[Senate Hearing 107-676]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
S. Hrg. 107-676
WEAK STATES IN AFRICA: U.S. POLICY IN LIBERIA
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HEARING
BEFORE THE
SUBCOMMITTEE ON AFRICAN AFFAIRS
OF THE
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS
UNITED STATES SENATE
ONE HUNDRED SEVENTH CONGRESS
SECOND SESSION
__________
JUNE 11, 2002
__________
Printed for the use of the Committee on Foreign Relations
Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.access.gpo.gov/congress/
senate
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COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS
JOSEPH R. BIDEN, Jr., Delaware, Chairman
PAUL S. SARBANES, Maryland JESSE HELMS, North Carolina
CHRISTOPHER J. DODD, Connecticut RICHARD G. LUGAR, Indiana
JOHN F. KERRY, Massachusetts CHUCK HAGEL, Nebraska
RUSSELL D. FEINGOLD, Wisconsin GORDON H. SMITH, Oregon
PAUL D. WELLSTONE, Minnesota BILL FRIST, Tennessee
BARBARA BOXER, California LINCOLN D. CHAFEE, Rhode Island
ROBERT G. TORRICELLI, New Jersey GEORGE ALLEN, Virginia
BILL NELSON, Florida SAM BROWNBACK, Kansas
JOHN D. ROCKEFELLER IV, West MICHAEL B. ENZI, Wyoming
Virginia
Antony J. Blinken, Staff Director
Patricia A. McNerney, Republican Staff Director
------
SUBCOMMITTEE ON AFRICAN AFFAIRS
RUSSELL D. FEINGOLD, Wisconsin, Chairman
CHRISTOPHER J. DODD, Connecticut BILL FRIST, Tennessee
BARBARA BOXER, California SAM BROWNBACK, Kansas
JOHN D. ROCKEFELLER IV, West GORDON H. SMITH, Oregon
Virginia
(ii)
C O N T E N T S
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Page
Amnesty International USA, statement submitted for the record.... 17
Anderson, Ms. Rory E., African policy specialist, World Vision
U.S., Washington, DC........................................... 29
Prepared statement........................................... 32
Frist, Hon. Bill, U.S. Senator from Tennessee, prepared statement 10
Kansteiner, Hon. Walter, Assistant Secretary of State for African
Affairs, Department of State, Washington, DC................... 2
Prepared statement........................................... 4
Nowrojee, Ms. Binaifer, senior researcher, Human Rights Watch
African Division, New York, NY................................. 19
Prepared statement........................................... 22
Sannoh, Benedict F., counsellor, Reagan-Fascell Democracy Fellow,
National Endowment for Democracy, Washington, DC............... 37
Prepared statement........................................... 42
(iii)
WEAK STATES IN AFRICA: U.S. POLICY IN LIBERIA
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TUESDAY, JUNE 11, 2002
U.S. Senate,
Subcommittee on African Affairs,
Committee on Foreign Relations,
Washington, DC.
The subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 2:30 p.m., in
room SD-419, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Hon. Russell D.
Feingold (chairman of the subcommittee), presiding.
Present: Senators Feingold and Frist.
Senator Feingold. I call this hearing to order. I want to
thank all of the witnesses for being here today as the
Subcommittee on African Affairs convenes the third in a series
of hearings focused on weak states in Africa. This series is an
attempt to identify some of the characteristics of Africa's
weakest states that make the region attractive to terrorists
and other international criminals, focusing on issues such as
piracy, illicit air transport networks and trafficking in arms,
gemstones, and sometimes people. The subcommittee hopes to
identify long-term policy options for changing the context in
these states such that they are no longer so weak and so
appealing to criminal opportunists.
Earlier hearings already examined Somalia and the
Democratic Republic of Congo. Today we turn to the case of
Liberia. So often we discuss Liberia only in the context of
what is happening in Sierra Leone or Guinea. Those discussions
of Liberia's role in the destabilization of the region are
certainly appropriate, but they rarely create a space for
considering the conditions of the Liberian people themselves,
or the state of Liberian institutions, or the extent to which
those institutions have been corrupted into private criminal
networks aimed at accumulating wealth for those in power. I
believe that that is an equally important discussion, and the
two are by no means mutually exclusive.
The United States and the international community have
invested tremendous resources in bringing peace to Sierra
Leone. The formal end of the war and recent elections are
positive signs, but chaos in neighboring Liberia is just the
opposite. Consider this--citizens of Sierra Leone are coming
home from the countries in which they sought refuge, Liberians
are fleeing into Sierra Leone--over 20,000 of them.
For all these reasons--because our post September 11
understanding of security threats must include international
criminal networks that operate in Africa, because allowing
Liberia to deteriorate further without taking action is to
ignore a major human tragedy, and because the success or
failure of a major international intervention in the region
hangs in the balance--it makes sense to focus on Liberia today.
Let me be very clear at the outset. I think that the
current President of Liberia is a war criminal, and I hope to
see him held accountable for his actions in a court of law. I
strongly support our continued efforts to isolate and pressure
the Taylor regime. I think there is nearly universal support
for this policy within both parties and both Chambers of
Congress. But I also recognize that pressuring Taylor is not a
complete policy toward this troubled and volatile country. We
must ask ourselves what will Liberia look like in 10 years, and
what will that mean for the Liberian people, for the West
African region, and for international criminal networks? What
steps can be taken today to influence that outcome?
I certainly will turn to the ranking member of the
subcommittee, Senator Frist, if he is able to make it. I know
that he cares deeply about Africa, and it is a pleasure to work
with him on this subcommittee, and I thank him for all his
cooperation.
Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs Walter
Kansteiner is here today to testify in behalf of the
administration. It is good to have you back. I know that the
Department intends to come and provide a thorough briefing on
the nature of international criminal activity and opportunities
in Liberia soon, and we look forward to that, and we appreciate
the administration's desire to be detailed and comprehensive,
but I hope that what we can do today is to hear how you would
comment and that you are prepared to discuss these issues in
general terms today, and to share the administration's thinking
on overall policy aims and policy tools with regard to Liberia.
And with that, it is good to see you again, and you may proceed
with your testimony.
STATEMENT OF HON. WALTER KANSTEINER, ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF
STATE FOR AFRICAN AFFAIRS, DEPARTMENT OF STATE, WASHINGTON, DC
Mr. Kansteiner. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. It is a pleasure
to be here again, and the failed state series is a very
important one to be looking at for Africa in particular. If I
could briefly review how Liberia came to the state that it is
in, and then perhaps look at some of the questions you have
raised as far as what the international community, particularly
the U.S. Government, is thinking about doing to assist.
Greed and lack of good governance are the root causes of
Liberia's descent into its present deplorable state of affairs.
Up until the early 1980s, the government, representing
primarily the interests of a privileged minority, ruled the
country. One night, a group of noncommissioned officers put an
abrupt end to that government, but unfortunately did not bring
an end to narrow-interest governance. The new Liberian leader
then was Sergeant Sammy Doe. He hijacked an election and
created a narrow, ethnically based government.
Within 9 years of taking power, he, too, faced a challenge,
this time by an insurgency led by Charles Taylor. Liberia
suffered a 6-year civil war and, as we know, that war was truly
devastating. Some 750,000 persons were driven out of Liberia as
refugees, and another 200,000 were killed. The unprecedented
regional military intervention that ECOWAS launched did bring
about a cessation of fighting, and elections followed. Those
elections were held under the threat of a renewal of violence
if Charles Taylor was not elected. Many observers believe that
the people of Liberia really voted for peace, and not
necessarily for Taylor.
Doe and Taylor both had an opportunity to provide Liberia
some real leadership, but they did not. For our part, we tried
to strengthen democratic institutions and help rehabilitate the
social and economic infrastructure. When Taylor came to power,
we had USAID support in full, ready to assist to help rebuild
those institutions. The opportunity of this period was
squandered.
Taylor devoted Liberia's resources to supporting the
Revolutionary United Front, the RUF, next door in Sierra Leone
and its continued efforts to seize power in that country.
Instead of investing in Liberia, Taylor divested Liberian
assets to support his broader ambitions in the region, to
enrich his cronies, and to ensure the loyalty of his hired
security forces. He stopped servicing Liberia's debt and, as a
result, the country is under Brooke sanctions.
To fund this regional ambition, Charles Taylor created new
sources of revenue primarily through trading illicit diamonds.
He provided the conduit and the paths through which the RUF got
their diamonds out, and by which they were marketed. Taylor
also contracted with the Oriental Timber Company and with other
foreign logging firms that exploit the indigenous hardwood
forests of Liberia, some of the most beautiful forests on the
continent, I might add. Global Witness and others have done an
excellent job of documenting this atrocious raping of Liberia's
irreplaceable natural resources.
Taylor has used these revenues from both diamonds and
timber to fund his reckless exploitation of the conflicts in
the neighborhood. In doing so, he has clearly violated a number
of U.N. embargoes, particularly the U.N. arms embargo, as he
pumps more weapons into the territory, into the neighborhood.
The international community reacted slowly to Taylor's
regional destabilization and even more slowly to his
malgovernance of Liberia. Faced with the disengagement of
ECOWAS forces, the Government of Sierra Leone negotiated a
power-sharing agreement with the RUF. Encouraged by Taylor, the
RUF repudiated the agreement and took as hostages several
hundred U.N. peacekeepers. Really, only by the intervention of
the British forces in May of 2000 did we see the RUF prevented
from seizing Sierra Leone.
Mr. Chairman, Charles Taylor has set Liberia on a course
toward ever-greater hardship and suffering of the Liberian
people and, as you mentioned, it is that which we need to focus
on in addition to his reckless behavior in the neighborhood.
The latest military challenge that he is now facing is by a
group called Liberians United for Reconciliation and Democracy,
known as the LURD. I do want to make it clear that the U.S.
Government does not condone armed insurrection in Liberia, nor
do we support the LURD. In fact, we have pressed the Government
of Guinea and others not to support the LURD.
But let me finally conclude with attempting to really get
at what you were asking earlier, and that is, how does a failed
state such as Liberia recover, and what role can and should the
United States play? It is important to recognize that Charles
Taylor's regime is probably unlikely to change. It would be a
long shot to assume he is going to change his stripes. He
might, and we need to be ready, but it is a long shot.
I think a more important starting point is that of the
widespread Liberian desire for peace and stability. That
popular will must be given more concrete direction by leaders
who are able to craft a widespread common vision of a new
Liberia. We believe that widespread vision is there, and we
need to help the opposition forces and those that have that
vision coalesce around that vision and with each other. A
united opposition should contest Liberia's 2003 election. With
the right support from the international community, the
elections can be made free and fair. If not free and fair, they
can be exposed as a sham.
The key to elections being free and fair is ensuring that
the Liberian people feel that their vote will be confidential,
and that their preferred candidates could run and win without
the renewed risk of violence. Securing this condition while
Taylor's security forces remain unchecked is going to be
difficult, and so that is why we are now discussing with our
European allies as well as African states perhaps looking at an
outside force, or maybe ECOWAS, to ensure that security and
give that pre-election environment that is so needed to make a
free and fair election.
The Liberian people want to see some improvements in the
quality of life. With few resources at its disposal, any post-
failed state government will depend on help from the
international community. Of paramount importance is ensuring an
adequate food supply until commercial mechanisms can be
restored. The United States should play a lead role here, along
with other international partners such as the World Bank and
the European Community and ECOWAS.
In conclusion, I might say two things are certain about
Liberia: No. 1, it is not going to recover from its present
deplorable state without some real help; and No. 2, the timing
and circumstances of any change really is not predictable. We
have to remain flexible, and with your help, and with
consultations, we plan to look for opportunities to do just
that.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Kansteiner follows:]
Prepared Statement of Hon. Walter Kansteiner, Assistant Secretary of
State for African Affairs
Mr. Chairman, members of the committee, it gives me great pleasure
to appear before you today to pursue the topic of failed states in
Africa. Today you have asked that I focus on Liberia, West Africa's
most failed state. I would like to review briefly how Liberia came to
its present nadir as well as how the decline in Liberia's fortunes has
affected the sub region and created an opening for international
criminal and terrorist activities. Then I would like to address what
the United States and others in the international community are doing
and I believe will need to do to bring Liberia back into the fold of
democratically well governed nations.
Greed and lack of good governance are the root causes of Liberia's
descent into its present deplorable state of affairs. Up until the
early 1980s, a government representing primarily the interests of a
privileged minority of Liberians pursued to excess the enrichment of a
narrow class. If you wanted to send your child to school, you had to
buy textbooks imported by a relative of the president. If you wanted to
operate a taxi, you had to buy the yellow paint for it from a company
owned by a close associate of the president. Rice, the staple food, was
imported and sold by another government monopoly. One night, a group of
non-commissioned officers put an abrupt end to that government, but
unfortunately, despite significant U.S. assistance, did not bring about
an end to narrow interest governance. The new Liberian leader, Sergeant
Doe, slowly eliminated most of his original compatriots, hijacked an
election and created a narrow ethnically based government. Within nine
years of taking power, he faced an armed insurgency led by Charles
Taylor. Though Doe lasted less than a year after Taylor launched his
bid for power, Liberia suffered a six-year civil war. That war had such
tremendous humanitarian consequences, with at least 750,000 persons
driven out as refugees, one million IDPs and estimates of up to 200,000
killed, and so threatened the stability of the sub region that the
Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) dispatched a
military force to try to restore order.
The unprecedented regional military intervention did bring about a
cessation of fighting, but the subsequent disarmament and
demobilization program it oversaw was far from complete and the
elections that followed were held under the threat of a renewal of
violence if Charles Taylor were not elected. Many observers believe
that the people of Liberia voted for peace, not Taylor.
Like Doe before him, Taylor had an opportunity to provide Liberians
the good governance they deserve. USAID support for Liberia during the
early Taylor period focused on the country's transition from emergency
assistance to sustainable development. We tried to strengthen
democratic institutions, reintegrated IDPs and invested in the
rehabilitation of social and economic infrastructure. The opportunity
of this period was squandered. Instead of good governance and
reconstruction, Taylor devoted Liberia's resources to supporting the
Revolutionary United Front's (RUF) continued efforts to seize power in
neighboring Sierra Leone. After five years in power, Liberia's capital
still has no reliable electric supply or running water. Instead of
investing in Liberia, Taylor divested Liberian assets to support his
broader ambitions in the region, to enrich his cronies and to ensure
the loyalty of hired security forces. While hundreds of thousands of
refugees and internally displaced persons (IDPs) returned home,
Taylor's government made no real efforts to foster development and
recovery to build on the investments the international community made
through reintegration assistance. He stopped servicing Liberia's debt
and the country fell under Brooke sanctions.
To fund his regional ambitions, Taylor went beyond diverting the
resources of the Liberian state. He created new sources of revenue
through trade in illicit diamonds. He provided the conduit around
international sanctions, for diamonds mined in RUF-controlled areas of
Sierra Leone to pass through middlemen based in Liberia to world
markets. The middlemen brought in by Taylor and his cronies have
certainly operated outside the legitimate diamond trade and may, though
we cannot confirm the press allegations on this, have dealt in diamonds
with persons affiliated with international terrorist groups. Taylor
also contracted with the Oriental Timber Company (OTC) and other
foreign logging firms that have exploit Liberia's hardwood tropical
forests. Global Witness and others have done an excellent job of
documenting this atrocious raping of Liberia's irreplaceable natural
resources. Possibly worse, there are reports that after signing a
forestry protection agreement with an international conservation group,
Taylor has allowed logging operations in the Sapo National Park.
Taylor has used revenues from diamond smuggling and reckless
exploitation of Liberia's rain forest primarily to buy weapons, to fuel
conflicts in neighboring countries, and to arm his proliferating
internal security forces. To obtain these weapons, Taylor has violated
successive United Nations arms embargos (UNSCR 788 of November 19,
1992, UNSCR 1343 of March 7, 2001 and UNSCR 1408 of May 6, 2002). He
dealt with gray and black-market agents, such as Victor Butt, to
procure and transport weapons into Liberia. Thus, both on the resource
generation side and on the expenditure side, Taylor has taken up
company with those on the fringe of and outside legal operations.
The international community reacted slowly to Taylor's regional
destabilization activities and even more slowly to his malgovernance of
Liberia. The United States and the rest of the international community
failed initially to provide the backing ECOWAS needed to continue its
peacekeeping operation in Sierra Leone. Faced with a disengagement of
ECOWAS forces, the Government of Sierra Leone negotiated a power
sharing agreement with the RUF. Encouraged by Taylor, the RUF
repudiated the agreement and took as hostages several hundred UN
peacekeepers who had gone to Sierra Leone to oversee its
implementation. Only intervention by British forces in May 2000
prevented the RUF from seizing power in Sierra Leone. In July 2000, the
United States gave Taylor an overdue ultimatum, cease supporting the
RUF and destabilizing the region or face serious consequences. In
September 2000, the Taylor-supported RUF invaded Guinea. We replied
with unilateral travel sanctions on Taylor and his cronies. A few
months later UN sanctions on diamonds, arms and travel were instituted.
Despite the RUF's reversal of fortunes at the hands of the Guinean
military and under pressure from an ever stronger and more determined
UN peacekeeping force in Sierra Leone, which led the majority of the
RUF to unconditionally agree to disarm and demobilize, Taylor remains
recalcitrant. He has welcomed into Liberia those elements of the RUF
who refused to disarm and demobilize, and has ensured they remain armed
and dangerous. This potential threat to peace and stability in the
region led the UN Security Council to renew sanctions on Liberia last
month.
The reluctance of the international community to address the
internal affairs of Liberia is beginning to crumble, as ECOWAS has
begun urging the Liberian government to talk with the rebels of the
group known as Liberians United for Reconciliation and Democracy
(LURD). On March 1, Embassy Monrovia issued a press statement that
clearly laid out what we expect of the Taylor government, both in terms
of its actions in the region and within Liberia. We called on Taylor
to: (1) discipline members of the security forces who have threatened
or have used violence against political or civil society leaders; (2)
to grant amnesty to all political opponents; (3) to respect the freedom
of the press, cease harassment of members of the press and allow
independent electronic media to broadcast AM, FM and shortwave
throughout Liberia; (4) to fully address the security/safety concerns
of political and civil society leaders; (5) to reach agreement with all
peaceful political movements and parties on the specific nature of
guarantees and mechanisms required for the conduct of open political
debate and free, fair and inclusive elections; and (6) to respect fully
the right of peaceful assembly and freedom of speech.
Using the pretext of a threat posed by an armed group calling
itself, ``Liberians United for Reconciliation and Democracy'' (LURD),
the Taylor government responded to our calls for greater openness with
a ban on public gatherings, closure of an independent newspaper,
harassment of human rights activists, and recruitment of new
undisciplined and unpaid militias to protect itself.
Mr. Chairman, Charles Taylor has set Liberia on a course towards
ever greater hardship and suffering of the Liberian people. He waged
war to gain power, but has failed to govern justly and wisely and now
faces an armed revolt. The United States government does not condone
armed insurrection in Liberia nor do we support the LURD. In fact, we
have pressed the government of Guinea not to support the LURD. Although
Taylor blames the LURD for the rampant insecurity in the countryside,
in fact, his own poorly trained and unpaid troops are mainly
responsible for the looting and fear that is generating tens of
thousands of internally displaced persons (IDPs). The Liberians
displaced by the depredations of Liberian security forces are resettled
by Liberian government authorities in areas where they are vulnerable
to further depredations by armed forces. Taylor blames the
international community for not responding to the plight of these IDPs.
The reality is that these people need protection from their own
government and humanitarian suffering will go on to some degree as long
as Taylor's lack of good governance persists. Nevertheless, the United
States government will do its part in addressing the humanitarian needs
of Liberian refugees and IDPs.
ECOWAS has also recognized that the growing instability in Liberia
demands an outside response. ECOWAS, at its recent meeting in Cote
d'Ivoire, issued a call for cease-fire and talks between the Liberian
government and the LURD. Although Taylor's spokesman initially rejected
the proposal and his government has since equivocated about how it will
respond, we are encouraged that ECOWAS has asked Nigeria's President
Obasanjo to pursue this. ECOWAS has also tried to facilitate a dialogue
between other political factions and the Liberian government. This is
the type of action warranted under the peer review provisions of NEPAD.
Mr. Chairman, let me conclude by attempting to address the
questions I believe most interest you: how can a failed state such as
Liberia recover and what role can and should the United States play.
First, it is important to recognize that the Taylor regime is unlikely
to change its manner of governance or its ambitions. Given the monster
of undisciplined security forces it has created, it is questionable
whether the Liberian government could survive if it sought to change
the way it governs. That leads to the question of what happens next.
Chaos is a possible scenario. Since a state in anarchy is fertile
ground for international criminal and terrorist activity and since
restoring order out of chaos is a tall order for the international
community, our focus must be to ensure there is a plausible alternative
scenario.
A starting point is the widespread Liberian desire for peace and
stability. That popular will must be given more concrete direction by
leaders who are able to craft a widespread common vision of a new
Liberia. Political and civil society leaders focused on a common vision
rather than internecine squabbling is a prerequisite for rebuilding a
peaceful, democratic and more prosperous Liberia. Due to the historic
relationship between the United States and Liberia, many Liberians
still look to the United States to help lead the way to a better future
for Liberia. As a first step in helping Liberia recover from its
current circumstances, the United States can facilitate discussion
about the shape of a new Liberia, but the vision of a new Liberia must
come from Liberians themselves.
A united opposition should contest Liberia's 2003 elections. With
the right support from the international community the elections can
either be made free and fair or exposed for the sham they easily could
be. The key to elections being free and fair is ensuring that the
Liberian people feel they can vote for their preferred candidates
without the risk of renewed violence. Securing this condition while
Taylor's security forces remain unchecked is unlikely to occur. Perhaps
the answer is an outside force, possibly an ECOWAS force to ensure
security.
However change may occur, no political leadership can succeed if
the armed thugs running rampant in the countryside are unchecked.
Experience in Eastern Europe, East Timor and Sierra Leone suggest that
an armed outside force, perhaps another ECOWAS force in Liberia's case,
will be needed in order to protect a nascent government, disarm and
demobilize the willing, and marginalize and hunt down as criminals
those who persist in living by the gun. Disarmament and demobilization
can only succeed if there is a new life for the former fighters. Some
can be retrained and reformed into a new Liberian Armed Force; most
will need to be provided retraining and real opportunities for
successful integration into civilian life.
First and foremost, the Liberian people want to see peace and feel
secure again. But for urban populations in particular, they will soon
want to see some improvements in the quality of life. With few
resources at its disposal, any post-failed state government will depend
on help from the international community. Of paramount importance is
ensuring an adequate food supply until commercial mechanisms can be
restored. Visible progress in restoring basic infrastructure and public
services such as water and electricity is likely also necessary to
generate popular support and the legitimacy such support confers. The
United States should play a lead role here along with other
international partners, such as the World Bank, European Community and
ECOWAS. Efforts must begin very early to develop national consensus on
a new political framework, to strengthen independent media and civil
society. Technical assistance and funds to rebuild institutions from
the courts to the civil service will also be critically needed. To
staff these rehabilitated institutions, Liberia will need its best and
brightest to return from abroad.
Two things are certain, Liberia will need our help recovering from
its present deplorable state, and the timing and circumstance of any
change is not predictable. We will need to remain flexible, prepared to
act quickly, boldly and generously if Liberia is to make a success of a
third opportunity to succeed.
Senator Feingold. Thank you, Mr. Kansteiner, for your
testimony. You referred to the Liberians United for
Reconciliation and Democracy, and let me ask a few questions
about that group. Has the U.S. Government had any contact with
the LURD?
Mr. Kansteiner. I think we have had some very minimal
contact, and it is primarily through individuals in surrounding
neighboring countries and in the United States. We do not have
a continuous running dialog with them, no.
Senator Feingold. Do you know if the LURD has a clear and
unified leadership structure, or do they have sort of multiple
voices that purport to speak for them?
Mr. Kansteiner. My analysis is the latter, in fact. It is
rather disunified, and they have multiple patrons, really,
supplying them and helping them.
Senator Feingold. I think I know your answer to the next
one, based upon your remarks, but let me be sure. Is
negotiation with the LURD feasible in this sense, based upon
what you just said?
Mr. Kansteiner. I think it would be very difficult.
Senator Feingold. Would it be desirable?
Mr. Kansteiner. I am not sure it would be desirable. I
think it is worth exploring that option, quite frankly. I think
it is worth learning more about this organization, and we in
fact have asked certain of our agencies in the government to
help us learn more about it.
Senator Feingold. So I take it at this point you would not
be ready to say negotiating with the LURD would be akin to
negotiating with the RUF?
Mr. Kansteiner. No, I do not advocate that our policy
priority be to seek them out and negotiate with them, no.
Senator Feingold. I know these are tough things to guess
about, but then how do you get to a cease-fire in Liberia,
given the difficulty of trying to negotiate with the LURD?
Mr. Kansteiner. I think a very important role can be played
by ECOWAS and by the neighboring countries. Clearly, some of
the neighboring states, Guinea in particular, seem to have some
influence with the LURD and other organizations; it is perhaps
through them that we can learn more about and pressure the LURD
to negotiate.
We also have to pressure the Taylor side, too, but again, I
do not think it is a policy priority. I certainly would not
want to rule it out, either. I think we need to explore it.
Senator Feingold. Let me pursue the connection to the
Government of Guinea. Your comments suggest the Government of
Guinea is assisting the LURD, is that correct?
Mr. Kansteiner. I am not sure I would characterize it as
assisting. I would say that they probably are aware of
assistance that is going through Guinea. If they are actually
part and parcel of that, I do not know, but they are certainly
aware there is assistance that is going through their country.
Senator Feingold. Have we in any way in our assistance,
American assistance to Guinea, tried to condition that
assistance on an end to support for the LURD?
Mr. Kansteiner. We have not.
Senator Feingold. Are there any plans to do so?
Mr. Kansteiner. No, but Guinea knows exactly where we stand
on the LURD, and we have told them that we see any direct
Government of Guinea assistance to the LURD as highly
problematic and, in fact, would jeopardize our relationship.
Senator Feingold. This is something we may want to pursue
with you in further discussions. Let me talk a little bit about
the relationship which you have already talked about between
the RUF and the Liberian Government. To what extent do you
believe that the RUF is still associated with the Liberian
Government?
Mr. Kansteiner. I believe there is still a link. As you
know, the RUF stood for elections in Sierra Leone and came down
in defeat as far as the electoral outcome is concerned.
Senator Feingold. Did the Government of Liberia get
involved in any of RUF's political activities that led up to
the elections in Sierra Leone?
Mr. Kansteiner. I would not rule it out. I do not know
specifically, but that would not surprise me, and recently, as
recently as 10 days ago, we have seen activity going on between
Liberia and the RUF into Sierra Leone. That linkage is still
there.
Senator Feingold. I think you have alluded to this, but as
I understand it, it is U.S. policy to support a transition to a
credible democratic government in Liberia and obviously to ease
the suffering of Liberian civilians. What precisely is the U.S.
Government doing to pursue these goals?
Mr. Kansteiner. We have a couple of programs that are
underway. We have a couple more we are considering. The ones
that are currently underway are assistance to authentic
opposition, that is, opposition parties helping them become
better organized in the sense of seeking this common vision we
discussed. The opposition is splintered, and the best way for
them to present a viable alternative to Taylor is, in fact, to
have some kind of coalition, some kind of unification.
The other way, the other project we are specifically
working on is communications, AM-FM and shortwave radio
transmissions. Again, as you know, Senator, the Taylor regime
has controlled the media very tightly and become quite
autocratic about it, and so what we are trying to do there is
simply get a free, independent, objective media source that has
some capability to get into Liberia and disseminate news and
information that is unbiased and objective.
Senator Feingold. Let me pursue both of those for a minute.
What exactly is being done to assist what may be perceived or
hoped to be authentic opposition? What are we doing to help
them?
Mr. Kansteiner. A couple of things we are doing is actually
trying to bring them together, literally, physically.
Senator Feingold. Hosting meetings?
Mr. Kansteiner. Primarily meetings, getting them to
understand some basic party-building exercises, some grassroots
organization. In the oppressive environment of Liberia,
building an opposition party is hard.
Senator Feingold. But there is an active effort that we are
involved in to do that?
Mr. Kansteiner. There is, yes, sir.
Senator Feingold. What about the radio piece again? What
exactly are we doing?
Mr. Kansteiner. We have an $800,000 program that will
promote independent media. It is shortwave AM and FM radio,
training journalists, and the purchase of what in Africa is
becoming quite standard are these wind-up radios, so it is not
necessary to have batteries or electricity. It is actually a
wind-up radio, and so we are providing these wind-up radios, so
once we get these shortwave and FM stations up and running,
people can hear them.
Senator Feingold. Let me ask you a closely related
question. To what degree is the United States providing
assistance to Liberian civil society, and how well is the civil
society well-developed in Liberia? I mean, to some extent that
is governed by opposition parties, but civil society is broader
than that.
Mr. Kansteiner. It is broader than that. In fact, we are
including the civil society into some of these discussions,
because they have a large role to play. So on the training of
the journalists, for instance, we are kind of broadening that
out, and we would consider independent journalists as a key
component of that civil society, so we are trying to be as
inclusive of civil society, and as you know it is pretty thin
right now in Liberia, and they need all the help they can get.
Senator Feingold. Very good. Thank you.
Last year, an article in the Washington Post alleged that
Hezbollah and even al-Qaeda representatives had purchased
Sierra Leonian diamonds through Liberia. Can you speak
generally about other international actors known to be doing
business in Liberia?
Mr. Kansteiner. We also read those reports and were quite
interested and concerned, and we have asked for a thorough
analysis of that. So far, we cannot find any direct evidence
that they were primary buyers, but they probably were secondary
buyers, though, and certainly tertiary buyers for the second
and third and fourth transactions that clearly were taking
place. These organizations quite frankly use all the
commodities, be they diamonds, or--as we know, al-Qaeda has
used honey--multiple businesses and commodities that they trade
and buy and purchase. I have no doubt that gemstones and
diamonds somewhere along that food chain are involved.
The other major source of revenue, of course, in Liberia
right now that could fall into that category, and I am not
saying it is, but could fall into that category, is timber. We
see the timber sales primarily going from the hardwood forests
that Taylor licenses and probably gets a cut of, no pun
intended, directly to end users. But there could be middle men
involved in that as well.
Senator Feingold. And who would be some of these other
international actors?
Mr. Kansteiner. Malaysian and Chinese timber companies have
been active in Liberia, and clearly getting licenses to cut
this timber from President Taylor.
Senator Feingold. Senator Frist, the ranking member of the
committee, has arrived, and what I will do at this point is
call on him for any remarks he has, as I have already taken a
few minutes to ask questions. If you wish, after you make your
remarks, you can ask your questions.
Senator Frist. I apologize, Mr. Secretary and Mr. Chairman,
for my tardiness. I planned on being here right on time, but I
apologize. Let me just say--and I will just be very, very
brief, actually, and will submit my opening statement to the
record if that is OK, Mr. Chairman.
[The prepared statement of Senator Frist follows:]
Prepared Statement of Senator Bill Frist
u.s. policy options in liberia
Mr. Chairman, thank you. I look forward to hearing what I
anticipate will be very thoughtful testimony and policy recommendations
from our witnesses here today.
There are three general issues that I hope we can explore here
today. First, what policy options do we have to place pressure on
President Charles Taylor so that he will stop engaging in behavior that
undermines regional stability? Should this pressure be extended to
others, and if so, who? Second, I hope to hear your thoughts on steps
can we take to help relieve the plight of ordinary Liberians. And
finally, Liberia is scheduled to hold elections in October 2003. I
would like to hear your thoughts on what steps can we take to ensure
that those elections are free and fair and how can we engage Liberia's
civil society to encourage their participation in the elections and
their efforts to rebuild civil society over the long-term.
As our witnesses will describe here today, Liberia has suffered
from a long-standing off-and-on civil war that has torn the country
apart for over a decade. Fighting between the regime of Charles Taylor
and the Liberian United for Reconciliation and Democracy (LURD)
threatens not only the citizens of Liberia but the fragile peace and
stability of the region.
Neighboring Sierra Leone is taking the first careful steps toward
reconciling its long and brutal civil war--holding free elections on
May 14. Yet, I am concerned that the Taylor regime could be undermining
those efforts through his support for RUF fighters who have refused to
disarm and demobilize. I would also like to hear from our witnesses
their assessment of the other participants in this fighting,
particularly the LURD and the support that Guinea might be providing to
the rebels.
Mr. Chairman, not only am I concerned with the threat the fighting
poses to neighboring countries of West Africa, I am also concerned with
the threat the Taylor government poses to its own citizens.
Increasingly, credible reports are showing that the regime continues to
harbor international arms strugglers, drug dealers, and other criminal
enterprises.
Special ``security officers'' and ``anti-terrorist units''
intimidate the civilian population and harass the political opponents
of the government. Human rights advocates and journalists are assaulted
jailed on a regular basis as independent newspapers and radio stations
are closed down. Liberians continue to live under a State of Emergency
imposed in February 2001 by President Taylor.
I am concerned for the welfare of Liberia's citizens who are caught
in the middle of the ongoing hostilities. Liberia's health care and
education systems are collapsing. The capital is without electricity
and running water, and communication with the outside world is mostly
limited to satellite telephones. On June 10, yesterday, our Ambassador,
Bismarck Myrick, declared a disaster due to the complex emergency in
Liberia.
In October 2003, Liberia is scheduled to hold presidential
elections. I am interested from hearing more from our witnesses their
thoughts on steps we should take to engage with the Liberians so that
we can help them prepare for the elections.
I look forward to hearing your views on how we, as legislators, can
support the Administration and use our influence to end the violence in
Liberia. Through your testimony, I hope we can get a better
understanding of how we can begin to address these problems and a
better understanding of how Liberia's civil war affects the United
States' own interests, so that we can further those interests and those
we share with Africa. Thank you for appearing before us today.
Senator Frist. A couple of the issues--I will just have one
question about that--you have already touched upon, but
something which I do not believe you have mentioned thus far is
about health care and education in Liberia, and the collapse
that as I read and study, and I have talked to people, seems to
be happening. The ongoing hostilities leave the welfare of
Liberian citizens in the middle.
When you look at health care, and you look at education,
and you look at infrastructure in the midst of these
hostilities, the potential for complete collapse is there, and
I want you to sort of paint the picture for me so I will
understand it. The capital is without electricity and without
running water, communication with the outside world seems to be
in large part limited to satellite telephones. On June 10,
Ambassador Myrick declared a disaster due to the complex
emergency in Liberia.
Could you take those comments and just expand upon them,
and then maybe lead into a little bit the humanitarian efforts,
either that are underway, or might potentially be underway as
we look to the future?
Mr. Kansteiner. Thank you, Senator. The general state of
affairs in Liberia and Monrovia in particular is rapid decay,
quite frankly. As you say, there is no electricity. Most
institutions and buildings that have power have it because they
have generators. Hospitals are lacking medicines and power. The
infrastructure of the country is sagging, if not broken. It is
in that context that some of the political maneuvering that
Taylor is doing is particularly egregious, in the sense that he
has three hearty meals a day and is living quite comfortably,
as are his cronies, while the country is increasingly lawless,
as well as lacking in infrastructure.
For instance, Taylor could not pay his own security forces
a few months ago, and so what he essentially did was pull out a
map of the country and allows certain units in the military to
basically take over this region of this county and go do
whatever they wanted, which meant rape, pillage, and plunder
there units what they need to be paid, since he is not paying
them. It is that kind of atmosphere that is prevalent
throughout the country.
Senator Frist. And education, what is education now?
Mr. Kansteiner. The education system has suffered mightily,
and a country that had a fairly high literacy rate is now only
38 percent.
Senator Frist. When you look at that, the potential for
humanitarian efforts to have some impact, given the hostilities
and the approach of the Taylor regime, will humanitarian
efforts have an impact?
Mr. Kansteiner. Well, the humanitarian efforts do have an
impact in the sense that they provide food assistance, they
provide medicines, and what we are trying to do, of course, is
funnel all of those food assistance and medical, particularly
those, through non-governmental organizations [NGOs]--we push
it through the NGOs that are, quite frankly, brave and bold
enough to be there. I think you are going to hear from some of
them who are there today. We make a very real effort to make
sure that that assistance does not go through the Government of
Liberia, and that it does go through independent NGOs that will
disburse it not based on political largesse, but based upon
true humanitarian need.
Senator Frist. Did you talk about the elections at all, the
May 14 elections?
Mr. Kansteiner. The Sierra Leone elections? We briefly
touched on it.
Senator Frist. Generally, the international community
obviously has recognized those as appropriate and free. As we
look at the alleged interference by Taylor in Sierra Leone as a
key source of the charges that Taylor's actions have
destabilized the region, and I speak in particular of his
support for the Revolutionary United Front in Sierra Leone,
what is the current status today? Does the Taylor government
pose a threat to what is a very fragile peace of Sierra Leone
and put it in danger of collapse?
Mr. Kansteiner. Senator, I think the good news is that
Taylor's influence on the election process in Sierra Leone is
pretty minimal. I mean, the RUF did very poorly, and I have no
doubt that Taylor was somehow trying to assist the RUF in their
political campaigns. That is the good news, that it was a
relatively free and fair election, and we do have now a
democratically elected government next door in Sierra Leone.
The bad news is that Taylor is still involved in cross-
border operations. They are not large-scale. They are
relatively small, but they are still occurring, and if it is
just shipping a few AK-47's into the RUF territory, or if it is
trying to smuggle 10 percent more diamonds out, whatever that
activity is, it is significantly less today than it was a year
ago. It is still going on to some degree.
Senator Frist. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Senator Feingold. Thank you very much, Senator Frist. I
will just continue with some further questions for Mr.
Kansteiner. I would like to follow on something Senator Frist
asked. Have we actually stepped up our humanitarian assistance
to Liberia since the fighting with the LURD began affecting
civilians?
Mr. Kansteiner. We have. The fiscal year 2002, which they
just handed me the numbers, we have provided $4.8 million in
support for humanitarian assistance programs. Again, most of it
is food assistance and medicines. A lot of it is targeted for
the refugees and the internally displaced persons. The total
2001 assistance for education, nutrition, and refugees and IDPs
was $10.7 million. That also gives the primary vehicles the
NGOs, as we mentioned, and also UNHCR we are working with, and
ICRC, and we predict that that the fiscal year 2002 level of
support will stay or increase in 2003, in fiscal year 2003.
Senator Feingold. I would like to go back to another
question that I was beginning with before Senator Frist came.
Are there links between people doing business in Liberia and
armed groups that are elsewhere in Africa, political parties
elsewhere in Africa?
Mr. Kansteiner. Not that come immediately to mind.
Senator Feingold. What about the relationship between
Liberia and Libya?
Mr. Kansteiner. The Taylor-Qaddafi relationship is a long
one. Some of Taylor's original training we believe in fact was
in Libya, and some of those early weapons shipments and perhaps
current weapons shipments clearly emanated from Libya.
Senator Feingold. Obviously, you have no reason to believe
that relationship has softened or changed.
Mr. Kansteiner. No, sir. I see no evidence of a lessening
relationship there, and as we have seen elsewhere in Africa,
when African leaders often get in tight spots they turn to the
few friends they have, and so as the pressure on Taylor
increases, we might even anticipate a deepening of that
relationship.
Senator Feingold. I am pleased you mentioned the timber
issue. We have talked about this before. Many credible reports
allege the Liberian Government's logging policy is not only
environmentally disastrous, but is also characterized by
abusive acts of security forces working with logging companies.
Could you talk about the relationship between the Government of
Liberia, the logging firms operating in Liberia, and state-
sponsored security forces?
Mr. Kansteiner. Well, the Government of Liberia has entered
into negotiations and, in fact, contracts with a number of
international timber companies. The OTC, Oriental Timber
Company, is probably its largest partner in the cutting of the
hardwoods. We are very pleased that the U.N. Security Council
agreed with the United States and the British in what we are
calling ring-fencing those timber revenues. It is a voluntary
process where the Security Council has demanded that the Taylor
regime and Monrovia give us a transparent and complete
accounting for all timber proceeds.
If they do not give us that accounting, I would hope that
the U.N. Security Council would, in fact, move the next step
forward, which would be a mandatory cordoning off of those
revenues, so we know exactly how much those revenues are, where
they are going, and how they are being spent.
Senator Feingold. You actually support the calls for a ban
on timber exports from Liberia because of the links between
timber revenues and illicit arms purchases?
Mr. Kansteiner. I think that is a very viable option we
ought to look at.
Senator Feingold. How would sanctions like that affect
Liberian civilians who are already suffering in a devastated
economy?
Mr. Kansteiner. We have looked at that, and we were
surprised to find how few Liberians are actually actively
engaged in some of the timbering operations. In fact, we have
seen where companies coming in from the outside, non-African
companies like the Oriental Timber Company, often bring in
workers to provide the labor, so the Liberians themselves are
not even benefiting from the clear-cutting of their own forest.
Senator Feingold. So the impact would be negligible?
Mr. Kansteiner. I think it would be pretty small.
Senator Feingold. Let me turn to another aspect of
Liberia's economy. Liberia maintains one of the largest
maritime fleets in the world. An expert report to the U.N.
Security Council last autumn concluded in part that the
Liberian Commission of Maritime Affairs Bureau acted at times
as, ``little more than a cash extraction operation,'' offering
cover to fund and organize Liberia's off-budget expenditures,
including prohibited U.N. sanctions-breaking activities.
In one particularly troubling allegation, the panel of U.N.
experts also presented evidence to suggest that the Maritime
Registry itself, which is run by a corporation in the United
States, transferred funds on behalf of the Government of
Liberia to suspicious nongovernmental accounts. Some of those
funds could have been used directly to support sanctions-
busting activities.
In a more recent report to the Security Council in April of
this year, that same expert panel reported that they had
obtained additional documentation linking an arms dealer to the
Maritime Affairs Bureau in Liberia. They also reported that
despite steps by the Maritime Registry and the Ministry of
Finance to provide a full accounting for all maritime funds, as
much as $2 million in recent payments from the Maritime
Registry to the Central Bank of Liberia remain unaccounted for.
Given these reports, do you believe that hard currency
revenues generated by the registry are being used by the
Government of Liberia to support arms trafficking or other
sanctions-busting activities, and should the United States
press the international community to set up an international
auditing mechanism to account for the money generated by the
maritime registry, thereby ring-fencing the revenues to ensure
that they are used for legitimate development or humanitarian
purposes?
Mr. Kansteiner. I agree on all of the above. We have pretty
clear evidence that there were at least some payments--now,
this goes back a couple of years, but there were some payments
from the Maritime Registry to arms shippers. We have been given
assurances, and the fiscal data we have seen since would
suggest that that has ceased, that has not occurred since, but
that does not mean that that money is not fungible.
The revenue stream goes from the ship registry to the
Government of Liberia, and once it gets into the Government of
Liberia's central bank system, we do not know where it all
goes. So with regard to the second part of your question, we
are very supportive of cordoning off that revenue stream. It
is, we think, about $20 million a year. We would like to know
where that $20 million a year goes, and how the Liberian
Government spends it. The Security Council has imposed
basically a process where the Government of Liberia would
voluntarily demonstrate to us ring-fencing and accountability.
There are a number of companies that could do this. Crown
Agents out of the U.K. is being considered right now as
basically an accounting mechanism. But if the Government of
Liberia does not proceed with some good intent, then I think we
need to go back to the Security Council and make it mandatory
rather than voluntary.
Senator Feingold. I appreciate that answer. Some observers,
notably the International Crisis Group, have suggested that the
international community should focus its energies on
encouraging a genuinely free and democratic election in October
of 2003. I would like your assessment of that suggestion. Will
the United States provide assistance in the months leading to
the elections and, given what you have described, the
government's history and the current state of emergency, can we
really take the prospect of democratic elections seriously?
Mr. Kansteiner. It is going to be the policy tactic or
strategy that I think we are going to need to work most on as
we approach the third quarter 2003 election. Will there be an
environment in Liberia that truly is going to allow for a free
and fair election. Or is there going to be intimidation? Are
Taylor's thugs going to run rampant? Hence my reference in the
testimony about possibly getting some kind of peacekeeping
operation, or certainly an outside force like an ECOWAS to be
there to provide that more open and friendly environment where
Liberians truly could have a voice and really could vote in a
reasonably free and fair environment. I think those are the
issues that are going to be confronting us in the next 15
months.
Senator Feingold. With regard to ECOWAS, what is the
current ECOWAS position regarding sanctions on Liberia? Do some
of the regional actors have some clear interest on easing
pressure on President Taylor?
Mr. Kansteiner. I think ECOWAS is walking this fine line
between wanting to see Liberia go right--that is, have a decent
election in 2003--and putting the pressure on Taylor to make
sure that that happens and on the other hand are concerned that
if they push too hard, Taylor will fall but chaos may follow.
They do not want a neighbor that is fraying at the edges in
every way, shape, and form, and refugees, overwhelming their
countries.
That worries them too, and so they, I think, are trying to
walk this fine line between keeping the heat on Taylor so he
will, in fact, have a free and fair election, but not pushing
so hard that they drive him over the edge prompting Liberian
chaos for the next 3 years or so.
Senator Feingold. One more question, then I will see if
Senator Frist has additional questions for you. Overall, how
effective has the international community been in implementing
sanctions on Liberia? How easy it is, really, to engage in
sanctions-busting activity in West Africa, and what can be done
to improve the enforcement?
Mr. Kansteiner. Well, I think our targeted sanctions have
been pretty effective. The U.N. has its sanctions against the
Taylor elites. We have additional sanctions on top of that. A
lot of these are travel prohibitions. That is important, and we
need to maintain that heat.
It is also important in the sense that it is a targeted
sanction. The people of Liberia do not really suffer because
Taylor's Cabinet cannot come to New York to shop. These are
targeted, personality-driven specific sanctions against
individuals, and in that sense I think they are effective. I
think it puts some heat on Taylor, and I think the financial
sanctions, that is, the prohibition on the diamonds and
hopefully placing the timber and maritime proceeds in escrow
will be additional pressure.
Senator Feingold. Senator Frist.
Senator Frist. Mr. Chairman, I do not have further
questions. I just want to thank the Secretary for his
outstanding work, and I appreciate the opportunity of working
with you on all of these issues. Thank you for being with us.
Mr. Kansteiner. Thank you, Senator.
Senator Feingold. I join in thanking Secretary Kansteiner
for his fine work, for his testimony, and his patience in
answering all of our questions.
Mr. Kansteiner. My pleasure. Thank you very, very much.
Senator Feingold. We will go to the second panel now. We
have an excellent private panel before us today. They all have
very distinguished backgrounds. Ms. Binaifer Nowrojee is
counsel for Human Rights Watch's Africa Division. She has been
with the organization since 1993. Prior to that, Ms. Nowrojee
served as staff attorney on Africa for the Lawyers Committee
for Human Rights from 1989 to 1992. She was most recently in
Liberia in April 2002, and is coauthor of the Human Rights
Report, ``Back to the Brink, War Crimes by Liberian Government
Rebels,'' published in May 2002.
Ms. Rory Anderson is government relations manager and
African policy advisor for the U.S. office of World Vision, one
of the largest privately funded humanitarian relief and
development organizations. World Vision gives direct
humanitarian assistance to local populations in over 95
countries worldwide, operational in 24 countries in sub-Saharan
Africa, including Liberia, Sierra Leone, Angola, and the
Democratic Republic of the Congo. Ms. Anderson has also worked
as a project manager overseeing multimillion dollar development
assistance projects funded by the U.S. Agency for International
Development. In 1993 and 1994, Ms. Anderson worked in the White
House Speechwriting Office of the President, and the
President's National Policy Council.
Mr. Benedict Sannoh is currently a Reagan-Fassell Democracy
Fellow at the National Endowment for Democracy. An attorney,
Mr. Sannoh has served as an assistant professor of law at the
Lewis Arthur Grimes School of Law at the University of Liberia,
and has successfully litigated several constitutional law cases
before the Supreme Court of Liberia. He is the founder of the
Liberian Center for Law and Human Rights.
I welcome all of you. I would also note we have a very good
statement here from Amnesty International that I will submit
for the record without objection.
[The prepared statement of Amnesty International follows:]
Prepared Statement by Amnesty International USA
help the liberian people build peace and justice
On behalf of the members of Amnesty International we would like to
thank the Africa subcommittee for holding these hearings on U.S. Policy
toward Liberia. Amnesty International is the largest non-governmental
human rights organization in the world with some 1 million members, 53
sections and groups in a further 22 countries. Since 1961 Amnesty
International has been monitoring the performances of governments in
terms of protecting fundamental human rights. In particular AI monitors
abuses such as arbitrary detention, extra judicial executions, torture
and restrictions on freedom of assembly, association and expression.
Amnesty International collaborates with local human rights groups to
document abuses and question and challenge the governments in question
in an effort to end the abuses and educate the general public about
their rights. Amnesty International also seeks to hold members of the
security forces accountable for human rights abuses.
It is time that the United States reengage in efforts to restore
the rule of law, respect for human rights and security in Liberia. With
elections scheduled for next year, a growing military conflict with
armed opposition groups and a serious humanitarian crisis--it is
essential that efforts being made by the international community to try
and end this 20-year old nightmare be vigorous, and coordinated--a
critical role that can only be played by the United States.
Introduction
The current military crisis in Liberia is now 12 years old. The
political and human rights crisis and the breakdown of U.S. policy
however, dates back to U.S. support for the regime of Samuel Doe who
came to power in 1980. Support for Doe, despite a wealth of
documentation showing rampant human rights abuses by the country's
security forces was the first in a series of policy decisions that
contributed to the deterioration of the protection of fundamental human
rights in Liberia and arguably the entire region. Following the Reagan
administration's endorsement of Doe, first Bush administration and the
Clinton administration declined to or play a leadership role in
military interventions to stop or limit bloodshed when opposition to
Doe coalesced and a brutal seven-year war ensued that soon spilled over
into Sierra Leone. Then when the Nigerian led West African peacekeeping
force known as ECOMOG, pulled out and allowed elections that were
neither free nor fair to be stolen by Taylor, and his NPLF faction that
had an appalling human rights record, the Clinton administration and
the international community did nothing arguing that there was no
alternative and no resources to do anything else. With each decision to
do nothing, the Liberian people have been sold down the river--and they
continue to pay the price to this day.
Liberia's political, human rights and economic crisis continues to
deepen as efforts by the international community to isolate the
government of President Taylor increase. While efforts to pressure the
Taylor government to change its behavior are a critical step in the
right direction. Such policies and initiatives must not be used to
disengage and walk away from the crisis and the needs of the Liberian
people. In other words, while seeking to neutralize the worst of the
Taylor regime the international community must also help build a viable
alternative based on respect for human rights and genuine democratic
practice. Lasting peace, stability and security in the West African
region will only be achieved if conflicts like the civil wars in Sierra
Leone and Liberia are replaced by peace, security and governments that
abide by and enforce the rule of law and human rights. The Bush
administration's efforts to pressure on President Taylor and his
supporters to reform should continue and be accompanied by increased
support for Liberian civil society and the Liberian people.
Current Situation
Liberia's government remains locked in a conflict with the rebel
group, Liberians United for Reconciliation and Democracy. Human rights
abuses continue to be perpetrated by all sides and the situation has
deteriorated since President Taylor issued a state of emergency in
February. There is great concern regionally that if unchecked and
unresolved the conflict in Liberia will undermine the fragile peace
painstakingly established in Sierra Leone, and beyond that the
stability of the wider region. Reports by the United Nations and human
rights groups have exposed that Liberian security forces collaborated
with Sierra Leone's armed rebel group, the Revolutionary United Front,
providing military training, equipment and supplies through the trade
of rough diamonds and timber. Liberia has also had military clashes
with Guinea who it accuses of housing and supporting the LURD. In yet
another example of U.S. policy gone awry, Guinea is currently the
recipient of U.S. military assistance as part of an effort to shut down
the RUF. Yes at the very same time Guinea is supporting the LURD, a
faction with an equally poor human rights record.
Human Rights Concerns
Tens of thousands of Liberians have fled the fighting and human
rights violations such as extra judicial killings, unlawful detention,
torture, rape, abduction, and forced labor and conscription,
perpetrated by all sides of the conflict. Human rights abuses
perpetrated by Liberian government forces occur frequently and with
impunity. Men and boys have been extra judicially executed on suspicion
of backing armed opposition groups, or illegally held as ``dissidents''
in dozens of illegal detention centers where they were held
incommunicado and tortured. They are sometimes held for weeks in holes
in the ground, tear-gassed, had acid thrown on them, were denied water
and food. Several have reportedly died as a result.
Sexual violence, including rape is used as a weapon by the
government forces to instill terror among the civilian population.
Hundreds of women and girls, some as young as 12 years of age, were
detained at military checkpoints and gang-raped. Some were forced into
sexual slavery in homes. Again, security forces continue to enjoy
impunity for these abuses.
Outside conflict areas government forces have attacked critics:
including journalists, human rights defenders, lawyers and opposition
politicians, some of whom were forced to flee the country. In April the
government banned all political activity, including public meetings,
declaring a state of emergency.
LURD forces have also committed human rights abuses against
civilians. They have reportedly deliberately killed and tortured,
including by raping, unarmed civilians suspected of supporting
government forces.
The crisis in Liberia has generated at least 40,000 internally
displaced people. Many others have crossed the border, including 4,000
who fled into Guinea, with 10,000 expected to join them, and 3,000
others trying to cross into Sierra Leone. These people are particularly
vulnerable to abuse by all armed groups in the region and face many
obstacles when trying to flee to these countries. Amnesty International
is extremely concerned with the lack of freedom of movement and the
right to seek safe refuge, as well as threatened food security for
Liberian citizens along with the other human rights abuses before
mentioned.
Recommendations
The U.S. must ensure that the United Nations Peace-building Support
Office (UNOL) in Liberia is activated and substantively strengthened.
UNOL must deploy more staff to monitor the human rights situation
throughout the country, including the situation at the borders, and
maintain a visible and strong international presence to try and help
create the conditions for free and fair elections due next year.
Liberia's conflict has been fueled by the government's ability to
trade in rough diamonds and timber, as well as the easy availability of
small arms in the region. The U.S. should support enforcement of UN
sanctions and take effective measures to prevent arms transfers,
including the exploitation and trade of diamonds and timber which helps
fund the weapons trade. Such measures should include: strict controls
and monitoring of international arms brokerage and arms transportation
by states' own nationals and residents; rigorous procedures to be
followed when considering applications for arms transfers to countries
known to have links to Liberia; and effective and transparent controls
of the diamond industry in the region.
Adequate humanitarian aid must continue to flow into the country
and the region, to protect food security and to take steps ensure that
displaced people are protected and allowed to move freely.
Senator Feingold. We will start with Ms. Nowrojee. Please
proceed.
STATEMENT OF MS. BINAIFER NOWROJEE, SENIOR RESEARCHER, HUMAN
RIGHTS WATCH AFRICA DIVISION, NEW YORK, NY
Ms. Nowrojee. I have been following the human rights
situation in Liberia since before the civil war in 1989, and
then through the war looking at human rights violations by
various rebel groups, and then since the election that brought
Charles Taylor to power, and I can tell you that Charles Taylor
runs his government pretty much in the same way as he ran his
rebel group, which is with lawlessness, a lack of
accountability, and without respect for human rights or the
rule of law, and so Liberia is in pretty bad shape at this
time, and it has only been 5 years since the shaky transition
to peace began, and the situation is extremely volatile.
State power is regularly used by high-ranking officials to
further political objectives of the state, to avoid
accountability, and for personal enrichment, and the
institutions in the state that could provide a check on the
Taylor government such as the judiciary, the legislature, the
Human Rights Commission, they are all weak and very cowed.
And then in the north of the country there is the rebel
incursion, and so the country is back at war, and LURD rebels
are basically doing hit-and-run attacks in the northwest,
coming quite close to Monrovia, and in response the government
has basically been remilitarizing the society, so what you have
is a situation where ex-combatants are being called up again,
and you see a proliferation of militia groups that are pretty
shadowy, hard to know who is controlling them, what their
numbers are, and so what you see is a return to war, but this
time the war lord is controlling the state.
So basically what is happening is, Liberians are basically
functioning in an environment where there is absolutely no rule
of law, and so what I was doing in Liberia at the beginning of
the year was documenting war crimes by both Liberian Government
forces and rebels, and there are some very serious war crimes
and human rights abuses going on.
The government troops that are going up to fight the rebel
incursion are basically running rampant in terms of violations
against civilians. What we are seeing are executions, rapes,
abductions, lootings, burning of villages, and pretty serious
violations, quite a serious pattern, including people being put
alive in houses and set alight, civilians, so the government
forces are behaving completely without any rein, and there is
no accountability at all.
And then in the face of rebel action the government of
Charles Taylor is becoming increasingly intolerant of this, and
what you see is a state of emergency imposed in February, and
since then harassment of civil society groups and the
independent media.
Additionally, the government supposedly to crack down
against the rebel incursion is also continuing its illegal flow
of weapons, so despite the U.N. arms embargo which has been in
place since 1992, the Taylor government is continuing to
procure weapons, so there is a documented network of arms
brokers and transport companies that are providing false
documents and relying on lax controls in places like Slovakia,
Moldova, Ukraine, Kyrgyzstan to arrange these illegal weapons
purchases, and then other countries that are providing cover.
For instance, in 1999-2000, Burkina Faso and Cote d'Ivoire
provided false cover for arms shipments destined for Liberia,
and the illicit flow continues to date. We have evidence that
shows that a plane that crashed outside Monrovia in February
2002 carried an illegal military cargo for the government, and
it was one of three suspicious flights coming from Chad using
planes fraudulently registered in Moldova, and filing false
flight plans. When the U.N. investigators went to Liberia they
were blocked from investigating this crash.
As has already been mentioned, Liberia's illicit arms
purchases are often financed through off-budget spending or by
payments not accounted for in the budget. For example, income
received by the U.S.-based Liberian International Shipping and
Corporate Registry was twice used to pay for Liberia's arms
purchases, and after they refused to engage in the practice as
of August 2000, other off-budget outlays of maritime funds were
utilized.
The U.N. has established that in 1999, a timber company
paid for an illegal arms shipment, so the recent move by the
U.N. Security Council to audit the shipping and timber revenues
is a very welcome step.
The lawlessness and chaos that is descending on Liberia is
not just detrimental to Liberia, but also to the subregion.
These three countries, Liberia, Sierra Leone, and Guinea, their
conflicts are intertwined. They spill over the borders. The
alliance has crossed borders, so that the lawlessness in
Liberia has the potential to up-turn the fragile peace
established in Sierra Leone.
Even now, fighters across the Liberia-Sierra Leone border
are moving hundreds of Sierra Leone ex-combatants who are
crossing into Liberia to fight as mercenaries for both sides,
and LURD rebels and Liberian Government troops cross into
Sierra Leone to loot, to escape fighting, and in some cases to
abduct people for forced labor, and Liberian Army deserters are
also found on the Sierra Leone side of the border, where they
could present an additional security threat.
LURD is also running a clandestine supply line along that
border, and there is no consistent policy either on the part of
the Sierra Leone Government or by the U.N. peacekeepers on how
to address this problem. Additionally, Guinea, is playing a
very detrimental role in providing support, logistic, and some
military support to the LURD rebels, and I think it is
important to recognize that Charles Taylor bears primary
responsibility for much of the longstanding aggression and
violence in the subregion, but at this time it is Guinea that
is playing a destabilizing role, and that needs to be
addressed.
The developing crisis in Liberia, if unchecked, threatens
to erode the fragile peace and stability that is established in
Sierra Leone, and may likely destabilize Guinea and the wider
region, and so it is imperative that the international
community actually remain engaged in efforts to establish
conditions for sustainable peace, and here I would like to just
stress the sustainable, because I think there have been efforts
to bring peace, and they are always sort of quick and dirty,
and they move in and out, but they are not sustainable, and it
has to be done for all three countries in the subregion so all
of the three governments need to be called on to do several
things to end cross-border attacks and illicit weapons flows,
to cease support for armed rebel activity, to respect the rule
of law and human rights, to prevent and punish war crimes and
other human rights abuses, and to create state institutions
that are transparent and accountable, particularly in the state
security apparatuses.
Moving to U.S. policy, I would like to just say that U.S.
pressure on the Liberian Government to address human rights
abuses has commendably been strong and consistent, and
relations between the United States and Liberia have
deteriorated, particularly as President Taylor's role in
fueling the war in Sierra Leone became more evident, and the
Bush administration has continued the Clinton policy of
isolating Taylor politically and diplomatically, although less
publicly.
Other initiatives that are in the right direction include
U.S. support for regional security and peacekeeping. For
example, the United States has been involved in several
initiatives to address regional peacekeeping efforts through
training and equipping of West African peacekeeping battalions.
Additionally, the United States has played a very constructive
role in bringing peace to Sierra Leone by concentrating its
efforts on ending the Liberian Government's support for the RUF
and by supporting the military actions, peacekeeping actions in
Sierra Leone, and providing humanitarian assistance.
The pledge of $15 million over 3 years to the Special Court
for Sierra Leone was the largest of any contributing nation, so
the U.S. Government should be proud of that. The Special Court
in Sierra Leone really can play an important role not only in
holding Sierra Leonians accountable for human rights
violations, but also Liberian nationals accountable for their
role in the Sierra Leone conflict, but there are aspects of
U.S. policy with regard to Liberia and the subregion that could
better contribute to the rule of law and respect for human
rights.
Pressuring and isolating the Taylor government while
turning a blind eye to similar abuses by other regional actors
will not result in sustainable peace to the subregion, so there
are three things I would like to suggest in terms of improving
U.S. policy. The first is that U.S. assistance and support to
Liberia's beleaguered civil society community could be
stronger, and greater efforts should be made to provide
independent journalists, human rights activists, and other
civil society groups with assistance and support for their
important work.
The United States has also remained silent on civil rights
abuses and war crimes being committed by the LURD rebel forces.
International condemnation could pressure the LURD to address
abuses against civilians by their fighters.
The last is, the United States has been silent about
condemning Guinea's flagging human rights record and its
destabilization of Liberia. The United States now has an
important role to play vis-a-vis Guinea's support for the LURD.
The United States is beginning a long-delayed training program
of $3 million for the Ghanian military, focusing on border
security to assist that country in defending its borders
against Charles Taylor's incursions, and we suggest that our
U.S. military assistance to Guinea should be conditioned on an
end to Guinea's support to the LURD.
Thank you for this opportunity to appear today.
[The prepared statement of Ms. Nowrojee follows:]
Prepared Statement of Binaifer Nowrojee, Counsel, Human Rights Watch/
Africa
Thank you very much for convening these hearings and inviting Human
Rights Watch to testify. My name is Binaifer Nowrojee. I serve as
counsel with Human Rights Watch's Africa Division. I have been with the
organization since 1993. Prior to that, I served as staff attorney on
Africa for the Lawyers Committee for Human Rights from 1989 to 1992. I
have been involved in human rights research and advocacy on West Africa
since 1989.
After only five years of a shaky transition to peace, the situation
in Liberia remains fragile and extremely volatile. President Charles
Taylor's government continues to function without accountability or
respect for the rule of law, exacerbating the divisions and resentments
fueled by the seven-year civil war. Due to the misallocation of
resources, the nation's economy remains in tatters, with some 80
percent of the workforce unemployed and 80 percent illiteracy. Basic
services such as health care, communications, electricity, and the
public supply of drinking water remain limited. Public and private
institutions continue to deteriorate amid widespread corruption and
fear.
Fighting has raged in the country's northwest since the start of a
rebel incursion in 2000, the fifth serious outbreak of violence since
the 1997 elections that ended the civil war. Fighters from the rebel
Liberians United for Reconciliation and Democracy (LURD) continue to
launch hit-and-run attacks moving steadily towards the capital
Monrovia. Both Liberian government forces and LURD are responsible for
committing war crimes and other serious human rights abuses against
civilians, including summary executions of civilians, rape of girls and
women, abduction, and looting and burning of villages. Tens of
thousands of Liberians have been forced to flee their homes. This
incursion sparked the fifth serious outbreak of violence since the
national elections of 1997 that ended a seven-year civil war.
In the face of renewed rebel action, the government of Charles
Taylor has become increasingly intolerant of dissent. Since imposing a
state of emergency on February 8, 2002, the government has intensified
its harassment of civil society groups and the independent media. The
government is also remilitarizing the society by remobilizing ex-
combatants and allowing the proliferation of militia groups. The
security forces regularly commit abuses with impunity.
The spreading conflict in Liberia presents an ominous prospect. The
lack of respect for the rule of law and human rights by the Taylor
government makes prospects for sustainable peace in Liberia unlikely. A
further escalation in repression and human rights abuses against
civilians can be expected as the area of fighting widens, causing more
suffering and displacement in Liberia.
Moreover, the renewal of war in Liberia threatens to further
undermine prospects for sustainable peace in the wider region, known as
the Mano River Union, encompassing Guinea, Sierra Leone, and Liberia.
Over the past decade, the governments of these three countries have
frequently harbored each other's rebel groups and supported cross-
border incursions, causing widespread instability. Charles Taylor, both
as leader of the former rebel group known as the National Patriotic
Front of Liberia (NPFL) and as president of Liberia since 1997, bears
primary responsibility for much of the long-standing aggression and
violence in the sub-region, both in Liberia and in particular through
his support for the Revolutionary United Front (RUF) in Sierra Leone.
The renewed war in Liberia could easily destabilize the fragile peace
in Sierra Leone as a result of a spillover of the Liberian war, as
growing numbers of Liberian refugees and combatants cross into
neighboring countries. At this time, the government of Guinea is also
playing a destabilizing role in providing considerable logistical and
some military support to the LURD rebels that operate from Guinea.
Guinea's support to the LURD intensified after the Liberian government,
assisted by Sierra Leonean rebel fighters and Guinean dissidents,
launched a series of cross-border attacks into Guinea in late 2000 and
early 2001.
The escalating conflict and repression in Liberia, and the
possibility of a spillover into neighboring countries, is a dire
prospect indeed for the people of a region that has already endured so
much war, wanton abuse and human suffering over more than a decade.
executive control, lack of accountability, and personal enrichment
Since taking office, President Taylor has steadily consolidated and
centralized power by rewarding loyalists and intimidating critics. One
of President Taylor's often repeated statements is that Liberia is a
country of laws, not of men. However, an examination of his record
illustrates the opposite. Political appointees are selected on the
basis of their loyalty to Charles Taylor. Ruling party officials are
able to behave with impunity as long as they are compliant to the
executive. In addition to loyalists from the war, Taylor has appointed
numerous family members to key government positions.
State power is regularly misused by high-ranking officials to
further the political objectives of the executive branch, to avoid
accountability, and for personal enrichment. State institutions that
could provide an independent check on the Taylor administration, such
as the judiciary, the legislature, the human rights commission, and the
commission on reconciliation, remain weak and cowed. In particular, the
National Human Rights Commission, created by the government in 1997,
suffers from a lack of qualified personnel, inadequate funding and a
flawed mandate. Independent voices in the media and the human rights
community are steadily being silenced.
President Taylor has used state power to personally enrich himself
and his inner circle, and to support the state security apparatus that
protects him. A Strategic Commodities Act reportedly passed secretly in
2000 gave President Taylor ``the sole power to execute, negotiate and
conclude all commercial contracts or agreements with any foreign or
domestic investor'' for designated commodities, including timber and
diamonds.
Despite being subject to a United Nations (U.N.) arms embargo
continuously since 1992, the Taylor government continues to procure
weapons. In some cases, the weapons were forwarded to RUF rebels in
Sierra Leone, breaking a second embargo. U.N. investigators have
documented a network of arms brokers and transport companies that
provided false documents and relied on lax controls in Slovakia,
Moldova, Ukraine, and Kyrgyzstan to arrange illegal weapons purchases.
In 1999 and 2000, respectively, Burkina Faso and Cote d'Ivoire
knowingly provided false cover for arms shipments destined to Liberia.
The illicit flow of arms to Liberia continues. Evidence strongly
suggests that a plane that crashed outside Monrovia in February 2002
carried an illegal military cargo for the Taylor government. The flight
was one of three suspicious flights from Chad, using planes
fraudulently registered in Moldova and filing false flight plans. U.N.
investigators were blocked from investigating the crash.
Liberia's illicit arms purchases are often financed through off-
budget spending, or payments not accounted for in the budget. For
example, income received by the United States-based Liberian
International Shipping and Corporate Registry (LISCR) was twice used to
pay for Liberia's arms purchases. After LISCR refused to engage in the
practice, as of August 2000, other off-budget outlays of maritime funds
were utilized. U.N. investigations also established that in 1999 a
timber company paid for an illegal arms shipment. In an important and
welcome move, the U.N. Security Council recently ordered Liberia to
audit its shipping and timber revenue to ensure that the funds are no
longer misused.
the state security apparatus: an impediment to peace
One of the major problems in Liberia under President Taylor is the
complete impunity with which his security and police forces operate.
Following his inauguration, President Taylor rejected the peace accord
provision that provided for an open and transparent restructuring of
the security forces by the West African peacekeeping force. Instead,
former Taylor faction fighters were placed in the security and police
forces without serious efforts to provide training or to meet pledges
to incorporate members from the other factions. Former Taylor fighters
have also been permitted by the government to create security firms for
hire by private sector companies.
One of the most important steps for Liberia's reconstruction after
the seven-year-long civil war ended in 1997 was to have been the
restructuring and retraining of the country's armed forces and law
enforcement agencies. The existing Armed Forces of Liberia (AFL) had a
long history of abusing human rights both before and during the civil
war, and there were thousands of excombatants from all sides in the war
to be demobilized and reintegrated into society.\1\ Under the Abuja
Peace Accords that signaled the end of the conflict, the restructuring
was to have been conducted by the Nigerian-led West African
peacekeeping force ECOMOG (the Economic Community of West African
States Monitoring Group), and the newly reconstituted Liberian armed
forces and police were to be drawn from all the disbanded factions.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ The six factions of the seven-year civil war in Liberia were:
the National Patriotic Front of Liberia (NPFL) headed by Charles
Taylor; the former government Armed Forces of Liberia (AFL); two rival
factions of the United Liberation Movement for Democracy in Liberia
(ULIMO), one led by Al-Haji Kromah representing ethnic Mandingo
interests, and the other headed by Roosevelt Johnson representing
ethnic Krabn interests; the Liberia Peace Council (LPC); and the Lofa
Defence Force (LDF).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
However, one of President Taylor's first policy decisions was to
refuse to allow ECOMOG to be involved in this process. Instead, he
reconstituted the security and police forces using his own ex-
combatants, purged and marginalized troops from the existing AFL that
had opposed him during the war, and created new security forces that
reported directly to him. Liberians began to have problems with the new
security and police forces almost immediately.
Shortly after his inauguration in 1997, President Taylor created
two elite paramilitary security forces, the Anti-Terrorist Unit (ATU)
and the Special Security Service (SSS); these units report directly to
Taylor and commit abuses with impunity. Neither of these forces is
established by law, nor are their operational costs included in the
state budget. There is no effective mechanism for victims of abuse by
these forces to lodge a complaint with any government structure and
obtain redress. Both forces have become notorious for abuses, including
abuse of civilians, extortion, and looting. There have also been
reports of extrajudicial killings and torture by the ATU, particularly
at its base at Gbatala. Victims of torture by the ATU have been held in
water-filled holes in the ground, burned with molten plastic, beaten
and sexually abused, and forced to drink urine and eat cigarette butts.
Additionally, within the Liberian National Police, headed by Paul
Mulbah, an elite Special Operations Division (SOD) was created after
Taylor came into office, made up largely of former Taylor-faction
fighters; this police unit has also been responsible for arbitrary
arrests, mistreatment, and extortion.
The Ministry of Defense, headed by Daniel Chea, oversees the now
marginalized AFL, but also appears to have some measure of control over
militia groups. Although it has had some new recruits, the AFL still
includes many soldiers who served under the government of former
president Samuel Doe (1980-1989), perhaps to secure their loyalty to
the Taylor government. For that reason, the AFL is not fully trusted by
the government, and its soldiers are neither well equipped nor
regularly paid. Even so, the AFL remains the largest government
fighting force, and the Taylor government has sent a large number of
AFL troops to oppose the rebel incursion. These soldiers are
effectively given free rein to pay themselves through looting.
Since the LURD incursion began, new militia groups have been
proliferating, whose numbers, structures, and leaders remain unclear.
Both the AFL command and Ministry of Defense officials told Human
Rights Watch that the Taylor government's frontline troops are drawn
not only from the AFL but increasingly include militia groups largely
made up of remobilized men who fought with Charles Taylor's NPFL during
the civil war. Hundreds of former combatants, many of them originally
recruited as children, are being regrouped, organized, and supported by
Taylor's former commanders. The militia groups are also believed to
include former members of Sierra Leone's RUF rebel group, many of whom
crossed into Liberia during and after the disarmament process in Sierra
Leone.
The various security agencies and militia groups have extensive
powers, poorly defined mandates, and overlapping functions. This
situation has resulted in a jockeying for power between the various
groups and a complete lack of accountability. The state security
apparatus as it exists today in Liberia undermines any possibility of
respect for human rights and the consolidation of peace in Liberia.
war crimes and serious human rights abuses by the state security forces
In combating the LURD incursion, Liberian government forces and
militias have committed widespread abuses against civilians,
particularly in Lofa and Cape Mount counties in the country's
northwest. These forces include the AFL, ATU, and various militia
groups. The abuses usually follow a similar pattern. After driving LURD
forces from an area, government forces hunt down and detain local
people whom they find hiding in the bush, including civilians. Those
they suspect of supporting the LURD are then beaten, tortured, or
summarily executed, in some cases by being confined in houses that the
soldiers set on fire, burning the victims to death. Young women and
girls are often raped and forced to become ``wives'' to the soldiers;
young men are subjected to forced labor, being made to carry looted
goods and captured weapons; and villages are systematically razed to
the ground. Government forces violently round up civilians fleeing from
the fighting, and separate and conscript young men in a manner which
violates human rights. Sometimes those conscripted include boys. The
conscripts are then sent to the front, often without any proper
training. In February 2002, after President Taylor accused people in
certain areas of Monrovia of harboring rebels, the Special Operations
Division (SOD) police conducted house-to-house searches, systematically
rounding up men. Hundreds of young men, and in a few cases boys, were
arbitrarily detained, beaten, and accused of being rebel supporters.
Many were given the choice of paying a bribe or being sent to the war
front. Some who could not pay were forcibly recruited.
Government soldiers and militias have also been responsible for
widespread looting, both in towns and villages that they occupied and
at checkpoints on the roads. Local residents are often forced to carry
looted belongings and captured weapons long distances by the army. As
civilians flee conflict areas, they are repeatedly made to pay
government soldiers in order to pass through checkpoints to safety, and
in order to cross the border into Sierra Leone.
crackdown against the independent media and civil society groups
In the face of renewed rebel action, the Taylor government has
become increasingly intolerant of dissent. Since the imposition of a
state of emergency in February 2002, the government has intensified its
harassment and intimidation of the independent press, civil society
groups, and legitimate political opposition groups who have been
imprisoned, harassed, beaten and in a few cases, killed.
Journalists Stanley Seekor, J. James, and Ellis Togba from
The Analyst newspaper were threatened and briefly detained
after their newspaper published an article discussing the state
of emergency.
The authorities also detained Frances Johnson Morris,
director of Liberia's Catholic Justice and Peace Commission,
for several hours among male inmates at the police prison at
the Police Headquarters in Monrovia ostensibly on grounds of
``mistaken identity'' only days after she had made a public
presentation questioning the state of emergency.
On March 27, Nipla Wiaplah, chair of the New Deal Movement
party, was held for several days in police custody without
charge as police determined whether an article in The News that
he had authored on the war posed a national security threat.
The News editor-in-chief Jerome Dalieh and acting news editor
Bill Jarkloh were also held briefly without charge for
publishing the article.
After the National Human Rights Center of Liberia, an
umbrella organization comprising nine nongovernmental human
rights groups, issued several press releases protesting
government abuses, five of its members--Aloysius Toe, Tunny
Zeogar, Peter Nickoson, John Okai, and Sam Nimely--were
arrested on March 28 and held without charge for several days.
Although they were released after a court order was filed, they
were rearrested shortly after, and charged with ``criminal
malevolence'' and ``preventing arrest and discharge of other
duties.''
Augustine Toe of the Justice and Peace Commission was
arrested on March 28 and held without charge for several hours.
On April 24, human rights lawyer Tiawan Gongloe was arrested
without charge by the police, and beaten so severely that he
was unable to stand and required hospitalization. He had been
speaking out against security force abuses and other human
rights violations. The Analyst newspaper, which had just
reported on a statement recently made by Gongloe at a
conference on peace in the Mano River Union, was ordered
closed.
Disturbingly, the conflict also has taken on an ethnic dimension,
with the Taylor government indiscriminately accusing ethnic Mandingo,
Krahn, and Gbandi citizens of Liberia of supporting the rebel
incursion. Members of these groups, as a result, face growing
discrimination, arbitrary arrests, and violence at the hands of the
government and its supporters, based on their ethnicity. Many LURD
fighters are ethnic Mandingo or Krahn. As a result, other ethnic
Mandingos and Krahns, as well as ethnic Gbandis, are clearly considered
suspect by the government and have been accused of being rebel
supporters. For their part, LURD forces have committed some of their
worst abuses against ethnic Kissi civilians, perhaps because the RUF
rebel group in Sierra Leone, which had a longstanding alliance with the
Taylor government, formerly had its stronghold in an ethnic Kissi area
in Sierra Leone.
prospects for sustainable peace in the mano river union
Prospects for sustainable peace in Sierra Leone, Liberia, and
Guinea remain tenuous as the intertwined conflicts continue to spill
over the borders, offsetting gains that are made in each country to
restore calm. As Sierra Leone's brutal conflict comes to an end,
violence and insecurity are rapidly escalating in Liberia. At this
time, Guinea is playing a destabilizing role in providing support to
the Liberian rebels.
The conflicts of the Mano River Union countries, encompassing
Sierra Leone, Liberia and Guinea, have shown a ready potential to
overflow and destabilize each other. A long-standing web of shifting
military and political alliances exists among the three governments and
the various armed opposition groups. Accountability for serious abuses
is practically nonexistent, and military impunity in all three
countries remains a serious problem. The area is also awash with
hundreds of ex-combatants willing to cross over to any side as
mercenaries.
the liberian conflict and the impact on sierra leone
For years, Charles Taylor helped fuel the Sierra Leonean conflict
through his arming and support of the RUF rebels, as well as
facilitation of illegal diamond exports from rebel-controlled areas. In
return, when Taylor's government came under armed attack from Liberian
dissidents in 1999, 2000 and 2001, RUF forces assisted in expelling
them from Liberia.
The escalating conflict and growing lawlessness in Liberia has the
potential to upturn the fragile peace in Sierra Leone. Fighters from
all sides are moving across the Sierra Leonean/Liberia border: Hundreds
of Sierra Leonean ex-combatants are crossing into Liberia to fight as
mercenaries. Liberian government troops and LURD rebel soldiers are
crossing into Sierra Leone to loot or escape fighting, and, in a few
cases, to abduct people for forced labor. Liberian army deserters are
also to be found on the Sierra Leone side of the border, where they
could present an additional security threat. LURD forces operating from
Sierra Leone are clandestinely recruiting and operating a supply line
along the border. There appears to be no consistent policy on the part
of either the Sierra Leonean government or the UNAMSIL peacekeepers on
how to address this problem.
In view of the close links between the Guinean government and the
LURD rebel forces in Liberia, the participation of Guinean troops in
UNAMSIL should also give cause for concern. The Guinea contingent of
UNAMSIL is currently deployed at the Sierra Leone/Liberia border,
raising fears that this area too could become a base of operations for
the LURD. At a minimum, these Guinea battalions removed from the border
where the likelihood of their involvement in Liberian rebel support or
refugee intimidation is higher. Ideally, they should be replaced
completely.
There is an urgent need for border security to be strengthened,
including screening to ensure that combatants are clearly distinguished
and separated from civilians seeking refugee protection in Sierra
Leone. The Sierra Leonean government needs to establish an adequate
police presence along the border areas, and to establish a status
determination body to screen combatants from refugees. Additionally,
there is a need for improved policing to ensure that refugees are
adequately protected and to guarantee the civilian nature of all
refugee camps. The United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees should
ensure as a priority the civilian nature of the refugee camps, increase
the number of international protection staff, and work closely with
neighboring host governments to establish screening mechanisms at the
border to separate Liberian combatants from refugees.
the role of guinea in destabilizing liberia
At this time, the government of Guinea is playing a destabilizing
role in providing considerable logistical and some military support to
the Liberian rebels that operate from Guinea. Evidence indicates that
this support is being given with the knowledge and support of high-
ranking Guinean officials, including the president.
Domestically, President Lansana Conte remains largely intolerant of
opposition and turns a blind eye to frequent abuses by his security
forces. A November 2001 constitutional referendum that removed a two-
term limit on the presidency, and virtually ensures him of lifetime
rule, is widely believed to have been manipulated in his favor.
Guinea's support to the LURD intensified after the Liberian
government, assisted by Sierra Leonean rebel fighters and Guinean
dissidents, launched a series of cross-border attacks into Guinea in
late 2000 and early 2001. They attacked towns and refugees camps
containing Sierra Leonean and Liberian refugees, causing thousands to
become further displaced and killing and wounding hundreds of refugees
and Guinean civilians. These Liberian-led incursions into Guinea were
opposed by Guinean government forces, backed by members of Sierra
Leonean civil defense force militias and Guinea-based LURD fighters.
They pushed back the Liberian and RUF forces, and the Guinean army also
carried out helicopter, artillery and ground attacks into RUF-held
areas of northern Sierra Leone, killing scores of civilians and burning
villages.
In view of the close links between the Guinean government and the
LURD rebel forces in Liberia, the participation of Guinean troops in
the U.N. peacekeeping mission in Sierra Leone, UNAMSIL, should give
cause for concern. The Guinean contingent of UNAMSIL is currently
deployed in Sierra Leone's Pujehun District, which borders Liberia,
raising fears that this area too could become a base of operations for
the LURD, enabling them to strike into Liberia from two directions. The
Guinean forces in the UNAMSIL operation in Sierra Leone should be
replaced with non-West African troops that are not implicated in the
sub-regional conflict. At a minimum, the Guinea battalions should be
removed from Pujehun District, and not be deployed near the Sierra
Leone/Liberia border where the likelihood of their involvement in
Liberian rebel support and/or refugee intimidation is higher.
the role of the international community
With Liberia again on the brink of collapse, it is vital that the
international community make a much more concerted effort to prevent
the war spreading and the emergence of yet another human rights
catastrophe in West Africa. The developing crisis in Liberia, if
unchecked and unresolved, threatens to erode the fragile peace and
stability so painstakingly established in Sierra Leone, and may likely
destabilize Guinea and the wider region.
During the past decade, the international community's interventions
in Liberia, largely under the auspices of the U.N. and ECOWAS, have
repeatedly focused on restoring a short-term peace, without adequately
addressing the long-term causes of the war, including continuing
impunity for gross human rights abuses and blatant disregard for the
rule of law in Liberia.
Examples abound, including the following: During the pre-1997 civil
war, ECOMOG forces in Liberia actively contributed to the proliferation
of the anti-Taylor rebel factions that were themselves responsible for
serious abuses and are resurfacing today, including among the LURD
combatants; the U.N. presence in Liberia during the war was limited to
a small observer mission without adequate authority to address regional
political interference or abuses by ECOMOG or by Liberian government or
rebel forces; the U.N. backed a peace accord that granted a blanket
amnesty to faction fighters and did not create any international
mechanism to hold violators accountable; fearful of a return to active
fighting, the U.N. rushed to hold the 1997 national elections before
important provisions of the peace accord were implemented, including
the restructuring of the security forces and the return of refugees;
since the 1997 election, the U.N. Peace-Building Support Office in
Liberia (UNOL) has remained silent on the continued erosion of the rule
of law by the Taylor government.
International engagement and action is urgently required and should
address both the Taylor government's abusive security apparatus and
domestic repression, as well as the regional nature of the conflict.
The international community must engage in comprehensive efforts to
establish conditions for a sustainable peace and the protection of
human rights in all three countries in the Mano River Union. All the
Mano River Union governments should be called on to: (1) End cross-
border attacks and illicit weapons flows; (2) Cease support for armed
rebel activity; (3) Respect the rule of law and human rights; (4)
Prevent and punish war crimes and other human rights abuses; and to (5)
Create state institutions that are transparent and accountable,
particularly the state security apparatus.
u.s. policy
For the past few years, United States (U.S.) pressure on the
Liberian government to address human rights abuses has commendably been
strong and consistent. Relations between the U.S. and Liberia
deteriorated as President Taylor's role in fueling the war in Sierra
Leone became more evident. In accordance with the U.N. sanctions
imposed in May 2001, the U.S. prohibited the importation of Liberian
rough diamonds. The Bush administration continued the Clinton policy of
isolating Taylor politically and diplomatically, although less
publicly. Administration officials have stressed that until Taylor
ceases efforts to destabilize the sub-region, U.S. policy will remain
unchanged.
Other initiatives that are in the right direction include U.S.
support for regional security and peace-keeping efforts. In 2000, a
program called Operation Focus Relief (OFR) was initiated by former
President Bill Clinton to train and equip seven battalions of West
African troops for peacekeeping with the U.N. in Sierra Leone. The
training was conducted by U.S. Special Forces. The first phase of the
program trained two Nigerian battalions that were deployed in January
2001 to serve with UNAMSIL. The second phase, which ended in August,
trained troops from Ghana and Senegal. The third phase, involved three
further Nigerian battalions. For FY 2001, OFR was budgeted at U.S. $24
million in peacekeeping funds, as well as U.S. $32 million in
Department of Defense funds for equipment and transportation. The U.S.
also deployed three military officers to work with the Sierra Leone
army as part of the British training program. These officers, as well
as other U.S. Embassy officials, had some responsibility for monitoring
the performance of the U.S.-trained troops. In addition, for fiscal
year 2002, Congress approved U.S. $26 million for the West African
Stabilization Program, part of the U.S.'s voluntary peacekeeping
operations budget, which includes $8 million in additional training and
equipment for the troops trained for peacekeeping in Sierra Leone,
known as Operation Focus Relief.
Additionally, the U.S. has played a constructive role in bringing
peace to Sierra Leone by concentrating its efforts on ending Liberian
government support for the RUF, supporting the British-led military
actions in Sierra Leone, and providing humanitarian assistance. The
pledge of U.S. $15 million over three years to the proposed Special
Court for Sierra Leone was the largest of any contributing nation.
However, there are three aspects to U.S. policy with regard to
Liberia and the sub-region that could contribute towards the rule of
law and respect for human rights:
U.S. assistance and support to Liberia's beleaguered civil
society community could be stronger. Greater efforts should be
made to provide independent journalists, human rights
activists, and other civil society groups with assistance and
support for their important work;
The U.S. has remained silent on human rights abuses and war
crimes being committed by the LURD rebel forces. International
condemnation could pressure the LURD to address abuses against
civilians by their fighters.
The U.S. has been much less consistent or vocal about
condemning Guinea's flagging human rights record and its
destabilization of Liberia. The U.S. now has an important role
to play vis-a-vis Guinea's support for the LURD. The U.S. is
beginning a long-delayed training program of U.S. $3 million
for the Guinean military, focusing on securing border security
to assist that country in defending against the destabilizing
activities of the RUF and Charles Taylor in Liberia. In June
2001, the Bush administration notified Congress of its
intention to provide U.S. $3 million in non-lethal training and
equipment to the Guinean military to assist that country in
defending against the destabilizing activities of the RUF and
Charles Taylor in Liberia. Congressional concerns about abuses
by the Guinean military led to additional reporting and
monitoring requirements. The training is designed in four six-
week segments for four companies, but will pause after the
first two to conduct an impact assessment, which will include
monitoring of the troops' behavior once they are deployed on
the border, as well as a human rights assessment. All U.S.
military assistance to Guinea should be conditioned on an end
to Guinean support for the LURD rebels.
recommendations
Human Rights Watch urges the U.S. government to bring
consistent pressure on all the Mano River Union countries to: (1) End
cross-border attacks and illicit weapons flows; (2) Cease support for
armed rebel activity; (3) Respect the rule of law and human rights; (4)
Prevent and punish war crimes and other human rights abuses; and to (5)
Create state institutions that are transparent and accountable,
particularly the state security apparatus.
Continue to sustain attention on institution building that
promotes respect for the rule of law and human rights, including the
Special Court in Sierra Leone that can examine crimes committed by
Liberian nationals in the context of the Sierra Leonean civil war.
Put pressure on the LUTRD rebels to cease committing human
rights abuses and war crimes against civilians.
Provide greater support to civil society groups and the
independent media in the Mano River Union.
Condition all U.S. military assistance to Guinea,
scheduled to begin in May 2002, on an end to Guinean support for the
LURD rebels.
Continue to call for the maintaining and strengthening of
existing U.N.-mandated controls on the flow of weapons that could
destabilize the sub-region, and to establish the mechanisms necessary
to break the cycle of impunity. Illicit weapons flows into the sub-
region should continue to be monitored, and Guinea's role in the
Liberian conflict should be investigated and ended. The U.S. should
call for the U.N. to mandate the placement of international military
observers and human rights monitors along the Guinea/Liberia and Sierra
Leone/Liberia borders to monitor and investigate cross-border attacks.
Advocate for the replacement of the Guinean forces in the
UNAMSIL operation in Sierra Leone with non-West African troops that are
not implicated in the sub-regional conflict. At a minimum, the Guinea
battalions should not be deployed near the Sierra Leone/Liberia border
where the likelihood of their involvement in Liberian rebel support
and/or refugee intimidation is higher. Work to secure and get
commitments for the deployment of an adequate number of troops along
the Sierra Leone/Liberia border to prevent cross-border attacks.
Senator Feingold. Thank you for that helpful testimony. We
now turn to Ms. Anderson.
STATEMENT OF MS. RORY E. ANDERSON, AFRICA POLICY SPECIALIST,
WORLD VISION U.S., WASHINGTON, DC
Ms. Anderson. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for the opportunity
to present testimony before the subcommittee on U.S. policy
options in Liberia. Again, World Vision is in 95 different
countries, and we have been an active relief agency in Liberia
for the past 15 years. I visited Liberia and Sierra Leone less
than a year ago and traveled extensively throughout each
country, and much of what I will discuss today are things I
have actually witnessed myself.
As an active relief agency on the ground in Liberia, we at
World Vision see that there are direct and immediate linkages
between humanitarian crises involving large-scale population
displacement and economic collapse to political and regional
instability. Fear of violence is the most common reason why
people flee their homes to seek safety elsewhere. In a region
that has seen sustained violence and instability, the rise of
human displacement in Liberia reinforces cycles of volatility.
As of the first week of June 2000, current figures on
accessible, internally displaced persons in Liberia have
reached over 176,000 people. Refugee statistics are less
definitive, largely due to border insecurity in both Guinea and
Sierra Leone, but the recent and rough estimates I have heard
is that as of January of this year there have been about 35,000
refugees which have flown to neighboring countries, and in 2001
there were over 80,000 refugees, so with the increased fighting
we can imagine that there are even greater than 35,000
refugees, along with the 80,000 that already existed, and women
and dependent children generally comprise more than 80 percent
of refugees and displaced persons.
The United Nations has said that in humanitarian disasters
they bear a disproportionate share of the suffering. Refugee
women must provide for their children in an atmosphere in which
their security is threatened, and the likelihood of sexual
violence is increased.
The violence between government forces--that is, the
Government of Liberia and rebel insurgents, again known as the
Liberians United for Reconciliation and Democracy, or the LURD,
as was referred to earlier, has been the chief cause for the
current Liberian displacement. Population displacement of this
magnitude creates instability in the following three ways.
First, it creates economic collapse, and in an agrarian society
such as Liberia, removal from entitled land creates
unemployment. That is, farmers who once cultivated their own
land now have no land to farm, as well as a serious food
security crisis. Farmers can no longer produce food and they
have no gainful employment to purchase food. The production of
rice, the main staple in Liberia, has been estimated by the
U.N. Food and Agricultural Organization to meet only a third of
the country's requirements right now.
The second cause for instability is that host communities
and displaced people compete and sometimes conflict over scarce
resources. Host communities that are already on the economic
margins now have to compete with a large influx of outsiders.
Again, earlier, as I stated, there are over 176,000 internally
displaced within Liberia alone, so you have a large influx of
outsiders throughout the country who also need access to scarce
resources of land, health care, and education.
Tensions can be further exacerbated between host
communities and displaced populations when ethnic or political
differences engender conflict. With lack of adequate aid,
stable communities can quickly become part of a conflict and
instability as well as a swelling population competes for
limited resources. Environmental destruction also occurs as a
result of the concentrated population in search of firewood and
construction material.
A third cause for instability with large population
displacement is that combatants often infiltrate camps. The
majority of displaced persons live in camps, which should
provide adequate levels of food, shelter, health care, and
protection. However, camps can become another source of
instability, because they often become havens for armed groups
who can easily hide weapons and infiltrate camps to receive
food and medical care. The presence of combatants make
noncombatants targets for attacks by warring parties outside of
the camp, and their presence inside the camps also increases
the rate of sexual violence and forced conscription,
particularly of child soldiers.
The humanitarian crisis in Liberia is currently unfolding
in a cycle of violence, local economic collapse, and large
displacements of the population, as I have just described.
These are symptoms of the following six regional trends within
the Mano River Union itself, the first being displaced,
unemployed, and mostly illiterate youth are vulnerable to
military recruitment both by state and non-state actors
throughout the region. These child soldiers often become the
most brutal perpetrators of violent acts, as we saw with the
RUF in Sierra Leone.
A second regional trend is that we are seeing the illegal
mismanagement of natural resources, especially of diamonds and
timber, which draws largely upon unemployed adult populations
where there is an absence of viable economies, or credible
industries, or viable civil service.
The third point for regional trends is, we are seeing a
militarization of formerly noncombatant communities as they
compete over scarce resources. This makes them pawns for
political actors ready to capitalize on ethnic or regional
differences and further widens regional violence.
The fourth regional trend is that the trafficking of small
arms in an unstable environment becomes a guaranteed source of
power and income through banditry and further exploitation and
trafficking of conflict diamonds, conflict timber, and other
resources.
A fifth regional trend that, as reflected in the rise, and
in the number and the degree of brutal acts of torture, rape,
harassment, and executions perpetrated against civilians,
especially women and children, and all of this foments
instability and sews the seeds for social discord and social
and economic collapse.
Finally, a sixth regional trend that we are seeing within
the whole Mano River Union is that there is a deterioration of
basic infrastructure and services due to perpetual cycles of
instability and violence, and this makes resettlement of
displaced populations and the restoration of economic activity
like trade in agriculture very difficult. U.N. agencies such as
the U.N. High Commission for Refugees and the World Food
Program are exhausting all of their resources, and they cannot
stretch their resources any further.
Now, despite the expansion of a regional humanitarian
crisis and all of these regional trends that I have just laid
out in the Mano River Union, U.S. humanitarian assistance to
Liberia has actually declined by 82 percent in just the past 5
years. In 1998, total U.S. Government assistance to Liberia,
including food aid, was $37.7 million. It has now decreased to
$6.5 million in fiscal year 2002.
This drastic decline in humanitarian assistance
demonstrates two unfortunate trends, the first being that
humanitarian assistance in the Mano River Union is a zero-sum
game, which means that there are only winners and losers. We
take from Liberia and give to Sierra Leone, rather than having
a balanced, regional approach to humanitarian assistance, and
second, policymakers in the United States and elsewhere have
incorrectly politicized humanitarian assistance to Liberia.
Instead, it is better to separate our humanitarian
assistance goals from our political strategy in dealing with
Charles Taylor. As the chairman just referred to, pressuring
Taylor alone is not the only policy that we need to have, but
we need to separate our two policies and be very clear about
that. Humanitarian assistance, especially when it is channeled
through the local international relief agencies has proven to
be a strong tool for building a strong civil society that can
democratically challenge the political establishment, while
rebuilding societies and economies damaged by war.
This is not a quick fix. These types of investments are
long- and medium-term, with long-term payoffs. Starving an
already volatile region or unevenly distributing aid, and
again, that is investing in Sierra Leone and not in Liberia or
Guinea, simply creates a merry-go-round of violence and
displacement, shifting war from one country to the next.
Mr. Chairman, in offering concluding observations and
recommendations, World Vision sees that increased violence
between the Government of Liberia and the LURD has caused
severe displacement in Liberia and could eventually disrupt the
fragile peace in Sierra Leone as displaced Liberians seek
asylum there. Sierra Leone itself has recently emerged from an
11-year conflict, and an influx of Liberian refugees, as well
as combatants competing for resources, has the potential of
widening the Liberian conflict and sending Sierra Leone back
into war. We do know that more war in the Mano River Union is
not going to resolve the existing war.
I would give, again, two recommendations, again a unified
and serious diplomatic initiative, especially led by the United
States and the United Kingdom, and also involving the French,
as they have significant influence with Guinea. All of these
allies have already demonstrated effective diplomatic
leadership in Sierra Leone, and they should continue by
initiating some sort of mechanism to channel whatever
compromises Charles Taylor and other combatants may be willing
to make into a process that is much more constructive than
conflict.
Second, humanitarian assistance to the region should also
increase to diffuse the potential for conflict within
communities and among the Mano River Union nations.
Over the past 2 years, World Vision and other agencies have
seen an increase in aid to Sierra Leone, but there has been a
rapid decrease in aid to Liberia, which ultimately undermines
the total U.S. Government investment in the region. Again, the
total U.S. Government assistance to Liberia went from $37
million in 1998 to $6\1/2\ million in fiscal year 2002 and
again, that was an 82 percent decrease in just 5 years. The
rapid decline and current restructuring of U.S. Government
assistance is forcing World Vision and other international aid
agencies to completely close down operations and more than
likely by the end of the year World Vision will have to pull
out.
Declining humanitarian assistance does not affect political
change, but rather gives incentives for conflict and
instability over scarce resources. Sustained diplomatic
leadership, coupled with increased and evenly disbursed
humanitarian assistance among all three of the Mano River Union
countries will bring long-term stability that will eventually
give way to indigenous political change in Liberia, which will
provide a peace dividend for the entire Mano River Union.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for the opportunity to present
this testimony.
[The prepared statement of Ms. Anderson follows:]
Prepared Statement of Rory E. Anderson, African Policy Advisor, World
Vision U.S.
introduction
Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for the opportunity to present testimony
to the Senate Subcommittee on Africa on the humanitarian situation and
U.S. policy options in Liberia. My name is Rory Anderson, Africa Policy
Advisor for World Vision, one of the largest, privately-funded
international relief and development organizations in the U.S.
Currently, World Vision implements more than 6,000 relief,
rehabilitation and long-term development projects in 95 countries, and
we have had an active presence in Liberia for almost 15 years.
i. background
Mano River Region
Since the late 1980s, sustained conflict in the Mano River basin
has spread across borders and engulfed the region, culminating in a
severe humanitarian crisis and sustained political instability.
Internal wars in Liberia and Sierra Leone in the early 1990s led to the
exodus of more than one million refugees to Cote d'Ivoire and Guinea
over the course of the decade. In addition to refugees, an estimated
one to two million people in the region have been internally displaced
at the height of the various conflicts. Although Guinea, Liberia, and
Sierra Leone formed the Mano River Union economic pact in 1973, the
conflicts of the past decade have severely strained political and
economic relations between the three states. A struggle for control of
diamond fields in Sierra Leone has been central to the crisis in recent
years. Several failed peace accords and peacekeeping efforts, collapsed
economies, and some of the worst human rights atrocities in recent
history has made the Mano River crisis one of the world's most severe
humanitarian disasters. Although 2001 brought improved security to
Guinea and Sierra Leone,.an upsurge in fighting in Liberia continues to
threaten the stability of the entire region. The U.N. Office for the
Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) estimates that 1.1 million
of the 15 million inhabitants of Guinea, Liberia, and Sierra Leone
continue to be either internally displaced persons (IDPs) or refugees.
Liberia
Civil war in Liberia from 1989 to 1997 led to the collapse of its
economy and left its infrastructure destroyed. Sustained fighting and
human rights abuses by warring factions led to the exodus of an
estimated 700,000 Liberian refugees to neighboring countries and an
estimated 1 million internally displaced persons during the height of
this conflict. In 1997, Charles Taylor was elected president by an
exhausted country and with the support of the international community.
Initial steps were taken to rebuild Liberia's infrastructure and to
resettle refugees. However, since 1999, the governments of Guinea and
Sierra Leone, as well as much of the international community, have
accused Charles Taylor of supporting anti-government forces in both
Guinea and Sierra Leone and exchanging diamonds for guns. The
Government of Liberia (GOL) has spent from 2001 until the present
engaged in battles of their own with anti-government factions in
northern Liberia. This continued fighting has lead to the internal
displacement of thousands of Liberians, and caused many more to flee to
Cote d'lvoire, Guinea, and Sierra Leone.
In May 2001, the U.N. Security Council (UNSC), in response to
Charles Taylor's involvement with the Revolutionary United Front (RUF)
in Sierra Leone, maintained an arms embargo on Liberia and imposed
sanctions on diamond exports and international travel by GOL officials.
ii. a complex humanitarian emergency
Insecurity, Internally Displaced and Refugees
Fighting in Liberia that was once confined to the northwestern
county of Lofa, which borders Guinea and Sierra Leone, has now spread
further south to within 25 miles of the capital, Monrovia. Clashes in
late November and December between GOL troops and rebels identified as
the Liberians United for Reconciliation and Democracy (LURD) in Grand
Cape Mount and Bong counties, caused the displacement of an estimated
4,000 Liberians. Due to heightened insecurity, World Vision was forced
to withdraw relief assistance from Grand Cape Mount County. On December
20, LURD forces captured the northern Lofa County city of Zorzor.
World Vision, in collaboration with other relief agencies in
Liberia currently estimate that over 176,000 persons are internally
displaced and have fled their homes to other parts of Liberia. Since
October 1, the movement of internally displaced persons (IDPs) has
remained fluid, particularly in and out of the Bopolu and Gemana camps
following the recent outbreak of violence. In late December, relief
agencies were planning on establishing transit centers for IDPs in the
towns of Sawmill and Nyomo in Bomi County. Because public services are
non-existent, relief agencies continue to provide the majority of
assistance to lDPs.
The resurgence of fighting over the past year has also created an
influx of Liberian refugees into Cote d'Ivoire, Guinea, and Sierra
Leone. The UN High Commission for Refugees (UNHCR) has registered an
estimated 20,000 Liberian refugees in Sierra Leone and 6,000 in Cote
d'Ivoire since May 2001: 3,400 have fled in this last week alone.
Unconfirmed numbers of Liberian refugees have also arrived in Guinea
throughout 2001, but have yet to be registered. Prior to 2001, UNHCR
estimated that 80,000 Liberians were living in Guinea and 120,000 in
Cote d'Ivoire. UNHCR also estimates there are still 70,000 Sierra
Leonean refugees living in Liberia.
iii. world vision in liberia
Overview
In order to address the human suffering brought by the civil war,
World Vision began the Liberia Emergency Response Program in 1988. The
program was based in Lofa, Bong, Grand Cape Mount and Bomi Counties,
but has shifted out of Lofa and Grand Cape Mount due to increasing
political violence between the government forces and the LURD. Since
it's inception, World Vision's work has had two components: (1) Basic
healthcare delivery; Maternal/Child Health services, and (2)
Agriculture rehabilitation of food production capacity. Both components
mutually reinforce each other--with increased food production capacity,
there is a corresponding improvement in nutrition and health. Likewise,
by improving healthcare delivery systems through the renovation of
medical clinics, and providing much needed medical supplies and primary
health care, a healthier population has the capacity for food
production and expanded economic activity.
Health
World Vision's original health objectives were to provide supplies,
supervision and management to 19 health facilities located in Lofa,
Grand Cape Mount, and Bomi counties. With target beneficiaries of
128,500, World Vision catchments provided immunizations to 50% of
pregnant and lactating women. In addition, we also helped to:
train certified midwives at clinics and in the bush
monitor weight/age of children under 5
immunize children against childhood diseases (75 percent of
children by age 3)
health education on a variety of subjects, including HIV/
AIDS
treat major health problems: malaria, diarrhea, acute
respiratory infection
We found that in our catchments, most people did not know how
malaria or cough was contracted; 77 percent of women delivered at home,
and only 10 percent of children were immunized. In addition, 60 percent
of households drank unsafe creek or river water, and 75 percent of
households do not have a toilet, multiplying the transmission of
waterborne diseases.
Causes for Scaling Back
Although we have had good success in the past, World Vision has had
to significantly scale back its health program for two reasons:
increased violence and severe declines in U.S. government funding for
health programs. Shortfalls in U.S. government funding will force World
Vision to completely close our current health program by Sept 30, 2002.
Agriculture
World Vision's agriculture program operated in the areas of Grand
Cape Mount County; CARI, which is most of Bong County; Fumah, which is
in parts of Bong and Margibi Counties; Monserrado, serving pen-urban
areas outside of Monrovia; and parts of Lofa County. The program has
had to retreat from two-thirds of that area due to violent conflict.
WV's agriculture program currently was serving 220 rural farming
communities with improved seed and technology, and 250 communities with
gardening inputs and technology. The major agricultural focus is to get
area farmers back on their feet by producing their own food for their
food security, and then helping them to sell any surplus, focusing on
indigenous crops of rice, sweet potato, plantain, banana, yam, and
expanded vegetable gardening. World Vision's specific activities
included:
Distribution of improved seeds and tools;
Technical assistance in organizing farmer groups for (1)
agricultural education and (2) for communal production of
improved seeds for distribution to the entire community;
Developing demonstration farm plots so that farmer groups
can test agricultural methods for themselves (For farmers
living on the margins, even improved seeds and techniques
constitute a life and death risk with their food security and
overall economic livelihood. Experimental plots give farmers
verifiable assurances that new seeds and techniques work.);
Promotion of lowland rice production which is the most
efficient, and productive, and damages the ecology the least;
Developing extensive improved seed production facilities and
training selected farmers as apprentices;
Introducing improved species of animals to breed with local
stock, since most animals were eaten by the soldiers during the
civil war; and
Introducing appropriate, small-scale agricultural machinery
to improve efficiency and the initial processing of
agricultural products for better storage, consumption and sale.
Causes for Scaling Back
As with our health program, because of continued violence, WV no
longer operates in Lofa or Grand Cape Mount counties. Additionally, the
CARI seed production facility, which provided seeds for World Vision's
target groups, was taken over by the GOL in the Fall of 2001. Declining
U.S. government funds will probably force World Vision to lose its
agriculture program by Sept. 30, 2002.
iv. humanitarian crisis and the links to political and regional
instability
Population Displacement and Instability
There are direct and immediate linkages between humanitarian crises
involving largescale population displacement and economic collapse to
political and regional instability. Fear of violence is the most common
reason why people flee their homes to seek safety elsewhere. In a
region that has seen sustained violence and instability, the rise of
human displacement in Liberia reinforces regional cycles of volatility.
As of the first week of June 2002, current figures on accessible,
internally displaced persons in Liberia have reached over 176,000. As
mentioned above, refugee statistics are less definitive, largely due to
border insecurity in both Guinea and Sierra Leone, but prior to 2001,
there were over 80,000 Liberian refugees; with increased conflict, this
number has surely increased. Women and their dependent children
generally comprise more than 80% of refugees and displaced persons. The
UN has said that, in humanitarian disasters, they bear ``a
disproportionate share of the suffering.'' Refugee women must provide
for their children in an atmosphere in which their security is
threatened and the likelihood of sexual violence is increased.
Violence between government forces and the LURD has been the chief
cause for Liberian displacement. Population displacement of this level
creates instability in the following ways:
Economic collapse. In an agrarian society such as Liberia,
removal from entitled land creates unemployment--farmers who
once cultivated their own land now have no land to farm--as
well as a serious food security crisis--farmers can no longer
produce food, and have no gainful employment to purchase food.
The production of rice, the main staple in Liberia, has been
estimated by the UN Food and Agriculture Organization to meet
only a third of the country's requirements.
Host communities and the displaced compete and sometimes
conflict over scarce resources. Host communities that are
already on the economic margins, now have to compete with a
large influx of outsiders who also need access to scarce
resources of land, healthcare, and education. Tensions can be
further exacerbated between host communities and displaced
populations when ethnic or political differences engender
conflict. With lack of adequate aid, stable communities can
quickly become part of conflict and instability as a swelling
population competes for limited resources. Environmental
destruction is also a result of a concentrated population in
search of firewood and construction materials.
Combatants infiltrating camps. The majority of displaced
persons live in camps, which should provide adequate levels of
food, shelter, healthcare and education. However camps can
become another source of instability because they often become
havens for armed groups, who can easily hide weapons and
infiltrate camps to receive food and medical care. The presence
of combatants makes non-combatants targets for attacks by
warring parties outside of the camps, and their presence
increases the rate of sexual violence and forced conscription,
especially of child soldiers. Theoretically, there should be an
attempt to separate combatants from noncombatants as they enter
into camps by interviewing persons as they enter. But camp
staff are usually out-numbered by the populations that they are
serving, often times by the thousands per every staff worker.
Displaced populations may or may not be able to identify
combatants within their midst, but most are all too often
worried about their own security and are intimidated into
remaining silent.
Regional Trends
The humanitarian crisis in Liberia is currently unfolding in a
cycle of violence, local economic collapse, and large displacements of
the population. These are symptoms of the following 6 regional trends:
1. Displaced, unemployed and mostly illiterate youth are vulnerable
to military recruitment by state and non-state actors
throughout the region. These child soldiers often become the
most brutal perpetrators of violent acts.
2. Illegal mismanagement of natural resources, especially of diamonds
and timber, draws on a largely unemployed adult population in
the absence of industries, or a viable civil service.
3. The militarization of formerly non-combatant communities as they
compete over scarce resources, makes them pawns for political
actors ready to capitalize on ethinic or regional differences,
further widening regional violence.
4. The trafficking of small arms in an unstable environment becomes a
guaranteed source of power and income through banditry and
further exploitation and trafficking of conflict diamonds,
timber and other resources.
4. Increasing disregard for human life by both state and non-state
actors, as reflected in the rise in the number and the degree
of brutal acts of torture, rape, harassment and executions
perpetrated against civilians--especially women and children--
foments instability and sows the seeds for future discord and
social and economic collapse.
5. Deterioration of basic infrastructure and services due to
perpetual cycles of instability and violence makes resettlement
of displaced populations and the restoration of economic
activities like trade and agriculture very difficult. UN
agencies such as the UN High Commission for Refugees (UNHCR)
and the World Food Program (WFP) are exhausting their resources
and cannot stretch their resources any further.
v. declining u.s. government assistance
Despite the expansion of a regional humanitarian crisis in the MRU,
U.S. humanitarian assistance to Liberia has declined by 82% over the
past 5 years.
Since 1998, total U.S. government assistance to Liberia, including
food aid, has declined to the following levels:
FY1998--$37,786,000
FY1999--$16,049,000
FY2000--$17,529,000
FY2001--$8,199,000
FY2002--$6,519,000
This drastic decline in humanitarian assistance demonstrates
unfortunate trends: (1) humanitarian assistance in the Mano River Union
is a zero sum game, which means that there are only winners and
losers--we take from Liberia and give to Sierra Leone, rather than
having a balanced, regional approach to humanitarian assistance. And
(2) policy makers in the U.S. have incorrectly politicized humanitarian
assistance to Liberia. Instead, it is better to separate humanitarian
assistance from our political strategy with Charles Taylor.
Humanitarian assistance, especially when it is channeled through local
and international relief agencies, has proven to be an effective tool
for building strong civil society actors that can democratically
challenge the political establishment while rebuilding societies and
economies damaged by war. These are a long and medium-term investments,
with long-term pay-offs. Starving an already volatile region, or
unevenly distributing aid--i.e., investing in Sierra Leone, and not in
Liberia or Guinea, simply creates a merry-go-round of violence and
displacement, shifting war from one country to the next.
vi. conclusions and recommendations
Increased violence between the GOL and the LURD has caused severe
displacement in Liberia and could eventually disrupt the fragile peace
in Sierra Leone as displaced Liberians seek asylum. Sierra Leone itself
has recently emerged from an 11 year conflict; an influx of Liberian
refugees and possible combatants competing for resources, has the
potential of widening the Liberian conflict and sending Sierra Leone
back into war. More war in the Mano River Union is not going to resolve
the existing war. Unified and serious diplomatic initiatives,
especially lead by the U.S. and the U.K. who have already demonstrated
diplomatic leadership in Sierra Leone, should continue by initiating a
mechanism to channel whatever compromises that Charles Taylor and other
combatants may be willing to make into a process that is more
constructive than conflict.
Humanitarian assistance to the region should also increase to
diffuse the potential for conflict within communities and among the MRU
nations. Over the past 2 years, World Vision and other agencies have
seen an increase in aid to Sierra Leone, but there has been a rapid
decrease in aid to Liberia, which, ultimately, undermines the total US
government investment in the region. Total US government assistance to
Liberia went from $37.7 million in FY 1998 to $6.5 million for FY 2002;
an 82% decrease in just 5 years. The rapid decline and current
restructuring of U.S. government assistance is forcing World Vision and
other international aid agencies to completely close down operations by
the end of this fiscal year. Declining humanitarian assistance does not
affect political change, but, rather, gives incentives for conflict and
instability over scarce public resources.
Sustained diplomatic leadership, coupled with increased and evenly
dispersed humanitarian assistance among the 3 countries will bring
about long-term stability, which will eventually give way to indigenous
political change in Liberia, which will provide a peace dividend for
the entire Mano River Union.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for the opportunity to present this
testimony.
Senator Feingold. Thank you, Ms. Anderson, for your
testimony, particularly in terms of the long-term perspective.
Mr. Sannoh.
STATEMENT OF BENEDICT F. SANNOH, COUNSELLOR, REAGAN-FASSELL
DEMOCRACY FELLOW, NATIONAL ENDOWMENT FOR DEMOCRACY, WASHINGTON,
DC
Mr. Sannoh. Mr. Chairman, members of this committee, I am
pleased to be here this afternoon upon your invitation to share
my views on Liberia as a free state, and I want to thank you
for the invitation.
Mr. Chairman, today Liberia has been described as a failed
state. Some have even referred to it as a rogue state, a state
that has disintegrated. In 1997, the Liberian people, after a
brutal and devastating civil war, went to the polls to elect a
government. President Taylor won that election by an
overwhelming majority of the vote, but elections, Mr. Chairman,
is not an end in itself but a process toward democratization,
and this process has been very bumpy for Liberia.
Notwithstanding the end of the civil war, peace and
stability in Liberia still remains elusive. Crucial elements
for democratization have not been nurtured. The government is
at war with the rebel faction, LURD, and also at war with its
own people. A third of the country is in the state of war, a
war that has the propensity of destabilizing the entire Mano
River Union region.
Thousands of our people are displaced either internally or
externally as refugees. The brain drain of professionals and
capable Liberians who otherwise would be in Liberia to
contribute to the democratization process is alarming, so I
have come here today to appeal to the U.S. Government to take a
leadership role in Liberia. This is the time we need you,
because when you needed us we stood by your side.
History tells us of the rule of Liberia during the cold war
in support of your own ideological struggle. The Voice of
America, VOA, in Liberia covered the entire continent of
Africa. You installed a communication relay station in Liberia
that served as a transit point for all communications between
the State Department in Washington, DC and U.S. Embassies in
sub-Saharan Africa. You installed the Omega Navigation Station
on Liberian soil that picks up signals from all vessels on the
high seas in Africa, and directs the vessels navigation. You
constructed the free Port of Liberia and the international
airport for you to use during the Second World War.
As a result of all of these efforts, Mr. Chairman, we
assisted you with all of our might, and you won the ideological
war. Now that you have won, you seem to have abandoned us.
Today, the United States is a world leader, and Liberia remains
in chaos and instability. Maybe except for Mr. Taylor and those
of his government, the bulk of the Liberian people are living
in abject poverty.
There is no electricity, there is no running water or
health care facilities, inadequate schools, only two
universities, and most of the time these universities are
closed. There is massive internal and external displacement,
posing an increasing burden on the subregion. If the United
States fails to take such a leadership role in Liberia, no
other country would, and Liberia risks slipping gradually into
anarchy and chaos.
The question is, Mr. Chairman, why is Liberia slipping into
anarchy? If Liberia is today characterized as a failed state
necessitating these hearings on Liberia, I would like to say
up-front that the dilemma has been occasioned by the entirety
of circumstances, including many factors, the abandonment of
Liberia by the United States, the civil war, the transition
from war to elected government through elections, and the
conduct of the constitutionally elected government of Mr.
Taylor himself, since he took control of our country in 1997.
For the purpose of this hearing and because of the brevity
of time I would like to limit my testimony to three of these
areas. The first is the transition from war to peace, and
perhaps what happened in Sierra Leone is born from the
experience of what happened in Liberia.
A crucial element of the EC, even the political parties,
who contribute to the democratization process. The Liberian
national transitional government and the parties to the
conflict failed to implement the restructuring aspect of Abuja
and went to the polls, and the international community knew
very well the impact of that failure on the reconstitution of
peace in Liberia.
Now, the conduct of the elected government. President
Taylor upon his inauguration in 1997 was faced with two
immediate challenges. One was how to protect the security of
the state, and to maintain peace and order throughout the
length and breadth of Liberia, because that responsibility has
been had by ECOMOG.
Second, how to foster general reconciliation between and
among the Liberian people in a manner that would induce peace,
stability, and national unification, and I want to submit, Mr.
Chairman, that the manner in which Taylor addresses these two
issues is in a way responsible for the state of affairs in
Liberia today.
So I address the issue of peace, or national unification.
The government established two commissions, one on human rights
and one on reconciliation and reunification. These commissions
remain mere institutions on paper. They have been dormant, and
they have not really done any effective work. As a result, the
Liberian people still remain at odds on many, many issues.
To address the question of security and the maintenance of
peace throughout the length of Liberia, Taylor immediately
after the elections occasioned the early departure of ECOMOG.
He did not secure any agreement for ECOWAS, for ECOMOG to stay
so as to supervise the issue of the problem of security during
his regime. With the departure of ECOMOG, Mr. Chairman, the
government exacerbated the problem when it did not restructure
the security apparatus of the country. Rather, it went on to
use the former rebels of the National Patriotic Party to fill
in the ranks of the Liberian National Police, and he also went
on to create a paramilitary force, the ATU, comprising again
mostly former fighters in the NPFL.
Now, compounding these two issues, the issues of security,
the issue of national conciliation, the country suddenly found
itself entangled in two other problems, first, the imposition
of sanctions by the international community, and second, the
attack by LURD, Liberians United for Reconciliation and
Democracy. Those remain problems in Liberia today.
We have another issue of good governance, human rights and
the rule of law. The issue of violation of human rights remains
a crucial issue. Sometimes in African countries efforts are
made with respect to national sovereignty. While individuals do
have a sovereignty, the respect for our sovereignty has been
incorporated in many international instruments, human rights
documents in which Liberia is a signatory.
Most of these documents have not been worked out. The
increasing violation of human rights are fundamentally
practiced in Liberia with impunity, lack of respect for the
rule of law, and the lack of accountability and transparency in
government, and increasingly as evidenced by events over the
past 2 weeks, the government seems to be closing the political
space for civil society organizations and activities, including
human rights advocates and the press.
On the issue of U.N. sanctions, there is a prevailing view
that the sanctions imposed by the U.N. Security Council is
primarily directed at President Taylor and his government, and
it has indirect repercussions on the lives of the Liberian
people. There has been a chilling effect on the level of
bilateral assistance to Liberia since the imposition of
sanctions.
Many of those who would impose sanctions have been major
donors of assistance to Liberia, and they have scaled down
their bilateral assistance to Liberia, and that is why when I
listened to the question that was posed to the representative
from the State Department as to the level of U.S. involvement
toward the civil society sector of Liberia so as to ameliorate
the effects of sanctions, those responses do not actually
reflect the reality on the ground. The reality on the ground is
that the efforts of assistance from the U.S. Government to the
civil society in Liberia is at a very low level.
What are the combined impacts of sanctions and LURD on the
democratization process in Liberia? Continued LURD attacks
against the government, coupled with sanctions and the economic
conditions in Liberia, would obviously affect the timetable for
general Presidential elections and the entire process of
democratization in Liberia. There are a number of legal
constitutional hurdles that must be overcome if we are going to
have elections in Liberia. This includes the issue of national
census.
The government does not have the resources to even conduct
a national census. No national census has been conducted in
Liberia since 1985. The demarcation of constituencies for the
voting population and the determination of the number of
representatives for the legislature, these issues have not been
discussed, the issue of security and the state of emergency
recently declared by the President.
Let me move a little bit to the dilemma of ordinary
Liberians. A couple of questions were raised with respect to
this issue. Mr. Chairman, I would like to submit that the
people of Liberia, the ordinary Liberians are in a dilemma. In
1997, after a bloody and devastating civil war, we went to the
polls to elect a government. Charles Taylor won the elections.
There now seems to be a consensus among most Liberians that the
best way to exercise, to move forward is through a democratic
process by means of the ballot box and not by violence.
This dilemma is obvious. On the one hand, Liberians have a
President and a government that they are stuck with for the
next 18 months, and perhaps even longer, in spite of the
questions of security, national reconciliation, and the lack of
resources to address the myriad of social and economic problems
confronting the Liberian people today.
On the other hand, Liberians are faced with rebel
incursions the consequences of which have relegated them to
internal and external displacement, suffering, and deprivation.
Still on that front Liberians are faced with sanctions and the
resultant effect of reduced bilateral assistance, as a result
of which, post conflict reconstruction and development in
Liberia never got off the ground, but in spite of all of these
concerns the international community seems to forget the view
that once sanctions have been imposed on Liberia because of the
alleged conduct of their President, the fate of the Liberian
public have become irrelevant and immaterial.
This is a very serious problem, Mr. Chairman. It is tough
for--one of the committees succinctly put this to me when I
tried to talk to many people here in the states, ``that the
fate of ordinary Liberians is linked to the fate of Charles
Taylor.'' I do not want to believe that. The isolation of
Liberia by the international community is also not limited to
the trivialization of the plight of the Liberian people who
have seen the focus on bringing peace to Sierra Leone. We see
U.S. involvement in Guinea, while Liberia remains a 10-foot
pole that nobody wants to touch. This has the potential of
destabilizing the subregion.
On the role of the international community, Mr. Chairman,
if Liberia is a failed state today, some of the causes emanate
from the actions taken or not taken by the international
community at the appropriate times or periods. For instance, I
briefly talk about the failure to implement the relevant
provisions of the Abuja agreement under international
supervision.
We are also seeing the failure of the international
community to condemn LURD, to intercede in the Liberian
conflict so as to bring about a lasting cease-fire, while at
the same time we are imposing a ban on the importation of arms
by the government to defend itself and the people of Liberia,
which is a constitutional duty imposed upon that government.
And second, there is a lack of U.S. interest and leadership
role in Liberia. The insistence on the policy of containment,
believing that with increasing sanctions and international
isolation there would be a change in Liberia has not achieved
the desired results. This policy trivializes the impact of
containment on the lives of ordinary Liberians, and links the
fate of ordinary Liberians to that of the government.
What recommendations do I have to address some of these
issues? Mr. Chairman, there are some key initiatives that can
dramatically turn around the turn of events in Liberia and put
it on a path toward democratization and sustained peace.
First, the Government of the United States must not rely
solely on the policy of containment and the increasing
isolation of Liberia as the only avenue toward bringing
political change in Liberia.
Second, efforts at bringing a durable peace, stability, and
security to Liberia cannot be left to ECOWAS alone. Growing out
of our experience with ECOWAS intervention during the Liberian
civil war, regional politics, combined with tribal and ethnic
affiliations will continue to have a negative impact on ECOWAS
initiatives. Accordingly, we recommend, Mr. Chairman, that the
United States take a leadership role in Liberia just as the
British did in Sierra Leone, and help evolve a process that
will bring Liberia back toward the cause of democratization.
The first step in evolving such a process is to help create
an enabling environment in Liberia for security, stability, and
sustained peace. There are several elements in this step.
First, the United States must take a leadership role in
creating a contact group, as suggested by the International
Crisis Group and Human Rights Watch, to supervise the process.
Second, the contact group, once created, should call upon
the government and LURD to declare an immediate cease-fire and
enter into a dialog and negotiations with a view on resolving
the conflict. These discussions must also include
representations from the political leadership of Liberia,
including political parties, or leaders of political parties
outside Liberia.
Third, one of the crucial items for discussion in Liberia
by this contact group that we are recommending for the United
States to take a leadership role in its creation is the issue
of security. There will be no lasting peace in Liberia, Mr.
Chairman, if the security apparatus of the government remains
intact. Hence, the contact group must obtain consensus from all
parties to deploy an international force on the ground in
Liberia to monitor the cease-fire, to take over the entire
security of the country, to disarm all combatants, including
the police, the ATU, and all security apparatus. The
composition of the force must again not be limited to ECOWAS
alone, and the emergency imposed by the government must be
lifted upon the arrival of the intervention force.
Fourth, the question of governance and the status of
democratic institutions in Liberia between now and the period
of general elections must be discussed. This includes the
elections commission, the judiciary, the prosecutorial arm of
government, and the control over the nation's resources and
finances.
And fifth, the contact group must visit the question of
general Presidential elections and obtain a consensus on such
crucial issues such as census, representation, number of
constituencies, and provide resources to facilitate the process
in Liberia.
Finally, Mr. Chairman, the U.S. Government must strengthen
civil society in Liberia to enable them to make informed and
reasoned decisions about the democratization process in
Liberia. The level of illiteracy in Liberia is very high. When
you combine the high level of illiteracy and the high level of
poverty amidst the war that is going on, it is very, very
possible that you'll have elections producing results that may
not reflect the views of the Liberian people. Crucial areas are
support for the press, human rights institutions, human rights
advocates, and pro-democratic organizations. We recommend
support for the strengthening of political parties and the
reactivation of the Human Rights Commission.
In conclusion, Mr. Chairman, we agree with the report of
the State Department, the analysis that Liberia is not likely
to change right now, and without a U.S. leadership role and
international involvement the country will slip into chaos and
potentially destabilize the subregion, and again, as I said, we
disagree with the analysis of the State Department that there
is a good level of support by the U.S. Government to the civil
society at this time.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Sannoh follows:]
Prepared Statement of Counsellor Benedict F. Sannoh, Reagan-Fascell
Democracy Fellow, National Endowment for Democracy (NED)
Mr. Chairman and members of the Committee, I am pleased to be here
this afternoon upon your invitation to share my views on Liberia as a
failed state. Thank you for the invitation.
My name is Benedict F. Sannoh. I am a Reagan-Fascell Democracy
Fellow at the National Endowment for Democracy here in Washington, D.C.
Prior to that I served as Executive Director of the Center For Law and
Human Rights, a non-profit, non-governmental human rights and pro-
democracy organization operating in Monrovia, Liberia. I also serve as
Assistant Professor of Law, Louis Arthur Grimes School of Law,
University of Liberia. For the past ten years, I have been involved in
human rights, the peace process during the course of the civil war, and
the process of democratization since the 1997 General and Presidential
elections.
Mr. Chairman, today Liberia has been described as a failed state.
Some have referred to it even as pariah state, a rogue state or a state
that has disintegrated. In 1997, the Liberian people, after a brutal
and devastating civil war went to the polls to elect a Government.
President Charles Taylor won the election by an overwhelming majority.
But elections, Mr. Chairman, is not an end in itself, but a process
toward a democratization. Notwithstanding the end of the civil war,
peace and stability in Liberia still remains elusive, but crucial
elements necessary for democratization have not been nurtured. The
Government is at war with a rebel faction, LURD, and at war with its
own people. A third of the country is in a state of war, a war that has
the propensity of destabilizing the entire Mano River subregion.
Thousands of our people are displaced either internally or externally
as refugees. The brain drain of professional and capable Liberians who
would otherwise be contributing to the democratization process in
Liberia is alarming.
So we have come here today to ask the United States Government to
take a leadership role in Liberia. This is the time we need you because
when you needed us, we stood by your side. History tells us of the role
of Liberia during the cold war in support of your ideological struggle.
You erected the Voice of America (VOA) in Liberia, that
covered the entire continent of Africa;
You installed a communications relay station in Liberia that
served as the transit point for all communication between the
State Department in Washington and U.S. embassies in sub-Sahara
Africa;
You installed the Omega Navigation Station on Liberian soil
that picked up signals from all vessels on the high seas in
Africa and also directed vessels during navigation;
You constructed the Freeport of Monrovia and the Roberts
International Airport (RIA) for use during the second World
War.
As a result of these efforts, we assisted you with all our might,
and you won the ideological war. Now that you have won, you seem to
have abandoned us. Today, the United States is a world leader, and
Liberia remains in chaos and instability. If the United States fails to
take such a leadership role in Liberia, no other country would, and
Liberia risks slipping gradually into anarchy and state collapse.
If Liberia is today characterized as a failed state, necessitating
the convening of these hearings, I would like to state up front that
the dilemma has been occasioned by the tyranny of circumstances,
including among others, the abandonment of Liberia by the United
States, the civil war, the transition from war to a democratically
elected Government through elections, and the conduct of the
constitutionally elected Government since it took over control of the
Country in August 1997, and the role of the international community.
For the purpose of this hearing, and because of the brevity of time, I
would like to limit my testimony to these three areas.
the civil war and the transition to a democratically elected
government: \1\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ See Liberian Dilemma: Remaining Engaged in the Face of
Sanctions, a paper delivered by Benedict F. Sannoh at the National
Endowment for Democracy, April 9, 2002.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
When the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS)
intervened in the Liberian Civil War, it had two principal objectives:
(1) To prevent the war from spilling beyond the borders of Liberia and
from threatening the peace and security of the West African subregion,
and (2) to forge ways and means to achieve a political settlement of
the conflict through dialogue. To achieve these objectives, ECOWAS
evolved what became known as the ECOWAS Peace Plan, which essentially
provided for a two prong approach to the settlement of the war; one
military and the other political.
On the political front, ECOWAS created the enabling environment for
Liberians themselves to establish a frame work for an Interim
Governance of the Country during the conflict, and in collaboration
with the United Nations, facilitated several conferences between the
parties geared toward the cessation of hostilities and obtaining a
consensus on the holding of a free elections to put into place a
democratically elected Government.
On the military front, ECOWAS deployed a multinational peace
keeping force, ECOMOG, in Liberia to separate the warring factions,
protect the Interim Government, and assist it in maintaining law and
order. The ECOWAS Peace Plan called for a cease-fire, disarmament,
encampment, demobilization and reintegration of all former fighters. To
enhance the success of the military approach, ECOWAS imposed a ban on
the importation of arms and ammunition into Liberia by any of the
warring factions, and called for the restructuring of the security
apparatus of the country prior to the hosting of general elections.
Within the contemplation of ECOWAS, the restructuring of the security
forces would have facilitated the creation of an enabling environment
substantial enough to:
Induce all political presidential aspirants, including heads
of warring factions, to participate in the elections, by
canvassing freely for votes throughout the length and breadth
of Liberia, without fear of intimidation and molestation,
actual or perceived from the various warring factions;
1. induce Liberian refugees in the subregion and elsewhere to
return home;
2. induce confidence among all the warring factions to submit
to the democratic process, with the expectation that their
interests, individual and collective, will be subjected to fair
opportunity and equal treatment; this in the mind of the
authority of ECOWAS, would have enhanced and facilitated
disarmament, encampment, demobilization, and the process of
reintegration of all combatants; and.
3. consolidate peace, stability, and the democratization
process in Liberia after elections in a manner that would have
induced not only those who lost the elections to remain in
Liberia, but also other Liberians living abroad to return home
after the elections and contribute to the development of the
nation.
Unfortunately, the Liberia National Transitional Government (LNTG),
and the parties to the conflict, failed to muster the political
fortitude to restructure the security apparatus of Liberia as mandated
by ECOWAS. Notwithstanding, and with full knowledge of the potential
implications of this situation, ECOWAS and the international community,
perhaps out of fatigue with the failure of the parties to the conflict
to adhere to successive peace agreements, urged the Liberian people to
go to the polls, as the only way forward to bring the conflict to an
end, in spite of opposition from some political parties and human
rights groups. In an election that was internationally certified as
free and transparent, Charles Ghangay Taylor, then leader of the
erstwhile National Patriotic Front of Liberia (NPFL) was elected as
President with over 74% of the votes.
the conduct of the elected government: \2\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\2\ Ibid.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Upon his inauguration in August 1997, the Government of President
Taylor was faced with two immediate challenges:
(1) How to protect the security of the state and to maintain
peace and order throughout the length and breath of Liberia;
and
(2) How to foster genuine reconciliation between and among
the Liberia people in a manner that would induce peace,
stability and national unification in a country that has been
torn apart by seven years of civil war with ethnic and tribal
underpinnings.
The manner in which the Taylor led Government responded to these
challenges continues to be the reasons for the current political
climate in Liberia and for the characterization of Liberia as a failed
state.
the issue of peace and national reconciliation:
To address the issue of peace and national reconciliation, the
Taylor led Government established two Commissions: The National
Commission on Human Rights (NCHR); and the Liberia National
Reconciliation and Re-unification Commission (LNRRC). Unfortunately,
however, these institutions either by design, or by default, have
failed to rise up to the task. The National Commission on Human Rights
has up to date not been fully constituted and without Government
support, has remained dormant since its creation nearly four years ago.
The National Reconciliation and Re-unification Commission, although
fully constituted, has not made any meaningful inroads in healing the
wounds of the war, in reconciling the Liberian people, or preventing
ethnic or tribal conflicts such as those between the Gios, Manos and
Mandingoes. Hence the challenge of fostering genuine reconciliation
between and among the Liberian people in a manner that would induce
peace, stability and national unification still remains elusive.
To address the question of security and the maintenance of peace
and order throughout the length and breath of Liberia, the Taylor led
Government started on the wrong foot. Firstly, through its failure to
obtain an agreement from the authority of ECOWAS, or the member states
thereof, the Government precipitated the early departure from Liberia,
of the West African Peace Keeping Force, ECOMOG, who had up to the
elections and the inauguration of the Government, been responsible for
the security of the Country.
With the departure of ECOMOG, the Government exacerbated the
problem when it elected not to restructure the security apparatus of
the Country, particularly its national army; the Armed Forces of
Liberia (AFL), it having lost its legitimacy as such when it allowed
itself to become factionalized during the conflict. In opting not to
restructure the national army, the Government advanced the argument
that the Abuja agreement, which had mandated the restructuring, was not
binding on the Government, it having lapsed upon the inauguration of an
elected Government and the reaffirmation of the Liberian Constitution
which had been suspended in 1990. Instead of restructuring the security
apparatus as mandated by Abuja, the Taylor led Government created a
paramilitaiy force, the Anti Terrorist Unit (ATU), comprised mostly of
former combatants of the National Patriotic Front of Liberia (NPFL).
The Government also swelled the ranks of the Liberia National Police
(LNP) with former combatants of the NPFL. It is these two factional
institutions that the Government relies upon for the defense of the
nation, for national security, and for the maintenance of law and
order, leaving the Armed Forces of Liberia (AFL) marginalized and
demoralized with over 4000 of its soldiers retired or discharged. It
was only when the Government came under increasing attack by the
dissident forces that the Government was constrained to recall most of
these soldiers to duty.
Compounding the failure of the Taylor Government to properly
address the challenges of security and national reconciliation, the
country suddenly found itself entangled in two developments. Firstly,
the International Community accused the Government of President Taylor
of engaging in conduct that allegedly posed a threat to the peace and
stability of the West African subregion. Specifically, the President
was accused of fueling the war in neighboring Sierra Leone through the
supply of arms to the Revolutionary United Front (RUF) in exchange of
diamonds. Led by the United States and Great Britain, the Security
Council of the United Nations imposed sanctions on Liberia--a ban on
the importation of arms into Liberia (note that the ban imposed by the
ECOWAS as part of its Peace Plan for Liberia was never lifted); a ban
on the exportation of diamonds from Liberia, and the imposition of
travel restrictions on key officials of the Government.
Secondly, the country came under armed attack by a rebel group, the
Liberians United For Reconciliation and Democracy (LURD), with the
professed goal of destabilizing and overthrowing the Government of
President Taylor. As the attacks shifted from the Bopolu and Kolahun
areas of Lofa County, (where the rebels were held by government forces
for a considerable period), to lower Lofa, and Klay, Bomi County, less
than forty miles from the Capital City of Monrovia, the Government
declared a state of Emergency on February 8, 2002. Fighting
intensified, notwithstanding. The LURD rebels took over Klay, a
strategic town located about 25 kilometers from Monrovia, and
subsequently Gbamga, the provincial capital of Bong County, on the
major trunk route to Ivory Coast, which necessitated a counter attack
by the Government. The rebels were dislodged, but at the expense of
lives and a massive humanitarian crisis. As I speak, sporadic fighting
is still going on in diverse parts of Liberia between LURD and forces
loyal to the Government.
Fearing that continued instability in Liberia may spill over into
the neighboring countries, and potentially undermine the peace and
security of the subregion, reminiscent of the civil war years, the
Heads of State and Governments of ECOWAS recently called upon the
Government of Liberia and LURD to declare an immediate cease-fire and
enter into dialogue with the view of ending the conflict. ECOWAS also
cautioned that if the parties do not adhere to this call, it will be
constrained to deploy an intervention force into Liberia. Initially,
the Government frowned on the call for cease-fire, noting that it is
poised for an all out offensive to get rid of LURD once and for all,
and that a cease-fire will give them an opportunity to regroup.
Further, the Government characterized LURD as a terrorist group, and
advancing the position that it cannot negotiate with terrorists. LURD
on the other hand, in a press release issued about three weeks ago, has
declared a unilateral cease-fire, stating that it will not attack any
new positions, but will hold those areas under its control and defend
them when attacked. Notwithstanding, war is still being waged in
Liberia. Hence the political climate in Liberia is very grim and is
deteriorating with a potential of posing yet another threat to the
peace and stability of the West African subregion.
good governance, human rights, and the rule of law: \3\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\3\ Ibid.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Exacerbating the problem of security and reconciliation, are the
increasing concerns over the internal governance of the country.
Increasingly, questions are been raised of the growing violations of
human rights and fundamental liberties in Liberia with impunity, of the
lack of respect for the rule of law, and the lack of accountability and
transparency in government. Increasingly, the Government seems to be
closing the political space for civil society organizations and
activists, including human rights advocates and the press. The arrest
and detention of Counsellor Frances Johnson Morris, former Chief
Justice of the Supreme Court and director of the Catholic Justice and
Peace Commission, the arrest of Counsellor Tiawon Gongloe, a human
rights lawyer, the closure of the Analyst newspapers, the summoning of
the Manager of the Catholic Radio program ``Radio Veritas'' and the
confiscation of the stations' cassette of a recorded program, all
without due process of law, demonstrates the low level of political
space and tolerance for divergent opinions and viewpoints.
u.n. sanctions: \4\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\4\ Ibid.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
With the failure of the Taylor Government to properly address the
challenges of security and national reconciliation, the country
suddenly found itself entangled in two developments. Firstly, the
International Community accused the Government of President Taylor of
engaging in conduct that allegedly posed a threat to the peace and
stability of the West African subregion. Specifically, the President
was accused of fueling the war in neighboring Sierra Leone through the
supply of arms to the Revolutionary United Front (RUF) in exchange of
diamonds. Led by the United States and the Great Britain, the Security
Council of the United Nations imposed sanctions on Liberia--a ban on
the importation of arms into Liberia (note that the ban imposed by the
ECOWAS as part of its Peace Plan for Liberia was never lifted); a ban
on the exportation of diamonds from Liberia; and the imposition of
travel restrictions on key officials of the Government.
While it is true that the sanctions imposed by the U.N. Security
Council is primarily directed at President Taylor and his Government,
it has indirect repercussions on the lives of ordinaty Liberians. The
imposition of sanctions have had a chilling and negative impact on the
bilateral relations between Liberia and several other countries from
which it traditional receives economic and development aid. It is
through these bilateral programs that Liberia had in the past addressed
its economic and social development agenda, such as light, safe
drinking water, schools, health care, roads and communication among
others. Such economic aid is all the more imperative for a country
emerging war, with most of its infrastructure, economy and institutions
virtually destroyed.
The development indicators for Liberia are very grim: A United
Nations Development Programs (UNDP) human development index ranks
Liberia at 174th out of 177 developing countries; the literacy rate is
less than 35%; the life expectancy at birth is pegged at 43 years; and
with over 85% of its population living in abject poverty. It appears to
me that with the imposition of sanctions, many of Liberia's traditional
partners have scaled down and in some cases cut off all bilateral
assistance to Liberia that would have otherwise inured to the benefit
of the masses.
the lurd attacks \5\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\5\ Ibid.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The second proximate result of the failure of the Taylor Government
to properly address the challenges of security and national
reconciliation, was the emergence of LURD attacks, whatever way one may
want to characterize it, is inherently brutal and violent. Those
against whom the war is directed are the least to face the brunt of the
suffering. Instead, Innocent people, the elderly, women and children
are the real victims; some get killed by the bullets or by the
starvation, deprivation and denial occasioned by the conflict, while
others are injured and maimed. Properties are destroyed, and the
inhabitants are forced to flee from the only place they know as home,
either internally as displaced persons or externally as refugees. The
consequences of a rebel war cannot all be placed squarely at the foot
of the rebels. Sometimes, more damage ensues out of Government's
counter attack to repel a rebel attack. What ever the cause is, as
between the rebels and the Government, a stage is set for a massive
humanitarian crisis. So is the case with the LURD incursion into
Liberia. The LURD dissident attacks have been going on for nearly three
years now, during which hundreds of people have died, while thousands
have been internally displaced or forced to flee from their homes into
neighboring countries as refugees. According to UNHCR sources, over
18,000 Liberians have crossed into Sierra Leone as refugees since the
Lofa and the Bomi attacks. The level of starvation and deprivations in
the areas affected by the conflict is reminiscent of the 1990 civil
war.
One may ask the question therefore, as to whether or not, it is
productive for LURD to keep launching sporadic attacks on innocent
civilians, in areas far removed from the seat of Government, causing
deaths and massive humanitarian suffering of innocent civilians,
especially the elderly, women and children, without any real military
gains. Broadcasts over BBC of military attacks and gains by LURD, only
to be reversed in less than twenty four hours by the government, at the
expense of lives and properties, is in my mind, counterproductive,
inhumane and politically incorrect. Liberia cannot go through such a
cycle of violence, while her counterparts in the subregion are
consolidating democratic gains at the polls and developing their
respective countries.
combined impact of sanctions and lurd attacks on the democratization
process in liberia: \6\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\6\ Ibid.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Continued LURD attacks against the Government coupled with
sanctions and the deteriorating economic conditions in Liberia will
adversely affect the time table for general and presidential elections
and the process of democratization in Liberia. Under the Constitution
and laws of Liberia, the President shall hold office for a period of
six years, and shall leave unless re-elected through a general
election. Hence the next general and Presidential election is slated
for October 2003. However, there are a number of legal and
constitutional hurdles in the path leading to the 2003 general and
presidential elections. These include the question of: (1) a national
census; (2) the demarcation of constituencies for voting purposes and
the determination of the number of representatives to the Legislature
from each county, (3) security; and (4) the state of emergency recently
declared by the government.
(1) National census and the determination of the number of
representatives:
The the Constitution of Liberia requires the taking of a national
census so as to determine the numerical population for the demarcation
of constituencies and the determination of the number of
representatives from each county for the Legislature. This is all the
more crucial when taken against the background that: (1) no census has
been taken in Liberia since the seventies; (2) when the 1997 elections,
dubbed as special elections, reverted to the allocations in the
Legislature obtained from the 1986 general elections, with no regard
for population increases, decreases, or movements; (3) two new counties
have been created since the 1997 elections by the Taylor Government,
resulting in a concomitant decrease in the population of the counties
from which these new counties were carved. The Constitution requires
that for each 20,000 people, there shall be one representative. The
Elections Commission determines the number of constituencies based on a
national census. While it is also true that the National legislature
can increase or decrease the number or the ratio of people in a
constituency to a representative, the power to do so is triggered only
upon the results of a national census. In the absence of a national
census therefore, how can a determination be made of the allocation of
representatives for the new counties, as well as other counties where
there have been substantial population movements.
Of further concern is the political utility of a national census
considering the demographic landscape of Liberia since the civil war.
Assume for instance, that a national census is taken prior to
elections; is it politically correct to use the figures obtained
therefrom as a basis for the allocation of seats in the Legislature,
especially where it results to a reduction in the existing allocations,
when there has been massive population movements occasioned by the
civil war, the recent rebel incursions and dissident attacks, as for
example in Lofa, Gbarpolu, Grand Cape Mount and Bomi Counties? These
issues require a national evolving from participation of all the
stakeholders, especially opposition political parties, the leaders of
some of which are currently out of the country.
(2) Question of Security:
As indicated elsewhere in this paper, one of the reasons why the
ECOWAS Peace Plan called for the restructuring of the security
apparatus of Liberia was not only to create the enabling environment
for all Liberians to participate in the elections, without fear of
intimidation and molestation, but also to consolidate peace, stability,
and the democratization process in Liberia after elections in a manner
that would have induced those who lost the elections to remain in
Liberia, as well as Liberian in the subregion and abroad to return home
after the elections and contribute to the development of the nation.
Since this was not done, and a paramilitary force dominated by former
fighters of President Taylor formed instead, thousands of Liberians
both in the subregion and diverse other parts, refused to return home
for the 1997 elections, and many have remained abroad since then. Since
the 1997 elections, thousands of Liberians have again left the country,
out of fear and insecurity. More recently, there has been additional
exodus of Liberians into the subregion, as result of the LURD attacks
in lower Lofa, and Bomi Counties.
That the enforcement competence of Abuja seized with the
inauguration of the Taylor Government in 1997 and the reaffirmation of
the Liberian Constitution by the National legislature, is not legally
debatable. However, it is necessaly to recognize that the underlying
objectives of Abuja not having being achieved, and peace and stability
at home still remaining elusive as a consequence thereof, there is a
need to implement what all the parties to the Liberian conflict had
agreed upon under Abuja to create the enabling environment for the 2003
elections. It is inconceivable to expect opposition politicians living
abroad, or anyone aspiring to the presidency, including heads of former
factions, and indeed thousands of Liberians living abroad, to have any
level of confidence in the existing security institutions established
by the government, substantial enough to induce them to return to
Liberia either to mount a meaningful challenge to President Taylor in
the ensuing elections, or to effectively participate in the electoral
process, without an overhaul of the security apparatus.
(3) State of Emergency:
The February 8, 2002 declaration of a state of emergency in Liberia
by the Government has a chilling effect on Liberia's democratic and
economic future. Firstly, if the LURD rebel attacks persist, the state
of emergency declared by the Government will remain in place as long as
it is necessary to contain the attacks and remove the threat it poses
to the peace and stability of Liberia. Such a situation will either
reduce the period available for aspiring politicians to return to
Liberia and to canvass and participate in the elections, or it may lead
to the postponement of the 2002 elections. Secondly, the declaration of
the states of emergency, has occasioned a new wave of violations of
human rights and other fundamental liberties, especially freedom of
expression and of the press, thereby undermining democratic values and
potentially creating a condition of fear and insecurity.
Government's Action: Over the past few months, the Government has
made several overtures, and stressed on each occasion that the action
was demonstrative of its commitment to peace, national reconciliation
and the holding of a free and fair elections in 2003. Firstly, the
Government granted a general amnesty to all Liberian opposition leaders
living abroad and encouraged them to return home to contribute to the
political process. Secondly, the Government ordered the re-opening of
the Radio Veritas, a shortwave station, owned and operated by the
Catholic diocese of Liberia. It also ordered the Star Radio, put in
place during the 1997 elections, opened so as to facilitate the
creation of a plain level field during the 2003 elections. Both Radio
Veritas and Star Radio have been closed for a protracted period as a
result of allegations that their broadcasts were anti-government.
Thirdly, the Government released all political prisoners who were
serving jail sentences without any pre-conditions, and mandated its
Ministry of Justice to drop charges against those indicted for treason
or other political offences, including those charged but not yet
arrested, all without pre-conditions. In addition, the Government has
resolved to host a national reconciliation conference in June 2003 in
Monrovia so as to resolve those vexing political issues that pose
obstacles to national reconciliation peace and stability in Liberia.
The Government, realizing the linkage between security at home, and
peace and stability, have also called for international assistance in
restructuring the national army, the Armed Forces of Liberia.
Notwithstanding, the Government consistently undermines and negates
its own progress by engaging in conduct unbecoming of a government
committed to democracy and respect for the rule of law. The arrest and
detention of Counsellor Frances Johnson Morris, former Chief Justice of
the Supreme Court and director of the Catholic Justice and Peace
Commission, the arrest of Counsellor Tiawon Gongloe, a human rights
lawyer, the closure of the Analyst newspaper, the summoning of the
Manager of the Catholic Radio program ``Radio Veritas'' Redgewood
Rennie, and the confiscation of the stations' cassette of a recorded
program of an opposition figure, all without due process of law,
demonstrates the low level of political space and tolerance for
divergent opinions and viewpoints. These latest conduct have cast a
dark cloud on the capacity of the Government to even attract a broad
based participation in the ensuing national reconciliation conference
scheduled for July, 2002. The Government is yet to address the vexing
concerns over the egregious and persistent violations of human rights
in Liberia and the muzzling of human rights and pro democracy
advocates, and to commit itself to ensuring that such excesses will
stop; and that those involved are investigated, tried and punished if
found guilty.
the dilemma of ordinary liberians and the international response: \7\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\7\ Ibid.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The people of Liberia are in a dilemma. In 1997 after a devastating
and bloody civil war, they went to the polls, under international
supervision, and elected Charles Ghangay Taylor as President. Under the
Constitution of Liberia, power is inherent in the people, and the
people have the right to change their government whenever their safety
and happiness requires it. There now seems to be a consensus among most
Liberians that the best way to exercise this constitutional power is
through a democratic process by means of the ballot box. That
opportunity will not come until October 2003, or it may not come at all
until years after, depending on the Liberian people themselves and the
position of the international community on Liberia. The dilemma is
obvious.
On the one hand, Liberians have a President and a Government that
they are stuck with for the next eighteen months and perhaps even
longer in spite of the vexing questions of security, national
reconciliation, and the lack of resources to address the myriad of
social and economic problems confronting them; on the other, Liberians
are faced with a rebel incursions, the consequences of which have
relegated them to internal and external displacement, suffering and
deprivation. Still on another front, Liberians are faced with sanctions
and the resultant effect of reduced bilateral assistance, as a result
of which post conflict reconstruction and development never took off
ground. In spite of this dilemma, the international community seems to
project the view that once sanctions have been imposed on Liberia
because of the alleged conduct of their president, the fate of the
Liberian people have become irrelevant and immaterial. As a staffer on
the House International Relations Subcommittee succinctly put it, ``the
fate of the ordinary Liberians is linked to the fate of Charles
Taylor.''
The isolation of Liberia by the international community is not only
limited to the trivialization of the plight of the Liberian peoples. It
has affected Liberia's position in the subregion. In spite of the
recognized fact that the peace and stability in the Mano River
subregion is interlinked, and that instability in any one of the three
countries, has the potential of destabilizing the others, the
international community has elected to approach the re-establishment of
peace and security within the subregion from a ``pocket approach'', as
opposed to a comprehensive approach. Led by Great Britain, the
international community has become fully engaged in Sierra Leone, and
under its supervision, successful disarmament, encampment,
demobilization and reintegration of former fighters have taken place.
In less than two months the people of Sierra Leone will be going to the
polls to put into place yet another democratically elected government.
In Guinea, with a government notorious for its human rights violations
and anti democratic tendencies, the United States is engaged with the
training of the national army. Liberia, on the other hand, remains a
``ten foot pole'', which neither Great Britain nor the United States
wants to do business with. The international community even seems
oblivious to efforts by the leaders of the three countries to normalize
relations and bring peace to the subregion as is evidenced by the
recent meeting in Rabat, Morocco and by the follow up meetings of their
respective Ministers of foreign affairs. Considering the porous nature
of the borders of the Mano River states, the tribal and ethnic
affiliations, and the immediate past relationships between the warring
factions operating in these countries, the desirability of turning a
blind eye on instability in Liberia, and focusing on Sierra Leone and
Guinea, is at best specious, and remains troubling, for it has the
potential of unraveling achievements made once the international
community departs.
the role of the international community:
If Liberia is a failed state today, some of the causes emanate from
actions taken or not taken by the international community at the
appropriate times or period. Perhaps out of fatigue with the intractile
peace process under the supervision of ECOWAS during the Liberian civil
war, those things that would have induced peace and guaranty security
and security in Liberia were not addressed fully.
1. There was no effective disarmament, encampment and
demobilization in Liberia prior to the 1997 general and
presidential elections. Hence there were over 60,000 former
combatants, traumatized and poorly integrated into the
political and democratic process in Liberia. With no skills, no
opportunities, these former combatants are easy targets for
recruitment back into the bush either by the Government or by
LURD. They also account for substantial percentage of the human
rights violations in Liberia.
2. The international community failed to ensure the
implementation of a vital provision of the Abuja agreement
calling for the restructuring of the army and the security
apparatus, prior to the internationally supervised 1997
elections. As a result, the elected Government went ahead and
constituted the security apparatus in a manner that they have
not created the necessary security environment appreciable
enough to induce opposition political leaders, trained
technocrats, and diverse groups of Liberians to return home to
contribute to the democratization process in Liberia.
3. The international community has in a way abandoned
Liberia. There has been very little international support for
Liberia's post conflict reconstruction and development,
especially so when the country's infrastructure, economy and
institutions were virtually destroyed. Hence the Government the
economic and social development agenda of Liberia, such as
light, safe drinking water, schools, health care, roads and
communication among others remain in shambles even as I speak.
4. The failure to condemn LURD, or to intercede in the
conflict so as to bring about a lasting cease-fire, especially
in the face of the massive humanitarian crisis its war efforts
is generating in Liberia against a democratically elected
government, while at the same time imposing a ban on the
importation of arms by the Government to defend itself and the
people of Liberia, a constitutional imposed duty.
5. Lack of U.S. interest and leadership role in Liberia. The
insistence on a policy of containment, believing that with
increasing sanctions and international isolation, there will be
a change in Liberia has not achieved the desired results. This
policy trivializes the impact of containment on the plight of
ordinary Liberians, and links the fate of ordinary to that of
the Government.
recommendations:
There are some key initiatives that can dramatically turn around
the trend of events in Liberia and put it on a path toward
democratization and sustained peace.
1. The Government of the United States must not rely solely on the
policy of ``containment and increasing isolation of Liberia'' as the
only avenue toward bringing change in the political direction of the
Country. Secondly, efforts at bringing durable peace, stability and
security in Liberia cannot be left to ECOWAS entirely. Growing out of
our experiences with ECOWAS intervention in the Liberia civil war,
regional politics combined with tribal and ethnic affiliations, will
continue to have negative impact and effectively undermine actions by
ECOWAS.
Accordingly, we recommend that the United States Government take a
leadership role in Liberia, just as the British did in Sierra Leone,
and help evolve a process that will bring Liberia back to a course of
democratization.
2. The first step in evolving such a process is to help create the
enabling environment in Liberia for security, stability, and sustained
peace. There are several elements in this step:
a. The United States must take a leadership role in creating
a ``contact group'' as suggested by the International Crisis
Group (ICG) and Human Rights Watch to supervise this process.
b. The contact group, once created, should call upon the
Government and LURD to declare an immediate cease-fire, and
enter into immediate dialogue or negotiations with the view of
resolving the conflict. These discussions must include
representation from political both at home and from abroad. We
urge the international community to deploy an intervention
force into Liberia, if the Government and LURD or either of
them, refuse to adhere to this call.
c. One of the crucial agenda items for discussions on Liberia
by the contact group is the issue of security. There will be no
lasting peace in Liberia if the security apparatus of the
Government is not dismantled. Hence the contact group must
obtain consensus from all parties to deploy an international
force on the ground in Liberia, with a mandate to:
monitor the cease-fire;
take over the entire security apparatus of the
country;
disarm all combatants including the Police, the
Army, the ATU and other security apparatus.
The composition of the force must not be limited to ECOWAS, and
the state of emergency imposed by the Government must be lifted
upon arrival of the intervention force.
d. The question of governance and the status of democratic
institutions in Liberia between now and the period of general
elections must be discussed. These include the Elections
Commission, the Judiciary, the prosecutorial arm of Government,
and the control over the nations resources and finances.
e. Finally the contact group must visit the question of the
General and Presidential elections and obtain a consensus on
such crucial hurdles such as census, representation, and number
of constituencies, and provide resources to facilitate the
process.
3. The United States Government must strengthen civil society in
Liberia to enable them make informed and reasoned decisions about the
democratization process in Liberia. Crucial areas are support for the
press, human rights institutions and advocates, and other pro democracy
organizations. We recommend support for these organizations as well as
the strengthening of political parties, and the re-activation of the
Human Rights Commission.
Thank you.
Senator Feingold. Thank you for your well-informed, candid
testimony. I thank all of you, and I will have some questions
now, starting with Ms. Nowrojee. Your testimony notes the
recent proliferation of militia forces in Liberia with
relationships to the ruling party. What might be the motive for
privatizing some of the state's use of force? Does the
Government of Liberia want to disassociate itself from some
policies that it still finds expedient, and what are some of
the human rights consequences of this?
Ms. Nowrojee. I think it is a combination of a number of
things. I think first of all the militia groups are being
headed by very trusted former NPFL, former Charles Taylor rebel
affiliates who are now businessmen, or they are not
particularly in government, and so they are being called up to
organize the boys that were under them previously.
Another thing is, I think that since the sanctions have
come into effect the Taylor government's revenues have been
squeezed because they no longer have access to Sierra Leonian
diamonds, so if you proliferate your formal armed forces you
have to pay them, and even that he is not currently doing, so
what is being done now is basically giving militia groups a
green light to basically loot and support themselves.
We interviewed three former child soldiers who were under
training just outside of Monrovia who were going to be
redeployed to the field, and they were basically being given
$250 cash as a sign-up, and then what they looted was theirs to
keep, and that seems to be the terms of the agreement, whereas
if you enroll them in the armed forces you have to do a little
more than that.
Senator Feingold. And in terms of the human rights
consequences?
Ms. Nowrojee. The human rights consequences are extremely
detrimental for a number of reasons. First of all, a lot of
these are former child soldiers who have a history of
committing atrocities from the war. They are also receiving
little training. There is also no accountability for their
actions, and there is no ability for civilians to lodge
complaints or to file any mechanism to actually keep them in
check, so it is very dangerous, and then above and beyond that,
they are so shadowy it is close to impossible--we tried to get
a sense of what the military command was, or if there was any
coordination or cooperation. It is much harder for human rights
groups to get a handle on the military structure.
Senator Feingold. Fair enough. For you as well as for Mr.
Sannoh, what role should accountability for human rights abuses
play in Liberia's political future? You addressed some of this,
but I am wondering, is the issue prominent in discussion among
members of civil society and the political opposition? Do you
expect that average Liberians will demand some degree of
justice and accountability in a post conflict democratically
governed Liberia?
I will start with you Ms. Nowrojee.
Ms. Nowrojee. I think most Liberians unfortunately are busy
with the day-to-day struggles of survival, so you do not see an
overwhelming call for accountability, but clearly the lack of
justice is on people's minds. It does not take long being in
Liberia to just see how people's hopes have been whittled away,
people who have been refugees once, who have come back, have
rebuilt their houses, been chased away again, so justice would
be a very welcome thing.
On the other hand, it is not something, a rallying point
around which the society is crying for. However, I think it is
the key to beginning to put a check on the cycle of violence we
are seeing repeating itself again and again. I see this special
court for Sierra Leone as being a very important actor now in
beginning to provide an out for the sort of checkmate that we
are in now, because I do not hold out much hope for the
elections.
I hope what happens in the next election is not what
happened in the last elections, where the international
community descends on the place in large numbers, observes a
quote-unquote fair and free election because there is no
ballot-stuffing, but does not take into consideration the
context within which such an election is being held, so I do
not hold out much hope for the next election.
I do not hold out much hope for LURD offering any future
that is any different, if you look at some of the characters
that are in LURD, particularly, for instance, somebody like
Charles Julu, who was the commander-in-chief of the armed
forces under the Doe administration. You see a history of equal
atrocities, you know, people with checkered records on either
side.
The special court provides an out, because if there is an
indictment for Liberian officials who have played a detrimental
role in Sierra Leone, you can, through the rule of law and
through an international institution, begin to remove some of
those faces and create a space for the opposition, which is
currently divided and very cowed, to begin to move in, and that
might be the beginning of a brighter future.
Senator Feingold. I appreciate what you said about the
special court in Sierra Leone. I have devoted a fair amount of
effort to urging it along both in terms of what it would mean
with regard to Sierra Leone, but also some of the things you
are talking about, the larger accountability, and I appreciate
that very much.
Mr. Sannoh, would you like to comment on that issue?
Mr. Sannoh. Yes, Mr. Chairman. It would be an
understatement to say that the Liberian people are not as
active as they should be in the process of democratization.
Those who observed the process in Liberia, especially up to the
elections, there was a high level of civil society involvement
in the process in Liberia. Since 1997 there has been a decrease
in the level of civil society activity, and some of this
decrease has been attributed to fear, intimidation, arrest of
human rights advocates. We had up to 14 human rights
organizations operating in Liberia up to the elections. After
the elections, it has come down to about three or four human
rights organizations working on the ground.
Now, on the issue of accountability, that was a position
that was disclosed immediately after the elections. When the
Liberian Human Rights Commission was constituted, one of the
questions we had faced, because I happened to have come up with
an original draft of that particular provision, one of our
concerns was, where do we go from here?
Do we go back and begin to review all of the atrocities
that are being committed and give that responsibility to this
Human Rights Commission, or shall we establish a Human Rights
Commission and give it a mandate so that it can move forward
from today, and not to be bogged down with what happened in the
past, and let the political decisions be made as to what
Liberia is going to do with the atrocities that have been
committed in Liberia?
Mr. Chairman, the problem here is, if President Taylor had
not emerged in the 1997 elections, then the issue of
accountability would have been on the fore of the agenda in
Liberia, but because Taylor led a rebel group, along with
several other groups in Liberia, there have been no incentive
for a government that had a rebel group imagined as winning the
elections to spearhead a process of accountability, and the
international community has not pressed on that issue, so that
is a problem of accountability. It is like throwing it under
the rock, and we are faced with that.
That still remains under the rock, but the Liberian people
are yearning for peace, they are yearning for democracy, and
that is why we keep stressing the call to empower the civil
society so that Liberians can be well-informed to make good
decisions about their own country.
Senator Feingold. Let me follow that with a couple of
questions for you, Mr. Sannoh, about the elections. There is
some skepticism or some pessimism expressed here about the next
round of elections. I think Ms. Nowrojee just suggested that.
How would you assess the current pre-election climate in
Liberia? Is there any chance at all of a reasonably free and
fair election in 2003? For example, do you think citizens will
have regular access to independent sources of information? Any
comments?
Mr. Sannoh. In my presentation I identified one of the key
issues to having elections in 2003, and that is the issue of
security. If we do not establish the enabling environment in
Liberia, then of course the road to 2003 is going to remain
bumpy. There is a state of emergency in place, and the more we
go into the period for elections from now until 2003 is about a
year and some few months. There has to be adequate time for
political parties to regroup, to converse in Liberia. Many of
these political parties are outside Liberia, the leaders are
outside Liberia. They cannot come back to Liberia because of
the security situation.
Now, if we get up one morning and we say, well, let us go
to elections tomorrow, and we do not have the participation of
those political parties or leaders who are in exile because
they cannot go back to Liberia as a result of the security
situation, then you are going to have a problem, and that is
why I keep stressing on, if we want to proceed with the process
of democratization in Liberia, the first step should be to
ensure that an enabling environment is created, that we induce
Liberians to go back home and participate in the process.
Senator Feingold. I think that answer is closely related to
my next question, which was to be, what is to stop a repeat of
the election scenario from 1997? I am told that many Liberians
felt their choice was to vote for Mr. Taylor or endure more
conflict. Would you talk about security? Are you really saying
that there is still a fear of the consequences that might
follow should President Taylor fail to win reelection?
Mr. Sannoh. Assuming Mr. Taylor remains as President up to
elections, and elections are conducted and he loses the
election, if the security apparatus remains as it is, I cannot
predict what would happen, but I do not see it as a beautiful
situation.
If you have an international force on the ground and Taylor
loses the election, it is more likely that he would abide by
the results, and when you talk about in 1997 elections, I have
heard people say that if we have elections tomorrow Taylor
would win, that may be true, but as the State Department
representative testified, when the Liberian people went to the
polls in 1997 it was immediately after the war. As a matter of
fact, in many, many areas there were still rebels roaming
through the villages and everything, and so these people voted
for peace.
It is true, Taylor won the elections. It was a free
election, Taylor won the elections, but there is no guarantee--
I cannot say that if elections are held in Liberia tomorrow, in
light of all of the problems that the country has been through,
in light of the fact that many Liberians are beginning to
believe that the problems they are having is because of Mr.
Taylor, that the results would be the same.
As to what is required to make the process happen, to make
it free and fair so that Liberians can make a decision for
themselves as to who they are going to vote for, eventually it
has to be left to the Liberian people to decide who they want
to be their President.
Senator Feingold. The way this is usually presented to me
is that Mr. Taylor won in the previous election because people
were afraid that if he did not win, that terrible things would
be done to them by Mr. Taylor. Is that accurate history?
Mr. Sannoh. Well, let me just go back. If you have followed
the Liberian situation, in 1996 there was a civil disturbance
in Liberia because of problems that came out of the Abuja
agreements. Prior to that, Liberia was divided, fractionalized
among the various factions, and each of these factions had
territories that they were controlling. With the composition of
the LNTG, all of these areas, many of the warring factions or
rebels deserted these areas.
As a result of the April 1996 crisis, when the fighting was
going on in Liberia, Taylor went around and tried to recapture,
to have his forces in most of the areas he had lost. Now, there
was a fear that if elections did not proceed and another round
of fighting ensued in Liberia, Taylor would have been at a
better footing in that process, and so during the course of the
elections and again, from their own experience, when people say
they were afraid that if Taylor does not win the election he
will go right back to fighting, that is why we have fears. That
is why we have fears. We cannot say it is imaginary.
Second, most people believe that if we can see this young
man to launch in Liberia and fight for several years, he must
have an agenda for Liberia, so perhaps let us give him an
opportunity to see what he can do.
Now that the Liberian people have seen what he has done,
that is why we say, let them be the determinants of their own
future, whether they are actually going to vote for Mr. Taylor
the second time around, but the 2003 elections will be entirely
different elections from 1997 if the process is free and fair
and it is given the type of international support and money
that it needs.
Senator Feingold. Thank you for that interesting answer.
Let me go to Ms. Anderson. I recently read about the
destruction of a hospital in Bong County, a casualty of
fighting between the Liberian Armed Forces and the LURD. In
this kind of situation, or in this situation, are humanitarian
and civilian institutions like hospitals and schools being
targeted in the conflict, or is this kind of a circumstance
more incidental, a consequence of what happened?
Ms. Anderson. I would probably say a combination of the
two. As my other colleagues alluded to, oftentimes fighters are
able to sort of pick out portions of the country to loot and to
raid, so that means including the looting and raiding hospitals
for medical supplies and also storehouses for food. So yes,
sometimes, hospitals and other humanitarian sites including and
especially food warehouses can be targeted.
We ourselves have experienced, at different times, attacks
on our own facilities, particularly our agriculture sites, and
our food warehouses. But oftentimes a lot of this is often a
casualty of just cross-fire, and so what happens usually is
that somebody hears a shot--or you hear a lot of skirmishes
perhaps 10 miles away--you immediately evacuate and clear out
your staff and as much equipment and supplies as possible. But
human beings are more important than commodities. Usually, what
happens is that people leave, and then the supplies the
soldiers would like are right there ready for them, so it is a
combination of the two.
Senator Feingold. Again for you, what role does the
Liberian Refugees Repatriation and Resettlement Commission play
in caring for the internally displaced in Liberia? It is a
politicized organization? Is the information accurate, and does
it act in the interest of the displaced, or in the interest of
the government?
Ms. Anderson. The LRRRC we have found has been a very
cooperative and collaborative partner in Liberia. I met with
several of those officials myself, and found that they were
members of the government who had a genuine and sincere concern
for the people of Liberia. They also were not in the inner
circle of Charles Taylor as well. Nevertheless, their hands are
tied because of declining international assistance to them.
When I had visited Liberia a couple of months back that,
some international officials claimed that their numbers were
inflated, but what I found most often when I talked with a
variety of international officials was that nobody really
wanted to admit the severity of the displacement and the
severity of the crisis because of the lack of international
political will, so LRRRC might have high numbers, but the
numbers are really not necessarily that far off.
Again, they were genuinely, sincerely concerned about the
plight of the Liberian people because they themselves were
suffering. The majority of the civil servants in Liberia have
not been paid for the past 14 months, and that is a report I
got recently from our national director. As of yesterday they
have not been paid, so they themselves are suffering.
And again, LRRRC, they were sincerely and genuinely
supportive in trying to work with NGOs to coordinate assistance
that was going throughout Liberia. Nevertheless, instability as
well as declining international assistance has made it
difficult.
Senator Feingold. I appreciate all of your patience. I just
want to ask one final question for whichever of you would like
to answer, and we have already talked about, and I appreciate
your candor with regard to the fact that some of you feel that
certainly the American efforts with regard to supporting civil
society are not adequate at this point, and I suspect that is
true.
And so often when we examine states with truly abusive and
corrupt governments, we have to pin our hopes on civil society
as we search for partners in an effort to improve conditions
for civilians and strengthen institutions and bolster the rule
of law. But this requires a civil society capable of working
together, rather than one that is full of opposing camps that
are just competing for power. So I guess I would like you to
comment on how politicized the Liberian civil society is in its
current state.
Mr. Sannoh. Let me start. Let me just say something briefly
about even the present level of assistance. The U.S. policy is
right now, instead of providing assistance directly to the
government, they would like to do it through UCIT. UCIT is on
the ground. UCIT has a policy where they cannot deal directly
with local NGOs on the ground. They would like to use
international NGOs as implementing partners.
Now, when you come to the issue of civil society and the
process of democratization in Liberia, there is no
international NGO on the ground in Liberia. NGI was there and
they left. AFROS was there for the elections. They left. So in
other words, if UCIT has money for civil society development
and democratization, then the money sits down, and last year
alone UCIT was left with about $574,000 that would have been
used for civil society development that was never implemented,
so that is a problem that really supersedes the issue of
politicization of the civil society, and again, perhaps the
problem is the lack of inertia because of the political stance
of the United States toward Liberia.
Perhaps those overtures are extending to UCIT so that UCIT
is factoring a political position in determining how to proceed
with the civil society movement or development, and also the
lack of interest in international NGOs, those involving
democracy, to go back to Liberia and begin to work.
Now, on the issue of politics between NGOs, nongovernmental
organizations on the ground in Liberia, that is not really a
factor in Liberia. There has been a lot of collaboration among
the various NGOs. There is collaboration within the human
rights community. We have the human rights center all of the
human rights organizations are a part of, even though we
operate individual organizations, but when it comes to major
issues there is a high level of collaboration on that, as
collaboration on the level of religious groups, the Interfaith
Mediation Committee. They have been very, very active for peace
in Liberia. They have been involved in reconciliation efforts,
so these institutions are there, they just need to be
empowered.
You look at the press, we have a very powerful press union.
The only problem they have is that a couple of times the press
is closed and thrown into jail and somebody needs to stand up
there to give them a type of moral support and assistance.
So the question of politics and the internal wrangling
between the NGOs is not a problem in Liberia in my own view.
Ms. Anderson. I might also just add, in terms of the
comment on NGOs, both international NGOs, of which World Vision
is one, as well as local NGOs, I think that if you do increase
humanitarian assistance, electoral NGOs like NDI will go. They
will go, but what we are finding is that you have diminishing
amounts of money actually being channeled toward democracy and
governance, so therefore NGOs cannot necessarily make their
costs, both their own internal costs and being able to work and
facilitate civil society organizations on the ground, and then
it is very difficult to run an operation there.
So we ourselves are finding from a humanitarian standpoint
that it is very difficult to run an operation when you are only
given a limited amount of funds, so you eventually do have to
fold up and leave, and because of the declining U.S. Government
assistance, particularly in democratization and governance--I
talked with aid officials whilst I was in Liberia. They
basically said, well, there is no free press so we cannot
really sponsor press unions, and I found when I interviewed and
talked with journalists while I was there that people were
willing to put their lives on the line, but they were not being
supported, so it is sort of a chicken and egg. Do you provide
the funding or not?
I would say you provide the funding and the international
NGOs as well as local Liberian NGOs will step up to the plate,
because I also found that people were very united, because the
suffering is universal.
Ms. Nowrojee. I would just add to that and say that the
types of support should not only be financial. I mean, I think
the civil society groups range from sort of very sort of
nascent and emerging groups, the few corrupt groups, and then
some excellent and really active work going on, and what some
of these Liberian groups lack in terms of experience or
exposure, they make up for in courage and bravery, and I am
always amazed at how much they are willing to take in terms of
being tossed into prison, being interrogated, being tortured,
being forced to flee the country, and they continue.
These human rights groups basically started around the time
of the war, and it is interesting in the safe haven created by
the West African peacekeepers in that regard, Dave Peterson
from National Endowment for Democracy is a real unsung hero in
this, because he took a chance on a lot of these people at a
time when nobody really knew who they were, what they were
doing, and what has emerged now is a really vibrant community
of human rights activists and independent media people.
And I think that when we talk about greater support for
civil society, it should not only be financial. It is not just
an issue of money. It is also an issue of providing them with
protection, providing them with exposure, providing them with
protection, the whole idea of providing them with radios,
access to the public to be able to hear their message. It
should be multifaceted, and then it will sift out, the sort of
genuine and very active ones will come to the fore, and others
will sift down.
Senator Feingold. Thank you. I want to thank all of you for
your help today. Liberia was the first African country that I
ever visited in 1994, when I was a new member of this
subcommittee, with Chairman Paul Simon, and it was a difficult
situation then. Obviously it is very difficult now, but the
purpose of these hearings, when we refer to certain countries
as failed states, or weak states, is not to suggest that that
is their permanent status.
In fact, I believe it would be an immoral policy for this
country to regard any nation, particularly an old friend of the
United States like Liberia, as a permanently failed state. The
purpose of that kind of a label and the purpose of these
hearings is to awaken Members of Congress and policymakers to
the fact that to allow such situations to persist is not only
immoral but dangerous for the United States, and I believe we
have seen some of that in our analysis of what happened on
September 11, and so that is the purpose of these hearings, and
I think this was an extremely good one, and I assure you that
as long as I am a member of this subcommittee, certainly,
whether as chairman or otherwise, I will continue to want to
work with each of you on the future of Liberia, and I
congratulate you on your efforts.
This concludes the hearing.
[Whereupon, at 4:25 p.m., the subcommittee adjourned, to
reconvene subject to the call of the Chair]
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