

**FUTURE WAR/FUTURE BATTLESPACE:
THE STRATEGIC ROLE OF AMERICAN
LANDPOWER**

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FOREWORD

What design would I be forming if I were the enemy?

Frederick the Great

The great difficulty in forecasting the future strategic environment and the force structure needed in response is the plethora of variables that change the calculus. Only hindsight reveals the failure of a *Maginot Line* or the brilliant success of a mechanized *Blitzkrieg* doctrine. In the final analysis, the reader must judge the line of reasoning.

In this monograph, Dr. Steven Metz and Lieutenant Colonel Raymond Millen examine the trends in the strategic environment in their development of the Future War/Future Battlespace. One fact is clear. Traditional warfighting has changed in the post 9-11 era. The U.S. military must adapt or fail. There is no other recourse.

Dr. Metz and LTC Millen have superbly framed the strategic environment into four strategic battlespaces and have examined the ways future adversaries will operate within them to thwart U.S. strategic initiatives. In this context, these variables influence the path that Transformation must take.

The Strategic Studies Institute is pleased to offer this monograph as a topic of debate concerning Transformation and the Objective Force.

DOUGLAS C. LOVELACE, JR.
Director
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BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCH OF THE AUTHORS

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SUMMARY

Although the events of September 11th signified the end of the short-lived post-Cold War era, they did not necessarily render obsolete U.S. inter-agency, future war analysis and planning. Rather, future war concepts require adaptation to the strategic environment. In order to link Army Transformation to security environment trends with specific focus on the “Objective Force” timeframe, this report’s conceptual framework assesses the nature of the emerging security environment, the modes of future armed conflict, the Objective Force characteristic requirements to remain strategically decisive, an Objective Force conceptualization for the emerging security environment, and the enduring relevance of the U.S. Army.

Two conclusions emerge from this report: first, the marked decline of large-scale state-on-state warfare and the rise of ambiguous, protracted, indecisive conflict in complex environments; second, because the collective international community will seek to harness American military hegemony, the United States should adopt a broad spectrum strategy based on partnership and shared risks for long-term national interests.

The future security environment will be characterized by minor conflicts due to the influence of the following interconnected trends: WMD proliferation, globalization (“Golden Straightjacket”), the glare of the information age, U.S. conventional military dominance, the positive and negative effects of rapid change on states, and the rapid diffusion of knowledge and technology.

Largely marginalized by the Cold War, smaller conflicts have assumed greater attention since the fall of the Berlin Wall, and with the inevitable fall of rogue states like Iraq and North Korea, major conflicts will become extremely rare as a result of the aforementioned trends. WMD

proliferation will constrain states from conventional war because of the increased risks and decreased benefits. To ensure the nuclear threshold is not crossed, states will engage in quick incursions with limited objectives. The increasing globalization of economies will restrain aggression because of the immediate, negative impact on an aggressor's economy. The glare of the Information Age means that any use of force will gain instantaneous world attention and if aggression is involved, will result in the immediate severance of the aggressor's external capital flows and markets. Few regimes can survive economic stagnation.

The sheer dominance of the U.S. conventional military will serve to deter most aggressors, and despite theoretical uses of asymmetric methods—anti-access strategies, terrorism, or weapons of mass destruction—to thwart U.S. intervention, aggressors will have to pause and weigh the associated risks. The continued period of decolonization will entail the struggle for resources and power, the opposition to globalization by failing states or non-state actors will result in a backlash against change, and the traditional competition for resources among poorer nations will continue unabated. Ordinarily, the machinations of non-state actors would be of small consequence, but for the greater availability of knowledge and technology. With greater access to WMD, funding and situational awareness, and unconstrained by norms, rules, and laws, non-state entities pose a serious threat to even the United States. Unlike traditional adversaries, these non-state entities seek victory by avoiding defeat. Protracted conflict, ethical, political, and legal ambiguity, and operating within population centers make them particularly virulent.

Three big strategic shifts demand a reshaping of American strategy. First, future adversaries will be much more savvy regarding U.S. capabilities and triggers for intervention. The era of the “stupid” enemy is over. Second, precision operations are crucial to avoiding the unintended and second order of military effects. Victories which

inadvertently alienate, destabilize, or impoverish neighboring states or regions (those not directly involved in the conflict) will prove counterproductive and debilitating in the long term. Third, the armed forces will most likely be employed to restore and sustain stability rather than to defeat a discernible enemy. Internal conflicts will be more prevalent, which if left unchecked, could grow or become intolerable to the international community. Hence, the security concerns will focus on staunching a conflict early, which will be characterized as protracted, complex, and ambiguous.

The future battlefield/battlespace expands the concept of armed conflict by placing the operational aspects within a broader context to include political, economic, social, ecological, demographic, legal, normative, diplomatic, and technological. Adversaries will employ complexity, ambiguity, and asymmetry to prevent, deter, and complicate outside intervention, and should that fail, avoid rapid, decisive operations. Adversaries will use any device (information warfare, the UN legalist paradigm tendencies, provocation attacks, and human shields) to fetter U.S. military power.

The four distinct but interrelated dominant strategic battlespaces are direct interstate war, nonstate war, intrastate war, and indirect interstate war. Direct interstate war is the traditional and conventional, but is declining in frequency. Nonstate war involves criminal and terrorist actors that thrive among various host states (knowingly or unknowingly) and use information technology for funding, intelligence, and internal communication, command and control. The Al Qa'ida terrorist network is an example. Indirect interstate war entails aggression by a state through proxies. Serbia's support of the Bosnian and Krajina Serbs is illustrative. Intrastate war involves a conflict between a state and a nonstate actor, such as an insurgents or separatists, or a conflict between two or more nonstate entities. Of the four

strategic battlespaces, indirect interstate and intrastate wars will be the most prevalent.

U.S. landpower is vital to operations within the strategic battlespaces. The United States prefers to fight rapid, decisive operations, but must also be adept at protracted, complex, and asymmetric warfare. Without this robust, flexible landpower, the U.S. military would be like a medieval knight or a battleship—very proficient at a narrow range of military tasks.

The Army role in future war transcends traditional warfighting. Although it is integral to defeating an adversary as part of the Joint Force, it must also help consolidate success by providing security and support to partners, other government agencies, and nongovernment agencies in the aftermath. Furthermore, the Army must render stabilization for a challenged state or uncontrolled region. History instructs that success entails military victory followed by a committed peace.

The Objective Force supports the Army's role in future war by providing strategic speed, full scale decisiveness, broad band precision, success in protracted, asymmetric, ambiguous, and complex conflicts, the ability to operate in a coalition, and rapid conceptual and organizational adaptation. As the Objective Force continues to mature, the Army must not lose sight of the need for adaptability and flexibility that modularity of the armed forces brings to the strategic battlespace. Transformation must continuously develop new operational and strategic concepts, educate soldiers and officers to implement them, and develop organizations and technologies to ensure they function.

To ensure dominance, Transformation must adopt two parallel tracks: one aimed at direct interstate war, and the other aimed at indirect interstate and intrastate war. Both tracks are naturally mutually supporting but require mutual cognizance to prevent tunnel vision.

The conceptual design of the Objective Force must permit maximum effectiveness in protracted, ambiguous, complex, and asymmetric conflicts. The three components of the Objective Force would be Strike Forces, Special Forces, and Support Forces. Together, they permit the Army to respond to the full spectrum of conflicts and crises with robust capabilities and without eviscerating standing units as occurs currently.

The Army serves a vital role to the Joint Team. It is the most versatile, permitting the United States to respond to every strategic battlespace without causing substantial unintended consequences and political fallout. In short, the Army will be extremely effective at the type of armed conflict that will dominate the global security environment in the coming decade as Transformation continues.

FUTURE WAR/FUTURE BATTLESPACE: THE STRATEGIC ROLE OF AMERICAN LANDPOWER

Introduction.

Many American strategists, military leaders, and politicians concluded that all previous thinking about the new security environment and future war became obsolete on September 11, 2001. No one could deny that the attacks were seminal events, driving the last nail into the coffin of the “Post-Cold War” era. But it is important to avoid overreaction by placing the attacks into a broader historical context. The world was not created anew on September 11. All of the analysis and planning for future war that had been undertaken by the Army, the Department of Defense (DoD), and the other Services was not rendered archaic but needs adjustment and refinement.

To continue to serve the Nation’s interests, the Army’s capabilities, organizations, and operational concepts must reflect the realities of the global security system and the forms of armed conflict that will occur in it. This report is intended to provide a conceptual framework for linking Army Transformation and trends in the security environment. Concentrating on what might be called the “Objective Force” time frame—the years 2015 and beyond—it will assess the nature of the emerging security environment, the modes of future armed conflict, the strategically decisive characteristics that the Objective Force will need, a broad structure for the Objective Force that reflects the emerging security environment, and the enduring strategic relevance of the U.S. Army.

The report will not, however, examine the full gamut of security challenges that the United States will face in coming decades. Important topics such as nuclear force posture, national missile defense, cyberwar, the role of the

Army in homeland defense, force sizing, and technology requirements must be left for later. The focus, instead, will be on the role of American landpower and the Army in armed conflict abroad. In the broadest sense, this report seeks to both make suggestions about the shape and capabilities of the Objective Force, and to explain why that force will play a vital strategic role in the emerging security environment.

Most of the analysis in this report is at the *military strategic level*. During the past 5 years several seminal futures studies have been conducted at the grand strategic level, seeking to understand the emerging global security environment. Recent examples include the 2001 *Quadrennial Defense Review* and the reports of the U.S. Commission on National Security/21st Century.¹ At the same time the Army, particularly TRADOC, has undertaken extensive analysis and experimentation to understand the operational level of future war. This report will not replicate either of those efforts but will, instead, link operational concepts and capabilities with trends in the security environment.

The primary analytical tool will be *strategic battlespaces*. A strategic battlespace is a mode of war in which the operational and technological aspects of armed conflict are placed within their broader political, economic, social, ecological, demographic, legal, normative, diplomatic, and technological contexts. By using strategic battlespaces as a heuristic device, Objective Force requirements can be derived from discernible trends in the global security environment. In addition, this report will update the assessment of the global security environment in the *Quadrennial Defense Review* and the reports of the U.S. Commission on National Security/21st Century to consider the effect that the September 11th attacks might have on American strategy and future armed conflict.

To do this, the report will answer to five key questions:

1. What will be the shape and characteristics of the future international security environment?
2. What will be the characteristics of the future battlefield/battlespace?
3. What are the potential or probable roles and missions of the Army?
4. How should the Objective Force contribute to the successful execution of those roles and missions?
5. Why an Army?

The ultimate goal is to build a consensus within the Army on these questions, to use it to shape the Transformation process, and to explain the vital contribution of landpower and the Army to the wider strategic community.

Two broad conclusions lie at the heart of this report. First, a range of factors will make large-scale, state-on-state war rare or even obsolete. Put simply, the costs and risks of traditional, cross-border armed aggression will mount to the point that most states will not consider it. This trend is reinforced each time the United States trounces an opponent decisively. At the same time, ambiguous, protracted, nondecisive armed conflict in complex environments, often involving nonstate participants, is likely to become even more common and strategically significant now that an enemy tiny in size can generate massive effects. All of this suggests that the United States in general and the Army in particular should assure that Transformation leads to an Objective Force suitable for this type of warfare.

Second, as the memory of the Cold War continues to fade, a natural tendency of the international system will be to balance, contain, or counter American power, often using international law or diplomatic maneuvers. The way that the United States exercises its power will determine the

extent and intensity of such attempts. A strategy based on partnership and shared risk rather than imposition of force from afar will maximize the degree to which other states accept America's leadership. Landpower must be a central component of such a strategy.

The Emerging Global Security Environment.

The global security environment includes multiple types of armed conflict. An effective strategy identifies the most strategically significant type or types and allocates the most resources—people, effort, money—to them. For nearly 400 years, large-scale conventional war has been the most strategically significant form of armed conflict. It was never the most common, but the level of effort and quantity of resources it required, along with the immense danger and cost of defeat, kept it preeminent. The world's great powers thus focused their strategy on this type of war and treated other modes of armed conflict as secondary or “lesser included” problems.

This norm began to change with the creation of nuclear weapons. In the decade following World War II, strategists recognized that “limited wars” would be a major concern since major war between a nuclear-armed West and a nuclear-armed East could literally obliterate the human species.² But even though nuclear weapons made full-scale war between the superpowers extraordinarily dangerous and unlikely, the fact that the Soviet Union retained a massive, offensively-configured conventional capability forced the United States to focus on it. Other types of armed conflict, particularly rural leftist insurgency, were more common, but less important. Limited warfare doctrine languished after the U.S. involvement in Vietnam turned out disastrously. Tacitly, the U.S. military vowed not to become embroiled in such messy conflicts again.

By the 1990s the chances of conventional aggression from Russia faded as its military disintegrated and Moscow became dependent on Western aid, trade, and market

access. Leftist insurgencies still sputtered on around the world, but with the major sponsors of revolution dropping that policy, multinational peacekeeping becoming more effective, Third World states undertaking political reform, and counterinsurgency becoming more successful, “people’s war” was moot outside a handful of places like Nepal, Colombia, and Algeria. As a result, the U.S. military lost interest in counterinsurgency by the end of the 20th century.³

Yet even as superpower war and rural insurgency faded, two new forms of armed conflict were on the ascent. The most dangerous was what became known as major theater war—conventional armed aggression against a neighboring nation by a Soviet- or Chinese-equipped “rogue state.” Iraq and North Korea were, of course, the classic rogue states since they possessed substantial military capability and were ruled by dictatorial regimes little concerned with the pariah status that aggression brought. The second form of armed conflict was internal war along sectarian, ethnic, or religious lines, most in the territory of the former European colonial empires. This was by far the most common form of armed conflict in the 1990s. While some “small wars” of this type lurched along without attracting outside intervention (for instance, Sudan and Ngorno-Karabakh), humanitarian disasters in Somalia, Northern Iraq, Rwanda, and Bosnia galvanized the will of the world community, particularly the United States, to intervene.⁴ Luckily, U.S. military forces optimized for major theater war proved effective at small wars, at least when used in combination with peacekeepers from other nations.

The Iraqi problem certainly demands resolution, possibly using major theater war. But it will be solved. The chances of Iraq posing a large scale conventional threat to its neighbors 5 years from now are very small. To an extent, the same holds for North Korea. Pyongyang may be a threat to regional and global stability for a few more years, but the nature of that threat is changing. The likelihood of a massive conventional strike south is in decline. While that

nation and its bizarre regime retain a massive military, China and Russia know that supporting North Korean aggression would be politically and economically disastrous. Plus, Russia has no ideological affinity with the regime in Pyongyang, and China only a titular one. With its economy in shambles, North Korea cannot even feed its own people. At the same time the South Korean military has become one of the most professional and effective on earth. Certainly North Korea still could strike south. So long as that nation is ruled by a regime that operates on ideology and delusional fantasy, the risk remains. But the chances of a successful North Korean invasion of the south are lower now than they have been since 1950 and continue to drop.

As the threat from Iraq and North Korea fades, no replacement “rogue states” with the incentive and the ability to invade their neighbors exist. States like China, India, and possibly Russia that have the economic and technological strength to field a military capable of conventional invasion of neighboring states increasingly depend on integration into the global economy for capital and markets. Aggression would cut them off from the global economy and thus condemn them to potentially disastrous decline and isolation. Their leaders would thus recognize that any military victory would be pyrrhic. The emergence of new rogues cannot be ruled out, but nothing suggests that it is likely.

Other factors also make conventional aggression increasingly risky and costly. One is the proliferation of nuclear weapons. As Martin Van Creveld wrote,

the effect of nuclear weapons, unforeseen and perhaps unforeseeable, has been to push conventional war into the nooks and crannies of the international system. . . . The signs are that, faced by actual nuclear weapons or by the ability to build them quickly, states have grown wary not merely of territorial expansion but of conventional war itself.⁵

The nuclear club is likely to increase in the future, further constraining large-scale, sustained conventional war. In

such an environment, if a state does use force against a neighbor, it is likely to undertake a quick incursion, limited in duration and objectives. Decisive war between major states is rapidly moving toward history's dustbin.

The cascading globalization of economies is also constricting states. This is changing behavior at many different levels. At the "tactical" level, businesses now must have a global approach to markets, financing, trends, risk amelioration, partners, and suppliers. The "strategic" outcome is a linkage of economies around the world. "Economic downturns," notes the U.S. Commission on National Security, "that have usually been episodic and local may become, thanks to the integration of global financial markets, more systemic in their origins and hence more global in their effects."⁶ This is not a new phenomenon. Thomas Friedman points out that the period from the late 19th century to the middle of the 20th also saw substantial globalization driven by a decline in transportation costs arising from the invention of the railroad, steamship, and automobile.⁷ But the process of globalization underway today is immensely more powerful in terms of its impact on politics, economics, culture, and values.

Every state must choose between participation in the globalized economy or persistent poverty. Participation means that the state—not just businesses within a state, but the government itself—must follow certain rules of behavior, including things like limiting corruption, opening markets, and implementing transparent budgeting and financial procedures. Friedman calls this the "golden straitjacket." "Transparency," write Robert Keohane and Joseph Nye, "is becoming a key asset for countries seeking investments. The ability to hoard information, which once seemed so valuable to authoritarian states, undermines the credibility and transparency necessary to attract investment on globally competitive terms."⁸ This has immense implications. Decisions made by multinational financial institutions, overseas banks, or investors on the other side of the world now determine the economic health

of a nation nearly as much as decisions made by its own leaders. As Jessica T. Mathews writes,

National governments are not simply losing autonomy in a globalizing economy. They are sharing powers—including political, social, and security roles at the core of sovereignty—with businesses, with international organizations, and with a multitude of citizen groups, known as nongovernmental organizations.⁹

In a sense, all states have taken on some of the weakness, vulnerability, and lack of control that traditionally characterizes small states. As the ability of the state to control its economy fades, it is likely to become weaker across the board, thus leading to a major, perhaps revolutionary, transformation of the global security system.¹⁰

With the glare of the information age revealing the details of any military operation other than the very smallest to a global audience, interconnectedness increases the risks and costs associated with the use of force. The more sensitive a regime is to pressure from within and outside its country, the greater the constraints. Aggression is at least marginally viable for North Korea and Iraq because their regimes have built effective systems of repression and thus can tolerate the poverty and misery that comes from flaunting global norms. Most other states, even nondemocratic ones, recognize that overt aggression would cut them off from external capital flows and markets. The ensuing economic decline would undercut support for the regime and possibly lead to its downfall. The demise of Slobodan Milosevic is a case in point. His aggressive policies cut Serbia off from investment, aid, and trade. Economic stagnation then undercut his political support. And so it continues: around the world globalization is tightening the “golden straitjacket” and increasing the costs of armed aggression.

American strategy since the end of the Cold War further decreased the utility of overt aggression. By retaining

overwhelming military power, the ability to project and sustain it, and a willingness to assist states facing aggression, the United States has helped craft a global security system in which traditional cross-border invasion has little chance of success. This does not appear likely to change, at least in the short- or mid-term. Even though the U.S. military is significantly smaller than during the Gulf War, it remains capable of reversing traditional aggression unless constrained by political considerations. While strategic thinkers have warned that asymmetric methods such as anti-access strategies, terrorism, or weapons of mass destruction may prevent the United States from intervening to stop or reverse an invasion in the future, this remains speculative.¹¹

While large scale, conventional, state-on-state warfare will be rare, the tensions that generate violence will, if anything, increase. Three causes of armed conflict will be most prevalent in the coming decades. One is the continuing struggle for power and resources among ethnic groups, sects, and clans as the long process of decolonization continues. This may seem like a strange idea since it is common to think of decolonization as complete. But as Ralph Peters points out, the vast majority of national borders that exist today were drawn during the era of European and Ottoman colonialism.¹² They more often reflect the administrative divisions of the colonial powers or diplomatic arrangements between them than they do social, economic, religious, and ethnic realities on the ground. The relationship between recent decolonization and large scale violence is clear. Of the 140 violent conflicts underway in the world today, only 10—all in North or South America—are not related to former colonial divisions and boundaries, or to the power structures that emerged from colonialism.¹³ As Peters argues, the rearranging of national borders to reflect current realities rather than colonial ones is likely to take several more decades.

Globalization will be the second major source of conflict in coming decades. Like any great shift, globalization has

winners and losers in terms of regions, states, corporations, and individuals. As the losers see their standard of living, power base, influence, and prospects erode, they sometimes will lash out against those they hold responsible. This may be institutions like the World Bank or, more often, the United States. A loose network opposed to globalization is already taking shape and flexing its muscle. Eventually this could coalesce into a more formal movement and even spawn some sort of new, radical ideology. After all, communism emerged from the attempts to mobilize the losers from the process of industrialization. Globalization's losers are as frustrated and angry as 19th century Europe's industrial proletariat. If a new radical ideology does take shape, it could inspire violence ranging from terrorism and sabotage to full blown war.

In fact, a case can be made that this is already happening: the Islamic world has proven unable to adapt to modernization and globalization, and thus remains mired in stagnation, anomie, poverty, and repression. This leads to frustration, resentment, anger, and terrorism. But rather than changing the culture that causes the failure, radicals like those in al Qaeda seek to bring down those who have succeeded in the globalizing world, particularly the United States. It is no coincidence that al Qaeda targets the American economy, since its collapse would lessen the gap between the United States and the Islamic world and thus diminish the daily reminders that Islamic culture in its current form cannot provide a foundation for modern, powerful democratic states.¹⁴ Without an historical cultural shift in the Islamic world akin to the Protestant Reformation and Enlightenment in Europe, this will not change.¹⁵

The third major source of conflict will be an intensified competition for resources, particularly in the poorer parts of the world. While the world's population is growing at a slower rate than a few decades ago, it will exceed 8 billion by 2030, with almost all of the increase in the poorer regions.¹⁶ Urbanization also continues unabated. By 2030 over three

fifths of the world's people will live in cities. This growth is accompanied by degradation of the physical environment. The mounting stress on the world's water supplies, deforestation, desertification and the erosion of farmland are particularly troubling. These, in turn, fuel further urbanization and migrations. So far, attempts by governments to control and manage the adverse effects of these trends have proven ineffective.¹⁷ Should this continue—and everything suggests it will—the competition for resources, whether arable land, water, or capital, can provide a foundation for future conflicts. This might take the form of state aggression as regimes seek access to water, land, minerals, ports, or other resources. In most cases, though, states will realize that any gains attained this way will be negated by the high economic and political costs of aggression. Most resource-based conflicts, then, will be sectarian or ethnic, much like those in Western and Central Africa today.¹⁸

Around the world, nation-states are hard pressed to meet the needs and demands of their population, whether for development or security. Again, the glare of the Information Age is a factor. Outside of North Korea, regimes have little success at preventing their populations from learning about conditions in others parts of the world, as well as the excesses and shortcomings of their rulers. The time is past when misery was considered normal and natural by its victims. The result is global disillusionment and frustration. A wide range of nonstate organizations are stepping into this void, providing everything from coherent ideologies that explain the source of the frustration and plan to alleviate it to more concrete goods like security. The information revolution and other factors like the expansion of the global market in arms serve to empower nonstate groups. In fact, one of the defining features of the information revolution is that the diffusion of knowledge and the multiple sources of information that it has brought tend to give small, versatile, and adaptive organizations a comparative advantage over large, ponderous, bureaucratic

ones. This is most evident in the business world, but the same tendency holds for organizations that provide security and a sense of shared meaning and purpose—states are finding nonstate organizations to be more competitive and, in some cases, more threatening than ever before.

All this is increasing the role of nonstate entities in security and armed conflict.¹⁹ In combination with the constraints on the warmaking ability of states, this means that most future armed conflicts will involve nonstate entities either as major or secondary combatants. In fact, trends suggest that armed conflict pitting a state against nonstate entities, or even pitting one or more nonstate entities against each other will account for the overwhelming majority of wars in coming decades. As Ralph Peters phrases it, “20th century wars were fought between successful powers for hegemony; 21st century conflicts will be between successful states and unsuccessful entities over behaviors.”²⁰

Nonstate entities necessarily fight differently than states. They are less bound by norms, rules, and laws. Terrorism and guerrilla operations are the norm. For protection, they attempt to be a poor target in the strategic sense, wrapping themselves in ethical, political, and legal ambiguity, using complex operating environments, and interspersing with noncombatants. Since finance is a major problem for them, they often blur the distinction between political and criminal organizations, forming “gray area phenomena.”²¹ They attempt to build networks of support inside and outside their regions. And, they seek victory primarily by avoiding defeat. Simply surviving is an indicator of success; protracted conflict is to their advantage.

The dynamic changes in the global security environment point toward three macro-level shifts which will shape American strategy. The first is the demise of “stupid” enemies who commit aggression based on the assumption that the United States will not intervene. For a decade now,

the United States has illustrated the capability and willingness to lead a coalition to stop or reverse overt aggression. Future aggressors, whether states or nonstate entities, will better understand the United States (due to information technology), expect American involvement and plan for it, attempt to stay below the threshold of U.S. intervention by disguising their aggression, seeking allies or protectors, constructing asymmetric defenses, or trying to deter the United States with terrorism or weapons of mass destruction.

To sustain international and domestic support for intervention, the United States will increasingly seek to limit the unintended and second order effects of military operations. Victories in which the United States inadvertently alienates, destabilizes, or impoverishes neighboring states or regions will, in the long term, prove counterproductive, even debilitating. To retain support and legitimacy, military operations must be as precise as possible.

Finally, most armed conflicts in coming decades are likely to be internal ones. The past decade has seen a tidal wave of economic and political reform around the world as state after state has undergone the transition to free enterprise economic systems and governments that are, to some degree, more open and democratic. While this is a tremendously beneficial trend, all indicators are that it has peaked. Many states are finding that sustaining an open government is more difficult than starting one. As fragile new democracies and the remaining authoritarian regimes struggle to meet the expectations of their publics—which are themselves growing due to the global information revolution—and to adjust to economic globalization, they are likely to face mounting frustration and outright opposition.

The outcome will be a plethora of internal conflicts (albeit with international dimensions, an inevitable by-product of interconnectedness, globalization, and the

profusion of information). As states themselves are constrained from overt military aggression, the armed forces of all nations will be involved in promoting internal stability and confronting internal enemies, whether separatists, militias, insurgents, terrorists, armed criminal cartels, or something similar. The first two decades of the 21st century will be dominated by protracted, complex, ambiguous armed conflicts rather than short, politically and ethically clear ones leading to decisive outcomes.

Armed Conflict in the Emerging Security Environment.

The emerging global security environment, then, will be characterized by a broad range of violent challenges to fragile states, but also by a United States which will use its own military power and that of allies to reverse or repel forms of aggression for which congressional, public, and international support can be mobilized and sustained. Recognizing this, aggressors, whether nonstate or state, will seek to prevent, deter, or complicate outside intervention by the United States and its partners. When this fails, aggressors will attempt to avoid rapid, decisive resolution of the conflict by using political, psychological, legal, and ethical ambiguity; complex operational environments including cities, mountains, jungles, the Internet, and the commercial cybersphere; interspersions among civilians; dispersion, not only within a country, but around the world as well; and asymmetric deterrents against the United States and other intervening powers, particularly the threat of attacks on the great power's homeland.

Within this environment, adversaries will open a new front, employing information warfare, through the Internet and flash journalism, to neutralize or diminish U.S. military power. They will attempt to portray the United States as a bully who kills arbitrarily and indiscriminately. Using baited provocation attacks on U.S. forces, adversaries

will use civilians as sacrificial lambs to energize the international community into restraining the United States. In this manner, adversaries can hobble U.S. power. Aggressors who do provoke a U.S. or U.S.-led response will seek to extend the conflict, recognizing that the United States cannot be matched at rapid, decisive outcomes but, because of the impatience that characterizes American strategic culture and the demands of global leadership, it is less adept at protracted conflicts, particularly those which take years or decades to resolve or peter out.²²

This future security environment will be dominated by four distinct but interrelated strategic battlespaces. The most familiar strategic battlespace will involve *direct interstate war* where state militaries are pitted against one another. It is regulated by 400 years' worth of laws, norms, and common practices. This is the strategic battlespace where things like the concept of "just war" and the international law of armed conflict come into play. This is also the strategic battlespace that American strategists have analyzed and wargamed in detail. Most of the force structure, equipment, technology, and operational concepts of the U.S. military were developed for major theater war between states. It is also the realm in which rapid, decisive outcomes have occurred (although proliferation and interconnectedness are making it more difficult to attain decisive outcomes). The 1990-91 Gulf War is a classic instance of direct interstate war.

Nonstate war involves at least one combatant that does not have a fixed geographic base. A nonstate enemy would rely on information technology for core functions such as fund raising, intelligence collection, internal communication, command and control, and, potentially, attacks. Nonstate opponents would select a physical location because of the inability or unwillingness of the host state to control the terrorist, insurgent, or criminal organization. This could be a result of the weakness of the state (e.g., the inability of the government of Colombia to destroy narcotrafficking organizations), of constraints that result

from legal and civil rights (e.g., the ability of Al Qa'ida to operate cells in the United States or Germany), or of the state simply being unaware of the organization or turning a blind eye due to corruption, fear, or sympathy.²³ The major point, though, is that a nonstate opponent does not depend on any *given* physical location. If a state acts against it, it could move to another location with a minimal erosion of capability. All this means that the state-to-state dimension of nonstate war is secondary.

Indirect interstate war entails proxy aggression by a state through the creation, encouragement, and support of insurgents, terrorists, armed criminal cartels, separatists, or militias which, in turn, undertake aggression against another state. It is a variant of state-on-state conflict, but one in which the aggressor camouflages its actions. The U.S. strategy of global engagement and the sustained effectiveness of the American military have made indirect interstate war an attractive option for aggressor states. Support for Al Qa'ida by the Taliban regime in Afghanistan is one example. North Vietnam's support for the Viet Cong, Pakistan's support for Kashmiri insurgents, and Rwandan and Ugandan support for the rebels that overthrew Mobutu Sese Seke in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (formerly Zaire) are others.

Countering indirect interstate aggression requires a two-track strategy: one track is aimed at the terrorists, insurgents, or the like; the other at the sponsoring state. If the sponsoring state is skillful at disguising its role, has a powerful protector (as often happened during the Cold War), or has nuclear weapons, the second track may be purely political and economic. Always, though, the two tracks of the strategy demand distinct forces and operational concepts. Since the strategic effectiveness of the United States in a conflict decreases as the degree of ambiguity increases, it will invariably find that pressuring or coercing the state sponsor of indirect aggression is simpler than dealing with insurgents, terrorists, or other nonstate enemies themselves.

Intrastate war involves either a conflict between a state and a nonstate opponent such as an insurgency, militia, or separatist movement, or armed conflict between two or more nonstate entities. The international law and norms which regulate armed conflict apply only in part or not at all. This type of war, then, is delimited and controlled more by resource limitations or self-restraint on the part of the belligerents rather than any formal framework. As a result, it can take a variety of forms, from the mostly psychological and political maneuverings of the Chiapas uprising in Mexico through the pure terrorism of Basque or Irish separatists to the horrific massacres by drugged child soldiers in Sierra Leone. At the upper end of the spectrum, intrastate war can come to resemble state-on-state war when the insurgents are powerful enough to control and administer territory (for instance, Colombia and Angola).

Given the growing constraints on traditional interstate war and the pressures on states, a combination of indirect interstate war and intrastate war is likely to dominate the global security environment during the next three decades. At the same time, direct interstate war cannot be ruled out and may occur in some regions. Nonstate war will be a growing problem and will require the most extensive adaptation by militaries and other elements of state security forces.

American Strategy in the Emerging Security Environment.

Trends suggest that indirect and internal aggression will dominate the emerging security environment. The United States will seek to sustain its position of leadership, to include orchestration of security from both a regional and a global perspective. Despite the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, the diffusion of technology, and the pursuit of asymmetric methods, the United States is likely to sustain military superiority over likely enemies *under conditions of ethical, legal, and political clarity*. With

military transformation proceeding apace, when a discernible aggressor poses a threat to important or vital U.S. national interests and the military is unleashed, victory is likely. The problem will be sustaining the utility of military force in the absence of clarity, particularly when enemies discover that the use of protracted warfare in physically, ethically, legally, and politically complex environments offers protection against the terrible, swift sword of the American military.

Precision will be the key to both operational and strategic success in this environment. Taken alone, that is certainly not a new idea. Increasing precision has long been considered a central element of the ongoing revolution in military affairs. George and Meredith Friedman, for instance, rank the development of precision guided munitions along with the introduction of firearms, the phalanx, and the chariot as “a defining moment in human history.”²⁴ But many of the architects of the American revolution in military affairs view precision narrowly, defining it simply as the ability to hit the desired target with accuracy and limited collateral damage. Tactical precision grows from improved intelligence, guidance systems and, increasingly, from the ability to adjust or “tune” the effects that a particular weapon has. A proposed electro-magnetic gun, for instance, could be adjusted from a nonlethal setting to an extremely lethal one.²⁵ This is indeed a useful capability.

But precision has at least two other equally important dimensions. One is *strategic*, specifically the ability to undertake military operations without damaging or disrupting neighboring states, a region, or the global economy. Globalization and interconnectedness are increasing the importance and the difficulty of strategic precision. If the only option available to the United States is to crush an opponent by pummeling its infrastructure and economy as in World War II or the Kosovo operation, the result will be unintended damage to neighboring states and the global economy, and thus a rapid erosion of support for

the operation. Such operational methods may appear attractive, particularly if they are based solely on stand-off strikes and thus promise to limit U.S. casualties, but they will be counterproductive in the long term and contribute to a decline in American influence.

A third form of precision is *psychological*. This entails shaping a military operation and campaign to have the exact desired psychological effect. Like so much of the revolution in military affairs, this is a new variant of an old idea. Military thinkers have long understood that war is integrally, perhaps even essentially psychological. Sun Tzu, of course, crafted the quintessentially psychological approach to strategy, contending that “all warfare is based on deception.”²⁶ While some disciples of Clausewitz, particularly German military strategists, acted with disregard for the psychological dimension of strategy, the Prussian theorist himself clearly understood that war was a psychological struggle and the objective is to break the enemy’s will.²⁷

Psychological precision requires tactical precision but also other capabilities such as nonlethality, other new technologies, a certain pace and intensity of activity, or even refraining from the use of force if that is what is required to have the desired effect. Psychological precision often requires extended, direct human contact in order to gauge and adjust effects. It also demands extensive and intensive cross-cultural understanding of the psychological effect of an action which is, to some extent, culturally determined. What causes fear in one cultural context, for example, might cause anger and intensified resistance in another. Ironically, the United States has not been particularly adept at culturally-focused military operations. Instead we tend toward psychological “mirror imaging”—assuming that if we can take actions against an enemy that would collapse our will if they were done to us, they will have the same effect on the enemy. Much of the thinking on “effects-based operations” reflects this sort of psychological mirror imaging. By contrast, psychological precision

demands long-standing, hands-on engagement with other cultures, and a willingness on the part of commanders and planners to incorporate the advice of cultural experts and social psychologists. Ultimately, though, U.S. strategy requires all three forms of precision.

To sustain global leadership, U.S. strategy must minimize the natural tendency of other countries to contain, balance, or oppose American influence. This is a mounting problem. Despite the fact that every time in history a single power has been dominant, other states have eventually become worried or fearful and attempted to contain, balance, or oppose it, Americans seem to feel this will not happen to us. It is as if we believe that the laws of history do not apply to us and that other states are as convinced that our power is as benign or beneficial as we are. This is simply not true. While the United States has some bedrock allies not intimidated by American power, many other states are not so sanguine. Most of these became America's partners because Washington was the lesser evil during the Cold War or post-Cold War period when Soviet- equipped rogue states posed a significant risk. Many others thought that a strategic partnership with the United States would bring economic or diplomatic benefits. Such friends are often disappointed. By the summer of 2002, for instance, Pakistanis were growing disillusioned with the limited economic gains of their support for the United States in the war on terrorism.²⁸ Later resentment grew when Pakistan's support for U.S. operations in Afghanistan did not prevent plans to require Pakistanis living in the United States to register with the government. Many less committed strategic partners will become distrustful, even fearful, if American power becomes oppressive. The pursuit of transformation by the U.S. military further fuels such fears. To many foreign observers, there is no reason for an already-dominant U.S. military to undertake such an effort unless it intends to impose its will on recalcitrant states.

Ultimately there is no way to prevent all attempts to contain, balance, or oppose American power. This is part of

the price of dominance. But the way that the United States exercises its power will affect the extent and intensity of this process. The more that U.S. strategy is based on the imposition of force from afar rather than partnership and the pursuit of conflict resolution, the greater the effort to contain, balance or oppose American power. This should be a consideration in strategy and force development.

Robust and versatile American landpower will be essential in the emerging security environment. When the use of force becomes necessary, the United States will continue to prefer and seek rapid decisive operations with an extensive use of precise standoff strikes, but enemies will increasingly use protracted, complex, ambiguous, and asymmetric methods to counter these. If the United States reaches a point where *all* that it can undertake are rapid decisive operations relying heavily on standoff strikes, it will be like a 16th century armored knight or mid-20th century battleship—extremely adept at a type of combat that has declining strategic relevance. Winning 21st century armed conflicts will require more than servicing targets. American military strategy should thus seek rapid decisive operations but also retain the ability to prevail in protracted, complex, ambiguous, and asymmetric warfare. To do this requires the versatility of landpower.

The Role and Structure of the Objective Force.

In the broadest sense, the Army will have three strategic functions in the future security environment (see Figure 1). First, it will remain an integral part of the Joint Team in traditional warfighting against an enemy state or other discernible enemy organization such as a paramilitary, militia, or guerrilla army. According to the *Objective Force White Paper*:

In 2015, the Objective Force is an integral component of the Joint Force. It is organized, manned, equipped, and trained as a JIM [Joint, interagency, and multinational] force, possess[ing]




Figure 1.

common overarching doctrine, integrated training, common-²⁹
ality, and interdependency/ interoperability.

In particular, the Objective Force will bring a campaign quality to the Joint fight, “ensuring long term dominance over evolving, sophisticated threats . . .”³⁰ But as direct interstate war declines in frequency, the Army’s special capabilities at protracted, complex, ambiguous, and asymmetric conflicts, particularly indirect interstate war and intrastate war, will become increasingly important. The Army is likely to be called on to help stabilize challenged states and ungoverned regions—functions that require a ground presence rather than standoff strikes.

The Army also provides the capabilities needed to consolidate battlefield success and turn it into strategic victory. This is a vital point. Throughout history, military victory has not always led to strategic success. For example, Napoleon won a long series of stunning military victories but was unable or unwilling to undertake the alteration of Prussian, Austrian, or Russian societies that would have consolidated his triumphs. Similarly, in World War I the

Western Allies won a clear military victory, but did not have the will to turn it into strategic victory by altering the elements of German society and culture that spawned armed aggression. In World War II, by contrast, military victory was transformed into strategic victory.

Strategic victory requires not only the defeat of the enemy military, but often occupation and a multiagency effort to change the society, culture, economy, and political system that undergirded aggression. This will be as true in the future as it has been in the past. While it is conceivable (but unlikely) that the United States might attain military victory over some future enemy relying primarily on standoff applications of military power from the air, sea, or space, strategic victory always requires effective landpower. In some future wars, the United States may seek only military victory, particularly if the enemy has weapons of mass destruction or there is some rationale to leave the enemy regime intact (as was thought to be true following the Gulf War). At other times, though, only strategic victory can assure the Nation's security. While the Army will be a vital component of the Joint Team in all future wars, providing the capability for strategic victory along with proficiency at protracted, complex, ambiguous, and asymmetric conflicts will be the Army's two *unique* strategic functions.

Trends in the global security environment suggest that there will be six strategically decisive characteristics for the Objective Force (see Figure 2). One is *strategic speed*. During the post-Cold War period, it became clear that the Army had unmatched capabilities once deployed but was, under some conditions, hindered by the length of time required for deployment. Given the fluidity of the emerging security environment and the advantages that accrue from having effective landpower available quickly, the Army's leaders have made strategic speed a primary objective of the Transformation process. "At the strategic level," according to the *Objective Force White Paper*, "the Objective Force deploys from either forward sanctuaries or the continental United States. The force has both expeditionary and




Figure 2.

campaign qualities; is configured for rapid deployment and ready at a moments [sic] notice for sustained operations.”³¹

A second strategically decisive characteristic for the Objective Force will be *full scale decisiveness*. This entails both military victory—providing “the essential capability to achieve decisive victory through the control of terrain, people, and resources without resorting to indiscriminate destruction”³²—and strategic victory, to include altering the basic social, political, and economic system that spawned aggression. The third strategically decisive characteristic for the Objective Force will be *broadband precision* including the tactical, strategic, and psychological dimensions.

The fourth strategically decisive characteristic for the Objective Force will be *proficiency at protracted, ambiguous, asymmetric, and complex conflicts*. This requires the continuing recruitment and education of soldiers and officers capable of decisionmaking in difficult environments and of understanding the psychological and cultural subtleties of this type of conflict. It will also require

the development of new operational and strategic concepts specific to protracted, ambiguous, asymmetric, and complex conflicts, and the building of networked Army units with appropriate technologies. Robotics and nonlethality hold particular promise. Finally, success in such conflicts will demand seamless links between the Objective Force and other partners including the Joint Team, nonmilitary U.S. government agencies, and nongovernment entities, whether humanitarian relief organizations, international organizations, nonstate political movements, or corporations.

Compatibility with coalition partners will be the fifth strategically decisive characteristic for the Objective Force. Since the beginning of the Cold War, American strategy has stressed developing and nurturing partnerships as a mechanism for creating regional stability without the need for a U.S. military so large that it would be economically debilitating. This is unlikely to change. The future U.S. military will be heavily involved in improving the capabilities of partners during peacetime, and supporting them and operating in conjunction with them during armed conflicts. To be successful, the Objective Force must be as compatible with coalition partners as possible—the goal is for multinational operations to be “business as usual for the Army.”³³ This entails overcoming technological problems, as well as developing common operational and strategic concepts.³⁴

Finally, *rapid conceptual and organizational adaptation* will be a strategically decisive characteristic for the Objective Force. The Information Age has made rapid, focused adaptation a determinant of success for any organization in a competitive environment. This was first seen in the business world with the movement away from rigid hierarchies toward networks, the building of “learning organizations,” and the making of long-range strategic planning and change—even revolutionary change—continual rather than episodic.³⁵ During the Industrial Age large, hierarchical organizations held advantage over

smaller, less formally organized ones. Firms like Standard Petroleum and General Motors could crush or absorb smaller competitors. Small states, unless protected by some quirk of politics or geography, could seldom compete militarily with large ones. Today, the trend in the business world is toward macro-level integration and “strategic partnerships,” but internal decentralization and the loosening of hierarchies. Technology is forcing a major shift in paradigms of scale with adaptability and speed as important as aggregate resources.³⁶ By allowing multiple, cross-cutting connections between individuals and organizations, technology is dispersing power, creativity, and productive capability. Now successful commercial firms have a global perspective, a web of strategic partnerships, and internal flexibility based on project teams or work groups rather than hierarchies or bureaucracies.

This shift in advantage from large hierarchical institutions to adaptable, networked ones is migrating to the military realm. As indirect interstate war and intrastate war become dominant, many of the opponents faced by the Army will be nonstate ones. While these enemies will only be able to mobilize miniscule resources in comparison to the U.S. military, they will be relatively free of bureaucratic encumbrances, and thus very adaptable and flexible. To succeed against them, the Objective Force must become more adaptable and flexible than its predecessors. This must entail the integration of modularity and “plug and play” capabilities from the squad to the strategic level. Specifically, the Objective Force must be much quicker than the Cold War or post-Cold War Army at developing new operational and strategic concepts, educating soldiers and officers to implement them, and developing organizations and technologies to make them work. Transformation must be continuous rather than episodic.

While the Objective Force must integrate all six strategically decisive characteristics, certain of these are linked to specific strategic battlespaces. In direct interstate war, for instance, strategic speed will be vital, particularly

the ability to deploy overwhelming force more rapidly than an enemy can. The “crucial measure of successful force projection is not the speed with which the first combat element engages, but rather the rate at which the United States and its allies are able to achieve overall operational superiority, depriving an enemy of freedom of action and making his ultimate defeat both inevitable and irreversible.”³⁷ Broad band precision will be important to retain domestic and international support for American engagement in a conflict, and to prevent political pressure from forcing the United States to cease activity before its strategic objectives are met. And the ability to operate in coalition will be important because of the scope and size of direct interstate war.

Nonstate enemies will be the most adaptable and least encumbered by bureaucracy or international law and norms. This means that the ability of the Objective Force to itself adapt and to craft seamless links with other organizations, including private ones, will be the keys to victory.

In indirect interstate and intrastate war, broad band precision, the ability to operate in coalition, and the ability adapt rapidly will remain important, as will the development of concepts, organizations, and technologies applicable in protracted, asymmetric, ambiguous, and complex conflicts. The ability of the Objective Force to sustain efforts over many months or years is particularly crucial in these strategic battlespaces since they are the ones where rapid, decisive operations will seldom, if ever, lead to strategic victory.

The trends shaping the emerging security environment and the roles which the Army will play in it suggest the need for two tracks to Transformation, one aimed at dominance in direct, interstate war, relying when possible on rapid decisive operations, the other aimed at dominance in indirect interstate and intrastate wars characterized by protractedness, ambiguity, asymmetry, and complexity (see




Figure 3.

Figure 3). Clearly the two tracks of Transformation are intertwined. Many concepts, organizations, and technologies will have equal application in both. But they also differ in some key ways. Indirect interstate and intrastate wars are not “lesser included instances.” An Objective Force that can defeat a state military in rapid decisive operations, in other words, might not necessarily be able to undertake protracted stability operations. The Transformation process must assure that both tracks lead to success.

An Objective Force designed for both military and strategic victory in a security environment dominated by protracted, asymmetric, ambiguous, and complex conflicts would, in the broadest sense, have three components (see Figure 4). One would be the strike forces built around the Future Combat System. This component would be characterized by rapid strategic mobility and be the master of rapid decisive operations. It would be the tool of decision in direct interstate war, but would also be used for the initial establishment of security in other strategic battlespaces when a discernible, armed enemy offers resistance. The second component would be Special Forces. These would be




Figure 4.

both numerically larger and more important to the Objective Force than to the Cold War and post-Cold War Army.

While the future of Special Forces requires detailed analysis and wargaming, the nature of the emerging security environment suggests a three way division here as well, with some Special Forces focused on protracted, ambiguous, complex, asymmetric (PACA) conflict, some on nonstate war, and some on direct action and support to strike forces, both in direct interstate war and in counterterrorism and counterproliferation activity. As Special Forces play an increasingly important role in American strategy, they must undergo a fundamental redesign in order to match capabilities to emerging threats, and to erase the seams between them and other military and civilian organizations with which they must work (see Figure 5).




Figure 5.

The third component of the Objective Force should be support forces. The idea here is simple: the more that partners can defend themselves and manage regional security, the better for the United States. Often partners need augmentation from the United States during crises or conflicts, particularly in specialized capabilities. Currently if the United States sends engineers, intelligence specialists, information warriors, or military police to support a partner, these units must be stripped from a combat division, leaving it less effective or even undeployable. To remedy this, the Objective Force should have units designed specifically to augment partners with the capabilities they are likely to be short of, particularly intelligence, engineers, medical units, military police, civil affairs, and psychological operations. This would improve the ability of the United States to support allies while retaining the readiness of the strike forces.

Why An Army?

It is ironic that nearly every analyst of the emerging security environment admits that it will be characterized by asymmetry and complexity, yet most assume that the solution is more technology and an even greater focus on a single type of military operation—rapid decisive operations. Ultimately only adaptability and versatility trump asymmetry and complexity. While all elements of the Joint Team play vital roles in the Nation's defense, the Army is the most versatile. Only the Army can simultaneously contribute to rapid, decisive operations against another state's military, undertake stability operations during an intrastate conflict, and assure strategic victory by providing security while an aggressor's political, social, and economic systems are reformed. An American military without robust and effective landpower capable of sustained operations would be like the 16th century armored knight or mid-20th century battlefield—very good but very limited.

If anything, the capability to attain *strategic* victory will become more important in the emerging security environment. History is replete with instances where overwhelming military victory did not lead to strategic success, from Jena-Auerstadt through World War I to the Gulf War. The terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, demonstrate the need for strategic victory. Even today if the global war on terrorism only leads to military rather than strategic victory, the threat will simply reemerge. Strategic victory is nearly always more costly than simple military victory, so there may be times when national leaders do not seek it. But when they do—and everything in the emerging security environment indicates the need to do so—robust and effective landpower will be vital. The Army, in other words, will be extremely effective at the type of armed conflict that will dominate the global security environment in the coming decade as Transformation continues.

As globalization and the information revolution rush ahead, the world is becoming even more interconnected.

The repercussions of this are far reaching. For instance, the increased concern for the Palestinians in the Arab world—which is a factor in the anti-Americanism that was the foundation for the September 11 attacks—is due in part to the information revolution as satellite television networks bring daily reminders of the Arab-Israeli conflict into homes throughout the Middle East and the West. Interconnectedness means that American military operations must be as precise as possible to sustain domestic and international support. When precision is understood as three dimensional, with tactical, strategic, and psychological components, the Army’s contribution to an effective American strategy becomes clear.

Finally, American leaders must be sensitive to the natural and historical tendency on the part of other states to seek ways to balance, limit, or contain U.S. power. As Joseph Nye writes, “Throughout history, coalitions of countries have arisen to balance dominant powers . . .”³⁸ The United States, however benign its power (and others do not see it as such), is not immune from the laws of history. The way that America exercises its power will, in part, determine the intensity and the extent of attempts to counter it. As Stephen Walt notes, “if the strongest state acts in a benevolent fashion and its goals are broadly compatible with the interests of other major powers,” the search for ways to keep it in check will be muted.³⁹ Given this, an American strategy that withdraws from the day-to-day (and often expensive and tedious) maintenance of regional security but instead simply applies force from afar as punishment will escalate efforts to balance, limit, or contain U.S. power. While such a strategy might appear attractive in the short term, it would ultimately prove less effective than one that commits the United States to deep engagement and shared responsibility with regional partners. The use of landpower is the most effective expression of deep engagement and shared responsibility. For four reasons, then, the Army is vital to the type of




Figure 6.

strategy that would best promote American interests over the long term (see Figure 6).

ENDNOTES

1. *Quadrennial Defense Review Report*, Washington, DC: Department of Defense, 2001; *New World Coming: American Security in the 21st Century*, Washington, DC: United States Commission on National Security/21st Century, 1999. For an outstanding survey of the official, semiofficial, and unofficial studies of the future security environment and future war undertaken in the past decade, see Sam J. Tangredi, "The Future Security Environment, 2001-2025: Toward a Consensus View," in Michele A. Flournoy, ed., *QDR 2001: Strategy-Driven Choices For America's Security*, Washington, DC: National Defense University Press, 2001.

2. The classic treatments of this problem are Robert Osgood, *Limited War: The Challenge to American Strategy*, Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1957; and, Morton Halperin, *Limited War in the Nuclear Age*, New York: Wiley, 1963.

3. For detail, see Steven Metz, *Counterinsurgency: Strategy and the Phoenix of American Capability*, Carlisle Barracks, PA: U.S. Army War College, Strategic Studies Institute, 1995.

4. The global community has evinced little interest in intervening to stop the world's remaining ideological insurgencies in Nepal, Colombia, Angola, and Algeria.

5. Martin van Creveld, *The Transformation of War*, New York: Free Press, 1991, pp. 11, 18. Some analysts contend that acquisition of nuclear weapons by Iraq would free it from conventional deterrence and thus pave the way for armed aggression. There is no evidence to support this. Similar claims were made when the Soviet Union and China first obtained nuclear weapons, but this did not inspire them to conventional invasion either. Saddam Hussein is, more than anything, a survivor and surely must recognize that use of nuclear weapons would cause his demise.

6. *New World Coming: American Security in the 21st Century, Supporting Research & Analysis*, Washington, DC: U.S. Commission on National Security/21st Century, 1999, p. 1.

7. Thomas L. Friedman, *The Lexus and the Olive Tree*, New York: Farrar, Straus, Giroux, 1999, pp. xv-xvi.

8. Robert O. Keohane and Joseph S. Nye, Jr., "Power and Interdependence in the Information Age," *Foreign Affairs*, Vol. 77, No. 5, September/October 1998, p. 93.

9. Jessica T. Mathews, "Power Shift," *Foreign Affairs*, Vol. 76, No. 1, January-February 1997, p. 50.

10. Martin van Creveld, *The Rise and Decline of the State*, Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1999, p. vii.

11. Other types of asymmetry, particularly moral asymmetry and an asymmetry of patience, may pose greater problems in the future. See Steven Metz and Douglas V. Johnson II, *Asymmetry and U.S. Military Strategy: Definition, Background, and Strategic Concepts*, Carlisle Barracks, PA: U.S. Army War College, Strategic Studies Institute, 2001.

12. Ralph Peters, presentation at the 1999 Strategy Conference of the Strategic Studies Institute, Carlisle Barracks, PA; and conversations with Dr. Metz.

13. Albert J. Jongman, *World Conflict and Human Rights Map 2001/2002*, Leiden, Netherlands: Interdisciplinary Research Programme on Causes of Human Rights Violations, 2002.

14. Islam as a culture system that includes social, political, economic, and legal dimensions must be distinguished from Islam as a religion. One of the most valuable contributions of the Protestant Reformation was to separate Christianity as a religion from particular political, economic, and social structures, thus freeing Europe to undertake political reform and the scientific and industrial revolutions. The Islamic world has not taken this same step. For detail on why the United States is seen as the font of repression and evil in parts of the Islamic world, see Bernard Lewis, "The Revolt of Islam," *The New Yorker*, November 19, 2001, pp. 50-63; and *idem.*, "What Went Wrong?" *Atlantic Monthly*, January 2002, pp. 43-45.

15. Because Islam considers Mohammed's revelations comprehensive and complete, most Muslims do not consider their religion open to reinterpretation. This makes modernizing reform very difficult. While Islam does have a long tradition of reform, it most often calls for a return to fundamentalism rather than modernization. See John L. Esposito, *Islam: The Straight Path*, Third Edition, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1988, p. 116.

16. *Population, Environment and Development: The Concise Report*, New York: United Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs, 2001, p. 45.

17. The best analysis of this is Thomas F. Homer-Dixon, *Environment, Scarcity and Violence*, Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1999. The issue is also explored across a number of regions in *Natural Resources and National Security: Sources of Conflict and the U.S. Interest*, Washington, DC: Jewish Institute for National Security Affairs, 2000.

18. For instance, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Uganda, Sierra Leone, Liberia, coastal and northern Nigeria, and the Casamance Province of Senegal.

19. *Quadrennial Defense Review Report*, p. 5.

20. Note to Dr. Metz at the SOCEUR Conference, Garmisch, Germany, May 2001.

21. The phrase "gray area phenomena" was developed by Peter Lupsha, a political scientist from the University of New Mexico. The most comprehensive early treatment was in Max G. Manwaring, ed., *Gray Area Phenomena: Confronting the New World Disorder*, Boulder, CO: Westview, 1993.

22. The concept of impatience is explored in Steven Metz, "Why Aren't Americans Better at Strategy?" *Military Review, Seventy-Fifth Anniversary Issue*, Vol. LXXVII, No. 1, January-February 1997, p. 188.

23. Along these lines, it makes sense to distinguish what can be called Category I supporters of terrorism who do it deliberately, Category II supporters who tolerate terrorists within their borders but do not officially support them, and Category III supporters who are unable to stop terrorists from using their territory or who are restrained by their laws from doing so effectively. This is developed in greater detail in Steven Metz, "State Support for Terrorism," in John R. Martin, ed., *Defeating Terrorism: Strategic Issue Analyses*, Carlisle Barracks, PA: U.S. Army War College, Strategic Studies Institute, 2002, pp. 21-25.

24. George and Meredith Friedman, *The Future of War: Power, Technology and American World Dominance in the 21st Century*, New York: Crown, 1996, p. x.

25. U.S. Army Chief Scientist A. Michael Andrews, interviewed by Ron Laurenzo, *Defense Week*, November 29, 1999, p. 6.

26. Sun Tzu, *The Art of War*, Samuel B. Griffith, trans., London: Oxford University Press, 1963, p. 66.

27. Clausewitz, *On War*, Michael Howard and Peter Paret, ed. and trans., Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1976, p. 90 and ff.

28. Keith Bradsher, "Pakistanis Fume as Clothing Sales to U.S. Tumble," *New York Times*, June 23, 2002.

29. *The Objective Force 2015 White Paper*, Arlington, VA: Department of the Army Objective Force Task Force, 2002, p. 2.

30. *Ibid.*, p. 1.

31. *Ibid.*, p. 2.

32. *Ibid.*, p. 3.

33. *Ibid.*, p. 4.

34. This is explored in Steven Metz, "The Effect of Technological Asymmetry on Coalition Operations," in Thomas J. Marshall, ed., *Problems and Solutions in Future Coalition Operations*, Carlisle Barracks, PA: U.S. Army War College, Strategic Studies Institute, 1997, pp. 49-67.

35. On “learning organizations,” see Peter M. Senge, *The Fifth Discipline: The Art & Practice of The Learning Organization*, New York: Currency Doubleday, 1990.

36. *New World Coming*, p. 6.

37. *Objective Force Operational and Organizational Concept* (draft), TRADOC Pamphlet 525-3-0, Fort Monroe, VA: U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command, November 2001, p. 10.

38. Joseph S. Nye Jr., *The Paradox of American Power*, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002, p. xii.

39. Stephen M. Walt, “American Primacy: Its Prospects and Pitfalls,” *Naval War College Review*, Vol. LV, No. 2, Spring 2002, p. 19.

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