[Senate Hearing 107-800]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
S. Hrg. 107-800
WEAK STATES IN AFRICA: U.S. POLICY IN ANGOLA
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HEARING
BEFORE THE
SUBCOMMITTEE ON AFRICAN AFFAIRS
OF THE
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS
UNITED STATES SENATE
ONE HUNDRED SEVENTH CONGRESS
SECOND SESSION
__________
OCTOBER 16, 2002
__________
Printed for the use of the Committee on Foreign Relations
Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.access.gpo.gov/congress/
senate
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COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS
JOSEPH R. BIDEN, Jr., Delaware, Chairman
PAUL S. SARBANES, Maryland JESSE HELMS, North Carolina
CHRISTOPHER J. DODD, Connecticut RICHARD G. LUGAR, Indiana
JOHN F. KERRY, Massachusetts CHUCK HAGEL, Nebraska
RUSSELL D. FEINGOLD, Wisconsin GORDON H. SMITH, Oregon
PAUL D. WELLSTONE, Minnesota BILL FRIST, Tennessee
BARBARA BOXER, California LINCOLN D. CHAFEE, Rhode Island
ROBERT G. TORRICELLI, New Jersey GEORGE ALLEN, Virginia
BILL NELSON, Florida SAM BROWNBACK, Kansas
JOHN D. ROCKEFELLER IV, West MICHAEL B. ENZI, Wyoming
Virginia
Antony J. Blinken, Staff Director
Patricia A. McNerney, Republican Staff Director
------
SUBCOMMITTEE ON AFRICAN AFFAIRS
RUSSELL D. FEINGOLD, Wisconsin, Chairman
CHRISTOPHER J. DODD, Connecticut BILL FRIST, Tennessee
BARBARA BOXER, California SAM BROWNBACK, Kansas
JOHN D. ROCKEFELLER IV, West GORDON H. SMITH, Oregon
Virginia
(ii)
C O N T E N T S
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Page
Feingold, Hon. Russell D., U.S. Senator from Wisconsin, prepared
statement...................................................... 2
Kansteiner, Hon. Walter H., Assistant Secretary of State for
African Affairs, Department of State, Washington, DC........... 3
Prepared statement........................................... 5
Additional questions submitted for the record................ 33
Global Witness, prepared statement submitted for the record...... 14
Kramer, David, attorney, Baird Holm, Omaha, NE................... 23
Press release of David Kramer on Angola Political Environment 27
Rostrup, Dr. Morten, president, Medecins Sans Frontieres/Doctors
Without Borders, Brussels, Belgium............................. 16
Prepared statement........................................... 19
(iii)
WEAK STATES IN AFRICA: U.S. POLICY IN ANGOLA
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WEDNESDAY, OCTOBER 16, 2002
U.S. Senate,
Subcommittee on African Affairs,
Committee on Foreign Relations,
Washington, DC.
The subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 10:05 a.m., in
room SD-419, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Hon. Russell D.
Feingold (chairman of the subcommittee), presiding.
Present: Senator Feingold.
Senator Feingold. I call this hearing to order. Good
morning.
Today, the Subcommittee on African Affairs will focus on
the case of Angola. This hearing marks the last in a series of
hearings focusing on weak states of Africa and looking at our
policy in those states with fresh eyes in the wake of the
horrific attacks of September 11, 2001.
My purpose in convening this series has been to try to draw
attention to some of the manifestations of states' weaknesses
in various parts of Africa, both in terms of humanitarian and
economic collapse and in terms of such phenomena as piracy,
illicit air transport networks, and trafficking in arms,
gemstones, and people. I wanted to call attention to these
issues and to explore long-term policy options for changing the
context in these states and addressing the relationship between
criminal activity, corruption, and humanitarian crisis to help
make these states less appealing to criminal opportunists.
Earlier this year, the subcommittee took up the cases of
Somalia, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, and Liberia.
Today, as we turn our attention to Angola, we consider a state
that, unlike the DRC or Somalia, does not have trouble
garnering attention at high levels in the United States.
Angola's impressive oil resources and the significant presence
of the United States private sector in the country pretty much
ensure that Angola is not in danger of falling off the policy
map. In addition, the end of Angola's long and costly civil war
presents a critically important opportunity for meaningful
change and progress in improving the lives of the Angolan
people and the capacity of the Angolan state.
In fact, I would say it seems that Angola's weakness is
qualitatively different from that of other states in this
series. The Angolan Government functions well enough to host
the international private sector and functions well enough to
have emerged the victor in the civil war. And yet malnutrition
and infant mortality rates in Angola are shocking, and many of
the Angola people have no access to basic services. News from
Angola in recent years has often featured prominent examples of
corruption and of sanctions busting activities, calling into
question the state's regulatory capacity. The state is weak,
but in its own distinct way.
Confronted by these contradictory characteristics, it is
not at all clear how U.S. policy will proceed. How will the
United States continue to protect U.S. business interests while
simultaneously pushing the Angolan Government to clean up the
rampant corruption that has inspired an international campaign
to improve transparency throughout the developing world known
as ``Publish What You Pay''? How can the United States work
with other members of the international community to take
advantage of the peace to improve the conditions of the Angolan
people while still impressing upon the Angolan Government that
it has responsibilities in these sectors, as well?
I remember very well visiting a camp in Angola for the
internally displaced, in 1994, on my first to Africa. Then I
visited again in 1999, and I saw displaced people who were even
worse off. Both visits were powerful, but it was the
realization that this degree of hardship and suffering was not
really temporary in any meaningful sense that made the most
powerful impression of all. I cannot imagine how an outcome
that could possibly be in the United States' interests could
emerge from that kind of misery.
[The prepared statement of Senator Feingold follows:]
Prepared Statement of Senator Russell D. Feingold
I call this hearing to order. Today, the Subcommittee on African
Affairs will focus on the case of Angola. This hearing marks the last
in a series of hearings focusing on weak states in Africa, and looking
at our policy in those states with fresh eyes in the wake of the
horrific attacks of September 11, 2001. My purpose in convening the
series has been to draw attention to some of the manifestations of
states' weakness in various parts of Africa--both in terms of
humanitarian and economic collapse and in terms of such phenomenon as
piracy, illicit air transport networks, and trafficking in arms,
gemstones, and people. I wanted to call attention to these issues, and
to explore long-term policy options for changing the context in these
states--and addressing the relationship between criminal activity,
corruption, and humanitarian crisis--to help make these states less
appealing to criminal opportunists.
Earlier this year, the Subcommittee took up the cases of Somalia,
the Democratic Republic of the Congo, and Liberia. Today, as we turn
our attention to Angola, we consider a state that, unlike the DRC or
Somalia, does not have trouble garnering attention at high levels in
the United States. Angola's impressive oil resources, and the
significant presence of the U.S. private sector in the country, ensure
that Angola is not in danger of falling off of the policy map. In
addition, the end of Angola's long and costly civil war presents a
critically important opportunity for meaningful change and progress in
improving the lives of the Angolan people and the capacity of the
Angolan state.
In fact, it seems that Angola's weakness is qualitatively different
from that of the other states in the series. The Angolan government
functions well enough to host the international private sector, and
functions well enough to have emerged the victor in the civil war. And
yet malnutrition and infant mortality rates in Angola are shocking, and
many of the Angolan people have no access to basic services. News from
Angola in recent years has often featured prominent examples of
corruption and of sanctions-busting activities, calling into question
the state's regulatory capacity. The state is weak, but in its own
distinct way.
Confronted by these contradictory characteristics, it is not at all
clear how U.S. policy will proceed. How will the United States continue
to protect U.S. business interests while simultaneously pushing the
Angolan government to clean up the rampant corruption that has inspired
an international campaign to improve transparency throughout the
developing world, known as ``Publish What You Pay''? How can the U.S.
work with other members of the international community to take
advantage of the peace to improve the conditions of the Angolan people,
while still impressing upon the Angolan government that it has
responsibilities in these sectors as well?
I remember visiting a camp for the internally displaced in 1994 on
my first trip to Africa. Then I visited again in 1999, and saw
displaced people who were even worse off. Both visits were powerful,
but it was the realization that this degree of hardship and suffering
was not really temporary in any meaningful sense that made the most
powerful impression of all. I cannot imagine how an outcome that could
possibly be in the United States' interests could emerge from that kind
of misery.
Senator Feingold. I know that Senator Frist is certainly
going to attempt to make it here, as the ranking member of the
subcommittee, and, as I always want to indicate on the record,
he is such a committed advocate for Africa, and, if he is able
to make it, we'll certainly turn to him for any remarks he
wants to deliver.
But I do look forward to exploring these issues with our
witnesses today. The Assistant Secretary of State for African
Affairs, Walter Kansteiner, is with us. He has made it a
tremendous priority of his to be available to this subcommittee
over the past year, and I appreciate all of his efforts.
Welcome back, Secretary, and please proceed with your
testimony.
STATEMENT OF HON. WALTER H. KANSTEINER, ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF
STATE FOR AFRICAN AFFAIRS, DEPARTMENT OF STATE, WASHINGTON, DC
Mr. Kansteiner. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, very much, and
it's a privilege to be back up in front of your subcommittee.
Your assessment on Angola is exactly the way we see it.
This is a different category than some of the other failed
states that we have looked at, although I would say it probably
has been in that failed state category, or close to it, during
its war years. It is now emerging as a potential leader for the
region, and that is very exciting.
The international community has a historic opportunity to
assist Angola in following the right path after more than two
decades of that civil war. Secretary Powell witnessed firsthand
the commitment of the Angolans in securing that peace and
achieving national reconciliation during his visit to Angola
last month. We believe that we should seize this opportunity to
transform Angola from a war-torn country to one that is stable
and has an economic future for all its people.
Our efforts in Angola are aimed at addressing humanitarian
needs, improving good governance, and building the private
sector, and help democracy flourish in a postwar environment.
Since April of this year, more than 84,000 UNITA soldiers
have reported with their families to 35 quartering areas. That
is probably double what we had expected. Nearly 5,000 of these
soldiers have been selected for integration into the Angolan
Armed Forces, the FAA, or National Police. The remainder have
now been decommissioned. The demobilization process has gone
relatively smoothly, and effective reintegration over the long
term now must include the assistance of local Angolan NGOs and
us, the international community.
Angola, in concert with this international community, must
now find ways to consolidate this peace, achieve genuine
democracy, protect the rights of its citizens, and better the
lives of all of its people. Part of that effort will be through
the Joint Commission; and the United States, as a member of the
troika, will play an active role in ensuring that the Joint
Commission lives up to its Security Council mandate, again, a
commitment that Secretary Powell highlighted in his visit.
As one of the troika members, we continue to exert
diplomatic pressure on the United Nations, on UNITA, on the
MPLA, stressing the need for the Joint Commission's work to
develop a comprehensive, inclusive political framework for the
country. We continue to train civil society actors so as to
strengthen their ability to influence Angolan Government policy
and to represent the needs of their constituents. We will also
assist Angolans to successfully make the painful transition
from a closed, one-party system to, hopefully, a truly
pluralistic, open party democracy.
Strengthening the protection of human rights is also
critically important to establishing long-term peace. During
the civil war, as you know, Senator, grave human rights
violations by the police, by the FAA, by UNITA occurred, and
occurred far too frequently. With the advent of peace, it is
imperative for the international community to work with the
police, to work with the military and with ordinary Angolans to
improve the understanding of international human rights norms.
Through our Democracy and Human Rights Fund, the United
States supports human rights education and training programs
for ordinary Angolans and supports indigenous NGOs in their
efforts to educate Angolans on human rights. For instance, we
have a very interesting legal assistance program providing
legal and attorneys' help in court settings. The judicial
system is not at all ideal, so we want to not only increase the
capacity for the judicial system, but we also want to provide
legal guidance for those people that, in fact, are charged.
We also have an interesting new program with a Luanda NGO
with prisons in trying to improve prison conditions, just some
of the NGO-type work that we are trying to do in this thing
called ``capacity building'' to make the human rights community
that much stronger in the country.
While the Angolan civil war is now over, it does leave
numerous humanitarian challenges, as well as human rights
challenges. We have some 4.3 million Angolans that are
internally displaced as a result of the years of fighting; 1.9
million receive ongoing humanitarian assistance. Compounding
these concerns are the 80,000 former UNITA combatants and the
300,000 UNITA family members that still remain in those 35
quartering areas.
The United States has been supporting the World Food
Program [WFP] feeding efforts in quartering areas throughout
the country, and we will continue to provide food, commodities,
and food donations through the USAID Office of Food for Peace.
We had a number of airlifts, actually, three airlifts and two
sea lifts, of emergency food for those quartering areas in the
last few months, and those included everything from health kits
to blankets to shelters to tents. And most of those quartering
areas still need assistance, and we are trying to encourage the
Angolan Government to provide that assistance.
When it is necessary, the international community is
willing to step in, but, again, it is the Angolan Government's
first responsibility. That's where it lies first. We're willing
to help. We want to make sure that they are doing it as
effectively as possible, and we will continue to keep a very
close eye on that.
Resettlement and reintegration of demobilized UNITA
combatants and family members is also important: internally
displaced persons of all political sizes and shapes. They need
to go home. That groundwork to get them home has started.
Tools, implements, farm equipment, agricultural extension
services, all of that is needed. On top of that, they need to
be assured that when they get home to their farm areas--and
most of these people are farmers--that they are de-mined--the
areas are de-mined. That they are not going to have to plant
their mealie or cassava in an area that in fact still has
mines. So we have a large de-mining project ahead of us, too.
All told, for 2002, we have spent about $110 million on food,
supplies, agricultural, HIV awareness, and HIV prevention.
Consolidating peace in Angola requires, not only addressing
the humanitarian crisis, but also immediate, serious
consideration of the long-term economic development. A nation
rich in both oil and diamonds, Angola has the resources needed
to greatly improve the lives of its people, as you suggested in
your opening remarks. This is a remarkable country when it
comes to its natural resources that the good Lord has given it.
The government must firmly put aside its statist past and
embrace a free market system led by the private sector, and a
private sector that is willing to invest in their own country.
Angola must now begin to tackle the problems of
corruption--and corruption is endemic at all levels. We will
continue to encourage the Angolan Government to implement and
enforce anti-corruption measures. We're helping train
indigenous NGOs in how to track and spot corruption and how to
``blow the whistle,'' if you will. We are also hopeful that
multipartyism, a pluralistic system, will open up the field for
criticism of those government officials that are participating
in corruption. There's nothing better than an opposing
political party to blow the whistle. And so we think that part
of this pluralistic system is, in fact, an anticorruption
angle.
Mr. Chairman, the Angolan civil war is at an end. Our
policy must now focus on the significant challenges associated
with consolidating that peace. We see this as a window, a
window of opportunity, and we look forward to working with you
on how to let the Angolan people really take advantage of this
very unique opportunity in their history.
Thank you very much.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Kansteiner follows:]
Prepared Statement of Hon. Walter H. Kansteiner, Assistant Secretary of
State for African Affairs, Department of State
Mr. Chairman, Members of the Committee. Thank you for inviting me
to testify today on the administration's policy towards Angola.
The international community has a historic opportunity to assist
Angola in following the right path after more than two decades of civil
war and poor governance. Secretary Powell witnessed first hand the
commitment of Angolans to securing peace and achieving national
reconciliation and development during his visit there in September. The
Administration believes that we should seize this opportunity to
transform Angola from a war-torn nation to a center for stability and
economic growth in southern Africa. Angola is blessed with tremendous
natural resources, which can assist the country's positive
transformation. But they must be used to benefit all Angolans and the
region.
Angola will have a prominent role to play in international affairs
and in both the southern and central African regions. For the next two
years, Angola will be seated as the African regional representative on
the United Nations Security Council. The Government of Angola has just
assumed the presidency of the Southern Africa Development Community.
Our efforts in Angola are aimed at addressing humanitarian needs,
improving governance, and building the private sector and democracy in
the new post-war environment--all themes stressed with the Angolans
during recent visits and underscored in our on-going diplomatic
dialogue and assistance programs.
As you are well aware, the February 22 death of the National Union
for the Total Independence of Angola (UNITA) leader Jonas Savimbi and
the subsequent April 4 demobilization accords ended a brutal civil war
that cost one million lives and squandered billions of dollars.
Since that time, more than 84,000 UNITA soldiers have reported with
their families to 35 quartering areas and relinquished approximately
35,000 weapons. Nearly 5,000 of these soldiers have been selected for
integration into the Angolan Armed Forces (FAA) or National Police. The
remainder were decommissioned on August 2. The demobilization process
has gone smoothly, and effective reintegration over the long-term must
include the assistance of local Angolan NGOs and the international
community.
This current success is due to the strong political will of both
the Angolan Government and UNITA to finally bring the conflict to a
definitive end. Angolans on both sides are tired of fighting and of the
destruction that has characterized the country since its independence.
The genuine desire to find a lasting peace and begin the process of
national reconciliation was stated when President Bush met with
President dos Santos on February 26 for the Southern Africa Mini-Summit
and evident during Secretary Powell's September visit. For the first
time, ordinary Angolans and politicians on both sides sincerely believe
that peace has arrived to stay.
Angola, in concert with the international community, must now find
ways to consolidate this peace, achieve genuine democracy, protect the
rights of its citizens, and better the lives of the Angolan people.
This process has begun through the reconstitution of the Lusaka
Protocol's Joint Commission under the chair of the UN Secretary
General's new Special Representative Ibrahim Gambari. As a member of
the Joint Commission's troika, the United States will play an active
role in ensuring that the Joint Commission lives up to its Security
Council mandate, a commitment highlighted by Secretary Powell in Luanda
in September. We view the Joint Commission as a vital vehicle to help
create the political framework that will enable the advent of multi-
party democracy in Angola.
To that end, any attempts to place artificial time limits or
restrictions on the body's work must be avoided. The Joint Commission's
efforts must produce a comprehensive political framework that benefits
all Angolans, not just UNITA and the governing Popular Movement for the
Liberation of Angola (MPLA).
The United States intends to remain engaged to help Angola achieve
this peace. As a troika member, we continue to exert diplomatic
pressure on the United Nations, UNITA, and the MPLA, stressing the need
for the Joint Commission's work to develop a comprehensive, inclusive
political framework for the country. We continue to train civil society
actors, so as to strengthen their ability to influence Angolan
government policy and to represent the needs of their constituents. We
will assist Angolans to successfully make the often painful transition
from a closed one party state to an open democracy, in training them on
the role of political parties in a democracy, encouraging them to
engage with local civil society organizations, and holding public
hearings on proposed legislation. We also plan to train political
parties, including UNITA to transform it from an armed rebel movement
to a constructive opposition political party. And, we will work in
concert with other donors to fund electoral preparations and ensure
that free and fair multiparty elections occur.
Strengthened protection of human rights is critically important to
establishing long-term peace. During the civil war, grave human rights
violations by the police, the FAA, and UNITA forces occurred. With the
advent of peace, it is imperative for the international community to
work with the police, the military and ordinary Angolans to improve
understanding of international human rights norms and standards. Such
efforts under the leadership of the United Nations have begun. Through
our Democracy and Human Rights Fund, the United States supports human
rights education and training programs for ordinary Angolans and
supports indigenous non-governmental organizations (NGOs) in their
efforts to educate Angolans on human rights and pressure the government
to improve its human rights records. Similarly, human rights remain a
key component of our on-going dialogue with the government. Equally,
the Angolan judicial system must be reformed to ensure its independence
and accessibility to all. We continue to pressure the government to
include judicial reform as a critical component of its democratic
transformation and to provide adequate resources for the court system
to function effectively.
The role of the Angolan Armed Forces, the FAA, will have to be
carefully considered. Our engagement with the FAA will need to
increase, primarily through increased diplomatic contacts with FAA
leadership. With manpower strength of around 100,000, the government
will need to define for the FAA a new mission in a post-conflict Angola
that supports the political and economic development process. The FAA
can also contribute to regional peacekeeping. The United States
European Command (EUCOM) will invite General Cruz Neto and a delegation
to visit the EUCOM Headquarters to receive briefings. The goal is to
build a rapport to allow U.S. DOD officials and military personnel
access and influence with Angolan civilian and military officials to
help them to develop an apolitical and transparent institution.
Training in civil-military relations, defense budgeting, and human
rights are priorities in our new engagement with the FAA, an engagement
that could benefit from a small carefully crafted expanded
International Military Education and Training (E-IMET) program for
Angola.
While the Angolan civil war is over, it leaves numerous
humanitarian challenges behind that if not adequately addressed could
result in renewed societal conflict. 4.3 million Angolans are
internally displaced as a result of the fighting, and 1.9 million
receive ongoing humanitarian assistance. The end of the war has opened
previously inaccessible areas to humanitarian organizations, and an
additional 800,000 people there may require assistance by year's end.
Compounding these concerns are the 80,000 former UNITA combatants and
300,000 family members that remain in 35 quartering areas and are
dependent on assistance. The United States has been supporting WFP
feeding efforts in quartering areas through on-going donations of food
commodities by the USAID Office of Food for Peace. In addition, the
USAID Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance arranged three airlifts and
two sealifts of emergency non-food items, including blankets, plastic
sheeting, water containers, soap, kitchen sets, and health kits to the
quartering areas valued at over $2 million.
The United States has been at the forefront of responding to the
humanitarian crisis with over $750 million in aid since 1990. Over half
of our 2002 humanitarian assistance to Angola is food aid for
vulnerable populations. Provided by the USAID Office of Food for Peace
and USDA, it is valued at nearly $70 million. In addition, the USAID
Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance is providing over $20 million in
emergency support, including over $2 million for the quartering areas.
The State Department's Bureau of Population, Migration, and Refugee
Affairs is providing $9.9 million in earmarked funding to UNHCR to
assist nearly 465,000 Angolan refugees in neighboring countries.
Resettlement and reintegration of demobilized UNITA combatants and
family members, internally displaced persons, and refugees are
necessary to begin the country's economic recovery and lay the
groundwork for elections. Success is dependent upon adequate support to
enable Angolans to start over when they return home. In response, over
$3 million in the Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance's budget will
be used to procure tools and seeds for some of the 500,000 internally
displaced that the UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian
Affairs estimates will begin to return home this year. The USAID Office
of Food for Peace, through its contribution to WFP, is supporting
resettlement activities estimated at $23 million in FY 02.
Additionally, the Office of Food for Peace is working to develop a
resettlement program with a consortium of private voluntary
organizations for FY 03. The Department of State's Humanitarian
Demining Program is contributing $6.8 million this year to ensure the
safety of returnees and other vulnerable groups.
This is not to suggest that humanitarian assistance does not
continue without challenges, particularly in the quartering areas. The
Angolan Government failed to deliver much of its promised assistance,
necessitating rapid international intervention to ameliorate
deteriorating conditions. While donor aid has been provided,
bureaucratic delays, lack of transparency, and a lack of adequate
Angolan logistical support have delayed shipments and led to worsening
conditions in a number of the quartering areas. We are pressuring the
Angolan government to meet its commitments and ensure that assistance
reaches intended recipients in a timely fashion.
Consolidating peace in Angola requires not only addressing the
humanitarian crisis, but also immediate, serious consideration of the
long-term economic development of the country. A nation rich in both
oil and diamonds, Angola has the resources needed to greatly improve
the lives of its people. Angola has the potential to develop far
stronger commercial ties with the United States and our companies, and
to become in Africa and internationally a substantial and reliable
supplier of energy. But the government must firmly eschew its statist
past and embrace a free-market system led by private sector investment.
And vast natural resources can be a magnate for problems of
transparency and revenue use. Angola must begin now to tackle the
problem of corruption at all levels and improve accountability. We will
continue to encourage the Angolan government to implement and enforce
anti-corruption measures. Training of indigenous NGOs, financing for
Voice of America's Angola programs, and planned support to the
independent print media are important strategies to strengthen our
partners in this fight.
International donors, NGOs, and the international financial
institutions remain seriously concerned by the large amounts of off-
budget government revenue and expenditures in Angola. The Angolan
Government must work with the international community to bring such
financial transactions on budget and to negotiate a new program with
the International Monetary Fund (IMF). In addition, the Angolan
government must begin to increase its investment in the well-being of
its people and the country's infrastructure to ensure that Angolans
receive the peace dividend that they deserve. We continue to underscore
to the Angolan government that both actions are necessary precursors to
any significant international reconstruction efforts.
Mr. Chairman, Members of the Committee, the Angolan civil war is at
an end. Our policy now must focus on the significant challenges
associated with consolidating the peace and effecting true national
reconciliation. We will press forward, in partnership with all elements
of Angolan society and the international community to build democracy,
protect human rights, end the humanitarian crisis, and set Angola on
the path towards development and economic growth. In this way, we can
begin to strengthen both the Angolan state and the Angolan people. The
Administration looks forward to working with Congress to that end.
Senator Feingold. Thank you, Mr. Kansteiner, for your
always clear presentation, and we appreciate your help with
this. I have a series of followup questions.
Would you go over to what extent the April 2002 cease-fire
agreement has actually been implemented, which provisions have
not yet been carried out, and what are the main implementation
issues that remain?
Mr. Kansteiner. The military demobilization component is
essentially done. That is, the UNITA troops have come to the
quartering areas. They have been disarmed. They have been
demobilized. On August 2, those that were not going to go into
the Armed Forces or the police were, in fact, decommissioned.
Uniforms are gone. They are civilians.
Those UNITA forces that will be integrated into the armed
services, including the police, that process is just beginning,
so we've got a ways to go on that, and we're watching that
carefully, because that integration of UNITA forces into the
FAA, into the police, is important. It acts as that balance.
And it's also symbolic that former fighters are now actually
serving in the same Armed Forces.
A slightly different aspect, of course, is the internally
displaced people. There are some 4 million, as I mentioned, and
that is going to be a tremendous task to get those people
reintegrated. We're talking almost a third of the population of
Angola is not living where they want to live.
Senator Feingold. Let me follow with a few more specific
questions concerning the demobilization. Maybe you've already
answered this, but I want to be sure. How many UNITA ex-
combatants and related military personnel were demobilized?
Mr. Kansteiner. Well, I think we've got about 5,000 going
into the--5,000 will be reintegrated, and so about 70, say,
70,000 to 75,000 were demobilized.
Senator Feingold. Do any of the UNITA personnel remain
armed?
Mr. Kansteiner. No. No, UNITA personnel. They have all been
disarmed.
Senator Feingold. How many former UNITA personnel have been
integrated into the Angolan Armed Forces and to the National
Police respectively? I think you talked about that some.
Mr. Kansteiner. Yes. And again, that is a process that is
ongoing, and it's nearly 5,000.
Senator Feingold. That's the 5,000?
Mr. Kansteiner. They have been selected. That integration
is now just beginning.
Senator Feingold. Is that a combined figure for the Armed
Forces and the National Police?
Mr. Kansteiner. That is combined. That is for both the FAA,
the Angolan Armed Forces, as well as the National Police.
Senator Feingold. What's the breakdown?
Mr. Kansteiner. A hundred to the police and the----
Senator Feingold. Dominantly the----
Mr. Kansteiner. Yes, dominantly to the Armed Forces.
Senator Feingold. OK. How many and what kinds of weapons
have been surrendered by UNITA? And what has been the
disposition of those weapons?
Mr. Kansteiner. There have been all sorts and sizes and
shapes of weapons, probably not as many as we had thought per
man, but there were more UNITA forces than we had anticipated.
A lot of them, quite frankly, were not armed. There were a lot
of porters and foot soldiers that did not have weapons. But
plenty of them did. About 35,000 total arms were collected, and
I would guess the majority of that would be AK-47s.
Senator Feingold. You talked about the conditions in the
so-called ``family reception areas,'' FRAs, in which the
demobilized UNITA ex-combatants and their dependents are
quartered. How many are in the FRAs, and who is responsible for
provisioning them with food and medicine? Are they adequately
supplied? And until when and on the basis of what criteria will
these FRAs remain in operation?
Mr. Kansteiner. Well, that's a very good question and a
very timely one. There are some 300,000 UNITA members and their
families in these quartering areas. We had gotten reports a
couple of weeks ago that the government was considering closing
these camps and basically encouraging, I suppose would be the
diplomatic word, those folks to return to their homes. Clearly,
they weren't ready to be returned to their homes. The
preparation to receive them in their homes had not been made.
Again, back to the de-mining issue, tools, and implements,
agricultural extensions, any kind of skilled training had not
taken place. So we, in fact, demarched the Angolan Government
to please refrain from closing these. They have refrained from
closing them. They are still open, and these quartering areas
are still up and running.
They are currently being supplied. But, again, you know,
these are the same quartering areas that we had to send in some
emergency shipments to, back some months ago. We're concerned
about it, and we're watching it closely.
Senator Feingold. Are they adequately supplied now?
Mr. Kansteiner. They are, yes.
Senator Feingold. What is the Angolan Government actually
doing to support the reintegration of ex-combatants? Say a
little bit more about what they are doing.
Mr. Kansteiner. Well, they have set up a new ministry for
basically reintegration of their population, both ex-combatants
and internally displaced people. They have a road map. They
have a game plan. They are starting to work with the U.N. on
how that road map is going to actually be implemented. We are
encouraging them to work with the U.N. This is a task that's
going to require a lot of helpful hands, and we think the U.N.
can be helpful.
My analysis is that the Angolan Government has the will to
do this. They have the political will. It's an enormous task,
and I think we need to help them with the actual implementation
of it.
Senator Feingold. What about humanitarian assistance? To
what extent and at what funding level is the Angolan Government
actually providing humanitarian assistance to its population?
Mr. Kansteiner. They are providing significant humanitarian
assistance, and we have explained to them--in fact, Secretary
Powell explained to them, in no uncertain terms, that the more
that they provide for their own people, they will actually get
large dividends from the international community, because the
international community will see that they are willing to spend
their own money on their own people, and that encourages donors
like us to do likewise. If they are stingy and withholding and
looking like they are playing politics with their humanitarian
assistance, we're all going to be that much more reluctant to
come in. And they got it. And, in fact, in the last few weeks
it seems as if they are moving toward bigger procurement, more
frequent procurement.
Senator Feingold. Is there some kind of quantification of
this? Do you have numbers?
Mr. Kansteiner. About $52 million in food stuffs and basic
supplies in the last probably--well, probably since April, you
could say.
Senator Feingold. Let's talk a bit about the situation in
Cabinda. Has the end of the war with UNITA led the Angolan
Government to focus its efforts on definitively defeating the
insurgency in Cabinda? To what extent does instability in
Cabinda affect the rest of Angola or neighboring African
states?
Mr. Kansteiner. Well, the instability in Cabinda has been a
long-term problem, as you know. And a few months ago, there
were attacks on some lians that were very, very concerning. The
security apparatus of the FAA did go up into Cabinda in a
significant sort of way. It seems as if the security situation
in Cabinda is improved, it's gotten better.
Cabinda is also sensitive in the sense that it is in
proximity to some of the oil-producing areas just offshore.
Cabinda is probably the single largest producing block right
now. Future blocks will end up producing more, it is our guess,
but right now that is the major production source. So for the
Angolans, it has a real national security import. But also it
is one that has historically been problematic for them.
Senator Feingold. Let me talk about another obviously
important resource in Angola. Efforts to curtail sources of
financial support to UNITA focused a great deal of attention,
of course, on Angola's diamond sector. What can you tell me
about recent efforts to regulate the diamond sector in Angola?
And what do these efforts tell us about the prospects for
reform in other sectors?
Mr. Kansteiner. We actually have some fairly good news on
the diamonds. The Angolan Government has been very cooperative
with the Kimberly Process. The Kimberly Process, as you know,
is now close to being signed in Switzerland early next month.
The Angolan Government is moving to register small-scale miners
and the middlemen who trade diamonds and establish basically a
single channel diamond marketing system.
This is one of those cases where a single channel marketing
system is maybe not all bad. We're often talking about we need
proliferation of the private sector, we want competition, and
all that; but, in this particular commodity, it will be a more
controlling influence, and we think it's probably a good step.
But, basically, they are taking some actions. And, most
importantly, they're willing to participate in the
international Kimberly Process.
Senator Feingold. It's my understanding that Angola is not
currently eligible for African Growth and Opportunity Act
[AGOA] benefits. Of course, one of the eligibility requirements
for gaining these benefits relates to a subject that you've
discussed already, anticorruption measures. What steps must the
Government of Angola take in this regard before the
administration will consider changing Angola's AGOA status?
Mr. Kansteiner. Well, as you know, there is no one
criterion that gets you in or keeps you out, but there are a
number of factors. The corruption factor is clearly one. Human
rights, we're concerned that there really isn't that much of a
institutional capacity to implement good human rights policies.
We also have economic measures that we are looking for:
privatization, for instance. The Angolan Government has
committed itself to a privatization process, but we haven't
seen a whole lot of traction there. So I think, collectively,
we'll have to look at all of them.
Senator Feingold. What's the status of the International
Monetary Fund's oil diagnostic audit? What actions, if any, is
the Angolan Government taking to improve fiscal transparency
and increase public accountability?
Mr. Kansteiner. Well, I think there is some good news and
bad news, Mr. Chairman. The good news is that the Central Bank
is going through an audit system, and that's good. It's going
well. It's working. Part of that, and in conjunction with that
Central Bank auditing, is the oil diagnostic, which, of course,
is to look at the cash-flow of the oil funds, where that
revenue goes and how it's generated and how it flows and where
it ends up. There are a number of private accounting firms that
have been tasked with this, given a contract to do this, along
with the IMF, and that diagnostic is seeming to be slowed. That
study is seeming to be going very slowly.
Why? I would say it has to do with the Angolan Government
opening up their books and showing exactly how that money
flows.
Some of the oil diagnostic is complete. I mean, they have
done some work. There's just some missing pieces of information
that are very important, and the IMF, the United States, and, I
say, the international community, writ large, is pushing hard
to get these blanks filled in.
I might just add, Senator, that there is also a piece of
good news on the customs receipts. The Port of Luanda was long
notorious for its ``falling off the back of the truck''
problem. You know, something like 25 percent of all goods that
flowed through the Port of Luanda came up missing at one point.
This was some 5 or 6 or 10 years ago. That has drastically
improved with the implementation of Crown Agents, the British
private firm that is now actually running Angola's customs
receipts at the Port of Luanda.
Senator Feingold. When did that start?
Mr. Kansteiner. About 4 months ago.
It took them awhile, as I understand it, to get up and
running, but they are now in the process of becoming the
customs agents for the country of Angola. It's good.
Senator Feingold. Well, I certainly recall specific
comments about this on both of my trips there, and I'm pleased
to hear that at least something is happening in this regard.
Why is the United States maintaining sanctions on UNITA at
this point? And what benchmarks would have to be met before the
sanctions would be lifted?
Mr. Kansteiner. Well, that's a very timely question. We are
now working with our colleagues in the U.N. at the Security
Council, with our colleagues in the troika, to remove those
sanctions. The notion that we're asking Angola to be a open,
pluralistic, multiparty country and then have international
sanctions against one party is schizophrenic and doesn't make
any sense. So we need to go ahead and remove those travel
sanctions, those financial sanctions, what they call
``diplomatic sanctions,'' which essentially allows a political
party to have an office overseas. We will be pushing and
working with our U.N. colleagues to have those removed.
Senator Feingold. Are you saying there are essentially no
benchmarks that have to be met?
Mr. Kansteiner. Well, there are a couple of other sanctions
that we are concerned about. One is the arms sanctions, and we
think it's probably wise to let those stay on. Political
parties don't need weapons. So it kind of goes back to the
notion of, well, what is good for pluralism? What is good for
multipartyism in Angola? Guns aren't. But certainly a party
needs finances.
Senator Feingold. I've heard about that.
Mr. Kansteiner. Exactly. And they certainly need to be able
to travel. So with the benchmark being what makes sense for an
open political system in Angola, that's what we're measuring
against.
Senator Feingold. What are the Angolan Government's primary
post-conflict reconstruction priorities now that the civil war
is no longer the government's top priority? What is the top
thing on their agenda?
Mr. Kansteiner. Well, it is exactly the question that
Secretary Powell asked President dos Santos last month. And I
was pleased--surprised, but pleased, to hear that President dos
Santos' response was, you know, ``This country is a former
Marxist, statist, centrally planned economy. What we're trying
to move to is an open market, private sector-dominated economy,
but I don't have a private sector. There is no private sector
in Angola.''
And so his No. 1 economic/development issue clearly was,
``How do I build an entrepreneurial class in my country? How do
I take what's always been owned and run by the government and
actually put it into private ownership?'' And it was good that
he clearly recognized this as a problem and wanted it to be a
priority.
Senator Feingold. You talked a little bit about the FRAs,
and I believe you suggested that the government, for awhile,
was considering closing them down, I think prematurely. But
clearly one of the long-term goals, when you're talking about a
third of the population, has to be resettling these people that
have suffered so much. Yet has the Angolan Government made any
real efforts in regard to preparing for that?
Mr. Kansteiner. They're at the very early stages, quite
frankly, and that preparation is everything from the de-mining,
the infrastructure--i.e., roads. There has to be an
agricultural extension--agricultural assistance of some kind.
You cannot expect these people, although they are people of the
land and know how to grow and know how to farm on a subsistence
basis, they still are going to need the basic implements to do
their trade. And the Angolan Government is just now wresting
with how they get those things that are needed in the hands of
those that need to go back home and start their lives again.
Senator Feingold. Well, let's sort of tie the last two
questions together, because you did indicate what President dos
Santos said about his priority apparently being a very
important issue of developing a legitimate private sector. But
did Secretary Powell get a sense that President dos Santos
believes that humanitarian issues and basic social services
should also be a government priority?
Mr. Kansteiner. He did, and we made that point, and we made
it in the context of the internally displaced people. Everyone
in Angola is in need of and deserving of social services, but
those internally displaced people are at the bottom rung of the
ladder, and they need at least something there to help them get
on with their lives.
Secretary Powell met with some street children in Luanda,
which was fascinating, in the sense that here were internally
displaced children that made their way to Luanda. And the
stories they had to tell were harrowing. I mean, it was
absolutely frightening to know what these kids have been
through in the time of war, but it was also enlightening in the
sense that they were incredibly optimistic because peace had
come to their country.
So it is a window of opportunity, and we need to push and
cajole the Angolan Government into keeping their priorities
straight, and we need to help out when we can.
Senator Feingold. Well, let me strongly agree with that,
because I was struck by the optimism of the people even in the
midst of all this, in 1994 and 1999, in similar conversations,
and also struck by the President's prism of reality being,
obviously, this war and his fight with Mr. Savimbi. So what I'm
looking for here, and I think we're all looking for, is a sign
that he is ready to move on to these critical priorities for
the people who have suffered so much.
Finally, recently, reports have surfaced alleging that
Angola has deployed troops to Cote d'Ivoire. What can you tell
us about these reports? Are Angolan troops currently operating
in other countries in the region?
Mr. Kansteiner. Senator, I saw that same report this
morning. We are looking into that.
As far as Angolans in other countries, as you know, the
Angolan troops have been in Congo Brazzaville and also Congo
Kinshasa. They have some minimal troop levels in both those
countries still, but I think they are relatively minimal.
The Cote d'Ivoire issue concerns us, and we will be
checking into that.
Senator Feingold. I look forward to hearing from you when
you determine that.
Thank you very much, Mr. Kansteiner for your testimony,
again.
Mr. Kansteiner. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Senator Feingold. All right. We have a very good second
panel of witnesses today to follow Mr. Kansteiner's testimony.
Dr. Morten Rostrup and Mr. Kramer, please come forward.
Dr. Rostrup is president of the International Council of
Doctors Without Borders, the private international humanitarian
organization that won the Nobel Peace prize in 1999. Doctors
Without Borders recently released two reports detailing the
humanitarian crisis in Angola. A specialist in internal
medicine, Dr. Rostrup headed the Norwegian branch of Doctors
Without Borders before assuming his current position. He has
experience working in Liberia, Kosovo, Sudan, Angola, Zaire,
Rwanda, and Tanzania.
Dr. David Kramer is an attorney with the Baird Holm law
firm in Omaha, Nebraska. From 1996 to 1998, David served as the
resident program director for the International Republican
Institute in Rwanda. In August of 2001, David led a Consortium
for Elections and Political Process Strengthening delegation,
including representatives from IRI, the National Democratic
Institute, and the International Foundation for Electoral
Systems, to assess the prospects for elections in Angola. David
returned with the Consortium for Elections and Political
Process Strengthening delegation team to Angola in May of 2002
to launch their report.
Originally, we planned to have three witnesses, but,
unfortunately, Global Witness was not able to send a
representative. However, they have submitted written testimony,
which I will now place in the record, without objection.
[The written testimony of Global Witness follows:]
Prepared Statement of Global Witness
background
Since December 1999 Global Witness has been investigating the role
of oil and banking in the privatization of Angola's war. This work has
followed from its launch of the ``conflict diamond'' issue in December
1998. In March 2002, Global Witness published its second report, ``All
the Presidents' Men,'' which provides the reader with a detailed
discussion of the scale of state-looting in Angola. Please see web
site: www.globalwitness.org
Simultaneously over this period, Global Witness has been involved
in a process of dialogue with key oil companies and government
officials to explore how to deliver transparency of oil revenues into
Angola. The central premise being that it is not possible for Angolans
to hold their government to account for the expenditure of resource
revenues, if there is no available information about government
income--of which, according to the IMF, approximately 87% is derived
from oil extraction and related activities.
angola--looting the war, into looting the peace?
It is hard to overstate the scale of state-looting that has taken
place in Angola over the past few years. In 1993, following huge loss
of territory to UNITA, the Angolan Government embarked on a desperate
effort of self-defense, pulling out an SOS in the direction of the
Mitterrand Presidency in France. This call for help resulted in the
introduction of two key individuals who, following their being given
Angolan diplomatic status, organised the funding and supply of weapons
to Angola, through a Czech front company, which appears to have
connections to the Russian heavy armament industry.
The Angolan Government usually paid approximately 30-35% of the
contract value of the shipments. Key individuals in the supply chain
then acquired weaponry for approximately 25% of the contract value.
Typically, this left approximately 10% of the contract value--the
remainder of the Angolan Government's down-payment as spare cash. At
this point, the remainder of the contract value would be made up by the
negotiation of an oil-backed loan--where oil not yet extracted would be
pledged against up-front payments from a variety of banks. This oil
loan cash, together with the remainder of the Government down-payment
would then be spare cash, available for the elite and all players to
direct as required. As such, the Angolan State had a very poor deal,
receiving weapons worth only a fraction of what was paid--in contrast
to elites, where it is possible to argue that there was a financial
vested interest for the conflict to continue. The scale of this
operation was so vast that Global Witness estimates, conservatively,
that at least US$1-1.5 billion has gone missing every year for the past
five years.
after the peace--what now?
Following the death of Jonas Savimbi, and the end of the war,
Angola now has an ideal opportunity to change. However, Global Witness
is concerned that the infrastructure of off-shore companies, trusts and
organizations, established to supply weapons, finances and the capacity
to loot state income remains in place. In fact, some of the individuals
involved have worked their way into almost every sector of the Angolan
economy and have become sufficiently elevated in importance that they
broker access to the Presidency. Are we moving from looting the war, to
the next phase of looting the peace--which is likely to be even more
lucrative?
There are a number of issues that continue to surface since the end
of the war, which indicate a ``business as usual'' approach. They are
best summarized as follows:
A perceived effort by some in the French judiciary that
France will close down the ``Angolagate'' investigations,
ending the possibility of there being a trial of amongst
others, Jean-Christophe Mietterrand, Charles Pasqua, Pierre
Falcone, and Arkadi Gaidamak.
A Judge in Geneva froze an account at a branch of the UBS
bank containing over US$770 million. These funds are believed
to be that which was stolen from an Angolan debt-to-Russia
renegotiation scam. Angola undertook significant diplomatic
effort to close down this investigation. The funds remain
frozen.
One of the key individuals involved in the structure of
state-looting in Angola continues to negotiate oil-backed
loans.
Angola passed a State Secrecy law in June 2002, which
appears to give the state (read elite) the capacity to declare
anything a state secret. This is a major threat to press
freedom and government accountability. There is a specific
clause relating to ``state income,'' which would tend to
suggest that the Government has no intention of releasing such
information, which would be a necessary precursor for
accountability.
the process of delivering transparency
In February 2001, BP announced that it would publish payments and
other data for its operations in Angola. Two weeks after, BP received a
letter which threatened to terminate their contract, should they
proceed, and which was copied to all the other oil companies operating
in Angola.
This brave move forward has had a profound effect on Global
Witness' thinking about how to move things forward. This is because, on
the one hand BP demonstrated that there is no legal excuse for all the
other companies not to also declare their payments, but on the other,
the reaction of the Angolan authorities clearly demonstrates the
impossibility of making such a move unilaterally and on a voluntary
basis. The threats to company interests are simply too high.
For this reason, Global Witness is convinced for the need for a
regulatory framework for companies to declare such data. Such a
regulatory approach would not be a threat to any company, as all would
have to do it. Our vision of how to move this forward is best
encapsulated in a campaign we launched with George Soros and others in
London in June 2002, called ``Publish What You Pay.'' This campaign
envisages the quickest, most cost-effective and painless (for all)
route to achieve transparency of income from this sector is through a
listing requirement on all the major stock-exchanges that holds
extractive company stock. The idea is that it would be a condition of
listing, that companies would declare all net payments that they make
to each government of operation. In this way, this issue now goes far
beyond Angola. Indeed, though Angola makes a compelling case for one of
the worst case scenarios, it is clear that lack of transparency of
state income from extractive companies is a major problem in many other
African countries; from an oil perspective, one only has to think of
Equatorial Guinea, Congo-B, Gabon, Cameroon, and so on, not those areas
beyond Africa, including countries such as Khazakhstan to see that
there is an urgent need for such a move on a global basis.
Senator Feingold. And I would ask, Dr. Rostrup, to please
begin with your testimony.
STATEMENT OF DR. MORTEN ROSTRUP, PRESIDENT, INTERNATIONAL
COUNCIL OF DOCTORS WITHOUT BORDERS [MEDECINS SANS FRONTIERES],
BRUSSELS, BELGIUM
Dr. Rostrup. Thank you very much, Senator Feingold, and
thank you for inviting Medecins Sans Frontieres [MSF] to this
very important hearing.
As you know, MSF, we have been working in Angola since
1983, so we have been in the country, and vast parts of the
country, for quite a long time period, and we have observed
what has been happening in this time that has passed.
I, myself, just to say that, also worked in Angola in 1997-
1998 in a small town called Camacupa where I was the only
doctor in a very small hospital. And at that point of time,
which was some years ago, I could already see the precarious
situation of the civilian population: a very huge amount of
malnourishment. We had very severe malaria cases. We had a very
high case fatality rate. So it was pretty difficult to work
under those circumstances. And we also witnessed at that time
that the health system was not really functioning. And MSF, as
such, we had to run the health care systems in many, many of
the provinces in Angola.
We had to evacuate Camacupa because of the resumption of
the war in 1998, and, as you know, it has been--especially the
last part of the war, from 1998 up until now, the cease-fire,
has been a very, very difficult situation for the civilian
population.
The civilians there have been targeted in this war. They
have been used as instruments in the war. They have been abused
in this war. And last week, as you mentioned, we released two
reports in Angola which are directly witnessing of the civilian
population that survived this period. And I think these reports
are very, very telling.
What we are facing today, after the cease-fire, is a
civilian population that has been suffered tremendously--both
physically, but also mentally. There are a lot of traumas,
psychological traumas, as you can imagine. And when the cease-
fire--and that was also one of the problems we faced in this
last part of the war, humanitarian agencies who didn't have
access to these agencies--so they were both abused in warfare
and in denied access, and this made a kind of double suffering
of these people.
So what we did after the cease-fire was signed April 4, was
that suddenly we had access to these areas and we did a lot of
rapid assessments only to get to know that the mortality was
very high and the malnutrition rate was also very high. We
talked about mortality rates 5, sometimes up to 10 times what
is considered the emergency threshold in this population, and
we also had malnourishment figures of severe malnourishment,
which is a life-threatening condition, affecting 13 percent of
children in many places and went up sometimes to 20 percent.
So the situation was very, very severe, and we launched a
huge kind of relief response, one of the largest we have
launched, in fact, MSF, and we have all in all now taken care
of almost 16,000 children that have been in a very, very
precarious situation.
So I went back to Angola, in fact, in May and June just to
get some firsthand knowledge about the situation, and I was
very shocked at what I was seeing. I went to the quartering
family areas, which they were called at that point of time, in
which there was no assistance to them--to the civilians. I went
to IDP camps. I went to the hospitals. I watched children die
of malnutrition, hypothermia, hypoglycemia, all kind of
conditions because they have a very reduced immune system.
So I was pretty shocked about the situation and also lack
of response. And I think I'm happy now, of the reports I've got
from Angola is that the situation has improved considerably in
many, many areas where they are working.
Still, we do see a mixed picture in Angola today, and we
still have, in fact, some areas in which there are still
nutritional emergencies. I can mention Mavinga, in the eastern
part of Angola, in which you now have a nutritional emergency
going on, and we have 250 children in our feeding center for
intensive care feeding, and we have to supply 10,000 people
weekly with food rations.
On top of this, we see epidemics. We have had some cases of
shigella. That is blooded dysentery, which is a real killing
disease when it affects a very malnourished population. And we
have also seen the consequences of a stop in general food
distribution due to the mines problems, and I will come back to
that afterwards.
In Baiundo, where I went in May, June, still we have a lot
of children in our feeding centers. Still we have 90 children
per week coming in a very severe condition. So even though we
see a large improvement in many parts of the areas, we still
have a nutritional emergency going on.
And then I would call attention to the food insecurity, and
I think this is also very essential, because whatever you do in
a therapeutic feeding center, it doesn't help much if you don't
have a general food distribution in place so you can prevent
them to fall back into malnutrition. And there we have seen a
total lack of resources. WFP is saying that they are 76 percent
underfunded, that they have just one quarter of what they need
to really supply 1.9 million people who now need food, and well
into 2003.
In addition to lack of resources, we see also huge
logistical constraints. The roads are very bad, as you may be
aware of. The rainy season is now coming up and makes it even
worse. And, of course, access is severely hampered due to the
mines and the mine problem. And we have instances that you can
travel 150 kilometers or miles and use 3 to 4 days to travel
this distance, just to tell how difficult it is to get around.
There have been some mine incidents, because during the
rainy season, which is coming up, the mines also have a
tendency to move, so roads that were considered safe are not
safe anymore. And there was last week, in Lavinga, a mine
accident killing 13 people due to, supposedly, movement of old
mines.
We have also seen that in Kumbulu in Lunda Norte, that due
to one of such mine incidents, they had to stop the food
distribution because it was considered too risky. It had to be
secured, these roads. And we saw an increased level in
malnourishment pretty soon after this disruption in food
deliverances. And it tells very clearly that the population now
that have really survived the period of war and have been
malnourished and been helped a bit back to a kind of life, they
are very, very vulnerable, and it's not much disruption that is
necessary for them to slide back into a severe malnutrition
state.
And, on top of this, we know that malnourished people have
been suffering during the civil war. They also are very
susceptible to get diseases, all kind of diseases, especially
infectious diseases. The immune system is really not
functioning a hundred percent in those patients.
And then what we do see is a very disrupted health care
system, as well, in Angola. Much was destroyed by the war
itself and also by neglect in the years that has passed. So, in
Lunda Norte, for instance, we did an assessment just some weeks
ago in which we found a totally destroyed hospital and a health
post who had 4 people. They hadn't received any salary for some
months. They didn't have any medicines to give to the people.
And, of course, if they have this kind of health care system,
we will see a lot of problems in these vulnerable people.
We have already seen the measles epidemics. We have
launched a vaccination campaign, the Minister of Health, as
well, for thousands and thousands of children, because this is
also a killing disease when people are so malnourished and have
been through the civil war and really been shaken up. And we
see also TB. It's a problem. Malaria is striking pretty
severely. And this is constituting, then, another problem, the
lack of, really, a health care system in place.
And then, on top of this, again, we see population
movements. We see people--some spontaneously--trying to move
into their places of origin, and some of them hope that there
will be support in these places, and there should be, before
people move to a place, there should be a certain minimum
support to these. There should be shelter, there should be
food, there should be water, there should be a health care
system, there should be security, when it comes to mines, and
there should be some authorities in place. Many places, this is
not at all there.
And the United Nations, themselves, they estimated that in
August and September there were 6,000 to 10,000 people per day
spontaneously moving back to their home places. But only in 20
percent of these places, the conditions were acceptable.
So what we see is a vulnerable population on the move into
areas where there is very little, if any, assistance. And what
will happen later is that they have to move again to get
assistance. And this continued movement of people will make
them even more vulnerable.
We have also observed that authorities have tried to put
some pressure on people to move back to their places of origin.
We have an incident in Qatata recently in which MSF also
protested and said that, for the first, we should not put
pressure on people to move. It should be a voluntary and well
informed movement of people. And to do this was not according
to international standard rules. So the pressure was stopped at
that incident.
In May, we observed that also people were told to go to a
certain place and told that there was assistance. We went to
this place. There was nothing. And thousands of people had
moved to this place. So I think it's very important to focus on
the criteria for resettlement in this very precarious situation
of the people there.
We also have registered that there was a point of closing
the reception areas, but that has now been changed, and that
is, in our opinion, also good.
So, just to make a short conclusion of the situation, as we
see it, as a humanitarian organization, we have millions of
people in a very precarious situation still. Even though the
peak of the emergency is over, these may enter into a new
emergency situation if they are not assisted satisfactorily.
We do still find pockets of famine. There are still areas
in Angola where nobody has been to assess the situation. It's
very difficult. But still, we have perhaps defined even more
pockets of famine. And what is needed, definitely, is more
food, more support. WFP doesn't have enough resources to deal
with the crisis. Access problems, de-mining here is pretty
essential to get access to the people and get supplies to them.
The health care system must be given the utmost priority,
building up a system that effectively can take care of the
people. And the resettlement must be voluntary and well
informed and only encouraged to places where there is support
in place.
So, thank you.
[The prepared statement of Dr. Rostrup follows:]
Prepared Statement of Dr. Morten Rostrup, President, Medecins Sans
Frontieres/Doctors Without Borders, Brussels, Belgium
We want to thank the Senators of the Committee on Foreign
Relations, especially Senator Feingold, for this opportunity to report
on the recent and current humanitarian situation in Angola. At the
hearing we hope to bring to your attention what we believe are the
major humanitarian issues that require urgent consideration.
Doctors Without Borders/Medecins Sans Frontieres (MSF) is an
international, independent emergency medical aid organization that has
been working in Angola since 1983. Since then MSF has worked in 15 of
the 18 provinces, running primary health care services in displaced
camps, nutritional programs and emergency feeding programs, supporting
hospitals and other health structures and running surgical, sleeping
sickness and tuberculosis programs. Our medical presence alongside the
Angolan population, all directly affected by the war, provides us with
a clear understanding of the scale of the humanitarian crisis in
Angola, its causes, and what must be done to assure the medical
wellbeing of the Angolan people.
It is premature to think that the post-conflict situation in Angola
has become normalized. A large number of Angolans are still in a
precarious situation. This testimony will address the continuing
nutritional crisis; food insecurity; MSF's concerns about the
resettlement of displaced people; and the lack of access to health care
for many Angolans.
1. background
The end of the fighting in April revealed a humanitarian crisis
previously hidden during Angola's three decade long war. Hundreds of
thousands of starving civilians emerged from rural areas to which MSF
and other agencies had been denied access by both the Angolan Armed
Forces (FAA) and UNITA. Our teams recorded mortality figures nearly
four times greater than what is internationally accepted as the
threshold for an emergency. Rapid assessments found moderate
malnutrition rates as high as 50% and severe acute malnutrition higher
than 20%.
These people were starving not because of natural disaster, drought
or crop failure, but as a direct result of how the war was fought. War
tactics pursued by both parties directly caused the pockets of famine
MSF encountered immediately after the ceasefire. In willful violation
of international humanitarian law, both warring parties cut civilians
off from humanitarian assistance for years. From 1998-2002, sanctions
against UNITA, compounded by UNITA's own strategies, prevented agencies
to operate under areas they controlled. The Government of Angola
restricted aid agencies to provincial capitals, and even in these
government-held regions, the neglect of the health system led to a
near-complete failure of health services.
Peace may have silenced the guns, but it did not bring relief:
thousands of Angolans who had survived the horrors of the war, and who
could have been saved, died needlessly. For example, in Malange
province, MSF found in May that 17% of the women whose children were
receiving emergency nutritional care said they had lost children since
the beginning of 2002.
Consistent with these urgent needs, MSF mobilized its largest
worldwide operation, with 175 international volunteers and 2,200
national staff working or monitoring activities in 15 of Angola's 18
provinces. Unfortunately, the slow humanitarian response to this
immense crisis by the Government of Angola, aid agencies and the UN, as
well as serious logistical constraints, prolonged the crisis throughout
the summer.
So far MSF has treated more than 16,000 children at our therapeutic
feeding centers (TFCs). In June, we were treating 3,600 children in
more than 20 intensive feeding centers throughout the country, and
provided supplementary feeding to more than 10,400. A preliminary
retrospective mortality survey showed death rates of 3.3/10,000 per day
for children under 5 years of age.
2. the current situation
``My husband received half a cup of rice. We, the family,
received half a cup of rice and one tin of sardines. That was
one month ago. Since then no one has given us anything. . . .
We haven? eaten anything for four days.''*
*J, 27 year old woman, mother of four children, one of whom is cared
for in an MSF nutritional center in Mavinga, Cuando Cubango
Province, June 2002.
Current Nutritional Crisis
Today, Angola presents a mixed picture. Across the country, we are
treating 1,400 children at 14 centers for acute severe malnutrition.
While the acute emergency has eased in most parts of the country,
localized emergencies persist, particularly in Mavinga and Bailundo.
The worst nutritional crisis is unfolding in the southeastern town
of Mavinga. In this pocket of dramatic famine, we are treating 250
children in our Therapeutic Feeding Center (TFC); we are supplying
10,000 children and vulnerable adults with weekly food rations there
and in two nearby Reception Areas with a combined population of 70,000.
Families walked through the bush for weeks to reach Mavinga, abandoning
their homes and fields, and had no means to provide for themselves.
Some people starved after arriving. A recent shigella outbreak (bloody
dysentery) affected 392 patients, and 100 people remain in an isolation
ward.
When General Food Distribution to the area was halted in August
because mines were discovered on the landing strip, an estimated 10,000
people went to Mavinga in search of food, overwhelming the town and our
feeding facilities. Our medical teams even report that children treated
in our TFCs during the summer have been readmitted in the past few
weeks with the same deadly symptoms of acute malnutrition.
Conditions are serious in Huambo Province as well, where MSF is
currently treating 350 children in therapeutic feeding centers in
Bailundo alone. This is certainly an improvement over the past 2
months, when we were treating more than 600. But we receive 90 new
patients each week.
From Famine To Food Insecurity
`` We don't have food or clothing because we didn't get
anything when we arrived. The people from the WFP came by two
weeks ago to register the population, but they haven't been
back since. They say they want to give us food for two weeks so
that we have enough time to return to Jamba Queio, but we don't
know when the government is going to decide on our return. For
the moment to get food to eat, the women work in nearby fields.
One day of work equals one basket of manioc. People who have
family in Menongue are getting help from them.''*
*M, about 50 years old. He is originally from Huambo Province, June
2002.
There should be no sense of false security. Even though the people
we treat successfully may be strong enough to leave intensive care,
they are still in the process of recovering from horrific conditions.
MSF continues to gain access to some previously cut-off regions,
finding high levels of malnutrition. The survivors of today are in an
unsteady state, and it will not take much to disrupt such a fragile
balance.
Lack of Resources
Several categories of displaced people each received different
levels of attention: the 85,000 former UNITA combatants along with
350,000 family members regrouped at 38 Reception Areas (RAs), a ``new''
IDP population of those who were trapped in isolated areas during years
of conflict, and the approximately 335,000 Internally Displaced People
receiving food aid prior to the April 4th ceasefire agreement. There
were also those in the ``newly accessible areas'' immobilized by
illness or the threat of mines. WFP integrated all of these groups into
one caseload, increasing their estimate of people requiring food aid
from 1.5 to 1.9 million.
The WFP estimates these nearly 2 million people will need food aid
for their daily survival until well into 2003. These people are
extremely vulnerable to inconsistencies in food supplies, and their
nutritional status could quickly deteriorate if confronted with
prolonged interruptions in aid deliveries.
Agencies involved in food supply already operate under several
constraints. As of early October, WFP's budget for Angola was 74%
under-funded, and cereal supplies are predicted to run out in January.
Even now, the WFP is delivering one month's worth of food every six
weeks in Mavinga, further weakening food security. Donor countries need
to insure such interruptions do not occur.
Logistical Constraints
Food distribution is severely hampered by logistical constraints,
by the ever-present threat of mines, and by damaged roads and collapsed
bridges. For example WFP General Food Distributions have been suspended
in large parts of Huambo, Cuanza Sul and Cuando Cubango Provinces
because they do not have enough heavy-duty vehicles needed to transport
cargo across rough terrain, they have difficulty identifying
Implementing Partners who manage on site general food distributions,
cannot ensure the security of field staff because of the presence of
landmines.
One of the major humanitarian priorities will be demining.
Provisions must be made to expand and accelerate demining activities.
In spite of investments in demining programs and increases in demining
teams, mines remain a significant threat throughout the country,
particularly on those routes that have not been traveled for decades.
For example, the detonation in August of two anti-tank mines in the
Cuango area led to the suspension of all aid to Xa-Muteba RA for
several weeks. Further such incidents, complicating the delivery of
aid, should be expected. The scale of the problem demands far greater
resources.
The network of roads has not been maintained for years, and bridges
spanning key rivers are down, posing a constant challenge to access.
Travel from Malange to the quartering area in Xa-Muteba, Lunda Norte
Province, a distance of about 150 miles, can take three to four days
because a bridge is destroyed and up to a hundred trucks queue at a
river ford waiting to be hauled across. The journey from Luanda to
Mussende in Cuanza Sul Province should take less than a day. It took
MSF three days last month, traveling roads that had not seen traffic
since before the war and crossing bridges only designed for
pedestrians. Mussende RA with 10,700 residents has still received no
food aid.
The rainy season, in full force by the end of October, poses a dual
threat to access. The already deteriorated roads will become impassible
as torrential rains erode the unpaved stretches, undermine weakened
pavement, and turn the powdery dry clay into deep bogs that few
vehicles can negotiate. Intense rains also expose buried landmines and
set them in motion. Areas previously thought safe will suddenly and
tragically prove otherwise. Just outside the city of Malange last week,
thirteen people were killed when their van swerved just off the main
road to avoid a pothole and hit an antitank mine that was probably
placed years before at a long-since forgotten checkpoint. It is likely
that recent heavy rains had eroded previously compacted earth above
this mine to render this stretch of road lethal once again.
This combination of a destroyed road network, the presence of
mines, and the lack of long term funding commitments compromises the
food security of this vulnerable population.
Lack of Access to Health Care
``The government does nothing for the people of Angola. They
just take the money for the school and hospital and put it in
their pockets. It doesn't matter to them, because if their
child is sick they just send them to Namibia or South Africa
and they just send their children to school to be educated
outside Angola. This is the way it is here in Angola.''*
*Elderly displaced man from Jamba Municipality, Huila Province, Nov.
2001.
As the malnutrition emergency recedes, lack of general healthcare
comes more into focus.
The health care infrastructure in Angola was not only destroyed by
war. Years of neglect have left most Angolans with inadequate basic
services. The problem is especially acute in the areas to which people
are returning. Before the ceasefire MSF was present in 11 of the 18
provinces of Angola, operating feeding centers and supporting hospitals
with medical personnel and drugs. We continue to support hospitals and
health posts in nine areas in addition to operating feeding centers.
Outside the former security cordons, extending around provincial
capitals, we see little improvement in the provision of healthcare.
Preventative healthcare is rarely provided, and curative care at the
primary level is either non-existent or limited to infrequent and
inadequate supplies of drugs. Referral services are similarly not in
evidence. In a recent assessment to Lunda Norte province, we found that
the hospital had been destroyed during the war. The health post had
been without medical supplies since July, and the 4 person nursing
staff had not been paid for months. This is the only health facility
serving an area that, when last surveyed, had a population of 147,000.
Reports of measles outbreaks continue to confirm the poor
vaccination coverage countrywide. MSF has reported Measles outbreaks in
Saurimo, Jumenge-Cameia and Lago Dilolo municipalities in Mexico, and
in Cuanza Sul and Lunda Sul Provinces. Sometimes reported outbreaks
prompt authorities to carry out vaccination campaigns, and MSF itself
has vaccinated more than 50,000 children against this deadly disease.
Return and Resettlement
``We all want to go back to living like we did before, in
1978 and 1979. The public servants could stay here in the town.
The ordinary people could go back to their fields and take
responsibility for themselves again. We know that all this will
take time, but we have hope, hope that everything will turn out
alright.''*
M, 32 year old man living in Mavinga with his wife and two children.
June 2002.
Massive population movements over recent months, as well as further
anticipated movements threaten to affect food security adversely. MSF
is seriously concerned that the resettlement process is not proceeding
according to international standards or national laws. Resettlement
must be voluntary and returnees well-informed, and only in places that
have minimum necessary access to drinking water, food, shelter health
services, seeds and tools, healthcare assistance and government
administration.
MSF has observed acute food shortages and inadequate sanitary
conditions among the 430,000 people living in RAs. These camps cannot
be closed without providing the mechanisms necessary for resettlement.
Where resettlement for hundreds of thousands of displaced Angolans
has already occurred, it has been hasty and haphazard. The UN estimated
that during August and September, between 6,000 and 10,000 people per
day were spontaneously returning to their place of origin. Up to 80% of
these people were returning to areas that were considered unsuitable
for resettlement.
Population movements also seem to have occurred through pressure.
MSF discovered how local authorities in Catata told the people living
in displaced camps that they were obliged to return to their village of
origin, and that their huts would be destroyed. MSF notified those
responsible that any return had to be voluntary, and in the end, people
were allowed to stay.
An earlier example of this is the departure in May of about 12,900
displaced people from camps surrounding Kuito in Bie Province. This
movement followed administration assurances that there would be no more
aid for them in Kuito and that food and materials would be distributed
in Trumba, 30 km away. Aid agencies were not informed of the
administration's decision, and on a subsequent visit to Trumba, MSF
found that there was little provision of assistance.
Spontaneous movements or an accelerated resettlement process
jeopardizes the safety and health status of returnees. Any return
should be voluntary, well informed, and in accordance with
international standards and norms. Only then will these people receive
even a measure of the dignity that has been denied them for so long.
3. conclusions and recommendations
1. Emergency nutritional needs must be met in the isolated
pockets of dramatic famine that persist. And nutritional
assessments must continue to areas that are still cut off from
assistance.
2. Sufficient food stocks and their delivery must be
guaranteed to ensure that food reaches the nearly 2 million
people estimated by WFP who will require such assistance well
into 2003.
a. Donor commitments must be met.
b. Access to isolated populations is seriously
hampered by a severely deteriorated road network and
destroyed bridges spanning major rivers.
c. De-mining operations must be accelerated to
support food distribution programs, the provision of
health services and the resettlement process.
3. People must be provided with adequate basic health care,
with a focus on training, primary health care, and basic
referral systems.
4. Resettlement must be voluntary and returnees well
informed. The process must be implemented in compliance with
international standards as well as the government of Angola's
Norms on the Resettlement of Displaced Populations. This
includes:
a. The adequate assessment of resettlement areas to
ensure security, access to health care, and proper
sanitation.
b. The prevention of forced and coerced resettlement.
c. Meaningful protection for returnees.
d. The distribution of food, non-food items, seeds
and farming tools to provide returnees with food and
shelter while they resume farming activities to become
food self-sufficient.
Senator Feingold. Thank you, doctor, for your excellent
testimony and certainly your work and the work of your
organization, the commitment to the people of Angola throughout
these many years, and especially now, when, despite the very
serious problems, there at least is some hope that maybe some
of these can be resolved. So I thank you for being here and for
your work.
Mr. Kramer, you may proceed with your testimony.
STATEMENT OF DAVID KRAMER, ATTORNEY, BAIRD HOLM, OMAHA, NE
Mr. Kramer. Mr. Chairman, thank you very much. It's a
pleasure and a privilege to be here today.
My name is David Kramer. And in the fall of 1996, a series
of personal and professional events came together in a
confluence that gave me the opportunity to move to Luanda,
Angola. And I'll never forget the phone call I got when I was
asked, ``Do you even know where Luanda, Angola, is?'' And I
said, yes, that I had followed U.S. foreign policy. I had
followed that region of the world for some time, and I looked
forward to the opportunity to move to Luanda and work with the
Angolan political parties, with the Angolan Parliament on
political party development, national reconciliation, and
parliamentary reform.
What brings me here today is an opportunity that I had last
fall as the head of a delegation--and one of my colleagues from
IFES, the International Foundation for Election Systems, Laurie
Cooper. I want to say thank you to Laurie for being here. Also
to the representative of the National Democratic Institute
[NDI], who, Jamina is here, as well. And I want to say a
special thanks to my colleagues who participated in that
mission and who returned with me this past spring to present a
report \1\ outlining what steps the Angolan Government needed
to take, the international community needed to take, and
political parties and civil society in Angola needed to take in
order to prepare for a situation where they might have
elections.
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\1\ The report is entitled, ``Angola Pre-Election Assessment
Report,'' March 2002. The assessment was conducted by the International
Foundation for Election Systems, International Republican Institute,
and National Democratic Institute, and can be accessed at www.iri.org.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
And I want to talk a bit today, not so much about
elections, but about basic conclusions of our report that deal
with what steps need to be taken, what priorities there ought
to be for democratic advancement, in general, in Angola, which
may ultimately one day lead to elections, with particular
emphasis on civil society and political parties, which we
focused our report upon.
I'd also like to take the opportunity to share a little bit
about what our perception is on the relationships between
governance, corruption, and the conditions that exist currently
for the Angolan people, and some recommendations that we have
about foreign policy in the future toward Angola.
We start from a series of fundamental premises that are, I
think, very important to remember, and we often, as Americans
who travel abroad, forget. But in Angola, it's the Angolans who
have to drive the process of democratic growth, of
transparency, of good governance, with the support,
encouragement, and sometimes open criticism by the
international community. And we, in the United States, have a
particularly important role to play in Angola, given our
historical involvement there and given the respect that we have
among all Angolan players today.
Second of all, that it ultimately will be the Angolan
Government that has the primary responsibility for creating the
conditions for there to be real democratic growth in Angola.
It's easy sometimes to be in the opposition, because all you
have to do is point the finger. It's very hard to govern, and
we have to encourage and support the Angolan Government as they
go forward trying to make the reforms necessary.
The third fundamental premise that we operated under is
that the process of democratic growth must be one that is a
result of free, open, and broad-based discussions among
Angolans, not just among the political elite, not just among
the economic elite, but among the broadest segments of society
possible, bringing in the civil society organizations, bringing
in political parties, bringing in all interested citizens.
And the fourth fundamental premise that I wanted to mention
today is that peaceful elections in a climate of openness,
trust, and national reconciliation based in a constitution
that's accepted by Angolans are a necessary step on the road to
bringing true democratic development to Angola.
And it's interesting that we've talked a lot--I heard
earlier testimony by both of my colleagues who are testifying
today about ways to encourage the Angolan Government to
effectuate change. I believe that the way we are most likely to
encourage the Angolan Government to effectuate change is if the
Angolan people themselves demand it of their government.
And we've talked today about optimism in Angola. I received
an e-mail message from a friend of mine yesterday, and I would
like to emphasize that Angola is a country that has been at war
for 30 years. They have been in the longest sustained period of
peace now for about 6 months. And there is incredible optimism,
thousands and thousands of people in Angola who have been
reunified with family members who they thought were dead.
People who believe and now--at a time of war, when there was no
opportunity for the government and others in power to point the
finger at UNITA or point the finger at war--there is now an
opportunity for them to begin the process of providing basic
services to the Angolan people. And, more importantly, I think,
there is opportunity for the Angolan people to demand that of
their government.
There are a number of priorities that we identified in our
report that ought to be focused on. First, the restoration of
basic freedoms. It's easy to harp on the negative.
And I want to emphasize that, since 1992, there has been
significant progress in Angola on basic freedoms, freedom of
expression, freedom of association, but the progress is not
enough. There are huge numbers of displaced persons, which,
from our perspective, is the second critical priority,
relocation of displaced persons. And, doctor, I think you said
it best when you talked about the fact that it has to be
voluntary, that we have to create the conditions for people to
be able to choose, do they want to stay in Luanda or in Huambo
or wherever they're at, or do they want to go back? And it
shouldn't be a forced one before the conditions are created.
Third, a critical concern about the situation in Angola is
that while we talk about that there may be 12 million, 13
million, 15 million Angolans, there are many Angolans who
aren't--we don't dispute they're Angolans, but have no way of
proving it. They have no basic means of identity documentation.
And as the process goes forward for preparations for elections,
for preparation for participation in basic government, who is
it that's entitled to receive benefits? People who cannot even
establish that they're Angolan citizens will have a much more
difficult time to participate in all segments of the process.
The fourth priority we've spoken about is the lessening of
state control of the media. There has been some political
liberalization of the media since 1992, but it continues to be
state owned and state run. There is one truly independent
media, the Catholic station, Radio Ecclesia. If there is to be
development, from a perspective of freedom of expression,
ability to air alternative ideas, the ability to question
government, the ability to look into transparency issues, there
has to be a freedom of expression, freedom of greater access to
the media.
The fifth priority we talk about would be the strengthening
of civil society and political parties. The emergence of a
politically active civil society of organizations is one of the
largely unheralded events in Angola that's occurred over the
last several years. It's exciting to see people in the midst of
war come together to advocate for social justice issues, for
basic equity, for basic human rights--not just the
international community, but Angolans doing so of their own
volition. Well known political party activists are beginning to
work together with civil society organizations, which is
something that never happened.
We know, in this country, that we talk about the influence
of special interests. Special interests have influence why?
Because we, as those in politics, listen to our constituents.
In Angola, that doesn't happen.
And so as we help the development of civil society, I
believe very strongly, and our report articulates, there has to
be a parallel assistance in development on the political side
of things, and, more importantly, creation of the expectation
that the two should not run parallel paths, but that the two
should interact with one another and that there's a
responsibility on the part of those who govern to listen to the
governed.
With respect to the political parties, there is not a level
playing field in Angola today. There is only one political
party that has the control of state resources to engage in its
activities. If we want to have a multiparty system, there are
significant issues that will have to be addressed to that. The
recent reunification of UNITA is a good step in that direction,
and there are 3 or 4 other political parties that have
significant potential at whatever time there may be an
opportunity for there to be elections.
The sixth priority ought to be, and it's an internal one
for Angolans, the resolution of the constitutional question.
There's a debate today over whether or not there should be a
new Angolan constitution. It's something that needs to be
resolved before they go forward.
The seventh priority would ultimately be preparation for
elections, electoral reform, setting a date certain for
elections, because I believe, as a political activist, that the
impetus for the Angolan Government and for other political
parties to begin to pay attention to what's going on in Angolan
society will be the prospect of elections. And as the Angolan
Government--one of the recent comments that we heard on
numerous occasions while we were in Luanda in May was that many
people believed, with the advent of peace, that the government
would feel a greater responsibility to provide basic services
to people on the thought that there might be an election. And
the longer it got away from war, the harder it would be to
justify the continuance of the types of situations that have
been talked about today.
Let me close by making a few basic recommendations and a
comment. There's no question that good governance,
transparency, corruption, all lead to the inability of the
Angolan citizens to participate in the system and really to
demand change. And everything that we've tried to encourage in
our report has been designed to increase transparency by the
government, but also to empower and encourage citizens in
Angola to demand that of their government and, interestingly,
to demand it of their political parties. As we've talked about
political parties who criticize the government for not being
transparent, but who are not transparent in their own finances,
we talk about that basic hypocrisy. And why should we trust
them, as a political party, to govern differently if they don't
handle their own internal affairs the same way? And so
transparency is a large component of what we talk about in
preparation for a new Angola.
As to a few recommendations, Senator, I can't emphasize
enough, having lived on the ground for 2 years, having
continued to stay engaged in Angola, that we have to adopt a
policy and stick to that policy for an extended period of time.
We have a tendency in--the good folks at USAID, who I've duked
it out with on one occasion or another--have a tendency to
change policy in midstream at a point at which you're just
beginning to make headway. We ought to commit to what our
policy is going to be, fund our NGOs to implement that policy,
and let them go, instead of nickel and diming them and changing
direction every couple of years. I understand the difficulty of
demonstrating results, but having lived on the ground, I've had
my feet cut out from under me more than once because, just as
we are making progress, somebody decided they wanted to go a
different direction.
Second of all, I believe very firmly that this commitment
ought to be made not just to civil society. Civil society must
work together with the political side. And if civil society
advances much faster than the political component, and there
are those in Angola who will tell you that over the last two
and a half years civil society has advanced much more quickly
than the political, because there's not capacity building going
on--you're going to have the inability of the political to
respond to the demands of civil society.
Last, I would say let's focus on the fact that only 6
months have passed since the cease-fire. The last time we went
through this exercise, UNITA's leadership did not come to
Angola--to Luanda. They're all there today.
There is tremendous opportunity. I, perhaps, am one of the
few people who would describe himself as an optimist about
Angola. The people of Angola are excited. I'm excited. The
members of our team who were there are excited. We think
there's great potential because of the vast resources they
have, but, more importantly, because of the resiliency of the
Angolan people. And so I would hope that we could do everything
we can to support them in their endeavor to become an example
of success in Africa.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
[A press release on Angola Political Environment follows:]
[Press Release, October 16, 2002]
IRI Consultant, David Kramer, to Address Congress on Angola Political
Environment
Washington, D.C. --David Kramer, a consultant for the International
Republican Institute (IRI), will testify before the Senate Foreign
Relations Committee on Wednesday, October 16 in a hearing on Angola's
political climate and the prospects for future democratic elections.
Angola's political landscape has changed drastically in 2002. The
death of UNITA leader Jonas Savimbi in February, the renewed
implementation of the Lusaka Protocol and the resulting return of the
Angolan Joint Commission have brought an end to the country's 27 year
civil war. These developments may provide Angolans with the first real
opportunity in decades for sustained peace and a new era of democracy.
Kramer will address the country's political environment, as well as
potential challenges in the current peace and reconciliation process.
Kramer will share the joint assessment recommendations with
congressional members regarding Angolan government, political parties,
civil society organizations and the international community
preparations for fully participatory and open elections. Additionally,
Kramer's testimony will provide benchmarks by which Angolans and the
international community can evaluate the reconciliation process' and
the election process' progress.
Kramer's comments will be based on a joint political assessment in
which IRI participated with NDI and IFES in August 2001. The assessment
took place in Luanda and involved meetings with representatives of the
Angolan government, the president of the 1992 Angolan Electoral
Commission, political leaders, leaders of civil society organizations,
representatives of the state and independent media, church leaders and
other relevant officials. The assessment team's report is available on
IRI's Web site at www.iri.org.
After conducting several effective political party training and
governance assistance programs in Angola in the 1990s, IRI's expertise
was requested in assisting the political parties prepare for the
upcoming elections. Their assistance to the political parties in 2002
will include capacity-building workshops and a technical resource
center.
IRI is a nonprofit, nonpartisan organization dedicated to advancing
democracy worldwide. IRI's programs span the globe and include a wide
range of programs including, training on civic responsibility and the
legislative process, strategies for building political parties and
election campaigns, energizing women and youth to engage in the
political process, communication training and election monitoring. IRI
is funded through federal grants, as well as private contributions from
individuals, corporations and foundations. For more information, please
visit our Web site at www.iri.org.
Senator Feingold. Thank you, Mr. Kramer. I found your
testimony interesting and very useful as well, and I appreciate
your help.
Let me ask some questions, first, of Dr. Rostrup. Would you
provide sort of an overview of international aid delivery in
Angola? How effectively is the humanitarian aid pipeline
actually functioning? And what are the most serious constraints
on the delivery of humanitarian aid?
Dr. Rostrup. I think it's--what we have seen during the
last half year, after April the 4th, is that, to start with,
there was really a clear insufficiency in the deliverance of
aid. And that was, in our opinion, a kind of failure of the
international community, but also the U.N. And we went public
criticizing, among other things, the United Nations, the WFP,
because it seemed that there was not the same way of judging
the situation as an emergency, as we did after our assessments.
So there were, obviously--in June, when I was there, there were
very big shortages in the food pipeline. They said they had
food perhaps three to four more months. They lacked funding to
really reestablish storage of food for the rest of the year.
Still, what we do see now is both, as I said, the lack of
resources that the WFP, who is the major actor here in food
distribution, still say they just have one-quarter of what they
need to give food to the people well into 2003, which will be
necessary for 1.9 million people, according to the estimates.
And we know that monthly deliverance in some places, which
should take place, is taking place on a 6-week basis, leaving
periods without food.
And we have in the field, as I also mentioned, seen how
precarious a situation this may end up with, because with short
food deliverances, then people very fast backslide into
malnutrition.
So I think it's pretty clear that we don't have enough
resources. There is not enough food in place. There is not
enough money in place to secure the population.
In addition, we face the logistical constraints. And this
is another problem. Even though we had enough food, to some
extent, to bring it out to the people is another problem. And
the de-mining efforts is an emergency in this situation, as
well, to get food out to the people, and then to avoid huge
population movements into areas where they may be very
difficult to access.
So I think overall it has scaled up quite a lot since June,
July. There's been huge efforts from many aid organizations to
assist the population. The situation has improved, overall,
quite a lot. But we still feel that, in the future, if we don't
do anything really to speed up the process and get enough
resources, they can fall back into a very precarious situation.
Senator Feingold. What portion of the Angolan budget is
spent on health care?
Dr. Rostrup. Well, the number I've heard is about 4 or 5
percent, but this is some time ago. So, of course, as we have
said it before, because we are working in the health care
system for quite a long time in Angola, and we have raised this
issue with the Angolan Government several times, that they need
more investment in the health care system. And as we see it, as
a medical/humanitarian organization, the fact that we are
present in Angola is really a sign of failure of the
government. We should never have been there. This is the
government's responsibility, and we need to push for the
government to take these responsibilities.
Senator Feingold. What kind of cooperation does the Angolan
Government typically provide to humanitarian agencies that are
operating in the country?
Dr. Rostrup. I think we have been able to operate pretty
freely now in Angola. We have been managing our health care
programs, hospitals, and so on. Still what is needed is more
resources from the government side into the health care system,
and we are pushing for that. But we can more or less do our job
without any big obstacles for the time being.
What we saw during the war was another situation in which
we were denied access to areas, both from the government forces
and from the UNITA forces, which was another situation which
made the situation very, very bad for the civilian population.
Senator Feingold. But that's not happening now.
Dr. Rostrup. No. No, it's not happening.
Senator Feingold. Does the so-called culture of corruption
in Angola affect the humanitarian efforts? And if so, how?
Dr. Rostrup. Well, it's nothing special I can comment on
that, actually, because I don't know all the details. Of
course, there is a bureaucracy, as in many countries, and we
have to deal with that to import goods and so on. We have
addressed some of this, but usually for MSF, as an independent
organization, we do control all other--you know, the whole
pipeline, from importing and to delivery of the goods. So we
will--we have managed--as far as the reports I've got, we have
managed pretty well to control this.
Senator Feingold. Finally, I recall being told, I assume
accurately, that there was good land for producing food in
Angola, but, obviously, because of the mines and other
problems, the idea of food self-sufficiency is very
questionable. Long term, is food self-sufficiency a realistic
goal for Angola? And what steps have to be taken to improve the
food security situation, in terms of----
Dr. Rostrup. I think, in the long term, de-mining of the
fields is very, very essential. And in the current situation, I
know that a lot of the civilian population, they want to go on
cultivating the land if it's secure, if they get the seeds,
tools to do that. I don't have, honestly, a total overview on
what the food security or the possibilities will be for Angola
in the future, but I would presume that they would be able to
take care of themselves in the future, taking these measures.
Senator Feingold. Thank you, doctor.
Mr. Kramer, what can you tell me about the state secrecy
law that was passed in June of this year? I understand there is
a clause relating to so-called state income. What effect will
this have on efforts to increase the transparency of the state
revenues?
Mr. Kramer. Well, in a word, chilling. Any legislation
designed to hide, whether it be--well, primarily, I'd guess,
financial data as a state secret is something that ought to be
opposed.
To the extent that--I mean, every country certainly does
have state secrets, but--if you want to take the time to read
through the volumes of our budget, you can. Unfortunately, in
Angola, there isn't the accuracy in the budget.
There's also a relatively recent law that continues to be
debated but has been enacted that puts significant restrictions
on the media, access to the media. Those types of laws, to the
extent that they prohibit the ability of the average citizen--
be they from civil society activists, political party
activists--to participate and engage in the system, are
something we should strongly oppose.
Senator Feingold. How is UNITA attempting to transform
itself into a conventional political party? Are the leaders of
UNITA able to freely organize? And do they have unhindered
freedom of movement?
Mr. Kramer. Let me say that, first of all, we don't even
have to talk about UNITA, in particular, with respect to the
issues of freedom of movement. I think any active political
party that has a seat in parliament will tell you that ability
to do anything outside of Luanda is severely restricted. The
ability in Luanda, on some occasions, to display your party
flag at the Angolan national football game--``football'' being
soccer for the rest of us--but, you know, it's very, very
difficult. There's not a great deal of tolerance and openness
for different political thought.
UNITA--the fundamental--from when I was there originally
for the 2-years, to the times I've been back, to me the
critical difference now is that UNITA's military leadership,
which historically had stayed in the bush, is gone from the
bush and has come to Luanda now. And they have transformed
themselves, I believe, into a political party. The
reunification that occurred, actually just within the last
several days, the final components of reunification, suggest to
me that they're making great strides.
Now, UNITA has one major problem. And actually all
political parties, other than the MPLA, have one major problem.
It's a problem that I know, Senator, you've tried to deal with
here, and that's access to financial resources to make them
competitive. Given that the MPLA routinely utilizes the
resources of the state, from the media to others, as part of
the--there's not an independence between the party and
governance--it makes it particularly difficult for any other
political party to develop.
One last note about UNITA. UNITA and MPLA are fundamentally
different than any of the other political parties, for a very
interesting reason. There is no unanimity of thought within
those two political parties. Some of the smaller parties, there
is not much dissension from what the President of the party
says. Even today, as I traveled in, we were there in May, and I
met with three different people in MPLA who, if dos Santos
doesn't run for President, will run for President. Within
UNITA, there are three or four people who I've had the
opportunity to meet with who, if given the opportunity, will
run for President. There is political debate going on within
UNITA, as a party. There's political debate within MPLA going
on, as a party. And that is a great, positive sign to me about
the potential for those parties to engage in a broader debate
on nationally important issues.
Senator Feingold. How about the role that civil society
plays in influencing the course of public policy in Angola?
I've seen, in different places around the world, especially in
African countries, what a very valuable role civil society can
play. To what extent are Angolan citizens able to engage in
civic organizing?
Mr. Kramer. Well, the biggest difficulty that the Angolans
face today is the fact that there is a registration process for
civil society organizations that, when organizations have the
potential vote to be perhaps significantly influential, they
may not get the appropriate registration, or the registration
process becomes delayed. It's something that we've heard about
on a number of different occasions during both of our most
recent trips to Luanda.
As I said in my opening remarks, one of the most exciting
things and exciting developments in the last two and a half
years in Luanda, in particular, not so much outside of Luanda:
there are two different worlds in Angola--but in Luanda, has
been the emergency of civil society organizations. What's
critical at this juncture is the ability to get them to talk to
one another.
Now, the activism of some MPLA--I won't call them
``dissidents,'' but at least internal critics in a couple of
the new civil society organizations is a positive development.
It remains to be seen whether or not those are serious
involvements and the politicos will pay attention to what civil
society has to say.
I have very strong feelings about one of the--from my
personal opinion, one of the critical causes of this, and it's
the system of governance that Angola has chosen, in terms of
elections. The MPs are elected based on a party list, not to
any defined constituency. There are 90 of them who are elected,
5 per province. But many of those, and I understand that
conditions didn't exist for extensive travel, but many of those
members of parliament who are elected from a particular
province haven't been back there since 1992. I know that NDI is
doing a great job there of trying to take MPs out to do town
hall-type meetings to create the concept of constituency and
the responsibility to constituency.
Today, the senior elected folks are responsible to the
party and to the President, who's the one who ensures whether
they get their checks, their cars, those kinds of things.
One other positive development in that vein is the fact
that Angolans, in the constitutional revision, and the MPLA,
while they're against election of Governors, because they
consider Governors to be an extension of state administration,
the proposals--even the MPLA proposal for a new constitution
contemplated having local elections, municipal and village
councils, maybe mayors. As a political activist, that will grow
the expectation--if it's your friend or your neighbor who's
your councilman or your mayor--you know, Senator, people come
to you when they need something, and if it's somebody you know,
you tend to be more responsive. And something--that development
is a positive one in Angola, which will make a difference.
Senator Feingold. Finally, let me ask you--because I've
raised issues in this regard when I've been to Angola, and I
know many others have--how free is the Angolan press, itself?
Mr. Kramer. One of my dear friends has been in jail a
number of times because it's not that free. Things are
improving. Radio Ecclesia is a great development. We hope that
Radio Ecclesia will get a nationwide permit. They have an
application pending. But open criticism of the government in
the media is still not completely welcome. And it's, more than
anything, it's just a historical bias about the way things--
it's not that the journalists intentionally do it a lot of
times.
I'll close with the example that there was a call-in radio
show on national radio during one of the periods that we were
there, and somebody called in to be critical of the government
and without missing a beat, the DJ said, ``Oh, you must be a
UNITA guy.'' And he said, ``No, I'm not a UNITA guy. I've been
MPLA my entire life.'' But it's just something that's ingrained
historically, and it's something that, with time, training,
adequate resources, encouragement, demand from the people, will
change.
Senator Feingold. Thank you.
I thank everyone who testified today. I think we all share
a passion to see Angola succeed. But the context of these
hearings has been--this being the last--what we've described as
``failed states.'' And certainly that has been my observation
with regard to Angola in the 10 years that I've been in the
Senate.
We very much, as a country, want to stay engaged in trying
to help Angola come out of that status, not simply because of
the obviously important economic relationship we have with the
country, but because, as several of you have indicated, this is
a country that has enormous potential to be a beautiful and
wonderful place in the world. But it cannot be done without the
reforms of the government and the recognition that the people
of the country have to be taken care of first. Otherwise, I
fear that the country will continue on the path that it has
been on for far too long.
But I thank you all, and I assure those who are here that
this subcommittee will continue to work closely in terms of
following the events in Angola and to continue to strengthen
our role with regard to helping Angola succeed.
That concludes the hearing.
[Whereupon, at 11:30 a.m., the subcommittee adjourned, to
reconvene subject to the call of the Chair.]
----------
Additional Questions Submitted for the Record
Responses of Hon. Walter H. Kansteiner, Assistant Secretary of State
for African Affairs, to Additional Questions for the Record Submitted
by the Senate Foreign Relations Committee
Question. The Agency for International Development has indicated
that the Office of Transition Initiatives will begin a program in
Angola this fiscal year, but that the program would not include the re-
integration of UNITA ex-combatants because the government of Angola has
made a commitment to do so. To date, what has the government of Angola
done to support the re-integration of UNITA former soldiers? What has
the government of Angola done to support the re-integration and/or
family reunification of child soldiers and UNITA ``wives'' who were
kidnapped into UNITA ranks? In what specific ways has the U.S.
government supported these efforts?
Answer. The Angolan Government has publicly committed to undertake
the reintegration and resettlement of all former UNITA combatants and
their family members. Reunification of both child soldiers and UNITA
``wives,'' to the extent feasible, is to be included as part of these
efforts. Under the April 4 Luena Agreement, all UNITA personnel and
family members were instructed to report to one of 35 quartering and
family member reception areas located throughout the country. Since
that time 84,000 soldiers and approximately 300,000 family members have
arrived at what are now termed ``gathering'' areas.
Initial focus in the gathering areas was on the registration,
disarmament, and decommissioning of UNITA combatants. This process was
concluded on August 2. As a first step to reintegration 5,007 UNITA
members were identified for integration into the Angolan Armed Forces
and 40 for integration into the National Police. The integration
process is proceeding with training and assignments for those selected.
The first step towards resettlement and reintegration of the
remaining demobilized combatants and their family members is to
complete family registration in the gathering areas. The Angolan
Government in cooperation with the UN Office for the Coordination of
Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) is finalizing this process.
The Angolan Government has established the National Commission for
the Reintegration and Resettlement of the Demobilized and Displaced
under the chairmanship of the Interior Minister, which will have the
lead in the resettlement/reintegration process. We are concerned that
the National Commission has not been provided with adequate resources
to carry out its responsibilities, including administration of the
gathering areas for which it technically assumed responsibility in
August. Since that time, the Commission has refused to coordinate
adequately with humanitarian operators and the international community
on relief efforts in the camps. Camp administration has largely been
left to the Angolan Armed Forces, which have not been provided adequate
resources to carry out this responsibility. The National Commission has
been working with the World Bank to design a reintegration/resettlement
strategy, but regrettably this process has not adequately sought the
full input of relevant stakeholders, including UNITA and others in the
international community. Launch of the World Bank resettlement/
reintegration program is expected in April, following the end of the
rainy season. International humanitarian operators agree that this is
the earliest launch date possible due to logistical challenges.
The U.S. Government has been the largest international donor in the
gathering areas. The USAID Office of Food for Peace has provided over
$70 million to Angola in FY 02, a portion of which has been used to
support food aid needs in the gathering areas. The USAID Office of
Foreign Disaster Assistance (OFDA) has arranged three emergency
airlifts and two sealifts of non-food items, including blankets,
plastic sheeting, water containers, soap, kitchen sets, and health kits
to the gathering areas valued at $4 million. OFDA has awarded a $3
million grant to the UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian
Affairs to support an emergency response fund to meet the needs of
demobilized soldiers and family members.
As part of our support for resettlement, reintegration, and
reunification activities, OFDA has provided $3 million to the Food and
Agriculture Organization for seeds and tools to support resettlement of
demobilized soldiers and family members. OFDA is also working with NGO
partners to expand coverage under existing programs to meet the
humanitarian needs of former UNITA combatants and family members who
have left the gathering areas and moved to urban areas. The USAID
Office of Food for Peace, through its contribution to WFP supported
resettlement activities estimated at $23 million in FY 02, and is
working to develop a resettlement program with a consortium of private
voluntary organizations for FY 03.
Given the importance that the Administration attaches to well-
organized reintegration and resettlement activities for former UNITA
combatants and their family members, our Embassy in Luanda continues to
raise the issue as a critical part of discussions in the Lusaka
Protocol's Joint Commission. We are concerned by recent Angolan
Government statements that it intends to close the gathering areas by
the end of 2002. We and other international donors believe that such a
move is premature given that organized resettlement cannot
realistically occur by that time. We are continuing to pressure that
Angolan Government at all levels to rescind this decision and to fully
cooperate in organizing a resettlement program over a realistic
timeframe for former UNITA combatants and family members.
Question. The World Food Program has indicated that its appeal for
Angola has been funded at less than thirty percent. The United States
has been its most generous donor, according to the WFP country
representative in Luanda. What diplomatic efforts by the United States
are underway to ensure that the rest of the donor community shoulders
its share of the humanitarian response needed in Angola and in the rest
of the southern African region?
Answer. The United States through the USAID Office of Food for
Peace and the Department of Agriculture have contributed approximately
$100 million in food assIstance to Angola in FY 2002. This assistance
is channeled through the World Food Program (WFP). Given the
preeminence of the WFP role in providing food assistance to 1.9 million
food insecure (mainly internally displaced) Angolans, we consider it a
priority to ensure that WFP has the necessary resources to fully meet
humanitarian needs.
Key donor countries meet on a regular basis on Angola both in
Luanda and in New York to coordinate humanitarian assistance. As a part
of those on-going consultations, the United States consistently
underscores the need to ensure that adequate resources are provided to
major international operators, including WFP, to meet the humanitarian
challenges in Angola. We have, thus far,been disappointed by the
response of other international donors to the WFP appeal for Angola and
continue to encourage our partners to share the burden of providing
support both to Angola and to southern Africa as a whole.
Question. Your written testimony indicates that military to
military contact between the United States and Angola will need to
``increase,'' and that an Expanded Military Education and Training
Program would be beneficial. What will the specifics of such an E-IMET
program be? When will the program begin? Have plans been developed for
regular International Military Education and Training programs for
Angola? What specifically will such a program entail and when will it
begin?
Answer. We anticipate initiating a small E-IMET program ($100,000)
for Angola in FY 03 conditioned on continued progress by the government
on the peace process and evenhanded treatment of former UNITA
combatants. The initial program would consist of the establishment of
an English language laboratory in Luanda and the training of English
language instructors. Establishment of an adequate English language
training capacity within the Angolan Armed Forces (FAA) is a useful
step toward the goal of enabling FAA participation in regular IMET
courses. Pending implementation of the initial E-IMET program, we have
not begun planning for follow-on IMET activities.
In addition to establishing an English language laboratory and
training language qualified FAA personnel, we anticipate seeking FAA
participation in other E-IMET courses. The emphasis within this program
will be on courses dealing with military justice, defense resource
management and civil-military relations, all areas in which additional
training is needed. As was noted in our FY 03 Congressional Budget
Justification, such a limited IMET program will advance initiatives to
promote greater awareness in the Angolan military of democracy, human
rights, the rule of law, and effective civil military relations and
improve the Angolan military's ability to effectively interact with
U.S. officials. Improved defense resource management will assist
efforts to increase budget transparency and accountability across the
Angolan Government and ensure that all expenditures are on-budget in
conformity with IMF requirements.
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