[Senate Report 107-335]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
107th Congress Calendar No. 747
2d Session Report 107-335
SENATE
======================================================================
NUCLEAR SECURITY ACT OF 2002
_______
November 12, 2002.--Ordered to be printed
_______
Mr. Jeffords, from the Committee on Environment and Public Works,
submitted the following
R E P O R T
together with
ADDITIONAL VIEWS
[to accompany S. 1746]
[Including cost estimate of the Congressional Budget Office]
The Committee on Environment and Public Works, to which was
referred a bill (S. 1746) to amend the Atomic Energy Act of
1954 and the Energy Reorganization Act of 1974 to strengthen
security at sensitive nuclear facilities, having considered the
same, reports favorably thereon with an amendment and
recommends that the bill, as amended, do pass.
General Statement and Background
This bill amends current law\1\ to enhance safety and
security at our nation's commercial nuclear facilities, and to
protect against terrorist use of radiological materials.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\This legislation amends various sections of the Atomic Energy
Act of 1954 (42 U.S.C. 2011 et seq.). It also amends Title II of the
Energy Reorganzation Act of 1974 (42 U.S.C. 5841 et seq.).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The events of September 11, 2001, have required our nation
to reevaluate the adequacy of our existing security measures.
The attacks in New York City and Washington, DC. invalidate
many of our past assumptions about the likelihood and method of
terrorist attack. It is clear that we must take new measures to
protect against those who would target American citizens and
domestic infrastructure. We have a particular responsibility to
ensure that our commercial nuclear resources, including our
nuclear reactors and radioactive materials used for research,
medical and industrial purposes, are not used as weapons of
destruction against us.
The Atomic Energy Act of 1954 assigned to the Atomic Energy
Commission responsibility for protecting public health and
safety from the hazards of radiation produced through nuclear
technology. The Energy Reorganization Act of 1974 abolished the
Atomic Energy Commission and created a new agency, the Nuclear
Regulatory Commission (NRC or Commission), to take over its
regulatory functions.
The Senate Committee on Environment and Public Works has
jurisdiction over the nonmilitary environmental regulation and
control of atomic energy. This includes both legislative and
oversight authority pertaining to the operations of the NRC.
Among the responsibilities entrusted to the Nuclear
Regulatory Commission are regulation of the nation's commercial
nuclear power plants, along with most other civilian uses of
radioactive materials. The mission of the NRC is to conduct an
effective regulatory program that promotes the safe use of
nuclear energy and materials, in a manner that protects the
public health and safety and the human environment, and
promotes the common defense and security.
As stated in the Atomic Energy Act:
. . . the development, use and control of atomic energy
shall be directed so as to make the maximum contribution to the
general welfare, subject at all times to the paramount
objective of making the maximum contribution to the common
defense and security . . .\2\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\2\Atomic Energy Act of 1954, section 1a, 42 U.S.C. 2011a.
As of December 2000, there were 104 commercial nuclear
power reactors licensed to operate by the NRC in 31 States.
Additionally, NRC has regulatory responsibility over seven fuel
fabrication and production facilities; two gaseous diffusion
uranium enrichment facilities; and 14 other facilities that
possess significant quantities of special nuclear material
(other than reactors) or process source material (other than
uranium enrichment facilities). The NRC also administers
approximately 5,000 licenses for medical, academic and
industrial uses of nuclear materials; and has agreements under
which States will administer approximately 16,000 additional
such licenses.
While prevention of accidents necessarily remains a key
component of nuclear safety, the events of September 11th bring
a new urgency to the need to deter and protect against attacks
at our nation's nuclear facilities, and against attempted theft
of radioactive materials.
Following the events of September 11th, the NRC took
immediate action to respond to heightened threat levels and
concerns. It undertook intensive consultation with other
Federal entities, including the FBI, the Office of Homeland
Security, the Department of Defense, the Federal Aviation
Administration and others to evaluate general and specific
threats to NRC licensed facilities, and to coordinate planning
and responsive actions. The NRC has consulted with Governors
regarding the deployment of State assets, including the
National Guard. It has issued a series of Orders to licensees
to enhance security at nuclear facilities. The NRC is also in
the process of conducting what it describes as a comprehensive
review of NRC policies and regulations relating to safeguards
and security.
Since September 11th, the committee has worked closely with
the NRC to monitor changing circumstances and to oversee
activities of the NRC and its licensees. The committee will
continue to work with the agency to ensure that all actions
necessary to protect the public are taken in a timely and
thorough manner.
Objectives of the Legislation
The Nuclear Security Act of 2002 is an important step in
ensuring protection of the public against potential terrorist
activities against commercial nuclear facilities or potential
theft of nuclear materials. While the NRC has voluntarily
undertaken a number of actions, these have been ad hoc
responses to emergency events. The purpose of this legislation
is to codify those actions necessary to protect against attack
on our nation's nuclear reactors and against theft or terrorist
use of radioactive materials, such as for so-called ``dirty
bombs.''
The legislation directs the NRC, in consultation with other
Federal agencies having experience in matters related to
national security, emergency preparedness, and radioactive
response, to undertake a series of actions to upgrade security
at nuclear power plants and to prevent the theft or terrorist
use of sensitive radioactive materials. It also requires the
NRC to update hiring and training standards for plant
employees; conduct and document security response evaluations
at each nuclear facility; and to ensure adequate emergency
planning, evacuation, and other public safety measures in the
event of a radiological release from a sensitive nuclear
facility. It also directs the President to ensure coordinated
Federal action to prevent a terrorist attack.
The legislation gives clear and permanent direction to the
NRC and its licensees, and will provide greater assurance that
NRC will receive the funding it needs to fully implement
essential security measures. The Nuclear Security Act of 2002
will assure the American public that these nuclear facilities
are as safe as they can reasonably be, and will clearly signal
to would-be terrorists that our nuclear facilities are heavily
protected, hardened structures that will make neither easy, nor
desirable, targets.
The committee has worked closely with the NRC since
September 11th to develop this legislation. The committee has
taken extensive testimony on the issues involved and has worked
with industry, public interest groups, private security guards
employed at nuclear facilities, and members of the public. This
legislation represents a carefully considered, bipartisan
response to the threat of U.S. nuclear resources being employed
as weapons of destruction.
Section-by-Section Analysis
Section 1. Short Title
This section provides that the Act may be cited as the
``Nuclear Security Act of 2002.''
Sec. 2. Definitions
This section amends section 11 of the Atomic Energy Act of
1954 to provide definitions for ``Homeland Security Officer,''
``Private Security Force,'' and `` Sensitive Nuclear
Facility.''
Sec. 3. Nuclear Facility Security
This section amends Chapter 14 of the Atomic Energy Act by
adding a new section 170C, ``Protection of Sensitive Nuclear
Facilities.''
New subsection 170C(a) provides definitions for
``Antiterrorism Team,'' ``Federal Security Coordinator,''
``Task Force,'' ``Threat,'' and ``Threat Level.''
New subsection 170C(b) establishes a task force, chaired by
the Chairman of the NRC, to examine and provide recommendations
and findings regarding a broad spectrum of security issues
surrounding nuclear facilities licensed by the NRC, and the use
of nuclear materials licensed by the NRC.
Paragraph (b)(2) specifies the membership of the task
force. The agencies included in the task force are intended by
the committee to include those which have expertise in
intelligence; defense of air space and waterways; road and
transportation access; radiological response; and emergency
preparedness. The committee recognizes that not every one of
these agencies will have expertise in all of the issues
addressed in this subsection. The committee assumes that the
Chairman of the NRC, as chairperson, will structure the task
force so as to best utilize the expertise of each agency in
relation to those issues within their respective jurisdiction.
However, the committee also expects that the task force's
report to Congress and the President will reflect and
incorporate the views of all agencies on the task force, as
appropriate, and if necessary should provide for minority or
dissenting views.
The committee is aware that, since September 11th, the NRC
has been in close consultation with most, if not all of these
agencies. The committee intends that the work of the task force
established in this subsection shall build upon, rather than
duplicate or interfere with, the process of consultation and
coordination that the NRC has already begun with these and
other agencies.
Paragraph (b)(3) addresses the duties of the task force.
The overall duty of the task force is to examine issues
surrounding the protection of sensitive nuclear facilities
against potential terrorist threats, and to report to the
President and Congress with its findings and recommendations.
This paragraph directs the task force to consult with other
Federal, State and local agencies, stakeholders and members of
the public, as appropriate, in making its examination.
This paragraph sets out in detail the matters which the
task force is to examine. These are: how threats to sensitive
nuclear facilities should be classified; how Federal, State and
local security efforts for protection of land, water, and
ground access to sensitive nuclear facilities should be
coordinated; the adequacy of existing emergency planning zones;
the adequacy of Federal, State and local emergency planning and
evacuation zones, and other measures to protect the public
health and safety in the event of a terrorist attack against a
sensitive nuclear facility; the specific threats against which
security forces at sensitive nuclear facilities shall be
required to protect; creation of a system of threat levels
appropriate to sensitive nuclear facilities; the development,
implementation and revision of security plans for sensitive
nuclear facilities; the establishment of an antiterrorism team;
the hiring and training standards that should be applied to
private security forces at sensitive nuclear facilities; how
Federal resources should best be coordinated to expedite and
improve the process of performing employee background checks;
and the creation of a program to provide technical assistance
and training for the National Guard, State law enforcement
agencies, and local law enforcement agencies, to respond to
threats against a sensitive nuclear facility.
Subparagraph (b)(3)(B)(i)(III) requires the task force to
examine the adequacy of all existing emergency planning zones
in the event of a terrorist attack against a sensitive nuclear
facility. The committee intends for this to be a full
examination in light of experiences derived from September
11th, including whether any planning zones should be facility-
specific to take into account population densities or special
obstacles to successful emergency evacuation. The committee
recognizes that concerns have been raised that existing
emergency planning and evacuation zones may not be adequate and
could require expansion, perhaps up to 50 miles. In light of
the increased potential for a terrorist attack, it is expected
that the task force will examine whether such a change is
warranted.
Subparagraph (b)(3)(i)(IV) requires the task force to
evaluate the adequacy and coordination of Federal, State and
local emergency planning, evacuation, and other measures to
protect the public health and safety in the event of a
terrorist attack against a sensitive nuclear facility. The
issues of specific interest to the committee include whether
actual capabilities are adequate for: warning the public;
facilitating movement of populations; transporting populations
that are trapped without ground escape routes; providing
shelter and medical care to those who have been relocated;
providing radiation monitoring to both individuals and the
environment; assuring the availability of properly trained
medical providers and emergency responders; and adequately
quarantining contaminated food and water supplies in the
ingestion zone where radiation has been deposited.
Subparagraph (b)(3)(B)(i)(V) requires the task force to
examine the threats that sensitive nuclear facilities must
protect against to prevent acts of radiological sabotage and
theft of special nuclear material. The committee intends that
this constitute a thorough and comprehensive review of the
types of threats that are appropriate for sensitive nuclear
facilities to protect against in light of September 11th. The
committee expects that this would include aerial, ground or
water-based attacks. The committee also intends that the task
force consider, as part of its examination, appropriate changes
to sensitive nuclear facilities in order to protect against
acts of radiological sabotage, including means to reduce the
vulnerability of spent fuel storage and the consequences of a
spent fuel fire.
New subsection 170C(c) requires the NRC, based on and
consistent with the findings and recommendations of the task
force, to promulgate regulations identifying the threats that
sensitive nuclear facilities must protect against to prevent
acts of radiological sabotage and the theft of special nuclear
material. The committee is aware that the design basis threats
are currently the NRC's primary regulatory framework for
protecting against acts of sabotage at sensitive nuclear
facilities. The committee therefore assumes that this section
will result in a revision to the NRC regulations covering the
design basis threats. However, it is the intent of this section
that regulations promulgated by the NRC pursuant to this
section will also address any other regulatory or programmatic
changes as are necessary.
Paragraph (c)(2) addresses the recognition by the committee
that post-September 11th, the need may arise to reduce the
amount of specific information contained in regulations open to
public dissemination, which address the design basis threat or
other security matters. For example, the NRC is considering
revising current regulations to remove certain details that may
now be considered safeguards information under section 147 of
the Atomic Energy Act, and include such details, as revised,
instead in Orders to licensees. This paragraph is intended to
clarify that the requirements of section 147 continue to apply
in full, including the need as appropriate under existing law
to protect safeguards and other sensitive information.
New subsection 170C(d) requires the NRC to promulgate
regulations establishing a system for the determination of
multiple threat levels to describe the threat conditions at
sensitive nuclear facilities. It is the intent of the committee
that in meeting this requirement the NRC will utilize the
Homeland Security Advisory System; or such other information or
guidance provided by the Office of Homeland Security, other
Federal agencies or other entities; as appropriate.
New subsection 170C(e) requires the NRC to review the
security plans for each sensitive nuclear facility. It
specifies the aspects of the review, requires the NRC to
establish a priority schedule for conducting reviews, requires
the NRC to report to the President and Congress, and requires
the NRC to ensure that licensees upgrade security plans as
necessary.
New subsection 170C(f) requires the NRC to review the
emergency response plans for each sensitive nuclear facility.
It specifies the aspect of the review, requires the NRC to
establish a priority schedule for conducting the reviews,
requires the NRC to report to the President and Congress, and
requires the NRC to ensure that licensees revise emergency
response plans as necessary.
Paragraph (f)(3) requires the NRC to establish a priority
schedule for conducting reviews of emergency response plans
based on the relative degrees of vulnerability of sensitive
nuclear facilities and the proximity of sensitive nuclear
facilities to large population areas. Consequently, the
committee anticipates that facilities near major metropolitan
areas such as New York City will be at the top of this priority
schedule.
New subsection 170C(g) requires the NRC to promulgate
regulations establishing the circumstances under which the NRC
shall request the President to deploy the Coast Guard or the
antiterrorism team created under subsection 170C(h) to a
sensitive nuclear facility, or provide for the protection of
air space in the vicinity of a sensitive nuclear facility.
New subsection 170C(h) requires the President to establish
a Nuclear Infrastructure Antiterrorism Team, the purpose of
which shall be to provide protection for the perimeter of
sensitive nuclear facilities against the threats identified
under subsection (c), in coordination with other Federal,
State, local, and private entities, as appropriate, and
consistent with the security plan for each sensitive nuclear
facility.
The nature, structure and specific duties of this Federal
team are left to the discretion of the President, with the
caveat that they shall be based on and consistent with the
findings and recommendations of the task force created under
subsection 170C(b). This includes whether such ``team'' shall
be regional or national in nature or shall be specific to each
sensitive nuclear facility. The committee however intends that
the team will consist of existing agency structures and
personnel, operating under existing Federal authorities. The
committee does not intend for the Nuclear Infrastructure
Antiterrorism Team to be an NRC entity or under the control of
the NRC.
New subsection 170C(i) requires the President to establish
a program to provide technical assistance and training for the
National Guard and State and local law enforcement agencies in
responding to threats against a sensitive nuclear facility.
Such program may include grants to State and local governments.
New subsection 170C(j) requires the NRC to review and
upgrade hiring and training standards for employees at
sensitive nuclear facilities, and to establish qualifications
and procedures to ensure that no individual that presents a
threat to national security is employed at a sensitive nuclear
facility.
New subsection 170C(k) requires the NRC to promulgate
regulations for the hiring and training of Federal security
coordinators, and to assign a Federal security coordinator at
each sensitive nuclear facility. The subsection sets forth the
duties of the Federal security coordinator.
New subsection 170C(l) provides that nothing in the section
shall be construed to supersede any existing law governing the
disclosure of classified or safeguards information.
Sec. 4. Fingerprinting and Background Checks
This section was developed by the Nuclear Regulatory
Commission and added at the NRC's request. It amends Chapter 12
of the Atomic Energy Act by adding specific requirements for
the performance of fingerprinting, and criminal history and
other background checks for persons having access to sensitive
nuclear facilities.
Sec. 5. Office of Nuclear Security and Incident Response
This section amends Title II of the Energy Reorganization
Act of 1974 by adding a new section 212, which establishes an
Office of Nuclear Security and Incident Response. This new
office is intended to codify the office created by the NRC
following the events of September 11th.
New subsections 212(a) and 212(b) provide definitions for
the new section and establish the Office of Nuclear Security
and Incident Response.
New subsection 212(c) provides for the appointment of a
Director to head the office, and specifies the duties of the
Director.
New subsection 212(d) establishes a Security Response Unit
within the Office of Nuclear Security and Incident Response, to
be headed by an Assistant Director for Security Response. The
section details the functions of this unit, which shall include
establishment of a mock terrorist team, and a program for
security response evaluations to assess the ability of each
sensitive nuclear facility to defend against threats in
accordance with the facility security plan. It details elements
of the security response evaluation program, including
requiring the NRC to establish performance criteria for judging
the security response evaluations. It is the assumption of the
committee that the Assistant Director for Security Response
would have primary responsibility for carrying out this
program. This would include making recommendations as required
under this paragraph on the timing, conduct and evaluation of
the security response exercises, including the establishment of
performance criteria for judging the evaluations.
New subsection 212(e) requires the NRC, in coordination
with the Director of the Federal Emergency Management Agency,
to conduct emergency response exercises to evaluate the ability
of Federal, State and local emergency response personnel to
respond to a radiological emergency at the sensitive nuclear
facility. It sets forth the factors which the emergency
response exercises shall evaluate, requires revisions to
emergency response plans as necessary, and requires periodic
reports to the President and Congress on the results of the
exercises and each revision to an emergency response plan.
The committee notes that in section 3 of the Nuclear
Security Act of 2002, under new subsection 170C(b)(3)(i)(III)
of the Atomic Energy Act, above, the task force is required to
examine the adequacy of all existing emergency planning zones.
Section 3 of the Nuclear Security Act of 2002, under new
subsection 170C(f)(1), also requires the Commission, based on
and consistent with the findings and recommendations of the
task force, to review the emergency response plans for each
sensitive nuclear facility. New subsection 170C(f)(5) of the
Act, above, requires the Commission to ensure that the licensee
of each sensitive nuclear facility revises, as necessary, the
emergency response plan for the sensitive nuclear facility.
Therefore, the committee intends that the emergency response
exercises conducted by the Commission in coordination with FEMA
under this new subsection 212(e) will reflect the
determinations made by the task force under new subsection
170C(b)(3)(i)(III).
New subsection 212(f) provides that nothing in the section
shall limit any authority of the Department of Energy relating
to the safe operation of facilities under the jurisdiction of
the Department.
Sec. 6. Carrying of Weapons by Licensee Employees
This section amends Chapter 14 of Title I of the Atomic
Energy Act.
It permits the NRC to authorize guards at certain NRC-
licensed or certified facilities, and guards transporting
special nuclear materials, to carry and use firearms to prevent
sabotage of such facilities or theft of nuclear explosive
material. The section also authorizes the NRC to issue
regulations shielding guards against State prosecution for
discharge of firearms in the performance of official duties.
These changes would enhance national security by providing NRC
facilities and transport with authority equivalent to the
authority currently possessed by the Department of Energy for
the protection of its nuclear facilities and transport.
This provision was included at the request of the NRC, and
is similar to language that passed this committee and the
Senate in the 106th Congress in S. 1627
Sec. 7. Sensitive Radioactive Material Security
This section amends Chapter 14 of the Atomic Energy Act of
1954 to add a new section 170E at the end.
New subsection 170E(a) contains definitions. Paragraph
170E(a)(1) defines ``sensitive radioactive material.'' This
language is broadly written to comprise material which could be
used by a terrorist in a radiological dispersal device, or
material that in any other way could threaten the health or
safety of the public due to its radiological properties. It is
the committee's intent primarily to improve protections on
those radioactive materials that are in common industrial,
medical, or research applications. The committee specifically
urges the task force to carefully examine protections on source
material, byproduct material or special nuclear material which
is stored in a sealed container to prevent leakage (otherwise
known as ``sealed sources'') and any other types of radioactive
material that NRC license holders have reported lost or stolen.
The committee also specifically encourages the task force to
consider radioactive materials that are not currently regulated
by the United States for their radioactive properties, such as
naturally occurring or accelerator produced radioactive
materials (NORM).
New subsection 170E(b) expands the duties of the task force
established under new section 170C(b), above, to include
evaluation of sensitive radiological material. It delineates
the additional matters the task force should consider. The
committee is aware that there are a broad range of radioactive
materials in public use and not all present a significant
threat to public health. As such, this subsection requires the
task force to identify and categorize those materials that
should be classified as sensitive radioactive material. The
committee expects that the development of improved security
recommendations under this section will be based on this
categorization, providing the greatest security to those
categories of sensitive radiological material which present the
greatest threat. In developing recommendations for methods to
ensure the return and proper disposal of sensitive radiological
materials required in paragraph 170E(b)(F), the task force may
consider financial incentives for achieving this goal.
New subsection 170E(c) requires periodic reports to the
President and Congress describing administrative and
legislative actions recommended by the task force.
New subsection 170E(d) requires the NRC to take such
actions as are appropriate to revise the system for licensing
radioactive materials and to ensure that States have entered
into appropriate agreements establishing compatible programs.
Sec. 8. Unauthorized Introduction of Dangerous Weapons
This section expands section 229a of the Atomic Energy Act
to include facilities, installations or real property subject
to the licensing or certification authority of the NRC.
This would allow NRC to apply the provisions of section
229a to NRC licensed or certified activities, thereby allowing
the NRC to prohibit a person who has not obtained prior
authorization from carrying, transporting, or otherwise
introducing or causing to be introduced any weapon, explosive,
or other dangerous instrumentality into any facility,
installation or real property regulated or subject to
certification by the NRC. This provision was included at the
request of the NRC, and is similar to language that passed this
committee and the Senate in the 106th Congress in S. 1627.
Sec. 9. Sabotage of Nuclear Facilities or Fuel
This section amends section 236a of the Atomic Energy Act
of 1954 to expand existing Federal criminal sanctions for
sabotage or attempted sabotage of production or utilization
facilities to include sabotage or attempted sabotage during the
construction stage of those facilities, if the damage could
affect public health and safety during facility operation. This
section also expands the sanctions to include sabotage or
attempted sabotage of operating fuel fabrication facilities.
This provision was included at the request of the NRC, and is
similar to language that was reported from the committee and
passed the Senate in the 106th Congress in S. 1627.
Sec. 10. Evaluation of Adequacy of Enforcement Provisions
This section requires the Attorney General and the NRC to
submit to Congress a report that assesses the adequacy of the
criminal enforcement provisions in Chapter 18 of the Atomic
Energy Act.
Sec. 11. Protection of Whistleblowers
This section amends section 212(a) of the Energy
Reorganization Act of 1974 to extend whistleblower protection
to NRC contractors and subcontractors.
Sec. 12. Technical and Conforming Amendment
This section provides technical and conforming amendments.
Sec. 13. Authorization of Appropriations
This section provides that there are authorized to be
appropriated such sums as are necessary to carry out this Act.
Legislative History
On November 1, 2001, the committee held an oversight
hearing on nuclear security. On November 29, 2001, Senators
Reid, Clinton, Lieberman, Jeffords and Torricelli introduced S.
1746. It was referred to the Committee on Environment and
Public Works. The committee held a hearing on June 5, 2002. The
committee held a classified hearing on June 20, 2002. On July
25, 2002, the committee met to consider S. 1746. The committee
voted to report the bill to the Senate with amendments.
Sections 6, 8 and 9 of the bill as agreed to are similar to
provisions reported by the committee and passed the Senate in
S. 1626 in the 106th Congress.
Hearings
On November 1, 2001, the Committee on Environment and
Public Works recieved testimony concerning infrastructure
security, recieving testimony from Michael Brown, Deputy
Director, Federal Emergency Management Agency; Joe Moravec,
Commissioner, Public Building Service, General Services
Administration; Dr. David Sampson, Assistant Secretary for
Economic Development, Economic Development Administration, U.S.
Department of Commerce; Dr. Richard Meserve, Chairman, Nuclear
Regulatory Commission; Herbert Mitchell, Associate
Administrator for Disaster Assistance, Small Business
Administration; and Marianne L. Horinko, Assistant
Administrator, Office of Solid Waste and Emergency Response,
Environmental Protection Agency.
On June 5, 2002, the Committee on Environment and Public
Works held a hearing to receive testimony on S. 1586, a bill to
amend the Atomic Energy Act of 1954 to authorize the carrying
of firearms by employees of licensees, and for other purposes,
and S. 1746, a bill to amend the Atomic Energy Act of 1954 to
strengthen security at sensitive nuclear facilities. For this
hearing the witnesses were Hon. Edward J. Markey, U.S.
Representative from Massaschusetts; Hon. Richard A. Meserve,
Chairman, Chairman, Nuclear Regulatory Commission; David
Lochbaum, Nuclear Safety Engineer, Union of Concerned
Scientists, Washington, DC; Jack Skolds, Chief Nuclear Officer,
Excelon Corp., Washington, DC; Danielle Brian, Executive
Director, Project on Government Oversight, Washington, DC;
Donna J. Hastie, Emergency Planning Consultant, Marrietta, GA;
and Irwin Redlener, M.D., F.A.A.P., President, Children's
Health Fund, New York, NY.
On June 20, 2002, the Committee on Environment and Public
Works held a classified hearing, receiving testimony from
Federal Government witnesses.
Rollcall Votes
On July 25, 2002, the committee met to consider S. 1746.
The bipartisan amendment in the nature of a substitute offered
by Senators Reid, Smith, Jeffords, Inhofe, Clinton, and
Lieberman was adopted for purpose of further amendment. An
amendment offered by Senator Smith, two amendments offered by
Senator Clinton, and an amendment offered by Senator Reid were
agreed to by voice vote. The committee voted by voice vote to
report the bill, as amended, to the Senate.
Regulatory Impact Statement
In compliance with section 11(b) of rule XXVI of the
Standing Rules of the Senate, the committee finds that S. 1746
does not create any significant additional regulatory burdens,
nor will it cause any adverse impact on the personal privacy of
individuals.
Mandates Assessment
In compliance with the Unfunded Mandates Reform Act of 1995
(P.L. 104-4), the committee finds that the bill may require
additional costs to the NRC, part of which may be passed along
to ratepayers under existing law. The committee believes that
such costs have been kept to the minimum necessary to ensure
adequate security at sensitive nuclear facilities and adequate
protection of sensitive nuclear materials. There will not be
significant additional costs to State and local governments.
Cost of Legislation
Section 403 of the Congressional Budget and Impoundment
Control Act requires that a statement of the cost of the
reported bill, prepared by the Congressional Budget Office, be
included in the report. That statement follows:
U.S. Congress,
Congressional Budget Office,
Washington, DC, October 25, 2002.
Hon. James M. Jeffords, Chairman,
Committee on Environment and Public Works,
U.S. Senate, Washington, DC.
Dear Mr. Chairman: The Congressional Budget Office has
prepared the enclosed cost estimate for S. 1746, the Nuclear
Security Act of 2002.
If you wish further details on this estimate, we will be
pleased to provide them. The CBO staff contact is Lisa Cash
Driskill, who can be reached at 226-2860.
Sincerely,
Dan L. Crippen.
----------
Nuclear Security Act of 2002, as ordered reported by the Senate
Committee on Environment and Public Works on July 25, 2002
Summary
S. 1746 would establish several new security programs for
the nation's nuclear infrastructure. Programs would include
Federal security coordinators for designated nuclear
facilities, antiterrorism teams to protect nuclear facilities,
mock terrorism drills, new rules on security compliance at
nuclear facilities, and a program to classify, track, and
monitor radioactive sources throughout the country.
Based on information from the Nuclear Regulatory Commission
(NRC), CBO estimates that implementing S. 1746 would have a
gross cost of $486 million over the 2003-2007 period. However,
the NRC has the authority to offset a substantial portion of
its annual appropriation with fees charged to the facilities it
regulates. Accounting for such collections, CBO estimates that
implementing S. 1746 would result in a net cost of $126 million
over the 2003-2007 period, assuming appropriation of the
necessary amounts.
The bill also would require all employees at nuclear
facilities to undergo background checks. Because the Department
of Justice (DOJ) would charge the applicant a fee to offset the
cost of background checks required by the bill, we estimate
that this provision would have a negligible impact on direct
spending.
In addition, S. 1746 would establish new criminal penalties
for the sabotage of nuclear production, utilization, or waste
storage facilities and for noncompliance with certain employee
background checks that would be established by the bill. CBO
estimates that these penalties would increase revenues and
subsequent direct spending of those collections by less than
$500,000 a year.
S. 1746 would impose both intergovernmental and private-
sector mandates as defined in the Unfunded Mandates Reform Act
(UMRA) by:
Effectively increasing the annual fees collected
from NRC licensees;
Requiring new security standards and procedures
at sensitive nuclear facilities; and
Expanding the system for licensing sensitive
radioactive materials.
Because several of the mandates are dependent upon future
actions of the NRC, for which information currently is not
available, CBO cannot precisely determine the aggregate cost of
all mandates contained in the bill. However, CBO estimates that
the costs to the private sector would likely exceed the annual
threshold for private-sector mandates ($115 million in 2002,
adjusted annually for inflation) in fiscal year 2004, primarily
because of the increase in annual fees imposed on NRC
licensees. CBO expects that the aggregate costs to public
entities of all mandates would not exceed the intergovernmental
threshold ($58 million in 2002, adjusted annually for
inflation).
Estimated Cost to the Federal Government
The estimated budgetary impact of S. 1746 is shown in the
following table. The costs of this legislation fall within
budget function 270 (energy) and 750 (administration of
justice).
Basis of Estimate
For this estimate, CBO assumes that the bill will be
enacted by the end of calender year 2002, that the necessary
amounts will be appropriated for each year, and that outlays
will occur at historical rates for similar programs.
Spending Subject to Appropriation
S. 1746 would establish several new security programs to be
implemented at the nation's sensitive nuclear facilities,
including creating antiterrorism teams, running mock terrorism
drills, and establishing Federal security coordinators at each
site. For this estimate, we assume that 84 commercial nuclear
sites in 35 States would meet the bill's definition of a
``sensitive nuclear facility'' and thus would be subject to its
requirements. In addition, the bill would require the
registration and tracking of radioactive material, several new
Federal rules concerning nuclear security, and it would
establish a training and grant program for the National Guard
and State and local law enforcement personnel.
By Fiscal Year, in Millions of Dollars
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
2003 2004 2005 2006 2007
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
CHANGES IN SPENDING SUBJECT TO APPROPRIATION\1\
Federal Security Programs at Nuclear Facilities:
Estimated Authorization Level.................................. 73 88 64 64 64
Estimated Outlays.............................................. 58 85 69 64 64
National Guard and Law Enforcement Training:
Estimated Authorization Level.................................. 11 17 14 14 14
Estimated Outlays.............................................. 9 16 15 14 14
Sensitive Radioactive Materials:
Estimated Authorization Level.................................. 9 17 10 8 8
Estimated Outlays.............................................. 7 15 11 8 8
Security and Emergency Response Plan Review:.......................
Estimated Authorization Level.................................. 8 9 1 1 1
Estimated Outlays.............................................. 6 9 3 1 1
Security Rulemakings:..............................................
Estimated Authorization Level.................................. 3 3 1 1 1
Estimated Outlays.............................................. 2 3 1 1 1
Estimated Gross Authorizations for the NRC under S. 1746:..........
Estimated Authorization Level.................................. 104 134 90 88 88
Estimated Outlays.............................................. 83 128 99 88 88
Offsetting Collections\2\..........................................
Estimated Authorization Level.................................. -98 -124 -81 -29 -29
Estimated Outlays.............................................. -98 -124 -81 -29 -29
Net New NRC Spending Under S. 1746:
Estimated Authorization Level\1\............................... 6 11 9 59 59
Estimated Outlays.............................................. -15 5 18 59 59
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Note: Components may not sum to totals because of rounding.
\1\ A full-year appropriation has not yet been enacted for the NRC; in 2002, the agency received a gross
appropriation of $553 million, and offsetting collections totaled $474 million.
\2\Collections are authorized at declining percentages of the NRC's budget: 94 percent in 2003, 92 percent in
2004, 90 percent in 2005, and 33 percent after 2005.
Based on information from the NRC and other Federal
agencies, CBO estimates that implementing S. 1746 would have a
gross cost of $486 million over the 2003-2007 period, assuming
appropriation of the necessary amounts. However, the NRC has
the authority to offset a substantial portion of its annual
appropriation with fees charged to facilities it regulates.
After accounting for such collections, we estimate that the net
cost of implementing S. 1746 would be $126 million over the
2003-2007 period.
Federal Security Programs at Nuclear Facilities. S. 1746
would authorize funding for Federal antiterrorism teams, mock
terrorism teams, and security coordinators for the nuclear
facilities covered by the bill. We estimate that implementing
these three programs would have a gross cost of $340 million
over the 2003-2007 period for additional staff, equipment,
training, and consulting.
Antiterrorism Teams. Although the bill does not specify the
scope of the antiterrorism teams, for this estimate, we assume
the NRC would establish 16 antiterrorism teams of 10 people
each (four teams for each of NRC's four regions). Those teams
would be trained in local topography, geography, nuclear
infrastructure, and security tactics and would be available to
respond to security incidents 24 hours a day. Based on
information from the NRC, we estimate that it could cost as
much as $500,000 per person, initially, to provide such
specialized training, equipment, and staff support. We expect
that annual costs would be reduced by half that amount once the
program is established. CBO estimates that implementing this
provision would have a gross cost of $232 million over the
2003-2007 period.
Federal Security Coordinators. S. 1746 also would require
that the NRC hire and train security coordinators to be
stationed at each of the 84 sensitive nuclear facilities that
would be covered by the bill. They would coordinate all
security programs at the nuclear facility. We expect that it
would take NRC 1 year to issue rules and establish this new
program. We assume that the agency would need 110 additional
people to staff and manage the Federal security coordinator
program at a cost of $11 million a year beginning in 2004 and
that NRC would spend an additional $3 million a year on
training and equipment. CBO estimates that implementing this
provision would cost $54 million over the 2003-2007 period.
Mock Terrorism Teams. Under S. 1746, mock terrorism teams
would be deployed to perform security drills at each nuclear
facility every 3 years. We estimate that the NRC would
establish a team of 30 people to conduct such drills at a cost
of about $3 million a year. In addition, we estimate the NRC
would need $10 million for support personnel, equipment, and
travel over the 2003-2004 period, and that the initial cost for
training and equipment would drop by about half after the teams
are established. We also would expect the NRC to contract with
private security firms or the Department of Defense for staff
support and assistance in designing the drills at a cost of
about $5 million per year. We estimate that this program would
cost $54 million over the 2003-2007 period, assuming
appropriation of the necessary amounts.
National Guard and Law Enforcement Training. S. 1746 would
require the President to establish a program to provide
technical assistance and training to the National Guard and
State and local law enforcement agencies to respond to threats
against the nation's nuclear facilities. Under this program, we
expect that the NRC would provide training at each of the
covered 84 nuclear facilities four times a year at a cost of
about $120,000 a year (or a total cost of about $10 million per
year). In addition, we expect that the 35 States with sensitive
nuclear facilities would receive grants of $100,000 per year
for technical assistance and training. Assuming appropriation
of the necessary amounts, we estimate that implementing these
training and assistance programs would cost on average $14
million a year.
Sensitive Radioactive Material. S. 1746 would require the
NRC to establish a program to register, track, and control
sensitive radioactive material. Currently, the NRC spends about
$1 million per year to regulate certain radioactive material
used for industrial purposes. S. 1746 would significantly
expand that program to include a wide variety of sources and
uses of radioactive material.
Based on information from the NRC we estimate this program
would cost an average of $10 million per year for evaluating,
classifying, and tracking of such materials. Funds would be
used for establishing new computer programs, hiring of
additional staff, and auditing sites with radioactive
materials. Overall, we estimate that implementation of this
program would cost about $50 million over the 2003-2007 period.
Security and Emergency Response Plan Review. S. 1746 would
require the NRC to review the emergency response plans for each
of the 84 sensitive nuclear facilities in the United States
within 9 months of enactment and their security plans within 21
months of enactment. In addition, the bill would require the
NRC to conduct emergency response exercises every 2 years at
each facility. After each review and exercise, the NRC would
submit a report to the Congress and work with the facilities on
any necessary improvements to plans and procedures. Based on
information from the NRC, we estimate those reviews would
require 60 additional staff at a cost of about $6 million in
2003, and that costs would drop significantly in the following
years as the reviews and follow-up inspections are completed.
We estimate that the agency would need about $3 million in 2003
and 2004 for travel and contract services to accomplish the
reviews in the timeframe established in the bill. We estimate
emergency response exercises would cost about $1 million a
year. In total, we estimate that implementing the security and
emergency response plan reviews required by the bill would cost
$20 million over the 2003-2007 period, assuming appropriation
of the necessary amounts.
Security Rulemakings. S. 1746 would require the NRC to
establish several new rules to enhance security at the nation's
nuclear facilities. The rulemakings would cover threat levels
and threats that facilities would be required to defend, the
coordination of Federal agencies during a nuclear threat or
attack, background checks for employees at nuclear facilities,
and weapons policies for security personnel at nuclear
facilities. We estimate that the NRC would need an additional
25 people at a cost of about $2.5 million a year to complete
these rulemakings over the 2003-2004 period. We expect that
staff needs would diminish as the rulemakings are completed,
thus reducing the cost to about $1 million per year. CBO
estimates all of these rulemakings would cost $8 million over
the 2003-2007 period, assuming appropriation of the necessary
amounts.
Direct Spending and Revenues
CBO estimates that enacting S. 1746 would increase both
offsetting receipts and direct spending of those receipts by
$2.3 million in 2003 for background checks on nuclear security
personnel required by the bill; thus, the net budgetary impact
of this requirement would be negligible. In addition, it would
establish criminal penalties for noncompliance with such
background checks and penalties for the sabotage of nuclear
facilities. We estimate that any increase in penalties would be
less than $500,000 per year.
Fingerprinting and Background Checks. S. 1746 would require
that all employees of covered nuclear facilities undergo
fingerprinting and background checks within 60 days of passage
of the bill. Such checks would be performed by the Department
of Justice. Based on information from DOJ, we expect most
checks would cost about $22 per person. On average, about 1,250
people work at each of the 84 covered facilities. Because DOJ
would charge a fee of $22 for each person that applies for a
background check, we estimate that the agency would collect
about $2.3 million in 2003. DOJ is authorized to spend such
fees without further appropriation, and we expect that most of
the money would be spent in the year in which it is collected.
Thus, the net impact on DOJ spending would be negligible.
Penalties. S. 1746 would strengthen the criminal penalties
for the sabotage of nuclear production, utilization, or waste
storage facilities and for noncompliance with the background
checks established by the bill. CBO estimates that enacting
these new penalties would increase governmental receipts by
less than $500,000 a year. Any criminal fines collected would
be deposited in the Crime Victims Fund and spent in subsequent
years. Any resulting change in direct spending from the fund
also would amount to less than $500,000 annually.
Intergovernmental and Private-Sector Impact
S. 1746 would impose both intergovernmental and private-
sector mandates as defined in UMRA by:
Effectively increasing the annual fees collected
from NRC licensees;
Requiring new security standards and procedures
at sensitive nuclear facilities; and
Expanding the system for licensing sensitive
radioactive materials.
Because several of the mandates are dependent upon future
actions of the NRC, for which information currently is not
available, CBO cannot precisely determine the aggregate cost of
all mandates contained in the bill. However, CBO estimates that
the costs to public entities would not exceed the
intergovernmental threshold ($58 million in 2002, adjusted
annually for inflation), while the cost to the private sector
would likely exceed the annual threshold for private-sector
mandates ($115 million in 2002, adjusted annually for
inflation) in fiscal year 2004.
Increasing Annual Fees for NRC Licensees
Under current law, the NRC collects annual fees from its
licensees, both public and private, to offset a major portion
of its general fund appropriation. Because S. 1746 would
require the NRC to engage in a variety of initiatives to
augment security at licensed facilities, CBO expects that
additional fees would be collected from the licensees to cover
the cost of such initiatives. The duty to pay those fee
increases would be considered both a private-sector and an
intergovernmental mandate under UMRA, as it results in an
increase in the cost of an existing mandate. Assuming an
appropriation level of amounts necessary to cover the costs of
the NRC's security initiatives starting in 2003, CBO estimates
that the increment in fees would total approximately $98
million in fiscal year 2003, $124 million in fiscal year 2004,
$81 million in 2005, and drop to around $29 million in
subsequent fiscal years. Because less than 5 percent of nuclear
facilities are publicly owned, CBO estimates that the increase
borne by public nuclear facilities would not be significant.
Security Procedures at Sensitive Nuclear Facilities
S. 1746 would establish new security procedures for nuclear
facilities in order to prevent acts of radiological sabotage
and the theft of special nuclear material. Accordingly, the
bill would require the NRC to promulgate rules revising:
The threats sensitive nuclear facilities must
protect against;
The threat levels at which each facility must
operate; and
The hiring and training standards for employees
of the facilities.
Compliance with each of the rules would constitute a
mandate as defined by UMRA. The extent of those mandates would
be based upon future actions of the NRC, which would track the
recommendations of an interagency task force on nuclear
infrastructure security. At this time, the NRC could not give
any indication as to the scope of the rules to be issued and
accordingly, CBO cannot determine the cost of compliance.
In response to the events of September 11, 2001, the NRC
issued interim security measures for sensitive nuclear
facilities, while further analysis regarding future regulatory
action was undertaken. The interim measures, which included
determinations as to the types of threats nuclear facilities
must protect against, became binding prior to, or in August of
this year for the vast majority of sensitive nuclear
facilities. In addition, the NRC issued voluntary guidelines on
the threat levels at which facilities could operate, which
parallel the threat levels established by the Office of
Homeland Security. The NRC indicates that most, if not all, NRC
licensees adopted those guidelines. According to
representatives of the nuclear industry, sensitive nuclear
facilities have already spent about $90 million to upgrade
security to comply with the NRC's interim security measures. To
the extent that future security and threat level regulations
mirror those that are currently in place, sensitive nuclear
facilities would not bear substantial additional costs
associated with the mandate.
In addition, S. 1746 would require that employees of
sensitive nuclear facilities undergo more extensive background
investigations that would include checks of fingerprint records
located in the National Crime Information Center data sets, the
United States National Central Bureau of Interpol, the National
Instant Criminal Background Check system, and the Immigration
and Naturalization Service data sets. Employees are currently
fingerprinted for an FBI criminal history check. According to
the Department of Justice, the incremental cost of the expanded
check would be approximately $22, and based upon the number of
individuals employed by the industry, CBO estimates that the
cost that would be borne directly by licensees would be roughly
$2.3 million in 2003.
Licensing System for Sensitive Nuclear Materials
The bill would require the NRC to revise and expand the
system for licensing certain radioactive materials, such as
those used in industrial, medical, and research applications,
based on the recommendations of an interagency task force.
Information from the NRC suggests that some regulatory changes
for sensitive radioactive material are already underway and
that the agency does not intend to impose a heavy burden on the
entities affected. Consequently, CBO expects that the costs
relating to this mandate would not be significant.
Estimate Prepared By: Federal Costs: Lisa Cash Driskill; Impact
on State, Local, and Tribal Governments: Angela Sietz; Impact
on the Private Sector: Lauren Marks.
Estimate Approved By: Peter H. Fontaine, Deputy Assistant
Director for Budget Analysis.
Additional Views of Senators Smith, Inhofe, Voinovich, and Chafee
We appreciate the leadership of the chairman to report out
a bipartisan bill aimed at ensuring our nations nuclear power
facilities remain among the most secured commercial facilities
in the world. We believe that this bill takes important steps
in achieving that goal. We are pleased with the inclusion of S.
1586, sponsored by Senators Inhofe and Smith, in the bill
reported by the committee. S. 1586, provides enhanced security
authority that the Nuclear Regulatory Commission has
specifically requested for many years. We note that in the
106th Congress a nearly identical bill to S. 1586 was reported
out of this Committee and passed the Senate by Unanimous
Consent.
In the days following the committee ordering S. 1746 to be
reported, the committee received detailed comments from the
Nuclear Regulatory Commission on the amended version of S.
1746. These constructive comments identified specific areas
where the bill should be improved in order to maximize security
without delaying or impeding current security efforts already
undertaken by the NRC and its licensees. We believe these
comments warrant our attention and consideration prior to S.
1746 being voted on by the full Senate. It is our hope to
continue to work with the chairman and members of the Committee
to improve S. 1746 in order to ensure that the goals we all
support will be achieved in an effective and timely manner. We
thank the chairmen of the full committee and subcommittee for
their leadership and for the bipartisan manner in which they
have undertaken this very important security matter. We look
forward to continuing to work in a bipartisan manner to
adequately address issues that have been raised.
Changes in Existing Law
In compliance with section 12 of rule XXVI of the Standing
Rules of the Senate, changes in existing law made by the bill
as reported are shown as follows: Existing law proposed to be
omitted is enclosed in [black brackets], new matter is printed
in italic, existing law in which no change is proposed is shown
in roman:
----------
ATOMIC ENERGY ACT OF 1954 \1\
An Act for the development and control of atomic energy.
Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of
the United States of America in Congress assembled,
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ This Act consists of the Act of August 1, 1946, ch. 724, as
amended by the Act of Aug. 30, 1954, ch. 1073 (68 stat. 921) and by
subsequent amendments. The Act appears generally in the United States
Code at 42 U.S.C. 2011 et seq. Bracketed notes are used at the end of
each section for the convenience of the reader to indicate the United
States Code citation.
* * * * * * *
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
TITLE I--ATOMIC ENERGY
Chapter 1. Declaration, Findings, and Purpose
Sec. 1. Declaration.
* * * * * * *
Sec. 149A. Access to nuclear facilities.
* * * * * * *
Sec. 170B. Uranium supply.
Sec. 170C. Protection of sensitive nuclear facilities.
Sec. 170D. Carrying of weapons.
Sec. 170E. Sensitive Radioactive Material Security.
* * * * * * *
CHAPTER 2. DEFINITIONS
Sec. 11. Definition.--The intent of Congress in the
definitions as given in this section should be construed from
the words or phrases used in the definitions. As used in this
Act:
a. The term ``agency of the United States'' means the
executive branch of the United States, or any Government
agency, or the legislative branch of the United States, or any
agency, committee, commission, office, or other establishment
in the legislative branch, or the judicial branch of the United
States, or any office, agency, committee, commission, or other
establishment in the judicial branch.
* * * * * * *
[jj.] ii. Legal Costs.--As used in section 170, the term
``legal costs'' means the costs incurred by a plaintiff or a
defendant in initiating, prosecuting, investigating, settling,
or defending claims or suits for damage arising under such
section.
(jj) Homeland Security Officer.--The term ``Homeland
Security Officer'' means a Federal official with responsibility
for coordinating efforts to maintain homeland security against
acts of terrorism, and designated by the President to perform
the duties of the Homeland Security Officer under this Act.
(kk) Private Security Force.--The term ``private security
force'', with respect to a sensitive nuclear facility, means
personnel hired or contracted by the licensee of the sensitive
nuclear facility to provide security at the sensitive nuclear
facility.
(ll) Sensitive Nuclear Facility.--
(1) In general.--The term ``sensitive nuclear
facility'' means a facility licensed by the Commission
(or the portion of a facility used in the conduct of an
activity licensed by the Commission).
(2) Inclusions.--The term ``sensitive nuclear
facility'' includes--
(A) an operating commercial nuclear power
plant;
(B) an independent spent fuel storage
facility;
(C) a commercial nuclear power plant that
is being decommissioned or a portion of a
commercial nuclear power plant that contains
material licensed by the Commission;
(D) a category I fuel cycle facility; and
(E) a gaseous diffusion plant.
* * * * * * *
Sec. 149. Fingerprinting for Criminal History Record
Checks.--
[a. The Nuclear Regulatory Commission (in this section
referred to as the ``Commission'') shall require each licensee
or applicant for a license to operate a utilization facility
under section 103 or 104 b. to fingerprint each individual who
is permitted unescorted access to the facility or is permitted
access to safeguards information under section 147. All
fingerprints obtained by a licensee or applicant as required in
the preceding sentence shall be submitted to the Attorney
General of the United States through the Commission for
identification and a criminal history records check. The costs
of any identification and records check conducted pursuant to
the preceding sentence shall be paid by the licensee or
applicant. Notwithstanding any other provision of law, the
Attorney General may provide all the results of the search of
the Commission, and, in accordance with regulations prescribed
under this section, the Commission may provide such results to
the licensee or applicant submitting such fingerprints.
[b. The Commission, by rule, may relieve persons from the
obligations imposed by this section, upon specified terms,
conditions, and periods, if the Commission finds that such
action is consistent with its obligations to promote the common
defense and security and to protect the health and safety of
the public.]
a. Fingerprinting and Background Checks
(1) In general--The Nuclear Regulatory Commission
(referred to in this section as the `Commission') shall
require the fingerprinting of each individual that is
permitted--
(A) unescorted access to a facility,
activity, radioactive material, or property; or
(B) access to safeguards information under
section 147.
(2) Performance of fingerprinting.--The Commission
shall require fingerprinting under paragraph (1) to be
performed by--
(A) a person that is licensed or certified
by the Commission;
(B) a person that is an applicant for a
license or certificate; and
(C) a person that is otherwise permitted--
(i) to operate a utilization
facility under section 103 or 104b.; or
(ii) to possess, use or transport--
(I) radioactive material;
or
(II) other property
regulated by the Commission and
determined by the Commission to
be of significance to the
public health and safety or the
common defense and security.
(3) Repetition of fingerprinting.--Fingerprinting
shall be repeated for each individual described in
paragraph (1) at least once every 5 years.
(4) Submission of fingerprints--
(A) In general.--A licensee, certificate
holder, or applicant shall submit to the
Attorney General, through the Commission, all
fingerprints obtained under paragraph (2)--
(i) for identification and
comparison against all categories of
individuals whose fingerprints appear
in--
(I) the National Crime
Information Center data sets;
(II) the United States
National Central Bureau of
Interpol;
(III) the National Instant
Criminal Background Check
system; and
(IV) the Immigration and
Naturalization Service data
sets (including the Student and
Exchange Visitor Information
System); and
(ii) for use to conduct a criminal
history background check to determine
past criminal history and any
outstanding arrest warrants on record
with the Federal Bureau of
Investigation.
(B) Cost.--The cost of a background check
conducted under this paragraph shall be paid by
the licensee, certificate holder, or applicant.
(C) Provision of results.--
(i) Attorney General.--
Notwithstanding any other provision of
law, the Attorney General shall provide
the pertinent results of the search to
the Commission.
(ii) The Commission.--In accordance
with regulations promulgated under this
section, the Commission may provide a
licensee, certificate holder, or
applicant submitting the fingerprints
the results of an identification and
record check under this paragraph.
b. Relief from Obligations.--
(1) In general.--The Commission may, by regulation,
relieve any person from the obligations imposed by this
section, under terms and conditions and for periods of
time specified by the Commission, if the Commission
determines that the provision of relief is consistent
with the responsibilities of the Commission--
(A) to promote the common defense and
security; and
(B) to protect the health and safety of the
public.
(2) Requirements of another agency.--A person that
is subject to the fingerprinting requirements of
another agency of the United States shall not be
subject to the obligations imposed by this section, if
the Commission determines that those fingerprinting
requirements afford security protection similar to that
resulting from the application of this section.
c. For purposes of administering this section, the
Commission shall prescribe, subject to public notice and
comment, regulations--
(1) to implement procedures for the taking of
fingerprints;
(2) to establish the conditions for use of
information received from the Attorney General, in
order--
(A) to limit the redissemination of such
information;
[(B) to ensure that such information is
used solely for the purpose of determining
whether an individual shall be permitted
unescorted access to the facility of a licensee
or applicant or shall be permitted access to
safeguards information under section 147;]
(B) to ensure that the information is used
solely for the purpose of determining whether
an individual shall be permitted access to a
facility or radioactive material or property of
a licensee, certificate holder, or applicant,
or shall be permitted access to safeguards
information under section 147;
(C) to ensure that no final determination
may be made solely on the basis of information
provided under this section involving--
(i) an arrest more than 1 year old
for which there is no information of
the disposition of the case; or
(ii) an arrest that resulted in
dismissal of the charge or an
acquittal; and
(D) to protect individuals subject to
fingerprinting under this section from misuse
of the criminal history records; and
(3) to provide each individual subject to
fingerprinting under this section with the right to
complete, correct, and explain information contained in
the criminal history records prior to any final adverse
determination.
d. (1) The Commission may establish and collect fees to
process fingerprints and criminal history records under this
section.
(2) Notwithstanding section 3302(b) of title 31, United
States Code, and to the extent approved in appropriation Acts--
(A) a portion of the amounts collected under this
subsection in any fiscal year may be retained and used
by the Commission to carry out this section; and
(B) the remaining portion of the amounts collected
under this subsection in such fiscal year may be
transferred periodically to the Attorney General and
used by the Attorney General to carry out this section.
(3) Any amount made available for use under paragraph (2)
shall remain available until expended.
* * * * * * *
CHAPTER 14. GENERAL AUTHORITY
Sec. 161. General Provisions.--* * *
* * * * * * *
[k. authorize such of its members, officers, and
employees as it deems necessary in the interest of the
common defense and security to carry firearms while in
the discharge of their official duties. The Commission
may also authorize such of those employees of its
contractors and subcontractors (at any tier) engaged in
the protection of property under the jurisdiction of
the United States and located at facilities owned by or
contracted to the United States or being transported to
or from such facilities as it deems necessary in the
interests of the common defense and security to carry
firearms while in the discharge of their official
duties. A person authorized to carry firearms under
this subsection may, while in the performance of, and
in connection with, official duties, make arrests
without warrant for any offense against the United
States committed in that person's presence or for any
felony cognizable under the laws of the United States
if that person has reasonable grounds to believe that
the individual to be arrested has committed or is
committing such felony. An employee of a contractor or
subcontractor authorized to carry firearms under this
subsection may make such arrests only when the
individual to be arrested is within, or in direct
flight from, the area of such offense. A person granted
authority to make arrests by this subsection may
exercise that authority only in the enforcement of (1)
laws regarding the property of the United States in the
custody of the Department of Energy, the Nuclear
Regulatory Commission, or a contractor of the
Department of Energy or Nuclear Regulatory Commission,
or (2) any provision of this Act that may subject an
offender to a fine, imprisonment, or both. The arrest
authority conferred by this subsection is in addition
to any arrest authority under other laws. The
Secretary, with the approval of the Attorney General,
shall issue guidelines to implement this subsection;]
k. authorize--
(1) to carry a firearm in the performance of
official duties such of its members, officers, and
employees, such of the employees of its contractors and
subcontractors (at any tier) engaged in the protection
of property under the jurisdiction of the United States
located at facilities owned by or contracted to the
United States or being transported to or from such
facilities, and such of the employees of persons
licensed or certified by the Commission (including
employees of contractors of licensees or certificate
holders) engaged in the protection of facilities owned
or operated by a Commission licensee or certificate
holder that are designated by the Commission or in the
protection of property of significance to the common
defense and security located at facilities owned or
operated by a Commission licensee or certificate holder
or being transported to or from such facilities, as the
Commission considers necessary, in view of site-
specific conditions, in the interest of the common
defense and security; and
(2) to carry and use any other weapons, devices, or
ammunition in the performance of officials duties, any
employees of persons licensed or certified by the
Commission (including employees of contractors of
licensees or certificate holders) who are trained and
qualified as guards and whose duty is the protection of
facilities or property described in paragraph (1),
regardless of whether the employees are Federal, State,
or local law enforcement officers;
* * * * * * *
SEC. 170C. PROTECTION OF SENSITIVE NUCLEAR FACILITIES.
(a) Definitions.--In this section:
(1) Antiterrorism team.--The term `antiterrorism
team' means the Nuclear Infrastructure Antiterrorism
Team established under subsection (h).
(2) Federal security coordinator.--The term
`Federal security coordinator' means the Federal
security coordinator assigned to a sensitive nuclear
facility under subsection (k).
(3) Task force.--The term `task force' means the
task force on nuclear infrastructure security
established by subsection (b).
(4) Threat.--The term `threat' means a threat
identified under subsection (c).
(5) Threat level.--The term `threat level' means a
threat level determined under subsection (d).
(b) Task Force on Nuclear Infrastructure Security.--
(1) Establishment.--There is established a task
force on nuclear infrastructure security.
(2) Membership.--The task force shall be comprised
of--
(A) the chairman of the Commission, who
shall serve as chairperson of the task force;
(B) the Secretary of Defense;
(C) the Secretary of Transportation;
(D) the Administrator of the Environmental
Protection Agency;
(E) the Attorney General;
(F) the Secretary of State;
(G) the Director of the Central
Intelligence Agency;
(H) the Secretary of Health and Human
Services;
(I) the Director of the Federal Emergency
Management Agency; and
(J) the Homeland Security Officer.
(3) Duties.--
(A) In general.--The task force, in
consultation with other Federal, State, and
local agencies, stakeholders, and members of
the public, as appropriate, shall examine the
protection of sensitive nuclear facilities from
potential terrorist threats.
(B) Security review.--
(i) In general.--The task force
shall examine--
(I) the classification of
threats as--
(aa) an act--
(AA) by an
enemy of the
United States
(whether a
foreign
government or
other person);
or
(BB)
otherwise
falling under
the
responsibilities
of the Federal
Government; or
(bb) an act
involving a type of
risk that the licensees
of the Commission
should be responsible
for guarding against;
(II) coordination of
Federal, State, and local
security efforts for protection
of land, water, and ground
access to sensitive nuclear
facilities in the event of a
terrorist attack or attempted
terrorist attack;
(III) the adequacy of
existing emergency planning
zones to protect the public
health and safety in the event
of a terrorist attack against a
sensitive nuclear facility;
(IV) the adequacy and
coordination of Federal, State,
and local emergency planning,
evacuation, and other measures
to protect the public health
and safety in the event of a
terrorist attack against a
sensitive nuclear facility;
(V) the threats that
sensitive nuclear facilities
must protect against to prevent
acts of radiological sabotage
and theft of special nuclear
material;
(VI) the system of threat
levels, consistent with the
Homeland Security Advisory
System, used to categorize the
threats against a sensitive
nuclear facility, including--
(aa) procedures to
ensure coordinated
Federal, State, and
local responses to
changing threat levels
for sensitive nuclear
facilities;
(bb) monitoring of
threats against
sensitive nuclear
facilities; and
(cc) procedures to
notify licensees of a
sensitive nuclear
facility of changes in
threat levels;
(VII) the development,
implementation, and revision of
security plans for sensitive
nuclear facilities;
(VIII) the establishment of
the antiterrorism team under
subsection (h);
(IX) the hiring and
training standards for members
of private security forces at
sensitive nuclear facilities,
in accordance with subsection
(i);
(X) the coordination of
Federal resources to expedite
and improve the process of
performing background checks on
employees with access to
sensitive nuclear facilities;
and
(XI) the creation of a
program to provide technical
assistance and training for the
national guard, State law
enforcement agencies, and local
law enforcement agencies to
respond, as appropriate, to
threats against a sensitive
nuclear facility, including
recommendations for the
establishment of a grant
program for State and local
governments to carry out any
recommended requirements under
this section.
(ii) Threats.--The threats to be
examined include--
(I) threats comparable to
the events of September 11,
2001;
(II) cyber or biochemical
threats;
(III) attacks on a
sensitive nuclear facility by
multiple coordinated teams of a
large number of individuals;
(IV) attacks from several
persons employed at the
sensitive nuclear facility,
some of whom may have
sophisticated knowledge of the
operations of the sensitive
nuclear facility;
(V) attacks from
individuals willing to commit
suicide to carry out the
attacks;
(VI) water-based and air-
based attacks;
(VII) attacks using
explosive devises of
considerable size and modern
weaponry;
(VIII) fire, especially
fire of long duration; and
(IX) any combination of
those threats.
(4) Report.--
(A) In general.--Not later than 120 days
after the date of enactment of this section,
the task force shall submit to the President
and Congress, in classified form and
unclassified form, a report with
recommendations and findings.
(B) Revision.--The task force shall revise
the recommendations periodically, but not less
than once every 3 years.
(c) Threats to Sensitive Nuclear Facilities.--
(1) In general.--Not later than 150 days after the
task force submits the report under subsection (b)(4),
the Commission shall promulgate regulations, based on
and consistent with the findings and recommendations of
the task force, identifying the threats that sensitive
nuclear facilities must protect against to prevent acts
of radiological sabotage and the theft of special
nuclear material at sensitive nuclear facilities.
(2) Protection of safeguards information.--In
promulgating regulations under this subsection, the
Commission shall ensure protection of safeguards
information in accordance with section 147.
(d) Threat Levels.--Not later than 150 days after the task
force submits the report under subsection (b)(4), the
Commission shall promulgate regulations, based on and
consistent with the findings and recommendations of the task
force, establishing a system for the determination of multiple
threat levels to describe the threat conditions at sensitive
nuclear facilities.
(e) Security Plans.--
(1) In general.--Not later than 1 year after the
date on which the Commission establishes the threats
under subsection (c), the Commission shall review,
based on and consistent with the findings and
recommendations of the task force, the security plan
for each sensitive nuclear facility to ensure that each
sensitive nuclear facility protects against those
threats.
(2) Aspects of review.--The Commission shall ensure
that the security plan provides for--
(A) the deployment and capabilities of the
private security force at the sensitive nuclear
facility for each threat level;
(B) coordination between the private
security force and the antiterrorism team for
the sensitive nuclear facility, as appropriate
for each threat level;
(C) secure operation of vital equipment,
such as control room equipment and backup
warning systems;
(D) access restrictions;
(E) security cameras, fire protection
barriers, and other physical security measures;
(F) protection of spent fuel, including
options such as placement of spent fuel in dry
cask storage;
(G) background security checks for
employees and prospective employees; and
(H) coordination among licensees of
sensitive nuclear facilities and appropriate
Federal, state, and local emergency response
personnel.
(3) Schedule.--The Commission shall establish a
priority schedule for conducting reviews of security
plans based on the vulnerability of each sensitive
nuclear facility and the proximity of the sensitive
nuclear facility to large population areas.
(4) Findings.--
(A) In general.--Not later than 30 days
after the review of each security plan, the
Commission shall submit to Congress and the
licensee of each sensitive nuclear facility
recommendations, findings, and a schedule for
implementation of changes to security that
shall be made not later than 18 months after
completion of the review of the security plan.
(B) Form.--The report submitted to Congress
under subparagraph (A) shall be submitted in
classified and unclassified form.
(5) Upgrades to security plan.--Not later than 30
days after the review of each security plan, the
Commission shall ensure that the licensee of each
sensitive nuclear facility revises, as necessary, its
security plan consistent with the findings under
paragraph (4).
(6) Upgrades to security.--The Commission shall
ensure that the licensee of each sensitive nuclear
facility makes any changes to security required by the
security plan according to the Commission schedule.
(f) Emergency Response Plans.--
(1) In general.--Not later than 150 days after the
task force submits the report under subsection (b)(4),
the Commission shall review, based on and consistent
with the findings and recommendations of the task
force, the emergency response plans for each sensitive
nuclear facility to ensure that each emergency response
plan provides protection for persons living in the
emergency response planning zones.
(2) Aspects of review.--The Commission shall ensure
that each emergency response plan provides for--
(A) the protection of public health and
safety, including the ability to implement
protective measures;
(B) clear definition and assignment of
responsibilities of emergency response
personnel;
(C) notification procedures;
(D) communication and coordination among
emergency response personnel;
(E) dissemination of information to the
public, including both pre-emergency education
and in the event of a radiological emergency;
(F) adequate emergency facilities and
equipment at and around the sensitive nuclear
facility;
(G) the use of methods, systems, and
equipment for assessing and monitoring actual
or potential impacts of a radiological
emergency;
(H) appropriate evacuation and sheltering
and the prophylactic use of potassium iodide;
(I) means for controlling radiological
exposures;
(J) appropriate medical services;
(K) plans for recovery and reentry; and
(L) radiological emergency response
training.
(3) Schedule.--The Commission shall establish a
priority schedule for conducting reviews of emergency
response plans for sensitive nuclear facilities based
on the relative degrees of vulnerability of sensitive
nuclear facilities and the proximity of sensitive
nuclear facilities to large population areas.
(4) Findings.--
(A) In general.--Not later than 30 days
after the review of each emergency response
plan, the Commission shall submit to Congress
and the licensee of each sensitive nuclear
facility recommendations and findings.
(B) Form.--The report submitted to Congress
under subparagraph (A) shall be submitted in
classified and unclassified form.
(5) Upgrades to emergency response plan.--Not later
than 30 days after completion of the review of each
emergency response plan, the Commission shall ensure
that the licensee of each sensitive nuclear facility
revises, as necessary, the emergency response plan for
the sensitive nuclear facility consistent with the
findings under paragraph (4).
(g) Federal Coordination.--Not later than 90 days after the
task force submits the report under subsection (b)(4), the
Commission shall promulgate regulations, based on and
consistent with the findings and recommendations of the task
force, establishing the circumstances under which the
Commission shall request the President to--
(1) deploy the Coast Guard to a sensitive nuclear
facility;
(2) provide for the protection of air space in the
vicinity of a sensitive nuclear facility; or
(3) deploy the antiterrorism team.
(h) Nuclear Infrastructure Antiterrorism Team.--
(1) Establishment.--Not later than 1 year after the
task force submits the report under subsection (b)(4),
the President shall establish, based on and consistent
with the findings and recommendations of the task
force, the Nuclear Infrastructure Antiterrorism Team.
(2) Purpose.--The purpose of the antiterrorism team
shall be to provide protection for the perimeter of
sensitive nuclear facilities against the threats
identified under subsection (c), in coordination with
other Federal, State, local, and private entities, as
appropriate, consistent with the security plan for each
sensitive nuclear facility.
(i) Training Program.--
(1) In general.--Not later than 180 days after the
task force submits the report under subsection
(b)(4)(B), the President shall establish, based on and
consistent with findings and recommendations of the
task force, a program to provide technical assistance
and training for the National Guard and State and local
law enforcement agencies in responding to threats
against a sensitive nuclear facility.
(2) Grants.--The President may provide grants,
consistent with the findings and recommendations of the
task force, to State and local governments to assist in
carrying out this section.
(3) Authorization of appropriations.--There are
authorized to be appropriated such sums as are
necessary to carry out this subsection.
(j) Employee Security.--
(1) Review.--Not later than 90 days after the task
force submits the report under subsection (b)(4), the
Commission, taking into consideration recommendations
of the task force, shall review and update the hiring
and training standards for employees of a sensitive
nuclear facility.
(2) Disqualification of individuals that present
national security risks.--The Commission, based on and
consistent with the findings and recommendations of the
task force, shall establish qualifications and
procedures, in addition to any background check
conducted under section 149, to ensure that no
individual that presents a threat to national security
is employed at a sensitive nuclear facility.
(k) Federal Security Coordinators.--
(1) In general.--Not later than 120 days after the
task force submits the report under subsection (b)(4),
the Commission, based on and consistent with findings
and recommendations of the task force, shall promulgate
regulations for the hiring and training of Federal
security coordinators.
(2) Assignment of federal security coordinators.--
Not later than 60 days after the Commission promulgates
regulations under paragraph (1), the Commission shall
assign a Federal security coordinator, under the
employment of the Commission, at each sensitive nuclear
facility.
(3) Responsibilities.--The Federal security
coordinator shall be responsible for--
(A) communicating with the Commission and
other Federal, State, and local authorities
concerning threats, including threats against
the sensitive nuclear facility;
(B) ensuring that the sensitive nuclear
facility maintains security consistent with the
security plan in accordance with the
appropriate threat level; and
(C) ensuring full and active coordination
of security measures among--
(i) the private security force at
the sensitive nuclear facility;
(ii) the antiterrorism team; and
(iii) other Federal, State, and
local authorities, as appropriate.
(l) Classified Information.--Nothing in this section shall
be construed to supersede any existing law (including a
regulation) governing the disclosure of classified information
or safeguards information.
SEC. 170D. CARRYING OF WEAPONS.
(a) Authority To Make Arrest.--
(1) In general.--A person authorized under section
161k. to carry a firearm, other weapon, device, or
ammunition may, while in the performance of, and in
connection with, official duties, detain or arrest an
individual without a warrant for any offense against
the United States committed in the presence of the
person or for any felony under the laws of the United
States if the person has a reasonable ground to believe
that the individual has committed or is committing such
a felony.
(2) Limitation.--An employee of a contractor or
subcontractor or of a Commission licensee or
certificate holder (or a contractor of a licensee or
certificate holder) authorized to make an arrest under
paragraph (1) may make an arrest only after the
Commission, licensee, or certificate holder has applied
for and been granted authorization from the
Commission--
(A) when the individual is within, or is in
flight directly from, the area in which the
offense was committed; and
(B) in the enforcement of--
(i) a law regarding the property of
the United States in the custody of the
Department of Energy, the Commission,
or a contractor of the Department of
Energy or Commission or a licensee or
certificate holder of the Commission;
(ii) a law applicable to facilities
owned or operated by a Commission
licensee or certificate holder that are
designated by the Commission under
section 161k.;
(iii) a law applicable to property
of significance to the common defense
and security that is in the custody of
a licensee or certificate holder or a
contractor of a licensee or certificate
holder of the Commission; or
(iv) any provision of this Act that
subjects an offender to a fine,
imprisonment, or both.
(3) Other authority.--The arrest authority
conferred by this section is in addition to any arrest
authority under other law.
(4) Guidelines--
(A) In general.--The Secretary and the
Commission, with the approval of the Attorney
General, shall issue guidelines to implement
section 161k. and this subsection.
(B) Effective date.--The authority to carry
and use weapons, devices, or ammunition
provided to employees described in section
161k.(2) and the authority provided to those
employees under this subsection shall not be
effective until the date on which guidelines
issued under subparagraph (A) become effective.
SEC. 170E. SENSITIVE RADIOACTIVE MATERIAL SECURITY.
(a) Definitions.--In this section:
(1) Sensitive radioactive material.--
(A) In general.--The term `sensitive
radioactive material' means--
(i) a material--
(I) that is a source
material, byproduct material,
or special nuclear material;
and
(II) that is any other
radioactive material
(regardless of whether the
material is or has been
licensed or otherwise regulated
under this Act) produced or
made radioactive before or
after the date of enactment of
this section; and
(ii) that is in such a form or
quantity or concentration that the
Commission determines, based on and
consistent with the recommendations of
the task force, should be classified as
`sensitive radioactive material' that
warrants improved security and
protection against loss, theft, or
sabotage.
(B) Exclusion.--The term `sensitive
radioactive material' does not include nuclear
fuel or spent nuclear fuel.
(2) Security threat.--The term `security threat'
means--
(A) a threat of sabotage or theft of
sensitive radioactive material;
(B) a threat of use of sensitive
radioactive material in a radiological
dispersal device; and
(C) any other threat of terrorist or other
criminal activity involving sensitive
radioactive material that could harm the health
or safety of the public due primarily to
radiological properties of the sensitive
radioactive material, as determined by the
Commission based on and consistent with the
recommendations of the task force.
(3) Task force.--The term `task force' has the
meaning given the term in section 170C(a).
(b) Duties.--
(1) In general.--The task force shall--
(A) evaluate the security of sensitive
radioactive material against security threats;
and
(B) recommend administrative and
legislative actions to be taken to provide the
maximum practicable degree of security against
security threats.
(2) Considerations.--In carrying out paragraph (1),
the task force shall make recommendations to--
(A) determine the radioactive materials
that should be classified as sensitive
radioactive materials;
(B) develop a classification system for
sensitive radioactive materials that--
(i) is based on the potential for
use by terrorists of sensitive
radioactive material and the extent of
the threat to public health and safety
posed by that potential; and
(ii) takes into account--
(I) radioactivity levels of
sensitive radioactive material;
(II) the dispersibility of
sensitive radioactive material;
(III) the chemical and
material form of sensitive
radioactive material; and
(IV) other appropriate
factors;
(C) develop a national system for recovery
of sensitive radioactive material that is lost
or stolen, taking into account the
classification system established under
subparagraph (B);
(D) provide for the storage of sensitive
radioactive material that is not currently in
use in a safe and secure manner;
(E) develop a national tracking system for
sensitive radioactive material, taking into
account the classification system established
under subparagraph (B);
(F) develop methods to ensure the return or
proper disposal of sensitive radioactive
material;
(G) modify current export controls on
sensitive radioactive materials so that, to the
extent feasible, exports from the United States
of sensitive radioactive materials are made
only to foreign recipients that are willing and
able to control the sensitive radioactive
materials in the same manner as recipients in
the United States; and
(H) establish procedures to improve the
security of sensitive radioactive material in
use, transportation, and storage.
(3) Procedures to improve security.--The procedures
to improve the security of sensitive radioactive
material under paragraph (2)(H) may include--
(A) periodic audits or inspections by the
Commission to ensure that sensitive radioactive
material is properly secured and can be fully
accounted for;
(B) evaluation by the Commission of
security measures taken by persons that possess
sensitive radioactive material;
(C) imposition of increased fines for
violations of regulations relating to security
and safety measures applicable to licensees
that possess sensitive radioactive material;
(D) conduct of background checks on
individuals with access to sensitive
radioactive material;
(E) measures to ensure the physical
security of facilities in which sensitive
radioactive material is stored; and
(F) screening of shipments of sensitive
radioactive material to facilities that are
particularly at risk for sabotage to ensure
that the shipments do not contain explosives.
(c) Report.--Not later than 90 days after the date of
enactment of this section, and not less frequently than once
every 3 years thereafter, the task force shall submit to the
President and Congress a report in unclassified form (with a
classified annex, if necessary) describing the administrative
and legislative actions recommended under subsection (b)(1).
(d) Administrative Action.--Not later than 60 days after
the date of submission of the report under subsection (b), the
Commission shall, based on and consistent with the
recommendations of the task force, take such actions as are
appropriate to--
(1) revise the system for licensing sensitive
radioactive materials based on and consistent with the
recommendations of the task force; and
(2) ensure that States that have entered into an
agreement under section 274b. establish compatible
programs in a timely manner.
* * * * * * *
Sec. 229. Trespass Upon Commission Installations.--
a. The Commission is authorized to issue
regulations relating to the entry upon or carrying,
transporting, or otherwise introducing or causing to be
introduced any dangerous weapons, explosive, or other
dangerous instrument or material likely to produce
substantial injury or damage to persons or property,
into or upon any facility, installation, or real
property subject to the jurisdiction, administration,
or in the custody of the Commission. Every such
regulation of the Commission shall be posted
conspicuously at the location involved or subject to
the licensing authority of the Commission or to
certification by the Commission under this Act or any
other Act.
* * * * * * *
Sec. 236. Sabotage of Nuclear Facilities or Fuel.--
a. Any person who intentionally and willfully destroys or
causes physical damage to, or [who intentionally and willfully
attempts] or who attempts or conspires to destroy or cause
physical damage to--
(1) any production facility or utilization facility
licensed under this Act;
(2) any nuclear waste [storage facility] storage,
treatment, or disposal facility licensed under this
Act;
(3) any nuclear fuel for such a utilization
facility, or any spent nuclear fuel from such a
facility; [or]
(4) any uranium enrichment [facility licensed] a
utilization facility licensed under this Act by the
Nuclear Regulatory Commission[.] ; or
(5) any production, utilization, waste storage,
waste treatment, waste disposal, uranium enrichment, or
nuclear fuel fabrication facility subject to licensing
or certification under this Act during construction of
the facility, if the destruction or damage caused or
attempted to be caused could adversely affect public
health and safety during the operation of the facility;
shall be fined not more than $10,000 or imprisoned for not more
than ten years, or both.
b. Any person who intentionally and willfully causes or
attempts to cause an interruption of normal operation of any
such facility through the unauthorized use of or tampering with
the machinery, components, or controls of any such facility,
shall be fined not more than $10,000 or imprisoned for not more
than ten years, or both.
* * * * * * *
----------
ENERGY REORGANIZATION ACT OF 1974
[Public Law 93-438]
* * * * * * *
SEC 203. OFFICE OF NUCLEAR SAFETY AND SAFEGUARDS
(a) Establishment; appointment of director.--There is
hereby established in the Commission an Office of Nuclear
Material Safety and Safeguards under the direction of a
Director of Nuclear Material Safety and Safeguards, who shall
be appointed by the Commission, who may report directly to the
Commission as provided in section 5849 of this title, and who
shall serve at the pleasure of and be removable by the
Commission.
(b) Functions of Director.--Subject to the provisions of
this chapter, the Director of Nuclear Material Safety and
Safeguards shall perform such functions as the Commission shall
delegate including:
(1) Principal [licensing and regulation involving]
licensing, regulation, and, except as otherwise
provided under section 212, carrying out safety
reviews, safeguards, and physical security of all
facilities and materials, licensed under the Atomic
Energy Act of 1954, as amended (42 U.S.C. 2011 et
seq.), associated with the processing, transport, and
handling of nuclear materials, [including] not
including the provision and maintenance of safeguards
against threats, thefts, and sabotage of such licensed
facilities, [and materials] and materials, to the
extent that the safeguards and security functions are
delegated to the Office of Nuclear Security and
Incident Response under section 212.
(2) Review safety [and safeguards] of all such
facilities and materials licensed under the Atomic
Energy Act of 1954, [as amended, and such review shall
include, but not be limited to--
[(A) monitoring, testing, and recommending
upgrading of internal accounting systems for
special nuclear and other nuclear materials
licensed under the Atomic Energy Act of 1954,
as amended;
[(B) developing, in consultation and
coordination with the Administration,
contingency plans for dealing with threats,
thefts, and sabotage relating to special
nuclear materials, high-level radioactive
wastes and nuclear facilities resulting from
all activities licensed under the Atomic Energy
Act of 1954, as amended;
[(C) assessing the need for, and the
feasibility of, establishing a security agency
within the office for the performance of the
safeguards functions, and a report with
recommendations on this matter shall be
prepared within one year of the effective date
of this chapter and promptly transmitted to the
Congress by the Commission] (42 U.S.C. 2011 et
seq.).
(3) Recommending research to enable the Commission to
more effectively perform its functions.
(c) Responsibility for safeguarding special nuclear
materials; high-level radioactive wastes and nuclear facilities
Nothing in this section shall be construed to limit in any way
the functions of the Administration relating to the
safeguarding of special nuclear materials, high-level
radioactive wastes and nuclear facilities resulting from all
activities within the jurisdiction of the Administration
pursuant to this chapter.
* * * * * * *
SEC. 211. EMPLOYEE PROTECTION
(a) Discrimination against employee
(1) No employer may discharge any employee or
otherwise discriminate against any employee with
respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or
privileges of employment because the employee (or any
person acting pursuant to a request of the employee) -
(A) notified his employer of an alleged
violation of this chapter or the Atomic Energy
Act of 1954 (42 U.S.C. 2011 et seq.);
(B) refused to engage in any practice made
unlawful by this chapter or the Atomic Energy
Act of 1954, if the employee has identified the
alleged illegality to the employer;
(C) testified before Congress or at any
Federal or State proceeding regarding any
provision (or proposed provision) of this
chapter or the Atomic Energy Act of 1954;
(D) commenced, caused to be commenced, or is
about to commence or cause to be commenced a
proceeding under this chapter or the Atomic
Energy Act of 1954, as amended, or a proceeding
for the administration or enforcement of any
requirement imposed under this chapter or the
Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended;
(E) testified or is about to testify in any
such proceeding or;
(F) assisted or participated or is about to
assist or participate in any manner in such a
proceeding or in any other manner in such a
proceeding or in any other action to carry out
the purposes of this chapter or the Atomic
Energy Act of 1954, as amended.
(2) For purposes of this section, the term
''employer'' includes -
(A) a licensee of the Commission or of an
agreement State under section 274 of the Atomic
Energy Act of 1954 (42 U.S.C. 2021);
(B) an applicant for a license from the
Commission or such an agreement State;
(C) a contractor or subcontractor of such a
licensee or applicant; [and]
(D) a contractor or subcontractor of the
Department of Energy that is indemnified by the
Department under section 170 d. of the Atomic
Energy Act of 1954 (42 U.S.C. 2210(d)), but
such term shall not include any contractor or
subcontractor covered by Executive Order No.
12344[.] ; and
(E) a contractor or subcontractor of the
Commission.
* * * * * * *
SEC. 212. OFFICE OF NUCLEAR SECURITY AND INCIDENT RESPONSE.
(a) Definitions.--In this section:
(1) Antiterrorism team.--The term `antiterrorism
team' has the meaning given the term in section 170C(a)
of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954.
(2) Assistant director.--The term `Assistant
Director' means the Assistant Director for Security
Response.
(3) Director.--The term `Director' means the
Director of Nuclear Security and Incident Response
appointed under subsection (c).
(4) Mock terrorist team.--The term `mock terrorist
team' means the mock terrorist team described in
subsection (d)(3).
(5) Office.--The term `Office' means the Office of
Nuclear Security and Incident Response established by
subsection (b).
(6) Sensitive nuclear facility.--The term
`sensitive nuclear facility' has the meaning given the
term in section 11 of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954 (42
U.S.C. 2014).
(7) Threat.--The term `threat' has the meaning
given the term in section 170C(a) of the Atomic Energy
Act of 1954.
(8) Unit.--The term `Unit' means the Security
Response Unit established under subsection (d)(1).
(b) Establishment of Office.--There is established in the
Commission the Office of Nuclear Security and Incident
Response.
(c) Director.--
(1) Appointment.--The Commission may appoint and
terminate a Director of Nuclear Security and Incident
Response to head the Office.
(2) Duties.--The Director shall perform any duties
delegated by the Commission to the Director,
including--
(A) carrying out security, safeguards, and
incident responses relating to--
(i) any facility owned or operated
by a Commission licensee or certificate
holder;
(ii) any property owned or in the
possession of a Commission licensee or
certificate holder that--
(I) is significant to the
common defense and security; or
(II) is being transported
to or from a facility described
in clause (i); and
(iii) performing any other activity
of a Commission licensee or certificate
holder that is significant to the
common defense and security;
(B) for a facility or material licensed or
certified under the Atomic Energy Act of 1954
(42 U.S.C. 2011 et seq.)--
(i) developing contingency plans
for dealing with threats, thefts, and
sabotage; and
(ii) monitoring, reviewing, and
evaluating security and safeguards;
(C) recommending upgrades to internal
accounting systems for special nuclear and
other materials licensed or certified under the
Atomic Energy Act of 1954 (42 U.S.C. 2011 et
seq.);
(D) developing and recommending standards
and amendments to the standards of the
Commission relating to the duties described in
subparagraphs (A) through (C); and
(E) carrying out any other safeguards and
physical security functions that the Commission
determines to be appropriate.
(3) Consultation.--In carrying out the duties under
paragraph (2), the Director shall, to the maximum
extent practicable, consult and coordinate with--
(A) other officers of the Commission; and
(B) other Federal agencies.
(d) Security Response Unit.--
(1) Establishment.--There is established in the
Office the Security Response Unit.
(2) Head of unit.--The Unit shall be headed by an
Assistant Director for Security Response.
(3) Mock terrorist team.--The personnel of the Unit
shall include a mock terrorist team comprised of--
(A) a number of individuals, consistent
with the threat, who have advanced knowledge of
special weapons and tactics comparable to
special operations forces of the Armed Forces;
(B) nuclear engineers, as appropriate;
(C) individuals with knowledge of the
operations of the sensitive nuclear facility
who are capable of actively disrupting the
normal operations of the sensitive nuclear
facility; and
(D) any other individual that the
Commission determines should be a member of the
mock terrorist team.
(4) Security response evaluations.--
(A) In general.--Not later than 1 year
after the date of enactment of this section,
the Commission shall establish a security
response evaluation program to assess the
ability of each sensitive nuclear facility to
defend against the threats in accordance with
the security plan for the sensitive nuclear
facility.
(B) Frequency of evaluations.--Not less
than once every 3 years, the Commission shall
conduct and document security response
evaluations at each sensitive nuclear facility
to assess the ability of the private security
force, in cooperation with the antiterrorism
team, at the sensitive nuclear facility to
defend against the threat.
(C) Security exemption.--The Commission may
suspend activities under this section if the
Commission determines that the security
response evaluations would compromise security
at any sensitive nuclear facility in accordance
with a heightened threat level.
(D) Activities.--The security response
evaluation shall include force-on-force
exercises by the mock terrorist team against
the sensitive nuclear facility that simulate
air, water, and land assaults, as appropriate.
(E) Performance criteria.--The Commission
shall establish performance criteria for
judging the security response evaluations.
(F) Corrective action.--
(i) In general.--When any of the
performance criteria established under
subparagraph (E) are not satisfied--
(I) the licensee shall
promptly correct any defects in
performance identified by the
Commission in the security
response evaluation; and
(II) the Commission shall
conduct an additional security
response evaluation within 6
months to confirm that the
licensee satisfies the
performance criteria
established under subparagraph
(E).
(ii) 2 consecutive failures to
satisfy all performance criteria.--
(I) In general.--If a
sensitive nuclear facility
fails to satisfy all of the
performance criteria
established under subparagraph
(E) in 2 consecutive security
response evaluations, the
Commission shall issue an order
specifying the corrective
actions that must be taken by
the licensee of the sensitive
nuclear facility.
(II) Failure to take
corrective action.--If the
licensee of a sensitive nuclear
facility does not take the
corrective action specified by
the Commission within 30 days
after the date of issuance of
an order under subclause (I),
the Commission shall assess a
civil penalty under section
234.
(G) Reports.--Not less often than once
every year, the Commission shall submit to
Congress and the President a report, in
classified form and unclassified form, that
describes the results of each security response
evaluation under this paragraph for the
previous year.
(e) Emergency Response Exercises.--
(1) In general.--Not less than once every 2 years,
the Commission, in coordination with the Director of
the Federal Emergency Management Agency, shall conduct
emergency response exercises to evaluate the ability of
Federal, State, and local emergency response personnel
to respond to a radiological emergency at the sensitive
nuclear facility in accordance with the emergency
response plans.
(2) Activities.--The emergency response exercises
shall evaluate--
(A) the response capabilities, response
times, and coordination and communication
capabilities of the response personnel;
(B) the effectiveness and adequacy of
emergency response and evacuation plans; and
(C) the availability of potassium iodide or
other prophylactic medicines.
(3) Revision of emergency response plans.--The
Commission shall ensure that the emergency response
plan for a sensitive nuclear facility is revised to
correct for any deficiencies identified by an
evaluation under this subsection.
(4) Reports.--Not less than once every year, the
Commission shall submit to the President and Congress a
report, in classified form and unclassified form, that
describes--
(A) the results of each emergency response
exercise under this subsection conducted in the
previous year; and
(B) each revision of an emergency response
plan made under paragraph (3) for the previous
year.
(f) Effect.--Nothing in this section limits any authority
of the Department of Energy relating to the safe operation of
facilities under the jurisdiction of the Department.
* * * * * * *
-