Operation Desert Storm: Apache Helicopter Fratricide Incident (Letter
Report, 06/30/93, GAO/OSI-93-4).
In a February 1991 incident involving "friendly fire" during the Persian
Gulf War, two American servicemen were killed and six were wounded by
missiles fired by an Apache helicopter. Concerns were raised about
whether equipment failure caused the incident, whether the U.S. Army
tried to mislead Congress about the Apache's performance, and whether
the Army improperly released information to the press. This report
contains a detailed discussion of the incident, including related events
and contributing factors; an analysis of the Army's investigation of the
incident; and responses to the specific concerns just mentioned.
--------------------------- Indexing Terms -----------------------------
REPORTNUM: OSI-93-4
TITLE: Operation Desert Storm: Apache Helicopter Fratricide
Incident
DATE: 06/30/93
SUBJECT: Military aircraft
Helicopters
Advanced weapons systems
Military operations
Airborne operations
Air warfare
Missiles
Army personnel
Accidents
Information disclosure
IDENTIFIER: Apache Helicopter
AH-64 Helicopter
Persian Gulf War
Iraq
Kuwait
Desert Shield
Desert Storm
Bradley Fighting Vehicle
M113 Armored Personnel Carrier
HELLFIRE Missile
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Cover
================================================================ COVER
Report to the Chairman, Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations,
Committee on Energy and Commerce, House of Representatives
June 1993
OPERATION DESERT STORM - APACHE
HELICOPTER FRATRICIDE INCIDENT
GAO/OSI-93-4
Apache Helicopter Fratricide Incident
Abbreviations
=============================================================== ABBREV
1-1 AVN - 1st Battalion, 1st Aviation Regiment, 4th Aviation
Brigade, 1st Infantry Division (Mechanized), VII Corps
1-4 CAV - 1st Squadron, 4th Cavalry, 4th Aviation Brigade, 1st
Infantry Division (Mechanized), VII Corps
1-41 - 1st Battalion, 41st Infantry, 2nd Armored Division
(Forward), VII Corps
1st CAV - 1st Cavalry Division, VII Corps
2nd ACR - 2nd Armored Cavalry Regiment, VII Corps
3-66 - 3rd Battalion, 66th Regiment, 2nd Armored Division
(Forward), VII Corps
AN/APR-39A(V)1 - Radar Warning Receiver (Voice Warning)
APC - Armored Personnel Carrier
AR - Army Regulation
FLIR - Forward Looking Infra-Red (thermal optical equipment)
IG - Inspector General
M113 - M113 Armored Personnel Carrier
NAV - navigation system
TAA - Tactical Assembly Area
TAC SOP - Tactical Standard Operating Procedures
TADS - Target Acquisition and Designation System
TF - Task Force
TOC - Tactical Operations Center
TOW - Tube-launched, Optically-tracked, Wire-guided missile
kilometer - approximately 3,280.8 feet or 0.62 mile
meter - approximately 3.28 feet
millimeter - approximately 0.039 inch
Letter
=============================================================== LETTER
Office of Special Investigations
B-252513
Letter Date Goes Here
The Honorable John D. Dingell
Chairman, Subcommittee on Oversight
and Investigations
Committee on Energy and Commerce
House of Representatives
Dear Mr. Chairman:
In response to your request and subsequent discussions with your
office, this report presents the results of our investigation of a
February 17, 1991, "friendly fire"\1 incident during the Persian Gulf
War. That incident involved three U.S. Army AH-64 Apache
helicopters and two U.S. ground vehicles from the 1st Infantry
Division (Mechanized). Two American servicemen were killed and six
were wounded by missiles fired by one of the Apache gunners.
As you requested, we are providing a detailed discussion of the
incident, including related events and factors that contributed to it
(see app. I-II); an analysis of the U.S. Army's investigation of
the incident (see app. III); and a response to specific concerns
raised in your request letter (see app. IV). Those concerns
included (1) whether equipment failure caused the incident, (2)
whether the U.S. Army attempted to mislead your Subcommittee about
the Apaches' performance in the incident, and (3) whether the 1st
Infantry Division improperly released information to the press that
identified the Apache gunner. We have also included, as you
requested, an integrated transcript of the three Apache gun tapes
(see app. V).
--------------------
\1 "Friendly fire" is the intentional, but mistaken, use of weapons
and munitions against friendly personnel or facilities believed to be
enemy. Fratricide is friendly fire that results in the death or
injury of friendly personnel.
BACKGROUND
------------------------------------------------------------ Letter :1
On August 2, 1990, Iraqi military forces invaded the emirate of
Kuwait. Almost immediately after the invasion, the United States and
allied countries deployed troops to the Middle East, implementing
Operation Desert Shield. On November 29, 1990, the United Nations
Security Council passed Resolution Number 678, condemning the Iraqi
invasion of Kuwait and authorizing its member states "to use all
necessary means to . . . restore international peace and security
in the area" and ensure Iraq's withdrawal from Kuwait. The United
Nations' deadline expired at midnight, Eastern Standard Time, January
15, 1991. When Iraqi forces refused to withdraw, U.S. and allied
forces implemented Operation Desert Storm on January 17, 1991,
beginning with an extensive air campaign. The ground war began on
February 25, 1991, and ended 3 days later when allied commanders
declared a cease-fire.
On February 17, 1991, at approximately 1:00 a.m. (Persian Gulf
Time),\2 a U.S. Bradley Fighting Vehicle (Bradley) and an M113
Armored Personnel Carrier (M113) were destroyed by two Hellfire
missiles fired from an Apache helicopter. Two U.S. soldiers were
killed and six others were wounded in the incident.
The incident occurred after U.S. ground forces, which were deployed
along an east-west line 5 kilometers north of the Saudi-Iraqi border,
reported several enemy sightings north of their positions. In
response, ground commanders called for Apache reconnaissance of the
area. A team of three Apaches subsequently found two vehicles, which
appeared to be those described by ground forces. These vehicles
were, in fact, a Bradley and an M113.
--------------------
\2 Unless otherwise indicated, the dates and times in this report
concerning events in the war theater are based on Persian Gulf Time.
RESULTS IN BRIEF
------------------------------------------------------------ Letter :2
Our investigation revealed human error to be the primary cause of the
February 17, 1991, fratricide incident. The Apache Battalion
Commander, who led the team of three Apaches, read the wrong grid
coordinate on his navigation system while flying as copilot/gunner.
As a result, he misidentified the target vehicles' location as being
north of the line of friendly vehicles and in the exact location of
one of the reported enemy sightings. Relying on this erroneous
information, the Ground Commander authorized the Apaches to engage
the targets. The Apache Battalion Commander fired his helicopter's
30-millimeter gun at the targets, but the gun emitted only a few
rounds before jamming. He then fired two Hellfire missiles\3 at the
targets, killing two soldiers, wounding six others, and destroying a
U.S. Bradley Fighting Vehicle and an M113 Armored Personnel Carrier.
Following an Army investigation of the incident, the Apache Battalion
Commander was relieved of command for failing to exercise command and
control over the Apache team by becoming personally engaged in the
fighting. We agree with the investigation's overall findings.
However, the investigation did not address the issue of the
Commander's fatigue, which may have been a factor in the incident.
We found no evidence that equipment failure caused the incident.
Some observers have speculated that the failure of the Apache
Battalion Commander's 30-millimeter gun significantly contributed to
the accident, since it would have caused less damage and therefore
could have provided an opportunity for the friendly vehicles to
identify themselves. However, the two accompanying Apaches each had
a working 30-millimeter gun that could have been used for firing
warning shots, had this been the intent of the Apache Battalion
Commander. Instead, he fired his Hellfire missiles soon after his
gun jammed, opting not to use either of the accompanying Apaches'
operational guns. We also found no evidence to indicate that the
Apaches' navigation systems were functioning improperly. In
addition, although the Apaches' radar warning receivers were known to
misidentify signals from U.S. ground radars as enemy signals and may
have contributed to the confusion on the night of the incident, this
was not a cause of the incident.
We also found no evidence to support allegations that the U.S. Army
attempted to mislead the Subcommittee on the Apaches' performance in
this incident.
In addition, we reviewed the Army Inspector General's (IG) inquiry
into allegations that Army officials had improperly released
information to the press by identifying the Apache Battalion
Commander as the person who fired the Hellfire missiles. We concur
with the IG's finding that there was no evidence of intentional
misconduct by Army public affairs officers. We also agree with the
IG's conclusion that Army Regulation 360-5, subparagraph 3-21d--which
sets forth the duties and responsibilities of public affairs
officers--is overbroad and should be clarified. Although the Army IG
has determined this was not the Army's intent, on its face, this
regulation requires the approval of an office within the Department
of the Army's Headquarters before the public release of information
on "findings of misconduct by individuals, resulting from official
investigations" of accidental casualties involving military
personnel. No such prior approval was given before the 1st Infantry
Division's Public Affairs Office discussed the incident with a
reporter and then distributed a press release. That press release
identified the Apache Battalion Commander by position and unit,
although not by name, as the individual directly involved in the
fratricide. The press release also stated that following an Army
investigation into the incident, the Battalion Commander had been
relieved of command for violating command guidance.
--------------------
\3 The laser-guided Hellfire missile is the main armament on the
Apache helicopter, designed for the destruction of armor and other
hard-point targets.
METHODOLOGY
------------------------------------------------------------ Letter :3
This report is based on information we obtained from interviews of
current and former U.S. Army personnel, including the six crewmen
who flew the three Apache helicopters; ground commanders involved in
the incident; helicopter maintenance personnel; and public affairs
officers. We studied division, brigade, and battalion logs,
maintenance records, and other military documents, as well as the
three video tapes, or "gun tapes," filmed by the Apache helicopters
during the incident. We integrated transcriptions of the three gun
tapes, found in appendix V, with the help of two of the Apache pilots
involved in the fratricide incident and representatives of the U.S.
Army. We also reviewed regulations governing Army investigations,
officer evaluations, and public information; policies regarding
command and control; and procedures for Apache tactical operations
and helicopter gunnery.
---------------------------------------------------------- Letter :3.1
We requested representatives of the U.S. Army to review the report's
contents to ensure their technical accuracy. However, as agreed with
your office, we did not obtain official agency comments on a draft of
the report. We are sending copies of this report to other interested
congressional committees; the Secretary of Defense; the Secretary of
the Army; and the Commander, 1st Infantry Division. We will also
send copies to others upon request. If you have questions concerning
this report, please call me, or Assistant Director Barbara Cart of my
staff, at (202) 512-6722. Major contributors to this report are
listed in appendix VI.
Sincerely yours,
Richard C. Stiener
Director
BACKGROUND OF THE FEBRUARY 17,
1991, INCIDENT
=========================================================== Appendix I
On the basis of numerous interviews with the Apache pilots, ground
commanders, helicopter mechanics, and other knowledgeable military
personnel, as well as extensive reviews of military logs, tapes, and
other relevant documents, we believe the background of the fratricide
incident of February 17, 1991, evolved as discussed below. This
discussion describes two earlier friendly fire incidents involving
Apaches from the same battalion as in the February 17 incident.
ARRIVAL IN WAR ZONE
--------------------------------------------------------- Appendix I:1
In December 1990, elements of the 1st Infantry Division (Mechanized),
assigned to the U.S. Army's VII Corps, began deploying to Saudi
Arabia. Exact arrival dates of the units varied according to their
individual missions. By January 28, 1991, after the air war had
begun, the Division was reunited at a designated attack position
located in northern Saudi Arabia. (See fig. I.1.) The Division
consisted of four brigades: the 1st and 2nd Infantry Brigades and
the 4th Aviation Brigade from Fort Riley, Kansas, and the 2nd Armored
Division (Forward)--assigned as the 3rd Infantry Brigade--from
Garlstedt, Germany.
Figure I.1: Movement of the
Army's VII Corps From Initial
Staging Area to Attack
Positions
(See figure in printed
edition.)
Source: U.S. Army
(See figure in printed
edition.)
While at its designated attack position, known as Tactical Assembly
Area (TAA) Roosevelt, the 1st Infantry Division established a breach
site and began rehearsing its primary mission--to breach the "berm"
(the 2-meter high, 3-meter deep mound of sand that serves as the
border between Saudi Arabia and Iraq) before the start of the ground
offensive. The Division was then to advance and provide security for
other advancing forces. This was to be the main effort of the VII
Corps.
TWO PREVIOUS FRIENDLY FIRE
INCIDENTS
--------------------------------------------------------- Appendix I:2
Two friendly fire incidents--on February 1 and 15, 1991--are relevant
to a full understanding of the February 17, 1991, fratricide
incident. The February 1 incident exposed problems with the Apaches'
AN/APR-39A(V)1 Radar Warning Receivers, while the February 15
incident highlighted the need for special control procedures to avoid
fratricide in the desert's featureless terrain.
THE FEBRUARY 1, 1991,
INCIDENT
------------------------------------------------------- Appendix I:2.1
APACHE BATTALION'S FIRST
MISSION
----------------------------------------------------- Appendix I:2.1.1
On the night of February 1, 1991, 4 days after the Division was
reunited at TAA Roosevelt, intelligence sources reported that a
possible Iraqi armor unit was moving south toward the 1st Squadron of
the 4th Cavalry (1-4 CAV), 4th Brigade, which was positioned along
the berm as a thin line of defense for other components of the
Division. Apaches (see fig. I.2) from the 1st Battalion of the 1st
Aviation Regiment (1-1 AVN), 4th Brigade, led by their Battalion
Commander, were launched to identify the targets and, if they were
enemy, to stop them. This was the battalion's first combat mission
in the Iraqi conflict.
Figure I.2: The Apache and Its
Essential Subsystems
(See figure in printed
edition.)
The 1-1 AVN Commander, as copilot/gunner, and his pilot flew ahead in
their Apache to conduct a full reconnaissance of the area; the
remainder of the designated Apaches were to follow when they became
airborne. The lead Apache located U.S. ground units along the berm,
flew forward of their position, but found no enemy forces.
While flying back toward U.S. ground units, the lead Apache's newly
installed AN/APR-39A(V)1 Radar Warning Receiver (Voice Warning),
which informed pilots of radar activity through brief audio messages
transmitted through the pilots' headsets, indicated that enemy radar
was searching the area. According to the 1-1 AVN Commander, the
AN/APR-39A(V)1 then indicated that an emission from an enemy
system--which was potentially lethal to helicopters--had "locked
onto," or targeted, the aircraft. The Apache crewmen believed,
however, that only friendly forces were in the area.
At this point, another Apache joined the Commander's aircraft and
became his wingman. The two Apache crews sighted three vehicles,
located about 3,800 meters from their position, from which the radar
signal appeared to be emanating. When this information was radioed
to the Ground Commander, he advised the Apache crews that the grid
coordinates of the vehicles they had spotted were approximately 300
meters from the location of a friendly outpost.
According to the 1-1 AVN Commander, while the Apaches were attempting
to identify the vehicles, the vehicles fired on the aircraft,
although no damage was sustained. The 1-1 AVN Commander indicated
that he did not give the order to return fire upon the ground
vehicles because the vehicles appeared to be within the "screen
line," or front line of U.S. forces, and the aircraft were unable to
positively identify the firing vehicles as enemy. The 1-4 CAV
Commander indicated that he had restricted the Apache gunners from
firing their weapons because of their close proximity to friendly
ground forces. The aircraft were withdrawn until the situation could
be clarified, in accordance with the Army's rules of engagement.\1
--------------------
\1 Rules of Engagement, as outlined in the Apache training procedures
manual, are discussed in app. III.
DETERMINATION THAT RADAR
WARNING RECEIVER
MISIDENTIFIED SIGNAL
----------------------------------------------------- Appendix I:2.1.2
The 1-4 CAV Commander conducted an informal investigation\2 into the
incident in an attempt to determine if the vehicles that fired on the
Apaches were enemy, as the AN/APR-39A(V)1 system had indicated. No
enemy vehicles were discovered in the area, yet no U.S. ground
forces admitted firing at the aircraft.
Flight tests conducted the following day, February 2, confirmed that
the Ground Surveillance Radar, used by friendly ground forces,
emitted a signal that the AN/APR-39A(V)1 misidentified as an enemy
system. According to the 1-1 AVN Executive Officer, information
regarding the February 1 incident was later sent to the Army Aviation
Systems Command in St. Louis, Missouri, and to the Aircraft
Survivability Unit at Fort Rucker, Alabama, for use in training and
to attempt to correct the misidentification problem.
In addition, as a result of this incident, the 1-1 AVN Commander
conducted numerous discussions and training exercises with the Apache
pilots on avoiding friendly fire accidents. Specifically, the pilots
were told they should always know where friendly ground forces were
located when flying missions to avoid firing on them by mistake.
Also, the Apache pilots spent several hours studying a sand table
built to scale by the Division Intelligence Staff, which marked map
grid lines with tape and string, and elevated model helicopters to
give the pilots perspective. The purposes of these exercises were to
identify where U.S. vehicles would be positioned, show expected
enemy positions, indicate how difficult it was to identify an object
from a distance, and identify possible difficulties with the battle
plan.
--------------------
\2 The Procedure for Investigating Officers and Boards of Officers,
Army Regulation 15-6, paragraph 1-4a, states "[a]n administrative
fact-finding procedure under this regulation may be designated an
investigation or a board of officers. The proceedings may be
informal . . . or formal. . . . Proceedings that involve a
single investigating officer using informal procedures are designated
investigations. Proceedings that involve more than one investigating
officer using formal or informal procedures or a single investigating
officer using formal procedures are designated a board of officers."
THE FEBRUARY 15, 1991,
INCIDENT
------------------------------------------------------- Appendix I:2.2
TASK FORCE IRON AND ITS
MISSION PLAN
----------------------------------------------------- Appendix I:2.2.1
The division remained at TAA Roosevelt until February 14, 1991, when
it moved approximately 115 kilometers to the west to a forward
assembly area known as TAA Manhattan. The following day, February
15, Task Force Iron\3 conducted a counter-reconnaissance mission
across the border into Iraq. The task force's mission was to destroy
reconnaissance elements of the Iraqi Army, thus limiting the accuracy
of Iraqi artillery.
U.S. ground forces had discovered Iraqi roving patrols and bunkers,
and intelligence information had confirmed vehicle sightings
suggesting that the Iraqi front line element was located near Phase
Line Wisconsin.\4 (See fig. I.3.) Task Force Iron was to operate
from Phase Line Vermont--the Saudi-Iraqi border--northward, while the
remainder of the 3rd Brigade stayed below the berm at Phase Line
Cherry. The 1st and 2nd Brigades were to remain at TAA Manhattan.
Figure 1.3: U.S. Army Map of
Task Force Iron's
Counter-Reconnaissance Mission
(See figure in printed
edition.)
The original mission plan called for Task Force Iron to cut 20 holes
in the border berm and secure the area. Task Force Iron would then
move north from Phase Line Vermont 10-12 kilometers into Iraq and
clear Phase Line Iowa. Artillery was to be brought forward; and
other elements, which would be used in the main thrust against the
Iraqi defense, were to replace Task Force Iron. The division
commanders speculated that the task force would encounter major
opposition in this effort and projected U.S. casualties of 40-50
percent.
--------------------
\3 Task Force Iron consisted of the 3rd Brigade (Headquarters), the
1-4 CAV, a task force element from the 1st Battalion of the 41st
Infantry Regiment (TF 1-41), supporting artillery, and other elements
formed under the command of the 3rd Brigade Commander.
\4 "Phase line" is a term used to identify a designated boundary
during planned tactical movements.
APACHE MISIDENTIFIED
TARGET
----------------------------------------------------- Appendix I:2.2.2
On the morning of February 15, 1991, a task force element from the
first Battalion of the 41st Infantry Regiment (TF 1-41) began
breaching the berm. Army construction equipment cleared the area of
mines and punched holes in the berm, creating lanes for the soldiers
and their equipment. The battalion-sized force then moved north
across the border into Iraq and established an initial front to allow
the 1-4 CAV, which was to the west of TF 1-41, to move forward.
While waiting for the 1-4 CAV to move through the berm, TF 1-41
reported several sightings of enemy vehicles but did not engage
hostile fire. According to the TF 1-41 Commander, his gunners did
not have a clear view of what was moving, and he was unsure if they
were mistaking fence posts for targets. In fact, some sightings
later turned out to be previously destroyed pickup trucks.
That afternoon, Apaches from the 1-1 AVN, which had been deployed
below the berm in support of Task Force Iron, received reports of
enemy sightings. Two aircraft were sent forward, across the berm,
for reconnaissance.
While on this mission, one of the Apache copilot/gunners visually
misidentified a Bradley as an enemy vehicle and fired a Hellfire
missile at it. The aircraft was on a northeast compass heading, in
daylight, with clear visibility. The vehicle was not struck,
apparently because the copilot/gunner had observed the target through
the Target Acquisition and Designation System (TADS) but had
mistakenly selected an alternate tracking choice, the Integrated
Helmet and Display Sight System, that used a sighting mechanism in
his helmet for the laser-guided missile to follow. (See fig. I.4.)
As a result, the missile followed an inaccurate line of sight.
Figure I.4: The Apache Target
Imagery Systems
(See figure in printed
edition.)
Upon their return that evening to the Apache staging area, the 1-1
AVN Commander grounded the crew of the firing Apache until they could
be given more training, which began immediately. The following
morning, the 1-1 AVN Commander advised the 4th Brigade Commander of
the incident. An informal investigation confirmed that the incident
had resulted from the copilot/gunner's error in misidentifying the
Bradley, not from equipment problems.
NEED FOR IMPROVED
PROCEDURES DISCUSSED
----------------------------------------------------- Appendix I:2.2.3
The 4th Brigade Commander recalled that when the 1-1 AVN Commander
advised him of the incident, they discussed the need for improved
prefire-check procedures when the Apaches were flying reconnaissance
missions near friendly forces. Specifically, he recalled that they
discussed the procedure of having the gunner's wingman "slave" the
TADS to the gunner's laser spot--allowing the wingman's sighting
mechanism to automatically focus on the gunner's selected target--to
ensure that the Apaches on the mission were identifying the same
target.
The 4th Brigade Commander also recalled that they discussed the
target approach to be used by aircraft when flying near friendly
troops. Since the enemy troops were positioned to the north and the
allied forces were positioned to the south, each along east-west
boundaries, the procedure discussed was for the aircraft to fly
perpendicular to the screen line, always approaching the enemy
targets from south to north.\5 This approach would provide
perspective and allow the crews to more clearly identify the location
of friendly forces in relation to enemy targets in the stark desert
environment. This so-called "south-to-north" approach was also
designed to complement the grid line navigation system used by the
Apache pilots, which was based on known north-south and east-west
coordinates.
The 1-1 AVN Commander recalled this discussion but told us that the
south-to-north procedure was discussed only in reference to a
specific mission planned for the night of February 16, which was
subsequently postponed. He recalled no discussion at that time in
which the 4th Brigade Commander ordered, or otherwise required, all
Apache missions to use this approach.
The 1-1 AVN Commander also recalled that, at a meeting on the evening
of February 16, the 4th Brigade Commander stated that he had decided
to keep the previous day's incident within the brigade and did not
want the incident discussed with the Assistant Division Commander.
However, the Brigade Commander maintained, and the Assistant Division
Commander confirmed, that earlier on February 16, the Brigade
Commander had personally advised the Assistant Division Commander of
the incident. For undetermined reasons, the Division Commander was
not advised of the February 15 incident until after the fratricide
incident on February 17.
--------------------
\5 Previously, some Apache pilots had used the perpendicular approach
to identify the screen line, but they did not necessarily use this
approach to identify individual targets.
FACTORS CONTRIBUTING TO THE
FEBRUARY 17, 1991, INCIDENT
--------------------------------------------------------- Appendix I:3
A number of factors contributed to the February 17, 1991, incident,
including the deployment of the task force's expansive screen line;
an unusual boundary on the right flank; the decision not to include
the Apaches in the counter-reconnaissance mission rehearsals; and
difficulties encountered by the ground troops in tracking and
identifying numerous reported enemy sightings.
DEPLOYMENT OF THE TASK FORCE
SCREEN LINE
------------------------------------------------------- Appendix I:3.1
Task Force Iron crossed the berm on February 15, 1991, on its
counter-reconnaissance mission and pushed north into Iraq. The task
force's forward line of advance was halted at Phase Line Minnesota
(the 25 east-west grid line), about 5 kilometers north of the berm,
because of concern that this forward element would be cut off from
reinforcements in the event of an Iraqi attack.
To cover the expansive terrain--approximately 50 kilometers wide--and
in anticipation of moving even further forward, the task force
deployed Bradleys (see fig. I.5) and M1A1 Abrams Main Battle Tanks
(see fig. I.6) along Phase Line Minnesota, forming a screen line
facing north. Vehicles from the 1-4 CAV were deployed approximately
20 kilometers along the screen line to the west, while vehicles from
the TF 1-41 were deployed approximately 30 kilometers along the
screen line to the east--twice the normal frontage assigned to a
force this size. (See fig. I.7.)
Figure I.5: The Bradley
Fighting Vehicle
(See figure in printed
edition.)
Figure I.6: The M1 A1 Abrams
Main Battle Tank
(See figure in printed
edition.)
Figure I.7: Task Force Iron's
Screen Lines
(See figure in printed
edition.)
(See figure in printed
edition.)
TF 1-41's sector was further divided into thirds--each about 10
kilometers wide--with three companies forward. To the west was a
mechanized (armored personnel carriers and Bradleys) company from the
1st Battalion, 41st Infantry (B/1-41); to the center was a tank
company from the 3rd Battalion of the 66th Regiment (B/3-66); and to
the east was a mechanized company (C/1-41). The fourth company, a
tank company (A/3-66), remained near the center of the sector,
somewhat to the east.
The remainder of the 1st Infantry Division was positioned to the
south of Task Force Iron, below the berm, with the 1st Cavalry
Division (1st CAV) to the east and the 2nd Armored Cavalry Regiment
(2nd ACR) to the west. Task Force Iron established screen lines
running north to south to link with U.S. forces deployed below the
berm. The screen lines served to link the task force to the 1st CAV
and 2nd ACR, while protecting its left (western) and right (eastern)
flanks.
THE RIGHT FLANK'S RAINBOW
BOUNDARY
------------------------------------------------------- Appendix I:3.2
According to the TF 1-41 Commander, Bravo Company's (B/1-41) sector
to the west was compartmented by wadis--streambed-like
depressions--while Charlie Company's (C/1-41) sector to the east was
open terrain. The more open the terrain, the more uniformly the
vehicles were spread. Charlie Company had 13 Bradleys, with 9
arrayed along the screen line and 4 behind them for control purposes.
The Bradleys were positioned with about 1 kilometer between each
vehicle, although some were as close as 500 meters.
The TF 1-41 Commander protected the right flank by taking advantage
of the terrain, creating a "rainbow boundary" that formed an arc of
scout vehicles from north to south. He estimated that the vehicle in
the northeast corner of his boundary was about 4 kilometers further
east than the vehicle in the southeast corner, closest to the berm.
The scout platoon leader, who commanded the scout vehicles along the
task force's right flank, estimated that more than 2 kilometers were
between his vehicle in the northeast corner of the boundary and the
C/1-41 vehicles along Phase Line Minnesota at the 25 east-west grid
line. He further estimated that his first platoon vehicle was
located 1 kilometer north of the border berm and that each of the
five remaining scout vehicles--Bradleys--was positioned along the
right flank facing northeast. The vehicles were positioned about 700
meters north and 200 meters east of each other, forming the rainbow
boundary that linked TF 1-41's right flank with the left flank of the
1st CAV. This would mean that the scout vehicle in the northeast
corner of the boundary was only about 1.5 kilometers further east
than the scout vehicle in the southeast corner, rather than 4
kilometers, as originally anticipated by the TF 1-41 Commander.
(Compare the planned arc of the rainbow boundary shown on fig. I.7
and the actual boundary shown on fig. II.1.)
PREPARATION FOR THE
COUNTER-RECONNAISSANCE
MISSION
------------------------------------------------------- Appendix I:3.3
The TF 1-41 Commander stated that he, his Operations Officer, and the
Brigade Operations Officer had concluded that the vehicles in the
northeast corner of the boundary were at risk of being fired upon by
the 1st CAV positioned below the berm. As a result, they had
discussed their concerns with the Charlie Company Commander, whose
troops were at greatest risk. In addition, TF 1-41 ground forces
rehearsed the counter-reconnaissance mission at least five times
while at TAA Roosevelt, with every tank commander walking through the
sand table exercise.
The Apache pilots/copilot gunners were not included in the mission
rehearsals at TAA Roosevelt because TF 1-41, which was a part of the
3rd Brigade based in Germany, had had no Apaches attached to it. In
addition, the Apaches, from the 4th Brigade based in Kansas, were not
expected to be part of the task force's counter-reconnaissance
mission. However, about a week before the mission, while Task Force
Iron was still positioned at TAA Roosevelt, the Task Force Commander,
the 4th Brigade Commander, the TF 1-41 Commander, and the 1-1 AVN
Commander met at the Brigade Tactical Operations Center to discuss
the possible utilization of Apaches. This was the only time the TF
1-41 and 1-1 AVN Commanders met prior to the fratricide incident.
During the meeting, the TF 1-41 Commander laid out his concept of the
operation using a map board, while the 4th Brigade Commander and the
1-1 AVN Commander speculated as how to best deploy the Apaches in
such situations. According to the TF 1-41 Commander, the plan was to
bring the Apaches up and behind the screen line. Once the aircraft
identified the line of friendly vehicles, the Apaches would search
forward and, if enemy targets were identified, fire. The officers
also discussed ways to mark the ground vehicles for identification by
friendly aircraft.
According to the TF 1-41 Commander, the 1-1 AVN Commander did not
object to flying counter-reconnaissance missions or to using Apaches
for counter-reconnaissance purposes. However, the 1-1 AVN Commander
did express his need to understand how the ground troops were to be
positioned, because he did not want the Apaches and the ground forces
to shoot at each other by mistake. It was agreed that the 1-1 AVN
Apaches would fly around the TAA Roosevelt area so that the pilots
could view the tanks and Bradleys through their sights, while the
ground gunners viewed the aircraft through their own sights. The TF
1-41 Commander arranged this exercise and suggested that it also be
done by other units.
The TF 1-41 Commander maintained that the rainbow boundary on the
right flank was a significant factor in the February 17 fratricide
incident. He admitted that he did not discuss his concerns with the
1-1 AVN Commander at their meeting, because the task force had not
planned to use the Apaches in the counter-reconnaissance mission.
However, he maintains that the 1-1 AVN Commander was given a copy of
TF 1-41's map graphics at that time, which showed the rainbow
boundary. The 1-1 AVN Commander recalled only that the Division was
concerned about the right flank because "there was a gap between us
and the 1st CAV Division," which was deployed south of the berm.
FEBRUARY 16, 1991, SIGHTINGS
------------------------------------------------------- Appendix I:3.4
Throughout the day on February 16, 1991, Task Force Iron received
reports of movement by suspected enemy vehicles north of where the
task force's line of advance had halted on Phase Line Minnesota.
This raised concerns that the Iraqis were possibly reconnoitering the
area penetrated by U.S. forces. According to the TF 1-41 Commander,
TF 1-41 saw flares along the trace, or outline, of the Iraqi main
defense line at about 7:30-8:30 p.m. Each of the three forward
companies reported sightings; and gunners, using thermal sights,
reported seeing "hot spots," or targets, in front of their positions
at ranges in excess of 5 kilometers. The TF 1-41 Commander noted
that the thermal imaging systems used on the Bradleys and the tanks
were capable of acquiring "hot spots" in excess of 4 kilometers,
depending upon the polarity setting, but the resolution was only a
blip of light and the systems could not distinguish shape or outline.
When the gunners--using a Ground Laser Locator Designator--began
detecting targets at a range of about 3 kilometers, the TF 1-41
Commander and the Task Force Commander began discussing what appeared
to be clusters of Iraqi vehicles. The vehicles appeared to be
separating into smaller groups and hiding in the folds of the
terrain. It appeared that the enemy vehicles were working their way
from west to east, which was consistent with what the U.S. forces
expected.
The TF 1-41 Commander became convinced that these sightings were
something more than camels or 50-gallon barrels, which had earlier
caused similar false target "sightings." When three vehicles were
sighted, he and the Task Force Commander discussed firing artillery
at the targets. The TF 1-41 Commander then received a call on his
communications network from the Operations Officer of the 1st CAV,
who reported having lost two vehicles. The vehicles had been sent
forward of the berm to do reconnaissance and were thought to have
strayed into TF 1-41's sector. Their last known position was a
kilometer or so forward of the 25 east-west grid line. Unable to
positively identify the sighted vehicles and concerned that they were
the 1st CAV's lost vehicles, the TF 1-41 Commander decided not to
engage the targets.
Later that evening, the 1st CAV Operations Officer advised the TF
1-41 Commander that he had regained control of all his vehicles, and
all were behind the berm. It was at this point that one of the
forward companies, Charlie Company, reported spotting three
vehicles--one large and two small armored ones--to the north of the
screen line. According to the TF 1-41 Commander, all of the TF 1-41
vehicles were positioned south of Phase Line Minnesota; any vehicles
to the north had to be enemy.
The Charlie Company Commander requested permission to engage and
subsequently fired at the targets with a TOW (Tube-launched,
Optically-tracked, Wire-guided) missile, which has a maximum range of
about 3,750 meters. No secondary explosions were reported, and it
was not clear if the targets were hit--or that they existed. TF 1-41
then lost sight of the targets, and the Task Force Commander
requested assistance from the Apaches in relocating them.
THE FEBRUARY 17, 1991, INCIDENT
========================================================== Appendix II
Shortly after midnight on February 17, 1991, following suspected
enemy sightings by ground troops, three Apaches from the 1-1 AVN were
launched on a reconnaissance mission to locate and destroy the
suspected enemy targets. At approximately 1 a.m. on February 17, an
Apache copilot/gunner--the 1-1 AVN Commander--fired Hellfire missiles
that destroyed two friendly vehicles, killing two U.S. soldiers and
wounding six others. The Apache copilot/gunner fired, believing that
the vehicles were enemy, because he had mistakenly read and reported
the vehicles' position as that of an earlier enemy sighting. An Army
investigation immediately following the fratricide incident concluded
that Hellfire missiles from the Apache had struck the friendly
vehicles.
THE FEBRUARY 17, 1991, INCIDENT
-------------------------------------------------------- Appendix II:1
THE APACHE RECONNAISSANCE
MISSION
------------------------------------------------------ Appendix II:1.1
On the evening of February 16, 1991, Apaches from the 1-1 AVN planned
to conduct an attack mission against Iraqi targets north of Phase
Line Minnesota--utilizing the south-to-north approach procedure.
However, Army logs reveal that at approximately 8:00 p.m., the 4th
Brigade Commander advised the 1-1 AVN Commander that the attack
mission for that night had been canceled.
At approximately 9:42 p.m., TF 1-41 reported sighting six vehicles
traveling south in the vicinity of grid coordinate NT877273.\1 (See
fig. II.1.) At approximately 10:10 p.m., TF 1-41 spotted another
group of three vehicles moving north to south in the vicinity of
NT790270. The 1-1 AVN log notes that at 11:00 PM, the 4th Brigade
considered launching Apaches to destroy the targets. At
approximately 11:25 p.m., the Brigade Commander issued the launch
order.
Figure II.1: Reported
Sightings and Flight Path of
the Apaches
(See figure in printed
edition.)
(See figure in printed
edition.)
The 1-1 AVN Commander told us that prior to receiving the launch
order, the 1-1 AVN Operations Officer telephoned, advising him that
suspected enemy vehicles had been located in front of the screen line
and that the Apaches would probably be ordered to fly in support of
the ground troops. The 1-1 AVN Commander recalled that he was
concerned about launching the aircraft because of the severe weather
conditions, which included winds in excess of 30 knots and blowing
sand; the lack of moonlight; and the close proximity to friendly
forces. Also, he questioned the use of the Apaches, since the M1A1
tanks on the screen line could engage enemy vehicles at the reported
range.\2
The 1-1 AVN Commander expressed his concerns to the Operations
Officer and requested that they be relayed to the 4th Brigade
Commander. At 11:39 PM, the 1-1 AVN log notes, "Bn Cdr [Battalion
Commander] concerned w/ friendlys [sic] close to enemy targets -
Primary targets 6 veh. NT885270." According to the 1-1 AVN
Commander, the Brigade Commander responded to his concerns by telling
the 1-1 AVN Operations Officer to get the Apaches airborne and
advising him that they would deal with the problem "up there." The
Brigade Commander confirmed that the 1-1 AVN Commander had indicated
that he did not want to go on the mission and that he did not want
any of his pilots to go, because he was concerned about the proximity
of the targets to friendly forces. The Brigade Commander said he
told the 1-1 AVN Commander that the mission had to be attempted and
to "launch the aircraft." The Brigade Commander advised us that if
wind conditions had proved to be too severe for the Apaches to fly,
the mission could have been canceled and the aircraft returned to
base.
When the launch order was received, the 1-1 AVN Commander informed
his pilot that the Apaches had been ordered to fly a reconnaissance
mission. He indicated that he was sending the Blue Team, which
consisted of two of his more experienced Apache crews, but that he
intended to lead the mission because of the bad flying conditions
that night and his concern over the two previous friendly fire
incidents. According to the 1-1 AVN Commander and his pilot, they
had difficulty locating their aircraft because of the blowing sand
and lack of moonlight, and one of the three Apaches almost crashed on
takeoff because of the high winds.\3
Shortly after midnight, at approximately 12:10 a.m., on February 17,
1991, the three Apache helicopters became airborne en route to the
designated enemy area. The lead aircraft was flown by the 1-1 AVN
Commander, a Lieutenant Colonel, acting as copilot/gunner, and a
Chief Warrant Officer 3, as pilot, under the radio call sign
"Gunfighter 6." The second aircraft, the Blue Team leader, was flown
by a Captain, as copilot/gunner, and a Warrant Officer 1, as pilot,
under the radio call sign "Blue 6." The third helicopter was flown by
a Chief Warrant Officer 2, as copilot/gunner, and a Warrant Officer
1, as pilot, under the call sign "Blue 5."
Apache crew members generally received detailed premission briefings
regarding their assignments, which included a thorough discussion of
such topics as intelligence summaries, weather, battle plan, and
status of radios. That was not the case on the February 16-17
mission, since it was launched in direct response to reports of enemy
vehicles in the area and time did not allow a detailed premission
briefing. Consequently, the Apache crew members had only a basic
knowledge of the enemy vehicles' reported position and had to develop
the mission on the basis of those reports.
--------------------
\1 Grid coordinates identify geographical areas where north-south and
east-west lines intersect. For example, the grid coordinate NT877273
indicates the geographical area (NT), the north-south grid line
(877), and the east-west grid line (273). Coordinates may be written
with varying specificity, i.e., 8727, 877273, and 87702730 represent
the same coordinate.
\2 The M1A1's 120-millimeter gun is capable of firing at targets up
to 3,650 meters away.
\3 OH-58C Kiowa light observation helicopters were attached to the
1-1 AVN but were not deployed during this mission because of the high
winds.
THE FLIGHT PATH OF THE
APACHES
------------------------------------------------------ Appendix II:1.2
Before takeoff, the Apache pilots had been provided the primary
target grids reported by the ground units. Each copilot/gunner
manually entered the data into his respective Fire Control Computer
using a Data Entry Keyboard. While en route, the TF 1-41 Executive
Officer (radio call sign "Stalwart 5"), located in TF 1-41's Tactical
Operations Center (TOC), gave them an operations briefing over the
radio, while guiding the Apaches into the area. The pilots were
advised that two enemy vehicles were apparently moving from west to
east in the vicinity of grid coordinate NT915270 and that one of the
vehicles was thought to have been hit by a TOW missile. The
copilot/gunners also manually entered this target grid into their
Fire Control Computers.
At approximately 12:30 a.m. on February 17, the Gunfighter 6
copilot/gunner (Gunfighter 6) reported that the aircraft were in the
area, "behind" the U.S. ground vehicles. The three Apaches had
apparently crossed the berm and were approaching the screen line from
south to north, along the 88 north-south grid line. (See fig.
II.1.)
As the aircraft approached the area, they observed friendly vehicles
facing north, deployed along an east-west line, which they identified
as the screen line. According to the 1-1 AVN Commander, the Apaches
observed no targets at the NT885270 grid coordinate. The aircraft
then began moving east toward the 91 north-south grid line, while
scanning with their Forward Looking Infra-Red (FLIR) thermal optical
equipment, in an attempt to locate the reported enemy vehicles at the
NT915270 grid coordinate. They flew at a northeast heading toward
the new search coordinate; they did not move due east and reapproach
the targets from the south--the procedure discussed between the 1-1
AVN Commander and the 4th Brigade Commander on the previous day.
At this point, the Blue 6 copilot/gunner (Blue 6) activated his
aircraft's gun tape recorder (video and audio). This recorded what
was seen in the TADS and what was heard over all radios in the
aircraft, including FM secure communications with ground forces,
VHF/UHF communications between aircraft, intercom communications
between the copilot/gunner and the pilot, and repeated warnings of
possible enemy presence by the AN/APR-39A(V)1 Radar Warning Receiver
(Voice Warning). Blue 5's copilot/gunner (Blue 5) and Gunfighter 6
subsequently activated their recorders. (See app. V for our
integrated transcription of the tapes.)
While flying toward the new target, Gunfighter 6 reported sighting
vehicles around the 29 east-west grid. The Task Force Commander
(radio call sign "Iron Deuce 6") confirmed that these were the
vehicles the Apaches were to identify. Gunfighter 6 commented that
the line of friendly vehicles appeared to be on the 22 or 23
east-west grid line and advised Blue 6 that they could "shoot
anything north of the 25" grid line.
SIGHTING THE TARGETS
------------------------------------------------------ Appendix II:1.3
Blue 6, flying northeast on a 050-degree compass heading, spotted six
vehicles that Gunfighter 6 advised were "friendly Bradleys oriented
north." Turning to a 068-degree compass heading, Blue 6 continued to
"screen," or survey, the area toward the northeast, and spotted two
targets "about 6,000 meters off my nose," which he estimated to be on
the 29 east-west grid. Iron Deuce 6, who overheard part of the
Apache communications, advised the TF 1-41 Executive Officer (call
sign "Stalwart 5"), "Looks like they are getting ready to engage. It
looks like around 9229 grid square." Apparently, none of those
listening to the radio traffic realized Blue 6's miscalculation,
namely, that if the Apaches were positioned on the 9123 grid lines at
a 068-degree compass heading, targets 6,000 meters directly in front
of them would be at approximately the 25 east-west grid--not the 29
east-west grid.
Gunfighter 6 then attempted to orient the Apaches. With the aircraft
on a 040-degree compass heading, he identified friendly vehicles "in
front of us--out to about two-and-a-half kilometers." Blue 6 advised
Gunfighter 6 to turn to a compass heading of 070-degrees--almost due
east--and to look out 6,000 meters. Gunfighter 6 apparently spotted
the vehicles; and using the TADS, he lased and stored the coordinates
of the targets.
The TADS identified the target locations by measuring their distance
from the aircraft with a laser beam. This information was then
stored in the Fire Control Computer, which computed the target
locations by comparing their distance and heading with the Apache's
location. The computer stored up to 9 grid coordinates (numbered
0-8) that the copilot/gunner could recall and view on a 3.5-inch
screen. (See fig. I.4 for depiction of the screen.) The screen
displayed three positions at a time, but the data could be scrolled
to view any of the grids stored in the computer.
The Gunfighter 6 gun tape indicates that Gunfighter 6 recalled the
first three grid coordinates in the system. He observed the
following readout:
0 38R NT 95592445 A+1060\4
1 38R NT 91502700 A+1024
2 38R NT 91302910 A+1101
He thought he was reading the grid coordinates for the vehicles he
was seeing 6,000 meters away on the 070 heading, which were stored in
position 0. Instead, he read the search coordinates given to him at
the beginning of the mission, which he had manually input and stored
in position 1. The display screen does not distinguish between
search coordinates that are input manually and those of actual
targets that are lased and stored automatically.
Gunfighter 6 advised the Ground Commander, Iron Deuce 6, that he had
located "two big APC [Armored Personnel Carrier] sort of vehicles,
grid coordinate NT915270" that did not appear to be part of the
screen line. (The 1-1 AVN Commander later confirmed that, in this
instance, the physical proximity of the vehicles had become his
primary focus, while the grid coordinates had become secondary.) Not
realizing that Gunfighter 6 had misread the target coordinates, Iron
Deuce 6 confirmed that the coordinates were "exactly where we shot
the last vehicle. Looks like we killed one of them. Those are
enemy. Go ahead and take them out."
Gunfighter 6 then checked the system and again misread the
coordinates, saying, "915270. Looks like one vehicle is pulled up to
another one there. They may be transloading people." This
information was consistent with the scenario presented by ground
commanders in which one of the two vehicles had been struck by a TOW
missile. Again, Iron Deuce 6 authorized the Apaches to "take them
out."
Although the Apaches had been authorized by the Ground Commander to
fire at the targets, Gunfighter 6 asked Blue 6 to verify the target's
position. Blue 6 then asked Blue 5 if he could verify the target,
commenting, "My target NAV's [navigation system] not working right."
Blue 6 advised Gunfighter 6, "when I NAV and store it, I get it
greater than 9524 vicinity. It doesn't--it's not coming out right."
Gunfighter 6 commented, "Yeah, and it's over behind the right of this
Bradley right here. They may have shot themselves."
In the meantime, Blue 5 lased and stored the target and advised Blue
6 that the targets appeared to be on the 25 east-west grid line.
Although Blue 5's transmission is recorded on the Gunfighter 6 gun
tape, when interviewed the 1-1 AVN Commander--Gunfighter 6--advised
us that he had not heard Blue 5's communication on the night of the
incident. He commented that the audio tape is much clearer, when
reviewed, than when the same communications are heard through a
helmet headset.
At this point, Gunfighter 6, which was approximately 4,750 meters
from the target, moved ahead of the other two aircraft, and stopped
3,437 meters from the targets. Gunfighter 6 then radioed the Ground
Commander, Iron Deuce 6, saying, "You have a Bradley at 946245 and
he's oriented north on the screen line. He's got an APC [Armored
Personnel Carrier] near him also. Then, off to his right [emphasis
added] are these two vehicles that I see, and those are the vehicles
at 915270"--again misreading the coordinates displayed on his screen.
Iron Deuce 6 asked, "Can you still engage those two vehicles at the
270 grid line?" Gunfighter 6 said he could, and Iron Deuce 6 again
told him, "Take 'em out." Clearly, the ground commanders did not
realize that the crews were viewing targets to the east--not to the
north--of the vehicles on the screen line, despite the contradictory
information provided by Gunfighter 6.
--------------------
\4 The first number (0) indicates the location of the grid coordinate
in the Fire Control Computer. The second set of numbers (38R NT)
identifies the geographical area. The next set of contiguous numbers
(95592445) is the grid coordinate, which identifies the area where
the north-south (9559) and east-west grid lines (2445) intersect.
The "A+," followed by a set of numbers, indicates the altitude above
mean sea level of the grid coordinate.
THE ATTACK
------------------------------------------------------ Appendix II:1.4
The Blue 6 and Blue 5 aircraft, which had remained behind while
Gunfighter 6 flew forward, then began to move toward the lead
aircraft. At this point, the TF 1-41 Commander (call sign "Stalwart
6") came on the communications network and, relying on the
description and location of the targets provided by Gunfighter 6,
confirmed that they were "consistent with the type that was fired
[upon] earlier." He told Gunfighter 6 to "go ahead and shoot those"
and then to move to another location farther west to search for a
vehicle that appeared to be hiding in low ground.
Gunfighter 6 commented that his aircraft was "at the 233 [grid] and
we're heading 070 [degrees]. Okay. Firing gun." He then said that
his 30-millimeter gun had "jammed," and his pilot suggested that he
"Go missiles." Instead, Gunfighter 6 responded to a call from the
Ground Commander, Iron Deuce 6, again describing the vehicles he saw
in his TADS. He answered, "It appears one of them is, in fact,
killed; and I'm going to go ahead and shoot the other one now." Iron
Deuce 6 responded, "Roger. I say, go ahead. Take 'em out."
Gunfighter 6 rechecked the coordinates but again mistakenly read the
search coordinates that he had input en route to the area instead of
the coordinates of the target he was viewing. Blue 6 confirmed that
he saw "two vehicles. One's pointed toward us, the other's about 90
degrees perpendicular to him." Gunfighter 6 lined his sights on the
target and fired a Hellfire missile, striking one of the vehicles.
He advised the Ground Commander that the first target was "completely
destroyed." He then lined his sights on the second target and fired
another Hellfire missile, destroying the second vehicle. Although
the 1-1 AVN Commander believed he had attacked two Iraqi vehicles
north of the screen line, he had actually attacked two U.S. vehicles
positioned along the northeast corner of the screen line.
Stalwart 6 gave the Apaches a new search coordinate and attempted to
move them away from the area to allow his artillery to "pick up any
dismounts." However, Gunfighter 6 spotted personnel walking away from
the targets "on a heading of east." Actually, the Apache gun tapes
reveal that the aircraft was on a 070-degree compass heading, meaning
that the personnel were walking south, toward friendly forces.
Since Gunfighter 6's 30-millimeter gun was jammed, he instructed Blue
6 and Blue 5 to engage the targets with their guns. Almost
immediately, Stalwart 6 reported that "friendly vehicles may have
been hit" in the NT965247 vicinity "from the rear"; and a cease-fire
was ordered. The time was approximately 12:56 a.m. on February 17.
Initially, ground commanders feared their vehicles had been fired
upon by enemy forces that had penetrated their screen line. They
also speculated that the 1st CAV, which was below the berm, had fired
at the friendly forces. While they were attempting to determine what
had happened, the commanders called for medical evacuation
helicopters to attend to the wounded and moved the Apaches out of the
area to search for additional targets. When the Apaches completed
their search, the 4th Brigade Commander ordered Gunfighter 6 to fly
over the TF 1-41 Tactical Operations Center, where it was confirmed
that the aircraft's navigation system was functioning. The Task
Force Iron Commander then released the Apaches, and they returned to
their base below the berm. (See fig. I.7)
THE TWO FRIENDLY VEHICLES
------------------------------------------------------ Appendix II:1.5
On the evening of February 16, 1991, an M113 Armored Personnel
Carrier (see fig. II.2) assigned to the scout platoon was to watch
the northeast area because the battalion had an exposed right flank.
M113s were usually attached to the scout platoons for the purpose of
transporting the Ground Surveillance Radar. Since the radar had to
be taken out of the vehicle and set on the ground, there was no
reason for the M113, which was facing northwest, to face a specific
direction. By comparison, Bradleys and tanks along the east-west
screen line faced north, while scout vehicles along the right flank
faced northeast.
Figure II.2: The M113 Armored
Personnel Carrier
(See figure in printed
edition.)
When the Commander of Task Force Iron advised TF 1-41 that the
Apaches had been called to identify the suspected enemy targets, the
scout platoon leader attempted, but was unable, to communicate this
information to his M113 by radio. (It was determined later that the
M113's radio was inoperable.) He then sent his squad leader, who was
in his Bradley on the right flank about 200 meters from the M113 to
provide security for that vehicle, to inform the M113's crew of the
Apache mission.
The squad leader, a sergeant, pulled his Bradley out of position and
drove over to the M113. He got out of his vehicle and walked over to
the M113 to speak to the soldiers. He then walked back to his
Bradley, which was facing northeast, and climbed inside just before
the Apache attacked the vehicle. Five men were inside the Bradley
when the Hellfire missile hit it: two were killed, three were
injured. The three men in the M113, who had stepped out of their
vehicle, were injured by the blast of the second Hellfire missile
when it struck their vehicle.
EVENTS IMMEDIATELY FOLLOWING
THE INCIDENT
-------------------------------------------------------- Appendix II:2
TF 1-41 continued to have sporadic contact with suspected Iraqi
vehicles throughout the early hours of February 17, 1991. When the
activity ceased, the TF 1-41 Commander moved some of his vehicles to
the site of the destroyed M113 and Bradley and confirmed their exact
location--NT965247--using the Global Positioning System. Later that
morning, TF 1-41 was authorized to make a 2-kilometer sweep north of
Phase Line Minnesota but did not find the vehicle that Charlie
Company had shot at with the TOW.
During the night of February 17, Bravo Company (B/1-41) reported
intermittent sightings of possible enemy vehicles at 3-plus
kilometers; but Apache support was not requested. After sunrise on
the following morning, February 18, Task Force Iron was ordered to
withdraw. By noon, the task force had withdrawn through the berm and
had relocated at TAA Manhattan.
An Army investigation following the fratricide incident concluded
that Hellfire missiles from the Apache, Gunfighter 6, had destroyed
the two friendly vehicles.
ANALYSIS OF THE ARMY REGULATION
15-6 INVESTIGATION OF THE FEBRUARY
17, 1991, INCIDENT
========================================================= Appendix III
Following the February 17, 1991, incident, the Army conducted a
formal investigation into the cause of the two deaths and six
injuries. The investigation concluded, among other points, that the
vehicles had apparently been struck by Hellfire missiles fired from
the Apache designated as Gunfighter 6. On February 20, 1991, the
Division Commander relieved the 1-1 AVN Commander of his command for
failing to follow the Commanding General's guidance on appropriate
command and control procedures by acting as the firing platform while
in command of the combat mission.
We agree with the Army's overall investigative findings. Our
investigation found insufficient evidence to contradict the Army's
conclusions regarding the Army's standard operating procedures or the
Division Commander's guidance concerning field commanders' use of
command and control procedures. However, we determined that the Army
Regulation (AR) 15-6 investigation for suspected misconduct by an
officer did not address the issue of fatigue, which may have been a
factor in this incident.
THE ARMY INVESTIGATION
------------------------------------------------------- Appendix III:1
On February 18, 1991, the Division Commander appointed the Assistant
Division Commander as the Investigating Officer to investigate the
deaths of the two soldiers who were apparent victims of fratricide.
This action was taken under AR 15-6, which provides guidance for
conducting official Army investigations.
The Investigating Officer was directed to determine "all the facts
surrounding this incident and, ultimately, determine the cause of the
deaths." He was specifically directed to (1) determine the procedures
in effect to prevent fratricide and to engage targets that could not
be positively identified, (2) determine whether those procedures were
followed, (3) clarify the guidance given the 1-1 AVN Commander
regarding command and control procedures to be employed during combat
operations, and (4) evaluate whether the 1-1 AVN Commander followed
the command and control guidance. The Investigating Officer was
authorized to conduct informal procedures but was to take sworn
statements and give warnings of Article 31(b) rights before
questioning soldiers suspected of violating the Uniform Code of
Military Justice.
THE INVESTIGATING OFFICER'S
FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
------------------------------------------------------- Appendix III:2
The Investigating Officer provided his findings and recommendations
to the Division Commander on February 19, 1991. In summary, he
determined that the vehicles "were destroyed from the rear by a large
caliber chemical energy warhead"--apparently Hellfire missiles fired
from an Apache--and that "the proximate cause of engaging friendly
forces was a breakdown in proper application of SOPs [standard
operating procedures] and pre-fire check procedures." The report
stated that a procedure had been established to approach friendly
screen lines from south to north. Although the three Apaches
initially followed the procedure, they departed from it when a target
was identified on a 070-degree compass heading, failing to backtrack
and reapproach the new target position from the south.
The Investigating Officer also determined that the 1-1 AVN Commander
had mistakenly read a grid coordinate previously entered into the
Fire Control Computer as the target grid. The report noted, "It
appears the firing AH-64 [Apache] did not lase and store the target
vehicle location to ensure the correct grid had been determined . .
. or, if the target was lased and stored, the grid called up was
NT910270. The Ground Commander was correct to direct engagement as
he was continually told 910270, well forward of his screen."
Finally, the Investigating Officer determined that the 1-1 AVN
Commander "would have been better able to control the engagement had
he stayed with his policy of supervision/synchronization as opposed
to being the firing platform."
On the basis of his findings, the Investigating Officer concluded
that (1) the incident was caused by violating procedures; (2) "the
Commanding General's [Division Commander] policy of leaders staying
where they can control as opposed to fighting was known"; and (3)
"Apache missions in close proximity to friendly troops are difficult
when there is a clear enemy presence. When the situation is such
that the AH-64 is looking for 1 or 2 elusive vehicles, the mission is
extremely dangerous with a concomitant risk of fratricide."
He recommended that standard operating procedures be continually
reinforced and rehearsed and that "commanders need to stay detached
from the immediate engagement so they are in a position to
effectively lead and control subordinates' actions." He also
recommended that Apaches be used against "clearly identified and
massed enemy formations/targets that simplify target acquisition and
engagement" and that the 1-1 AVN Commander receive a letter of
reprimand from the Division Commander.
DECISION TO REMOVE 1-1 AVN
COMMANDER
------------------------------------------------------- Appendix III:3
The Division Commander related to us that he had read the Army
investigation report and recommendations of the Assistant Division
Commander and had reviewed the gun tapes several times before
reaching his decision to remove the 1-1 AVN Commander from command.
He explained that the 1-1 AVN Commander, as the Apache Battalion
Commander, had the responsibility to coordinate, synchronize, and
direct his forces in the engagement. He also noted that when the 1-1
AVN Commander's 30-millimeter gun had jammed, he had the opportunity
to remove himself from the gunner position, resume command and
control, and direct the other two Apache aircraft in the attack. In
the Division Commander's view, the 1-1 AVN Commander had failed to
exercise command and control over his forces and had chosen to become
personally engaged in the attack.
On the basis of his review of the tapes, the Division Commander
determined that the 1-1 AVN Commander--who commented as he was firing
the first missile, "I hope they're not friendlies"--was uncertain
that his target was enemy before he fired the missiles. The Division
Commander stated that the 1-1 AVN Commander was not required to
engage the enemy if he was in doubt concerning the identity of the
targets. He commented that the 1-1 AVN Commander's "severe
leadership failure" resulted in the deaths of the two U.S. soldiers.
Consequently, he decided to relieve the 1-1 AVN Commander of his
command. The VII Corps Commander reviewed and concurred with the
Division Commander's decision.
GAO'S REVIEW OF THE
INVESTIGATION
------------------------------------------------------- Appendix III:4
Our review of the Army's AR 15-6 investigation focused on the
antifratricide standard operating procedures in effect at the time of
the February 17, 1991, incident. These included written and verbal
procedures on the proper approach to suspected enemy targets,
prefire-check procedures, and rules of engagement. We also examined
the 1-1 AVN Commander's concerns regarding the use of attack Apache
helicopters as reconnaissance aircraft and the Division Commander's
decision not to request an aviation safety investigation.
STANDARD OPERATING
PROCEDURES
----------------------------------------------------- Appendix III:4.1
SOUTH-TO-NORTH APPROACH
--------------------------------------------------- Appendix III:4.1.1
According to the 4th Brigade Commander, the February 1 and 15
incidents and general perspective problems encountered in the stark
desert environment indicated the need for special control procedures
to avoid fratricide. The Brigade Commander advised us that he had
discussed these problems with the 1-1 AVN Commander on February 16,
1991, and that they had agreed that aircraft should fly south to
north, perpendicular to the screen line, whenever approaching their
targets.
The Brigade Commander additionally advised us that prior to the
February 17, 1991, incident, he had no indication that the 1-1 AVN
Commander had failed to brief the soldiers under his command about
the new procedure. He added that he now believes that the 1-1 AVN
Commander did not brief his subordinates on this issue.
During our investigation, we learned that some Apache pilots flew
perpendicular to the screen line as a means of orienting their
aircraft in the featureless desert terrain. However, none of the 1-1
AVN pilots we interviewed were aware--prior to the February 17
incident--that this was the procedure they were to use whenever
approaching suspected targets.
The 1-1 AVN Commander recalled having the conversation with the
Brigade Commander regarding the south-to-north approach on the
evening of February 16, 1991. However, he further recalled that the
special procedure was to be used on a planned mission to attack the
Iraqi trench line. He stated that the mission was postponed later
that evening because the Air Force had reserved the air space to make
bombing runs. According to the 1-1 AVN Commander, the south-to-north
approach was to be implemented "to obtain maximum standoff" from
known Iraqi targets that had been located and identified by prior
reconnaissance.
The 1-1 AVN Commander maintained that the south-to-north approach
procedure was not a standard operating procedure and was not required
on all Apache missions. However, he and the other Apache crews
initially followed the procedure on the February 17 mission and
approached the screen line from south to north to establish the
position of the U.S. screen line. They found no enemy targets at
the first reported location but spotted possible targets to the
northeast. The aircraft then approached the targets on an
east-northeast compass heading of 070 degrees, instead of flying due
east and approaching the new targets from the south. The 1-1 AVN
Commander contended that, once the Apaches had identified the screen
line of friendly vehicles, nothing required them to exit a target
site, move laterally, and then reapproach the targets from south to
north. He stated that the Apaches were flying directly above
friendly ground units, which he believed were a part of Task Force
Iron's screen line, and he saw no need to reapproach the new targets
from south to north.
PREFIRE-CHECK PROCEDURES
--------------------------------------------------- Appendix III:4.1.2
The 4th Brigade Commander, during the Army's AR 15-6 investigation,
identified the following prefire-check procedures as being in effect
at the time of the February 17, 1991, incident. In summary, the
copilot/gunner visually acquired the target through the TADS, lased
the target, and stored the information in the target navigation
system. The copilot/gunner then viewed the target coordinates and
provided them to the Ground Commander for verification. Once the
copilot/gunner received clearance to fire, he checked his equipment
to ensure that he had used the correct line of sight to lase the
target. If the gunner ensured that all of his systems were correct,
he attempted to acquire the target. If the systems did not work, the
gunner did not fire.
Our investigation confirmed that the 1-1 AVN Commander, while acting
as the firing platform, had lased and stored the target grid
coordinate in the Fire Control Computer and that he had previously
stored the search coordinate, provided to the Apaches by the ground
troops. However, in viewing the first three coordinates, he confused
their order; misread the search coordinate as the target coordinate;
and as a result, gave the Ground Commander erroneous information
regarding the location of the target. In short, he gave back to the
Ground Commander the same grid coordinate that the Ground Commander
had given him. This error was repeated at least three times prior to
the attack.
RULES OF ENGAGEMENT
--------------------------------------------------- Appendix III:4.1.3
The Division Commander indicated that his decision to relieve the
Apache Battalion Commander was based in part upon the 1-1 AVN
Commander's decision to fire upon the targets even though he had some
doubt that the target was enemy, as evidenced by his comments on the
gun tape.
When interviewed, the 1-1 AVN Commander commented that the urgency to
fire emanated from the Ground Commander. He referred to the
"complete flow of information," commenting that he had been told that
two enemy vehicles had been spotted, they had been engaged, and one
was believed to have been hit. When he saw the two target vehicles
parked side by side, what he observed fit the target description.
While the 1-1 AVN Commander admitted that "the responsibility to fire
always rests with the firing person," he commented that "I would have
never fired on my own, and did not fire on my own, but fired at the
urging and pestering of a ground commander senior to me who I was
working for." He added that the Ground Commander told him three times
to "go ahead and take them out," which he considered to be a "lawful
order."
During our investigation, we reviewed the Apache Training Brigade
Tactical Standard Operating Procedures (TAC SOP) manual, used for
training when the 1-1 AVN attended the Apache Training Course at Fort
Hood, Texas, in 1990. The TAC SOP "applies to all commands assigned,
attached, or under the operational control of the Apache Training
Brigade" and is the "base document for the Unit Training Program
field operations which incorporates evaluation standards, lessons
learned, and standard operating procedures from fielded units."
The Apache TAC SOP outlines engagement priorities as (1) immediate
threat to self, (2) immediate threat to team members, (3) immediate
threat to ground forces, and (4) other targets in priority. The
rules of engagement state,
"[C]riteria for determining clearance to fire will be
disseminated through the chain of command. In situations where
air crews are uncertain as to the identification of the target,
or doubt exists that the target is hostile, the following
criteria will be used: a. If the target commits a hostile act,
it will be immediately engaged. b. If the target cannot be
visually identified as hostile, it will not be engaged until
confirmed as hostile by at least one report from US or Allied
Forces in relation to the target's position and orientation on
the battlefield."
The Apache gun tapes clearly show that no hostile action had been
taken by the target vehicles. Although the AN/APR-39A(V)1 Radar
Warning Receiver (Voice Warning) repeatedly warned of possible enemy
presence, the immediate nature of the threat is arguable. Since the
target could not be visually identified as hostile and was not
committing hostile acts, the 1-1 AVN Commander's decision to confirm
the target coordinate with ground commanders was consistent with the
TAC SOP. Unfortunately, however, the 1-1 AVN Commander provided
incorrect information to the ground commanders, who were dependent
upon him for information regarding the target's position.
COMMAND AND CONTROL--THE
DIVISION COMMANDER'S
GUIDANCE TO COMMANDERS
----------------------------------------------------- Appendix III:4.2
None of the commanding officers we interviewed questioned the 1-1 AVN
Commander's decision to go on the February 17 mission, especially in
view of the weather conditions that evening. The issue they
consistently raised, however, was his decision to act as the firing
platform, placing his subordinate officers in the awkward position of
having to challenge him on grid verification. In fact, although Blue
6 advised the 1-1 AVN Commander that his instrumentation system
showed a different grid coordinate--information that was supported by
the third aircraft and that placed the vehicles below the screen line
of friendly vehicles--the subordinate officer questioned his
equipment rather than the judgment of his commanding officer.\1
Unfortunately, the 1-1 AVN Commander failed to resolve the perceived
navigation equipment problem reported by Blue 6 before firing.
The 1-1 AVN Commander told us that he was aware of the Division
Commander's guidance about controlling subordinate forces. He added
that the Division Commander had wanted commanders to control the
units from where they could see the battlefield but not to be so far
forward that they became personally engaged in the battle. However,
the 1-1 AVN Commander commented that it was his impression that the
guidance was not a prohibition, because he believed that the Division
Commander, at a meeting, stated that he had fired his tank at
unoccupied houses located near the Saudi-Iraqi border.
The 1-1 AVN Commander also told us that, in his opinion, the Division
Commander's actions clarified his previous guidance, in that there
was no prohibition for commanders to fire, based upon their
experience and judgment. When we interviewed the Division Commander,
the Assistant Division Commander, and another Lieutenant Colonel, who
attended the meeting, they each recalled the meeting but noted that
the Division Commander did not state that he had personally fired his
tank. The Assistant Division Commander recalled a related
conversation but stated that the Division Commander was merely
commenting on what he had seen, not what he had done.
--------------------
\1 The 1-1 AVN Commander had been criticized in the April 1990
after-action report, issued following the battalion's training at
Fort Hood, Texas, for exerting "centralized control" and "allowing
little initiative or freedom of action for subordinate commanders."
USE OF APACHES AS
RECONNAISSANCE AIRCRAFT
----------------------------------------------------- Appendix III:4.3
We learned that when the 1-1 AVN attended the Apache Training Course
at Fort Hood, Texas, in April 1990, the training concentrated
primarily on attack missions that involved clearly identified targets
behind enemy lines--not reconnaissance missions in close proximity to
friendly forces. We also learned that Apache fratricide-avoidance
procedures were just being developed.
The 1-1 AVN Commander advised us that he had voiced concerns to his
superior officers about the use of Apaches for surveillance missions
close to the screen line of friendly vehicles prior to the February
17, 1991, incident. He contended that the Apache was designed to
attack and destroy large numbers of clearly identifiable enemy tanks,
not to conduct reconnaissance missions. He explained that the
target-viewing screen used by the copilot/gunner is only 3.5 inches
wide, limiting the copilot/gunner's ability to distinguish between
friendly and enemy vehicles. (See fig. I.4.)
In addition, according to the 1-1 AVN Commander, between February 1
and 16, 1991, the 1-1 AVN Apaches flew numerous armed reconnaissance
missions in search of reported enemy vehicles; but enemy vehicles
were never found. He attributed this to false readings by the ground
radars or misidentification of images by ground forces unfamiliar
with the use of radar in the flat desert terrain. He noted that
there was a growing pressure on the Apache pilots to locate hostile
targets.
The Division Commander informed us that he ordered the Apaches
launched on the night of February 16, 1991, to respond to reports of
suspected enemy vehicles. He stated that the Apaches, which were
equipped with the Forward Looking Infra-Red (FLIR) targeting and
sighting system, were the appropriate choice for the mission because
of their ability to view the "depth of the battlefield." He explained
that the Apache could fly to the screen line and, using the FLIR
optic system, could "see" further than the ground vehicles, which
lacked the more sophisticated night vision system. Additionally, he
commented that the Apaches, using the Hellfire missiles, were capable
of firing on the enemy at greater distances than tanks. He
summarized that because of the strong wind conditions and lack of
moonlight, the Apache was the appropriate choice for the mission
because it had the night vision capability and lethality to deal with
the enemy.
FATIGUE WAS NOT ADDRESSED
----------------------------------------------------- Appendix III:4.4
Fatigue was not addressed in the AR 15-6 investigation, although it
may have been a contributing factor. We learned that the 1-1 AVN
Commander kept the Apache battalion operational 24 hours a day,
dividing the aircraft and pilots into one day company and two night
companies. He placed his Operations Officer in charge of the day
company, while he remained in charge of the night companies.
When interviewed, the 1-1 AVN Commander stated that he had deployed
with his Apaches when they moved closer to the berm in support of
Task Force Iron on February 15. Because of the cold weather and
concern with that night's mission, he had less than 3 hours sleep;
and battalion and brigade logs confirm that he was active throughout
the day on February 16. The 1-1 AVN Commander advised us that after
the night mission on February 16 was canceled, he was preparing to
sleep when the Ground Commander requested air support and the Apaches
were launched.
The AR 15-6 investigation, which is conducted when misconduct on the
part of an individual officer is suspected, was the only
investigation of the February 17 incident conducted by the Army. An
aviation accident investigation--which is generally conducted when
soldiers are killed or injured and/or damage is sustained to aircraft
as a possible result of equipment failure--was not conducted at the
time of the incident, apparently because combat was imminent and an
initial review of the gun tapes indicated that the incident had not
resulted from equipment failure. We were advised that an aviation
safety investigation often takes a broad view as to the cause of an
accident, including factors such as pilot fatigue.
According to the Division Commander, representatives from the Army
Aviation Safety Board at Fort Rucker, Alabama, expressed interest in
the incident and requested a copy of the gun tapes at the end of the
war. He recalled that the tapes were not released because they were
considered "incidental evidence" to the official AR 15-6 report.
APACHE EQUIPMENT/PERFORMANCE AND
PRESS RELEASE
========================================================== Appendix IV
Although we identified several equipment problems that occurred
during the incident, we do not believe equipment failure was a cause
of the incident. We also found nothing to suggest that the Army
misled the Subcommittee. Although we found no impropriety on the
part of the 1st Infantry Division Public Affairs Office in the
release of information to the press, we believe the current Army
regulation outlining the duties and responsibilities of the Public
Affairs Office is overbroad and should be clarified.
EQUIPMENT FAILURE NOT A CAUSE
OF THE INCIDENT
-------------------------------------------------------- Appendix IV:1
We reviewed three problems with Apache equipment: the apparent
failure of a 30-millimeter gun; a perceived problem with one Apache's
navigation system; and the possible misidentification by the
AN/APR-39A(V)1 radar warning receivers during the February 17, 1991,
incident. We determined that the 1-1 AVN Commander's 30-millimeter
gun jammed but the Blue 6 navigation system was working
appropriately. We were unable to confirm whether the AN/APR-39A(V)1
systems were detecting friendly or enemy radar emissions. However,
equipment failure was not a cause of the fratricide incident.
THE 30-MILLIMETER GUN
------------------------------------------------------ Appendix IV:1.1
The Apache's 30-millimeter M230A-1 Chain Gun is a single-barrel
cannon capable of carrying 1,200 rounds of ammunition. It is
considered to be an area-suppression weapon and can be set to emit
bursts of 10, 20, 50, 100, or ALL rounds. Its maximum range is 4,000
meters.\1 The gun is controlled by a Fire Control Computer, which
automatically stops, or "LIMITS," the gun from firing if the angle of
the gun would cause the trajectory of the rounds to hit the
helicopter's nose. (See fig. I.2.)
Our review of the Gunfighter 6 gun tape revealed that when the
copilot/gunner identified the targets, he attempted to fire his
30-millimeter gun. The tape confirms that the gun, which was set to
fire 10-round bursts, fired only 3 shots before going into "LIMITS"
and terminating firing. When the copilot/gunner attempted to fire
his gun again, he discovered that it had jammed.
--------------------
\1 GAO previously reported on malfunctions of 30-millimeter gun
systems in Operation Desert Storm: Apache Helicopter Was Considered
Effective in Combat, but Reliability Problems Persist
(GAO/NSIAD-92-146, Apr. 20, 1992).
CAUSE AND REPAIR OF THE
GUN FAILURE
---------------------------------------------------- Appendix IV:1.1.1
We interviewed available maintenance personnel and reviewed copies of
maintenance records on repair work performed on the 1-1 AVN
Commander's 30-millimeter gun. We found that the repair was
accomplished by replacing a "carrier" link of the conveyor assembly
in the ammunition belt system. (See fig. IV.1.)
Figure IV.1: Conveyor Assembly
of the Apache Helicopter's
30-Millimeter Gun
(See figure in printed
edition.)
An Army Quality Control Supervisor, who was assigned to inspect the
1-1 AVN Apaches after maintenance was performed, recalled seeing the
"Dash 13" form, reflecting that the gun had jammed on the 1-1 AVN
Commander's Apache during the February 17, 1991, fratricide incident.
He explained that the Dash 13 form was kept with the flight log book
for the aircraft and that upon returning from a mission, the pilot,
who maintained the log, completed and submitted the form for any
maintenance problems encountered during the mission. When the repair
work was completed, the repair was logged and the maintenance records
submitted for review. Maintenance records were maintained for 6
months and then routinely destroyed.
The supervisor recalled that the maintenance forms had been completed
and that the Quality Inspector had inspected and approved the repair
of the gun. He recalled that the cause of the gun failure was a
broken link in the ammunition belt system.
JAMMING OF THE
30-MILLIMETER GUN NOT A
CAUSE OF THE INCIDENT
---------------------------------------------------- Appendix IV:1.1.2
The gun tapes reveal that Gunfighter 6 was approximately 3,800
meters--maximum range is 4,000 meters--from the targets when he fired
the 30-millimeter gun. We were advised that the maximum effective
killing range of the 30-millimeter gun is about 2,500-to-3,500 meters
when used against APCs, although damage can be sustained when fired
at greater distances.
According to the 1-1 AVN Commander, he intended to saturate the area
with a couple of hundred rounds, thinking that the enemy would
probably surrender. When asked why he then chose to fire the
Hellfire missiles instead of ordering his wingmen to fire their fully
functional guns at the target, he replied that (1) he was leading the
mission; (2) he had confidence that they were engaging the enemy; (3)
he was receiving encouragement from the Ground Commander to fire; and
(4) he felt "it was time to get on with it."
We confirmed that the 30-millimeter guns on the two accompanying
Apaches were functional and could have been fired for reconnaissance
purposes. Although the 1-1 AVN Commander had moved his aircraft
ahead of the other two Apaches when he was preparing to fire his
30-millimeter, the wingmen had apparently moved closer to him at the
time he fired the gun and would have been in position to fire
additional rounds when his gun jammed. As a result, we disagree with
assertions that the gun's failure indirectly caused the accident by
preventing the 1-1 AVN Commander from firing warning shots.
NAVIGATION SYSTEM
------------------------------------------------------ Appendix IV:1.2
The Apache pilots used two methods of navigation: comparison of
terrain to a map and use of the lightweight doppler navigation
system. The recommended procedure was to use a map with the doppler
as backup, but this procedure was difficult in unlit cockpits during
nighttime operations.
The 1-1 AVN Commander characterized the doppler system as "a ball
park navigator" and related that in his aircraft, in a 2-hour flight
in the immediate area, the system would "drift" about 300 to 500
meters. We were told that because of the desert's featureless
terrain, the Apaches were assigned designated landing pads that had
been surveyed using a Global Positioning System. Before launching
Apaches, the aircraft's present position was keyed into the Data
Entry Keyboard and compared with the position determined by the
doppler navigation system. If the two reflected the same location,
the system was ready. If not, the doppler was reset.
GUNFIGHTER 6'S NAVIGATION
SYSTEM
---------------------------------------------------- Appendix IV:1.2.1
On the afternoon of February 16, 1991, the 1-1 AVN Commander and his
pilot flew to the Division Tactical Area Command. Upon their return,
they did not land on their designated landing pad. The 1-1 AVN
Commander advised us that when the Apaches were launched in support
of Task Force Iron that evening, he did not have the opportunity to
update his aircraft's position. However, the Blue 6 aircraft was
launched from its designated pad and its position would have been
updated for the mission.
After the fratricide incident, the 4th Brigade Commander instructed
the 1-1 AVN Commander to fly his aircraft over the TF 1-41 Tactical
Operations Center. Although it was confirmed that the Apache's
navigation system was functioning, the gun tapes indicated that the
1-1 AVN Commander reported "there's been some drift of the navigation
package" when the aircraft returned to the 1-1 AVN landing area.
The following day, ground troops using a Global Positioning System,
determined the exact location of the vehicles as NT965247. By
comparison, the Gunfighter 6 navigation system had recorded the
coordinates as NT955244, while the Blue 6 navigation system had
recorded the coordinates as NT959245. Although the navigation
systems recorded different coordinates, all three Apache navigation
systems appear to have been functional; and the coordinates recorded
by the Apaches identified the targets as being below the screen line
of friendly vehicles.
BLUE 6'S NAVIGATION
SYSTEM
---------------------------------------------------- Appendix IV:1.2.2
On the February 16-17, 1991, mission, the Blue Team Leader, Blue 6,
lased the targets, receiving a grid coordinate of NT95922454. He
then advised Gunfighter 6 that "when I NAV and store it, I get it
greater than 9524 vicinity. It doesn't--it's not coming out right,"
raising the issue of whether his navigation system was functioning
properly.
When asked why he had questioned his system rather than Gunfighter 6,
he told us that by that time, Gunfighter 6 had confirmed the targets
on the 27 east-west grid line and the Ground Commander had confirmed
the description of the targets as those he had earlier engaged. In
addition, Blue 6 perceived a distinct screen line with two vehicles
clearly at least 1,000 meters in front of the screen line; and the
Ground Commander had stated he had no friendly vehicles in front of
his screen line. All of this, reinforced Blue 6's belief that his
coordinate NT95922454 may have been incorrect.
AN/APR-39A(V)1 RADAR WARNING
RECEIVER
------------------------------------------------------ Appendix IV:1.3
The AN/APR-39A(V)1 Radar Warning Receiver (Voice Warning) had been
installed on the Apaches a few weeks before the aircraft were
deployed to the Persian Gulf. The new system used an electronic
voice, instead of a tone, to warn crew members of enemy radar and gun
tracking of their aircraft. Only after the Apaches were deployed on
missions in the Persian Gulf War was it learned that the
AN/APR-39A(V)1 misinterpreted signals from U.S. Army Ground
Surveillance Radars as enemy signals.
The Apache gun tapes indicate that the AN/APR-39A(V)1 repeatedly
warned the Apache crew members that their helicopters were being
"painted," or tracked, by enemy radar. Although a number of
suspected enemy sightings had been reported just prior to the
Apaches' launching on the mission, the Apaches' crew also knew that
the AN/APR-39A(V)1 had previously misread U.S. ground radar
emissions as enemy signals.
The six Apache crew members differed as to the level of concern
generated by the repeated activation of the AN/APR-39A(V)1. One, who
had been fired upon previously, expressed concern. Another dismissed
the system's warning as an erroneous signal, commenting that the
aircraft was out of range of the two suspected enemy vehicles and it
was possible that the signal was being emitted by a friendly vehicle.
However, the 1-1 AVN Commander believed that the radar signals were
emanating from enemy radars. He told us that in a possible radar
environment, the standard procedure is for one aircraft to provide
"overwatch," while the second aircraft moves forward to make a
positive identification. He elected not to send an Apache crew
forward, because he was concerned they could be destroyed by enemy
anti-aircraft fire.
THE CONGRESS NOT MISLED
-------------------------------------------------------- Appendix IV:2
We found no attempt by the Army to mislead the Subcommittee on
Oversight and Investigations, House Committee on Energy and Commerce,
about the jamming of the 30-millimeter gun on the 1-1 AVN Commander's
aircraft during the February 17, 1991, mission.
During a GAO review of the Apaches' performance in Desert Storm,
conducted in July 1991, the 4th Brigade Commander advised GAO that
the systems on the Apaches involved in the February 17, 1991,
fratricide incident were functional. In that same interview, he
acknowledged that the 30-millimeter gun had jammed on the 1-1 AVN
Commander's aircraft but apparently did not clarify that the gun had
jammed before the Hellfire missiles had been fired.
In a subsequent interview with GAO, the Brigade Commander
acknowledged that the gun had jammed prior to the firing of the
missiles. However, he noted that he did not see the matter as
relevant to the overall investigation since the other two Apaches had
working guns. Also, while the Army's AR 15-6 investigation report
did not mention the jamming of the 30-millimeter gun, this
information was contained in the statements attached as exhibits to
the report.
REGULATION REGARDING PUBLIC
RELEASE OF INFORMATION SUBJECT
TO MISINTERPRETATION
-------------------------------------------------------- Appendix IV:3
On February 21, 1991, a newspaper reporter accompanying the 1st
Infantry Division submitted, to the Division's Public Affairs Office
in Saudi Arabia, a draft of a story he intended to file on the
February 17, 1991, fratricide incident. For security reasons, all
news media stories during Operation Desert Storm had to be cleared by
the Public Affairs Office before they could be released for
publication. The Public Affairs Office approved the story submitted
by the reporter.
The story identified the 1-1 AVN Commander and reflected the reasons
for his relief from command. The reporter advised us that he had
learned from more than one source, all of whom were outside the
Division's command structure, that the 1-1 AVN Commander had fired on
the friendly targets. He also said that he had spoken with the
Division's Public Affairs Officer about the incident, but he could
not recall whether the officer had advised him of the Commander's
relief from command or whether the officer had merely confirmed the
information.
The next day, February 22, 1991, in anticipation of the story's
release, the Division's Public Affairs Office issued a press release.
It stated that following an Army investigation of the February 17,
1991, fratricide incident, the 1-1 AVN Commander had been relieved of
his command for failure to follow command guidance. The press
release also identified the Commander, by position and unit, as the
soldier who had fired on friendly vehicles in the incident. Several
news articles regarding the incident, naming the 1-1 AVN Commander,
subsequently appeared in U.S. newspapers.
In October 1991, the 1-1 AVN Commander submitted a complaint to the
U.S. Army Inspector General (IG) and requested an inquiry into his
allegation that Army public affairs officials had improperly released
information concerning the findings of the official investigation of
the incident to the press corps without approval from the Department
of the Army's Headquarters staff, as required by Army Regulation (AR)
360-5 paragraph 3-21. The IG responded to the 1-1 AVN Commander's
complaint in a letter dated January 23, 1992, saying that the
Commander's "allegation was unsubstantiated."
The IG's letter discussed AR 360-5, paragraph 3-21, which outlines
restrictions on the public release of information on "accidental
casualties involving military personnel or equipment." The letter
specifically cited subparagraph 3-21d, which provides as follows:
"Information on line-of-duty status or findings of misconduct by
individuals, resulting from official investigations, will not be
released to the public except with the approval of The Adjutant
General, HQDA [Headquarters, Department of the Army] for Reserve
or retired Army members, or HQDA (DAPC-PED) for Active Army
members."
According to the IG's letter, DAPC-PED "is the office, in The Deputy
Chief of Staff for Personnel, designated by The Adjutant General to
execute DA [Department of the Army] policy pertaining to line-of-duty
(LOD) determinations regarding soldiers killed or injured on active
duty." The IG went on to state that the information contained in the
1st Infantry Division press release concerning the 1-1 AVN Commander
"was unrelated to LOD status or any other matter over which DAPC-PED
exercises proponency. Accordingly, the press release in question was
outside the scope of paragraph 3-21d, and no prior approval by
DAPC-PED was required."
The IG found no "impropriety" on the part of the 1st Infantry
Division Public Affairs Office in releasing the information, noting
"[p]ersonnel on the spot were responding as best they could under the
circumstances to information the press had already discovered." The
IG acknowledged, however, that the language of subparagraph 3-21d was
"very broad" in scope and subject to possible misinterpretation. As
a result, the IG indicated that he had requested the Army Office of
Public Affairs, the proponent of AR 360-5, to "review the regulation
and clarify this paragraph as appropriate."\2
We learned that the IG's interpretation of subparagraph 3-21d was
based upon a memorandum written to the IG by the Assistant Judge
Advocate General for Military Law and Operations, dated December 23,
1991. The memorandum also acknowledged the "overbroad language" used
in subparagraph 3-21d, "which appears to a person unfamiliar with the
policy therein expressed and the role of DAPC-PED to apply to a broad
spectrum of information unrelated to line-of-duty determinations."
We were told that DAPC-PED is the office designation for the Memorial
and Administrative Affairs Branch of the Casualty and Memorial
Affairs Operations Center. The role of DAPC-PED, in part, is to
review press releases on accidents involving military casualties to
ensure that the information released does not reflect negatively on
the Army, does not contain a basis for liability against the Army,
contains actual facts, and contains no adverse information that would
be unsettling to the family--such as naming casualties before the
next of kin have been notified. DAPC-PED does not usually review
press releases involving battle deaths or injuries.
We found no evidence of misconduct by Army public affairs officers in
preparing and distributing the press release or in speaking with the
reporter. However, as currently written, AR 360-5 does not define or
limit the role of DAPC-PED. Instead, the regulation requires that
when accidental casualties involve military personnel or equipment,
"[i]formation on line-of-duty status or findings of misconduct by
individuals, resulting from official investigations, will not be
released to the public except with the approval of . . . HQDA
(DAPC-PED) . . . "[Emphasis added.] As a result, the regulation
appears to confer on this office a responsibility beyond the review
of line-of-duty status.
If the Army does not intend to confer oversight responsibility with
HQDA (DAPC-PED) on fratricide incidents, then we believe that the
language of AR 360-5 is overbroad and should be clarified.
--------------------
\2 As of June 2, 1993, the Army Office of Public Affairs had
indicated its intent to revise AR 360-5, subparagraph 3-21d, to
address the "overbroad language." Changes had been recommended, and
the office was considering them for inclusion when it updates the
regulation.
TRANSCRIPTION OF GUN TAPES
RECORDED DURING FEBRUARY 17, 1991,
INCIDENT
=========================================================== Appendix V
The following transcript is a compilation derived from the three
Apache gun tapes that recorded the February 17, 1991, incident. The
Army's chain of custody of the tapes was broken, apparently in Saudi
Arabia. Months later, a news agency returned the purported tapes to
the Army. During OSI's investigation, the six Apache crewmen
indicated that the returned tapes appeared to contain accurate
recordings of the actual incident and the events that led to the
incident; but they could not agree upon the completeness of the taped
conversations.
Extensive efforts have been made to produce an accurate transcript of
the three tapes. The Army provided an initial draft, which OSI staff
revised and edited with assistance from two of the Apache crew
members.
The tapes include the intercom conversations inside the aircraft
between each pilot and copilot/gunner team. They also include the
conversations transmitted by each aircraft's three radios, which had
several different frequencies. Radio 1 was secure voice FM, which
was normally tuned to the ground or air commander's frequency. Radio
2 was UHF only and was used for air-to-air communications; it was the
primary radio for command and control while in the air. Ground units
could not transmit or receive on this band. Radio 3 was a VHF/FM
radio. In the FM mode, it had no secure capability and was rarely
used for command-and-control purposes. In the VHF mode, it was used
for air-to-air communications. Ground units could not transmit or
receive on this band. The AN/APR-39A(V)1, which can also be heard on
the tapes, was the Voice Radar Warning Receiver that gave a
computer-voice warning of air defense radar systems tracking or
targeting the aircraft.
IDENTIFICATION OF SPEAKERS
------------------------------------------------------- Appendix V:0.1
BLUE 5 (CPG)
----------------------------------------------------- Appendix V:0.1.1
Copilot/gunner
BLUE 5 (P)
----------------------------------------------------- Appendix V:0.1.2
Pilot
BLUE 6 (CPG)
----------------------------------------------------- Appendix V:0.1.3
Copilot/gunner
BLUE 6 (P)
----------------------------------------------------- Appendix V:0.1.4
Pilot
DRAGON 6
----------------------------------------------------- Appendix V:0.1.5
4th Aviation Brigade Commander
GUNFIGHTER 6 (CPG)
----------------------------------------------------- Appendix V:0.1.6
1-1 AVN Commander, Copilot/gunner
GUNFIGHTER 6 (P)
----------------------------------------------------- Appendix V:0.1.7
Pilot
HANDLER OSCAR
----------------------------------------------------- Appendix V:0.1.8
Medical Evacuation Tactical Operations Center
IRON HORSE 3
----------------------------------------------------- Appendix V:0.1.9
1st Cavalry Division Operations Officer
IRON DEUCE 6
---------------------------------------------------- Appendix V:0.1.10
Task Force Iron Commander
IRON DEUCE OSCAR
---------------------------------------------------- Appendix V:0.1.11
Task Force Iron Tactical Operations Center
STALWART 5
---------------------------------------------------- Appendix V:0.1.12
TF 1-41 Executive Officer
STALWART 6
---------------------------------------------------- Appendix V:0.1.13
TF 1-41 Commander
STALWART OSCAR
---------------------------------------------------- Appendix V:0.1.14
TF 1-41 Tactical Operations Center
ABBREVIATIONS
------------------------------------------------------- Appendix V:0.2
ALOC
----------------------------------------------------- Appendix V:0.2.1
Administrative and Logistics Operations Center
A&L
----------------------------------------------------- Appendix V:0.2.2
Administrative and Logistics Communications Network
ALT
----------------------------------------------------- Appendix V:0.2.3
altitude
APC
----------------------------------------------------- Appendix V:0.2.4
Armored Personnel Carrier
CAV
----------------------------------------------------- Appendix V:0.2.5
1st Cavalry Division
CPG
----------------------------------------------------- Appendix V:0.2.6
Copilot/gunner
DEK
----------------------------------------------------- Appendix V:0.2.7
Data Entry Keyboard
DTAC
----------------------------------------------------- Appendix V:0.2.8
Division Tactical Area Command
DUST-OFF
----------------------------------------------------- Appendix V:0.2.9
Medical Evacuation Helicopter
557
---------------------------------------------------- Appendix V:0.2.10
M-557 Command Armored Personnel Carrier
FREQ
---------------------------------------------------- Appendix V:0.2.11
frequency
FSCL
---------------------------------------------------- Appendix V:0.2.12
Fire Support Coordination Line
GPS
---------------------------------------------------- Appendix V:0.2.13
Global Positioning System
GSR
---------------------------------------------------- Appendix V:0.2.14
Ground Surveillance Radar
GUN 6 LIMA
---------------------------------------------------- Appendix V:0.2.15
Gunfighter 6
LZ
---------------------------------------------------- Appendix V:0.2.16
landing zone
MAN-STAB
---------------------------------------------------- Appendix V:0.2.17
manual stabilizer
NAV
---------------------------------------------------- Appendix V:0.2.18
navigation system
NET
---------------------------------------------------- Appendix V:0.2.19
communications network
PPOS
---------------------------------------------------- Appendix V:0.2.20
present position
VT
---------------------------------------------------- Appendix V:0.2.21
Variable Timed Fuse for artillery shells
WAS
---------------------------------------------------- Appendix V:0.2.22
Weapons Action Switch
LEGEND OF TRANSMISSIONS
------------------------------------------------------- Appendix V:0.3
1
----------------------------------------------------- Appendix V:0.3.1
Gunfighter 6 Gun Tape
2
----------------------------------------------------- Appendix V:0.3.2
Blue 6 Gun Tape
3
----------------------------------------------------- Appendix V:0.3.3
Blue 5 Gun Tape
IC
----------------------------------------------------- Appendix V:0.3.4
Intercom; radio communications between pilot and copilot/gunner
VHF/UHF
----------------------------------------------------- Appendix V:0.3.5
Radio communications between aircraft
FM
----------------------------------------------------- Appendix V:0.3.6
Secure radio communications between ground forces and between ground
forces and aircraft
S
----------------------------------------------------- Appendix V:0.3.7
Information displayed on monitor screen in aircraft
AN/APR-39A(V)1
----------------------------------------------------- Appendix V:0.3.8
Voice Radar Warning Receiver
COMBINED TRANSCRIPTS
--------------------------------------------------------- Appendix V:1
1-GUNFIGHTER 6 CPG (IC):
----------------------------------------------------- Appendix V:1.0.1
It is the--
1-GUNFIGHTER 6 PILOT
(IC):
----------------------------------------------------- Appendix V:1.0.2
I don't have a message back here.
1-GUNFIGHTER 6 CPG (IC):
----------------------------------------------------- Appendix V:1.0.3
Okay. Stay. I got it up here. Today's date is the 16th. It's
17--there's the time--24 in the afternoon, present position,
1-GUNFIGHTER 6 CPG (S):
----------------------------------------------------- Appendix V:1.0.4
Time 17 24 22
PPOS 3 BR NS 4663 8937
Alt +1111 HG 30 06 IN
And we're departing now for--
1-GUNFIGHTER 6 PILOT
(IC):
----------------------------------------------------- Appendix V:1.0.5
Iraq?
1-GUNFIGHTER 6 CPG (IC):
----------------------------------------------------- Appendix V:1.0.6
No, not really. We're departing for the DTAC. There's present
position right there.
1-GUNFIGHTER 6 CPG (S):
----------------------------------------------------- Appendix V:1.0.7
Time 12 24 37
PPOS 3 BR NS 4601 8908
Alt +1109 HG 30 06 IN
1-GUNFIGHTER 6 CPG (IC):
----------------------------------------------------- Appendix V:1.0.8
Stand by.
* * * * * * *
1-GUNFIGHTER 6 CPG (IC):
----------------------------------------------------- Appendix V:1.0.9
[Inaudible]. . . here. Get the recorder here. Okay. Recorder is
working. Okay. Night mission of 16--
1-GUNFIGHTER 6 PILOT
(IC):
---------------------------------------------------- Appendix V:1.0.10
17.
1-GUNFIGHTER 6 CPG (IC):
---------------------------------------------------- Appendix V:1.0.11
Yeah, 17 February.
* * * * * * *
2-GUNFIGHTER 6 CPG (FM):
---------------------------------------------------- Appendix V:1.0.12
And north-south grid line is 29er. Looks like they're driving away
from you on the 29.
2-IRON DEUCE 6 (FM):
---------------------------------------------------- Appendix V:1.0.13
Go after 'em. That's your target.
2-BLUE 6
(AN/APR-39A(V)1):
---------------------------------------------------- Appendix V:1.0.14
Guns at 8 o'clock.
2-GUNFIGHTER 6 CPG (FM):
---------------------------------------------------- Appendix V:1.0.15
Roger. Right behind you.
2-GUNFIGHTER 6 CPG
(VHF/UHF):
---------------------------------------------------- Appendix V:1.0.16
Go ahead and identify the target and give me a heading.
2-BLUE 6 CPG (VHF/UHF):
---------------------------------------------------- Appendix V:1.0.17
Roger. Stand by. [Inaudible]. . . I've got to pull [Blue 5
Pilot] out 'cause I can't--
3-BLUE 5 CPG (IC):
---------------------------------------------------- Appendix V:1.0.18
What happened?
3-BLUE 5 PILOT (IC):
---------------------------------------------------- Appendix V:1.0.19
What'd he say? Two minutes?
3-BLUE 6 PILOT (VHF/UHF):
---------------------------------------------------- Appendix V:1.0.20
I'm going to be stopping in here, [Blue 5 Pilot].
3-BLUE 5 PILOT (VHF/UHF):
---------------------------------------------------- Appendix V:1.0.21
Roger. Right behind you.
3-BLUE 6 CPG (VHF/UHF):
---------------------------------------------------- Appendix V:1.0.22
Roger. Stand-by.
3-BLUE 5 PILOT (IC):
---------------------------------------------------- Appendix V:1.0.23
I'm MAN-STAB.
2/3-BLUE 6 CPG (VHF/UHF):
---------------------------------------------------- Appendix V:1.0.24
Gun 6, Blue 6. What is their front line trace, east-west grid line?
2/3-GUNFIGHTER 6 CPG
(VHF/UHF):
---------------------------------------------------- Appendix V:1.0.25
Roger. They're on the 22, 23 grid line. So, you can shoot anything
north of the 25.
2-BLUE 6
(AN/APR-39A(V)1):
---------------------------------------------------- Appendix V:1.0.26
[Inaudible]
2/3-BLUE 6 CPG (VHF/UHF):
---------------------------------------------------- Appendix V:1.0.27
Okay. I've got them on the--I've got targets out to my front. I'm
looking out 040. I've got one, two, three, four--I've got about six
vehicles out there, anywhere from about--[inaudible] . . . 3,000
meters out to about 7,000 meters out.
2-STALWART OSCAR (FM):
---------------------------------------------------- Appendix V:1.0.28
Stalwart 5. We're going to do a repeat on that last target we flew.
If they go forward, they need to stay to the east of the--91 grid.
2/3-GUNFIGHTER 6 CPG
(VHF/UHF):
---------------------------------------------------- Appendix V:1.0.29
Give me a heading for the target.
2-STALWART OSCAR (FM):
---------------------------------------------------- Appendix V:1.0.30
To the 91 grid line.
2/3-GUNFIGHTER 6 CPG
(VHF/UHF):
---------------------------------------------------- Appendix V:1.0.31
Blue 6, give me your heading to the target.
2/3-BLUE 6 CPG (VHF/UHF):
---------------------------------------------------- Appendix V:1.0.32
Heading to the target is 050. How do you hear me?
2/3-GUNFIGHTER 6 CPG
(VHF/UHF):
---------------------------------------------------- Appendix V:1.0.33
Roger. 050 is friendly Bradleys oriented north.
2-BLUE 6
(AN/APR-39A(V)1):
---------------------------------------------------- Appendix V:1.0.34
Guns 8 o'clock. Now 6 o'clock.
2/3-BLUE 6 CPG (VHF/UHF):
---------------------------------------------------- Appendix V:1.0.35
Okay. If you look out there, there's a string of vehicles that go
out almost, oh, 5,000 meters from my position, out to about 270 grid
line.
2/3-GUNFIGHTER 6 CPG
(VHF/UHF):
---------------------------------------------------- Appendix V:1.0.36
They're 3,000 meters from me. Now, you're saying you see something
in there between them?
2/3-BLUE 6 CPG (VHF/UHF):
---------------------------------------------------- Appendix V:1.0.37
Negative. What I see is--I got a screen line, ah, about on the 22--
2-BLUE 6
(AN/APR-39A(V)1):
---------------------------------------------------- Appendix V:1.0.38
Guns. Guns. 8 o'clock tracking. Now lock broken.
2/3-BLUE 6 CPG (VHF/UHF):
---------------------------------------------------- Appendix V:1.0.39
--24, 25 east-west line, and there's vehicles further out than them I
can see. If you orient about 070, I've got two targets out about on
the 27, 28 grid line.
2-BLUE 6 CPG (IC):
---------------------------------------------------- Appendix V:1.0.40
I lost them. There they are.
3-BLUE 5 PILOT (IC):
---------------------------------------------------- Appendix V:1.0.41
Sliding right, [Blue 5 CPG], looks like they're moving . .
.[inaudible].
2/3-GUNFIGHTER 6 CPG
(VHF/UHF):
---------------------------------------------------- Appendix V:1.0.42
Roger. It looks to me like he's got a GSR track out in front of him
out there. We're going to fly heading 070 and move into--move into
these friendlies.
2/3-BLUE 6 CPG (VHF/UHF):
---------------------------------------------------- Appendix V:1.0.43
This is Blue 6, Roger. That--he's about 6,000 meters off my nose.
That'll put it at the 290 east-west grid line, the two vehicles I
see, heading 0--about 068 from me.
2-BLUE 6 PILOT (IC):
---------------------------------------------------- Appendix V:1.0.44
Do they follow?
2-BLUE 6 CPG (IC):
---------------------------------------------------- Appendix V:1.0.45
Yeah.
2/3-BLUE 6 CPG (VHF/UHF):
---------------------------------------------------- Appendix V:1.0.46
Now, the screen line, that's out about 050, I can see--
2-STALWART 5 (FM):
---------------------------------------------------- Appendix V:1.0.47
Iron Deuce Oscar, Stalwart 5.
2/3-BLUE 6 CPG (VHF/UHF):
---------------------------------------------------- Appendix V:1.0.48
--about five vehicles right in front of you.
2-IRON DEUCE 6 (FM):
---------------------------------------------------- Appendix V:1.0.49
Iron Deuce 6, go ahead.
2/3-BLUE 6 CPG (VHF/UHF):
---------------------------------------------------- Appendix V:1.0.50
--and then--two vehicles beyond them.
2-STALWART 5 (FM):
---------------------------------------------------- Appendix V:1.0.51
Roger. The Apaches drop to an internal freq? Over.
3-BLUE 5 PILOT (IC):
---------------------------------------------------- Appendix V:1.0.52
It's a [expletive deleted] to fly.
2-IRON DEUCE 6 (FM):
---------------------------------------------------- Appendix V:1.0.53
Roger. He's talking to his team now. They have targets engaged.
Looks like they are getting ready to engage. It looks like around
9229 grid square.
2-STALWART 5 (FM):
---------------------------------------------------- Appendix V:1.0.54
Roger. Understand, 92 grid line. [Pause.]
2/3-GUNFIGHTER 6 CPG
(VHF/UHF):
---------------------------------------------------- Appendix V:1.0.55
Okay. You on--where are you off on me right now. Come up on my
right wing.
2/3-BLUE 6 CPG (VHF/UHF):
---------------------------------------------------- Appendix V:1.0.56
Roger. I'm off--
2-BLUE 6
(AN/APR-39A(V)1):
---------------------------------------------------- Appendix V:1.0.57
Guns 8 o'clock. Now 6 o'clock.
2/3-BLUE 6 CPG (VHF/UHF):
---------------------------------------------------- Appendix V:1.0.58
--about your 4 o'clock now.
2/3-GUNFIGHTER 6 CPG
(VHF/UHF):
---------------------------------------------------- Appendix V:1.0.59
Okay. These are all friendlies in front of us--out to about
two-and-a-half kilometers in front of me.\1 These are all Bradleys.
--------------------
\1 The Blue 6 gun tape indicates that the aircraft was on a
040-degree compass heading.
2/3-BLUE 6 CPG (VHF/UHF):
---------------------------------------------------- Appendix V:1.0.60
Roger. Turn in the direction about 070, 068, 070, and look out about
6,000 meters. I got two hot spots right next to each other.
[Pause.]
2/3-GUNFIGHTER 6 CPG
(VHF/UHF):
---------------------------------------------------- Appendix V:1.0.61
Those are big APC kind of vehicles.
2/3-BLUE 6 CPG (VHF/UHF):
---------------------------------------------------- Appendix V:1.0.62
Roger. It looks almost like a 557.
2/3-GUNFIGHTER 6 CPG
(VHF/UHF):
---------------------------------------------------- Appendix V:1.0.63
See nothing else, right?
2/3-BLUE 6 CPG (VHF/UHF):
---------------------------------------------------- Appendix V:1.0.64
Roger, and I got those out there about 5,000 meters from my position.
That puts it out about the 28, 29 grid line.
3-BLUE 5 PILOT (IC):
---------------------------------------------------- Appendix V:1.0.65
Do you see what he sees? You need to talk to them, because I haven't
looked at anything of what you're seeing. I'm too busy flying.
2/3-BLUE 6 CPG (VHF/UHF):
---------------------------------------------------- Appendix V:1.0.66
You want to check my spot?
3-BLUE 5 CPG (IC):
---------------------------------------------------- Appendix V:1.0.67
I've seen the things that he's seen.
2/3-BLUE 6 CPG (VHF/UHF):
---------------------------------------------------- Appendix V:1.0.68
I'll put a spot out there. I'm on a delta.
2/3-GUNFIGHTER 6 CPG
(VHF/UHF):
---------------------------------------------------- Appendix V:1.0.69
Stand-by one.
2-BLUE 6 CPG (VHF/UHF):
---------------------------------------------------- Appendix V:1.0.70
Anybody want--another lonely vehicle right there.
2/3-BLUE 5 CPG (VHF/UHF):
---------------------------------------------------- Appendix V:1.0.71
6, this is 5.
2/3-BLUE 6 PILOT
(VHF/UHF):
---------------------------------------------------- Appendix V:1.0.72
6.
2/3-BLUE 5 CPG (VHF/UHF):
---------------------------------------------------- Appendix V:1.0.73
What's the range on those targets you're looking at?
2/3-BLUE 6 PILOT
(VHF/UHF):
---------------------------------------------------- Appendix V:1.0.74
5,000--about 5,000 meters.
2/3-BLUE 5 CPG (VHF/UHF):
---------------------------------------------------- Appendix V:1.0.75
Roger. I got 'em.
2-IRON DEUCE 6 (FM):
---------------------------------------------------- Appendix V:1.0.76
Gunfighter 6, Iron 6.
2-GUNFIGHTER 6 CPG (FM):
---------------------------------------------------- Appendix V:1.0.77
Gunfighter 6 has two big APC sort of vehicles, grid coordinate
915270. They do not appear to be a part of--
2-GUNFIGHTER 6
(AN/APR-39A(V)1):
---------------------------------------------------- Appendix V:1.0.78
Guns, guns, 6 o'clock tracking.
2-GUNFIGHTER 6 CPG (FM):
---------------------------------------------------- Appendix V:1.0.79
--your screen line. They're stationary. Let me look at them a
little bit here.
2-IRON DEUCE 6 (FM):
---------------------------------------------------- Appendix V:1.0.80
Roger. That's exactly where we shot the last vehicle. Looks like we
killed one of them. Those are enemy. Go ahead and take them out.
For your information, I've also check fired the artillery. They will
not fire as long as you're in the area.
2-GUNFIGHTER 6 CPG (FM):
---------------------------------------------------- Appendix V:1.0.81
Roger. I'm going to do it again one more time. 915270. Looks like
one vehicle is pulled up to another one there. They may be
transloading people.
2-IRON DEUCE 6 (FM):
---------------------------------------------------- Appendix V:1.0.82
Roger. Go ahead and take them out. One of them should be dead
already.
3-BLUE 5 PILOT (IC):
---------------------------------------------------- Appendix V:1.0.83
Fuel transfer.
2-GUNFIGHTER 6 CPG (FM):
---------------------------------------------------- Appendix V:1.0.84
Roger.
2/3-BLUE 5 CPG (VHF/UHF):
---------------------------------------------------- Appendix V:1.0.85
6, this is 5. A little bit to the right of those vehicles on heading
070 from me. There's another single hot spot.
2-BLUE 6 CPG (S):
---------------------------------------------------- Appendix V:1.0.86
0 3BR NT79002700 A+1001
1 3BR NT87702730 A+1033
2 3BR NT65009400 A+1001
3 3BR NT91802700 A+1001
4 3BR NT88502700 A+1001
5 3BR NT95892456 A+1053
2-BLUE 6 CPG (VHF/UHF):
---------------------------------------------------- Appendix V:1.0.87
I know it. I know.
2/3-BLUE 6 PILOT
(VHF/UHF):
---------------------------------------------------- Appendix V:1.0.88
Roger. We got contact with them.
2-BLUE 6
(AN/APR-39A(V)1):
---------------------------------------------------- Appendix V:1.0.89
Guns. Guns. 7 o'clock tracking. Now lock broken.
2-DRAGON 6 (FM):
---------------------------------------------------- Appendix V:1.0.90
Gun 6, Dragon 6.
1/2-DRAGON 6 (FM):
---------------------------------------------------- Appendix V:1.0.91
You know, you probably have the capability to close in close. Over.
1/2-GUNFIGHTER 6 CPG
(FM):
---------------------------------------------------- Appendix V:1.0.92
Gun 6, Roger. I'm at 4,800.
1-GUNFIGHTER 6 CPG (S):
---------------------------------------------------- Appendix V:1.0.93
0 3BR NT95592445 A+1060
1 3BR NT91502700 A+1024
2 3BR NT91302910 A+1101
2-BLUE 6 PILOT (IC):
---------------------------------------------------- Appendix V:1.0.94
This is close enough. It's moving.
1/2-GUNFIGHTER 6 CPG
(FM):
---------------------------------------------------- Appendix V:1.0.95
Blue 6, Gun 6 on Brigade Command. What do you see those two vehicles
as? You think--
1-GUNFIGHTER 6 CPG (S):
---------------------------------------------------- Appendix V:1.0.96
Laser 4750
1/2/3-BLUE 6 CPG (FM):
---------------------------------------------------- Appendix V:1.0.97
Stand by. Let me get a--
2-BLUE 6 PILOT (IC):
---------------------------------------------------- Appendix V:1.0.98
You're not on his freq.
2-BLUE 6 CPG (IC):
---------------------------------------------------- Appendix V:1.0.99
I know.
3-BLUE 5 PILOT (IC):
--------------------------------------------------- Appendix V:1.0.100
[Expletive deleted], this is hard to fly.
2-BLUE 6 PILOT (VHF/UHF):
--------------------------------------------------- Appendix V:1.0.101
[Pause.] Can you guys make those out at all?
2-BLUE 6
(AN/APR-39A(V)1):
--------------------------------------------------- Appendix V:1.0.102
Guns. Guns. 8 o'clock tracking. Now lock broken.
1/2/3-BLUE 5 CPG
(VHF/UHF):
--------------------------------------------------- Appendix V:1.0.103
Negative. They're hot spots.
2-BLUE 6 CPG (S):
--------------------------------------------------- Appendix V:1.0.104
0 3BR NT79002700 A+1001
1 3BR NT87702730 A+1033
2 3BR NT65009400 A+1001
3 3BR NT91802700 A+1001
4 3BR NT88502700 A+1001
5 3BR NT95922454 A+1070
2-BLUE 6 CPG (IC):
--------------------------------------------------- Appendix V:1.0.105
My target NAV's not working right.
1/2/3-BLUE 6 CPG
(VHF/UHF):
--------------------------------------------------- Appendix V:1.0.106
Hey, Gun 6, this is Blue 6. I tell you, I'm getting a range about
4,000 meters--
3-BLUE 5 CPG (S):
--------------------------------------------------- Appendix V:1.0.107
0 38R NT94232557 A+1239
1 38R NT79002700 A+1102
2 38R NT87702730 A+1102
1/2/3-BLUE 6 CPG
(VHF/UHF):
--------------------------------------------------- Appendix V:1.0.108
--but when I NAV and store it, I get it greater than 9524 vicinity.
It doesn't--it's not coming out right.
1/2/3-GUNFIGHTER 6 CPG
(VHF/UHF):
--------------------------------------------------- Appendix V:1.0.109
Yeah, and it's over behind the right of this Bradley right here.
Right. They may have shot themselves here. We'd better go take a
look. Do you think so?
1/2/3-BLUE 6 CPG
(VHF/UHF):
--------------------------------------------------- Appendix V:1.0.110
Roger.
1/2/3-GUNFIGHTER 6 CPG
(VHF/UHF):
--------------------------------------------------- Appendix V:1.0.111
Roger. I'll be sliding up.
2-BLUE 6 CPG (IC):
--------------------------------------------------- Appendix V:1.0.112
How come the NAV's not working?
2-BLUE 6 PILOT (IC):
--------------------------------------------------- Appendix V:1.0.113
Why don't we check with our wingman, see what he comes up with.
2/3-BLUE 6 PILOT
(VHF/UHF):
--------------------------------------------------- Appendix V:1.0.114
What are you guys coming with a range, after you lase and store?
3-BLUE 5 CPG (VHF/UHF):
--------------------------------------------------- Appendix V:1.0.115
Blue 6. Are you talking to me?
3-BLUE 6 PILOT (VHF/UHF):
--------------------------------------------------- Appendix V:1.0.116
Yeah.
2/3-BLUE 5 CPG (VHF/UHF):
--------------------------------------------------- Appendix V:1.0.117
6, this is 5. Say again.
2/3-BLUE 6 CPG (VHF/UHF):
--------------------------------------------------- Appendix V:1.0.118
What kind of a range are you coming up with on that one?
1-GUNFIGHTER 6 PILOT
(IC):
--------------------------------------------------- Appendix V:1.0.119
Heading?
1-GUNFIGHTER 6 CPG (IC):
--------------------------------------------------- Appendix V:1.0.120
Okay. Let's do it like that. I want to go about 2 kilometers,
heading 070.
1-GUNFIGHTER 6 PILOT
(IC):
--------------------------------------------------- Appendix V:1.0.121
Roger.
1-GUNFIGHTER 6 CPG (IC):
--------------------------------------------------- Appendix V:1.0.122
Nice and easy. Nice and easy.
1-GUNFIGHTER 6
(AN/APR-39A(V)1):
--------------------------------------------------- Appendix V:1.0.123
Radar searching.
1-GUNFIGHTER 6 CPG
(VHF/UHF):
--------------------------------------------------- Appendix V:1.0.124
That's a Bradley [inaudible] in.
1-BLUE 5 CPG (VHF/UHF):
--------------------------------------------------- Appendix V:1.0.125
6, this is 5. Say again.
1-GUNFIGHTER 6 PILOT
(IC):
--------------------------------------------------- Appendix V:1.0.126
Yes, that is. Doesn't look like no--
1/2/3-BLUE 5 CPG
(VHF/UHF):
--------------------------------------------------- Appendix V:1.0.127
On the single hot spot, I'm getting 4,794. [Pause.]
2/3-BLUE 6 PILOT
(VHF/UHF):
--------------------------------------------------- Appendix V:1.0.128
And the double?
1/2/3-BLUE 6 CPG
(VHF/UHF):
--------------------------------------------------- Appendix V:1.0.129
Go ahead, lase and store it and see what kind of grid you get.
3-BLUE 5 PILOT (VHF/UHF):
--------------------------------------------------- Appendix V:1.0.130
Lase and store it and see what NAV range you get, [Blue 5 CPG].
1-GUNFIGHTER 6 CPG (IC):
--------------------------------------------------- Appendix V:1.0.131
Go ahead and stop right here please. Go ahead and start slowing down
and stopping.
1/2/3-BLUE 5 CPG
(VHF/UHF):
--------------------------------------------------- Appendix V:1.0.132
NAV range is 4.8, and that puts it on the--showing on the 25 grid
line.
3-BLUE 5 (CPG) (S):
--------------------------------------------------- Appendix V:1.0.133
0 38R NT94232557 A+1239
1 38R NT79002700 A+1102
2 38R NT87702730 A+1102
2-BLUE 6
(AN/APR-39A(V)1):
--------------------------------------------------- Appendix V:1.0.134
Fixed wing. Fixed wing. 8 o'clock tracking. Now lock broken.
1/2-GUNFIGHTER 6 CPG
(FM):
--------------------------------------------------- Appendix V:1.0.135
Iron Deuce 6, Gunfighter 6.
1/2-IRON DEUCE 6 (FM):
--------------------------------------------------- Appendix V:1.0.136
Iron Deuce 6.
1/2-GUNFIGHTER 6 CPG
(FM):
--------------------------------------------------- Appendix V:1.0.137
Roger. What has happened here is that you have a--you have a
Bradley, and let me give you the grid of this Bradley. [Pause.]
1-GUNFIGHTER 6 CPG (S):
--------------------------------------------------- Appendix V:1.0.138
Time 21 44 18
PPOS 3BR NT 9158 2318
Alt +1119 HG 30 06 IN
0 3BR NT95592445 A+1060
1 3BR NT91502700 A+1024
2 3BR NT94682455 A+1015
1/2-GUNFIGHTER 6 CPG
(FM):
--------------------------------------------------- Appendix V:1.0.139
Okay. You have a Bradley at 946245 and he's oriented north on the
screen line. He's got an APC near him also. Then, off to his right
are these two vehicles that I see, and those are the vehicles at
915270. Your Bradley is not even looking anywhere near them. Over.
1/2-IRON DEUCE 6 (FM):
--------------------------------------------------- Appendix V:1.0.140
Roger. I ain't worried about that. Can you still engage those two
vehicles at the 270 grid line?
1/2-GUNFIGHTER 6 CPG
(FM):
--------------------------------------------------- Appendix V:1.0.141
Roger. I can shoot those easy, right.
1-GUNFIGHTER 6 CPG (S):
--------------------------------------------------- Appendix V:1.0.142
Laser 3437
1/2-IRON DEUCE 6 (FM):
--------------------------------------------------- Appendix V:1.0.143
I say, go ahead. Take 'em out.
2-BLUE 6 CPG (IC):
--------------------------------------------------- Appendix V:1.0.144
They don't look like they are doing a [expletive deleted] thing.
2-STALWART 5 (FM):
--------------------------------------------------- Appendix V:1.0.145
Iron Deuce Oscar, Stalwart 5. Once he takes those victors out, if
you'll move off to the side, we'd like to refire and take care of any
dismounts that might get away. Over.
1/2-IRON DEUCE 6 (FM):
--------------------------------------------------- Appendix V:1.0.146
Roger. The other thing I'd like to do is orient 'em over, after we
get done with the engagement--
2-BLUE 6
(AN/APR-39A(V)1):
--------------------------------------------------- Appendix V:1.0.147
Guns. Guns. [Inaudible] . . . o'clock tracking. Now lock
broken.
1/2-IRON DEUCE 6 (FM):
--------------------------------------------------- Appendix V:1.0.148
--if he has no more vehicles to the north, over to the west where you
reported the other vehicles moving. Over.
2-BLUE 6 CPG (IC):
--------------------------------------------------- Appendix V:1.0.149
Let's move up closer to him.
1/2-STALWART 5 (FM):
--------------------------------------------------- Appendix V:1.0.150
Roger. I'll get with Stalwart 6. I know he's got some priority of
targets based on those earlier sightings. Over.
2/3-BLUE 6 CPG (VHF/UHF):
--------------------------------------------------- Appendix V:1.0.151
Okay 5, this is 6. We're going to move up towards him.
1/2-IRON DEUCE 6 (FM):
--------------------------------------------------- Appendix V:1.0.152
Roger. Go ahead. Let Stalwart 6 . . . [inaudible].
1/3-BLUE 5 PILOT
(VHF/UHF):
--------------------------------------------------- Appendix V:1.0.153
Roger.
1/2-IRON DEUCE 6 (FM):
--------------------------------------------------- Appendix V:1.0.154
--in my push.
1-GUNFIGHTER 6 CPG (IC):
--------------------------------------------------- Appendix V:1.0.155
And move forward at these vehicles.
1-GUNFIGHTER 6 PILOT
(IC):
--------------------------------------------------- Appendix V:1.0.156
Move forward.
3-BLUE 5 PILOT (IC):
--------------------------------------------------- Appendix V:1.0.157
There's a 30-knot . . . [expletive deleted] tail wind. Keep an
eye on them. For some reason, I get the idea that these are supposed
to be bad guys--something--'cause of the way he said, "I think
they're shooting at each other"--something.
1/2-STALWART 6 (FM):
--------------------------------------------------- Appendix V:1.0.158
This is Stalwart 6.
1-GUNFIGHTER 6 PILOT
(IC):
--------------------------------------------------- Appendix V:1.0.159
How far are they?
1-GUNFIGHTER 6 CPG (IC):
--------------------------------------------------- Appendix V:1.0.160
4 kilometers.
1/2-STALWART 6 (FM):
--------------------------------------------------- Appendix V:1.0.161
The two box-like vehicles, a box APC-type vehicles [sic], are
consistent with the type that was fired earlier. Break. I have no
forces forward of the 25 grid line. Let's go ahead and shoot those,
get out of the way of those, and look over grid 790270. I had
vehicle movement there--
1-GUNFIGHTER 6 CPG (IC):
--------------------------------------------------- Appendix V:1.0.162
You can stop here.
1/2-STALWART 6 (FM):
--------------------------------------------------- Appendix V:1.0.163
--and it went down into a--into low ground. It did not come back
out, so it may still be over there.
1-GUNFIGHTER 6 CPG (IC):
--------------------------------------------------- Appendix V:1.0.164
You can stop here. We're at the 233 and we're heading 070. Okay.
Firing gun.
1/2-STALWART 6 (FM):
--------------------------------------------------- Appendix V:1.0.165
Gunfighter, Stalwart.
1-GUNFIGHTER 6
(AN/APR-39A(V)1):
--------------------------------------------------- Appendix V:1.0.166
Radar searching.
1-GUNFIGHTER 6 CPG (IC):
--------------------------------------------------- Appendix V:1.0.167
[Expletive deleted] . . . gun jammed.
1-GUNFIGHTER 6 PILOT
(IC):
--------------------------------------------------- Appendix V:1.0.168
Roger.
1-GUNFIGHTER 6 CPG (IC):
--------------------------------------------------- Appendix V:1.0.169
[Expletive deleted].
1/2-STALWART 6 (FM):
--------------------------------------------------- Appendix V:1.0.170
Iron Deuce 6, Stalwart 6. Radio check.
1-GUNFIGHTER 6 PILOT
(IC):
--------------------------------------------------- Appendix V:1.0.171
All right. Go missiles.
1/2-IRON DEUCE 6 (FM):
--------------------------------------------------- Appendix V:1.0.172
This is Iron Deuce 6. Roger. I'm trying to get Gunfighter up so he
can talk to you. Over.
1/2-GUNFIGHTER 6 CPG
(FM):
--------------------------------------------------- Appendix V:1.0.173
Gunfighter 6 is on the net. Have the two vehicles in sight. It
appears one of them is, in fact, killed and I'm going to go ahead and
shoot the other one now.
1/2-IRON DEUCE 6 (FM):
--------------------------------------------------- Appendix V:1.0.174
Roger. I say, go ahead. Take 'em out.
1-GUNFIGHTER 6 PILOT
(IC):
--------------------------------------------------- Appendix V:1.0.175
De-WAS gun. [Pause.]
1/2/3-BLUE 6 CPG
(VHF/UHF):
--------------------------------------------------- Appendix V:1.0.176
Let me know when you shoot.
1/2/3-GUNFIGHTER 6 CPG
(VHF/UHF):
--------------------------------------------------- Appendix V:1.0.177
Boy, I'm going to tell you, it's hard to pull this trigger. Back me
up a little bit here. Tell me--I'm firing heading 070 3,800 meters.
So my current grid is--let me pull up the current grid.
3-BLUE 5 PILOT (IC):
--------------------------------------------------- Appendix V:1.0.178
[Blue 5 CPG]. Check it with the Colonel.
3-BLUE 5 CPG (S):
--------------------------------------------------- Appendix V:1.0.179
0 38R NT94232557 A+1239
1 38R NT79002700 A+1102
2 38R NT87702730 A+1102
1-GUNFIGHTER 6 CPG (S):
--------------------------------------------------- Appendix V:1.0.180
Time 21 47 26
PPOS 3BR NT 9212 2344
Alt +1143 HG 30 06 IN
1/2/3-GUNFIGHTER 6 CPG
(VHF/UHF):
--------------------------------------------------- Appendix V:1.0.181
Grid is 9223.
3-BLUE 5 PILOT (IC):
--------------------------------------------------- Appendix V:1.0.182
He's getting ready to shoot. So, we've got to make sure--
1-GUNFIGHTER 6 CPG
(VHF/UHF):
--------------------------------------------------- Appendix V:1.0.183
And the grid of the target--
1-GUNFIGHTER 6 CPG (S):
--------------------------------------------------- Appendix V:1.0.184
0 3BR NT95592445 A+1060
1 3BR NT91502700 A+1024
2 3BR NT94682455 A+1015
2-BLUE 6 CPG (S):
--------------------------------------------------- Appendix V:1.0.185
0 3BR NT79002700 A+1001
1 3BR NT87702730 A+1033
2 3BR NT65009400 A+1001
3 3BR NT91802700 A+1001
4 3BR NT88502700 A+1001
5 3BR NT95902459 A+1038
1/2-BLUE 6 CPG (VHF/UHF):
--------------------------------------------------- Appendix V:1.0.186
Roger. 9223, I've got it out at 3,800 meters.
1-GUNFIGHTER 6 PILOT
(IC):
--------------------------------------------------- Appendix V:1.0.187
Ready in the back.
3-BLUE 5 CPG (IC):
--------------------------------------------------- Appendix V:1.0.188
What is he shooting at?
1/2/3-BLUE 6 CPG
(VHF/UHF):
--------------------------------------------------- Appendix V:1.0.189
I've got two vehicles. One's pointed toward us, the other's about 90
degrees perpendicular to him.
2 BLUE 6
(AN/APR-39A(V)1):
--------------------------------------------------- Appendix V:1.0.190
Guns. Guns. 8 o'clock tracking. Now lock broken.
1-GUNFIGHTER 6 PILOT
(IC):
--------------------------------------------------- Appendix V:1.0.191
Roger. That's what I got, too.
1-GUNFIGHTER 6 CPG (IC):
--------------------------------------------------- Appendix V:1.0.192
Won't track.
1-GUNFIGHTER 6 PILOT
(IC):
--------------------------------------------------- Appendix V:1.0.193
Switch to black hot. There you go. Now, do the . . . [expletive
deleted].
3-BLUE 5 PILOT (IC):
--------------------------------------------------- Appendix V:1.0.194
Do you see the targets?
3-BLUE 5 CPG (IC):
--------------------------------------------------- Appendix V:1.0.195
Yeah. I got 'em right there.
1/2/3-GUNFIGHTER 6 CPG
(VHF/UHF):
--------------------------------------------------- Appendix V:1.0.196
Okay. I'll be firing in about 10 seconds.
1/2/3-BLUE 6 CPG
(VHF/UHF):
--------------------------------------------------- Appendix V:1.0.197
Roger.
1/3-BLUE 5 PILOT
(VHF/UHF):
--------------------------------------------------- Appendix V:1.0.198
5. [Pause.]
1-GUNFIGHTER 6 CPG (IC):
--------------------------------------------------- Appendix V:1.0.199
Okay. 070, ready.
1-GUNFIGHTER 6 PILOT
(IC):
--------------------------------------------------- Appendix V:1.0.200
Ready in the back. Do him.
1-GUNFIGHTER 6 CPG (IC):
--------------------------------------------------- Appendix V:1.0.201
Recorder is on.
1-GUNFIGHTER 6 PILOT
(IC):
--------------------------------------------------- Appendix V:1.0.202
Check.
1-GUNFIGHTER 6 CPG (IC):
--------------------------------------------------- Appendix V:1.0.203
Roger.
1/2-STALWART 6 (FM):
--------------------------------------------------- Appendix V:1.0.204
This is Stalwart, over.
1-GUNFIGHTER 6 CPG (IC):
--------------------------------------------------- Appendix V:1.0.205
We're ready. Lined up.
1-GUNFIGHTER 6 PILOT
(IC):
--------------------------------------------------- Appendix V:1.0.206
We're ready. Do him.
1-GUNFIGHTER 6 CPG (IC):
--------------------------------------------------- Appendix V:1.0.207
Missile is--
1/2/3-BLUE 6 CPG
(VHF/UHF):
--------------------------------------------------- Appendix V:1.0.208
Blue 5, I want you to--don't look at the target. I want you to
orient, clear our flank, provide a little flight security there for
us.
3-BLUE 5 PILOT (VHF/UHF):
--------------------------------------------------- Appendix V:1.0.209
Roger.
2-BLUE 6 CPG (IC):
--------------------------------------------------- Appendix V:1.0.210
There it goes.
1-GUNFIGHTER 6 PILOT
(IC):
--------------------------------------------------- Appendix V:1.0.211
Nice and steady.
1-GUNFIGHTER 6 CPG (IC):
--------------------------------------------------- Appendix V:1.0.212
I hope it's enemy--
1-GUNFIGHTER 6 PILOT
(IC):
--------------------------------------------------- Appendix V:1.0.213
That's all right. Just stay on them.
1-GUNFIGHTER 6 CPG (IC):
--------------------------------------------------- Appendix V:1.0.214
--'cause here it comes. [MISSILE IMPACT]
1-GUNFIGHTER 6 PILOT
(IC):
--------------------------------------------------- Appendix V:1.0.215
That's one.
3-BLUE 5 PILOT (IC):
--------------------------------------------------- Appendix V:1.0.216
Look around to the right over there and to the left.
1/2/3-BLUE 6 CPG
(VHF/UHF):
--------------------------------------------------- Appendix V:1.0.217
I guess you could say that hit it.
3-BLUE 5 PILOT (IC):
--------------------------------------------------- Appendix V:1.0.218
God, yes. Look to the left and the right of our battle position
here, [Blue 5 CPG]. Make sure nobody . . . [expletive deleted]
sneaks up on us.
3-BLUE 5 CPG (IC):
--------------------------------------------------- Appendix V:1.0.219
There's another--wait a minute.
3-BLUE 5 PILOT (IC):
--------------------------------------------------- Appendix V:1.0.220
Don't panic if you see them.
3-BLUE 5 CPG (S):
--------------------------------------------------- Appendix V:1.0.221
0 38R NT94232557 A+1239
1 38R NT79002700 A+1102
2 38R NT87702730 A+1102
1-GUNFIGHTER 6 PILOT
(IC):
--------------------------------------------------- Appendix V:1.0.222
All right. Now, let's take a look at the second one.
1/2-GUNFIGHTER 6 CPG
(FM):
--------------------------------------------------- Appendix V:1.0.223
Gunfighter 6. Completely destroyed the first target with the first
bullet.
1-GUNFIGHTER 6 PILOT
(IC):
--------------------------------------------------- Appendix V:1.0.224
Let's pick up the second one. Let's go. [Pause.] You got the second
one.
1/2-STALWART 6 (FM):
--------------------------------------------------- Appendix V:1.0.225
Gunfighter 6, Stalwart 6.
1/2-GUNFIGHTER 6 CPG
(FM):
--------------------------------------------------- Appendix V:1.0.226
Gunfighter 6.
1/2-STALWART 6 (FM):
--------------------------------------------------- Appendix V:1.0.227
This is Stalwart 6. When you get done there, I have another grid for
you.
1/2-GUNFIGHTER 6 CPG
(FM):
--------------------------------------------------- Appendix V:1.0.228
Roger. I'm going to go ahead and shoot the second vehicle. It's
still intact, but it's fixing to go away.
2-BLUE 6
(AN/APR-39A(V)1):
--------------------------------------------------- Appendix V:1.0.229
Guns 8 o'clock. Now 6 o'clock.
1-GUNFIGHTER 6 PILOT
(IC):
--------------------------------------------------- Appendix V:1.0.230
Ready in the back.
1-GUNFIGHTER 6 CPG (IC):
--------------------------------------------------- Appendix V:1.0.231
Are you lined up on it?
1-GUNFIGHTER 6 PILOT
(IC):
--------------------------------------------------- Appendix V:1.0.232
Yep. Ready in the back. Let's do him.
1/2/3-BLUE 5 PILOT
(VHF/UHF):
--------------------------------------------------- Appendix V:1.0.233
6, this is 5. You've got a hot spot right underneath you there.
1/2/3-BLUE 6 CPG
(VHF/UHF):
--------------------------------------------------- Appendix V:1.0.234
Roger, that's the screen line.
1/2/3-BLUE 5 CPG
(VHF/UHF):
--------------------------------------------------- Appendix V:1.0.235
Okay. Thank you.
1-GUNFIGHTER 6 PILOT
(IC):
--------------------------------------------------- Appendix V:1.0.236
On him. Looking good. This Bud's for you.
1-GUNFIGHTER 6 CPG (IC):
--------------------------------------------------- Appendix V:1.0.237
Uh-oh. [MISSILE IMPACT]
1-GUNFIGHTER 6 PILOT
(IC):
--------------------------------------------------- Appendix V:1.0.238
That's all right. He's dead too.
1/2/3-BLUE 5 PILOT
(VHF/UHF):
--------------------------------------------------- Appendix V:1.0.239
Blue 6, this is 5. I've got another target heading 120 range, 3,100
meters.
1/2-STALWART 6 (FM):
--------------------------------------------------- Appendix V:1.0.240
Roger. New grid, 790270.
2/3-BLUE 6 PILOT
(VHF/UHF):
--------------------------------------------------- Appendix V:1.0.241
Hold on. Roger. 120. 3,100.
3-BLUE 5 CPG (S):
--------------------------------------------------- Appendix V:1.0.242
0 3BR NT93562313 A+1212
1 3BR NT79002700 A+1102
2 3BR NT87702730 A+1102
1/2/3-BLUE 5 CPG
(VHF/UHF):
--------------------------------------------------- Appendix V:1.0.243
Roger. Grid showing 9323. [Pause.] Probably is one of ours.
3-BLUE 5 PILOT (IC):
--------------------------------------------------- Appendix V:1.0.244
Roger. Fuel transfer is complete.
1/2-STALWART 6 (FM):
--------------------------------------------------- Appendix V:1.0.245
That did not come out. It could not have gotten--it couldn't be the
same one that went--
2-BLUE 6 CPG (IC):
--------------------------------------------------- Appendix V:1.0.246
It's looking backward.
1/2-STALWART 6 (FM):
--------------------------------------------------- Appendix V:1.0.247
--west 'cause there's too much flat ground. Break--east, 'cause
there's too much flat ground. 790270. When you're set and out of
the way, I need for you to tell me whether or not I can shoot--
1-GUNFIGHTER 6 PILOT
(IC):
--------------------------------------------------- Appendix V:1.0.248
Recorder still on?
1-GUNFIGHTER 6 CPG (IC):
--------------------------------------------------- Appendix V:1.0.249
Yeah.
1/2-STALWART 6 (FM):
--------------------------------------------------- Appendix V:1.0.250
--VT in on top of what you just killed to pick up any dismounts that
were around it.
2-BLUE 6 CPG (VHF/UHF):
--------------------------------------------------- Appendix V:1.0.251
I don't think you have to worry about--
1/2-GUNFIGHTER 6 CPG
(FM):
--------------------------------------------------- Appendix V:1.0.252
Roger. Trust me when I say that anything that was around those two
vehicles is dead. There are no hot targets--oops. Got two personnel
walking away from the targets.
1/2-STALWART 6 (FM):
--------------------------------------------------- Appendix V:1.0.253
Roger. You got guns?
1/2-GUNFIGHTER 6 CPG
(FM):
--------------------------------------------------- Appendix V:1.0.254
My gun is jammed. They're walking on a heading of east.
3-BLUE 5 CPG (S):
--------------------------------------------------- Appendix V:1.0.255
0 3BR NT93562313 A+1217
1 3BR NT79002700 A+1102
2 3BR NT87702730 A+1102
3-BLUE 5 PILOT (IC):
--------------------------------------------------- Appendix V:1.0.256
I don't know what he was shooting at, but both missiles were in the
same area there.
1/2/3-BLUE 6 CPG
(VHF/UHF):
--------------------------------------------------- Appendix V:1.0.257
Roger. Got 'em.
3-BLUE 5 PILOT (IC):
--------------------------------------------------- Appendix V:1.0.258
Man. I can't hear the Colonel talking.
1/2-GUNFIGHTER 6 CPG
(FM):
--------------------------------------------------- Appendix V:1.0.259
Roger. We've got 'em here. They're walking 090 here. Break. Blue
6, can you engage with guns?
1/2/3-BLUE 6 CPG
(VHF/UHF):
--------------------------------------------------- Appendix V:1.0.260
Roger. Engaging with guns.
2-STALWART 6 (FM):
--------------------------------------------------- Appendix V:1.0.261
This is Stalwart--
1/2/3-BLUE 5 PILOT
(VHF/UHF):
--------------------------------------------------- Appendix V:1.0.262
6, this is 5. What can we engage with a gun? [Pause.]
2/3-BLUE 6 CPG (VHF/UHF):
--------------------------------------------------- Appendix V:1.0.263
What are we engaging? There's two people walking away from the
engaged vehicle.
2-BLUE 6 PILOT (IC):
--------------------------------------------------- Appendix V:1.0.264
Did our gun jam or something?\2
--------------------
\2 The Blue 6 gun tape indicates that the 30-millimeter cannon went
into "LIMITS."
3-BLUE 5 PILOT (IC):
--------------------------------------------------- Appendix V:1.0.265
Okay. Check on that vehicle. See--
3-BLUE 5 CPG (IC):
--------------------------------------------------- Appendix V:1.0.266
I'm looking.
3-BLUE 5 PILOT (IC):
--------------------------------------------------- Appendix V:1.0.267
Okay. Shoot some 30 out there beyond the vicinity of the captain
over there, out to the left.
3-BLUE 5 CPG (IC):
--------------------------------------------------- Appendix V:1.0.268
I'm getting a "LIMITS" message.
3-BLUE 5 PILOT (VHF/UHF):
--------------------------------------------------- Appendix V:1.0.269
[Expletive deleted.]
3-BLUE 5 CPG (IC):
--------------------------------------------------- Appendix V:1.0.270
Okay. I'm firing.
1/2-GUNFIGHTER 6 CPG
(FM):
--------------------------------------------------- Appendix V:1.0.271
Okay. Stalwart, 790270. I'll be right back with you.
2-BLUE 6 CPG (IC):
--------------------------------------------------- Appendix V:1.0.272
No.
1-GUNFIGHTER 6 CPG (IC):
--------------------------------------------------- Appendix V:1.0.273
Ooo-wee, did we hit those targets.
1-GUNFIGHTER 6 PILOT
(IC):
--------------------------------------------------- Appendix V:1.0.274
All right. You got the personnel walking--
1-GUNFIGHTER 6 CPG (IC):
--------------------------------------------------- Appendix V:1.0.275
Yeah.
1-GUNFIGHTER 6 PILOT
(IC):
--------------------------------------------------- Appendix V:1.0.276
--on the recorder?
1-GUNFIGHTER 6 CPG (IC):
--------------------------------------------------- Appendix V:1.0.277
Yeah, I've got them walking on the recorder. They won't be there for
long.
2-BLUE 6 CPG (IC):
--------------------------------------------------- Appendix V:1.0.278
Got it. Got it right in there. Did you see that?
2-BLUE 6 PILOT (IC):
--------------------------------------------------- Appendix V:1.0.279
No, I didn't.
1/2-STALWART 6 (FM):
--------------------------------------------------- Appendix V:1.0.280
Iron Deuce, Stalwart reporting that maybe friendly vehicles may have
been hit. Over.
1-GUNFIGHTER 6 PILOT
(IC):
--------------------------------------------------- Appendix V:1.0.281
What?
2-BLUE 6 CPG (VHF/UHF):
--------------------------------------------------- Appendix V:1.0.282
Don't you dare say that.
1/2-GUNFIGHTER 6 CPG
(VHF/UHF):
--------------------------------------------------- Appendix V:1.0.283
Roger. I was afraid of that. I was really afraid of that.
1/2/3-BLUE 5 PILOT
(VHF/UHF):
--------------------------------------------------- Appendix V:1.0.284
Blue 5 is engaging the target with 30 . . .
1/2/3-GUNFIGHTER 6 PILOT
(VHF/UHF):
--------------------------------------------------- Appendix V:1.0.285
Cease fire, cease fire.
1/2/3-GUNFIGHTER 6 CPG
(VHF/UHF):
--------------------------------------------------- Appendix V:1.0.286
Cease fire.
2-BLUE 6
(AN/APR-39A(V)1):
--------------------------------------------------- Appendix V:1.0.287
[Inaudible] . . . o'clock tracking. Now lock broken.
1/2/3-GUNFIGHTER 6 PILOT
(VHF/UHF):
--------------------------------------------------- Appendix V:1.0.288
Acknowledge cease fire.
1/2-BLUE 6 PILOT
(VHF/UHF):
--------------------------------------------------- Appendix V:1.0.289
Roger. Cease fire.
1-GUNFIGHTER 6
(AN/APR-39A(V)1):
--------------------------------------------------- Appendix V:1.0.290
Radar searching.
3-BLUE 5 PILOT (VHF/UHF):
--------------------------------------------------- Appendix V:1.0.291
5. Roger. [Pause.] De-WAS the gun, [Blue 5 CPG].
1-GUNFIGHTER 6 CPG
(VHF/UHF):
--------------------------------------------------- Appendix V:1.0.292
Okay. [Pause.]
3-BLUE 5 PILOT (IC):
--------------------------------------------------- Appendix V:1.0.293
[Expletive deleted.]
2-STALWART 6 (FM):
--------------------------------------------------- Appendix V:1.0.294
Two victors hit, 965247. Break.
2-IRON DEUCE 6 (FM):
--------------------------------------------------- Appendix V:1.0.295
Okay.
2-STALWART 6 (FM):
--------------------------------------------------- Appendix V:1.0.296
The other vehicle, 965295.
2-BLUE 6 CPG (VHF/UHF):
--------------------------------------------------- Appendix V:1.0.297
I don't believe it. [Pause.]
2-STALWART 6 (FM):
--------------------------------------------------- Appendix V:1.0.298
They were shot from the rear. Nothing from the front. Over.
1/2-GUNFIGHTER 6 CPG
(FM):
--------------------------------------------------- Appendix V:1.0.299
I hope it's not friendlies I just blew up because they're all dead.
1/2-GUNFIGHTER 6 CPG
(FM):
--------------------------------------------------- Appendix V:1.0.300
Give me your new grid, please, 790270. [Pause.]
1/2-STALWART 6 (FM):
--------------------------------------------------- Appendix V:1.0.301
Those scouts are well east of where we were just firing. We're
working Iron Horse 3. He had a patrol out.
1/2-GUNFIGHTER 6 CPG
(FM):
--------------------------------------------------- Appendix V:1.0.302
Roger. What kind of vehicles were they in? This was not a Bradley.
This was not an M-1 tank.
1/2-STALWART 6 (FM):
--------------------------------------------------- Appendix V:1.0.303
Iron 6, Stalwart 6. The scouts are well west of where we just
engaged with Apache. We're sorting it out over here now. Those were
taken from--those two vehicles were taken from the rear.
1/2-IRON DEUCE 6 (FM):
--------------------------------------------------- Appendix V:1.0.304
This is Iron Deuce 6. Say again. Over.
2-BLUE 6 PILOT (IC):
--------------------------------------------------- Appendix V:1.0.305
De-WAS here.
3-BLUE 5 PILOT (IC):
--------------------------------------------------- Appendix V:1.0.306
Have you heard the Colonel transmit?
3-BLUE 5 CPG (IC):
--------------------------------------------------- Appendix V:1.0.307
No. I heard [Gunfighter 6 Pilot].
3-BLUE 5 PILOT (IC):
--------------------------------------------------- Appendix V:1.0.308
Fuel transfer, again.
1/2/3-BLUE 5 PILOT
(VHF/UHF):
--------------------------------------------------- Appendix V:1.0.309
Blue 6, Blue 5.
2-BLUE 6 CPG (IC):
--------------------------------------------------- Appendix V:1.0.310
Tell them to stand-by.
1/2/3-BLUE 6 PILOT
(VHF/UHF):
--------------------------------------------------- Appendix V:1.0.311
Stand-by. [Inaudible] . . .
1/2-IRON DEUCE 6 (FM):
--------------------------------------------------- Appendix V:1.0.312
Stalwart 5, this is Iron Deuce 6.
2-BLUE 6 PILOT (IC):
--------------------------------------------------- Appendix V:1.0.313
Why don't you pull your 2 switch and I'll talk to [Blue 5 Pilot].
1/2-IRON DEUCE 6 (FM):
--------------------------------------------------- Appendix V:1.0.314
Roger. Tell me what's going on.
1-GUNFIGHTER 6
(AN/APR-39A(V)1):
--------------------------------------------------- Appendix V:1.0.315
Radar searching.
2-BLUE 6 CPG (IC):
--------------------------------------------------- Appendix V:1.0.316
Which one?
2-BLUE 6 PILOT (IC):
--------------------------------------------------- Appendix V:1.0.317
Pull your number 2 and I'll talk to [Blue 5 Pilot].
2-STALWART 6 (FM):
--------------------------------------------------- Appendix V:1.0.318
Two scouts have been hit vicinity 965247. Break. Right now, we're
trying to determine where they were hit from. It appears they were
hit from the rear. Break.
2-BLUE 6 CPG (S):
--------------------------------------------------- Appendix V:1.0.319
Time 04 54 54
PPOS 3 BR NT 9238 2338
Alt +1138 HG 30 12 IN
0 3BR NT79002700 A+1001
1 3BR NT87702730 A+1033
2 3BR NT65009400 A+1001
3-BLUE 5 PILOT (IC):
--------------------------------------------------- Appendix V:1.0.320
There goes the secondary. Something's going on up there.
2/3-BLUE 5 CPG (VHF/UHF):
--------------------------------------------------- Appendix V:1.0.321
Blue 6. This is Blue 5.
2/3-BLUE 6 PILOT
(VHF/UHF):
--------------------------------------------------- Appendix V:1.0.322
Blue 5 on 2.
2/3-BLUE 5 CPG (VHF/UHF):
--------------------------------------------------- Appendix V:1.0.323
Roger. That target I'm looking at about a 075, it looks like there's
an individual to the left of it walking toward the north.
2/3-BLUE 6 PILOT
(VHF/UHF):
--------------------------------------------------- Appendix V:1.0.324
Roger.
2-IRON DEUCE 6 (FM):
--------------------------------------------------- Appendix V:1.0.325
Roger. Is anyone clear--like over in the CAV sector--shooting?
2-STALWART 6 (FM):
--------------------------------------------------- Appendix V:1.0.326
Just contacted the CAV sector. They say they have not engaged
anybody.
2-BLUE 6
(AN/APR-39A(V)1):
--------------------------------------------------- Appendix V:1.0.327
[Inaudible] . . . tracking. Now lock broken.
2/3-BLUE 5 PILOT
(VHF/UHF):
--------------------------------------------------- Appendix V:1.0.328
Blue 6. This is Blue 5. Be advised I haven't heard Gun 6
transmissions lately.
2/3-BLUE 6 PILOT
(VHF/UHF):
--------------------------------------------------- Appendix V:1.0.329
Okay. Apparently, we shot some friendlies.
3-BLUE 5 PILOT (IC):
--------------------------------------------------- Appendix V:1.0.330
[Expletive deleted.]
3-BLUE 5 CPG (IC):
--------------------------------------------------- Appendix V:1.0.331
Everything's blowing up.
3-BLUE 5 PILOT (IC):
--------------------------------------------------- Appendix V:1.0.332
God.
3-BLUE 5 CPG (IC):
--------------------------------------------------- Appendix V:1.0.333
Be cool.
3-BLUE 5 PILOT (IC):
--------------------------------------------------- Appendix V:1.0.334
It's all right. It's not all right, but--turn the recorder off.
2-GUNFIGHTER 6 CPG (FM):
--------------------------------------------------- Appendix V:1.0.335
Iron Deuce 6. Gunfighter 6. What's the status?
2-IRON DEUCE 6 (FM):
--------------------------------------------------- Appendix V:1.0.336
This is Iron Deuce 6. The report is that 2 vehicles on the right
flank at grid 965247 were in fact engaged. One was a GSR, which was
a 113 type vehicle, and the other would have been a platoon sergeant,
which would have been a Bradley. Over.
1-GUNFIGHTER 6 CPG (IC):
--------------------------------------------------- Appendix V:1.0.337
I'll bet I killed friendly people.
1-GUNFIGHTER 6 PILOT
(IC):
--------------------------------------------------- Appendix V:1.0.338
Is that recorder on or off?
1-GUNFIGHTER 6 CPG (IC):
--------------------------------------------------- Appendix V:1.0.339
It's on. They're blowing up like--
1/2-GUNFIGHTER 6 CPG
(FM):
--------------------------------------------------- Appendix V:1.0.340
I--I am sure that--I'm sure they were forward the grid lines you gave
me.
2-BLUE 6
(AN/APR-39A(V)1):
--------------------------------------------------- Appendix V:1.0.341
[Inaudible]
1-GUNFIGHTER 6 CPG (FM):
--------------------------------------------------- Appendix V:1.0.342
We sat here and confirmed where we were and where we shot. But, I'm
pretty sure, like I told you, that those are the vehicles I hit.
Now, they're at--I got them recorded at the grid I gave you. 915270
is where they were sitting. Those were the vehicles I shot.
[Pause.] They're just blowing up like mad out there. [Pause.]
1-GUNFIGHTER 6 PILOT
(IC):
--------------------------------------------------- Appendix V:1.0.343
I want you to talk to me.
1-DRAGON 6 (FM):
--------------------------------------------------- Appendix V:1.0.344
Iron Deuce 6, Dragon 6.
1-GUNFIGHTER 6 CPG (FM):
--------------------------------------------------- Appendix V:1.0.345
Dragon 6, Gunfighter 6. I destroyed two vehicles at 917--correction,
915270, and they were both friendly vehicles. Over.
1-DRAGON 6 (FM):
--------------------------------------------------- Appendix V:1.0.346
Roger. You continue to work for Iron Deuce. He's got other targets
for you. Over.
1-GUNFIGHTER 6 CPG (FM):
--------------------------------------------------- Appendix V:1.0.347
Roger. Request permission to break station and go home.
1-DRAGON 6 (FM):
--------------------------------------------------- Appendix V:1.0.348
Negative. Remain on station. Those things are going to happen.
Over.
1-GUNFIGHTER 6 CPG (FM):
--------------------------------------------------- Appendix V:1.0.349
Roger. We don't see any vehicles. Like we--every night we come out
here, and we don't see any other vehicles.
1-STALWART 6 (FM):
--------------------------------------------------- Appendix V:1.0.350
Gunfighter, this is Stalwart 6.
1-GUNFIGHTER 6 CPG (FM):
--------------------------------------------------- Appendix V:1.0.351
Go ahead, Stalwart.
1-STALWART 6 (FM):
--------------------------------------------------- Appendix V:1.0.352
This is Stalwart 6. Roger. I need for you to move to the
east--break, to the west and look on the 790270, look at the grid
square 7927. Over.
1-GUNFIGHTER 6 CPG (FM):
--------------------------------------------------- Appendix V:1.0.353
Roger. 7927. Roger. [Pause.]
1-GUNFIGHTER 6 CPG (IC):
--------------------------------------------------- Appendix V:1.0.354
Okay. Fly heading at 270.
1-GUNFIGHTER 6 PILOT
(IC):
--------------------------------------------------- Appendix V:1.0.355
270.
1-GUNFIGHTER 6 CPG (IC):
--------------------------------------------------- Appendix V:1.0.356
Right. Flying 270.
1-GUNFIGHTER 6 PILOT
(VHF/UHF):
--------------------------------------------------- Appendix V:1.0.357
And Gunfighter elements be advised that Gun 6 Lima--
1-GUNFIGHTER 6 CPG (IC):
--------------------------------------------------- Appendix V:1.0.358
Left turn.
1-GUNFIGHTER 6 PILOT
(VHF/UHF):
--------------------------------------------------- Appendix V:1.0.359
--is going to be coming out of a left turn and we're going to be
going 270.
1-BLUE 6 CPG (VHF/UHF):
--------------------------------------------------- Appendix V:1.0.360
6, Roger.
1-GUNFIGHTER 6 CPG
(VHF/UHF):
--------------------------------------------------- Appendix V:1.0.361
That's--[Blue 6 CPG], what do you think? Do you think we got--those
guys, or do you think I screwed up on that one?
1-BLUE 6 CPG (VHF/UHF):
--------------------------------------------------- Appendix V:1.0.362
No, I don't think you screwed up. I'd rather talk about it when we
get back.
1-GUNFIGHTER 6 CPG
(VHF/UHF):
--------------------------------------------------- Appendix V:1.0.363
Roger. Do you think I hit the right--do you think I hit 9127?
1-BLUE 6 CPG (VHF/UHF):
--------------------------------------------------- Appendix V:1.0.364
The--
1-STALWART 6 (FM):
--------------------------------------------------- Appendix V:1.0.365
Iron Deuce 6, Stalwart 6.
1-GUNFIGHTER 6 PILOT
(IC):
--------------------------------------------------- Appendix V:1.0.366
Do me a favor now? Quit talking and--
1-GUNFIGHTER 6 CPG (IC):
--------------------------------------------------- Appendix V:1.0.367
Roger.
1-GUNFIGHTER 6 PILOT
(IC):
--------------------------------------------------- Appendix V:1.0.368
--and tell me 270, how far--
1-IRON DEUCE 6 (FM):
--------------------------------------------------- Appendix V:1.0.369
--at 915270. Is there a possibility that in fact we have people out
there?
1-GUNFIGHTER 6 PILOT
(IC):
--------------------------------------------------- Appendix V:1.0.370
I mean, Mr. Doppler is not being real cooperative.
1-STALWART 6 (FM):
--------------------------------------------------- Appendix V:1.0.371
--6. Negative. We don't have people out there. I think that the
possibility is that I have some enemy vehicles over on that flank--
1-GUNFIGHTER 6 PILOT
(IC):
--------------------------------------------------- Appendix V:1.0.372
Colonel?
1-STALWART 6 (FM):
--------------------------------------------------- Appendix V:1.0.373
I've got some people looking--401.
1-GUNFIGHTER 6 CPG (IC):
--------------------------------------------------- Appendix V:1.0.374
What? What? What?
1-GUNFIGHTER 6 PILOT
(IC):
--------------------------------------------------- Appendix V:1.0.375
Give me a Doppler, would you?
1-STALWART 6 (FM):
--------------------------------------------------- Appendix V:1.0.376
915270 is middle of my sector and north. That--they came up and
identified 25 grid line, vehicles on screen, and then identified WUPS
[ph] targets, 29er--just short of 29er. I think that--we'll see. I
still think there's a possibility that the two vehicles reported
moving to the west from the east by 1st CAV got over on to my screen
line.
1-IRON DEUCE 6 (FM):
--------------------------------------------------- Appendix V:1.0.377
Roger. That's a possibility. Did you see the Gunfighter shoot?
1-STALWART 6 (FM):
--------------------------------------------------- Appendix V:1.0.378
This is Stalwart. Say it again.
1-IRON DEUCE 6 (FM):
--------------------------------------------------- Appendix V:1.0.379
I say again. Did you see Gunfighter shoot? Over.
1-STALWART 6 (FM):
--------------------------------------------------- Appendix V:1.0.380
This is Stalwart. I'm in the belly of my Bradley.
1-GUNFIGHTER 6 PILOT
(IC):
--------------------------------------------------- Appendix V:1.0.381
Do we have a problem?
1-STALWART 6 (FM):
--------------------------------------------------- Appendix V:1.0.382
We're trying to confirm shots by the folks up on the line.
1-GUNFIGHTER 6 PILOT
(VHF/UHF):
--------------------------------------------------- Appendix V:1.0.383
Gun 6 Lima is going to be slowing back.
1-BLUE 6 CPG (VHF/UHF):
--------------------------------------------------- Appendix V:1.0.384
Blue 6. Roger.
1-IRON DEUCE 6 (FM):
--------------------------------------------------- Appendix V:1.0.385
They may be separate and distinct targets. Let them go ahead to work
that target to the left. We have good positive ID--
1-GUNFIGHTER 6 CPG (IC):
--------------------------------------------------- Appendix V:1.0.386
Fly heading 230, 240.
1-IRON DEUCE 6 (FM):
--------------------------------------------------- Appendix V:1.0.387
--see what we can find out. You got somebody moving over to the
other position now? Over.
1-GUNFIGHTER 6 CPG (IC):
--------------------------------------------------- Appendix V:1.0.388
240.
1-STALWART 6 (FM):
--------------------------------------------------- Appendix V:1.0.389
Roger. I have that in--
1-GUNFIGHTER 6 PILOT
(IC):
--------------------------------------------------- Appendix V:1.0.390
Roger, coming--
1-STALWART 6 (FM):
--------------------------------------------------- Appendix V:1.0.391
--back system is working it. It's being worked on by A&L net.
1-GUNFIGHTER 6 CPG (IC):
--------------------------------------------------- Appendix V:1.0.392
240.
1-GUNFIGHTER 6 PILOT
(IC):
--------------------------------------------------- Appendix V:1.0.393
I'm coming around.
1-STALWART 6 (FM):
--------------------------------------------------- Appendix V:1.0.394
The scouts--it's a little confused over there right now. I'll sort
it out.
1-IRON DEUCE 6 (FM):
--------------------------------------------------- Appendix V:1.0.395
Roger. Give me--
1-GUNFIGHTER 6 CPG (IC):
--------------------------------------------------- Appendix V:1.0.396
230.
1-GUNFIGHTER 6 PILOT
(IC):
--------------------------------------------------- Appendix V:1.0.397
Coming around 230.
1-GUNFIGHTER 6 CPG (IC):
--------------------------------------------------- Appendix V:1.0.398
Okay. 210.
1-GUNFIGHTER 6 PILOT
(IC):
--------------------------------------------------- Appendix V:1.0.399
Coming around 210. [Pause.] 210.
1-GUNFIGHTER 6 CPG (IC):
--------------------------------------------------- Appendix V:1.0.400
All right.
1-GUNFIGHTER 6 PILOT
(IC):
--------------------------------------------------- Appendix V:1.0.401
How far?
1-GUNFIGHTER 6 CPG (IC):
--------------------------------------------------- Appendix V:1.0.402
Okay. Turn right now to 24.
1-GUNFIGHTER 6 PILOT
(IC):
--------------------------------------------------- Appendix V:1.0.403
Turning right to 24. [Pause.] 24.
1-GUNFIGHTER 6 CPG (IC):
--------------------------------------------------- Appendix V:1.0.404
[Inaudible.]
1-GUNFIGHTER 6 PILOT
(IC):
--------------------------------------------------- Appendix V:1.0.405
Pardon?
1-GUNFIGHTER 6 CPG (IC):
--------------------------------------------------- Appendix V:1.0.406
Stop--no, continue moving. 240.
1-GUNFIGHTER 6 PILOT
(IC):
--------------------------------------------------- Appendix V:1.0.407
Roger. [Pause.]
1-STALWART 6 (FM):
--------------------------------------------------- Appendix V:1.0.408
Gunfighter, this is Stalwart. Over.
1-GUNFIGHTER 6 CPG (FM):
--------------------------------------------------- Appendix V:1.0.409
Gunfighter 6.
1-STALWART 6 (FM):
--------------------------------------------------- Appendix V:1.0.410
This is Stalwart. Let me know when you're set over there behind my
screen line. Let me know where you're at so that I can identify my
screen line to you.
1-GUNFIGHTER 6 CPG (FM):
--------------------------------------------------- Appendix V:1.0.411
Roger. I'm flying right down your screen line right now. I've got
it identified, and I'm flying right down your screen line.
1-BLUE 5 CPG (VHF/UHF):
--------------------------------------------------- Appendix V:1.0.412
6, this is 5.
1-BLUE 6 CPG (VHF/UHF):
--------------------------------------------------- Appendix V:1.0.413
6.
1-BLUE 5 CPG (VHF/UHF):
--------------------------------------------------- Appendix V:1.0.414
Roger. I've got a few targets together. Looks like they're moving--
1-GUNFIGHTER 6 CPG (IC):
--------------------------------------------------- Appendix V:1.0.415
Come left.
1-BLUE 5 CPG (VHF/UHF):
--------------------------------------------------- Appendix V:1.0.416
--27 by 275, 5.6 kilometers.
1-GUNFIGHTER 6 CPG (IC):
--------------------------------------------------- Appendix V:1.0.417
Left. There's the screen line. We're flying right down the screen
line now.
1-GUNFIGHTER 6 PILOT
(IC):
--------------------------------------------------- Appendix V:1.0.418
How much more left?
1-GUNFIGHTER 6 CPG (IC):
--------------------------------------------------- Appendix V:1.0.419
I don't know--
1-GUNFIGHTER 6
(AN/APR-39A(V)1):
--------------------------------------------------- Appendix V:1.0.420
Radar searching.
1-GUNFIGHTER 6 CPG (IC):
--------------------------------------------------- Appendix V:1.0.421
--very hard for me to concentrate right now.
1-GUNFIGHTER 6 PILOT
(IC):
--------------------------------------------------- Appendix V:1.0.422
I know it.
1-BLUE 5 CPG (VHF/UHF):
--------------------------------------------------- Appendix V:1.0.423
Double check--looks like they are.
1-GUNFIGHTER 6 CPG (IC):
--------------------------------------------------- Appendix V:1.0.424
I just killed a bunch of people, you know?
1-GUNFIGHTER 6 PILOT
(IC):
--------------------------------------------------- Appendix V:1.0.425
Yeah, but we don't know which ones they are.
1-GUNFIGHTER 6 CPG (IC):
--------------------------------------------------- Appendix V:1.0.426
They were friendlies. They were U.S. people. Okay. Heading 24.
1-GUNFIGHTER 6 PILOT
(IC):
--------------------------------------------------- Appendix V:1.0.427
24.
1-GUNFIGHTER 6 CPG (IC):
--------------------------------------------------- Appendix V:1.0.428
That's good. [Pause.]
1/2-GUNFIGHTER 6 CPG
(VHF/UHF):
--------------------------------------------------- Appendix V:1.0.429
Blue 6, I'm going to go over to the 79 grid line and stop and then
look north. I'm on the 81 right now.
1/2-BLUE 6 CPG (VHF/UHF):
--------------------------------------------------- Appendix V:1.0.430
This is Blue 6. Roger. I'm right behind you. [Pause.]
1-GUNFIGHTER 6 PILOT
(IC):
--------------------------------------------------- Appendix V:1.0.431
Okay. What do I got in front of me here? I got two targets in front
of me--
1-GUNFIGHTER 6 CPG (IC):
--------------------------------------------------- Appendix V:1.0.432
Slow down and stop. Those are friendlies. That's the screen line.
1-GUNFIGHTER 6 PILOT
(IC):
--------------------------------------------------- Appendix V:1.0.433
Keep going or stop?
1-GUNFIGHTER 6 CPG (IC):
--------------------------------------------------- Appendix V:1.0.434
Stop.
1/2-GUNFIGHTER 6 PILOT
(VHF/UHF):
--------------------------------------------------- Appendix V:1.0.435
6 Lima--is slowing down to a stop.
1/2-BLUE 6 CPG (VHF/UHF):
--------------------------------------------------- Appendix V:1.0.436
Roger.
1-GUNFIGHTER 6 CPG (IC):
--------------------------------------------------- Appendix V:1.0.437
Orient 360.
1-GUNFIGHTER 6 PILOT
(IC):
--------------------------------------------------- Appendix V:1.0.438
All right, let me get--360. Roger.
1-GUNFIGHTER 6 CPG (IC):
--------------------------------------------------- Appendix V:1.0.439
You need to hold position. You go just in front of the screen, you
get shot. So you need to come left now. Come left. More left to
get behind the screen line--
1-GUNFIGHTER 6
(AN/APR-39A(V)1):
--------------------------------------------------- Appendix V:1.0.440
Radar searching.
1/2-STALWART 5 (FM):
--------------------------------------------------- Appendix V:1.0.441
Stalwart Oscar--Stal . . . correction, Iron Deuce Oscar, Stalwart
5.
1/2-IRON DEUCE 6 (FM):
--------------------------------------------------- Appendix V:1.0.442
Iron Deuce 6.
1/2-STALWART 5 (FM):
--------------------------------------------------- Appendix V:1.0.443
Your Stalwart 6's just talked to Charlie Commander.
1-GUNFIGHTER 6 CPG (IC):
--------------------------------------------------- Appendix V:1.0.444
Come left.
1/2-STALWART 5 (FM):
--------------------------------------------------- Appendix V:1.0.445
He is moving folks down along with medics--
1-GUNFIGHTER 6 PILOT
(IC):
--------------------------------------------------- Appendix V:1.0.446
Now what?
1/2-STALWART 5 (FM):
--------------------------------------------------- Appendix V:1.0.447
--to assist scouts. Break. On our admin log net we've made contact
with--
1-GUNFIGHTER 6 PILOT
(VHF/UHF):
--------------------------------------------------- Appendix V:1.0.448
--and I'll be turning left.
1/2-IRON DEUCE 6 (FM):
--------------------------------------------------- Appendix V:1.0.449
Stalwart 5, Iron Deuce 6. Say again. Over.
1-GUNFIGHTER 6 CPG (IC):
--------------------------------------------------- Appendix V:1.0.450
Straight ahead.
1/2-STALWART 5 (FM):
--------------------------------------------------- Appendix V:1.0.451
They in turn are getting in touch with DUST-OFF to move them to the
grid location of 965247--
2-BLUE 6
(AN/APR-39A(V)1):
--------------------------------------------------- Appendix V:1.0.452
Guns. Guns. 8 o'clock. Now lock broken.
1/2-STALWART 5 (FM):
--------------------------------------------------- Appendix V:1.0.453
--for casualty evac. Over.
1/2-IRON DEUCE 6 (FM):
--------------------------------------------------- Appendix V:1.0.454
Roger. Say again. I missed the first part of it.
1-GUNFIGHTER 6 CPG (IC):
--------------------------------------------------- Appendix V:1.0.455
Turn right.
1/2-STALWART 5 (FM):
--------------------------------------------------- Appendix V:1.0.456
Roger. Stalwart 6 has directed Charlie Team to move his band-aids--
1-GUNFIGHTER 6
(AN/APR-39A(V)1):
--------------------------------------------------- Appendix V:1.0.457
Radar searching.
1/2-STALWART 5 (FM):
--------------------------------------------------- Appendix V:1.0.458
--and assist in the evacuation of the casualties. Break. Admin log
frequency is in the process of calling for DUST-OFF and has given
them location for LZ of 965242. Over.
1-GUNFIGHTER 6 CPG (IC):
--------------------------------------------------- Appendix V:1.0.459
There's the Bradleys. You can just--stop here now. Stop.
1/2-IRON DEUCE 6 (FM):
--------------------------------------------------- Appendix V:1.0.460
Roger. Do you have any idea what kind of casualties you got?
1-GUNFIGHTER 6 PILOT
(IC):
--------------------------------------------------- Appendix V:1.0.461
I'm trying, I'm trying.
1/2-STALWART 5 (FM):
--------------------------------------------------- Appendix V:1.0.462
Negative. Still working on that right now. Over.
2-BLUE 6
(AN/APR-39A(V)1):
--------------------------------------------------- Appendix V:1.0.463
Guns. 8 o'clock. Now, 6 o'clock.
1/2-IRON DEUCE 6 (FM):
--------------------------------------------------- Appendix V:1.0.464
Roger. Is there any contact in that area?
1/2-STALWART 5 (FM):
--------------------------------------------------- Appendix V:1.0.465
Negative. No contact at this moment, although every--ah--the rest of
the scouts are--
1-GUNFIGHTER 6 CPG (IC):
--------------------------------------------------- Appendix V:1.0.466
Stop.
2-STALWART 5 (FM):
--------------------------------------------------- Appendix V:1.0.467
--still screening, looking for dismounts.
1-STALWART 5 (FM):
--------------------------------------------------- Appendix V:1.0.468
Over.
1/2-IRON DEUCE 6 (FM):
--------------------------------------------------- Appendix V:1.0.469
Dragon 6, wait. Break. Stalwart 5, go ahead.
2-STALWART 5 (FM):
--------------------------------------------------- Appendix V:1.0.470
Roger. Scouts report negative contact in their zone of action at the
moment. Over.
2-IRON DEUCE 6 (FM):
--------------------------------------------------- Appendix V:1.0.471
Roger. Go ahead and give me a report as fast as you can. Let me
know what's going on. I've already alerted the DUST-OFF down in the
FSCL with Handler. They ought to be flying as soon as you call the
mission.
2-STALWART 6 (FM):
--------------------------------------------------- Appendix V:1.0.472
Stalwart, Roger. Break.
1-STALWART 5 (FM):
--------------------------------------------------- Appendix V:1.0.473
From the west, by missiles fired from the ground. Over.
1-GUNFIGHTER 6 CPG (IC):
--------------------------------------------------- Appendix V:1.0.474
There's the screen line.
1-IRON DEUCE 6 (FM):
--------------------------------------------------- Appendix V:1.0.475
Any idea who might have--
1-GUNFIGHTER 6 CPG (IC):
--------------------------------------------------- Appendix V:1.0.476
There's the screen line.
1-IRON DEUCE 6 (FM):
--------------------------------------------------- Appendix V:1.0.477
Are those vehicles--
1-GUNFIGHTER 6 CPG (IC):
--------------------------------------------------- Appendix V:1.0.478
And there's the vehicles way out in front.
1-IRON DEUCE 6 (FM):
--------------------------------------------------- Appendix V:1.0.479
--same description that Gunfighter gave you?
1-GUNFIGHTER 6 CPG (IC):
--------------------------------------------------- Appendix V:1.0.480
There's the screen line I saw.
1-STALWART 6 (FM):
--------------------------------------------------- Appendix V:1.0.481
Stalwart 6. That--stand by.
1-GUNFIGHTER 6 CPG (IC):
--------------------------------------------------- Appendix V:1.0.482
There's the screen line, and there's the vehicles out in front of the
screen line. The vehicles were in front of the screen line.
1-GUNFIGHTER 6 PILOT
(IC):
--------------------------------------------------- Appendix V:1.0.483
Affirmative. That is correct. We were butted up right behind the
screen line.
1-GUNFIGHTER 6 CPG (IC):
--------------------------------------------------- Appendix V:1.0.484
Right. We went in right behind the screen line.
1-GUNFIGHTER 6 PILOT
(IC):
--------------------------------------------------- Appendix V:1.0.485
That's right.
1-GUNFIGHTER 6 CPG (IC):
--------------------------------------------------- Appendix V:1.0.486
And those vehicles were way out front there.
1-GUNFIGHTER 6 PILOT
(IC):
--------------------------------------------------- Appendix V:1.0.487
Like I said, let's let them work through it. Doesn't seem to me like
they know what the . . . [expletive deleted] going on.
1-GUNFIGHTER 6 CPG (IC):
--------------------------------------------------- Appendix V:1.0.488
Hold on here. Okay. We're headed 090 right now--
1-GUNFIGHTER 6 PILOT
(IC):
--------------------------------------------------- Appendix V:1.0.489
Yeah, and we'll--
1-GUNFIGHTER 6 CPG (IC):
--------------------------------------------------- Appendix V:1.0.490
--and the screen line running--is back to the southwest like it's
supposed--southeast, like it's supposed to. We got in these,
identified those vehicles, and then, way out front of them was that
vehicle right there, those two vehicles out there. And we called and
says, yeah, they're out there, and they says, yeah, shoot 'em up.
1-GUNFIGHTER 6 PILOT
(IC):
--------------------------------------------------- Appendix V:1.0.491
Right.
1-GUNFIGHTER 6 CPG (IC):
--------------------------------------------------- Appendix V:1.0.492
There they are. They are shot up.
1-GUNFIGHTER 6 PILOT
(IC):
--------------------------------------------------- Appendix V:1.0.493
Okay. Are the other birds in line?
1-GUNFIGHTER 6 CPG (IC):
--------------------------------------------------- Appendix V:1.0.494
I have no idea.
1-GUNFIGHTER 6 PILOT
(IC):
--------------------------------------------------- Appendix V:1.0.495
All right. Let's take care of our flight.
1-GUNFIGHTER 6 CPG (IC):
--------------------------------------------------- Appendix V:1.0.496
Roger.
1-GUNFIGHTER 6
(AN/APR-39A(V)1):
--------------------------------------------------- Appendix V:1.0.497
Radar searching.
1-GUNFIGHTER 6 CPG
(VHF/UHF):
--------------------------------------------------- Appendix V:1.0.498
Blue 6, Gun 6. Those vehicles are 2 kilometers in front of the
screen line, aren't they?
1-BLUE 6 CPG (VHF/UHF):
--------------------------------------------------- Appendix V:1.0.499
I'd have to go back. My target NAV indexer says it's on the--it was
9524 is where those targets were.
1-GUNFIGHTER 6 CPG
(VHF/UHF):
--------------------------------------------------- Appendix V:1.0.500
9524?
1-BLUE 6 CPG (VHF/UHF):
--------------------------------------------------- Appendix V:1.0.501
I have to go back and check. [Pause.] Roger. 9524.
1-GUNFIGHTER 6 CPG (IC):
--------------------------------------------------- Appendix V:1.0.502
We lost them now. Where's the burners?
1-GUNFIGHTER 6 PILOT
(IC):
--------------------------------------------------- Appendix V:1.0.503
Ah, [expletive deleted.]
1-GUNFIGHTER 6 CPG (IC):
--------------------------------------------------- Appendix V:1.0.504
Way out there.
1-GUNFIGHTER 6 PILOT
(IC):
--------------------------------------------------- Appendix V:1.0.505
I don't know, but what do we--
1-BLUE 5 CPG (VHF/UHF):
--------------------------------------------------- Appendix V:1.0.506
My target NAV had them on 24 grid line also.
1-GUNFIGHTER CPG (S):
--------------------------------------------------- Appendix V:1.0.507
0 3BR NT95592445 A+1060
1 3BR NT91502700 A+1024
2 3BR NT94682455 A+1015
3 3BR NT69001900 A+1175
4 3BR NT62951316 A+0809
5 3BR NT88702495 A+1170
1-GUNFIGHTER 6
(AN/APR-39A(V)1):
--------------------------------------------------- Appendix V:1.0.508
Radar searching. [Pause.]
1-IRON DEUCE 6 (FM):
--------------------------------------------------- Appendix V:1.0.509
Stalwart 5, Iron Deuce 6.
1-GUNFIGHTER 6 CPG (IC):
--------------------------------------------------- Appendix V:1.0.510
There was this line right here--
1-STALWART 5 (FM):
--------------------------------------------------- Appendix V:1.0.511
Stalwart 5. Over.
1-GUNFIGHTER 6 CPG (IC):
--------------------------------------------------- Appendix V:1.0.512
There's the--out in front.
1-UNIDENTIFIED:
--------------------------------------------------- Appendix V:1.0.513
Is that working now?
1-GUNFIGHTER 6 PILOT
(IC):
--------------------------------------------------- Appendix V:1.0.514
All right. I see the targets burning.
1-GUNFIGHTER 6 CPG (IC):
--------------------------------------------------- Appendix V:1.0.515
Yeah.
1-STALWART 6 (FM):
--------------------------------------------------- Appendix V:1.0.516
My ALOC reports that he cannot raise Medevac. However, conversations
with Handler over this freq here--it appears that they have lifted a
bird off the ground and they were given the coordinates. Over.
1/3-IRON DEUCE 6 (FM):
--------------------------------------------------- Appendix V:1.0.517
Roger. Let me check. Break.
1/2/3-IRON DEUCE 6 (FM):
--------------------------------------------------- Appendix V:1.0.518
Handler Oscar, Iron Deuce 6.
1/2/3-HANDLER OSCAR (FM):
--------------------------------------------------- Appendix V:1.0.519
Iron Deuce 6, this is Handler Oscar. Over.
3-IRON DEUCE 6 (FM):
--------------------------------------------------- Appendix V:1.0.520
Handler. That'll be fine.
3-STALWART 6 (FM):
--------------------------------------------------- Appendix V:1.0.521
Stalwart. Roger.
2/3-IRON DEUCE 6 (FM):
--------------------------------------------------- Appendix V:1.0.522
Roger. Have your DUST-OFF pilots received the call yet?
2-BLUE 6
(AN/APR-39A(V)1):
--------------------------------------------------- Appendix V:1.0.523
Guns. Guns. 8 o'clock tracking. Now lock broken.
2/3-HANDLER OSCAR (FM):
--------------------------------------------------- Appendix V:1.0.524
There's not been a call on 39.15. I have them on stand-by waiting.
Over.
2/3-IRON DEUCE 6 (FM):
--------------------------------------------------- Appendix V:1.0.525
Roger. Are you on admin log and are you contacting Stalwart's
casualty evacuation folks?
2/3-HANDLER OSCAR (FM):
--------------------------------------------------- Appendix V:1.0.526
I've just tuned to their A&L net and am in the process of doing that
at this time.
2/3-IRON DEUCE 6 (FM):
--------------------------------------------------- Appendix V:1.0.527
Go ahead and contact them at this time. Get those birds up.
2/3-STALWART 6 (FM):
--------------------------------------------------- Appendix V:1.0.528
Gunfighter 6, Stalwart 6.
2/3-GUNFIGHTER 6 CPG
(FM):
--------------------------------------------------- Appendix V:1.0.529
Gunfighter 6.
2/3-STALWART 6 (FM):
--------------------------------------------------- Appendix V:1.0.530
Roger. Come to my frequency 38.85.
2/3-GUNFIGHTER 6 CPG
(FM):
--------------------------------------------------- Appendix V:1.0.531
Roger.
2-BLUE 6 PILOT (IC):
--------------------------------------------------- Appendix V:1.0.532
Want me to switch?
2-BLUE 6 CPG (IC):
--------------------------------------------------- Appendix V:1.0.533
Ah, no. [Pause] I don't see anything out there.
3-BLUE 5 PILOT (IC):
--------------------------------------------------- Appendix V:1.0.534
I can't get this . . . [expletive deleted] to hover. [Pause.]
[Expletive deleted.]
3-HANDLER OSCAR (FM):
--------------------------------------------------- Appendix V:1.0.535
Iron Deuce 6, this is Handler Oscar.
3-BLUE 5 PILOT (IC):
--------------------------------------------------- Appendix V:1.0.536
I can't . . . [expletive deleted]--I can't get this velocity
vector to go to zero.
3-HANDLER OSCAR (FM):
--------------------------------------------------- Appendix V:1.0.537
I need your . . . [inaudible]. I'm monitoring the transmission,
but they're not reading mine. Go ahead and send their traffic.
Over.
3-IRON DEUCE 6 (FM):
--------------------------------------------------- Appendix V:1.0.538
Roger. Stalwart 5, do you monitor?
3-STALWART 6 (FM):
--------------------------------------------------- Appendix V:1.0.539
We're in the process of trying to send that. They obviously can't
hear it. We need a Medevac at 965247. Over.
3-GUNFIGHTER 6 CPG (FM):
--------------------------------------------------- Appendix V:1.0.540
Iron Deuce 6, Gunfighter 6. I'm in the middle of your sector,
looking at the 77 grid line, north, and there are no targets in front
of your screen line center sector.
3-IRON DEUCE 6 (FM):
--------------------------------------------------- Appendix V:1.0.541
Roger. You're talking to Stalwart 6, also? Over.
3-GUNFIGHTER 6 CPG (FM):
--------------------------------------------------- Appendix V:1.0.542
Affirmative.
3-IRON DEUCE 6 (FM):
--------------------------------------------------- Appendix V:1.0.543
Roger. Keep looking. We'll keep . . . [inaudible] . . . on
the other side. Don't worry about it.
3-DRAGON 6 (FM):
--------------------------------------------------- Appendix V:1.0.544
Iron Deuce 6, Dragon 6.
3-IRON DEUCE 6 (FM):
--------------------------------------------------- Appendix V:1.0.545
Iron Deuce 6.
3-DRAGON 6 (FM):
--------------------------------------------------- Appendix V:1.0.546
Roger. Have Gun 6 do a check of his coordinates over somebody who's
got a GPS.
3-IRON DEUCE 6 (FM):
--------------------------------------------------- Appendix V:1.0.547
Roger. We can do that. Break. Stalwart 6, Iron Deuce 6.
3-STALWART 6 (FM):
--------------------------------------------------- Appendix V:1.0.548
This is Stalwart 6. Over.
3-IRON DEUCE 6 (FM):
--------------------------------------------------- Appendix V:1.0.549
Did you monitor Dragon 6?
3-STALWART 6 (FM):
--------------------------------------------------- Appendix V:1.0.550
This is Stalwart. Roger.
3-IRON DEUCE 6 (FM):
--------------------------------------------------- Appendix V:1.0.551
Why don't you get him over to your position. You got a GPS?
3-STALWART 6 (FM):
--------------------------------------------------- Appendix V:1.0.552
This is Stalwart. Roger. [Inaudible] . . .
3-IRON DEUCE 6 (FM):
--------------------------------------------------- Appendix V:1.0.553
I say, go ahead. [Pause] Handler Oscar, Iron Deuce 6.
3-BLUE 5 PILOT (IC):
--------------------------------------------------- Appendix V:1.0.554
I got it.
3-STALWART 5 (FM):
--------------------------------------------------- Appendix V:1.0.555
Iron Deuce 6, Stalwart 5. Believe our admin log is talking with
Handlers right now. Over.
3-IRON DEUCE 6 (FM):
--------------------------------------------------- Appendix V:1.0.556
[Inaudible] . . . Stalwart X-ray's grid location to Gunfighter--
3-STALWART 5 (FM):
--------------------------------------------------- Appendix V:1.0.557
Roger. Gunfighter 6, Stalwart 5.
3-GUNFIGHTER 6 CPG (FM):
--------------------------------------------------- Appendix V:1.0.558
This is Gunfighter 6.
3-STALWART 5 (FM):
--------------------------------------------------- Appendix V:1.0.559
Roger. Stalwart X-ray's position is as follows--840217. Over.
3-BLUE 5 PILOT (IC):
--------------------------------------------------- Appendix V:1.0.560
Take a look around out there, [Blue 5 CPG].
3-STALWART 5 (FM):
--------------------------------------------------- Appendix V:1.0.561
Stalwart 5. Did you monitor? Over. Gunfighter 6, Stalwart 5. Did
you monitor?
3-GUNFIGHTER 6 CPG (FM):
--------------------------------------------------- Appendix V:1.0.562
Gunfighter 6. Roger. Do you want me to fly over there?
3-STALWART 5 (FM):
--------------------------------------------------- Appendix V:1.0.563
Gunfighter, this is Stalwart 5. Did Stalwart 6 ask you to move over
to his location to scan this area? Over.
3-GUNFIGHTER 6 CPG (FM):
--------------------------------------------------- Appendix V:1.0.564
Gunfighter 6. Roger.
3-STALWART 5 (FM):
--------------------------------------------------- Appendix V:1.0.565
Roger. The location I gave you is my current location. Break.
There was other enemy sightings vicinity 835260. Over.
3-GUNFIGHTER 6 CPG (FM):
--------------------------------------------------- Appendix V:1.0.566
835260. Over.
3-BLUE 6 CPG (FM):
--------------------------------------------------- Appendix V:1.0.567
Roger. 835260.
3-BLUE 5 PILOT (IC):
--------------------------------------------------- Appendix V:1.0.568
835260. Put that in your DEK, [Blue 5 CPG]. [Inaudible] . . .
Did you hear that?
3-BLUE 5 CPG (IC):
--------------------------------------------------- Appendix V:1.0.569
Yup.
3-BLUE 5 CPG (S):
--------------------------------------------------- Appendix V:1.0.570
0 3BR NT93832425 A+1248
1 3BR NT79002000 A+1102
2 3BR NT87702730 A+1102
3-STALWART 6 (FM):
--------------------------------------------------- Appendix V:1.0.571
Iron Deuce 6, Stalwart 6.
3-BLUE 5 CPG (S):
--------------------------------------------------- Appendix V:1.0.572
0 3BR NT93832425 A+1248
1 3BR NT83502650 A+1102
2 3BR NT87702730 A+1102
3-IRON DEUCE 6 (FM):
--------------------------------------------------- Appendix V:1.0.573
Stalwart . . . [inaudible].
3-STALWART 6 (FM):
--------------------------------------------------- Appendix V:1.0.574
It appears that the scouts were attacked from dismounted positions.
We're confirming that now, but it looks like they were . . .
[inaudible] . . . dismounted fire.
3-IRON DEUCE OSCAR (FM):
--------------------------------------------------- Appendix V:1.0.575
Oscar. Roger.
3-BLUE 5 PILOT (VHF/UHF):
--------------------------------------------------- Appendix V:1.0.576
Blue 6, this is Blue 5. Be advised I'm right out your right.
3-BLUE 6 PILOT (VHF/UHF):
--------------------------------------------------- Appendix V:1.0.577
Roger.
3-GUNFIGHTER 6 CPG (FM):
--------------------------------------------------- Appendix V:1.0.578
Iron Deuce 6. Gunfighter 6 has no targets in front of your sector.
Your screen line is intact other than the burning vehicles on the
right flank, and those are in front of your screen line, by the way.
3-IRON DEUCE 6 (FM):
--------------------------------------------------- Appendix V:1.0.579
That's affirmative. They're screening our right flank. Did you
monitor Stalwart 6's conversation with Iron Deuce Oscar?
3-GUNFIGHTER 6 CPG (FM):
--------------------------------------------------- Appendix V:1.0.580
That's affirmative. Go ahead.
3-IRON DEUCE 6 (FM):
--------------------------------------------------- Appendix V:1.0.581
It appears that those two victors were taken under fire by ground
weapons systems. We're still trying to confirm it. But appears now
it may have been ground weapons systems.
3-GUNFIGHTER 6 CPG (FM):
--------------------------------------------------- Appendix V:1.0.582
I got two vehicles on fire over there, where there's--that I hit.
They're burning and the ammunition on board is blowing up.
3-BLUE 5 PILOT (IC):
--------------------------------------------------- Appendix V:1.0.583
Do you see anything out there?
3-BLUE 5 CPG (IC):
--------------------------------------------------- Appendix V:1.0.584
Nope.
3-GUNFIGHTER 6 CPG (FM):
--------------------------------------------------- Appendix V:1.0.585
We're going to go back over there and take a look. Then I need to
leave the sector here.
3-IRON DEUCE 6 (FM):
--------------------------------------------------- Appendix V:1.0.586
Roger. Give us a call when you're preparing to leave. Over.
3-GUNFIGHTER 6 CPG (FM):
--------------------------------------------------- Appendix V:1.0.587
Roger.
3-GUNFIGHTER 6 CPG
(VHF/UHF):
--------------------------------------------------- Appendix V:1.0.588
Gunfighter 6 calling Blue 6 and Blue 5. Follow me back.
3-DRAGON 6 (FM):
--------------------------------------------------- Appendix V:1.0.589
Iron Deuce 6, Dragon 6. Is Gunfighter 6 . . .
3-BLUE 6 CPG (VHF/UHF):
--------------------------------------------------- Appendix V:1.0.590
Blue 6. Roger.
3-BLUE 5 PILOT (VHF/UHF):
--------------------------------------------------- Appendix V:1.0.591
Blue 5. Roger.
* * * * * * *
1-IRON DEUCE 6 (FM):
--------------------------------------------------- Appendix V:1.0.592
Roger. Are your Medevacs in-bound right now?
1-HANDLER OSCAR (FM):
--------------------------------------------------- Appendix V:1.0.593
Iron Deuce 6. Right now they are shackling that grid coordinate.
Break.
1-GUNFIGHTER 6 PILOT
(IC):
--------------------------------------------------- Appendix V:1.0.594
That target is way the [expletive deleted] out there.
1-HANDLER OSCAR (FM):
--------------------------------------------------- Appendix V:1.0.595
--I understand you want them there or to the rear that--at a secure
pick-up site. Over.
1-GUNFIGHTER 6 PILOT
(IC):
--------------------------------------------------- Appendix V:1.0.596
Yeah, I also got more targets--
1-IRON DEUCE 6 (FM):
--------------------------------------------------- Appendix V:1.0.597
--right now 965--
1-GUNFIGHTER 6 PILOT
(IC):
--------------------------------------------------- Appendix V:1.0.598
--12 o'clock--
1-IRON DEUCE 6 (FM):
--------------------------------------------------- Appendix V:1.0.599
--247. Now. Release them.
1-HANDLER OSCAR (FM):
--------------------------------------------------- Appendix V:1.0.600
DUST-OFF will be on their way. Over.
1-IRON DEUCE 6 (FM):
--------------------------------------------------- Appendix V:1.0.601
This is Iron Deuce 6, out.
1-GUNFIGHTER 6 PILOT
(IC):
--------------------------------------------------- Appendix V:1.0.602
Are you up there?
1-GUNFIGHTER 6 CPG (IC):
--------------------------------------------------- Appendix V:1.0.603
I'm just--I'm ruined.
1-GUNFIGHTER 6 PILOT
(IC):
--------------------------------------------------- Appendix V:1.0.604
I know it, but listen to me.
1-GUNFIGHTER 6 CPG (IC):
--------------------------------------------------- Appendix V:1.0.605
I killed some people here.
1-GUNFIGHTER 6 PILOT
(IC):
--------------------------------------------------- Appendix V:1.0.606
I know it. We don't know that yet. The . . . [expletive deleted]
thing is burning--
1-UNIDENTIFIED:
--------------------------------------------------- Appendix V:1.0.607
--here.
1-GUNFIGHTER 6 PILOT
(IC):
--------------------------------------------------- Appendix V:1.0.608
--way the [expletive deleted] out there.
1-UNIDENTIFIED:
--------------------------------------------------- Appendix V:1.0.609
And then I'll be right back with you. 840217. I'm in-bound.
1-UNIDENTIFIED:
--------------------------------------------------- Appendix V:1.0.610
Roger--
1-GUNFIGHTER 6 CPG (IC):
--------------------------------------------------- Appendix V:1.0.611
--back in about the same spot we took off from and--
1-GUNFIGHTER 6 CPG (S):
--------------------------------------------------- Appendix V:1.0.612
Time 22 53 32
PPOS 3 BR NS 4536 8965
Alt +1140 HG 30 06 IN
1-GUNFIGHTER 6 CPG (IC):
--------------------------------------------------- Appendix V:1.0.613
--there's been some drift of the navigation package--from Charlie
Company about the same place. That's it. Just a minute. There's
the landing position.
TAPES ENDED.
--------------------------------------------------- Appendix V:1.0.614
* * * * * * *
MAJOR CONTRIBUTORS TO THIS REPORT
========================================================== Appendix VI
OFFICE OF SPECIAL INVESTIGATIONS,
WASHINGTON, D.C.
Barbara J. Cart, Assistant Director for Defense and National
Security Crimes
William E. McDaniel II, Senior Special Agent
E. Randy Stone, Special Agent
M. Jane Hunt, Special Assistant for Investigative Plans and Reports
OFFICE OF GENERAL COUNSEL,
WASHINGTON, D.C.
John D. Tower, Attorney Adviser
OFFICE OF INFORMATION MANAGEMENT
AND COMMUNICATIONS, WASHINGTON,
D.C.
Jane K. Ervin, Publication Graphics Specialist
KANSAS CITY REGIONAL OFFICE
John B. Mollet, Senior Evaluator
EUROPEAN OFFICE
Michael J. Courts, Staff Evaluator
Office of Special Investigations