[House Report 107-771]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
107th Congress Report
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
2d Session 107-771
======================================================================
R E P O R T
OF THE
COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
ON
H.R. 5132
together with
ADDITIONAL VIEWS
[Including cost estimate of the Congressional Budget Office]
November 4, 2002.--Committed to the Committee of the Whole House on the
State of the Union and ordered to be printed
HOUSE COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
One Hundred Seventh Congress
BOB STUMP, Arizona, Chairman
DUNCAN HUNTER, California IKE SKELTON, Missouri
JAMES V. HANSEN, Utah JOHN M. SPRATT, Jr., South
CURT WELDON, Pennsylvania Carolina
JOEL HEFLEY, Colorado SOLOMON P. ORTIZ, Texas
JIM SAXTON, New Jersey LANE EVANS, Illinois
JOHN M. McHUGH, New York GENE TAYLOR, Mississippi
TERRY EVERETT, Alabama NEIL ABERCROMBIE, Hawaii
ROSCOE G. BARTLETT, Maryland MARTIN T. MEEHAN, Massachusetts
HOWARD P. ``BUCK'' McKEON, ROBERT A. UNDERWOOD, Guam
California ROD R. BLAGOJEVICH, Illinois
J.C. WATTS, Jr., Oklahoma SILVESTRE REYES, Texas
MAC THORNBERRY, Texas TOM ALLEN, Maine
JOHN N. HOSTETTLER, Indiana VICTOR F. SNYDER, Arkansas
SAXBY CHAMBLISS, Georgia JIM TURNER, Texas
VAN HILLEARY, Tennessee ADAM SMITH, Washington
WALTER B. JONES, North Carolina LORETTA SANCHEZ, California
LINDSEY GRAHAM, South Carolina JAMES H. MALONEY, Connecticut
JIM RYUN, Kansas MIKE McINTYRE, North Carolina
BOB RILEY, Alabama CIRO D. RODRIGUEZ, Texas
JIM GIBBONS, Nevada CYNTHIA A. McKINNEY, Georgia
ROBIN HAYES, North Carolina ELLEN TAUSCHER, California
HEATHER WILSON, New Mexico ROBERT BRADY, Pennsylvania
KEN CALVERT, California ROBERT E. ANDREWS, New Jersey
ROB SIMMONS, Connecticut BARON P. HILL, Indiana
ANDER CRENSHAW, Florida MIKE THOMPSON, California
MARK STEVEN KIRK, Illinois JOHN B. LARSON, Connecticut
JO ANN DAVIS, Virginia SUSAN A. DAVIS, California
EDWARD L. SCHROCK, Virginia JAMES R. LANGEVIN, Rhode Island
W. TODD AKIN, Missouri RICK LARSEN, Washington
RANDY FORBES, Virginia
JEFF MILLER, Florida
JOE WILSON, South Carolina
Robert S. Rangel, Staff Director
C O N T E N T S
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Page
Purpose and Background........................................... 1
Legislative History.............................................. 2
Section-by-Section Analysis...................................... 2
Section 1--Findings Concerning Fiscal Year 2003 End Strengths
Needed for the Armed Forces to Fight the War on Terrorism.... 2
Section 2--Sense of Congress................................... 3
Committee Position............................................... 3
Fiscal Data...................................................... 3
Congressional Budget Office Estimate........................... 3
Committee Cost Estimate........................................ 4
Oversight Findings............................................... 4
Constitutional Authority Statement............................... 5
Statement of Federal Mandates.................................... 5
Record Vote...................................................... 5
Additional Views of John M. McHugh............................... 6
107th Congress Report
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
2d Session 107-771
======================================================================
EXPRESSING THE SENSE OF CONGRESS CONCERNING THE FISCAL YEAR 2003 END
STRENGTHS NEEDED FOR THE ARMED FORCES TO FIGHT THE WAR ON TERRORISM
_______
November 4, 2002.--Committed to the Committee of the Whole House on the
State of the Union and ordered to be printed
_______
Mr. Stump, from the Committee on Armed Services, submitted the
following
R E P O R T
together with
ADDITIONAL VIEWS
[To accompany H.R. 5132]
[Including cost estimate of the Congressional Budget Office]
The Committee on Armed Services, to whom was referred the
bill (H.R. 5132) to express the sense of Congress concerning
the fiscal year 2003 end strengths needed for the Armed Forces
to fight the War on Terrorism, having considered the same,
report favorably thereon with an amendment and recommend that
the bill as amended do pass.
The amendment (stated in terms of the page and line numbers
of the introduced bill) is as follows:
Page 5, beginning on line 5, strike ``so long as the Nation
is at war against terrorism''.
PURPOSE AND BACKGROUND
The purpose of H.R. 5132 is to express the sense of
Congress that, in light of the global war against terrorism:
(1) the increases in military personnel end strengths
recommended by the Senate and House of Representatives in their
respective versions of the National Defense Authorization Act
for Fiscal Year 2003 are appropriate and justified; (2) the
President and Secretary of Defense should not reduce end
strengths; and (3) the President should support the recommended
end strength increases.
H.R. 5132 is a direct outgrowth of the committee's long-
standing concerns about the inadequacy of the force structure
and strength of the Armed Forces for carrying out the national
military strategy, while also trying to sustain their long-term
readiness and viability. Such concerns predate the September
11, 2001, commencement of the Nation's global war on terrorism.
For example, committee initiatives led to the establishment of
minimum end strength levels for each of the military services
in the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1996,
Public Law 104-106. More recently, a majority of committee
Members in an August 2001 letter expressed to the Secretary of
Defense their strong opposition to any effort to reduce Army
force structure. Since the terrorist attack on the United
States of September 11, 2001, the extent and scope of
operations undertaken by the Armed Forces in the global war on
terrorism, the impact of new missions related to Homeland
Defense, and the testimony of senior U.S. military commanders
have convinced the committee that additional military forces
and strength will be required to adequately carry out the
missions assigned to our Armed Forces. In addition, the
committee became concerned that military manpower reductions
were being considered within the Department of Defense as part
of the department's overall transformation efforts. As a
result, the committee recommended and the House of
Representatives adopted, in H.R. 4546, the Bob Stump National
Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal year 2003, increases in
active duty end strength totaling more than 10,300 above the
budget request. The Senate also adopted active end strength
increases totaling 12,000 more than the budget request as part
of S. 2514, its version of the National Defense Authorization
Act for Fiscal Year 2003.
LEGISLATIVE HISTORY
H.R. 5132 was introduced on July 16, 2002 and was referred
to the Committee on Armed Services. On July 18, 2002 the
Committee on Armed Services held a mark-up session to consider
H.R. 5132. The committee adopted the bill with an amendment and
reported the same favorably by voice vote.
SECTION-BY-SECTION ANALYSIS
The following is a section-by-section analysis of those
sections of H.R. 5132 amended by the Armed Services Committee.
Section 1--Findings concerning fiscal year 2003 end strengths needed
for the Armed Forces to fight the war on terrorism
This section presents the Congressional findings in support
of H.R. 5132. Among those findings are that: (1) Prior to
September 11, 2001, the uniformed chiefs of the Armed Forces
testified that they did not have sufficient military personnel
to carry out all their operational requirements, and that since
September 11, 2001, senior operational commanders have
testified that the war on terrorism has further highlighted the
insufficiency of the Armed Forces to meet operational
requirements; (2) The war on terrorism has become global in
scope, requiring not only thousands of active duty personnel
but also the mobilization of more than 80,000 reservists; (3)
The President has repeatedly stated that the war on terrorism
will continue for some time; (4) Prosecuting the war on
terrorism will require, among other things, increased
expenditures for military personnel, and in recognition of that
both the House and Senate versions of the National Defense
Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2003 increased the
authorizations for military end strength above the levels
requested by the President; and (5) Press reports indicate that
the Secretary of Defense has under consideration substantial
reductions in military end strengths.
Section 2--Sense of Congress
This section would express the Sense of Congress that: (1)
the increases in military personnel end strengths recommended
by the Senate and House of Representatives in their respective
versions of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal
Year 2003 are appropriate and justified; (2) the President and
Secretary of Defense should not reduce end strengths; and (3)
the President should support such increased end strengths.
COMMITTEE POSITION
On July 18, 2002, the Committee on Armed Services ordered
H.R. 5132, as amended, reported to the House with a favorable
recommendation by voice vote, a quorum being present.
FISCAL DATA
Pursuant to clause 3(d)(2)(A) of rule XIII of the Rules of
the House of Representatives, the committee attempted to
ascertain annual outlays resulting from the bill during fiscal
year 2003 and the four following fiscal years. The results of
such efforts are reflected in the cost estimate prepared by the
Director of the Congressional Budget Office under section 402
of the Congressional Budget Act of 1974, which is included in
this report pursuant to clause 3(c)(3) of rule XIII of the
Rules of the House.
CONGRESSIONAL BUDGET OFFICE ESTIMATE
In compliance with clause 3(c)(3) of rule XIII of the Rules
of the House of Representatives, the cost estimate prepared by
the Congressional Budget Office and submitted pursuant to
section 402(a) of the Congressional Budget Act of 1974 is as
follows:
July 19, 2002.
Hon. Bob Stump,
Chairman, Committee on Armed Services,
House of Representatives, Washington, DC.
Dear Mr. Chairman: The Congressional Budget Office has
prepared the enclosed cost estimate for H.R. 5132, a bill to
express the sense of Congress concerning the fiscal year 2003
end strengths needed for the Armed Forces to fight the War on
Terrorism.
The CBO staff contact is Matthew Schmit. If you wish
further details on this estimate, we will be pleased to provide
them.
Sincerely,
Dan L. Crippen,
Director.
H.R. 5132--A bill to express the sense of Congress concerning the
fiscal year 2003 end strengths needed for the Armed Forces to
fight the War on Terrorism
CBO estimates that enacting H.R. 5132 would have no impact
on the federal budget. Because the bill would not affect direct
spending or receipts, pay-as-you-go procedures would not apply.
H.R. 5132 contains no intergovernmental or private-sector
mandates as defined in the Unfunded Mandates Reform Act and
would impose no costs on state, local, or tribal governments.
H.R. 5132 would express the sense of the Congress that the
increases in end-strength authorizations for the armed forces
for fiscal year 2003 recommended by the Senate and House of
Representatives in their respective versions of the National
Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2003 are wholly
appropriate and justified by the increased missions and tempo
of operations associated with prosecution of the war against
terrorism. In addition, the bill would express the sense of the
Congress that the President and the Secretary of Defense should
not reduce, or seek to reduce, the number of members of the
armed forces, and that the President should support the
increase in end-strength levels for the armed forces
recommended by the Senate and House of Representatives for
fiscal year 2003 because of the demands of the war against
terrorism.
The determination of end strengths for the armed forces
will affect spending by the Department of Defense, but this
legislation would neither authorize nor fund any particular end
strength. Rather, it affirms Congress's support for end
strengths specified in the defense authorization bill. Hence,
H.R. 5132, by itself, would have no budgetary impact.
The CBO staff contact is Matthew Schmit. This estimate was
approved by Peter H. Fontaine, Deputy Assistant Director for
Budget Analysis.
COMMITTEE COST ESTIMATE
Pursuant to clause 3(d) of rule XIII of the Rules of the
House of Representatives, the committee generally concurs with
the estimate contained in the report of the Congressional
Budget Office.
OVERSIGHT FINDINGS
With respect to clause 3(c)(1) of rule XIII of the Rules of
the House of Representatives, this legislation results from
hearings and other oversight activities conducted by the
committee pursuant to clause 2(b)(1) of rule X.
With respect to clause 3(c)(2) of rule XIII of the Rules of
the House of Representatives and section 308(a)(1) of the
Congressional Budget Act of 1974, this legislation does not
include any new spending or credit authority, nor does it
provide for any increase or decrease in tax revenues or
expenditures. The fiscal features of this legislation are
addressed in the estimate prepared by the Director of the
Congressional Budget Office under section 402 of the
Congressional Budget Act of 1974.
With respect to clause 3(c)(4) of rule XIII of the Rules of
the House of Representatives, the committee has not received a
report from the Committee on Government Reform and Oversight
pertaining to the subject matter of H.R. 5132.
CONSTITUTIONAL AUTHORITY STATEMENT
Pursuant to clause 3 (d)(1) of rule XIII of the Rules of
the House of Representatives, the committee finds the authority
for this legislation in Article I, section 8 of the United
States Constitution.
STATEMENT OF FEDERAL MANDATES
Pursuant to section 423 of Public Law 104-4, this
legislation contains no federal mandates with respect to state,
local, and tribal governments, nor with respect to the private
sector. Similarly, the bill provides no unfunded federal
intergovernmental mandates.
RECORD VOTE
In accordance with clause 3(b) of rule XIII of the Rules of
the House of Representatives, the committee notes that no roll
call votes were taken with respect to H.R. 5132.
The committee ordered H.R. 5132, as amended, reported to
the House with a favorable recommendation by a voice vote, a
quorum being present.
ADDITIONAL VIEWS OF CONGRESSMAN JOHN M. McHUGH
Unlike many things in America today, the debate about
military manpower does not easily divide itself between pre-
and post-September 11, 2001 perspectives. Prior to the
terrorist assault on our nation, the U.S. Armed Forces, already
under resourced, understructured, and undermanned, were
struggling to carry out the demanding missions the nation had
assigned them. Following the start of the war on terrorism,
those same forces now are challenged to both continue those
pre-existing missions and to perform new, even more critical
ones: Defending the homeland and prosecuting a war that is
global in scope and, thus far, without foreseeable end.
H.R. 5132 succinctly addresses this dilemma and the
inescapable reality regarding the continuing inadequacies of
current levels of military force structure and manpower. The
resolution also challenges the apparent view of some within the
Department of Defense that significant reductions in uniformed
personnel in the middle of a war will somehow contribute to a
more efficient, more effective, and transformed future
military. I reject such a plan and fully support H.R. 5132,
which not only opposes reductions to current military end
strength, but also urges support for reasonable increases to
active strength--some 10,000 to 12,000 personnel--as proposed
by both the House and Senate in their respective defense
authorization bills for fiscal year 2003.
Prior to September 11, based on years of review, testimony
and direct observation, the House Armed Services Committee
understood very well the disturbing discrepancies and
debilitating mismatches between a significantly reduced force
structure and military personnel strength on the one hand, and
the growing range of new, enduring missions, with an attendant
increase in personnel and operations tempos on the other. One
measure of the inadequacy of the active component forces to
carry out the full range of their assigned peacetime operations
is demonstrated by the fact that in each of the last several
years, reservists have been required to serve more than 12
million days on active duty--replacing the equivalent of more
than 35,000 active duty personnel.
In spite of such an environment, the Quadrennial Defense
Review and other internal Department of Defense documents of
that period somehow ignored this reality and concluded that
significant manpower reductions should be made in the Armed
Forces, thus exacerbating an already tenuous situation. Such
cuts, it was apparently argued, were both permissible and
required because technology promised a quantum increase in the
operational capabilities and lethality of our military forces,
and were necessary to finance the technological transformation
of the services.
In August 2001, specifically in reaction to reports that
the Department of Defense was considering the elimination of
two Army active duty divisions, 83 House members (including 34
of 60 on this committee) expressed ``strong opposition'' to
reductions in Army force structure.
September 11 brought with it not only the added requirement
for the military to fight a global war on terrorism, but also
the need to address significant new force protection and anti-
terrorism homeland defense requirements within our borders. To
meet these immediate requirements, the services today have more
than 85,000 reservists on active duty, as well as thousands of
other personnel involuntarily retained in service beyond their
normal tour end through the implementation of so-called ``stop
loss'' initiatives. Clearly, those reservists cannot stay on
active duty indefinitely, and stop loss must end. Therefore, as
the committee moved towards mark-up of the National Defense
Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2003, the Army, Navy and Air
Force identified their respective active duty manpower needs
that were required beyond those strength levels requested by
the budget. Ultimately, the House approved a good portion of
those additional manpower figures the military services argued
were required for fiscal year 2003. I believe the House acted
judiciously and carefully in approving that increase--a growth
of less than one percent in active end strength above the
requested levels.
Now, with no foreseeable end to the ongoing commitments and
requirements for military forces and personnel, reports again
have been heard of plans within the Department of Defense for
significant active end strength reductions, totaling up to
90,000 personnel.
Such suggestions are not just simply unjustified, they are
frightening. The demands placed upon our military both before
and since the events of September 11 are too stark to be
ignored any longer.
The Secretary of Defense has taken the position that in the
long term, no end strength increases are likely to be required.
He has further stated that before any manpower increases are
made, the services must prove that they have done everything
within their ability to meet requirements from existing
military personnel authorizations.
I commend the Secretary for this hard-nosed business
approach. Each service should, indeed, clearly define their
needs for long-term growth in manpower requirements. Further,
the demonstrated success of advanced technology on the
battlefield undeniably underscores the need to pursue the
promise that science and research have to offer. My concern,
however, lies in the fact that, too often, arguments in support
of transformation have invariably called for manpower
reductions based solely upon the unfulfilled promise that
technology, force enhancements, and other reforms will someday
eliminate or reduce the need for structure and personnel.
Moreover, given the range of reforms and reductions that each
service has already experienced over the past decade,
fundamental questions need to be asked about how much more so-
called manpower transformation can yet be wrung from the
military services, especially if the current intensity and
scope of the military operations does not abate significantly
below pre-September 11 levels.
I would urge the Secretary of Defense and others in the
department to heed the unequivocal message of H.R. 5132:
Manpower reductions do not constitute a feasible course of
action to transform the military. Additional manpower, not
less, will be required to sustain the Armed Forces through the
global war on terrorism and beyond.
John M. McHugh.