Defense Plans: Plan to Better Use Air Force Squadrons Could Yield
Benefits but Faces Significant Challenges (30-APR-02,
GAO-02-542).
To reduce the deployment burden on Air Force personnel by
spreading deployments more evenly across its force and increasing
the predictability of deployments, the Air Force implemented its
Expeditionary Aerospace Force concept in 1999. By dual-tasking
some fighter squadrons the Air Force could fulfill two
requirements as the 2010 Concept envisions. Although significant
challenges could impede the ability to maximize these benefits,
the Air Force has not specifically analyzed what is needed to
implement dual-tasking by 2010. Dual-tasking would result in more
efficient use of squadrons and a greatly reduced need to task
squadrons above and beyond the Air Force's goal of one 90-day
deployment every 15 months. Dual-tasking would provide theater
commanders with the same number of aircraft to meet requirements
as under current practice; however, the aircraft would come from
fewer squadrons. Because a larger proportion of a squadron's
aircraft would be used to meet requirements, and because
dual-tasking uses fewer squadrons to meet requirements, the need
to repeatedly task the same squadrons would be reduced. The
number of squadrons needed for more than one 90-day period over a
15-month period would decline from 26 squadrons to five. More
training would be required under dual-tasking. Yet, the Air Force
has not quantified this increase, assessed how it would manage
the increase, nor projected how it would support such an increase
either logistically or in its budget. To support deploying a
greater portion of dual-tasked squadron's aircraft, more of the
authorized maintenance positions would have to be filled.
Currently, more than half of the maintenance specialties at the
wings GAO analyzed were undermanned, and some were manned at less
than 60 percent. Such shortages already pose difficulties, since
wing officials are limited in what they can do to make up for the
shortages. Dual-tasking could cause maintenance personnel to be
deployed more frequently than desired unless more of these vacant
positions are filled. In addition, almost all of a squadron's
pilots would be needed to meet dual-tasking requirements. This
will pose challenges in managing pilot deployments.
-------------------------Indexing Terms-------------------------
REPORTNUM: GAO-02-542
ACCNO: A02927
TITLE: Defense Plans: Plan to Better Use Air Force Squadrons
Could Yield Benefits but Faces Significant Challenges
DATE: 04/30/2002
SUBJECT: Air Force personnel
Defense contingency planning
Fighter aircraft
Personnel management
Strategic planning
Internal controls
Air Force Expeditionary Aerospace Force
Concept
F-16 Aircraft
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GAO-02-542
Report to the Secretary of Defense
United States General Accounting Office
GAO
April 2002 DEFENSE PLANS Plan to Better Use Air Force Squadrons Could Yield
Benefits but Faces Significant Challenges
GAO- 02- 542
Page i GAO- 02- 542 Defense Plans Letter 1
Results in Brief 2 Background 3 Implementation of the 2010 Concept Could
Yield Benefits 4 Significant Challenges Could Limit Realization of Benefits
9 Conclusions 14 Recommendations for Executive Action 14 Agency Comments and
Our Response 15
Appendix I Scope and Methodology 17
Appendix II Comments from the Department of Defense 20
Tables
Table 1: Projected Increase in Sorties and Flying- Hour Costs Required to
Train Pilots in All Active F- 16 CG and F- 16 CJ Wings for Dual- Tasking. 10
Table 2: Pilots Required and Remaining in Dual- Tasked Versus
Single- Tasked Squadrons 13
Figures
Figure 1: Illustration of How Single- Tasked and Dual- Tasked Squadrons
Could Meet a Requirement for a 90- Day Period 5 Figure 2: Comparison of
Squadrons Tasked More Than Once Under
Single- and Dual- Tasking 6 Figure 3: Comparison of Squadrons Tasked to Meet
Requirements
Under Single- and Dual- Tasking 7 Figure 4: Comparison of Residual Aircraft
During a 15- Month Cycle
Under Single- and Dual- Tasking 8 Figure 5: Example of Shortages in the
Electrical and
Environmental Systems Specialty 12 Contents
Page 1 GAO- 02- 542 Defense Plans
April 30, 2002 The Honorable Donald H. Rumsfeld The Secretary of Defense
Dear Mr. Secretary: Since the end of the Cold War, the Air Force has been
continuously involved in unforeseen and ongoing contingency operations, such
as enforcing the no- fly zones in Iraq, while operating with fewer
squadrons, people, and overseas bases. In October 1999, the Air Force
implemented its Expeditionary Aerospace Force concept to reduce the
deployment burden on Air Force personnel by spreading deployments more
evenly across its force and increasing the predictability of deployments.
Under that concept, groups of forces, which include fighter squadrons, are
made available on a rotating basis to meet theater commanders? requirements
for one 90- day period every 15 months. 1 By 2010, the Air Force plans to
update this new way of covering peacetime deployments to increase the
efficiency of how it uses certain fighter squadrons through a concept it
terms ?dual- tasking.? Dual- tasking fighter squadrons would result in
providing theater commanders with the same number of aircraft they currently
require but from fewer squadrons. For example, currently, if a theater
commander requires the delivery of precision- guided munitions and
suppression of enemy air defenses, two F- 16 squadrons might be used to meet
these requirements. However, each squadron would use only about half of its
aircraft. In contrast, a dual- tasked F- 16 squadron could meet both
requirements, using most of its aircraft to do so. This is more efficient
because the second squadron is then available to meet other requirements.
Because the full implementation of dual- tasking is not expected until 2010,
the Air Force has not yet conducted detailed analyses of possible impacts.
To help determine the possible impacts, we conducted a detailed comparison
of how selected squadrons would deliver precision- guided munitions and
suppress enemy air defenses in 2010 under dual- tasking versus today?s
single- tasking approach. Our objectives were to determine
1 The theater commanders? requirements that existed during our analysis
period included supporting Northern Watch (Iraq), Southern Watch (Iraq),
Bosnia, counter- drug operations (South America), Iceland, and crisis
response.
United States General Accounting Office Washington, DC 20548
Page 2 GAO- 02- 542 Defense Plans
(1) what benefits would likely accrue from dual- tasking squadrons and (2)
what challenges must be addressed to maximize those benefits. In conducting
this analysis, we compared how the Air Force met theater commanders?
requirements in the most recent 15- month period- December 2000 to February
2002- with how it would meet these same requirements during a similar period
under the 2010 dual- tasking concept. (For a complete description of our
methodology, see app. I.)
Our analysis shows that the Air Force could reap significant benefits by
dual- tasking some fighter squadrons to fulfill two requirements as the 2010
Concept envisions. Although significant challenges could impede the Air
Force?s ability to maximize these benefits, the Air Force has not done the
specific analysis to know what is needed to implement dual- tasking by 2010.
Our analysis showed that dual- tasking would result in more efficient use of
squadrons and a greatly reduced need to task squadrons above and beyond the
Air Force?s goal of one 90- day period every 15 months. With respect to
efficiency, dual- tasking would provide theater commanders with the same
number of aircraft to meet requirements as under current practice; however,
the aircraft would come from fewer squadrons. The benefits are that a larger
proportion of a squadron?s aircraft would be used to meet requirements, and
because dual- tasking uses fewer squadrons to meet requirements, the need to
repeatedly task the same squadrons would be reduced. Our comparison of
actual deployments over a recent 15- month period with those needed under
dual- tasking showed that the number of squadrons that would be needed for
more than one 90- day period during that time would decline from 26
squadrons to 5. Air Force officials believe that other intangible benefits
would accrue. For example, when a squadron is dual- tasked, the theater
commander would be able to quickly shift the number of aircraft and pilots
between the two requirements as the situation demands. This should allow the
commander the flexibility to quickly adjust when requirements change without
having to deploy more forces into the theater.
However, addressing significant challenges- such as the need for increased
pilot training and filling vacant maintenance positions- is essential if the
full benefits are to accrue. Our analysis of selected F- 16 squadrons showed
that more training sorties would be required under dual- tasking. Yet, the
Air Force has not quantified this increase, assessed how it would manage the
increase, or projected how it would support such an increase either
logistically or in its budget. Our analysis also showed Results in Brief
Page 3 GAO- 02- 542 Defense Plans
that the Air Force would need to fill more of its authorized maintenance
positions to support deploying a greater portion of a dual- tasked
squadron?s aircraft. Currently, more than half of the maintenance
specialties at the wings we analyzed were undermanned, and some were manned
at less than 60 percent. Such shortages already pose difficulties, since
wing officials are limited in what they can do to make up for the shortages.
Dual- tasking could cause maintenance personnel to be deployed more
frequently than desired unless more of these vacant positions are filled.
Another one of our comparisons showed that under dual- tasking, almost all
of a squadron?s pilots would need to be used to meet requirements. This will
pose challenges in managing pilot deployments.
Because long- term budgets and plans must be put into place soon to maximize
the benefits of dual- tasking, we are recommending that the secretary of
defense direct the Air Force to specifically identify the budgetary and
operational requirements related to the dual- tasking 2010 Concept and
develop plans and milestones for accomplishing the necessary actions. In
commenting on a draft of this report, the Department of Defense partially
concurred with our recommendations, agreeing that it would ultimately need
to develop a strategic plan to implement the dual- tasking concept.
In October 1999, the Air Force designated most of its combat, mobility, and
support forces into 10 similar groups of forces termed Aerospace
Expeditionary Forces. This approach was implemented to help the Air Force
manage its commitments to theater commanders and reduce the constant
deployment burden on its people. According to Air Force officials, more
frequent overseas deployments had increased the strain on Air Force
servicemembers. Some units were tasked many times to support contingencies
while others were tasked infrequently. Therefore, the Air Force implemented
an approach wherein, at any given time, 2 of the 10 Aerospace Expeditionary
Forces are tasked to cover theater commanders? requirements for one 90- day
period every 15 months. Limiting contingency deployments to 90 days allows
servicemembers to participate in training and exercises away from their home
station and still meet the Air Force?s overall deployment goal of having
servicemembers away from their home station not more than 120 days each
calendar year.
The dual- tasking concept is an Air Force plan to use some of its fighter
squadrons more efficiently by 2010. This concept applies to specific,
specialized active squadrons- primarily the seven active F- 16 CG Background
Page 4 GAO- 02- 542 Defense Plans
squadrons that specialize in delivering precision- guided munitions and the
nine active F- 16 CJ squadrons that specialize in suppressing enemy air
defenses. 2 By 2010, planned upgrades to these aircraft will be completed to
enable both types of F- 16 aircraft to deliver precision- guided munitions
and to suppress enemy air defenses. Although the aircraft will be equipped
for both tasks, they can perform only one on any given sortie. These
aircraft upgrades were planned before the concept to dual- task entire
squadrons was developed. Dual- tasking these squadrons would result in
providing theater commanders with the same number of aircraft they currently
require but from only one squadron capable of performing both tasks. This
contrasts with today?s practice of providing the required aircraft from
portions of two squadrons, each specializing in a single task. Dual- tasking
of aircraft would not require any restationing of squadrons.
We analyzed the benefits that the Air Force anticipated would accrue from
dual- tasking specific fighter squadrons in the active force. Our analysis
shows that dual- tasking could allow the Air Force to make more efficient
use of fighter squadrons, resulting in tasking significantly fewer squadrons
for more than one 90- day period to meet requirements. Also, dual- tasking
would use a larger percentage of each squadron?s aircraft to meet
requirements, leaving fewer aircraft at their home station. Finally, Air
Force officials believe that intangible benefits will accrue. For example,
the squadron?s personnel can train and fight together as a unit when both
requirements are met from the same squadron.
The Air Force anticipates several benefits from dual- tasking. First, fewer
squadrons would be tasked to meet requirements. Second, dual- tasking would
employ a larger percentage of each squadron?s aircraft, resulting in more
efficient use of the squadrons because fewer aircraft would remain behind at
their home station. Figure 1 illustrates an example of how a requirement is
met currently under single- tasking and how the same requirement would be
met in the future under dual- tasking.
2 By 2010, F- 15Es and future F- 22s are also expected to be dual- tasked.
Implementation of the
2010 Concept Could Yield Benefits
Benefits the Air Force Anticipates
Page 5 GAO- 02- 542 Defense Plans
Figure 1: Illustration of How Single- Tasked and Dual- Tasked Squadrons
Could Meet a Requirement for a 90- Day Period
Source: GAO?s analysis of the Air Force?s data.
As shown in figure 1, although the theater commander would require 18
aircraft to meet the requirements in both cases, only one squadron would
provide these aircraft under dual- tasking instead of the current two. As a
result, fewer squadrons would need to be tasked to meet requirements. In
addition, the requirement, as figure 1 illustrates, is currently met by
tasking 18 of 42 aircraft (43- percent) from two squadrons and keeping 24
remaining at their home stations. In contrast, the same requirement under
dual- tasking would result in using more of a squadron?s aircraft- 18 of 24
(75- percent) aircraft from one squadron meeting the requirement and keeping
6 at their home station. Currently, the aircraft left at their home station
cannot be used to meet another requirement in a different deployed location.
Other than being flown to train pilots remaining at their home station,
these aircraft can be used only to augment the aircraft already deployed.
Page 6 GAO- 02- 542 Defense Plans
Our analysis showed that, as the Air Force anticipated, dual- tasking would
result in fewer squadrons being tasked for more than one 90- day period
during a 15- month cycle and fewer total squadrons being tasked to cover
requirements. For example, during the December 2000 through February 2002
period, the Air Force had to task 26 squadrons more than once to cover all
requirements in every 90- day period. This most often occurred because the
Air Force did not have enough of a specific capability, such as suppression
of enemy air defenses, to cover all the requirements. Under dual- tasking,
the Air Force would have to task only five squadrons more than once during
the 15- month period- an 81- percent reduction. (See fig. 2.)
Figure 2: Comparison of Squadrons Tasked More Than Once Under Single- and
Dual- Tasking
Source: GAO?s analysis of the Air Force?s data.
This reduction in tasking squadrons for more than one 90- day period allows
the Air Force to spread the deployments more evenly across all squadrons. By
doing this, dual- tasking would help make it possible for the Air Force to
better meet its goal of one 90- day tasking every 15 months.
With fewer squadrons being tasked more than once to cover requirements,
dual- tasking would also result in fewer total squadrons being tasked to
meet requirements. The Air Force tasked 95 squadrons to meet requirements
from December 2000 through February 2002. As illustrated in figure 3, our
analysis showed that dual- tasking would result in the Air Our Analysis
Quantified
Anticipated Benefits
Page 7 GAO- 02- 542 Defense Plans
Force?s being able to meet these same requirements with just 72 (or 24
percent fewer) squadrons. 3
Figure 3: Comparison of Squadrons Tasked to Meet Requirements Under
Singleand Dual- Tasking
Source: GAO?s analysis of the Air Force?s data.
Finally, our analysis showed that dual- tasking would result in more of a
squadron?s aircraft being used to meet requirements. Currently, the Air
Force tasks an average of 45 percent of a squadron?s aircraft along with the
necessary pilots and maintenance personnel to cover a single requirement.
This practice splits the squadron, leaving the residual aircraft and pilots
at their home station. Since squadrons are not equipped to conduct two
independent operations in different locations, the residual aircraft can
augment only their own squadron in its deployed location or continue
training at their home station. Our analysis showed that during the most
recent 15- month cycle, the Air Force tasked 613 of 1,647 aircraft, leaving
1,034 aircraft at their home station. In contrast, under dual- tasking,
theater commanders would receive about the same number of aircraft- 618 of
1,350 aircraft 4 -leaving 732 aircraft at their home station. This is
possible because dual- tasking meets requirements with fewer squadrons,
using up to 78 percent of the aircraft in a squadron. This higher usage of
squadron aircraft would reduce the number of aircraft remaining at their
home station by almost 30 percent.
3 The dual- tasked aircraft included F- 16s specializing in delivering
precision- guided munitions (F- 16 CGs), F- 16s specializing in suppressing
enemy air defenses (F- 16 CJs), as well as some F- 15Es and future F- 22s.
4 The number of aircraft in tasked squadrons is less under dual- tasking
because, under single- tasking, the Air Force had to task 95 squadrons to
meet requirements versus 72 under dual- tasking. (See fig. 3.)
Page 8 GAO- 02- 542 Defense Plans
Figure 4: Comparison of Residual Aircraft During a 15- Month Cycle Under
Singleand Dual- Tasking
Source: GAO?s analysis of the Air Force?s data.
Air Force officials said that dual- tasking 75 percent of a squadron?s
aircraft would significantly reduce or eliminate the need to conduct home
station training while the squadron is deployed, since all the pilots would
also be tasked. One Air Force official indicated that operating in this
manner would further allow the squadron to better continue training while
deployed because the squadron?s senior instructor pilots and more junior
pilots would be in the same location.
According to wing officials, two intangible benefits could result from
dualtasking. One benefit, according to the officials, would be improved
unity of command. Officials explained that tasking the entire squadron
allows the squadron command to focus its people on one operation and marshal
the majority of the squadron?s assets to support that operation. Aircraft
that suppress enemy air defenses protect aircraft delivering precision-
guided munitions. For this reason, wing officials believe that unity of
command under dual- tasking would be further enhanced when both requirements
are met from the same squadron because the squadron would train and fight
together as a unit. Wing officials viewed this as an optimal situation
Intangible Benefits the Air
Force Anticipates
Page 9 GAO- 02- 542 Defense Plans
that could improve unity of command, which, in turn, could improve mission
effectiveness.
The second intangible benefit identified by Air Force officials is that
dualtasking entire squadrons could increase the theater commanders?
flexibility in employing the squadron?s capabilities. These Air Force
officials pointed out that when a squadron is dual- tasked, the theater
commander could quickly shift the number of aircraft and pilots between the
two requirements as the situation demands. This would allow the theater
commander the flexibility to adjust if requirements change without having to
deploy more forces into the theater, as is the current situation.
Implementing dual- tasking under the 2010 Concept presents the Air Force
with some significant challenges. These include increased pilot training and
a greater impact from existing aircraft maintenance position vacancies. To a
lesser extent, the Air Force will be challenged to manage pilot deployments,
since dual- tasking will use more of the squadron?s pilots. However, because
the Air Force is only in the early stages of implementing this concept, it
has not yet identified or planned for the specific operational and resource
requirements, such as training and funding, to address these challenges.
Preparing to dual- task F- 16 CG and CJ squadrons will require additional
training sorties for these squadrons to prepare for both delivering
precision- guided munitions and suppressing enemy air defenses. However, the
additional training needed plus existing training requirements would exceed
the maximum number of sorties that these squadrons can currently fly because
of constrained maintenance and logistic support.
Since the Air Force had not yet quantified the additional training required
for dual- tasking, we projected how many additional sorties would be
required, assuming that all other training requirements remained the same.
We analyzed actual fiscal year 2001 sorties flown for two wings 5 -one F- 16
CG wing, whose primary task is delivering precision- guided munitions, and
one F- 16 CJ wing, whose primary task is suppressing enemy air defenses. We
projected that the F- 16 CG wing would require an additional 3,347
5 Active Air Force fighter wings generally contain three squadrons.
Significant Challenges
Could Limit Realization of Benefits
Pilot Training Will Increase in Dual- Tasked Squadrons
Page 10 GAO- 02- 542 Defense Plans
sorties to train for both tasks. 6 This represents about a 22 percent
increase over fiscal year 2001 training requirements. We projected that the
F- 16 CJ wing would require an additional 2,735 sorties to train for both
tasks. This represents about a 12 percent increase over fiscal year 2001
training requirements.
Furthermore, if the F- 16 CG wing we analyzed flies the additional 3, 347
sorties it needs to accomplish dual- tasking, it would need to increase the
number of sorties each aircraft flies each month from 18.8 to about 23. If
the F- 16 CJ wing we analyzed flies the additional 2,735 sorties, it would
need to increase the number of sorties each aircraft flies each month from
18.8 to about 21.7. If all active F- 16 CG and F- 16 CJ wings train for
dualtasking, a projected total of 12,264 additional sorties would be
required, which would cost $83. 5 million annually. According to Air Force
officials, this increased flying hour cost has not yet been integrated into
the Air Force?s budgets. The sortie requirements and annual flying- hour
costs for all active F- 16 CG and CJ wings are illustrated in table 1.
Table 1: Projected Increase in Sorties and Flying- Hour Costs Required to
Train Pilots in All Active F- 16 CG and F- 16 CJ Wings for Dual- Tasking.
Dollars in millions
All active wings Sortie increase Annual flying- hour cost a
F- 16 CG wings 6,860 $ 45.1 F- 16 CJ wings 5,404 38.4
Total 12,264 $ 83.5
a Based on Air Force cost factor of $4,939 per hour.
The wings we studied were already falling short of meeting their training
requirements. 7 If training is increased for dual- tasking, the shortfall
will increase. For example, in fiscal year 2001, one wing flew only 84
percent of its required training sorties. If this wing trains for dual-
tasking without any reduction in other training requirements, it would be
able to fly only 70 percent of the required training sorties. Wing officials
said that they fall
6 Our training projections for both wings took into account training common
to both tasks to avoid an inflated estimate. (For a complete description of
our analysis methodology, see app. 1.)
7 We reported in 1999 that the Air Force had not flown all its budgeted
flying hours. See U. S. General Accounting Office, Defense Budget:
Observations on the Air Force Flying Hour Program, GAO/ NSIAD- 99- 165
(Washington, D. C.: July 8, 1999).
Page 11 GAO- 02- 542 Defense Plans
short of training requirements because the number of sorties they can
currently fly is limited. Wing officials have said that they cannot fly each
aircraft more than about 18 times each month because of parts shortages and
maintenance required on aging aircraft. As part of our Performance and
Accountability Series, we reported in 2001 that insufficient spare parts are
a major contributor to lower- than- expected mission capable rates. 8
Furthermore, the average age of the Air Force?s tactical aircraft will grow
from 13 to 21 years by 2011. 9 The Department of Defense has stated that as
aircraft age, they are less available for training and operations. 10
Therefore, the Air Force will be challenged to increase sorties to train
pilots for dualtasking and would have to pay a greater amount for parts- in
addition to the flying hours.
The Air Force might be able to offset some of the increased training by
reducing training requirements in other areas. However, if the Air Force
chooses to require these squadrons to train exclusively for dual- tasking,
it faces the risk that may be associated with eliminating training
requirements for other missions, such as close air support. For example, if
the F- 16 CG wing in our analysis trained exclusively for delivering
precision- guided munitions and suppressing enemy air defenses, the Air
Force would not incur the cost to fly an increased number of sorties, but
these squadrons would no longer train for close air support.
Our analysis showed that the Air Force would need to fill more of its
authorized maintenance positions to support deploying a greater portion of a
dual- tasked squadron?s aircraft. Since the Air Force had not estimated the
maintenance requirements for dual- tasking, we assessed the extent to which
two wings had sufficient maintenance personnel. To do so, we compared the
number of authorized maintenance positions with the number of maintenance
personnel assigned to an F- 16 CG wing and an
8 Mission capable rates indicate the material condition of an aircraft. See
U. S. General Accounting Office, Performance and Accountability Series:
Major Management Challenges and Program Risks- Department of Defense, GAO-
01- 244 (Washington, D. C.: Jan. 2001).
9 See U. S. General Accounting Office, Tactical Aircraft: Modernization
Plans Will Not Reduce Average Age of Aircraft, GAO- 01- 163 (Washington, D.
C.: Feb 9, 2001). 10 See U. S. General Accounting Office, Military Aircraft:
Services Need Strategies to Reduce Cannibalizations, GAO- 02- 86
(Washington, D. C.: Nov. 21, 2001). Filling Maintenance
Positions Is Critical
Page 12 GAO- 02- 542 Defense Plans
F- 16 CJ wing. 11 Our analysis showed that although the wings may have a
sufficient number of maintenance positions, many of the positions are
currently unfilled. Specifically, the two wings need a total of 1,056
additional people to fill the positions authorized. More than half of the
maintenance specialties at both wings were undermanned, and many were
assigned 60 percent or fewer of the people authorized. For example, the
positions for journeyman electrical and environmental systems technicians at
one wing were manned at 45 percent. Figure 5 illustrates this maintenance
personnel shortage.
Figure 5: Example of Shortages in the Electrical and Environmental Systems
Specialty
Source: GAO?s analysis of the Air Force?s data.
Vacant maintenance positions already pose problems, since wing officials are
limited in what they can do to make up for the shortages. For example,
although some positions are overmanned, the wings have very little ability
to transfer people from overmanned positions to undermanned positions. This
is due to differences in skill levels or required technical training. For
example, a propulsion technician would not be qualified to do structural
maintenance. Likewise, an entry- level helper would not be able to fill the
position of a supervisory journeyman, even in the same skill area. The
problems posed by vacant maintenance positions would be even more pronounced
under dual- tasking, since the wing would need to deploy more maintenance
personnel to support the greater portion of a squadron?s aircraft that would
be deployed.
11 Some maintenance personnel are assigned to squadrons, and some are
assigned to the wing and work with whichever squadron needs their specialty.
Therefore, our analysis covered the total maintenance positions- those at
the wing and squadron level. (For a complete description of our methodology,
see app. 1.)
Page 13 GAO- 02- 542 Defense Plans
Officials at both wings stated that, assuming parts and supplies are also
available, they could meet the maintenance demands of flying more sorties
and deploying more aircraft under dual- tasking if the maintenance positions
were filled. If the positions are not filled, then some maintenance
personnel would have to deploy more than one 90- day period in every 15-
month cycle and/ or work extra hours, according to wing officials. Thus, the
officials asserted it is critical that the Air Force recruit, train, and
retain personnel to fill more of these positions by the time dual- tasking
begins. If the Air Force is unable to fill these positions, it could affect
aircraft as indicated in a 2001 GAO report, which stated that higher-
thanexpected attrition of experienced maintenance personnel may affect
aircraft mission capable rates. 12
Since dual- tasking would task 75 percent rather than an average of 45
percent of a squadron?s aircraft, the number of pilots from each squadron
used to meet requirements would also increase. To assess whether dual-
tasked squadrons would have enough pilots to meet the higher deployment
requirements under dual- tasking, we compared the number of pilots in
squadrons with the number that would be required if the squadrons were dual-
tasked. Our comparison showed that there would be enough pilots to meet the
dual- tasking requirements, albeit, with a slim margin as table 2
illustrates.
Table 2: Pilots Required and Remaining in Dual- Tasked Versus Single- Tasked
Squadrons Pilots required Pilots remaining Squadron
Number of pilots in the squadron Dec. 2000- Feb. 2002 Dual- tasking Dec.
2000- Feb. 2002 Dual- tasking
A 301225185 B 301525155 C 231220113
Source: GAO?s analysis of the Air Force?s data.
The fewer remaining pilots significantly narrows the margin for error in
managing pilot deployments to achieve the Air Force?s goal of one 90- day
period every 15 months. Officials stated that there are always some pilots
who cannot deploy because they are ill, in transit, or need to complete
initial qualification training. The officials we spoke with stated that
since only partial squadrons are tasked currently, they can usually meet
12 GAO- 01- 163. Pilot Deployment Goals
Could Be Stressed
Page 14 GAO- 02- 542 Defense Plans
deployment goals and spread out the need to also meet other stateside
requirements such as supporting exercises or accident investigations.
However, the officials believed that, when they routinely deploy more
aircraft and pilots under dual- tasking, they will have to manage pilot
deployments more carefully.
The Air Force could reap significant benefits from implementing dualtasking
under the 2010 Concept but will face challenges that, if not addressed,
could limit those benefits. The most significant challenge we identified is
pilot training. If the Air Force does not reduce the training requirements
for dual- tasked squadrons, it will need to increase its flyinghour budget
and enable squadrons to increase training flights. Also, if current training
requirements do not change and the Air Force cannot increase the number of
training flights, the additional training sorties required for dual- tasking
will exceed the wing?s ability to produce such flights. As a result, dual-
tasking could exacerbate existing training shortfalls. On the other hand, if
the Air Force reduces training requirements for dual- tasked squadrons, it
would face the risk of these squadrons? not being trained in missions now
required. Another challenge to implementing dual- tasking is that if
maintenance positions are not filled, maintenance personnel would likely
deploy more than one 90- day period and/ or work many extra hours. Finally,
long lead times may be needed to put everything into place to successfully
implement this initiative, yet the Air Force has not yet specifically
identified the necessary operational and resource requirements.
To be in a position to effectively implement its plans for dual- tasking by
2010, we recommend that you direct the secretary of the Air Force to
determine the actions and associated resources needed to fully implement
this new concept. We further recommend that you direct the secretary of the
Air Force to incorporate the actions from this analysis into a strategic
implementation plan and set milestones for accomplishing the actions.
Specifically, the plan should identify
the actions needed to meet the anticipated increase in pilot training,
how squadrons might mitigate the risks associated with any reduction in
training requirements, the specific funding requirements to cover the
increased costs of pilot
training and how these requirements will be integrated into the Air Force?s
budget, and a strategy to fill aircraft maintenance positions. Conclusions
Recommendations for Executive Action
Page 15 GAO- 02- 542 Defense Plans
As you know, 31 U. S. C. 720 requires the head of a federal agency to submit
a written statement of the actions taken on our recommendations to the
Senate Committee on Governmental Affairs and the House Committee on
Governmental Reform not later than 60 days after the date of this report. A
written statement must also be sent to the House and Senate Committees on
Appropriations with the agency?s first request for appropriations made more
than 60 days after the date of this report.
In commenting on a draft of this report, the Department of Defense partially
concurred with our recommendations, agreeing that it would ultimately need
to develop a strategic plan to implement the dual- tasking concept. The
department also agreed that the plan should include actions to address
increased pilot- training requirements, actions to mitigate risks if some
training requirements are reduced, and specific funding requirements, as we
recommended. The department preferred to complete its study of manpower
issues before developing a strategy for filling maintenance positions.
While agreeing that an implementation plan would be needed, the department
noted that our analysis had not included Reserve Component F- 16 aircraft
and therefore it would be premature to develop such a plan before the
implications of dual- tasking these reserve forces could be reflected.
We do not believe that the department should delay analyzing the actions
needed to implement dual- tasking nor in developing the plan we recommended
in anticipation of undefined future actions related to reserve forces.
According to Air Combat Command officials, Reserve Component F- 16s (CGs and
CJs) will be single- tasked in 2010 as they are today and as reflected in
our analysis. Moreover, only 75 of the 395 Reserve Component F- 16s are
scheduled to receive the upgrades that would enable them to be dual- tasked.
The rest are older versions that will not receive the upgrades. Given the
lead time needed to enact the changes necessary for adequate pilot training
and maintenance as well as to secure needed funding, we continue to believe
that the Air Force should not delay in defining these actions and developing
the strategic plan we recommended.
Comments from the Department of Defense are reprinted in appendix II. Agency
Comments
and Our Response
Page 16 GAO- 02- 542 Defense Plans
We are sending copies of this report to the secretary of the Air Force, the
director of the Office of Management and Budget, and interested
congressional committees. We will also make copies available to others on
request.
If you or your staff have any questions, please call me on (202) 512- 3958
or by E- mail at schusterc@ gao. gov. Major contributors to this report were
Gwendolyn R. Jaffe, Brenda Waterfield, Fred Harrison, and Dawn Godfrey.
Sincerely yours, Carol R. Schuster Director Defense Capabilities and
Management
Appendix I: Scope and Methodology Page 17 GAO- 02- 542 Defense Plans
To accomplish our first objective of determining what benefits would likely
accrue from dual- tasking squadrons, we conducted a detailed comparison of
how selected fighter squadrons are used to meet requirements currently and
under dual- tasking in 2010. To do this, we compared how the Air Force met
requirements in the most recent Expeditionary Aerospace Force 15- month
cycle (Dec. 2000 to Feb. 2002) 1 with how it would meet these same
requirements under the 2010 dualtasking concept.
Specifically, to project the affect that dual- tasking would have on how
squadrons would be used to meet requirements, we first identified the
requirements specified in the Joint Forces Command documents. To determine
how the Air Force met these requirements, we used Air Combat Command
scheduling documents that identified the actual squadrons assigned to cover
each requirement. Officials from the Air Combat Command?s Scheduling and
Aerial Events Office verified the number of aircraft actually tasked from
each squadron during the December 2000 to February 2002 cycle, including
squadrons from the 20th Fighter Wing and the 388th Fighter Wing. We also
discussed with officials from both wings the reasonableness of how their
squadrons were tasked in this cycle and how they may be tasked under dual-
tasking.
To project how these requirements would be met by dual- tasking in 2010, we
obtained the notional force structure presented in the Air Force?s official
2010 brief, verifying with the Air Force that this continues to be an
accurate force structure projection. We also identified dual- tasked
squadrons that the Air Force depicted as being capable of carrying out two
tasks by 2010 and the specific tasks or missions that each of these aircraft
would be capable of performing. With this information, we aligned
requirements with the capabilities in the 2010 force structure, maximizing
the use of squadrons with dual- tasking capabilities.
From this analysis we compared, for the most recent 15- month cycle and in
2010, the total number of squadrons used to meet requirements, the number of
squadrons used for more than one 90- day period, the number of aircraft
deployed to cover requirements from each squadron, and the number of
aircraft that remained at their home station. We identified how many
squadrons were used to meet requirements with substantially their
1 These requirements include supporting long- standing operations such as
enforcing the nofly zones in Iraq. Appendix I: Scope and Methodology
Appendix I: Scope and Methodology Page 18 GAO- 02- 542 Defense Plans
entire squadron of aircraft. We then compared these results with the
benefits identified by the Air Force. We validated with Air Combat Command
officials that we had correctly applied the 2010 force structure and the
dual- tasking capabilities that would exist by 2010 to cover all the
requirements.
To accomplish our second objective of determining what challenges must be
addressed to maximize dual- tasking benefits, we conducted analyses in three
areas: pilot training, maintenance personnel, and pilot deployments.
To project the increased training that may be required for pilots in these
two wings to prepare for dual- tasking, we analyzed their actual fiscal year
2001 training sorties. One wing was a F- 16 CG wing (the 388th Fighter Wing
at Hill Air Force Base, Ogden, Utah), which specializes in delivering
precision- guided munitions. The other wing was a F- 16 CJ wing (the 20th
Fighter Wing at Shaw Air Force Base, Sumter, S. C.), which specializes in
suppressing enemy air defenses. Air Force officials provided these data from
the automated system the Air Force uses to track pilot compliance with
training requirements. Although we did not test the Air Force?s management
controls over its automated systems, we performed several tests to ensure
the data?s accuracy and validated the data through discussions with Air
Force officials to further ensure their accuracy and completeness.
Our approach was to use each wing?s experience in training for either
delivering precision- guided munitions or suppressing enemy air defenses to
project the impact of training for both tasks. To do this, we used each
wing?s actual fiscal year 2001 sorties flown to project the future
dualtasked training requirements, backing out the overlapping sorties common
to both tasks. We then used these results to project the total increase in
sorties required for all active F- 16 CG and F- 16 CJ squadrons. Finally,
using Air Force cost factors, we determined the cost of the associated
flying hours for all these squadrons.
Our basis for selecting these wings was that under dual- tasking (after
planned aircraft upgrades), each of these aircraft types will be capable of
both tasks interchangeably. We selected delivering precision- guided
munitions and suppressing enemy air defenses as the dual- tasked missions
because they represent the more stringent pair of tasks the Air Force
expects these wings to perform in the future.
To assess the extent to which two wings had sufficient maintenance
personnel, we compared the number of personnel assigned, by Air Force
Appendix I: Scope and Methodology Page 19 GAO- 02- 542 Defense Plans
specialty, as of September 2001 with the number of positions authorized as
of fiscal year 2002. The authorized positions reflect what would be required
to support deploying almost all aircraft in a wing as in wartime, which is
similar to tasking 75 percent of a squadron?s aircraft under dualtasking.
Additionally, to assess whether dual- tasked squadrons would have enough
pilots to meet the higher deployment requirements under dualtasking, we
compared the number of pilots in squadrons with the number that would be
required if the squadrons were dual- tasked.
We discussed this methodology and the results with officials at Air Combat
Command at Langley Air Force Base in Hampton, Virginia, and officials at
fighter wings at Hill Air Force Base in Ogden, Utah, and Shaw Air Force Base
in Sumter, South Carolina. All the officials agreed our methodology was
appropriate.
We conducted our review from January 2001 through March 2002 in accordance
with generally accepted government auditing standards.
Appendix II: Comments from the Department of Defense
Page 20 GAO- 02- 542 Defense Plans
Appendix II: Comments from the Department of Defense
Appendix II: Comments from the Department of Defense
Page 21 GAO- 02- 542 Defense Plans
Now on p. 14. Now on p. 14.
Appendix II: Comments from the Department of Defense
Page 22 GAO- 02- 542 Defense Plans
Now on p. 15. Now on p. 15.
Now on p. 14. Now on p. 14.
(702100)
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