Selected Recommendations

Background

I. Conflict Resolution in Africa

II. The United States and Africa

About the Symposium

SPECIAL REPORT 11

The U.S. Contribution to Conflict Prevention, Management, and Resolution in Africa

Selected Recommendations

• Africans should determine under what conditions it is helpful to have the international community engaged in conflict resolution efforts.
• Africans should be aware that all stages of a peace process are equally important. Although considerable attention is focused on getting the parties to the table or reaching an accord, less attention has been paid to ensuring that the agreement is properly implemented.
• Over the long term, Africans must work to arrest the decline in state capacities. Many African states are losing control of territory and the ability to tax, to maintain roads and transportation links, and to provide basic services to their people.
• The capacity of the newly formed Organization of African Unity (OAU) mechanism for the prevention, management, and resolution of conflict should be strengthened, and the OAU should develop a clear sense of what aspects of the mechanism the international community can best support.
• The work of nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) in intervening to resolve disputes should be improved, as well as their capacity to provide policy-relevant information and analysis.
• The U.S. is unavoidably involved in Africa because of continuing national interest in the stability of the continent and to further other foreign policy aims such as democratization.
• The U.S. should be engaged, when appropriate, at each step of the conflict resolution process: prenegotiation (bringing the parties to the table); negotiating a peace accord; and the peace-building or implementation phase.
• The U.S. should support the OAU mechanism for conflict prevention, management, and resolution by providing mediation and problem-solving training, organizational training and assistance, and logistics or support for specific missions. U.S. diplomatic efforts should be coordinated to support, when desirable, OAU conflict resolution initiatives.
• When appropriate and feasible, the U.S. should support promising peacekeeping operations on the continent, including United Nations (UN) and possible future subregional missions. Support can come in the form of conflict resolution skills training, military equipment, training of soldiers for nontraditional operations, logistics, and communications.

Background

The failure of the United Nations peacekeeping mission in Somalia (UNOSOM II) to build a new state in that war-ravaged country, after the costly U.S. military intervention is often viewed as a critical lesson about the problems associated with the international community's attempts to resolve conflict in Africa. The widely publicized killings of U.S. and other peacekeeping troops by Somali militiamen hardened attitudes among American policymakers and the public about the efficacy and costs of U.S. military intervention in Africa, the limitations of UN peacekeeping, and the ability of Africans to resolve their own conflicts. A mood of "Afro-pessimism" and "peace fatigue" has prevailed.

Thus, when genocidal strife erupted in Rwanda in 1994, causing millions of Rwandans to flee into neighboring countries, there was a strong reluctance to allow U.S. forces to become engaged in a conflict where many believe the U.S. has no obvious strategic interests. Although several thousand U.S. troops helped deliver humanitarian relief to Rwanda and to refugees in camps in neighboring countries--after the worst of the brutality and the massive refugee crisis had eased--the mission was narrowly confined to humanitarian relief, and U.S. engagement in broader efforts to resolve the conflict has been limited. Only about 200 U.S. troops were actually deployed to the Rwandan capital of Kigali, with a mission to keep the airport open for relief flights.

Yet, in the recent past, the U.S. has played a significant role in successful efforts to manage or resolve conflicts in Africa--for example, in Namibia, South Africa, Ethiopia-Eritrea, and Mozambique--and has provided assistance to Africans as they attempt to resolve conflicts such as those in Liberia, Lesotho, and Sudan. African security institutions, such as the Organization of African Unity (OAU), have recently embarked on initiatives to resolve conflict on the continent. The OAU's Mechanism for the Prevention, Management, and Resolution of Conflict, established after the Cairo summit in 1994, is an example of efforts to create new institutions to bolster regional capacities. Despite Afro-pessimism and peace fatigue, some developments augur well for future conflict prevention and resolution.

Most analysts who study Africa believe that the U.S. will continue to be engaged in African conflict resolution because of interests in stability and trade as well as environmental and humanitarian concerns. In light of the wariness to become militarily engaged in Africa after the experience in Somalia, what options exist for the U.S. to strengthen the capacity of Africans to resolve conflicts within or between African states?

There is broad consensus that conflict prevention, management, or resolution in Africa requires that Africans themselves act as a rudder, guiding peace processes forward and working with local disputants to bring about conciliation. Outside parties such as the U.S. can contribute by providing support to propel the search for peace forward, but peace cannot be imposed from abroad. Yet conflicts in Africa have international ramifications, evident in refugee flows and environmental damage, for example, but also in purely humanitarian terms. The recent genocidal conflict in Rwanda demonstrates perhaps more than any other case the interconnectedness between African conflict and the global agenda. A failure by Africans and external powers alike to address and mitigate conflict in Africa can have disastrous results that will eventually--and usually at a considerably higher cost--capture the attention of the global community and compel an international response.

Broad consensus also exists that the old adage of "an ounce of prevention is worth a pound of cure" is especially applicable to conflicts in Africa. In both Somalia and Rwanda, it is argued, there were early warnings of impending crisis, but African institutions and the international community failed to act decisively as the conflicts escalated. The real problem is not just early warning, but translating knowledge of an impending crisis into preventive action. A related question is, who should respond to ameliorate conflict at various points in its escalation?

One answer to this question is the notion of "layered responses." As a crisis escalates local organizations respond first, then subregional and regional organizations, and finally the international community. Local actors such as states, NGOs, or regional organizations may be able to deal with small-scale crises with mediation, conciliation, and negotiation assistance, particularly when they are supported by larger powers in the international community. The U.S. and other outsiders may support intervention to end conflicts at various stages of their development. Only when a crisis has gone beyond the capacity of African institutions to respond should military intervention by the international community be considered. Above all, close coordination among myriad actors at all stages is required for successful peacemaking, peacekeeping, or peace-building.

Therefore, in the post-Cold War world -- where the doctrine of noninterference in the affairs of sovereign states is being reconsidered--there is a growing mutual interest in a cooperative approach between Africans and the international community aimed at conflict prevention, management, and resolution. Africans have expressed a commitment to do more to address conflicts on the continent in this new environment and have established new institutional mechanisms in the OAU to promote conciliation and negotiation. Likewise, the international community--especially the UN--has sought to devolve more responsibility for peacemaking and peacekeeping to regional and subregional organizations. Given these trends, a basis for a partnership for peace arises, implying mutual commitment and obligations. This report summarizes the views and recommendation of symposium participants on the broad principles behind a cooperative approach to fostering peace in Africa and the specific options available to Africans and to the U.S. in developing the terms of partnership.

I. Conflict Resolution in Africa

Principles of African Conflict Resolution
African Policy Options

Some analysts have referred to recent changes on the African political scene as a "second independence." With the end of the Cold War and the onset of widespread democratization initiatives throughout the continent, old paradigms have given way to new realities. The end of apartheid and white minority rule in South Africa has given new impetus to changing relationships within and among African states. The post-Cold War environment has brought a new emphasis on conflict resolution, which is seen as a precondition to further economic and social development and democratization.

The conflict management role of the OAU is already being strengthened. For example, the OAU sent observer missions to South Africa during its transition to democracy (in conjunction with UN, European Union, and Commonwealth teams) and now has missions deployed in Mozambique and Burundi. The roles of regional and subregional organizations are also being reconsidered. For example, the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) was called on to intervene militarily in Liberia's bloody civil war and the Intergovernmental Authority on Drought and Development (IGADD), a subregional organization in the Horn of Africa, is mediating between Sudan's government and rebel factions. Finally, African leaders such as Zimbabwe President Robert Mugabe and South Africa President Nelson Mandela have launched peacemaking efforts in Angola and Lesotho. What principles should guide African efforts to deal with conflicts? Symposium participants suggested the following.

Principles of African Conflict Resolution

• Africans should concentrate on adherence to clearly defined norms and standards, such as respect for election outcomes and the inviolability of borders, the violation of which would prompt collective intervention.

  The absence of clearly defined norms and standards for dealing with the causes and manifestations of conflict in Africa contributes to the lack of an effective response mechanism. Although the inviolability of borders has been upheld as a norm since the founding of the OAU, similar norm-building should occur on issues such as democratization, sovereignty, and border delimitation and demarcation. Regarding democratization, efforts should be focused on ensuring that governments uphold basic human rights, tolerate opposition, and respect election outcomes. In its 1991 Santiago Declarations, the Organization of American States declared that violations of basic democratic norms, such as a military coup, affected regional stability and would trigger a collective response if member states considered the problem sufficiently serious. This statement is viewed as a model that Africans could emulate. Sovereignty issues may address, for example, the role of minorities in a given state and the degree of autonomy (territorial or cultural) that may be afforded to minorities that seek it. Such norm-building could contribute to the development of criteria for action and more extreme cases of military intervention. Some criteria suggested for the most extreme intervention (deployment of a military force with a peace enforcement mandate authorized under Chapter VII of the UN charter) include the full collapse of a state, the threat of tyranny to others in the region, and low costs and low risks.

  In the Kampala Document outlining the creation of a Conference on Security, Stability, Development and Cooperation in Africa (an institution similar to the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe), proposals for principles and standards and for specific mechanisms are raised. The mechanism proposals have been essentially adopted by the OAU; but work needs to continue on the development of principles.

• Africans should determine under what conditions it is helpful to have the international community engaged in conflict resolution efforts.

  In some instances, "African solutions to African problems" may be appropriate, while in others, the engagement of the international community may be desirable. Some observers suggest that there is a dilemma: Africans do not want interference in their affairs, but such intervention is often requested by parties to the conflict who seek to bolster their hand or weaken an opponent's. One option for dealing with these issues is the concept of layered responses, described earlier. A critical element in implementing the concept is capacity-building at each layer. Local NGOs, states, subregional and regional organizations, and the OAU all have comparative advantages for dealing with certain types of conflict situations in certain instances. Capacity-building involves the development of the ability to both act immediately and to institutionalize the ability to respond over the longer-term.

• Africans should be aware that all stages of a peace process are equally important. Although considerable attention is focused on getting the parties to the table or reaching an accord, less attention has been paid to ensuring that the agreement is properly implemented.

  Implementing peace agreements is a critical step in the process of moving from war to peaceful relations, as shown in the tragedy of renewed fighting in Angola after the November 1992 elections to implement the Bicesse Accords. Getting parties to the table and reaching an agreement are considered the most important steps in the peace process, but ensuring that the agreements are actually implemented helps build peace and makes relationships more durable. Both the international community and Africans must pay more attention to ensuring that sufficient resources are available to help consolidate agreements once they are reached. Emphasis should be placed on both the process by which new constitutions are created and the rules of the game by which politics are conducted in the long term.

• Africans should consider whether, in some instances, power-sharing or coalition government may be a desirable short-term or transitional device to resolve intrastate and interethnic conflicts.

  Although there are concerns about power-sharing as a panacea for crises of governmental legitimacy in Africa, in some instances agreeing to create a government of national unity in a postconflict environment can instill confidence in new political institutions and entice all significant parties to a dispute to accept them. South Africa's government of national unity, in which most significant political forces in the country are represented, is an example of a power-sharing pact that emanated from the parties themselves. However, power-sharing may pose difficulties for governance. In a coalition government, decisionmaking is difficult and potentially inefficient, the absence of an opposition may inhibit accountability and transparency, and an inclusive government may delay action on the root causes of a conflict (for example, socioeconomic disparities). If such an accord arises from a democratization process in which the parties engage in efforts to build a new national consensus, an initial period of power-sharing may prove stabilizing. Most important, however, the states must adopt a constitutional framework to which all parties are willing to subscribe, one that creates a durable structure capable of mediating social conflict through legitimate, democratic political institutions.

• Over the long term, Africans must work to arrest the decline in state capacities. Many African states are losing control of territory and the ability to tax, to maintain roads and transportation links, and to provide basic services to their people.

  Underlying sources of conflict in Africa are underdevelopment and deprivation, overpopulation, environmental stress, and refugee and migration flows. Attention is rightly focused on cases such as Somalia and Rwanda, in which these problems have exacerbated already tense social relations, particularly among ethnic and religious groups. But even in states that are or were once considered relatively successful, such as Kenya and Algeria, the capacity of the state to administer territory has been severely eroded. Failure to address the issue of state capacity will create additional and potentially critical economic stresses, thereby stimulating conflict and increasing competition over scarce resources. Conflict resolution in Africa will be successful only when the underlying sources of violence are addressed and ameliorated and when citizens of African states perceive that economic resources are distributed fairly to all segments of the population.

Continue

See the complete list of Institute reports. The views expressed in this report do not necessarily reflect those of the United States Institute of Peace, which does not advocate specific policies.