[Senate Hearing 107-799]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
S. Hrg. 107-799
A PROGRESS REPORT ON 10 + 10 OVER 10
=======================================================================
HEARING
BEFORE THE
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS
UNITED STATES SENATE
ONE HUNDRED SEVENTH CONGRESS
SECOND SESSION
__________
OCTOBER 9, 2002
__________
Printed for the use of the Committee on Foreign Relations
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COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS
JOSEPH R. BIDEN, Jr., Delaware, Chairman
PAUL S. SARBANES, Maryland JESSE HELMS, North Carolina
CHRISTOPHER J. DODD, Connecticut RICHARD G. LUGAR, Indiana
JOHN F. KERRY, Massachusetts CHUCK HAGEL, Nebraska
RUSSELL D. FEINGOLD, Wisconsin GORDON H. SMITH, Oregon
PAUL D. WELLSTONE, Minnesota BILL FRIST, Tennessee
BARBARA BOXER, California LINCOLN D. CHAFEE, Rhode Island
ROBERT G. TORRICELLI, New Jersey GEORGE ALLEN, Virginia
BILL NELSON, Florida SAM BROWNBACK, Kansas
JOHN D. ROCKEFELLER IV, West MICHAEL B. ENZI, Wyoming
Virginia
Antony J. Blinken, Staff Director
Patricia A. McNerney, Republican Staff Director
(ii)
?
C O N T E N T S
----------
Page
Biden, Hon. Joseph R., Jr., U.S. Senator from Delaware, prepared
statement...................................................... 3
Bolton, Hon. John R., Under Secretary of State for Arms Control
and International Security Affairs, Department of State,
Washington, DC................................................. 8
Prepared statement........................................... 12
Responses to additional questions for the record from Senator
Biden...................................................... 77
Response to an additional question for the record from
Senator Bill Nelson........................................ 79
Bronson, Lisa, Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Technology
Security and Counter-Proliferation, Department of Defense,
Washington, DC................................................. 31
Prepared statement........................................... 32
Responses to additional questions for the record from Senator
Bill Nelson................................................ 80
Responses to additional questions for the record from Senator
Jesse Helms................................................ 88
Brooks, Hon. Linton, Acting Administrator, National Nuclear
Security Administration, Department of Energy, Washington, DC.. 35
Prepared statement........................................... 37
Holgate, Laura S.H., vice president for Russia/New Independent
States Programs, Nuclear Threat Initiative, Washington, DC..... 63
Prepared statement........................................... 66
Lugar, Hon. Richard G., U.S. Senator from Indiana, prepared
statement...................................................... 6
Luongo, Kenneth N., executive director, Russian-American Nuclear
Security Advisory Council, Princeton, NJ....................... 48
Prepared statement........................................... 52
Wolf, Hon. John S., Assistant Secretary of State for
Nonproliferation, Department of State, Washington, DC.......... 26
Prepared statement........................................... 29
Responses to additional questions for the record from Senator
Biden...................................................... 80
Responses to additional questions for the record from Senator
Bill Nelson................................................ 83
Responses to additional questions for the record from Senator
Helms...................................................... 84
(iii)
A PROGRESS REPORT ON 10 + 10 OVER 10
----------
WEDNESDAY, OCTOBER 9, 2002
U.S. Senate,
Committee on Foreign Relations,
Washington, DC.
The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 10:20 a.m., in
room SD-419, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Hon. Joseph R.
Biden, Jr. (chairman of the committee), presiding.
Present: Senators Biden, Bill Nelson, and Lugar.
The Chairman. The committee will come to order. I apologize
for the brief delay.
In June of the last summer at a meeting in Canada, the
heads of state of the G-8--the United States, Great Britain,
France, Germany, Italy, Japan, Canada, and Russia--agreed to
establish a Global Partnership Against the Spread of Weapons
and Materials of Mass Destruction. Under this initiative, which
has become known as ``10 + 10 over 10,'' the United States and
other members of the G-7 club of the advanced industrial
democracies agreed to commit up to $20 billion in funding over
the next 10 years to support specific projects in
nonproliferation, disarmament, counterterrorism, and nuclear
safety. These projects will initially focus on Russia, but they
could expand to other nations, including other states of the
former Soviet Union.
The United States appropriated approximately $1 billion in
fiscal year 2002 on threat reduction efforts in the former
Soviet Union, so it remains unclear whether the Global
Partnership will result in additional U.S. funding above and
beyond our current spending levels. At the very least, it may
leverage increased funding on those important projects by our
allies in Europe, Japan, and Canada.
The Global Partnership contains an agreement on a set of
common guidelines to govern future nonproliferation projects.
These include consensus on tax exemption, liability protection,
and adequate access by donor representatives to work sites to
ensure funds are being well spent, issues that have complicated
previous international efforts in nonproliferation assistance
to Russia. The announcement of this new Global Partnership
pleased many of us who have been calling for a more focused
international commitment to reduce the threat posed by weapons
of mass destruction in the former Soviet Union, in particular.
We live in an age in which, as the President has put it,
``The greatest threat to the U.S. national security is the
danger that outlaw states or terrorist groups will acquire
weapons of mass destruction for use against the United States
and our allies.'' This concern is the principal reason why the
U.S. Senate is now debating a resolution to authorize the
President of the United States to use force, if necessary,
against Iraq. It is also why we must focus on the vast
repository of nuclear, chemical, and possibly biological
weapons that still exist in Russia today, more than a decade
after the Soviet Union collapsed. Nothing, in my view, poses a
more clear and present danger to our security. Our greatest
concern remains that groups like al-Qaeda or states like Iraq
will steal or illicitly purchase poorly guarded stocks of
weapons of mass destruction in Russia.
Russia is committed to securing and destroying its excess
weapons, but it needs help, financial and technical, to do so.
Although the United States has provided billions of dollars in
threat-reduction assistance to Russia, there remain, under
varying conditions of security, roughly 1,000 metric tons of
high enriched uranium, 40,000 metric tons of chemical weapons,
including 2 million artillery shells containing nerve gas at
one of Russia's facilities alone, and an unknown supply of
biological pathogens.
Russia is making fitful progress in disarmament and
dismantlement, but with military budgets of roughly $7 billion
a year, it can only do so much without significant
international assistance. The United States and our allies have
fundamental responsibility to do all we can to help Russia
destroy its excess weapons and better secure its remaining
stocks.
The announcement of the G-8 Global Partnership was a
significant achievement, in my view, but it was only a first
step. We cannot allow this important international commitment
to dissolve into empty words and failed implementation.
At the request of my colleague and the leader in this
entire area, Senator Lugar, I called this hearing to examine
how the United States plans to work with its allies in carrying
out the terms of the G-8 Global Partnership. How will the
existing nonproliferation programs in Russia be affected?
Should we increase the current levels of U.S. assistance, or do
we envision the Global Partnership only as a means to leverage
greater contributions by our allies in Europe, Canada, and
Japan? What role do we envision for ``debt for
nonproliferation'' as a potential funding mechanism? And to
what degree will the G-8 members coordinate assistance efforts?
What benchmarks will we use in measuring progress in coming
years for carrying out this commitment?
To help us answer these questions, we have today an
impressive set of witnesses. First, the Honorable John R.
Bolton, the Under Secretary of State for Arms Control and
International Security Affairs, will provide the committee with
an overview of the G-8 Global Partnership and the long-term
U.S. vision for this agreement.
On the second panel, representatives from the Departments
of State, Defense, and Energy will explain how the Global
Partnership will affect existing U.S. programs and whether new
avenues of cooperation may yet exist.
For the final panel, we are pleased to have distinguished
outside witnesses to discuss how the Global Partnership is
faring in Europe where outside experts recently held an
important nonproliferation conference.
I will hold off for now on individual introductions of the
witnesses of the last two panels. Before Mr. Bolton begins his
statement, let me yield the floor to my colleague, Senator
Lugar.
[The prepared statement of Senator Biden follows:]
Prepared Statement of Senator Joseph R. Biden, Jr.
In June, at their summit meeting in Kananaskis, Canada, the Heads
of State of the G-8--the United States, Great Britain, France, Germany,
Italy, Japan, Canada, and Russia--agreed to establish a Global
Partnership against the Spread of Weapons and Materials of Mass
Destruction.
Under this initiative, which has become known as ``10 Plus 10 Over
10,'' the United States and other members of the G-7 club of advanced
industrial democracies agreed to commit up to $20 billion in funding
over the next ten years to support specific projects on non-
proliferation, disarmament, counter-terrorism and nuclear safety. These
projects will initially focus on Russia, but they could expand to other
nations, including other states of the former Soviet Union.
The United States appropriated approximately $1 billion in FY 2002
on threat reduction efforts in the former Soviet Union. So, it remains
unclear whether the Global Partnership will result in additional U.S.
funding above and beyond our current spending levels. At the very
least, it may leverage increased funding on those important projects by
our allies in Europe, Japan, and Canada.
The Global Partnership contains an agreement on a set of common
guidelines to govern future nonproliferation projects. These include
consensus on tax exemption, liability protection, and adequate access
by donor representatives to work sites to ensure funds are being well
spent--issues that have complicated previous international efforts at
nonproliferation assistance to Russia.
The announcement of this new Global Partnership pleased many of us
who have been calling for a more focused international commitment to
reduce the threat posed by weapons of mass destruction in the former
Soviet Union in particular. We live in an age in which, as the
President has put it, the greatest threat to U.S. national security is
the danger that outlaw states or terrorist groups will acquire weapons
of mass destruction for use against the United States and our allies.
This concern is the principal reason why the United States Senate
is now debating a resolution to authorize the President of the United
States to use force if necessary against Iraq.
It is also why we must focus on the vast repository of nuclear,
chemical, and possibly biological weapons that still exists in Russia
today, more than a decade after the Soviet Union collapsed.
Nothing poses a more clear and present danger to our security. Our
greatest concern remains that groups like al-Qaeda or states like Iraq
will steal or illicitly purchase poorly guarded stocks of weapons of
mass destruction in Russia.
Russia is committed to securing and destroying its excess weapons.
But it needs help--financial and technical--to do so.
Although the United States has provided billions of dollars in
threat reduction assistance to Russia, there remain, under varying
conditions of security, roughly 1000 metric tons of highly enriched
uranium, 40,000 metric tons of chemical weapons, including two million
artillery shells containing nerve gas at one of Russia's facilities
alone, and an unknown supply of biological pathogens.
Russia is making fitful progress in dismantlement and disarmament,
but with a military budget of roughly $7 billion per year, it can only
do so much without significant international assistance.
The United States and our allies have a fundamental responsibility
to do all we can to help Russia destroy its excess weapons and better
secure its remaining stocks.
The announcement of the G-8 Global Partnership was a significant
achievement in my view, but it is only a first step. We cannot allow
this important international commitment to dissolve into empty words
and failed implementation.
At the request of my colleague and the leader in this entire area
Senator Lugar, I called this hearing to examine how the United States
plans to work with its allies in carrying out the terms of the G-8
Global Partnership.
How will existing U.S. nonproliferation programs in Russia
be affected?
Should we increase current levels of U.S. assistance, or do
we envision the Global Partnership only as a means to leverage
greater contributions by our allies in Europe, Canada, and
Japan?
What role do we envision for debt for nonproliferation as a
potential funding mechanism?
To what degree will the G-8 members coordinate assistance
efforts?
What benchmarks will we use in measuring progress in coming
years for carrying out these commitments?
To help us answer those questions, we have an impressive set of
witnesses today. First, the Honorable John R. Bolton, the Under
Secretary of State for Arms Control and International Security Affairs,
will provide the committee with an overview of the G-8 Global
Partnership and the long-term U.S. vision for this agreement.
On the second panel, representatives from the Departments of State,
Defense, and Energy will explain how the Global Partnership will affect
existing U.S. programs and whether new avenues of cooperation may
exist.
For the final panel, we are pleased to have distinguished outside
witnesses to discuss how the Global Partnership is faring in Europe,
where outside experts recently held an important nonproliferation
conference. I will hold off for now on individual introductions for the
witnesses on the last two panels.
But before Mr. Bolton begins his statement, let me yield the floor
to my colleague Senator Lugar.
Senator Lugar. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. I thank
you, personally, for having this hearing and for your own
enthusiasm on this subject.
President Bush has enumerated Iraq's violations of U.N.
Security Council resolutions. He has also outlined in detail
the risks of failing to enforce those resolutions. As the
President, Congress, and the Nation focus increasing attention
on Iraq, it is important we not lose sight of the purpose of
this debate.
Underlying American and international concern with Iraq is
the fact that Saddam Hussein possesses chemical and biological
weapons and is aggressively pursuing nuclear weapons. The
possibility that he may transfer such weapons to terrorists or
use such weapons to blackmail the United States and our allies
is substantial if no action is taken. Iraq is, indeed, an acute
problem, but it is one proliferation problem among many. We
must pursue the containment and elimination of weapons of mass
destruction on a global basis with the same intensity that has
characterized our debates on Iraq.
The purpose of this hearing is to look beyond Iraq to
achieve better perspective on the broader problem of keeping
weapons of mass destruction out of the hands of terrorists. For
almost 11 years, the United States has been engaged in efforts,
through the Cooperative Threat Reduction Nunn-Lugar program to
address proliferation in its most likely source, the former
Soviet Union. Those efforts have been highly successful, with
approximately 6,000 nuclear warheads destroyed along with
hundreds of bombers, missiles, and submarines. The program has
facilitated the transfer of all nuclear weapons out of Ukraine,
Kazakhstan, and Belarus. It's employing tens of thousands of
Russian weapons scientists so they are less tempted to sell
their knowledge to the highest bidder. The program has also
made strides toward protecting and safeguarding nuclear
warheads, biological weapon laboratories, and chemical-weapons
stockpiles. We have come further than many thought we could,
but much more needs to be done, and it needs to be done
quickly.
Eleven years ago, when the Nunn-Lugar program was
conceived, the terrorist threat was real, but vague. Now we
live in an era where catastrophic terrorism, using weapons of
mass destruction, is our foremost security concern. We must not
only accelerate weapons dismantlement in Russia, we must
broaden our capability to address proliferation risks in other
countries and attempt to build a global coalition against the
proliferation of weapons of mass destruction.
Today, we will discuss one of the most promising vehicles
to achieve such a result. On June 27, 2002, leaders of the G-8
member states, attending a summit meeting in Canada, agreed to
form and participate in a global partnership against the spread
of weapons and materials of mass destruction, also known as
``10 + 10 over 10.'' The goal of the initiative was to increase
international efforts to eliminate the threat posed by the
proliferation of weapons of mass destruction from the states of
the former Soviet Union. I would add that such a coalition
could be expanded to address proliferation threats around the
globe.
Under this new G-8 agreement, the United States pledged to
spend at least $10 billion, and the other members states agreed
to match this commitment over the next 10 years. The focus will
be on nonproliferation, disarmament, counterterrorism, nuclear
safety, and containing environmental damage. In effect, 10 + 10
over 10 will double the resources currently being expended in
these areas.
Still, the future of the G-8 initiative is not assured.
Many of our international partners will find it difficult to
increase nonproliferation funding in a period of stagnating
domestic economies. And equally difficult will be ensuring
Russia's willingness to extend full audit rights and exemptions
from taxes and liability to nations other than the United
States.
After visiting several G-8 capitals and meeting with their
leaders, I have come to the conclusion that the 10 + 10 over 10
initiative will be successful only if the United States leads
this effort vigorously. I understand that administration
officials, including several testifying before the committee
today, recently returned from a 10 + 10 over 10 meeting in
Ottawa. I'm hopeful they will be able to report on their
progress.
Notwithstanding G-8 coordination and organization issues,
it is clear that the United States will have to continue to
press Russian officials to abide by President Putin's
commitments at the summit. President Putin has committed Russia
to a path that will provide the international community with
another effective tool to combat the threat of proliferation of
weapons of mass destruction. But, as we have learned in other
fora, President's Putin's biggest obstacle could be his own
governmental bureaucracy.
Over the August recess, I visited several Nunn-Lugar
dismantlement sites and met with Russian leaders on
nonproliferation issues. I found our Russian counterparts eager
to discuss the 10 + 10 over 10 initiative. Shipyard directors,
former biological weapon facility directors, and military
commanders looked forward to the opportunities that will be
provided by the G-8 agreement. Likewise, interest in this
initiative is keen in some European capitals. Great Britain is
already moving forward to set aside as much as $750 million for
the 10 + 10 over 10.
And Norway, although not a G-8 country, has been a leader
in working with the Russians to address the security and
environmental problems posed by Russia's decaying nuclear
fleet. Our own experience with Norway and Russia in the
trilateral Arctic Military Environmental Cooperation program,
AMEC, may provide instructions for integrating G-8's nations
into a broader dismantlement effort.
Russian Defense Minister Ivanov has already identified a
number of nonstrategic items for which Russia will request
destruction assistance because of the potential threat they
pose and the costs associated with their maintenance. But
interest alone is insufficient. President Putin has committed
to provide G-8 member states with the umbrella legal agreements
necessary to permit the initiative to go forward. But perhaps
more importantly, the government bureaucracies of the Russia,
the United States and other G-8 states must be committed to the
program's success.
I commend the Bush administration for efforts to win allied
and Russian support for the G-8 weapons of mass destruction
initiative, but there is hard work ahead of us. Each of you
have been provided with a copy of my own top 10 list. And, in
my opinion, this should be a guide that directs the United
States in G-8 spending over the next several years. This top 10
list is an effort to assist the administration in setting out
goals of 10 + 10 over 10, as well as the Nunn-Lugar program and
its partner programs at the departments of State and Energy.
I thank you again, Mr. Chairman, for this important forum.
[The prepared statement of Senator Lugar follows:]
Prepared Statement of Senator Richard G. Lugar
INTRODUCTION
President Bush has enumerated Iraq's violations of U.N. Security
Council resolutions. He also has outlined in detail the risks of
failing to enforce those resolutions.
As the President, Congress, and the nation focus increasing
attention on Iraq, it is important that we not lose sight of the
purposes of this debate. Underlying American and international concerns
with Iraq is the fact that Saddam Hussein possesses chemical and
biological weapons and is aggressively pursuing nuclear weapons. The
possibility that he may transfer such weapons to terrorists or use such
weapons to blackmail the United States and our allies is substantial if
no action is taken.
Iraq is indeed an acute problem, but it is one proliferation
problem among many. We must pursue the containment and elimination of
weapons of mass destruction on a global basis with the same intensity
that has characterized our debate on Iraq. The purpose of this hearing
is to look beyond Iraq to achieve better perspective on the broader
problem of keeping weapons of mass destruction out of the hands of
terrorists.
For almost eleven years the United States has been engaged in
efforts through the Nunn-Lugar program to address proliferation at its
most likely source: the former Soviet Union. These efforts have been
highly successful, with approximately 6,000 nuclear warheads destroyed,
along with hundreds of bombers, missiles, and submarines. The program
has facilitated the transfer of all nuclear weapons out of Ukraine,
Kazakstan, and Belarus. It is employing tens of thousands of Russian
weapons scientists so they are not tempted to sell their knowledge to
the highest bidder. The program has also made strides toward protecting
and safeguarding nuclear warheads, biological weapons laboratories, and
chemical weapons stockpiles.
We have come further than many thought that we could, but much more
needs to be done, and it needs to be done quickly. Eleven years ago
when the Nunn-Lugar program was conceived, the terrorist threat was
real, but vague. Now we live in an era when catastrophic terrorism
using weapons of mass destruction is our foremost security concern. We
must not only accelerate weapons dismantlement efforts in Russia, we
must broaden our capability to address proliferation risks in other
countries and attempt to build a global coalition against the
proliferation of weapons of mass destruction.
Today we will discuss one of the most promising vehicles to achieve
such a result. On June 27, 2002, leaders of G-8 member states attending
a summit meeting in Canada, agreed to form and participate in a Global
Partnership Against the Spread of Weapons and Materials of Mass
Destruction, also known as ``10 + 10 over 10.'' The goal of the
initiative is to increase international efforts to eliminate the threat
posed by the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction from the
states of the former Soviet Union. I would add that such a coalition
could be expanded to address proliferation threats around the globe.
SENATOR LUGAR'S ``TOP TEN''
1. Chemical Weapons Destruction
Two million rounds of chemical shells and warheads await
destruction at Shchuch'ye.
Chemical weapons are also stored at six other sites awaiting
destruction: Kizner, Pochep, Leonidovka, Gorny, Maradyokvsky,
Kambarka.
Russia is falling far behind their commitments under the
CWC.
2. Securing Biological Pathogens
Russia has refused to grant access to four closed military
institutes: Kirov 200, Yekaterinburg (formerly Sverdlovsk),
Sergeyev Possad, Military Medicine Institute at St. Petersburg.
3. Tactical Nuclear Weapons Elimination and Secure Storage
Tactical nuclear weapons are more portable, less secure, and
deployed closer to potential flashpoints than strategic
systems.
4. Engagement of former Weapons Scientists and Engineers
ISTC and IPP programs engage tens of thousands of former
weapons scientists.
A successful end-game must include American corporate
investment or purchase of Russian laboratories.
5. Material Protection, Control & Accounting Programs
Only 40% of the facilities housing nuclear materials in
Russia have received security improvements and only half of
these have received complete security systems.
6. Radioactive Sources (Radioisotope Thermal Generators)
The Soviet Union manufactured RTGs to supply power at remote
sites.
These generators pose a proliferation threat and are spread
all over the states of the former Soviet Union.
7. Shutdown of Plutonium Producing Reactors
Three nuclear reactors produce 1.5 metric tons of weapons-
grade plutonium each year.
Russia has agreed to shut down the reactors if replacement
power sources are built.
8. Plutonium Disposition
The U.S. and Russia have agreed to eliminate 34 tons of
plutonium by fabricating it into MOX fuel that will be
irradiated in commercial nuclear reactors.
Disposition will require sizable up-front costs to construct
required facilities.
9. Dismantlement of Non-Strategic Submarines
Nunn-Lugar can only dismantle strategic submarines, but non-
strategic subs are also a threat because some carry cruise
missiles and others have highly-enriched nuclear fuels which
are a proliferation threat.
10. Reactor Safety
Converting reactors that utilize HEU to lower enriched fuels
and safely storing spent fuel. (Concerns in Georgia led to
Operation Auburn Endeavor, a classified mission to remove
weapons-grade nuclear material from a dangerous situation.)
SHUTDOWN OF PLUTONIUM PRODUCING REACTORS
There are three nuclear reactors in Siberia that produce 1.5 metric
tons of weapons-grade plutonium as a natural byproduct of their
operation. Russia will not shutdown these reactors until replacement
power sources are available because the reactors are the sole source of
power and heat in the region. As we continue to safeguard and eliminate
nuclear material in Russia we must also take steps to ensure that no
additional weapons-grade material is created. This must be started
immediately.
PLUTONIUM DISPOSITION
The U.S. and Russia have agreed to dispose of 34 metric tons of
weapons-grade plutonium. Both sides will fabricate the material into
mixed oxide fuel that will be irradiated in commercial nuclear
reactors. The processes, on both sides, will require significant
investments in new facilities that will be needed to fabricate the
fuel. An estimated $2 billion will be needed to build and implement the
Russian effort.
NON-STRATEGIC SUBMARINES
Each time I visit Russian shipyards I'm startled by the enormity of
the task that lies before us in the area of submarine dismantlement.
Nunn-Lugar is limited to dismantling strategic missile submarines. This
is a mistake. There are important non-proliferation and security
benefits to the timely dismantlement of conventional submarines. Many
carry cruise missiles which could prove valuable to rogue nation
missile programs. Other submarines, such as the Alfa attack submarine,
is powered by nuclear fuel enriched to very high levels which could
pose serious proliferation risks if unsecured.
REACTOR SAFETY
The United States and our allies must work together with Russia and
other states of the former Soviet Union and elsewhere to convert
reactors that currently use weapons-grade material to a lower fuel
level. Potential threats stemming from these kinds of reactors are not
hypothetical. Operation Auburn Endeavor was launched to take material
from a Georgian reactor to safekeeping.
The Chairman. Thank you, Senator, for your leadership.
Secretary Bolton, the floor is yours.
STATEMENT OF HON. JOHN R. BOLTON, UNDER SECRETARY OF STATE FOR
ARMS CONTROL AND INTERNATIONAL SECURITY AFFAIRS, DEPARTMENT OF
STATE, WASHINGTON, DC
Mr. Bolton. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. I appreciate
you and Senator Lugar taking the initiative in calling the
hearing. I have a prepared statement, which I'd just ask be
submitted for the record, and I'll try and summarize the----
The Chairman. The entire statement will be placed in the
record.
Mr. Bolton. We have tried to address in there several of
the important questions that you raised in your letter of
invitation.
The subject of Russian proliferation and the threat of
proliferation from its existing stocks of weapons of mass
destruction has been one of the three main areas of
concentration for the administration in the elaboration of our
new strategic framework with Russia. We were concerned and
remain concerned with questions of strategic offensive weapons
and strategic defensive weapons.
On defensive weapons, we tried extensively to work with the
Russians to find a way that we could mutually move beyond the
ABM Treaty, but being unsuccessful in that, we announced our
withdrawal from the treaty, which has now become effective. We
are beginning to have exchanges with the Russians on the
subject of cooperation in the missile defense field.
On the subject of strategic offensive weapons, the
committee is familiar with the Moscow Treaty, which is pending
before it, which codifies the decisions of both sides to reduce
their operationally deployed strategic nuclear warheads from
their present levels to a range of between 1,700 and 2,200 over
a 10-year period.
We appreciate the work, Mr. Chairman, that the committee
has done to move the treaty toward Senate consideration, and we
remain very hopeful that it will be possible to do that before
the Senate adjourns for this session.
The third critical element, as I mentioned, is the subject
of proliferation.
The Chairman. I should note--if you don't mind me
interrupting you; I do apologize for this--it is our intention
to try to do that. But, for the press here, it should be known
that I know of no outright opposition to that treaty. I don't
know when we're leaving, whether that is next week or later,
and we may not get it done by then. We may have a lameduck
session. It would be my intention to bring it up in a lameduck
session to get it finished if we, in fact, have a lameduck
session. And if that is not the case, if I am reelected,
whether I am ranking member assisting the chairman or the
chairman, I think we could both say we'd be prepared to move it
immediately. So I just want the message to go out that there is
no delay related to opposition to this treaty.
Anyway, I'm sorry for the interruption, but I think it's
important, because a lot of people have been asking, and that's
why I interrupted you.
Mr. Bolton. Right. You'll permit me, then, to digress to
say that the Russian Federation, of course, is looking at its
schedule, and the Duma, as well. Their most recent prediction,
which is no more perfect than our predictions, is that they
would be able to bring it to the State Duma probably in late
October, early November, although that remains a target, as
well. In any event, the ratification by both parties of the
Treaty of Moscow would be an important step forward.
But on proliferation, there are really two aspects of our
concern with Russia, the first being what they continue to do
in terms of outward proliferation activity. I think the
committee is familiar with our extensive consultations, from
the Presidential level on down, with the Russians to try to get
them to reduce the flow of technology and materials to
countries like Iran and Syria and others in the field of
nuclear weapons cooperation, ballistic missile technology, and
others, to avoid the existing Russian programs being a source
of support for proliferation by these rogue states.
But the other aspect, and really the centerpiece of this
hearing, is what to do about the existing stocks of weapons of
mass destruction. On that point, obviously, our alpha and, at
least up to this point, our omega, is the Nunn-Lugar program,
beginning back in 1991. It has gone through a series of
modifications. It's been expanded, not only from work at DOD,
but to the other departments which you've mentioned and which
you'll hear about in more detail.
The administration conducted a review of the wide range of
programs going on in all of those departments, concluding last
year with, I think, an extremely positive assessment of the
work that had been conducted over the past 9 years and which
resulted, as you have indicated, in a request for funding last
year and this year in the range of about 1 billion U.S.
dollars.
But it was clear from our review of the programs and from
the extensive travels and discussions that Senator Lugar and
others on the committee have made that the amount of activity
that could be conducted in Russia and the other states of the
former Soviet Union was substantially in excess of our
available resources. And I think the need and the importance of
addressing these problems was certainly highlighted by the
events of September 11, and the risk of what terrorist
organizations would do if they were able to get their hands on
weapons of mass destruction, whether through acquisition of the
requisite technology or whether through getting the weapons and
delivery systems themselves.
So building on thoughts that many had, President Bush took
the lead in working with G-8 colleagues to come up with the 10
+ 10 over 10 program, in effect to achieve close to a doubling
of the international resources available for work in the former
Soviet Union on these kinds of programs. And that, as you've
said, was successfully negotiated and announced by the leaders
at Kananaskis.
I do want to say we owe a particular debt to Canada, the
host of this year's G-8 Summit, because, without their work, I
think we would not have come as far as we did.
The commitments that we have so far from the other G-8
members don't quite get us to the ``plus 10'' that we're
looking for, and work remains to be done on that subject. And
it was one of the principal subjects of conversation at our
first followup meeting to Kananaskis, which took place a couple
of weeks ago in Ottawa.
One, I think, very important development that emerged from
that meeting was that the French, who take over as G-8 Chairman
for the year 2003, followed up on a speech that President
Chirac made, where he underlined the importance of 10 + 10, or
the Global Partnership, as we call it in the G-8 context, and
made it clear that that would be a priority for the Government
of France during their Presidency.
I think it's also important that we are actively seeking
non-G-8 participation in funding of these programs in the
former Soviet Union. Senator Lugar, as you mentioned, Norway is
a good example. We think the Nordic states, in general, because
of their concern for nuclear and other military activities in
their region around the Port of Murmansk, in the Kaliningrad
enclave, and other areas may well be quite interested in
participating.
I can say, from my own experience at Kananaskis, that
getting this agreement was not easy. I fully support what both
Senators have said about this being a good beginning, but a lot
of work remains. There's just no question about it. And one of
the things that we have been working on in particular, along
with getting the other G-7 members to get large pledges on the
table and to get nonmembers to participate, is working with the
Russians to get them to do what they must do to support the
activities and to help those of us in the G-7 and elsewhere in
getting the amount of resources that we need.
There are two aspects to this with respect to Russian
performance. One is Russian financial contribution. It is the
case here in Congress, it is the case, our G-7 partners have
told us, in other parliaments, that elected officials want to
know not only what they're going to contribute to the
elimination of Russia's weapons of mass destruction, but what
the Russians are going to contribute to it. And that remains a
subject that we're in close consultation with the Russian
Government on to make sure that their financial commitment and
support is adequate to the task at hand.
In that connection, we have been in the forefront among G-7
countries in considering the option of debt-for-program swaps,
whereby existing official Russian debt could be converted or
utilized in ways that provide additional resources inside
Russia. We're considering now exactly how to implement that. We
appreciate your work here in the committee and in Congress to
get the authorizing authority for that adopted, and we intend
to pursue it. It's not a subject that carries a lot of favor
with some of our other G-7 partners, those that have heavier
official debt than we do with the Russians. But it's something
that may well require our leadership and experimentation, and
we're certainly working away on it.
The second aspect, though, of Russian involvement is more
troubling. I must say this was an area that we spent a
considerable amount of time on in Ottawa. As you know, we have
been operating for most of the past 10 years under an umbrella
agreement that was negotiated with the Russian Federation at
the beginning of the Nunn-Lugar program. That agreement
expired. It's now up for Duma reconsideration. And it has all
of the protections that both you Senators have enumerated, in
terms of liability protection, transparency, audit and access
rights.
The Government of Russia has expressed a number of concerns
about the provisions of that agreement on liability insurance
in a nuclear context, and on a variety of other things. And
we're going to be working closely with the Government of Russia
to ensure that the political commitment is there to get the
Duma to ratify this extension without crippling amendments or
reservations.
I think our feeling is that if we are able to get the
umbrella agreement ratified, the extension of the umbrella
agreement ratified, that we can clear the way for the other
members of the G-8 to participate. And that, frankly, was one
of the things most on our mind when we began to organize this
and looked at ways that we could coordinate with other G-7
members.
Alone, they could not solve the problems that they had
encountered. And I'll just give you one example. The Japanese
have a substantial interest in the dismantlement of general
purpose nuclear submarines, and they had appropriated and
actually expended a certain amount of money on that subject.
But, over the years, they've run into enormous difficulties in
gaining access to the facilities where the submarines would be
dismantled. They didn't feel there was adequate coordination
among the different Russian ministries involved. And so the
project has been basically on dead stop for a number of years.
The Japanese argued, I think, persuasively to us, that
they're not in a position to contribute more money to the
Global Partnership until they've resolved these difficulties on
implementation that they've already run into. And I think you
will find this a persuasive point. They said their Diet members
would say to them, ``Why should we appropriate new money for
you when you haven't even spent the money we've already
appropriated?''
So that, to us, was a signal that we had to work with the
other G-7 members and get through the, what sounds like the
mundane business of these agreements and protections for
liability, but which are, in fact, show stoppers for expansion
of the program for all of the G-7 members, if they're not
resolved.
Another major subject that we discussed at Kananaskis and
in Ottawa was how to coordinate, how to assist each other, and
how to make sure that others, particularly, could benefit from
our experiences. That is something that I expect will take a
lot of our time and attention, as well as making sure that as
the new contributions flow into the pot of the Global
Partnership money, that they're expended in a coordinated
fashion and that we're not duplicating or overlapping efforts.
Finally, let me just conclude by expressing our
appreciation for the work that you've done on the question of
waivers of the certification authority, both on the CTR program
broadly and on the Shchuch'ye chemical weapons facility. This
has been something that you've taken the lead on here, both
Senators have. And we're hoping that those will be adopted,
perhaps at the same time the Moscow Treaty is considered, or
even before, that we can get that waiver authority and proceed
with exercising it to begin, to continue funding those
programs.
That's a very general overview of where we are. I know, in
your opening statements, both of you were concerned, and I
think importantly so, with the implementation of the G-8 Global
Partnership. It is something that we are committed to working
on, because we don't want to come to the Evian Summit in France
next summer and find that we're in the same position that we
were last year, that is to say with projects stopped, without
new money being committed, without the expression of support
and progress on the Russian side. And I think having this
hearing will be very helpful in that regard.
I'd be pleased to answer any questions you may have.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Bolton follows:]
Prepared Statement of Hon. John R. Bolton, Under Secretary of State for
Arms Control and International Security, Department of State
Mr. Chairman, Senator Helms, Senator Lugar, distinguished members
of the Committee, I'm pleased to appear before you to discuss the new
G8 Global Partnership Against the Spread of Weapons and Materials of
Mass Destruction and the Administration's plans to implement that
initiative. Over the past decade, this Committee and its members have
been strong advocates of nonproliferation and threat reduction
cooperation programs with Russia and other former Soviet states, while
at the same time demanding that the programs fulfill their mandate.
Let me begin by putting that initiative within the larger context
of the changed international security situation and the U.S.-Russian
relationship. From the beginning of the Administration, President Bush
has worked with President Putin to forge a New Strategic Framework for
a cooperative relationship with Russia that deals with the security
problems we face in the post-Cold War world.
The first element of the new framework involved issues of strategic
defense and the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty. Signed in 1972, the ABM
Treaty posed fundamental problems to our need to defend against a
growing missile threat from rogue states intent on acquiring weapons of
mass destruction and the missiles to deliver them--a threat that did
not exist when the ABM Treaty was written. The Treaty prevented us from
defending our country and our friends and allies from missile attacks,
and hampered the development of partnership and cooperation with
Russia. This phase of our work came to a conclusion with the
announcement in December 2001 of our decision to withdraw from the ABM
Treaty.
That opened the way to an intensive effort on the second element of
the New Strategic Framework, substantial reductions in strategic
offensive weapons. Starting during the presidential election, Governor
Bush had promised to reduce such weapons to the lowest level possible
consistent with our national security. Through the 2001 nuclear posture
review, and embodied in the Treaty of Moscow signed in May, we have
decided to reduce operationally deployed strategic nuclear warheads
over the next 10 years to between 1,700 and 2,200. We are pleased that
the Committee has completed its hearings on the Moscow Treaty, and look
forward to action on the Treaty before the Senate adjourns.
Success in the strategic offensive and defensive fields now allows
us to focus our attention with Russia on the third critical element of
the New Strategic Framework, nonproliferation. One critical aspect of
our nonproliferation work with Russia is the assistance program
launched in 1991 by the Nunn-Lugar legislation. Last year the
Administration reviewed U.S. nonproliferation and threat reduction
programs and concluded that, with a few adjustments, they were
effective and should be continued. The Global Partnership that is the
subject of today's hearing represents a broadening of this program to
encompass other G8 members.
Before turning to the Global Partnership, however, I'd like to note
the second element of our nonproliferation effort with Russia: ensuring
that WMD and their delivery systems, related materials and technology
do not flow from Russia to other countries. We remain very concerned
that the nuclear and missile programs of Iran and others, including
Syria, continue to receive the benefits of Russian technology and
expertise. President Bush has raised this issue with President Putin at
their meetings in Moscow and Kananaskis and in their correspondence.
Secretary Powell, Secretary Rumsfeld and Secretary Abraham have
addressed this problem at length with their Russian counterparts, and
we continue to press this issue.
Iran is seeking all elements of a nuclear fuel cycle, from mining
uranium to enrichment to production of reactor fuel. There is no
economic justification for this effort, given Russia's commitment to
supply all the fuel for the Bushehr reactor, not to mention Iran's
abundant supplies of energy in the form of oil and gas. The inescapable
conclusion is that Iran is building a nuclear fuel cycle to support a
nuclear weapons program. Equally worrisome is Iran's long-range missile
program. They have developed and tested a 1300 kilometer range missile,
the Shahab 3, based on North Korean technology, and are pursing longer
range missiles that could threaten Europe, Russia, and eventually the
United States.
Concerns about Russia's performance on its arms control and non-
proliferation commitments have already adversely affected important
bilateral efforts, and unless resolved could pose a threat to new
initiatives including the Global Partnership.
Having established the overall context of the New Strategic
Framework, let me turn to the Global Partnership. In the aftermath of
September 11, the United States not only elaborated the New Strategic
Framework with Russia, but also intensified dialogue with other allies
regarding the need to expand and accelerate efforts to address
nonproliferation and threat reduction goals, especially in Russia and
other former Soviet states. As a result of these discussions, the
President early this year proposed to the Group of Eight the ``10 plus
10 over 10'' initiative--commitments of $10 billion from the United
States would be matched by $10 billion from the other G8 for
nonproliferation cooperation for Russia and other former Soviet states
over the next ten years.
After several months of intense work by G8 officials, G8 Leaders
(the United States, Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, Russia, and
the United Kingdom) launched the Global Partnership Against the Spread
of Weapons and Materials of Mass Destruction at the Kananaskis Summit
in June. We owe a particular debt of gratitude to Canada, host of the
Kananaskis Summit, for its tireless efforts to make the Global
Partnership a reality. Under this initiative, the Leaders pledged to
raise up to $20 billion over ten years to support specific cooperation
projects, initially in Russia, to address nonproliferation,
disarmament, counter-terrorism, and nuclear safety issues. The
President has committed to provide half of this amount. The U.S.
continues to believe that the nonproliferation concerns are paramount,
and we will be pressing members to ensure that the most critical
proliferation threats are addressed.
Among the priority concerns, the G8 specifically named destruction
of chemical weapons, disposition of fissile materials, employment of
former weapon scientists, and dismantlement of decommissioned nuclear
submarines. The full scope of programs under the Partnership is much
broader; in fact, U.S. nonproliferation and threat reduction programs
implemented by the Departments of Defense, Energy, and State, Commerce,
and Treasury (through the Customs Service) are all encompassed under
the Partnership. My colleagues in the panel presentation will address
these programs in more detail.
This initiative, a major achievement for the G8 and this
Administration, represents a significant expansion of international
commitment to provide financial resources address proliferation issues.
The United States has pressed allies to provide such support since the
U.S. launched the Nunn-Lugar programs in 1992. But while from FY1992
through FY2002 the U.S. Government has provided over $7 billion for
security assistance to Russia and other former Soviet states, G7
members have contributed less than $1 billion. Under the Global
Partnership, the G7 members' commitments should represent a fairer
share of the responsibilities. From early indications from other G8
members, we are about halfway toward meeting the $10 billion target. At
current exchange rates, Canada will contribute $650 million US; the UK,
$750 million; Germany, $1.5 billion; the European Commission, $1
billion; and Japan, initially, $200 million. Other pledges have not
been publicly announced; and not all members have taken decisions on
pledges.
In addition, we are pleased that under the French G8 presidency in
2003, the Global Partnership will continue to be a priority. In August
remarks about the upcoming French presidency, President Chirac has
announced that ``all the necessary impetus will be given to this
programme's implementation.''
But participation in the Global Partnership will not be limited to
the G8. The Global Partnership statement invited other countries ``that
are prepared to adopt its common principles and guidelines to enter
into discussions on participating in and contributing to this
initiative.'' Other countries are already making valuable
contributions; Sweden, Norway and the Netherlands are examples. The
Senior Officials will be addressing outreach strategies in more detail
at their next meeting, but have agreed to take advantage of bilateral
and multilateral opportunities to inform other countries and encourage
their participation. One such opportunity will be the Nonproliferation
and Disarmament Cooperation (NDCI) Conference on nonproliferation
cooperation with Russia and Eurasian states in Brussels on December 16-
17, 2003. The European Union, Canada, and the U.S. are sponsoring this
multilateral conference of experts from current and potential donor and
recipient countries to discuss implementation and coordination of new
programs as well as new projects to meet outstanding needs.
From my personal involvement in negotiating this initiative I can
attest that getting to agreement at Kananaskis was not an easy task.
Many G8 members have experienced serious difficulties in implementing
their nonproliferation cooperation commitments with Russia. Some have
been unable to conclude government-to-government implementing
agreements because of inability to reach agreement with Russia on
adequate provisions for liability protections, exemption from taxation,
access to work sites, and other conditions. Program delays due to poor
coordination within the Russian Government and among federal, regional,
and local entities have been another concern. Millions of dollars
previously committed by G8 members remain unexpended at present due to
these problems, and G8 members will have difficulty committing new
funds if these difficulties persist. In response to these difficulties,
we negotiated Guidelines for New or Expanded Cooperation Projects,
which outline basic elements to be incorporated into legal frameworks
for implementation. For the new Global Partnership to be successful,
the Russian Federation will need to take concrete actions to resolve
outstanding problems.
On September 26-27 in Ottawa, I attended the G8 Senior Officials
first meeting following the Summit to discuss concrete implementation
of the Kananaskis commitments. A major part of the meeting was devoted
to the implementation problems, and we pressed the Russians hard on
this issue. The Senior Officials agreed that we should continue to meet
to provide the coordinating mechanism called for by the Leaders. This
welcome development will help ensure high-level attention on any areas
of difficulty. We have already planned another meeting before the end
of the calendar year to engage further on implementation guidelines,
projects for cooperation, and outreach to countries beyond the G8.
It came as welcome news that G8 governments are engaged in
implementing the Global Partnership; establishing interagency
coordination mechanism, identifying potential projects, and beginning
to budget resources. With respect to contributions, not all members
have made commitments. From initial indications some have shared
current thinking on anticipated pledges; others have not yet been able
to do so. For the Evian Summit, we intend to press to have total
commitments reach the $20 billion goal.
The G8 as a group and individual members will be working on
projects to be pursued. The Russian Federation has identified chemical
weapons destruction and general-purpose nuclear submarine dismantlement
as program priorities. Some members intend to contribute to cooperation
in these areas; some have reiterated their commitments to support
plutonium disposition. In addition, members will continue to address a
range of other projects under the Partnership, including employment of
former weapon scientists.
In general, G8 members, including the United States, intend to fund
and implement cooperation projects of their choice on a bilateral basis
under government-to-government agreements with the Russian Federation.
We do not intend to establish a Global Partnership multilateral
implementation mechanism or common fund. However, the G8 Senior
Officials, as the coordinating mechanism, will address priorities,
identify program gaps, and to prevent duplication and overlap.
Mr. Chairman, as I mentioned earlier, all current U.S.
nonproliferation programs in the former Soviet Union are encompassed
within the scope of the G8 Global Partnership and reflect U.S. plans to
address the goals that are reflected in the Partnership. The
Administration's FY03 request for these programs is about $1 billion.
The President has indicated that the U.S. will maintain this level of
effort for a ten-year period. Of course, the President's annual budget
request will include our specific requests by program based on need for
that specific year, within the overall context of the Administration's
budget priorities.
The U.S. programs have a significant role in shaping cooperation
under the Global Partnership. We had already provided information on
U.S. programs and noted projects where substantial resources are needed
from others. We believe that this information has been useful to other
G8 members as they consider how to direct resources. The Administration
will of course continue to assess where and how our resources can be
most usefully directed.
With respect to financing, the inclusion of authorities to reduce
Russian Soviet-era debt in exchange for nonproliferation program
spending by the Russian government in the recently passed Foreign
Relations Authorization Act provides welcome flexibility to the
Administration. I very much appreciate the Committee's role in enacting
these provisions. The Administration is actively considering debt for
nonproliferation program options, and we look forward to consulting
with you on the outcome of these deliberations.
In closing, I'd like to express my appreciation for the support of
this Committee for these critical national security concerns. We
welcome the passage of the authorization of debt exchanges with Russia
for nonproliferation projects. We are looking forward to completion of
FY03 appropriations at the President's requested levels. There are two
other provisions still under consideration in the Congress which are
very important to the Administration's ability to meet our
nonproliferation goals. First, we are seeking in the Defense
Authorization bill Congressional approval of authority for the
President to waive the annual certification requirement for Cooperative
Threat Reduction and Freedom Support Act Title V funding when it is in
the U.S. national security interest to do so. Second, we are seeking
authority to waive the conditions for cooperation with Russia on
construction of a chemical weapons destruction facility at Shchuch'ye.
We hope that both these provisions can be passed before the Congress
leaves for the fall elections.
The Chairman. Thank you very much, Mr. Secretary.
I have a very basic question. What is the operational
mechanism for implementing this initiative? Who's in charge? Is
there a committee of your counterparts in each of the other
countries--a council, in effect? How, other than principals
being involved, do we get from this commitment to actually
having boots on the ground somewhere dismantling something that
is categorized as a weapon of mass destruction? Mechanically,
how does this happen?
Mr. Bolton. We made a very basic decision before Kananaskis
that each country would essentially run its own program. That
is to say, we would not set up a new multilateral organization.
We would not set up a bureaucracy to do it. We felt that each
country knew best how to handle its own political system, knew
best what its priorities were. Some, in the case of Japan, more
concerned about nuclear submarines, others more concerned with
chemical weapons, others more concerned with fissile material
disposition.
Particularly for the countries that are relatively new,
they have actually gone ahead, in many cases, Canada being a
good example, and set up their own internal structures,
appointed people to head this up, committed money in their
budgets, and have gone to their parliaments seeking the
requisite legislation. We've had representatives from several
countries here looking at what we do to learn from our
experience, to see where they might be interested in launching
new programs, so that each country is responsible for getting
the money and for its allocation and expenditure.
We will use the so-called ``senior officials gathering'' to
coordinate, to gather information, to make sure that there is
not duplication and overlap in this. I don't think, as an early
matter, that's much of a concern, because the level of need is
substantially higher than the resources as they buildup. Some
of the countries are going to have to start and get, ramp up to
a higher level of expenditure. I think that's a prudent thing
to do. They don't want to be in a position of not being able to
tell their parliaments how the money is being spent.
But all of these countries have experience in programs of
bilateral assistance, and, just as we did in the early years of
Nunn-Lugar, drawing on that experience. We're working
cooperatively with them since we have the largest program, and
I think, so far, that's going fairly well.
The Chairman. So that again, to be very practical, the
Canadian Government would contact the Russian Government and
discuss specific, site-specific initiatives. Are the Canadians,
for example, at liberty, under this agreement, to, in effect,
set their own guidelines? Could they yield--I'm not suggesting
they should--on some aspect of liability insurance or some
other matter? Were the outlines of the agreement, relative to
improper taxation, bureaucratic obstacles and the like, just
meant as broad guidelines, or did we all agree, so none of us
are out of sync with one another?
Mr. Bolton. Yes, these are really bare minimums. In other
words, these express what I think the contributing governments
absolutely have to have in order to be able, confidently, to go
to their parliaments.
The Chairman. Right.
Mr. Bolton. They need to say, ``We believe that we have
adequate oversight and supervision over the expenditure of
these funds.''
I think what we did was, we exchanged our umbrella
agreement and other agreements we had had. Other nations had
their own agreements. We looked over them, and there is, I
think, surprising agreement among the contributors, or
potential contributors, that these protections that we've
outlined in the guidelines are absolutely essential. I think
it's hard to imagine a circumstance where a particularly
important one would be omitted from any significant agreement.
The Chairman. To use a Washington word that my folks back
home always are confused by, for good reason, do we think it's
important that there be certain ``benchmarks'' of knowing who
spent what for what? And how do we establish those? How do we
know? Is it a year from now, when the next G-8 meeting occurs,
that each contributing country reports what they committed,
what they've spent, what action they've taken? Is that the
effective benchmark, the yearly meetings?
Mr. Bolton. The leaders tasked the Sherpas, and then,
effectively, the people actually working in this senior
officials group, to report to them and to report to each other
for consideration at the next summit what they had done. And
the Canadians, because this is still their year of leadership
of the G-8, have begun to get that material pulled together.
We've exchanged information before. We need to make it a little
bit more regular so that we can start understanding different
accounting systems and whatnot.
But we all know what the priorities are. We've discussed,
and, at this most recent meeting in Ottawa, we discussed what
the newer participants actually are beginning to focus on. And
I am confident that, by the time of the Canadian handover to
the French at the end of this year, that we will have in place
the requisite reporting mechanisms so that the countries can
lay out in a more common system exactly what programs are
involved. Because we have the most elaborate, most extensive
programs, I think a lot of countries have looked at the kind of
reporting and allocation that we've done, and are modeling much
of what they've done on the way we've proceeded, taking into
account that they have their own particular budgeting
procedures, fiscal years, and the rest of it.
But we're not going to wait, in other words, until the
summer of 2003. Work on accumulating that information has begun
already.
The Chairman. My last question, before I turn it over to
Senator Lugar is: What can the next Congress expect from the
administration in terms of requests for this program? Is it
``steady as she goes,'' a billion dollars next year, like this
year? Are we talking about upping the ante ourselves? Is there
a baseline that we're starting from that is a billion above
what we, in fact, already have committed? Or is it that we're
meeting an obligation, and this is just used to leverage
outside assistance? How is it viewed in your administration?
Mr. Bolton. The expectation had been that because we were
at about a billion dollars of appropriations request a year,
that it was foreseeable we could extend that out over a 10 year
period, and that that was a substantial enough projection, at
least, that we should go to the allies and say, ``This is
something that benefits us, to be sure, benefits you, as well,
and that we'd like to see a more equitable burden sharing.''
Over the life of Nunn-Lugar, up until last year, we had
spent approximately $7 billion, and the other G-7 members had
spent approximately $1 billion, so we were trying to move it
up.
I don't think any of us believe that we can really project
out 10 years, in budget terms, or maybe even 5 years, and I
wouldn't rule out that we could look at other possibilities.
But, on the other hand, what we said was 10 + 10. We didn't say
15 + 5. And I think it's important that we get the commitments,
at least, that get us to the 10 + 10 level and then see how
things are going inside Russia, look at their absorption
capacity, look at how, for example, if we get the Shchuch'ye
chemical weapons destruction facility up, how production is
going. Is it ahead of schedule? Is it behind schedule? And
these are things we would need to take into account.
But I think the commitment is certainly there to do this as
expeditiously as we can.
The Chairman. Well, actually, I have one followup on that.
What is the progress and status of Shchuch'ye right now, in
terms of constructing the chemical destruction factory that we
are building, that we are intending to build? Can you tell us
what the status of that is?
Mr. Bolton. Well, I think a certain amount of work on local
infrastructure and so on has gone ahead. But in terms of the
major construction, it awaits our appropriation. That was
always the expectation, that we would have the lead on it. The
Germans had the lead on Gorny. We had the lead on Shchuch'ye.
The Chairman. OK, thank you.
Senator Lugar.
Senator Lugar. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Secretary Bolton, just picking up from that question
because you have mentioned the waiver authority, and I
appreciate the letter that National Security Director
Condoleezza Rice wrote requesting a waiver authorization. I
incorporated her views into an amendment that's in the Senate
appropriation bill giving the President waiver authority with
regard to congressional requirements. That doesn't mean that
the President doesn't take those into consideration, but he has
the ability to permit the destruction of chemical weapons might
proceed. And, as you know, about $200 million or more has been
spent at this facility. Now it's stymied because the funds
cannot be obligated and expended.
Last week, in a visit to the White House, I asked Secretary
Powell and Dr. Rice to weigh in once again. Both have reached
out to Members of House and Senate conferees, which is ongoing,
I believe, again today.
Last week, in a conversation with the President on the
telephone, we continued our discussion on these important
subjects. Our dislog began during a meeting Senator Biden and I
had with the President about the Moscow Treaty in June. The
President was very concerned about about the lack of progress
on Nunn-Lugar. He referred to his commitment to President Putin
to get on with the dismantlement.
I had a meeting with 15 Members of Congress this morning at
breakfast, many of them on the House Armed Services Committee,
who were relevant to both the appropriation and authorization
situations. Participants indicated that the difficulty lies on
the Republican side.
I passed out a Los Angeles Times editorial which condemned
the House for its failure to support the Nunn-Lugar program. It
is not the House. It is just a few Members who refuse to agree.
And I don't know at what level we have to go. The President,
the Secretary of State, Secretary Rumsfeld in his testimony
before this committee and Dr. Rice on two occasions, have
expressed their strong support for waiver authority. I have
offered an amendment based on their request but the House has
expressed strong opposition to permitting U.S. assistance for
the destruction of chemical weapons in Russia.
I have visited Shchuch'ye on two occasions. I have returned
with pictures of the dangerous weapons stored there. In one
picture I am holding a briefcase easily holding an 85 mm shell
filled with VX. There are 1.9 million shells and warheads
ranging from 85 mm to Scud warheads all with sarin and VX. The
Russians claim that each can kill 85,000 people in a stadium.
Now, I appreciate the fact that the appropriation level
requested by the administration and the review of the programs
was a very generous appraisal. The President was under the
impression, when Senator Biden and I met with him in July, that
things are on track, but they are not on track. As a matter of
fact, not just the chemical weapon thing had been shut down at
that point, but the whole program after a certification could
not be made by the Secretary of State. And it was on that basis
the administration asked for a permanent Presidential waiver.
The Senate bill contains that. The House bill, as I understand,
has a 3-year waiver.
But there has been no movement on that. So we had a hiatus
during consideration of the supplemental appropriation for
about 2 months. But finally things re-started. I was over in
Russia. I saw everything getting going again, but it all
stopped again as of October 1. Nothing. No new programs.
Now, the general public doesn't understand that. I don't
understand it. But, nevertheless, that's the way it is. And we
have two very significant conferences going, on authorization
and appropriation.
So I plead with you and everybody in the administration to
weigh in, because we can talk about all of this conceptually,
we can appropriate the money for it, and we assure our allies
that we're contributing the billion dollars for, but I'm here
to tell you it has stopped. It has stopped because our own
bureaucracy, our own congressional machinations, our own
micromanagement at the staff level stops it.
Now, I've found that the Russians have the same problems.
And when I visited with Minister Ivanov in Defense and we
reviewed all the stymies that I had had during my Russian
visits, including difficulty in getting into the Kirov 200,
including their stiffing us on an anthrax strain they promised
to send to us. He pledged to get into the bowels of the
bureaucracy. He understands the gravity of the situation. The
President of our country understands the gravity. But somewhere
down in the bowels of the situation, the worker bees are trying
to undermine all of this.
So it's tough work, and I appreciate that, and you are one
of these that has to deal with this at all levels in your
negotiations, and you've done so very well. But I make this
plea at the outset, because I think it's relevant.
Now, I would also mention that you have discussed the
possibility of other countries, in addition to the G-8, getting
involved. this is very important, because they could and
should. However, the success of the G-8 is, of course, of the
essence in enticing others and giving some confidence that we
have a structure.
As you pointed out an umbrella agreement is crucial to our
success. Without the right protections on liability/taxation
issues that we have continually had to wrestle with and which
we have to wrestle with in behalf of out G-8 friends and
others, the chances of success plummet. Norway and other
nations are facing similar problems. So that's a problem, but
hopefully not insuperable. President Putin, as you and others
have testified, certainly pledged in Canada to go about this
and presumably will try to make that happen.
My basic question is, can you develop a plan or a chart
that illustrates the contributing countries, their monetary
commitments over the next 10 years and the progress they will
sponsor as a part of the existing threat. I understand that
appropriations can't be guaranteed, governments change, but can
we start applying allied commitments to the threats and
dismantlement requirements. We could fill in ours, at least
conceptually, $10 billion across the chart. And then you can
drop down to Great Britain. As I have mentioned, their Under
Secretary of Defense, the comparable one in their ministry,
says $750 million. The French are still uncommitted, as far as
I can tell, so question marks across. But, it seems to me, you
know, bit by bit, for our purposes of oversight, we would like
to see who is living up to their commitments and where the
priorities lie.
Now, as you say, there's a lot of work to be done. For
example, Russian general purpose submarines. I visited the
Nerpa shipyard, near Murmansk, in August. The shipyard
director, wants to destroy 150 general purpose submarines. Now,
a lot of countries all around want that to happen, too. While
all of the so-called Nunn-Lugar equipment is there: the cutting
machines, the bailors, et cetera because you can do it fairly
economically. But we have no authority to do that now.
The Cooperative Threat Reduction can dismantle the 41
strategic subs: no more, no less. I had to say that in a public
forum with national television broadcast back in Moscow, that
we would not pay to dismantle these submarines. We had to. We
don't have the authority. But, in fact, it's in our general
strategic interest, as well as in terms of the nuclear
situation, to extract that fissile material and dismantle the
sub.
The other day, USEC celebrated the delivery of 150 tons of
low enriched uranium taken from nuclear warheads. This is part
of a deal to eliminate 500 tons of material. This comes at a
time when fears about Iraq and Saddam getting a few pounds of
fissile material, not tons? There is plenty out there in the
world. It'll be out there in the world if we don't take care of
the general purpose subs.
And so I appreciate that you and those who crafted this
agreement understood these threats and the need to respond to
them. There is grave suspicion in the Nordic states the
Russians may already have dumped something in the past, in
terms of nuclear cores. And the need to prevent this from
occurring now or in the future really is of the essence.
So I suppose my only basic question to you is, is it
reasonable to try to fill in the blanks, at least in some
suppositions of money, sort of across a hypothetical chart?
General purpose submarines might be one category. Tactical
nuclear weapons might be another, which is a priority as
Secretary Powell testified. And maybe there are others that the
administration will want to put forward.
So I've offered a list of ten. That's just for sake of
argument, to, sort of get it going. What are our priorities?
What are anybody's priorities? And what should we fill in to
the chart?
Mr. Bolton. Right. Well, I think that is one of the
critical questions. Some of the countries in the G-7 have given
us notional amounts that they've asked not be made entirely
public yet. Others have not really given us a number at all, or
certainly not given us a number that you could consider
satisfactory, looking at the general size of their economies
and so on. And we will continue to work on getting the--both
the public commitment and the necessary followup.
For a number of them, one of the major inhibitions is the
point I mentioned a moment ago about the difficulties they've
had in prior projects in states of the former Soviet Union,
particularly Russia where, being unable to show progress on
these earlier appropriations, they have found resistance at the
political level at home to trying to get more appropriation. So
that's why getting these what seem to be, sort of, nitty-gritty
issues of liability and audit and access resolved is critically
important----
Senator Lugar. Very important.
Mr. Bolton [continuing]. Not just to make our books look
pretty, but to free up the existing money that's tied up, and
then to be able to induce parliaments to see the worth of
appropriating additional money.
In terms of the priorities, you're obviously quite familiar
with things we've been doing. I'll maybe leave it to my
colleagues to talk about what the different programs are moving
ahead on. I think some of the other countries are beginning to
establish their own priorities. I think there's a lot of
interest in President Putin's two highest, that being chemical
weapons destruction and general purpose submarine
dismantlement. So I think there will be a lot of interest in
that.
We have problems. We see lack of funding in, for example,
the plutonium disposition field where there's a much larger
need than we can currently see filled. Some governments, like
Germany, don't want to get into plutonium disposition questions
at all. That's obviously their prerogative, and they've just
had an election, which I'm sure will confirm that policy, but
we see that as an area that could certainly use substantial
additional work.
I think, given that we've got countries that are relatively
new to this, we have to give them a certain amount of time to
talk about where they want to focus their efforts. Again,
Canada comes to mind as a country that's moving very
aggressively, working with us, looking to see where they can
add on, where they might have a special role for themselves.
And I think as others proceed along, that we'll be in a better
position to answer your question.
But the kind of chart you're talking about is very much on
our minds. And, with your permission, I will give the top 10
list, not only back to our executive branch, but to the other
G-8 partners, as well.
Senator Lugar. I'd be very pleased if you would do that
and, likewise, I expect the committee will, at least
periodically, ask you and others to testify about this so that
we have some flow of information. After this initial
enthusiasm, the follow-through becomes tedious, and we don't
mean it to become that way, but I think it is important.
Mr. Bolton. It's very important, because when the G-8 is
successful, it's as an incubator of ideas that then tend to run
on their own. But on something like this that's a little bit
far afield from some of the things that they've done before, I
think it's important that we keep attention at the leader
level. That's why a French commitment is so important coming
into this next Presidency.
But I think as you and other members of the committee are
meeting with officials from the other G-8 countries, the
expression of your interest, obviously, gets their attention,
so that would be helpful, as well. And we will figure out a way
to keep you informed on a regular basis. I think that's----
Senator Lugar. That would be great.
Mr. Bolton [continuing]. Very much in everybody's interest
to do that.
Senator Lugar. Let me just ask one more thing, and it's
really a request for your department to try to think ahead.
Recently, under the work of the Nuclear Threat Initiative that
my former colleague, Sam Nunn, now heads, about $5 million of
private funds that came from the Nuclear Threat Initiative was
spent, along with $2-plus million funds from our Department of
Energy, to take fissile material from Belgrade, Yugoslavia, to
Russia. It was significant, and perhaps you were responsible
for the opening in Russia. Again, Russia has not been willing
to accept the spent fuel or other fissile material in such
endeavors for many years, but did so on this occasion, perhaps
because President Putin has given the authority. So that was
important.
As it was reported, about 1,500 Yugoslav soldiers were
involved in guarding the highways, the airports, as well as the
site, and it was perceived as a dangerous operation, as
movement of this and other proliferation threats would be. But,
for the moment, it meant Yugoslavia had decided not to indulge
in any fantasies with regard to nuclear capabilities. It was
important. And there are 24 more sites around the world, as I
understand, identified by the State Department as probably
worthy of similar attention.
Now, one of the problems that is still a hangup in the
conference with the House is the authority requested, in fact,
by the Defense Department. At their request, I offered an
amendment, and it was adopted in the Senate legislation, to
give the administration at least authority to shift as much as
$50 million of Nunn-Lugar funds quickly, if necessary, to
emergencies where we are involved in the war against terrorism
if proliferation problems are perceived. The current
legislation says Russia and the former Soviet Union only.
Strangely enough, in the House, there is resistance to even
this degree of flexibility in the midst of the war on
terrorism, despite administration testimony by Secretary
Rumsfeld, Secretary Powell, and others, which is almost
inconceivable to me. But, nevertheless, inconceivable or not,
it's happening. Right now. So I ask you once again to think
about that.
Now, second, I would hope that the State Department, and
maybe Defense, too, will have suggestions as to how flexibility
for the administration in all of these things might come about,
how many of the past restrictions imposed over 11 years of
Nunn-Lugar are still worthy of consideration and which really
have been rendered obsolete.
There were times, 10 or 11 years ago, where many Members of
Congress said, ``Not a penny for the Russians. We will throw up
almost every barrier conceivable to make sure they don't get a
dime.'' And there are some who may still have that point of
view. You're not one of them, nor is the chairman or myself.
We're trying to think constructively, how we work with Russia
to gain their cooperation in addressing these threats. Their
cooperation is necessary if this G-8 program is going to work.
So I would like to work with you, and I'm sure the chairman
would, too, in trying to think through legislation next year
that clears away some of the bramble bushes, but, even more
importantly, thinks about how this administration could be more
effective in the war against terrorism, given the locus of this
material in so many places, so that you have the necessary
powers at your disposal. Because, for the moment, there will
not be another $5 million coming from the Nuclear Threat
Initiative. The other 24 places are still out there, but
somehow our Government--State, Energy, Defense, whoever--will
have to help deal with that and, prayerfully, will do so.
Mr. Bolton. Well, I think we would look forward to working
with you on those questions, and, indeed, my colleagues have
been considering what to do on those other----
Senator Lugar. Great.
Mr. Bolton [continuing]. 24 locations. And I feel certain
that President Bush and President Putin will be addressing this
as a priority in just a couple of weeks at the APEC Summit.
Senator Lugar. That'll be good news.
Mr. Bolton. They will be meeting again on it.
Senator Lugar. Thank you very much.
Mr. Bolton. Thank you.
The Chairman. I know you have to go; I have just two more
questions if I may, Mr. Secretary. Senator Lugar said he is
perplexed by the House inaction. I find it absolutely
astonishing, in the years that I've been here, how, either the
left or the right would push, in the political context of the
Congress, and then all of a sudden you'd find them taking
action completely contrary to their overall objective.
Now, the very people who are for the broadest authority to
go after Saddam Hussein are reluctant to deal with the very
thing that our intelligence community tells us is the greatest
risk, which is his ability to get hold of fissile material.
There is a reluctance to give the Defense Department the
flexibility, and right to waive conditions, so as to be able to
do the kinds of things which will at least make it more
unlikely that he would be able to purchase or steal the very
thing everyone says that, if he stole or purchased, would leave
us in real trouble. I mean, I find that mind-boggling.
But one of the things I want to ask you about, and it's
sort of an offshoot of that, is the bureaucratic recalcitrance,
once you get below Putin, to carrying out Nunn-Lugar and/or any
new initiative in the 10 + 10, with each country involved. The
other seven countries are essentially adopting their own Nunn-
Lugar-type program here. And once you get below the very top
level in Russia, we find these roadblocks that are thrown up
that are, you know, either old apparatchik hangovers or
bureaucratic inertia or whatever it is, and that's on one side
of the equation.
On the other side of the equation, there is the second
reality: Russia has no money. I mean, we're in a circumstance
where the intelligence community indicates to us--and I'm not
revealing anything that's classified--we're talking about a
modest military budget and a total budget for all the Russian
Federation of around $30 billion. And that's a reality, as
well.
Now, I find it suspect when the phrase is used, ``what we
expect from the Russians financially.'' That is part of the
equation here in determining whether or not we and our G-7
partners go forward with this roughly $20 billion commitment
over 10 years.
Can you flesh out for us any more, what dialog in Canada
took place relative to what is at least a generic expectation
of Russian financial contributions? I'm not talking about
removing roadblocks. I'm not talking about liability insurance,
tax issues. I'm talking about direct Russian appropriations. I
assume that's what we mean by ``what we expect of Russia
financially.'' Is that correct?
Mr. Bolton. Right.
The Chairman. Can you flesh that out a little for me? What
are we, in broad proportions--if we're talking about spending
$20 billion as a world community, G-8, over the next 10 years,
what are we looking for Russia to, quote, ``spend'' over that
same period? Do we have a sense of that? Can you help me out?
Mr. Bolton. We have not put quantitative assessment to that
yet.
The Chairman. I didn't think you did. I'm just trying to
get a notion.
Mr. Bolton. Right. What we have in mind, though, is for
them, for any kind of projects like those we're talking about,
to bear associated local costs. I think I mentioned earlier the
local infrastructure in connection with the Shchuch'ye chemical
weapons destruction facility, and there are other such things
that we would expect them to be forward-leaning on.
And I should say we also need them to avoid the kind of
problem that we had on the missile fuel facility that we
constructed that's been the subject of press reports, in which
Secretary Rumsfeld put very directly to his counterpart several
months ago when he was here, about how that money had actually
been used for something else. Now, that's still being
considered and discussed. It was troubling when we found out
about it. At least the Russians admitted it. We're going to
have to deal with it. I don't need to tell you that that can
cause political difficulties in explaining that we're
appropriating all of this money, some $1 billion a year, and
finding that maybe it's not actually going for the purposes for
which it was intended. I think the Russians understand the
seriousness of that point.
But I did not mean to suggest, and I don't think you meant
to ask, you know, are we asking for the same amount from them
or something like that.
The Chairman. No, I just want to get a sense because, as
you know, John, there are still--it is a diminishing number,
but there are still--a number of Senators and Congressmen who
believe that this is fungible money and, therefore, we
shouldn't be involved in this at all. There are still those who
truly believe that we just shouldn't be involved in this at
all, because whatever money we spend, they, quote, ``won't
spend,'' and they'll do bad things with the money that they
save.
I'm not belittling the argument; I'm just outlining it. And
so what I hope we can avoid is, a year from now, when we're
analyzing what progress has or hasn't been made, the assertion
that, well, the Russians didn't put up their share, and it be
something that is either unrealistic, unreasonable, or beyond
their capacity, even if they had the will. It's a different
thing if there are diversions of those moneys. It's a different
thing if there is no willingness to participate in any way,
when they could and it's clearly within their means to do it.
That's the reason I asked the question.
Mr. Bolton. Right. And I think it does tie in with this
question of the guidelines and the transparency and the audit
rights and the rest of it, because other countries that don't
have the kind of sophisticated, not to say complex, programming
mechanisms that we have that might make contributions directly
to the Government of Russia, might find themselves in some
difficulty if they couldn't explain how that money has actually
been expended. And I think they recognize that, and that's one
of the reasons why, not only, obviously, did we want these
guidelines because of our umbrella agreement, we felt it was
critical to get them so that the other G-7 members would have
the protections that we have essentially had these last 10
years.
The Chairman. Well, I thank you. You've been generous with
your time. You told us ahead of time you had a meeting with the
boss downtown, and we'll accommodate that. But I have about a
half dozen questions for the record. They're just expansions on
some of what the Senators have already asked you.
The distinguished Senator from Florida says he does not
have any questions for you.
Senator Nelson. I will submit some to you in writing, as
well.
The Chairman. We thank you very much, Mr. Secretary, for
being here, and we wish you God speed on making sure we're able
to take this very promising development, which you are
responsible for in the administration, and turn it into
something that will actually make us safer.
Mr. Bolton. Well, I appreciate that, Mr. Chairman. And, as
I said earlier, we're pleased to work with the committee in
terms of priorities as they develop and making sure that you
are supplied with information about what the Global Partnership
is doing and we would be happy to come up at whatever time is
convenient and keep you and your colleagues briefed on it.
The Chairman. Speaking only for myself, but I expect it
would even be a greater commitment if this chairmanship
changes. The single highest priority this committee is going to
focus on, if I am chairman, for the next year will be the whole
notion of cooperative threat reduction. We know, that
international events intervene and we must respond, and we're
going to have a lot else going. But this, to me, is the single
most significant and potentially most promising thing that we
could do in order to enhance the prospect that we avoid the
most disastrous consequence: weapons of mass destruction ending
up in the hands of non-nation states or nation states that are
rogue states.
So we're going to be spending a lot of time on this, and
I'm positive, if my friend is the chairman, that that will be
the case.
Mr. Bolton. I won't comment on that.
The Chairman. But, either way, either way, this is
something we're going to, on a frequent basis, be focusing on.
But thank you very, very much.
Mr. Bolton. I look forward to working with both of you and
the entire committee.
Senator Nelson. Mr. Chairman, I would just add, thank you--
and I know Senator Lugar feels the same way--about the focus of
the committee. Take, for example, as we've approached this
question of the vote this week on the Iraq resolution, we know
Saddam Hussein has the chemical and biological weapons, we know
he's trying to develop nuclear weapons, and what do we hear
over and over from all of the experts? It is that if he's got
to develop it himself, it's going to take some number of years;
but if he gets the fissile material from elsewhere, he can do
it in a matter of months.
And so what better proof do we have than the debate we're
having right now that this is one of the most important things
that the United States can do, is to stop the proliferation.
The Chairman. Thank you, Senator.
We thank you for your leadership, John.
Mr. Bolton. Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
The Chairman. And we look forward to working with you.
Mr. Bolton. Thank you.
The Chairman. Now, our second panel is the Honorable John
S. Wolf, Assistant Secretary of State for Nonproliferation,
U.S. Department of State; Lisa Bronson, Deputy Under Secretary
of Defense for Technology Security and Counter-Proliferation,
the Department of Defense; the Honorable Linton Brooks, Acting
Administrator of the National Nuclear Security Administration,
U.S. Department of Energy.
And then we'll have a third panel, I say to those who are
in the audience, with two additional witnesses whom I'll
introduce at that time.
Secretary Wolf, if you would begin, we would appreciate it.
STATEMENT OF HON. JOHN S. WOLF, ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF STATE
FOR NONPROLIFERATION, DEPARTMENT OF STATE, WASHINGTON, DC
Mr. Wolf. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and I thank the
committee for the support that you give on these vital
programs.
Under Secretary Bolton has already talked about the big
picture of the Global Partnership and the importance that it
has and the possibilities that it has, and I'm not going to try
and duplicate that discussion except to say that there's still
work to do, first, within the G-8 to make sure that we're
actually able to use the guidelines to accomplish the kinds of
purposes that the leaders set at Kananaskis, and then to expand
the effort to include other donors.
I guess I should have said at the outset, I have a
statement, and I'll just paraphrase parts of it and then leave
the rest for questions.
So I would start by saying that the Global Partnership,
though, is also--is more than a fundraising effort, and it's
very important to remember that at Kananaskis the leaders
incorporated a set of principles that all the partners signed
up to, and we actually use those principles to help shape the
way in which we, at the State Department and in the inter-
agency, focus our worldwide efforts. And it's important to
think of the Global Partnership and remember the word
``global,'' because it does have application beyond Russia and
the former Soviet Union.
So we use the principles within State to organize efforts
that are related to curbing the supply of weapons of mass
destruction, missile technology expertise and materials, to
interdict weapons of mass destruction in international
commerce, to restrain programs, to curb demand, to strengthen
the international treaties and export groups and the norms, and
also to improve cooperation on nuclear safety and security.
In that context, for this purpose, I'll talk largely about
how we're working on supply possibilities, things that are
related to curbing supply. And there, State, DOD, and,
increasingly, Treasury all have roles to play. Let me talk a
little bit about what we do.
First, the International Science Centers in our biological
and chemical engagement, designed to keep Russian and Eurasian
scientists from working for terrorists or proliferant states.
We use numbers that are very significant, when we talk about
this. We have, at one time or another, engaged 50,000
scientists. I think it's important, impressive though that
achievement may be, to remember that this is only a fraction of
the total population or the total man-years, when you look at
it over 10 years, if there were 50,000 to 70,000 weapons of
mass destruction scientists, 10 years is 700,000; or 50,000 is
a fraction. We are working to expand that effort. We need to do
it ourselves, and the Global Partnership anticipates that our
partners will also do more on the Science Centers in biological
and chemical engagement.
We're also, importantly, working with U.S. businesses to
accelerate the transitions of the Science Centers work from
stopgap efforts to things that will enable the Science Centers
to promote long-term fixes and to enable the labs to get onto
long-term sustainable work that will provide peaceful private
sector jobs for these former Soviet Union scientists.
We began the Bio-Industry Initiative to work with our
Russian partners to reconfigure former Soviet biological
weapons production facilities, engage more of the scientists in
collaborative R&D. They're working on a variety of things:
accelerated vaccine and drug therapy for highly infectious
diseases, such as drug-resistant tuberculosis. There are a
variety of opportunities for U.S. and Russian industry, and
we're looking to develop a sustainable Russian biotech
industry.
Congress has given us other tools that include the
reauthorization of the Soviet Scientists Act that was included
in the State Department authorization. And this will provide a
way in which we can enable former weapons scientists to
emigrate to the United States and work with our scientific
community instead of being at risk for proliferant states.
We have a variety of anti-smuggling efforts that we conduct
with our colleagues from the Department of Energy, Defense,
Commerce, and this is an important focus of the State
Department's work. We oversee an interagency effort that draws
on our worldwide presence and DOE's extraordinary analytic and
technical capabilities. We marry these up in our work with
local law enforcement officers, and it's designed to stop the
risk of nuclear smuggling, roll up rings of criminals that are
engaged in the activity.
You read lots of reports; there was another report today
about 27 tons of uranium. Most of these turn out to be scams or
to be legitimate commerce, and the one today, according to our
reports and the IAEA's, was a paperwork problem, not an illegal
effort.
Another important part of our strategy is to work on export
control programs and to assist states that need to shore up
their capabilities to prevent and stop smuggling. Effective
export and border controls, vigorous enforcement are all part
of the tools that we're trying to put in place to stop the
spread of weapons of mass destruction and their delivery
systems. We work with a variety of agencies on this, in terms
of equipment and in terms of technique.
We're also working with our international partners to make
clear that export controls not only cover things, but they
cover the technology, the intangibles, the data and the
intellectual property that a lot of proliferant states are
trying to get. They find that they can get the dual use
technology that they need, but what they really need is the
scientific knowhow. And so we're trying to make sure that the
export of that is illegal and that countries enforce those
laws. More needs to be done.
We're working to interdict weapons of mass destruction,
missile-related shipments. We do a variety of things in the
Australia group, the Missile Technology Control Regime, the
Nuclear Suppliers Group. In this regard, we use diplomacy, we
use intelligence, we use law enforcement, we use multilateral
means, we use pluri-lateral means, and we are--and we will use
unilateral interdiction where it is necessary to stop these
kinds of shipments and where the opportunities present
themselves.
We have a rapid flexible response capability in the
Nonproliferation and Disarmament Fund [NDF]. It works in the
kinds of ways that we also anticipate the Global Partnership
will. Over the past few months, NDF has helped negotiate, fund,
and organize the removal of highly enriched uranium [HEU] from
the Vinca Research Reactor in Yugoslavia. We have deployed
radiation detection systems on the Turkish border with Syria,
Iran, and Iraq. We're currently overseeing the destruction of
SS-23 and Scud missiles in Bulgaria. There are a number of
operations, a number of potential projects like this.
Linton Brooks and I are working together to come up with a
plan that will deal with the remaining 24 research reactors.
We're working with DOE and DOD on the wider question of
dangerous materials worldwide. We intend to assist countries to
strengthen and modify their laws, regulations, develop and
deploy tracking systems and secure stockpiles, when
appropriate, and to remove materials when necessary.
This is a difficult job, as you all have stated today and
previously, and we thank you for the support that you give. It
requires active diplomacy. The facilities we often want to see
are very sensitive facilities, and host governments are
reluctant to let in either our program officials or visiting
Senators.
That said, Senator Lugar, I know you're interesting in
getting access--you were interested in getting access to the
bioweapons facilities in the Kirov area you mentioned earlier.
We are, too. And so we have just made an initial--we've got
some initial entree now to the Kirov 200 BW facility, and we
are working on the production of drugs to combat multidrug-
resistant tuberculosis. It's a small first step, but journeys
all start with a small step.
Global Partnership: big opportunity. We intend to work with
our international partners to deal with the problems of weapons
of mass destruction, as you said and as Under Secretary Bolton
said. We've been doing a lot. We're trying to do more, but we
think that our partners have an important role, and that's why
10 + 10 over the next 10 years provides an opportunity to
engage a greater degree of focus by our G-8 and other partners.
Thank you very much.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Wolf follows:]
Prepared Statement of Hon. John S. Wolf, Assistant Secretary of State
for Nonproliferation, Department of State
Good morning, Mr. Chairman and members of this Committee. It is an
honor to appear before you with my colleagues from the Energy, and
Defense Departments. The Administration relies on these three agencies
to work together to combat the spread of weapons of mass destruction
and dangerous technologies.
Under Secretary Bolton has given you the big picture on the Global
Partnership initiative. It provides a golden opportunity to leverage
our own threat reduction programs, and to galvanize long overdue
international support to deal with the WMD proliferation.
While the Partnership's initial focus is on Russia and Eurasia,
there is a basis for the partnership to operate more broadly. But, the
first task is to build G-8 support--this includes gaining financial
commitments and designing projects. And, Under Secretary Bolton said
Russia bears significant responsibility to assure that the projects can
be implemented under the guidelines and also to use its own resources
to help accomplish the tasks.
My staff and I have been active diplomatically first to rally
support among the G-8 for the Partnership concept and then to maintain
it. While we still need to do more with our G-8 partners, I hope we
will soon be able to approach other countries outside the group to seek
their contributions to this effort as well. I suspect we will have
better chances when we have cleared away some of the implementation
issues discussed at the G-8 Senior Officials meeting in Ottawa last
month.
The Global Partnership is more than a fundraising effort--it
includes a set of core nonproliferation principles that all the
partners signed up to. We use these principles within State to organize
efforts to:
Curb the supply of WMD and missile technology, expertise and
materials
Interdict WMD transfers
Restrain WMD programs
Strengthen WMD norms, regimes, and treaties, and
Promote nuclear cooperation in the context of safety and
security
In the context of the Global Partnership, we are focusing largely
on curbing supply possibilities. State, DOD and, increasingly, Treasury
all have roles to play in this effort. Let me talk a bit about our
efforts at State.
First, through the International Science centers and bio and
chemical engagement, we are keeping Russian and Eurasian scientists
from working for terrorists or proliferant states. The break-up of the
USSR left thousands of former WMD scientists and engineers without a
future. After ten years of effort we estimate that we have engaged half
of them, at one point or another. But impressive though that
achievement may be, the fact is that the science center projects
account for only a fraction of the projected weapons scientist man-
years available--we are expanding our efforts and persuading others to
do likewise. More importantly, we are working with U.S. businesses to
accelerate the transition of science center work from stopgap measures
to long-term fixes built on new, sustainable, peaceful, private sector
jobs for these former Soviet weapons scientists.
Recently, we began the Bio-Industry initiative to work with our
Russian partners to reconfigure former Soviet biological weapons (BW)
production facilities and engage more Soviet biological and chemical
Weapons scientists in collaborative R&D projects for the purpose of
accelerated vaccine and drug therapy development for highly infectious
diseases such as drug resistant tuberculosis. Our strategy in this area
is to create new Russian-U.S. Industry partnerships as well as help
develop a sustainable Russia biotech industry.
Congress has given us other tools to prevent proliferation of WMD
expertise. The reauthorization of the Soviet Scientists Act included in
State's authorization legislation will provide a way for former weapons
scientists to immigrate to the United States and work with our
scientific community instead of to proliferant states.
Our anti-smuggling efforts, conducted with our colleagues from the
Department of Energy, Defense, and Commerce, are another important
focus. We oversee an interagency effort that draws on State's worldwide
presence and DOE's extraordinary analytical and technical capabilities.
We marry up these capabilities with local law enforcement to detect
nuclear terrorism and roll up rings of criminals engaged in scams. For
example, in 2000, State facilitated the safe retrieval of the HEU
seized at a border checkpoint in Rousse, Bulgaria. The HEU underwent
nuclear forensic analysis at Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory.
This case was linked to other cases and law enforcement and
intelligence authorities are continuing to follow-up on it.
Another important part of our strategy is our export control
program which assists states that need to shore up their capabilities
to prevent and stop such smuggling. Effective export and border
controls, combined with vigorous enforcement, are crucial tools in
stemming the proliferation of WMD and their delivery systems. We are
working with implementing agencies such as the Departments of Commerce
and Energy and the U.S. Customs Service to ensure that potential
supplier countries have proper controls on exports, and that transit
and transshipment countries in the region have the tools to interdict
illicit shipments crossing their territories. Potential source
countries remain our highest priority. But even as we work with them on
export control lists, we find a number of countries still lack the
trained personnel and enforcement infrastructure necessary to carry out
nonproliferation commitments. We are also working with our
international partners to make clear that export controls must not only
cover ``things'' but also intangibles, such as data and intellectual
property. And in fact, more needs to be done.
We're putting considerable effort into the interagency effort we
lead to strengthen enforcement, and have recorded measurable success.
In several NIS states, U.S.-trained officials, using U.S.-provided
detection equipment, have made seizures of potentially dangerous
radioactive materials. In one Caspian basin country, U.S.-trained
officials detected a shipment of military equipment bound for a
suspicious end-user in the Middle East. Following consultation with our
in-country Export Control and Border Security program advisor, the
equipment was detained. But much more needs to be done in Central Asia,
as well as countries like Russia, China, India, and the countries in
Southeast Asia.
State is also working to interdict WMD- and missile-related
shipments of concerns to proliferant states. We work very closely with
our partners in the Australia Group, Missile Technology Control Regime,
and the Nuclear Suppliers Group to prevent shipments of concern from
reaching CEW, missile and nuclear, programs around the world. We use
diplomatic, intelligence, and law enforcement channels as appropriate
to disrupt the flow of raw materials, production equipment and
technological know-how to these programs.
I should also add that State maintains a rapid, flexible response
capability to respond to emerging dangers. Our Non-proliferation and
Disarmament Fund (NDF) supplements initiatives such as the Global
Partnership that focus on Russia and the NIS by providing similar
capabilities worldwide. Over the past few months NDF helped negotiate,
fund and organize the removal of HEU from the Vinca Research Reactor in
Yugoslavia; deployed radiation detection systems on Turkish borders
with Syria, Iran and Iraq; and is currently overseeing the destruction
of SS-23's and SCUD missiles in Bulgaria.
Sadly, many sites like Vinca pose a proliferation danger. Over the
next several months, the NDF working with DOE will begin work to
protect dangerous material worldwide. This initiative will assist
countries to strengthen and modify their laws and regulations; develop
and deploy automated means of tracking inventories and shipments of
these materials; secure stockpiles; and when necessary, remove
dangerous materials from insecure locations.
State recognizes that advancing nonproliferation in Russia and the
NIS is difficult. As members of this committee can attest, much of this
work involves increasing the security of facilities so sensitive, host
governments are reluctant to let in either U.S. program officials or
congressional delegations. That said, we have made a lot of progress
with a very small budget. Senator Lugar, I know you were interested in
getting access to bio-weapons facilities in the Kirov area. We are too.
For example, we have begun discussions with the Kirov 200 BW facility
on the potential production of drugs to combat multi-drug resistant
tuberculosis. We hope this is the first step toward greater engagement
of scientists and facilities in that region.
Global Partnership provides us an opportunity to spread the burden
and expand the scope of these non-proliferation effort, and State will
aggressively move ahead to increase international support for the
initiative while vigorously pursuing the programs we already have
underway.
The Chairman. Secretary Wolf, I thank you, not just for
your statement, but for your enthusiasm. You sound like you're
committed to this, which makes me feel a lot better.
I think next would be Secretary Bronson. Welcome.
STATEMENT OF LISA BRONSON, DEPUTY UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
FOR TECHNOLOGY SECURITY AND COUNTER-PROLIFERATION, DEPARTMENT
OF DEFENSE, WASHINGTON, DC
Ms. Bronson. Thank you.
Thank you for inviting me to discuss the Department of
Defense Cooperative Threat Reduction program and how the CTR
program can support the G-8 Global Partnership against the
spread of weapons and materials of mass destruction. I have
submitted a written statement, so I will keep my remarks this
morning brief.
The Chairman. Your entire statement will be placed in the
record.
Ms. Bronson. The Department of Defense's Cooperative Threat
Reduction program has helped to reduce WMD and WMD
infrastructure. It has improved accountability for WMD and
improved the storage and transport security of WMD. In
addition, the CTR program has helped provide secure storage for
weapons-grade fissile material.
The Global Partnership offers a means to accelerate and
expand this effort. In today's security environment, CTR's
technical and regional expertise will serve well the global
security cooperation we envision that our G-8 partners can
undertake and help sustain our longstanding commitment to work
with other countries to prevent the proliferation of weapons of
mass destruction.
With over a decade of CTR experience, success, and lessons
learned, the Department is prepared to work with our G-8
partners to help them address implementation and government-to-
government procedural issues that may have blocked expenditure
of nonproliferation and threat reduction funding. The CTR
umbrella agreements we have negotiated with the FSU states,
with their liability protections, exemption from taxation, and
access to work sites, offer an excellent template for the
assistance contemplated by the Global Partnership.
We hope that this interaction will promote a coordinated
effort between the G-8 partners that is beneficial to the
recipient nations. We are confident that a common approach to
the challenging implementation issues will strengthen our
efforts of each participating party.
To ensure a coordinated and mutually reinforcing effort, it
is vital that DOD and others share the lessons we have learned.
For example, the administration has developed more stringent
guidelines for cooperative research with Russia on dangerous
pathogens in response to our continuing concerns over Russia's
commitment to comply with the biological weapons convention.
These guidelines should be shared with other donor states if
they are to decide to fund similar research.
We have invested over $229 million in the design and site
preparations for the chemical weapons destruction facility. The
President's budget has requested $126 million for fiscal year
2003 to construct the pilot plant.
The Chairman. I beg your pardon, Madam Secretary, how much
did you say that was? Requested how much?
Ms. Bronson. The request is $126 million, sir.
The Chairman. Thank you.
Ms. Bronson. We are working with Russia on meeting
congressionally mandated conditions so that construction can
begin. We intend to continue to press Russia to address the
concerns embodied by these conditions. However, as Dr. Rice
stated in her July 30 letter to Senator Lugar, at a minimum,
the information gathering process will be very time-consuming.
But the proliferation threat gives us no time to delay.
Therefore, the Department joins Under Secretary Bolton in
urging that Congress approve the administration's request for
authority for the President to waive these conditions if he
deems it is in the national interest.
Given the magnitude of the effort required, it is critical
for other donor states to invest heavily in this effort if
Russia is to eliminate all of its CW stocks by 2012.
We are working with other donors to identify the work and
to break it down into pieces that they can afford to fund. Thus
far Canada has committed nearly $4 million to this effort. The
United Kingdom is providing up to $18 million, and Italy
approximately $7 million. Germany has already committed $1.3
million and has also built a blister agent destruction
facility. The EU has committed $1.8 million in 2001. Other
states, including Netherlands, Norway, Sweden, and Switzerland,
will provide additional money for chemical weapons destruction.
DOD has developed an effective and efficient means to
eliminate WMD intercontinental delivery systems. Several
nations have indicated that they are interested in eliminating
shorter-range WMD delivery systems. We are prepared to share
with them what we have learned about the capabilities of a
variety of Russian enterprises involved in this area. We are
also prepared to share the numerous contracting procedures, the
rules of thumb that we have learned work best, such as
insisting on fixed-price contracts with recipient country
contractors, with pay after the work is completed, and unique
government cost-estimating experience.
The Chairman. You sound like you've tried to build a home.
Ms. Bronson. Whether it be responding to a specific
proliferation threat keeping WMD and related technologies out
of the terrorists' hands, or other scenarios, the Comprehensive
Threat Reduction program has a key role to play in securing
U.S. interests and in more actively engaging our G-8 partners
to accelerate the proliferation prevention solutions to the
issues that affect the entire international community.
Once again, congressional support for these efforts is
essential. As Under Secretary Bolton has testified, we are
seeking, in the Defense authorization bill, congressional
approval of the authority for the President to waive the annual
certification requirement. In this, and in all of our CTR
endeavors, we look forward to working with the Congress, which
has played such an important role in founding and improving
this program.
Thank you very much.
[The prepared statement of Ms. Bronson follows:]
Prepared Statement of Lisa Bronson, Deputy Under Secretary of Defense
for Technology Security and Counter-Proliferation
Thank you for inviting me to discuss the Department of Defense
Cooperative Threat Reduction (CTR) Program and how the CTR program
supports the G-8 Global Partnership Against the Spread of Weapons and
Materials of Mass Destruction.
The Soviet Nuclear Threat Reduction Act of 1991--the Nunn-Lugar
Act--charged Department of Defense (DOD) with establishing a program to
assist the Soviet Union and any successor state to destroy, safeguard
and prevent the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD).
Following the negotiation of the Umbrella Agreements with Russia,
Ukraine, Kazakhstan, and Belarus by the State Department, the DOD
created the CTR program to implement the Nunn-Lugar Act. Subsequently,
Moldova, Georgia, and Uzbekistan were added to this program. Through
CTR, the U.S. has assisted these states to dismantle, consolidate, and
secure WMD and their associated delivery systems, infrastructure, and
technology. CTR's defense and military cooperation with these states
has also furthered the objective of preventing proliferation.
Sustained support from Congress will remain essential as DOD
completes its ongoing programs to destroy or secure WMD in the States
of the former Soviet Union (FSU) and as DOD works with the interagency
to build a self-sustaining border security program in the non-Russian
States. In this respect, I want to take a moment to recognize the
vision shown by Senators Lugar and Nunn in creating this program and
continuing to support it for over a decade.
Since 1992 DOD has obligated over $3 billion for CTR assistance.
This investment has produced real dividends. The CTR program has helped
deactivate 5,990 nuclear warheads and eliminate 831 ballistic missile
launchers, 97 heavy bombers, 24 ballistic missile submarines and 815
ballistic missiles. Belarus, Kazakhstan and Ukraine acceded to the
Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty in 1993 and 1994 based on promises of
United States assistance to rid their countries of nuclear weapons. The
CTR program helped fulfill this promise by 1996.
dismantling fsu wmd, delivery systems, and associated infrastructure
The potential proliferation of FSU nuclear weapons, delivery
systems and related technologies continues to pose a threat to U.S.
national security. Several CTR program areas assist the FSU in
dismantling these items at their sources.
Russia. The President's FY 2003 budget request includes funding for
the Strategic Offensive Arms Elimination (SOAE) program area to assist
Russia in reducing its strategic nuclear delivery systems, including
the elimination of SS-24 and SS-25 mobile ICBM systems. We are also
moving forward with the design and site preparation of a chemical
weapons (CW) destruction facility at Shchuch'ye, and continuing
demilitarization of former CW production facilities.
Ukraine. Strategic Nuclear Arms Elimination projects have
eliminated all of Ukraine's START-accountable nuclear delivery vehicles
and are helping to dismantle WMD infrastructure and remaining delivery
systems (i.e., SS-24 missiles, Tu-22M bombers, and Kh-22 nuclear
capable air-to-surface missiles).
Kazakhstan. We have completely eliminated all strategic arms from
Kazakhstan. We plan to continue efforts to destroy equipment and
facilities that were used to support the deployment and operation of
Soviet WMD and delivery systems, including liquid missile propellant
and a chemical weapons production facility.
Uzbekistan. DOD conducted a CTR project in FY 2002 in Uzbekistan to
destroy anthrax that the Soviet military buried at the biological
weapons testing complex on Vozrozhdeniye Island there, and DOD
completed dismantlement of the former Soviet chemical weapons research,
development and testing facility at Nukus, Uzbekistan.
consolidate and secure fsu wmd and related technology and materials
DOD's CTR and DoE's nonproliferation programs support U.S. efforts
to prevent the proliferation of FSU WMD and related technology by
consolidating and securing nuclear weapons, fissile material, chemical
weapons and dangerous pathogen collections. We continue to be concerned
with the potential for theft or diversion of Russian nuclear weapons,
and plan to complete integration and installation of enhanced storage
site security systems, as well as secure better access to sites under
Russian law. The two chemical weapons sites storing artillery shells
and missile warheads are receiving security upgrades as are dangerous
pathogen collections. In Kazakhstan we are continuing efforts to
consolidate and secure fissile and radioactive material.
The Nuclear Weapons Transportation Security program with Russia
will continue assisting the consolidation of nuclear weapons from
Russia's Ministry of Defense (MoD) operational sites to Ministry of
Atomic Energy nuclear weapons dismantlement facilities. DOD will
continue funding rail shipments designed to carry nuclear warheads to
dismantlement sites, the maintenance of Russian railcars, and the
provision of specialized emergency response vehicles and nuclear
weapons recovery equipment to support MoD training for accidents or
incidents involving nuclear weapons.
We anticipate completing construction of a Fissile Material Storage
Facility at Mayak, Russia in 2003. Once operational, it will provide
centralized, safe, secure, and ecologically sound storage of up to 50
metric tons of weapons-grade plutonium and 200 metric tons of weapons
grade highly enriched uranium (HEU). The Russian Government has
informed us of its plans to begin loading it ``with fissile materials
derived from destruction of nuclear weapons'' in late 2003.
SUPPORT FOR DEFENSE AND MILITARY COOPERATION WITH THE OBJECTIVE OF
PREVENTING PROLIFERATION
We are increasing our contribution to the USG effort to combat the
smuggling of materials that could contribute to nuclear, biological,
and chemical weapons programs. The WMD Proliferation Prevention
Initiative is designed to enhance non-Russian FSU capabilities to
prevent, deter, detect and interdict illicit trafficking in WMD and
related materials, and to respond effectively to trafficking incidents
at the border. This initiative will provide training, equipment and
infrastructure designed to enhance recipient countries' capabilities to
prevent WMD or related materials from falling into the hands of
terrorists and rogue states. We are working with our interagency
counterparts to finalize an overall U.S. government strategic plan for
the future of WMD border security assistance to ensure that DOD's
efforts are fully coordinated with those of other agencies. We have
begun development of prototype projects that DOD expects to begin
implementing in FY 2003.
dod's role in supporting the global partnership
The CTR program has helped: 1) reduce WMD and WMD infrastructure;
2) improve accountability for, and storage and transport security of,
WMD; and, 3) provide secure storage for weapons grade fissile material.
The Global Partnership provides a means to accelerate and expand
this effort. In today's security environment, CTR's technical and
regional expertise will serve well the global security cooperation we
envision with our G-8 partners and help to sustain our long-standing
commitment to work with other countries to prevent the proliferation of
WMD. With a decade of CTR experience, success, and lessons learned, DOD
is prepared to work with our G-8 partners to help them address
implementation and government-to-government procedural issues that may
have blocked expenditure of non-proliferation and threat reduction
funding. The CTR Umbrella Agreements we have negotiated with FSU
states--with their liability protections, exemption from taxation and
access to work sites--offer an excellent template for the assistance
contemplated by the Global Partnership. We hope that this interaction
will promote a coordinated effort between the G-8 partners that is
beneficial to the recipient nations. We are confident that a common
approach to challenging implementation issues will strengthen the
efforts of each participating Party.
To ensure a coordinated and mutually reinforcing effort, it is
vital that DOD and others share the lessons we have learned. For
example, the Administration has developed more stringent guidelines for
cooperative research with Russia on dangerous pathogens in response to
our continuing concerns over Russia's commitment to comply with the
Biological Weapons Convention. These guidelines should be shared with
other donor States if they decide to fund similar research.
We have invested over $229 million in the design and site
preparations for the Chemical Weapons Destruction facility. The
President's budget has requested $126 million for FY 2003 to construct
the pilot plant. We are working with Russia on meeting Congressionally
mandated conditions so that construction can begin. We intend to
continue to press the Russians to address the concerns embodied by
these conditions. However, as Dr. Rice stated in her July 30, 2002
letter to Senator Lugar, ``At a minimum, the information-gathering
process will be very time consuming, but the proliferation threat gives
us no time to delay.'' Therefore, we join Under Secretary Bolton in
urging that the Congress approve the Administration's request for
authority for the President to waive these conditions if he deems it is
in the national interest.
Given the magnitude of the effort required, it is critical for
other donor states to invest heavily in this effort as well if Russia
is to eliminate all its CW stocks by 2012. We are working with other
donors to identify the work and break it down into pieces they can
afford to fund. Thus far Canada has committed nearly $4 million to this
effort, the United Kingdom is providing up to $18 million and Italy
approximately $7 million. Germany committed $1.3 million in 2002, and
has also built a blister agent destruction facility. The EU committed
$1.8 million in 2001. Other states, including The Netherlands, Norway,
Sweden, and Switzerland will provide an aggregate of approximately $24
million for chemical weapons destruction.
DOD has developed an effective and efficient means to eliminate WMD
intercontinental delivery systems. Several nations have indicated they
are interested in eliminating shorter-range WMD delivery systems. We
are prepared to share with them what we have learned about the
capabilities of a variety of Russian enterprises involved in this area.
We are also prepared to share the numerous contracting procedures
and rules-of-thumb we have learned work best, such as insisting on
fixed price contracts with recipient country contractors, with pay
after the work is completed, and unique Government cost estimating
experience.
EMERGING OPPORTUNITIES FOR CTR
Whether it be responding to a specific proliferation threat,
keeping WMD and related technologies out of terrorists' hands, or other
scenarios, CTR has a key role to play in securing U.S. interests and in
more actively engaging our G-8 partners to accelerate proliferation
prevention solutions to issues that affect the international community.
Once again, Congressional support for these efforts is essential. As
Under Secretary Bolton has testified, we are seeking in the Defense
Authorization bill Congressional approval of the authority for the
President to waive the annual certification requirement for the
Cooperative Threat Reduction funding. In this and all other CTR
endeavors, we look forward to working with Congress, which has played
such an important role in founding and improving this program.
The Chairman. Thank you very much.
Ambassador Brooks.
STATEMENT OF HON. LINTON BROOKS, ACTING ADMINISTRATOR, NATIONAL
NUCLEAR SECURITY ADMINISTRATION, DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY,
WASHINGTON, DC
Mr. Brooks. Mr. Chairman, thank you very much, members of
the committee. Like my colleagues, I have a statement, and,
like my colleagues, I will truncate it, with your permission.
You will find when you review our formal statements that
there's a great deal of overlap. That's because we seek to
present before you our common enthusiasm for the Global
Partnership and our common determination to work together to
make it succeed.
Under Secretary Bolton has spoken about the
administration's general support. I would just like to add, on
behalf of Secretary Abraham, that this is a very high priority
for the Department of Energy, as well, and he has made that
clear most recently in his dealings at the International Atomic
Energy Agency's General Conference.
From the standpoint of the Department of Energy, we were,
of course, working on proliferation well before the Global
Partnership. Of the roughly $1 billion for nonproliferation in
Russia for fiscal 2003, our share is about $443 million, and I
would expect comparable figures in future years.
We look forward, as Secretary Bolton said, to support from
our G-8 partners. We've made substantial progress in Russia,
but there still exists hundred of tons of poorly guarded
weapons grade material, a large nuclear weapons complex, and
there's still three reactors producing plutonium.
If I may digress, we are working, as Secretary Wolf said,
on the shutting down of various research reactors. Our next
step in that, I hope, will occur with the return of spent fuel
from Uzbekistan later this year. That's somewhat more
challenging than the Vinca operation, which involved only fresh
fuel, but we believe that the Russians have finally gotten
their legal system in order to let this happen.
Now, in all of these areas, if our allies choose, and we
hope very much they will choose, they can make a substantial
contribution. But most important, from the standpoint of the
Department of Energy, is participation in the Russian portion
of plutonium disposition.
The Chairman. Plutonium disposition.
Mr. Brooks. Plutonium, yes, sir. Gaining full funding for
that program is crucial to our attempts to eliminate 34 tons of
Russian weapons plutonium, which is enough for well over 8,000
warheads.
There are other areas where contributions by our allies
would be particularly valuable. They would permit us to carry
out the decommissioning of reactors in Russian Kazakhstan that
produced plutonium, carry that out more rapidly. They would
assist in preventing the hemorrhage of WMD expertise. They
would assist in expediting the research reactor fuel return
that I just mentioned. And, in particular, a relatively new
task, we see a role for our allies in assisting in securing
radiological sources.
We also think that there is a value beyond the financial.
The visible involvement of the world's leading economies in
cooperative nonproliferation demonstrates that this is, in
fact, a global response to a global challenge.
Now, as Secretary Bolton mentioned, we have to be
realistic. In agreeing this year on a Global Partnership, the
G-8 laid the foundation, but there's a good deal of work that
we have to do to turn promise into performance. It'll take time
to realize the potential of this partnership. Our partners have
to continue to match their words with financial commitments,
and Russia has to cooperative on implementing arrangements. And
that's a key question.
The G-8 is committed to resolving the type of sensitive
implementation issues that have impeded all of our efforts to
work effectively in Russia. The guidelines call for effective
monitoring and transparency, for exemption from taxes, duties,
and levies, for privileges and immunities.
In implementing our program, we have regularly run into
problems in this area. For example, our efforts to expand down-
blending of highly enriched uranium under the Material
Consolidation Conversion Program are being hampered by Russian
issues that relate to taxes and liabilities and by other
Russian bureaucratic problems. We continue to face access
issues in the closed cities and in the serial production
points. Access restrictions, of course, hinder our ability to
conduct the program, but they also hinder our ability to
demonstrate the transparency that allows us to assure you and
the skeptical colleagues you referred to earlier that our funds
are being spent on the purpose for which they are intended.
I don't mean to overstate our problems. In general, I'm
quite pleased with our cooperative efforts, but it would be
foolish to ignore these difficulties. Secretary Bolton pointed
out our allies have faced similar problems. And if the Global
Partnership is to fulfill its potential, Russia has to work
with us to resolve these issues.
Despite these challenges, however, it's clear that the
Global Partnership is an opportunity to write a new chapter in
nonproliferation and cooperative efforts. And, under the
President's leadership, we intend to work tirelessly to make
this happen. And, as we do, we continue to be extremely
grateful for both the leadership and the support shown by this
committee.
Thank you, sir.
[The prepared statement of Ambassador Brooks follows:]
Prepared Statement of Hon. Linton Brooks, Acting Administrator,
National Nuclear Security Administration, Department of Energy
Mr. Chairman, Members of the Committee. I am pleased to have the
opportunity to appear before you and discuss the impact of the G-8
Global Partnership on Department of Energy non-proliferation programs.
At the outset, I want to thank the Senate, and Senators Biden, Lugar
and the other members of this Committee in particular, for the support
and leadership shown in passing the Foreign Relations Authorization Act
and its specific language that is relevant to the Global Partnership.
We agree completely with the legislation's conclusion that addressing
threats of under-secured nuclear and radiological materials in Russia
is ``a burden that will have to be shared by the Russian Federation,
the United States, and other governments, if these threats are to be
neutralized.'' The President's initiative in establishing the G-8
Global Partnership illustrates how firmly the Administration shares
this view.
laying the groundwork for expanded global nonproliferation efforts
Under Secretary Bolton has made it clear that the Administration
strongly supports the Global Partnership, which we regard as a
significant step toward more effective nonproliferation. The Department
of Energy and the National Nuclear Security Administration share that
strong support. We look forward to helping to implement, the Global
Partnership initiative. During last month's IAEA General Conference in
Vienna, Secretary Abraham commented to our G-8 partners that the United
States is ``especially excited about the G-8 Global Partnership
Initiative because it . . . binds us together in a spirit of resolve.
And I know that the Global Partnership will increase and accelerate the
good works that we can do.''
The Global Partnership has the potential to establish a coordinated
nonproliferation effort with a global reach. This is reflected in the
substantial resource commitments that the G-8 allies have set as their
goal to address proliferation threats in Russia, and in the six
principles for action that the G-8 agreed to in their June 27th
statement. These principles provide measures that all states can look
to as they fashion responses to proliferation threats.
DOE IMPACTS
The United States was moving to deal with the challenges of
nonproliferation well before the establishment of the Global
Partnership. The Administration has requested approximately $1 billion
for nuclear nonproliferation programs in Russia and other former Soviet
states for FY 2003, and is committed to maintaining that general level
of commitment over the ten-year period of the Global Partnership. The
Department of Energy's budget for nonproliferation programs in Russia
and other NIS is approximately $443 million for FY03 and I anticipate
comparable or increased funding for FY04. Thus it is clear that the
United States is already making its contribution toward its Global
Partnership commitment. We look forward to comparable support from our
G-8 partners.
The Global Partnership will affect the Department of Energy's
nuclear nonproliferation programs in many ways. While we have made
enormous progress in Russia by securing hundreds of tons of weapons-
usable material, facilitating the consolidation and downsizing of
Russia's nuclear weapons complex, and fostering the conversion of
former weapons scientists and experts to civilian activities, much
remains to be done. There still exist hundreds of tons of poorly
guarded weapons-grade nuclear material, a very large nuclear weapons
complex that is still fading serious economic and employment hardships,
and a nuclear infrastructure that continues to produce plutonium via
three operating plutonium production reactors. If our allies choose--
and we hope they will choose--the Global Partnership could lead to
projects providing much-needed resources to areas being addressed by
the Department of Energy. International funding will be especially
important to support Russia's participation in the plutonium
disposition program. Gaining full funding for this program is crucial
to our attempts to eliminate 34 metric tons of Russian weapons
plutonium, enough for over 8,000 nuclear Weapons.
Contributions by our allies would also help in other areas. For
example, they would permit us to carry out the decommissioning of
reactors in Russia and Kazakhstan used to produce plutonium. We have
also encouraged other G-8 members to contribute to cooperative efforts
aimed at preventing the hemorrhaging of WMD expertise, expediting
research reactor fuel return, and securing radiological sources, and we
continue to support multilateral civil nuclear reactor safety programs.
Beyond the benefit of additional resources, the visible involvement
of all of the world's leading economies in cooperative nonproliferation
efforts will demonstrate that securing and eliminating weapons of mass
destruction and related materials is truly a contribution to global
security. The challenges we face are global; the solutions must be
global as well.
POTENTIAL PROBLEMS
As these brief examples make clear, the United States sees great
potential benefit from the Global Partnership. But I am also a realist.
In agreeing on June 27 of this year to the Global Partnership, the G-8
nations laid the foundation for expanded global nonproliferation
efforts, but much work remains to be done to turn promise into
performance. It will take time to realize the potential of this
Partnership, and it will require leadership and persistence on the part
of the United States. Our partners must match their words with
financial commitments and Russia must cooperate on implementing
arrangements. A key question is whether the leadership of the Russian
Federation will take the implementation decisions necessary for the
Global Partnership to succeed.
Through the Global Partnership the G-8 has committed to resolving
the type of sensitive implementation issues that have at times impeded
our ability to work effectively in Russia. The implementation
guidelines call, among other things, for ``effective monitoring . . .
and transparency measures,'' for provisions to ensure assistance will
be ``exempt from taxes, duties, levies and other charges,'' and for
``appropriate privileges and immunities.'' In implementing our
programs, the Department of Energy has regularly had to address
obstacles in several of these areas. For example, our efforts to expand
downblending of highly enriched uranium under the Material
Consolidation and Conversion Program or to move forward with other
cooperative projects have been delayed by bureaucratic problems
associated, in part, with issues of taxation and liability. In
addition, we continue to face access problems at Ministry of Atomic
Energy's (MinAtom) closed cities and serial production plants. Access
restrictions hinder both our efforts to conduct our joint programs and
our ability to ensure the transparency that is correctly required by
Congress.
I do not mean to overstate our problems, which we are working to
resolve. In general, I am pleased, with our cooperative efforts. But it
would be foolish to ignore these difficulties. Some of our allies have
faced similar problems that they have not yet been able to resolve. If
the Global Partnership is to fulfill its potential, Russia must work
with the other G-8 nations to resolve these and other issues related to
liability protection, exemption from taxation, and access.
CONCLUSION
Mr. Chairman, the Global Partnership offers an opportunity to write
a new chapter in cooperative non-proliferation. If we are able to bring
its promise to fruition, we can help create a safer world for all
humanity. Under the President's leadership, we intend to continue to
work vigorously with our G-8 partners to seize this new opportunity. As
we do so, we continue to be grateful for the leadership and support
shown by this Committee.
Thank you for your attention, and I look forward to your questions.
The Chairman. Thank you.
Let me begin by asking you something, Mr. Brooks, that I
think is important for folks to understand. You pointed out
that the Plutonium Disposition Initiative relates to 34 tons of
plutonium.
Mr. Brooks. Yes, sir.
The Chairman. Enough for 8,000 nuclear weapons, roughly.
Describe for the committee where the 34 tons of Russian
plutonium is and what, from your perspective--and I'd invite
Defense or anyone else to chime in--what the nature of the
security relating to this plutonium is.
Mr. Brooks. It's in various locations throughout the
Ministry of Atomic Energy's complex. We are working--and this
is an area where we've had a good deal of success--to improve
the security of those facilities. Rather than give figures in
terms of number of facilities, we tend to like to give figures
in terms of amount of material.
We see about 600 tons of plutonium and uranium in the
MinAtom complex. By the end of this year, we'll have had
initial upgrades on between 80 and 90 percent of those. And
we'll be starting on the more robust comprehensive upgrades. We
will complete----
The Chairman. Upgrades in security?
Mr. Brooks. Upgrades in security. We will complete the
upgrades throughout the MinAtom complex by 2008, which is about
3 years earlier than I would have testified a year or so ago,
as a result of a combination of the very strong support of the
Congress and some work that Secretary Abraham and his
counterpart have done in clearly away bureaucratic obstacles.
The Chairman. Let me tell you why I asked the question. I'm
going to make a comparison that is not completely appropriate.
Years ago, when we were trying to get a handle on the drug
problem in the United States, we identified source countries,
the type of materials they were producing, the type of activity
they were engaged in, precursor chemicals and their sources, et
cetera. And we found that it was an incredibly broad problem.
And to be able to do everything one would ideally like to do
have exceeded the resources we had available to us.
But we found there were 34 agencies within the Federal
Government that had responsibility for dealing with the drug
problem in America, and there was no master plan. There was no
list of priorities. There was no place you could go and ask one
person, what is the Federal Government's plan to deal with this
problem? What are you going to attack first? Are you going to
attack poppy fields or coca fields? What continent are you
going to look to? How are you going to allocate your resources?
Everyone, over the past years, who has testified about the
problem relating to weapons of mass destruction and vehicles
that can deliver them, and the application of Nunn-Lugar
funding, has said the extent of the work to be done far exceeds
the resources available to do it. And now we are engaging, in a
very positive way, the energies, and hopefully, the funds of
other industrial nations. As Senator Lugar said, we hope to go
beyond the G-8 promise and get participation here.
But what confuses me--and this is not a criticism--is that
I cannot find one place in the Federal Government and get one
document that says, ``These are our priorities. This is our
wish list. This is where we're going to expand our limited
energies and our funds, and this is and this is where we're
going to try to get our allies and our friends and those who
share our concern to weigh in, to be helpful.'' Ms. Bronson
came as close as anybody to dealing with this issue.
There seems to be, to me, a disconnect between the real
system and what you would get if you gave this problem to a
management kid at the Wharton School and said, ``How would you
manage this effort?'' I would respectfully suggest they
wouldn't manage it the way we're managing it. Now, granted,
this is all building on an initiative that was incredibly
important, started by Senator Lugar and Senator Nunn, and in an
environment that's rapidly changed, and we've learned more.
We've learned more about the difficulty in access, the
credibility of the assertions, the bureaucratic difficulties
getting there, the total amount of the offending material, et
cetera.
But if I were to ask the question--I ask all three of you
this--is there any one place I could go to get a single
document that said, ``The U.S. Government believes that the
single most dangerous elements of this problem are the
following, and we are attempting to match our resources to the
degree to which we think a danger exists,'' has that kind of
inventory, has that kind of list, has that kind of
prioritization been done? Does one exist?
And, second, if it exists, how have we begun to use
opportunity to work with our allies in dealing with what we
think are the priorities?
So that's my question, the only question I'll ask you, Is
there a place I could go and get one document that said, ``This
is our wish list based on the threat that is presented by the
existence of this material''? And, two, what resources we're
going to assign to that, and what we're going to seek from the
Congress or interagency? And, three, how do we begin to
interface with our allies who are only now coming to grips with
this by virtue of their recent commitment?
Mr. Brooks. With respect to nuclear materials, the one
place you can go is me, under the supervision of the Secretary
of Energy, because that's clearly our responsibility. We do
have an overall strategy, and your question reminds me that we
may not have done as good a job about setting it forth in a
written form, so let me describe it.
The first part of the strategy is to stop making the stuff;
in particular, to stop making it in the Russian Federation.
There, we seek to shut down the 3 remaining plutonium
production reactors, and we seek allied cooperation to make
that happen sooner.
The second thing is to take what exists and try and
consolidate it. We're spending about a quarter of the material
protection, control, and accounting funds in trying to
consolidate material, both within sites and among sites.
Third is to guard the material that is consolidated. I want
to talk about the Russian Federation. I'll talk about the rest
of the world in a minute. There, we seek to do, first, the
quick upgrades, and then the more comprehensive upgrades, and
we are not now limited by money. We are limited by the ability
of the Russian Federation to absorb this in a meaningful way.
So there, although there may come a time when we want our
allies to contribute, that's less high on my priority list for
allied cooperation. And then, finally, wherever possible, to
eliminate it.
Senator Lugar mentioned the HEU Purchase Agreement which
eliminates HEU. An experts group which I chaired for the U.S.
side was chartered by the two Presidents to look at other ways
to eliminate materials. Our results are a foot in the door, but
we are working to implement them. Plutonium production is
another major form of implementation. And there, once again, I
need to have the support of my partners internationally.
Now, if you look at that chain, and then you step outside
of the Russian Federation, you look at consolidation, and say,
highly enriched uranium at research reactors--you want to
consolidate that by moving the material back. That's a
combination effort for Secretary Wolf and myself, because it
has both diplomatic and technical efforts. We, as he alluded,
are working to see if we can move that process a little faster.
There have been problems with Russian legislation which
allegedly are almost overcome. When one deals with Russian
legislation, the word ``allegedly'' is used advisedly.
Then there is material which is part of the fuel cycle in
the rest of the world. There are, for example, about 200 tons
of separated plutonium in the world. The part that's not in
Russia is largely in western Europe and Japan. There, the
Secretary has begun a dialog with his counterparts to try and
look, not at U.S. funding, but at best practices to make sure
that we are all focusing on this material. Within the United
States, we have long held very strong controls over materials,
and we upgraded and improved those in the aftermath of last
September.
So that's the strategy.
Now, priorities. I'm reluctant to give priorities, because
I want to do it all. But, if you notice, I've fully funded
protecting the stuff, and I am drawing on my partners for
elimination and cessation of production. So that's probably a
pretty good judge of the near-term priority, is to protect what
exists. The long-term priority is to reduce the amount of
material. That's the broad strategy, and the lead for that is,
on the materials side, firmly within the Department of Energy.
The Chairman. That's very helpful. I would like to ask you,
either in open forum or in a classified forum, and there is no
hurry--between now and you tell me a reasonable time, a month,
whatever it takes--to submit to this committee in writing those
points which you outlined for me just now and, attached to each
of the points you made, what are the problems related to that
effort, what are the Russian absorption capacities? Be specific
in the response. What is that absorption capacity problem? I'm
not asking you now. How does that play out? What kind of
bureaucratic problems are you running into? I'd like to have as
specific an analysis as we can.
And, again, if you conclude that it needs to be in
classified form, I'm not sure why it would, but if it does, if
you conclude that, then you let us know. But it would be a very
helpful guidepost for us in being able to follow and fully
understand the nature of this undertaking. Although it would
not be your purpose, you may find, as we authorize moneys, that
we insist you have more than you say you need, because no one
ever says they need more than the OMB tells them that they can
say they need.
And, to the extent that each of you would be willing,
within your sphere, to prepare a similar document for us,
please do so. I know I'm making work for you, but I know it's
all available. This is a matter of gathering this together. It
would be a very useful three sets of documents for this
committee to have, in order for us--and not that Senator;
Senator Lugar, as an old joke goes, has forgotten more about
this than most people are going to learn--but it would be a
useful three documents for the rest of the members of this
committee, including myself, if you'd be willing to do that.
Mr. Brooks. I'd certainly be delighted in the materials
area, and we'll look at the other areas where it's appropriate.
The Chairman. And, Senator Lugar--I kind of warned him of
this ahead of time--I'm going to ask, since I must go to a
12:15 meeting, and I apologize to the last panel, if you'd be
willing to chair this to its conclusion.
But I'm going to submit, with your permission, to each of
you, about three to five questions.
But the main thing, if you did nothing else for me, is to
try to organize what we've just spoken about from each of your
perspectives. That would be a very, very helpful--at least for
me, and I think the rest of my committee--if you'd be willing
to do that.
Yes, Mr. Wolf.
Mr. Wolf. I'd just make one point. I think some of this is
also going to be evolutionary, and we can take the stock photo
of where we are in the issues that we've talked about today.
But after September 11, we've defined additional new problems
that we're looking at, the whole question of dangerous
materials and trying to get our hands around what the nature of
the problem is, and some of them are almost unbounded, like BW-
type problems.
The Chairman. I agree.
Mr. Wolf. But we have the whole set of radioactive
materials that Ambassador Brooks didn't talk about, but
radioactive materials all around the world. He mentioned it
briefly in his remarks. And some of this, for instance----
The Chairman. We have a problem here in the United States
with radioactive materials.
Mr. Wolf. And we're trying to use--we will try to look--
we're doing an NDF survey, for instance, and I think NTI is
doing something----
The Chairman. They are.
Mr. Wolf [continuing]. Looking at the nature of this
problem. We're working with the IAEA. We will not be able to
tell you the answer to that one this week, but we're working on
it.
The Chairman. No, but you will be able to tell me where you
are now.
Mr. Wolf. Yes, sir.
The Chairman. I understand, we fully understand this is not
a static issue. We fully understand that this changes; for
example, it could change in direct proportion to our knowledge
of what terrorist groups were seeking.
Mr. Wolf. Yes, sir.
The Chairman. I mean, it may very well change. There are
certain things that are clear. For example, as bad as, and as
lethal as biological pathogens could be, and are, if, in fact,
there were a nuclear device in the hands of a terrorist group,
and/or even state actors, we know that the consequences of
that, at least in terms of limiting our potential ability to
respond to the actions of the state actors, would be
substantial. So obviously, plutonium is a big deal. We also
know that anthrax is a problem.
But if you're in a world, in which Presidents and
Secretaries have to make these hard decisions. As my deceased
father used to say, ``If everything's equally important to you,
nothing is very important to you.'' And these are tough calls.
I just want to know where you are at the moment. It is not
to hold anyone accountable. This is not to go back and say,
``Wait a minute now, man, you said this and you didn't do,
that.'' That's not the purpose of this. Truly. The purpose of
my inquiry relates to the state of your thinking and how it's
evolving. How it's evolving.
So I realize your thinking is not static, but it is,
nonetheless, important that we get a sense of where you are in
the game. Because you may find the three of you, what I have
found after 30 years of being a United States Senator in
oversight hearings: that sometimes a circumstance arises where
a committee in the Congress may actually be able to be helpful
in meshing what we find upon submission are slightly different
perspectives.
As an old bad joke goes, you know, ``We're from the
Congress; we're here to help.'' But that's really the purpose
here, for us to have a better grasp.
Secretary Bronson, you had a comment, and then I'll yield
to Senator Lugar.
Ms. Bronson. Mr. Chairman, we would be happy to respond to
your request. I can give you a partial answer that has two
parts. First, the administration undertook a review of all the
assistance that we're providing to Russia. And, in that review,
the administration identified general priorities. And that
process led to the shifting of some of our priorities. I'll
give you three examples.
One example can be seen in the funding requests we have for
the chemical weapons destruction facility. Last year, we
requested $35 million. This year, to reflect our increased
priority on this project, we have requested $126 million. In
the area of biological weapons, the Department last year asked
for $17 million. We renotified $33 million, and this year we
have asked for $55 million. We've added an additional program
of $40 million to work specifically on WMD border security. In
the----
The Chairman. That's exactly the point I'm making. And let
me be bold enough to suggest that, in addition to the
incredible and enlightened initiative of you and others at
Defense, there were two other intervening acts. One was 9/11,
and the other was Richard Lugar. And that is a fact. The truth
of the matter is, you are all as concerned as Senator Lugar and
others are about those close to 2 million artillery shells at
Shchuch'ye. Were it not for Senator Lugar, there would have
been no public discussion about that particular facility.
Internally, you'd all discuss it. But it's kind of amazing, you
know, when a spotlight is focused on something that everybody
at home can understand: It is palpable. They can taste it. They
understand it. They can feel it. They can sense it. They know
it. They don't need to have a degree in physics. They don't
have to be a United States Senator or a Secretary. They
understand.
It makes no sense to have 2 million of these shells lying
around, like in a Wal-Mart, on shelving and us not destroying
them, no matter what else they're doing with their money. Even
if they're taking every penny we're putting in there and going
and building tactical nuclear weapons, it makes no sense not to
destroy those chemical weapons shells. None. Zero. People get
that. They didn't need any education, except Senator Lugar
showing up with a briefcase in that facility and showing it
would fit in it. All of a sudden, the focus went ``whoom.'' And
that's why we like to know these things, because we may be able
to help.
At any rate, I yield to the man with the briefcase.
Senator Lugar [presiding]. Let me extend your question, and
I appreciate the over-generous comments you made.
You know, as you pointed out, Secretary Bronson, the
administration did request, for chemical destruction, $126
million, as opposed to $35 million last year. That's a fourfold
increase, and it reflects this place, Shchuch'ye, we've been
discussing today and other things that you might be able to do.
That is, I suppose, our frustration, that despite the
Administration request, despite all of the weeks and months of
impetus to do this, it simply is not happening. That's where
focus has to come now, to the Appropriation bill conference.
House and Senate people meeting now are going to determine
whether a dime of that goes there, despite the fact the whole
world is interested in it. And I really, seriously underline
that. This is not a theoretical problem. It's a very practical
political problem in Washington, DC, within miles of us today,
or within a few hundred yards, maybe, of where that conference
is going to meet.
But I think Senator Biden's question of Dr. Brooks is so
important, because you pointed out the strategy. That is the
first time I have heard such a comprehensive explanation of the
strategy. So the record you have created already is a written
record, which is extraordinary. Now, for all of you who are
insiders, it may not be--you discuss this all the time. But,
for us who are in the outside world, even though each of these
elements is fairly evident, the composition of them certainly
has not been, the quantification at least of these elements--
you've suggested 34 tons of plutonium and 600 tons of highly
enriched uranium--that may be the amount, and maybe you want to
quantify that some more. As I said, the USEC people the other
day thought that it was 500.
Mr. Brooks. Senator, 500 is what we have an agreement to--
--
Senator Lugar. To do. But you----
Mr. Brooks [continuing]. 600 is the----
Senator Lugar. What you think is out there.
Mr. Brooks [continuing]. The material that I'm guarding in
Russia. That's not all plutonium, though.
Senator Lugar. So here we are on the threshold of potential
hostilities with Iraq, over the potential of their obtaining
some of this, and it makes all the difference between whether
they have the potential to make a bomb this year or 5 years
from now, according to intelligence estimates. They're now
quite public, and we all discuss them daily. That's a huge
difference.
Now, in fact, we know how much highly enriched uranium, or
we think we know, is in Russia and how much plutonium. And as
you say, you're trying to stop the production so that the
latter figure doesn't increase. Very important, just in a
logical sequence. But to quantify this helps us, that is, the
Congress.
Now, it may not help you. You got beat up within the
bureaucratic process, the budget process. You have requests.
You ardently argue your case. As loyal soldiers, you march back
down the hill, because that's the way that it is. We don't have
those constraints. We can say, in behalf of the American
people, it might be wise--and, granted, this requires Russian
compliance, because this is cooperative threat reduction; it's
on their soil, their plutonium--we might decide we want to
destroy that much more rapidly. But we might decide that even
though the upgrades, as you say, are now very substantial--and
they are, thank goodness, for both of our countries, Russia,
the United Sates, and the world, it would take to 2008 for
these to be completed. And that, at least under your work and
that of the Secretary, Mr. Abraham, is now 3 years sooner than
it might have been.
I've sat in briefings in which I have listened to how the
upgrades were going to go, and it was like building college
dormitories, one a year almost at that same degree of--not
casualness, but this is not that kind of a project. It had to
be, because you didn't have the money and there really was not
the commitment by the last administration or this one, thus
far.
All I'm saying is that, you know, given the head of steam
you saw with the chairman this morning, there may be much more
commitment. Once again, Russian cooperation required, because--
--
The Chairman. If I could interrupt you for a second to make
that point. The hearings on the FBI, when the Director of the
FBI sat there and said their computers would not be up to the
job, that they needed to be able to deal with what happened
from Minneapolis and Arizona for, I think he said 2007 or
something, people went, ``What? What? We are building highways
and we're doing tax cuts and we're doing health insurance, and
we're doing all that and you're telling me that we don't have
the money to give to the FBI to do that tomorrow?''
Because if the money were totally available, that time gets
cut by 75 percent. But they had it planned, based upon their
budget. And when people heard that, they went, ``Give me a
break.''
Now, granted, it was all before us anyway. You know, it was
all laid out there. But what you can help us do, for us, is
help us be able to explain to our colleagues. I believe, for
example, if we went to the floor and said, look, folks, it's
going to cost an extra $10, $20 billion to front end load
within the next 18 months to increase the destruction of the
plutonium stockpile by whatever--I'm making the numbers up,
because I don't know what they are--by 75 percent, and we made
the case on the floor, we'd get the $20 billion.
But you all have to operate, as planners, based upon what
you anticipate--what you're told you are likely to be able to
get. All we need to know is what your timeframe is. And we may
not win. We may go to the floor, and they'd say, ``No, we would
rather go out there and provide for building a--you know, a
Lawrence Welk Museum in somebody's home state.'' OK, so be it,
but at least we would be able to make the--I shouldn't have
said that, because there is a Lawrence Welk Museum somewhere.
I'm sorry. It's built. At any rate----
You understand what I'm saying here, OK? But the point is--
and I will stop with this--it makes a gigantic difference,
because our colleagues who don't do this every day, any more
than I do health care every day, not being on that committee.
Our colleagues, if they knew what the danger was relative to
the amount of money to deal with that danger, they may make a
different decision.
And the separation of powers deal, it is ours to propose.
The President can do it, too. But we have it fully within our
authority to say, ``Mr. President, we love you. We're going to
give you more money to do it faster. You may not like that, but
that's our priority.'' Just like the President is--he gets to
propose Justices and Secretaries, we get to dispose. It's a
flip here.
And so it's really very important. And, again, if you think
we're exaggerating, think of when Director Mueller sat there
and said, ``By the way, we won't be able to have--even have
Internet connections among''--or excuse me--``e-mail among our
own people for the next''--whatever the heck he said, you know,
x number of years.
People went, ``Wait a minute. My company does that. I'm
going to go out of business if I don't get mine upgraded.''
And we may go out of business, in a different way if we
don't upgrade ours.
And so that's, sort of, the context, in case you think
we're exaggerating our ability with your help to be able to
maybe do the job, help you front-end load the job. You sit
there, because, look, if I go to bed staring at the ceiling
sometimes wondering about this, each of you go to bed every
night confident you're doing your best, but staring at the
ceiling going, ``Whoah, whoah.'' We may be helping you sleep a
little better.
Senator Lugar. Mr. Chairman, let me just say
parenthetically that the President of the United States, two
Presidents ago, did not ask for the Nunn-Lugar Act. It happened
here. You've had to struggle with that ever since. But,
nevertheless, you're doing so remarkably.
The Chairman. I apologize to the third panel. I really do.
But thank you, Senator.
Senator Lugar. Let me just mention----
The Chairman. By the way, this may be the only committee in
the U.S. Senate where a Democrat would leave a Republican in
charge of the whole operation.
Senator Lugar. Thank you. I thank the chairman.
Let me just say, Dr. Brooks, you have been negotiating with
the Russians for a long time. I remember visits with you during
your START II negotiating days, long, tedious days with Russian
counterparts across the table, so you know these subjects
extraordinarily well. And this is why we are imposing upon your
good nature today, it's because we understand you know a whole
lot about it, much more than we do.
In order to make the arguments that Senator Biden has
suggested, we really need to know more, and we think we can be
helpful without causing difficulty for you. But we are sincere
in saying we think are colleagues really are of a mind in the
same way that our intelligence committees, and I'm part of that
joint inquiry, have been inquiring, how in the world do we
upgrade our intelligence in this country? There is a very great
desire on the part of the Congress. But in order to channel
that constructive element, we need the expertise of people who
have hands-on, who are working the problems.
And there's no doubt in my mind we're talking about
something here that shares that same degree of enthusiasm. If
we knew how to get through the quantities of materials--and
you've stated the priorities, how to help you enhance your
success--I think we can be helpful. And, as you can tell,
there's a certain degree of bipartisan support in this
committee and, I think, elsewhere to do that.
Let me just say, first of all, Secretary Wolf, you
mentioned specifically the Kirov situation, and that is a good
case in point. Although I did not enter the specific building
suspected of agent production at Kirov 200, I did visit with
persons who have worked there. They had moved down the street,
and they conveyed to us everything that's going on up the
street. We had an agreement in hand, an ISTC agreement; our
State Department is responsible for that. And we signed that
with the university people that very day. The people--the
former employees already had an ISTC agreement, and, therefore,
as you say, they had been working for a few months on very
vital projects, such as how to protect against biological
threats and various other things to which they could contribute
a lot of expertise.
So even within Kirov, already, ISTC is at work, in ways
that give us a full ability to deal with these people. By
``us,'' I mean, not just Senators, but members of the staff,
the Departments of Defense and State and Energy as they come
into the situation.
And, Secretary Bronson, behind you is Colonel Jim Reid
today, and I just must pay tribute to him, because he has been
a faithful traveler up and down Russia for years, understands
these questions remarkably well, and has been a tremendous
informant for me, and I appreciate the strong partnership that
you have with all of your staff, but I wanted to mention
specifically Colonel Reid.
Let me mention also that, in the case of the highly
enriched uranium, even the troubles we've had with USEC and our
own Government over the years are probably never going to be
over. We live in a real world in which the purchase of highly
enriched uranium sometimes conflicts with commercial interests,
people dealing with uranium in our own country. In the State of
Kentucky, for example, this has risen to the fore. And I
compliment those who have tried to work out formulas now, a
flexible formula for the price, and the Russians have
cooperated in working this out, so that we are now coming into
a much better flow in terms of offering and purchase. And that
the public, by and large, can't follow any more than most of us
can, because it's extremely complex, but extremely important.
Literally, this highly enriched uranium is being blended
down to low-enriched uranium and being utilized by nuclear
power plants in the United States.
Plutonium has been a tougher thing. Our colleague Senator
Domenici, as you know, is very active in this, and he's assured
me in the next Congress he wants to be even more active. He's
leaving the Budget chairmanship. He's coming over now to the
Energy Committee, either as chairman or ranking member,
depending upon the election. So he will be a vigorous partner
with us, as you may know.
But the Russians that we've visited with over the past few
years have been reluctant to destroy plutonium, and this is why
the large Mayak storage facility has been created for storage
of a lot of it.
Now, your progress in moving toward disposition of it,
whatever it may be, is tremendously important. And, once again,
not well understood, but plutonium is not as easily converted
as highly enriched uranium to some other purpose, but
tremendously important in terms of the material for, not just
Iraq, but anybody else who may come along in the war against
terrorism. Or al-Qaeda cells, wherever they may be, if they try
to work up something.
So we're going to be at this, I think, for a period of time
as it relates to this war against terrorism we are in. It's not
projected to 2008. It's happening now. So that does change our
perspective, I think, very substantially.
Let me just say, finally, in the same spirit the chairman
has asked Secretary Brooks to, sort of, write something up, I
would request that both Secretary Bronson and Secretary Wolf.
We really want to have a responsible set of proposals. We're
not going at this point, late in the session, to be rewriting
the act, because we're beyond that point. We're trying
desperately to get the appropriation bills finished
constructively now, and, likewise, authorization. But there is,
as you can tell in this committee, tremendous enthusiasm for a
comprehensive revision of this at the beginning of next
session, and we want to work with the administration.
This is why I've cited, because they're not confidential,
these two meetings with the President of the United States in
which I've had an audience, and I appreciate the generosity of
the President taking his time to understand the same things
we're saying publicly to you today. He absorbs this. He wants
it to happen, and he's tried to convey that.
Now, our bureaucracy is difficult, too, and to get that
message all the way through is trying, but I want to help him,
and he knows that, and so we're working together.
I thank all three of you for your testimony and, hopefully,
for the papers you will prepare in the next few weeks so that
we're ready for the next session.
Thank you.
The chairman would like to call now the third panel, Mr.
Kenneth Luongo, executive direction of the Russian-American
Nuclear Security Advisory Council of Princeton, New Jersey, and
Ms. Laura S.H. Holgate, vice president for Russian/NIS Programs
for the Nuclear Threat Initiative in Washington, DC.
We welcome both of you. Thank you for your patience,
although the hearing, I think, has provided a good prelude for
your testimony. And we appreciate the expertise that both of
you bring to this. I'd like for you to testify in the order
that I introduced you.
First of all, Mr. Luongo, would you offer your testimony?
STATEMENT OF KENNETH N. LUONGO, EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR, THE
RUSSIAN-AMERICAN NUCLEAR SECURITY ADVISORY COUNCIL, PRINCETON,
NJ
Mr. Luongo. Thank you, Senator Lugar, and thank you for the
invitation to testify today.
I really applaud the committee for holding this hearing. I
think the subject is absolutely essential. And, as both you and
Senator Biden alluded to, high level support and attention from
the Congress is essential, and this committee has been quite
good in that regard.
I have a formal statement, I ask that it be submitted for
the record.
Senator Lugar. It will be published in full.
Mr. Luongo. Thank you. My testimony is about two different
subjects. One, is the importance of threat reduction, and, the
second, is the Global Partnership, including financing and
prioritization.
The Cooperative Threat Reduction program has produced
significant and quantifiable results, which are all the more
remarkable because of the circumstances in which the program
has had to operate. There is intense collaboration with
ministries and institutes that, a decade ago, were enemies.
We've got approximately 6,000 nuclear warheads that have
been removed from deployment, 400 missile silos destroyed, and
almost 1,400 ballistic missiles, cruise missiles, submarines,
and strategic bombers that have been eliminated. The
transportation of nuclear weapons is more secure. The storage
and the security of nuclear materials has been improved. On the
human side, there's almost 40,000 weapons scientists in Russia
and the other FSU states that have been provided with some
peaceful research or commercial projects to work in.
So there are many, many statistical measures of the
importance of this work. But, beyond the statistics, there's
also the political importance of this work in U.S.-Russia
relations and, in terms of the numerous interactions between
U.S. and Russian scientists, military officers, and political
officials. I think that these issues provide an intangible
benefit of this work that is not well understood, either in the
public or perhaps in the political arena.
But the news is not all good on threat reduction, Senator,
as you know and you have alluded to. We have some essential
agenda items which are lagging, and, in some cases, work has
come to a virtual standstill. One example is this Cooperative
Threat Reduction program where the CTR certification dispute
stopped new contracts from being written in the spring and
early summer. Then there was a temporary waiver that allowed
work to begin again. Now, at the end of the fiscal year, we
have a stoppage yet again.
The restrictions on chemical weapons destruction in
Shchuch'ye have created a serious crisis and may result in the
termination of the project if it is not resolved. Access and
transparency has been alluded to many times today. These issues
are impeding both warhead and fissile material security
efforts. And the redirection of weapons scientists is not
producing lasting and career-changing employment opportunities,
which, in my view, is a very essential issue.
On the bioweapons side, since we don't know everything that
we would like to know, our information baseline is incomplete.
As a result, it's not clear that we're managing this threat to
the degree that we would like to do so.
With all of these problems and successes up to this point,
we now have a major new opportunity with the global
partnership. While the principles of the agreement are quite
broad, most of the focus has been on what projects would be
implemented in Russia and the FSU.
The first priority that is obvious from this initiative is
the issue of identifying funding. And the number that's been
alluded to is up to $20 billion over the next 10 years. The
projects that have been discussed in the Global Partnership
statement and in some of the meetings that have occurred since,
include destruction of chemical weapons, dismantlement of
decommissioned nuclear nonstrategic submarines, disposition of
fissile material, and the employment of weapons scientists. The
assumption, obviously, is that the United States would bear
about half of the $20 billion cost, because we're spending
about a billion dollars a year.
If you look at the non-U.S. G-8 nations that have committed
funds publicly to date, it totals only about $3.4 to $3.8
billion, so roughly about a third. If you add in what the EU
has said that they would contribute, which is about a billion
dollars over the 10 years, then you're roughly at the 50-
percent point, or actually slightly below $5 billion dollars.
But one of the things that I think the committee should
take note of is that there are certain loopholes about how
contributions are credited against this $20 billion. These
include the ability to count prior appropriations that are
unspent against the $20 billion total. It's not clear that
anybody will do that, but certainly that door is open.
Another financial question is the budget pressures on the
G-8 nations. It's not clear to me where the other $5 billion is
going to come from, if it must be found in national budgets.
Therefore, debt swap, as you and Senator Biden alluded to, is
one particular option in this regard. The passage of the
Foreign Relations Authorization Act is very important in this
regard. But, in my view, I think it would be a mistake if the
United States decided to enter into debt for nonproliferation
swap with Russia and then used that money to substitute for
current appropriations. I think only debt swap funds should be
used as a supplement to currently appropriated levels.
The other G-8 members, unfortunately, don't have quite the
cohesive view that the United States does on debt swap.
Germany, which is by far the largest creditor in the Paris
Club, is owed about $20 billion. It has concerns about Russia's
swapping its debt to finance nonproliferation activities. In
fact, it's so concerned that it's made a commitment of $1.5
billion in new money in order to not have to go through the
debt swap route, which I think is a very interesting decision.
Both Italy and France have expressed support for debt swap
initiatives. Neither Canada nor the United Kingdom and Japan
have taken a firm stance one way or the other, though perhaps
Canada and the U.K. might be more inclined.
But perhaps most importantly, it's not clear to me what the
Russian position on debt swap is. We've been hearing about some
concerns in Moscow that engaging in a debt swap might hurt the
international credit rating of Russia and that it could spur
inflation. But I'm not sure that I've seen a definitive
statement on this subject.
Let me turn now to the programmatic priorities of the
Global Partnership. As other witnesses have alluded to, I think
the initiative has to be carefully structured and coordinated
to maximize the efficient use of funds and to generate real
progress. It's clear what the interests of the G-8 nations are
from the Global Partnership statement, but I was in Europe last
week talking to a variety of different people about this
subject, and I think there are some hints, beyond what was in
the statement, that some of these nations could be interested
in additional activities. These include assisting with the
security of nuclear material, perhaps in concert with the
United States, and the physical protection of nuclear warheads.
What I think is lacking from the statements so far about
what the G-8 nations excluding the United States, are
interested in financing, is that there's been virtually no
focus on ``brain drain'' and scientists. I think this is a very
important problem, and I think it's going to be a persistent
problem. As I understand it, there are various lists floating
around Washington, not unlike your list, Senator, about what
the threat reduction priorities ought to be, and that the
conversion of defense facilities and the downsizing of the
defense complexes is one of the high priorities on these lists.
I think that it's inevitable that this downsizing is going to
create additional dislocation for these weapons scientists.
We've spent a lot of time in my organization on this
question of the reemployment programs for weapons scientists.
While they are essential, they are not working as well as they
could. It's very true that there are very few conversions of
weapons scientists' careers to non-weapon work. There is
definitely a lifeline that is being provided by the current
programs, but the career conversion of individual weapons
scientists has not been very effective. I think this is
something that both the G-8 nations and that the EU itself
should focus on more.
In this regard, I would like to comment on Ambassador
Brooks' statement that the billion dollars that the EU may
commit to the Global Partnership may be spent on plutonium
disposition. I think plutonium disposition is important, but
I'm not sure it's as important as dealing with the scientists
issue, and I think some portion of the EU contribution should
be devoted to that question.
I won't go into the details of what individual countries
are doing under the Global Partnership, it's in my formal
testimony, but let me just leave the committee with five
questions. Perhaps they are questions that the committee
already has considered, but they're questions that I think are
unanswered and are critical to the future and the success of
the Global Partnership.
The first is, are the projects identified for funding in
the G-8 statement the most urgent global nonproliferation
priorities, or should they be changed to reflect other
priorities?
Second, can the G-8 effectively coordinate their activities
to avoid overlap and duplication, or facilitate the
implementation of key projects where the U.S. cannot or will
not act?
Third, what will Russia do, both politically and
financially, to make this process work efficiently and to clear
away the impediments to progress that have developed over the
last 10 years?
And if I could just digress for a moment, I think this is
an essential issue. There is a lot of money which is backlogged
in some of these key threat reduction programs because of the
inability to spend it. And, in fact, the U.K. previously has
committed $750 million, I don't remember what exactly it is,
and now they also have committed another $120 million over a 3-
year period. That $750 million is essentially being spent in
support of U.S. programs because they cannot conclude an
agreement with the Russians to spend it by themselves. So I
think the problems of implementation in Russia are absolutely
essential.
Fourth, will the European G-8 nations and Japan really be
able to find $10 billion for this initiative over the next 10
years?
Finally, and perhaps most importantly, will U.S. political
support for threat reduction and leadership in this area remain
strong over the next 10 years, or will nagging problems and
disagreements sap the strength of the agenda?
Thank you.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Luongo follows:]
Prepared Statement of Kenneth N. Luongo, Executive Director, Russian-
American Nuclear Security Advisory Council
PERSPECTIVES ON THE G-8 GLOBAL PARTNERSHIP AGAINST THE SREAD OF WEAPONS
OF MASS DESTRUCTION
Mr. Chairman and members of the committee, thank you for your
invitation to testify before the committee today on the G-8 Global
Partnership, also known as the 10 + 10 Over 10 program. I am currently
the Executive Director of the Russian-American Nuclear Security
Advisory Council (RANSAC), a non-profit research organization dedicated
to supporting cooperative threat reduction efforts with Russia and the
Former Soviet States. RANSAC works closely with many governments,
particularly in the U.S., Russia, and European states, to develop new
cooperative nuclear security initiatives and to ensure the timely and
effective implementation of existing cooperative threat reduction
programs.
I applaud the committee for holding this hearing at this time. The
proliferation of weapons of mass destruction is a very serious issue
and the global effort to stem this proliferation and secure and destroy
existing weapons and materials requires high-level attention and
scrutiny of the type that this committee is providing today.
I am pleased to address the committee today on the subject of the
G-8's contributions to prevent the spread of weapons of mass
destruction as I just returned from a week in Europe where I had many
discussions on this subject. While the Global Partnership has very
broad principles that span many global objectives, the heart of the
initiative is focused initially on specific non-proliferation projects
that can be undertaken with Russia. Therefore, my remarks will focus
primarily on G-8-Russian non-proliferation activities.
Mr. Chairman, I will summarize my formal statement and ask that the
full text of my testimony be included in the official record of the
hearing.
THE STATUS OF THREAT REDUCTION
The U.S. Congress, in bipartisan action in 1991, laid the
foundation for the cooperative security agenda by enacting what became
known as the Nunn-Lugar program, named for its primary cosponsors,
Senators Sam Nunn (D-GA) and Richard Lugar (R-IN). This initiative has
since developed into a broad set of programs that involve a number of
U.S. agencies, primarily the Departments of Defense, Energy, and State.
The government now provides these programs with approximately $900
million to $1 billion per year.
Among the program's highlights:
The first success came in 1992, when Ukraine, Belarus, and
Kazakhstan agreed to return to Russia the nuclear weapons they
had inherited from the Soviet breakup, and to accede to the
Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty as non-nuclear weapon states.
The same year, the United States helped establish two science
centers designed to provide alternative employment for
scientists and technicians who have lost their jobs, and in
some cases have become economically desperate, as weapons work
in Russia and the FSU was significantly reduced.
In 1993, the United States and Russia signed the Highly
Enriched Uranium Purchase agreement, under which the United
States would buy 500 metric tons of weapons-grade highly
enriched uranium that would be ``blended down,'' or mixed with
natural uranium to eliminate its weapon usability and be used
as commercial reactor fuel. The two nations also established
the Material Protection, Control, and Accounting program, a
major effort to improve the security of Russia's fissile
material, and they signed an accord to build in Russia a secure
storage facility for fissile materials.
In 1994, U.S. and Russian laboratories began working
directly with each other to improve the security of weapons-
grade nuclear materials, and the two countries reached an
agreement to help Russia halt weapons-grade plutonium
production. Assistance to the Russian scientific community also
expanded, with weapons scientists and technicians being invited
to participate in the Initiatives for Proliferation Prevention
program, which is focused on the commercialization of non-
weapons technology projects.
In 1995, the first shipments of Russian highly enriched
uranium began arriving in the United States. The U.S. and
Russia also began to implement a new program to convert the
cores of Soviet-designed research reactors so that they no
longer use weapon-grade uranium.
In 1996, the last nuclear warheads from the former Soviet
republics were returned to Russia. In the United States,
Congress passed the Nunn-Lugar-Domenici legislation, which
expanded the original cooperative initiative and sought to
improve the U.S. domestic response to threats posed by weapons
of mass destruction that could be used on American soil.
In 1997, the United States and Russia agreed to revise their
original plutonium production reactor agreement to facilitate
the end of plutonium production.
In 1998, the two nations created the Nuclear Cities
Initiative, a program aimed at helping Russia shrink its
massively oversized nuclear weapons complex and create
alternative employment for unneeded weapons scientists and
technicians.
In 1999, the Clinton administration unveiled the Expanded
Threat Reduction Initiative, which requested increased funding
and extension of the life spans of many of the existing
cooperative security programs. The United States and Russia
joined to extend the Cooperative Threat Reduction agreement,
which covers the operation of such Department of Defense
activities as strategic arms elimination and warhead security.
In 2000, the United States and Russia signed a plutonium
disposition agreement providing for the elimination of 34 tons
of excess weapons-grade plutonium by each country.
In 2001, the Congress increased the funds for critical
threat reduction activities substantially above the requested
amounts, including in the post-9/11 supplemental appropriations
act.
In 2002, the G-8 agreed to expand the scope, funding, and
timeline for WMD threat reduction activities in Russia and the
Congress again provided supplemental funding for key efforts.
These and other efforts have produced significant, and
quantifiable, results--which are all the more remarkable since they
have been achieved under often difficult circumstances as ministries
and institutes that only a decade ago were enemies must now cooperate.
In Russia, roughly 6,000 nuclear warheads have been removed from
deployment; more than 400 missile silos have been destroyed; and almost
1,400 ballistic missiles, cruise missiles, submarines, and strategic
bombers have been eliminated. The transportation of nuclear weapons has
been made more secure, through the provision of security upgrade kits
for railcars, secure blankets, and special secure containers. Storage
of these weapons is gradually being upgraded at some sites, through the
employment of security fencing and sensor systems, and computers have
been provided in an effort to foster the creation of improved warhead
control and accounting systems.
With construction of the first wing of the Mayak Fissile Material
Storage Facility, the nuclear components from more than 12,500
dismantled nuclear weapons will be safely stored in coming years.
Security upgrades also are under way to improve the security of the
roughly 600 metric tons of plutonium and highly enriched uranium that
exist outside of weapons primarily within Russia and improvements have
been completed at all facilities containing weapon usable nuclear
material outside of Russia. Through the Highly Enriched Uranium
Purchase Agreement, 150 metric tons of weapon-grade uranium has been
eliminated.
On the human side of the equation, almost 40,000 weapons scientists
in Russia and other nations formed from the Soviet breakup have been
provided support to pursue peaceful research or commercial projects.
Beyond yielding such statistical rewards, these cooperative
programs also have created an important new thread in the fabric of
U.S.-Russian relations, one that has proven to be quite important
during times of tension. Indeed, the sheer magnitude of the cooperative
effort and the constant interaction among U.S. and Russian officials,
military officers, and scientists has created a relationship of trust
not thought possible during the Cold War. These relationships are an
intangible benefit that is hard to quantify in official reports, but
they are a unique result of this work.
However, the news in threat reduction is not all good. Progress on
this essential agenda has been lagging in key areas and in some
projects work is at a virtual standstill. Cooperation under the
Cooperative Threat Reduction (CTR) program was virtually suspended this
Spring and Summer over a dispute concerning Russia's chemical and
biological weapons declarations. This issue is likely to linger. U.S.
restrictions on funding for chemical weapon destruction at Shchuch'ye
have created a crisis that could result in the termination of the
project. Access and transparency disagreements are impeding warhead and
fissile material security efforts. The redirection of weapons
scientists is not producing lasting and career-changing new employment
opportunities. And our understanding of the Russian bio-weapons complex
and its security needs are incomplete and therefore our efforts to
manage this threat are lacking.
CONTRIBUTIONS FROM THE G-8 TO THREAT REDUCTION
Many of the recent G-8 summits have addressed the danger of the
proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. Past summit statements
have specifically focused on: nuclear reactor safety, radioactive
environmental dangers, and the threat of nuclear proliferation from the
FSU. However, there has been a mismatch between U.S. and other nation's
financial contributions to the non-proliferation agenda. Since 1992,
the U.S. has provided approximately $7 billion to nonproliferation
activities in Russia while G-8 nations have spent substantially less.
Some of the key G-8 activities are:
Nuclear Reactor Safety
During the Munich Summit in 1992, the G-7 established a
multilateral program for financing nuclear safety improvements for
countries in Central Europe and the FSU, and in 1993 proposed that the
European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD) establish the
Nuclear Safety Account (NSA) to receive contributions from donor
countries for the financing of short-term operational and safety
improvements of civilian reactors, specifically the VVER 440/230 and
RBMK-type reactors.
NSA played a critical role in officially decommissioning the
Chernobyl site in December 2000. In addition to the NSA, the EBRD also
administers the Chernobyl Shelter Fund (CSF). This program was
established after the 1997 Denver Summit, during which the G-7,
European Union, and Ukraine agreed to establish a multilateral funding
mechanism to assist Ukraine to transform the existing Chernobyl
sarcophagus over the destroyed Unit 4 into a stable and environmentally
safe system. The objective of the program is to stabilize the existing
sarcophagus and to build a confinement facility around it to isolate
its radioactive materials from damaging the surrounding environment and
water supplies. Stabilization is expected by 2003, while completion of
the confinement is anticipated in 2006.
Nuclear Smuggling
During the 1996 Nuclear Safety and Security Summit in Moscow, the
G-8 initiated the ``Programme for Preventing and Combating Illicit
Trafficking in Nuclear Material.'' The G-8 made the following pledges:
Share and promptly disseminate information on nuclear theft
and smuggling incidents on a regular basis;
Exchange information on significant incidents in this area,
especially if sensitive material is involved, and establish
appropriate national points of contact for this purpose;
Foster enhanced cooperation and coordination among national
intelligence, customs, and law enforcement agencies and
cooperation to ensure prompt investigation and successful
prosecution in cases of illicit nuclear trafficking;
Exchange experience and assistance to ensure safe and
effective nuclear material storage, protection, control and
accounting;
Maintain effective national systems of export licensing and
control, which are important to deter and prevent illicit
trafficking;
Establish training requirements pertaining to detection of
concealed nuclear material, radiation protection, safe handling
and transportation of nuclear material and radiation
protection, for law enforcement agencies (customs, police) in
accordance with their respective tasks and closely coordinate
relevant training activities in this area;
Aid the exchange of scientific information and data to
permit the identification of the origin, history, and route of
seized illicit nuclear material;
Support efforts to ensure that all sensitive nuclear
material (separated plutonium and highly-enriched uranium) not
intended for use in meeting defense needs.
To date, the program's progress has been slow in that is has
focused mostly on developing information exchange mechanisms, expanding
the number of countries involved, and convening a series of conferences
and development activities related to nuclear forensics. Most of the
international efforts to exchange information and consult on possible
responses in these areas are now being coordinated by the IAEA.
Plutonium Disposition
Also during the 1996 Summit, the G-8 began to identify possible
means of international cooperation to address the management and
disposal of plutonium no longer required for defense purposes. Since
1996, G-8 countries have been examining the mixed-oxide (MOX) fuel
pathway and/or immobilizing plutonium. France, Germany, Canada, and
Japan have all been involved in the investigation of MOX fuel
fabrication in Russia.
Now that both Russia and the United States have signed an agreement
to dispose 68 metric tons (34 tons each) of excess weapons-grade
plutonium no longer needed for defense purposes, plans are starting to
move forward. Beyond the studies, however, limited funding has been
provided.
other multilateral and bilateral efforts involving g-8 nations
Besides activities undertaken through the G-8 auspices, individual
G-8 nations have developed specific bilateral non-proliferation
cooperation with Russia and the FSU states and are participating in
other multilateral activities.
International Science and Technology Center
All of the G-8 nations are partners in the International Science
and Technology Center (ISTC) in Moscow. Through September 2002, the
international contributions to ISTC from the donor countries have
totaled $452.8 million, for 1,625 projects. This program has, according
to ISTC, provided employment to more 30,000 weapons scientists.
The European Nuclear Cities Initiative
In December 1999, Italy's Ministry of Foreign Affairs proposed a
program called the European Nuclear Cities Initiative (ENCI). This
program is envisioned as a complement to the U.S.-Russian Nuclear
Cities Initiative (NCI) in its effort to facilitate economic
development and downsizing in the Russian nuclear weapons complex. Like
NCI, ENCI will address ways to eliminate the economic strain on key
facilities in the Russian nuclear complex--in particular the cities of
Sarov and Snezhinsk--thus eliminating a source of potential leakage of
fissile materials and knowledgeable scientists to countries posing a
proliferation risk. The ENCI, through a working group it has
established consisting of European, Russia, and U.S. representatives,
hopes to coordinate the various European countries' inputs into Russian
nonproliferation projects to avoid overlap. The immediate ENCI priority
is to focus on the development of a ``roadmap'' of pilot projects in
Russia's closed nuclear cities that meet key criteria such as a
demonstrated market demand, and an ability to meet international
product manufacturing and quality assurance requirements. As currently
envisioned, funding for ENCI projects is likely to be channeled through
the European Union's Technical Assistance for the Commonwealth of
Independent States (TACIS) program, the ISTC, and bilateral programs.
Plutonium Disposition
Throughout the 1990s, both Germany and France supported bilateral
plutonium disposition technology development in Russia. In 1998, the
two countries decided to merge their efforts under a trilateral
agreement. The main objective of this program was the construction of a
plutonium conversion facility and a MOX-fuel fabrication facility
capable of processing 2.3 MT of weapons plutonium each year. The
project would utilize German technology and French financing. The U.S.,
Italy, and Belgium also planned contributions to the construction of
the facility. The total cost of the project was believed to be $1.7
billion. This project was frozen when funding provided by the U.S. and
France was not sufficient to meet required costs, and Siemens, the
German contractor, discontinued its plans to produce the necessary
equipment in 2001.
Nuclear Submarine and Fuel Management
Since the days before the Soviet Union's dissolution, Scandinavian
countries, particularly Norway, have been concerned about dumping of
nuclear waste in northwest Russia in the Barents and Kara Sea region.
Additional concerns have focused on Russia's many retired and
deteriorating nuclear reactor-powered vessels, some of which are still
fully fueled, and pose a proliferation threat. In 1994, after
conducting a series of studies in search of solutions, Norway developed
a ``Plan of Action'' to address concerns of an aging Russian nuclear
fleet in the region. The Plan of Action has four priority areas: 1)
safety measures at nuclear facilities; 2) spent fuel management and
radioactive waste issues; 3) radioactive pollution in the Barents and
Kara Seas; and 4) arms-related environmental hazards.
In addition to its bilateral relationship with Russia, Norway is
also involved in the Arctic Military Environmental Cooperation
Initiative (AMEC), which includes the U.S., Russian, and Norwegian
defense establishments. Established in 1996, AMEC focuses on
environmental hazards associated with military activities in the
Arctic. To a great extent, AMEC initially complemented the U.S.
Cooperative Threat Reduction program, which, among other things, is
assisting in the dismantlement of Russian strategic submarines. The
three militaries work together on specific environmental issues
associated with the removal and storage of spent nuclear fuel from
nuclear submarines being decommissioned and dismantled in Northwest
Russia. This spent fuel, if not properly managed, could release
significant concentrations of radioactivity into the sensitive Arctic
environment and ecosystems. Additionally, this nuclear fuel material
poses a serious security issue.
Bilateral Activities of the United Kingdom
In addition to the roughly $36 million the United Kingdom has
contributed to the Nuclear Safety Account, a new effort was launched in
late 2000, in which the UK government pledged up to $120 million over
three years for nuclear problems in Russia and the FSU. This budget
will cover work in Northwest Russia to decommission Russian nuclear
submarines, the UK commitment to plutonium disposition, security,
material accountancy and physical protection projects, commitment to
the international Chernobyl shelter fund and projects to assist
diversity and business development in the closed nuclear cities. Within
this commitment, the U.K. intends to provide $4.5 million for
cooperation with closed city scientists. Concerning the decommissioned
submarines, both sides hope to begin work soon on the construction of a
UK-funded interim spent nuclear fuel storage facility in the Murmansk
region, costing up to $7.5 million. Discussions about other projects
are ongoing, pending the final establishment of a legal framework for
nuclear cooperation between the UK and Russia.
Bilateral Activities of Canada
Bilateral relations between Canada and Russia on nuclear issues
were established in 1989 when they signed a nuclear cooperative
agreement. In June 1992, both countries launched a three-year, $30
million program called the Canadian Nuclear Safety Initiative (CNSI).
The main purpose of CNSI was to enhance the short-term safety of Soviet
designed nuclear power stations through technical assistance and safety
and regulatory training. Canada established the Nuclear Safety and
Engineering Program in which nuclear experts from Atomic Energy of
Canada Limited (AECL) work directly with Russian personnel on RBMK
nuclear plant management and safety procedures at a handful of Soviet-
designed plants. In addition to CNSI, the Canadian government
administers an internship program for high-level officials of Russian
regulatory agencies to study nuclear safety issues at its Atomic Energy
Control Board. Canada has also started receiving shipments of MOX
nuclear fuel under the Parallex Project, which will provide technical
information on the performance of Canadian Deuterium Uranium (CANDU)
reactors to facilitate the disposition of excess U.S. and Russian
weapons plutonium.
Bilateral Activities of Germany
The Federal Republic of Germany's most sustained nonproliferation
support to Russia has focused on chemical weapons destruction. In 1993,
it committed funds to the production of a facility for this purpose in
Gorny, which initiated its pilot destruction activities this year.
Germany has committed approximately $30.5 million to chemical weapons
destruction in Russia. Germany also supported limited upgrades of
physical security systems and analytical and accountancy capabilities
for nuclear materials in the Russian Federation.
Bilateral Activities of Japan
Japan is another important contributor to enhancing nuclear
security in the FSU. Most of its funding for nuclear efforts goes
through nongovernmental organizations, and most of this cooperation has
consisted of information exchanges and delegations, and seminars on
specific topics in both countries. Japan began government-to-government
cooperation with Russia in the 1990s. In 1993, the Japanese government
pledged approximately $100 million to support the dismantlement of
nuclear submarines in Russia, primarily focusing on the disposal of
radioactive liquid waste. In June 1999, at the Cologne Summit, Japan
pledged an additional $200 million for continued support of
dismantlement of decommissioned submarines in the Russian Far East,
conversion of Russian military resources to the private sector, and
disposition of surplus weapons-grade plutonium removed from dismantled
nuclear weapons. Japan's nuclear assistance can be largely broken down
into four areas: 1) management of radioactive waste; 2) dismantlement
of nuclear submarines; 3) maintenance of civilian reactors; and 4)
fast-breeder reactor development.
Bilateral Activities of France
France's bilateral cooperation with Russia has been somewhat
limited, though valuable. The government of France has provided 100
super-containers to Russia to facilitate the transport of nuclear
warheads from heavy SS-18 missiles by railcar.
EUROPEAN UNION ACTIVITIES
The European Union has been identified as a potential contributor
to the Global Partnership and therefore it seems appropriate to provide
a brief overview of its threat reduction related activities.
Technical Assistance to the Commonwealth of Independent States
The European Union has provided over E140 million through the TACIS
program for nonproliferation programs in Russia. It has provided
assistance in market reform, grant assistance and research projects for
weapons scientists.
Nuclear Safety
Including the funds given by EU countries of the G-8 to aid in
decommissioning Chernobyl, the EU, through TACIS, has over the period
of 1991-1999 committed roughly $640 million to international efforts to
improve FSU nuclear safety. A total number of 650 projects have been
financed, 450 projects are ongoing and another 200 are in the pipeline.
The EU plans to continue its nuclear safety program in the FSU well
into the next decade.
The European Union Cooperation Programme for Nonproliferation and
Disarmament in the Russian Federation
This program, also known as the Joint Action Russia Programme
(JARP), was formed as a result of the EU Common Strategy on Russia. Its
objectives include:
Cooperate with Russia's efforts to dismantle or convert
infrastructure and equipment linked to WMD in a safe, secure,
and environmentally sound fashion
Provide a framework for an enhanced EU role in cooperative
risk reduction in Russia
Promote coordination of projects at the Member State and
international levels.
Activities currently supported within JARP, as of a Council
Decision in June 2001, include:
Development of a regulatory basis by GAN for weapon-grade
plutonium disposition
Study of MOX demonstration and licensing
Study of feasibility of immobilization of waste containing
weapon-grade plutonium
Support of the Russian Munitions Agency's efforts to fulfill
CWC obligations Construction of chemical weapons dismantlement
infrastructure at Shchuch'ye.
JARP's 1999-2000 budget was E8.9 million. As of July 2001, a total
of E6.08 million had been allocated, including E3.2 million for
plutonium disposition activities, and E2.7 million for chemical weapons
activities. In May 2002, E645,000 in additional financing was added by
the council to set up units of experts stationed in Brussels and Moscow
who would be responsible for implementing JARP. Earlier activities
supported within JARP included facility construction at Gorny and GT-
MHR development. It appears that support for these projects was
discontinued.
The Northern Fleet's Lepse Vessel
Beyond reactor safety, the EU has also become involved in securing
the Lepse fuel storage vessel, a program that was initiated by Norway.
Between 1962 and 1981, the Lepse was used as a service ship at the
nuclear icebreaker base in waters in Northwest Russia. Since then, the
Lepse has been used as floating storage for spent nuclear fuel from the
reactors of nuclear icebreakers. The 624 spent fuel assemblies onboard
the Lepse today are under highly unsatisfactory conditions; the fuel
has become partially jammed in the holding tubes and is now difficult
to remove. The EU expert group appropriated $18.5 million for a
technical solution to the Lepse problem. Funding was provided by the
EU's TACIS program.
THE G-8 GLOBAL PARTNERSHIP
The statement at the Kananaskis G-8 Summit on the Global
Partnership Against the Spread of Weapons of Mass Destruction was a
major step forward for G-8 threat reduction efforts. Under this
initiative, the G-8 nations committed to support specific cooperation
projects, initially in Russia, to address non-proliferation,
disarmament, counter-terrorism and nuclear safety issues. Since threat
reduction activities had recently passed their ten-year anniversary the
agreement at the Summit, that these programs should continue for
another decade but with substantially more funding and participation
from countries other than the U.S., has provided a framework for
thinking concretely about the future of threat reduction with Russia
and the FSU.
Further, the G-8 leaders called on all countries to join them in
commitment to the following six principles to prevent terrorists from
acquiring or developing nuclear, chemical, radiological and biological
weapons; missiles; and related materials, equipment and technology:
Promote the adoption and implementation of multilateral
treaties to prevent the proliferation;
Develop and maintain appropriate effective measures to
account for and secure such items;
Develop and maintain appropriate effective physical
protection measures applied to facilities that house such
items;
Develop and maintain effective border controls, law
enforcement efforts and international cooperation to detect,
deter and interdict in cases of illicit trafficking;
Develop, review and maintain effective national export and
transshipment controls over items on multilateral export
control lists, as well as items that are not identified on such
lists but which may nevertheless contribute to the development,
production or use of nuclear, chemical and biological weapons
and missiles;
Adopt and strengthen efforts to manage and dispose of stocks
of fissile materials designated as no longer required for
defense purposes, eliminate all chemical weapons, and minimize
holdings of dangerous biological pathogens and toxins, based on
the recognition that the threat of terrorist acquisition is
reduced as the overall quantity of such items is reduced.
Global Partnership Funding
While these broad principles may form the basis of a global effort
to control WMD, the immediate objective of the G-8 initiative is to
raise up to $20 billion for these projects over the next ten years. The
G-8 statement does specify projects that are of interest, including:
destruction of chemical weapons; dismantlement of decommissioned
nuclear submarines; the disposition of fissile materials; and
employment of former weapons scientists.
The assumption is that the U.S. would bear the cost of about half
the $20 billion since it is currently spending about $1 billion per
year on threat reduction activities in Russia and the FSU. However, as
the attached table indicates, even if the U.S. spends $10 billion over
the next decade, only $3.4 to $3.8 billion--or slightly more than one-
third--of the remaining $10 billion has been publicly pledged by other
G-8 nations to date. If an EU contribution of $1 billion over ten years
is added in then the contribution percentage is raised to almost half.
But the source of the remainder of the G-8 funding is not completely
clear at this point.
Further, under the terms of the statement made by G-8 leaders
regarding the crediting of contributions against the $20 billion
target, there are some accounting loopholes. For example, funds that
are obligated to nonproliferation efforts by G-8 countries from the
date of the statement can be included in the total contribution. This
would allow prior appropriations made by member countries to be counted
toward the $20 billion contribution.
There are numerous sensitivities regarding the G-8 initiative and
the financing is chief among them. Given the budgetary pressures on the
other G-8 nations it is not clear that they will be able to find
substantially new money to support this initiative. Therefore, one
option is to exchange Russian debt to key nations in return for non-
proliferation activities in Russia as a source of meeting the $10
billion pledge.
In this regard, the passage of the Russian Federation Debt for Non-
Proliferation Act of 2002 as part of the FY03 Foreign Relations
Authorization Act is a welcome development. The legislation could allow
the U.S. to trade up to $2.7 billion in Russian lend-lease and
agricultural debt for equivalent amounts of non-proliferation
investment. I applaud the Senate Foreign Relations Committee for its
essential role in sponsoring and passing this legislation. However, if
the U.S. decides to trade some or all of its debt for nonproliferation
activities in Russia, these funds should supplement the roughly $1
billion that the U.S. is currently spending on threat reduction. These
funds should not be used as a substitute for this appropriated funding.
The infusion of additional funding could create new opportunity for
progress on this agenda.
The G-8 member state attitudes on reducing Russia's debt burden,
however, are varied. Germany, which is by far the largest creditor in
the Paris Club where Russia owes them over $20 billion, has concerns
about the reduction of Russia's debt. Some states, however, such as
Italy and France, have both expressed support for debt reduction
initiatives. Neither Canada, the United Kingdom, nor Japan have made
direct statements on relieving Russia's debt, although in general
international financial negotiations, the former two have tended to be
supportive of debt relief initiatives like the World Bank and
International Monetary Fund's Heavily Indebted Poor Country (HIPC)
Initiative, whereas Japan has usually been opposed.
In addition, and perhaps most importantly, Russia's position on a
debt-swap program is not completely clear. Some officials are arguing
that it may hurt their international credit rating at a point when
Russia has begun to manage its foreign debt sufficiently or that it
could spur inflation.
Global Partnership Programmatic Priorities
Another set of issues that the Global Partnership will need to deal
with is the prioritization and coordination of activities. The
initiative must be carefully structured and coordinated to ensure the
maximum efficient use of the funds and to generate real progress. It is
clear from the attached table that the major interests of the G-8
nations other than the U.S. are in chemical weapons destruction,
submarine dismantlement, plutonium disposition, and nuclear safety.
Some of these interests overlap with the U.S. and some could cover
areas where the U.S. is not currently focused. Coordination will be
necessary to avoid duplicative spending. But there are some hints that
some G-8 nations may be interested in additional activities including
assisting with the security of nuclear material and the physical
protection of sub-strategic warheads.
What is lacking, however, in the statements by G-8 nations on the
projects that they want to fund, is an urgent focus on brain drain and
the redirection of former weapons scientists. This is a persistent
problem that will increase in importance in coming years. In recent
months there have been clear indications that the conversion of defense
production facilities in Russia ranks very high on Washington's list of
non-proliferation priorities. Such a focus will generate more excess
weapons scientists.
To date, the re-employment programs for weapons scientists, while
essential, are not working well in any of the WMD complexes in Russia
and the FSU. While some European G-8 nations believe that the issue of
scientist conversion is to be dealt with at the EU level, it is clear
that no G-8 country or the EU is doing enough in this area. It has been
reported that the EU is to contribute $1 billion to the Global
Partnership and it has been speculated that these funds may be
primarily utilized for plutonium disposition. Addressing the
redirection of weapons scientists is an equal if not greater priority
than plutonium disposition and the EU and individual G-8 nations should
seriously consider providing substantial funding for this purpose.
Besides the U.S., Germany, Canada, and the U.K. have spelled out
their Global Partnership contributions in the greatest detail to date.
In Canada the top program priority is the security and disposition of
submarine fuel.
For Germany the top three priorities are facilitating chemical
weapons destruction at Kambarka, submarine dismantlement, and securing
nuclear materials and waste. While Germany has been active in plutonium
disposition in the past, the recent election has made German
participation in MOX-based plutonium disposition impossible. Germany
will utilize a pre-existing agreement with Russia to implement its
programs.
The U.K. has increased its participation in threat reduction
activities over the past few years, previously approving $125 million
over three years. But at the Kananaskis Summit, the U.K. committed
another $750 million over 10 years. The top U.K. priorities are nuclear
safety and security, plutonium disposition, and submarine dismantlement
and disposition. However, the U.K. has run into substantial difficulty
in finalizing an agreement with Russia that would exempt British funds
from taxes and protect the country from liability in nuclear projects.
As a result, some of the original $125 million is being spent on U.S.-
developed projects and the expenditure of the promised $750 million
awaits the finalization of the agreement.
The experience of the U.K. raises questions about how Russia will
improve the overall environment in which threat reduction operates.
Financial transparency, facility access, and legal protections are all
key issues that are impeding many threat reduction efforts among the G-
8 nations and the EU. There is also a question about the structural
ability of Russia to absorb a potential doubling of threat reduction
funding. Only Russia can address these issues authoritatively.
Therefore, strong political will is necessary in that country to ensure
that the G-8 initiative is kindled to life and that it thrives.
conclusion
In conclusion, I would leave the committee with five questions that
I believe are not yet answered about the G-8 Global Partnership.
Are the projects identified for funding in the G-8 statement
the most urgent global non-proliferation priorities or should
they be changed?
Can the G-8 effectively coordinate their activities to avoid
overlap and duplication or facilitate the implementation of key
projects where the U.S. cannot or will not act?
What will Russia do both politically and financially to make
this process work efficiently and to clear away the impediments
to progress that have developed over the past ten years?
Will the European G-8 nations and Japan really be able to
find $10 billion for this initiative over the next 10 years?
Will U.S. political support for threat reduction and
leadership in this area remain strong over the next ten years
or will nagging problems and disagreements sap the strength of
this agenda?
The answers to these questions are not clear at this point but the
answers will determine whether the G-8 Global Partnership will be a
catalyst for renewed enthusiasm and real progress in threat reduction.
THE 10 PLUS 10 OVER 10 INITIATIVE: CONTRIBUTIONS AND PROPOSED PROJECTS
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Russia's
Reported or Paris Club
State Planned debt ($ Projects Notes
Contributions billions)
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Germany $1.5 billion 20.2 CW Germany will not participate in the MOX aspects of
\1\ dismantlement plutonium disposition
at Kambarka;
submarine
dismantlement
; securing of
nuclear
material and
waste;
plutonium
disposition.\
2\
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Italy $400 million 7.0 Submarine These projects were discussed in a recent Russia-Italy
dismantlement inter-MFA meeting
; CW
dismantlement
.\3\
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
U.S. $10 billion 3.7 Continuation
\4\ of existing
activities at
approximately
$1 billion
per year;
additional
activities
may include
new efforts
to reduce
excess
nuclear
materials.\5\
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
France N/A 2.0
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Japan $200 million 2.0 Dismantling Japan has conditioned its provision of assistance within
\6\ the Russian the G-8 framework on strict accountability requirements.
nuclear Japan stated that 50% of its contribution should be put
arsenal; aside to help set up an international organization for
plutonium surplus plutonium disposition
disposition.\
7\
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Canada $600 million .8 Submarine The $650m source indicates that this would be provided in
\8\ to $1 dismantlement $65m increments over 10 years
billion \9\ ,\10\
security and
disposition
of submarine
fuel.
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
U.K. $750 million .6 CW The $750m will be spread over a decade. The U.K. has
\11\ destruction; conditioned sub dismantlement aid on its control of fund
employment of allocations and permission to analyze the entire
former dismantlement process. The Russian MFA is resolving these
weapons conditions. The employment of scientists and CW
scientists; destruction were highlighted in addition to sub
submarine dismantlement by PM Blair in a speech to Parliament as
dismantlement priorities for the G-8 plan
; plutonium
disposition;
nuclear
reactor
decommissioni
ng; MPC&A;
nuclear
safety.
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
EU $1 billion N/A .............. This funding may primarily be used for plutonium
\12\ disposition over the next 10 years utilizing the JARP
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ Werner Kolhoff. ``Russischer Atomschrott und deutsche Geschafte,'' Berliner Zeitung. June 28, 2002. Personal
translation.
\2\ Agence France Press. ``G8 clinches deal to secure Russian plutonium: German source.'' June 27, 2002.
Informal remarks of German official.
\3\ Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation Daily News Bulletin. ``Georgy Mamedov, Deputy Foreign
Minister and Russia's Political Director in the Group of Eight, Meets with Gianfranco Facco Bonetti, Italian
Ambassador to Moscow.'' September 17, 2002.
\4\ Charles Digges. ``G8 Pledges $20 billion to Secure Russian Weapons of Mass Destruction.'' Bellona. June 28,
2002.
\5\ ``U.S.-Russia Identify New Ways to Reduce Nuclear Materials.'' Washington File, U.S. Department of State,
International Imformation Programs, September 17, 2002. http://usinfo.state.gov/cgi-bin/washfile.
\6\ Asahi News Service. ``Japan to sweeten Russia arms proposal.'' June 29, 2002.
\7\ Kyodo News Service. ``Japan backs weapons disposal with $200 million.'' June 28, 2002. http://
www.japantimes.co.jp/cgi-bin/getarticle.pl5?nn20020628a2.htm.
\8\ Mike Tricket. ``Russia, Mideast steal Africa's limelight: Big bucks go to Putin, media focus on peace
plan,'' Ottawa Citizen. June 28, 2002.
\9\ Reuters. ``G8 frets on ex-Soviet nuclear arms, works on deal.'' June 27, 2002.
\10\ Nikolai Vlasov. ``Canadian PM satisfied with agreement on financing elimination of Soviet weapons of mass
destruction,'' RIA Novosti. June 28, 2002.
\11\ Tony Blair. ``Statement on the G8 Summit in Kananaskis,'' Foreign and Commonwealth Office. July 1, 2002.
\12\ Reuters, ibid, AFP, ibid.
Senator Lugar. Thank you very much.
Ms. Holgate.
STATEMENT OF LAURA S.H. HOLGATE, VICE PRESIDENT FOR RUSSIA/NIS
PROGRAMS, NUCLEAR THREAT INITIATIVE, WASHINGTON, DC
Ms. Holgate. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, I'm grateful for the
chance to give testimony this afternoon before such steadfast
and visionary leadership as this committee represents on these
issues. This hearing on the opportunities for a greater global
security cooperation presented in the G-8 launched this June of
the Global Partnership is exactly what is needed right now.
I will paraphrase my written testimony, in the expectation
that it can be entered in the record.
Senator Lugar. It will be included in the record in full.
Ms. Holgate. Senator Nunn went on the record this summer
commending the U.S. leaders for their success in achieving this
diplomatic breakthrough, and our organization has been devoted
to trying to assist in the conclusion of the meeting of those
pledges.
We have seen some early initiative from the G-8 nations to
honor these pledges, but all member nations have much more to
do to meet the high expectations they created with the bold
statements at Kananaskis. The G-8 nations have given themselves
and the world a fleeting opportunity to truly transform threat
reduction efforts.
The stability of a $20 billion commitment over the next
decade creates an entirely new fiscal environment for such
activities, and the multilateral nature of the Global
Partnership affords new opportunities for collaboration and
synergy, which, in the whole, really is greater than the sum of
its parts.
This striking opportunity could be squandered if
governments see these pledges as status-quo-plus, just doing a
little bit more than what they were already doing before. To
fulfill its promise, the G-8 initiative should be seen not
merely as an effort to address the problems, but as an effort
to actually solve them. This calls for a concentrated,
coordinated, and, above all, a comprehensive, strategic
approach that analyzes the threats, assesses the risks, and
directs resources in the most high-leverage, cost-effective
way, taking into account the special capabilities and concerns
of all involved countries and establishing a sensible strategic
division of labor.
I'll list briefly a dozen or so new approaches beyond the
essential programmatic foundation that's currently underway
that was so ably characterized by the last panel. These
approaches could help the G-8 fulfill their promise to go
beyond this bedrock and identify greater resources in a more
comprehensive, better coordinated worldwide commitment
reflected in this June announcement.
I'll start with the concept of pooled funds, and this could
be combined with the debt-for-program exchange, as the recent
Biden-Lugar legislation has permitted.
Second, confirming the quantity and security of Russia's
tactical nuclear weapons. Europe has a special interest here,
because of the range of these weapons.
Third, an approach of adopting a closed city and trying to
create the most comprehensive set of supports possible, whether
it's retraining, retirement, resettlement, economic
development, infrastructure, job creation, demolition, and
other needs with a 3-year goal, and let's start with Sarov,
which has been MinAtom's first priority.
Fourth, border export controls. And here, Europe has a
special role with the borders they share with Russia.
Divide and conquer on material security. Have Europe take
over the civilian nuclear material facilities, and let the U.S.
efforts focus on the military and weapons-related materials
facilities.
A global ``clean out and secure'' initiative to look at the
materials wherever the exist, and including the flexibility
that you have so eloquently described the need for, that
Project Vinca really clarified and demonstrated.
Research reactor conversion, eliminating the stocks and the
need to have continuous stocks of highly enriched uranium at
institutions and research facilities around the world.
Accelerating the blend-down of highly enriched uranium
currently tied up in Russian weapons and storage facilities.
Perhaps an outright purchase of Russian plutonium as a way
to accelerate the security and disposition of it.
Obviously, chemical weapons destruction is an area where
there's been probably the most robust multilateral sharing, and
there's opportunities to continue that with the U.S. focusing
on Shchuch'ye or the pieces of Shchuch'ye it can do, and other
nations focusing on other pieces. And the transportation
questions will be a whole new set of needs as Russia makes good
on its commitment to move some of those weapons to Shchuch'ye.
Biological weapons--again, Europe has a very powerful role
to play here with a strong biotechnology industry.
General purpose submarines, we've discussed at some length
already, but, there again, Europe and Japan are natural
candidates to concentrate there.
Looking at some nonsecurity assistance applied to security
needs, in the World Bank, in the EU, in other bilateral
programs. Economic and humanitarian assistance programs can be
targeted regionally or contextually to areas that are dealing
with weapons issues, whether it's at Shchuch'ye, or whether
it's at Sarov, or whether it's other areas where these
humanitarian or economic-assistance needs are going to be part
of the solution to the proliferation and security problems.
And I'll spend a couple of minutes on the legal impediments
question, because that's a natural for a legislative body. And
as much as legislatures around the world deserve credit for
creating and funding existing threat-reduction programs,
they've also authored huge impediments, sometimes
unintentionally.
Certainly, the certification requirements and other
legislative restrictions attached to the U.S. CTR programs over
its decade of life were designed to have a limiting effect,
owing initially to the uncertainty of how the post-Soviet
Republics would relate to the United States, and, subsequently,
to the continued opposition of some in Congress to the threat-
reduction mission.
In this era of partnership with Russia, these limits need
to be removed, and I'm very pleased to hear of your initiative
on this point and would love to work with you on that.
In the realm of unintended consequences, U.S. Federal
Acquisition Regulations, which were designed to assure fair
access to Federal contracting dollars, not to disarm an enemy,
and, more importantly, visa restrictions, more recently,
designed to catch potential terrorists, have severely hampered
cooperative efforts. Somehow targeted exceptions have to be
written into the law so that our counterterrorism policies do
not thwart the actual countering of terrorism.
Russia has some work to do here, as well. The nine
implementing guidelines agreed to at Kananaskis called for
reasonable measures of tax exemption, accountability, and
access, liability protection, and other legal terms and
conditions governing the provision of international assistance.
Rather than pursuing multiple bilateral agreements, all of
which require Duma ratification, Russia should modernize its
own legal and regulatory structures to accommodate legitimate
threat reduction cooperative needs.
As this list makes clear, each member of the G-8 has plenty
to do. Some members still have their hands on their wallets and
need to declare the amount of their financial commitment.
Russia has reportedly already failed to apply the principles of
the nine guidelines in ongoing bilateral negotiations.
Reassuringly, the ad hoc group of senior officials who met
recently in Ottawa appears to be the designated coordination
mechanism called for in the Kananaskis Summit statement. Done
right, this group will be very busy, both in meetings with each
other and in pursuing their own nations' execution of their
June pledges.
One way to help the annually changing membership of the G-8
remain focused on this pledge, which is, after all, one of
multiple pledges in the G-8, would be to institute a year-end
President's report from each departing G-8 President on the
progress on the execution of these pledges.
Along with the hard work needed to forge a true G-8
partnership to address proliferation risks in Russia, it will
take a determined effort to match the rhetoric of the Global
Partnership into reality. The G-8 needs to develop an explicit
plan for including nations like China, Pakistan, India, Brazil,
and Egypt into this partnership. The G-8 also needs to move
quickly to bring non-G-8 donors, like the Netherlands and
Norway, into the partnership. A global partnership requires
global participation. Recruiting new members must be seen as an
essential and ongoing element of the effort.
I'll close with a recent conversation with one you know
well, Zinovy Pak, on the chemical-weapons issue, which
clarifies both the opportunities and the perils of this G-8
pledge. Dr. Pak has been instrumental in expanding Russia's own
investment in its chemical weapons destruction program by
sixfold in recent years, and he is attempting even further
increases. Since June, however, he is challenged more and more
by his colleagues, or, you might say, even rivals, in his
interagency process of pulling and hauling over Federal
budgets.
They are telling him he doesn't need anymore Russian
rubles, because the G-8 is clearly going to take care of his
chemical weapons destruction problem with dollars, Euros, and
yen. This is a pernicious situation on two fronts. First,
because it suggests that some officials in Russia may not yet
understand that the international commitment to funding threat
reduction inside Russia depends on a continued, even
intensified, demonstration of Russia's own commitment to doing
its part.
Second, it reflects the degree to which Russia's threat
reduction plans are currently being structured in legitimate
anticipation of the other G-8 nations meeting their $20 billion
pledge. A failure of commitment on one side will weaken the
commitment of all sides and make all of us less secure. That's
why it's so essential that all nations everywhere do their
part, not only because no nation wants to carry the burden
alone, but because no nation, in fact, can.
It would be, in my judgment, a great service to the cause
and ideals of this partnership if this committee can continue
to serve as a reminder to our government and to partner
governments of the commitments they have made, the expectations
they have raised, and the obligations they have embraced for
making the most of this moment to increase the security of the
world.
Thank you very much.
[The prepared statement of Ms. Holgate follows:]
Prepared Statement of Laura S.H. Holgate, Vice President for Russia/New
Independent States, Nuclear Threat Initiative
G-8 PLEDGES FOR THREAT REDUCTION IN RUSSIA
Mr. Chairman and Members of the Committee: My name is Laura
Holgate. I am Vice President for Russia and the New Independent States
at the Nuclear Threat Initiative, a charitable organization founded by
Ted Turner, co-chaired by Mr. Turner and former Senator Sam Nunn and
dedicated to reducing the global threat from nuclear, biological and
chemical weapons.
I thank you for inviting me to testify before the committee today
on the opportunities for greater global security cooperation presented
by the G-8 launch this June of a ``Global Partnership Against the
Spread of Weapons and Materials of Mass Destruction.''
I would like to begin my testimony by quoting from a statement
Senator Nunn issued this summer in response to the G-8 announcement.
``The decision by G-8 leaders to establish this global partnership
represents a major step in the right direction in terms of how the
United States and its partners and allies must work together to prevent
dangerous groups from gaining control of the most dangerous materials--
materials that could be used to commit catastrophic terrorism. The G-8
pledge to spend $20 billion over the next ten years to secure the
former Soviet Union's vast stores of nuclear, chemical, and biological
materials suggests that member states are willing to back their
commitments with much-needed resources.''
We have seen some early initiative from G-8 nations to honor their
pledges, but all member nations have much more to do to meet the high
expectations they created with their bold statements at Kananaskis. G-8
nations have given themselves and the world a fleeting opportunity to
truly transform threat reduction efforts. The stability of a $20B
commitment over the next decade creates an entirely new fiscal
environment for such activities, and the multilateral nature of the
``Global Partnership'' affords new opportunities for collaboration and
synergy, in which the whole really is greater than the sum of its
parts.
This striking opportunity could be squandered if governments see
these pledges as ``status quo plus''--doing a little bit more to
address the problem, and thus merely adding more money to existing
efforts. To fulfill its promise, the G-8 initiative should be seen not
as an effort to address the problem, but to solve it. This calls for a
concentrated, coordinated and above all, a comprehensive strategic
approach that analyzes the threats, assesses the risks, and directs
resources in the most high-leverage, cost-effective way--taking into
account the special capabilities and concerns of all countries, and
establishing a sensible, strategic division of labor.
I would like to list briefly a dozen or so different approaches
that could help the G-8 fulfill the promise of the greater resources
and more comprehensive, better coordinated world-wide commitment
reflected in its June announcement of the Global Partnership:
``Pooled'' funds. A single funding structure consolidating
contributions from several nations or other funders, jointly
administered by donors and recipients, would create
efficiencies and--more importantly--a greater sense of
partnership that is appropriate in fighting a common threat.
Confirming the quantity and security of Russia's tactical
nuclear weapons. We must work with Russia to ensure an accurate
accounting and the security of Russia's tactical nuclear
weapons. Tactical nuclear weapons have never been covered in
any treaties or agreements--and that is an ongoing, decades-
long mistake that requires immediate correction. Measures must
be developed to provide confidence that Russian tactical
warheads are secure and fully accounted for. The short range of
these weapons make them particularly risk from the European and
Japanese perspective, and as such, this area may be a fruitful
avenue for a dedicated dialogue.
``Adopt a closed city'' approach. Russia's Ministry of
Atomic Energy has identified the shrinkage of nuclear weapons
facilities in the closed city of Sarov as its top conversion
priority. Successful conversion of Sarov is the key to ``right-
sizing'' the entire bloated Russian weapons complex. Several
U.S. efforts are focusing on Sarov's challenges, but current
efforts fall short of what's needed. Joint development and
execution of a comprehensive plan to address the retraining,
retirement, resettlement, economic development, infrastructure,
job creation, demolition and other needs within 3 years would
allow different partners to play to their diverse strengths in
a way that covers all the necessary bases.
Border controls. Given the shared borders between Europe and
Russia, rigorous control over trafficking in nuclear,
biological and chemical weapons should be a natural concern of
the G-8 nations. Technologies and equipment developed for
European borders should be extended to Russia's borders with
Central Asia, and borders within Central Asia. U.S. Government
programs in this area have been neither comprehensive nor well
organized; a division of labor in which Europe and Japan
execute the lion's share of border security assistance would
free U.S. funds for other priorities.
Divide and conquer materials security. Another natural
division of labor comes in the security of weapons materials.
The Partnership needs to act swiftly and comprehensively to
secure vulnerable materials at nuclear and biological
facilities. Given Russian sensitivities about military-oriented
facilities--which they are only likely to open to the U.S., if
anyone--G-8 partners and others should focus on upgrading
security at civilian facilities, freeing U.S. resources for
more intense and thorough security improvements at nuclear
weapons facilities.
Global clean-out and secure. The recent success of Project
Vinca demonstrates both the risks posed by unneeded weapons
materials around the globe but also the limitations of U.S.
authorities to provide the incentives required to complete the
removal and destruction of these materials. The U.S. should
expand its nascent Russian Reactor Fuel Return activity with a
goal of removing and destroying all excess weapons usable
nuclear material world-wide, specifically including adequate
flexibility to address incentives for such removal, which are
likely to be as diverse as the facilities themselves. Any
facilities that continue to have a legitimate use for weapons
usable material must have appropriate security, which may also
require assistance. Where the U.S. is not well positioned
politically to approach certain holders of such material, other
G-8 partners, as well as nations outside the G-8, should be
called upon to provide such access and resources.
Research reactor conversion. We are rapidly approaching the
point where new, high-density low-enriched uranium fuels can
equal or exceed the performance of highly enriched uranium
fuels in research reactors. Within a decade, all research
reactors using HEU should be converted, and their spent fuel
secured until disposed of.
Accelerated HEU blend down. Russia has produced, by some
calculations, well over 1000 tons of highly enriched uranium.
Of this amount, 500 tons is currently being blended down at the
rate of 30 tons per year, based on market absorption capacity.
This U.S.-Russia ``HEU Deal'' will take another decade to
complete. In the mean time, Russia still has much more HEU than
they could possibly need for defense purposes, based on any
reasonable calculation of warhead maintenance and naval
propulsion requirements. The surest way to keep this material
out of the hands of those who would harm us is to destroy it at
a pace faster than current markets can absorb it--buying it up,
blending it down, selling it, and storing what can't be sold.
This may require support to Russia to increase its industrial
blend down capacity, as well as to process and store the low
enriched uranium before it is sold.
Plutonium purchase. One of the challenges in reducing U.S.
and Russian stocks of plutonium. The U.S. produced just under
100 tons in the last 50 years, while the total Russian
production is 140 to 170 tons, and rising. Current agreement on
plutonium disposition addresses equal reductions of 34 tons
apiece, which will not only leaves behind enormous quantities
of weapons plutonium, but leaves Russia with approximately
twice as much as the U.S. The goal should be to reduce stocks
to no more than the level required for both sides to maintain
agreed numbers of nuclear weapons. The U.S. or a larger group
of nations could purchase 100 or so tons of Russian plutonium
and take responsibility for storing it securely, whether in
Russia, Europe, or the U.S., and ultimately disposing of it.
Such a transfer of control and responsibility would remove many
of the concerns about long-term storage of plutonium pending
disposition, as well as address some of the problems associated
with reciprocity and matched reductions.
Chemical weapons destruction. Chemical weapons destruction
in Russia is probably the area of most robust multilateral
participation. Based on largely ad hoc coordination, several
nations are contributing tens of millions of dollars both to
infrastructure needs not covered by U.S. Cooperative Threat
Reduction pledges for the destruction facility at Shchuchye,
but also to destruction facilities and equipment at other
locations in Russia. Even assuming that the U.S. will resolve
its certification problems and complete the destruction
facility at Shchuchye, much more will remain to be done. The
U.S. should be prepared to fund the second phase of the
Shchuchye destruction facility, which will be used to destroy
chemical agents currently stored at other locations. G-8
nations should also be prepared to commit additional resources
to fund the transportation needs of the project. Russia will
need a greater number of vehicles and improved transportation
infrastructure to destroy chemical weapons and consolidate
current stocks at a smaller number of sites.
Biological weapons. Europe's strong biotechnology industry
has a powerful role to play in addressing biological weapons
proliferation risks, both in addressing its own research and
industrial practices, and in supporting efforts to redirect
Russia's former bioweaponeers. Industry involvement in such
redirection efforts has been tentative at best, in part because
of the political taint of working with former weapons
facilities and staff. Governmental leadership can highlight the
risks such facilities pose, and urge the bio industry to become
part of the solution in government-reviewed and--sanctioned
programs of cooperation.
General purpose submarines. While the level of environmental
and proliferation risk posed of general purpose submarines are
not a matter of wide agreement, Russia considers the risks
significant and has made this problem a top priority. Taking
this priority seriously is part of treating Russia as a real
partner, which is reason enough to address these concerns. New
concepts are being developed, which look at the potential
enrichment value remaining in the nuclear fuel in these
reactors to partially defray the costs of dismantling them.
This is a natural area of cooperation for the Nordic states
near Russia's Northern Fleet, and for Japan near the Pacific
Fleet.
Apply some ``non-security'' assistance to security needs.
The key to accomplishing many disarmament or nonproliferation
goals lies in areas that may have nothing to do with security
as traditionally defined. Whether the challenge is building a
chemical weapons destruction facility from scratch, or
redirecting weapon scientists to peaceful employment, or
creating incentives for retired nuclear military officers to
leave their last posted base, traditional economic and
humanitarian assistance is an indispensable part of the
package. The World Bank, the European Union, and multiple
bilateral efforts all have some of these types of assistance
programs underway. Wherever possible, these programs should be
regionally or topically directed so that they have the
additional impact of addressing security needs.
Remove legal impediments. As much as legislatures deserve
credit for creating and funding existing threat reduction
programs, they have also authored huge impediments, sometimes
unintentionally. Certainly the certification requirements and
other legislative restrictions attached to the U.S. Cooperative
Threat Reduction program over its decade of life were designed
to have a limiting effect, owing initially to the uncertainty
of how the post-Soviet republics would relate to the U.S., and
subsequently to the continued opposition of some in the
Congress to the threat reduction mission. In this era of
partnership with Russia, these limits need to be removed. In
the realm of unintended consequences, U.S. federal acquisition
regulations (designed to assure fair access to federal
contracting dollars, not to disarm a former enemy) and, more
recently, visa restrictions (designed to catch potential
terrorists) have severely hampered cooperative efforts.
Somehow, targeted exceptions have to be written into the law so
that our counterterrorism policies do not thwart the actual
countering of terrorism. Russia has some work to do here as
well. The nine implementation guidelines agreed at Kananaskis
call for reasonable measures of tax exemption, accountability
and access, liability protection, and other legal terms and
conditions governing the provision of international assistance.
Rather than pursue multiple bilateral agreements, all requiring
Duma ratification, Russia should modernize its own legal and
regulatory structures to accommodate threat reduction
cooperation programs.
As this list makes clear, each member of the G-8 has plenty to do.
Some members still have their hands on their wallets and need to
declare the amount of their financial commitment. Russia has reportedly
failed to apply the principles of the nine agreed implementation
guidelines to ongoing bilateral negotiations. Reassuringly, the ``ad
hoc group of senior officials'' who met recently in Ottawa appear to be
the designated coordination mechanism called for in the Kananaskis
Summit statement. Done right, this group will be very busy, both in
meeting with each other and in ensuring their own nations' execution of
the June pledges.
Along with the hard work needed to forge a true G-8 partnership to
address proliferation risks in Russia, it will take a determined effort
to make the rhetoric of a ``global partnership'' a reality. The G-8
needs to develop an explicit plan for including nations like China,
Pakistan, India, Brazil and Egypt. The G-8 also needs to move quickly
to bring non-G-8 donors like the Netherlands and Norway into the
partnership. A global partnership requires global participation;
recruiting new partners must be seen as an essential and ongoing
element in this new effort.
A recent conversation with a Russian leader in threat reduction
cooperation, Zinovyy Pak of the Russian Munitions Agency responsible
for chemical weapons destruction, clarifies both the opportunities and
the perils of this G-8 pledge. Dr. Pak has been instrumental in
expanding Russia's own investment in its chemical weapons destruction
program six-fold in recent years, and he is attempting even further
increases. Since June, however, he is challenged more and more by his
colleagues (or rivals) in the interagency pulling and hauling over
federal budgets. They are telling him he doesn't need any more Russian
rubles since the G-8 is obviously going to take care of his problem
with dollars, euros and yen. This is a pernicious situation on two
fronts. First, because it suggests some officials in Russia may not
understand that the international commitment to funding threat
reduction inside Russia depends upon continued, even intensified
demonstration of Russia's commitment to doing its part in reducing the
threat.
Secondly, it reflects the degree to which Russia's threat reduction
plans are currently being structured in anticipation of the other G-8
nations meeting their $20 billion pledge. A failure of commitment on
one side will weaken the commitment on all sides, and make everyone
less secure.
This dynamic is true not only in the natural tension between Russia
and the other G-8 partners; it applies in every pairing and every
possible combination of partners, within the G-8 and without. When any
member of a partnership pulls back from a commitment--either because
they question the importance of a task or because they believe they can
leave that task to others--the natural advantages of partnership are
lost, partners start calculating their investments and returns compared
to those of other partners, and the objective of each partner suddenly
changes--while the goal in the beginning is to ``achieve a common
aim,'' the goal in the end becomes ``not doing more than your share.''
That is why it is so essential that all nations everywhere do their
part--not only because no nation wants to carry the burden alone, but
because no nation can. It would be, in my judgment, a great service to
the cause and ideals of the partnership if this committee could serve
as a reminder to our government and to partner governments of the
commitments they have made, the expectations they have raised, and the
obligations they have embraced for making the most of this moment to
increase the security of the world. Thank you.
Senator Lugar. Thank you very much for that testimony.
Let me just mention, as a point of continuity with your
last comment, that one reason that I raised with Secretary
Bolton the need for United States leadership in the G-8
agreement is that things could fall apart. As Secretary Bolton
pointed out, there needs to be a Russian commitment to meet
their commitments made in Canada. But it has to be a good-faith
effort. And Dr. Pak, in the chemical weapons situation, has
been doing that. The appropriation this year by the Duma was
substantial, and this is real money in Russia. The politics of
that, as you suggest, are that Duma members who were exhorted
by Dr. Pak, and, more importantly, by President Putin, to do
this may feel, as you say, that the Europeans or the Japanese
may take over, that we may do more, that they don't really need
to do very much. That would be pernicious.
On the other hand, the degree of our commitment is crucial.
Ten billion over 10 years will extend through three more
administrations and several Congresses, with people coming and
going throughout that period of time. It is miraculous that
cooperative threat reduction has gone on for 11 years at this
point, and some feel that may have been too long and want to
bring it to a halt. But we're now committed for another 10
years of this at the levels that we have reached currently. And
so that's important.
What faith does everybody have in us, even as we're drawing
the box and trying to think of the commitment? Well, we hope a
whole lot. You know, the degree of enthusiasm that we all have,
administration and Congress, assures the Russians, the G-8 and
others that there is a fount of leadership here that is
constant and that is reaching out to every nation in the world
who ought to feel our urgency, and most do, in the war against
terrorism, and the way in which weapons of mass destruction
intersect that.
Let me just ask this question. Mr. Luongo, I think you made
a very important point that in all of our priorities, we
perhaps have not paid enough attention to the scientists and to
those who have been involved in the research effort. And, as
you say, many people find it very difficult to change their
career plans. As a matter of fact, your observation is probably
correct, that most have not. They are trying to transfer at
least what they have over to somebody else.
Specifically, as I've stated earlier, at Kirov that I keep
raising the scientists who were working at the defense facility
down the street in the military installation moved up the
street to the ISTC to our situation. Now, they're not doing the
same thing. They're now thinking about how to stop an anthrax
epidemic, even one in Russia, quite apart from one in the
United States or somewhere else. What are the antidotes to
that, or how would you detect chemical-weapon attacks upon
their country. These are very constructive projects, which
exercise the same expertise as when you were in the production
mode, or thinking about that, but now you're discussin defense.
So that's the ideal situation: by this time, at least a
hundred or so people, sort of, moving into that. Almost all the
rest who are in the military thing and the bankrupt affair are
hoping to get a real job with the ISTC.
Now, an ideal situation that relates to work that NTI, Ms.
Holgate's organization, are doing is in the biological side. At
the Ultrapure Laboratory in St. Petersburg, there are two to
three hundred people--at least that was the estimate the
director gave to me--who used to be involved in biological
weapons research. There's not an open admission that they were
doing that sort of thing, but what they described sounds very
much like that. But now they are involved in aerosol antidotes
to biological attacks. They hope to develop a process that
would provide total immunity against all BW threats, a
comprehensive thing. This raises the interesting scientific
question, in a very big thought, can you finally defeat
biological warfare by working through the science of how the
human body adapts--preferably before an attack, but, if
necessary, after one--so that casualties are limited or so that
in fact, we survive? That limits the efficacy of biological war
very substantially.
Now, there is great debate in the scientific community as
to whether this is doable, but it's a very important thought.
And the Russians are pursuing it at Ultrapure and other places,
and hopefully we're doing similar work in the United States.
But it shows that transition is possible. And in this
particular laboratory, they've developed three pharmaceutical
products that they are now selling commercially, principally to
hospitals in Russia, making up about 50 percent of the budget
of what used to be a bioweapons plant--and the other 50 percent
still comes essentially from cooperative threat reduction or
various other situations.
Now, I mention this because its the good news. The bad
news, as you point out, is we've had maybe checks to 20,000
people, some estimate 50,000 people--not really clear what all
of them are doing. This was a temporary stopgap. We know many
of them are e-mailing the United States laboratories looking
for work. Among other things, some of us have been trying to
promote the idea of American pharmaceutical companies
purchasing these plants and the scientists and employing them.
And that, I think, is doable if the commercial code of Russia
would be improved substantially and if they did not have as
much trouble getting in to Kirov as I did, as I pointed out to
the Defense Minister.
In order to resurrect this situation, really we'll have to
change the system, and they showed some recognition, so there's
some hope.
But I appreciate your underlining this. What further
thoughts do you have as to how that particular goal of dealing
with the scientists or the technicians--how would we best
perform that?
Mr. Luongo. I agree with a lot of what you said, Senator. I
think that each of the weapons complexes has its own unique
characteristics and its own unique problems. Obviously,
biological weapons scientists' knowledge has applicability to a
wide range of scientific activities, where, even if you're
doing basic science, you're contributing to the overall
knowledge base.
As we've analyzed the situation, part of the problem is
that you've currently got, in essence, two extremes when trying
to develop non-weapons employment for weapons scientists. One
is basic research for scientists, which are often in the form
of contracts, which extend for up to 3 years or so. However,
it's not clear that there's a real global market for most of
this research. At the end of the contract most of the results
just go back to the agency that funded them.
On the other end, you have commercialization, which is a
solution particularly pushed by the Congress. Congress has a
very strong interest in commercialization but it is difficult.
I'll just give you this example. We had someone with very great
experience in this field come and talk to us, and he showed us
the form that a real startup business in Russia filled out on
what the liabilities they saw were. This list was submitted to
a venture capitalist. It included everything from ``the
government can take your facility and your money'' to ``our
chief might leave'' and everything in between. When you overlay
on top of that all of the problems of a closed weapons city, as
you said, access to facilities, a bureaucracy that still is not
completely reformed, et cetra, commercialization is extremely
difficult to do.
The example that you gave in Kirov, I think is really the
middle ground, and that's harnessing what these scientists know
to real-world problems, not just in the biological field, but
in a variety of different areas such as in the environmental
field and nonproliferation analysis. We've tried to contribute
to this process by creating, in Sarov, the city that Laura
mentioned, a center for nonproliferation analysis which has,
depending on how you count it, maybe 35 people working for it,
maybe 35 FTEs, probably not 35 bodies. But they're
contributing. They're making some analysis that's useful. The
Russian Government has gotten wind of it, and they're giving
assignments to this center, as well.
So my theory is, we should keep basic science, we should
keep commercialization, that both are important, but that
there's this yawning chasm in the middle, which is the
application of scientific knowledge to real-world problems, and
that's where a greater focus needs to be.
Senator Lugar. Well, I appreciate that comment and its
applicability to our hearing theme today of this G-8 agreement,
because this is something on which we really need to visit with
our G-8 partners. Some of them, have been involved in ISTC and
have made contributions. The United States' contribution, I
think, unfortunately, verges toward 60 percent or so. It was
meant to be less than 50, with other people coming in, but we
are picking up the slack because it's so important to keep this
going.
But we really do need some emphasis. And even as much as I
feel that general-purpose submarines, the tactical nuclear
weapons, the control of the fissile material are critically
important, as you point out, the knowhow is important. As we
are all discussing Iraq, for example, and this is not
irrelevant to this issue, many people are saying our basic
intelligence of what goes on in even the nuclear, quite apart
from the chemical and biological dual purpose facilities in
Iraq, comes from people, from scientists, people who have been
in there and who try to describe to you what to look for. And
when you can pack up almost all the apparatus of a biological
laboratory, put it in a truck, and move it, this completely
changes the parameters of an inspection regime. Many believe
that there are installations there, and you overfly and you see
them, or even something on the ground that an inspector might
drive up to, but that might not be the case. It might be an
empty building, because the same apparatus that made anthrax
one day could be off making something else, elsewhere the next.
Witness, for instance, the conversion in Pokrov, a Russian
agricultural laboratory, that was making anthrax to something
now making Green Mama Shampoo as a commercial product. It's the
same identical facility and awfully hard to point out on any
one day what you're doing unless somebody knows. So it's a
terribly difficult problem.
As you pointed out, the scientists could go anywhere. But,
they don't want to go anywhere. People in Kirov live in Kirov.
They want to stay in Kirov. And our predicament, then, is to
try to think that through, hopefully with cooperative Russians
as well as our G-8 allies. I think it's a very important
contribution you've made trying to outline your own experience
in Sarov, which is substantial.
Ms. Holgate, let me just ask you for some further comments
about the bioweapons situation. I know that your colleague,
Peggy Hamburg, at NTI, has been working in this issue
extensively, and board members had a briefing yesterday from a
brilliant person from Johns Hopkins who described this
situation. Unlike the nuclear, it takes some time and effort to
do this sort of thing, but given the pace of biological life
studies in the world, there is almost no limit to how much of
this type of thing you can produce, almost no limit
geographically as to where it can happen. A different kind of
problem, in terms of quantity. And although life sciences leap
ahead and with great promise for our health, for our
agriculture, for other things, as it was described by this lady
yesterday, there is a dark side of this. Unlike the nuclear
program in which there were restrictions from the time of
Werner Von Braun over in Germany or Oppenheimer here or
whoever, no restrictions in the bio. All of this information is
on Web sites ad nauseam. It had been the case for years with
all of the upgrading of either good or evil, common knowledge
among those who get into this sort of thing.
Now, Ms. Holgate, how can the G-8 situation we're talking
about today, address this threat?
Ms. Holgate. Well, the exciting thing about dealing with
the bioterrorism risk or the bioweapons risk, in contrast to
nuclear, is that a lot of the things that you need to do to
deal with the bioterrorism risk have beneficial impacts, even
if you never have a bioterrorist incident. A lot of the
information we heard from Dr. O'Toole yesterday was about
improving the public health systems, improving knowledge, as
you indicated, of human immune responses and things like this.
Those are worth knowing even if we had certainty that a
bioterrorism event would never occur. So the process of
preparing for bioterrorism actually has real near-term
collateral benefits that are very helpful.
And that's somewhat in contrast to the nuclear area, where
the things you do to protect against nuclear terrorism are good
for that, but do not necessarily contribute a lot else that
needs doing.
The G-8 contribution on the bio front, I think, is exciting
in a couple of different areas. The very powerful biotechnology
industry in Europe--that's where a lot of the leading corporate
entities are located--and the slightly more planned industries
and economies of Europe give European governments perhaps
slightly more influence over their industrial partners than may
necessarily be the case in the United States to do perhaps some
more directed research or some directed commercial activity in
Russia.
The other area that could be very interesting there comes
in this question--and I very much agree with Ken on the need
for a diverse set of solutions to the challenge of human
capital--and that is, whether it's retirement, in some cases,
whether it's resettlement in a new type of housing or in
another venue, there's a lot of things that the U.S. system to
deal with the human side has been moved out of by congressional
restrictions or other decisions by the U.S. Government. And to
be able to have a set of partners in the G-8, who have yet to
grow those restrictions into their own legislation, who have
alternative models of economic development, of local
governance, of flexibility in other kinds of assistance that's
going to be required to really deal with these problems--that,
to me, is what's exciting about what the G-8 can bring to
supplement the robust efforts of the United States.
But, finally, I would say, I'm not going to let the U.S.
colleagues off the hook; at the November summit between U.S.
President Bush and Russian President Putin, there was a
statement signed to accelerate cooperation on bioterrorism
preparation and activities. That commitment has yet to be
fulfilled, and I was slightly dismayed at the way that Deputy
Under Secretary Bronson discussed the narrowing, in fact, of
cooperative activities in the area of very dangerous biological
weapons within the military-to-military context. In fact,
broadening that cooperation is the key to taking advantage of
the information, however ill-gained, over the last several
decades. Russia has information about these pathogens, about
how to deal with the pathogens, how to address the health needs
that come away from that, and a military-to-military,
classified, quiet, but very targeted set of cooperative efforts
is another key piece of the puzzle.
Senator Lugar. Well, that's a very important suggestion,
and I appreciate your making that, because you've had great
experience in your travels in Russia in behalf of this
Government for some time, and so you speak really from a
background that is very knowledgeable.
Mr. Luongo. Could I just make one point on that? When we
talk about scientific knowledge and what we're going to do
about it, it's really one area that actually could use more
money. The current funding between ISTC and the U.S. programs
is less than $100 million a year. It's actually substantially
less than $100 million a year. Other programs like fissile
material control, through the largesse of the Congress in the
last fiscal year, are up around $320 million per year.
So I really do think it's urgent to focus more funding on
scientific conversion. And unlike other areas where money is
maybe less important right now, and access and products and
actual progress are more important, I do think this is one area
where more money could be very usefully spent.
Senator Lugar. I appreciate that testimony. Both of you
know, but just for the sake of the record, that it is through
the ISTC that most of us have gained access to any of the
biological facilities. And it's because ISTC brought the
directors--on one occasions, of 13 such facilities to Moscow in
a conference that Senator Nunn and I attended, that we really
found the roster and began to make the visits. Now, the four
military were not there at the table, and those are visits that
we still need to make. But the fact is, when we went to
Obelinsk over 3 years ago, we were the first visitors outside
of a few surreptitious types who have been in and out of there.
It was a shocker, with barbed wire around the place, one guard
at the gates, and a whole floor of pathogens.
So the first thing we talked about for an hour and a half
was how to secure the place. And in our visit this year, it is
secure. Now there are other problems, cooperation with the
scientists there, but at least whatever they've got in there is
not as likely to be misappropriated.
Now, the problem of getting an American firm involved in
this, both of you have pointed out, is really prodigious given
the liabilities, given the commercial codes, all the rest of
it. This is something, in a government-to-government way at the
highest levels, we have to continue to work with President
Putin, who does want to bring about some resurrection of the
Russian economy, and the economic issues for him, in many
cases, are more important than the military hierarchy, and the
reason the military is often overruled, in terms of the benefit
of all Russians. We must continue to push on these issues.
The G-8, I think, can help a whole lot in that way. These
are people who have commercial interests, and they could have
interests in Russia. So it serves the purpose of employing
Russians in Russia, the proliferation of knowledge and people,
in addition.
But with the previous panel, we're really trying to get
this down on paper, somebody to write a comprehensive plan,
even if we don't have a single administrator in the government
that deals with all of it. If we all had the same song sheet as
to what our strategies are, what the priorities are, what the
moneys are that are required, we can then make choices, as
Members of Congress. Absent that, why, we're hunting and
pecking in hearings like this one trying to glean bits and
pieces of knowledge, sometimes promoting something on the
excitement of one hearing that if you had another group of
witnesses you might feel as second or third priority, not as
keen as the one you just heard.
Let me just ask this question, which you raised, Mr.
Luongo, which I thought was intriguing, that we don't know as
much as we should about the Russian reaction to so-called debt
swap plans. The assumption being that the Russians would be
delighted if a good part, if billions of dollars of their debt
were removed, because they're going to have trouble in the
coming year in keeping afloat with regard to that debt service.
So, as you point out, you hear at least some rumblings, I
gather, from Russian economists, or from where, that they might
fear inflation or fear of what else, but can you amplify this
somewhat more?
Mr. Luongo. Certainly. We had a series of three or four
meetings over the summertime in cooperation with the Carnegie
Endowment for International Peace, where we tried to delve into
how do you reshape threat reduction for the next 10 years. And
obviously, because of the cash crunch, the issue of debt swap
came up.
What's obvious to me is that the people in the relevant
military and weapon ministries view debt swap as an
opportunity. I'm not saying that the people in these ministries
have good ideas for the expenditure of this money; I'm just
saying that they view it as a real opportunity. But their
interactions with the Finance Ministry and some of the other
economic ministries in Russia have not been particularly
smooth.
And some of the information that was filtered back to us
was that there is some concern about whether or not this is
something that the Russian Government really wants to do for a
variety of different reasons. One concern is that it could
affect their credit rating, because it may spur inflation.
Second, if it was going to be done, would a swap for
nonproliferation activities be something that the Russian
Government would be interested in, or would it perhaps include
other issues such as environment, or some other issues.
So as far as I know at this point in time, there hasn't
been a formal statement from the Russian Government on this
subject, and the debate is still a little bit unsettled over
there.
Senator Lugar. Well that may well be, but as either of you
gain some intelligence about this please share it with us.
Senator Biden and I have taken some leadership in trying to
facilitate the debt swap business, and I think constructively,
but we must make certain that we--not necessarily rectify, but
maybe sharpen up our own focus if there are these situations,
valid or not, there.
All I know is that we all appreciate the crisis the world
economy fell into when the Russian economy went aground. Small
as it may be, it generated, for many, a long-term capital
crisis in this country with debt swaps derivatives. We had
people coming to the IMF meeting very glumly that particular
year anticipating bank failures all over the world generated by
miscalculations in the Russian situation.
So leaving aside our thrust of our weapons of mass
destruction situation, we have an economic predicament here
that the Russians, many feel, will be alleviated by the price
of oil and by the expansion of the energy markets, other
revenues coming into the system that maybe were not a part of
the picture 2, 3, 4 years ago. And maybe so. Maybe not.
And so we want to keep an eye on that aspect, particularly
with our G-8 partners, because one reason for the G-8s to meet
is often economic issues. That may be the principal reason they
meet. And a derivative from this now has been this cooperation
on weapons of mass destruction, which is certainly desirable.
Well, I thank both of you for staying with us through your
lunch hour into the afternoon. You've offered a great deal to
the committee, as always, and we thank you for coming.
Mr. Luongo. Thank you, Senator.
Senator Lugar. The hearing is adjourned.
[Whereupon, at 1:20 p.m., the committee adjourned, to
reconvene subject to the call of the Chair.]
----------
Additional Questions Submitted for the Record
Additional questions for the record were submitted to Hon. Linton
Brooks, Acting Administrator, National Nuclear Security Administration,
Department of Energy, but responses had not be received at the time of
publication on March 18, 2003.
______
Responses of Hon. John R. Bolton, Under Secretary of State for Arms
Control and International Security, to Additional Questions for the
Record Submitted by Senator Joseph R. Biden, Jr.
Question. Under the guidelines adopted for cooperative projects
under the G-8 Global Partnership, all governments will take necessary
steps to ensure that assistance be exempt from taxes, duties, levies,
and other charges. Does this agreement apply to taxes or fees imposed
by all levels of the recipient government--national regional/
provincial, and local levels?
For example, can a Russian province still levy taxes even if
the federal government has provided an exemption?
Answer. U.S. assistance is exempt from taxation, customs, duties,
fees and other charges under our bilateral assistance agreements with
the former Soviet states, including the Cooperative Threat Reduction
umbrella agreements. The exemption provisions in these agreements apply
to all levels of government. Under our government-to-government
agreements, the recipient national government is responsible for
ensuring that such protections are observed. When agencies or officials
occasionally fail to observe this commitment, we have been successful
in ensuring corrective action is taken.
The Global Partnership guideline on taxation does not specifically
address the issue of exemption at the regional and local levels. Other
GB members have stated that they share our view that exemption from
taxation and other charges must extend to all levels of government.
Question. Has President Putin indicated any intention to
incorporate the guidelines for cooperative projects on future
nonproliferation assistance into Russian law?
If so, does he plan to announce a presidential decree or
will he submit the guidelines to the Russian Duma for final
approval?
What are the views of the United States on the necessity of
further legal steps by the Russian Government?
Answer. To date, President Putin has not indicated any plans to
incorporate the guidelines into law. With respect to most guideline
provisions, it appears unlikely that legislative action would be
necessary. In the case of liability protections and exemption of
assistance from taxation, Russian officials have argued that the
provisions sought by the United States and other G-8 members are not
consistent with current Russian law. U.S.-Russian agreements
incorporating these provisions, including the CTR Umbrella Agreement,
are being provisionally applied. Our view is that the Russian
Government in order to open the way to contributions from G-8 members
under the Global Partnership must take any steps required to implement
the guidelines, including legislative changes if required.
Question. Under the Global Partnership, the G-8 members adopted six
nonproliferation principles to guide future actions on preventing
terrorists or states that harbor them from acquiring or developing
weapons or materials of mass destruction. How does the United States
intend to work with its G-8 partners to ``turn those principles into
concrete action?''
What benchmarks will be used to review national progress?
Answer. To build upon and maximize the impact of the G-8
nonproliferation principles, the Administration is developing an action
plan to operationalize them. This action plan will contain a list of
goals and describe specific steps that can be taken to advance each
principle. The U.S. expects to circulate the action plan for
consideration by our G-8 Partners this year. We also plan to recommend
a strategy for promoting adherences to these principles by all
countries. We will suggest that the G-8 report on progress toward
meeting the goals outlined in the action plan by the next Summit. Once
the action plan is approved by the G-8, we can consider establishing
national benchmarks.
Question. The first G-8 nonproliferation principle is to ``promote
the adoption, universalization, full implementation, and, where
necessary, strengthening of multilateral treaties and other
international instruments whose aim is to prevent the proliferation or
illicit acquisition of such items; strengthen the institutions designed
to implement these instruments.''
What is the United States doing to implement this principle?
Answer. The United States continues to support and advance the
multilateral nonproliferation regimes that are currently in force. We
are also working to improve their effectiveness and enforcement.
Specifically, to reinforce the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT)
and International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) we are seeking acceptance
of Additional Protocols by all NPT non-nuclear weapon States Parties,
and working to ensure the IAEA has adequate resources to do its job. We
are strengthening the Missile Technology Control Regime by focusing it
on the regional aspects of missile nonproliferation and by updating its
export controls in light of evolving threats, such as unmanned air
vehicles. We are also pressing for universal adherence to the
International Code of Conduct against Ballistic Missile Proliferation,
which will establish a new supplementary international missile
nonproliferation mechanism. In the Australia Group (AC), the U.S. is
working to address chemical-biological weapons (CBW) programs in non-AC
countries, sources of support for such programs in non-AC countries,
and CBW terrorism. The Nuclear Suppliers Group is considering U.S.
proposals to enhance its ability to deal with the threat of nuclear
terrorism. These proposals include enhanced information sharing on
approvals of Trigger List and nuclear-related dual-use exports as well
as denials of Trigger List exports. In the Wassenaar Arrangement, the
U.S. is seeking to strengthen controls for items on the dual-use list
and to add a new small arms/light weapons reporting category for the
Wassenaar Munitions List. In addition, the Administration is conducting
a review of multilateral nonproliferation regimes to identify further
measures that could strengthen their effectiveness in our efforts to
stop WMD proliferation.
Question. For example, what is the United States doing to apply it
to the Biological Weapons Convention? What detailed proposals will the
United States present to the resumed BWC review conference next month?
Answer. There are currently 146 States Parties to the Biological
Weapons Convention. The United States takes every appropriate
opportunity in dealing with states not party to encourage them to
become party to the Convention, as well as to press certain States
Party to come into compliance with the Convention.
Additionally, in implementing the BWC, the United States works
closely with allies to strengthen international efforts to stem the
proliferation of biological weapons-related materials, equipment,
technology, and know how. Examples of these efforts include the
programs of the Science and Technology Centers in the former Soviet
Union, which seek to redirect former biological weapons scientists to
peaceful projects, and the harmonization of export controls on
biological agents and related production equipment and technology in
the Australia Group.
We proposed at the November 2001 Review Conference a number of
measures to help accomplish the objectives of the Biological Weapons
Convention and to combat the BW threat. We are working closely with
friends and allies in a variety of fora--such as the BWC, the World
Health Organization, the G-8, and the Australia Group--to pursue such
alternative approaches which we assess will have a real impact in
strengthening the BWC ban on biological weapons, including:
Investigating suspicious outbreaks of disease;
Sound procedures for study, modification, and shipment of
pathogenic organisms;
National criminalization of activities prohibited by the
Biological Weapons Convention; and
Sound national oversight mechanisms for security of
dangerous pathogens.
The U.S. proposals, underpinned by current efforts to counter the
BW threat, will continue to be the basis for the U.S. approach at the
resumed Review Conference in November 2002.
Question. What role does the United States envision for the
biological weapons convention in stemming biological weapons
proliferation?
Answer. The Biological Weapons Convention reflects the total
rejection of biological and toxin weapons by the international
community. The norm it reflects provides the basis for all other
efforts to stem proliferation of such weapons and to eliminate them
entirely as a security threat. Although specific means to deal with the
biological weapons threat may be implemented through a wide variety of
different mechanisms, the Convention remains the foundation on which
they are built.
Question. The G-8 Global Partnership envisions ``specific
cooperation projects, initially in Russia, to address nonproliferation,
disarmament, counter-terrorism and nuclear safety issues.'' Please
discuss the types of projects envisioned under the objective of
counter-terrorism.
Will these projects be related to efforts to eliminate or
better secure weapons of mass destruction and related
materials?
Or might they include assistance to facilitate military or
law enforcement operations to root out terrorist cells in
Russia and other nations?
Answer. The impetus for the Clobal Partnership, in the wake of the
September 11 attacks, is to prevent terrorists, or those that harbor
them, from acquiring or developing weapons of mass destruction,
missiles, and related materials, equipment, technology, and expertise.
In a very real sense, nonproliferation and disarmament cooperation
programs that eliminate or secure weapons and related materials help
counter terrorist threats. The G8 statement identified chemical weapons
destruction, fissile material disposition, nuclear submarine
dismantlement, and peaceful, civilian employment of former weapon
scientists as among the Global Partnership priority concerns. G-8
members to date have not discussed military or law enforcement
assistance projects to identify and root out terrorists.
Question. On October 8, 2002, Senators Biden and Specter introduced
S. 3079, a bill to permit the Secretary of State and the Attorney
General, acting jointly to bring into the United States up to 500 Iraqi
weapons scientists (plus their families) who provide reliable
information on Saddam Hussein's weapons of mass destruction programs.
Do you believe that this authority would help international inspectors
and the United States to obtain such reliable information and to lessen
Saddam Hussein's access to key weapons scientists?
Does the Administration favor enactment of this measure
before the 107th Congress adjourns?
Answer. The Administration strongly supports enactment of
legislation that would accomplish the policy objectives of the proposed
initiative before the 107th Congress adjourns. This legislation would
support a key element of the U.S. strategy to strengthen the
effectiveness of UN weapons inspections in order to disarm Iraq of its
weapons of mass destruction. The ability to allow specified Iraqi
citizens and their families authorized under this Act to reside in the
United States would assist in determining the extent of Saddam
Hussein's weapons of mass destruction programs. Specifically, it would
provide an alternative means for interviewing the individuals specified
in the bill free from monitoring or intimidation by the Iraqi regime.
While S. 3079, as introduced, provides a good starting point for
achieving the Administration's policy objectives, the legislation would
require substantial technical modifications to ensure a solid
foundation for a successful program. In response to your request that
we review the draft legislation, we previously provided comments in a
letter dated October 23, 2002, and we understand the Justice Department
may soon do the same. With these proposed modifications, the
Administration could support S. 3079.
______
Response of Hon. John R. Bolton, Under Secretary of State for Arms
Control and International Security, to an Additional Question for the
Record Submitted by Senator Bill Nelson
Question. Russian weapons earmarked for elimination and destruction
under the Moscow Treaty force limits pose additional challenges to the
Russians and to the U.S., which we have typically addressed with the
Nunn-Lugar Cooperative Threat Reduction programs. If we are unable to
attain $10 billion as pledged from other G-8 nations, how could this
affect Russia's ability to destroy weapons?
Answer. The United States, through the Department of Defense
Cooperative Threat Reduction programs, has played a significant role in
helping Russia eliminate strategic nuclear delivery systems, such as
heavy bombers, SSBNs, and ICBM silos and mobile launchers. The U.S.
originally helped Russia meet START requirements and now will help
Russia implement Moscow Treaty reductions. There has been minimal
assistance to Russia from other G-7 nations for strategic nuclear
projects, and it would be particularly difficult for non-nuclear weapon
states to be involved in this area. Therefore, the extent of funding
for the Global Partnership from the other G-7 will not have an impact
on Russia's elimination of strategic nuclear delivery systems.
However, $20 billion of needs have been identified for a broad
range of nonproliferation requirements. Shortfalls in the $10 billion
target for other G-8 members could make it more difficult for Russia to
undertake some disarmament activities. Among the Global Partnership
priority programs, the G-8 leaders in the Kananaskis statement
identified chemical weapons destruction, nuclear submarine
dismantlement, fissile material disposition, and employment of former
weapon scientists. Other C-7 members have indicated they intend to
focus on projects in these and other areas. The United States
particularly welcomes their contributions to chemical weapons
destruction and plutonium disposition.
______
Responses of Lisa Bronson, Deputy Under Secretary of Defense,
Technology Security Policy and Counter-Proliferation to Additional
Questions for the Record Submitted by Senator Bill Nelson
IRAQ'S WMD ARSENAL
Question. Would each witness please discuss their Department's take
on the feasibility of using these funds [$20.0 billion for G8 Global
Partnership] to destroy Iraq's arsenal of weapons of mass destruction
in a post-Saddam Iraq?
Answer. The G8 established the Global Partnership Against the
Spread of Weapons and Materials of Mass Destruction to address
nonproliferation, disarmament, counterterrorism and nuclear safety
issues in Russia and other former Soviet Union (FSU) states. Thus, it
is unlikely that funds allocated for this initiative by our Allies
would be used to destroy Iraq's arsenal of weapons of mass destruction.
I would note that Iraq has the financial resources to fund fully this
destruction, through sales of its oil and gas. With increased
flexibility to use Cooperative Threat Reduction (CTR) funds for
activities outside the FSU or to achieve long-standing U.S.
nonproliferation goals, I could foresee the limited use of such
authority to ensure that CTR expertise and infrastructure were
available to an effort to destroy completely all WMD and its associated
infrastructure in Iraq.
COOPERATION WITH G8
Question. I would like for each witness to comment on the existing
level of cooperation on nonproliferation issues with members of the G8.
Will there be more formal and frequent fora established to address
nonproliferation issues in the future?
Answer. The Department of Defense (DOD) enjoys excellent
cooperation on nonproliferation issues with members of the G8. For
several years, we have worked with the Government of Japan to
coordinate our support for elimination of Russian strategic submarines
in the Far East. Japan has allocated approximately $100 million for
this effort. Although Norway is not a G8 member, it has worked directly
with DOD to build infrastructure to store and process low level
radioactive waste and spent fuel from Russian nuclear submarines.
Similarly, we have collaborated closely with several G8 and other
donors to coordinate their participation in the project to destroy
chemical weapons in Russia and construct the chemical weapons
destruction facility (CWDF) at Shchuch'ye, Russia. Since DOD is
designing and plans to construct the pilot destruction facility, we
have encouraged other donors to fund ``outside the fence'' support
infrastructure. As a result:
The United Kingdom signed an agreement with Russia in
December 2001 to provide up to $18 million for Shchuch'ye
infrastructure over three years.
Germany plans to commit $1.3 million in 2002 to fund
communication lines and has equipped the Gorny facility to
destroy blister agent.
Italy has agreed with Russia to provide approximately $7.15
million over three years for Shchuch'ye infrastructure
projects.
Canada provided $70,000 in 2000 and $180,000 in 2001, and
plans to contribute $3.4 million in 2002.
The European Union (EU) committed $1.8 million in 2001 to
fund infrastructure.
France and Japan have expressed interest in providing
assistance for the Shchuch'ye project.
______
Responses of Hon. John S. Wolf, Assistant Secretary of State for
Nonproliferation, to Additional Questions for the Record Submitted by
Senator Joseph R. Biden, Jr.
Question. In your prepared testimony, you assert, ``we have made a
lot of progress with a very small budget'' for nonproliferation
assistance. What would you do with a larger budget?
Answer. First, the supplemental funding provided by the President
from the Emergency Response Fund (ERF) last year and the increased
spending requested by the President for FY 2003 base programs covering
the Nonproliferation and Disarmament Fund (NDF), Export Control and
Related Border Security (EXBS) Assistance, and Science Centers and Bio-
Redirection programs has provided us with a larger budget than in
previous years. The President also requested in FY 2003 as in FY 2002,
a $50 million voluntary contribution to the International Atomic Energy
Agency (IAEA) in addition to our regular assessment.
Last year and in prior years, we managed to make good progress by
focusing on the areas where we can have the greatest impact. The point
is that these programs give the U.S. a very good return for the small
amount of funds invested. Even at the requested level for FY 2003, the
combined total still represents a very small budget relative to
government spending overall. Thus we encourage your full support for
the FY 2003 request.
The successful NDF project in September 2002 to remove the highly
enriched uranium from the Vinca research reactor in Yugoslavia for
secure storage in Russia shows how we can reduce the risk that
dangerous materials will fall into terrorist hands. We also see NDF as
a vehicle to assist governments, companies and universities in
automating controls over the inventories and shipments of chemical,
biological and radiological materials.
Our EXBS program helps foreign governments develop export and
border controls that meet international standards and thus prevent WMD
and their components from crossing borders. We plan to continue the
EXBS program focus on former Soviet countries, while expanding to South
Asia as well as key transit and transshipment states in the Middle East
and Southeast Asia. In the future, we will seek to deploy sophisticated
detection equipment to a greater number of significant transit
countries more quickly.
Our voluntary contribution to the IAEA helps support verification
of the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT), which is achieved through
the IAEA safeguards system. In today's post 9/11 world, there are
significant new demands to improve nuclear material security. As part
of the war on terrorism, the IAEA initiated a review of its programs to
enhance those that will help states protect against acts of nuclear and
radiological terrorism (the ``dirty bomb'' threat). In March 2002, the
IAEA Board of Governors approved an action plan that will help states
around the world address the critical problem of reducing risks
associated with radiological terrorism or nuclear sabotage. We agree
that the safeguard system should be strengthened as recommended by the
IAEA.
The 2001 White House review of Russia nonproliferation and
security-related programs made several recommendations to strengthen
nonproliferation efforts including the expansion of the Science Centers
and the Bio Redirection programs. As discussed above, the President's
actions on allocation of ERF funds and the request for FY 2003 reflects
the priorities set forth in the review. [For your information, I have
attached a fact sheet released by the White House that discusses the
key outcome of the Administration's review.]
As you know, the Administration is currently developing the FY 2004
budget request for these programs. We are continuing our efforts to
ensure that our programs are focused on priority threat reduction and
that they are conducted as efficiently and effectively as possible. In
some cases, this may result in an additional request for FY 2004, a
reallocation of existing resources, or pursuit of alternative
approaches. The Administration appreciates your attention to ensuring
that necessary resources are provided to achieve U.S. nonproliferation
goals.
Attachment:
Fact Sheet: Threat Reduction Assistance
UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT NONPROLIFERATION/THREAT REDUCTION ASSISTANCE
TO RUSSIA
From 1992-2002, the Departments of State, Defense and Energy
have funded over $4.9 billion in nonproliferation and threat
reduction assistance to Russia. For FY 2002, United States
Government security-related assistance for Russia totals over
$870 million.
The Administration review of nonproliferation assistance to
Russia, completed in December 2001, found that most programs
are effective and well run, some should be expanded and a few
modified. FY02 budget allocations reflect these decisions.
State Department FY02 funding is about $41 million for
nonproliferation efforts under the Science Center, Civilian
Research and Development Foundation (CRDF), Biological Weapons
(BW) Expertise Redirection and Export Control and Related
Border Security assistance. Some of this assistance cannot be
obligated until Russia is certified under FREEDOM Support Act
Title V criteria or a waiver is authorized by Congress and
exercised by the President.
Congress increased Department of Energy funding with an FY02
Supplemental in addition to FY02 appropriations. Assistance
increased for Material Protection, Control and Accounting to
$291 million; Plutonium Disposition to $61 million; and
Initiatives for Proliferation Prevention (IPP) and Nuclear
Cities Initiative to $57 million.
FY02 funding for DOD's Cooperative Threat Reduction (CTR)
Program is estimated at $400 million; with $307 million in
Russian programs. CTR continued funding Strategic Offensive
Arms Elimination and Chemical Weapons Destruction. CTR funds
cannot be obligated until Russia is certified as eligible to
receive CTR aid or a waiver is authorized by Congress and
exercised by the President.
The Administration Review resulted in direction to transfer
to DOE the CTR project to eliminate weapons-grade plutonium
production ($74 million) under the Plutonium Production Reactor
Agreement. In FY03, DOE will fund this effort. Also, Congress
directed $30 million be transferred from DOD/CTR to State for
BW Redirection under the Science Centers.
FY03 request for threat reduction and nonproliferation
programs in former Soviet states is over $1 billion.
http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2002/05/20020524-16.html
Question. In your prepared testimony, you declare ``we are
expanding our efforts'' on International Science and Technology Center
(ISTC) and Bio Redirect projects. Yet the FY 2003 budget request for
these programs is $52 million, while the final level of FY 2002
appropriations, including supplemental appropriations, was $81 million.
Do you plan to request increased funding for these programs in FY 2004?
How much could these programs usefully spend, if the funds were
available?
Answer. The Science Centers--the International Science and
Technology Center (ISTC) in Moscow and the Science and Technology
Center in Ukraine (STCU) in Kiev--and the Bio Redirection programs are
interagency efforts. The FY 2002 State Department appropriation of $81
million includes $37 million for Science Centers from NADR funds and
$15 million for use by the Department of Health and Human Services,
Department of Agriculture and the Environmental Protection Agency for
Bio Redirection programs from Freedom Support Act (FSA) funds.
It also includes a Congressionally-directed one-time transfer of
$30 million from unobligated DOD funds for a Bio Industry Initiative as
part of the FY 2002 emergency response funds appropriation. This
initiative supports new engagement at former biological weapons
production facilities and an initiative of accelerated drug and vaccine
development. DOD Cooperative Threat Reduction funding for engaging BW
scientists under the Bio Redirection effort was $17 million in FY 2002.
In addition to these appropriations for Science Center and Bio
Redirect, individual USG agencies fund research proposals through the
Science Centers' Partner Program. For example, DOE contributed about $6
million to fund IPP projects carried out through the Science Centers in
FY 2002. The USG also provides assistance to help nonproliferation of
weapons expertise in the former Soviet states under the Civilian
Research and Development Foundation, which received $14 million in FY
2002 for this purpose. Other individual USG entities, including a
number of U.S. military R&D components, several U.S. national
laboratories under DOE, the National Cancer Institute of the NIH, and
NASA also fund partner projects through the Centers, with a combined
value of several million dollars per year.
The overall Administration request for FY 2003 for the Science
Centers and Bio Redirect programs was $107 million. The State
Department request of $52 million includes $32 million for Science
Centers and $20 million for Bio Redirection. As a new component within
the Bio Redirection program for FY 2003, State also seeks to fund an
expanded engagement initiative for former chemical weapons scientists,
as recommended during the Administration's 2001 NSC review of
nonproliferation assistance. The FY 2003 DOD Cooperative Threat
Reduction request for Rio Redirect, now appropriated, was $55 million.
The Administration is now preparing its FY 2004 budget request,
which will be submitted to the Congress in February. In so doing, the
Administration will consider the expected number of highly-ranked
Science Center and Rio Redirect projects, along with the institutes'
absorptive capacity, our oversight and monitoring resources, and the
possibility of increased funding by our G7 partners under the G8 Global
Partnership Against the Spread of Weapons and Materials of Mass
Destruction. In addition, we want to encourage the increasing awareness
at the former Soviet WMD institutes of the need to be able to reform
and compete in the global science market as a means of facilitating
greater self-sustainability; consequently, we are beginning to shift
the State Department program focus, too, toward funding more business
training, valorization and patent support.
Question. Do you have enough funds and legal authority to handle
the problem of Russian highly enriched uranium in other countries'
research reactors? In the successful operation to retrieve HEU in Vinca
at the end of August, the State Department turned to the Nuclear Threat
Initiative for $5 million in private funds, but the NTI has warned that
such private assistance is unlikely to be available in the future. If
the Congress provides the executive branch the necessary legal
authority, will you have enough funding for HEU retrieval? Is this an
area where a G-8 project with other donors would make sense?
Answer. The Department of Energy has both adequate legal authority
and funds to repatriate Soviet/Russian supplied HEU to Russia. Funding
for this effort has recently increased dramatically. The Russian
Research Reactor Fuel Return (RRRFR) program was first funded at the $1
million level in fiscal years 2001 and 2002. A $3.8 million
supplemental for fiscal year 2002 has just been approved, and the
President's proposed fiscal year 2003 budget of $9.5 million would
appear to be without opposition. Additional funding will be needed for
material transport, spent fuel management, and research reactor
conversion to use of low enriched uranium in order to complete the
RRRFR program.
In addition to DOE's program, the Department of State can utilize
resources from the Nonproliferation and Disarmament Fund (NDF) for
projects that require immediate or urgent attention and that fall
within its nonproliferation mandate. Although NDF funding is limited,
the NDF has sufficient legal authority to transport and dispose of
nuclear materials that present a proliferation risk. For example, NDF
funds will be used to provide $3.5 million to support initial shipments
from and conversion of a research reactor in a former Soviet state. In
some cases, to facilitate implementation of these projects, the U.S.
may need to address country and facility specific requirements. For
example, some of these projects may require environmental remediation.
In the Vinca project, funding provided by the Nuclear Threat Initiative
(NTI) addressed radioactive hazards at the Vinca Institute.
Each project presents its own opportunities and challenges; we
welcome supplementary efforts from organizations such as NTI in
appropriate situations as well as assistance and interest from our G-8
Partners.
______
Responses of Hon. John S. Wolf, Assistant Secretary of State for
Nonproliferation, to Additional Questions for the Record Submitted by
Senator Bill Nelson
Question. Would each witness discuss their Department's take on the
feasibility of using these funds to destroy Iraq's arsenal of weapons
of mass destruction in a post-Saddam Iraq?
Answer. At the Kananaskis Summit, President Bush and other G-8
Leaders agreed that the initial geographic focus of the G-8 Global
Partnership Against the Spread of Weapons and Materials of Mass
Destruction will be on projects in Russia, given the magnitude and
urgency of the proliferation threat there. United States has also made
clear that we will include our nonproliferation and threat reduction
assistance work with other states of the former Soviet Union in the
Global Partnership, with whom we already have agreements incorporating
the Kananaskis implementation guidelines.
In the future, other countries would be able to participate in the
Global Partnership by agreeing to the Kananaskis nonproliferation
principles and implementation guidelines. However, Iraq is a special
case. UNSCR 1284 mandates that Iraq will be liable for all costs
associated with UNMOVIC and the IAEA in relation to their work to
disarm Iraq of its weapons of mass destruction. This is an appropriate
means to finance the destruction of Iraqi WMD.
Question. I would like for each witness to comment on the existing
level of cooperation on nonproliferation issues with the members of the
G-8. Will there be more formal and frequent fora established to address
nonproliferation issues in the future?
Answer. The G-8 has evolved from a forum that primarily addressed
economic issues to an annual meeting of leaders with a broader focus
and scope. In recent years, political and security issues have grown on
the G-8 agenda and since September 11, the G-8 has placed a higher
priority on enhancing cooperation on nonproliferation issues. The G-8
has launched initiatives on plutonium disposition (1996 Moscow Nuclear
Safety and Security Summit) and the Global Partnership Against Weapons
and Materials of Mass Destruction (2002 Kananaskis Summit). It has been
an effective and useful forum for nonproliferation cooperation.
There is an existing G-8 mechanism for promoting information
exchange and cooperation on nonproliferation issues, the
Nonproliferation Experts Group (NPEG). G-8 nonproliferation experts
meet several times each year to propose possible nonproliferation
agenda items for the annual Foreign Ministerial and Leaders Summit. The
NPEG discusses nonproliferation priorities and pressing concerns. NPEG
representatives assist in implementing the commitments made by Leaders
at previous Summits.
Last year, the NPEG was mandated to consider practical steps to
reduce the WMD terrorist threat and WMD proliferation. The NPEG
developed a set of recommendations for preventing terrorist access to
weapons of mass destruction and radiological weapons. In June, Leaders
endorsed six nonproliferation principles based on those NPEG
recommendations. Over the coming year, the NPEG will continue to
consider areas for further work by the G-8.
______
Responses of Hon. John S. Wolf, Assistant Secretary of State for
Nonproliferation, to Additional Questions for the Record Submitted by
Senator Jesse Helms
Question 1. What is the current state of agreement between the
United States and the Russian Federation on the issue of taxation of
assistance? Will this issue be resolved prior to the introduction of
additional assistance? To what extent do prior commitments from the
national and local Russian authorities remain unsatisfied?
Answer. Under our bilateral assistance agreements with the Russian
Federation, U.S. assistance is exempt from taxation, customs, duties,
fees and other charges. The exemption provisions in these agreements
apply to all levels of government. Under our government-to-government
agreements, the recipient national government is responsible for
ensuring that such protections are observed. There is no pending
taxation issue to be resolved that would impede additional U.S. funding
for programs covered by these agreements, nor would we characterize
commitments of Russian authorities as unsatisfied.
Question 2. What safeguards have been developed to ensure that the
assistance provided is not subject to diversion? What have been the
results of audits and analyses to date?
Answer. U.S. assistance to the former Soviet states is provided for
specific purposes primarily in the form of goods, services and
training, rather than funds. This helps minimize risks and the
possibility that such assistance can be diverted.
Our assistance is provided under bilateral agreements which include
protection provisions ensuring that: ``Any commodities, supplies or
other property provided under United States assistance programs will be
used solely for the purposes agreed upon'' . . . as well as provisions
for audit and examination rights of the U.S. assistance provided.
We consistently exercise the rights and protections afforded U.S.
assistance under such agreements to ensure our assistance is used for
its intended purposes. U.S. assistance programs implement these rights
in different forms--for example, some programs have routine, scheduled
external and internal audits by project; others include the presence of
``incountry'' personnel to oversee and monitor assistance through
random checks; others use ``national technical means'' as appropriate;
some programs include various combinations of these safeguards.
In particular, I would like to address the oversight mechanisms for
the Science Centers, for which I am responsible. Although the overall
budget represents only three percent of overall assistance for Eurasia
security programs, we take seriously the importance of safeguarding
funds against diversion. Internal audits and independent outside audits
by the Science Centers and by the United States and other parties
provide multiple layers of oversight for grants for civilian research
by former WMD scientists.
For example, International Science and Technology Center (ISTC)
staff conducted financial audits on 244 projects, including 229 final
audits and 15 annual audits during on-site visits to 367 participating
institutes during CY2001. ISTC contracted with Deloitte Touche Tohmatsu
to conduct an audit of the Center last year, while Lubbock and Fine
performed the audit of the STCU. The European Union (EU) Court of
Auditors conducts periodic audits at the request of the European
Commission. The Department's Bureau of Nonproliferation contracts with
the Defense Contract Audit Agency (DCAA) to perform financial audits of
selected projects (50 projects in 2002; 60 planned for 2003), and
engages scientific experts to conduct concurrent technical performance
audits. Our access and audit rights extend up to three years after the
end of a project.
Moreover, a recent GAO audit report (GAO-01-582), submitted to
Congress in May 2001, examined the Department's role in selecting
projects that meet program objectives and monitoring to assure adequate
program oversight. We believe that this report and additional
clarifications provided by the Department as an appendix to the GAO
report present a positive picture of the Department's oversight of the
program as envisioned when the Science Centers were established.
The international agreements establishing the Centers provide
access to the former WMD laboratories and to the scientists, project
financial records, research workbooks, and progress reports.
Financial controls constitute a second set of checks to guard
against diversion. The Centers arrange for direct deposit of all U.S.
and other research grants into scientists' personal bank accounts,
rather than through participating governments or former WMD institutes.
Secondly, procurement for all projects is handled by the Centers,
rather than through the WMD institutes or project teams. Finally, chief
financial officers of both institutions and other senior positions are
staffed by the United States.
Results of audits and analysis suggest that for the most part, the
systems of checks and controls are working well.
Audit findings have generally been positive. There continue to be
some recurring problems--failure of scientists to maintain their own
time records, or to record their times on a daily basis, for example--
but these are usually minor problems that do not appear to involve
fraud or diversion. A recent audit finding that ISTC was unable to
easily match equipment procurement records with equipment inventoried
at specific projects has led to the introduction of new software to
obviate this problem.
Science Center financial comptrollers are advised by external
auditors of all audit conditions and are required to provide corrective
remedies. Science Centers staff from the Department's Bureau of
Nonproliferation provide oversight for this process and attend annual
conferences under DCAA auspices to discuss audit findings and solutions
with chief financial officers of the centers, and to plan audits for
the following year.
Similar safeguards against diversion are incorporated into other
State programs implemented through the Office of Nonproliferation and
Disarmament Fund (NP/NDF) and the Office of Export Control Cooperation
(NP/ECC). For example, NP/ECC initiated financial audits through
State's Office of the Inspector General in 2000. The OIG awarded
contracts to two companies for audits of the four principal executing
agencies (Coast Guard, Customs, Commerce and Energy) of the Export
Control/Border Security Assistance (EXBS) Program. To date, the audits
of Commerce, Coast Guard and Customs have been completed. No audit has
uncovered problems of a serious nature, although auditors have offered
useful recommendations for improving the program accounting procedures
of each agency. An audit of the Department of Energy is in its last
phase of completion and also appears to be headed toward positive
conclusions.
Question 3. Have audits been conducted to ensure that funds were
appropriately expended down to the second and third tier of
subcontracts in the Russian Federation?
Answer. Audits of all second and third tier subcontracts are not
routinely conducted, but may be identified for auditing based on
contract size, type of subcontract, and a variety of risk factors.
Question 4. In what government or entity does title reside for
those items of equipment that have been provided under previous and
current assistance programs?
Answer. Practices vary depending on the agency providing
nonproliferation assistance and the agreement under which assistance is
being provided. For example, under the Export Control and Related
Border Security Assistance program, the State Department holds title
until a grants document is signed by both parties, then the equipment
becomes the property of the grantee in the recipient country. Under
some other programs, such as the Science Centers program, the U.S.
agency or implementing body retains title to equipment, at least until
the conclusion of activities for which the equipment was provided. In
some of these situations, if the cost of returning equipment to the
United States after the conclusion of the activities exceeds the value
of the equipment, the U.S. agency may agree to transfer title to the
host government. U.S. agencies generally impose specific conditions on
these types of equipment transfers, such as stipulating that:
the U.S. party has continuing audit and examination rights;
none of the equipment may be transferred or sold to nations
of concern;
if equipment is sold, all proceeds will be used to finance
nonproliferation efforts;
a designated ministry or department provide the United
States an annual report stating the location of the equipment,
the purpose for which it is being used and, if equipment has
been sold or transferred, to whom it was sold or transferred,
the price and which nonproliferation programs were financed
with the proceeds.
These requirements are in addition to whatever protections the
United States has in umbrella and implementing assistance agreements.
Question 5. What is the current state of the Blend Down Monitoring
System (BDMS), the system associated with transparency in the HEU
program? Will the system provide the basis for future transparency
measures in that program? If not, what measures have been accepted and
implemented by the Russian Federation to achieve the same level of
transparency as would be provided by the BDMS?
Answer. The BDMS is currently in routine operation at the Ural
Electrochemical Integrate Enterprise (UEIE) in Novouralsk, Russia and
provides transparency for the down blending of HEU at that facility.
Negotiations will take place with Minatom during mid-November 2002 to
revise the existing transparency Annex to include agreed procedures to
implement BDMS operations at the Electrochemical Plant (ECP) in
Zelenogorsk, Russia. Installation of BDMS at ECP is planned for the
first quarter of calendar year 2003. We have initiated discussions for
installation of BDMS at the remaining down blending facility in
Seversk, Russia and currently plan to install BDMS at that facility in
late calendar year 2004.
Question 6. How will U.S. assistance provided through multilateral
mechanisms be audited and tracked?
Answer. U.S. policy is that nonproliferation and threat reduction
assistance provided through multilateral mechanisms must be implemented
according to strong guidelines that ensure that assistance is used for
its intended purpose. The primary existing multilateral mechanisms are
the International Science and Technology Center (ISTC), headquartered
in Moscow, and the Science and Technology Center in Ukraine (STCU),
which implement programs to redirect former weapon scientists and
experts to peaceful civilian employment. Science Center projects are
subject to a rigorous review during the proposal stage and are also
subject to internal, as well as independent outside audits from the
Centers. The United States also carries out audits, which have been
performed by the U.S. Army Defense Contract Audit Agency. Science
Centers staff and U.S. officials have access to the work sites where
projects are being implemented, and have audit rights up to three years
after the completion of the projects.
The U.S. would require that any new multilateral mechanisms
developed to implement multilateral cooperation, such as the program
for cooperation on Russian plutonium disposition, currently under
negotiation, would provide for such auditing and accountability. The
U.S. would also require other essential elements such as exemption of
assistance from taxation, liability protections, environmental and
safety conditions, intellectual property rights, and fair procurement.
Question 7. Has the Russian Federation, nationally and locally,
enacted all legislation and issued all legal authorities necessary to
fulfill Russian obligations under bilateral assistance programs? What
remains to be done? What steps are being taken by the U.S. Government
to ensure that these steps are taken prior to the provision of
additional assistance?
Answer. The Government of Russia is implementing the obligations it
has undertaken in U.S.-Russian assistance agreements. The Government of
Russia is bound by the terms of these agreements, and is responsible
for ensuring that such protections are observed, including at the local
levels. Some agreements are being provisionally applied, pending
ratification by the Duma. Russian officials have indicated that
provisions for exemption of assistance from taxation and liabiity
protections are not consistent with current Russian law. While we
encourage Russia to conform their domestic law, we regard that as an
internal matter, and we insist on receiving the benefit of all
provisions of such agreements. We can continue to provide assistance so
long as agreements providing the necessary protections are either in
force, or are being applied provisionally.
With respect to others participating in the G-8 Global Partnership,
some G-8 members have negotiated bilateral agreements with Russia that
provide a framework for nonproliferation assistance programs. Others
are engaged in negotiating such agreements, or have indicated that they
hope to do so shortly. The U.S. has made clear the importance of Russia
taking the necessary steps for the Global Partnership to succeed.
Question 8. What is the current state of security regarding the
storage of off-loaded and reserve U.S. strategic nuclear warheads? What
is the current state of security regarding reserve or off-loaded
Russian warheads? What are the prospects for increasing the level of
security associated with Russian nuclear weapons through bilateral
cooperative efforts? To what degree have previous efforts been
successful in increasing the level of security of Russian reserve and
off-loaded nuclear warheads?
Answer. The security of off-loaded and reserve U.S. nuclear
warheads in storage is very strong. It includes well-trained guards,
secure storage facilities, comprehensive sensor suites and proven
security procedures. Russian non-deployed and reserve warheads are
generally well protected, although Moscow faces several challenges in
protecting its weapons, including regional political instability, and
terrorist and insider threats due to financial difficulties.
U.S. assistance is designed to further improve the security of
Russian warheads, including non-deployed and reserve weapons, in the
context of this difficult threat environment. U.S. assistance includes
improvements to physical protection (fencing, sensors, communications);
weapons accounting (improved hardware and software); personnel
reliability (better screening of people); and guard force capabilities
(improved equipment and training).
U.S. assistance provided to date has increased the security of
Russian warheads significantly. As a result of increased U.S. access to
those sites, we plan to expand cooperative work with Russia to provide
comprehensive security upgrades at weapons storage sites. Thus, we
believe we can continue to increase the security of non-deployed and
reserve warheads in Russia through such joint efforts.
Question 9. Describe previous efforts to conduct an information
exchange with the Russian Federation regarding non-strategic nuclear
weapons. What impediments remain to a full and meaningful exchange of
information?
Answer. Recently, the U.S. has made several efforts to exchange
information with Russia on non-strategic nuclear weapons (NSNW),
bilaterally and in the NATO-Russia channel.
In February 2001, NATO presented Russia with four nuclear
Confidence and Security Building Measures proposals as part of the
process established by the 1999 NATO Washington Summit. One of these
proposals calls for exchanging data on U.S. and Russian sub-strategic
nuclear forces. NATO is planning to continue discussing these proposals
with Russia. Thus far, Russia has shown little enthusiasm for
exchanging data on NSNW. Instead, it has chosen to focus the
discussions on nuclear weapons safety and security issues.
Consequently, a NATO-Russia seminar on safety and security issues was
held in The Hague last April. NATO and Russia have indicated they plan
to continue information exchanges on these issues, including a follow
up seminar.
The U.S. has pushed for exchanges of information on NSNW in
bilateral venues as well. During the Moscow Treaty negotiations,
Secretary Powell proposed that the U.S. and Russia exchange information
to improve stockpile transparency. At the September 20, 2002,
Consultative Group for Strategic Security (CGSS) meeting, the U.S.
stressed the importance of enhancing NSNW transparency and recommended
that it be addressed in working group meetings.
Exchanging data on numbers and locations of non-strategic nuclear
warheads has not been addressed before in negotiated transparency
measures. Such an endeavor would pose political, technical and legal
challenges. U.S. NSNW in Europe are an issue for our NATO Allies who
prefer to retain the ``neither confirm/nor deny'' principle; it is
difficult to distinguish nonstrategic nuclear warheads from strategic
warheads; an exchange of data could involve divulging information about
sensitive nuclear weapon facilities; and such an exchange would
probably involve Restricted Data or Formerly Restricted Data, which
would require negotiation of an Agreement for Cooperation under the
Atomic Energy Act.
Question 10. What effect would the imposition of unilateral treaty
withdrawal restrictions have on U.S. strategic flexibility?
Answer. In general, we believe that it would not be in the U.S.
interest to impose unilateral withdrawal restrictions that go beyond
negotiated treaty language in arms control agreements. In particular,
if you are referring to the Moscow Treaty, that Treaty contains a
provision allowing each Party, in exercising its national sovereignty,
to withdraw upon three months written notice to the other Party.
Neither country can predict what security challenges may arise within
the next decade. The United States will need to maintain the
flexibility to respond to any potential challenges. For this reason,
the withdrawal provision was deliberately fashioned to allow greater
flexibility for each Party to respond in a timely manner to unforeseen
circumstances, whether they are caused by technical problems in the
stockpile, the emergence of new threats, or any other significant
changes in the international environment. This withdrawal provision
also reflects our much-improved strategic relationship with Russia,
where a decision to withdraw likely would be prompted by causes
unrelated either to the Treaty or to our bilateral relationship. For
these reasons, it would not be in the U.S. interest to restrict
unilaterally the flexibility provided by the Moscow Treaty's withdrawal
provision.
______
Responses of Lisa Bronson, Deputy Under Secretary of Defense,
Technology Security Policy and Counterproliferation, to Additional
Questions for the Record Submitted by Senator Jesse Helms
TAXATION OF ASSISTANCE
Question. What is the current state of agreement between the United
States and the Russian Federation on the issue of taxation and
assistance? Will this issue be resolved prior to the introduction of
additional assistance? To what extent do prior commitments from the
national and local Russian authorities remain unsatisfied?
Answer. The CTR Program is implemented pursuant to a government-to-
government umbrella agreement with the Russian Federation (RF). This
agreement provides a comprehensive legal framework for CTR activities
and includes exemption of CTR activities from all taxes and similar
charges. The RF indicates that it must submit the umbrella agreement to
the Duma for ratification, but has not done so, to date. Nevertheless,
the RF has agreed to provisional application of the agreement to CTR
assistance until it is ratified. Consequently, DoD has experienced few
significant problems regarding RF attempts to tax CTR assistance. All
American firms involved in CTR projects are not paying Value Added Tax
(VAT), customs fees, or other taxes. DoD has experienced some problems
with local tax collectors that are unaware of, or ignore, CTR's tax-
free status, but these typically have been resolved quickly by
providing necessary documentation to local authorities or involving RF
officials.
PREVENTING DIVERSION OF ASSISTANCE
Question. What safeguards have been developed to ensure the
assistance provided through DoD is not subject to diversion? What have
been the results of the audits and analysis to date?
Answer. DoD's Cooperative Threat Reduction (CTR) program has
established a layered system to reduce the risk of diversion of U.S.
assistance. First, the CTR Program is implemented through a series of
government-to-government umbrella agreements. These agreements provide
a comprehensive legal framework for CTR activities, including the
following:
Exemption of CTR activities from all taxes and similar
charges,
Immunity for participating U.S. personnel from foreign
criminal jurisdiction,
Audit and examination rights for U.S. assistance,
Waiver of all liability claims by recipient governments,
Assumption of all liabilities by host governments for third-
party claims,
Application of U.S. contracting rules,
Imposition of various other obligations including the duty
to not transfer any CTR assistance without U.S. permission.
Second, DoD has concluded implementing agreements for all program
areas with a designated executive agent from recipient countries. For
example, DoD concluded the Nuclear Weapons Storage Security
Implementing Agreement with the Russian Ministry of Defense (MOD).
Implementing agreements link assistance activities to the protections
of the umbrella agreement, establish a limit for the amount of funding
involved, and establish arrangements for audits and examinations of
materials, goods and services. DoD has concluded implementing
agreements that define the types and levels of CTR activity with
counterpart ministries and agencies in the former Soviet Union (FSU)
states.
Third, DoD conducts audits and examinations (A&Es) as a key means
to ensure CTR assistance is used for the intended purpose and not
diverted. The USG has established the right to examine the use of any
material, training, or other services provided through the CTR program
pursuant to umbrella and implementing agreements with each recipient
state. From 1993 to October 2002, DoD conducted a total of 126 A&Es in
Russia, Ukraine, Kazakhstan, Belarus, and Georgia. In FY 2002, DoD
conducted a total of 14 A&Es.
Fourth, DoD accomplishes CTR projects in accordance with U.S.
contracting laws and regulations, including the Federal Acquisition
Regulations (FAR) to ensure proper use of CTR assistance in the FSU.
Implementation of the FAR is a non-negotiable item in contract
negotiations with U.S., FSU and other contractors. Application of the
FAR ensures that DoD is minimizing costs using an objective metric and
provides assurances that the program is executed properly and diversion
is prevented. In addition, the following principles have proven
important to providing CTR assistance in the FSU:
A rigorous and detailed discussion of the requirements as
necessary before work is contracted, including site access to
ascertain the scope of the problem and possible solutions.
An independent U.S. Government (USG) cost estimate before
beginning procurement.
A prohibition against transferring any assistance to other
entities without written U.S. Government approval.
Contracts must comply with the Competition in Contracting
Act. FSU private companies may be contracted for work, but only
for work performed under a firm fixed price contract.
U.S. project managers must be allowed to monitor closely and
regularly the cost, schedule, and performance of the contractor
and the project to ensure that the contract is finished on time
and at cost.
U.S. project managers must be able to monitor any work
promised by the recipient that is integral to the project
success (e.g., infrastructure needed to support a CTR
constructed demilitarization site).
No work is paid for unless it is inspected and accepted by a
USG representative. Payment to recipient country contractors or
subcontractors is made only after work is completed.
Only accepted Western financial accounting methods may be
used for non-fixed price contracts.
U.S. project managers must be able to monitor the payments
from the USG to the bank selected by the contractor.
U.S. project managers must be able to meet regularly with
CTR contractors (both U.S. and foreign) to review their work,
and discuss their banking arrangements and financial
situations.
DoD program management teams travel extensively in the FSU to
oversee CTR project implementation (140 trips during FY 2002). These
trips provided an opportunity to develop requirements, negotiate
contracts, agreements and arrangements, monitor contractor performance,
resolve program concerns and assess whether CTR-provided services,
materials, and equipment were used for their intended purpose. These
trips were in addition to project visits by U.S. embassy officers and
on-site project management support by USG teams and U.S. contractors
who reside in country and report frequently to DoD program managers.
Additionally, CTR Logistics Support (CLS) personnel visits to perform
preventive and corrective maintenance on CTR provided equipment help
ensure equipment is used properly. Additionally, CLS contractors train
recipient-country personnel to provide assurance that the equipment is
properly used.
Fifth, the CTR Program uses National Technical Means as a
supplemental method to enhance CTR's confidence that assistance is
being used as intended.
Six, DoD is holding semi-annual reviews with RF executive agents to
develop a Joint Requirements and Implementation Plan to define agreed
requirements, assumptions, risks, and risk mitigation, and
responsibilities of each party for CTR projects. The U.S. meets with
the other recipient countries on an as needed basis.
To date, DoD's implementation of the above activities has
identified no confirmed diversion of CTR assistance by recipient
governments. While not a diversion of assistance, the RF was discovered
to be using heptyl fuel from dismantled ballistic missiles in
commercial space launches rather than storing it for disposal by a $90
million facility built by CTR due to open in summer 2002. DoD took
immediate action to prevent future such occurrences: instituted semi-
annual reviews with Russian executive agents; developed implementing
agreement amendments to replace Russian good faith obligations with
legal commitments; and has developed the Joint Requirements and
Implementation Plans describing assumptions, risk assessments, risk
mitigation and proposed responsibilities for each CTR project.
AUDITS OF SUBCONTRACTS
Question. Have audits been conducted to ensure that funds provided
through DoD were appiopriately expended down to the second and third
tier of subcontracts in the Russian Federation?
Answer. CTR contracts are subdivided into firm fixed price (FFP)
and cost contracts. FFP contracts are not audited. The work and price
is agreed to prior to signing the FFP contract, and payment occurs only
after the work is complete and inspected by a U.S. Government
representative, in accordance with the Federal Acquisition Regulations
(FAR). CTR only uses firm fixed price contracts when dealing with
former Soviet Union (FSU) companies.
A cost contract is often used with American or Western firms. These
contracts are moritored by an U.S. Government team and audited by the
Defense Contract Audit Agency (DCAA), in accordance with the FAR. DCAA
audits the prime contractor and often audits subcontractors down to the
third tier. DCAA's decision to audit at this level is based on the
dollar value of the contract, the service or material involved, the
contract type, and other factors. DCAA may also audit to this level if
the contracting office specifically requests it. The American and
Western firms working on cost contracts often use FSU subcontractors,
but the U.S. firms employ firm fixed price subcontracts with the FSU
firms.
As a result, U.S. or Western subcontractors may be audited on cost
contracts. However, FSU firms are not audited by DCAA because FSU
contractors only work on firm fixed price contracts.
EQUIPMENT TITLE
Question. In what government or entity does title reside for those
items of equipment that have been provided under previous or current
CTR assistance?
Answer. DoD provides the vast majority of CTR assistance by service
under a contract. For example, a contractor constructs a facility to
eliminate ballistic missiles. In other cases, DoD provides equipment or
materials to a former Soviet Union (FSU) state for a CTR project to
eliminate or secure weapons of mass destruction, delivery systems or
infrastructure.
In the end, the completed facility or equipment is transferred to
the recipient state's executive agent. The ``title'' document is called
a Transfer of Custody (TOC) document. The TOC is issued in accordance
with the umbrella agreement, which controls equipment retransfer and
restricts use of equipment for its intended purpose. For example,
Article VI or the CTR umbrella agreement states:
Unless written consent of the United States of America has
first been obtained, the Russian federation shall not transfer
title to, or possession of, any material, training or services
provided to pursuant to this Agreement to an entity, other than
an officer, employee, or agent of a Party to this Agreement and
shall not permit the use of such material, training, or
services for purposes other than those for which it has been
provided.
DoD monitors compliance with these terms through audits and
examinations, National Technical Means and routine logistics service of
equipment or facilities that have been transferred.
RUSSIAN OBLIGATIONS
Question. Has the Russian Federation, nationally and locally,
enacted all legislation and issued all legal authorities necessary to
fulfill Russian obligations under bilateral assistance programs
administered by DoD? What remains to be done? What steps are beirg
taken by the U.S. Government to ensure that these steps are taken prior
to the provision of additional assistance?
Answer. The record is somewhat mixed. DoD implements the CTR
Program pursuant to a government-to-government umbrella agreement
concluded with the Russian Federation (RF). In the late nineties, the
RF concluded that it must submit the umbrella agreement to the Duma for
ratification, but has not done so, to date. Nevertheless, the RF has
agreed to provisional application of the agreement until it is ratified
by the Duma. Consequently, the RF has continued to comply with the
umbrella agreement regarding the provision of USG assistance
thereunder. We understand from the Ministry of Foreign Affiirs that the
RF will submit the CTR umbrella agreement for ratification in the near
future.
For several years, DoD was unable to provide comprehensive security
upgrades to Russian nuclear weapons storage sites through the CTR
program due to RF legal constraints on non-Russian access to these
sites. In spring 2002, the Russian Prime Minister reportedly issued a
directive allowing U.S. Government personnel limited access to its
nuclear weapons storage sites in order to monitor installation of
security systems. DoD is currently negotiating with the Russian MOD to
conclude the necessary protocols and arrangements to provide the site
access necessary for implementation of CTR projects and protection for
Russian sensitive information. DoD provided a revised version of these
documents to MOD in mid-December. We anticipate resolving minor
differences with MOD in the near future on these documents, so that we
can proceed with initial security enhancement projects at agreed sites.
On a few occasions, the RF has experienced difficulty in securing
land allocation for CTR projects due to local/regional opposition and
political maneuvering. This delayed initiation of the Chemical Weapons
Destruction Facility project, but was eventually resolved and land
allocated in 1998. In 1997, local opposition precluded construction of
a facility at Perm to eliminate solid rocket motors from Russian
ballistic missiles destroyed through CTR projects. Subsequently, the RF
identified Votkinsk as the site for construction of this facility. To
date, the RF has been unable to secure from local authorities the
necessary land allocation and permits for construction of this
facility. Consequently, DoD has held up awarding the ``Phase II''
contract (initial construction and long lead equipment procurement)
pending satisfactory resolution of this issue.
INFORMATION EXCHANGE ON NON-STRATEGIC NUCLEAR WEAPONS
Question. Describe previous efforts to conduct an information
exchange with the Russian Federation regarding non-strategic nuclear
weapons. What impediments remain to a full and meaningful exchange of
information?
Answer. While the Moscow Treaty focuses on reductions in strategic
nuclear warheads, we have made clear to Russia our interest in non-
strategic nuclear weapons (NSNW), and in particular, in greater
transparency regarding those weapons.
In the early 1990s, the United States and Russia both announced
significant reductions in their non-strategic nuclear weapons without
the need for a formal arms control agreement. While the U.S. has made
such reductions, we have a great deal of uncertainty regarding the
status of Russia's non-strategic nuclear weapons.
We are concerned about the large number of Russian non-strategic
nuclear weapons and Russia's nuclear warhead production capability. We
believe that the best way to address these concerns is through
expanding mutual transparency.
Both Secretary Rumsfeld and Secretary Powell have raised these
concerns with their Russian counterparts. We put them on notice that we
intend to address these issues bilaterally. We plan to pursue
transparency discussions on NSNW as a priority matter in the
Consultative Group for Strategic Security (CGSS).
Many aspects of the issue of tactical nuclear weapons also involve
our NATO allies and our Alliance commitments, so it is an Alliance
matter in addition to a bilateral issue with Russia.
In the past, the U.S. has proposed comprehensive stockpile data
exchanges. Russia thus far has shown little interest in this concept.
Even so, depending upon the detail and nature of information that may
be exchanged regarding future reductions of non-strategic weapons,
Restricted Data or Formerly Restricted Data may be involved. In such an
instance, the exchange of data would require completion beforehand of
an Agreement for Cooperation under the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as
amended.
TREATY WITHDRAWAL RESTRICTIONS
Question. What effect would the imposition of unilateral treaty
withdrawal restrictions have on U.S. strategic flexibility?
Answer. In general, we believe that it would not be in the U.S.
interest to impose unilateral withdrawal restrictions that go beyond
negotiated treaty language in arms control agreements. In particular,
if you are referring to the Moscow Treaty, that Treaty contains a
provision allowing each Party, in exercising its national sovereignty,
to withdraw upon three months written notice to the other Party.
Neither country can predict what security challenges may arise within
the next decade. The United States will need to maintain the
flexibility to respond to any potential challenges. For this reason,
the withdrawal provision was deliberately fashioned to allow greater
flexibility for each Party to respond in a timely manner to unforeseen
circumstances, whether they are caused by technical problems in the
stockpile, the emergence of new threats, or any other significant
changes in the international environment. This withdrawal provision
also reflects our much-improved strategic relationship with Russia,
where a decision to withdraw likely would be prompted by causes
unrelated either to the Treaty or to our bilateral relationship. For
these reasons, it would not be in the U.S. interest to restrict
unilaterally the flexibility provided by the Moscow Treaty's withdrawal
provision.