Virtual
Diplomacy Homepage >> Virtual
Diplomacy Publications >> Information
Technology and Peace Support Operations
Information Technology and Peace Support Operations
Relationship for the New Millennium
Lt. Col. Donna G. Boltz
2000-2001 Senior Fellow
Jennings Randolph Program for International Peace
The views expressed in this report are those of the author and
do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position
of the U.S. government, the Department of Defense, or any of
its agencies.
Introduction
The United Nations came into existence
on October 24, 1945, when China, France, the Soviet Union,
the United Kingdom, the United States, and a majority of
other signatories ratified its charter. Some sixteen weeks
later, on February 14, 1946, scientists at the University of
Pennsylvania introduced the world's first electronic,
large-scale, general-purpose computer—the Electronic
Numerical Integrator and Computer (ENIAC). The potential
roles these two creations—the United Nations and the
electronic computer—would play over the next fifty years
surely must have seemed unrelated in the middle of the
twentieth century. Today, although that relationship is
stunningly clear, it is also surprisingly undeveloped.
Of the fifty-four peace support operations (PSOs) approved
by the United Nations since 1948, more than forty occurred
in the past twelve years. During the same period, advances
in and applications of information technology (IT) have also
exploded. The twenty-first century opened with more than a
dozen UN mandates for peace support operations around the
globe—a globe connected by an infrastructure of
telecommunications networks, ultra-fast computer processors,
and consumer electronics.
Whether the future strategic (security) environment will
necessitate major wars remains to be seen. However, it is
clear that smaller scale contingency operations will likely
dominate future conflicts. The United Nations and its member
states must respond if the international community is to
stem the tide of conflicts raging around the world. In an
era of peace support operations, people also find themselves
in a high-tech world characterized by the Internet;
personal, mobile communication devices; and near-real-time
news broadcasts on twenty-four hours a day news channels.
Few individuals and fewer organizations in the
multinational, interagency field of peace operations remain
untouched by information technology—from UN headquarters
to military and police in the field to an extended community
of interested actors ranging from policy makers to regional
and international news consumers.
Despite rapid developments in computer technology, remote
sensors, aerial imagery, and communications since the end of
the Cold War, the potential of information technology in
peace support operations remains largely untapped. The
defense industry, which supported important IT advancement
in response to military necessity through World Wars I and
II and the Cold War, has not responded in kind to peace
operations. For this reason, UN member states must field and
refine existing IT in peace support operations while pushing
for new and effective IT programs tailored to the PSO
environment. Simultaneously, the United Nations must take a
leadership role in developing strategy and policy for IT
applications in peace operations. Against a backdrop of
increased regional instability and cries for UN
intervention, technologies can help promote unity of effort,
ensure mission credibility and legitimacy, and save manpower
and funds by improving communication and training of
potential actors in these complex operations as well as to
assist in overall mission accomplishment.
The UN secretary general recently assembled a group of
experts—the Panel on United Nations Peace
Operations—which noted that modern, well-utilized
information technology is the key to improving UN peace
support operations. According to the panel, the United
Nations can more effectively act to prevent conflict and
help societies to find their way back from war by
facilitating communication and data sharing and providing UN
staff the technological tools they need to do their
work.1
To set the context for the development and integration of IT
in peace support operations, this report begins with two
brief sections addressing the historic development of IT and
information operations (IOs), respectively; it then
describes their role in peace operations. The report's
objective is not to present IT as a panacea for all the
challenges of these highly complex, politically charged
operations. In fact, operating within the IT environment
could very well introduce new and confounding challenges.
Strong leadership and insightful development of IT solutions
to PSO challenges, however, are cornerstones to meeting the
challenges of peace operations in the Information Age.
The Information Age
What does it
really mean to talk about the conduct of peace support
operations in the Information Age? What defines the
Information Age? How is it shaping the environment in
which future operations will take place?
A recent book described the
Information Age as a series of three revolutions—the
first beginning with the invention of the radio,
telephone, and telegraph.2
The second revolution, the authors characterize as the
introduction of the television, satellites, and
early-generation computers, like the thirty-ton ENIAC,
which were large and slow with limited applications.
The third revolution—where some authors begin to
consider a transition to an "information
society"—extends from the 1980s to the present and
addresses development and employment of myriad
information/communications technologies. This
three-revolution description spans 150 years, from the
mid-1800s to the present.
Alvin Toffler, in his book considering the
multifaceted impact of information technology on the
"Third Wave" of developing society, argues that the
transition to the Information Age began after World
War II, when progress began to depend more on mind
than on muscle.3
According to Toffler, the Information Age is only some
fifty-odd years old. Futurist John Naisbitt narrows
the time frame further by identifying it with the
period of "computer-liberation," which arrived in the
1960s and 1970s and led to the birth of the
information society.4
Regardless of how one may define the start of this
era, it is clear that billions of people around the
world now thrive in an information-driven environment.
In many developed countries, communication via e-mail
is as much a part of "keeping in touch" as the
telephone or postal service. The Information Age has
welcomed a culture of transborder communication.
People share information, ideas, attitudes, and
opinions through instantaneous transmissions that
connect the world.
Countries are acquiring and applying technologies at
differing rates. According to the World Bank's latest
World Development Indicators, most have Information
Age capabilities. Radio remains the most available
medium for receiving information, though in some
countries television prevails. Personal computers are
available to varying degrees in most countries,
although in most developing countries access is
extremely limited beyond major cities and economic
centers.5
In the end, information begets more information,
linking more actors through more activities and
interests across greater distances and cultural
differences than ever before. Technology, and in
particular information technology, is ushering in an
increasingly connected world, affected more than ever
by events occurring in far-off places. Regional
instability that once evoked a "not in my backyard"
response now threatens businesses, incenses interest
groups, and unites the moral voices of a
media-informed public that just last week didn't know
the name of the country for which a peacekeeping
intervention is being discussed. Commercial demands
are driving the development of information technology
at a phenomenal rate in the twenty-first century, but
that was not always the case.
Back
to Top
Developing Information Technology: An Historic
Look
Defense technology played a major role in driving IT development
through most of the twentieth century. In World War I, commanders sometimes
used wireless telegraph to control the movement of forces. Field telephones
were developed to facilitate communication in trench warfare. Photo-mapping
and reconnaissance missions along with electronic and acoustic sensors
provided solutions to challenges in observation, especially for artillery
missions.6 Scientists developed
the ENIAC to support the U.S. Army Ordnance Department in World War
II. The ENIAC computed 1,000 times faster than any existing device.
Although its purpose was to compute the paths of artillery shells, the
ENIAC also solved computational problems in fields such as nuclear physics,
aerodynamics, and weather prediction.7
In addition to the ENIAC, scientists in World War II developed sensors
like those used in World War I to detect German U-boats that threatened
Allied operations by disrupting ship movement and resupply activities.
The new sonar and radar capabilities set up in Combat Information Centers
(CICs) on Allied ships located these dangerous submarines. Military
specialists then communicated the coordinates to Allied submarines and
ships. The CICs used a combination of telephone, radar, and sonar—effectively
integrating electronic communication and information processing.8
Given the pressing need to monitor the development and potential deployment
of nuclear weapons, developments in information technology continued
throughout the Cold War. The U.S. Semi-Automatic Ground Environment
(SAGE) system was one such response to the Cold War threat. Designed
as an air defense system in the early 1960s, SAGE sent by telephone
information collected through a system of geographically dispersed radar
to a central location where it was gathered and processed by a large-scale
digital computer.9 Later in the same
decade, the U.S. Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency, DARPA, introduced
the predecessor to the Internet—-ARPANET. What started as a simple
four-node network grew to span the globe, connecting a world of ideas,
societies, and actors for a host of activities far surpassing its fledgling
capabilities.
The technologies developed during the two world wars and throughout
the Cold War era introduced many advancements for conducting conventional
war. Yet todays increasing demand on nations to participate in peace
operations rather than conventional warfare suggests a critical need
to fund and develop information technologies specifically to meet PSO
challenges. The expectation seems to persist, however, that the residual
technological advances made transforming national militaries for future
conventional wars should also satisfy PSO needs. This is faulty logic
at best, and it detracts from the efficient conduct of peace operations.
Retrofitting tools of war to support contingency, or peace support,
operations is a slow and imperfect process. Moreover, the commander
of such operations cannot wield the same degree of control over the
information environment as he does over a conventional military campaign.
This is apparent on multiple fronts, from information gathering to control
of the media. To maintain situational dominance in the PSO environment,
one needs specialized tools. The U.S. Army maintains that information,
when transformed into capabilities, is the currency of victory and that
the military objective in operations other than war is to establish
situational dominance.10 Information
technology may be the most powerful tool in the commanders kit for achieving
PSO goals while saving money, manpower, and lives and maintaining the
PSO fundamentals of legitimacy, impartiality, unity of effort, use of
force, and credibility. Integrating information technologies into the
operational plan is a critical part of IOs.
Back to Top
Information
Operations as a Force Multiplier and Deterrent
One of the greatest Information Age boons to PSOs is an
increased capability to share information quickly, universally, and
objectively. Conversely, obstacles to information sharing, not to mention
equipment incompatibility, can threaten ITs potential contribution to
a PSO success. Information operations—-a concept that originated
in U.S. Army planning doctrine—-8211;have great application for
actors throughout the PSO environment as a means to foster transparency,
build credibility, express impartiality, and maintain legitimacy. Yet
as written in PSO doctrine, information operations are relegated to
support status for combat power in a peace operation. U.S. Army Field
Manual 100-6 explains that "information operations integrate all aspects
of information to support and enhance the elements of combat power,
with the goal of dominating the battlespace at the right time, right
place, and with the right weapons or resources."11
The concept should be expanded beyond wartime applications; IOs can
be both a force multiplier and a guarantor of the PSO fundamentals during
these complex operations.
Information operations include a unique group of activities ranging
from collecting and analyzing information, to interacting with the media,
to direct communication with the local public—-including formerly
belligerent factions. They also take into account communication and
coordination with NGOs and international governmental organizations,
whose presence most often precedes the introduction of soldiers, civilian
police, and elections monitors. The military commander and civil affairs
specialist have to work diligently toward establishing, developing,
and maintaining functional relationships with these actors. Since impartiality
is paramount to the credibility and effectiveness of humanitarian relief
agencies, they may resist liaisons with soldiers and police in particular.
Nevertheless, cooperative civilian/military operations enhance the credibility
of the friendly force, promote consent and legitimacy, and encourage
the parties to work toward peace.12
An effective information campaign articulates the value of working together
and determines the best means to facilitate communication. The following
vignette demonstrates the successful integration of information technology
and civil affairs.
In the Implementation Forces (IFOR) Multinational Division North (MND[N])
in 1996, Maj. Gen. William Nash, then MND(N) commander in Bosnia-Herzegovina,
invited the three former warring faction commanders in his sector to
observe the monitor display of a real-time downlink from an unmanned
aerial vehicle (UAV) during a break in a Joint Military Commission (JMC)
meeting in the Zone of Separation. The general told the commanders he
wanted to show them a piece of technology employed by his force to conduct
the IFOR mission. The UAV was flying over the Zone of Separation in
the area of the JMC, and the commanders could see themselves on the
monitor. The UAV then covered the road en route to the site. As it moved
along, the commanders clearly understood that it could see personnel,
equipment, and movement with great accuracy and high resolution. General
Nashs point was this: I can see what you are doing anywhere, all the
time, and without deploying the soldiers in sector to do the job. It
was clear to the commanders that if they violated the terms of the General
Framework Agreement for Peace (i.e., the Dayton Peace Accords), IFOR
would know, report them, and if necessary unleash forces to deal with
issues of noncompliance.13
General Nash understood the terrific potential information technology
held for success in his peace support operation. By using the UAV, he
could cover a manpower-intense mission without a considerable commitment
of Task Force Eagle troops. More importantly, by highlighting the technology
and its capabilities, he could evoke compliance on the part of the faction
leaders without using force. This anecdote illustrates how information
operations support peace operations. General Nash used IT as soft, impartial
power to collect information critical to the mission. By demonstrating
the technology to the faction leaders, he added the strategy of showing
them the level of information available to him with the purpose of affecting
their decision-making. All the while, his methods upheld the fundamentals
of peace support operations because his application of the technology
was transparent. His use of the technology demonstrated impartial collection
abilities. Finally, most important, his reliance on information to compel
appropriate response by the commanders reduced the likelihood that he
would have to use force.
The general could have used the UAV very differently, and with much
less impact, had he applied the technology clandestinely, as he would
have during war. But peace support operations require innovative applications
of existing technologies and well-thought-out and -developed information
operations that synchronize those technological capabilities in planning
from the outset. Leaders therefore must leverage the full power of IT
in order to plan for and support information operations.
Although information operations are not easily executed, IT can expedite
and strengthen their effect. Established actors such as NGOs—and
in some cases, the media—have historical information that peacekeepers
need both for background and for its predictive value. Moreover, by
the time peacekeepers get to the field, chances are information already
will have been manipulated for censorship, propaganda, and disinformation.
Then, once in the field, local detractors seeking to weaken PSO credibility
often have access to and employ some of the same information technologies
to speed faulty, sometimes deliberately dangerous information across
the theater of operation. Cellular telephones, radios, television, and
websites, when equally accessible to every force and faction within
the environment, may play to the advantage of a local factional leader
who is more familiar with the language and culture. Thus, PSO commanders
must develop a decisive information campaign that considers the array
of IT available to those who seek peace and to those who seek to disrupt
the peace. Failure to use IT effectively threatens the forces ability
to gain the requisite knowledge and information to conduct a successful
peace support operation and simultaneously to deny adversaries information
domination in the environment.
Information operations in the PSO environment integrate the skills of
a group of nontraditional actors as first-tier advisors to the commander.
In 1996, when the U.S. 1st Armored Divisions Task Force Eagle deployed
to Bosnia, the chief of the Coalition Press Information Center in Multinational
Division North was surprised to find herself sitting in the front row
of chairs for the battle update brief (a nightly operational update).
The task force commander had relegated the traditional warfighting personnel
to the second row. His reasoning: The threats to his operation were
most likely to come from loosely organized groups trying to use disinformation,
rumor, and propaganda through an effective, if unsophisticated, information
campaign to drive wedges between the various parties and to exacerbate
feelings of dissatisfaction and disenfranchisement within the population.
To counter these efforts, civil affairs, public affairs, and psychological
operations experts worked together with intelligence analysts and combat
arms planners and operators in an effective IO working group. They synchronized
information and planned contact with publics to maintain credibility,
transparency, and impartiality.14
Information operations touch all the actors in the PSO environment because
they include the cultural and political dimensions of the operation.
The measure of success is not dominating the enemy but influencing the
affected parties to create the conditions for a stable environment in
which businesses flourish, children regularly attend schools, and families
live free from the fear of being forced from their homes. It is clear,
then, that a relationship of trust and understanding must exist between
and among the military, police, and civilians supporting the operation
as well as members of the threatened, failing, or failed state. For
information operations to be successful, as they were in IFORs MND(N),
requires the understanding and full support of the commander.
The U.S. Army defines conventional psychological operations (PSYOP)
as operations to convey selected information to foreign audiences with
the goal of influencing behavior favorable to the originator. Psychological
operations take on a different role during peace operations from those
during conflict situations. Given that transparency and credibility
are fundamental to peace support operations, the information communicated
by all actors from the same force or coalition must be both harmonious
and truthful. In an effective information campaign, planners and leaders
wholly integrate PSYOP.
The information operation in IFOR, Multinational Division North, is
instructive in this regard. The chief of psychological operations in
Multinational Division North requested permission to use press releases
developed by the commanders public affairs officer about breaking news—material
that fell outside the routine approval process for PSYOP—-for timely
dissemination of information to the local population. He received approval,
which allowed the PSYOP team to broadcast in a timely manner over its
own (PSYOP) radio stations the same information that was available to
the local media via public affairs releases and announcements. PSYOP
specialists also used some of the same information in their native-language
newspaper, Herald of Peace, which was distributed to the locals.
This cooperative measure ensured sharing of accurate and timely information
with the local audience regardless of delivery methods.15
In this instance, success in sharing and transmitting information from
press releases hinged on clear communication both within the command
and to the local audience. The idea that the public affairs specialist
and the PSYOP chief intentionally limit their own interactions may seem
absurd. However, a worse situation is occurring between individual nations
and agencies, which deploy state-of-the-art technologies that cannot
interface. Inability to communicate is one of the most common complaints
among actors in the PSO environment.
Back to Top
Information
Sharing
Problems arise when NATO units communicate with non-NATO
units. Military units must also be able to communicate with civilian
organizations, like CIVPOL. These organizations normally do not have
military equipment and their means for communications are very basic.
Technically it means that you have to choose the lowest common denominator
or provide the organizations with equipment and operators.16
–Goran Tode, The First International Workshop, "Challenges of
Peace Support into the 21st Century," Stockholm, Sweden, September 1997.
Information sharing is essential to establishing and maintaining an
atmosphere of cooperation among PSO actors in the area as they begin
to coordinate their respective activities. Information sharing is at
the heart of unity of effort. Clearly, communication is simplest and
information sharing is optimal when actors are homogenous—sharing
a common language and culture—-and better yet when they are in
close proximity. However, this type of homogeneity and spatial relationship
rarely exists among PSO actors. Representing many countries and organizations,
actors always have different languages and cultures. Add to these differences
the obstacle of communicating from and between remote mission sites—whether
cities be fifty miles apart or countries on different continents—the
challenges are apparent.
Used as a tool to train soldiers, police, and civilians to manage language
and culture gaps, information technology can help shorten time and distance
and expedite relationship building. For this reason, it is critical
that PSO planners in the Information Age capitalize upon IT capabilities.
Planners of peace support operations must use IT to bridge gaps before
the PSO environment is populated by a diverse group of actors who aspire
to the same objective but cannot coordinate on the ground. The following
section highlights the role of IT in information-sharing activities
for military and police forces, UN headquarters, and field activities.
Back to Top
Issues of Communication Interoperability: Talking from
Day One
One of the greatest obstacles to effective information
sharing is the introduction of multiple communication systems without
an overarching strategy toward interoperability. Equipment incompatibility
creates problems ranging from failing to transmit critical information
in a timely manner to developing feelings of "haves" and "have nots"
among those nations contributing to peace support operations. The inability
to share information across the PSO environment because of different
systems confounds military personnel, UN administrators, and NGOs alike.
Col. Patricia Capin, chief of the Multinational Joint Logistics Center
for Headquarters, Kosovo Force (KFOR), described the early communication
challenges faced by KFOR this way: "If we wanted to communicate with
one another we either met somewhere or provided national equipment to
our multinational counterparts (or received equipment from them). We
each deployed with our own communications system, none of which could
talk to the other. We need to deploy with a common system that allows
us to communicate between nations and agencies from day one."17
Great advances in telecommunications capabilities in the 1990s, fed
by a demand for systems able to support global commerce and education,
have resulted in increased commercial information-sharing means and
methods. Systems that once relied exclusively on cable connections now
take advantage of microwave and satellite capabilities. Unfortunately
in terms of interoperability, the rapid development of IT sparked competing
markets globally, resulting in widely different systems designed without
an eye toward operating across the multinational, interagency landscape
of peace support operations. Absent a comprehensive equipment interoperability
strategy, it is not surprising that communicating with the agency across
the street or the force on the other side of the cantonment area has
become at minimum an irritant and potentially a showstopper during a
crisis.
The former deputy chief of communications for KFOR, Lt. Col. Peter Varljen,
expanded on the KFOR dilemma in a recent interview. He explained that
the first force in Kosovo was the Allied Command Europe Rapid Reaction
Corps (ARRC), which was not NATO equipped. The ARRC telephone system,
Ptarmigan, was unable to interface with the national systems of most
of the other multinational brigades (MNBs). To bridge the communication
gap, the ARRC provided a Ptarmigan system to each of the MNB headquarters.
This short-term solution put stress on the ARRC's physical capacity
for communication. The ARRC also outfitted the UN element—initially
arriving without communications—with a Ptarmigan system. The only
electronic communications immediately possible were between the U.S.
multiple subscriber element and Ptarmigan through a NATO interface located
in Mannheim, Germany. Commercial communication, Lieutenant Colonel Varljen
explained, was infeasible because the only existing systems went through
Belgrade—not operationally acceptable routing early in the KFOR
mission.18
Technical problems were compounded when attempts were made to communicate
with NGOs, most of which possessed small, earth station communication
dishes to support satellite communications, none of which could interface
with any of the national systems. One work-around solution designed
in response to the NGO link was Hotmail, which Colonel Capin explained
became a depository for routine information regarding supply routes
and meetings. Although equipment sharing and Internet mail domains worked
as expedient field solutions, the multinational force and related agencies
and organizations needed a readily deployable communications package
based on an assessment addressing interoperability shortfalls—especially
in the early days when stress and uncertainty were at their highest.
Despite significant communications capabilities of any single player
in the scenario described above, each suffered interoperability handicaps.
Although there is no "cost-free" cure to the problem of communication
mismatches like these, off-the-shelf technology solutions exist. In
fact, a communications infrastructure with terrific potential exists
within the UN's Department of Peace Keeping Operations (DPKO), Field
Administration Logistics Division (FALD). The Communications and Electronic
Services Section (CESS) of FALD established an IT infrastructure that
enables communications between and among all UN peacekeeping and DPKO-administered
missions, their field offices, and the DPKO offices in New York City.
The system relies on four satellites with near-global coverage, more
than 300 small, rapidly deployable, earth station communication dishes,
and some 900 portable (briefcase) terminals supported by the system
of international maritime satellites called INMARSAT. With a leased
digital circuit between the communications hub in Brindisi, Italy, and
New York City, one public telephone network, and secured communications
circuits, this network reaches thirty-two countries on four continents.
When military forces are part of a UN peace support operation, the force
is included in the UN communications umbrella. When working with a regional
organization, a memorandum of understanding addressing communications
support and terms for reimbursement must be developed between the United
Nations and the regional force. In the case of Kosovo, where the regional
force preceded the UN peace support operation, the UN communications
infrastructure was initially unavailable. However, the existence of
the supporting DPKO CESS infrastructure suggests that a standing agreement
that extends IT capabilities significantly could contribute to overcoming
some of the confusion attributed to poor communications interoperability
in peace support operations.19
At the heart of the DPKO CESS infrastructure is an information management
system originally developed to support a system of accounting for UN
equipment in peace support operations. The Field Administration Logistics
Division of DPKO developed the Field Assets Control System (FACS)—described
by the project coordinator as the "kernel" for the overall project—to
enhance equipment accountability and assist in budget resolution and
development.20 The system introduced
a standardized program for tracking the life cycle of UN equipment in
peace support operations. Using groupware—software that integrates
work on a single project by several concurrent and separated users—the
system provides data entries and updates to UN headquarters within minutes
of input at workstations around the world. In 1997, FALD distributed
the software to missions, most of which previously used "homegrown"
tracking systems, and simultaneously developed a communications infrastructure
to support FACS. Computer bulletin boards encouraged use of the new
system and facilitated feedback, although the new system initially drew
only weak response from the field. Within three years, FALD developed
and refined the FACS module as the first module of the Field Mission
Logistics System (FMLS). Recently completed or in development as part
of FMLS are programs to track maintenance, expendable goods and supplies,
contingent owned equipment, memoranda of understanding, and field personnel
movement.
The DPKO Wide Area Network (WAN), which supports FMLS, also supports
a mail routing operation that enables communications among and between
field missions and UN headquarters. In fact, the WAN supporting DPKO
makes the UN headquarters intranet available to field missions and UN
peace support operation headquarters. Developers could add instant messaging
to the system to enable computer conferencing and real-time dialogue.
Beyond the UN infrastructure, open source instant messaging software
might be another option available to PSO actors interested in conducting
online dialogue and conferencing. One example of instant messaging architecture
easily accessible via the World Wide Web is "Jabber." Similar to a private
chat room, this type of instant messaging allows users with access to
the host server via computer or cellular telephone to participate in
instant messaging among a dedicated user group. While not suitable for
classified information, Jabber could facilitate real-time dialogue for
routine communication.21
However, accessible instant messaging products like Jabber require operational
telecommunications. How do actors in the PSO environment communicate
when commercial telephone links may be compromised? How do they communicate
in failed states or undeveloped countries where telephone connections
typically do not exist? In the past, these obstacles prevented the PSO
force from using commercial telecommunications.
However, emerging satellite technology soon may offer a solution. In
November 2000, StarBand Communications, a U.S.-based company, launched
a commercial two-way satellite Internet venture. The company seeks to
establish satellites as the leading route for high-speed Internet connections.22
This technology could unleash the "tele-bonds" of nonsecure Internet
communication and enable computers to be linked to the outside world
far from telephone switches, regardless of who controls the ground-based
communications hub. StarBand still is working out bugs, such as ways
to make the satellite system more resistant to inclement weather. Finally,
the company must decrease the operational costs of consumer satellites
to become a practical application in peace support operations. Still,
deployed as part of a PSO communications package, satellite-based Internet
technology holds promise as a means to connect PSO actors reliably from
the start.
Long recognized as an issue among allied forces conducting training
operations, discussions of interoperability between nations participating
in the XIV International Seapower Symposium raised the possibility of
IT solutions to challenges in communication interoperability. In a panel
discussion, "Interoperability in the Information Age," R. Adm. Kevin
Wilson of the Royal New Zealand Navy proposed an Internet-based solution.
Admiral Wilson explained that the advantage of using the Internet for
communication interoperability is that it "allows remote, long-range,
dynamic data retrieval and manipulation from any connected source."23
Acknowledging that the problem with using an Internet solution is security,
Admiral Wilson predicted that given IT advances, security limitations
will be temporary at most.
In the same panel discussion, V. Adm. Simpson-Anderson of the South
African Navy approached the problem from a more traditional point of
view, that of making existing national systems interoperable. Short
of purchasing a single, common system, Admiral Simpson-Anderson suggested
a common interface that links existing systems. Viewing this as a more
affordable solution that uses legacy systems, he acknowledged that any
agreed-upon interface must link with each individual system—requiring
each nation to perform input modification.24
The U.S. Navy is looking at a digital modular radio that may hold the
key to enhancing communication with allied nations because it has a
radio interconnection that facilitates interoperability between systems.
The digital modular radio, available commercial technology, is attractive
because it avoids the high costs and maintenance requirements associated
with supporting legacy communications equipment. It holds costs down
by being adaptable to different systems and not requiring an outright
replacement or total purchase to provide the desired communications
interface. The digital modular radio has an embedded security feature
and can operate using satellite communications, line of sight, very
high frequency, and high-frequency communications among different channel
settings, all existing in the radio's computer software.25
When developing strategy and policy for IT interoperability, leaders
and planners must integrate systems currently used with good results
at the national and regional levels. One such system is video-teleconferencing
(VTC). The United Nations and military organizations use VTC as a cost-effective
(in terms of time and travel dollars) way to convene routine and ad
hoc meetings. Besides bringing distantly located parties together for
meetings without travel or schedule interruption, the VTC enhances voice
message by allowing the incorporation of slides to illustrate briefings
and concepts, which "attendees" simultaneously view and discuss. Military
personnel using the VTC in peace support operations remind potential
users that they need to formalize employment of the technology by establishing
a protocol for recording (written) meeting minutes, recognizing speakers
(especially in a time-constrained, multinational meeting), and staffing
information shared following the meeting. Users who fail to develop
such a protocol may find the technology frustrating and disruptive to
other coordination processes.
The cellular telephone is another information-sharing tool that has
proven invaluable in linking individual actors to information resources
for advance warning, situation updates, and changes in guidance. Accessible
mobile communications like the cell phone are particularly important
because the success of peace support operations can hinge on the actions
of one or two relatively junior soldiers far from headquarters. These
individuals must have up-to-the-minute information for decision making
at the lowest level. With satellite support, the cellular telephone
gives them that kind of crucial information.
There is no question that today, well into the Information Age, technology
exists to support global communications in any environment. It is encouraging
that the United Nations already owns and operates a communications infrastructure
capable of supporting a global network. Yet it falls short of its potential
for three primary reasons. Organizational, administrative, and budgetary
constraints limit the United Nations' full exploitation of its IT potential.
First, organizationally, the United Nations operates as a system of
parallel agencies and divisions—none of these units is empowered
to take the lead in developing a standardized, interoperable, IT-based
communication system. Consequently, the United Nations operates several
communications networks without an overarching interoperability strategy
to connect its own agencies, much less all the actors that truly represent
the PSO environment—whose coordination is critical to the operation's
success. Finally, tight budgets and varying priorities do not guarantee
the availability of funds to develop or support effective communications
before initiation of a peace support operation.
Back to Top
An
Exemplary Product: Global Information
Systems
Among the most promising information-sharing technologies
for the PSO environment are geographic information systems (GIS). Comprising
systems and software with deep commercial roots, the products rely on
information from multiple actors across the peace support operation
environment: military and police, NGOs and IGOs, local government, media,
mission observers and monitors and open source information.
GIS's are software applications with the ability to capture, store,
check, integrate, manipulate, analyze, and display data related to physical
positions on the earth's surface. With applications ranging from city
planning to tourism to mining information, GIS's have an important application
in peace support operations because of their ability to "layer" data
from multiple sources. The layers come from the expertise and experience
of PSO actors. For example, in creating a GIS multilayered map, the
terrain and weather data may come through military channels. NGOs may
provide up-to-date information on the location of various aid agencies,
while the UN High Commissioner for Refugees may add current information
on resettlement progress. This example is oversimplified to illustrate
the required collaboration. In actuality, several actors may be able
to update information in the same area—different teams and organizations
traveling between villages and towns can update road conditions, for
example. GIS's integrate current information and maps to promote "information
sharing, advance planning, operational cooperation and evaluation of
progress toward complementary goals"26
and provide data that can be distributed around the world using new
Internet software.
Cooperating agencies have used GIS with positive results in the Balkans.
In Bosnia, GIS systems were used to "correlate the pattern of ethnic
expulsions with information about military lines of control of paramilitary
units operating in the area at the time."27
In Kosovo, GIS applications combined information about refugee returns,
minefields, unexploded ordnance, potable water, housing status, and
lines of communication.28 This information
helped UN administrators and PSO forces to manage the immense task of
resettlement. This information-sharing mechanism drives agencies to
collaborate in order to develop a complete picture of their common zone
of activity.
The Russian application of a GIS system, known as Project Sentinel,
in Kosovo advanced the Russian sector objectives of preventing the renewal
of battle action, creating the conditions for refugee return, and supporting
demining efforts.29 Sentinel combined
military-mapping data with dynamic information about troop movement,
training activities, refugee movement, route conditions, and demining
progress to meet mission requirements. The Canadian reconnaissance vehicle,
Coyote—essentially a monitoring technology—has an onboard
GIS that combines a television camera, thermal imager, laser range finder,
ground surveillance radar, and modem for wireless transmission of the
collected data up the chain of command.30
Nevertheless, simply collecting, integrating, and verifying layered
information for GIS does not indicate a solid information-sharing regime.
In April 2000, the United States Institute of Peace and the U.S. Army's
353rd Civil Affairs Command cosponsored an international conference
on information sharing to support advanced planning and operational
cooperation during PSOs. Among its conclusions was that an information
strategy that addresses issues of data requirements, information security,
and field constraints should be developed involving all major participating
organizations. To elaborate, conference participants reported that relevant
data needs and trained individuals to provide accurate data must be
identified. They also determined that agreements should exist to inform
relationships and mechanisms for identifying and disseminating data.
Finally, they said that information systems that provide input for GIS
must be supported within the operating environment—simple off-the-shelf
technology that assumes infrastructure shortfalls.31
To ensure compliance with these measures, it is clear that responsibility
for this type of information sharing must be assigned to a PSO actor
with IT capability, field presence, and requisite expertise.
The Report of the Secretary-General on the Implementation of the
Report of the Panel on United Nations Peace Operations (A/55/502)
acknowledges the need to establish a responsibility center to devise
and oversee the implementation of a common IT strategy for the peace
and security departments with a counterpart responsibility center in
the offices of the special representative to the secretary general in
complex peace operations. To be successful, field offices should take
guidance from FALD within DPKO—the office with the technical expertise,
talent, and vision to make the most of GIS.
Back to Top
A
Final Note on Information Sharing
Regardless of what information
systems nations adopt to break down the barriers to
communication interoperability, the United Nations
must take a leadership role in establishing any
lasting IT strategy. Although there are numerous
examples of successful applications of national IT
assets, until these efforts are integrated, the value
of existing technologies will remain unexploited,
extant only in the anecdotes of national and regional
forces. This unacceptable consequence degrades unity
of effort and results in organizations being unable to
attract the attention of the communication and
electronics industry to develop and market PSO
technology. Contributing nations must develop, test,
and fund viable IT solutions to overcome their current
frustration and promote effective peace support
operations from the earliest days of deployment.
To speak with one voice from the PSO environment,
actors must develop and transmit messages that others
hear and understand. Unity of effort, impartiality,
credibility, and legitimacy in peace support
operations require actors to speak with one
voice—from message development to communicating
urgent changes that occur as a result of actions and
reactions in the field. The dynamic PSO environment
requires effective communications that bridge time and
distance; simply arriving in the field with the means
to communicate between forces and organizations,
however, does not guarantee a common understanding
among them. A common base of knowledge and information
is required to develop a framework for an efficient
working relationship.
Back
to Top
Using
Information Technology to Bridge the Training
Gap
It is extremely important,
especially as the demands of peace operations
accelerate and become more complex worldwide, that
training of professionals become more attuned to new
technologies, specifically computer-based learning and
distance-learning techniques.32
–Amb. George Ward, "Challenges
of Peace Support into the 21st Century," Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania,
May 2000.
Military training exercises for multinational and
allied operations traditionally involve costly
deployments to conduct training at a common location.
The inherent characteristics of peace support
operations—international response from multiple
agencies and organizations—means that traditional
training can be cost prohibitive in terms of both time
and funds. Conducting training that requires large
unit movement is expensive not only in travel funds
but also in the associated costs of moving soldiers
around in the field and fueling and maintaining
equipment for use in the exercise. Figuring into those
costs is the fact that crisis-driven deployments often
occur on relatively short notice—severely
compressing the schedule for troop movement
alone—making efficient use of training time a
critical factor in rapid response. This time crunch
especially affects nations that conduct PSO training
only after a unit is identified for participation in
an operation. For short-notice deployments in
particular, a combined exercise at a single training
center is impractical when there is barely time to
ready troops and equipment for movement. Military,
police, and civilians participating in peace support
operations can utilize the same information
technologies and techniques that are employed to share
information among them to support cost-effective,
integrated predeployment training. The combination of
computers, telecommunications infrastructures, and
video-teleconferencing equipment creates a
cost-effective interface for global distance education
programs.
Because IT can enable predeployment training that
otherwise may not occur, its use yields intangible
dividends in support of PSO fundamentals. Doctrine
development for peace operations is generally newer
and less established than doctrine used in training
for war. Consequently leaders must develop some
critical skills, including negotiation, relations with
civilian organizations, relations with UN
headquarters, and an understanding of mission
specifics, during preparatory training. At lower
levels and among small units, soldiers typically do
not even meet or learn about their foreign partners
until they deploy. Leaders of past operations have
likened this approach to assembling the team for the
first time on the field the day of the big game. It is
easy to see that a teaching approach that fails to
develop standardized tactics, techniques, and
procedures for a multinational force in the course of
operations could threaten force credibility and
legitimacy. Credibility is compromised when former
warring factions view disparate responses among
deployed actors as evidence of poor coordination and
visible cracks in the ability of the force to
accomplish the PSO mission. Legitimacy is at stake
because a strong, coordinated response is critical to
undermining the legitimacy of the malefactors and to
gaining and maintaining support of the indigenous
people, allies, and national and international
publics. Using IT to enable PSO training contributes
to operational success by establishing relationships
and standards of professionalism that enhance force
credibility and legitimacy and exercise unity of
effort.
Back
to Top
Distance Learning
Solutions derived from the application of information
technology support global training and learning in preparation for peace
support operations. In modern distance learning, IT equipment bridges
the gaps of time and space between the trainer and trainee, redefining
distance learning. Once characterized by correspondence courses delivered
through postal systems, distance learning today takes advantage of communication
channels and media such as computers and associated networks, print,
audio, cable, satellite, and videotape or a combination thereof. Interactive
delivery systems account for the growing numbers of colleges and universities
using distance learning around the world to attract students who cannot
attend classes because of their locations or schedules. Audio and video
conferencing (using telephone lines and satellites), and webcasting
(real-time broadcasts of digital images delivered to websites) make
obsolete the old "passive learning" stereotype of distance learning.
Contemporary distance-learning approaches have a distinct advantage
over traditional education in that they enable a dialogue between students
and instructors when the two are in different places—creating a
virtual classroom. Because of its ability to bridge distances between
citizens, communities, states, and nations, education specialists recognize
distance learning as part of the international landscape.33
Back to Top
Computer
Simulations
Another virtual approach to
training for peace support operations is the use of
computer simulations to create, not the classroom, but
the PSO environment. Designed to train leaders in
decision making for such operations, these
applications allow actors to observe the impact of
decisions and refine or modify practices without
actually affecting a community moving toward
resettlement or a local police force reorganizing in
an operation's postconflict phases, for example. The
introduction of analytical tools developed
specifically for peace support operations came on line
slowly.
Despite early recognition of the role
computer-assisted simulations could play in planning
and executing peace support operations, trainers
continued to rely on existing war analysis tools to
fill this need. In addition, new modeling for
simulations was slow to develop because the historical
data about peace operations was not being assembled.
Finally the reality of the ever-increasing frequency
of peace support operations since the end of the Cold
War sharpened the need for PSO training simulations,
ranging from computer simulations specifically
designed to support integrated leader training,
bringing together policy makers, military leaders, NGO
representatives, religious leaders, and legal experts
to interactive sessions exercising soldier
decision-making through packaged vignettes and
scenarios.
The U.S.-based Institute for Defense Analysis (IDA)
developed an experiential simulation that can be used
to provide military leaders, policy makers, and
NGOs—among those operating in the PSO
environment—insight into the consequences of their
proposed actions. The IDA computer simulation,
Synthetic Environments for National Security Estimates
(SENSE), simultaneously addresses economic, social,
political, and military issues in a virtual exercise.
Using desktop computers and interactive software,
participants in a SENSE exercise identify potential
crises, scope options, and test crisis action
plans.34
The software accepts the input of participants and
allows them to experience the consequences of their
decisions and actions. This step of moving beyond
discussion and collaboration to experience is one of
IT's unique contributions to training. Although
computer simulations cannot replicate exactly what
occurs in real-time operations, they provide
invaluable interactive experiences for participants to
observe possible outcomes of their decisions and to
analyze and debate the impact with expert advice and
input.
For the individual soldier or police officer
supporting a peace operation, a decision in a
stressful environment can make the difference between
provoking a riot and developing the trust and respect
of the local public. However, before deployment, it is
difficult for soldiers to envision a village that lies
halfway around the world, divided by hate and history.
Equally difficult for troops is to deal diplomatically
with a throng of strangers who act and speak
differently from their peers. The U.S. Institute for
Creative Technologies is developing a virtual
environment that transports soldiers from a studio
setting with a 180-degree screen to a stressful
incident played out in a Balkan
village.35
Like the leaders' "games," the vignette allows
soldiers to see—ideally to learn from—the
consequences of their actions. In other words, it
gives troops a chance to practice likely courses of
actions in a virtual setting. Comments from many
participants in after-action reviews indicate that
conventional situation training exercises are the best
training methodology to prepare soldiers for
operations. The virtual environment builds on this
feedback.
Back
to Top
Viking '99
In light of distance-learning
capabilities and the value of computer simulations,
the potential of combining the two applications is
compelling. Envision a network of leaders engaging in
a real-time simulation of a PSO environment without
having to leave their home stations.
In late November 1999, governmental,
intergovernmental, and nongovernmental organizations
worked together with police and military forces from
more than twenty-seven countries to restore and
maintain peace in the fictitious country of Betaland.
Exercise VIKING '99, a full-scale computer-assisted
exercise hosted by Sweden, supported NATO and
Partnership for Peace countries through communications
hubs in Denmark, Finland, Latvia, and the host nation.
Combining simulation software, computer hardware,
telephone, fax, and radio, the exercise supported
multinational participants using a scenario similar to
recent conflicts in the Balkans. The scenario manager
for the exercise, Swedish Maj. Raymond Iller, credits
the realism of the scenario to the input of people
experienced in peace support
operations.36
Working with PSO-veteran soldiers, lawyers, doctors,
and aid organizations, Iller created Betaland. Players
around the world experienced Betaland from their daily
workspaces and local simulation centers.
Commenting on the VIKING '99 exercise, U.S. Marine
Corps Capt. David M. Griesmer says that building
virtual training centers to support simulated training
exercises is affordable—costing as little as
$15,000. Additional costs include leasing lines for
Internet and teleconferencing to support the
system.37
These relatively low costs, and the fact that the
technology is available using off-the-shelf hardware
with specialized software designed by the United
States and Sweden, puts within reach a realistic
program that can be tailored to fit the peculiarities
of any PSO environment.
The next step is supporting the leaders' training with
soldiers who—having discussed a common definition of
the use of force in a distance-learning program—are
exercising restraint in a virtual village of rioting
and chaos. The powerful benefit of IT training
includes its own set of challenges. Common language,
technical support, time zone differences, and
curriculum development to support the exercises
present considerable hurdles. Nevertheless, the
increased tempo of peace support operations over the
past decade makes clear the importance nations must
assign to development of IT-supported training. UN
member states should take the lead in developing model
training centers. The DPKO telecommunications
infrastructure could serve as the backbone for
connecting IT-enhanced training programs.
Back
to Top
Monitoring
The peacekeeping operation
can be vital in supporting and encouraging
confidence-building measures which in turn foster an
atmosphere of cooperation and mutual benefit. For
instance, active and continuous monitoring of mutual
compliance, such as we undertake in the Multinational
Force and Observers (MFO), contributes significantly
to confidence building.38
–Maj. Gen. Trygrove Tellefsen,
"Challenges in Peace Supportinto the 21st Century,"
Amman, Jordan, October 1998.
Although training may focus on various areas and
tasks, one specific skill set that bears special
mention is monitoring. Monitoring is essential to
confidence building and consent maintenance in peace
support operations. Of the fifteen UN-sanctioned peace
support operations ongoing during the writing of this
report, all included monitoring as part of the
mandate.39
Monitoring tasks in peace support operations serve to
detect and deter threats, verify agreements or
resolutions, and supervise or assist with field
activities. Monitoring is instrumental when the UN
Security Council calls upon parties to settle a
dispute in accordance with Chapter VI of the UN
Charter (and in peace enforcement operations carried
out within the provisions of Chapter VII of the
charter). Military forces supporting peace operations
monitor sanctions, military activity, police activity,
elections, and the physical security of regions,
demilitarized zones, and PSO camps.
Nontechnological monitoring is a manpower-intense task
that relies mainly on human detection and observation
conducted via patrols, observation posts, and
checkpoints. Generally speaking, the larger the area
and more complex the monitoring tasks, the greater the
demand for personnel to conduct monitoring missions.
Because budgetary constraints, national directives,
and public support for peace support operations all
affect the resources available, the United Nations and
member states must consider IT monitoring to enhance
human monitoring when possible. In addition to
reducing manpower demands, IT monitoring supports PSO
fundamentals of impartiality, consent, freedom of
movement, and legitimacy. Monitoring technologies in
and of themselves are objective and impartial in the
collection of data. When forces share monitoring data
with local populations and leaders, they demonstrate
evenhanded application of the technology and reinforce
consent and support for the PSO forces and the
legitimacy of the operation.
Even a PSO force with a good reputation for
professionalism can be challenged over time by rumors
(or accurate reports) of partiality and bias. The
information-sharing methodology must be established
from the outset of the mission, not as an afterthought
when problems and doubts result in a need to submit
proof of rightful actions. No amount of righteous
indignation on the part of the compromised force can
change perceptions of mistrust, which chip away at the
efficacy of the peacekeeper. Further, information can
be applied as a nonlethal "use of force" to compel or
support compliance. General Nash's demonstration of
the unmanned aerial vehicle is a perfect example of
using information technology in this manner. Just the
knowledge that a force can see and report the actions
of a group or individual can act as a deterrent.
To understand IT's contribution to monitoring
missions, one must understand the objectives of the
mission and related tasks. The Royal Netherlands Army
Military Doctrine, for example, assigns "observation,
monitoring and control" as a sequenced task cluster
for peace operations. Each of these activities
requires the PSO force to acquire, process, share, and
as required, act on information regarding compliance
with or violation of agreements and international
laws. The level of action and force Dutch peacekeepers
may apply increases as each task is required by the
situation.40
The U.S. Army PSO doctrine lists six subtasks to the
mission of "observing, monitoring, verifying and
reporting any alleged violations of the governing
agreements."41
From investigating cease-fire violations and boundary
incidents to verifying disarmament and demobilization,
each activity affords warring factions the opportunity
to observe impartiality in relation to the
responsibilities of the PSO force. Planners must apply
monitoring devices not purely as intelligence
collectors, but as operational tools—much like
radios and vehicles—to appreciate the force
multiplier value of sensing devices that enable fewer
peacekeepers to cover a greater mission area while
increasing the coverage time for the area.
Back
to Top
Optimal Use of Remote-Sensing Devices
Interest in the role IT could play in monitoring during
peace support operations has led to a comprehensive study by U.S.-based
Sandia National Laboratories.42
In their report, Sandia researchers established a consent/force balance
to determine the applicability of monitoring technologies to the operations.
The report defines the variables of consent and force as commonly applied
in peace support operations: that is, consent is the degree of agreement
the parties involved in the conflict hold for the international peacekeeper's
activities. Force indicates the force available and the level of use
authorized for peacekeepers. Generally, peacekeeping operations are
high in consent, deploying with lower force levels, while peace enforcement
operations are characterized by less consent and higher force levels.
However, operations can change from peacekeeping to peace enforcement
or the reverse, given a dynamic operational environment. Decision makers
who may summarily include or dismiss the application of monitoring technologies
based on the initial conditions when deploying a PSO force should recognize
the fluidity of the situation.
According to the consent/force balance developed by Sandia, operations
with a high level of consent and low force capabilities should employ
open and relatively unprotected systems for specific monitoring tasks.
Operations with low consent levels and high force capabilities need
to protect, hide, or add redundancy to monitoring devices. It is important
to note that hiding the collection device suggests not a less transparent
application of the technology but protection from theft or destruction.
Those collecting information still can and should share data. One objective
of the Sandia study was the "concept of cooperative monitoring, which
is the use of monitoring and security technology to acquire and share
objective information."43 For example,
in an environment with a high level of consent and low force requirement,
unattended ground sensors of various types—seismic, acoustic, weight,
infrared, break-beam, magnetic, microwave, and radar—can effectively
monitor facilities, ports of entry, lines of control, and weapons storage.
The operator can relay information collected from the multitype ground
sensor system to a monitoring center for recording, action, or reporting
as required. Military forces using monitoring technologies are capable
of providing a continual feed of assurance by using closed-circuit televisions
and digital cameras to project the images captured by some key monitoring
activities. A decrease in consent and a simultaneous increase in force
requirement may dictate protective and redundancy measures for some
of these sensing devices.44
The Sandia report identified five typical monitoring missions in which
technology may reduce the number of soldiers required for an operation
while visibly demonstrating impartiality and enhancing the credibility
of military and police forces in the mission: monitoring movement of
peacekeepers and locals, monitoring facilities, monitoring checkpoints
and ports of entry, monitoring lines of control, and monitoring weapons
transport and storage.
The Sandia team evaluated the potential for various classes of technology
to assist in the five tasks based on criteria of affordability, simplicity,
durability, reliability, and validity. Ground-based sensing devices
had the best applicability in static missions—where there is the
strongest argument for reducing personnel. Tracking systems were recommended
for monitoring movement of people, equipment, and weapons systems. Motion
detectors and entry control systems were recommended for physical protection
of facilities and for weapons monitoring. All these systems have the
added advantage of enhancing the protection of actors in the PSO environment
through early warning and constant surveillance.45
Back to Top
Examples of Monitoring Technologies
Among the most often cited historical cases of applying
monitoring technology in a peace support operation is the U.S.-sponsored
Sinai Field Mission (SFM), which ran from 1976 to 1980. The field mission
used four unattended ground sensor fields with TV and infrared scanner
technology to supplement human observers in monitoring the Giddi and
Mitla passes, which separated the Israeli and Egyptian forces during
the staged withdrawal process. Practitioners and academics alike often
characterize the mission in the Sinai as "traditional peacekeeping"—and
it fits the Sandia description of an environment in which monitoring
technologies can be used in an open and relatively unprotected manner
(high consent/low force). Although SFM used the systems successfully—identifying
ninety minor violations over a four-year period—it discontinued
their use chiefly because of a political decision to employ a large
and visible force instead of electronic monitoring.46
The mission employing monitoring devices used only 150 operators and
support staff—many fewer than required to monitor the passes without
remote sensors.47
More recently, the U.S. 311th Military Intelligence Battalion employed
the Remotely Monitored Battlefield Surveillance System in Bosnia, Multinational
Division North, to enhance the task force's ability to monitor assigned
areas given identified manpower constraints. The remote ground sensors
established a trip-wire system around areas where returning refugees
were resettling. The sensor system, deployed during hours of limited
visibility, provided information about movement in the area. The engineers
captured the information in a summarized report, which they provided
to the intelligence section for analysis and trend development. That
information helped the force to determine which areas were potential
"hot spots" for resettlement—aiding in mission development and
force allocation.48
Back to Top
Eyes
in the Sky—Complementary
Surveillance
The Sandia report recommends
using aerial sensors (including UAVs) to supplement
ground monitoring in large, dangerous, or inaccessible
areas. Satellite imagery with resolution refined to
one meter can provide information on ground activity
ranging from activity on military installations and
around arms storage areas to route traffic and refugee
movement.
UAVs are pilotless aircraft controlled by radio
signals. Planners recommend the use of "drones," as
they sometimes are called, to perform dull, dangerous,
or dirty missions (repetitive or sustained, in a
hostile environment, or in a chem-bio environment,
respectively). For combat deployment, UAVs may require
special engines that reduce noise signature, engines
and structures that allow them to operate at high
altitudes and speeds, and special chemical and
biological detectors—functions that increase their
cost and may not be required for peace support
operations. Contemporary UAVs (aircraft only) range in
cost from $1,000 to $14 million. However, the cost of
the system, including the aircraft, ground control
station and shelter, launching mechanism, and
(typically) two to three spare aircraft, is
higher.49
Still, the system and operating costs are lower than
those of manned aircraft. The observation range of the
UAV (weather dependent) replaces individual PSO troops
who otherwise would have to do the mission. The
systems, formerly equipped with conventional cameras
that required operators to recover and develop the
film, now employ video and digital cameras with
instant downlink capabilities.
The UAV already has established a reputation for
successful deployment in peace support operations. In
addition to deployment in Macedonia and Bosnia, the
U.S. Navy deployed the Pioneer system off ships for
flights over Haiti in Operation Provide Democracy and
over Somalia in support of Operation Provide
Promise/UNOSOM II.50
NATO UAVs deployed by the United States, Germany,
France, and the United Kingdom flew numerous
cease-fire compliance-monitoring missions over Kosovo
in 1999 and 2000. Although more than two dozen UAVs
crashed over Kosovo in 1999, those losses involved no
pilot deaths or injuries. All the branches of the U.S.
military have contracts for UAVs. The U.S. Defense
Department reports a spending plan of $30 million in
UAV research and development over the next four
years.51
The UAV alone, despite substantial peace support
operations deployment, cannot address all the tasks
associated with the monitoring mission. As with other
monitoring technologies, redundancy—both
technological and physical—is required. There will
be times when troops on the ground are the preferred
monitoring method—for their military and political
significance.
Back
to Top
The Training Imperative
One of the criticisms accompanying the employment of IT
in any area of peace support operations, but perhaps most significantly
at the user level in monitoring missions, is that soldiers do not know
how to use the high-tech systems provided them. Three approaches may
satisfy this situation. The first option, when conducting decentralized
training for peace support operations, whether as part of a planned
curriculum or as a "just-in-time" program, is to include training in
monitoring technologies. At the Lester B. Pearson Canadian International
Peacekeeping Training Centre, an annual two-week seminar entitled "Live,
Move and Work" introduces potential leaders of peace support operations
to the types of technology that may be applied to enhance force effectiveness
in monitoring missions as well as to technologies for communication,
protection, and the latest in nonlethal weapons. Classroom instruction,
unless incorporated into a larger, routine PSO training program like
the one at the Pearson Center, may prove impractical in terms of time
and costs. The second option, which may diminish or even preempt the
training requirement, is to establish contract responsibility for designing,
fielding, developing, and assisting in operating the monitoring technology
structure—each tailor-made for the peace support operation. A third
option, a combination of the first two, may be best. That option would
employ the distance-learning techniques discussed in the training section
of this chapter in the development of a global training package that
draws on contract expertise in monitoring technologies. Regardless of
which approach an organization selects, there must be a system for fully
assessing the value of using monitoring technologies. When the decision
is made to use monitoring devices, trained technicians must operate
them and have a complete information management system in which to record
and store collected data for future analysis—all covered by a comprehensive
in-country maintenance capability.
Back to Top
The
Power of Information Technology in Communicating with
the Public
Peacekeeping operations are
carried out under the full glare of public scrutiny.
By using satellites and other modern communications
technology, the press is able to distribute reports
and pictures faster than ever before. Incidents,
sometimes embellished or slanted toward a partisan
viewpoint, are screened on television the same day and
the next morning are in the press to excite audiences
in those countries that are parties to the dispute, as
well as their allies.52
–Lt. Gen. M.
R. Kochhar, "Challenges in Peace Supportinto the 21st
Century,"
Delhi, India, September 2000.
Information technology's power does not reside solely
in communications architecture, remote-sensing
devices, and training simulations. A significant
strength of the new technologies lies in their ability
to communicate quickly with global publics. From
international reporters recording the deployment of
military forces to the faction leader using
state-controlled radio to provoke violence, PSO forces
must prepare to respond. They must do so without
jeopardizing the credibility and legitimacy of the
operation or violating a profile of impartial mission
conduct. The access, filing capabilities, and
pervasiveness of the modern media corps virtually
guarantee that reporters will transmit all newsworthy
events to international audiences—often in real
time. A comprehensive information plan that is part of
the overall PSO planning process must address how
forces should interact with local factions and media
outlets. Although arguments continue over the power of
the media to lead nations and organizations into or
out of these operations ("the CNN effect"), this
section focuses on operating with the media and other
agents disseminating information in the PSO
environment.
Journalists enjoy greater access to soldiers
supporting peace operations than in any other kind of
military operation. Journalists often bring
communications equipment superior to that of most
other actors—including the military. Coupled with
privately contracted transportation, this means that
journalists, once dependent on PSO forces for logistic
and communications support, are independent
agents—often arriving before the first military
response. Add to this changed reporting environment
journalists' ability to file real-time or
near-real-time news. Using satellites, cellular
telephones, and computers, they file their stories and
provide simultaneous reports of activities occurring
throughout the PSO environment. Indeed, journalists
file stories faster than information is transmitted up
a military chain of command or through an aid
organization to its leadership. One vehicle for
information—around-the-clock news reporting—has
created a seemingly insatiable hunger for newsworthy
stories.
These three IT-driven characteristics—unfettered
access, real-time reporting, and the twenty-four-hour
news cycle—significantly affect peace support
operations. The media can flatten the traditional
organizational hierarchy through unrestricted access
and compress decision-making cycles through real-time
reporting. As information gatekeepers, journalists
become the voice from the field, providing continuous
reporting and analysis.
Leaders, planners, and managers in peace support
operations need not be impeded by the IT capabilities
of those desiring to communicate with publics. An
effective information campaign developed as part of
information operations should address not only the
military's IT capabilities and how best to apply them
but also the capabilities of other actors and how to
support, coordinate with, or in some cases, counter
them.
Back
to Top
Real-Time
Reporting and the 70 Percent Solution
These powerful journalistic capacities present PSO personnel
with daunting challenges. Leaders and managers may feel pressed to act
or make decisions based on what the media are about to report. Intensifying
this pressure, guidance from higher headquarters can spring from the
latest news reported on CNN, even before forces on the ground have had
time to report through routine command channels.
To counter the speed with which stories can be filed from the field,
leaders must trust spokespersons to respond to issues of breaking news
with available facts before perfectly sterilized words have made their
way down from headquarters. The 100 percent solution—triple checked
and command endorsed—on a press release or statement that lands
a day late, lands without impact. Addressing the essential elements
of a breaking story promotes transparency and fosters credibility and
impartiality. Continual feed is what sustains the twenty-four-hour news
realm. Although no leader or policy maker should feel pressured to supply
information to the news media, there is little room for argument after
the film has rolled if the facts are still awaiting a thorough review
on the desk of the chief of staff.
The importance and immediate impact of live-feed visuals have changed
the dynamics of the relationship between the spokesperson and members
of the media. A common concern on both sides of the table in press conferences
has always been time. In the Information Age, reporters can leverage
a live image in protest when they feel they are not getting information
quickly enough. Leaders in turn often feel reporters ask for too much
information too quickly—especially regarding breaking news. The
ability of the broadcast media to transmit real-time images to an all-news,
all-the-time network can pressure leaders to produce answers and solutions
as quickly as the press produces pictures. NATO spokesman Jamie Shea
warns leaders and fellow spokespersons to be responsive to the media
without following them slavishly—to provide timely responses to
avoid the accusation of "too little, too late."53
Achieving realistic release authority for the 70 percent solution—that
is, delivering incremental information with the command message—the
approved contextual theme and tone—has to work effectively in a
media-intense environment. All the information known to be factual should
be made available as it is known. The intent of this strategy is maximum
disclosure with minimum delay. Its success depends on three essential
elements: the role of the spokesperson, the organization and deployment
of the public information structure, and the education of the media
corps.
Spokespersons are key personnel who must be included in operational
briefings and meetings and given clear guidance on what information
can be released to the media. The collateral benefit of an inclusive
role for spokespersons is their education and growing understanding
of the intent of senior leaders. The better informed the spokespersons,
the better they can put responses in context and help the media understand
what can be confounding about operational processes and procedures.
Former U.S. Assistant Secretary of Defense for Public Affairs Kenneth
Bacon taught junior public affairs officers that their greatest power
was their credibility, based on the trust and confidence they garnered
on both sides of the microphone. Senior policy makers and military leaders
must trust the intellect and prudent confidentiality of the spokesperson.
Members of the media must know that the information they get is current
and accurate—while understanding that spokespersons often know
more than they can share on an issue.
In addition, the public information team must deploy early in the operation,
in sufficient numbers and with communications equipment comparable to
that being used by journalists in order to respond to the likely flood
of media that will meet the first regular soldiers deployed to the operation.
The story of some 500 registered media representatives in Bosnia, nearly
all of whom traveled to Multinational Division North to meet the first
arriving U.S. forces in 1995, is legend. If there are too few military
public information experts on hand, providing adequate comment on breaking
news can be difficult. In peace support operations, it is realistic
to expect the media to precede the military deployment. Often they have
been present for prolonged periods during which they developed deep
background on the history of the conflict and appreciation of the people
and culture.
Finally, the relationship between the PSO force and the media should
be established and nurtured as early as possible—most significantly
by working with national media before a crisis occurs. Efforts to educate
the press corps on the policies, people, and equipment that comprise
peace support operations will pay dividends when reporters are filling
news holes in the twenty-four hour broadcast cycle. In addition, relationships
forged before crises foster cooperation when breaking news and deadlines
ratchet up the inherent tension between those covering the news and
those making it.
Especially during the stressful and often confusing early days in an
operation, commanders need a trusted spokesperson, a well-equipped public
information team, and an informed press corps to keep up with the constant
demand for accurate, timely information. To start with anything less
risks the overall fundamental of mission transparency by providing "too
little or too late" information to the throng of reporters with cameras
rolling—live.
Back to Top
Media
Access and the Strategic Corporal
This report started out with the
observation that the contemporary relationship between
IT and peace support operations is clear but
undeveloped. The concept of the strategic corporal
most vividly illustrates the relationship as it plays
out on the ground between forces supporting peace
operations and journalists covering them. The
dispersed, dynamic PSO environment forces independent
decision-making responsibilities on young, junior
soldiers. The former commandant of the U.S. Marine
Corps, Gen. Charles Krulak, dubbed Marines operating
"far from the flagpole" without the direct supervision
of senior leadership "strategic corporals." They are
asked to deal with a bewildering array of challenges
and threats, under demanding conditions requiring
maturity, judgment, and strength of character.
Strategic corporals are assigned missions that require
them to make well-reasoned independent decisions under
extreme stress—decisions that will likely be subject
to the harsh scrutiny of both the media and the court
of public opinion. The ever-present, IT-equipped
journalist plays a significant role in lending
strategic weight to those soldiers' decisions and
actions. Consequently their actions can directly
affect the outcome of the larger
operation.54
One of Jamie Shea's "Spokesman's Rules" for dealing
with the media in crises and peace support operations
is to flatten the management of speaking to the media
as much and as quickly as possible to insure rapid and
responsive reactions to their
inquiries.55
The pervasive presence of media in peace operations
plays havoc with the rigorously hierarchical structure
in military operations. Nevertheless, flexible leaders
equip and educate their soldiers to interact with
journalists within the bounds of operational
security.
In light of their challenges, role, and
responsibilities, strategic corporals must be given
information, guidance, and license to respond to and
inform reporters on the scene. In Bosnia, a number of
approaches proved effective in empowering the U.S.
Army soldier on the ground when dealing with the
media. Among those approaches were talking points and
commander's messages developed by the Task Force
Commander's Information Coordination Group (CICG) and
approved by the commander. They were disseminated to
brigade and battalion task forces weekly via e-mail
and fax for use by leaders and their soldiers in media
encounters. When emergent issues arose, the CICG
provided specific, timely guidance for soldier use
beyond the weekly updates. That information was
transmitted via telephone, command conference calls,
e-mail, and fax to get it into the hands of the
soldiers who needed it as soon as possible. In Kosovo,
more and more soldiers operate from remote posts
equipped with cellular telephones that allow them to
receive immediate guidance and updated
information.
Electronically disseminated messages and open
communication systems provide leaders confidence that
soldiers have the information they require to speak to
the media. Soldiers, for their part, confident in
their guidance and empowered by leaders, address
journalists effectively. The end state is an informed
public able to balance disinformation with a
consistent story from a unified peace support
force.
Back
to Top
Other
Voices in the Crowd
Despite the characterization of the media as gatekeepers,
for the most part the press corps' application of IT in the collection
and dissemination of news is balanced because of its own need to remain
a credible source of information. Other agents using information technology
to communicate with publics include faction leaders and local activists
with distinct agendas to persuade or provoke an active response from
the audience. The PSO force must be equally prepared to deal with these
actors.
In Somalia, for example, General Aideed had strict control over a radio
station known as Radio Mogadishu. During Operation Restore Hope, U.S.
forces initially succeeded in countering the rhetoric broadcast over
Radio Mogadishu by establishing their own newspaper and radio station
to reach the local population. Information provided in both formats
was in the Somali language and carefully drafted to be culturally sensitive.
Gen. Anthony Zinni, commander of the U.S. Marines deployed for the operation,
credits effective communication with preventing violent clashes on the
streets in the early days of the mission.56
Success in countering forceful propaganda can be attributed to several
factors.
General Zinni's force deployed with the expertise and equipment they
needed to reach the local public. They understood Somalis' preferred
media of communication and crafted their messages for those vehicles.
They developed informative, truthful, culturally sensitive messages,
which they expressed in the language of their audience. General Zinni
said he resisted those who encouraged the force to destroy Aideed's
Radio Mogadishu, because doing so would contradict the U.S. value of
free speech. Later, in UNOSOM II when Pakistani peacekeeping forces
entered the radio station as part of a weapons inspection, the resulting
firefight left twenty-four of the peacekeepers dead. By that time, forces
had rotated and the information campaign had deteriorated.57
Back to Top
The
Internet News Source
In the Millennium Report of the
Secretary General of the United Nations, Secretary
General Kofi Annan said, "The Internet is the fastest
growing instrument of communication in the history of
civilization, and it may be the most rapidly
disseminating tool of any kind ever."58
The United Nations' website, established on September
18, 1996,59
registered an average of 129,066 site visits (hits) a
day in its first year.60
By June 2000 the site was being visited an average of
444,761 times daily.61
The power of the Internet, given its global
reach62
and the speed and ease with which it transfers and
propagates information, portends numerous applications
for peace support operations. The Internet provides
information on every UN peace support operation and on
regional organizations' responses to crises across the
Balkans, Southwest Asia, and the Middle East.
At the same time, the Internet has introduced a new
medium for journalists and propagandists alike. From
the screens of computer monitors around the world,
"news" glares free from the scrutiny of editors and
publishers. Credentials be damned, computer
"reporters" are signing their bylines in a virtual
newsroom of cables and diodes. With sources unchecked,
the opportunity for disinformation looms. An article
written by an information specialist in the U.S.
Department of State about the "web wars" in Kosovo
illustrates how the Internet wields the soft power of
information, despite its inherent vulnerabilities.
The Internet, economically and technically accessible
to the Milosevic regime enabled the global posting of
propaganda depicting Serb victims, bombings in
violation of international law, and NATO aggressors.
Those stories were magnified not so much by
individuals accessing the website, a factor that is
difficult to quantify and more difficult to interpret,
but rather by media interest in the role of the
Internet in the conflict. Numerous news stories
regarding the Internet served to amplify information
posted to the Serb websites—without apparent regard
for the credibility and accuracy of information
posted. In contrast, the Kosovars, lacking digital
cameras and accessible websites, were unable to
counter their Serbian foes with an effective Internet
response.63
To counter Milosevic's activities, the U.S.
Information Agency's Information Bureau, now operating
as the U.S. State Department's Office of International
Information Programs, tailored a number of activities
to the Internet that can serve as a model in future
information campaigns. Their Kosovo website
distributed video, print, and audio information in
eight languages. A public outreach listserv provided
information to foreign and national opinion leaders.
In a public-private partnership, Internet centers
established at refugee centers in Europe and the
United States allowed refugees to access information
and send e-mail to trace family members—an effort
aided by an on-line newspaper distributed in all
locations hosting refugees. Finally, the Information
Agency's cyberwatch group remained active throughout
the conflict to track Kosovo coverage on the Internet
and monitor Serbian disinformation.64
Given the Internet's potential power, participants in
peace support operations must plan for its use in
public information campaigns. Organizations and forces
responding to international crises must become active
in offering information via the World Wide Web to
reach a greater audience and to add balance to the
information available via the Internet.
Back
to Top
Conclusion
The pace of IT development in
the second half of the twentieth century clearly has
outrun its application in peace support operations.
While IT innovations grew through defense industry
solutions to challenges during World Wars I and II and
the Cold War years, commercial growth in IT exploded
in the 1990s. Peace support operations, never
achieving the national and international popular
support of war efforts, hardly have begun to take
advantage of advanced telecommunications capabilities,
information systems, and broadcast media.
In the case of communications architecture, the
diversity of commercially available systems has
created interoperability challenges that handicap
dialogue between nations even as the incidence of
crisis response becomes more frequent—and more
frequently multinational. The United Nations,
hamstrung by a horizontal structure and the well-nigh
impossible task of consensus building among an
ever-growing membership, has demonstrated neither the
willingness nor the ability to assume a leadership
role in highlighting IT solutions. Nor have UN member
states—particularly financially able developed
nations—assumed a cooperative role in deploying and
testing the practicality of IT solutions in endeavors
such as monitoring roles for militaries acting in
support of peace operations. Nations stymied by the
start-up costs and insufficient time to develop
coordinated distance-learning programs enhanced by
computer simulations too often continue to train
unilaterally—if at all—before deploying to peace
support operations. The broadcast news media, eager to
attract large audiences, have magnified for all actors
in these politically delicate operations how IT is
changing the reporter's capabilities and redefining
the relationship between the media, the public, and
newsmakers.
As this new millennium continues, it seems clear that
there will be many more peace support operations than
full-scale wars. The solid framework for IT-enabled
PSOs—evolving from the introduction of a thirty-ton
computer and the signing of the UN charter some fifty
years ago—must be updated without delay. The growing
gaps between that framework's promise and PSO practice
are unacceptable. Active involvement by UN member
states to field and refine existing IT in peace
support operations, while pushing for new and
effective IT programs tailored to the PSO environment,
is critical. Nations must redirect some of their IT
warfare budgets toward preparing for this future. UN
headquarters must step up to the responsibility for
developing strategy and policy for emerging and
existing technologies to ensure an effective IT
program that serves as the foundation for response to
PSO challenges today and into the future. Although
information technology is not the answer to all the
challenges of peace support operations, it can go a
long way toward improving how actors communicate in,
monitor, train for, and explain them.
Back
to Top
Endnotes
1. Panel on United Nations Peace
Operations, Report of the Panel on United Nations Peace Operations,
Part Five: Peace Operations and the Information Age (New York: United
Nations, A/55/305 - S/2000/809), 42.
2. David S. Alberts, Daniel S. Papp, and Alissa
Tuyahov, "Historical Impacts of Information Technologies: An Overview,"
in The Information Age: An Anthology on Its Impacts and Consequences.
Vol. 1 Part 1: Information and Communication Revolution, edited
by David S. Alberts and Daniel S. Papp (Washington, DC: Center for Advanced
Concepts and Technology, 1997), 30-32.
3. Alvin Toffler, Creating a New Civilization:
The Politics of the Third Wave (Atlanta: Turner Publishing, 1995).
4. John Naisbitt, Megatrends: Ten New
Directions Transforming Our Lives (London: Macdonald & Co.,
Ltd., 1982), 13-14.
5. International Bank for Reconstruction
and Development, "The Information Age," in 1999 World Development
Indicators (Washington, DC: The World Bank, 1999), 300-303.
6. Michael Howard and John F. Guilmartin,
Jr., Two Historians in Technology and War (Carlisle Barracks,
PA: Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, 1994), 20.
7. Martin Campbell-Kelly and William Aspray,
Computer: A History of the Information Machine (New York: Basic
Books, 1996).
8. R. S. Edwards, "CIC (Fleet) Terms and
Meanings," in C.I.C. Shore Based Fighter Control, Air Warning, and
Radar Notes, OPNAV 30/37, No. 1-44 (Washington, DC: Office of the
Chief of Naval Operations, March 1944), 34. Also incorporated is information
from the Information Age Exhibit, Smithsonian Institute of American
History, Washington, DC.
9. MITRE Corporation, "Semi-Automatic Ground
Environment (SAGE): Beginnings," http://www.mitre.org/pubs/showcase/sage/sage_feature.html,
accessed October 16, 2000.
10. Department of the Army, Information
Operations, Army Field Manual 100-6 (Washington, DC: U.S. Department
of the Army, August 27, 1996), iv-v.
11. Ibid., 2-3.
12. Department of the Army, Stability
Operations and Support Operations, Army Field Manual 3-07 (Initial
Draft) (Washington, DC: U.S. Department of the Army, June 15, 2000),
4-17.
13. Telephone interview with Brig. Gen.
John M. Brown, U.S. Army, January 8, 2001. BG Brown was the chief of
staff, First Armored Division, during the first rotation (IFOR) in Bosnia,
December 1995 to December 1996.
14. The author was the operational public
affairs officer for MND(N) and organized the Commander's Information
Coordination Group, June-September 1996.
15. Lt. Col. Jack C. Guy, U.S. Army Reserve,
"Feedback," e-mail message to Donna Boltz, November 16, 2000.
16. Goran Tode, "Information Technology
and Crisis Management," in Challenges of Peace Support into the 21st
Century, edited by Bo Huldt, Annika Hilding, and Arita Eriksson
(Stockholm: Swedish National Defense College, 1997), 173.
17. Interview with Col. Patricia Capin,
U.S. Army, November 2, 2000.
18. Lt. Col. Peter J. Varljen, U.S. Army,
"Overcoming Communication Incompatibility," e- mail message to Donna
Boltz, November 9, 2000.
19. Interview with Rudy Sanchez, chief,
CESS, FALD, January 25, 2001.
20. Interview with Susan Flores, FMLS project
coordinator, FALD, January 24, 2001.
21. April Mestas, "Looking for an IM Solution,"
e-mail message to Donna Boltz, December 21, 2000.
22. Peter S. Goodman, "Dishing up a New
Link to the Internet," Washington Post, November 6 2000, A-1.
23. Fourteenth International Seapower Symposium,
"Panel Discusion: Interoperability in the Information Age," in Report
of the Proceedings, edited by John B. Hattendorf and Ernest J. King.
(Newport, RI: Naval War College Press, 1998).
24. Ibid.
25. Henry S. Kenyon, "One Box Covers Many
Systems: Digital Modular Tool Enhances Flexibility and Reduces Logistics,
Training Requirements," SIGNAL Magazine, December 2000, http://www.us.net/signal/CurrentIssue/Dec00/one-dec.html,
accessed December 19, 2000.
26. Michael J. Dziedzic and William B. Wood,
Kosovo Brief: Information Management Offers a New Opportunity for
Cooperation Between Civilian and Military Entities, Virtual Diplomacy
Series No. 9 (Washington, DC: August 2000), 1.
27. Michael J. Dziedzic and William B. Wood,
Information Technology as a Catalyst for Civil-Military Unity of
Effort: The Kosovo Test Case (unpublished report, April 2000), 2.
28. Ibid.
29. Sergey G. Korsey, "GIS in the Kosovo
Ethnic Conflict Solution: The Project —Sentinel'," Environmental
Systems Research Institute (ESRI), Inc., http://www.esri.com/library/userconf/proc00/professional/papers/PAP929/p929.htm,
accessed January 2, 2001.
30. Cyperus, "Global Geomatics' GIS on the
Digital Front Lines of Military Operations,
http://www.cyperus.fr/CyperusFR?FR/Societes.nsf/communiques/
C125680A0027195AC12568F7005BBF1D?OpenDocument, accessed October 25,
2000.
31. Dziedzic and Wood, Kosovo Brief,
4-5.
32. George Ward, "Training Doctrine," in
Challenges of Peace Support into the 21st Century (Carlisle Barracks,
PA: U.S. Army War College, 2000), 76.
33. Gary "Lee" Frantz and James W. King,
"The Distance Education Learning Systems Model (DEL)," Educational
Technology, May-June 2000, 33-39
34. Institute For Defense Analysis, Synthetic
Environments for National Security Estimates, Research Summaries
(Alexandria, VA: Institute for Defense Analysis, 1999), executive summary.
35. Gloria Goodale, "Army Enlists Hollywood
to Help Harden Its Soldiers," Christian Science Monitor, October
2, 2000.
36. Central Joint Command, "CIMIC: Viking
99," Swedish Armed Forces, 1999, http://www.mil.se/pfp/viking99/nepresen.html,
accessed February 15, 2001.
37. Michelle Hankins, "Simulated Training
Efforts Foster Interoperability, Develop Common Procedures," SIGNAL
Magazine 53, no. 10 (June 1999) 40-41.
38. Trygoove Tellefsen, "Multinational Force
and Observers' Experience in Implementing Confidence-Building Measures
and Post-Conflict Peace Keeping," Challenges of Peace Support into
the 21st Century (Amman: Jordan Institute of Diplomacy, 1998), 102.
39. Telephone interview with Fancesco Manca,
deputy chief, Situation Center, DPKO, February 1, 2001.
40. Commander in Chief of the Royal Netherlands
Army, Royal Netherlands Army Doctrine Publication, part I, Military
Doctrine (Doctrine Committee of the Royal Netherlands Army, 1996), 185-186.
41. Department of the Army, Stability
Operations and Support Operations, Army Field Manual 3-07 (Initial
Draft) (Washington, DC: U.S. Department of the Army), 4-4.
42. Sandia National Laboratories is a multi-program
laboratory operated by Sandia Corporation, a Lockheed Martin Company,
for the U.S. Department of Energy.
43. Reynolds M. Salerno et al., Enhanced
Peacekeeping with Monitoring Technologies (Albuquerque, NM: Sandia
National Laboratories, June 2000), 3.
44. Reynolds M. Salerno, Randall R. Parish,
Michael G. Vannoni, and David S. Barber, Peace Operations: The Potential
Role of Monitoring Technologies (Albuquerque, NM: Sandia National
Laboratories, December 2001). For a discussion of the consent/force
balance with diagram, see 12-14.
45. Ibid, 17.
46. UNIDIR Expert Meeting, "The Training
of Peacekeepers in Disarmament Operations," October 16-19, 1995, http://www.mfo.org/P_Papers/tech_a.htm,
accessed January 23, 2001.
47. Salerno, Parish, Vannoni, and Barber,
Peace Operations, 44.
48. Timothy D. Tolison, "Ground Surveillance
Operations in Bosnia," Military Intelligence, January-March 1999,
21-22.
49. Unmanned Aerial Vehicle (UAV) Forum,
"Frequently Asked Questions," Adroit Systems Inc., http://www.uavforum.com/faq.htm,
accessed October 23, 2000.
50. Steven E. Reid, "Operational Use of
the Pioneer Unmanned Aerial Vehicle (UAV) System," SPIE Technical Conference:
Airborne Reconnaissance XX; Pioneer UAV, Inc., August 1996, http://www.aaicorp.com/pui/opuse.htm,
accessed October 23, 2000.
51. Stephen Willingham, "Remotely Piloted
Air Vehicles Are for Coastal Warfare," National Defense, January
2001, http://www.ca.dtic.mil/cgi-bin/ebird?doc_url=/Jan2001/s20010102remotely.htm,
accessed January 2, 2001.
52. M. R. Kochhar, "Relations Between Peacekeeping
Force and Other Agencies in the Mission Including NGOs," in The Sixth
International Seminar on the Challenges of Peacekeeping and Peace Support
into the 21st Century (Delhi: United Services Institution of India,
2000), Annex M.
53. Jamie P. Shea, "Dealing With the Media
During Crises and Peacekeeping Missions," in The First International
Workshop on Challenges of Peace Support into the 21st Century, edited
Bo Huldt, Annika Hilding, and Arita Eriksson (Stockholm: Swedish National
Defense College, 1998), 160.
54. Charles C. Krulak, "The Strategic Corporal:
Leadership in the Three Block War," Marines Magazine, January
1999.
55. Shea, "Dealing With the Media," 163.
56. Gen. Anthony Zinni, "Operation United
Shield (Somalia)," in Managing Communications: Lessons from Interventions
in Africa, Virtual Diplomacy Series No. 2 (Washington, DC: January
2000), 16.
57. Warren Strobel, Late-Breaking Foreign
Policy: The News Media's Influence on Peace Operations (Washington,
DC: United States Institute of Peace Press, 1997), 119.
58. Kofi A. Annan, We the Peoples: The
Role of the United Nations in the 21st Century (New York: United
Nations Department of Public Information, 2000), 12.
59. Telephone interview with Lena Yacoumopoulou,
Media and NGO Liaison Office UN Information Center, Washington, DC,
December 2000.
60. Hits are logged as the number of pages
the user accesses within the website.
61. Telephone interview with Ahmud Mahbub,
chief of Information Technology Section, DPI, United Nations, January
10, 2001.
62. According to the U.S.-based telecommunications
firm Telecordia Technologies, there are an estimated 350 million Internet
users worldwide.
63. Howard Cincotta, "Web Wars and Mail
Storms" (unpublished article,
June 22, 1999).
64. Dena Weinstein, "Lessons Learned," Internal
report of USIA's Information Bureau to the international public (n.d.).
Back to Top
About the
Report
This report explores issues and
initiatives raised during the "Challenges of Peace
Keeping and Peace Support into the 21st Century"
seminar series, which focused on the application of
information technology (IT) in peace support
operations. The seminar series is part of the larger
"Challenges" project initiated by Annika Hilding
Norberg. The project, supported by the seven partner
countries: Sweden, Russia, United States, Jordan,
South Africa, India, and Japan—encourages new ideas
and recommendations for international cooperation in
peace operations.
In 2001, during her year as a
Jennings Randolph Senior Fellow at the United States
Institute of Peace, Lt.
Col. Donna Boltz, a
seminar participant, synthesized the seminar series—
discussion, researched new IT developments and uses in
peace operations, and compiled this report with the
able assistance of Yohann de Silva. She presented this
report at the World Wide Civil Affairs Conference, New
York City, June 2001, as part of the Virtual Diplomacy
session.
Lt. Col. Donna G. Boltz is a
career officer in the U.S. Army. Currently, she is
chief of Regional Contingency Operations, Department
of Defense, Office of Stability Operations.
The views expressed in this
report do not necessarily reflect those of the United
States Institute of Peace, which does not advocate
specific policies.
Back to Top
Virtual Diplomacy Initiative Homepage | About the Initiative | What's New | Activities | Grants
Publications | Electronic Discussion Group | Contact Virtual Diplomacy
Institute Home | Education & Training | Grants & Fellowships | Policy Research | Library & Links
Publications | News & Media | About Us | Events | Resources | Jobs | Contact Us
Site Map
United States Institute of Peace -- 1200 17th Street NW -- Washington, DC 20036
(202) 457-1700 (phone) -- (202) 429-6063 (fax)
Send Feedback
|
|