to beat them down even further, but I will tell
you from my own judgment, Russia will be back at some point.
The Russian people are very talented. The intellectual quotient
is very high. They have vast natural resources. They have a
strong history, as a matter of fact. So they will come back at
some point.
The question is how they come back. Will it be as a full
integrated partner in the international community, or as an
inward-looking, nationalistic, militaristic power? And so we
have a--assuming we can all make it to that point, assuming all
those piles of nuclear material and anthrax and all the other
things that have been developed do not fall into hands other
than Russian.
We have an opportunity to work with them over a period of
time in order to make sure that as we all evolve in the future,
that our relationship is one that is cooperative and
collaborative, rather than antagonistic, which is not to say
that we are never going to have disagreements with Russia. We
have them with our allies all of the time, but we are able to
sit down and somehow work out and rationalize those differences
in ways that are at least peaceful.
So it is not foreign aid. It is for defense. I point out
that 80 percent of the money being spent on Nunn-Lugar is going
to U.S. contractors. So most of the money is going to us, in
that sense.
Mr. Chairman, I simply point out that we cannot afford--if
you look at that in very simplistic terms, you have piles of
dangerous material on the other side of this fence which has
large, gaping holes in it. And we have enemies who are seeking
to get their hands on that before we do, who will use it to
destroy us.
I do not think we can afford to sit back and say, ``Well,
the Russians may benefit in some other way and use the money
that is being used to reduce that threat in ways that might
pose a danger to us down the line.'' I do not think we can
afford to wait that long and to use that argument to defeat
this program.
The Chairman. Very important point to emphasize here in the
context of the revival, as my friend from Indiana said.
You served on the Intelligence Committee and as Secretary
of Defense. You controlled a significant part of the
Intelligence Committee, the Defense Intelligence Agency. We
have sat on the Intelligence Committee. I think all of us have.
We have known for a long time--we have not been able to say,
but we can say now because it happened--there are individuals
and groups attempting to purchase, purchase by whatever means,
the talent in terms of the personnel, wholesale constructed
weapons, nuclear, chemical, biological, raw products like
refined--that is a contradiction in terms--anthrax.
There is a bazaar out there. People are walking up to the
table. There have been people arrested because there are sting
operations in effect out there. This is not something that is a
hypothetical. The American people should understand: People are
attempting to purchase weapons.
And last--and I am going to ask my staff for the quote, it
came from a closed hearing, but the quote is from the general
literature. There is some quote in effect from a famous nuclear
scientist that says, in effect: Anybody who thinks it is easy
to build a sophisticated nuclear weapon is wrong. Anyone who
thinks that it is difficult, it is impossible, to build a crude
nuclear weapon is wrong. And I will get the exact quote.
The only thing that keeps some of these outfits or
individuals from building a nuclear weapon, is having the
material, not the material to construct the casing, not the
material to make it go boom--I cannot get any more specific
than that--but the actual enriched uranium or plutonium, the
weapons grade material. And there is tons of it.
I will conclude with this: I was telling this to my mother,
whom you know, Bill, is a very bright lady, incredibly well
read, 85 years old and, as they say, sharp as a tack, watches
everything on C-SPAN. And I come home, and she is now, because
my dad is ill, living with us. So I came home after a hearing,
oh, a couple weeks ago, just before the recess.
And she said, ``Why would they not spend the money to build
a fence?''
And I started the explanation. She said, ``Joey, that's
biting our nose off to spite our face.''
Ever hear that expression, biting your nose off to spite
your face? ``We will teach those Russians. We are not going to
help them build that damn fence,'' figuratively speaking. ``We
will show them.''
It is yours, Mr. Enzi. It is your floor.
Senator Enzi. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
And I come from that part of the United States that has
sacrificed its uranium industry in order to be able to use up
that highly enriched uranium from that part of the world. It is
important that we do that, and it is part of the plan.
I want to mention, too, that when I went to Russia, I was
accompanied by three professors from the University of Georgia,
two of whom grew up in the Soviet Union. The third one was from
the United States but had spent a great deal of time in
education in Russia. So all three of them spoke Russian.
And, of course, all of the conversations over there were
through interpreters. And I was so glad that I had some
interpreters from the United States. Their culture has changed,
but their vocabulary has not been able to catch up with the
changes. They have not had words for ``management'' and
``contracts'' and ``corporations.'' Those parts I could
understand, because they have adopted the English version.
Management is management. So they just took the same word and
made it----
The Chairman. Like my neighborhood.
Senator Enzi. Their word for ``security'' and ``safety'' is
the same. And those are two absolutely different responses. And
had I not had some interpreters with me that had the U.S.
perspective of it, there could have been a lot of difficulties
in the discussion when it came to security and safety.
One of the things we have been trying to do here, of
course, is to get a State Department liaison in the Senate part
of the building, much as we have the military liaisons. And I
hope the committee will help me to push for them to get some
space, so that we have easier capability, when we get foreign
visitors, to be able to get interpreters, for one thing, people
to sit in on the meeting who have a broader background on what
is happening.
There were a lot of instances where my interpreters were
able to jump into the interpretation and add in a little more
depth, so that they understood exactly what we were talking
about, instead of having some of the confusion.
One of the points that was helpful was when we were talking
about the ``evil axis,'' Iran and Iraq and North Korea. And I
have to say, they are very sensitive on that in Russia. I was
surprised that they were most sensitive about North Korea, more
so than Iran. Now that is one of the things that I and the
interpreters picked up from the lengthy discussion we had about
what could be done with those countries to make sure that
technologies they are getting are not going to be harmful to
the Russians or to us.
And, Mr. Secretary, I was wondering if you could share with
us what the United States could do to persuade, from your
perspective, Russia to stop the transfer of sensitive nuclear
missile technologies to Iran and North Korea? Are you aware of
any sticks or carrots that we could employ to do that?
How do we resolve investing more money in nonproliferation
programs in Russia while witnessing this continued
proliferation? Any ideas on what we can do with those
countries?
Mr. Cohen. Well, for one thing, we have to continue to deal
with the Russians in a cooperative fashion. I know the word
``engagement'' initially was not well embraced or
enthusiastically embraced by the administration, but I do not
know another word for it, whether it is dialog, discussion,
collaboration.
I think engagement really does summarize what we have to
do, which is to work with the Russians to say, ``There has to
be a better option than you gaining revenues from the sale of
`commercial nuclear technology' to a country like Iran that we
are satisfied is dedicated to acquiring weapons of mass
destruction and the means to deliver them. There has to be a
better way in terms of your relationship with the United States
and the West than transferring similar technology to the North
Koreans.''
They might point out, for example, that it is a bit
inconsistent on our part, since we have a program with the
North Koreans to help develop their capability to produce
commercial nuclear power. And they might say ``You are
operating on a different standard here.''
But, of course, the Bush administration might say ``You are
right, and we want to cease and desist from that assistance to
North Korea.''
But it does put us in a somewhat awkward position to say
that they should not be transferring commercial technology. Our
fear is that that level of technology--and this is for the
experts to testify to--but that level of technology could be
converted for military uses. And that is an issue of concern to
us.
But I think the only answer to that is to try to engage
them more actively in other pursuits with the United States on
a trade basis.
Senator Enzi. They did mention, of course, that they were
working on export controls and were further ahead than we were
on getting their legislature passed.
Mr. Cohen. Well, you know, the fact of the matter is that
they are looking for ways to acquire revenues any way they can
that is consistent with their national interest.
What we have tried to persuade them, and will continue, I
assume, is that transferring sophisticated technology to Iran,
Iraq, or North Korean could pose a long-term threat to them, as
well as to us. And therefore, we have a joint interest in
trying to prevent that from taking place. ``And are there not
ways that we can work together to find some other avenue or
stream of revenue for you to help build your economy while
reducing the threat, the long-term threat, to both of our
countries''?
Senator Enzi. We did find that the small businessmen that I
met with have utilized some of those engineers in different
ways than they are used to happening. They found a way to add
more sugar to sugar beets. And they found a way to keep
chemicals from leaking into their water systems. And they have
gotten some of the engineers excited about working on those
kinds of projects for profit. But profit is still a difficult
motive for them to adjust to. Making a living, they are used
to. Getting perks, they are used to. But making a profit, they
are not.
Mr. Cohen. Well, this is something that is going to take
perhaps generations. The Russians, certainly in the last
century, have not had any experience with profit. From
imperialism to communism and now to a democratic capitalism, it
is new for them. And it may take some time before that is
ingrained.
So the question for us is how do we work with them, because
our livelihood and our lives are at stake as well in this
particular endeavor.
If I could take just a few more moments of your time,
Senator Enzi, to respond to what both Senator Biden and Senator
Lugar have said. And I come back to this whole issue of, is
this really in our interest to do that? I think all of us are
familiar with the sort of steps that we take when we talk about
national security, deterrence, first line of defense.
Then we go to crisis management. Then we go to consequence
management. And all of us are familiar with what we are trying
to do. Now, what happens if, and CSIS, the Center for Strategic
International Studies, at a program last year ran an experiment
called Dark Winter with the release of a smallpox virus in
multiple sites and what would happen under those circumstances.
So it is all involved in consequence management.
But then it evolves into questions about preemption. And it
is something that we have to give serious consideration to, as
we are, as a matter of fact, in Iraq. As you discuss what is
going to be our policy toward Iraq, we are saying, here is a
country dedicated to acquiring chemical, biological, nuclear
weapons and the means to deliver them. And should not we seek
to remove Saddam Hussein and his regime and to prevent that
from ever taking place? So it is a form of preemption that we
are considering right now with Iraq.
Is this not another form of preemption that we are talking
about, that we are seeking to preempt an attack upon the United
States with a willing partner, that we provide the money? Think
about how much money we are going to spend if an attack takes
place. And I am making no commentary at this particular point
in terms of what our policy is or should be or one that might
take place. But how much would be involved if we were to
militarily take down Saddam Hussein's military infrastructure?
This is a small fraction of what would be involved in such
an endeavor. And it has equally, if not much greater,
consequence to allow that much material to sit unguarded or
underguarded to the future of this country.
I see the Nunn-Lugar program as a preemption of sorts, that
we are preempting an attack upon the United States by groups
that are dedicated to killing us and to use the most massive
means at their disposal to produce these kind of casualties.
And that comes in the form of nuclear, radiological,
biological, and chemical weapons. So this is a program of
preemption by non-military means with a cooperating partner in
the form of the former Soviet Union.
Senator Enzi. Thank you.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
The Chairman. I apologize. What I was trying to get here
with the staff is to put a lot of this in perspective, what you
said, Mr. Secretary. And we will not keep you much longer.
If I add up what most folks would look at and think of as
threat reduction-type programs, they are the programs relating
to nuclear weapons, the programs relating to chemical weapons,
and the programs relating to biological weapons. And they range
from the Nunn-Lugar Cooperative Threat Reduction Program--I
just want to list a couple of these--to the Materials
Production Control and Accounting Program, the MPC&A Program,
the U.S./Russian Plutonium Disposition Effort, the Highly
Enriched Uranium Purchase Agreement, the Initiatives for
Proliferation Prevention and the Nuclear Cities Initiative, two
separate programs, the International Science and Technologies
Centers, the Bioreduction Program, and the Export Control and
Border Security Assistance. They all relate to these issues.
As I calculate it, based on funding levels for this coming
year that would allow us to, in effect, fully fund on a level
that, within 10 years, we would make significant progress in
dealing with, again, the 17,000 to 22,000 strategic and
tactical nuclear weapons that remain in the Soviet Union, in
Russia, 160 metric tons of weapons grade separated plutonium,
approximately 1,000 metric tons of highly enriched uranium, 10
nuclear cities with 120,000 scientists and skilled personnel,
and so, 60,000 scientists and personnel in the biological
weapons programs, et cetera.
You take all these potential places for mischief, and if we
were to fully fund--I will submit this for the record--I will
not bore you, because you know all this.
[The following information was supplied by committee
staff.]
$167 million in additional funding per year to accelerate
the pace of the Materials Protection, Control, and Accounting (MPC&A)
program so that we will not have to wait until the end of the decade
before all Russian fissile material is stored at securely guarded
facilities.
$250 million per year to finance an expansion of the
Highly Enriched Uranium Purchase Agreement to buy more processed
nuclear fuel down-blended from Russian stocks of highly enriched
uranium. Doubling the size of that program from 500 metric tons of HEU
to 1000 metric tons would safeguard enough material for 20,000 nuclear
weapons--material that terrorists could readily use, if they got their
hands on it.
$200 million in additional funding per year to incentivize
and assist Russia in moving faster on its plutonium disposition under
the August 2000 U.S.-Russian agreement, possibly to include additional
plutonium beyond the original 34 metric tons agreed upon.
$67 million in additional funding to help jump start
Russia's chemical weapons destruction as called for under the Chemical
Weapons Convention.
$125 million in additional funding for International
Science and Technology Centers/Bio Redirect to engage more Russian
scientists in collaborative projects; one idea is to organize them into
a massive public health effort to research and treat drug-resistant TB
and other infectious diseases.
$100 million per year to help replace plutonium burning
reactors in Russia and Kazakhstan and begin securing radioactive
sources in the former Soviet Union.
The Chairman. But if we were to fully fund to the level
that we were able to get what was envisioned by each of these
programs finished within the timeframes when the agreements
were made, we would have to add roughly another $900 million to
the--I am going to refer to them all as threat reduction, and
that encompasses everything. We would have to add roughly
another $900 million to the total threat reduction effort
underway, which right now includes in fiscal year 2003
roughly--how much is the administration asking for?
Staff Member. They are asking for $1.6 billion.
The Chairman. Asking for $1.6 billion. So $2.5 billion
total spending on everything relating to threat reduction out
of a budget, including the Department of Energy's portion that
relates strictly to defense, of somewhat in excess of $380
billion.
We are talking about a relatively small percentage here of
the total amount of the budget. The total is, I am told by my
staff, three-quarters of 1 percent or equally in a plus-up of
one-quarter of 1 percent of our total defense spending. And the
reason I raise this is--and I realize we have varying degrees
of agreement and disagreement on the utility, the efficacy, and
the soundness of seeking a national missile defense. And I am
not trying to juxtapose them as a tradeoff.
I know my friend from Maine supports national missile
defense. My friend from Wyoming, I do not know, but I suspect
he supports a national missile defense program. Senator Lugar
supports one. And I think he is waiting to see the detail of
it, like I am. I am the least enthusiastic about it, depending
on exactly what it is. I am not opposed to it. I voted for over
$100 billion in my 30 years here for research on national
missile defense.
But regardless of what position we all take, just to
juxtapose this, in terms of an immediate threat to the United
States of America in the near term, the idea that out of a
close to $400 billion, $380 billion probably, counting, you
know, maybe as high as $390 billion on what you count as
defense related, that we are not prepared to spend, that we are
not prepared to spend $2.5 billion to fully fund all these
programs, I find close to mindless. I mean, I really do.
It is not like Senator Lugar and myself--and I do not want
to put words in Senator Enzi's mouth, but Senator Enzi is
obviously very concerned about this--are asking for there to be
gigantic tradeoffs here. It is not like I am saying to the
administration, ``Look, if you fully fund this, you are not
going to be able to maintain the end strength of the military.
If you fully fund this, you are going to have to drastically
cut back the conventional weapons program. If you fully fund
this, you have to shelve national missile defense.''
The idea of putting additional silos in Fort Greely,
Alaska, in the near term versus doing this in the near term, I
do not think are even remotely comparable in terms of our
security.
And so I wonder, because you are an incredible--I mean, you
and I have been personal friends for 30 years or, to be precise
28 years. You were elected in 1974.
Mr. Cohen. In 1972.
The Chairman. In 1972. I was--actually 30. I am wrong. I
was right the first time.
One of the things I have found out about you is you have
the ability, Bill, more than most with whom I have ever worked
in or out of the government, to be able to get a sense of what
is moving, what pieces are moving on the board here, in terms
of national politics, international politics, the public
opinion.
What do you think is the reluctance? Am I missing something
here? Is there some underlying concern beyond fungibility that
prevents us from doing what I think--if you had been on Mars
the last 30 years, you got dropped back on Earth today, and
they laid out to you the players on the globe and what the
threats were, I mean, I cannot imagine anybody, whether they
were a right wing conservative or a left wing pinko, whoever
they were, saying, ``Hey, wait a minute. $380 billion, $2.5
billion, deal with all these programs to fully fund''--why
would you not do that? What is going on?
Mr. Cohen. OK. I----
The Chairman. And I realize I am asking you to be a
political commentator here, but I know you too well and know
how smart you are. What is your----
Mr. Cohen. Well, I do not want to assume the role of any
kind of a national psychotherapy either, but----
The Chairman. No. I know that. But I would like you to just
think out loudly.
Mr. Cohen. First of all, we have been dealing with a
country--we are coming out of this post-cold-war world with
them as well. There are still a lot of lingering doubts. For
example, I think some who are not here today would say, ``Is
not Russia simply pleading poverty, when in fact they have much
more resources available to them than they are fessing up to?''
That would be one sentiment that probably could be reflected on
the part of some.
``Are they not just using Uncle Sam? Are they not taxing
our people when, in fact, they should be cutting back on
whatever else they are expending their resources for in
developing either new ICBMs or counters to the national missile
defense program or whatever it might be? Are they not just
using us to fund those programs? Are they not just going to
divert this money to other purposes? Are we not subsidizing a
dying Russian military?''
Then the question would be, ``Why do we not just let them
sink into the primordial ooze of history?'' That is a sentiment
that runs at least in some segments of our society.
The answer to that, I think, is: They are not going to go
away. They are not going to sink into history. They are
brilliant people, who--if there is anything we have learned
about them over the years, it is, when it comes to ``their
national security,'' they will sacrifice everything else in the
process. So they are not going away.
They are going through a very difficult period of time now.
And the question for us to answer is: Is it better for us in
the long term to try to help them regain their economic status,
to help evolve that particular country in a way that is
consistent with our own ideals and our own democratic processes
and our commitment to democratic capitalism, or is it better to
let them sink as low as they can, feeding their own internal
nationalism, their frenetic contempt for the United States,
their fear, as I tried to outline?
If you are looking at it through a Russian eye to say, ``We
are looking at what the United States is doing, and they are
getting pretty close. And they are building a national missile
defense system. And they say it is not against us, but who
knows what 5 or 10 or 15 years might be with the ability of the
United States to have space-based systems to counter our ICBM
program,'' et cetera.
You could make a case that there are elements inside of
Russia today that see us as an enemy, a long-term enemy, as
well as a short-term one, in which they need to rebuild their
country to defeat that. What we have to do is to say: Is there
a way that we can reach across this divide that we have had
over much of the 20th century, and to find a way to help lift
them up into a level of prosperity?
And with that prosperity comes the interest of preserving
that and promoting it. And as long as we can continue to engage
them in a constructive way, that has the chance of reducing the
fears on the part of some in their society from spreading and
becoming a majority opinion, turning inward and using their
vast size, the 11 times zones that we have talked about, and
using those natural resources with whatever assistance they can
find from wherever they can find it, using those in ways that
are disadvantageous to the United States.
So I come back to this point. We tend to go from
oscillating between what Alan Greenspan might call geopolitical
irrational exuberance in terms of what our relations should be
to one that is manic depressive. And what we have to understand
is that Russia will be a powerful country in the future. When
that takes place remains to be seen. I have no doubt that it
will take place. They will regain, if not all of their power,
then a good part of their power because of their intuitive
capabilities, indigenous capabilities.
What we have to do to reduce tensions between us and to
have a better relationship is to work with them. As I indicated
to Senator Lugar and Senator Enzi, this is a program of
preemption. This is a preemption program. We are preempting
terrorists from getting those assets that they currently have.
And it is in our interest to do that.
I think that the more discussion, whether you call it a
national revival, Senator Lugar, whether we call more and more
hearings to raise this level of concern to the American people,
if we, once again, weigh what it will cost to take down Saddam
Hussein's capability, just weigh that in these programs and
say, ``There is much greater chance that terrorists will get
access to these materials in the former Soviet Union and we
know will use them against us, causing untold billions of
damage, as well as massive loss of life,'' then this is a small
investment by any standard.
This is a mere--I hate to use the word ``bagatelle''
because it will be taken out by the Wall Street Journal as
someone saying Cohen has lost his ability to calculate here.
But it is a small amount of money compared to the amount of
damage that will be done to us in terms of lives and in terms
of our economic livelihood if we fail to do this.
Now the other argument is: There is no guarantee. There is
no guarantee, if we do all of this, that that will present.
The Chairman. Absolutely.
Mr. Cohen. There may, in fact, be some loss of these
revenues. There may be some diversion. But in terms of what the
risk and the consequence is to failing to act in promoting this
program, I think that anyone, anyone of common sense, would
look at this as a pretty good investment. It is a pretty small
downpayment in terms of ensuring our security compared to what
the consequences are if we do not.
The Chairman. In the Maine tradition, you have been a great
Senator and held a significant Cabinet post. This is my
concluding question.
In the Baker-Cutler report, they made reference to a lack
of coordination between U.S. nonproliferation programs as one
key impediment to greater success. Senator Lugar and myself and
others, we introduced with Senator Hagel the Nonproliferation
Assistance Coordinating Act last year--I am not asking you to,
since you have not seen the legislation, comment specifically--
to provide greater coherence in existing U.S. efforts.
Drawing on your experience as the Secretary of Defense, can
you give us a sense about whether we should have a coordinating
body? I am just giving you the context in which I ask the
question.
And if you want to comment, then please do, but a sense of
the level of the coordination between the various departments
and agencies on nonproliferation assistance that you
experienced. I mean, you sat there, you know, at the top of the
pyramid. Is there a need for greater coordination? I am sure
there are other ways than what Senator Lugar and I have
proposed. Or is it pretty well coordinated? Do you feel pretty
confident about it?
Mr. Cohen. Well, I agree with what Senator Baker and Lloyd
Cutler concluded in their analysis. There is not sufficient
coordination amongst agencies. And I tried certainly with
setting up the Cooperative Threat Reduction Agency and tried to
consolidate. But there are still many gaps.
And I think any mechanism that can be devised to get
greater coordination is going to make the program that much
more efficient.
The Chairman. Thank you very much.
Senator Enzi. I have no more questions, Mr. Chairman. I
thank the witness.
The Chairman. Mr. Secretary, I found those quotes I
referenced. I am just going to read them.
One says: ``Those who say that building a nuclear weapon is
easy are very, very wrong. But those who say that building a
crude nuclear device is hard, they are even more wrong.''
The second quote is an alternative version that came from
the American Physical Society meeting in Albuquerque. And it
said, ``Those that think it's easy to build a plutonium
implosion bomb are very, very wrong. But those who say that
it's hard to fashion a uranium gun bomb are even more wrong.''
And by the way, a uranium gun bomb could, if able to be done,
could easily generate a one kiloton explosion. Nagasaki or
Hiroshima was six kilotons, to put this in perspective.
Nobel prize winner Dr. Louise Alvarez did write to the
effect that--and I will paraphrase the following sentence. I do
not have the exact quote, but it is close to this. It says:
Making an implosion bomb is one of the most difficult jobs in
the world. But making a uranium gun bomb is one of the easiest.
You could almost do it by dropping one piece of uranium on
another.
Now that is a paraphrase. I want to make that clear.
The bottom line here is: It is hard, but it is far, far,
far, far, far from impossible. And we know full well what has
been attempted, what people are attempting to do.
Mr. Cohen. Just remember what----
The Chairman. Those two Pakistani scientists were not on
vacation in Afghanistan.
Mr. Cohen. I was just going to say, just remember how
dedicated bin Laden and his legions are. They are determined to
destroy this country, to inflict as much damage as they
possibly can. We have seen the consequences of just a small
amount of anthrax going through the mail.
If you think about the hundreds of tons in existence and
the creative ways in which that might be distributed and
dispersed, you can see what could take place just with anthrax
itself, not to mention what would happen if you had nuclear
materials that could be constructed, either to have a nuclear
explosion or a radiological explosion.
This is something that really cannot wait. Again, Nunn-
Lugar and the Cooperative Threat Reduction Program is not the
panacea for everything. It may not ultimately succeed in
preventing our worst nightmares. But I think the absence of it
will accelerate the future in ways that we will not want to
see.
The Chairman. I cannot thank you enough, Mr. Secretary, for
being here. And I know you will be available for us if we ask
for more help. And we will be asking, I am sure, as time goes
on. It is great to see you. And thank you for coming.
Mr. Cohen. Thank you.
The Chairman. We now have as our second and concluding
panel two esteemed scientists. And I thank them for being here.
Dr. Siegfried Hecker is a senior fellow at Los Alamos
National Laboratory. And Dr. Constantine Menges is a senior
fellow at the Hudson Institute.
Dr. Hecker served as the Director of Los Alamos National
Laboratory from 1985 to 1997 and participated in some of the
initial lab-to-lab exchanges between the United States and
Russia during the early 1990s. Last summer Dr. Hecker published
an article on ``An Integrated Strategy for Nuclear Cooperation
with Russia'' and offered a number of intriguing proposals. I
hope that he will expand on some of those proposals and discuss
them with us today and give us his sense of which ideas deserve
our immediate attention.
Dr. Constantine Menges has previously served as a professor
at George Washington University, where he directed the program
on Transition to Democracy and initiated a project on U.S.
Relations with Russia. He has also served on the National
Security Council and as a national intelligence officer.
With that, I turn to Senator Lugar, if he would like to
make any comment.
Senator Lugar. I welcome the witnesses and look forward to
your testimony.
The Chairman. And why do we not proceed in the order in
which you were called? Doctor, if you would begin, I would be
happy to hear what you have to say.
STATEMENT OF DR. SIEGFRIED S. HECKER, SENIOR FELLOW, LOS ALAMOS
NATIONAL LABORATORY, LOS ALAMOS, NM
Dr. Hecker. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Senator Lugar, very nice to see you again.
As you said, Mr. Chairman, I have two statements for the
record. And what I had planned to do was summarize them
briefly. But because of the hour, I will try to summarize them
even more briefly. But I do want to state at the outset, much
as Secretary Cohen did, how much I personally appreciate the
leadership that both of you have shown in this very, very
important subject.
And I know, Senator Biden, that the March 6 hearing that
you held on radiological terrorism, and I think what you also
called basement nukes, really should be required reading for
people on that subject. It was very, very educational.
And, of course, Senator Lugar is very well known not only
in this country, for cooperative threat reduction, but the
place where I travel a lot, which is in Russia, including in
the closed cities.
In the extensive paper that I have offered for the record,
I try to tackle the issue of solutions. You have very well
outlined the problems. And the solutions are quite specific. As
you saw, there are two tables. The tables are based on a
methodology of looking at the following. First, define what
sort of relationship we want to have with Russia.
When I wrote this paper in August of 2001,\1\ that was not
clear. So I actually wrote it for three potential scenarios,
one of not friend, not foe, which is, I think, where we were
then, to potential ally. And I said the best we probably could
get to was what I call the France model, which is an
independent-minded ally. And the third was reemerging
adversary.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ The paper referred to can be accessed at the following Web
site: http://cns.miis.edu/pubs/npr/vol08/82/heck82.htm
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
I think that situation has been cleared up since last
August because of the tragic events of 9/11 and also the
decision made by President Putin to ally himself with the
United States. So clearly, we should be looking in my tables at
the ally scenario.
But then also, in looking at a hierarchy or risk, I thought
it was important to set priorities because, as you have already
indicated, the U.S. programs in this arena are not necessarily
terribly well-structured and coordinated. And so I offer a
hierarchy of nuclear risks from the very worst that could
happen to things that are still important. And the bottom line
is that I believe we need a comprehensive strategy to tackle
the entire set of nuclear issues in Russia.
I also believe that there is no single silver bullet to
solve this problem. I also believe strongly that what you had
just indicated, Mr. Chairman, the importance of funding, that
money is essential. In other words, it is necessary, but it is
not a sufficient condition.
Today how we run these programs, how we actually work with
the Russians is at least as important as how much money we put
in these programs. And in fact, and I outline this in my
written statement, we have lost our way from the early days of
remarkable cooperation between the nuclear complexes of Russia
and that of the United States to the last 4 or 5 years, during
which that spirit of partnership has essentially drifted away.
And I personally believe that we will not make the progress
that you have called for so far this morning without
reestablishing a set of common objectives. After all, the
materials that you talked about, the dangers that you talked
about, these are Russia's responsibilities. They are their
responsibilities; they cannot delegate those responsibilities.
All we can do is help. We cannot dictate. We cannot buy our way
into the Russian nuclear complex.
And so structuring how we run these programs is absolutely
crucial to making progress. Nevertheless, the solutions that I
outline, I think, are still as applicable today as when I wrote
them. However, in the written statement I also update, let us
say, the scenario of risks that I view today; that is, nuclear
risks in the world after 9/11.
The single thing that really hits me is that today, as we
look at the urgency of problems, there are nuclear risks
outside of Russia that are actually more urgent today than
those within Russia. Now as I also state, the risks and
vulnerabilities within the Russian complex remain high because,
although we have made much progress through the Nunn-Lugar
program, through the lab-to-lab programs, the fundamental
problems have not been resolved in the 10-years that we have
been working together.
But as we look today, the problems are also international.
And I lay out--and actually, Senator Lugar, this was inspired
by your effort and your speech in December, where you talked
about broadening the solution to look at the international
problem. There are three pieces to the strategy.
First and foremost, we should make sure that the nuclear
weapons themselves are safe. And that means in the five nuclear
powers, as well as in India, Pakistan, and Israel, for example.
That we must develop rigorous what we call MPC&A--and that is
the Materials Protection Control and Accounting programs--not
only in Russia, but wherever those materials might be. I mean
weapons-useable materials. That means materials that are
originated in either the defense programs of a country or those
that are part of the civilian programs.
And particularly the ones I am concerned about today are
materials associated with research reactors around the world.
As a result of President Eisenhower's initiative for Atoms for
Peace in 1953, these were distributed around the world. And of
course, the International Atomic Energy Agency has
responsibility.
But as we look at the security of those materials today,
especially in light of the concerns that you mention about gun-
type weapons, that means highly enriched uranium, and that is
what is in many of these research reactors, that needs
reconsideration today.
The commercial nuclear power situation is one where today I
feel quite comfortable that we have adequate safeguards. But
many people believe that the way to the future in energy is
more nuclear power. And even if we do not believe it ourselves,
let me tell you, the Russians do. There is hardly a day that
passes that you do not read in the newspaper of yet another
deal of Russia with some country to build a commercial nuclear
power station. So if there is an expansion of commercial
nuclear power, we must also be certain that those materials are
guarded.
And then the third piece to the overall integrated
international strategy is the one that you adequately covered
in the March 6 hearing. This is not new, but it has really been
brought to our attention since 9/11. And that is the threat of
radiological terrorism. And that is not just weapons-useable
material to make a bomb, but to scatter radioactive materials
either through some sort of a dirty bomb or radiological
dispersal device.
The Chairman. If I could interrupt you just for a second. I
am not--I have no personal knowledge of this, just reporting on
a report, though, on Sunday in the Washington Post. According
to--I mean, today. Was it the Post--in the Post today that Abu
Zubaida, the highest al-Qaeda operative allegedly, told U.S.
interrogators on Sunday that al-Qaeda was working on a dirty
bomb radiological weapon and that they ``know how to do it.''
Dr. Hecker. Let me just--I can summarize to some extent the
bottom line of your hearing on March 6. And that is that a
dirty bomb is not a weapon of mass destruction. It is a weapon
of mass disruption. And there are things that can be done to
avoid that disruption, because it comes from fear and panic.
There are lots of things that can be done.
There are also, then, things that can be done in terms of
getting rid of or controlling these materials worldwide. And I
believe that should be part of an international program now
that we have had the events of 9/11.
So that is what I have laid out in my statements. I just
wanted to briefly reiterate those points. And, of course, I
will be happy to answer any questions that you may have.
The Chairman. Thank you very much.
[The prepared statement of Dr. Hecker follows:]
Prepared Statement of Dr. Siegfried S. Hecker, Senior Fellow, Los
Alamos National Laboratory
Mr. Chairman, I am honored to share my views about what can be done
to increase our nonproliferation efforts in the Former Soviet Union.
Many of the questions raised in your letter of invitation are covered
in detail in my Summer 2001 Nonproliferation Review article on nuclear
cooperation with Russia. With your permission, I would like to enter it
into the record. In my written statement, that I would also like to
enter into the record, I address how the nonproliferation risks have
changed since September 11. I will summarize my statement this morning.
Specifically, I want to make three points.
First, the risks and vulnerabilities in the Russian nuclear complex
remain high. Fortunately, in the ten years that have passed since the
dissolution of the Soviet Union, nothing really terrible has happened
in the Russian nuclear complex. Most of the credit must go to the
Russians, although initial progress made by cooperative programs
sponsored by the United States had a significant positive impact.
However, many opportunities were missed to build a lasting partnership
and to tackle the root causes of the problem.
Second, following the tragic events of 9/11 and President Putin's
decision to ally Russia with the West, we should ask Russia to join
with us in a new cooperative effort to reduce the threat of terrorism
and proliferation of weapons of mass destruction by improving nuclear
security worldwide, and to redouble her own efforts to improve nuclear
security within Russia. Today, the nuclear security challenge outside
Russia is even more urgent than that within Russia itself. The events
of 9/11 and the recent violence in the Middle East have heightened our
concerns about nuclear security in South Asia, Central Asia, and the
Middle East.
Third, to keep nuclear weapons, their constituent materials, and
other dangerous radioactive materials out of the wrong hands worldwide,
we should mount an intense, comprehensive international nuclear
security initiative with three thrusts: 1) Ensure rigorous security and
control of nuclear weapons in each of the five nuclear weapons states,
as well as in India, Pakistan, and Israel; 2) Develop and enforce
rigorous protection, control, and accounting for all weapons-usable
nuclear materials whether designated for peaceful or defense purposes,
and 3) Address the threat of radiological terrorism by developing
effective security, control, and disposition measures for radioactive
materials. Improving security at nuclear facilities to protect against
sabotage is an important part of this third thrust.
i. 1991-2002: important progress, but also an opportunity lost.
The attempted coup in August 1991, and the attendant uncertainties
about the control of the Soviet nuclear arsenal, underscored a vital
concern: how Russia manages and protects her nuclear assets will affect
our security and potentially threaten our people and assets around the
world. In the years that followed, the threat of ``loose nukes'' and
the ``clear and present danger'' posed by Russia's large and poorly
secured stock of weapons-usable materials--plutonium and highly
enriched uranium (HEU)--emerged as vital national security issues for
the United States whose solution required cooperation with Russia.
I had the opportunity to witness the new environment in February
1992 as one of the first Americans to visit the Russian nuclear weapons
complex. This visit occurred only two months after the dissolution of
the Soviet Union. I was struck by how the Soviet Union's strength--an
enormous nuclear weapons complex, huge number of weapons and weapons-
usable materials--had suddenly turned into a liability because Russia
could no longer afford them or secure them adequately. In spite of
popular reports to the contrary, Russian nuclear weapons appeared to be
adequately protected, at least as long as the military organizations
responsible for security maintained the high level of discipline that
had distinguished them for many years.
The security of nuclear materials, however, was of great concern as
Russia made a wrenching transition from a centrally controlled police
state to a more open, democratic form of government. During Soviet
times, the nuclear complex had an admirable record of nuclear security.
Now, however, the upheaval of political, economic, and social
structures in Russia created unacceptable nuclear security
vulnerabilities in Russia and for the rest of the world. A much more
rigorous nuclear safeguards system in which modern technology and
practices are combined with personnel and physical security was
urgently needed to replace Soviet guns, guards, and gulags.
As we now look back over the last decade, the good news is that
nothing really terrible happened in the Russian nuclear complex in
spite of the enormous hardship endured by the Russian people. The early
years were marked by surprising cooperation between our governments in
the nuclear area, through unilateral actions on both sides (most
notably, the presidential initiatives in the fall of 1991) and through
the initial implementation of the Nunn-Lugar Cooperative Threat
Reduction (CTR) program. By the end of 1996, the CTR program helped the
newly independent states of Ukraine, Kazakhstan, and Belarus return to
Russia the nuclear weapons inherited from the Soviet Union. Much of the
strategic missile and nuclear weapons infrastructure in these states
was destroyed. Technical assistance was rendered to Russia to protect
nuclear weapons in transit. Some vulnerable nuclear materials in
Kazakhstan were removed to safety in the United States. Construction of
a large modern, safe storage facility for excess Russian fissile
materials was begun. And, a landmark agreement led to the conversion of
weapons-grade uranium to low enriched uranium (LEU) reactor fuel sold
to the U.S. nuclear power market (the so-called HEU/LEU deal).
In parallel, the informal scientific network (lab-to-lab
cooperation) established between U.S. and Russian nuclear scientists
during our first visit to Russia ten years ago began to tackle problems
such as nuclear materials safeguards that were stalled or moving very
slowly in formal governmental diplomatic channels. In June 1994, with
the strong encouragement of then Under Secretary Charles Curtis, I
signed the first contracts for cooperative nuclear materials
protection, control, and accounting (MPC&A) with Russian defense and
civilian nuclear institutes on behalf of the Department of Energy. In
addition to strong backing from Mr. Curtis and others the Executive
Branch, a bipartisan coalition in Congress, led by Senator Pete
Domenici, provided both political and financial support for the lab-to-
lab MPC&A activities. With their support and the remarkable spirit of
cooperation based on mutual respect and shared objectives between the
U.S. and Russian laboratories, we were able to break the logjam and
rapidly accelerate improvements in nuclear safeguards in Russia.
Senator Domenici's leadership in building support for the lab-to-lab
program also extended into many related threat reduction programs and
was instrumental, along with that of Senators Nunn and Lugar, in
establishing the comprehensive and wide-ranging cooperative threat
reduction programs that have accomplished so much over the last decade.
However, most of the credit for avoiding disaster in the Russian
nuclear complex must go to the Russians--most importantly to the
loyalty and patriotism of the Russian nuclear workers. Their discipline
under conditions of personal hardship was remarkable. We must also
credit the leadership of the nuclear complex during and right after the
transition, specifically former Minister of Atomic Energy, Viktor N.
Mikhailov, and First Deputy Minister, Lev D. Ryabev, as well as the
directors of the nuclear institutes and enterprises. Their actions
early in the transition managed against difficult odds to sustain the
complex through those turbulent times and prevented it from fragmenting
into even more dangerous and desperate entities. Also, although their
decision to keep the most sensitive defense facilities and towns (so-
called nuclear cities) closed undoubtedly had several distinct
motivations, in retrospect, it was the right decision from the
standpoint of nuclear security. Although this restrictive approach
hampered much-needed business development, defense conversion, and
downsizing efforts in these cities, it helped protect nuclear materials
and nuclear secrets. Civilian nuclear facilities and some defense sites
located in open cities generally experienced a more abrupt and
difficult transition. In fact, these facilities along with the Russian
Navy posed by far the greatest immediate proliferation risk. Several
confirmed thefts of nuclear materials, albeit of small quantities, in
the early 1990s highlighted the vulnerability of the Russian nuclear
complex.
Much of the initial success in the MPC&A program must be credited
to the partnership approach between the Department of Energy
laboratories and the Russian facilities and to the remarkable access
the laboratories had to Russian nuclear facilities. I believe that only
a self-declared ``hawk'' such as Minister V.N. Mikhailov was capable of
providing the requisite political cover and he had the clout with
Russian security services to enable this progress. In fact, he opened
the door for the first American visits to the Russian nuclear weapons
laboratories shortly after he led the Russian scientific delegation to
the 1988 Joint Verification Experiments and the subsequent nuclear
testing talks at Geneva. During the ramp-up of the MPC&A program in the
mid-1990s, the U.S. side was able to make a convincing case to the
Russians that the program was in their interest. In spite of the fact
that Russian security services took control of the program, progress
was rapid because of the strong partnership between U.S. and Russian
institutes and the fact that the Russian institutes acted as the
intermediaries to some of the key sensitive sites in the Russian
complex. For example, the Kurchatov Institute was the lead laboratory
for the Russian Navy to help it address some of the most urgent nuclear
materials vulnerabilities.
The bad news is that the problems in the Russian nuclear complex
were much greater and more pervasive than either Russians or Americans
realized ten years ago. The Russian nuclear complex in 1992 was vastly
oversized and overstaffed for post-Cold War defense requirements, and
had been in difficult economic straits for years. Yet, unlike in the
United States, dramatic downsizing of the Russian complex was believed
too risky by its government. Such downsizing was painful in the United
States, but was ameliorated by significant increases in federal
environmental budgets at DOE nuclear sites, an innovative community and
worker transition program, and by a healthy U.S. economy. In Russia, on
the other hand, the closed cities were embedded in a country with a
bankrupt federal government whose governing institutions were
collapsing. Laying off workers in the closed cities risked serious
social unrest. Opening up the cities for business development posed a
major proliferation risk. Consequently, the Russian government chose to
proceed with a slow but deliberate conversion-in-place program. Such an
effort would have been difficult under conditions of a healthy economy
and was extraordinarily difficult for these isolated cities in a
chaotic national economy. U.S. programs designed to help the Russian
nuclear complex conversion received inadequate support from Congress.
Moreover, some of the initial efforts were misguided and elicited
strong negative reactions from the Russian side. Some of the problems
been rectified during the past year and substantial progress is now
being made in some of the programs that experienced difficulties
earlier.
Today, serious concerns about security of weapons-usable materials
in Russia and the other states of the former Soviet Union remain
because progress slowed dramatically in the second half of the 1990s as
mistrust replaced cooperation. What went wrong? Why did we miss the
chance to help Russia further improve nuclear security in its complex
and put our relationship with Russia on firmer ground? I believe that
some of our leaders were slow to recognize that we truly were
threatened more by Russia's weakness than her strength. Consequently,
instead of developing and maintaining an integrated strategy based on
such an overriding guiding principle, the executive agencies and
Congress independently developed their own projects resulting in a
patchwork quilt of programs. Although each may have been useful and
justified on its own terms, overall strategic direction was missing and
little effective coordination existed, either with Russia or within the
U.S. interagency community. Some programs pushed by the U.S. side ran
counter to Russia's national security interests or energy strategy,
forcing Russia to choose between her national interest and receiving
much-needed financial assistance. Moreover, the overall political
relationship between our countries was severely strained by NATO
expansion, the bombing of Serbia, national missile defense, and
disagreements over Iran, Iraq, and Chechnya.
Concurrently, partially to placate a skeptical Congress, executive
agencies dramatically changed the execution of key nuclear materials
security programs with Russia. They began to take a confrontational
line with Russian counterparts, replacing partnership with a
unilateral, bureaucratic approach that insisted on intrusive and
unnecessary physical access to sensitive Russian facilities in exchange
for U.S. financial support. During a trip this March, I was told by one
of my Russian colleagues: ``The nuclear materials arena is very
sensitive for the Russians. Despite this sensitivity, the American side
constantly tried to get access everywhere and to obtain sensitive
information. This must have been motivated by various reasons (implying
that Russia suspected an intelligence motivation). This American desire
for extensive information and access backfired. It caused the
strengthening of the security services--back to their previous role and
prominence.'' I believe that the Russian bureaucracy and security
services made a strong comeback on their own for other reasons, but the
change in tactics on the U.S. side made matters worse and accelerated
the trend. Furthermore, it eroded the spirit of partnership and nearly
depleted the bank account of trust and good will. Consequently,
progress in nuclear materials protection in key Russian nuclear defense
facilities has slowed substantially in recent years. The jury is still
out whether or not the recently signed access agreements will put us
back on a more productive path, but we hope they will be a springboard
for repairing the damage of the last few years and returning to a
pattern of genuine cooperation. Thanks to congressional action, the
current funding for the MPC&A program is plentiful. However, we must
not make the mistake of trying to buy our way into the Russian
facilities. Instead, we must re-examine our common objectives, re-
establish the spirit of partnership, and together tackle the remaining
challenges in the Russian nuclear complex.
During the past five years, several other cooperative threat
reduction programs ran into similar difficulties as U.S. and Russian
objectives progressively diverged. The HEU/LEU purchase deal, which
initially provided the Russian complex much of the funds for conversion
of its facilities, has been on the ropes periodically for several
years. The plutonium production reactor conversion project was ill
conceived from the outset and had to be overhauled several times.
Progress on implementing the plutonium disposition agreement in a
timely manner remains elusive. And the proposed moratorium on civilian
fuel processing never got off the ground. Meanwhile, the financially
desperate nuclear ministry aggressively marketed its civilian nuclear
technologies around the world, including to potential proliferant
states such as Iran. Russian nuclear cooperation with Iran has greatly
alarmed the U.S. government and seriously hampered many of the U.S.-
Russian cooperative programs. Concurrently, the partial recovery of the
Russian economy based mostly on the global rise of energy prices and
the August 1998 devaluation of the ruble changed the economic situation
in the nuclear complex for the better, giving Russia greater
independence from U.S. financial support.
So, as we look back over the past decade, much has been done to
help Russia deal with the clear and present danger resulting from the
turmoil in its nuclear complex following the breakup of the Soviet
Union. And although Russia avoided the worst during this difficult
transition, the United States lost a promising opportunity to help
shape the future direction of Russia's nuclear enterprise and together
with Russia to build a new era of global security. Neither side focused
on the historic opportunity to jointly reduce the nuclear dangers.
Before 9/11 the window of opportunity appeared to be closing, both
because Russia did not need our money as desperately as before and
because the security services were once again closing up the complex.
ii. post 9/11: another chance to build a partnership
The tragic events of 9/11 combined with President Putin's decision
to ally Russia with the West in the struggle against terrorism provide
another chance to build a partnership. The terrorist attacks crossed
the threshold of inflicting mass casualties and underscored our
vulnerability to the nexus of terrorism and mass destruction. Therefore
the statement made by Presidents Bush and Putin at their Crawford Ranch
meeting last November--``Our highest priority is to keep terrorists
from acquiring weapons of mass destruction''--should form the basis of
a new partnership against the threat of terrorism and proliferation of
weapons of mass destruction. Because of the events of 9/11, this threat
is now more urgent than that posed by the Russian nuclear complex. We
should now challenge Russia to work with us side by side to tackle the
most urgent international nuclear dangers. We should re-examine the
highly debatable proposition that Russia is the world's greatest
proliferation threat, and we should place the Russian threat, important
as it is, in its proper perspective among the full spectrum of threats.
Although significant differences are bound to remain in U.S. and
Russian security objectives, we have much more to gain than to lose by
cooperation, especially in the nuclear arena.
The events of 9/11 call for a greater sense of urgency in dealing
with international nuclear security matters. For example, the fragile
nature of Pakistan's government and that divided nation's strong anti-
Western sentiments heighten our concerns about the security of its
nuclear weapons and materials. This situation is exacerbated by the
tense situation in Kashmir, and has the potential of a spillover to
India and its nuclear arsenal. The renewed violence in the Middle East
highlights long-standing concerns about the potential, sooner or later,
for nuclear conflict in that region. It is especially important to
thwart the nuclear ambitions of Iraq and fran. The war in Afghanistan
highlights the need to keep nuclear weapons and materials out of
Central Asia. Fortunately, the Nunn-Lugar program facilitated the
return of nuclear weapons from Kazakhstan to Russia, but dangerous
weapons-usable nuclear materials remain in Kazakhstan. A renewed joint
U.S. and Russian commitment to nonproliferation and export controls may
also help to hold in check North Korea's nuclear ambitions and prevent
other states or groups from obtaining nuclear weapons. The United
States and Russia can play separate but supportive roles to effectively
and quickly help enhance nuclear security around the world.
To deal with the likelihood that some weapons-usable materials are
already in dangerous hands, the United States and Russia should now
prepare to respond jointly to potential nuclear terrorist incidents or
threats. Such preparations may include sting operations against
suspected targets to recover missing materials and joint emergency
response exercises spanning the gamut from disabling nuclear devices to
mitigating the consequences in case of nuclear attacks. The well-
intended ``Atoms for Peace'' program promoted nuclear research reactors
in countries of the world that now do not have the financial means or
political stability to maintain and protect them. Together we should
accelerate work with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) to
expedite the conversion of weapons-grade fuels at all reactors and the
removal of reactors from countries that are judged willing or can be
persuaded to give them up.
The events of 9/11 have also brought our vulnerability to
radiological terrorism into starker focus--dispersing nuclear materials
(without a nuclear explosion) or sabotaging a nuclear facility.
Although the consequences of a radiological act are dramatically less
than a nuclear detonation, the likelihood of such an event is also much
greater because of the relative ease of obtaining suitable materials--
which include nuclear waste, spent fuel, and industrial and medical
radiation sources. Together, our countries should lead efforts to
counter radiological terrorism.
Although international vulnerabilities represent the most urgent
nuclear concerns today, many of the vulnerabilities in the Russian
nuclear complex resulting from the dissolution of the Soviet Union and
the subsequent economic hardship remain. Therefore, it is imperative
that Russia redouble her efforts to safeguard her own nuclear
materials. This responsibility is an inherently governmental function
of the Russian Federation. It cannot be delegated; it cannot be
compromised. The United States can only offer to help, we cannot
dictate; we cannot demand. We must rebuild the spirit of partnership
that characterized initial cooperation. The threat of international
terrorism offers another chance to rebuild this partnership because the
United States and Russia have common objectives to counter this threat
and both bring substantial skills to the table. Also, the activities
under the new partnership should be viewed as less threatening by
Russia or accusatory toward Russia and should allow us to restore good
will and trust.
Such a partnership should allow the United States to restructure
nuclear cooperation with Russia, putting in practice the belief that we
are threatened more by Russia's weakness than her strength. We should
first focus our efforts to help Russia downsize its complex and to
become self sufficient in all aspects of safety and security of its
complex--its nuclear weapons, its nuclear materials, and its nuclear
experts. This effort should be considered a transitional phase with the
objective of helping the Russian Federation develop its own modern,
indigenous MPC&A system. We should not impede progress by insisting on
unnecessarily intrusive physical access to sensitive Russian
facilities. Instead, our support should be focused on helping the
Russian Federation develop and implement its own system, while ensuring
ourselves that U.S. money is spent properly and effectively.
Beyond this transitional phase, we should strive to develop an
equal partnership--one without money changing hands--to jointly lead
international efforts to fight terrorism and prevent the proliferation
of weapons of mass destruction. Such a partnership should include a
commitment to reduce all nuclear dangers worldwide while promoting the
beneficial contributions of nuclear technologies. In fact, the 5Oth
anniversary of President Eisenhower's ``Atoms for Peace'' initiative in
December 2003 provides an opportune occasion to announce a truly new
vision and new partnership that reflect the dramatically different
political environment of today.
iii. an outline of a u.s.-russian partnership to fight nuclear
terrorism and proliferation
To meet the urgent concerns highlighted by the events of 9/11, we
should begin immediately to build a partnership on the foundations of
the Nunn-Lugar-Domenici legislation and the lab-to-lab cooperation. I
briefly outline the three components of a joint U.S.-Russian initiative
to fight nuclear terrorism and proliferation.
1. Rigorous security for nuclear weapons
The events of 9/11 prompted a reexamination of the security
controls for nuclear weapons by each of the five nuclear weapon states.
We can assume that the same occurred in India, Pakistan, and Israel.
Concerns over the security of nuclear weapons and nuclear materials in
these countries have been increased dramatically by the war in
Afghanistan and the resulting tensions in Pakistan, the ethnic unrest
and terrorist activities in India and Pakistan, and the escalating
violence in the Middle East. The United States should do everything in
its power to work with all of these states to prevent the loss of
control of nuclear weapons and its devastating consequences.
The five nuclear weapon states could share the lessons learned from
their own reexaminations of nuclear weapons security. They could share
ideas and information on recommended practices and standards for
nuclear weapons security. They should take additional steps if
necessary to demonstrate to the world, without divulging sensitive
details, that their weapons are secure. Such cooperation falls within
the bounds of historical relations of the United States, Great Britain
and France, and to a lesser extent Russia. During the Cold War, there
was virtually no interaction with the Soviet Union on matters of
nuclear weapons security, but in recent years a substantial cooperative
effort has been mounted with Russia under the Nunn-Lugar program. Some
preliminary work has also been started on safety and transparency.
Although delicate, these efforts should all be accelerated and
expanded. Cooperation and transparency should be explored, including
revisiting the possibility of an agreement for cooperation that would
permit limited sharing of certain kinds of classified information under
carefully established rules and procedures.
Any dialog with China on nuclear weapons security would require
delicate diplomacy. China adopted the old Soviet model of security,
which is effective only in a tightly controlled, closed society--a
model that may not work in the China of tomorrow. The initial U.S.
contacts in the mid-1990s that focused on security of civilian nuclear
materials were suspended late in the decade as result of the furor over
potential Chinese nuclear espionage. Now, however, heightened concerns
over nuclear security call for a re-evaluation of limited, focused
dialog with China on nuclear security. Exchanges focusing on the
security of civilian nuclear materials could be revisited before
attempting to deal with defense materials or the security of nuclear
weapons themselves. Such exploration must, of course, be done within
the context of the larger U.S.-China security relationship.
The most striking and urgent nuclear security concern today is the
security of nuclear weapons and materials in Pakistan, coupled with
closely related concerns in India. The U.S. government has opened a
limited dialog with both countries on these matters. For many years,
any sort of cooperation with, or assistance to, the nuclear programs of
Pakistan and India was out of the question, because of nonproliferation
imperatives. Now, a reassessment is unavoidable. Clearly, it is in the
interest of the international community that India and Pakistan
implement rigorous nuclear safeguards in their nuclear weapons
programs. But there is a fine line between helping them avoid disaster
and tacitly appearing to approve their nuclear weapons status and
programs, in effect undermining the nonproliferation regime. The U.S.
government must re-examine where to draw that line. At a minimum, we
must do what we can to make sure India and Pakistan each devote
adequate attention to the issue and that they take a sufficiently
broad, systematic approach to matters of nuclear security (both for
weapons and for materials). Given that, they can probably do the job
themselves. Similar dialog is necessary with all countries where this
threat exists.
2. Rigorous protection, control, and accounting for all weapons-usable
nuclear materials whether designated for peaceful purposes or
for defense programs
To be successful in this endeavor, we must first and foremost
finish the job we started with the Russian nuclear establishment to
help it protect its vast storehouse of nuclear materials. I described
above how these programs should be restructured to help Russia build
and implement a modern, indigenous MPC&A program. One of the key
components of getting the job done is the consolidation of the number
of sites--addressing hundreds of tons of material, not just the few
tons being addressed in the existing material consolidation and
conversion effort--and a continued reduction of the total amount of
material (through programs such as the HEU/LEU purchase and disposition
of excess weapons plutonium).
Second, we have unfinished business in the other states of the
former Soviet Union. As mentioned, the Nunn-Lugar program helped to
return Soviet nuclear weapons from the newly independent states of
Kazakhstan, Ukraine, and Belarus. However, weapons-usable materials
remain, most of which are no longer needed for their original purpose.
So, now we must tackle the more difficult job of converting or removing
all unneeded weapons-usable materials from these and all other newly
independent states. Until that can be accomplished, all materials must
be protected by a rigorous nuclear safeguards system.
Focusing on weapons-designated materials is not sufficient.
Weapons-usable uranium and plutonium are also fuel and/or byproducts of
the civilian nuclear fuel cycle. Although most current commercial power
reactors in the world use uranium enriched only to 3 to 4% uranium-235
(the weapons-usable isotope), they produce plutonium that can be (and
in some countries is) separated from the spent fuel. Moreover, smaller
reactors such as those used for research are often fueled with uranium
enriched to more than 20% uranium-235 (the IAEA threshold for weapons-
usable uranium). Commercial power reactors today enjoy a very good
record of nuclear materials safeguards. This problem will become more
challenging as more reactors are built around the world, especially in
some less stable nations. The IAEA plays an important international
role here. With sufficient vigilance this problem can be adequately
addressed even in a future with increased nuclear power.
The situation with research reactors (and other nuclear research
facilities) is more problematic. The ``Atoms for Peace'' program
encouraged the export of research reactors to all parts of the globe.
In retrospect, reactors, often fueled with HEU, were in some cases
located in politically unstable, technologically unprepared, and
economically disadvantaged countries (currently 43 countries, including
Uzbekistan, Ghana, and Algeria, for example). The IAEA and the U.S.
government have encouraged the conversion of research reactors from HEU
to LEU (an agreement was recently reached with Uzbekistan, for
example). However, the current effort is insufficient in light of the
concerns raised by the events of 9/11. A large number of these reactors
(many of which are no longer operable) should be shut down,
decommissioned and the nuclear materials withdrawn completely. A
significant number of reactors or nuclear research facilities are
located in the states of the former Soviet bloc; states that can no
longer afford them or adequately provide for their security. Solutions
to these problems are urgently needed and will require an expensive
effort and difficult choices. Among the major challenges is dealing
with the spent fuel and radioactive waste. Solving these problems will
require strong leadership from the United States, Russia and other
reactor-exporting countries working closely with the IAEA.
The IAEA should have a major role in the effort to enhance the
security of nuclear materials in civilian applications worldwide. The
Nuclear Threat Initiative has pointed the way, through its monetary
contribution announced in Vienna in October 2001. The U.S. government
pledged a matching contribution in November when Energy Secretary
Abraham addressed the IAEA Board of Governors, and other countries have
followed suit. But a great deal of heavy lifting will be necessary to
translate these initial steps into a meaningful action-oriented program
on the worldwide scale that is needed. Congress will need to take
strong action. And the Executive Branch must follow through with major
bilateral and multilateral efforts to enlist the strong support of
other countries. In parallel, the United States and Russia could lead a
campaign to down-blend all of the world's HEU not required for
legitimate purposes to less than 20%, thereby eliminating its
proliferation danger. There is much less need for HEU today than was
envisaged in the early days of nuclear power.
3. Expand security measures to radioactive materials for radiological
terrorism
Radiological dispersal devices (often referred to as ``dirty''
bombs) that spread radioactive materials without a nuclear detonation
are weapons of mass disruption rather than weapons of mass destruction.
The disruption resulting from the 9/11 attacks had a devastating ripple
effect, both economically and psychologically, across the entire
nation. Had the attack also involved the dispersal of dangerous amounts
of radioactive material in a populated area, the resulting disruption
would have been significantly greater. We must improve our efforts to
avoid and respond to radiological terrorism.
The source materials for radiological terrorism are highly diverse
and relatively accessible, much more accessible than weapons-usable
nuclear materials. Materials for radiological devices include all
radioactive materials of the nuclear fuel cycle (both civilian and
military) as well as radiation sources used in medical and industrial
applications. They vary enormously in their radiotoxicity and their
lethality. Moreover, radioactive materials from the nuclear fuel cycle
(including fresh fuel, spent fuel, and nuclear waste) are present in
dozens of nations, and radiation sources are present in most nations of
the world. If and when Al Qaida or other terrorist organizations decide
to use radiological weapons, there is little doubt--under current
conditions--that they will be able to obtain them. In addition,
sabotage of nuclear reactors or other fuel-cycle facilities poses a
serious potential threat.
Securing radioactive materials that constitute a radiological
threat presents an enormous challenge. Even in the United States, where
extensive government regulations control the handling and
transportation of radioactive materials, the security of such
materials, in light of new, post 9/11 concerns, needs more attention.
For example, as of 2001, close to 5,000 orphaned radiation sources
(sources without a current owner) were identified in the United States.
Prior to 9/11, the orphan source problem was recognized and the steps
and the resources required to solve the problem were well understood,
but there was no sense of urgency. Post 9/11, there is little excuse
for delay.
Annually, more than 200 radiation sources are reported stolen,
lost, or unaccounted for in the United States alone. Internationally,
110 countries do not even have adequate regulations controlling such
materials. We must challenge our experts now to devise a way to deal
with this problem internationally. We should explore establishing an
aggressive international orphan source program. In some countries or
for new problems, we may want to focus on information exchange and
sharing best practices and standards. Also, we must strengthen our
capability to respond to acts of radiological terrorism, if and when
they occur. Effective response can greatly reduce the harm from a
radiological event. One of the most important aspects of homeland
security against radiological threats will be to inform the public
concerning the real hazards before an incident occurs. If one can
clearly communicate the fact that radiological weapons are not weapons
of mass destruction, then we may be able to avoid mass disruption.
A high priority radiological security initiative should include
both a domestic and an international component. The domestic part would
necessarily involve the various agencies with responsibilities and
expertise in this area, under the coordination of Governor Ridge's
office. The international component should build on the capabilities
and experience of the IAEA, which has already assembled the basic
building blocks of a comprehensive international program. However,
Congress and the Executive Branch must act aggressively, through
bilateral as well as multilateral channels, to enlist strong
international support and commitment.
Mr. Chairman, I want to close my remarks by restating my three main
themes. 1) We are fortunate that a major disaster in the Russian
nuclear complex has been avoided in the 10 years since the dissolution
of the Soviet Union. However, risk and vulnerability of the Russian
nuclear complex remains high because we lost a grand opportunity to
help Russia build its own, sustainable nuclear safeguards system and to
develop a partnership for greater global security. 2) Post 9/11, we
have another opportunity to rebuild the partnership by focusing on the
fight against international terrorism and proliferation of weapons of
mass destruction. 3) I briefly outlined the three elements of a program
to meet the urgent concerns of today and I described the opportunity
that we have to build a better, more strategic partnership with Russia
in the spirit of revisiting the ``Atoms for Peace'' initiative at its
50th anniversary next year.
Thank you Mr. Chairman for giving me the opportunity to share my
views on these important issues.
The Chairman. Dr. Menges, welcome.
STATEMENT OF DR. CONSTANTINE C. MENGES, SENIOR FELLOW, THE
HUDSON INSTITUTE, WASHINGTON, DC
Dr. Menges. Senator Biden, it is a pleasure to be with you
and you, Senator Lugar.
I have been working on the Soviet Union and issues of
Soviet and Russian foreign policy for more than 35 years. And I
am pleased to have had the opportunity to serve my government
three times. And I commend the enormous leadership you both
have shown in this whole matter, this important matter of the
control of weapons of mass destruction that are on Russian
territory. And I think the Cooperative Threat Reduction Program
has been one of the most important initiatives, one of the most
farsighted that the Senate has launched. And I think it has
been extremely--and I support it completely.
My focus in the testimony that I prepared for you, and I
summarize briefly in my overview of what we should do, but my
focus has been not on the question of weapons of mass
destruction on Russian territory, but on Russia's transfer of
weapons of mass destruction, components, and expertise on
ballistic missiles, to regimes the United States of America
correctly considers hostile.
And I have a very, I think, nicely summarized, one-page
chart \2\ in my testimony of North Korea, Iran, and Iraq, and
the transfer of weapons of mass destruction materials,
chemical, biological, nuclear ballistic missiles by China and
Russia--our report dealt with both China and Russia--derived
entirely, may I say, from the U.S. Government sources, from
U.S. Government intelligence reports that are declassified,
that themselves are the result in my view of a farsighted and
sensible congressional view to have the intelligence community
of the United States report on this regularly on a biannual
basis.
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\2\ The chart referred to is on page 54.
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So I will begin with a brief statement on what Russia is
doing and has continued to do year after year after year. I
think it is important to focus on that.
Russia has continued to provide for North Korea significant
assistance with its chemical and biological weapons of which it
has large stocks capable of killing hundreds of thousands that
it has integrated into its combat doctrine for use against our
ally, South Korea. Russia has also provided significant help
with North Korea's ballistic missile program.
And North Korea in turn, as you know, has provided
significant help, as the Rumsfeld Commission documented, to
many other hostile terrorist-supporting states in other
countries with their missiles and other programs.
In the case of Iran, which the Department of State calls
the most active supporter of state terrorism in the world as a
regime, in its annual report, Russia has provided significant
help with its development of chemical and biological weapons,
of which it now has large stocks, as well as with its help for
nuclear weapons.
And this continued after September 11, 2001, regrettably,
as we saw when Secretary of State Powell visited in November
2001 in Moscow. He brought the issue up, and once again, as has
happened year after year since 1995, the Russian Government
turned aside the concerns of the United States about Iran's
development of nuclear weapons.
Russia has also provided major help with the development of
Iran's ballistic missile capabilities, the medium-range and the
long-range ballistic missile, the 9,200-mile range missile, the
9,200-mile range missile, which can reach us directly, which,
of course, is a variation of the North Korean 9,200-mile
missile.
Finally, Russia has provided major help to Iraq in its
development of large stocks of chemical weapons, biological
weapons, unknown in the matter of its nuclear weapons from the
intelligence community point of view, and help with its
ballistic missile program.
Now I take those three countries because they are three of
the terrorist-supporting regimes that are significant and
important and I think pose a direct threat to us. And I would
say that I would simply like to place on your agenda of
concern, the agenda of concern of the U.S. Government and our
public policy, that while it is very important to help Russia
control weapons of mass destruction on its territory, it is, I
would say, of equal importance to reduce the spread of these
weapons and the transfer to regimes that are hostile and that
we know intend to do the people of the United States harm.
We know that those regimes intend to harm us. We also know
that they are intending to harm our close allies, South Korea,
Israel, regional allies. And, of course, I think it is
important to point out they also pose a direct threat to Russia
and to Russia territory. And this is where I come to the
question, ``Well, what do we do? What should we do in terms of
public policy?''
I offer in the concluding two pages of my testimony an
overview in broad terms of what we should do and then eight
specific steps. Let me categorize the broad terms.
First, I begin with information. And here, Senator Lugar, I
think again you are absolutely right. We have to dramatize for
our citizens, for our public--you both are correct--the threat
that these weapons pose, both on Russian territory and the
threat that they pose when transferred to these hostile
regimes. We have to make this much more a matter of discussion
and concern. I think that is the first thing we have to do.
I think, second, we have to control the spread of U.S.
technology. That is, we have to be more effective in terms of
our programs to maintain and guarantee the security of our own
military and dual-use technology under U.S. law.
Third, I believe we need to reestablish effective export
controls. I think it was a mistake to dismantle the COCOM
system that had worked so well for many years and denying a
dual-use and advanced military technology to potentially
hostile powers, or to proliferating powers. And I think we have
to reestablish that, and I offer some particular examples.
Fourth, I think it is very important to move beyond words
with Russia. And here I want to--I began my testimony in the
written form with the perspective on our approach to Russia
since the unraveling of communism, which I think has been
exactly correct. I think there has been bipartisan consensus
since 1991 and 1992, led by you both, if I may say, that we
want to see and help Russia to develop as a pluralist political
democracy, a market-oriented economic system, and to control
these weapons. Those have been our three fundamental purposes.
They have been good purposes and correct purposes. They
continue. They should continue.
I believe there has been progress in Russia. I have just
completed a book on U.S. relations with Russia and China. So I
have examined the internal political evolution, as well as the
foreign policy of Russia in some depth. I think that is
progress, but there is a mixed picture, as we well understand,
internally in Russia.
Nevertheless, I think our assistance program should
continue. However, it is important to put this in perspective.
Since 1991/1992, our bilateral assistance, according to the
latest executive branch reports, has totaled more than $35
billion to Russia, of that--to the former Soviet Union--and
about $18 billion to Russia alone. And that is about evenly
divided between grant assistance and insurance and commercial
loans and so forth.
At the same time, the United States has supported the very
large program of multilateral assistance. And, of course, many
of our democratic allies have provided assistance. Based upon
the available data, the democracies, the major democracies,
have provided Russia since 1991/1992 to the present about $150
billion in assistance. This is extremely generous. It is
significant. The money comes, as we all understand, from the
working men and women of all the democracies.
The Chairman. Doctor, does that count--is that $150 billion
total, including us, or is that----
Dr. Menges. Yes, it includes us. It includes our $35
billion bilateral. And that includes, also, some of the debt
forgiveness and debt restructuring. So that is about $150
billion. So there is a lot of money that has been provided, a
lot of----
The Chairman. I am sorry to--I want to just make sure I
understand. And that is since----
Dr. Menges. Since 1992.
The Chairman. Since 1992. Thank you very much.
Dr. Menges. Yes. And that also includes all the cooperative
threat reduction funds and the bilateral assistance.
I did--by the way, a few years ago, I did an assessment of
our aid over the first 6 years. And I testified on that before
the Senate--I was pleased and honored to do so--on just how we
have done, what we have done with it, how it has worked so far,
and so forth. That was quite a task, as you could imagine. And
I think we could do better, as in everything we do in life.
But keeping with that in mind, with the fact that we have
and are providing a lot of assistance to Russia, I think it is
now time to go beyond words and say in a polite, but firm, way
to the Government of Russia, ``We have asked you to stop this
selling and transfer of weapons of mass destruction, components
and expertise year after year after year, through two
Presidents, two administrations, and it continues. And it
continues after September 11, 2001, unfortunately, in the new
context of a more cooperative relationship.''
Now I would suggest that it is time to consider reducing
U.S. economic assistance. Not cooperative threat assistance,
because I agree with you both, this is part of our defense,
this is in the strong interest, but to reducing the assistance
in direct proportion to the added cost to the United States and
its major allies of defending against the military threats
resulting from Russia proliferation.
I think this is the time to do this. That is a difficult
number to estimate. We understand that. But it can be done, and
I think it is time to do that.
Now that is where my testimony ends in terms of the overall
approach. But I would like to add another thought, which I have
also published in the past and talked with many Russian leaders
about. And I discuss it in my book.
And that is, I am also--I believe in disincentives and
being practical and tangible, but I also believe in incentives.
And we understand that one of the major priorities for Russia
and for President Putin is to help the Russian economy develop.
And it seems to me that it should be possible for the
industrial democracies, which have a combined GDP of roughly
$30 trillion, to put together--that is a lot of money, $30
trillion GDP combined--to put together a grant program for
Russia on the order of $10 billion to $15 billion a year. A
grant program, not a World Bank program, not a loan program,
but a grant program for the development of consumer production
industries in Russia, consumer production----
The Chairman. That is a good idea.
Dr. Menges [continuing]. And tie that into conversion of
the defense sector; and put that grant program together with
cooperation as a kind of a Marshall Plan, as it were, in which
Russia's--the professed need to earn this money from the
transfer of the weapons of mass destruction, components and
expertise is put aside. But Russia would have to fulfill the
conditions.
What cannot continue to go on, in my view, is for Russia to
receive the funds and never to comply with the requests that
are reasonable.
And so my view is that Secretary Cohen is right in response
to Senator Enzi's question ``What do we do?'' that dialog is
where it should start. And I think part of the dialog also has
to be to make tangible and practical to the Russians, looking
at the ready eye of the missiles and other things, how
dangerous this is for them. After all, a number of these are
Islamic regimes. One never knows where they are going to go
with their hostility.
Russia is dealing with the Islamic movement in Chechnya and
has 70 million to 90 million Islamic population. There is a lot
going on in the former Soviet Union and in Russia itself. And
it is contrary to Russia's interest to building up these
dangerous weapons near its borders, that actually can reach it
in direct terms before they can reach us.
But beyond dialog, I think we also need to do the other
things I have just mentioned. So I would just summarize:
Information to inform our public and leaders about the problem
much more actively; the control of U.S. technology; reestablish
export controls in an effective way; overall economic
disincentives for Russia; cutting the assistance in other
domains, not cooperative threat reduction, unless this transfer
stops; and finally, propose also an incentive, design and
propose an incentive program; but there would have to be
complete compliance.
In my book I talk about this. And I describe a situation
where I think the administration of the program would have to
be by American officials on Russian territory, who would take
the $9 billion or $15 billion and allocate it in grants
themselves, would monitor that it really goes to civilian
production, that it really involves defense conversion; and, if
not, that it is cutoff immediately, so that there cannot be
this lag of a year or two to find out what is going on. There
would have to be sort of conditions. But I think the grant
program could be very attractive.
In conclusion, I think it is important to understand, as we
look at our relations with Russia, that there are good
opportunities for an improvement in relations, a continuing
improvement in relations, as we go forward. And I believe, as I
indicate in the article in the Washington Post, from the
Washington Post that I have attached,\3\ on the Russia/China
relationship, that part of having a good relationship with
Russia is understanding the new relationship it has with China
and being realistic about what that means.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\3\ The article referred to is on page 55.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
You may have noted, Senators, that very few people in
Washington have discussed the fact that in June of last year,
Russia and China signed the Shanghai Cooperation Agreement
establishing a security alliance among Russia, China, and four
Central Asian countries. They also, Russia and China, also
signed for the first time since 1950 an alliance agreement in
July, a bilateral alliance agreement.
Now I believe that the strategy that Russia and China are
both following toward us is to have a two-level relationship;
one to be normal and civil in relations with the United States
and to obtain tremendous amounts of economic benefits, Russia
through assistance and trade, China through the one-way trade
it has had, which has led, as you know, to a Chinese surplus
from 1990 to 2000 of $720 billion with the industrial
democracies, $480 billion with us alone. So that has worked
very well for them at one level.
At the second level, I believe Russia and China have
decided, as we see this in the annual summits and I discuss it
in my new book called ``The Preventable War, the Strategic
Challenge of Russia and China,'' I believe that they have
decided that they want to limit the United States, and they
want to do this in as discreet a way as possible.
But regrettably, I believe the proliferation, the transfer
of these weapons of mass destruction to these regimes hostile
to the United States and its allies, are part of this method,
are part of this method of limiting the United States and the
world, doing it discreetly, doing it indirectly.
And I believe we, too, should have a two-part strategy
toward Russia and China, a normal civil relationship at one
level, but on the other level a realistic relationship, which
involves certain conditions on the economic benefits they
obtained from the United States, so using our economic benefits
as a positive instrument to in fact ensure a future of peaceful
relations with both countries and both powers. And I think we
can do that, and I think it would make all the difference, if
we would now move to that kind of approach.
Thank you very much.
The Chairman. Thank you very much, doctor.
[The prepared statement of Dr. Menges, including additional
material, follows:]
Prepared Statement of Constantine C. Menges,\1\ Ph.D., Senior Fellow,
The Hudson Institute
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ Constantine C. Menges Ph.D., a Senior Fellow with the Hudson
Institute, served as Special Assistant for National Security Affairs to
the President and as National Intelligence Officer with the CIA. His
forthcoming book is 2007: The Preventable War: The Strategic Challenge
of Russia and China. [Contact tel. #s 202/974-2410 or 202/223-7770]
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
russia and the transfer of weapons of mass destruction
U.S. Purposes and Assistance
Following the unraveling of the Soviet Union and the establishment
of the Russian Federation in 1992, presidents and political leaders in
both major parties in the United States have supported a large program
of assistance for Russia. The purposes have been to encourage a
transition to ever more broad based and stable political democracy
together with a market oriented economy and to assist Russia in
controlling and reducing its large arsenal of strategic and tactical
nuclear weapons, other weapons of mass destruction, and its ballistic
missiles. These were seen by the leaders in the United States and
Russia as being in the interests of both countries since a more
democratic and market oriented Russia would more likely be peaceful
internationally and provide for greater prosperity and well-being for
its citizens.
From 1991 until the end of 2000, the United States has provided
more than $35 billion in bilateral assistance to all 15 post-Soviet
republics: $17 billion in direct funding together with an additional
$18 billion in commercial financing and insurance. Russia has received
more than $17 billion including $8 billion in direct funding and $9
billion in commercial financing and insurance.\2\ This funding
continues. At the same time, the United States has joined with the
other major democracies to provide an estimated additional $120 billion
in economic assistance through bilateral programs and international
financial institutions.\3\ Further, on several occasions the
democracies have canceled or generously refinanced more than $40
billion of Russia's external debt. Therefore, we can estimate that as
of this time total expenditures and grants by the United States and its
democratic allies in assistance for Russia have been worth more than
$150 billion dollars since the unraveling of the Soviet Union.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\2\ U.S. Government Assistance to and Cooperative Activities with
the Newly Independent States of the Former Soviet Union, Department of
State, January 2001.
\3\ Speaker's Advisory Group on Russia, Christopher Cox, Chairman,
Russia's Road to Corruption, U.S. House of Representatives, September
2000.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
This is an important starting point for considering Russia's
continuing transfer of components and expertise for weapons of mass
destruction and the ballistic missiles to launch them. It is often said
that these highly dangerous transfers have occurred because Russia and
various Russian weapons manufacturing organizations need and want the
funds they derive from these transfers. The question facing the current
leadership of the United States is whether it is the national interest
to continue the many forms of economic assistance for Russia even
though its government either denies or fails to stop the proliferation.
Russian Proliferation
For more than a decade, there has been bipartisan agreement among
U.S. presidents and the political leadership in Congress that the U.S.
and its allies are gravely threatened by the continuing transfer of
weapons of mass destruction and ballistic missiles to dangerous regimes
such as those in North Korea, Iran, Iraq, and Libya, among others.
Those dictatorships support international terrorism, threaten U.S.
regional allies, and year after year have demonstrated by their words
and actions, that they intend to threaten and if possible harm the
people of the United States.
In the mid-1990s, the U.S. Congress decided that the Clinton
Administration needed to act more effectively to stop proliferation and
that this might occur if the intelligence agencies were required to
provide biannual classified and unclassified reports to Congress on
this major issue. As a result, the unclassified reports have become a
means through which the legislature, citizens and experts could inform
themselves about an activity that is largely conducted in secrecy, with
some degree of deception and frequent denial.
In 1997 the U.S. Congress established a bipartisan Commission
chaired by the Honorable Donald Rumsfeld to examine this question. It
had access to all available government information and produced both a
classified and an unclassified report. As an example of the dangers
deriving from this proliferation, the Rumsfeld Commission predicted in
1998 that Iran could have an intercontinental range ballistic missile
able to reach the U.S. ``within five years'' \4\. Informed experts
believe Iran could have its own nuclear weapons within two years; if so
Iran might then be in a position to launch or threaten a nuclear attack
directly against the U.S. as well as Israel. In December 2001 a senior
Iranian cleric publicly threatened to ``totally destroy'' Israel when
Iran has its own nuclear weapons.\5\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\4\ Report of the Commission to Assess the Ballistic Missile Threat
to the United States, Executive Summary, Washington, DC July 15, 1998.
\5\ From FBIS, World News Connection, cited in Constantine Menges,
``China, Russia, Iran and Our Next Move,'' The Washington Times,
February 10, 2002.
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The latest annual U.S. Department of State report identifies Iran
as ``the most active'' state supporter of terrorism in the world.\6\
Starting in the early 1980s, Iran has provided training, weapons and
other aid for Hezbollah and Hamas, terrorist organizations attacking
Israel. This continuing Iranian indirect war of terrorism against
Israel was again revealed in January 2002 when Israel captured fifty
tons of weapons and explosives on a freighter, the Karine A. Its
Palestinian captain admitted that the Palestinian Authority had
obtained the weapons from Iran, and many of the weapons containers bore
Iranian markings. These terrorist supplies included about 3,000 pounds
of C-4 explosives, which could be used by suicide bombers against
civilians.\7\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\6\ Patterns in Global Terrorism, U.S. Department of State, April
30, 2001.
\7\ Menges, ``China, Russia, Iran,'' op. cit.
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The unclassified government intelligence reports on proliferation
conclude that Russia and China are the two countries that have been
most consistently active in transferring weapons of mass destruction
and ballistic missile components and expertise to hostile regimes.\8\
The following table is drawn from the most recent unclassified CIA
report, released on January 30, 2002. It concludes that Russia has done
the following:
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\8\ Central Intelligence Agency, Foreign Missile Developments and
the Ballistic Missile Threat to 2015, Summary of a National
Intelligence Estimate released in January 2002 and Central Intelligence
Agency, Unclassified Report to Congress on the Acquisition of
Technology Relating to Weapons of Mass Destruction and Advanced
Conventional Munitions, 1 January through 30 June 2001, released
January 30, 2002.
for Iran--assistance in building its stocks of chemical,
biological weapons, with its nuclear weapons program, as well
as with its mid range ballistic missile and its planned ICBM,
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
the 9200 mile Shahab 4/5;
for Iraq, major assistance in building its large stocks of
biological and chemical weapons, as well as aid for its short
range (370 miles) ballistic missile;
for North Korea--provided major assistance in building its
large stocks of chemical and biological weapons, as well as
major assistance in building its No-dong medium range ballistic
missile and aid in building its 9200 mile intercontinental
ballistic missile, the Taepodong.
Background on Russia's Current Transfers of Weapons of Mass Destruction
It is a fact of international politics that virtually all the
Soviet-linked anti-U.S. dictatorships of the cold war era outside
Europe survived during the 1990s. These include Iran, Iraq, Libya,
Syria, North Korea, Cuba--all of which have been judged by the United
States government to be states which support international terrorism.
The Middle Eastern anti-U.S. regimes, Iran, Iraq, Libya, Syria continue
to seek to build weapons of mass destruction for possible use against
the United States as well as against U.S. allies such as Israel and the
Persian Gulf oil states.
These are the states which during the 1990s have been supported by
Russia and China politically and with weapons transfers at ever
increasing tempo. In the congressionally-mandated public reports, the
Director of Central Intelligence has indicated that Russia and China
are the countries which provide the largest number of conventional
weapons and the most weapons of mass destruction to these and other
hostile regimes.
The Soviet purpose in working for 30 years with these regimes in
the Middle East was essentially to use them and their hostility against
Israel and its alliance with the United States as a means of helping
radical pro-Soviet groups gain control of the Middle East oil wealth.
This included unsuccessful attempts to overthrow the moderate Persian
Gulf oil regimes--Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, United Arab Emirates. The
Soviet view was that with radical pro-Soviet regimes in charge of those
oil resources and Europe and Japan depending on these for about 70
percent of their energy supplies, it would be possible to neutralize
Europe and Japan by imposing political conditions such as leaving NATO
and other U.S. security alliances on further supplies of Middle Eastern
oil to Europe and Japan.
In the 1990s, Russia and China sold weapons to the anti-U.S.
regimes in the Middle East to earn hard currency, to support their own
military producers and also to establish closer relations and build up
these regimes as another means of counterbalancing the United States.
In addition to China's transfer of weapons of mass destruction to these
countries, starting in 1994, Russia began to sell a large number of
weapons to Iran along with nuclear weapons-related equipment which
reportedly led a 1999 U.S. government analysis to conclude, ``if not
terminated, can only lead to Iran's acquisition of a nuclear weapons
capability.'' \9\ The conventional weapons Russia sold to Iran during
the 1990s included many aimed at the U.S. Navy including three
submarines, a variety of long-range guided torpedoes for the
submarines, a large number of anti-ship mines, as well as tanks and
armored personnel carriers.\10\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\9\ Bill Gertz, ``Letter Showed Gore Made Russian Deal,''
Washington Times, October 17, 2000, A-1.
\10\ John M. Broder, ``Despite Secret `95 Pact by Gore, Russian
Arms Sales to Iran Go On,'' New York Times, October 13, 2000, A-1.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Years after the event, reports revealed that in 1995 Vice President
Gore had entered into a secret agreement with Prime Minister
Chernomyrdin of Russia that the United States would not implement
sanctions required by the Gore-McCain Nonproliferation Act of 1992 if
Russia promised to stop selling these conventional weapons to Iran.
This surprising revelation led Senate Majority Leader Trent Lott and
Senator Jesse Helms to write President Clinton on October 13, 2000
saying, ``please assure us . . . the Vice President did not in effect
sign a pledge with Victor Chernomyrdin in 1995 that committed your
Administration to break U.S. law by dodging sanctions requirements.''
\11\ In fact, Russia did not stop selling such weapons. Despite U.S.
diplomatic protests, Russian weapons transfers continued into the years
2001 and 2002.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\11\ As cited by Bill Gertz, op.cit., October 17, 2000.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The New Russia-China Alliance After September 11, 2001
Although Russia has cooperated in important ways with the United
States since the massive terrorist attack of September 11, 2001, there
is no evidence that Russian transfers of components and expertise for
weapons of mass destruction and ballistic missiles have changed in any
significant degree. In November 2001 it was reported that Secretary
Powell raised these issues in his visit to Moscow without any
success.\12\ Nor is there any sign that the several summit meetings
between Presidents Putin and Bush have led to any marked decrease in
Russian proliferation activities.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\12\ Tyler, ``U.S. and Russia to Complete Talks on Arms Control
Pact,'' New York Times, December 11, 2001, A13.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
To the contrary, Russian President Putin has publicly stated that
the U.S. should take no action against Iraq, Russia has continued to
work to have the sanctions against Iraq lifted, and Russia has
indicated that it continues to have a close relationship with the
clerical dictatorship in Iran.
It is important to understand that the United States faces a new
strategic situation as a result of the June 2001 Russia-China treaty
establishing the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) involving six
countries and the July 2001 Russia-China bilateral alliance treaty.
Together the countries of the Shanghai Pact, as it is referred to by
President Jiang Zemin of China, have a population of 1.5 billion, they
control thousands of strategic and tactical nuclear weapons, and these
combined conventional military forces number 3.6 million.
Iran hopes to join the Shanghai Pact soon. This may have been
discussed during the visit of Chinese President Jiang Zemin to Iran on
April 18, 2002.\13\ Reports are that at the coming June 2002 Shanghai
Pact summit Russia and China might agree on adding Iran while China
would also like to add Pakistan, and Russia reportedly wants India in
the Shanghai Pact as a participant. If all these joined, the Shanghai
Pact could include about 2.8 billion people and it might become much
more than the current mostly paper alliance.\14\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\13\ ``China's President Visits Iran,'' UPI, April 18, 2002.
\14\ See C. Menges, ``China, Russia, and What's Really on the
Table,'' Washington Post, July 29, 2001 [This article is attached].
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
My analysis of the new Russia-China strategic relationship suggests
that its current negative effects, from the U.S. perspective, include:
1. Russia and China both transfer expertise and components
for weapons of mass destruction and ballistic missiles to North
Korea, Iran, Iraq, Libya and have not reduced this after
September 11, 2001;
2. Russia continues selling its avanced weapons to China
which aims these at U.S. forces in the Pacific--about $18
billion have already been sold and $30 billion more are
scheduled for the next four years;
3. The political and military-to-military relationship with
China is strengthening authoritarian groups within Russia.
Possible Constructive U.S. Actions
The U.S. needs to be more effective in dramatizing how this
proliferation of weapons of mass destruction might result in immense
tragedy for countries near these hostile regimes such as those in
Europe, South Korea, Israel and other friendly states in the Middle
East as well as countries more distant such as the United States. In
addition, the U.S. should become more effective in preventing the theft
and illegal export of its own advanced military or dual use technology,
should move to reestablish effective international export controls to
keep such technology from potentially hostile regimes and from
proliferating states such as Russia and China, and should reduce its
economic support for Russia until it halts this dangerous activity.
In terms of specific actions and steps to accomplish these
purposes, the United States should allocate the skilled manpower and
budget resources necessary to:
1. Maintain the integrity of and control over classified
information within the U.S. government and among all U.S.
contractors with sensitive military technology information;
2. Significantly improve and expand U.S. counterintelligence
operations in order to prevent, deter, and defeat Russian,
Chinese and other espionage operations. From 1975 to 2000, more
than 127 U.S. citizens were convicted for spying, most on
behalf of the Soviet Union/Russia, some for China.\15\ The
repeated spy scandals of the 1990s and the compendium of
information in the bipartisan report produced by the Select
Committee chaired by Representative Christopher Cox on
successful Chinese military espionage led the Congress to
instruct President Clinton to improve U.S. security.\16\ This
resulted in Clinton signing a Presidential Decision Directive
on Dec. 28, 2000 on ``U.S. Counterintelligence Effectiveness-
Counterintelligence for the 21st Century.'' Instead of the
``piecemeal and parochial'' approach in place up to then it
urged, in the words of Sen. Richard Shelby, then Chairman of
the Intelligence Committee in the U.S. Senate, a ``more policy
driven . . . proactive . . . approach to identifying . . . the
information to be protected enhanced information sharing
between counterintelligence elements.\17\ The administration of
President Bush should make this a major priority.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\15\ Sen. Richard Shelby, Intelligence and Espionage in the 21st
Century, Washington D.C.: The Heritage Foundation, May 18, 2001, 1.
\16\ U.S. House of Representatives, Select Committee on National
Security and Military/Commercial Concerns from the People's Republic of
China, Washington D.C., May 25, 1999.
\17\ Ibid, 6.
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3. Terminate all launches of U.S. satellites on the rockets
of Russia, China or any other foreign country except for close
U.S. allies. Such launches give a country the experience,
technology and additional financial resources to bring about
important improvements in its military ballistic missile
capabilities since the systems are so similar--this is
fundamentally contrary to U.S. national security interests. The
EU is drafting a new code of conduct on missile proliferation
to be introduced in 2002. While still urging advanced states to
``exercise the necessary vigilance'' when aiding other
country's space launch programs, the new language would be more
lenient than the current restriction under the MTCR (Missile
Technology Control Regime) rules.\18\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\18\ Brooks Tigner, ``EU Hopes Code of Conduct Will Cool Missile
Proliferation,'' Defense News, July 9-15, 2001, pp. 1, 4. The U.S.
should resist such liberalization, but cannot effectively do so when
violating the spirit of the rules itself by aiding China's missile
program through satellite launchings.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
4. Military exchanges with Russia and China should focus on
building understanding and relationships among the participants
and should help foreign military personnel understand the truth
about U.S. international purposes and activities. These should
not involve the transfer of military skills from the United
States to these other countries.
5. The U.S. must restore the full, objective functioning of
the elements of the Department of Defense (such as the Defense
Technology Security Administration [DTSA]) and the intelligence
community responsible for the review of the potential military
sensitivity of U.S. defense technology exports.\19\ The
``export virtually everything'' approach of the Clinton
Administration resulted in pressures on and a weakening of
these organizations. In the present and future they must be
fully staffed by competent professionals who are able to
provide independent analyses of the national security
implications of possible military/dual use technology exports.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\19\ Reps. Dan Burton, Curt Weldon and Dana Rohrabacher wrote the
Secretary of Defense in May 2001 to express their support for an
effective DTSA, see Bill Gertz, Roman Scarborough, ``Inside the Ring,''
Washington Times, June 15, 2001, A 12. The investigative reporter,
Kenneth R. Timmerman, (Selling Out America, Ex Libirs, 2000, Chapter 8)
wrote that a high technology area of California could be called
``China's 22nd province'' because there were hundreds of such front
companies for the Chinese military and military production system with
offices there, many listing no telephone numbers or having any of the
facilities for normal business operations.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
6. The United States should expel all companies which
function as fronts for any military or intelligence related
entities in Russia, China or any other non-allied state.
7. Establish and restore an effective multilateral entity
such as the Coordinating Committee on Trade with Communist
Countries (COCOM) that for so many years served to prevent the
U.S. and its main allies from exporting military technologies
to the former Soviet Union and its allied states. In 1999, the
U.S. Congress urged that this step be taken in view of the
relative ineffectiveness of the existing multilateral
organizations such as the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG), the
Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR), and the Wassanar
Arrangement of Conventional Arms and Dual-Use Goods and
Technologies.\20\ In April 2001 a bipartisan congressional
study group, involving leading members of both the House and
the Senate recommended improving the U.S. export control
process and also working to strengthen ``multilateral export
controls based on . . . enhanced defense cooperation with close
allies and friends.'' \21\ This provides a good basis for
making rapid progress in this little known but very significant
domain of international policy.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\20\ CSIS, Study Group on Enhancing Multilateral Export Controls
for U.S. National Security, Washington, DC April 2001, 1.
\21\ Ibid.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
8. Last and perhaps most important--link current U.S.
economic aid to Russia ending its proliferation. Since years of
requests to Russia to end this dangerous transfer of weapons of
mass destruction and ballistic missile expertise and components
have produced very few results, the time has come for the
United States to inform Russia in a polite but clear way that
U.S. economic support for Russia will be reduced in direct
proportion to the additional costs to the United States of
defending its allies and people against the ever more serious
threats resulting from these weapons in the arsenals of the
hostile dictatorships. During the first year that would
probably suggest a minimum reduction of 20% in direct bilateral
assistance and perhaps comparable reductions in U.S. support
for international financial assistance and measures to relieve
or stretch out payment of Russia's approximately $150 billion
foreign debt.
In international politics, words and declarations alone often do
not bring about improvements changes in the negative actions of foreign
governments. It is time for the United States to act with seriousness
of purpose to persuade Russia to completely terminate its continuing
proliferation of components and expertise for weapons of mass
destruction and ballistic missiles.
North Korea, Iran and Iraq: Weapons of Mass Destruction and Ballistic Missiles*
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Assistance from:
Country Type of Weapon Model (Range in Miles) -------------------------------------------------------- Numbers
China Russia
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
North Korea Chemical .................................... major major large stocks \1\
Biological .................................... major major large stocks \1\
Nuclear .................................... Unknown Unknown 1 to 5
Ballistic Missile Hwasong 5/6 (175-425) \2\ No No at least 500
............................. Nodong (900) \3\ Yes major 12-100
............................. Taepodong (9200) \4\ Yes Yes in development
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Iran Chemical .................................... Yes Yes large stocks \1\
Biological .................................... Unknown Yes in development
Nuclear .................................... Yes Yes no, intends to develop
Ballistic Missile Shahab 1/2 (175-425) \2\ No No 600+
............................. Shahab 3 (900) \3\ major major in development
............................. Shahab 4/5 (9200) \4\ major major in early development
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Iraq Chemical .................................... Unknown major large stocks \1\
Biological .................................... Unknown major large stocks \1\
Nuclear .................................... Unknown Unknown in development
Ballistic Missile Al-Hussein (370) \2\ No Yes Unknown
............................. Likely Taepodong \4\ No No Intends to buy upon
............................. .................................... .......................... .......................... end of UN sanctions
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ ``large stocks'' mean that each nation keeps enough warheads of this kind to kill several hundred thousand civilians or soldiers.
\2\ These missiles are variants of the Soviet SCUD. Hwasong 5/6 are North Korean variants. Shahab-1/2 are the Iranian names for the Hwasong 5/6, which it purchased and produces. Al-Hussein is
the Iraqi name for its own indigenous variant of the SCUD.
\3\ The Nodong is designed to hit Japan, including the U.S. bases there. The Shahab-3 is a modification of the Nodong intended to hit Israel and the Gulf States.
\4\ The Taepodong is under development, but the U.S. government believes that the final version will be an intercontinental missile capable of hitting the United States.
Sources for the Table:
Central Intelligence Agency, Foreign Missile Developments and the Ballistic Missile Threat to 2015, published January 9, 2002.
Central Intelligence Agency, Unclassified Report to Congress on the Acquisition of Technology Relating to Weapons of Mass Destruction and Advanced Conventional Munitions, 1 January through 30
June 2001, published January 30, 2002.
Office of the Secretary of Defense, Proliferation: Threat and Response, January 2001.
* This table is taken from North Korea, Iran, and Iraq: Building Nuclear, Chemical, Biological Weapons and Ballistic Missiles, Briefing Note from the Russia, China Security and Democracy
Project, Hudson Institute, March 2002.
[From the Washington Post, July 29, 2001]
Russia, China and What's Really on the Table
(By Constantine C. Menges)
Russian President Vladimir Putin's surprise agreement last week to
begin a discussion with the United States on offensive and defensive
strategic nuclear forces was widely praised. And indeed, it was good
news. Putin's willingness to talk might in time produce the ``new
framework for peace'' that President Bush seeks--although, as national
security adviser Condoleezza Rice correctly cautioned, talking does not
guarantee final agreement.
But it was only part of a larger picture. This is the same Putin
who on July 16 signed a treaty of cooperation with Chinese President
Jiang Zemin at their summit in Moscow.
While the treaty states that it ``is not aimed at any third
country,'' it explicitly seeks to promote a ``new international
order.'' This is the phrase China and Russia use to describe
international politics when the United States no longer has or seeks
what they call ``unilateral military and security advantages.''
Since their first meeting a year ago, Putin and Jiang have met
eight times to coordinate what the new treaty describes as their ``work
together to preserve the global strategic balance.'' The two events
clearly illustrate a dual-track strategy of Russia and China toward the
United States. That strategy should worry the White House.
First, the two countries maintain a sense of normal relations with
the United States and other democracies so that they will continue
providing China and Russia with vitally needed economic benefits. (Bush
noted that he and Putin had also discussed ``economic cooperation'' and
that he would send Treasury Secretary Paul H. O'Neill to Moscow ``to
discuss a wide range of topics.'' These might include concessions on
Russia's $150 billion foreign debt. Meanwhile, China's yearly trade
surplus with the United States is about $85 billion--and growing.)
Second, Russia and China are using mostly political and covert
means to oppose the United States on security issues and to divide
America from its allies. This was the preferred KGB approach when Putin
served there (1975-1991), and this has been China's approach during the
Jiang years.
This month's China-Russia summit followed a little-noticed
agreement signed on June 15 by the presidents of China, Russia and four
former Soviet Central Asian republics establishing a political-military
coalition, the Shanghai Cooperation Organization. Jiang called it the
``Shanghai Pact,'' perhaps intending to evoke the former Warsaw Pact.
He said that these six countries had agreed on political, military and
intelligence cooperation for the purpose of ``cracking down on
terrorism, separatism, extremism'' and to maintain ``regional
security.'' Moscow said the agreement would improve ``global
security.''
Then, for the first time in its history, China agreed to
participate in joint military exercises, with its fellow Shanghai Pact
members this fall. Together, the Shanghai Pact countries have a
population of 1.5 billion; they control thousands of strategic and
tactical nuclear weapons, and this combined conventional military
forces number 3.6 million. Iran, Mongolia and Turkmenistan hope to join
the pact soon. They would add another 78 million people and bring the
combined military forces to nearly 4.2 million.
Such an arrangement could grant protection to Iran, which continues
to support terrorist attacks against Israel and other states. Iran
recently sent 8,000 katyusha rockets to Hezbollah guerrillas in
Lebanon. Iran could also link the Shanghai Pact with the Middle East,
where Russia and China already provide political and military support
to Syria, Libya and Iraq--three former Soviet allies that might also be
welcomed into the pact. In addition, Putin reportedly hopes that India
will join, while China would like Pakistan to participate. If all these
countries became part of the Shanghai group, it would include 40
percent of the world's population and could still be open to North
Korea, Cuba and the pro-Castro Chavez regime in Venezuela, which in May
became a ``strategic partner'' of China and of Iran.
Judging by its initial public response, the Bush administration may
believe that these new treaties are nothing more than symbolic acts--or
it simply may not have taken the time to explore this issue fully. The
July treaty, according to State Department spokesman Richard Boucher,
``is a treaty of friendship, not an alliance. It doesn't have mutual
defense in it or anything like that.''
That view ignores two facts: first, mutual defense is implicit in
the treaty, which states that ``if a threat of aggression arises,'' the
two sides ``will immediately hold consultations in order to eliminate
the emerging threat''; and second, China and Russia have another
agreement for mutual defense in the Shanghai Pact, a point well made by
a senior Chinese official who said candidly that the July treaty did
not explicitly include military cooperation ``because we have ample
agreements on that issue.''
The new China-Russia treaty marks a complete turnabout from 1992
and 1993, when the previous president George Bush and Russian president
Boris Yeltsin met three times and agreed on the need for changes in the
Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty of 1972 to permit missile defense against
third states. Back then, Russia spoke of strategic partnership with the
United States and kept communist China at a distance. After 1996,
because of pressures from communists and ultra-nationalists in Russia
and the failure of the Clinton administration to follow through on some
of the Yeltsin-Bush initiatives, Russia and China formed a strategic
partnership, which China steered increasingly in an anti-U.S.
direction.
Putin has said this month's China-Russia treaty was Jiang's idea,
and it seems clear that the Shanghai group was as well. Over the past
five years, the China-Russia alignment has had many negative effects on
the United States. Russia has accepted much of China's anti-U.S. world
view, and the relationship with China has strengthened authoritarian
tendencies within Russia. The two countries have frequently issued
joint statements opposing missile defense for the United States or its
Asian allies. And the Russia-U.S. discussions proposed in Genoa are
unlikely to change that. Moreover, Russia has sold about $18 billion in
advanced weapons to China; some $30 billion more are scheduled for the
next four years, all aimed at U.S. forces in the Pacific. Chinese and
Russian aid to Iran, Libya and North Korea includes expertise and
components for weapons of mass destruction and expertise.
Evidence of the potential new military risks to Washington and its
allies came this past February in the form of Russian military
exercises that included large-scale simulated nuclear and conventional
attacks against U.S. military units ``opposing'' a Chinese invasion of
Taiwan, according to a report based on U.S. intelligence published in
the Washington Times. But significant challenge to the United States,
at least early on, is more likely to come from Chinese-Russian
political and covert actions aimed at reducing Washington's
international role. Consider the recent defeat of the U.S. proposal for
``smart sanctions'' against Iraq: First China extracted economic
concessions from Washington in return for not using its veto in the
U.N. Security Council to stop the U.S. plan. Then Russia stepped in
with a veto.
Broader examples of Russian-Chinese political cooperation may well
include actions to oppose or delay U.S. missile defense plans; to
intimidate and lure Taiwan into accepting China's terms; to continue
the North Korean partial or pseudo-normalization; and to use Chinese
economic opportunities for financially pressed Japanese businesses, in
tandem with the possibility of Russian territorial concessions, to
persuade Japan to begin moving away from its U.S. security alliance.
Two months ago, Russian and Chinese officials announced they would
coordinate policy toward Colombia and Cuba. Russia and China have
political and military relations with Cuba as well as electronic
monitoring bases aimed at the United States. This joint policy might
well include more help for Castro as he works with the Chavez regime to
support anti-U.S. radical groups seeking to take power in Colombia and
other Latin American countries, now even more fragile due to the global
economic slowdown. Jiang and Putin might see this as a way of keeping
the United States occupied near its borders and less involved in
Eurasia.
The Clinton administration ignored early signs of strategic
cooperation between Beijing and Moscow. There is no need for a public
sense of crisis at this stage, but the Bush administration should avoid
repeating that mistake. It should give the China-Russia axis its
immediate attention.
The Chairman. This may surprise you: I agree a great deal
with what you have to say about the relationship as well. I
find particularly intriguing and, I would think, especially
today worthy of serious, serious, not just discussion, but
planning on the part of this administration or any successor
administration to deal with the prospect of your putting
together among the industrial nations a multi-billion-dollar
grant program for the express purposes you have stated.
You probably know, because you have testified, and I think
not inaccurately, in the past about the spottiness of our
efforts to provide assistance to the emerging ``democracy of
Russia.'' I am the guy that wrote that first piece called the
Seed Program that became the Freedom Support Act in the Bush
administration.
I found that--knowing what I know now, I think I would have
drafted it differently. I think probably President Bush,
knowing what he knows now, George the first, President Bush,
might have done it differently.
This has been a learning experience. Hopefully, our
learning curve is going to get sharper here. But I do not want
to take your time now, but possibly either in person or on the
phone--to followup with you on this large notion and idea you
have. And I am curious as to whether or not you have gotten any
response to the idea from any of your contacts within the
administration.
Now, granted, I do not say this as a criticism, because
there has been obviously a preoccupation of late within the
administration. But it is an intriguing notion to me.
I also want to suggest to you that when President Putin was
here last--I cannot remember whether Senator Lugar was in the
room or not; there were several of us--I asked him a question
about Iraq and why did he not understand that after at least 50
years, and probably closer to 80, of a very spotty, if not
hostile, relationship with the Muslim minorities within the
former Soviet empire, why he did not think that Moscow might
just as easily be a--or find themselves the victim of some of
the initiatives that Russia was helping Iran with?
And he was somewhat irritated in his response. He said
something to the effect, and I am paraphrasing, Do you not
think I understand that a longer range missile is equally as
likely, if not more likely, to strike Moscow than New York some
day?
I followed up with, ``Why?'' I mean, there was initial
hostility to my question. Because Senator Lugar and I had
proposed a debt-for-nonproliferation swap here and the
possibility of, although some of this has already been done in
Germany, the possibility with Japan, Germany, other countries
with whom there is a much larger debt, outstanding debt, that
Russia absorb from the former Soviet Union.
As you know, the due bill is coming due. So far, the
Russians have met their obligations. But in 2003 and 2004 there
is, in effect, a balloon payment coming up. They need very
badly to have the World Bank and the IMF and others continue to
essentially, my words, not literally applicable, but for those
that are listening, grade their bonds highly, so that they can
be lent to and/or get assistance.
It seems to us there is a real possibility here. And I
raised that with him. I said, ``Would you be interested?'' And
he first launched into--how can I phrase it?--a response that
was not particularly friendly. But as he spoke in Russian, you
could see him starting to calculate this and realized I was not
trying to be polemic with him; I was trying to figure out a
way.
He warmed up to the idea but then made the following
statement, which gets me to my question. He said essentially,
``We do not want to be told with whom we can trade. And our
single most significant bilateral relationship we have in terms
of trade surpluses is with Iran now.''
Now maybe that is not exactly what he said, but that is the
point he was making; and that there are others, other bilateral
trade relationships with Iran that do not relate to technology
and weapons technology and capability.
My question is this: Any part of what seems to be a
counterintuitive continuation of a relationship on weapons with
Iran, is any part of that, in your view, related to the
thinking on the part of the Russians that that need be done in
order to have access to markets for non-defense-related items,
or do you know?
Dr. Menges. Yes, Senator, I think so. I am sure the uranium
theocracy tries to make that point, ``Well, if you do this, we
will look more favorably on other aspects of trade with you.''
I think that is undoubtedly used.
And, of course, President Putin has been very explicit
about the concern about repayment of the Iraqi debt to Russia.
You know, he has looked at this in monetary terms quite a bit.
And yet we know he has a very strategic mind. And in fact, I am
very happy that you raised that question with him.
And certainly the events in Chechnya, the tragedy there,
and the degree of hatred that has evolved against Russia there,
that could also directly impact other Muslim peoples in the
former Soviet Union and in Russia, and has to be a major
concern.
And that relationship to the regimes, the clerical regimes
of other radical groups, the Saddam Hussein regime, which is
totally willing to work in any way that will work against its
major enemy, the United States, and Israel and so forth, all
has to--it is the kind of thing in which I think if he would
talk with you both some more, I could see you raising the kinds
of issues that would have a big impact.
There is always--as we know, in decisionmaking in every
country, there is always a coalition of interest groups that
come together. And so you have the military industrial complex
that does its--you know, has its relationships. And you have
the trading groups. And you have the geopolitical thinkers, who
say, ``Well, this is part of containing the United States.''
And we have a special relationship, the people who think,
``Well, we have to appease them.'' So there are lots of
different motivations that come together.
But all this happens in the absence of the United States
creating any consequences, because words by Secretary of State
Powell at a meeting are not consequences. And so that is why I
think it is time to create consequences. And so--that is why I
think it is time to create consequences, either positive, as I
think your debt swap idea is a superb idea of positive, or in
terms of reducing opportunities economically.
The Chairman. I would also suggest, it seems to me that
with a little bit of imagination, we should be able to generate
a win-win relationship with Russia on Iraq. They are owed, I
quoted $8 billion to them. I think he responded $9 billion or
whatever. And as you know, there are contracts that have been
acquired for by Gazprom to be able to develop fields which they
cannot get into to develop, and that they are estimating are
worth tens of billions of dollars.
And I do not know why it would be so difficult to walk and
chew gum at the same time here. The fear of taking down Saddam,
I think, on the part of the French and the Russians--and
someone mentioned the French model are different, but they do
relate to economic interests.
And it seems to me that there ought to be a way to deal
with that. But that is, as they say in my business, above my
pay grade. We cannot make foreign policy. We can encourage
folks, but----
Dr. Menges. Right.
The Chairman. Dr. Hecker, I would like to move to you, if I
may. How can we best recreate those positive conditions that
you cited on proliferation cooperation that in your testimony
you have indicated have been absent for the last 4 years, or--I
think you said 4 years, but in the recent past?
And my question is this that relates to that: Is it because
we have fundamental policy disagreements unrelated to
nonproliferation that have caused this to occur--i.e., the
withdrawal from the ABM treaty, expansion of NATO, other
broader issues--or is it something that you think is happening
inside the Soviet scientific establishment and military
establishment that suggests that it is, for strategic reasons
within Russia, less advantageous to cooperate? I mean, can you
give us a sense of why you think this has occurred?
Dr. Hecker. It is a combination, and let me try to lay them
out in the order I see them. First, it starts with what you
just mentioned. At the strategic level, the difficulties
between our governments over the last 3 or 4 years related to
the issues of ABM Treaty, the bombing of Yugoslavia, et cetera.
The next level is the one you were just discussing, and
that is, the disagreements over Iran. Any nuclear cooperation
between Russia and Iran has made them, if anything else, more
difficult.
The next level, I would say, is one within Russia. And that
is the re-emergence of the Russian security services. It turns
out, right after the dissolution of the Soviet Union, they were
sort of scattered in all directions. And that allowed much of
that earlier cooperation, both in the military, as well as in
the nuclear complex between the scientists. It took a few years
for the security service to pull themselves back together. And
let me just say: Today, it is much more difficult to get into
those closed cities than it was to get in 10 years ago for me.
So that is the third.
The fourth level, which actually is the one that we can fix
the easiest, is that we have lost the sense of partnership. And
that is recognizing that these are their materials and their
facilities. They have to safeguard them. And all we can do is
help.
And so the program execution over the last 3 to 4 years has
gone in the direction of essentially saying, ``We will pay you,
but you will do it the way we will tell you to do it.'' And
that simply does not work. They are not going to let us into
their sensitive closed facilities.
So the issue boils down to--and that is what it has been
the last two, two-and-a-half years, is requiring physical
access of Americans in sensitive Russian facilities versus a
system of assurances.
``Is there not some other way,'' the Russians would say,
``that we can assure you that your money is spent well and we
are actually making these upgrades?'' That is really the key
today, because at least at the top level--I think President
Putin has fixed that for the time being. Iran still remains a
problem.
But in this latter case, there was essentially a 2-year
standstill or, let us say, a significant slowdown in defense
programs related to MPC&A. There was a very important agreement
signed in September of last year to allow better access. And
hopefully, that will spring some of these things loose.
However, along with that there has to be this change in
approach back to saying, ``This is a partnership. We are going
to help you do the job, and we will all be better off if you
protect your materials.''
The Chairman. Thank you.
Senator Lugar.
Senator Lugar. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Dr. Hecker, you have been on the scene with the MPC&A
program an other department efforts and have testified to the
merits of continuing these programs and projects. And I agree
with you generally, that the last 2 years have been difficult.
On the other hand, it is an ambivalent situation, at least
I found from my own experience. By that I mean a good number of
persons in either a chemical or a biological facility,
scientists, people who have been running the show for quite
awhile, have really personal needs to visit with Americans.
Much has been made in the Judy Miller book of Andy Weber, this
remarkable person with the Cooperative Threat Reduction program
now, and his work in helping Americans to gain access,
particularly in chemical and some biological facilities. And
that has been a part of my experience that may be an off day
with regard to the bureaucracy.
But still, we are invited to come because the facilities
are in terrible shape. They are run down. The material is in
dangerous condition. The scientists are in disarray, strange
commercial enterprises juxtaposed to weapons of mass
destruction. And these Russians are worried about this. And
this sort of gets to your first point, this question of how to
forge the cooperative attitude, sometimes literally on the
ground at the time that physically you are there and you have
an opportunity to visit with the right people, and they say,
``OK. Come along, and I will show you something.''
I think that is important. I do not know how you foster
that specifically, except I salute our people in cooperative
threat reduction or on the ground, Jim Reed and Tom Kuenning,
various other people, who are physically there a good part of
the time. And I wish that somehow we were able to pay more
attention to them, that their work sort of permeated higher
realms in the Pentagon either in the last administration or
this one. But we try to do that.
What I am curious about and sort of interweaving what you
have said with what Dr. Menges has said--because the Iran
problem is one that everyone in our government has thought
about and we continue to seek a solution. For years all of us
have had a mission to ask, ``Why are you doing this?''
Now for a while, it was total denial. Then more frankness
came in this cooperative spirit. And they said, ``We need the
money. It is as simple as we need the money. We are bankrupt.
You have to understand that. Our programs are in disarray. The
Duma does not appropriate money for us. Furthermore, in a
spirit of democracy, we do not control everything anymore. You
have to understand there are entrepreneurs who are out there
doing these things. It is not a totalitarian state. Now could
we control the entrepreneurs better? Perhaps. But on the other
hand, they are useful in their own ways.''
Clearly, the Russians have been ambivalent about this. This
gets to Dr. Menges's point. This has helped guide Senator Biden
and me in our work in thinking about the debt swap situation.
There finally has to be some reason why the Russians would
consider other alternatives. I think President Bush and
President Putin, in their new relationship, have been starting
to have a dialog about: What is to happen to the Russian
economy? How constructively can something occur there? This is
of considerable interest to President Putin, not an obsession,
but very strong priority.
I understand, there is sort of a dialog going along there.
But from time to time, people have suggested that if we are
serious about this, we are going to have to think of reasons
why the Russian economy develops in a normal way, as opposed to
these dangerous sales to Iran or Iraq or China or so forth.
Now there could be people in the Russian hierarchy, whether
they are in the military or nationalists and so forth, who
still, as you suggested, want to control the relationship with
the United States, want to control our ability to permeate the
whole situation. We saw a little bit of that at the beginning
of the September 11 dialog, when some Russians were quoted as
saying ``Americans are simply not going to be permitted to do
very much in Uzbekistan or Tajikistan. This is off limits.''
And then President Putin says something else, ``This is a war
against terrorism. In fact, we are together.''
Now you suggested, Dr. Menges, that rather than this being
an ad hoc basis of the Biden-Lugar loans and so forth--and
which some have criticized us for giving away debt owed to
Germany or others, which is considerably greater than that owed
the United States in our program--that we may approach this in
a straightforward way, that there be a fund, free enterprise
fund or what have you.
In fairness, President Bush back in the earlier
administration and some of his people had some ideas, Jim Baker
and others, about doing a lot of this. It all sort of got
frittered away in terms of enthusiasm as we became
disillusioned with the lack of Russian reform or overt acts by
Russians. They were purely hostile.
So the Congress began to strip away one thing after another
that might have addressed the commercial situation and the
reform business, until we finally got down to the Nunn-Lugar
program as the core part of the relationship. Well, that is not
enough, although it is important. There has to be some hope out
there for something more.
In your dialog on this subject what do you believe is the
political possibility of this in this country, quite apart from
the views of other countries. If we began to work with Russia
on normalizing commerce, but they continued to go to Iran for
the money, would we stop the fund, because it is not clear to
me, in visiting with some of our European friends that they are
eager to be that abrupt. As a matter of fact, they have
relations with Iran and Iraq. And in part, it is because of the
money. It is debt and commercial relationships.
So to internationalize, this gets beyond merely the Russian
problem, but likewise our most intimate NATO friends or others
and their willingness to be hard-nosed about this. Absent that,
it seems to me we are back almost to a bilateral dialog with
President Putin, in which we finally offer a good enough deal
that he says, ``OK, I understand, and we are going to stop Iran
and Iraq because this deal is superior.''
Well, we have not come to that point. And in fact, the
proposal has not come to the Congress at all. And if it did, if
we are having a small problem on fungibility of the Nunn-Lugar
funds, imagine the kind of debate if we talk about $10 billion
of U.S. taxpayer funds doing this sort of thing in Russia, and
people saying, ``My goodness, you folks really have been
snookered. You have $10 billion out there, and the Russians are
now building a super missile. And they have you again.''
How do we overcome fungibility, the NATO allies? Are these
aspects of your program that you have considered, as you have
written or visited with your colleagues?
Dr. Menges. Well, Senator Lugar, I think the answer is, in
one word, ``comprehensiveness.'' I think there has to be a
holistic look at this. And I was suggesting about $10 billion
among all the industrial democracies.
Senator Lugar. Yes.
Dr. Menges. So the U.S. share might be $1 billion. It might
be closer to the $900 million for the full funding or so for
the testing programs. But aside from the particular amount of
money, the point is really the important one, that this is an
opportunity, a grant for, let us call it, the consumer
enterprise fund, something like that. So the production has to
be consumer production.
And it has to be done in the context of a holistic
relationship with Russia, in which the security and the
political aspects, the proliferation aspects, are all
considered together; and there is a shared agreement that is on
a piece of paper that is signed, and there are consequences
spelled out for not carrying through the agreement. And the
consequences are in fact implemented by the United States and
its partners in fact.
I think there is a problem--we have a problem with
implementation of consequences. We tend not to do so. And
therefore, year after year governments, well, feel it does not
matter what we say, what we sign. We could just forget about
that and go on from there.
So I think there is a possibility of doing this. And the
opportunity for Russia is enormous, because, as we know, the
dollars do not translate one to one. It is $10 billion, when
scientists are earning $100 a month and not $10,000 or $8,000 a
month, as they are here. It is sort of a 20 to 1 ratio in terms
of purchasing power and what it means and what it can do for
the people of Russia.
And this is President Putin's highest priority. And he does
not want to accept the World Bank loans and the IMF loans and
get back into the debt cycle. So I think there is an
opportunity now, and in fact I think you two are just among the
people who could lead the way in proposing these kind of ideas
because it does link directly to our fundamental national
security interests in stopping and doing both with the weapons
of mass destruction on Russian territory and stopping the
transfer to these hostile regimes, which clearly menace us.
By the way, we are--it is through divine providence, I
think, so far that they have not transferred them. They, the
regimes, have not transferred them to some of the terrorist
groups. I mean, that has not happened so far and obviously
could happen, which I think argues for the urgency of helping
the good people in those countries replace the regimes. And I
might just say to Senator Biden's point--and do it soon.
I might say to Senator Biden's point about the Russian
economic interest and Iraq, I think it is an important one. And
I think it can be addressed by the Iraqi National Congress. And
I know the leadership. And I think they are sensible people. It
seems to me they could simply declare that they will honor
previous debts, they will honor contracts. And if they succeed
to government, as of the heads of moderate constitutional
government in Iraq, that they will have a good relationship
with Russia, a trading relationship, a normal relationship.
They will give Russia the opportunities for exploration;
France, the same; and other countries, perhaps the same.
I know that they would be happy to do that. And I think if
we had a clear political strategy, as well as the verbal
strategy that seems to be in the air, then one would be moving
toward a situation where the Iraqi National Congress and other
representatives of a new, moderate constitutional government
for Iraq would make those overtures and I think then maybe
clear the way internationally to their moving toward ending the
enormous danger, I think, represented by that regime.
Senator Lugar. Well, I share the enthusiasm that Senator
Biden expressed on hearing your ideas. And my questions are
merely to try to refine them. I think this is an area that we
really ought to think about very seriously for the reasons you
have suggested, and even given all the hurdles that I might
perceive.
I want to take the chance with Dr. Hecker here to ask a
technical question, because your work in the accounting aspect
for these weapons of mass destruction has really been profound.
There remains considerable disagreement on how much remains
and where, which is almost bound to be the case given the
stashes all over, given all the laboratories and storage sites.
I remember earlier on, one of the small Nunn-Lugar grants were
for some computers, in which people actually began to register
some data, so that it was not kept in ink and paper in various
locations around the place.
But how goes this situation? What sort of a handle do we
have in terms of mutual confidence as to how much material that
deals with weapons of mass destruction is, in fact, in Russia
presently?
Dr. Hecker. In the end, we do not know. And the reason we
do not know is because the Russians still keep that information
classified. That is, they keep information about the specifics
of the nuclear material classified.
For example, what we call the isotopics of plutonium--how
much of the different isotopes are in their nuclear weapons
systems--the chemistry, the places where they are located, the
quantities where they are located are classified? So ``we do
not know'' is the bottom line.
From a Russian standpoint, one of the programs we tried to
start is actually to help them to get to know how much they
have. And I am not being facetious because in the United States
we did not know either necessarily. You know, these are
industrial materials. You work with them. You chemically
process them. You do not just keep them locked up in a safe.
You make them, and then you work with them.
So we had a program in the United States, and we published
a report in the 1996 timeframe called ``Plutonium, The First 50
Years.'' We went back and said, ``Look, this is how much we
have produced. This is how much we have put in the atmosphere.
This is how much we have put in the ground. This is where we
think it is. This is how much is not actually accounted for,
because it is lost in processing.''
And so I worked with the Russians to begin a program like
that. We called it the Plutonium Registry. And they said, of
course, ``Well, you cannot do this on our classified
materials.'' And I said, ``OK, we will do it together on the
civilian materials, and then you use the methodology to do it
on your own classified materials.''
I think anything we can do in that direction would be
extremely helpful so the Russians can use these themselves. The
problem we have always gotten into is we tend to push one step
too far. And we want to get into the areas that they consider
sensitive and classified. And so then often the progress stops.
But the bottom line is that right now there is a slight
benefit to the fact that the security services have
reestablished themselves. These places are more secure today
than they were a few years ago. Now, you know, that has its
detriments. If you are going to try to convert these
facilities, then it makes it that much more difficult.
Many of the easy targets that were there have been taken
care of. Particularly, in my own opinion, the Russian nuclear
navy and the highly enriched uranium was the most vulnerable at
one time. And significant improvements have been made.
Actually, some of the civilian facilities were very vulnerable.
And significant improvements have been made.
But what we need to look at is the long term, the whole
mentality of how to do nuclear safeguards. And that still
remains to be done. So the answer is, there is lots there. We
are in much better shape. They are in much better shape today
than they were 10 years ago. But the job is not done.
Senator Lugar, if I may offer one comment on your dialog on
Iran, and Senator Biden. When I asked the Russians this same
question, my colleagues in the nuclear weapons complex ``Why do
you do this with Iran,'' they first of all say, ``It is not
just a matter of money.'' So it is more complicated.
They say there are three principal reasons. The first one
is money. The second one is what they do for that money
provides jobs for the very people that they are worried about,
the nuclear workers And in this case, thousands of jobs, not
just a handful that we tend to establish with our programs. And
that keeps down the turmoil in their nuclear complex.
The third thing it offers is prestige. You know, they want
to export nuclear reactors all around the world. And they want
to demonstrate that they can do this.
The other aspect, of course, from a political standpoint is
that they view, as has already been said, Iran as a strategic
trading partner. You know, to us it is a rogue state.
So as they look, then, at the risks versus the benefits,
they come up with a different answer. The one thing that we do,
which has us stuck right now, is we fail to differentiate
between those things that are done by the Russians in Iran that
represent a true proliferation danger versus those that do not
represent such a great danger. And specifically, as I point out
in my paper, when it comes to a nuclear power plant, we have
said ourselves that we are willing to put some in North Korea,
that we can manage that proliferation risk. However, what the
Russians also did because of their entrepreneurial institutes
or people, and the Iranians very much pushed for this, is to
develop the capabilities for the rest of the fuel cycle. And
that is a no-no from a proliferation standpoint.
So I think we must differentiate more specifically as to
what is truly a nonproliferation problem and what can be
managed. And I have not seen that distinction made sufficiently
to break this roadblock. That is just my own opinion.
Senator Lugar. That is very, very helpful.
Mr. Chairman, I conclude just by saying that Dr. Hecker has
offered an anti-fungibility argument, namely that the Russian
security now is improved. They are doing more of it themselves,
as a result. And it is an interesting problem, perhaps less
open because of all of this. But nevertheless, for those who
are worried about United States funds being transferred to the
Russians, they apparently are deciding to use it on security,
my hope is the same as yours, that they will find out how much
they have. So if something is missing, they have some idea what
they have lost. The real fear has been they really would not
have any idea in some of these situations. And therefore, all
of the strange arguments about the nuclear suitcases and other
items which might have been stolen is difficult, because no one
really knows; and until they know they could not share it with
us, even if they wished to do so.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
The Chairman. We survived 50 years in a hostile
relationship on these issues. I am quite confident--I would
love to have them to have that capability, even if I did not
know what the results were, because I am confident we can
survive much better with an emerging democracy that has this
control. So however the heck they get the control, I feel
better for it, even though it is through the re-emergence of a
security apparatus.
And I turn to recognize my friend from Florida, who has a
keen interest in this overall subject matter. I knew he was an
astronaut. I knew he was a man of many talents. But I was
recently in Florida with a fellow who looked like something
right out of a novel, who was wearing alligator boots and a
hat, you know, this cowboy hat. He would not call it a cowboy--
no, no, no, no. This fellow lives in the middle of the
Everglades. I do not know where. He wrestles alligators and is
a very successful businessman as well.
He started to talk about my friend, our friend, from
Florida, he said, ``This guy Bill Nelson is a great guy. And he
goes through the Everglades with me. He has been out there. He
goes out at night with me,'' et cetera.
So from now on, in the tradition of Fritz Hollings, who
gives us all nicknames, I am referring to the Senator from
Florida as the Swamp Fox.
So I yield now to the Senator, who I knew as an astronaut,
who I knew as an accomplished legislator, but I never knew that
he knew the Everglades as intimately as this gentleman, who I
know knows the Everglades intimately. He invited me to come
along, and I said I would rather go to space.
But at any rate, I yield to my friend from Florida.
Senator Nelson. Would you go in the Everglades with me
sometime?
The Chairman. With you, I would, as long as you are the one
jumping out and wrestling the alligator.
Senator Nelson. I have better sense than that.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and Senator Lugar.
The issue that I wanted to pursue here is the proliferation
outside of Russia. And, Senator Lugar, your legislation, with
your permission, I want to be a cosponsor.
Senator Lugar. Great.
Senator Nelson. I think it is very important. And what I
wanted to ask for, because of the hour, just a quick commentary
on your reflection upon what more the United States can do. Let
me tell you about what I discovered on a trip that my chairman
had authorized for me to take to Central Asia and the Middle
East.
In Uzbekistan, out in the Aral Sea, is the former Soviet
anthrax and other bacteriological production. And the Aral Sea
is evaporating. And the most recent international team that
went out there to see it found all these tire tracks all around
it. And this thing is unguarded. And there is no telling the
anthrax spores that are buried, the carcasses that may be
infected with plague that are buried. That is one thing.
And then we go on to Pakistan, and we specifically talk to
President Musharraf. And then we go to India and talk to Prime
Minister Vajpayee and talk to them about reducing tensions, as
their two nuclear armies are facing off each other. And so here
is another area that we clearly have an interest in, that there
is not a proliferation of those two countries. In that case,
nuclear; in the other case, bacteriological.
Your comments, please.
Dr. Hecker. I agree with you completely, Senator Nelson.
And that is why I laid out in my written statement the fact
that today, say post-9/11, we realize that those type of
problems that you have just brought up are actually more urgent
than the serious problems that are left in Russia and need to
be addressed.
You made a good case for Uzbekistan and the biological
weapons program. In my paper, I lay out on the nuclear side the
equivalent challenge in Kazakhstan. You know, thanks to Nunn-
Lugar, and as the chairman had already indicated, we got the
weapons back from Kazakhstan, Ukraine and Belarus into Russia;
in my opinion, the single greatest accomplishment of the
nineties in terms of nonproliferation.
However, we did not get the weapons-useable materials back
from those countries. And the greatest amount is left in
Kazakhstan. And should you visit some of the places in
Kazakhstan, nuclear places, you would find the same situation
that you just indicated, whether it is the former Soviet test
site or nuclear reactors. Fortunately, in some of the reactors,
as part of the MPC&A program, some of those upgrades were made.
However, there is also--on the Caspian Sea, there is an old
Soviet-style reactor that produced a lot of plutonium.
There are weapons-useable materials left in Kazakhstan. Our
job is not done. Because of the concerns in Central Asia, those
should be addressed in a comprehensive and urgent fashion.
Then you go on to a reactor in Uzbekistan. You have a
reactor in Belgrade. You have reactors in much of the former
Soviet Union. Many of those had highly enriched uranium as the
fuel. There are programs, spotty programs, either through the
International Atomic Energy Agency or the Department of Energy,
for those reactors, for reactors in Ghana, in Algeria, in
places in the world that today you say, ``Why do we have
reactors there, and why do we have, you know, potentially
weapons useable material?''
I think we need to look at that and develop a comprehensive
strategy and figure out how we go after that proliferation
risk. I think it is very important, and it is very serious.
Dr. Menges. Senator, I share your concern. And I think it
is a very important one, the issues you brought up. I think
when you look at India and Pakistan--I will not deal with the
Central Asian countries--it is important to note how it is that
it came to the fact that in 1998 both powers tested nuclear
weapons and now are soon to have them deployed. And, of course,
we have just seen this very significant face-off between them
from mid-December 2001 until the present to some degree. It
really has not resolved.
So the example of how serious the proliferation problem
is--and that, of course, brings me to China, because it is the
Peoples' Republic of China that has been the major source of
the weapons technology for Pakistan. It has been part of its
strategy to encircle India and to intimidate India. And that
has been public. It is in the CIA reports, the unclassified CIA
reports, that we can read as citizens. You have their
classified information and reports.
I think it really brings us to the fact that as we look at
this issue of the transfer of weapons of mass destruction, we
have to look at both Russia and China and pay serious attention
and can give serious thought to, again, giving both powers
reasons not to continue doing this.
Senator Nelson. All right. Mr. Chairman, with your
permission, Admiral Fargo is here, and I need to visit with
him.
The Chairman. We are going to end right now, but I also
want to set the record straight. My staffer pointed out to me
that when I said the exploration deal with Iraq was Gazprom, it
is really Lukoil. I was wrong. It is not Gazprom; it is Lukoil
that has the contract. And I thank Dr. Haltzel for that.
Also, one of the reasons why I have been concerned, Dr.
Menges, in light of your last point--and I am not looking for a
response now. We are going to have some hearings on this as we
go along. And with your permission, we may very well invite you
back. I know that is the bad news. You impressed us both, and
we may ask you back. It is like contributing and finding out
you are on the list.
But one of the reasons why I am a little concerned about
the way the Nuclear Posture Review has been formulated, even
though there is not a lot that is fundamentally new from the
last administration, is it seems to give a green light to the
possibility of renewed nuclear testing, which I find to be
disquieting for the very reasons, doctor, you just pointed out.
The nations most likely to benefit the greatest from that,
from re-engaging the nuclear testing and would be given an
absolute green light, in my view, internationally if we began
it, if we did it, talk about risk benefit analysis, is China.
And I am very concerned that we do not send the wrong signals
here.
But at another time I might ask you both, and at a minimum,
with your permission, be able to pick up the phone or ask to
meet with you privately to talk with you about that. And I am
not making a generic criticism of the Nuclear Posture Review.
If I look at it, there is not a whole lot that is fundamentally
new in there. It is an emphasis that I am a little concerned
about. But I just raise that for your thoughts at a later date.
I cannot tell you how much I appreciate both of your
efforts. And I will conclude by saying: Every once in a while
we get asked questions by school children or college students
or the press, who do not follow the specifics, that are more
looking at profile kinds of approaches to the Congress or to
the Senate or the individual Senator. And we often get asked
the question, ``What is the single most valuable asset America
has?'' And that goes right along with the ``Senator, do you
have a bodyguard'' question. I do not, by the way. None of us
do.
And after I point out that our single greatest asset is our
ideas and our values embodied in our Constitution, the single
greatest physical assets we have--and you reinforce it,
doctor--is the National Institute of Health and our
laboratories. I cannot think of--if this were a Monopoly game,
the last thing in the world I would trade--I would give up the
Senate office buildings, I would give up the accoutrements of
the Capitol, before I would give up those two institutions.
And they are a product of you, and you are a product of
them. I just wish Americans had a better understanding of just
what an incredible, incredible set of assets those laboratories
are and the men and women who work there.
But I just wanted to state that, as they say, for the
record. And I cannot thank you both enough. And as you know
from experience, we will continue to trespass on your time and
call upon your expertise.
We are adjourned. Thank you.
[Whereupon, at 12:57 p.m., the committee adjourned, to
reconvene subject to the call of the Chair.]
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