Key Points

A Better Future Ahead

What's Next

Democratic Consolidation

The View From The Neighborhood

Conclusions

About This Report

The USIP Bosnia in the Balkans Initiative

SPECIAL REPORT 36

Croatia After Tudjman

The View From The Neighborhood

Croatia and Bosnia

Tudjman's departure from political power will have more of an impact on Bosnia's future than that of any leader except Milosevic. In keeping with his vision of a greater Croatia, Tudjman considers Bosnia and Herzegovina an appendage of Croatia. Although Western pressure prevents him from dismembering it, Tudjman and the HDZ have maintained de facto control of the Croatian portions of Herzeg-Bosna through political party ties, joint Croatian institutions, a shared currency, and preexisting integrated power and telecommunications grids. Participants in the working group, however, questioned which way political power flowed between Herzeg-Bosna and Zagreb. It has become increasingly apparent that extremist Herzeg-Bosnian Croats may actually exercise control over Zagreb through monetary contributions and voting privileges. Zagreb's control of western Bosnia has also been attenuated by the death of Susak. Known as "the enforcer," Susak maintained a strong political base in Herzeg-Bosna and had significant influence over the region.

One of the pillars of dissatisfaction of the "Small Croatia" community is the disproportionate influence exercised by their "country cousins" in Bosnia. Twelve of 132 seats in the Croatian parliament are reserved ostensibly for the diaspora community worldwide, but in reality they are mostly occupied by Herzegovina politicians, who vote consistently with the HDZ. The democratic opposition and certain factions of the HDZ want the ties to Herzeg-Bosna severed and the diaspora vote eliminated. They believe that although the HDZ cannot win the majority vote in Croatia proper in the next parliamentary elections, it could form a government with the support of the 12 "diaspora" seats.

Bosnia's Croat leaders are also reevaluating relations with Zagreb. Their wartime central Bosnian leader, Kresimir Zubak, recently made public his split from the Croatian HDZ, citing serious differences over party ideology. These differences include Tudjman's policies regarding corruption and party leadership which have consistently favored Zagreb's nationalistic politics and politicians. Zubak, in his remarks at the United States Institute of Peace, indicated that his campaign for the presidency is now premised on building a future for Bosnian Croats within the Federation. Although Ante Jelavic -- the nationalist whom Zagreb supports -- is likely to win Zubak's seat in the Presidency of Bosnia and Herzegovina, Zubak's and his followers' defections represent a significant weakening of the HDZ in Bosnia and of the Mostar-Zagreb axis. The Bosnian Croats seem ready to recognize that their interests are not identical to Zagreb's and that they must improve relations with the Bosnian Muslims if they are to thrive in post-war Bosnia.

Croatia and Serbia

Despite the complex, intimate relations of the war period, Serb-Croatian relations today are distant and ambivalent. Although Belgrade retains an interest in acquiring previously held Serb property in Croatia, Croats have effectively, if not officially, given up their claims in Serbia. Croatian disinterest gives them the upper hand, while the Serbs resent the loss of assets and land. Having abandoned Serbs in Croatia and Bosnia, Milosevic has lost influence with these groups and is unlikely to force the issue of restitution. Croat resistance to Serbian restitution is likely to remain strong and can be overridden only with international pressure. Participants noted that the war was felt acutely in Zagreb, while citizens of Belgrade were largely shielded from its effects. As a result, intolerance remains strong in Croatia, a fact that, combined with declining leverage by Belgrade, has prevented Croatia from dealing judiciously with its former citizens of Serbian descent. Croatian opposition leaders confirmed the increasing distance at the official (Zagreb-Belgrade) level, also noting that their own ties to Serb democrats are quite weak. As they see it, Serbia remains influential in Croatia only indirectly -- the Milosevic autocracy tends to reinforce Tudjman's worst tendencies.

Working group participants predicted that relations between Zagreb and Belgrade will become increasingly remote as each country embraces distinct postwar futures. Although short-sighted, Croatia has abandoned trade relations with its eastern neighbors, setting its sights on Europe and its prospects for integration. Increasingly content to fix what is ailing on the domestic scene, rather than expanding its territorial domain, Croatia no longer needs Serbia to accomplish its national agenda. Linked together politically and economically since the end of the Austro-Hungarian Empire, Zagreb and Belgrade remain close geographically, but seem increasingly far apart in terms of national aspirations and common interests.

Croatia's Political Transition and Relations with the United States

As Croatia turns westward to fulfill its national interests in building a strong, independent state, the West enjoys increasing influence in Zagreb. Participants noted that the United States has been engaged in Croatian affairs for some time, focusing primarily on the establishment of democratic institutions and political pluralism. U.S. programs have reached out to a range of political figures in the HDZ and the opposition parties, providing guidance on political party development, campaign organization, and the establishment of independent media. In 1997, Washington pushed hard for free and fair presidential elections, lobbying for a special Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) mission headed by Paul Simon to oversee the event. While voter participation was high, the campaign barely met minimal standards for fair elections. Tudjman received extensive media coverage in the days leading up to the election; his opponents received little -- in effect, no -- air time (60 and 16 seconds respectively for the second and third runners-up). Elements of society have since worked to establish international standards for elections and campaigns: (1) mainstream media representatives formed a lobbying group, Forum 21, for the establishment of free, independent media; (2) citizens in general are learning and promoting proper campaign and electoral norms.

Working group participants argued that pressure on the Croatian government to strengthen its commitment to democratic transition must be increased. Croatia's stated aim to join Europe offers the West substantial leverage with which to push hard for increased democracy -- a key criterion for joining European institutions -- and at the same time means by which to support Croatian national interests. Participants argued further that the West must use its access more effectively to seek repeal of criminal and libel laws that stifle the development of civil society, as discussed above.

Repatriation of refugees is also an issue that the West must advance more forcefully. Croatia has recently passed a reasonable program for refugee returns but has failed consistently to implement it, violating a fundamental tenet of the Dayton accords to which Croatia is a signatory. Croats must begin to understand that a successful return program guarantees a stable, peaceful future for their state. Resentment by refugees who are denied access to their homes and communities is a potent destabilizing force for the entire region. Such feelings of victimization are remembered and cultivated for generations and are the basis for further conflict. One participant noted that tensions are relieved even when refugees choose not to return home. Knowing they had the opportunity has an important healing effect. Zagreb must understand that it will not achieve a place in Europe until it provides convincing evidence of its willingness to repatriate those Croatian Serbs who want to return home.

In the process of promoting the democratization of Croatia, the United States must accept a diminution of Zagreb's influence in Herzeg-Bosna. Western powers since the end of the war have relied on Zagreb to affect Herzeg-Bosna's compliance with Dayton -- a confusing policy given the Dayton accords' goal of strengthening the central Bosnian institutions and the Federation. Croatia's democratic opposition and elements of the HDZ are willing to abandon Croatia's wartime territorial aspirations to concentrate on domestic democratic and economic reform, thereby loosening and even severing ties with Herzeg-Bosna. Working group participants speculated that Croatians would come to see the loss of influence in western Bosnia as more than offset by the gains from democratization. Furthermore, Croats in western Bosnia are a relatively small community in an economically backward section of the Federation. As such, they cannot go it alone. If support from Zagreb dried up, they would be compelled to integrate more completely with the Federation.

Conclusions

Croatia is poised to complete its democratic transition. With both control over all its territory and its independence ensured, Croatia has an opportunity to become a responsible neighbor and a partner of Europe. It need only abandon designs on Bosnian territory and focus on its own political and economic development, including:

• repatriation of Serb refugees
  
• establishment and tolerance of open and independent media
  
• improvement of electoral process under multiparty supervision
  
• ending the Mostar-Zagreb axis, including elimination of diaspora voting and representation in the Croatian Parliament
  
• adoption of measures to weaken the presidency while bolstering the parliament and judiciary
  
• fostering equitable and transparent privatization programs

With these steps, Croatian ambitions to be regarded as Western and European will be fulfilled. In doing so, Croatia will have achieved not only independence, but a better life for all its citizens.

About The Report.

On July 14, 1998, the United States Institute of Peace conducted a meeting of its Balkans Working Group on "Croatia After Tudjman" in order to understand longer term factors that might affect regional stability. The group also met on July 8 with leaders of the Croatian opposition, and on July 24 with Kresimir Zubak, the Croat member of the Presidency of Bosnia and Herzegovina. The working group is composed of representatives from government agencies, think tanks, and nongovernmental organizations active in Balkan affairs. Chaired by the former U.S. Ambassador to Bosnia and Herzegovina John Menzies, the working group has met throughout 1997-98 to discuss implementation of the Dayton peace accords. Recognizing that Bosnia cannot exist as a viable, democratic state unless it is embedded in a region that is itself stable and democratic, the Institute has begun a Bosnia in the Balkans Initiative to explore the prospects for regional political and economic development. The recent meeting on Croatia is one component of this work, which has included separate meetings and reports on Serbia's democratic development and the crisis in Kosovo. For information on these publications, please contact the Institute at (202) 429-3828.

The views expressed in this report do not necessarily reflect those of the United States Institute of Peace, which does not advocate particular policies.

The USIP Bosnia in the Balkans Initiative

The Bosnia in the Balkans Initiative of the United States Institute of Peace uses the efforts of various Institute programs to support the peace implementation process in Bosnia. The Institute has conducted training programs for staff of international and local NGOs working in Bosnia to help them in their relief and reconciliation work in the aftermath of this intense conflict. The Institute's Religion, Ethics, and Human Rights Program has supported the efforts of top religious leaders in Bosnia to form an Inter-Religious Council to work "together to replace hostility with cooperation and respect" and to acknowledge their shared moral commitment. It is also working with other members within the religious communities to support their efforts at reconciliation. The Institute also recognizes that, if any measure of reconciliation is to occur for Bosnia, war victims, regardless of ethnic affiliation, must have access to fair hearings and due process. To support citizen participation in the justice process, the Institute's Rule of Law Program has begun to work with a variety of Bosnian officials on a number of initiatives, including establishing protection for trial witnesses, more effective police screening procedures, and programs to improve the efficiency of the International War Crimes Tribunal at The Hague. It is also helping to create a Truth and Reconciliation Commission for Bosnia in response to requests from the country's judicial officials and community leaders. The Institute's Grant Program funds a variety of scholarly investigations of the Bosnian conflict and conflict-resolution projects for NGO and other practitioners in the country. Through these and other efforts, the Institute seeks to fulfill its mandate to find and explore creative solutions to international crises and conflict.

The Bosnia in the Balkans Initiative is under the direction of Harriet Hentges, executive vice president of the Institute.

See the complete list of Institute reports. The views expressed in this report do not necessarily reflect those of the United States Institute of Peace, which does not advocate specific policies.