[Senate Hearing 107-662]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
S. Hrg. 107-662
REVIEW OF THE NATION'S
INFRASTRUCTURE SECURITY
=======================================================================
HEARING
BEFORE THE
COMMITTEE ON
ENVIRONMENT AND PUBLIC WORKS
UNITED STATES SENATE
ONE HUNDRED SEVENTH CONGRESS
FIRST SESSION
ON
ENSURING THE SECURITY, PROTECTION, AND PRESERVATION OF PUBLIC WORKS,
UTILITIES, AND ECONOMIC ZONES AGAINST TERRORIST ATTACKS
__________
NOVEMBER 1, 2001
__________
Printed for the use of the Committee on Environment and Public Works
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COMMITTEE ON ENVIRONMENT AND PUBLIC WORKS
ONE HUNDRED SEVENTH CONGRESS
JAMES M. JEFFORDS, Vermont, Chairman
MAX BAUCUS, Montana BOB SMITH, New Hampshire
HARRY REID, Nevada JOHN W. WARNER, Virginia
BOB GRAHAM, Florida JAMES M. INHOFE, Oklahoma
JOSEPH I. LIEBERMAN, Connecticut CHRISTOPHER S. BOND, Missouri
BARBARA BOXER, California GEORGE V. VOINOVICH, Ohio
RON WYDEN, Oregon MICHAEL D. CRAPO, Idaho
THOMAS R. CARPER, Delaware LINCOLN CHAFEE, Rhode Island
HILLARY RODHAM CLINTON, New York ARLEN SPECTER, Pennsylvania
JON S. CORZINE, New Jersey PETE V. DOMENICI, New Mexico
Ken Connolly, Majority Staff Director
Dave Conover, Minority Staff Director
C O N T E N T S
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Page
NOVEMBER 1, 2001
OPENING STATEMENTS
Carper, Hon. Thomas R., U.S. Senator from the State of Delaware.. 28
Clinton, Hon. Hillary Rodham, U.S. Senator from the State of New
York........................................................... 5
Corzine, Hon. Jon S., U.S. Senator from the State of New Jersey.. 8
Jeffords, Hon. James M., U.S. Senator from the State of Vermont.. 3
Smith, Hon. Bob, U.S. Senator from the State of New Hampshire.... 1
WITNESSES
Brown, Michael, Deputy Director, Federal Emergency Management
Agency......................................................... 10
Prepared statement........................................... 35
Horinko, Marianne L., Assistant Administrator, Office of Solid
Waste and Emergency Response, Environmental Protection Agency.. 20
Prepared statement........................................... 46
Meserve, Richard, Chairman, Nuclear Regulatory Commission........ 16
Prepared statement........................................... 42
Mitchell, Herbert, Associate Administrator for Disaster
Assistance, Small Business Administration...................... 18
Prepared statement........................................... 45
Moravec, Joe, Commissioner, Public Building Service, General
Services Administration........................................ 13
Prepared statement........................................... 38
Sampson, David, Assistant Secretary for Economic Development,
Economic Development Administration, U.S. Department of
Commerce....................................................... 15
Prepared statement........................................... 39
REVIEW OF THE NATION'S
INFRASTRUCTURE SECURITY
----------
THURSDAY, NOVEMBER 1, 2001
U.S. Senate,
Committee on Environment and Public Works,
Washington, DC.
The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 2:08 p.m. in room
406, Senate Dirksen Building, Hon. Jim Jeffords (chairman of
the committee) presiding.
Present: Senators Jeffords, Clinton, Smith, Corzine, and
Carper.
Senator Clinton [assuming the chair]. The hearing will come
to order.
I turn first to our ranking member, Senator Smith.
OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. BOB SMITH, U.S. SENATOR FROM THE
STATE OF NEW HAMPSHIRE
Senator Smith. Thank you very much, Madam Chairman. I
appreciate that. Again, I did speak privately to the witnesses,
but I want to apologize for having to make a brief statement
and then leave. I am going to try to get back, but at 2 o'clock
I have three things going on at the same time. One thing none
of us has been able to learn to do around here is be at
different places at the same time. But I want to thank Senator
Jeffords for conducting the hearing.
The attacks that we all endured on September 11 and
basically continue to endure ever since have left this Nation
with a number of questions dealing with preparedness and
security measures. I think I have talked to almost each and
everyone of you personally and I want to compliment all you for
the job that you are doing and will have to continue to do. It
is not going to be easy. As we read the papers, we hear of more
and more anthrax turning up in different locations in the
country.
We did hear from Director Allbaugh a couple of weeks ago
about the emergency responders and about the response in New
York and the Pentagon and what lessons were learned. Today, we
take the next step. We want to consider whatever we can do to
help you do your jobs better in legislative proposals.
Obviously, you cannot sit around and wait for every legislative
proposal; you have a job to do, and we understand that. But we
want to try to help you in every way that we can to be better
prepared should the unthinkable happen. That is the spirit--I
know that Senator Jeffords would agree is the spirit of this
hearing. There are a number of agencies within our jurisdiction
that do play vital roles, in addition to your own.
I am pleased that all of you could be here this afternoon.
Assistant Secretary, Dr. Sampson, joined me about a month ago--
I guess it has been in New Hampshire, actually, it is more than
that because it was before September 11--to discuss economic
development options in some of the northern communities in New
Hampshire. It is amazing how priorities have changed. We
thought we had some terrible problems up there with the
military closing, and they are bad, but little did we know very
soon after that what serious problems we were going to have. A
couple weeks ago I did meet with Mike Brown of FEMA to discuss
some of the terrorism legislation and various pieces of
legislation.
I want to thank all of you for working so closely with me
on issues of importance, not only to New Hampshire, but the
Nation. I look forward to hearing your thoughts. I will read
them even if I am not here to hear them, about what needs to be
done. There are a lot of bills out there to try to help. I have
some. I do not claim to be the authority on all of them. But we
want to get the dialog started and the debate started.
I hope you will all at some point in the future offer your
views on these bills regarding such things as a coherent
national strategy, Federal coordinating, and planning. We heard
Director Allbaugh talk about the fact that the band of
communications, that this is a big issue on how we communicate
in time of emergency, everybody is on a separate radio band. We
had a meeting in New Hampshire with the Governor about this
issue and it came up that they were very concerned about that.
So I think that is one issue that we are going to have to
address. I know Senator Clinton has been working hard as well
on legislation dealing with small businesses and others that
were right there in the eye of the storm.
I thank you again, Mr. Chairman, for conducting this
hearing. I apologize to you and to the witnesses, to my
colleagues for having to leave.
[The prepared statement of Senator Smith follows:]
Statement of Bob Smith, U.S. Senator from the State of New Hampshire
Mr. Chairman, Thank you for conducting this hearing.
The attacks of September 11, left this Nation with a number of
questions dealing with preparedness and security measures.
A couple of weeks ago we heard from FEMA Director Allbaugh and
emergency responders about the response in New York and at the
Pentagon--and what lessons were learned.
Today we take the next step. We are here to consider legislative
proposals not only to help prevent further attacks, but also to be
better prepared if the unthinkable should happen again.
This committee has a number of agencies within our jurisdiction
that play vital roles in both security and response--and we will
exercise our responsibility to ensure that these agencies have all the
tools necessary to perform their jobs.
I am pleased to welcome the witnesses here today--some of whom I
have spent a good deal of time with recently. Assistant Secretary
Sampson joined me about a month ago in New Hampshire to discuss
economic development options in Berlin and Gorham.
A couple of weeks ago I met with Mike Brown of FEMA to discuss my
terrorism preparedness legislation and FEMA's role in terrorism
response. Just last night I sat down with Chairman Meserve of the
Nuclear Regulatory Commission to discuss nuclear security issues,
especially those dealing with Seabrook Station in New Hampshire.
I want to thank you all for working closely with me on issues of
great importance, both to New Hampshire and the Nation. You all play
important roles in our national preparedness efforts.
I look forward to hearing your thoughts on our current security
situation and what needs to be done in order for the American people to
have the utmost confidence in this Nation's ability to protect our
vital infrastructure against further terrorist attacks.
As you know, I have introduced a few bills to address both security
and preparedness/response needs.
A terrorism preparedness bill that will: Establish the mechanism to
create a coherent national strategy for terrorism preparedness and
response. It will create a single Federal coordinating and planning
office for consequence management. It will integrate both State and
local responders in the planning and development of national terrorism
preparedness policies.
I have also just introduced a water infrastructure grant bill to
provide resources in order for these facilities to take care of
immediate security needs.
The grants in this bill can be used for a variety of needs
including: training programs for rural utilities, gates, security
cameras, surveillance equipment and other needs as identified by the
utility.
While the Nation's utilities believe the water supplies are safe
and measures are in place to protect from attack, we must be sure that
every possible step is being taken to close any existing security gaps.
This bill will help to do that.
I have also joined Senator Inhofe in introducing a Nuclear security
bill. I have been working with Senator Jeffords on a bill to deal with
communication needs in time of an emergency.
This is an issue that has consistently come up in our hearings and
in private meetings B including a meeting I held last week in New
Hampshire with our Governor and Federal, State and local emergency
responders.
I know that Senator Warner also has a strong interest in this
issue.
These are just a few positive steps to address security and
preparedness needs of this Nation.
I look forward to hearing the testimony of our witnesses in order
to explore other avenues to provide for our Homeland Security.
We are also here to discuss economic recovery options for the
devastated area in and around Ground Zero in New York City. I know
Senator Clinton has been working hard on legislation to get those small
businesses in that area back on their feet as soon as possible. I
visited Ground Zero shortly after the attack and can't even begin to
describe the devastation I saw.
One way of defeating what these terrorist stand for is to prove the
resiliency of this Nation. The Senator from New York and people of New
York have my commitment to help in that effort. As I told Mayor
Giuliani at Ground Zero--``on September 11, we all became New
Yorkers.''
I will be working closely with the members of this committee to
address the economic needs of those who suffered from the terrorist
attack of September 11.
Mr. Chairman, thank you again for holding this hearing.
OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. JAMES M. JEFFORDS, U.S. SENATOR FROM
THE STATE OF VERMONT
Senator Jeffords [resuming the chair]. Well, I am sorry but
I did not get here either. So you do not have to apologize, I
apologize to you.
Senator Smith. I really was inclined to grab that gavel,
but Senator Clinton got it before me.
[Laughter.]
Senator Jeffords. I should have known I should not have
been concerned about being here. But anyway.
[Laughter.]
Senator Jeffords. Actually, we had for a luncheon speaker,
the head of NIH and he was telling us all about anthrax and who
ought to be in charge. So I got a little carried away. I was
listening and suddenly I was reminded that I was not where I
was supposed to be. So, I apologize for that. But, here I am. I
will make my opening statement now and we will get on.
I especially want to thank the witnesses from the various
Federal agencies for appearing here today and look forward to
hearing from all of you.
Tuesday night, I watched game three of the World Series. As
I watched the game, I was heartened by the pictures of faithful
fans cheering their beloved teams and a tattered flag flapped
in the breeze in the outfield, the same flag that had been
pulled from the rubble of Tower 2, 3 days after the World Trade
Center disaster. During the seventh inning stretch, the Anthem
``God Bless America'' replaced the familiar refrain of ``Take
Me Out To The Ball Game.'' On the field in storied Yankee
Stadium in the grand old city, two teams competed in the Fall
Classic. As I marveled at the sights and sounds, I was overcome
with the feeling that through our collective efforts as a
Nation, we will overcome this very sad chapter in our history.
But the healing journey will not be an easy one. Many
additional responsibilities have been thrust upon each of us by
this change. A successful journey to recover will require
citizens and communities across America to come together, to
lend a helping hand and to strengthen the feeble knees. While
we take our journey as a Nation, we must not forget the
horrible events of September 11 or the people directly affected
by those attacks.
It is in this spirit that we gather here today to discuss
various legislative proposals to aid the victims of these very
tragic events. I would like to acknowledge Senator Clinton's
tireless efforts to address and to anticipate the needs of
citizens affected by this tragedy. You have done a great job
and I would like to let everybody know. The Senator has
listened to her constituents, she has worked with the city and
the State officials, and she has put forward credible proposals
worthy of our serious and expedited attention. I trust that we
will have a candid and forthright discussion of these
proposals.
A successful journey to recover will also require improved
critical infrastructure security. Just yesterday I heard about
a recent event at a Florida chemical storage facility which
underscores this point. I was alarmed and, quite frankly, a bit
incredulous to learn that only a few days ago a significant
quantity of lethal pesticide methyl bromide was stolen from a
Florida chemical storage facility. Apparently, the thieves
absconded with the poison through a hole cut in the facility's
fence while security personnel stood guard. How could this
happen? This is unacceptable. We must act.
I applaud Senator Corzine for recognizing the need for
improved chemical site security and for introducing legislation
to attempt to remedy the problem. You were right on cue. Thank
you. I look forward to an open and honest debate on the
subject, and I look forward to a meaningful discussion on how
we can improve the security of our Nation's water supply,
nuclear facilities, and Federal buildings.
I also want to thank my good friend Senator Smith and his
staff for the help and the cooperation over the last several
weeks. We have travelled together to the World Trade Center, we
have seen the devastation, and we share a commitment to help
this Nation heal.
Speaking to a group of young Americans just after the turn
of the 20th century, Mark Twain advised, ``Always do the right
thing. This will gratify some and astonish the rest.'' As this
legislative session draws to a close, let this committee do the
right thing. Let us work in a bipartisan and timely fashion to
aid victims of the recent terrorist attacks on our soil and to
take the necessary steps within the committee's jurisdiction to
improve the Nation's critical infrastructure security.
Our national journey to recovery may be a long one. But if
we join together as an American family, I am confident we can
make it. Thank you very much.
[The prepared statement of Senator Jeffords follows:]
Statement of Senator Jim Jeffords, U.S. Senator from the State of
Vermont
Tuesday night I watched Game 3 of the World Series. As I watched
the game, I was heartened by the pictures of faithful fans cheering
their beloved teams. A tattered flag flapped in the breeze in the
outfield, the same flag that had been pulled from the rubble of Tower
2, 3 days after the World Trade Center disaster. During the 7th winning
stretch, the anthem ``God Bless America'' replaced the familiar refrain
of ``Take Me Out To The Ballgame.'' On the field, in storied Yankee
Stadium, in that grand old city, two teams competed in the Fall
Classic. As I marveled at the sights and the sounds, I was overcome
with the feeling that with our collective efforts, as a Nation we will
overcome this sad chapter in our history.
But the healing journey will not be an easy one. Many additional
responsibilities have been thrust upon each of us by change. A
successful journey to recovery will require citizens in communities
across America to come together, to lend a helping hand, and to
strengthen feeble knees. While we take our journey together as a Nation
we must not forget the horrible events of September 11 or the people
directly affected by the attacks. It is in this spirit that we gather
here today to discuss various legislative proposals to aid the victims
of these tragic events. I would like to acknowledge Senator Clinton's
tireless efforts to address, and to anticipate, the needs of the
citizens affected by this tragedy. The Senator has listened to her
constituents, she has worked with the city and State officials, and she
has put forward credible proposals worthy of our serious and expedited
attention. I trust that we will have a candid and forthright discussion
of these proposals.
A successful journey to recovery will also require improved
critical infrastructure security. Just yesterday, I heard about a
recent event at a Florida chemical storage facility which underscores
this point. I was alarmed, and quite frankly a bit incredulous, to
learn that only a few days ago a significant quantity of the lethal
pesticide methyl bromide was stolen from a Florida chemical storage
facility. Apparently, the thieves absconded with the poison through a
hole cut in the facility's fence while security personnel stood guard.
How could this happen?
This is unacceptable. We must act. I applaud Senator Corzine for
recognizing the need for improved chemical site security and for
introducing legislation to attempt to remedy the problem. I look
forward to an open and honest debate on the subject. I also look
forward to a meaningful discussion of how we can improve the security
of our Nation's water supply, nuclear facilities, and Federal
buildings.
Speaking to a group of young Americans just after the turn of the
20th Century Mark Twain advised, ``Always do right--this will gratify
some and astonish the rest.'' As this legislative session draws to a
close, let this Committee do the right thing. Let us work in a bi-
partisan and timely fashion to aid the victims of the recent terrorist
attacks on our soil and to take the necessary steps within this
Committee's jurisdiction to improve this Nation's critical
infrastructure security.
Our national journey to recovery may be a long one, but if we join
together as an American family, I am confident we can make it.
Senator Jeffords. We will now proceed.
Senator Clinton.
OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. HILLARY RODHAM CLINTON, U.S. SENATOR
FROM THE STATE OF NEW YORK
Senator Clinton. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I thank you and
our ranking member and your staffs for the extraordinary
support, both personally and officially, that you have provided
to New York and to me. I would like to thank all the agencies
represented here who have done a very commendable job in
working to ensure that we recover and rebuild after the
horrific attacks on our Nation.
I have to say that we in New York, and there is a
delegation of business and labor and elected officials who have
been making the rounds talking to Senators and House Members on
both sides of the aisle, are in an awkward and somewhat
challenging position. On the one hand, we are resilient--the
Yankees are going to win the series again----
[Laughter.]
Senator Clinton. Everyone is doing their very best to have
the stiffest possible upper lip in the face of the
extraordinary damage that we have suffered. If you go back to
Ground Zero, you know that the fires are still burning, the
impact of the devastation is beyond our understanding and very
difficult for us to fully calculate even at this time. We have
almost one million tons of rubble still awaiting removal
despite the extraordinary efforts that have already been
undertaken to remove tens and hundreds of thousands of tons. We
know we are in for quite a long recovery period.
In speaking with many of my constituents, there are a
number of issues that I have raised, and I appreciate very much
the work that some of you have done in a short period of time
to respond to these ideas, because there are gaps that are
difficult for us to fill under existing legislative authority.
I have no pride of authorship; I am just looking for solutions.
If we can enhance discretionary authority, if we can create new
vehicles by amending the Stafford Act or looking at EDA or CDBG
more creatively, we can solve these problems, that is what we
are looking for. I just want to quickly run through four that I
have seen.
One is that now that people are coming out of their shock
and denial, we are faced with a lot of very serious issues
concerning the children who have been directly affected. I have
proposed creating a Children's Coordinating Office within FEMA
to pay particular attention to the needs of children who have
lost one or both parents. We are only now beginning to assess
what that would include, whether there would be need for mental
health services, guardianships, temporary care services, but,
clearly, we need more of a focus that we particularly pay
attention to children who do not have adult representatives or
advocates who can speak for them.
The second issue is to track the health of the victims,
volunteers, and workers who have been exposed to harmful
substances. This would amend the Stafford Act to allow for this
kind of health protection assessment and monitoring. We have
been monitoring the air and I am very confident that the
results that we are getting which demonstrate that there are
not broadscale problems with the air are absolutely accurate.
But no one argues that right there on the site there are
problems and those problems are intense. We have had some
people working in that rubble now for nearly 2 months. They
have worked day and night, many of them have been exposed to
the air. We are now hearing something colloquially referred to
as the Trade Center cough because it has been reported that
11,000 firefighters have worked at Ground Zero, almost 4,000
are being treated with steroid inhalers for severe coughs.
Under the amendment I have proposed to the Stafford Act,
FEMA would carry out an outreach education, protection, and
monitoring program based upon a determination by the President
that harmful substances have been released into a disaster
area. We need to track these workers, we need to get the best
possible baseline, and then we need to act to help them with
their health issues.
The third issue is an unemployment assistance bill, which
would extend unemployment assistance under the disaster as
provided by the Stafford Act for an additional 26 weeks, for a
total of 52 weeks, for any individual eligible to receive DUA
as a result of the attacks. Thousands of individuals have
become unemployed because their businesses no longer exist, or,
frankly, because their businesses, even if they are up and
going, are not only in a disaster zone but in a crime scene
zone and people cannot get to them because of the police
barricades and the difficulty of knowing what streets are open
when.
Currently, nearly 25,000 individuals have applied for
disaster unemployment. The applicants are expected to grow. We
have to really take care of these people. That is something
that I feel very strongly about. We need to help them go
through this transition, hopefully by some other means get
these businesses up and going and they can return to work.
That brings me to my final proposal. I believe we should
establish an Office of World Trade Center Attack Claims. We did
lose nearly 25 million square feet of office space, we have
displaced 850 businesses, we have displaced over 125,000
people, and access has been denied to 9,000 other businesses
partly because of the crime scene designation and the debris
removal efforts. Senator Schumer and I are introducing this
bill to help address the needs of businesses that cannot apply
for the existing SBA loans. They do not know if they are going
to be in business in 6 months. Even if it is a 0 percent
interest rate loan, they do not feel that they can sign for it.
This proposed Office of World Trade Center Attack Claims is
modelled after, though much narrower, the Office of Cerro
Grande Fire Claims that was created in response to the New
Mexico fires last year. The Cerro Grande model has been proven
to work. As of this past August, the Office of Cerro Grande
Fire Claims has processed and awarded more than 13,700 claims
totaling over $207 million.
Based on the lessons we have learned, we have worked
significantly to limit the scope of this proposed office, both
in terms of eligible claimants and eligible injuries for
reimbursement. This obviously would come, if we were to
authorize it, out of the $20 billion that has already been set
aside and supported by the President for disaster recovery and
assistance efforts. We would be seeking to use between $1 and
$2 billion of that $20 billion for this office. By comparison,
$455 million was appropriated for the Cerro Grande fire claims
office.
I believe that these steps are very important and help to
authorize authority and plug some of the gaps that we have
found now that we are on the ground trying to help people
exist. I very much appreciate the extraordinary help that we
have received from this staff, Mr. Chairman. They have really
helped us work through this. I look forward to hearing from our
witnesses any ways that we can, either within the existing
legislation or through the ideas that I am proposing, help
create some solutions for the problems that we still find.
Thank you very much.
Senator Jeffords. Thank you very much. Very excellent
statement.
Senator Corzine.
OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. JON S. CORZINE, U.S. SENATOR FROM THE
STATE OF NEW JERSEY
Senator Corzine. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I, too, want to
congratulate you on holding this hearing on economic recovery
and infrastructure security. There is hardly anything that
captures the public's imagination save anthrax I think more
than making sure that we put in proper position the everyday
lives that we are now operating with.
This has obviously taken a huge toll, as Senator Clinton
has talked about, at the epicenter of this in New York City. I
support wholeheartedly all of the efforts that are now working
their way through our processes here to make sure that they are
appropriately addressed. I do want to make sure that people
also understand that there is a metropolitan community
surrounding New York City and a number of the communities in
northern New Jersey, in particular, deeply impacted with regard
to human loss, and certainly some of the economic issues that
Senator Clinton outlined have major impact on small business,
in particular, in our communities.
The Federal Government has a large role to play here. FEMA
has done an outstanding job in spearheading this, but some of
the rules that surround FEMA do not bite necessarily
effectively with regard to a number of the problems that have
come up, whether it is in New York or small businesses on the
west side of the Holland or Lincoln Tunnel that are impacted
almost as seriously by the lack of attention that comes out of
the way the Stafford Act is structured. I think there is a real
need for us to go back and parse through that to make sure that
necessary changes are put in place to deal with a different
kind of attack, just as we are dealing with a different kind of
war. I certainly intend to support Senator Clinton's and the
chairman's proposals in this regard, and I look forward to
working with them and staff to make sure that they truly meet
the needs of post-September 11.
With regard to infrastructure, as I said, I think this is
one of those things that the public is looking to all of us as
public officials to bring greater elements of security to the
potential targets. Whether that is our water systems, nuclear
power plants, chemical facilities, natural gas pipelines,
whatever the issues that could be specific vehicles for a
terrorist attack, I think we are remiss if we do not make sure
that we have in place the kinds of quality checks and balances
to make sure that these are secure.
In that vein, yesterday, along with the partnership of the
chairman and Senator Clinton, I introduced legislation that
addresses one of these problems which was a serious issue
before we contemplated terrorism, and that is threats to our
chemical processing and distribution infrastructure. It is a
serious issue. We have had a number of tragic accidents in New
Jersey itself through history that have cost life and there is
a very recent example in France which cost almost 180 lives. I
think we need to make very clear that this is something that
needs to be addressed. I think our legislation and staff has
been able to come up with an act that I think will be not too
heavy-handed but definitely proactive in moving us forward. I
look forward to working with the chairman and the committee to
make sure we get this in ship shape and move it forward.
Again, I think what you are doing here and the kinds of
suggestions that are here in the committee are terrific steps
forward and do a lot to bring both public confidence and also
deal with the enormity of the tragedy that occurred on
September 11 in New York City. So, thank you for having this
hearing, and I look forward to hearing from the witnesses and
appreciate their efforts in preparation. Thank you.
[The prepared statement of Senator Corzine follows:]
Statement of Jon S. Corzine, U.S. Senator from the State of New Jersey
Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for holding this important hearing on
disaster recovery and infrastructure security. The events of September
11 have taken a huge toll on our Nation. Everyone has been impacted,
and these impacts are particularly acute around the Pentagon and in the
New York metropolitan area, which includes many New Jersey communities.
The Federal Government has a major role to play in helping these
communities get back on their feet. FEMA has spearheaded this effort,
and I appreciate their hard work under difficult circumstances. I think
that they have tried hard to work within the confines of the Stafford
Act. But the Act did not contemplate the scope of this disaster or the
unique challenges that it poses. So I think changes are necessary to
make the Federal Government's response more effective. I support
Senator Clinton's and Senator Jeffords proposals in this regard. I ask,
however, that they will be willing to work with me to ensure that these
proposals are responsive to the needs of New Jersey businesses, many of
which literally operated in the shadows of the World Trade Center.
With respect to infrastructure security, I think we all recognize
that our Nation's assets now need to be considered targets. We need to
assess the potential threats to our water systems, nuclear power plants
and chemical facilities and get on with the business of making them
more secure. Staying ahead of the curve on these issues will be
critical to preventing new types of terrorism from occurring. As we
respond to the acts of terrorism that have already taken place, we need
to anticipate and address a range of problems.
Yesterday, I introduced legislation that addresses one such
problem-threats to our chemical processing and distribution
infrastructure. The bill would give the Administration new tools to
help secure these assets against terrorist acts. Recent reports of the
theft of methyl bromide, a highly toxic pesticide, from a Florida
manufacturing facility underscore the need to act on this front.
Senator Boxer and Senator Chafee have agreed to hold a hearing on this
legislation next Wednesday, and I thank them for agreeing to this
hearing on short notice. I think we need to act, and I pledge to work
with my colleagues on the committee, the Administration, and industry
to come up with proactive solutions. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Senator Jeffords. Thank you for your excellent statement.
I also want to thank my staff who have put together the
hearing today and moving us into this very important and
essential area.
I also want to thank Mr. Brown especially. I had an
opportunity to work with you and all of the FEMA staff both at
the Pentagon and back in New York City and observe the amazing
cooperation I found, which is so much due to your leadership,
of the coordination of the local communities as well as the
Federal Government. It is just a wonderful experience to watch
you all operate. I appreciate that.
Mr. Brown. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Senator Jeffords. Mr. Brown, please proceed.
STATEMENT OF MICHAEL BROWN, DEPUTY DIRECTOR, FEDERAL EMERGENCY
MANAGEMENT AGENCY
Mr. Brown. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, Senator Corzine, and
Senator Clinton. I am very pleased to be here this afternoon on
behalf of Director Allbaugh. Today I want to reiterate a couple
of points that the Director made during his testimony last
month, and the first one is probably most important, which you
just alluded to now, Mr. Chairman, and that is the incredible
cooperation that we are getting from all of our Federal
partners, the other agencies. I want to take just a moment away
from my prepared text and say just a short comment about the
extraordinary cooperation that I think we are getting from the
members of the legislative branch also.
I have met with Senator Clinton and the New York
delegation, and I would like to extend that invitation that we
ought to do that more often I think, Senator. It helps us
figure out what the problems are that maybe are not getting
addressed and gives us time to go back and figure out ways to
get those addressed. So, to the extent that we can continue to
do that, I think we ought to do that.
Senator Corzine, I would add that I have had conversations
just today with Governor Ridge about some issues that have
arisen in New Jersey. Again, I think it would be helpful if we
just got together and talked sometime about some of those
issues and how we might address those. I think they are really
issues that maybe we can resolve just by getting together and
talking face to face and saying what are you hearing out there
that maybe we are not hearing in terms of the disaster field
office. If we can do that, I think we can resolve a lot of
problems.
The second point I want to make, just to return to my
prepared remarks, is that I think oftentimes we take for
granted one main point, and that is the Stafford Act actually
does work. The legislative framework that this committee has
provided to us really provides us the necessary tools to carry
out both the response and the recovery mission of the agency,
and particularly in response to the attacks of September 11.
Just briefly, some of those authorities give us support
from the Urban Search and Rescue Task Forces, which I think we
all agree have done an incredible response in New York and at
the Pentagon. It allows us to mission assign other departments
and agencies to take care of activities that need to be taken
care of that perhaps other departments and agencies are not
entirely focused on and allows us to coordinate those quickly
and efficiently. It allows us to provide temporary housing
assistance and rebuild the public infrastructure. It allows us
something that we often take for granted, we do not think about
it often enough, and that is, it allows us to provide crisis
counseling for those who have suffered and it allows us to
assist those State and local governments who have given
everything they can and yet are losing so much.
Those particular authorities I think absolutely empower
FEMA to do the job that it needs to do in responding to all
types of disasters, whether or not they are man-made or natural
disasters.
If we look at particular changes, I want to thank Senator
Smith, who has now left but I will pass it on to the staff for
all of their effort, for helping us with the Office of National
Preparedness and actually taking some of those authorities and
putting them into law. We appreciate both the intent and the
spirit of that legislation, and we thank the ranking member for
his help in that regard and look forward to working with him in
the future on that.
FEMA is uniquely suited to work closely with State, local,
and tribal governments to ensure their consequence management
planning, their training, and equipment needs are met. FEMA and
its Office of National Preparedness will continue to support
the Office of Homeland Security and Governor Ridge in those
efforts.
I want to call the committee's attention to the technical
amendments we transmitted to the committee on September 21. We
believe those are modest changes that will improve our ability
to carry out our job in responding to all types of attacks.
Over the past several days we have looked, very quickly I
might add, very quickly, at a lot of legislative ideas that
have been drafted. We do understand and we appreciate both the
good will and the sound purpose of the authors of those
amendments and the intent of those amendments. To the extent
that we can, we should use current Federal authorities and
programs before creating new or duplicative efforts. I do not
want any of my comments though to be taken in the wrong
context. I think we all agree we are here for really three
purposes--How can we help? How can we do more? What can we do
better? To that extent, we want to work as closely as we can
with you in resolving any problems that are outstanding.
One bill would require FEMA, in coordination with the FCC
and the Department of Defense, to conduct a study to determine
the resources that are needed to develop an effective
communications system for the use of emergency response
personnel during disasters. Clearly, we have no objection to
this concept. Director Allbaugh has testified and we have
spoken to many members of the Senate about the need to get a
coordinated response system that allows us to communicate
across all types of systems. The only thing I would ask the
committee is to consider the timeframe in which we do that
study and, of course, the resources needed to conduct that type
of study.
Another bill under consideration would establish within
FEMA an Office of World Trade Center Attack Claims to reimburse
individuals and businesses that were injured by the Trade
Center attack on September 11. The draft legislation would
establish the office and would require the Director or an
independent claims manager appointed by the Director to
reimburse claimants for losses suffered as a result of the
World Trade Center attack. We believe the Stafford Act already
contains a broad range of authorities that were triggered by
President Bush's declaration of a major emergency.
Nevertheless, it is clear that the draft legislation would
cover a substantially broader range of injuries and losses than
FEMA is currently authorized to address under the Stafford Act.
As you are aware, Congress recently enacted the Air
Transportation Safety and System Stabilization Act. Title IV of
that particular Act authorizes the Justice Department to
provide compensation to any person, or relatives of a deceased
person, who was either injured or killed during the September
11 attacks. Although the draft legislation creates a claims
office within FEMA to provide assistance to a broader range of
claimants than is currently provided by the Air Transportation
Safety and System Stabilization Act, we are concerned about
creating a separate claims office within FEMA. We might
recommend that before this legislation proceeds further, we
consider the idea of placing some of that claims processing
within the Justice Department rather than FEMA because of some
of the programs they are currently administering.
In addition to our concern about potentially duplicative
claims processing authorities, we believe it may be preferable
to consider legislation in this situation to authorize
additional flexibility within the Stafford Act as opposed to a
different claims office. Again, we agree. We ought to make
certain we are taking care of all of those victims. Let us just
figure out the best track to do that.
Another of the bills I would like to address would amend
the Stafford Act to authorize the President to appoint
Children's Coordinating Officers whenever an emergency or major
disaster has caused children to lose one or more custodial
parents. In every disaster, FEMA is concerned about the effects
that these events have on children. FEMA is already authorized
to provide crisis counseling assistance to disaster victims. We
administer this authority by funding the State's costs of
administering counseling services.
New York's application addresses the need to provide
counseling services to children who have been affected by the
attack. According to the New York Office of Mental Health,
these activities are being provided through outreach programs,
education, and other existing children's services to those
children who have suffered tragically by this attack. In
addition, and a point I do not want to gloss over too quickly,
FEMA's Disaster Legal Services Program can provide direct
assistance to children who have lost parents in a disaster. I
just met with that group during the ADA convention in Chicago a
few months ago, and I am pleased to say that I think they are
an incredible group of young people from the Young Lawyers
Division who are concerned about providing guardianship advice,
providing any sorts of advice that these children may need in
terms of providing legal services that they might need to get
the services provided by other agencies or departments.
The proposed amendment to section 410 of the Stafford Act
would extend the availability of Disaster Unemployment
Assistance an addition 26 weeks, up to a full year, for
individuals who are already eligible for such assistance. FEMA
routinely tasks the Labor Department to administer this
authority on our behalf in Labor. It does so in conjunction
with its administration of its generic unemployment assistance
authority. Most individuals who become unemployed as a result
of a Presidentially declared disaster qualify for unemployment
assistance that the Labor Department administers under its own
authorities.
The unemployment claims that have been filed in the
aftermath of the attack are being paid by the Labor Department
under their general unemployment assistance authorities and
under the Disaster Unemployment Assistance provision of the
Stafford Act. Because of the uniqueness of this situation, the
Administration does support a 13-week extension of the
availability of unemployment assistance benefits for qualified
individuals as a result of the attack both under the Labor
authority and under the DUA provision of the Stafford Act
itself.
The final draft bill I would ask to address in this hearing
would amend the Stafford Act to authorize the President to
implement a program to protect the health and safety of
emergency response personnel in the aftermath of disasters
which cause harmful substances to be released. FEMA routinely
calls on the Environmental Protection Agency and the Department
of Health and Human Services for expertise in assessing these
types of concerns in the aftermath of disasters. This system
has worked efficiently, and we therefore are not aware of any
need to amend the Stafford Act to address this issue. But to
the extent there are issues on the ground at Ground Zero that
need to be addressed. We want to address those promptly and
efficiently.
Finally, the committee letter mentioned a need to amend the
Stafford Act's temporary housing authority to increase the
amount of funding that may be provided to repair ownership-
occupied housing that is damaged by a major disaster. There is
a new provision in the Stafford Act that will take effect in
May 2002 that would impose a $5,000 cap on this form of
temporary housing assistance. In previous correspondence, we
have asked the committee to amend this provision because of the
unintended severe hardship on disaster victims with the lowest
incomes and the most significant disaster impacts. While the
cap does not affect the response in New York, we continue to
urge the committee to make this technical amendment before the
cap takes effect in May.
In closing, I just want to add that despite any differences
that might exist about technical amendments, that might exist
about some of the legislation that is now before this
committee, FEMA is absolutely committed to sitting down with
each and every one of you to find out where those needs are not
being addressed and how can we address those under the existing
authorities. If we cannot, then let us work on some new
legislation. But to that extent, I will be happy to answer any
questions that the committee may have down the road. Thank you,
Mr. Chairman.
Senator Jeffords. Thank you very much.
Mr. Moravec, I enjoyed meeting with you last week. We had
an interesting discussion and I am sure you are going to cover
some of those issues in your statement today. So, please
proceed.
STATEMENT OF JOE MORAVEC, COMMISSIONER, PUBLIC BUILDING
SERVICE, GENERAL SERVICES ADMINISTRATION
Mr. Moravec. Good afternoon, Mr. Chairman, and members of
the committee. I am Joe Moravec, Commissioner of the Public
Buildings Service. Thank you for the opportunity to discuss
improving security in GSA-owned and leased facilities.
We have had an ongoing effort to improve our security
measures. In addition to our own initiatives, H.R. 307 was
introduced in January of this year to provide for the reform of
the Federal Protective Service, and to enhance the safety of
Federal employees, the public, and children enrolled in
childcare facilities located in facilities under GSA's control.
A significant proposal in H.R. 307, the establishment of
the Federal Protective Service as a separate service from PBS,
did not have support from GSA nor the Senate. The principal
reason we oppose making the Federal Protective Service a
separate service within our agency is that it would divorce
security from other Federal facility functions when the
opposite needs to be done.
Security needs to be tightly integrated into decisions
about the location, design, and operation of Federal
facilities. Divorcing FPS would create an organizational
barrier between protection experts and the Public Buildings
Service asset managers, planners, project managers, and
facility managers who oversee the daily operations in our
facilities. A separate GSA security service would lead to
confusion about who was responsible for what in GSA's security
efforts. It is also contrary to agency efforts to present our
customers with a seamless GSA, capable of offering more
integrated workplace solutions.
Last year the Senate Transportation and Infrastructure
Subcommittee recommended the establishment of direct line
authority within PBS. The Administrator subsequently
reorganized the Federal Protective Service and reassigned the
reporting authority to the Federal Protective Service Assistant
Commissioner in the central office.
Under direct line authority, PBS has made substantial
strides in fulfilling our mission to reduce the threat to
Federal facilities under GSA control nationwide. The Federal
Protective Service budget, personnel actions, and operational
focus have been centralized to yield results better than that
which could be obtained by establishing a separate competing
service.
Leading the Federal Protective Service is Acting Assistant
Commissioner Richard Yamamoto, who is here with me today. Mr.
Yamamoto is a graduate of the FBI National Academy with over 20
years of law enforcement experience in the U.S. Army. He also
spent 7 years coordinating joint Federal, State, and local law
enforcement activities through the High Intensity Drug
Trafficking Areas Program at the Office of National Drug
Control Policy. Not only does Mr. Yamamoto possess extensive
law enforcement and security skills, he also has been
designated as a certified protection professional, which is one
of the premier accomplishments in the field of security.
Within Federal Protective Service, we are developing and
requiring both law enforcement and security core competencies
for all of our operational managers. While most of our current
managers have Federal, military, or local police training and
experience, those who do not have law enforcement training will
be sent to the Leadership Academy Law Enforcement Course at the
Federal Law Enforcement Training Center in Glynco, GA, to
attain these necessary skills.
Specifically addressing the proposal in H.R. 307 that there
should be at least 730 full-time equivalent FPS police
officers, we believe that FTE levels should not be based on an
arbitrary number set forth in legislation, but rather on the
threat that may vary from time to time. FPS regularly conducts
individual facility security surveys and regional threat
assessments to determine the threat to Federal facilities. FTE
requirements are based upon these threat assessments.
Specifically, we are increasing the number of our criminal
investigators and uniformed law enforcement security officers
who have both law enforcement and security competencies.
That concludes my prepared testimony. I am of course
available to answer whatever questions you may have.
Senator Jeffords. Thank you very much.
Dr. Sampson, please proceed.
STATEMENT OF DAVID SAMPSON, ASSISTANT SECRETARY FOR ECONOMIC
DEVELOPMENT, ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT ADMINISTRATION, U.S.
DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE
Mr. Sampson. Chairman Jeffords, members of the committee,
it is a pleasure to be with you today. The Administration, the
Department of Commerce, and the Economic Development
Administration are committed to the economic revitalization of
the New York economy.
As you are aware, the Administration is providing
considerable funding for efforts that are underway to promote
the city's recovery and economic revitalization. In this
context, this means that we are developing a multi-pronged
approach at getting people back to work and businesses, both
large and small, back on their feet as quickly as possible.
The Economic Development Administration has contributed to
previous disaster response efforts and has the statutory
authority to assist communities in long-term economic recovery
efforts. We have participated in those recovery efforts dating
back to 1969 and Hurricane Camille. We play a supplemental role
to the lead role played by FEMA, SBA, and other agencies,
including the Department of Transportation and the Department
of Housing and Urban Development.
Let me speak just a little bit about the redevelopment
strategy as I see it. While it is important that the Federal,
State, and city governments move as quickly as possible to
address the economic impacts in New York City, it is also
critically important that economic revitalization efforts be
based on a sound understanding of the New York City economic
landscape both prior to September 11 and post-September 11 to
ensure that Federal efforts are truly market-based and phased
appropriately in light of the projected timeline for clearing
the World Trade Center site.
The Administration is committed to taking a thorough,
comprehensive, and coordinated market-based approach in
addressing New York's immediate and long-term economic recovery
efforts. To this end, we believe it is vitally important to
work not only with State and city officials, but also with New
York's business leaders.
With that in mind, last week several senior administration
officials met with New York City business leaders and the New
York City Partnership, the leadership of which includes CEOs of
some of the global businesses headquartered in New York. The
New York City Partnership has commissioned seven of the world's
leading consulting firms, including A.T. Kearney, Booz-Allen,
Bain, Boston Consulting Group, KPMG, McKinsey, and Pricewater-
houseCoopers, to assess the economic impact of the World Trade
Center attack on New York City and identify investment
priorities for renewal.
Based on our conversations with New York City business
leaders, my sense is that the most urgent need is to focus on
recovery of businesses in the collateral damaged area because
Ground Zero cleanup is probably a year away. The best
information I have seems to indicate that there are
approximately 5,000 businesses directly affected in New York
City at Ground Zero as well as the cordoned off areas that
Senator Clinton mentioned earlier. Approximately 4,000 of those
are small businesses that previously employed about 77,000
people. These are the most vulnerable businesses.
Because of the indeterminate extent of the New York City
recovery plan and timeline, it is evident that loans will not
be the most appropriate vehicle in support of these businesses
and they can only be retained by some sort of grant program. To
that end, the Director of the Office of Management and Budget,
Mitch Daniels, earlier today announced the release of
additional funds from the Emergency Supplemental Appropriation
that New York can use for such grants to businesses.
The Administration is currently providing significant
funding to New York through a variety of agencies, many of whom
are at this table today, and is looking at a range of existing
Government programs for a comprehensive solution. The
Administration is focused on ensuring that economic recovery
funding is effective and truly focused on rebuilding New York
City's economic infrastructure in order to get people back to
work and businesses up and running again as soon as possible.
I believe that working together in this fashion, with the
private sector certainly as a very important part of that, we
will not disappoint those who need the assistance of an
effective, coordinated Federal, State, and local response to
rebuilding the economic infrastructure.
I would of course be pleased to answer any questions that
the committee may have.
Senator Jeffords. Thank you very much. Very helpful.
Mr. Meserve, a pleasure to be with you again. Please
proceed.
STATEMENT OF RICHARD MESERVE, CHAIRMAN, NUCLEAR REGULATORY
COMMISSION
Mr. Meserve. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and members of the
committee. I am pleased to have been invited to appear before
you on behalf of the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission. I will
discuss programs related to safeguards and security for NRC-
licensed commercial nuclear facilities, as well as actions NRC
and its licensees have taken in response to the terrorist acts
that occurred on September 11. I have submitted a longer
statement for the record. Allow me to provide just a brief
summary.
The NRC response began immediately after the September 11
attacks. Within 30 minutes of the plane strikes, we activated
and staffed the NRC operations center at NRC headquarters and
the incident response centers at NRC regional offices and we
began close coordination with the FBI and other intelligence
and law enforcement agencies, our licensees, and various
military, State, and local authorities. Shortly after the
attacks, we advised all our major licensees to go to the
highest level of physical security, which they promptly did. We
have provided continuing oversight and advice to our licensees
since September 11.
As of today, the NRC and our licensees are still in a
heightened state of security readiness. Our headquarters
operational center and regional response centers are full
staffed, 24 hours per day, 7 days per week. We are prepared to
make adjustments to security measures as circumstances warrant.
NRC activities related to domestic safeguards and security
and emergency response can be grouped into four categories.
First, developing and implementing requirements for
safeguarding nuclear facilities and materials and inspecting
for compliance with those requirements; assessing the threat
environment, including the international environment insofar as
it has implications for domestic threats; maintaining and
coordinating emergency response capabilities; and finally,
providing physical security for NRC employees and offices.
Beginning in the late 1970's the NRC established
requirements to safeguard civilian nuclear power plants and
fuel facilities. The result is that nuclear power plants are
among the most hardened civilian facilities in this country.
The NRC inspects these facilities to verify compliance with NRC
requirements, to assess licensee safety performance, and to
enforce our regulations.
In the aftermath of the terrorist attacks of September 11,
and the continuing uncertainty about future terrorist
intentions, the NRC is undertaking a comprehensive review of
its safeguards and physical security program. We currently are
interacting with the FBI, other Federal law enforcement and
intelligence organizations, the military, and the newly
establish Office of Homeland Security so that necessary changes
to our programs consider pertinent information from all
relevant Federal agencies. We also are reevaluating the
agency's ability to communicate with the press, the public, and
interested parties regarding information relevant to security
and physical protection of our licensees.
As the Commission conducts its comprehensive reassessment
of plant safeguards and security, we recognize that specific
legislative needs may become apparent. In the interim, the
Commission on June 22 submitted legislative proposals to your
committee that we believe we need now. Specifically, we are
seeking legislation that would amend the Atomic Energy Act to
enhance the protection provided by guards at designated NRC-
licensed nuclear facilities, to criminalize sabotage of nuclear
facilities during their construction, and to make clear that
the unauthorized introduction of weapons or explosives into
nuclear facilities will be subject to significant Federal
criminal penalties for the individuals involved. I might add
that we submitted that legislative proposal well before
September 11.
We have also recently developed a fourth proposed statutory
change. We seek to confer upon guards at NRC-designated
facilities the authority to possess or use weapons that are
comparable to the Department of Energy guard forces or other
Federal protective forces.
In closing, I would like to reiterate that the NRC had a
strong security and physical protection in place prior to
September 11, and we are building on that strong foundation. We
look forward to working with the Congress to address our mutual
concerns and determine where the assets of our Nation are best
deployed to fight the terrorist threat.
I appreciate your invitation to appear here today to
discuss the NRC's programs, and of course I am prepared to
respond to your questions.
Senator Jeffords. Thank you. We will have questions I
assure you and look forward to working with you.
Mr. Mitchell, you have had a tough time I know. This is not
something that you experience very often, obviously, to be
facetious. I appreciate all the work you have done. Please
proceed.
STATEMENT OF HERBERT MITCHELL, ASSOCIATE ADMINISTRATOR FOR
DISASTER ASSISTANCE, SMALL BUSINESS ADMINISTRATION
Mr. Mitchell. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Mr. Chairman and
members of the committee, my name is Herb Mitchell. I am the
Associate Administrator for Disaster Assistance and I am
appearing on behalf of the agency in the absence of
Administrator Barreto. We thank the committee today for
allowing us to come and just share with you what SBA's role has
been not only in all disasters, but particularly in New York
City.
SBA continues to play an immediate and major role in
providing disaster assistance loans not only for businesses but
for homeowners and renters as well. While certainly the
disaster in New York is different in scope, it does provide us
with the same opportunity to assist in the immediate recovery
of New York City, the region, and the Nation as a whole.
In this disaster and all disasters, we have experienced a
great deal of cooperation within the Federal family, with FEMA.
In the past, we have worked with EDA and HUD in terms of
economic recovery in disasters all around the country. FEMA
certainly serves as the coordinator and the one-shop stop to
ensure that those who are in need of disaster assistance have
one place to come, and at that point all businesses are
referred to SBA for assistance.
Since the afternoon of September 11, SBA has been in lower
Manhattan, working with FEMA and the State agencies to
coordinate our response to the recovery effort. SBA has since
deployed 94 people to the New York City area to complement our
staff in Niagara Falls where the actual processing has taken
place with about 200 employees there as well. We have employees
around the country who are available to us in the need to
supplement that staff in Niagara Falls.
SBA's disaster program is the primary Federal program for
funding recovery for private sector disaster victims. The
program provides low interest loans, not to exceed 4 percent,
to applicants without credit available elsewhere, and a higher
rate not to exceed 8 percent for those who do have credit
available elsewhere. We offer loans to repair real and personal
property for homeowners, business loans to repair the property
that is lost by the businesses there in New York. Economic
injury loans are available to provide working capital to
sustain those businesses until they are able to return to
normal operations. A recent addition has been the Military
Reservist loan program, where small businesses around the
country that are impacted economically as a result of a key
employee being called to active duty, those businesses that are
impacted economically are also eligible to apply for working
capital assistance.
To complement the programs that SBA has available, we have
been working with the New York Empire State Development Agency
and several financial institutions in New York, the city of New
York and the State, along with these financial institutions, to
set up ``bridge loan'' and ``gap loan'' programs. The ``bridge
loan'' program is intended to provide those businesses with
immediate assistance until the SBA application process is
completed and then at that point we are able to pay off those
loans to the bank. The ``gap'' financing is intended to address
those needs that the SBA loans are unable to address either
because of size limitations or because they may not fall within
the eligibility criteria. The ``gap'' financing that the
lenders are providing will certainly try to address those
needs. As of October 31, the SBA has made almost 1,000 loans
for $82 million.
Historically, under the disaster program, our assistance
has been limited to the declared disaster area, in this case,
it would be New York City and the immediate area and the State
of Virginia as well. But because of the unprecedented nature of
this attack and the widespread economic impact that it has
caused around the country, SBA, working with the
Administration, has expanded the Economic Injury Disaster
Program around the country to allow those small businesses that
have been impacted by the terrorist attack or subsequent
Federal action, most of which have consisted of closure of
airports and security measures along the border, for those
small businesses that have been economically impacted as well,
regardless of where they are located, to apply for economic
disaster loans.
Mindful of the nature of the businesses located in lower
Manhattan, the Administration has also submitted legislation
to, among other things, increase the size standards for
businesses in New York City, to address the need where we find
that there are a number of small- or medium-size businesses
which, based on our current size standards, would not qualify
for the working capital assistance. We have also proposed
legislation that would allow financial service organizations
and nonprofits to be eligible. Historically, these categories
or industries have not been included in the assistance for
working capital assistance.
Also recognizing the tremendous need in New York, we are
also proposing that we have the authority to raise the $1.5
million loan cap that is currently in place, to increase that
to $10 million.
SBA's disaster loan program is also complemented by our
regular loan programs and the technical assistance programs
that we are able to provide through our resource partners,
including the Small Business Development Centers, the Women's
Business Centers, the Business Information Centers, and the
Senior Corps Retired Executives, which have all been brought to
bear in providing assistance businesses and the New York City
community.
We look forward to working with all of you to help the
citizens of New York as well as those around the country that
refuse to let terror destroy what we have collectively worked
to build.
In closing, I just simply want to share with you that while
Administrator Barreto and I were in New York on our first
visit, we met a business owner and I would just share with you
what he told us at that time. He said, ``The terrorists tried
to declare victory by destroying the World Trade Center
buildings but,'' he insisted, ``they would not score a second
victory by closing his business.'' This is the patriotism and
this is the spirit that we have seen every time we visit New
York. There are business owners there that want to get back in
business, they want the customers to return so that they can
get on with their lives.
I would be pleased to answer any questions that you may
have. Thank you.
Senator Jeffords. Thank you, Mr. Mitchell.
Ms. Horinko, please proceed.
STATEMENT OF MARIANNE L. HORINKO, ASSISTANT ADMINISTRATOR,
OFFICE OF SOLID WASTE AND EMERGENCY RESPONSE, ENVIRONMENTAL
PROTECTION AGENCY
Ms. Horinko. Mr. Chairman and members of the committee,
thank you for the opportunity to discuss the Environmental
Protection Agency's role in domestic terrorism preparedness
and, more specifically, the agency's role in the protection of
the Nation's water resources.
The tragic events of September 11 have raised valid
concerns over our Nation's vulnerability to terrorist attack.
As a Nation, we are scrutinizing our efforts to prepare for and
to prevent terrorist events. Realizing that we must always
remain vigilant to new threats and must always be ready to
respond, the agency welcomes the opportunity this hearing
offers to examine these issues.
My testimony today covers four major areas: EPA's role in
counterterrorism preparedness and response before and after
September 11; a specific discussion of drinking water
protection related to the September 11 attack; EPA's overall
protection of our Nation's drinking water; and the critical
Federal coordination needed to meet the counterterrorism
challenges that we face.
The National Response Team consists of 16 Federal agencies
with responsibilities, interests, and expertise in various
aspects of emergency response to pollution incidents. The EPA
serves as chair and the Coast Guard serves as vice chair of the
NRT. This partnership includes such Federal agencies as the
Agency for Toxic Substances and Disease Registry, Department of
Defense, Department of Energy, Federal Bureau of Investigation,
FEMA, and key nongovernmental organizations.
Our Federal partnership sprung into action on September 11.
Before the second plane had struck the World Trade Center in
Manhattan, EPA headquarters had already begun coordination with
our New York regional office to address the crash of the first
plane. Ten minutes later, our EPA headquarters had linked all
of our east coast regional offices to begin coordination in
support of the New York response effort. EPA's Emergency
Response Program was present onsite in New York, Virginia, and
Pennsylvania within hours of the four plane crashes.
Throughout the response effort, EPA worked in coordination
with our Federal partners to monitor and protect human health
and the environment from potential hazards associated with the
three crash sites. At both the World Trade Center and the
Pentagon, EPA provided monitoring for various air contaminants.
For example, EPA and other Federal, State, and city agencies
have taken literally thousands of samples of dust, air,
drinking water, stormwater runoff, and river sediments in and
around the World Trade Center site. We have tested for the
presence of pollutants such as asbestos, lead, volatile organic
compounds, dioxin, benzine, metals, PCBs, and other chemicals
and substances that could pose a threat to the public and
workers at the site.
Fortunately, EPA, OSHA, and others have found no evidence
of any significant public health hazard to residents, visitors,
or workers beyond the immediate World Trade Center area.
Despite recent press accounts which suggest otherwise, these
findings have not changed.
In addition to our monitoring activities, EPA assisted in
removal and cleanup of dust and debris from the streets using
vacuum trucks. EPA has also provided rescue workers and others
onsite with protective gear and health and safety
recommendations for the difficult conditions onsite.
Regarding water concerns associated with Manhattan, EPA
collected and tested drinking water at several distribution
points. Following several days of heavy rain immediately after
the incident, we collected water samples from storm sewers and
surface runoff to determine if potential contamination from the
site was entering the Hudson or East rivers. All samples of
water, which were tested for a wide range of contaminants, had
levels below the Federal standards.
Recognizing the need to ensure appropriate coordination of
water security activities, EPA has established a Water
Protection Task Force that will guide efforts on long term
drinking water infrastructure protection and wastewater
treatment infrastructure protection.
The Administration has requested $34.5 million as part of
the terrorism supplemental appropriations for support of
vulnerability assessments for drinking water systems and $5
million for State grants for drinking water counterterrorism
coordinators to work with EPA and the drinking water systems.
With EPA support, the Sandia National Laboratory of the
Department of Energy, in partnership with the American Water
Works Association Research Foundations, is developing a ``tool
kit'' to assist drinking water systems in conducting
vulnerability assessments and identifying remedial action. We
expect training on this resource to be available later this
month. As an interim measure, EPA has disseminated a fact sheet
that outlines measures utilities can take immediately to
protect their drinking water supplies. Issued through the State
drinking water program managers, this document should now be in
the hands of every public water system.
As this tool kit is being developed, the American Water
Works Association Research Foundation is drafting additional,
more detailed training materials that will provide step-by-step
guidance to drinking water utilities on conducting
vulnerability assessments, identifying remedial actions, and
strengthening their emergency operation plant. Formal training
sessions that will take utility security officials through the
first steps of their vulnerability assessments will begin in
December.
As EPA continues to strengthen its counterterrorism program
by building on the existing National Response System, the
agency is involved in a variety of other activities with
Federal, State, and local officials. EPA is requesting $5.5
million in the terrorism supplemental appropriations to
establish and equip a West Coast environmental response team,
similar to the East Coast team that exists in Edison, NJ, and
has been so instrumental in assisting at the World Trade
Center.
In the 10 EPA regions, the agency's first responders are
the on-scene coordinators. The OSCs have been actively involved
with local, State, and Federal authorities in preparing for and
responding to threats of terrorism. EPA's OSCs, located
throughout the United States, have broad response authority and
a proven record of success in responding rapidly to emergency
situations.
We are expanding work with the State Emergency Response
Commissions and the Local Emergency Planning Committees to help
them incorporate terrorism response issues into their existing
emergency plans. We are working closely with the Office of
Homeland Security to develop long-term agency response plans
for terrorist attacks.
Finally, Mr. Chairman, I would like to say a word about the
anthrax situation that we face here in the District of
Columbia, in Florida, and in New York. The agency is receiving
an increasing number of requests to provide assessment,
sampling, and cleanup assistance at anthrax-contaminated
buildings across the country, many very close to home here in
this hearing room. The dilemma we face is that the Superfund
statutory language that allows us to respond to these
biological releases also limits our ability to recovery our
response costs. To the extent these activities will continue,
they will have an impact on our Superfund cleanup activities
later in the year in many parts of the country.
Finally, Mr. Chairman, I would like to emphasize that the
Administrator, Governor Whitman, has made very clear to the
entire agency that there is no higher priority than ensuring
that EPA's mission to protect the environment and public health
is a broad umbrella that encompasses homeland security. The
expertise and experience the agency has developed over 30 years
is poised to assist and support the hard work Governor Ridge
and this Congress will be doing.
Clearly, the Administrator is adamant that EPA's efforts to
help secure the safety and integrity of America's water supply
and infrastructure must be undertaken with great speed, energy,
and attention. Deadlines that were established before September
11 are no longer appropriate. We have no time to waste in
completing this work and we intend to devote the resources
necessary to make certain that it is done quickly and properly.
Governor Whitman, myself, and our professionals throughout
EPA welcome the opportunity to work with you, your colleagues
in Congress, your professional staff, and with Governor Ridge
and the Office of Homeland Security to protect and preserve the
health and well being of every American citizen. Thank you.
Senator Jeffords. Thank you. Thank you all for your very
interesting statements. I deeply appreciate all the effort that
has gone into your testimony for today.
I am going to change the ordinary procedure in view of the
fact that we have two Senators here from the area and allow
them to ask questions first before I do.
Senator Clinton. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. Let me
thank all of the witnesses for your testimony and your
extraordinary response to our needs.
Mr. Meserve, I look forward to seeing you next week, so I
will hold my questions about nuclear security. I have got some
that I will submit to you in preparation for our meeting, and I
thank you very much for your testimony today.
Mr. Mitchell, I understood you to say you were submitting
legislation with respect to the size requirements and to raise
the loan caps. Does that request go to the Small Business
Committee?
Mr. Mitchell. My understanding is it has gone up as part of
the Administration's request for the additional supplemental. I
am not sure what particular appropriation it actually will be
attached to. But we have submitted that.
Senator Clinton. That is very good news, and I thank you
for that. Perhaps we could check into that, Mr. Chairman, and
find out if it is not part of the SBA responsibilities under
the Stafford Act, that wherever that authority resides we could
perhaps help to expedite that so that more companies will be
able to take advantage. I greatly appreciate your sensitivity
to the difference in size issues in New York.
I also want to thank both Mr. Brown and Dr. Sampson for
your understanding of the particular issue that we are
confronting, which is trying to allow direct payments to
private businesses so that, as Dr. Sampson reported from his
meetings with a lot of our business leaders, they can get back
on their feet more quickly. I was with Director Daniels earlier
and appreciate his announcement of what the Administration is
trying to do through CDBG. I hope though that we will continue
to work together to try to figure out how to get this done
right in the next several weeks.
There are some real problems with moving through CDBG. We
have tried CDBG in the past with direct payments in other
disasters like Oklahoma City. It is my understanding that there
was a lot of bureaucracy, it took a year, the agency that
administers it, HUD, is not used to this kind of expeditious
necessity that grows out of a disaster. I think that we could
perhaps slightly structure it differently or look for ways of
getting the money out more quickly. I know that both Senator
Schumer and Congressman Walsh, because of their committees of
jurisdiction, will be working with the Administration to try to
determine how best to do that.
I think I would like to offer, we keep looking for the best
way to achieve this, that finally, after looking through many
different options, we concluded that the Cerro Grande model
would be particularly helpful. I would appreciate both of you
responding to that.
Mr. Brown. Well, the Cerro Grande model has, as you know,
been an incredibly good model. It has been proven to work. We
got the money on the ground very quickly, very efficiently. I
hope GAO agrees with us in the future that we did it
appropriately, but I think we did it efficiently and quickly.
There are some differences, though. I do not want this to
sound crass or inappropriate, but in Cerro Grande it was a
federally-caused disaster and here we have a terrorist caused
disaster. While that should not impact our decision to try to
get money on the ground in New York as quickly as possible, the
basis for the models is different in the sense that Cerro
Grande was in response to a federally-caused disaster. That is
just a difference I think we ought to be aware of.
I think there are ways to take the Cerro Grande model and
what we are doing now in Santa Fe and apply that to the
Stafford Act now through maybe some regulatory changes that
would accomplish the same thing without actually creating the
office. In all honesty, Senator, it has come on us so quickly
that we have not really set down and analyzed that. I would
just lay that on the table, that that is something I would like
to do is go back and say to the Director and to our staff is
there some way regulatorily that we can accomplish the same
thing without creating the separate office.
Senator Clinton. I really appreciate that offer, Mr. Brown.
I think we are all trying to get to the same solution.
Mr. Brown. Exactly.
Senator Clinton. We are concerned that the CDBG model has
some built-in problems. One of my Republican colleagues in the
House came up to me after Director Daniels' announcement and
said how are we going to make sure that they do not just run it
through the same old political system that they have had before
where we will never see that money, or at least not in any
expeditious way. So that is our goal, to try to figure out how
to streamline this and maximize the return. One of the
executives who was with us today was representing a city group
and he told us that they are processing about $800 million
worth of private insurance for about 16,000 businesses. He says
the vast majority of those businesses, even with their
insurance proceeds, are not going to keep their doors open.
They just cannot figure out how to make it an economic go under
the circumstances.
If they could get some bridge help through grants like
this, and if we get through with the crime scene problems which
are such an impediment--and I keep mentioning that because I
have been to lots of disasters, Senator Lott was with us and he
said that he and I having had experience in tornado alley were
well aware of disasters, but this is a massive disaster with
the lay over of the crime scene and businesses cannot get
customers. So we are just struggling for creative answers.
I appreciate greatly the distinction that others have drawn
between the Cerro Grande model. Saying that the Federal
Government had caused that fire, I mentioned that to some of my
businesses executives. I said, you know, the difference is that
the Federal Government caused the fires, and this gentleman
said, ``Well, does that mean if Mohammed Atta had been a
Federal employee we would get the claims office?'' It is a very
chilling kind of question.
We need the money now however we can get it out. One of our
problems is the timing. Congress is moving toward adjournment.
If we do not get the authorizing legislation or the regulatory
changes, then the appropriated dollars that will come from the
promised money that the President has stood behind and Director
Daniels again reiterated today, the $20 billion will not be
able to be allocated. So that is the urgency that we face.
So I would like to work with Dr. Sampson and Mr. Brown,
particularly, to see if we cannot come up with a model, through
regulatory or statutory changes, through this committee or
others, that we can push through.
I also wanted to ask, Mr. Brown, when you said that you
have agreed to the 13 additional weeks on unemployment
insurance, is that in addition to the 13 weeks that have
already been declared, so that we would have a total of a 26
week extension now?
Mr. Brown. That was my understanding that it is now a full
26 week extension.
Senator Clinton. Would this only apply when your other
criterion is met, a 30 percent increase in the unemployment
rate since September 11?
Mr. Brown. I am not aware of that. Let me ask some of the
experts if we know that answer. We are not familiar with that.
We will find out, Senator, and let you know.
Senator Clinton. Because we know that we have already gone
up from 5 percent to 6.3 percent. I think the 13 weeks is great
and welcome news. We are still of the opinion that we need an
additional 26 weeks on top of that. But we are going to work
with you on that, and I am very grateful for your support.
I also appreciate your reviewing of the health tracking
legislation because I am very concerned about our World Trade
Center cough. We are worried that the men on the pile are
injuring their health while they try to continue to do the work
we are requiring to be done. So we need to work that out as
well.
But I appreciate greatly the extraordinary cooperation. If
we can have a sense of urgency to try to figure out what
regulatory and statutory changes we need, we then can get into
this process the sort of authority that is required.
Dr. Sampson, did you want to add to that?
Mr. Sampson. Yes, Senator. I concur and am very sensitive
to your concern about delivering funds through the same
mechanisms that may delay. I think there are some very
intriguing models that we became aware of in visiting in New
York with New York's business leaders. I think one of the
opportunities through the CDBG program is perhaps creatively to
channel some of those funds through pre-existing business-based
organizations that have a protocol in place to assist these
businesses, that have a very extensive volunteer network based
on a workforce that is being provided by all the banks in the
area to assist these small businesses. So I think there are
some creative ways to be able to get that money delivered much
more quickly than perhaps traditionally is done.
Senator Clinton. That would be great, because the Downtown
Business Association, which I think was represented at your
meeting, is a very competent organization.
Mr. Sampson. Yes, ma'am.
Senator Clinton. If we could by-pass the usual bureaucracy,
which, frankly, has a different set of criteria--they usually
work with low- and medium-income people, predominantly low-
income people in different settings than what we are facing
now--if we can get that money out and get it to some of our
voluntary associations who know how to run lean and effective
programs, that would be a big help.
Mr. Sampson. I think that is very promising. We would be
happy to work with you to explore that.
Senator Jeffords. Thank you.
Senator Corzine.
Senator Corzine. Thank you. Let me once again compliment
all of your agencies for I think outstanding work in a time of
crisis for our country. So if the questions do not match those
words, I think that is the primary message that I want to get
across.
[Laughter.]
Senator Corzine. There are occasionally things that I think
we can learn from some of the issues. Let me start with Mr.
Brown. The New Jersey senatorial delegation has a call in to
the Director to try to set up just the meeting that you are
talking about. It is not because there has not been
cooperation, it is just that enough time has gone by that we
know the things that we need to work on.
Mr. Brown. Senator, let me just say that the Director is
going to be out of pocket for probably another 5 to 7 days for
a personal health matter. So I would just suggest that perhaps
your staff get hold of the Director's office again and let us
get that set up immediately. Let us not waste any more time.
Senator Corzine. Most of the issues that evolve from New
Jersey are right from the centerpiece of major disaster
declaration versus emergency declaration. I think there is an
important issue here that goes to the heart of the Stafford
Act. It may be hard to actually designate New Jersey, even
though it has enormous loss of life and real impact, within the
context because it does not meet some detailed definition or
standards. By any normal human standards, the kind of loss of
life you would think would lead to reactions that are similar
to any other area and it just happens to be that we have a
river running between the two States. We call them the New York
Giants but they play in the Meadowlands. That is really
symbolic of what the nature of the neighborhood is.
I think that there are a number of things within the
Stafford Act, starting with how you deal with the declarations,
that end up dictating terms. This is certainly one that I want
to talk about specifically as it relates to a number of issues
that flow specifically from that. I will not tie up the
committee with respect to those, but they are really quite
serious in application.
I would mention one which I think also relates to New York,
and that is the issue of straight time versus overtime
repayment. A number of the emergency personnel and police
forces, it is how resources are allocated that sometimes is the
issue, not whether there is overtime payment actually going on
with respect to law enforcement and other facilities. I
forewarn you that it will be at the second or third point of a
meeting. But I think it is equally true for New York City and
New York State, New Jersey, and a number of people that are
involved in anthrax situations and others with regard to needs
that I think need to be addressed within the context of FEMA
reimbursements. I think it is actually quite a significant
issue.
I listened to the conversation. I think it was you, Dr.
Sampson, who said there were 5,000 businesses south of Canal
Street, 4,000 of them small businesses. I think it is
remarkable, Mr. Mitchell, that we have 1,000 loans out and $82
million. But there is a disconnect with 4,000 businesses and
1,000 loans for small businesses when undoubtedly the need is
really quite great. While I do not have as much information on
this as I do on some of the hurricanes that have come along,
this is a cumbersome process, not because anybody intends it to
be but because it is.
I think within the context of the FEMA response in disaster
areas we need to expedite this process. While I like some of
these models, I am of the ``keep it simple, stupid'' stage with
regard to how we deal with getting money into pockets of people
who do not have business interruption insurance, do not have
the sophistication to deal with a lot of the applications or
even interfacing with Citicorp to try to get some of these
loans. I think that there is real need for examining the
Stafford Act within these contexts. I wish I were smart enough
to tell you all of the ways that should be done. I do not think
it is ill will on anybody's part. I think it is just a very
complicated process.
I compliment EPA for the creativity of tapping the
Superfund site to get money into certain pockets that would not
naturally tie. I certainly would encourage that with regard to
Small Business in lower Manhattan. I would like you to think
about the west side of the river as well. But these are
desperate times for those companies and time is their enemy as
much as the issue with respect to access to loans. I think
actually grants are more appropriate since it is a national
disaster and not something that anyone could have legitimately
planned for.
I would say also, Mr. Chairman, if we took a tour of EPA's
testing facility in Edison, we would find that it is in a 1942
barracks refitted for laboratories. There are more trailers
than there are buildings. If we expect our people to do timely
and adequate work, I think we have a real obligation to
understand what it is we are investing in the facilities to be
able to generate the kind of response that I think we need. I
would encourage, whether it is formal or informal, a review of
how this is all put together. People have done an outstanding
job at EPA to do what they have done.
I think I am going to stop there. There is so much to learn
and so much that I think we need to do, but time really is an
enemy of recovery because a lot of people will lose their
ability if not their will to survive in these times. I look
forward to working with the chairman on a number of these
issues and making sure that we replenish the Superfund since
New Jersey has 115 Superfund sites.
[Laughter.]
Ms. Horinko. We are more than pleased, Senator Corzine, Mr.
Chairman and Senator Carper, to come up and brief you on what
we are doing and some of the challenges that we face.
Senator Jeffords. We appreciate that.
I waited for my questions till last because I had a rather
long list and I let the Senators from the area go first. But if
you want to have a comment now, Senator Carper, I would be
happy to accommodate you.
OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. THOMAS R. CARPER, U.S. SENATOR FROM
THE STATE OF DELAWARE
Senator Carper. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. I will
not be long. I do not watch much TV but every now and then I
catch a commercial that I especially enjoy. I had the news on
this morning and there was a commercial that had a band that
sort of looked like the rock group KISS in concert. After the
show, they were backstage and this guy walks in and says ``I
smell world tour. I'm going to take you guys and make a fortune
going around the world.'' Then they start taking off their
costumes and they are not KISS at all, they are some other
group. The guy says, ``Who are you guys?'' and one of the
fellows says, ``I am nobody special but I did stay in a Holiday
Inn last night.''
[Laughter.]
Senator Carper. It reminded me of another similar
commercial for the same company. The situation was a nuclear
power plant and the place was just about to have meltdown and
the alarms were going off. This one guy just kind of takes
charge right in the middle of everybody. He is sitting there
eating a jelly donut and telling everybody what to do, what to
shut down and so on. After he gets everything under control,
everybody turns around and says ``Who are you?'' He says,
``Well I am nobody special but I did stay at a Holiday Inn last
night.''
So this is a question involving nuclear power, not jelly
donuts, not KISS, but nuclear power. What if the terrorists
strike one of our nuclear power plants and the guy that was in
that commercial is not around or nobody there stayed at the
Holiday Inn last night? How do we react and how do we make sure
that the terrorist attack does not somehow spill over and cause
the kind of calamity that we all know that it could? Just put
us at ease, Mr. Meserve, if you will, and tell us how we are
preparing for that eventuality.
Mr. Meserve. Let me say that I think it is very easy for
people to have a lot of dramatization about nuclear power
plants. Fortunately, the reality is quite different. Before
September 11, we had in place a very serious capability at
nuclear power plants to provide security. That includes
basically a perimeter defense system, detection systems for
intruders, heavily-armed response forces that are also well
trained, defensive positions that are within the facility that
are armored in order to be able to respond to various kinds of
attacks, and, of course, a whole defensive strategy. We inspect
the facilities to verify that the facilities have the capacity
to be able to defend themselves against what we call the design
basis threat, which is the regulatory obligation that every
power plant have a capacity and demonstrate the capacity to
defend against certain kinds of attacks.
Since September 11, we have required that all of our power
plants go onto a heightened security status, the details of
what that has meant you will appreciate are ones that we are
not advertising and do not advertise publicly. It is classified
information.
Senator Carper. We do not want to know.
Mr. Meserve. That basically involves an enhancement of the
kinds of things that I have described as part of the
capability--increased number of guards, increased weapons,
increased patrols and control posts.
I have also communicated after September 11 with the
Governors of 40 States to make sure that those States were
aware of the nature of the defenses at the facilities and aware
of the limitations of those defenses in the event some
extraordinary attack were marshalled, that there would be State
assets that could be provided. As a result of that, at most of
the sites today there is assistance being provided, at the
perimeter of the facilities typically, by local law
enforcement, by State police, and by National Guard.
We have also had extensive interaction with other agencies
of the Government, including the military, to ensure that there
is an awareness of the limitations of the defenses at the
facilities and the need perhaps under some circumstances for
Federal assets to be provided. So there is an awareness
throughout the Government of these plants and what they can and
cannot do.
I think we have taken every reasonable and prudent action
to assure that the nuclear power plants are capable of
defending themselves against the circumstances in which we now
find ourselves.
Senator Carper. Good. One follow up on that, Mr. Chairman,
if you do not mind. The law which deals with the insurance,
Price Anderson, which I believe is up for reauthorization this
year----
Mr. Meserve. That is correct.
Senator Carper. How is the need for reauthorization of
Price Anderson affected, if at all, by the kind of threat that
our nuclear power plants might be under?
Mr. Meserve. Well, the Price Anderson Act covers a large
number of different kinds of facilities including Department of
Energy facilities. With regard to the existing nuclear power
plants, the Price Anderson protections will continue on even if
the Price Anderson Act itself terminates. So with regard to
existing power plants, there is no effect on the liability and
protection scheme that is established by that statute. If there
were to be new construction, the failure to have a Price
Anderson Act would mean that the new plants would not have the
benefit of that statutory system. So if it were nuclear power
plants, there would be a need for reauthorization. There is
also a need for reauthorization in light of the Department of
Energy facilities. But the demand is not there because of a
pressing need for existing power plants.
Senator Carper. Are there some proposals that have come to
your attention to build some new nuclear power plants in the
next couple of years, or at least to start that process?
Mr. Meserve. There is serious evaluation that is underway
by the generating companies about the prospect of new
construction. No one has come to us and said that they
assuredly will file an application. But this is an area in
which there is interest. The reason is really I think quite
simple to see, is that the existing nuclear power plants have
established really quite an extraordinary record of both
economic performance and safety performance over the last
couple of decades, steadily improving performance. One of the
consequences of that is that the production costs for nuclear
power plants are such that they are now the cheapest form of
electricity on average that is on the grid today. So that has
meant that if you are a generating company you are interested
in those types of assets.
Senator Carper. OK. Thanks very much. Mr. Chairman, thanks
for letting me go ahead of you.
Senator Jeffords. Thank you.
Senator Carper. Hopefully inject a little humor into this
serious deliberation.
Senator Jeffords. Thank you. It is always a pleasure to
have you with us.
Ms. Horinko, have there been any studies pertaining to the
health effects of human exposure to chlorine dioxide gas? I
have staffers who are pregnant and staffers who suffer from
asthma who work in the Dirksen Building which joins Hart. Can
you assure me that their health will not be compromised by
these remediation activities?
Ms. Horinko. Mr. Chairman, that is a common question that
we are hearing from folks on the Hill whom we are briefing on
our proposed remediation plan for the Hart Building. A couple
things I would like to say to put their minds at rest about our
plan.
Senator Jeffords. That is why I am asking it.
Ms. Horinko. Absolutely. Very valid concerns. First of all,
the actual chlorine dioxide gas itself will only be present in
the building during very limited times during which we have the
building sealed off and access to the Dirksen Building sealed
off. The Dirksen Building itself will be empty during that
period. So there will be no human exposure to the chlorine
dioxide gas during the period in which we propose to remediate
the building. The gas itself decomposes relatively quickly. In
fact, it will be a challenge to us to make sure that we keep it
active long enough at levels that are appropriate to remediate
the anthrax spores. Then we will scrub the building and make
sure that it is completely safe, both from the standpoint of no
gas being present and also no spores being present, before
anyone is allowed back in the building.
The gas itself decomposes to relatively harmless salts. In
fact, it is commonly used today in a number of commercial
settings such as sanitizing bakeries or dairies or other
places, used on computer equipment, on many household products
and food products. In fact, we are exposed to this pretty
ubiquitously in the environment because it is used so commonly
today.
My staff is telling me that in fact, by virtue of having
run this gas through the HVAC system in the Hart Building,
whatever spores or mold or bacteria was in the HVAC system will
actually be remediated, so anyone who has asthma will probably
be in better health as a result of our fumigating the building
than they would be if we had not.
So we will work to get our scientific data up to you all so
that you can see that this is a very safe and effective product
and that they will not suffer any ill effects as a result of
the residual impacts of this technology.
Senator Jeffords. Thank you for that answer. I have never
been through an experience like this, I do not think any of us
have, where we are in the midst of the exposed areas. There is
a great deal of anxiety created in our staffs in particular. So
that is very helpful.
Back to the power plants. It is good to see you again.
Mr. Meserve. Nice to see you, Mr. Chairman.
Senator Jeffords. I understand that the FAA has established
a no-fly zone of sorts around a nuclear power plant. This no-
fly zone applies only to noncommercial aviation and expires
November 7. Additionally, there seems to be a question of how
this no-fly zone can be enforced. This is a concern to my State
where reports of an unidentified plane flying close to the
Vermont Yankee plant on September 13 have never been fully
explained and obviously caused some anxiety. In your opinion,
what is the advisability of providing greater protection for
air space around nuclear plants? Do you have any suggestions on
ways that this might be accomplished, and is there anything we
need to do to help you?
Mr. Meserve. This is a difficult issue. Immediately in the
aftermath of the September 11 event, we started our discussions
with the FAA and with the military about the possibility of
another aircraft attack. There has been for some time something
that is called a notice to airmen that is issued by the Federal
Aviation Administration that requests pilots not to fly over or
in the vicinity of nuclear power plants and other similar
facilities, not just nuclear power plants but other
infrastructure of a similar kind, chemical plants and the like.
We did see a reduction in the number of fly overs as a result
of that notice but they were not eliminated.
We established a protocol with the FAA so that if there
were a fly over our licensees were to do their best as they
could to observe the tail number on the aircraft, communicate
that to the FAA, to us, and to the military in order that there
could be a follow up activity to pursue the reason for that fly
over and to discourage any further fly overs. We were not
always successful of course in identifying the aircraft, nor
when there were police or military efforts to intervene did
they always find the aircraft that had exited the region by the
time they got there.
As a result of the intelligence that led to the
announcement by Attorney General Ashcroft the other day, there
was a decision to establish no-fly zones for general aviation
aircraft over 70 sites licensed by the NRC and 16 or 17 sites
that are under the control of the Department of Energy. That
was as a result of a discussion that not only involved the NRC
but the Office of Homeland Security, the military, FAA, and
other agencies with interest in the matter. It is a balance
between the disruption of civilian usage of the airspace and
the need to provide protection. This is a limitation that is
going to expire in a week or so as this current threat is
understood to diminish.
It is my view that this is an issue that you have
commercial issues that have to be evaluated in terms of the
impact on the usage of airspace by general aviation aircraft,
some of which are of course commercial, not for flying
passengers but business travel and for freight and the like.
There is a question of the military response in that there is
little point to establish a no-fly zone if there is not some
way to enforce it. So you have an issue about the deployment of
your defensive assets that have to be resolved. So I think this
is a complicated issue that involves interests that go well
beyond just the NRC's. It involves the interests of a variety
of other agencies.
Senator Jeffords. It obviously does. So I do not know
whether any legislation is needed or whatever, but I am sure
you will let me know. This committee has a responsibility over
the plants in the sense of security, so we want to work with
you and make sure that you have whatever authority you feel is
appropriate.
Mr. Meserve. Thank you very much, Senator.
Senator Jeffords. Mr. Moravec, last week I met with you and
GSA and Administrator Steven Perry. In that meeting we
discussed the Federal buildings security and you told me that
one of the biggest obstacles facing your agency is the
retention of security personnel. Because of the differences in
pay grades between GSA and other Federal law enforcement
agencies, you told me that your agency experiences a tremendous
amount of turnover with your Federal security personnel. Can
you discuss what needs to be done to help your service attract
and retain trained law enforcement personnel and what kind of
legislation, if any, you need to help you?
Mr. Moravec. Thank you, Senator. This is a point of
vulnerability for the Federal Protective Service. Particularly
lately, with the high state of alert that we have been forced
to maintain at all Federal facilities, it has thrown into high
relief the pressure our manpower is under. We have determined
that we need not only to keep the manpower that we have, the
Federal law enforcement and security officers that we have, but
probably to increase that force. We are being forced to run 12-
hour shifts and that is putting a lot of pressure on them.
Frankly, we are stretched pretty thin.
The Federal Protective Service uniformed personnel are at a
disadvantage relative to other Federal police forces in terms
of the pay scale that they are entitled to and also in terms of
the benefits package which they are entitled to upon
retirement. That has proven to be a challenge for us in terms
of retaining people. We are also, of course, subject to people
being called up by the National Guard which is putting pressure
on it. There is really not very much we can do about that. The
principal concern is losing our people to other Federal
services. For example, the air marshals right now are offering
a $25,000 signing bonuses for qualified law enforcement and
security personnel and that is awfully tempting for some of our
people.
Senator Jeffords. Have you seen a number looking into that,
is that what you are telling me?
Mr. Moravec. Have we seen----
Senator Jeffords. A number of your employees looking to go?
Mr. Moravec. Yes. In fact, just last week we lost two of
our most highly qualified people in the national capital
region, people that we could ill afford to lose. We are
concerned that that could be a continuing challenge for us.
Senator Jeffords. How do you go about approaching a
solution? Do you have to come to us?
Mr. Moravec. Well, a certain amount of relief I think can
be orchestrated through work with the Office of Personnel
Management. But it is my understanding that legislative relief
would be required to change particularly the benefits package
which we are able to offer these people.
Senator Jeffords. Well I feel for you. So if we can be of
help, let us know.
Mr. Moravec. Thank you very much, Senator.
Senator Jeffords. Mr. Brown, on October 16 this committee
held a hearing to discuss FEMA's response to the events of
September 11. During a discussion with the emergency response
personnel at that hearing the emergency responders suggested
the need for a dedicated national communications system for
emergency responders to better coordinate and respond to
disasters. Listening to that, I could easily understand. We
have a hodgepodge of communications systems and trying to
connect them up in a disaster is not an easy thing. Crews from
Maryland and Virginia responding to the Pentagon disaster were
at times unable to communicate with each other because they
were using different radio frequencies, etc. What is the
solution?
Mr. Brown. The solution, Mr. Chairman, is to do the study,
get some money, and fix it. It is very simple. The solution
itself is not going to be simple, getting there is. We have to
identify how we are going to use those different broadbands,
get those dedicated to us, get the money, and have a national
system.
Senator Jeffords. OK. What about the digital spectrum, do
you need access to that?
Mr. Brown. Yes, we will.
Senator Jeffords. So, again, you need----
Mr. Brown. Although I have heard, and I will have to get
back to you on this, I have heard that actually we have more
problems utilizing the digital spectrum than we would an analog
and that actually analog in terms of disasters may be more
beneficial to us.
Senator Jeffords. OK. Please keep me advised.
Mr. Brown. We will do that.
Senator Jeffords. If you need any help----
Mr. Brown. We need your help in that area.
Senator Jeffords. All right. We are here to help.
Mr. Brown. Good.
Senator Jeffords. Dr. Sampson, since 1992 the EDA has
received over $600 million in supplementary appropriations to
deal with the aftermath of major disasters. Can you explain the
disaster grant process and the role EDA plays in post-grant
oversight, and how can the agency put this experience to use to
aid the people of New York?
Mr. Sampson. The EDA has primarily three sets of tools to
use in disaster response grants. First, our technical
assistance and planning grants; second, capitalization of
revolving loan funds that can be used where appropriate for
financing that is not available on the market; and the third
primary tool is through public works grants.
As we discussed, the circumstances in New York and the
needs of those businesses are somewhat unique to many of the
other disasters that we have been involved in. I think the
major lessons that we have learned from working with those
disasters over the past really many number of years is that the
fundamentals of economic recovery do not change after the
disaster. Economic development stays basically operating
through several principles. Before businesses will reinvest,
there has to be a likely outcome that they are going to get a
return on that investment, and I think Senator Corzine referred
to that basic principle.
Second, the effort needs to be thorough, comprehensive, and
coordinated. I think we have learned that we need to carefully
scope the problem and then apply the right resources. That is
the approach the Administration is trying to take right now by
identifying the appropriate Federal resources to bring to bear.
One of the major lessons is there is a need for streamline
delivery of those services. I think Senator Clinton already
identified the importance of that.
The role that EDA has consistently played is as a partner
to those lead agencies that are here at this table--FEMA, SBA,
Department of Transportation, HUD. We are happy to bring those
lessons to bear and assist our partner agencies in dealing with
this disaster as well.
Senator Jeffords. Thank you.
Mr. Meserve, I understand that the NRC has been in close
contact with the Governors and the Federal intelligence and
enforcement agencies as well as the military. Have these
discussions dealt with evacuation plans should an emergency
occur? Do all nuclear power plants have in place clear
procedures for notifying and coordinating with local and
Federal disaster response personnel? Would local police,
firefighters, and government officials know what to do, how to
coordinate, and what roads should be opened and closed, etc.?
People like reassurance on this, as you understand.
Mr. Meserve. I appreciate the question. In the post-
September 11 environment, our discussions have principally
focused on whether a threat exists and assuring that there is
appropriate defensive capability to be able to respond to any
threat.
We do have as part of our normal regulatory process a
requirement that every nuclear power plant have an emergency
plan and that would cover events of all types. The NRC's focus
is on the onsite portion of it and we work with our colleagues
at FEMA and with the State emergency response agencies with
regard to the offsite portions of it. Those plans are required
to be updated whenever there is a significant change. Like a
road were to close or what have you, then the plan would have
to be adapted. We require in any event that those plans be
reevaluated every 2 years. At every site we have every 2 years
a full exercise--that means not only the NRC portion, the
onsite portion of the plan, but also involving the FEMA assets
and the State and local assets--in order to attest the capacity
of the plans to be able to respond to events. So this is
something that is part of our normal emergency planning at the
nuclear power plants and is subject to continuing review to
assure that the emergency plans are adequate.
Ms. Horinko. Mr. Chairman, if I might add, our----
Senator Jeffords. I was going to ask you a question, too,
so go right ahead.
Ms. Horinko. I was going to say that in addition to our lab
at Edison, New Jersey, that Senator Corzine mentioned he
believes is sadly in need of upgrading, we have a fine team of
radiological emergency responders who are specialized and can
assist our on-scene coordinators, our network of EPA teams that
respond to chemical and oil spills and also are responding to
the anthrax. So our folks are also trained to respond to
nuclear incidents and can help out in these situations.
Senator Jeffords. Thank you both. I will follow up with my
question to you, Ms. Horinko. In your testimony, you state that
the anthrax remediation and World Trade Center cleanup efforts
may be depleting the Superfund trust fund. I am very concerned
about depleting the Superfund, but we obviously need to provide
for anthrax cleanup as well. Are you certain that if there is
another terrorist event the EPA will have money readily
available to respond? In light of this, are you certain that
you have adequate resources to continue your current pace of
cleanup at the Superfund sites?
Ms. Horinko. Mr. Chairman, that is a very important
question and, frankly, we are at a point now where we are going
to be taking a very hard look at our portfolio of sites. Thus
far, we have been able to respond using our existing emergency
funding authority under the Superfund law and deploy our
resources. But it looks like we are in this for the long haul.
I will be meeting with my regional Superfund division directors
next week and we are going to take a very careful look at the
portfolio of sites that we must address this year and figure
out what we can and cannot do. I will be pleased to follow up
with you and your staff after that meeting and figure out what
we need to do the job properly.
Senator Jeffords. I appreciate that. We did not think about
these kind of things when we were creating the Superfund, and
yet it certainly fits in that kind of a situation.
Ms. Horinko. I will say that our existing system is
responding very well and I am proud of the work that our folks
are doing in the field.
Senator Jeffords. Mr. Mitchell, thank you for your help. I
do not have a question for you. Senator Clinton cleared up that
area. So I just want to thank you for sharing with us your
experiences.
Thank you all. We also reserve the right to question any of
you that we feel like by writing after you leave, so do not get
too rested.
[Laughter.]
Senator Jeffords. Thank you all.
[Whereupon, at 3:55 p.m., the committee was adjourned, to
reconvene at the call of the chair.
[Additional materials submitted for the record follow.]
Statement of Michael D. Brown, Acting Deputy Director, Federal
Emergency Management Agency
Good afternoon, Chairman Jeffords and Committee members. I am
Michael D. Brown, the General Counsel and Acting Deputy Director of the
Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA), and I am pleased to testify
today about several draft bills that are being considered in the
aftermath of the World Trade Center attack.
One bill would require the Director of FEMA, in coordination with
the Federal Communications Commission and the Department of Defense, to
conduct a study to determine the resources that are needed to develop
an effective communications system for the use of emergency response
personnel during disasters. We have no objection to the concept of
performing such a study, but note that allocating resources to this
effort would have an impact on our operating budget.
Another bill under consideration would establish within FEMA an
Office of World Trade Center Attack Claims to reimburse individuals and
businesses that were injured by the World Trade Center attack on
September 11.
Several other bills under consideration would amend the Stafford
Act to: (1) authorize the President to conduct studies relating to
protection of the health and safety of emergency responders in the
aftermath of disasters where harmful substances have been released into
the disaster area; (2) direct the President to appoint Children's
Coordinating Officers following disasters where children have lost one
or more custodial parents; and (3) extend from 26 weeks to a year the
availability of disaster unemployment assistance for individuals who
are already eligible for this assistance under the Stafford Act. In
addition, FEMA was asked informally to address whether there is a need
for new legislation involving housing repairs relating to the September
11 attack.
The draft legislation to establish a World Trade Center claims
office within FEMA would require the Director of FEMA or an independent
claims manager who would be appointed by the Director to reimburse
claimants, including individuals and businesses that live or maintain
businesses in the area around the attack site, for losses suffered as a
result of the World Trade Center attack. The bill indicates that
claimants could file claims for a variety of different losses,
including property losses, infrastructure damage, business interruption
losses, wages for work not performed, insurance deductibles, temporary
living or relocation expenses, and debris removal costs. The bill also
requires FEMA to deduct from any claim payments the amounts that
claimants received from insurance recoveries and disaster assistance
payments provided by FEMA, other Federal agencies, State or local
governments, charities, or non-profit organizations. Initially $2
billion would be authorized to be appropriated to implement the
legislation--$1,925,000,000 to pay claims, and $75,000,000 to cover the
costs of administering the program.
As you are aware, the Stafford Act already contains a broad range
of authorities that were triggered by the President's major disaster
declaration. We have provided temporary housing assistance to address
the housing-related needs of victims of the attacks. FEMA is also
providing funding to cover 100 percent of the costs of performing
debris removal at the site of the attack. In addition, we are providing
assistance to repair and replace all publicly owned and certain
nonprofit facilities that were damaged or destroyed by the attack.
Nevertheless, it is clear that the draft legislation would cover a
substantially broader range of injuries and losses than FEMA is
authorized to address under the Stafford Act. For example, the Stafford
Act does not authorize FEMA to reimburse disaster victims for business
interruption losses, wages for work not performed, and business
relocation expenses. In addition, the Stafford Act only authorizes FEMA
to provide assistance to eligible applicants, such as State and local
governments and a limited number of nonprofit organizations. The draft
legislation, on the other hand, would require FEMA to pay claims that
might be submitted by virtually all individuals and businesses that
were injured by the attack.
As you know, Congress recently enacted the Air Transportation
Safety and System Stabilization Act. Title IV of that Act authorizes
the Justice Department to provide compensation to any person, or
relatives of a deceased person, who was injured or killed in the
September 11 airplane crashes. Although the draft legislation that
would create a claims office within FEMA would provide assistance to a
broader range of claimants than is covered by the Air Transportation
Safety and System Stabilization Act, we question whether this is an
appropriate role for FEMA.
While Justice is still developing the regulations of this program,
FEMA is already addressing a substantial percentage of the needs of
individuals who were injured by the attack at the World Trade Center
pursuant to the authorities of the Stafford Act. On the other hand, our
preliminary review of the draft legislation suggests that most of the
claims that would be paid pursuant to the bill would flow to businesses
that were damaged by the attack and that agree to re-establish their
business activities in the area affected by the attack.
FEMA believes that there are already authorities administered by
the Small Business Administration (SBA) that would cover many of the
types of losses that the bill would require FEMA to address. While I
recognize that there are caps on the disaster assistance loans that SBA
is currently authorized to provide, and while I also recognize that
affected businesses would prefer to have access to Federal grants,
rather than loans, we believe it would be preferable to consider
legislation in this situation that would authorize additional
flexibility for existing Federal programs.
Another one of the bills that I was asked to address would amend
the Stafford Act to authorize the President to appoint Children's
Coordinating Officers whenever an emergency or major disaster caused
children to lose one or more custodial parents. The Coordinating
Officers would be responsible for providing support and assistance to
such children to ensure that they were provided with adequate temporary
care services, mental health services, and counseling to address their
long-term needs. As you know, FEMA is already authorized to provide
crisis counseling assistance to disaster victims. We administer this
authority by funding States' costs of administering counseling
services. State applications for crisis counseling funds must address
how services will be provided generally, and in particular to special
populations, such as children.
New York's application already addresses the need to provide
counseling services to children who have been affected by the attack.
According to the New York Office of Mental Health, these activities are
being provided through outreach programs, education, and other existing
services to children who lost a parent in the attack. We are not aware
that this has become an issue which needs to be addressed by amending
the Stafford Act, but we would welcome the opportunity to discuss this
issue with Committee members, as well as representatives of the State,
New York City, and counseling providers to ensure that appropriate
counseling and long-term services are available to all needy children.
Additional needs in this regard would probably best be addressed by
agencies with a traditional role in the provision of such services.
I was also asked to address a draft bill that would amend section
410 of the Stafford Act to extend the availability of Disaster
Unemployment Assistance (DUA) an additional 26 weeks--to a full year--
for individuals who are already eligible for such assistance. As you
may be aware, the DUA program is administered on our behalf by the
Department of Labor, the Federal partner in the Federal-State
unemployment compensation system. The Department of Labor enters into
agreements with the States to administer the DUA program through the
State unemployment compensation systems. Most workers who become
unemployed as a result of Presidentially declared disasters qualify for
unemployment compensation under the regular State programs. Those who
do not may qualify for DUA.
The unemployment claims that have been filed in the aftermath of
the attack are, therefore, being paid under State unemployment
compensation laws and under the DUA provision of the Stafford Act. The
Administration has proposed, as part of the Back-to-Work Relief package
which has been introduced in the Senate by Senator Allen as S. 1532, to
extend unemployment compensation for an additional 13 weeks for
individuals who became unemployed on or after September 11 in States
where a major disaster or emergency was declared as a result of the
attacks and in States where the unemployment rate increases by 30
percent over the pre-September 11 rate. In addition, in light of the
uniqueness of this situation, the Administration would support an
additional 13 weeks of disaster unemployment assistance in those States
where a major disaster was declared due to the September 11 events.
The final draft bill that I was asked to address in this hearing
would amend the Stafford Act to authorize the President to implement a
program to protect the health and safety of emergency response
personnel in the aftermath of disasters which cause harmful substances
to be released. The program would authorize: (1) the provision to
community members and emergency response personnel, including
volunteers, of information about harmful substances; (2) monitoring of
the long-term health impacts of harmful substances; and (3) training in
the use of personal protective equipment for emergency response
personnel. FEMA routinely calls on the Environmental Protection Agency
and the Department of Health and Human Services for expertise in
assessing these types of concerns in the aftermath of disasters. This
system has worked efficiently, and we therefore are not aware of a need
to amend the Stafford Act to address this issue. However, this is an
important issue that may require more time for review within the
Administration.
Finally, the Committee letter mentions a need to amend the Stafford
Act's temporary housing authority to increase the amount of funding
that may be provided to repair owner-occupied housing that is damaged
by major disasters. There is a new provision of the Stafford Act that
will become effective next May that would impose a $5,000 cap on this
form of temporary housing assistance. In previous correspondence we
have asked the Committee to amend this provision, which, when it
becomes effective in May of 2002, will work a severe hardship on
disaster victims with the lowest incomes and the most significant
disaster impacts. This cap was enacted within Public Law 106-390. While
the cap does not affect the response in New York, we continue to urge
the Committee to make this technical amendment before the cap takes
effect next May.
Thank you for this opportunity to testify before you today. I would
be pleased to answer any questions you might have.
Statement of Joseph Moravec, Commissioner, Public Buildings Service
Good morning Mr. Chairman, and members of the Committee. I am
Joseph Moravec, Commissioner of the Public Buildings Service. Thank you
for the opportunity to discuss improving security in GSA-owned and
leased facilities.
In addition to our own initiatives, H.R. 307 was introduced January
30, 2001, to provide for the reform of the Federal Protective Service,
and to enhance the safety of Federal employees, the public and children
enrolled in childcare facilities located in facilities under GSA
control.
Former PBS Commissioner Robert Peck addressed H.R. 809, the
predecessor to H.R. 307, on September 28, 2000 during a hearing in the
House Subcommittee on Economic Development, Public Buildings and
Emergency Management. A significant proposal in H.R. 809, the
establishment of the FPS as a separate service from the PBS, did not
have support from GSA nor the Senate. The principal reason we at GSA
continue to oppose H.R. 307's proposal to make FPS a separate service
within our Agency is that it would divorce security from other Federal
facility functions when the opposite needs to be done. Security needs
to be tightly integrated into decisions about the location, design and
operation of Federal facilities. Divorcing FPS would create an
organizational barrier between protection experts and the PBS asset
managers, planners, project managers and facility managers who set PBS
budgets and policies for our inventory as a whole and who oversee the
daily operations in our facilities.
The security we provide is financed out of rent revenues collected
by PBS from our tenants who look directly to PBS for responses to their
security needs. A separate GSA security service would lead to confusion
about who is responsible for what in GSA's security efforts. It is also
contrary to agency efforts to present our customers with a seamless
GSA, capable of offering more integrated workplace solutions.
Following the September 2000 testimony by Commissioner Peck, the
Senate Transportation and Infrastructure Subcommittee recommended the
establishment of direct line authority within PBS. The Administrator
subsequently approved and issued GSA Orders ADM 5440.548 and ADM
5450.137, effective November 17, 2000, that reorganized the FPS and
reassigned the reporting authority of FPS Regional Directors from the
PBS Assistant Regional Administrators to the FPS Assistant Commissioner
in the Central Office.
Under direct line authority, PBS has made substantial strides in
fulfilling our mission to reduce the threat to Federal facilities under
GSA control nationwide. The FPS budget, personnel actions and
operational focus have been centralized to yield results better than
that which could be obtained by establishing a separate competing
service. All FPS Regional Directors now report to the FPS Assistant
Commissioner in the Central Office. The FPS Assistant Commissioner
reports to the PBS Commissioner who reports to the Administrator.
Leading the Federal Protective Service is Acting Assistant
Commissioner Richard Yamamoto. Mr. Yamamoto is a graduate of the FBI
National Academy with over 20 years law enforcement experience in the
U.S. Army. He also spent 7 years coordinating joint Federal, State, and
local law enforcement activities through the High Intensity Drug
Trafficking Areas (HIDTA) Program at the Office of National Drug
Control Policy.
Mr. Yamamoto exemplifies the core competencies we desire of all our
operational management personnel within FPS. Not only does Mr. Yamamoto
possess extensive law enforcement and security skills, he also has been
designated as a certified protection professional--one of the premier
accomplishments in the field of security. Within FPS, we are developing
and requiring both law enforcement and security core competencies for
all of our operational managers. While many of our current managers
have Federal, military or local police training and experience, those
who do not have law enforcement training will be sent to the Leadership
Academy Law Enforcement Course at the Federal Law Enforcement Training
Center (FLETC) in Glynco, GA, to attain these necessary skills. This
course provides the same essential core elements of the courses taught
in the FPS Mixed Basic Police Training Program with identical
examinations and standards including the full firearm qualification
course and test.
Specifically addressing the proposal in H.R. 307 that there be at
least 730 full-time equivalent FPS Police Officers, we believe that FTE
levels should be based not on an arbitrary number set forth in
legislation, but rather on the threat that may vary from time to time.
FPS regularly conducts individual facility security surveys and
Regional Threat Assessments to determine the threat to Federal
facilities. FTE requirements are based upon these threat assessments.
Currently, our planning anticipates that current levels should be
adjusted for Fiscal Year 2002 and Fiscal Year 2003 to enable FPS to
achieve a more desirable mix of operational personnel. The Fiscal Year
2003 FTE targets have been constructed to support an anticipated need
for 408 Federal Protective Police Officers and 323 Law Enforcement and
Security Officers, for a total of 731 uniformed positions.
Specifically, we are increasing the number of our criminal
investigators and uniformed Law Enforcement Security Officers (LESO)
who have both law enforcement and security competencies.
FPS has made great strides in reducing the threat to Federal
facilities, tenants, visitors and their property. We are actively
implementing many initiatives to identify and decrease threats through
individual facility security assessments and the Regional Threat
Assessment Program. Relying on this information, we have refined our
requirements, coordinated more effectively with other law enforcement
agencies, improved our training, and positioned ourselves to measure
our expected outcome of reducing the threat.
We at GSA have no more important responsibility than providing for
the security of the tenants and visitors in our facilities and are
continually striving to enhance our protection services. I thank the
Committee for this opportunity to discuss our promising new security
initiatives at GSA facilities. This concludes my prepared statement. I
am pleased to answer any questions you should have.
__________
Statement of David A. Sampson, Assistant Secretary of Economic
Development, U.S. Department of Commerce
Chairman Jeffords, Senator Smith, Members of the Committee: Thank
you for this opportunity to appear before the Environment and Public
Works Committee regarding the Economic Development Administration's
(EDA) role in the economic revitalization of New York City. I have a
longer prepared statement; with your permission, I ask that it be
inserted into the record.
One week ago today Deputy Secretary of Commerce Samuel Bodman,
Lloyd Blanchard (Office of Management and Budget Associate Director
General Government Programs), Doug Holtz-Eakin (Chief Economist of the
President's Council of Economic Advisors), and I toured the World Trade
Center site and met with leading members of New York City's business
community. As you know, Ground Zero is quite literally beyond
comprehension or description. But equally moving was the sight of
thousands of New Yorkers who were lined up outside Madison Square
Garden to participate in a job fair for displaced workers.
The Administration, the Department of Commerce, and the Economic
Development Administration are committed to the economic revitalization
of New York. As you are aware, the Administration is providing
considerable funding for efforts that are underway to promote the
City's recovery and economic revitalization. In this context this means
we are developing a multi-prong approach at getting people back to work
and businesses, both large and small, back on their feet.
eda administration of disaster assistance
The Economic Development Administration (EDA) has contributed to
previous disaster response efforts and has the statutory authority to
assist communities in long-term economic recovery efforts. EDA has
participated in over 20 major disaster adjustment efforts since
Hurricane Camille in 1969, and has received in excess of $600 million
in supplemental appropriations to deal with disasters since 1992.
Appendix A illustrates EDA's supplemental disaster appropriations. This
funding has supplemented the lead roles assigned to the Federal
Emergency Management Agency (FEMA), the Small Business Administration
(SBA), and other agencies, including the Department of Transportation
(DOT) and the Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD). EDA
has limited ability to respond without a supplemental appropriation.
Under existing statutory authority, EDA administers disaster
program funds through targeted grants to disaster-impacted communities
designed to achieve long-term economic recovery.
EDA disaster recovery efforts assist communities in shifting focus
from short-term emergency response to long-term economic impacts of the
disaster, and enabling the development of an economic recovery program
that reflects local priorities.
EDA's disaster response is organized into three phases: (1)
monitoring, (2) mobilization, and (3) program delivery. Each phase has
a triggering event with specific roles and responsibilities for EDA's
divisions. The plan builds upon the basic organizational structure and
is designed to enable EDA to reasonably adapt its resources to be
responsive to the size and scope of the disaster.
Reports of potential disaster situations, such as severe storm
warnings and FEMA advisories, or the occurrence of a sudden
catastrophic disaster such as an earthquake or tornado, trigger the
initial monitoring phase. Activities include monitoring the events and
gathering information critical to positioning EDA to move quickly into
the mobilization phase, if warranted.
A Presidential declaration of a major disaster triggers the
intermediate mobilization phase. Other types of non-Presidential
disaster declarations may also trigger portions of EDA recovery plan
actions.
EDA triggers the final program delivery phase by issuance of a
Disaster Response Guidance Memorandum from EDA headquarters to
appropriate EDA organizational units. Generally, proceeding with the
program delivery phase also assumes that emergency supplemental
appropriations or other funding resources have been identified and
dedicated to EDA's disaster response, recovery, and mitigation
activities.
EDA's discretionary grant implementation for disasters is in
accordance with the prevailing statutory requirements and regulations.
Within the statutory and regulatory framework and subject to any
disaster specific restrictions, EDA uses all available program tools to
implement a timely and appropriate strategic disaster recovery response
to the disaster, consistent with EDA's economic recovery role.
When asked to assist with disaster recovery, EDA has a
comprehensive and flexible set of program tools, including:
Targeted economic recovery planning and technical
assistance grants;
Revolving loan fund grants to address unmet business
financing needs where other financing is insufficient or not available;
and
Infrastructure construction grants to rebuild an
environment attractive to private investment for the re-creation of job
opportunities.
While our program tools are flexible, EDA has a clearly defined
target group of those eligible to receive EDA investment dollars. Those
eligible include State and local governments, public and private
nonprofit organizations, and regional economic development districts.
Businesses are not eligible for direct assistance under EDA's major
programs.
Additionally, FEMA may direct EDA to perform economic impact
evaluations or carry out other specific tasks through special ``mission
assignments.'' Recently, FEMA mission assignments have tasked EDA to
perform economic impact assessments in North Carolina, Virginia and New
Jersey resulting from Hurricane Floyd.
administrative costs
The additional EDA staff and staff administrative costs would
depend greatly on the amount of funds involved and the nature of the
assistance. Since 1994, EDA has received additional funding for
Salaries and Expenses (S&E) to administer emergency supplemental
appropriations. The S&E rate averaged 5 percent of the funds
appropriated, with the expectation that the funds would cover the costs
associated with both grant award and post-approval monitoring for 3 to
5 years.
EDA currently oversees New York City development projects from our
Philadelphia regional office, which is staffed with 35 employees. As
this region consists of more than a dozen States, EDA at this time has
relatively few staff devoted exclusively to New York City development
projects. Were EDA to be assigned a responsibility for a portion of New
York economic revitalization and recovery efforts, we would, as we have
in past disasters, assemble a special disaster response team comprised
of existing headquarters personnel as well as existing personnel from
the six regional economic development offices around the country.
redevelopment strategy
While it is important that the Federal, State, and city governments
move as quickly as possible to address the economic impacts in New York
City, it is also critically important that economic revitalization
efforts be based on a sound understanding of the New York City economic
landscape both pre-September 11 and post-September 11 to ensure that
Federal efforts are truly market-based and phased appropriately in
light of the projected timeline for clearing the World Trade Center
site.
The Administration is committed to taking a thorough,
comprehensive, and coordinated market-based approach in addressing New
York's immediate and long-term economic recovery needs. To this end, we
believe it is vitally important to work not only with State and city
officials, but also with New York's business leaders.
With that in mind, last week we met with New York City business
leaders and the New York City Partnership. This group's leadership
includes CEO's of global businesses headquartered in New York. The New
York City Partnership has commissioned seven of the world's leading
consulting firms (A.T. Kearney, Booz-Allen, Bain, Boston Consulting
Group, KPMG, McKinsey, and PricewaterhouseCoopers) to assess the
economic impact of the World Trade Center attack on New York City and
identify investment priorities for renewal. As I understand from my
briefing, the overall project objectives will be to:
Adopt a base line of New York City economic forecasts
prior to the World Trade Center tragedy;
Assess the economic impacts of the World Trade Center
tragedy on all key industries and sectors of the City economy, both
short-term and long-term;
Understand the economic and fiscal impact on lower
Manhattan and New York City and fiscal impact on New York State; and
Identify priorities to accelerate recovery.
Based on my conversations with New York City business leaders, my
sense is that the most urgent need is to focus on recovery in the
collateral damaged area because Ground Zero cleanup is probably a year
away. The best information I have seen indicates that there are
approximately 5,000 businesses directly affected in New York City at
Ground Zero and the cordoned off areas. Approximately 4,000 of those
are small businesses that employ approximately 77,000 employees. These
are the most vulnerable businesses. Because of the indeterminate extent
of the New York City recovery program, it is evident that loans will
not be an appropriate vehicle in support of these businesses and they
can only be retained by some sort of grant program. The Director of the
Office of Management and Budget, Mitch Daniels, is announcing today the
release of funds from the Emergency Supplemental Appropriation that New
York can use for such grants to businesses.
The Administration is currently providing significant funding to
New York through a variety of agencies. The proposed authorization for
a major grant to provide employment incentives needs more analysis to
ensure the funding of recovery is effective and provides the
infrastructure necessary to move the economic base of New York City
forward. The Administration is looking at a range of existing
government programs for a comprehensive solution. We believe this is a
better systemic approach than locking into a $2 billion appropriation
at EDA.
The Administration is focused on ensuring that economic recovery
funding is effective and truly focused on rebuilding New York City's
economic infrastructure in order to get people back to work and
businesses up and running again. As the Administration and Congress
make these decisions, I respectfully suggest we do not limit ourselves
to one narrow path of assistance, but use a wide range of existing
Federal programs and delivery infrastructure to maximize every Federal
dollar on rebuilding New York City. Working together with the private
sector, we will not disappoint those who need the assistance of an
effective, coordinated Federal, State and local response to rebuild the
economic infrastructure and get people back to work.
Thank you for allowing me to testify before you today. I would be
happy to answer any questions you may have.
APPENDIX A
EDA Supplemental Disaster Appropriations.--1992 to Present
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Program
Fiscal Year Disaster Funds S&E Funds
(Millions) (Millions)
------------------------------------------------------------------------
92........................... Hurricanes $70 $5
Andrew, Iniki
and Typhoon
Omar.
EDA awarded 63
grants in
Florida,
Hawaii,
Louisiana, and
Guam.
93/94........................ Midwest Floods. 200
EDA awarded 297
grants in
North Dakota,
South Dakota,
Iowa,
Missouri,
Kansas,
Wisconsin,
Minnesota, and
Illinois.
94........................... Southern 91
California
Earthquake
(Northridge).
EDA awarded 20
grants in
southern
California.
94........................... NE Fishery 18
Disaster.
EDA awarded 21
grants in the
New England
States.
94........................... Tropical Storm 50 5
Alberto.
EDA awarded 74
grants in
Georgia,
Alabama and
Florida.
96........................... 1996 Floods.... 16.75 1.25
EDA awarded 41
grants in
Maryland, New
York,
Virginia,
Pennsylvania,
West Virginia,
Kentucky,
Idaho, Oregon,
Washington and
North Dakota.
97........................... Hurricanes Fran 25
and Hortense.
EDA awarded 44
grants in
North
Carolina,
South
Carolina,
Virginia, West
Virginia, and
Puerto Rico.
97........................... Upper Midwest 50.2 2
Floods of 1997.
EDA awarded 74
grants North
Dakota, South
Dakota,
Minnesota,
Kentucky, West
Virginia,
Ohio, Indiana,
Illinois,
Arkansas and
Tennessee.
99........................... Alaska 19.1 .9
Fisheries.
EDA has to-date
awarded 29
grants in
Alaska.
Implementation
is still
proceeding.
00........................... Hurricane Floyd 55.8 1.9*
EDA awarded 51
grants
primarily in
New Jersey,
North Carolina
and Virginia.
01........................... Alaska Norton 10 ...........
Sound
Fisheries.
EDA has to-date
awarded 10
grants in
Alaska.
Implementation
is still
proceeding.
-------------------------
TOTAL.......... $605.85 $14.15
------------------------------------------------------------------------
*1.9 M for S&E for Hurricane Floyd and Norton Sound Fisheries provided
through an fiscal year 2001 reprogramming.
__________
Statement of Richard A. Meserve, Chairman, Nuclear
Regulatory Commission
Mr. Chairman and members of the Committee, I am pleased to have
been invited to appear before you, on behalf of the United States
Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC), to discuss programs related to
safeguards and security for NRC-licensed commercial nuclear facilities,
and to discuss the actions that NRC and its licensees have taken in
response to the terrorist acts that occurred on September 11.
The NRC response began immediately after the September 11
attacks.Within 30 minutes of the plane strikes, we activated and
staffed the NRC Operations Center at NRC Headquarters and the incident
response centers in the NRC Regional offices, and we began close
coordination with the FBI and other intelligence and law enforcement
agencies, our licensees, and various military, State and local
authorities. Shortly after the attacks, we advised all nuclear power
plants, non-power reactors, nuclear fuel facilities, gaseous diffusion
plants, and decommissioning facilities to go to the highest level of
physical security (Level 3), which they promptly did, discussed
immediate actions and addressed specific questions. Increased security
measures were also implemented at NRC offices.
As of today, the NRC and our licensees are still in a heightened
state of security readiness. We have enhanced NRC building security,
and we continue to monitor the situation closely. Our Headquarters
Operations Center and Regional Response Centers are fully staffed, 24
hours per day, 7 days per week. We are prepared to make adjustments to
security measures as circumstances warrant.
security and safeguards for commercial nuclear facilities
The NRC's primary focus and responsibility is to ensure adequate
protection of public health and safety is maintained and promotion of
the common defense and security in the peaceful use of Atomic Energy
Act materials. We fulfill this responsibility by establishing and
refining requirements and programs intended to protect NRC-licensed
facilities and nuclear materials against both radiological sabotage and
theft or diversion. The NRC has the statutory responsibility to
maintain the protection of the public's health and safety by ensuring
adequate physical security and safeguards.
NRC activities related to domestic safeguards and security and
emergency response can be grouped into four categories:
Developing and implementing requirements for safeguarding
certain types of nuclear facilities and material and inspecting for
compliance with those requirements;
Assessing the threat environment, including the
international environment insofar as it has implications for domestic
threats;
Maintaining and coordinating emergency response
capabilities; and
Providing physical security for NRC employees and offices.
Beginning in the late 1970's, the NRC established requirements to
safeguard civilian nuclear power plants and fuel facilities that
possess special nuclear material. The regulations apply a graded
approach--that is, greater controls and protection are applied to
nuclear materials and facilities that could pose higher risks to public
health and safety. Accordingly, nuclear power plants must implement
security programs that include site access controls, intruder detection
systems, central alarm stations, physical barriers, armed guard forces,
and detailed response strategies. The result is that nuclear power
plants are among the most hardened facilities in this country. The NRC
inspects these facilities to verify compliance with NRC requirements,
to assess licensee safety performance, and to enforce our regulations
in a manner that ensures adequate protection of the health and safety
of the public.
For example, one NRC requirement which reflects the graded approach
to protection, is that commercial power reactors must have the
capability to defend against certain defined security threats, referred
to as a Design Basis Threat. The specifics of this Design Basis Threat
are safeguards information. What I can say in public, is that the
Design Basis Threat assumes that the adversaries will consist of a
number of well-trained and dedicated individuals with knowledge of the
facility, armed with weapons up to and including automatic weapons and
specialized equipment, such as incapacitating agents and explosives. It
also envisages use of land vehicles and a potential truck bomb.
Licensees must establish and implement a security plan to respond to
this assumed threat. NRC oversight of licensee efforts in this area
includes routine and event-based onsite inspections, performance
indicator reviews, and force-on-force exercises. Any deficiencies found
in an exercise are promptly corrected and the corrections are verified
by NRC inspectors. In addition to the capacity to defend against a
Design Basis Threat, licensee security programs include provisions for
requesting assistance from offsite authorities when appropriate.
The requirements to protect against sabotage or theft or diversion
of nuclear materials also apply to major NRC-regulated fuel cycle
facilities, such as the gaseous diffusions plants and uranium
hexafluoride conversion facilities. Aside from the nuclear materials
aspects of these operations, these types of facilities present chemical
hazards. The NRC coordinates with other Federal agencies, such as EPA
and FEMA, to address these non-radiological hazards.
The NRC continuously monitors and assesses--in coordination with
Federal intelligence organizations--the overall threat environment in
the United States and abroad in support of the domestic regulatory
program. Insights from this threat assessment program are used to
ensure the continued adequacy of the physical protection programs
required by NRC regulations. We also maintain a more ``real-time''
assessment capability, again through ongoing liaison with the national
intelligence and law enforcement communities, to evaluate threats to a
licensee and to provide timely threat advisory and assessment
information to our licensees. Further, all reported security-related
events of more than minor significance are promptly analyzed by an
internal team of subject matter experts to help guide immediate NRC
followup actions.
The NRC's emergency response program includes the capability to
respond to a radiological sabotage incident. This would be accomplished
within the U.S. Government interagency crisis and consequence
management framework. Most of these activities are conducted under the
Federal Radiological Emergency Response Plan, in coordination with the
Federal Emergency Management Agency, Federal Bureau of Investigation,
Department of Energy, and other Federal participants. As noted earlier,
NRC has lead Federal Agency responsibilities for radiological
emergencies. NRC's program is designed to assess licensee responses to
plant-specific events and to support local, State, and Federal
authorities in the case of an emergency declaration.
I would also like to point out that all NRC licensees with
significant radiological material have emergency response plans to
mitigate the impacts of radiological events, including terrorist
attacks, on the public. Public health would be safeguarded even if a
terrorist attack damaged one of these facilities because of the
mitigating actions of personnel and emergency response plans.
Finally, we protect NRC personnel and contract staff and facilities
through a comprehensive physical and personnel security program. This
program includes the continual assessment and adjustment of physical
security measures in response to Federal Government-wide advisories. In
this regard, since September 11 we have increased our physical
protection in a variety of areas, including the controls of access to
NRC campuses by persons and vehicles. Most recently, we have taken
measures to protect NRC mailroom employees from the biological threat
posed by contamination by anthrax spores spread through the mail.
In the aftermath of the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001,
and the continuing uncertainty about future terrorist intentions, the
NRC is expanding its review of its safeguards and physical security
program, even though we believe that the nuclear power plants and fuel
cycle facilities that fall under NRC jurisdiction are among the best
protected industrial sites in America. The nature of the attacks
requires that the NRC's review include a comprehensive examination of
the basic assumptions underlying the current safeguards and physical
security program.
Additionally, in light of the devastating September 11 attacks, and
threats of unspecified future attacks against the United States, this
review must involve other U.S. national security organizations. We
currently are interacting with the FBI, other Federal law enforcement
and intelligence organizations, the military, and the newly established
Office of Homeland Security so that necessary changes to our programs
consider pertinent information from all relevant Federal agencies. We
believe it is essential that agencies coordinate their requirements for
infrastructure security.
We also are re-evaluating the agency's ability to communicate with
the press, the public, and interested parties regarding information
relevant to security and physical protection of our licensees. Prior to
September 11, the NRC provided to the public via NRC's Website or its
electronic ADAMS data base, most documents pertinent to its regulatory
regime, including extensive information on individual plant design and
operation. In light of the events of September 11, which showed that
some of the information that the NRC had made available to the public
via the Internet could be of potential use to terrorists, the NRC shut
down public access to these electronically available documents and
removed some documents from our Public Document Room. The NRC is now in
the midst of a careful review to determine the material that should be
electronically made available to the public. In recent days we have
restored public meeting notices, pertinent information on agency
rulemaking proceedings, electronic reading room material, and
information on contracting opportunities. Substantially more
information will be restored in the coming weeks. As part of its
ongoing re-examination process, the agency is examining issues related
to withholding from the public critical infrastructure information. If
the NRC determines that additional authority is needed to protect such
information, the NRC will seek the necessary legislation.
As the Commission conducts its comprehensive reassessment of plant
safeguards and security, we recognize that specific legislative needs
may become apparent. In the interim, the Commission on June 22, 2001,
submitted legislative proposals to your Committee that we believe we
need now. Specifically, we are seeking legislation that would amend the
Atomic Energy Act to enhance the protection provided by guards at
designated NRC-licensed nuclear facilities, to criminalize sabotage of
nuclear facilities during their construction, and to make clear that
the unauthorized introduction of weapons or explosives into nuclear
facilities will be subject to significant Federal criminal penalties
for the individuals involved.
We have also, since June 22, 2001, developed a fourth proposed
statutory change which would confer upon guards at NRC designated
facilities the authority to possess or use weapons that are comparable
to the Department of Energy guard forces or other Federal protective
forces. Some State laws, for instance, in New Jersey, currently
preclude guard forces at NRC-regulated facilities from utilizing a wide
range of weapons, which are available to the guard forces at other NRC-
regulated facilities in States without such restrictions. We would
advocate a more uniform national system.
We expect that our reassessment of commercial nuclear security and
safeguards will strengthen our ability to improve our security
requirements and programs, as needed. In considering potential
legislative and regulatory changes, we must consider carefully the
boundaries between private and government responsibility, and the
delicate balance between openness and security. The balance between
risk avoidance and risk mitigation must also be considered. These are
difficult areas, but we are determined to address safeguards and
security needs expeditiously in light of the September 11 events.
In closing, I would like to reiterate that the NRC continues to
fulfill its obligations to ensure adequate protection of the public
health and safety from acts of sabotage, theft, or diversion directed
at the Nation's civilian nuclear facilities and materials.
We believe that we had an excellent security and physical
protection program in place prior to September 11, and we are prepared
to build on that solid foundation. We look forward to working with the
Congress to address our mutual concerns and determine where the assets
of our Nation are best deployed to fight these threats. I appreciate
your invitation to be here today to discuss the NRC's programs and am
prepared to answer your questions.
__________
Statement of Herbert L. Mitchell, Associate Administrator for Disaster
Assistance, U.S. Small Business Administration
Mr. Chairman, Ranking Member, and distinguished members of the
committee, my name is Herb Mitchell, and I am the Associate
Administrator for Disaster Assistance for the U.S. Small Business
Administration (SBA). Administrator Barreto asked that I represent the
Agency today in his absence. We thank the committee for the opportunity
to testify about the disaster assistance program, and our role in the
economic recovery for New York City.
For the past 50 years, with any disaster that occurs in the United
States, the SBA has played an immediate and major role in providing
disaster assistance loans for businesses, homes, and personal property.
This disaster, while different in scope, provides us the same
opportunity to assist in the immediate recovery of the New York City
region, and the Nation as a whole.
In a major disaster SBA participates with FEMA in conducting damage
assessment surveys to determine the scope of the damage and the
assistance needed. Once the declaration is made SBA co-locates with
FEMA at the Disaster Field Office to coordinate assistance to
individuals and businesses, thus ensuring that Federal assistance is
not duplicated. The FEMA telephone registration line serves as a one-
stop shop for Federal assistance, all businesses being referred to SBA
for assistance. Additionally, SBA and FEMA will co-locate at disaster
recovery centers to provide one-on-one assistance to disaster victims.
The afternoon of September 11, our Niagara Falls, New York Disaster
Area Office was dispatched to lower Manhattan, where they met with FEMA
and the State emergency management officials to coordinate our response
with the overall recovery effort. We also began working with Governor
Pataki's office to set up an SBA office in the NY State Business
Resource Center in Manhattan, where we met with disaster victims,
discussed SBA loan programs, issued applications, and provided direct
assistance on the application process. The SBA has since deployed
approximately 93 people in the New York City area to complement its
Disaster Area 1 staff of over 200, and hundreds of additional SBA
disaster trained employees are available and on call in New York and
nationwide if needed to supplement our efforts.
The SBA's disaster assistance loan program is the primary Federal
program for funding recovery for private-sector disaster victims. This
program provides low interest rate loans (not to exceed 4 percent) to
applicants without credit available elsewhere and a higher rate (not to
exceed 8 percent) for those with credit available elsewhere. We offer
real and personal property loans, physical disaster business loans, and
economic injury disaster loans. Our real and personal property loans
and physical disaster business loans are intended to assist people with
their actual loss of property as a result of a disaster. The economic
injury disaster loans are available to provide small businesses
working-capital loans to help pay ordinary and necessary operating
expenses that would have been payable absent the disaster. To
complement these existing loan programs, the SBA, through its Disaster
Area Office in New York, is working with New York's Empire State
Development Agency and several private financial institutions to
provide ``Bridge Loan'' and ``Gap Loan'' financing for the NYC business
community. ``Bridge Loans'' are short-term loans that may be repaid by
the long-term SBA disaster loan, and ``Gap Loans'' offer financing to
disaster victims who are unable to qualify for SBA loans.
In addition, Military Reservist Economic Injury Disaster loans are
available to businesses that suffer an impact as a result of a key
employee being called to duty as military reservists.
We are also focusing on getting information to the individuals and
businesses that have been affected. Our staff has canvassed the
neighborhoods to talk to small business owners suffering from this
tragedy in order to inform them of SBA assistance, and distribute loan
application packets personally. Administrator Barreto and I joined SBA
disaster staff in New York City on September 17th, and saw first hand
the empty restaurants and stores that normally would have been packed
prior to the disaster. While in New York City, we met one notable small
business owner, who told us that the ``terrorists tried to declare a
victory by destroying the World Trade Center buildings, but insisted
they would not score a second victory by closing his (sic) business.''
This is the patriotism and the true American entrepreneurial spirit
that we have seen in New York and across the country. America will
recover and thrive, and the SBA is proud to operate at the heart of
that recovery, making whole again those businesses that have suffered.
As of October 31st, the SBA is proud to report its combined
response to the New York disaster as follows:
We have distributed almost 17,400 applications, some door
to door, in Lowe Manhattan and from 44 locations throughout the region;
We have Directly Counseled and assisted over 17,000
individuals and businesses with loan applications or general
information, incorporating Spanish, Mandarin Chinese, Croatian, Arabic,
Hindu, Vietnamese, German, French, Korean and Japanese speaking
counselors when necessary.
We have received and processed 3,200 completed
applications;
We have approved nearly 1000 loans for $82,132,900.
We have staffed six full Disaster Information Field
Offices, conducted several workshops in multiple neighborhood
locations, and placed trained disaster loan personnel in 4 additional
Small Business Development Center (SBDC) offices in the region.
Under the agency's historic disaster loan program parameters,
businesses eligible for SBA disaster loan products are physically
located in direct proximity to the declared disaster location. The
September 11 attacks have presented a unique situation in regard to the
scope of the Administration's response.
In recognition of the widespread financial difficulties faced by a
number of small businesses around the country as a result of the
September 11 terrorist attacks, the SBA has worked through the Bush
Administration to expand its Economic Injury Disaster Loan Program.
Effective October 22, 2001, businesses located outside of the declared
disaster areas in New York and Virginia that have suffered substantial
economic injury as a direct result of the September 11 attacks, or as a
direct result of a Federal action related to the September 11 disaster
are now eligible to apply for assistance through SBA's Economic Injury
Disaster Loan program. These loans can help small businesses with
working capital in order to meet its ongoing financial obligations.
Mindful of the nature of the businesses located in lower Manhattan,
we have also submitted legislation to increase our size standard
regulations for NY businesses to qualify for our loan programs, and
have made them retroactive to the September 11 date; allow financial
services organizations and non-profits to qualify for loans, and to
increase the cap on aggregate loans.
SBA's disaster programs have evolved over the years to meet the
needs of small businesses. They work well, meet the needs of the
Nation's affected small business communities, and the mechanisms are
already in place to handle additional services as necessary. We are
confident that utilizing existing disaster loan programs and resources
to assist the NYC small business community, and the Nation's as a
whole, is the most immediate and effective way to aid in its' economic
recovery from this disaster.
In addition to our disaster loan program, SBA provides numerous
short-and long-term loan programs to small businesses through our
lending partners, such as Microloans, 7(a) guaranty loans, 504 loans
and the Small Business Investment Company program. SBA's technical
assistance includes business counseling and training through our
Business Information Centers, Service Corps of Retired Executives, One
Stop Capital Shops, Women's Business Centers and the SBDCs.
We look forward to working with all of you to help the citizens of
New York, as well as those around our country that refuse to let terror
destroy what we have collectively worked so hard to build.
I'm pleased to answer any questions.
Thank you.
__________
Statement of Marianne Horinko, Assistant Administrator, Office of Solid
Waste and Emergency
Mr. Chairman and Members of the committee, thank you for the
opportunity to discuss the Environmental Protection Agency's (EPA) role
in domestic terrorism preparedness and, more specifically, the Agency's
role in protection of the Nation's water resources.
The tragic events of September 11, 2001, have raised valid concerns
over our Nation's vulnerability to terrorist attack. As a Nation, we
are scrutinizing our efforts to prepare for and to prevent terrorist
events. Realizing that we must always remain vigilant to new threats
and must always be ready to respond, the Agency welcomes the
opportunity this hearing offers to examine these issues.
My testimony covers four major areas: EPA's role in
counterterrorism preparedness and response before and after September
11; a specific discussion of drinking water protection related to the
September 11 attack; EPA's overall protection of our Nation's drinking
water; and the critical Federal coordination needed to meet the
counterterrorism challenges ahead.
the federal partners and ngo's: a unique partnership
The National Response Team (NRT), established by the National
Contingency Plan (NCP), consists of 16 Federal agencies with
responsibilities, interests, and expertise in various aspects of
emergency response to pollution incidents. The EPA serves as chair and
the Coast Guard serves as vice chair of the NRT. This partnership
includes such Federal agencies as the ATSDR (Agency for Toxic
Substances and Disease Registry), DOD (Department of Defense), DOE
(Department of Energy), FBI (Federal Bureau of Investigation), FEMA
(Federal Emergency Management Agency) and key non-governmental
organizations.
september 11, 2001--emergency response actions
Our Federal partnership sprung into action on September 11, 2001.
Before the second plane had struck the World Trade Center in Manhattan,
EPA headquarters had already begun coordination with our Region 2
office to address the crash of the first plane. Ten minutes later, our
EPA headquarters had linked all of our east coast regional offices to
begin coordination and support of the New York response effort. EPA's
Emergency Response Program was present onsite in New York, Virginia,
and Pennsylvania within hours of the four plane crashes.
Throughout the response effort, EPA worked in coordination with our
Federal partners to monitor and protect human health and the
environment from potential hazards associated with the three crash
sites. At both The World Trade Center and the Pentagon, EPA provided
monitoring for various air contaminants. For example, EPA and other
Federal, State and city agencies have taken literally thousands of
samples of dust, air, drinking water, stormwater runoff and river
sediments in and around the World Trade Center site. We've tested for
the presence of pollutants such as asbestos, lead, volatile organic
compounds, dioxin, benzene, metals, PCBs and other chemicals and
substances that could pose a threat to the public and workers at the
site. Fortunately, EPA and OSHA have found no evidence of any
significant public health hazard to residents, visitors, or workers
beyond the immediate World Trade Center area. Despite recent press
accounts which suggest otherwise, these findings have not changed. In
fact, environmental conditions off the site have improved in recent
weeks.
In addition to our monitoring activities, at the World Trade
Center, EPA assisted in debris removal, and cleanup of dust and debris
from the streets using vacuum trucks. EPA has provided rescue workers
and others onsite with protective gear and health and safety
recommendations for the difficult conditions onsite. We have also set
up washing stations for response workers at Ground Zero and vehicles
and heavy equipment departing the Zone are being washed down prior to
departure.
Signs informing rescuers of the need to wear protective gear are
posted throughout the washing stations.
epa's anthrax response
I want to bring to your attention the increasing number of requests
the Agency has received to provide assessment, sampling, and cleanup
assistance at anthrax-contaminated buildings across the country. The
dilemma we face is that the Superfund statutory language that allows us
to respond to these biological releases also limits our ability to
recover our response costs. To the extent these activities will
continue, they will have an impact on our Superfund cleanup activities
later in the year in certain parts of the country.
september 11, 2001--water protection
Regarding water concerns associated with the crash site in
Manhattan, EPA collected and tested drinking water at several
distribution points. Following several days of heavy rain in New York,
we collected water samples from storm sewers and surface runoff to
determine if potential contamination from the World Trade Center site
was entering the Hudson or East rivers. All samples of drinking water,
which were tested for a wide range of contaminants, had levels below
Federal standards. Analysis of runoff following heavy rain on September
14 did show some elevated levels of PCBs and other pollutants. Followup
sampling on several occasions found levels back to those normally found
in area waters.
water protection task force
Recognizing the need to ensure appropriate coordination of water
security activities, EPA has established a Water Protection Task Force
that will guide efforts on long-term drinking water infrastructure
protection and wastewater treatment infrastructure protection.
Governor Whitman announced some specific projects to Protect
America's Drinking Water:
The Administration has requested $34.5 million as part of
the terrorism supplemental appropriations for support of vulnerability
assessments for drinking water systems and $5 million for State grants
for drinking water counterterrorism coordinators to work with EPA and
drinking water systems.
With EPA support, the Sandia National Laboratory of the
Department of Energy in partnership with the American Water Works
Association Research Foundation is developing a ``tool kit'' to assist
drinking water systems in conducting vulnerability assessments and
identifying remedial action.
We expect training on this resource to be available later
this month. As an interim measure, EPA has disseminated a fact sheet
that outlines measures utilities can take immediately to protect their
drinking water supplies. Issued through the State drinking water
program managers, this document should now be in the hands of every
public water system.
As this ``tool kit'' is being developed, the American
Water Works Association Research Foundation is drafting additional,
more detailed training materials that will provide step-by-step
guidance to drinking water utilities on conducting vulnerability
assessments, identifying remedial actions and strengthening their
emergency operation plans. Formal training sessions that will take
utility security officials through the first steps of their
vulnerability assessments will begin in December.
Training others to conduct vulnerability assessments will
be an integral component of this effort. Consequently the Agency
envisions that a significant cadre of professionals will be available
to assist systems in doing these vulnerability assessments.
These activities focus on enhancing preparedness of water
utilities; other projects will bolster the existing methods for
responding to emergency situations, including terrorist acts.
Currently, a drinking water utility would activate its existing
emergency response plan with its local police and State emergency
officials. If needed, these provide for shutting down the system,
notifying the public of any emergency steps they might need to take
(e.g., boiling water) and providing alternate sources of water. EPA's
extensive network of expert emergency response personnel can be
dispatched to the scene immediately to support local communities.
epa's counterterrorism activities
As EPA continues to strengthen its counterterrorism (CT) program by
building on the existing National Response System for hazardous
materials (hazmat) prevention, preparedness, and response, the Agency
is involved in a variety of activities with Federal, State, and local
officials that include:
Requesting $5.5 million in the terrorism supplemental
appropriations to establish and equip a West Coast response team.
In the 10 EPA regions, the Agency's first responders are
the On-Scene Coordinators (or OSCs). The OSCs have been actively
involved with local, State, and Federal authorities in preparing for
and responding to threats of terrorism. EPA's OSC's, located throughout
the United States, have broad response authority and a proven record of
success in responding rapidly emergency situations.
Providing expertise in performing offsite monitoring,
extent of contamination surveys, working with health officials to
establish safe cleanup levels conducting protective cleanup actions.
Communicating technical information or health data to
affected citizens is essential for a successful Federal response to an
act of terrorism that involves a release of chemical, biological, or
radioactive material. EPA brings unique capabilities and experience to
the response process.
Expanding work with State Emergency Response Commissions
(SERCs) and Local Emergency Planning Committees (LEPCs) to develop
emergency response plans for hazardous materials releases to encourage
them to incorporate terrorism response issues into their existing
emergency plans.
Working closely with other Federal agencies to refine
interagency response plans for terrorist attacks.
Conducting forensic evidence collection on nonmilitary
industrial chemicals in the event of an eco-terrorism event by EPA's
National Enforcement Investigations Center (NEIC) and training State,
local, and Federal personnel in this type of work.
conclusion
Finally, Mr. Chairman, I would like to emphasize that the
Administrator, Governor Whitman, has made very clear to the entire
Agency that there is no higher priority than ensuring that EPA's
mission to protect the environment and public health is a broad
umbrella that encompasses homeland security. The expertise and
experience the Agency has developed over 31 years is poised to assist
and support the hard work Governor Ridge and this Congress will be
doing.
Clearly, the Administrator is adamant that EPA's efforts to help
secure the safety and integrity of America's water supply and
infrastructure must be undertaken with great speed, energy, and
attention. Deadlines that were established before September 11 for such
action are no longer appropriate. We have no time to waste in
completing this work and we intend to devote the resources necessary to
make certain that it is done quickly and that it is done properly.
Governor Whitman, myself, and our professionals throughout EPA
welcome the opportunity to work with you, your colleagues in the
Congress, your professional staff, and with Governor Ridge and the
Office of Homeland Security to protect and preserve the health and well
being of every American citizen.