

EGYPT AS A FAILING STATE: IMPLICATIONS FOR US NATIONAL SECURITY

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“So something is going to have to get very badly out of whack for the relationship really to suffer.”

Ambassador Robert H. Pelletreau, *Middle East Policy*, June 2001

INTRODUCTION

Short-term solutions to more profound, long-term problems are not sufficient to safeguard United States interests in the Middle East. This paper challenges the current United States policy towards Egypt and its underlying assumption that regime stability supercedes a US interest in true political development. The key question in this paper queries why the status quo policy towards Egypt is no longer fulfilling US objectives when it has been a successful pillar for US Middle East policy in the past. One can easily understand the seductive nature of adhering to the status quo policy by recalling Anwar Sadat’s initiatives moving Egypt squarely from the Soviet camp to the American one, the Egyptian-Israeli peace treaty, and Egypt’s support during the Gulf War in 1991. The United States must take bold new steps towards its relationship with Egypt and leverage Egypt’s historical regional leadership to better support US interests for the future.

What has changed in the global and regional security environment that demands the re-evaluation of our policy à propos Egypt? The global and regional security environments have undergone monumental shifts; new fault lines exist. Although President Husni Mubarak has led a state and society that has weathered economic dislocations, political “deliberalization,” a growing Islamist movement and an apathetic political culture, these

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forces will quickly overwhelm Mubarak's traditionally autocratic and oppressive short-term fixes. The United States must not be lulled into a false sense of security based on Mubarak's grip on power for over twenty years. The possibility of unrest is real; with the correct confluence of domestic, regional, and international events, Egypt can quickly be added to the list of failed states.

In the wake of terrorist attacks in the United States on September 11, 2001, leading to the US war on terror, along with the continued violence between the Palestinians and Israelis, the potential for acute political violence within Egypt is high. This study will present two scenario-driven US policy options and recommend a realpolitik view of democratization for Egypt. The United States can no longer afford to be timid about the power of democracy. For the United States, pushing for political systems that are accountable to their populations should not be viewed in an idealistic, normative sense, but rather in a strategic context. This paper contends that democracy is a security imperative for the post-9/11 world.

Heightened political turmoil within Egypt can adversely affect our regional and global interests and objectives. With the advent of attacks on US soil, it is vital for America to maintain a strong relationship with Arab and Muslim allies to combat global terrorism and to safeguard US interests. Particularly, the United States must evaluate first-, second-, and third-order effects of possible policy options. Pertinent to this analysis is understanding that Egypt's state legitimacy is the primary target of terrorism. After the first World Trade Center bombing in 1993, Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak continued his policies of political de-liberalization coupled with a widespread assault on Islamic militants and other legitimate

opposition groups. His actions renewed a cycle of violence within Egypt. Due to the inevitable continuation of a US war on terrorism, the Egyptian government has used this instance to intensify a crackdown on opposition groups, thus increasing dissent and a potential for violence within Egypt. Egypt's volatility poses a real threat to US interests in the Middle East.

Due to Egypt's importance to United States interests in the region, the first goal of this study is to understand the new global and regional security environments, which may serve to catalyze Egypt's regime instability. Second, this study defines Egypt as a potential failing state by examining key indicators and catalysts, namely the lack of political participation, unequal distribution of wealth, harsh government repression, overpopulation, unemployment, and a rise of Islamist support. Central to this analysis is measuring the level of state legitimacy across the Egyptian population since opposition groups' grievances, including those of the Islamic militants, stem from their exclusion from the political process, economic inequality, and human rights abuses. Third, using a scenario-driven examination of policy options, this project reveals possible second- and third-order effects domestically, regionally, and globally. Hard and unpleasant ramifications of policies, such as the abrogation of the Egypt-Israel peace treaty resulting in increased regional violence, a growth in radical anti-US groups and human rights abuses must be explored. Policy options that include a risk analysis allow decision makers to make prudent choices.

GLOBAL AND REGIONAL SECURITY ENVIRONMENTS¹: POTENTIAL CATALYSTS OF INSTABILITY

An analysis of Egypt's domestic security environment first requires a strategic context, one with an international and regional

perspective. There have been many proposed theories since the end of the Cold War designed to explain state behavior such as clash of civilizations, democratic peace theory, nationalism, and others. And perhaps September 11, 2001, marks another paradigm shift in the international security environment. According to Shibley Telhami, there has indeed been a paradigm shift.

What has changed in the past two years is not al-Jazeera. It is the world. What has changed in the past two years is that there has been a complete transformation of the environment. We had a world in the 1990s that had a seemingly working Israeli-Palestinian peace process. People could point to it, and when a moderate in the Arab world debated an extremist on al-Jazeera or anywhere else, they could not only reject the extremist method, but they could put forth a positive alternative. They could say look, we have a peace process, peace is around the corner. We're going to have an agreement.²

This study examines the interaction of observable forces in the domestic, regional, and international environments to gain an understanding of their full impact on the Egyptian regime. Yet, before scholars can offer theory, they must provide a systematic analysis of apparent forces to explain state behavior.

First, there is the observable phenomenon of globalization. Its opposite, fragmentation or localization, is also a powerful force in the form of ethnic-nationalism and religious extremism. Both processes—globalization and localization—are neither good nor bad, democratic nor non-democratic, or security-enhancing or detracting. Indeed, both are dynamic processes that scholar James Rosenau explains simply. “In short, globalization is boundary-broadening and localization is boundary-heightening.”³ Jessica Mathews describes the post-Cold War as reflective of a monumental “power shift,” that is a move from two superpowers to one, and a shift away from the nation-state to non-state actors. The reason for

this change stems, in part, from the information age in which, due to computers and telecommunication innovations, the government no longer has a monopoly on collecting and managing information. “In every sphere of activity, instantaneous access to information and the ability to put it to use multiplies the number of players who matter and reduces the number who command authority.”⁴ This revolution alters communal relations by establishing new groupings, disconnecting established state-societal relations, and building communal bridges across borders.⁵

Likewise, the US Commission on National Security/21st Century acknowledges these powerful forces by indicating “two contradictory trends ahead: a tide of economic, technological, and intellectual forces that is integrating a global community, amid powerful forces of social and political fragmentation.”⁶ But as Dr. Josef Joffe commented, we may be witnessing a rise in the powers of nation-states.⁷ The events of September 11 seem to have galvanized states to cooperate and defeat a common enemy, international terrorism. It is, however, beyond the purview of this study to argue which force is dominant, though it is crucial to understand that these trends affect state action and more specifically, the Egyptian regime’s behavior.

It is clear the demise of the bipolar global structure has influenced a rise of competing forces in the international system including irredentism, nationalism, religion, and ethnicity. According to Bruce Hoffman, these developments fuel terrorism and he warns that they “long held in check or kept dormant by the cold war may erupt to produce even greater levels of non-state violence. . . .”⁸ Of course, terrorism is only one of many global

threats as reflected in *The US National Security Strategy's* description of transnational threats.

. . . threats that do not respect national borders and which often arise from non-state actors, such as terrorists and criminal organizations. . . . Examples include terrorism, drug trafficking and other international crime, illicit arms trafficking, uncontrolled refugee migration, and trafficking in human beings. . . . We also face threats to critical infrastructures, which increasingly could take the form of a cyber-attack in addition to physical attack or sabotage. . . .⁹

Furthermore, with the rise of weak, illegitimate and failing states, internal conflicts can quickly become regional or even global in nature. Michael Brown argues that internal conflicts matter because of their scope, their resultant human suffering, involvement of nearby states, and the impact on the interests of international organizations and “distant powers.”¹⁰ What happens inside Egypt matters and for Egypt, what occurs regionally and globally is also relevant.

Due to the interconnectedness of the international, regional and domestic systems, opportunities exist that must not be disregarded.¹¹ The common threat of terrorism can form the basis for alliances, treaties, international organizations, and international regimes. The European Union is a pertinent example of how pooling sovereignty enhances national interests. Initially, the European Community (EC) provided Germany with a means to secure iron and steel resources; acceptance in the international system; and a path for eventual reunification. For France, the EC mitigated the idea of a “German problem,” while providing a forum for France’s role in Europe.¹² Additionally, the growth of non-state actors as evidenced by the growth of civil society in many countries including non-governmental organizations provides the United States with new targets of opportunities in international relations.

The United States must recognize these developments and capitalize on them.

Implications of these Forces

In relation to the Middle East in general and Egypt specifically, there are three seemingly discreet events that reflect the intricate interrelationship among the international, regional, and domestic security environments: the US war on terrorism, the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, and US nation-building in post-conflict Iraq. Increased access to media, coupled with growing economic and political despair of a progressively more youthful population has begun to mobilize the Arab street. Thomas Friedman claims that

We are seeing the convergence of three historical trends. . . . The first is this terrible intifada, this Israeli-Palestinian violence that is of a level of intensity and depravity we've never seen in this conflict before. . . . From another direction, we have a huge pig in a python," [namely] "a huge population explosion going on in the Arab-Muslim world. . . . Fifty percent of the Muslim world under 20 . . . or 25. . . . So a huge population explosion marching toward the workplace. And from a third direction we have an explosion of multimedia, Jazeera,¹³ satellite TV, Internet, and basically, what is going on is that the media is taking these images of this Intifada and feeding it to this population explosion coming up the road. . . .¹⁴

Rampant despair in the region reflects anger towards the illegitimate, closed political systems, economic malaise and issues of foreign policy.¹⁵ Not only is the flame of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict fanned by the above mentioned forces, but also the US war on terrorism, and the *perception* of an American occupation in Iraq fuels these anti-Western sentiments. Already, thousands of Egyptians protested Israeli actions in the West Bank and Gaza Strip.¹⁶ And, a Gallup Poll reported that 77 percent of Islamic respondents feel that military action in Afghanistan is not

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justified.¹⁷ The confluence of the war on terrorism, the Palestinian-Israeli conflict, and the presence of US troops in Iraq must be examined to understand the potential for Egypt as a failing state and any subsequent US policy towards Egypt. As “the Arab world’s natural leader,” the United States cannot afford to dismiss the domestic political and economic milieu of Egypt.¹⁸ As a key player in the coalition to oust Saddam Hussein from Kuwait in 1991, Egypt allowed over-flights, worked to keep the coalition together, facilitated passage of a US nuclear carrier task force through the Suez and sent troops to the Gulf. Therefore, Egypt remains an important cornerstone of US interests in the Middle East. Despite various conflicts of interests including lifting its embargo on Iraq, Egypt’s compliance with our regional objectives remains important. “Egypt’s involvement in the Palestinian-Israeli negotiation has been a vital ingredient of every Palestinian-Israeli agreement since 1993 . . . [and the] Egyptian-Israeli peace treaty remains the cornerstone of the peace process”¹⁹ It is a country of 68 million with the region’s most educated and largest middle class.²⁰ Moreover, with Cairo as the cultural center of the Arab world, Egypt has the ability to lead; it is in the best position to influence public opinion and intellectual thought throughout the region.²¹

However, as the Arab street becomes more volatile given the convergence of events and rampant frustration, many observers believe that a “a backlash against the Arab regimes themselves is closer than ever before.”²² And within the Middle East, the transnational threat of terrorism repeatedly manifests itself and reflects the inability for illegitimate regimes to effectively root it out. This phenomenon is especially keen when one looks at the authoritarian regimes of Saudi Arabia and Egypt. While Egypt and

Saudi Arabia harshly repress domestic Islamic extremism and are successful, they cannot control the transnational effects of governmental crackdowns. “Despite Egyptian and Saudi claims that they have vanquished the violent Islamist threat, they have also fragmented, radicalized, and militarized the movement, inducing any survivors to leave the country.”²³ In essence, the Egyptians have “exported” the threat as the world clearly learned on September 11. Also, due to the difficult economic situation in Egypt during the 1980s and 1990s, many Egyptians found work in the Gulf. During their tenure in Saudi Arabia, “the strong religious and conservative forces in Saudi society and Saudi financial religious institutions were already making inroads in the religious practices and beliefs of its foreign imported workforce as they returned home to Egypt, the Palestinian Authority, or Sudan.”²⁴

For all these reasons, it is important to examine Egypt’s potential for instability. Not only would the United States lose important regional leverage, but an unstable Egypt could define the region in a way unfavorable to American interests. A continued repressive regime in Egypt actually lends legitimacy to any opposition, even extremists. The confluence of exogenous events combined with intense despair and frustration may have transformed terrorism into a political movement that at least offers empowerment and hope.²⁵

Before we offer solutions, however, we must first understand the problem. Consequently, the following section will examine indicators for Egypt’s instability, and the concluding sections will recommend US policy that will best secure US interests, which includes a thriving Egyptian state and society.

DEFINING A FAILING STATE: THEORY

In much of the third world literature, scholars define the concept of political development to include differentiation within more sophisticated political systems, equality before the law and with regards to opportunity, and a regime's capacity to absorb change. The argument follows that sustained political development leads to stability, while in its absence the potential for instability is high as reflected in a series of developmental crises. Yet political development as explained by the above mentioned imperatives overlooks crucial elements that this study contends are significant for true stability to occur. Democratic political development—which includes both institutions and a democratic value system, or democratic political culture—is imperative to maintaining a stable system. This study argues that it is in the US interests to push sustained democratic political development and in doing so, help regimes alleviate developmental crises indicated by economic dislocations, legitimacy issues, gaps between governing and governed, and participation issues. This section will develop the concepts of political development, democratic political development, and the ensuing crises associated with a lack of democratic political development.

In the aftermath of the colonial era, many states in the Middle East attempted to usher in a period of modernization and promised to implement liberal parliamentary democracy. Although enthusiastically endorsed, many rulers could not or would not deliver on their promises. Instead, Western-influenced rulers embarked on a period of rapid modernization following independence that did not lead to sustained political development. As such, economic and social dislocations associated with rapid

change led to increased frustration with most governments' inability to provide more participatory systems. R. Hrair Dekmejian argues that aside from the effects of economic and social deprivation, contemporary Islamic states suffer from a "crisis of the spirit; the crisis of identity and culture; and the crisis of legitimacy—the erosion of the moral basis of authority and its dysfunctional concomitants: elite misrule, military importance, and class conflict."²⁶

To determine whether or not Egypt's stability is at risk, it is crucial to examine several indicators and catalysts leading to instability. This paper assesses the level of political and economic development in Egypt, along with perceived regime legitimacy to analyze the *potential* for unrest in that country. Nonetheless, the lack of political development and the ensuing developmental crises do not necessarily predict instability. A regime's response to the crises, together with specific external catalysts, plays an important role in determining whether or not a regime can maintain control. Aside from providing insights into the stability of a regime, the scope and intensity of the crisis environment can also determine the level of Islamic revival within a society.²⁷ In other words, whether or not the Egyptian Islamist movements adopt violent forms that threaten regime stability depends upon the amount of discontent present in society. Currently, Mubarak's regime perceives the Islamist movement as its greatest challenge. Although the Egyptian government devotes its attention to the Islamists' ability to pose a direct military and ideological threat to the government, it apportions less regard to the important role that sustained political development can play in deterring the Islamists' ideological challenge and other secular opposition.

There are a plethora of definitions of political development. Simply, it can be defined as “the capacity of government not only to sustain and adapt to the stresses of modernization, but to direct the course and rate of economic, social and political change.”²⁸ It involves the creation of political institutions that include popular participation and various power competitors. Political development also refers to “a capacity not only to overcome the divisions and manage the tensions created by increased differentiation, but to respond to or contain the participatory and distributive demands generated by the imperatives of equality.”²⁹ This definition provides the basis for three requirements that a regime must meet to achieve political development: differentiation, equality, and capacity.³⁰

Differentiation refers to the greater specialization of roles within the political structure to accompany a more developed political system. Governments can best create this type of differentiation through the specialization of political functions and roles, as in a complex—but well integrated—bureaucracy.³¹ Authoritarian governments concentrate all power in the hands of the governing elites rather than establishing institutions necessary to ensure the specialization of roles within the regime. Thus, a lack of differentiation is common in authoritarian governments.

Moreover, the concept of equality obligates the government to provide universal national citizenship, equality under the law, and equal opportunity. According to Lucien Pye, to meet this imperative a government must include popular participation and a universalistic, impersonal legal system. Additionally, in an area of constant and significant change such as the Middle East, a government must have the ability not only to generate change

spurred on by modernization, but also to absorb those changes. As such, a regime must demonstrate the capacity, or ability, to adapt to pressures adherent to pursuing the first two imperatives.³² Clearly, the linkages between political development and democracy are evident. Although on a conceptual level political development does not dictate Western democracy, for our purposes, political development refers here to democratic political development with democracy being defined as “a political system characterized by representative decision-making institutions, by mass participation in the selection of decision-makers, and by open competition in both the electoral and policy-making processes.”³³

Yet institutional elements alone are not sufficient for a true liberal democracy to develop. A democratic political culture describes how citizens perceive and feel towards important aspects of liberal democratic systems to include “the legitimacy accorded to democratic ideals, tolerance of opposition parties, willingness to compromise and cooperate, and trust in the political environment.”³⁴ This definition reveals why there exist many democracies, albeit illiberal democracies that hold elections and have legislatures. Larry Diamond reminds us, while democratic processes are important, they are insignificant if not backed by a liberal state of mind. According to Diamond, elections are only one aspect of democracy. A liberal democracy must include

Freedom of belief, expression, organization, demonstration, and other civil liberties, including protection from political terror and unjustified imprisonment; a rule of law under which all citizens are treated equally and due process is secure; political independence and neutrality of the judiciary and other institutions of “horizontal accountability” that check the abuse of power, such as electoral administration, audits, and a central bank; an open and pluralistic civil society, including not only

associational life but the mass media as well; and civilian control of the military.³⁵

Democratization, on an institutional level, generally trails well after social or economic transformation.³⁶ Mir Zohair Husain points out that many Muslim nations experience difficulty in attaining political development because the pace of modernization has outstripped their capacity to transform political institutions.³⁷ According to the Arab Human Development Report from the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), Arab States lag behind most regions “in terms of participatory governance.”³⁸ To achieve stability, a regime must balance the population’s desire for political participation with a corresponding level of political institutionalization and have a democratic political culture. Since the ability to both generate and absorb change is crucial to achieve sustained political development, a regime that fails to meet any of the three imperatives will inevitably face a series of interrelated developmental crises.³⁹

The identity crisis often occurs with rapid industrialization and urbanization where traditional patterns of economy and social life are uprooted.⁴⁰ The perception of alienation spurred on by this crisis contributes to problems of legitimacy that, according to Michael Hudson, proves a severe problem in the Arab world.⁴¹ One expert defines legitimacy as referring to “that crucial and ubiquitous factor in politics which invests power with authority.”⁴² Many writing about revolutions in the third world concur that the main reason for unrest is intrinsically linked with the concept of legitimacy. The idea of legitimacy directly affects a regime’s stability, or as Timothy J. Lomperis claims, its ability to rule well.⁴³ Norton contends that the most important element for state survival is legitimacy, meaning “that authority which rests on the shared

cultural identity of ruler and ruled.”⁴⁴ States base legitimacy on a “political formula” which justifies a leader’s rule.

Intricately connected to legitimacy, effective leadership can only occur when the governing elite joins the gap to the governed through political institutions including governmental agencies, political parties, and village councils.⁴⁵ With the fast pace of modernization programs implemented by the elites, a cultural chasm also alienates the political cultures of the elite and masses. Although elites create and control the political systems, “the long-term survival of these systems depends on popular support.”⁴⁶ As such, it is crucial for the regime to bridge this cultural divide. Similarly, a participation crisis develops when governing regimes ignore the population’s demand for a greater say in the political realm.⁴⁷

Ralf Dahrendorf explains legitimacy and effectiveness as two keys to a state’s stability and, although states may be effective without being legitimate, legitimacy will erode if the regime cannot deliver on its promises.⁴⁸ The advent of internal war and revolution indicate a breakdown in legitimate political order. When the population challenges the government’s right to rule, revolution follows. Therefore, many governments deficient in legitimacy suffer from an inability to enforce their policies.

When a government does not (or cannot) allocate resources, services, and other benefits equitably to its population, it will most likely suffer from a distribution crisis.⁴⁹ Yet, political violence does not necessarily emerge out of absolute or relative poverty, but from a gap between expectations and what can be obtained realistically.⁵⁰ Therefore, a growth in expectations without an increase in achievement or a decrease in capabilities without a corresponding

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decline in expectations will cause relative deprivation.

Subsequently, this situation leads to an increase of frustration and probable aggressive reaction.⁵¹ Scholars have discovered that when people are concerned with basic needs, they are less likely to rebel. Instability occurs when a period of social and economic progress is followed by a sharp reversal. “It is the dissatisfied state of mind rather than the tangible provision of ‘adequate’ or inadequate supplies of food, equality, or liberty which produces the revolution.”⁵² Accordingly, it is not deprivation alone that causes people to exhibit an aggressive response to frustration, but an anticipation of not obtaining expectations.⁵³ Adhering to this psychological explanation, economic and political control of a population does not necessarily lead to unrest. It is only when the dependents realize their state of dependency that discontent increases. When the population perceives it has the means to change its situation, instability will occur.⁵⁴

Concerning the situation in Egypt, the most likely scenario for a period of instability is not revolution à la Iran, but an overthrow of Mubarak’s government through other means including assassination or coup d’etat.⁵⁵ Although Egypt suffers from all the crises to a certain degree, problems of political inclusion and economic inequalities are blatantly obvious. Both Islamist and other opposition groups have been mostly excluded from the political system, though there had been periods in contemporary Egyptian history where they were partially incorporated. Egypt created institutions to facilitate political participation, but in essence curbed access to these few existing participatory bodies. As such, the dearth of political avenues of expression has increased the potential

for instability in Egypt along with a reversal of more liberal policies.

In Egypt, the extent of the legitimacy crises can be measured by the following indicators: lack of inclusive political institutions, accountability and free press, increased protests, radicalization of extremist groups, and the elite-mass gap. The distribution crisis can be examined by assessing the economic indicators including unemployment, population growth, GDP per capita, inflation, and the increased stratification of society.

Domestic Catalyst: Government Response

As mentioned previously, the existence of crises does not necessarily predict that violence and instability will result. According to Ronald Francisco, the relationship between protest and coercion is one key to understanding the direction unrest will take.⁵⁶ The government's perception of the threat in terms of regime maintenance compels the regime—when faced with opposition—to respond to the unrest. Although the discontent and motivations of the opposition are crucial to understanding conditions for instability, regime response determines the course violence will follow and its subsequent success or failure.⁵⁷ The effectiveness of government response depends more upon the “degree of vigor, determination and skill with which the incumbent regime acts to defend itself, both politically and militarily” than the insurgent's strength.⁵⁸ The regime must have a clear picture of its adversary since a flawed assessment of the opposition group's goals will lead to an incorrect choice of tactics. Thus, ruling powers that carefully explore insurgent strategies are better prepared “to conceptualize a broad and relevant counterstrategy.”⁵⁹ A government must utilize good intelligence and assess both the

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nature of the threat and the character of the opposition's goals. If a government misreads its adversary and tactics, the costs to the regime might escalate.

The government is usually faced with two choices when dealing with growing violent opposition and discontent in society. The regime can choose military measures coupled with positive sanctions to woo the dissatisfied members of society into its realm or it can deter further action by using coercive force. The most productive path to pursue is one with a mix of tactics. A prudent application of military and social-economic measures is designed to garner local support for the regime, while keeping unrest and anti-regime actions in check.

If a government concedes to the demands of the opposition and implements positive sanctions, the incentives may encourage neutral potential insurgents to join the government or at minimum, not lend support to the insurgents. In this way, the power holders can undermine insurgent actions.⁶⁰ Yet nationalism and the pursuit of religious aims, with their potent appeal in many insurgencies, are difficult to combat over the long term. The government must show the potential insurgents that the benefits of either cooperating with the authorities or remaining neutral outweigh the advantages of joining the rebels. The regime in power, however, must be cautious because reform might not forestall unrest, but may actually encourage it. The character of the dissident group, the nature of reforms and their timing are crucial factors in determining if the changes will pacify the opposition.⁶¹

In other cases, the government might attempt to exacerbate internecine conflicts to lessen the united front against the regime. As Bard O'Neill contends, the government must realize that

insurgent groups might be factious and thereby the regime could exploit these group differences. If the ruling power does not recognize this potential, the government may be precluding an efficacious tactic.⁶² Nevertheless, the precarious nature of playing one group off the other carries potential danger if the government-sponsored group has a greater attraction than expected. For example, Mubarak vigorously pursued the Islamic militants who were responsible for President Anwar Sadat's assassination while simultaneously offering the Islamic establishment such as the Muslim Brotherhood the opportunity to enter mainstream Egyptian life. While the regime imprisoned and battled with the radicals, the Brotherhood continued to influence the population by enlarging their political role.⁶³ Governments, therefore, are in a very difficult position when formulating a political/military policy for insurgents and most importantly for the *potential* insurgent population.⁶⁴

Accordingly, the initial responses of a government establishes the crucial parameters of the conflict, defines the issues at stake and the presumed character of the struggle.⁶⁵ The main objective of a government at the commencement of violence is to maintain legitimacy. The inflexibility of the regime leads to a test of strength between the government and the rebels as to who defines the basic issues of the conflict and subsequently the solution. At the outset of a conflict, the government might characterize the conflict by perceiving the rebels, not as insurgents, but as criminals. This definition forces the government to implement tactics reflecting its assessment. The regime is compelled by this decision to pursue the impossible task of arresting all "criminals."⁶⁶ Understanding the futility of its task, the government must redefine the conflict and broaden its approach by creating an all-encompassing

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counterinsurgency policy. Government inflexibility and indecision at the outset of the conflict decreases its legitimacy and creates a situation where the rebels believe the government has lost control. Therefore, a state's response to unrest is a crucial determinant of the direction it will follow.

EGYPT'S CRISES AND POTENTIAL FOR INSTABILITY

The last section delineated some of the key indicators of a failing state including: political and social dislocations, economic disparities, population explosion, an alienated political culture and a crisis of legitimacy. Due to its impact on regime stability, an evaluation of the level of political development in Egypt is essential to understanding the *potential* for severe instability within this Arab nation. Thus, the following portion on Egypt details the country's capacity for sustained political development. Although discontent cuts across sectarian lines, the possibility always exists to mobilize a disaffected population. According to Jack Snyder, national identity varies according to circumstance. Civic nationalism refers to national identity based on inclusion in a territory, whereas ethnic nationalism is founded on a belief in common ancestry and shared culture.⁶⁷ When a group is viewed as equal before the law and has effective institutions through which to participate in the rule, then civic nationalism is prevalent. The group will identify strongly with the state in addition to its ethnic group. Yet when a country's institutions fail to meet a group's collective action needs, then ethnic nationalism comes to the forefront. Thus, in the face of institutional collapse where ethnic identity prevails, groups are more vulnerable to political mobilization and hence more susceptible to external influence.⁶⁸ In Egypt where the majority shares a similar

ethnic background, it is the religious identity that comes to the forefront during periods of discontent.

Economic Crises

Although Mubarak's government had allowed for limited political liberalization in the 1980s, by the early 1990s a process of "de-politicization" had begun. This occurred for several reasons including an economic downturn and a fear of the mounting influence of Islamic revivalism. Furthermore, the remittances from its citizens working in the oil industry in the Gulf States during the oil boom of the 1970s and 80s ended, precipitating an economic downturn in Egypt.⁶⁹

As such, Egypt's economic situation remains challenging. With a population of approximately sixty-eight million, a reduction of oil revenues together with a stagnant tourist industry due to both internal and external violence, Egypt's economic growth has been severely harmed.⁷⁰ Some economists agree that mass privatization must continue to expand the Egyptian economy. However, in the short-term, privatization means dismissing large numbers of people from their state jobs in a bloated bureaucracy, thus exacerbating an already troubled economic situation.⁷¹ Although the economy has expanded since the early 1990s sustaining growth rates of five percent and improving public services and infrastructure, the population explosion leading to a lowering of per capita income in Egypt along with a government crackdown on dissent is causing a more radical element to appear in Egypt.⁷² In a 2001 report on Egypt's economy, the unemployment rate hovered around nine percent.⁷³ Unofficial data place the rate at closer to twenty percent.

Following the attacks on September 11, 2001, Egyptian tourism declined further. It had still not recovered from the low level of

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tourism due to attacks in 1997 by Islamic militants in Luxor, an important tourist stop. The Gamaat Islamiyya took responsibility for murdering 58 tourists visiting Luxor's ancient ruins. Militant groups strike at the tourist industry determined to undermine the government by destabilizing the economy. The Asian crisis of the same year further aggravated Egypt's economic woes. Revenues from the Suez Canal also fell off as both investors and insurance companies viewed the area as a war zone. Even prior to the attacks on the WTC, Egypt's economic and political arena suffered from severe stagnation manifesting itself in the form of a recession.⁷⁴ According to some estimates, prior to September 11th, tourism represented ten percent of Egypt's GDP. Current projections call for at least a fifty percent decline in money from tourism.

Yet Egypt's economic tribulations also stem from poor economic choices such as failing to reform the banking system and to develop a larger export sector.⁷⁵ According to the World Bank's vice president for Middle East and North Africa, Jean-Louis Sarbib, "It was Egypt's non-tradable sectors such as services and construction that accounted for a significant share of GDP growth during the 1990s, not participation in world trade as was the case in countries that performed best on the world stage,"⁷⁶ Under the auspices of the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and World bank, in the early 1990s Egypt began an economic recovery and structural adjustment program (ERSAP) to increase privatization and encourage foreign investment in Egypt. Yet due to structural adjustment and other factors, the gap between rich and poor has grown leaving almost forty percent of Egypt's population living below the poverty line. Although Egypt had made some progress economically, Samiha Fawzy, the deputy director of the Egyptian

Center for Economic Studies, contends that whenever Egypt was doing well it was usually not due to a solid economy, but to “external sources.”⁷⁷

Pertinent to this analysis is the link between economic decline and instability. Some scholars argue that there is a connection between the growth of militant movements and an economic downturn. Professor Eliyahu Kanovsky of Bar Ilan University finds the link to be significant.⁷⁸ The growing disparities in wealth along with more difficult economic times have made it challenging for the Egyptian government to penetrate the masses. In sum, unless Egypt can improve its distribution crisis and the subsequent destabilizing factor of relative deprivation by allocating goods and services for the well-being of a majority of the population, the potential for instability is strong. Additionally, unchecked population growth puts added stresses on society not least of which is a greater number of people entering the workforce and greater demands on resources.

Legitimacy Crisis: Contracting Pluralism

Along with the economic woes of the country, Egypt suffers from a series of crises connected to its process of political “de-liberalization.” Mubarak, who assumed power after the assassination of Anwar Sadat by Islamic militants in 1981, has managed to maintain control and stability through a judicious mix of accommodation and repression of opposition forces. For years, the Egyptian president balanced the growth of radical Islam, economic liberalization and state bureaucracy à la Nasser.⁷⁹ Nevertheless, economic mismanagement, along with external events, has continued to batter the Egyptian economy and nourish the growth of Islamic groups. Although there has been an increase in political parties and an opening of the economic system

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beginning in the 1970s, currently several serious factors operate against the stability of the Arab Republic.

In the 1980s President Mubarak embarked on a series of moves designed to expand the political system. He met with opposition leaders, allowed NGO's with a democratic bent to operate, and tolerated a more open media. However, the liberalization of the economy forced Mubarak to relinquish some power to businessman and other elites who demanded more political and economic influence.⁸⁰ Traditionally, professional societies were independent from government control, yet in recent years, the Engineer's Syndicate and the Bar Association were banned from electing their own officials after government allegations that they were controlled by the Islamists.⁸¹ Indeed, the regime took measures to control Islamic militants that inhibited the growth of a vibrant civil society.⁸² Many indicators of corporatist life including professional groups, labor unions, and other populist associations have been weakened under the guise of protection from Islamist control. Although this is a useful policy for the short-term, the legitimacy and penetration crisis may come to the forefront in the long-term.

An aggressive media campaign by the incumbent regime coupled with an offensive on opposition groups has disconnected the masses from political activity resulting in a participation crisis. In 1999, the Group for Democratic Development (GDD) organized a conference to instruct teachers on how to implement more democratic techniques in the classroom. Government officials detained participants and docked them fifteen days pay for taking part in the meeting. The result of these harsh actions has been to deter the masses from convening any type of political activity. Additionally, in 1998 the government cracked down on human

rights groups especially ones working with Non Governmental Organizations (NGOs). “The real aim of the case appears to have been to warn people to stay away from troublesome NGOs as well as dissuade common people from wanting to participate in politically relevant activities for fear of punishment or simply governmental hassle.”⁸³

Beginning with Sadat’s economic liberalization program, or *infitah*, of the 1970s, Egypt was seen as more liberal than its Arab counterparts, although by the 1990s, it was considered a “blocked transition to democracy.”⁸⁴ In actuality, the roads to political participation were not stopped completely, as implied by “blocked transition,” but restricted. Yet according to Eberhard Kienle, Egypt’s political system was never as liberal as it appeared. Although Sadat created a multi-party system after disbanding President Nasser’s Arab Socialist Union in 1977, the National Democratic Party (NDP) has always held a majority of seats as a result of government interference with a free and open political process.⁸⁵ Since Sadat’s assassination, the government has instituted emergency laws which has “eroded the constitutional foundation of the government and has undermined its legitimacy.”⁸⁶

Despite democratic rhetoric and the appearance of opposition parties, real political development is severely restricted. The executive branch of government wields inordinate powers which “overwhelm the legislature and marginalize the judiciary.”⁸⁷ According to one study, due to the dominant presidency and the nature of Egypt’s political institutions, progress towards democratization has actually retreated since 1990.⁸⁸ Mubarak’s legitimacy began to erode further in 1993 when he abandoned his promise to serve only two terms. With this decision, “a healthy

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measure of the regime's legitimacy seemed to vanish overnight.⁸⁹ Additionally, his decision not to appoint a successor or set a process in place for succession solidifies Mubarak's autocratic rule. New laws have been invoked expanding police power, and in 1995 a Press Law was passed warning that criticism of the government would not be tolerated.⁹⁰ Also beginning in 1992, to counter the increasing attacks from Islamic militants, the regime instituted a policy to try civilians in military tribunals further marginalizing the judiciary.

Although Egypt boasts 14 legal political parties, only three can be viewed as opposition parties. The incumbent party maintains a close hold on the activities of other political parties. For example, in May 2000, the Labor party was frozen and its newspaper banned.⁹¹ The perception by a majority of the population of the futility of influencing politics has contributed to an apathetic political culture and hence, an inability of the elite to be effective on a local level. The last election in 2000 appeared more impartial than in the past due to judiciary control of elections rather than their being under the authority of the Ministry of Interior. Despite this change, Mubarak's National Democratic Party (NDP) still maintained key advantages.⁹² The government's monopoly on the media allowed it to air its platforms without equal time for its opposition. Additionally, the use of state resources allowed the NDP to bus people in to particular areas. In some provinces where the ruling party's candidate was Christian, people in Islamic dress were turned away from the polls. Even with the advantages of being an incumbent power, the NDP experienced important losses, garnishing 87 percent of the vote, perhaps indicating that changes are occurring with respect to political culture.⁹³

One impediment to true political development is the government's ongoing battle with Islamic groups. Indeed, the Islamist movement is the most visible opposition to Mubarak's regime. In Egyptian society where many avenues to participate in political life are blocked, the mosques provide a place to air grievances. Prior to 1993, the mosques had more or less operated independently from government control. As such, they became hotbeds of government opposition forces and further eroded regime legitimacy. In response, Mubarak's regime has implemented a broad program to combat Islamic opposition and, more specifically, militant opposition using a mix of accommodation and repression. As part of this approach, the Egyptian government nationalized many private mosques and brought them under the control of the Ministry of Religious Endowments. Even so, many mosques continue to use Friday prayer times to denounce the government and encourage antigovernment fervor.⁹⁴

Mubarak's concessionary policies coupled with a constricted political system, however, are proving to be a double-edged sword. Even those Islamists who forsake violence to work within the political system to assume power envision an Islamic state based on the Sharia as the end goal. Allowing the more moderate Islamic groups such as the Muslim Brotherhood to operate within society has actually led to an increase in their influence. In order to neutralize the more militant Islamists, Mubarak allowed the Muslim Brotherhood access to media to denounce the use of violence.

During this period, Mubarak ignored the political gains being made by the group. The Muslim Brotherhood continued to expand its power base by providing social services where the government could not. Although denied the status of a political party, it aligned

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with other parties to win seats in the parliamentary elections. In 1984, it won seven seats when it joined the Wafd party and by 1987 gained thirty-eight seats in an alliance with the Socialist labor and Liberal parties.⁹⁵ Subsequently, the regime found the moderate Islamist groups to be more of a challenge than expected. “The ruling National Democratic Party lacked grassroots support, because it had allowed the Islamists to assume the role of socializing the grassroots by penetrating the education system and redefining the norms of political legitimacy.”⁹⁶ As such, the government was losing the battle of legitimacy due to its inability to offer effective political and social reform.

Though Mubarak, like his predecessors, tried to reach an accommodation with several Islamic groups, he returned to severe crackdowns following the World Trade Center bombing in 1993. Harsh repression, like the concessionary policies, boasts mixed results. In addition to targeting Islamists, the government cracked down on any legitimate dissent further exacerbating the participation and legitimacy crises. Mubarak repressed Islamists, but also “cracked down on non-threatening activities of the Muslim Brotherhood and imposed strict limits on permissible NGO and human-rights activity.”⁹⁷ A prominent sociologist and human rights activist, Said Ibrahim, was sentenced to seven years in prison in May 2001 convicted of taking foreign funds from the European Commission and offering bribes. Twenty-seven other co-defendants were also found guilty. The charges were leveled to stifle Ibrahim’s anti-government comments alleging corruption during elections and exposing an institutional bias against the Coptic Christian minority.⁹⁸

According to the Egyptian Organization for Human Rights (EOHR), “the state is practicing a form of terrorism against civil society institutions to deplete their resources and discourage them from defending human rights or backing democracy. . . .”⁹⁹ The group also believes that the Egyptian government wanted to silence calls for more democracy prior to parliamentary elections in November 2000. Likewise, the Egyptian regime used the September 11, 2001 attacks to increase repression of political opponents including, but not limited to, the Islamic militants. In May 2001, the government rounded up members of an Islamic group, Al-Waad, and charged them with conspiring to transfer weapons into the Gaza Strip. After the World Trade Center and Pentagon attacks, they amended the charges to include domestic terrorism.¹⁰⁰ In essence, the fight against the Islamist groups has led to the erosion of institutions and civil society, weakening the regime.¹⁰¹ In order to maintain control, the regime must implement harsher methods to counter its eroding legitimacy.

Therefore, although many scholars recognize that Mubarak has been effective in controlling dissent, they also concede that a change of domestic and international events can easily challenge Egypt’s stability. Historically, Egypt has undergone periodic, sharp eruptions of public discontent. By increasing repression to maintain stability while simultaneously narrowing his political base, Mubarak may have inadvertently lessened his ability to control future outbursts.¹⁰² Accordingly, one scholar argues that Egyptian political culture is not inherently anti-democratic, but suffers from political apathy due to the antidemocratic nature of its institutions and leaders. As such, the masses’ alienation from the political sphere has resulted in an apathetic population concerned more with

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the economic realm.¹⁰³ Frustration caused by political deprivation and lack of penetration by the government paves the way for severe instability. The gap between the political culture of the elite and masses also exacerbates the crisis environment in Egypt. The “ambivalent and schizophrenic” nature of the Egyptian intellectuals who believe in democratic institutions to promote legitimacy, yet oppose democracy in Egypt due to their fear that Islamist groups would garner considerable support as they did in Algeria, alienates the masses who have been convinced by the authoritarian nature of the government not to participate in political life.¹⁰⁴

Yet, despite the argument that the lack of political development has led to an apathetic political culture in Egypt, it would be dangerous to assume that the population cannot be mobilized if a potent “tipping” event occurred. As Dekmejian warns, “given the magnitude of Egypt’s problems, the traditional patterns of authority, legitimacy, and obedience are likely to change under the impact of modern conditions.”¹⁰⁵ Although the heavy restrictions on public demonstrations exist, an Israeli military response in the West Bank in March 2002 to a wave of suicide bombings in major Israeli cities unleashed an unprecedented response from Egyptians. Thousands of students protested almost daily after Israel’s action began on 29 March with calls for the abrogation of the peace treaty between Israel and Egypt signed in 1978.¹⁰⁶ In fact, riot police killed one Egyptian student in Alexandria frustrating further an already mobilized population.¹⁰⁷

Additionally, Mubarak’s tight control of the opposition and fervent control over the media might prove to be his downfall. Since the Al-Aqsa intifada erupted in September 2000, the Egyptian media has been viciously anti-Israel, provoking strong reaction

within Egypt. The Palestinian-Israeli issue could prove to be the motivating factor for the politically apathetic masses. If progress is not made towards a two-state solution, the masses may push for a more militant response from the Mubarak regime.

The future challenge does not stem from the Islamists alone. The curtailing of legitimate opposition along with increased stratification of society can mobilize the population to question the legitimacy of the regime. The regime response to the Islamists has led to a narrower base supporting Mubarak. The Islamists themselves are a major challenge to the regime, but regime response to the Islamists has made political development and long-term regime stability the real victims.

With this said, Mubarak retains a tight grip on power and it appears as if Egypt will be stable for the short-term due to political apathy, aggressive regime policies towards Islamic militants, and Mubarak's understanding of his opposition forces. Yet the indicators including increased stratification of society, unemployment, growing poverty, an expanding population, and a dearth of routes for political participation all portend the *potential* for Egypt to become a failing state. Pair these indicators with a confluence of unexpected internal and external events and the tide of stability can easily flow chaotic.

Despite the fact that Mubarak's regime has managed to control and balance internal threats for over twenty years, the West would be foolish to assume that instability can be staved off for the long-term. Mubarak's success in repressing the threat posed by militant Islamic groups adds to future instability. Unable to operate in Egypt, militants fled the country and joined Al-Qaeda and other terrorist groups. With Al-Qaeda members on the run due, in part, to

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the US war on terror, the probability exists for these militants to return to their home countries at some future date.¹⁰⁸ Given difficult internal circumstances and exogenous events, the potential exists for the current regime to face severe instability. Clearly the observable forces in the domestic, regional, and international environments have impacted the Egyptian regime.

POLICY OPTIONS

Already, the Israeli-Palestinian conflict and the war on terrorism have mobilized and increased anti-American dissent. As such, the United States needs to reassess its policy towards Egypt to safeguard its interests in this post-September 11 security environment. Since the potential for instability in Egypt is heightened, the time is ripe to assess the risks and benefits of retaining the status quo policy and to analyze the costs and advantages associated with prodding Egypt to democratize. Within the policy options, the impact that an unstable Egypt will have on US national security interests will be discussed.

Status Quo: A Strategy of Tactics

United States policy in the Middle East, according to Kenneth Pollack, director of national security studies at the Council of Foreign Relations, “seems a little like a cushion: it seems to take the shape of the last person to sit on it.”¹⁰⁹ Maintaining stability in Egypt is a security necessity for the United States, but its means to attain this goal are questionable. The lack of a long-term strategy which ignores the Mubarak regime’s stifling of most political activity along with a crackdown on legitimate dissent will spell disaster for US regional interests in the future.

Since Mubarak assumed power after President Sadat’s assassination in 1981, US policy has varied little, though the

rhetoric emanating from most administrations has vacillated from encouragement of peace and stability to democracy and liberalization. During the Cold War, US interest in stable, pro-Western governments were clearly the priority. With the dissolution of the Soviet Union and the onset of the Gulf War in 1991, the United States again was more interested in gaining support from regional allies in its fight against Saddam Hussein, than in pushing for democratic reform in the mostly authoritarian regimes of the Arab world. By 1993, following the guise of a “new world order,” then National Security Advisor Anthony Lake delineated “a new foreign policy vision replacing ‘containment’ with the ‘encouragement’ of free market democracies.”¹¹⁰ Yet with regards to US policy toward Egypt and other regimes such as Saudi Arabia and Jordan, “the shift in emphasis was as seductive as it was disingenuous.”¹¹¹

In reality, the United States pursued its vital objective of stability for regimes of key regional allies at the detriment of encouraging genuine liberalization of these governments. To explore the relationship between US policy statements and actual policy, one scholar examined the following: “To what extent are the instruments of US foreign policy used in a manner consistent with proliberalization rhetoric?”¹¹² By measuring whether or not the United States limited its exports of arms to countries that have strong human rights records and democratic government, the author concluded that human rights and democracy were important with respect to an initial decision to export arms, but were less significant with respect to Egypt and other Middle Eastern countries.¹¹³ Also in 1993, Human Rights Watch produced a report citing Egypt’s human rights violations and, although the

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organization acknowledged that the Clinton Administration stressed human rights issues more than the previous Reagan and Bush administrations, it still fell “significantly short” in supporting or acting in crisis areas worldwide.”¹¹⁴ Additionally, the administration lacked the ability to stay the course when the “going got rough.”¹¹⁵

For more than twenty years, US policy towards Egypt was more extemporized than a reflection of a well-thought out, long-term policy. In 1997, Robert Satloff of the Washington Institute testified before a House Committee on International Relations, that “for two decades, the US-Egyptian relationship has been a centerpiece of US efforts to bolster peace and security in the Middle East. This reflects Egypt’s dominance in Arab political, military, diplomatic and cultural circles.”¹¹⁶ Four key elements established the basis for the US-Egyptian including a strategic alliance, pursuit of peace and economic reforms, and a gradual shift towards liberalization and democratization.¹¹⁷ Yet despite the professed American support of political and economic liberalization in non-democratic countries, President Clinton’s concern was cautious, especially with regards to human rights and a narrowing of political freedoms in Egypt. The Clinton Administration continued to provide aid and arms to Egypt, obviously calculating that in the immediate future a stable Egypt was more important than one accountable to its people.

America’s difficulty with its status quo policy concerning Egypt and other Middle East allies became readily apparent in June 2002. On June 24, 2002, President George W. Bush called for “regime change” for the Palestinians. He envisioned a new, democratic ruler assuming power to replace a corrupt and authoritarian Yasir Arafat.¹¹⁸ As a sign of President Bush’s interest

in promoting democracy, Lorne Craner, the Assistant Secretary of State for Democracy, Human Rights and Labor was sent to the Middle East in June to meet with several leaders of key US strategic allies. The United States “is gingerly beginning to nudge authoritarian Arab governments to undertake democratic reforms, a process fraught with risk for the Bush administration and for Middle Eastern governments themselves.”¹¹⁹

In actuality, although the Bush administration supports rapid change for the Palestinians, it is more cautious about its approach to Egypt. Since the attacks in the United States on September 11, many human rights groups are apprehensive that the United States is more concerned with anti-terror activities of strategic allies than their human rights abuses or lack of democracy.¹²⁰

Ends. The United States perceives Egypt as a lynchpin in the Arab-Israeli conflict, in control of strategic waterways and necessary to secure our interests in the region including access to oil and the security of Israel. As such, maintaining stability by supporting regimes that are friendly to the US—without regard to their political structure—has been the prevalent policy. United States aims concerning Egypt since September 11, 2001 has been to pursue an Israeli-Palestinian peace track with Egypt’s assistance, garner support for the war on terrorism while continuing to secure the constancy of the Mubarak regime with economic aid.

Although the US professes to support democracy around the globe, it is clear that goal is secondary. For example, America’s consideration of utilizing military tribunals to try those allegedly involved in the terror attacks inadvertently signaled to the Egyptians that their emergency laws were acceptable. “While still denied such a forum, Egyptian officials say Western governments, once critical

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of Egypt's use of military tribunals and summary justice, are showing a new willingness of their own to invoke harsher measures. The US has said it will try some foreigners linked to Sept. 11 in military tribunals."¹²¹ Additionally, the Israeli-Palestinian question has made it increasingly difficult for the administration to articulate a coherent Middle East policy. "In the face of demands for rigor and precision, though, Mr. Bush and his top advisers often seem less like a well-conducted orchestra than like improvisers in a jazz combo."¹²² At one point, when President Bush met with Mubarak, he proposed working expediently to establish a Palestinian state. Within a day of that meeting, he told Israeli Prime Minister Ariel Sharon that the Palestinian Authority needed to reform before peace could occur.¹²³

As seen from an Egyptian perspective, witnessing increased crackdowns following the September 11 terrorist attacks, the United States is "supporting a regime that crushes dissenting voices and limits individual liberties because to do so suits Washington's interests."¹²⁴ American support for democracy is only rhetoric, according to many Arabs. Mohammed Zarei, the founder of the Human Rights Center for the Assistance of Prisoners, contends that "if there was democracy in Egypt, and people would be free to choose, probably [Mubarak's party] would not be in power. The Islamists would control parliament and government, and that is against what America wants."¹²⁵ It is clear that stability supercedes our commitment to democracy in Egypt. The United States pursuit of stability in the absence of democracy ignores the long-term implications of its actions.

Means. How have we executed our policy towards Egypt? In other words, how do we exercise our power to fulfill our interests in

Egypt and assist the Mubarak regime to maintain stability? The United States has several elements of power available to achieve a state's objectives vis-à-vis another state, including diplomatic, economic, informational, and military choices. Since President Sadat's historic visit to Jerusalem in 1978 and its overture to closer relations with the United States, contacts between the two nations have been strong. To cement the peace treaty with Israel, America promised approximately two billion dollars of aid each year making Egypt the second largest recipient of US aid after Israel. According to the State Department, "An important pillar of the bilateral relationship remains US security and economic assistance to Egypt, which expanded significantly in the wake of the Egyptian-Israeli Peace Treaty in 1979."¹²⁶ The economic aid also assists Egypt by funding projects to expand water and sewage systems, electricity, telecommunications, housing, and other investments. Ahmed Galal, the executive director of the Egyptian Center for Economic Studies, expressed the belief that the Egyptian economy "would have been starved for resources" without this aid.¹²⁷

This aid not only benefits Egypt, but gives the United States leverage to influence the government to pursue American interests. "US assistance promotes Egypt's economic development, supports US-Egyptian cooperation, and enhances regional stability."¹²⁸ During the Gulf War buildup, Mubarak helped assemble an Arab coalition and sent 35,000 troops to force Hussein to leave Kuwait. After the war, the United States and others forgave Egypt billions of dollars in loans. Thus, as a result of Egypt's participation in the war, the United States recognized the importance of its investment in Egypt.¹²⁹ Egypt's participation in the coalition gave legitimacy to the operation and eased the problems associated with linking Arab

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and Western forces. The United States continues military contacts through the annual Bright Star exercise to build cooperation with Egypt and other states in the region. “US military cooperation has helped Egypt modernize its armed forces and strengthen regional security and stability.”¹³⁰

Additionally, America continues to fund a variety of economic projects through the United States Agency for International Development (USAID) and private investments. USAID also has become “a driving force in a long-term effort to reform a number of Egypt’s sclerotic public institutions—including the court, customs and financial systems—but the jury is still out on that project.”¹³¹

Benefits. Many argue that the benefit of maintaining the status quo policy towards Egypt is that it has succeeded for over two decades. A pro-Western leader, supportive of United States policies in the region, has retained control of the Egyptian regime. Proponents of the status quo point to the Gulf War in 1991 when Egypt joined the American-led coalition to force Saddam Hussein to withdraw from Kuwait.

Since one of the US interests in the region centers on a secure Israel, Mubarak’s continued encouragement of peace over military action assists the United States in fulfilling this goal. Although Mubarak broke off all government-to-government contacts following Israel’s military operation into the West Bank in March 2002, he would not expel the Israeli Ambassador nor did he mention abrogating the peace treaty, despite popular protests in his country.¹³² Mubarak had removed his ambassador from Israel following Israel’s incursion into Lebanon in 1982. As such, the breaking of “all contacts” with Israel can be interpreted as merely

symbolic and as an appeasement to his population calling for some Egyptian response to Israel's actions in the occupied territories.

Mubarak contends that peace with Israel is in his country's interest and that Egypt can play a role in ameliorating the Palestinian condition. A crucial United States concern is the question of what happens to Egypt if Islamists gain power. Since the Islamists do not hide their disdain for the Jewish State, many in the US government assert that if the Islamic groups achieve power, they would almost certainly terminate the peace with Israel. The ramifications of this action, according to US officials, would be disastrous for the entire region.

Risks of the Status Quo. As mentioned previously, the potential for volatility does not dictate destabilization. Several factors can produce "tipping events" including a government's response to discontent, a confluence of external events and elements of the political culture. Accordingly, in today's global security environment maintaining the status quo policy has several perils and can actually undermine the American policy of retaining stability. If the US is viewed as continuing to support Mubarak's authoritarian rule, while simultaneously calling for regime change in other states, specifically within the Palestinian Authority, anti-American sentiment will increase. It is evident that there has been an intensification of public anti-US views in Egyptian media. Hamdy Qandil, a television personality who harshly criticizes American and Israeli policy vis-à-vis the Palestinians and the US war on terrorism, has gained popularity.¹³³ United States officials believe that the Egyptian regime allows the show to air in order for the population to vent frustration over US action in Afghanistan and the deteriorating situation in the West Bank and Gaza Strip.¹³⁴

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Additionally, the print media has become viciously anti-American and anti-Semitic.

Again, the confluence of external events can mobilize a population. Currently, the US war on terrorism, the explosive Israeli-Palestinian issue, and the difficulties of stabilizing a post conflict Iraq will all affect US policy in Egypt. The continuation and exacerbation of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict can marshal the Egyptian population. Former Al-Ahram editor, Mohamed Hakki is convinced that the resolution of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict is crucial to decreasing anti-US sentiment in the Middle East. This is due, in part, to a belief that the United States is not a fair arbiter of the conflagration. Hakki argued that although the elite might condemn the Palestinian suicide attacks in Israel, the majority of the “Arab street” supports them.¹³⁵ Egyptian analysts argue that there is an upsurge of terrorist cells in Egypt, but a resolution of the violence would stem their growth.¹³⁶

Yet others contend that although the Israeli-Palestinian issue is a key target of the Islamists discontent, their agenda extends beyond Israel. Many are dismayed by Mubarak’s authoritarian and secular regime and are waiting for the “right time to spring into action.”¹³⁷ As such, along with the fomenting of anti-US attitudes is an increase in anti-Mubarak sentiment who some oppositionists view as supporting America’s stance on Israel along with stifling the growth of more open political processes. Interestingly, while President Bush called for immediate reform of the Palestinian regime, he supports a more gradual approach with strategic allies including Egypt, Saudi Arabia, and Jordan. “The irony will not be lost on people in the region, of course—Egyptians and Jordanians

will once again conclude that the United States cares about democratic values only when it is strategically convenient.”¹³⁸

Added to this conflict is the continuing “war on terrorism” and post conflict nation-building in Iraq. According to a Gallup Poll in February 2002, seventy-seven percent of Arabs surveyed perceive the US war on terrorism as “morally unjustified and express a breathtaking depth of anti-US sentiment.”¹³⁹ As such, the risks of maintaining the status quo policy in a vastly modified global security environment may prove costly to the United States. Already anti-American fervor is high; this, coupled with the potential for instability that exists in Egypt due to economic and political dislocations, can create the type of unstable political situation that the United States is trying to avoid. Thus, it is in the US interests to assess the value of a new policy.

Democratization: Strategy of Opportunity

This following strategy takes a long-term view towards US interests and the means available to secure those interests. As with the status quo strategy, this section assesses risks along with the second- and third-order effects of this policy while remaining flexible and open to constant re-assessment. The key is to anticipate changes in the security environment as a result of actions implemented in support of US policy and to plan for the unexpected. To do this, this section explores scenarios based on the driving forces observed in the domestic, regional, and international environments as discussed in earlier sections. To foresee the unexpected requires a re-examination of long-held assumptions and the questioning of the conventional wisdom of the day. Peter Schwartz warns that, “Rather than asking questions, too many people react to uncertainty with denial.”¹⁴⁰ For example, why

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should the US anticipate only an Algerian outcome should free and fair elections take place in Egypt? If Islamists come to power, could there be a democratic mechanism to oust undemocratic leaders? As one high official explains, “It is not undemocratic to oust the wicked.”¹⁴¹

Ends. This strategy views democratization as a “security imperative.”¹⁴² In the long term, not only will democratization help alleviate the current economic and societal malaise, but it will offer a legitimate alternative for the Egyptian people. Of late, the only substitute to the authoritarian regime has been Islamist ideology (although, in the past an assortment of ideologies have been attempted, such as Pan-Arabism, socialism, Nasserism, etc) While it is still important to rid society of Islamist extremists as Mubarak has attempted, more must occur to implement real democratic reform. Increased crackdowns without far-reaching reforms will only radicalize segments of the population, whereas democracy will bolster state legitimacy, while marginalizing terrorism. Since terrorism cannot be completely eliminated, excusing the maintenance of an authoritarian regime as the only solution to a war on terrorism is not helpful for US interests. However, any democratic transition is extremely dangerous; terrorists operating in such environments view transitions as their last window of opportunity to garner support.

For example, during vulnerable transitional periods, terrorists have increased violence to incite harsh government reactions to delegitimize the state. One need only look at the example of the Euzkadi ta Askatasuna’s (ETA) violent actions implemented to delegitimize Spain after Franco. Spain, however, adhered to democratic principles and successfully transitioned to democracy

while marginalizing the ETA. Unfortunately, terrorism persists in Spain forcing a flexible reassessment of Spain's security policies while balancing civil liberties.¹⁴³ The United States needs to be prepared for a tumultuous period of transition in relation to Egypt.

Means. Interests and objectives are just one facet of the strategic equation. The operationalization of objectives and interests lies with the integration and choice of the elements of power. These elements of power affect the security environment and may have unintended consequences with ramifications for the achievement of goals. As such, it is imperative for US policy-makers to assess the potential outcomes of a new policy. As Dr. Said Aly, the Director of Al-Ahram Center, explains, "I think bilateral and regional are linked. But both sides realize that without a regional settlement, Egypt cannot go too far. Nobody invests in a country; they invest in a region. And tourism is very vital to us and is highly sensitive to developments in Palestine and Israel."¹⁴⁴ Moreover, gradual democratization emphasizes utilizing economic, diplomatic, political, and informational elements of power along with military support.

This aforementioned combination of tools of power recognizes the media's influence on the Arab street, the growing socioeconomic problems, the burgeoning and increasingly youthful population, and the existence of Islamist extremism in the region. For Egypt, the influence of these factors is most critical on Mubarak's traditional bases of support, especially the junior officers.¹⁴⁵ First, the media's influence requires American sensitivity to Arab sentiment towards regional events. Polls taken by Zogby international reflect intense anti-Israeli sentiments coupled with a profound importance placed on the plight of the

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Palestinians.¹⁴⁶ Eighty percent of Egyptians surveyed viewed Palestine as one of the most significant global issues.¹⁴⁷ As mentioned earlier, other surveys reveal minimal support for the US military action in Afghanistan. Moreover, despair and frustration lead many to cling to ethnic-nationalist sentiments, religion, or traditional values. These responses to frustration manifest themselves in the adulation of such tyrants—and defiantly anti-Western tyrants—such as Saddam Hussein and Osama Bin Laden.¹⁴⁸

The United States must understand these sentiments as it crafts regional foreign policies since they will affect the Arab street directly. If Egyptians perceive that they have no alternative means of expression within their country, attitudes may solidify further in an anti-Western mold, undermining any US regional foreign policies. As such, the best way to affect the Arab street is with soft power. Soft power refers to civil society, that network of non-governmental institutions that helps empower individuals and develops those attributes necessary for a thriving democracy.¹⁴⁹

Before September 11th, US policymakers became increasingly aware of the impact of autocratic regimes in the Arab world and the anger they elicited. Without political space, the Arab street has increasingly blamed its own autocratic leaders and the United States. One observer noted that before September 11th, US policymakers regarded “the street” as a “new phenomenon of public accountability, which we have seldom had to factor into our projections of Arab behavior in the past.”¹⁵⁰ Information technologies and the explosion of media in the region, including CNN and al-Jazeera, are fueling public opinion, thereby putting pressure on the Arab regimes. No one knows, including the Arab

leaders, how this stress will shape these regimes and their policies.¹⁵¹ In February 2001, Director of Central Intelligence George J. Tenet testified before the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence that the “right catalyst—such as the out-break of Israeli-Palestinian violence—can move people to act. Through access to the Internet and other means of communication, a restive public is increasingly capable of taking action without any identifiable leadership or organizational structure.”¹⁵²

Therefore, this increased significance of the Arab street provides the United States with an opportunity to relay its messages. Public diplomacy that allows the United States to speak directly to the Arab public can be a powerful tool, especially as the masses become political players.¹⁵³ Egypt, as well as the other Arab states, will have to acknowledge that in this information age of improved levels of education, travel, and the new communications media, the people—not just the political and economic elite—will have a role in governance and political life.¹⁵⁴ Public diplomacy, consequently, should include more than professional diplomats. In fact, to be effective, citizens and private institutions will make the most headway towards understanding and good will between the West and the Middle East as activities including teaching and providing effective health care are strong instruments for building mutual awareness. Even sports events are valuable mechanisms for cultural comprehension. In actuality, these vehicles are more readily trusted and accepted than professional diplomats.¹⁵⁵

Fulfillment of basic needs also cultivates an allegiance to the political system. As such, the United States must continue economic aid to Egypt, while simultaneously promoting political reforms. Transparency in government ensures that aid is directed

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towards socio-economic development, not corrupt bureaucrats.

“Securing a better future for all requires putting the attack on poverty at the top of national agendas in Arab countries.”¹⁵⁶

Additionally, transparencies, accountability mechanisms, a free press, civil society, NGOs, community groups, and widespread political participation will facilitate the efforts focused on socioeconomic development.¹⁵⁷ These actions, in turn, will encourage foreign investment and business growth. Moreover, a regime less dependent on the military can channel US aid from the military and towards economic development.

The United States need not start from scratch regarding its efforts in Egypt. The Zogby polls (see Appendix) suggest that a sizeable percentage of those surveyed favor American education, movies, television, people (although this percentage is only at 35), freedom, democracy, and American science and technology. From these polls, it is evident that education provides an important medium for transforming Egyptian political culture. Interestingly, in the Arab countries, the youth’s views towards US education were very favorable.¹⁵⁸ This bodes well for future prospects for change.

How can the United States capitalize on these favorable sentiments towards American education? Strategically, it is important for the United States to assist Egypt in educational reform and encourage democracy as a means of empowerment.

Unfortunately, Osama Bin Laden appealed to those without power and explained that “with a few dozen men and knives, we’re able to shake up the world. You can do it.”¹⁵⁹ A reformation in education offers a non-violent and democratic alternative to Bin Laden’s pull. Education can transform Egyptian political culture, a necessary vehicle for Egypt’s political development and a crucial medium

through which the regime can absorb change and respond to the imperatives of differentiation, equality, and capacity. These imperatives are the basis for democratization in the form of institutions and liberal values or a democratic political culture.

These values can be learned without turning away from Arab culture or Islam.¹⁶⁰ There have been other current democracies that in the past were considered unable to democratize due to their culture such as Spain, Portugal, along with several Asian countries. According to Michael Ignatieff, “adopting the values of individual agency does not necessarily entail adopting Western ways of life. Believing in your right not to be tortured or abused need not mean adopting Western dress, speaking Western languages, or approving of the Western lifestyle.”¹⁶¹ Moreover, seeking human rights should not be antithetical to any civilization. It is a human impulse “to be free from oppression, bondage, and gross physical harm.”¹⁶² The UNDP concludes, further, that Egypt and the Arab region as a whole must meet the challenge of correcting the three deficits as noted in its report: “the freedom deficit; the women’s empowerment deficit; and, the human capabilities/knowledge deficit relative to income.”¹⁶³

Previous sections of this paper described Egyptian political culture as one of “apathy, isolation, and alienation.”¹⁶⁴ However, political culture can change, but “change won’t come about unless ordinary Arabs want it themselves. . . . A second, related point is that if we’re talking about changing the political culture of the Arab world, then ‘soft power’ is as important as hard military power.”¹⁶⁵ By affecting socialization agents, such as education and civil society, including a free press, at the grassroots level, political culture can change and embrace liberal values.¹⁶⁶

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Furthermore, it is not just the masses that have been influenced by domestic, regional, and global events. In fact, one could argue that the elites have been ripe for anti-regime sentiment for some time. Mubarak's support base among the elite seemed to be in decay even as early as 1986. Robert Springborg observed indicators of regime instability as

the lack of organizational and ideological cohesiveness within the elite, increasing lassitude with state structures, the emergence of counterelites and ideologies within the increasingly active legal and underground political oppositions, and the growing independence of associational groups and even governmental bodies, such as the judiciary.¹⁶⁷

Increasingly, there is evidence of discontent in the junior officer corps especially with regard to the regime's response to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict.¹⁶⁸ This is worrisome for Mubarak as the military has always been a solid base of support. For democracy to take root in Egypt, political culture not only must transform from below, but also from the top; political culture reflects the attitudes of the elite, as well.¹⁶⁹

Consequently, interactions at the elite level must also occur. Dr. Said Aly suggests that the Egyptian leadership must take some diplomatic initiatives.

Egypt needs to promote itself better. When other heads of state come to the United States, they visit other cities. They don't stay in Washington. They go to Chicago, Houston, San Francisco to promote their countries. Some countries even have a 'Minister of the Month' program where every month the oil minister, the education minister, the trade minister come and there's a constant flow and reminder of the relationship.¹⁷⁰

Cultural exchanges are very important at all levels.¹⁷¹ For example, Ambassador Frank Wisner remarked that there can be much to gain with an exchange among judges as the

quality of Egyptian judges is high. The United States currently participates in exchanges between chief justices of other countries. Definitely, such an exchange with Egypt would enhance rule of law providing a stabilizing influence on democratization. Other fruitful exchanges would include ones in journalism, parliamentary, military, business, and technology.¹⁷²

Religious elites must also establish a dialogue as part of a reformation of Islam. “It is time for the Arab-Muslims to break the heavy shackles of the past and to try to come to terms with the West”¹⁷³ According to Fuller, moderate religious and social leaders of the Muslim world must find the courage to critique Islam and call for changes. “When highly traditional or fanatic groups attempt to define Islam in terms of a social order from a distant past, voices should be raised to deny them that monopoly.”¹⁷⁴ The current wave of violence is not derived from religion, even though the perpetrators claim otherwise.

There is an alternative ideology for the Egyptians that could strengthen political allegiance and, therefore, legitimacy. Egyptian nationalism has a seven thousand year long history. It is a sentiment that Nasser, Sadat, and Mubarak tapped for legitimacy when forced to make hard foreign policy decisions, such as Egypt’s realignment with the West in the 1970s and Mubarak’s support during the 1990-91 Gulf War. Along with asserting the primacy of Egypt in the Middle East, the United States can provide diplomatic incentives for Mubarak or his successor to democratize. Namely, the United States can highlight Egypt’s role in negotiations concerning the Israeli-Palestinian conflict; turn to Egypt on other regional matters; and provide Egypt with the forums required to

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lead. While transitions can be unstable in the short term, the Egyptians tend to support their leaders when hard regional decisions are required.

On the international level, the United States must recognize that the war on terrorism cannot be won unilaterally; international cooperation is necessary to fight the transnational threat of terrorism. More work must be done with the UN to arrive at a common understanding of this threat. Telhami suggests that the deliberate targeting of civilians should be the defining measure of terrorism and the basis of an international treaty.¹⁷⁵ He also suggests that the United States help moderates in the region to accept and articulate a “global vision.” One way to accomplish this goal is to establish an international forum that discusses economic and political change backed by resources. Second, there must be an Arab-Israeli peace, not as a sufficient condition, but a necessary one. This is a long term process, and “we are not going to buy hope in the short term.”¹⁷⁶

Risks. In conceptualizing the problems of pushing for democratization in Egypt, several scenarios come to mind. They include the following: 1) Islamists assume power and abrogate the peace treaty with Israel, 2) an anti-US leader assumes power, and 3) a weak leader follows Mubarak. We will take each one of these cases in turn to assess the risks involved with prodding Egypt to democratize.

Islamist in Power. The argument against free and fair elections concludes that Islamists will come to power and subsequently end the democratization process. Proponents of this argument invoke the example that Hitler came to power through democratic institutions. This oft-uttered comment regarding Egypt and

democratization begs the comparison between Egypt's situation and that of Iran in 1979 or Algeria in 1990. No one can say for sure that an Islamic group will or will not assume power if a democratic election were held in Egypt, yet the argument that the situation would be similar to revolutionary Iran and Algeria is not valid. Regarding Algeria, President Chandli Benjadid terminated one-party rule and phased elections began in 1990. In local elections, the Islamic Salvation Front (FIS) won "sixty percent of regional assemblies and fifty-five percent of municipal councils."¹⁷⁷ In the second round of elections choosing parliament members, FIS gained 188 of the 231 seats. After Benjadid was forced to resign, the third phase of elections was cancelled and the democratic process stifled. As Robin Wright explains, "the world's first Islamic democracy never had a chance to prove itself."¹⁷⁸ As such, the effect of having an Islamic party in power in Algeria remains unknown.

By contrast, in 1989 Jordan held elections and the Islamists won 34 out of 80 seats in the lower house of Parliament. In subsequent elections in 1993 after King Hussein ushered in multiparty elections, the Islamists captured 18 of the 80 seats. The King believed that he could co-opt the Muslim Fundamentalist groups through political liberalization rather than employing harsh crackdowns.

Regarding Iran, a revolution, not an election created an Islamic theocracy. Although the potential exists that an Islamic theocracy may develop in Egypt after an election, it is unlikely to take the same form as Iran in 1979. Ambassador Frank Wisner contends that it would be difficult to argue whether or not Egypt would follow in Iran's footsteps since the environment of 2002 is significantly different than the historical context of 1979.

Clearly the concern of many is that Islamists by their very nature are undemocratic, and, therefore, could not promote political development.¹⁷⁹ An Islamist win would be antithetical to meeting the challenges of under-development and the deficits described in the UNDP's report. Many women are concerned with an Islamist regime. One participant in a roundtable sponsored by the Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance commented that, "Democracy should not include [violence] or be violent itself . . . and violence for me as a woman is to want to apply sharia literally."¹⁸⁰ However, Islamists could serve in a representational capacity in a democratic framework. A constitutional framework that provides for a democratic process with free and fair elections can also insist on democratically minded leaders and prohibit those who are not democratically inclined from assuming a governing role. This type of constitutional arrangement may be the necessary stop-gap for transitioning regimes that are still developing institutions and democratic political cultures.

There are some models that could be explored as viable ways to deal on a political level with undemocratic Islamists. In Turkey, the military ousted the ill-performing Islamist-led government only one year after they assumed power. However, Islamist mayors in cities across Turkey, including Istanbul and Ankara, continue to capture votes because they are responsive to their constituency.¹⁸¹ (This is the point of democracy, and it is where many Islamists fail.) Jordan and Morocco have been able to sustain various political and economic reforms, while integrating Islamists into political life. Jordan has done this while pursuing terrorists and maintaining a peace treaty with Israel.

In fact, one may argue that it was intractable American support of the Shah that created the conditions for the Iranian revolution.¹⁸² In a study of Islamic revivalism in Pakistan, the author concludes that the Islamic extremists could not cultivate a following, and “in the final analysis, participation in the political process can do more to tame Islamic revivalism than repression from the state.”¹⁸³ Furthermore, as an opposition group, Islamists succeed because they represent a veto to the current regime. However, by being ambiguous about democracy and human rights, while resorting to terror, these groups quickly lose credibility.¹⁸⁴

As such, United States policymakers should recognize that Islamic resurgence is not inevitable if democratization takes root. The popularity of Islamists stems from a crisis environment including closed political systems, the gap between elite and masses, and the inability of regimes to absorb change. Moreover, one should temper the appearance of a large Islamist political movement with Egyptian a political culture that is attuned to state power. Egypt has had a secular regime for more than 200 years and has never been revolutionary.¹⁸⁵ Perhaps, the answer to how to pursue US interests in the Middle East is in staring directly at US policy-makers—a persistent push for democracy.¹⁸⁶

Abrogation of the Peace Treaty. A scenario involving an Egyptian ruler abrogating the peace treaty with Israel seems unlikely. First, Egypt continues to be concerned about its borders with Sudan and Libya and therefore appreciates a peaceful border. Second, coupled with the fact that the United States is the sole superpower, an Egyptian government is unlikely to reject billions of dollars of US military aid.¹⁸⁷ Third, Egypt’s treaty with Israel gives it regional prestige that is also a source of legitimacy at home.

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Additionally, what would Egypt gain from withdrawing from the peace treaty? Perhaps the more prescient question is what would it lose?

When one looks at the treaty, it becomes clear that it is very advantageous for Egypt. For example, Egypt regained the Sinai and established normal relations with Israel defined as “full recognition, diplomatic, economic and cultural, termination of economic boycotts and discriminatory barriers to the free movement of people and goods. . . .” The treaty’s preamble also states that the intent is “to constitute a basis for peace not only between Egypt and Israel but also between Israel and each of the other Arab neighbors....”¹⁸⁸ But the so-called pro-US Egyptian regime has been ineffective and uncooperative in its roles to facilitate the Arab-Israeli peace process. Egypt even opposed US efforts to advance Israel’s regional integration.¹⁸⁹ In reality, in the absence of “hot war” the relationship has not moved beyond “cold peace.” In fact, many Egyptian intellectuals, and cultural and religious figures, do not support normalization with Israel.¹⁹⁰ In a 1994 poll by Al Ahram Weekly, seventy-one percent of Egyptian surveyed said that they would not buy Israeli goods, sixty-three percent said that they would not visit Israel, and seventy-five percent did not want industrial cooperation with Israel.¹⁹¹ While Egyptian-Israeli relations do not seem to reflect the spirit of the treaty, abrogation of the treaty does not mean war. In fact, sixty-five to seventy percent of Egyptians surveyed held that “peace is good for Egypt.”¹⁹²

The next order question becomes, what would change should Egypt abrogate the peace treaty? Edward N. Luttwak envisions the worst case scenario as Egypt going to war with Israel. Most likely, if Egypt launched an attack on Israel, the United States would cut

all aid. Although other Arab countries may follow Egypt in battle, Israel still maintains the advantage in conventional combat.¹⁹³ The more probable scenario is that if Egypt abrogated the peace treaty, Egypt's support of Islamic extremists in asymmetrical warfare against Israel would increase. The United States, however, retains key financial leverage. By cutting off much needed aid, Egyptian leaders would face severe socio-economic challenges.

Anti-US Leader in Power. This scenario is another worst-case scenario. However, the United States de-legitimizes itself when it supports an autocratic leader and issues no admonishment for the sentencing of Saad Eddin Ibrahim to seven years of hard labor “for promoting the peaceful alternative to fundamentalist violence....”¹⁹⁴ Friedman warns that “if there is no space in Egypt for democratic voices, then Egyptians will only be left with the mosque. If there is no room in Egypt for Saad Ibrahims, then we will only get more Mohammed Attas. . . .”¹⁹⁵ For the same reasons why it is not prudent to abrogate the Israeli-Egyptian peace treaty, anti-US sentiment will provoke a rethinking of the US aid package to Egypt.

Moreover, Egypt's harsh crackdown on Islamists included repression of legitimate opposition groups. As Egypt tightened the noose around the already limited political space, it deflected regime criticism towards the United States. Egypt, our strategic partner, has created a widespread anti-American consensus that includes not just the Islamists, but also the pan-Arabists, and intellectuals.¹⁹⁶ The question then becomes, how much more anti-American would a democratically elected leader be than the current regime?

Weak Leader takes Over. This risk is one without any option. Mubarak has been a strong, autocratic leader for 21 years. Whoever succeeds him will most likely be weaker in comparison.¹⁹⁷ If the

leader is indeed a product of free and fair elections, then he or she must be held accountable. At the end of the day, it takes a much stronger leader to serve the interests of his or her citizens than to serve him- or herself.

CONCLUSION

With the confluence of the domestic, regional, and international events discussed, it appears that Mubarak has reached the crossroads—and so has US policy. The strategy of opportunity minimizes future risks and considers US strategy towards Egypt with a regional and global perspective. This study reveals that any modification in US Middle East policy must contemplate all factors. For example, as the United States struggles with post-conflict nation-building in Iraq, the possibility of a regional backlash must be assessed. Egypt, Jordan, and Saudi Arabia are particularly fearful of unrest within their borders if the Iraqi people do not begin to reap the benefits of “regime change.”

Augustus Richard Norton asks, “Will America now define national security as it did a half century ago to see the betterment of others’ conditions as key to ensuring its own safety and well-being? Or will it be satisfied merely to aggressively police the frontiers of hostility at home and abroad to reduce the likelihood of a new terrorist-inflicted disaster? The lessons of 1947 would be to do both. . . .”¹⁹⁸ The United States must recognize that the post-9/11 world is a “war of ideas, and it will be much more difficult than the military campaign.”¹⁹⁹ The problems are not only those of the United States, but of the global community.

Most importantly, the United States cannot afford to be timid in its insistence on principles of democracy; it is the best antidote to Islamist extremism and hardened authoritarianism. Calling it the

“End of History,” Francis Fukuyama, assessed the demise of the Soviet Union and communism as the end of ideological conflict.²⁰⁰ However, this post-September 11 period reveals that democracy is not only the ideological victor over communism, but can be extended as an ideological champion over extremism. More than an ideological force, however, democracy is exactly the security imperative the United States has sought; perhaps post-9/11 will be the true end of history.

NOTES

¹ A more detailed discussion of these environments is found in Cindy R. Jebb, *The Fight for Legitimacy: Liberal Democracy versus Terrorism* (Newport, RI: US Naval War College, 2001), 5-16.

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³ The discussion on globalism and globalization is found in James Rosenau, “The Complexities and Contradictions of Globalization,” in *Understanding International Relations*, eds. Daniel J. Kaufman, Jay Parker, and Kimberly C. Field (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1999), 756-758; the quote and the idea of the predominance of globalization is found on 758-759.

⁴ Jessica Mathews, “Power Shift,” in *Strategy and Force Planning*, 3rd ed., eds. Strategy and Force Planning Faculty (Newport, RI: US Naval War College, 2000), 94.

⁵ Mathews, “Power Shift,” 94-95.

⁶ “Seeking a National Strategy: A Concert for Preserving Security and Promoting Freedom,” *The U.S. Commission on National Security/21st Century* (April 15, 2000), 5.

⁷ Speech by Dr. Josef Joffe at the Partnership for Peace Conference, Paris, France 17-19 June, 2002.

⁸ Bruce Hoffman, “Low-intensity Conflict: Terrorism and Guerilla Warfare in the Coming Decades,” in *Terrorism: Roots, Impact, Responses*, ed. Lance Howard (New York: Praeger, 1992), 139.

⁹ “A National Security Strategy For A New Century,” The White House, December 1999, 2.

¹⁰ Michael Brown, "Introduction," *The International Dimensions of Internal Conflict*, ed. Michael E. Brown (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1996), 3.

¹¹ For a comprehensive discussion of a security framework that includes a security environment consisting of opportunities, threats, vulnerabilities, and challenges, see Richmond Lloyd, "Strategy and Force Planning Framework," *Strategy and Force Planning*, 3rd Edition, ed. Strategy and Force Planning Faculty (Newport, RI: US Naval War College, 2000), 1-17.

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¹⁶ Philip Smucker, "Egypt's Unrest a Two-Edged Sword," *Christian Science Monitor* (4 August 2002): 1. Accessed 22 July 2002 from <http://ehostvgw.com>.

¹⁷ Tim Russert cites this poll in "Tom Friedman and Bill Kristol Discuss Violence in the Middle East," 2.

¹⁸ "The Poor Arab Street," *Economist*, 3 July 2002, 1. Accessed 10 July 2002 from <http://proquest.umi.com>.

¹⁹ Ambassador Robert Pelletreau as quoted in, "U.S. Egyptian Relations," *Middle East Policy* 8, no. 2 (June 2001). Accessed 23 July 2002 from <http://proquest.umi.com>.

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²¹ Ambassador Pelletreau in U.S Egyptian Relations."

²² Smucker, "Egypt's Unrest a Two-Edged Sword."

²³ Singerman, 34.

²⁴Ibid.

²⁵ The idea of today's terrorism taking on the characteristics of a political movement is taken from Bruce Hoffman, "Lecture to Terrorism Seminar," at the United States Military Academy, April 2002.

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²⁷ Dekmejian, 6.

²⁸ Mir Zohair Husain, *Global Islamic Politics* (New York: HarperCollins College Publishers, 1995), 163.

²⁹ James A. Bill and Robert Springborg, *Politics in the Middle East* (New York: HarperCollins College Publishers, 1994), 6.

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³³ Gilbert R. Winham, "Political Development and Lerner's Theory: Further Test of a Causal Model," *The American Political Science Review* 64 (1970): 810.

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³⁶ Samuel Huntington, *Political Order in Changing Societies* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1968), 4.

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⁴⁰ Husain., 165.

⁴¹ Michael C. Hudson, *Arab Politics: The Search for Legitimacy* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1977), 2.

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- ⁵⁹ Bard O'Neill, *Insurgency and Terrorism* (New York: Brassey's Inc., 1990), 126-127.
- ⁶⁰ O'Neill, *Insurgency in the Modern World*, 21.
- ⁶¹ Huntington, *Political Order in Changing Societies*.
- ⁶² O'Neill, *Insurgency and Terrorism*, 127.
- ⁶³ See Dekmejian, 178. Another interesting example concerns Israel and its relationship with the Palestinians. Israel supported the growth of the Islamic movement in the 1980's, specifically HAMAS (The Islamic Resistance Movement), in the West Bank and Gaza Strip as a counterbalance to nationalist groups. The Israelis hoped the new group would gain support, thereby weakening the pull of the nationalist opposition parties. The Islamic groups, however, have continued to gain influence and have become a threat to the Israelis.
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¹²⁵ Ibid.

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¹³³ Although viewing figures were unavailable, the current affairs press review-cum-talk show has become the most talked-about television in Egypt since Qatari maverick television station Al Jazeera first broke political taboos in the Arab world with its rowdy Opposite Direction show in 1996." Andrew Hammond, "A New Era of Openness," *Middle East*, no. 320 (February 2002): 46. Accessed on 31 July at <http://ehostvgw4.epnet.com>.

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¹³⁷ Ibid.

¹³⁸ Jackson Diehl, "Don't-Rock- The-Boat Diplomacy," *The Washington Post*; 24 June 2002, A19. Accessed 1 August 2002 from <http://proquest.umi.com>.

¹³⁹ "Islamic World sees U.S. Negatively," *Veterans of Foreign Wars Magazine* (May 2002). Accessed 1 August 2002 from <http://proquest.umi.com>.

¹⁴⁰ Peter Schwartz, “The Art of the Long View,” *Strategy and Force Planning*, 2nd edition, eds. Strategy and Force Planning Faculty (Newport: US Naval War College, 1997), 29. For further explanation of scenario building, that is identifying driving forces, predetermined elements and critical uncertainties, see *Ibid*, 29-44.

¹⁴¹ Dr. Bill Luti, interview conducted by authors, 24 July 2002 in Washington D.C.

¹⁴² Jebb, 115.

¹⁴³ See Jebb, 21-38 for full discussion of the case of Spain and ETA.

¹⁴⁴ Aly and Pelletreau, 10.

¹⁴⁵ Ambassador Wisner explained that while Egypt does not have a revolutionary culture, the impact of these factors on Mubarak’s narrow support base is dangerous for him in an interview with the authors on 18 September 2002, New York City.

¹⁴⁶ Tables and explanations are depicted in Appendix. The polls are taken from “The Ten Nation Impressions of America Poll,” Zogby International, 11 April 2002. Accessed 31 July 2002 at <https://interactive.zogby.com/clickon/products.dbm>.

¹⁴⁷ Shibley Telhami supports the Zogby statistic and found 79 percent of Egyptians surveyed felt that the Palestinian issue “was the single most important issue to them personally,” in Telhami, 4. Moreover, he claims that the Palestinian issue “...is central to the collective consciousness in the region, to the collective Arabic and Islamic identity.... And thus when an Arab or Muslim makes a judgment about the world, subconsciously he or she makes a judgment through the prism of the Palestinian issue.” The West does not understand this, and “We think of it in very simplistic terms.” See Telhami, 4.

¹⁴⁸ Fuller, 6.

¹⁴⁹ Ignatius, 2-3.

¹⁵⁰ Author cites Edward S. Walker, “The New U.S. Administration’s Middle East Policy Speech,” *Middle East Economic Survey* 44, no. 26 (June 25, 2001) in Dale F. Eickelman, “Bin Laden, the Arab ‘Street,’ and the Middle East’s Democracy Deficit,” *Current History: A Journal of Contemporary World Affairs* 101, no. 651 (January 2002): 38.

¹⁵¹ *Ibid*.

¹⁵² Eickelman, 38.

¹⁵³ Eickelman, 38-39.

¹⁵⁴ Eickelman, 39.

¹⁵⁵ Michael Holtzman, "Privatize Public Diplomacy," *New York Times*, 8 August 2002, A25. See also Shibley Telhami expresses concern that politicians who speak directly to the Arab Street are really speaking to Congress. Consequently, they are ineffective as messengers of public diplomacy in Telhami.

¹⁵⁶ *Arab Human Development Report 2002*, 11.

¹⁵⁷ *Arab Human Development Report 2002*, 12.

¹⁵⁸ Zogby International, 16.

¹⁵⁹ Telhami, 3.

¹⁶⁰ The idea that political culture is learned is from Stacher, "A Democracy with Fangs and Claws."

¹⁶¹ Michael Ignatieff, "The Attack on Human Rights," *Foreign Affairs* 80, no. 6 (November/December 2001): 110.

¹⁶² Ibid.

¹⁶³ *Arab Human Development Report 2002*, 27.

¹⁶⁴ Stacher, 3.

¹⁶⁵ Ignatius, 2-3.

¹⁶⁶ During the authors' interview with Mohamed Hakki, he stressed the importance of a free press as an agent of change.

¹⁶⁷ Jon B. Alterman cites Robert Springborg, *Mubarak's Egypt: Fragmentation of the Political Order* (Boulder: Westview, 1989), 9 in Jon B. Alterman, "Egypt: Stable, but for How Long," *The Washington Quarterly* 23, no. 4 (2000): 2.

¹⁶⁸ This point has been confirmed by several high ranking officials and analysts interviewed by the authors and Dr. Sara Daly, analyst at RAND, interviewed 25 July 2002, and Mr. Hakki, interviewed 26 July 2002.

¹⁶⁹ Stacher, 2. Quote is taken from Larry Diamond, *Political Culture and Democracy in Developing Countries*, (Boulder: Lynne Rienner, 1994), 19.

¹⁷⁰ "U.S. Egyptian Relations."

¹⁷¹ The point of cultural exchange was stressed during the authors' interview with Mr. Hakki.

¹⁷² The idea about exchanges among judges, journalists, and parliamentarians was based on an interview with Ambassador Frank Wisner, former Ambassador to Egypt and India, on 18 September 2002, in New York City.

¹⁷³ Mahmud A. Faksh, "Islam and the West," *Maine Telegram*, 7 October 2001, section c, c1.

¹⁷⁴ Fuller, 7.

¹⁷⁵ The idea of cooperation is taken from Jebb, 112-115 and Telhami, 7. Also the idea of a common definition concerning the targeting of civilians is from Telhami, 7.

¹⁷⁶ Telhami, 7.

¹⁷⁷ Robin Wright, "Islam, Democracy and the West," *Foreign Affairs* 71, no. 3 (Summer 1992) Accessed 2 October 2002 at <http://www.proquest.umi>.

¹⁷⁸ Ibid.

¹⁷⁹ In this paper we are not arguing whether or not Islam is compatible with democracy, but we are arguing that for democratic political development to occur, it is necessary to have the conditions mentioned in this paper. As such, a country run strictly by Shariah law will not satisfy these conditions.

¹⁸⁰ This quote is from a roundtable discussion that took place over a 28-29 March 1999 and reported in "Democracy in the Arab World – Challenges, Achievements, Prospects," Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance, 2. Accessed 10 July 2002, http://www.idea.int/publications/arab_world_excerpt.htm.

¹⁸¹ The idea about Turkey is taken from Graham Fuller, "The Future of Political Islam," *Foreign Affairs* (March/April 2002), 3. Accessed on 7 August 2002 at <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>.

¹⁸² Indyk, 86-87.

¹⁸³ S.V.R. Nasr, Democracy and Islamic Revivalism," *Political Science Quarterly*, 110, no. 2 (Summer, 1995), 284-285. Accessed 6 August 2002 at <http://www.jstor.org/>.

¹⁸⁴ Gerges, 600.

¹⁸⁵ Interview with Ambassador Frank Wisner, former Ambassador to Egypt, 18 September, New York City.

¹⁸⁶ It will be interesting to see if, in fact, the Palestinian National Authority (PNA) democratizes. It will be harder for the U.S. not to

insist on democracy in Egypt, while promoting the democratization elsewhere.

¹⁸⁷ Alterman, 6.

¹⁸⁸ The first quote is found in *The Middle East*, 8th ed. (Washington D.C.: Congressional Quarterly, 1994), 397, and the second quote is found in *Ibid.* 396.

¹⁸⁹ Martin Indyk, "Back to the Bazaar," *Foreign Affairs* 81, no. 1 (January/February 2002), 79-80.

¹⁹⁰ Fawaz A. Gerges, "Egyptian-Israeli Relations Turn Sour," *Foreign Affairs*, May 1995, 3. Accessed 7 August 2002 at <http://proquest.umi.com>.

¹⁹¹ *Ibid.*, 4.

¹⁹² "U.S. Egyptian Relations."

¹⁹³ Edward Luttwak, "Worst Case Scenario," *Time* 8 April 2002, 1-2. Accessed 10 July 2002 at <http://proquest.umi.com>.

¹⁹⁴ Thomas L. Friedman, "Bush's Shame," *New York Times*, 4 August 2002, sect 4, 13.

¹⁹⁵ Friedman, 13.

¹⁹⁶ Indyk, 82.

¹⁹⁷ Interview with Sara Daly, RAND.

¹⁹⁸ Augustus Richard Norton, "America's Approach to the Middle East: Legacies, Questions, and Possibilities," *Current History: A Journal of Contemporary World Affairs* 101, no. 651 (January 2002): 4.

¹⁹⁹ Telhami, 7.

²⁰⁰ Stanley Hoffman refers to the Francis Fukuyama piece in Stanley Hoffman, "Clash of Globalizations," *Foreign Affairs* (July/August 2002), 2. Accessed 13 August 2002 from <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>.

