

NATO AND ENLARGEMENT: A UNITED STATES AND NATO PERSPECTIVE

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WEDNESDAY, JUNE 19, 2002

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,
SUBCOMMITTEE ON EUROPE,
COMMITTEE ON INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS,
Washington, DC.

The Subcommittee met, pursuant to call, at 10:15 a.m. in Room 2172, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Elton Gallegly [Chairman of the Subcommittee] presiding.

Mr. GALLEGLY. I call the hearing to order. Today the Subcommittee holds its third hearing on NATO's future and enlargement. On several occasions, United States Government officials have stated that in preparation for the summit in Prague in November, the United States has identified three goals to be accomplished:

One goal was to address the need to redefine a new relationship between NATO and Russia. On May 28, in Rome, the Heads of State and Government of the NATO Alliance met with Russian President Putin and formalized that new relationship in the form of a new NATO/Russia Council. We certainly welcome that development and support its intentions.

A second goal for Prague was to address NATO's missions and capabilities, especially in light of the new emerging threats to Euro-Atlantic security as demonstrated in the event last September 11. At the NATO ministers meeting in Iceland in May, the Alliance partners affirmed the need to make the Alliance more flexible in addressing threats such as global terrorism and weapons of mass destruction and to develop the capabilities necessary to meet those threats from wherever they originate. This was welcome news and I believe reaffirmed the U.S. Commitment to the Alliance and what it stands for.

A final objective for the U.S. at Prague was to welcome new members into the Alliance. At our last hearing in May, we had the Ambassadors of the 10 candidate nations come before this Subcommittee to make their case for why their countries valued membership in NATO and what they were doing to meet NATO's entry requirements as outlined in the MAP process established. I have to admit, the enthusiasm and commitment I saw demonstrated by most or by all those Ambassadors at our hearing was very gratifying. The progress they have made thus far seems to be significant, and the contributions many of them are currently making to NATO and the U.S., both in the Balkans and Afghanistan, should be recognized and appreciated. However, as I told them, the proc-

ess of joining NATO does not end at Prague for those who receive an invitation to join the Alliance, but really just begins, and so they must continue to work diligently to meet their MAP criteria.

I know the Heads of State of each of these candidate countries meet in just a few weeks at Riga for that last major summit before Prague. I hope they will pledge to continue to refine and improve upon the good efforts they have made to date.

Today we have asked SACEUR General Joseph Ralston and representatives from the Departments of State and Defense to share their thoughts on NATO's future; to tell us how the Administration and NATO view the MAP application process as an indicator of how well the applicants for NATO membership are shaping up; and, finally, how adding new members will impact the Alliance in its ability to carry out its missions.

As I mentioned at our first hearing on NATO back in April, we hope to conclude these hearings by introducing legislation which would address NATO's future and enlargement issue. A draft of that legislation has been circulated among several interested parties and it would be my intention to introduce the resolution sometime next week before the recess begins, and I look forward to the testimony of our witnesses today.

[The prepared statement of Mr. Gallegly follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF THE HONORABLE ELTON GALLEGLY, A REPRESENTATIVE IN CONGRESS FROM THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA, AND CHAIRMAN, SUBCOMMITTEE ON EUROPE

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However, as I told them, the process of joining NATO does not end at Prague for those who receive an invitation to join the Alliance but really just begins and so they must continue to work diligently to meet their MAP criteria.

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I look forward to the testimony of our witnesses.

Mr. GALLEGLY. And at this time I would defer to my good friend the gentleman from Nebraska, Mr. Bereuter.

Mr. BEREUTER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, I will be brief because of the delays in getting started due to Floor votes and quorum calls.

Mr. Chairman, I just want to say that I appreciate very much the hearings that you have held. No subject that has greater interest for me in foreign policy and security issues than NATO and NATO expansion. We have with us today three men who are extraordinarily well-qualified to discuss NATO and NATO expansion.

I want to mention two in particular. Ian Brzezinski had been the foreign policy adviser to Senator Bill Roth who served as the President, eventually, of the NATO Parliamentary Assembly and as Secretary of the Senate delegation. We met with Mr. Brzezinski many times and we appreciated his capabilities and his good sense of humor. We know he is qualified for his position in an outstanding fashion.

And, General Ralston, I would say no SACEUR has ever spent more time in helping the House and Senate delegations to the NATO Parliamentary Assembly and all of us interested in NATO than General Ralston. He has given us advice when we requested it for places to visit, facilities to visit after or before our NATO meetings, and we are very proud of his service.

And the same is undoubtedly true of Secretary Bradtke who we are just getting to know better, and I want to thank you for bringing such outstanding witnesses in the third hearing, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. GALLEGLY. I thank the gentleman from Nebraska. At this time I will defer to the gentleman from Michigan, Mr. Smith, for a brief opening statement.

Mr. SMITH. I would like to start, Mr. Chairman, by commending you and the Subcommittee for holding this important hearing. You know, the potential for NATO expansion certainly is a cause for celebration. Two decades ago, who could have imagined or foreseen the collapse of the Soviet Union, much less the integration of the Warsaw Pact Nations, and now even some of the former republics of the Soviet Union, into NATO, the EU, and the club of Western democracies. To be able to talk today about adding these countries to NATO shows how far we have come from the confrontations of the Cold War.

We should not, however, let these successes blind us to the serious obligations we undertake bringing new countries into NATO.

We are binding ourselves to their defense, and vice versa. For the moment none of these countries faces an imminent threat, but that doesn't mean that they will not face threats in the future that could require the United States and other NATO countries to wage war in their defense.

Is it really so far-fetched to imagine that the world could change in the next several decades like it has changed in the last two decades? Let me say for the record that I tend to favor NATO expansion. Certainly all of these countries have worked extraordinarily hard to establish democracy, recover from Communism, and certainly meet the various requirements for NATO membership. If the issue was merely that of these countries' worthiness to join the family of Western democracies, I would unhesitatingly support and welcome them all into NATO.

But I want to take a hard look in this hearing and in the future at the obligations we undertake, the costs associated with the expansion, the military readiness of these countries to participate in the military Alliance, and the consequences and feasibility of defending some of these countries. We do our taxpayers and citizens no favor by making serious commitments lightly.

Again, let me commend Chairman Gallegly for holding these hearings. I look forward to the testimony.

Mr. GALLEGLY. Thank the gentleman from Michigan.

And now I would yield to the gentleman from Illinois, our Chairman of the Full Committee, a fellow that we have followed to the ends of the world, Mr. Hyde.

Mr. HYDE. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. I will waive any opening statement other than, again, to join in commending you for holding these very important hearings and for arranging for a superbly knowledgeable panel to instruct us, and I am going to listen with great interest.

Thank you.

Mr. GALLEGLY. Thank the gentleman.

Our first witness I first of all want to thank very much for making the tremendous effort that he did in flying in all the way from Belgium to be at this hearing today. We recognize the effort that it took to be here, and we appreciate that, and I think it should be made a part of the record. General Ralston.

STATEMENT OF JOSEPH W. RALSTON, USAF, COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF, UNITED STATES EUROPEAN COMMAND

General RALSTON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, distinguished Members of the Committee. It is my privilege to appear before the Committee today. I have provided a written statement that, with your permission, I will submit for the record and be brief in my oral statement.

Mr. GALLEGLY. Without objection.

General RALSTON. I would like to begin by telling you how grateful the service men and women of the European Command are for the resources that you authorized for fiscal year 2002. Your support of programs such as the foreign military financing and the international military education and training, as well as NATO, is absolutely critical to our security cooperation efforts. Without those efforts, we would be hard-pressed to develop the military-to-military

relationships needed to respond to both regional and global crises and elicit support for U.S. actions in current conflicts. We are genuinely appreciative and hope that you will continue your support for this year's President's budget requests for security cooperation programs and activities.

As you know, the European Command encompasses a vast geographic region. EUCOM is somewhat misnamed because, as you can see from the map on the two screens, our area of responsibility includes not only Europe but also two thirds of the African continent and the Middle East countries of Israel, Syria, and Lebanon.

Currently there are 91 countries included in the European theater, and with the changes to the Unified Command Plan, our area of responsibility will become even larger, including all of Russia, Greenland, Iceland, the Azores, and approximately half of the Atlantic Ocean this October.

To respond to regional threats to our national interests and to conduct security cooperation activities throughout this area, we typically have about a 117,000 service members. That is just 8 percent of U.S. active duty military serving in the European theater. I think you would agree that that is a relatively small investment for the activities with roughly half of the world's countries.

As I address the Committee today, EUCOM is involved in five ongoing combat operations. Three of these are NATO operations, and NATO allies are playing a critical role in the other two. With support from the United Kingdom and Turkey, EUCOM forces patrol the skies over the northern no-fly zone in northern Iraq, and they are enforcing the U.S. Security Council resolutions against Iraq as part of Operation Northern Watch.

In Bosnia and Kosovo we contribute with our NATO allies in operations Joint Forge and Joint Guardian to ensure security, promote stability, and allow those fragmented societies to rebuild their civil institutions and restore the rule of law.

In the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, we are providing on-call support to the international communities monitors working there as part of Operation Amber Fox, and we have made and continue to make substantial contributions to Operation Enduring Freedom and to the global war on terrorism in general.

Most recently, we deployed a small force to the Republic of Georgia to train and equip their forces to more effectively protect their own territorial integrity, to include combatting terrorist activity and instability in the Pankisi Gorge.

EUCOM represents the standing U.S. Contribution to NATO and promotes U.S. leadership within that organization. This leadership includes my own position as the Supreme Allied Commander of NATO military forces in Europe. NATO remains a vibrant, strategically relevant Alliance, playing an exceptionally important role in maintaining greater European regional stability and security, while also making vital contributions to the global war on terrorism.

In terms of regional stability, NATO has made significant progress in its efforts in the Balkans, and as a result we have been able to reduce our military presence there. Every 6 months we take a look at the situation on the ground and we adjust the force levels to suit that situation. When we went into Bosnia 6 years ago,

NATO forces consisted of 60,000 troops; 33 percent of that force, or a full 20,000, were Americans.

As you can see on the chart that I have there, and I think you may have in front of you, by January of last year, U.S. Forces were down to 4,400. By April of this year we were at 2,500, and by October we will be down to 1,800. That is less than 10 percent of the troops that we started with in Bosnia in December 1995, and instead of 33 percent of the total force, Americans will comprise 15 percent of that force.

In Kosovo the story is similar. NATO began the effort in Kosovo with 47,000 troops assigned to KFOR, and by this fall we should have less than 30,000. The U.S. Contribution to KFOR, as this chart indicates, will fall to about 4,000 troops, or 15 percent of the total force.

These are good news stories for the Balkans and they represent real progress on the ground. But I don't want to mislead you. We still have much left to do. The fundamental challenge that remains in both Bosnia and Kosovo is to establish the rule of law and to promote confidence in the indigenous judicial and law enforcement institutions. This will take time, and until it is complete, some level of international military presence will continue to be needed.

NATO's actions in the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia represent another good news story. Although the situation there remains tenuous, it is significantly better than it was a year ago. NATO applied lessons learned in Bosnia and Kosovo to recognize the key difficulties in Macedonia: Get involved early, employ the right combination of diplomacy and a very modest military presence to curtail the violence. In the last year, the Macedonian government has made significant progress in terms of constitutional change, and although we are not out of the woods yet, the situation there is manageable, with the conflicting parties communicating in a constructive manner.

NATO's commitment to maintaining stability in the Balkans and its prompt September 12th invocation of Article 5 for the war against terrorism clearly demonstrate the strategic flexibility that makes the Alliance as valuable today as it was 50 years ago. It is ironic that after more than 50 years of perfecting plans to move U.S. Forces east, and to reinforce our European allies, the first time NATO actually invoked Article 5 of the Washington Treaty, it sent NATO AWACS forces west to help secure the skies of the United States in the aftermath of 11 September. Until recently the NATO AWACS actively patrolled the skies over North America. They replaced the U.S. AWACS that deployed forward for Enduring Freedom. NATO standing Naval forces deployed to the Mediterranean to deter terrorist movement and impede the ability of terrorist groups to organize and orchestrate operations against the U.S. or our allies.

Several NATO allies, as well as other nations within our area of responsibility, have provided intelligence, frozen terrorist financial assets, detained suspected terrorists in their respective countries, provided basing and overflight rights and other forms of key support in our global efforts to combat terrorism.

Some NATO nations provided cargo aircraft, manpower, and expertise to prepare and load cargo pallets for shipment in support

of the humanitarian efforts in Afghanistan. Some contributed directly to the strike missions in Afghanistan, and several NATO allies are contributing to the international security assistance force there today. Without an aggressive and continuous Security Cooperation Program, many of these contributions would not have been possible.

NATO's Partnership for Peace Program, for example, laid the groundwork for the current cooperative relationship we have with Uzbekistan, a key contributor to Enduring Freedom. The Partnership for Peace Program allows the U.S. to develop active bilateral and multilateral relationships across Western and Central Europe as well as the area formerly within the Soviet Union. The security cooperation contributes to the extraordinary democratic process many nations have achieved both militarily and politically.

Furthermore, by ensuring access, interoperability, and intelligence cooperation, our efforts have dramatically expanded the range of options available to our Nation during times of crises.

Mr. Chairman, this concludes my opening comments. Thank you for the opportunity to appear before the Committee today, and I would be pleased to answer any questions you may have.

Mr. GALLEGLY. Thank you very much, General.

[The prepared statement of General Ralston follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF JOSEPH W. RALSTON, USAF, COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF,
UNITED STATES EUROPEAN COMMAND

INTRODUCTION

Mr. Chairman, distinguished members of the Committee, it is my privilege to appear before you to discuss the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). As Commander-in-Chief, U.S. European Command, my job is to ensure USEUCOM fulfills its missions to maintain ready forces to conduct the full spectrum of military operations, promote regional stability, advance U.S. interests in the Theater, and enhance transatlantic security through support to NATO. These tasks are interdependent and mutually supportive.

USEUCOM's support to NATO encompasses an array of activities. Beyond providing forces to NATO, we also participate in Partnership for Peace (PfP), a multilateral program that promotes interoperability and cooperation between 19 NATO allies and 27 non-NATO partners. Far from a Cold War relic, NATO demonstrated its continued strategic relevance by invoking Article 5, the mutual defense pledge in the Washington Treaty, for the first time in its history—the very day after the horrific attacks of September 11th. Furthermore, it has continued to adapt to the changing global security environment by adjusting its command and force structures, expanding its membership and developing new relationships with Russia and other former adversaries. NATO's continued success in preserving stability in and around Europe, its evolution in the face of the changing global security environment, and its determination to counter emerging threats ensure that NATO will meet future challenges as successfully as it met those of the past.

NATO'S PAST SUCCESS

The North Atlantic Treaty established an alliance that has endured over half a century. During its first forty years, NATO manifested the political will and military capability to deter the Soviet threat; provided for the rearmament of Germany within a framework acceptable to her wartime foes; and linked, through capable, forward deployed forces and nuclear deterrence, the United States to the security of Western Europe. This stable security environment, combined with the Marshall Plan, facilitated a rapid economic recovery and the subsequent growth of Western Europe into our largest trading partner. Eventually, the Soviet Union, its planned economy overtaken by the vibrant markets of the Alliance, collapsed along with the Warsaw Pact.

Without a common foe, some argued, NATO would lose its reason for existence, yet the member nations chose to continue their Alliance, and to transform and adapt it to new circumstances. Like the original 12 signatories of the Washington

Treaty, numerous newly independent nations looked to NATO as a source of stability in an uncertain world. The newly independent nations were linked to NATO through the North Atlantic Cooperation Council, followed by the establishment of PfP in 1994, and, later, the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council.

NATO'S CONTINUED CONTRIBUTIONS

The attacks of September 11th, NATO's rapid response immediately thereafter, the commitment of its members, and NATO's stabilization of ethnic conflict in the Balkans affirms its continued relevance in the face of new threats. Also, NATO's development of new relationships and preparation of new members for eventual entry into NATO through PfP provide a critical foundation for the future.

War on Terrorism

The last 50 years of NATO cooperation ensured that despite speaking different languages and relying on different equipment, allies could successfully operate together in armed conflict. This success comes from the multinational experience afforded by training, operating and participating in NATO's various joint commands and military exercises. This interaction has been key to bringing a number of commitments to fruition, and has provided the U.S. with the network of relationships needed as a foundation to coordinate an international response to terrorism.

Although Operation ENDURING FREEDOM (OEF) is not a NATO operation, NATO nations as well as non-NATO partners are providing substantial equipment, capabilities and personnel to the fight against terrorism. NATO nations, not including the United States, have contributed approximately 18,000 allied troops in support of OEF and other operations in support of the global war on terrorism (GWOT). Fourteen NATO nations are currently operating in Afghanistan, and young men and women from seven of these nations are involved in armed combat.

These allies are providing invaluable air reconnaissance, air refueling, cargo handling, close air support, mine clearing and medical capabilities to the effort. All of the NATO allies have provided blanket overflight rights, access to ports and bases and refueling assistance, and all have stepped up their individual intelligence efforts. Less visible but equally important are the cooperative intelligence efforts and information sharing occasioned by the invocation of Article 5, which has provided numerous leads in the campaign against terrorism. Allies such as Germany, Spain, Turkey, France, Canada, Italy and the United Kingdom have assigned liaison officers to the USEUCOM Counter-terrorism Joint Planning Group (JPG). The JPG is playing a critical role in developing and executing the Theater Counter-terrorism Campaign Plan to include the on-going maritime interdiction operations and the Georgia train and equip program. Throughout the USEUCOM area of responsibility, Allied nations have provided increased security around U.S. facilities. They have improved our security in time of crisis while reducing our costs. In sum, the Alliance continues to play an enormously valuable role for the United States.

A dramatic manifestation of NATO's relevance and commitment to the GWOT was the deployment of part of NATO's Airborne Early Warning and Control System to patrol America's skies. This deployment constituted the first time NATO forces crossed the Atlantic to defend the United States. Some 830 crewmembers from 13 allied nations contributed to this successful operation. Allied aircrews logged over 4,300 total flying hours while patrolling the skies over American cities in support of Operation NOBLE EAGLE before returning home on 16 May. NATO's standing naval forces are making another important contribution to the war. These forces are patrolling the Mediterranean to detect and prevent terrorist and terrorist support movement and thereby impede the ability of terrorist groups to organize and orchestrate operations against the U.S. or our European allies. Up to a dozen ships have simultaneously taken part in this operation, titled ACTIVE ENDEAVOR. This force routinely shares important information with the U.S. Sixth Fleet, which often uses the information in the conduct of maritime interdiction operations.

Balkans Operations

The operational employment of NATO forces to solve a major European security problem in the Balkans, outside the territory of NATO member nations, confirms the enduring value of the Alliance in quelling threats unleashed by nationalist, ethnic or religious violence. While NATO's multinational effort in the Balkans continues to enjoy success, many hurdles remain before this troubled region can be considered safe and secure. NATO is involved in two distinct and unique missions in Bosnia and Kosovo, each with its own successes and challenges. In Bosnia we have a political framework through the Dayton Accords. In Kosovo we do not have a similar political framework. Bosnia is complicated by an ethnic reality that has three highly dispersed and intermingled groups with few common interests; Kosovo, on

the other hand, is overwhelmingly ethnic Albanian with a small number of non-Albanian minorities, mostly Serbs, in numerous enclaves throughout the province. In Bosnia the police forces have in many ways remained separate ethnic fiefdoms, while in Kosovo, there is an effective police-training program that provides an increasingly effective, internally recruited force on the street.

The success to date of the Allied effort in bringing stability to Bosnia is reflected in the ongoing reduction of Allied forces needed, from a high point of 60,000 in 1996 to today's total troop strength of approximately 16,000. In 1996, 33 percent of those troops were U.S. Within the last eleven months alone, we have reduced U.S. forces by 1,850 troops. U.S. forces now total approximately 2,500, or about 15 percent of the Stabilization Force's (SFOR) total strength. One of the ways we have been able to reduce the American footprint is by capitalizing on rapid reaction combat service support units from neighboring NATO countries. For example, the Hungarians are keeping an engineer unit ready to respond to contingencies in Bosnia, thereby freeing a similar American capability to return to its home station. The U.S. force will be downsized even further by the end of the year, in conjunction with an overall reduction to SFOR.

The fundamental challenge that remains in Bosnia is to establish the rule of law and promote confidence in indigenous law enforcement institutions. Consistent with this objective, the Peace Implementation Council (PIC) that met in Brussels in December 2001, underscored the importance of a seamless transition from the United Nations (UN) International Police Task Force (IPTF) currently facilitating the development of a professional police force in Bosnia to a more robust, follow-on mission. There is widespread acknowledgement in the international community that the follow-on police effort should be part of a larger mission that would address all elements of the rule of law, including prosecutorial, judiciary and penal system reform. The creation of an indigenous police force, backed up by reformed prosecutorial, judiciary and penal systems, will enable the Bosnian government to effectively assume responsibility for maintaining a safe and secure environment that currently depends largely on SFOR's presence. On 18 February 2002, the European Union General Affairs Council (GAC) took the first step in meeting this requirement by adopting a resolution for a Police Mission (EUPM) to replace the IPTF at the end of the latter's mandate on 31 December 2002.

While we do not have an agreed political framework in Kosovo, progress is measurable and the security and economic indicators are generally moving in the right direction. Thirty-three contributing nations maintain approximately 35,000 troops on the ground in Kosovo (KFOR), with the U.S. contributing 15 percent of the force on average, or approximately 4,800 troops. Military progress promises to allow us to reduce U.S. and NATO forces in the near future. The UN International Police Force continues its efforts with 51 nations contributing approximately 4,500 police officers. The Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe's (OSCE) Kosovo Police Service (KPS) School graduated its 18th class on 30 March 2002, and has placed over 4,600 new multi-ethnic officers on the beat since opening its doors in September 1999. This latest class graduated almost 300 cadets, including 32 from smaller municipalities as well as 19 women. The next class of 307 cadets should graduate on 29 June 2002. The ultimate goal of the KPS effort is to replace the UN contract force, turning police responsibility over to the citizens of Kosovo entirely.

The UN Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK) has published more than 100 regulations with the force of law. They have also appointed more than 400 local judges and prosecutors, with five district courts and some lower courts in operation. Additionally, 11 international judges and five international prosecutors have been appointed to the district courts, and an international judge now sits on the Supreme Court. With the effort to restore the rule of law, we can commence the process of transferring the internal security of Kosovo back to civilian authority where it belongs. This is where the military exit strategy begins.

The Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (FYROM) is also an area of ethnic turbulence in the Balkans. In late August 2001, following a NATO-European Union brokered settlement with the country's four leading political parties, NATO conducted Operation ESSENTIAL HARVEST, facilitating the voluntary disarmament of the National Liberation Army (NLA). The international community (IC) moved expeditiously on post-ESSENTIAL HARVEST activities in an effort to continue support for the peace process and FYROM security. As part of this effort, NATO deployed approximately 700 personnel this past September as part of Operation AMBER FOX. These 700 personnel, known as Task Force Fox, are now in place, with Germany serving as the lead nation. The Netherlands will assume leadership this month, on 27 June. These forces provide support to the IC monitors who are working with Macedonian police and military forces to reenter villages that suffered from last year's conflict. Following a request by President Trajkovski to NATO's Sec-

retary General Lord Robertson, the North Atlantic Council recently authorized an extension of AMBER FOX until 26 October 2002.

Task Force Fox's mission is limited. It provides select intelligence, roving monitor liaison teams, Medical Evacuation (MEDEVAC) and a force to conduct emergency extraction operations should an IC monitor team get into trouble. It does not guarantee a specific safe and secure environment, provide close protection for the IC monitors, or serve as a buffer between ethnic groups. Task Force Fox is not responsible for the implementation or enforcement of any agreements between the FYROM government and any other party. In addition to Task Force Fox, the 2,000 NATO soldiers manning the National Support Elements also remain in and near Skopje, along with the NATO Coordination and Cooperation Cell (NCCC). Recently merged into one NATO office located in Skopje, these forces have proven their worth over the past year in providing liaison, operational coordination for border security, and information sharing with the FYROM government.

Much has changed since NATO sent troops to the Balkans. Thanks to an improvement in the security environment in the Balkans, the North Atlantic Council recently approved a plan to further reduce NATO forces in Kosovo and Bosnia. SFOR in Bosnia will be reduced from 18,000 troops to approximately 12,000 by the end of 2002 (U.S. forces will be reduced proportionately with other nation's forces at that time). KFOR, too, will undergo force reductions in Kosovo, and the U.S. contribution will decrease by 20 percent, from a current force of approximately 5,000 to an end of year strength of 4,000. Over the next 12 months, NATO will also develop an over-the-horizon reserve force concept to complement the Alliance's in place forces. These changes should be complete by mid-2003 and will create lighter, more mobile and more flexible forces that are both cost effective and able to maintain security and stability in the Balkans.

Partnership for Peace (PfP)

PfP is NATO's primary military tool for enhancing stability and security in Europe. The PfP program has been a key contributor to the significant democratic progress many nations have achieved both militarily and politically. The inclusion of Partner nations in Balkan operations underscores the payoff of PfP, both in the reform of former communist militaries, and in the relief of the manpower burden on NATO. Partner nations have also made important contributions to OEF and the GWOT. Bulgaria and Romania, for example, have provided basing and overflight rights. Uzbekistan, a PfP partner in U.S. Central Command's area of responsibility, has also provided critical support. USEUCOM's Security Cooperation efforts established the framework to gain and coordinate this support. By improving access, interoperability and intelligence cooperation, our PfP efforts have dramatically expanded the range of options available to the U.S. and to NATO.

CHALLENGES

NATO's core mission remains the collective defense of its members. NATO must continue to adapt to ensure that it can continue to successfully carry out this mission in the face of new threats.

Defense Capabilities Initiative (DCI) & NATO Interoperability

In 1999, the member-nation Heads of State recognized that NATO needed to focus on improved capabilities. The Defense Capabilities Initiative was given impetus by the ongoing allied operations in Yugoslavia. Similarly, the events of the last year compelled a renewed focus on interoperable defense capabilities, as several members of the Alliance went to war in Afghanistan. Following the events of September 11th, the Alliance clearly recognizes the need to adapt to deal with 21st century threats. NATO has seen what unarmed airliners can do to a city, and none of the NATO member-nations want to see what weapons of mass destruction (WMD) in the hands of transnational terrorists can do. Therefore, it is urgent that the Alliance develops ways to better defend against these weapons and their means of delivery. The best defense is sometimes a good offense, and members have agreed to develop their lift capabilities to get forces to wherever they are needed and sustain them for as long as they are needed. These forces must be able to communicate easily yet securely with one another. And crucially, these forces must be effective, which means they must have adequate stocks of precision-guided munitions. Precision-guided munitions have made it possible for a few aircraft to accomplish the destructive effect of an entire squadron of World War II bombers with substantially less losses, less collateral damage and less logistics. Finally, air defenses are a real threat. Allied aircraft must be able to suppress them to accomplish that precise destructive effect with minimal losses. In summary, NATO should renew their efforts to focus within DCI on missile defense, chemical-biological defense, strategic and operational lift

and mobility, command, control and communications systems, precision-guided munitions and suppression of enemy air defenses.

A critical linkage exists between capability and interoperability. The United States would like allies to be able to operate alongside its forces. To do so, they need the capabilities enumerated above, and this is the main thrust of DCI. But these alone are not sufficient. Interoperability is also needed. Interoperability allows those forces to exchange services, like communications and navigation signals, data, fuel and weapons. It also allows them to have a common understanding of tactics, techniques and procedures. Interoperability increases the effectiveness of a multinational force on the battlefield, and is the fruit of long years of effort establishing common technical and doctrinal (and linguistic) standards within NATO. Interoperability is not glamorous, and it is not tangible, like a C-17 or missiles, yet it is the glue that makes several national forces able to operate in a coherent way—and it is relatively inexpensive. In an era of flat European defense budgets, this bears mentioning.

There has been some mention of asking allies to specialize in capabilities the Alliance needs. For example, NATO has abundant fighter and attack aircraft, but limited airlifters. While NATO as a whole should increase its airlift capacity, that does not mean that each nation should buy airlifters. It is not cost-effective for smaller nations to buy limited numbers of airlifters because they must also purchase the associated overhead at disproportional additional expense. Finally, some nations have already specialized in certain areas and established themselves as world-class experts, and it makes sense to build upon these accomplishments. The challenge lies in convincing a sovereign nation that its security is better served by not having the full spectrum of capabilities, since its options could be limited. Nations would need assurances that the capabilities they agreed to forego would be made available to them in case of need. This adds new relevance to the fundamental Article 5 commitment to collective defense.

Emerging Threats

NATO plays a key role in ensuring transatlantic security in the face of new threats. Since September 11th, NATO has acted on its core commitments to deter and defend against threats of aggression against any NATO member state, as provided for in Articles 5 and 6 of the Washington Treaty. Members have responded to the most immediate and serious threat we face—national and transnational terrorism—and are contributing, as individual allies, to the fight in Afghanistan and around the world. The threat of terrorism since the attacks on New York City and Washington, DC has galvanized the organization, and the North Atlantic Council's Communiqué of 14 May following the Reykjavik Ministerial confirms NATO's "determination to combat the threat of terrorism for as long as necessary."

Even prior to September 11th, the strategic projection for the global security environment involved increasing uncertainty due to dangerous conditions from the convergence of negative global trends no less threatening to national security than terrorism itself. Organized crime and drug trafficking, ethnic and religious violence, attacks on our infrastructure, and the proliferation of fissile material and missile components are threats that are an increasing part of the security environment in Europe and around the world. While such threats will require novel solutions to meet unfamiliar challenges, NATO must also be prepared to deter continuing military threats posed by the strategic and regional forces of other nations, including conventional forces and WMD.

NATO countries are working together to deal with the threat posed by WMD, and the means of their delivery, either by nations or terrorists. Disarmament, arms control and non-proliferation make an essential contribution to preventing the use of WMD, along with deterrence and defense. The Alliance is now working on proposals to develop more effective defenses against biological and chemical weapons. NATO will continue to adapt its military capabilities to both face these emerging threats and be better able to perform its fundamental security tasks.

NATO Relationship with the European Union (EU)

As NATO's relationship with the EU continues to evolve, it is particularly critical, given resource constraints, that the two organizations develop mechanisms to coordinate each other's efforts at ensuring peace, stability and prosperity in Europe. The EU clearly has political, informational and, predominantly, economic tools of international power that can complement NATO's own political, informational and, primarily, military tools. The EU remains committed to developing a common European Security and Defense Policy (ESDP) among its members, and the attacks of September 11th have enhanced that commitment. In our view, ESDP can strengthen Europe's security posture as long as it is achieved in a manner that is com-

plementary to NATO, not in competition with it. Both U.S. and NATO interests are best served by a relationship with the EU that results in transparency and cooperation.

Accordingly, U.S. leadership must continue to assist efforts to harmonize NATO and EU policies and avoid duplication of command, control, communications, computers and intelligence (C4I) structures and processes. NATO's Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe (SHAPE) should continue to play the central role in military planning to meet crises and contingencies. If the EU were to create a duplicate planning headquarters, it would only serve to make it more confusing to develop coherent plans and hence, complicate the process of gaining the consensus needed to act. The EU should also seek to avoid investing limited resources in ESDP capabilities that are redundant with, as opposed to complementary to, NATO capabilities. Equally important is avoiding the imposition of dual mission requirements on units and resources already stretched thin. The best way to do this is to give the Deputy Supreme Allied Commander Europe a robust role as strategic coordinator for both NATO and EU-led operations.

FUTURE OF NATO

Efforts to evolve NATO's forces to execute new missions, accept additional members to further enhance European stability, and develop strategic relationships to advance NATO's principles of peace and stability ensure that its effectiveness continues and its values endure. The Prague Summit will further define the NATO Alliance for the 21st century—its new capabilities, new members, and new relationships. The enlargement of NATO is ultimately a political, not a military decision—a country whose military still has a way to go with reform may still be a productive addition to the Alliance. A case could also be made where a country with a strong military may not be a productive addition due to a lack of adherence to democratic principles. There are nevertheless valid military considerations bearing upon an aspirant nation's ability to contribute to NATO's missions.

Three New Members

At the time of the 1999 accession, an interagency review estimated 10 years would be required for full integration of the new members. The integration processes that we would expect to be accomplished in the first three years have been largely successful; the new members, Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic, are fully engaged in the NATO defense planning process, manning the majority of their NATO staff positions, and are committed to making progress toward providing the forces and resources that NATO is asking of them. Despite the progress to date, some long-term efforts, such as development of a non-commissioned officer (NCO) corps or major weapons systems acquisitions, will take longer, perhaps even a generation, before success is fully realized.

NATO's new members have made significant contributions to ongoing operations in the Balkans since joining the Alliance. They supported Operation ALLIED FORCE by providing bases, airfields and transit rights for NATO troops and aircraft and their contributions to Balkans operations continue. The combined SFOR/KFOR troop contributions of the new members have historically averaged nearly 2,000 troops. In response to NATO's April 2000 call for additional reserve forces, Poland quickly sent an additional 700 troops. This planned 60-day KFOR rotation lasted more than five months. More recently, the Czech Republic contributed an additional 120-man contingent to support Operation ESSENTIAL HARVEST in Macedonia.

The Czech Republic, Poland and Hungary, thanks to their similar backgrounds, have also proven to be excellent mentors to the current round of NATO aspirants. They are working to extend peace and security eastward. The Poles are particularly active with military-to-military contacts with Lithuania. The Czechs are active with the Slovaks and Lithuanians, and plan to contribute an artillery battalion to the 2,500-strong Slovak-Polish-Czech Peacekeeping Brigade, which is expected to be ready for duty by 2005. Similarly, Hungary has worked in close cooperation with Romania and Bulgaria.

The defense budgets for each of the new members have remained strong since accession, despite domestic economic challenges. For example, the Czech Ministry of Defense was the only ministry to be spared cuts during their recent two year-long recession, and Poland's six-year defense plan guarantees defense spending at 1.95 percent of gross domestic product (GDP). According to the Secretary of Defense's 2001 report on allied burden sharing, the Czech Republic, Poland and Hungary, respectively, are ranked 6th, 8th and 11th in terms of defense spending as a percentage of GDP in relationship to the other NATO members. While all defense budgets of all three new members will continue to face pressure from competing needs, they have clearly demonstrated the will to support national defense.

The three new members are making hard choices about where to spend their limited defense dollars, while maintaining the momentum they have established. We are watching their progress closely, and find significant challenges lie in areas such as developing a viable NCO corps, implementing an integrated planning, budgeting and procurement process, and modernizing their inventory of Soviet-era equipment. Meeting these challenges will require significant monetary investment over an extended period. Equally important, but not as costly, is continued exposure to Western schools and training, which will help them adapt to Western style thinking, leadership and especially decision-making.

Costs Associated With Enlargement

With each round of enlargement, the issues of cost and military capability are justifiably debated. As reported by the Congressional Budget Office, the addition of Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic to NATO reduced the U.S. share of the civil budget from 23.3 percent to 22.5 percent, and the military budget from 28.0 percent to 26.2 percent. The U.S. share of the NATO Security Investment Program (NSIP) budget fell from 28.3 percent to 25.2 percent. The allies share the common costs of the 1999 enlargement, which NATO has estimated at \$1.5 billion over 10 years, through the military budget and the NSIP. Of those costs, \$1.3 billion is for infrastructure improvements to be paid by the NSIP. The U.S. share would be approximately \$400 million—or roughly one-fourth, over 10 years. The payoff resides partly in having airfields and logistics facilities able to support NATO and U.S. operations and exercises. Readiness also improves given the greater freedom of maneuver allowed our forces exercising in these countries.

An additional, discretionary cost borne by the United States is the financing of purchases of U.S. equipment and training through Security Assistance. The President's request for FY 03 Foreign Military Financing (FMF) and International Military Education and Training (IMET) combined for the new members is just under \$41 million. These grant funds, managed by the Department of State and authorized by this Committee, support important Department of Defense initiatives to improve new member defense capabilities and enhance interoperability with U.S. forces, while providing U.S. access to new member militaries, governments, and bases. Thus, this sum could be seen as an investment, especially since the FMF funds return to American industry in the form of equipment purchases. I have provided some preliminary considerations, but other DoD organizations will provide authoritative cost forecasts for the upcoming round of enlargement.

Military Considerations for Enlargement

The aspirants have a common legacy of inflexible operational doctrine and authoritarian Communist defense planning that was unaccountable to the public. They have dedicated considerable effort to producing new national strategy documents in a transparent way, to garner public and parliamentary support. The aspirant militaries can be broken down into two main categories: those who inherited a burden of obsolete Warsaw Pact equipment and imbalanced personnel structures, and those who had to build armed forces from scratch. Romania, Bulgaria and Albania fit clearly into the first category. Slovakia, to a lesser degree, also fits into the first category since it began its existence as an independent nation in 1993, obtaining a disparate mix of one-third of the Czechoslovak armed forces.

The Baltics fit clearly into the second category, having been stripped bare of all equipment and infrastructure upon the departure of Soviet forces. Similarly, Slovenia and Macedonia did not inherit any part of the Yugoslav armed forces upon independence. Aspirants with legacy militaries have struggled to downsize equipment and personnel while restructuring their forces according to their new strategic situation. Aspirants without legacy militaries have concentrated on recruiting sufficient qualified personnel and acquiring a coherent mix of equipment.

Areas of concern common to both categories, on which they have made good progress, include English language capability, legal arrangements in support of operations, the ability to secure classified information, infrastructure to support NATO deployments, NCO corps development and quality of life for troops. All are financially constrained in their reform efforts by small defense budgets, which compete with other national reform priorities.

Aspirant Military Capabilities

As U.S. European Command's military contribution to the decision making process regarding which aspirants the United States will support for admission to NATO, we have been tasked to provide the Secretary of Defense with an assessment of each aspirant's current military posture. In making our assessment of their progress and current status, USEUCOM focused on four primary areas: strategy

and force structure, defensive capabilities, legal and legislative issues, and security procedures.

Strategy and Force Structure. Sound national security and military strategy documents, effective interagency resource management, rationalized force structures, personnel management, and English language capability are top-level indicators of military potential. The aspirants are currently revising their military force structures to combine immediate reaction, rapid reaction, and main/territorial defense forces, with national resources, to include funding, focused on the first two. In all cases, transition requires painful personnel restructuring, and its success will be indicative of a sound National Military Strategy. Personnel management includes accession, knowing what specialists you have and need, a balanced rank structure, an effective NCO corps, quality of life and professional education. These are the building blocks of a quality force. Similarly, English language proficiency is the foundation of NATO interoperability, since proper communications depend upon common language.

Defense Capabilities. Defense capabilities, aligned according to the NATO DCI categories, are the heart of preparedness and proof of sound planning and budgeting. The bottom line is: can they deploy a reasonably sized force, sustain it, communicate with it, protect it, and fight effectively with it? USEUCOM assessed the aspirants' ability to deploy a small (company-sized) light infantry unit in support of NATO and their ability to sustain, protect, communicate and fight with that force. We consider this size effort to be the smallest reasonable capability expected of any NATO aspirant. We evaluate each aspirant's effective engagement ability, which includes a basic ability to fight, on the offense and defense, in varying conditions of daylight, weather, terrain, etc. The aspirants have focused funding on equipping and training elite units in the short-term, expanding to the entire force in the long-term. In evaluating an aspirant's ability to engage effectively, we closely examine the capabilities of their land, air and maritime forces. We also measure the survivability of the aspirants' forces and infrastructure to ensure the military can continue to fight once attacked. Finally, we evaluate each aspirant's Consultation, Command and Control capability (a NATO term synonymous with the U.S. term "Command, Control, Communications and Computers" or C4), through reliable and secure communication and information systems strengthen the effectiveness and interoperability of forces. Aspirants have been investing in this area and have benefited from comprehensive C4 studies accomplished by USEUCOM and the USAF Electronic Systems Center.

Legal and Legislative. Aspirants are aware that legal obstacles to reinforcement of, or transit by NATO forces, as well as to deployment of national forces in support of NATO, can be prejudicial to accession. Accordingly, they each have goals oriented at easing restrictions in this regard. Their progress in this area is important if they are to contribute appropriately to the Alliance.

Security. Finally, USEUCOM looked at each aspirant's ability to protect classified information, both physically and within electronic systems. The appropriate internal security mechanisms must be in place to prevent the compromise of Alliance intelligence and information.

The military assessments of the aspirants, based on the criteria in these four major areas, continue to be updated and provided to the Department of Defense. It would be imprudent to view the information obtained from these assessments in isolation. Rather, they will be combined with other inputs from a number of other organizations both inside and outside of DOD to determine the President's recommendation on which aspirants the United States will recommend for an invitation to NATO membership.

New NATO Relationships with Russia

As NATO transforms its military capabilities and enlarges its membership, it is simultaneously redefining its relationship with Russia. The NATO-Russia relationship was originally based on the 1997 Founding Act, which outlined broad areas of political and military consultation and cooperation, and when mutually agreed, joint decision-making. For the past five years, NATO and Russia have developed annual Work Programs involving a wide array of issues to include nuclear confidence and security building measures (CSBM), defense reform, terrorism, arms control and regional security. In the military sphere, NATO-Russia cooperation and consultation has centered on the two peacekeeping operations in the Balkans and advancing Russian participation in PfP and "In the Spirit of PfP" training activities. Over the past three years, there has been a measurable improvement in Russian willingness to cooperate in these NATO-related military activities as evidenced by the Russian Navy's participation in BALTOPS 01 and Russian participation in a five-day Russia-U.S.-U.K. war game last month. Over the past few years, high-level consultations by NATO and Russian Ministers of Foreign Affairs, Ministers of Defense and Chiefs

of Defense have improved mutual understanding and advanced our military to military cooperation in SFOR and KFOR.

After September 11th, the shared threat of international terrorism has been an impetus for further political, diplomatic and military cooperation among the allies. After six months of negotiation, on 28 May, NATO Heads of State and Russian President Putin signed an agreement in Rome to establish new NATO-Russia Council. This new council will replace the Permanent Joint Council, but does not alter the goals, principles and commitments set in the 1997 Founding Act. The new council will identify and pursue opportunities for joint action, but will not impact on the Alliance's ability to act independently. The NATO-Russia Council provides a new mechanism to enable broader political and military consultation, cooperation and joint actions. The new council will specifically address enhanced cooperation in the struggle against terrorism, crisis management, non-proliferation, arms control and confidence-building measures, theater missile defense, search and rescue at sea, military-to-military cooperation and defense reform, civil emergency cooperation, and assessing new threats and challenges. It is hoped these political developments and areas of enhanced cooperation will open a new chapter in NATO-Russia military relations and significantly advance European security and stability.

CONCLUSION

NATO is evolving its military capabilities, enlarging its membership and developing new relationships to meet future challenges. NATO's members recognize that past success does not guarantee future relevance; all organizations must adapt to changing circumstances and NATO's Cold War victory does not, in itself, justify its continued existence. Thanks to 50 years of day-to-day military interaction between NATO allies and non-NATO partners, these militaries now share common languages, doctrine and techniques. This military interoperability helps ensure NATO's effectiveness, and sets the groundwork for NATO to realize its potential in the future.

The strong integration record of Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic, indicates further enlargement can be successfully managed, given the needed resources. As for the next round of enlargement, it is important to consider the potential cost of not enlarging. The aspirant nations have put forth a strong effort in good faith toward becoming members, and have taken political positions in support of the Alliance in recent conflicts. Their elected officials have made membership an important part of their public agenda and sought to increase public support for NATO. From a military standpoint, we should continue to foster and promote the outstanding cooperation and support we have enjoyed in terms of troop contributions to ongoing operations and the use of infrastructure and transit rights.

NATO's overarching objective of opening up the Alliance to new members is more than just an expansion of NATO's military influence or capabilities, or altering the nature of its basic defense posture. Rather, NATO seeks to enhance stability in Europe as a whole. NATO's prompt invocation of Article 5 for the campaign against terrorism, the contributions NATO has provided to this protracted war, the benefits to be realized from its new members, and new relationships now being developed demonstrate the strategic flexibility that makes NATO as relevant and viable in the post-September 11th world as it was during the Cold War. Transformation of its capabilities, enlargement of its membership, and continued development of new relationships will ensure that NATO's best days are yet to come. I will be pleased to provide the Committee with any additional information it may require on these or any other matters of concern.

Mr. GALLEGLY. Our next witness will be the Deputy Secretary of State, Bureau of European Affairs. Secretary Bradtke, welcome.

STATEMENT OF ROBERT A. BRADTKE, DEPUTY ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF STATE, BUREAU OF EUROPEAN AFFAIRS

Mr. BRADTKE. Thank you very much. Mr. Chairman, Members of the Committee, I would like to begin by thanking you and the other Members of the International Relations Committee and the House for your strong and continuing support for NATO enlargement. The International Relations Committee support for the Freedom Consolidation Act last fall helped to advance the debate on how bringing new members into NATO can strengthen the Alliance and promote American interests.

In inviting me to testify, you asked that I address how the Administration views the process of enlargement and the progress of candidate countries in preparing themselves to be invited to join NATO at NATO's summit in Prague in November. To address these issues, Mr. Chairman, I would like to first answer briefly another more basic but very important question: What kind of Alliance do we want in the 21st century?

The Administration believes that today we face new and grave threats, but NATO's original and fundamental mission to defend its members and deter attack on them remains the same. As President Bush said in Berlin, and I quote:

"NATO's defining purpose—our collective defense—is as urgent as ever. America and Europe need each other to fight and win the war against global terror."

This means that we want as many allies as possible in the struggle against those who would attempt to destroy our way of life and who would threaten with terrorism and weapons of mass destruction. We need allies who share our values, who will work with us to shut off terrorist financing, who will join us in diplomatic and political actions to promote security and stability, who will be vigilant about the export of sensitive technologies and, when necessary, who will go with us into battle.

In the aftermath of the terrorist attacks of September 11, we have been discussing intensively with our allies how NATO should adapt to the new threats we face. The United States proposed that at the Prague Summit, NATO's leaders make the decisions that will prepare NATO for the 21st century. We want to put enlargement of NATO in the broader context of what capabilities NATO needs, and how to develop these capabilities, and how NATO can build new relationships with Russia, Ukraine, and the other countries of the Euro-Atlantic partnership.

This integrated vision of NATO in the 21st century, new capabilities, new members, new relationships, was strongly endorsed by NATO's Foreign Ministers at the Reykjavik ministerial meeting in May, and it will be the agenda for the leaders meeting in Prague in November.

Let me now turn more specifically to the process of enlargement. NATO has, of course, enlarged several times in the past. In fact, four times: First, Greece and Turkey in 1952; then the Federal Republic of Germany in 1955; Spain in 1982; and then Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic in 1999.

When these last three countries formally joined NATO at the Washington Summit in 1999, NATO's leaders reflected upon the experience of these members and recognized that preparing for NATO membership was a difficult task. They decided to create a tool to help aspirant countries to understand better what was expected of them and better prepare themselves for membership. They created the Membership Action Plan, or MAP.

In creating the MAP, NATO leaders acknowledged a basic fact about NATO: One size does not fit all. NATO's membership is highly diverse, from the United States to Luxembourg, from Turkey to Iceland. When it comes to selecting new members, Article 10 of the Washington Treaty states only that—and I quote:

“The Parties may, by unanimous agreement, invite any other European State in a position to further the principles of the Treaty and to contribute to the security of the North Atlantic area to accede to this Treaty.”

So when the MAP was created in 1999, NATO’s leader stated specifically that MAP, and I quote, “cannot be considered as a list of criteria for membership.” Instead, MAP is a tool to help countries prepare themselves. Each fall, under the MAP, aspirant countries develop an annual national program to set objectives and targets for reform. These reforms are focused in five key areas: Political and economic development; defense and military issues; security of sensitive information; budgets; and legal issues. In the spring, each aspirant meets with the North Atlantic Council in a 19-plus-1 format to review the progress and receive feedback.

The nine aspirant countries for this round of enlargement—Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Slovenia, Slovakia, Romania, Bulgaria, Albania, and Macedonia—have just completed their third cycle of MAP and have begun the fourth round. In this round, they will be joined by Croatia, whose participation in the MAP was welcomed at the NATO ministerial in May. However, Croatia will not be considered as a candidate for invitation at Prague to join in NATO enlargement at the Summit in November.

In February, Mr. Chairman, I had the opportunity to visit all the MAP countries as part of an interagency delegation headed by Ambassador Burns, our Ambassador to NATO. In the meetings we had, we stressed that NATO members would be asking themselves two basic questions in the weeks and months before Prague:

First, can we be confident that a candidate country’s commitment to democracy and the support of allied values and interests such as rule of law, human rights, and a free market economy will be enduring?

And, second, will this candidate country strengthen the Alliance’s ability to protect and promote its security, its values and its interests?

We found that all nine aspirant countries have taken the MAP process seriously. The goal of NATO membership has helped their governments to propose and push for reforms, and the MAP has provided a clear focus for a critical dialogue between the allies and aspirant countries. The success of the MAP is reflected in the real progress that all the aspirants have made in addressing difficult and sensitive issues. They are demonstrating their commitment to real political and economic reform. They are all working hard to consolidate democracy and the rule of law, to strengthen judicial systems, to promote good relations with their neighbors, to improve the treatment of minorities, and to privatize state enterprises.

To cite a few examples, Estonia and Latvia have done well on minority rights issues, eliminating their language requirement for electoral candidates. Lithuania and Slovakia have worked with the Jewish community representatives to address property restitution issues. Slovenia has taken steps to reduce the role of the state in its economy. Romania has moved ahead on the establishment of a national anticorruption office. Bulgaria has adopted important legislation on export controls and the protection of classified information. Albania has made important advances in political reform. And

Macedonia has made progress in completing the legislative requirements associated with the framework agreement.

The aspirant countries have also undertaken difficult tasks of reforming and restructuring their military establishments, including strengthening their defense capabilities. And my colleague, Deputy Assistant Secretary Brzezinski, will address those.

We have also seen a commitment by all the aspirants to act as *de facto* allies, even before joining NATO. We have seen that by their contributions in Afghanistan in the war against terrorism and also to KFOR and SFOR in the Balkans, and I have cited some specific examples in my written testimony.

While the record of accomplishments and contributions by the aspirant countries is impressive, all of the members, all of the aspirant countries, need to do more to prepare themselves to join the Alliance. None can afford to become complacent. As you mentioned, Mr. Chairman, the process of reform will not and cannot end with Prague. The commitment to reform is one that will be needed after Prague, which is why the NATO Foreign Ministers agreed at Reykjavik that the MAP should continue for countries invited at Prague until they formally join the Alliance.

As we have told the aspirant countries, no NATO member is perfect and we do not expect aspirant countries to achieve perfection. Rather, we are looking for the strongest possible commitment to dealing with problems, some of which are found in NATO countries themselves.

Let me share with you a number of problem areas we have discussed with the aspirant countries, and again I will leave the military and defense reform issues to Mr. Brzezinski.

First is the problem of corruption. This is a problem not just for NATO aspirants but for many countries that are in transition. Corruption's highly corrosive effect on democracy, public confidence, and trust can undermine democracy. Corruption also opens the door to the influence of organized crime and creates an environment in which NATO members cannot be confident that classified information will be protected. The aspirant countries need to strengthen their legal and judicial systems, toughen enforcement of existing laws, and put in place laws on conflict of interest and transparency decision-making.

A second area of reform that we have stressed in our dialogue with aspirants is the treatment of minorities. While the situation varies from country to country, history and conflict have left many of the aspirant countries with substantial groups that may be ethnically different, speak different languages, or practice different religious faiths. Allies will look closely at how a government treats its own people, including groups, such as the Roma and Sinti, and will want to be assured that countries seeking to join the Alliance are promoting the values of tolerance and diversity.

A third area that is featured in our dialogue is how governments treat their oppositions. There are few better indicators of the long-term strength of democracy than the acceptance by a government of the legitimacy of opposition views. We have encouraged open, honest, political debate with broad participation by all groups in a society.

A fourth area of our dialogue with aspirant countries is dealing with the legacy of the past, including the issue of the Holocaust. Again, the situation varies from country to country, but we have urged all the aspirant countries to be as positive and forthcoming as possible in addressing issues such as property restitution and educating their publics about the Holocaust. The willingness of the aspirant countries to address the injustices of the past is a sign of how successful their democracies will be in the future.

Finally, we have told all the aspirant countries that membership in NATO brings with it serious commitments, commitments to fight for each other's defense, and the ability of members to carry out these commitments rests upon the public backing that the public in the aspirant countries gives to membership in the Alliance. So we have urged them all to strengthen the outreach to their publics in gaining public support from NATO membership.

Mr. Chairman, as I have mentioned, all the aspirants need to do more in these and other areas. Since we favor admission to NATO for as many of the candidates as are qualified and ready to assume the burden of membership, we want to give the aspirants as much time to prepare as possible. For that reason, the Administration plans to wait as long as possible before making a decision, in consultation with Congress, on which of the aspirant countries should be invited to Prague.

The decision to invite new members, however, is not just a decision for the United States alone. The United States will have a voice, but not the only voice within NATO. The United States and its allies must come to a consensus on the candidates. I would not expect that NATO selection process would be completed until the eve of the Prague Summit.

Mr. Chairman, if you would allow me, I would like to end on a personal note. Over the more than 29 years of my career in the Foreign Service, there are naturally some memories that stand out quite strongly. I recall my first visit to Bucharest in 1979 and seeing the grim conditions of daily life under the Ceausescu dictatorship. I also recall a visit I made in the winter of 1991 to Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania. This was a time of great tension with Moscow, of Soviet troops ringing Vilnius' TV towers, parliamentarians barricaded in the buildings, and new martyrs in the cause of freedom. The future at that point appeared bleak in the Baltics, as it had appeared to me a decade earlier in Romania.

However, history and the people of those countries proved us wrong. In recent months I have returned to Bucharest, and Tallinn, Riga, and Vilnius. I have seen changes that I could not have imagined during my earlier visits. The process of change is not complete. None of the aspirants is perfect, but as we try to measure how far the aspirant countries have to go, we cannot forget how far they have come as we prepare over the next 5 months for Prague.

I firmly believe in the wisdom of the words that President Bush used in his speech in Warsaw when he said of NATO enlargement:

"We should not calculate how little we can get away with, but how much we can do to advance the cause of freedom."

Thank you Mr. Chairman.

Mr. GALLEGLY. Thank you very much, Mr. Secretary.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Bradtke follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF ROBERT A. BRADTKE, DEPUTY ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF
STATE, BUREAU OF EUROPEAN AFFAIRS

Mr. Chairman, Members of the Committee: I would like to begin by thanking you and other members of the International Relations Committee and the House for your strong and consistent support for NATO's enlargement. The International Relations Committee's support of the Freedom Consolidation Act last fall helped advance the debate on how bringing new members into NATO can strengthen the Alliance and promote American interests. It is in the spirit of wanting to continue our consultation and dialogue on NATO enlargement that I appear before you today.

In inviting me to testify, you asked that I address how the Administration views the process of enlargement and the progress of the candidate countries in preparing themselves to be invited to join NATO at the NATO Summit in Prague in November. To address these issues, Mr. Chairman, I would like to take a step back and first answer briefly another more basic, but very important question: What kind of Alliance do we want in the 21st Century?

The Administration believes that today we face new and grave threats, but NATO's original and fundamental mission—to defend its members and deter attack on them—remains the same. As President Bush said last month in Berlin:

“NATO's defining purpose—our collective defense is as urgent as ever. America and Europe need each other to fight and win the war against global terror.”

This means that we want as many allies as possible in the struggle against those who would destroy our way of life and who would threaten us with terrorism and the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. We need allies who share our values, who will work with us to shut off terrorist financing, who will join us in diplomatic and political actions to promote security and stability, who will be vigilant about the export of sensitive technologies, and when necessary, who will go with us into battle.

In the aftermath of the terrorist attacks of September 11, we have been discussing intensively with our Allies how NATO should adapt to the new threats we face. The United States has proposed that at the Summit in Prague, NATO's leaders make the decisions that will prepare NATO for the 21st century. We want to put the enlargement of NATO in the broader context of what capabilities NATO needs and how to develop these capabilities, and how NATO can build new relationships with Russia, Ukraine, and other members of the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council.

This integrated vision of NATO in the 21st century was strongly endorsed by NATO's Foreign Ministers when they met in May in Reykjavik. The Ministers agreed that in the world of new threats to our security, NATO needs:

- new capabilities, such as strategic lift, precision-guided munitions, and secure communications, to enable NATO to carry out the full range of its missions and field forces that can move quickly to wherever they are needed;
- new members, who demonstrate a commitment to the basic principles and values of the Washington Treaty and the capability to contribute to collective defense and the security of the Alliance; and,
- new relationships, with Russia, Ukraine, and other members of the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council, who will work with NATO in the common effort to promote security and stability.

New capabilities, new members, new relationships: this is the Prague Summit agenda, and this is the context for the decision that NATO's leaders will make about which countries should be invited to join the Alliance.

Let me turn now more specifically to the process of enlargement. NATO has of course, enlarged several times in its past—in fact four times previously: first Greece and Turkey in 1952, followed by the Federal Republic of Germany in 1955, and then Spain in 1982.

But when Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic were invited to join NATO in 1997, it marked an historic first: inviting former members of the Warsaw Pact to join the Alliance. When these countries formally joined NATO at the Washington Summit in 1999, NATO's leaders reflected upon the experience of the three new members, and recognized that preparing for NATO membership was a difficult task. They decided to create a tool to help aspirant countries to understand better what was expected and to prepare themselves better for membership. They created the Membership Action Plan or MAP.

In creating the MAP, NATO's leaders acknowledged a basic fact about NATO: one size does not fit all. NATO's membership is highly diverse, from the United States to Luxembourg, from Turkey to Iceland. When it comes to selecting new members, Article 10 of the Washington Treaty states only that:

"The Parties may, by unanimous agreement, invite any other European State in a position to further the principles of the Treaty and to contribute to the security of the North Atlantic area to accede to this Treaty."

So when they created the MAP in 1999, NATO's leaders stated specifically that the MAP "cannot be considered as a list of criteria for membership." Instead, MAP is a tool to help countries prepare themselves. Each fall, under the MAP, aspirant countries develop an Annual National Program (or ANP) to set objectives and targets for reform. These reforms are focused in five key areas: political and economic development; defense and military issues; budgets; security of sensitive information; and legal issues. NATO reviews the Annual National Plans, and each Ally provides comment and feedback. In the spring, each aspirant meets with the North Atlantic Council in a "19 plus 1" format. The nine aspirants for this round of enlargement—Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Slovakia, Romania, Slovenia, Bulgaria, Albania, and Macedonia—just completed their third MAP cycle and have begun their fourth round of the MAP. In this MAP round, they will be joined by Croatia whose participation in the MAP was welcomed at the May NATO ministerial. However, Croatia will not be considered a candidate for this round of NATO enlargement.

In February, I visited all the MAP countries, as part of an inter-agency delegation, headed by Ambassador Burns, our Ambassador to NATO. In meetings with Presidents, Prime Ministers, Foreign and Defense Ministers, military officers, and parliamentarians, we stressed that NATO members would be asking themselves two basic questions in the weeks and months before Prague:

- Can we be confident that a candidate's commitment to democracy and the support of Allied values and interests—such as free market economy, rule of law, and human rights—will be enduring? And
- Will this candidate strengthen the Alliance's ability to protect and promote its security, values, and interests?

We found that all nine countries have taken the MAP process seriously. The goal of NATO membership has helped their governments to propose and push for reforms, and the MAP has provided a clear focus for a critical dialogue between the Allies and aspirant countries. The success of the MAP is reflected in the real progress that all of the aspirants have made in addressing difficult and sensitive issues. They are demonstrating their commitment to real political and economic reform. They are all working hard to consolidate democracy and the rule of law, to strengthen judicial systems, to promote good relations with neighboring countries, to improve the treatment of minorities, and to privatize state enterprises.

To cite a few recent examples, Estonia and Latvia have done well on minority rights issues—eliminating their language requirement for electoral candidates. Lithuania and Slovakia have worked with Jewish community representatives to address property restitution. Slovenia has taken steps to reduce the role of the state in its economy. Romania has moved ahead on funding for a national anti-corruption office. Bulgaria has adopted important legislation to strengthen export controls and ensure the protection of classified information. Albania has made significant advances in political reform and continues to boast the highest level of public support for NATO membership among the aspirants, and Macedonia has made progress in completing the legislative requirements associated with the Framework Agreement, including laws on election and equal rights and opportunity for all its citizens.

The aspirant countries are also undertaking the difficult tasks of reforming and restructuring their military and defense establishments, including strengthening their defense capabilities, as my colleague Deputy Assistant Secretary Brzezinski will describe in greater detail.

We have also seen a commitment by all of the aspirants to act as *de facto* allies, even before being invited to join NATO. After September 11, all of the aspirant countries opened their airspace and ports in support of Operation Enduring Freedom; many of them offered to send troops.

Bulgaria allowed the United States to base refueling aircraft on its territory, and has provided a Nuclear, Biological, and Chemical decontamination unit to support the International Security Assistance Force in Kabul. Romania, using its own air transport capability, has sent military police to Afghanistan, and the Romanian parliament recently authorized the deployment of an infantry battalion. Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania have offered to deploy forces to the region as part of a Danish contingent. And, Slovakia will send an engineering unit to Kabul in August.

Other aspirant countries continue to make valued contributions to KFOR and SFOR in maintaining peace and stability in the Balkans. Macedonia and Albania have provided essential use of their territory and infrastructure to support NATO's operations in Kosovo. And, Slovenia, which already provides troops to KFOR and SFOR, will deploy a motorized infantry company to SFOR this fall.

While the record of accomplishments and contributions by the aspirant countries, working with their Membership Action Plans, is impressive, all of the countries need to do more to prepare themselves to join the Alliance. None can afford to become complacent. Indeed, the process of reform will not and cannot end with Prague. The commitment to reform is one that will be needed after Prague, which is why NATO Foreign Ministers agreed at Reykjavik that the MAP should continue for countries invited at Prague until they formally join the Alliance. And as the current members of NATO know, the process of reform continues even after membership.

As we have told the aspirant countries, no NATO member is perfect, and we do not ask that the aspirant countries achieve perfection. Rather we are looking for the strongest possible commitment to dealing with problems, some of which are found in NATO countries themselves.

I would like to share with this Committee some of the areas that we have discussed with the aspirants as requiring more attention. (Again, my colleague, Mr. Brzezinski will address areas of military and defense reform.)

First is the problem of corruption, a particularly acute problem for many countries in transition, not just the NATO aspirants. Corruption's highly corrosive effect on public confidence and trust can undermine democracy, which is essential to NATO membership. Corruption also opens the door to the influence of organized crime, and creates an environment in which NATO members cannot be confident that classified information will be protected. The aspirant countries need to strengthen their legal and judicial systems, toughen enforcement of existing laws, and put into place laws on conflict of interest and transparency of decision-making. It is not realistic to think that corruption can be completely eliminated from any country before Prague, but NATO Allies will need to see a strong degree of commitment at the highest levels of government to combating corruption and will need to be convinced that NATO secrets will be safe.

A second area of reform that we have stressed in our dialogue with the aspirants is the treatment of minorities. While the situation varies from country to country, history and conflict have left most of the aspirant countries with substantial groups that may be ethnically different, speak different languages, or practice different religious faiths. Intolerance is not a problem exclusive to the aspirant countries, but NATO Allies will look closely at how a government treats its own people, including groups such as the Roma and Sinti, and will want to be assured that the Alliance is not bringing ethnic conflict into NATO.

A third area that has featured in our dialogue with many of the aspirants is how governments treat their oppositions. There are few better indicators of the long-term strength of a democracy than the acceptance by a government of the legitimacy of opposition views. We have urged the aspirants to ensure that opposition parties have fair access to the media, and that opposition groups are not subjected to unfair pressures or tactics. We have encouraged open, honest, political debate, with a broad participation by all groups in a society as a demonstration of the fundamental strength of a democracy.

A fourth area of our dialogue with aspirant countries is dealing with the legacy of the past, including the issue of the Holocaust. Again, the situation varies from country to country, but we have urged all of the aspirant countries to be as positive and forthcoming as possible in addressing issues such as property restitution and educating their publics about the Holocaust. These issues are inevitably complicated, but the willingness of the aspirant countries to address the injustices of the past is a sign of how successful their democracies will be in the future.

Finally, another key area has been public support for NATO. We have told all the aspirant countries that membership in NATO brings with it serious commitments, commitments to fight for each other's defense. The ability of NATO members to carry out these commitments and ensure that adequate resources are available to contribute to Alliance security rests upon public backing for NATO. So, we look upon public support as a sign of the aspirants' future ability to contribute to Alliance's security, and we have encouraged all of the aspirants to build public support for NATO membership.

Mr. Chairman, as I have mentioned, all of the aspirants need to do more in these and other areas. Since we favor admission to NATO for as many of the candidates as are qualified and ready to assume the burdens of membership, we want to give the aspirants as much time as possible to prepare themselves and make their cases

for an invitation. For that reason, the Administration plans to wait as long as possible to decide, in consultation with Congress, on which of the aspirant countries should be invited at Prague. This is also the reason why the Administration has resisted the "naming the names" of the countries we think will be invited, or expect to support. We believe that all nine aspirants should receive fair and careful consideration. We want to see the candidate countries work together, as they have in the Vilnius-10 and not compete or engage in some kind of "beauty contest."

The decision to invite new members, however, is not just a decision for the United States alone. The United States will have a voice, and a strong voice, but not the only voice within NATO on this issue. The United States and its Allies must come to a consensus on the candidates. I would not expect NATO's selection process to be completed until the eve of the Prague Summit.

Once new members are invited at Prague, the Administration supports a straightforward enlargement and accession process. At the NATO ministerial in Reykjavik last month, the foreign ministers agreed that all invitees should accede on the same date before the next Summit. In common enlargement parlance, this means the Allies do not support "the regatta approach" of staggered accession. Or, as Secretary Powell has said, there will be "no purgatory" after Prague; Prague will not set new conditions to be met.

"Historic opportunity" is a term that has been used in conjunction with the coming Prague Summit and with this round of enlargement in particular. This is not an over statement. Developments, particularly over the past nine months, have created conditions that are even more favorable to NATO's enlargement. As President Bush said in Berlin:

"The expansion of NATO will also extend the security on the European continent, especially for nations that have known little peace or security in the last century. We have moved cautiously in this direction. Now we must act decisively."

To enable us to act decisively at Prague, as the President has urged, all of the candidate countries must undertake a renewed commitment to reform.

If you will allow me, Mr. Chairman, I would like to end on personal note. Over the course of my more than twenty-nine years in the Foreign Service, there are naturally some memories that stand out. I recall my first visit to Bucharest in 1979, and finding the grim conditions of daily life and repression under the Ceausescu dictatorship to be deeply depressing. I also recall a visit to Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania in the winter of 1991. This was a time of great tension with Moscow, of Soviet troops ringing Vilnius' TV towers, parliamentarians barricaded in their buildings, and new martyrs in the cause of freedom. The future appeared bleak in the Baltics, as it had appeared a decade earlier in Romania.

History, however, and the people of those countries proved us wrong. In recent months, I have returned to Bucharest, and Tallinn, Riga, and Vilnius. I have seen changes that I could not have imagined on my earlier visits. That process of change is not complete; none of the aspirants is perfect. But as we try to measure how far the aspirant countries have to go, we cannot forget how far they have come. As we prepare over the next five months for Prague, I firmly believe in the wisdom of the words of President Bush in Warsaw when he said of NATO enlargement: "We should not calculate how little we can get away with, but how much we can do to advance the cause of freedom."

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. GALLEGLY. Now we welcome a gentleman that we are all familiar with from the other side of the table, and we welcome Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for European and NATO Affairs, Secretary Brzezinski. Welcome, particularly as this is your first time as a witness on the other side, we welcome you.

STATEMENT OF IAN BRZEZINSKI, DEPUTY ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE FOR EUROPEAN AND NATO AFFAIRS

Mr. BRZEZINSKI. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Mr. Chairman, distinguished Members of the Committee, I appreciate the opportunity to discuss with you NATO's future, including the next round of enlargements, an issue that involves very significant obligations and commitments.

First I would like to thank Congress for the passage of the Freedom Consolidation Act, also known as "the Gerald Solomon Act." That legislation is an important statement of the purpose and vision driving NATO enlargement.

On a personal note, I would just like to add that one of my personal and professional highlights in my career was the time I got to spend as a Senate staffer working with Chairman Solomon, with his responsibilities on the NATO Parliamentary Assembly. He strongly believed in the transatlantic community. He worked to strengthen it. He was a man of firm and honest convictions and boundless enthusiasm. He was a great leader.

When approaching the issue of NATO enlargement, I think it is useful to step back and remember what are the fundamental purposes of the Washington Treaty. Its preamble states: The parties are determined to safeguard the freedom, common heritage, and civilization of their peoples, founded on the principles of democracy, individual liberty, and the rule of law. They seek to promote stability and well-being in the North Atlantic area.

NATO accomplished these objectives during the Cold War. Over the last decade it has furthered these goals in Bosnia. It has stopped brutal ethnic cleansing in Kosovo. And over the last decade it has adapted itself to play an important role in supporting the current war on terrorism.

General Ralston enumerated the many contributions our allies are making today, and indeed there are over 18,000 allied troops supporting OEF and ISAF in the war on terrorism. And I believe that in the future, an expanding list of NATO members will continue to promote Euro-Atlantic stability and strengthen NATO's ability to promote and protect other values and interests.

One important point to remember is that our ability to respond as effectively as we have with our allies and partners in the war on terrorism rests on 50 years of joint planning, joint operations, joint training, joint deployments which have all occurred through NATO. Nonetheless, there is room and a need for change in NATO so that NATO can continue to fulfill its responsibility in promoting peace and to perform and serve other purposes.

For this reason, the Administration has emphasized three themes for the Prague Summit: New capabilities, new members, and new relationships.

I am going to touch briefly on new capabilities before I address NATO enlargement. NATO's integrated forces are the essence of the Alliance's core mission of collective defense. But we still face a capabilities gap between the United States and its allies, and this gap is growing. If this divergence is not reversed, it will increasingly impede the Alliance's ability to operate, and it could ultimately weaken the Alliance's political cohesion.

For this reason, the Department of Defense has been a forceful proponent of a new and more focused capabilities initiative that will enable allies to fight more effectively together. And our top priorities in this initiative are beefing up the Alliance's defenses against nuclear, biological, and chemical attacks, enhancing strategic lift and logistical support capacities. Allies have to have the ability to transport their forces and equipment rapidly and to support them.

Third, we need to strengthen the Alliance—we need to beef up the Alliance's ability to communicate with each other through deployable and interoperable communication information systems.

And, fourth, we still have a gap among our allies with modern weapons systems; namely, precision-guided munitions, jamming systems, and other operations necessary to have success on the battlefield.

The United States has also emphasized to its allies that NATO's ability to carry out its agreed missions will depend not only on the hardware it has but also on how it structures and commands its forces. Just as the United States is revising its Unified Command Plan to reflect current circumstances in the world, NATO must also assess its command structure for relevance and effectiveness. And at the recent defense ministerial in Brussels, allies did agree on the need for an urgent and comprehensive review of NATO's command and force structure.

The Prague Summit will have three themes: New capabilities, new members, and new relationships. NATO enlargement as one of those elements doesn't just complement the two other goals, it reinforces our ability to accomplish them. Enlargement reinforces NATO's capabilities by introducing into its ranks allies committed to contributing to the full spectrum of Alliance missions and responsibilities. On a broader level, NATO enlargement will help Europe become more effective in dealing with new global challenges.

Enlargement works to eliminate the still existing and destabilizing residues of the Cold War. I believe a Europe that is whole, free, and secure will be less encumbered by these Cold War vestiges and therefore more able to direct its attentions and military assets to the new and urgent challenges of the post-9/11 era.

NATO enlargement has also demonstrated that it reinforces our efforts toward rapprochement within an evolving and more cooperative Russia. Despite the predictions of some, relations between Russia and Poland and the Czech Republic and Hungary have actually improved dramatically since their accession to NATO. This is a significant historical fact that should not be overlooked.

The integration of NATO's three newest members is going well. All three have contributed to the ongoing operations in the Balkans from the day they joined the Alliance in 1999, and they are making significant contributions to the war on terrorism. As NATO's new West members, they are also serving as important mentors to partner countries. The Poles have established joint battalions with Lithuania and Ukraine, and the Polish Ukrainian battalion is serving well in the Balkans. Hungary has created a joint infantry battalion with Romania, and the two are developing another joint unit with the Ukrainians.

I would like to add that the defense budgets of Poland, the Czech Republic, and Hungary as a portion of their GDP is higher than the non-U.S./NATO average.

Looking forward to the next round of enlargement, alliances are built on the experience of these three new West members, and has developed, as Bob pointed out, an extensive engagement program with each aspirant. Moreover, I would add that through their participation in NATO peacekeeping operations in the Balkans, these

aspirants have attained real experience and knowledge in how NATO conducts

its military operations.

In addition to the MAP, the United States has conducted an extensive bilateral engagement program with each of the aspirants. Since I joined the Department of Defense, I have led bilateral working groups that focus on defense reform, with a particular emphasis on what is needed to meet NATO requirements with Ministries of Defense of Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, and Slovenia. My deputy has led similar groups in Bulgaria and Romania, and I plan to have a bilateral working group with Slovakia in July for the same effort.

Each aspirant brings a different set of challenges in the military reform area, and each require different approaches to defense reform. While each aspirant has made significant progress to date, we continue to emphasize to them that more reforms need to be accomplished before the Prague Summit, and we recognize that the process of reform must continue well into the future, especially if that country is able to accede to the Alliance.

Today, no aspirant should rest on its laurels, expecting a positive answer at Prague. Our reform work with aspirants has covered the full spectrum of defense policy and operations. Let me emphasize that when measuring a country's commitment to Alliance values and its commitment to live up to the responsibilities that come with NATO membership, defense policy is in some ways the most tangible way to measure that commitment because it involves plans and resource projections that go well into the future.

When I have conducted these bilateral working groups, I have emphasized a number of areas, and I would like to list a few of them for you to give you a sense of the reforms that were encouraging further progress by each of the aspirants.

One is the development of sound national strategy documents, documents that lay out the groundwork for determining defense needs and that lay out the maps for resources that will be allocated to ensure that partnership goals, and eventually maybe NATO force goals, are addressed.

We also emphasize the need to have systems that will enable these aspirants to have effective command, modern command control and communication systems. Indeed, secure deployable and interoperable communications is an absolute requisite for participation in NATO missions.

We are pressing them to develop their host nation support capacities, as NATO needs the ability to deploy to any allied territory. And we have had some success. Bulgaria has had a NATO interoperable airfield at Krumovo, and last November and December it supported six U.S. KC-135 tanker aircraft that supported operations, flights into Afghanistan for humanitarian purposes.

Personnel reform and training is another area we continue to press hard. Collective and individual training is paramount to fielding effective fighting forces, especially training at the collective level; company and battalion level training, not just individual—training of individual soldiers.

Downsizing a large Warsaw Pact military, as in the case of Bulgaria and Romania, or creating a force essentially from scratch, as

in the case of the Baltic States, all require sound personnel planning to ensure that that force structure is affordable and correctly sized and well prepared for NATO missions.

Information security is another issue of great concern to us. The ability to safeguard NATO classified material is essential for planning and executing NATO missions. And, overall, the aspirants have made progress in this area, but more progress must continue.

As we consider these reform priorities, it is important not to just emphasize these reform areas and the need for more accomplishment, but also to recognize the important contributions that these aspirants are making in NATO operations in the Balkans and in the war on terrorism.

Let me address the latter, just briefly. Bulgaria, in addition to providing support for our tanker aircraft, has sent a 40-person nuclear/biological/chemical decontamination unit to Afghanistan. Romania has delivered one military police platoon, which it did on its own with its own C-130 aircraft, and it will soon deploy an infantry battalion to Afghanistan.

Three Baltic States have offered personnel to augment a Danish contingent deployed to Manas. Slovakia will deploy an engineering unit to Afghanistan, and has offered a special forces regiment, NBC units—that is, the nuclear/biological/chemical warfare units—and a mobile field hospital.

Most of the aspirants have offered equipment and personnel over and above what I just mentioned. Through such concrete actions in the war on terrorism and in the Balkans, NATO aspirants have conducted themselves as de facto allies. Not only have they demonstrated the military capability to add positively to NATO operations, they have demonstrated the political will to accept the risks and responsibilities of NATO missions.

To conclude, let me end with one final thought: NATO is here to stay. It is healthy. Without NATO, I don't think the Euro-Atlantic community would be what it is today. And the growth of NATO, the process of enlargement, is a sign of the Alliance's vitality and its political attraction. As the Administration looks forward to enlargement, I look forward, the Administration looks forward to working with you and other Members of Congress in this next round.

Thank you.

Mr. GALLEGLY. Thank you, Mr. Secretary.

[The prepared statement of Mr. Brzezinski follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF IAN BRZEZINSKI, DEPUTY ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF
DEFENSE FOR EUROPEAN AND NATO AFFAIRS

Mr. Chairman, Members of the Committee, I appreciate the opportunity to discuss with you NATO's future, including the next round of NATO enlargement, as we approach the Alliance's summit meeting in Prague this November.

I would like to thank Congress for passage of the Freedom Consolidation Act, also known as the Gerald Solomon Act. This legislation, recently signed by the President, is an important statement of the purpose and vision driving NATO enlargement.

Allow me to add that one of the personal and professional highlights of my career was the privilege I had as a Senate staffer of assisting Chairman Solomon with his responsibilities in the NATO Parliamentary Assembly. He strongly believed in the transatlantic community. He worked to strengthen it. He was a man of firm and honest convictions and a great leader.

When approaching the issue of NATO enlargement, it is useful to review the fundamental purposes of the 1949 Washington Treaty. Its preamble states:

[The parties] are determined to safeguard the freedom, common heritage and civilization of their peoples, founded on the principles of democracy, individual liberty, and the rule of law. They seek to promote stability and well-being in the North Atlantic area.

NATO accomplished these objectives during the Cold War. Over the last decade, it has furthered these goals in Bosnia and halted brutal ethnic cleansing in Kosovo. It has adapted itself to play an important role supporting the current U.S.-led war on terrorism. In the future, an expanding list of NATO members will continue to promote Euro-Atlantic stability and strengthen the Alliance's ability to promote and protect its values and interests.

In his recent remarks to the German Bundestag, President Bush reminded us that "NATO's defining purpose—our collective defense—is as urgent today as ever. America and Europe need each other to fight and win the war against global terror." The horrific attacks of September 11 and the war on terrorism have underscored the continued, if not increased, relevance of NATO to America's security. Today, more than 18,000 Allied troops are conducting missions in support of Operation Enduring Freedom and the war on terrorism. NATO Partner countries are also making significant equipment and personnel contributions.

One must not forget that our ability to respond effectively with our Allies and partners in the war is in no small way the result of over 50 years of joint planning, joint training and joint operations within NATO.

Those contributions have entailed great sacrifice. America is not the only NATO Ally to have lost soldiers in Operation Enduring Freedom. The forces of our NATO Allies also have suffered losses, as have other coalition states.

As President Bush said, NATO's core mission remains the collective defense of its members. But there is room and need for change in how NATO fulfills its responsibility to promote and protect Allied values and interests. NATO needs to transform itself to handle new threats and serve its other purposes.

Hence, the Prague Summit will stress three themes: "New Capabilities, New Members, and New Relationships."

New Capabilities

NATO's integrated military forces are the essence of the Alliance's core mission. But the "capabilities gap" between the United States and its European and Canadian Allies continues to grow. If this divergence is not reversed, it will increasingly impede the Allies' ability to operate with U.S. forces and will, ultimately, weaken the Alliance's political cohesion. So our first goal at Prague must be to begin to remedy the capability deficiencies within NATO.

The Department of Defense has been a forceful proponent of a new, more focused capabilities initiative to enable Allies to fight more effectively together, capitalizing on the special strengths that each can contribute. During their June 6–7 meeting in Brussels, NATO Defense Ministers agreed to prepare for approval by NATO heads of state and government at the Prague Summit an action plan to remedy shortfalls in four top-priority areas:

- First: Enhanced defenses against nuclear, biological, and chemical attacks against Allied forces.
- Second: Strategic lift and Logistical Support. Allies have to have the ability to transport their forces and equipment rapidly to wherever they are needed, and to supply them until their mission is completed.
- Third: Secure, deployable, and interoperable communication and information systems that will connect Alliance forces.
- Fourth: Modern weapons systems—such as all-weather precision guided munitions, jamming systems, and air-ground surveillance platforms—that will enable Allies to make first tier contributions to combat operations.

NATO Ministers of Defense issued a Statement on Capabilities affirming these four priority areas and that the new action plan "should be based on firm national commitments, with specific target dates, that our countries will make."

To best achieve success in improving Alliance capabilities in these priority areas, Defense Ministers also agreed that this initiative should lead to increased multilateral cooperation and role sharing. The pooling of military capabilities, increased role specialization, cooperative acquisition of equipment and common and multilateral funding will be encouraged.

The U.S. also pointed out to Allies that NATO's ability to carry out its agreed missions will depend not only on its military "hardware", but also on how it structures and commands its forces. Just as the United States revises its Unified Command Plan to reflect current circumstances in the world, NATO also must assess its Com-

mand Structure for relevance and effectiveness. In Brussels, Allies agreed on the urgent need for a comprehensive review of all elements of the NATO command and force structure. NATO heads of state and government will be presented for their approval at Prague clear guidelines and a firm timeline for completing this review, so that decisions on command arrangements can be taken by the summer of 2003.

New Relationships

It is our intention at the Prague summit to strengthen NATO's relationship with Russia, Ukraine, and other members of NATO's Partnership for Peace.

President Bush's top priorities include creating a new, cooperative US-Russian relationship. This effort is integrated with NATO's effort to forge a closer relationship with Russia based on specific, practical joint-initiatives. The goal is to erase vestiges of Cold War hostility. Fostering improved NATO-Russia cooperation can prompt further democratic, market and military reform in Russia and contribute to improving Russia's relations with its neighbors. The NATO-Russia Summit on May 28th, which created the NATO-Russia Council, was the first step forward on this path. NATO Defense Ministers and their Russian counterpart convened the first NATO-Russia Council for Defense Ministers on June 6th.

As we move forward on this path, NATO will take care to retain its independent ability to discuss, decide and act on security issues as its members see fit. Protecting Alliance solidarity and effectiveness is of the utmost importance. The North Atlantic Council will decide, by consensus, on the form and substance of our cooperation with Russia. Russia will not have a veto over Alliance decisions. And, we shall ensure that NATO-Russia cooperation does not serve to discourage or marginalize other Partners.

NATO's relationship with Ukraine has begun to deepen. Ukraine recently announced its aspirations to join NATO. We welcome and encourage Ukraine's decision to move closer to the Euro-Atlantic institutions. Through more intensive interactions with NATO, Ukraine will receive guidance and recommendations on such issues such as defense and political reform. However, Ukrainian aspirations can only become a reality if Kiev is able to accelerate the pace of its political, military, and economic reforms.

The Partnership for Peace began in 1994. It has been an invaluable tool to foster reform in the countries of Central Europe, the Caucasus and Central Asia and to build bridges between them and NATO. The importance of NATO's exercises with its Partner nations was not fully understood until the war on terrorism began. The ability to base coalition forces in Partner nations has paid off in spades. Through the Partnership for Peace, these nations knew NATO, its values, and its procedures well enough that our requests were treated as favors asked for by neighbors, not strangers.

New Members

President Bush defined our goals for enlargement last year in Warsaw when he said that he believes "in NATO membership for all of Europe's democracies that seek it and are ready to share the responsibility that NATO brings." He also said, "As we plan the Prague Summit, we should not calculate how little we can get away with, but how much we can do to advance the cause of freedom." The President reiterated his strong commitment for enlargement in Berlin last month.

NATO enlargement does not just complement the other two goals for the Prague Summit; it is a key element of the Prague summit agenda that will reinforce "new capabilities" and "new relationships." Enlargement reinforces NATO capabilities by introducing into its ranks Allies committed to contributing to the full spectrum of Alliance missions and responsibilities.

On a broader level, NATO enlargement will help Europe become more effective in dealing with new global challenges. Enlargement works to eliminate the still existing and destabilizing residues of the Cold War. A Europe that is whole, free and secure will be less encumbered by these Cold War vestiges. Such a Europe, therefore, will be more able to direct its attentions and military assets toward the new and urgent challenges of the post-September 11th era.

In addition, NATO enlargement has already demonstrated that it reinforces our efforts toward rapprochement with an evolving and more cooperative Russia. Despite predictions by some critics of the last round of enlargement, senior Polish, Czech, and Hungarian officials have told us that, since joining NATO, their relations with Russia have improved dramatically. This significant fact should not be overlooked.

The integration of the newest three members of the Alliance is going well. All three have contributed to the ongoing operations in the Balkans from the moment they joined the Alliance. They are also making significant contributions to the war

on terrorism. For example, The Czech Republic deployed its 6th Field Hospital, consisting of 150 men, to Bagram, Afghanistan to support the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF). Polish Combat engineers and logistics forces have also deployed to Bagram and a Polish Special Operations Forces unit is assisting in Maritime Interdiction Operations (MIO) and Leadership Interdiction Operations (LIO).

Even though they are the newest Allies, the Czechs, Hungarians, and Poles serve as mentors to Partner nations. For example, Poland has joint battalions with Lithuania and Ukraine. Hungary has created a joint infantry battalion with Romania, and the two are developing another joint unit with the Ukrainians.

In addition, defense budgets of Poland, the Czech Republic and Hungary as a portion of GDP average 1.93%, above the non-U.S. NATO average of 1.90%.

Looking forward to the next round of NATO enlargement, the Alliance has built on the experience of its three newest members, developing extensive engagement programs with each aspirant. Compared to the last round of enlargement, we have had a much greater role in assisting the current aspirants to reform their defense establishments, and we have a more detailed understanding about them. Moreover, through their participation in NATO peacekeeping operations in the Balkans, the aspirants have attained real experience and knowledge in how NATO conducts its military operations.

NATO's Membership Action Plan (or "MAP"), adopted in 1999, created a framework to assist aspiring nations. The MAP covers five main areas: political/economic, defense/military, resources, security, and legal. It works on an annual cycle, beginning with each aspirant submitting an Annual National Program to NATO in the fall. This aspirant-developed program lays out plans and expectations for the five areas. The key to the Annual National Program is that it is realistic and achievable. Throughout the year, the NATO International Staff and the NATO Allies meet with each aspirant individually to review and make recommendations. However, each aspirant decides on a national basis the areas on which it wants to work. The MAP culminates with an Individual Progress Report for each aspirant drafted by NATO, reviewing the aspirant's accomplishments and deficiencies.

The MAP has been a success story. All aspirants have made progress in implementing their reforms to meet their MAP objectives. Even if an aspirant is not invited to join NATO at Prague, participation in the MAP will have been a positive step for both that country and the rest of Europe. The MAP gives that country a deeper understanding and appreciation of NATO's values and how civil-military relations should work for democracies, as well as facilitating transformation required in any case to make its armed forces more modern and effective.

In addition to the MAP, the U.S. has conducted an extensive bilateral engagement program with the aspirants. In February, U.S. Permanent Representative to NATO, Ambassador Nick Burns, led a team, including Bob Bradtke and me, to all nine MAP participants. Since then, I have led Bilateral Working Groups with the Ministries of Defense of Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, and Slovenia. My deputy has led similar groups to Bulgaria and Romania. I plan on visiting Slovakia in July for the same effort. EUCOM has sent teams to the aspirants, and General Ralston has visited them all in his role as SACEUR.

Each aspirant brings a different set of challenges, which require different approaches to defense reform. While each aspirant has made significant progress to date, we have emphasized that more reforms should be accomplished before the Prague Summit. We recognize that the process of reform must continue well into the future, especially if a country accedes to the Alliance. No aspirant should rest on its laurels, expecting a positive answer at Prague.

Our reform work with aspirants has covered the full spectrum of defense policy and operations. The following are a few of the priorities our engagement with MAP countries has emphasized and some of the progress that has been accomplished in each area. These examples are not meant to be exhaustive.

National Strategy Documents. Such documents lay the groundwork for determining defense needs and the resources that will ensure Partnership Goals (and eventually NATO Force Goals) are addressed. All the aspirants have adopted national security concepts/strategies. To implement these national security concepts/strategies, Bulgaria is spending more than 3% of GDP on defense; Estonia 1.99%; Latvia 1.75%; Lithuania 1.96%; Romania 2.38%; Slovakia 1.90%; and, Slovenia 1.6%. Lithuania has committed to reach 2% of GDP as a goal for defense spending by 2002; Estonia and Latvia by 2003; Slovakia by 2006; and Slovenia by 2008.

Command, Control, and Communications—Secure, deployable, and interoperable communications are essential for participation in NATO missions. Romania has made improvements in its command and control systems at all levels and has made this area a top modernization priority. Romania, Bulgaria, Slovakia, and Slovenia have functioning Air Sovereignty Operations Centers (ASOC). Lithuania has ad-

vanced radios at the battalion level and is updating its command and control structure. Estonia approved a command and control development plan in 2001, including plans for integrating advanced radios into its units.

Infrastructure for host nation support—NATO needs the ability to deploy to any Allied territory. Bulgaria has a NATO-interoperable airfield at Krumovo and has made significant upgrades to the Graf Ignatievo air base, which will be NATO-interoperable later this year. During November and December of last year, Sofia provided basing in Burgas for six U.S. KC-135s aircraft supporting humanitarian flights into Afghanistan. Estonia's force structure review includes plans to establish two airfield security companies, one ground-based air defense company, and an airfield engineer company, thereby enhancing Estonia's ability to provide host nation support.

Training—Collective and individual training is paramount to fielding effective fighting forces. Slovakia is transitioning to a decentralized training management system and plans to establish a Training and Support Command this year. Latvia is developing a Baltic Diving Training Center and plans to have a Training and Doctrine Command established by 2004. Romania has established a Non-Commissioned Officer (NCO) Academy that produces Western-quality NCOs with the assistance of the U.S. Marine Corps.

Logistical Support—Allies need to sustain their troops during deployments. Estonia established a logistics center in 2001 and is producing a new logistics doctrine, scheduled to be completed this year. Slovenia's logistics system will support a company's deployment to Bosnia in October.

Personnel reform—Whether downsizing a large Warsaw Pact military (as has been the case for Bulgaria and Romania) or creating a military force virtually from scratch (as in the Baltic states), personnel planning is required for an affordable and correctly sized force. All aspirants are expanding the percentage of professional soldiers in their ranks and developing clearer career paths for them. Some of these decisions are painful: Bulgaria amended its Law on the Armed Forces in April 2002, lowering the mandatory retirement age for military officers, thereby forcing the early retirement of senior officers. However, this effectively sped up the necessary downsizing of the Bulgaria's officer corps. The peacetime strength of the Slovak Armed Forces has been reduced from 45,000 in 1999 to 27,520 in 2001, and will reach 19,320 by the end of 2006. While this has included the closure of a significant number of bases, Slovakia has developed a transition assistance program for troops that are leaving.

Information Security—The ability to safeguard NATO classified material is essential for planning and executing NATO missions. Overall, the aspirants have made significant progress toward meeting the legislative, physical, organizational, personnel and procedural requirements necessary to handle sensitive NATO documents and information.

As we consider these reform priorities, we should not overlook the fact that each of the aspirants has made very real contributions to NATO operations in the Balkans and to the war on terrorism.

With regard to the latter, Bulgaria, in addition to the basing it provided U.S. KC-135 aircraft, has sent a 40-person Nuclear, Biological Chemical (NBC) decontamination unit to Afghanistan to support ISAF. Romania delivered one military police platoon and one C-130 aircraft for ISAF and will soon deploy one infantry battalion to Afghanistan. The Romanian Parliament recently approved the deployment of a 405-person motorized infantry battalion and 70-person NBC company. The three Baltic States have offered personnel to augment a Danish contingent deployed to Manas. Slovakia will deploy an engineering unit to Afghanistan and has offered a special forces regiment, NBC units, and a mobile field hospital. All aspirants have granted overflight rights for the war on terrorism. Most of the aspirants have offered other forms of specific capabilities, equipment and personnel.

Through such concrete actions, the NATO aspirants have conducted themselves as *de facto* Allies. Not only have they demonstrated the military capability to add positively to NATO operations, they have demonstrated the political will to accept the risks and responsibilities of NATO missions.

To conclude, let me end with one final thought: the Alliance is here to stay. Without NATO, the Euro-Atlantic community would not exist. Its growth—the process of NATO enlargement—is a sign of its vitality and political attraction. The Administration looks forward to working with Congress on this next round of NATO enlargement.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. GALLEGLY. At this point, the gentleman from California will be recognized for the purpose of making an opening statement. Mr. Sherman.

Mr. SHERMAN. I thank the Chairman for allowing me to make an opening statement at this point in our hearings. NATO expansion is most important precisely where it is most problematic. If you were talking about Ireland and Sweden joining NATO, should they wish to do so, these hearings might be unnecessary. But, instead, we are talking about the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia. That raises some questions with our allies.

And perhaps the greater problem raised by this is the reaction in Russia. Just because Russia has shown itself willing to swallow quite a number of things that were beyond what any of us could have imagined that Moscow would swallow does not mean that we now have to pile on more and more to see just how acquiescent the world's only former superpower can be.

The Baltic States continue to have issues dealing with their Russian-speaking minorities and the ability of the Russian people to accept, and their government to accept, the new world in which a country has gone from superpower to a country that does not have that level of power this. This is one of the few times in history that has ever occurred without a country facing defeat in battle, usually in a long war.

The Germans, both after World War I and World War II, recognized that they had declined in world power, but that was a lesson they had a chance to learn over a long period of time. And I would say that little would be lost to America's defense capacity if Latvian battalions were unavailable to us in the next conflict, wherever that might be, and that perhaps we might allow this to move slowly, because this NATO enlargement is, for the most part, symbolic.

As you have demonstrated, as all three speakers have demonstrated, we can cooperate with the aspirant states quite well while they remain aspirant states. Their joining NATO just may be pouring one more spoonful of salt into wounds that are just under the surface in Russia.

But I would like to raise another issue, and this was the issue that I had called the Chairman about and we have exchanged phone calls, and it directly relates to our role in NATO, but with our traditional allies, and that is Europe's policy toward Iran. We may want to have hearings on this before this Subcommittee, but it does relate to this hearing as well.

The President of the United States has not been fooled. The government in Tehran, while it has a few titular, allegedly moderate leaders, is actually run by those who bring the most extreme hatred to the United States. That is why the President identified Iran as part of the axis of evil and the State Department identified it as the number one state sponsor of terrorism. That government takes the minimum revenues and economic strength that it needs to hold power and shares that with its people. Everything else is available for terrorism and to develop nuclear weapons that could be smuggled into the United States, perhaps into the Los Angeles area, perhaps even into eastern Ventura County. So, preventing

Iran from having resources is an important national policy of the United States.

Yet our traditional friends in NATO announced this week that they are going to begin a new very important round of trade negotiations with Iran for their own economic benefit. They announced—or, rather, the World Bank leaked 2 weeks ago that, chiefly with the votes of our friends in NATO, up to \$755 million of World Bank funds, roughly 29 percent of them from the American taxpayer, are likely to be loaned to the Islamic Republic of Iran.

And so the question arises: What can we do about it? Well, I will tell you what the last Administration did about it before September 11th: They sent strong letters, and said we don't agree with this, shrugged their shoulders, and let the World Bank loan \$200 million to Iran in the year 2000. My fear is that we will learn nothing from September 11th, that we will go on and do business as usual with our European friends as they finance the development of nuclear weapons that can be smuggled in to destroy American cities. And then, after we lose not 3,000 people but 3 million people, we may ask who financed the nuclear destruction of American cities.

Perhaps we should be exploring turning over all responsibilities in the Former Yugoslavia to those Western European countries that are financing the attacks, the future attacks and the current attacks against the United States, as perhaps the only thing that I can think of to drive home to our European friends that friends do not finance the destruction of their allied cities.

So, I would hope that as we go forward with these hearings, there will be some comment on this, and that you gentlemen would explore what it would take to drive home to Europe that their new relationship with Iran and their hijacking of some of our taxpayer money for that purpose is simply unacceptable. A strongly worded letter, a protest press release, or a vote to get outvoted in the World Bank is unacceptable and will certainly not be successful in driving this point home. And Mr. Chairman, I hope that this Subcommittee will have hearings on Europe's new relationship with Iran.

Mr. BEREUTER. [Presiding.] I thank the gentleman from California. I yield to the gentleman from New York, Mr. Gilman, for the purposes of an opening statement.

Mr. GILMAN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I want to thank Chairman Gallegly for holding this very important hearing, and I welcome our expert witnesses who are here today.

It is one of a series of hearings on the critical issue of the next round of NATO enlargement. We appreciate the distinguished panelists who are here before us today and we welcome their view.

Mr. Chairman, I was an early supporter of NATO enlargement, before it was fashionable, as we addressed this years ago, and I think it is critical we keep the doors open. The last round's entrants are among the most dedicated friends of our own Nation. We need their voices in NATO's councils, and I very reasonably believe that this pattern will be repeated in the next round. And, of course, we also welcome the views of our experts with regard to Russia's involvement.

I am sure that some of our colleagues will have some questions, but, Mr. Chairman, if you will allow me to ask one question now, as I have to go on to another meeting in a moment.

Is there any evidence of pressure being brought on recent NATO entrants or current aspirants to change their political positions on security matters as a way of advancing their EU membership applications which are being presently considered? In other words, are there EU aspirants being held hostage to decisions on military purchases, positions on the international criminal court, or any other matter in the security realm? And I would welcome, Mr. Chairman, if you would allow the panelists to just answer that one question for me.

Mr. BEREUTER. Without objection, I assume that is a unanimous consent request.

Mr. GILMAN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. BEREUTER. And, without objection.

Mr. GILMAN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I appreciate that.

General RALSTON. Mr. Gilman, first of all, I think that is a subject that I would defer to my State Department and OSD colleagues on. I can only tell you that from a military point of view, I have had nothing but the absolute finest support from all three of the new NATO members, being the Czech Republic, Poland, and Hungary. I have no complaints whatsoever in that regard.

Mr. GILMAN. Secretary Bradtke.

Mr. BRADTKE. Mr. Gilman, we believe that NATO membership and European Union membership should be compatible. We support the enlargement of the European Union. We think that the dual enlargements that will take place this fall, NATO's enlargement in Prague, the enlargement of the EU in Copenhagen, can do a great deal to strengthen the political and economic stability of Europe, to build this Europe that is whole and free.

At the same time, in regards to the specific question you raise, I am not aware that the aspirant countries have come under direct pressure to make certain decisions on the securities side to advance their aspirations with the European Union.

Having said that, they obviously do want to maintain good relations with the European Union. And I am sure they are looking at a range of their decisions, just as they are looking at decisions they make in their relations with us, in light of their aspirations to join these organizations. But I am not aware of specific decisions, specific pressures in the security area that they have come under.

Mr. GILMAN. Secretary Brzezinski.

Mr. BRZEZINSKI. Sir, I will just repeat what my colleagues have said, which is that we don't see any real collision or competition between the EU and NATO. In fact, the enlargement of both organizations to Central Europe is a dynamic that reinforces security stability by promoting greater integration, political reform, military reform.

Mr. GILMAN. You don't see or hear any pressures being brought on any of the aspirants?

Mr. BRZEZINSKI. No, sir.

Mr. GILMAN. I thank the panelists, and thank you, Mr. Chairman, for allowing me to intervene.

Mr. BEREUTER. Thank you, Mr. Gilman.

Before we start the questions, I want to welcome representatives from the candidate states who are here with us today, including the Ambassadors from Bulgaria, Slovenia, and Latvia. Also, I want to welcome Albanian armed forces delegation which is here as well. We welcome you, and appreciate your interest and participation.

Secretary Bradtke. Well you know, I didn't mean to demean you. I can see a slander suit issued against me. [Laughter.]

Mr. Secretary, Transparency International rates Romania as the region's most corrupt country, followed by Latvia, Slovakia, and Bulgaria. For them, corruption discredits free enterprise and undermines the very rule of law needed in these countries. Is the Administration confident that these countries are doing all that they can to address this issue and this assessment?

Mr. BRADTKE. Mr. Chairman, as I mentioned in my statement, the issue of corruption is a very important one. It is an area that we have raised in our dialogue with all the aspirant countries, not just the ones that you mentioned there, because it is so damaging to the long-term prospects of democracy.

We believe that the countries you mentioned—all the countries that are aspiring to join NATO are working very hard to deal with this issue. When I visited the nine aspirant countries in February, we had very good discussions on this issue. We urged them all to continue the work they are doing. Realistically, they are not going to end all corruption by November in their membership in Prague. But what we need to see from all of them are actions, specific actions that show that they are committed at the highest level to dealing with the problems of corruption.

You mentioned Romania, for example. Now they have established and have sought our advice on the setting up of an anticorruption unit to try to focus specifically on the problems of corruption. We, with Bulgaria, signed an agreement to provide some assistance in setting up a national audit office, because corruption cuts across so many different areas. It is in areas like licensing, regulatory issues, judicial systems, prosecutors. It cuts across so many of these areas that we are working with all of these countries to try to strengthen their capabilities to deal with this issue.

So, again, I would say that they are making progress, but I would like to see more progress in this area, particularly before we get to Prague, and then beyond Prague; because, as I say, we will not have solved this issue by November. This is an issue that will need a long-term approach. But we need to see that strong commitment to dealing with this issue.

Mr. BEREUTER. Thank you, Mister Secretary.

General Ralston, again I want to thank you for your extraordinary effort to be here today.

General, some NATO skeptics have said that global challenges require global security, and thus a global NATO, if the Alliance is to remain relevant. In your professional opinion, does NATO need to deploy to places like the Philippines, Sudan, or even Kashmir, to be relevant?

General RALSTON. Mr. Chairman, I would answer the question this way. It does not need to deploy to the Philippines to be relevant. But at the same time, NATO needs to have those capabilities that, if the 19 nations decide that a threat is emanating

against a NATO country, they should have that capability to go counter it. And I think if 11 September taught us anything, a threat to a nation doesn't necessarily have to come from an adjacent nation. We had a case where a plot was hatched in Afghanistan, planned somewhere else, and executed against the United States. And that was an attack against a NATO country.

So NATO, in my view, needs to have the capability to get wherever they need to go in order to counter the threat to NATO. But it doesn't necessarily mean that they have to go to every place around the globe, only where the 19 nations would decide that their interests are threatened.

Mr. BEREUTER. Thank you, General.

Secretary Brzezinski, in your estimation, how well have the candidates performed with respect to the MAP sections on defense and military assessments? Have the applicant countries been able to clearly define what capabilities each will be expected to provide to the Alliance?

Mr. BRZEZINSKI. Sir, in terms of fulfilling the MAP, it is important to remember, one, that these are nationally defined programs. They set the goals for themselves; and that is an important point, because they are not meeting an imposed NATO requirement.

My second—to answer your question directly, they have made progress. And these countries, as part of the MAP process and part of our bilateral dialogue, have identified forces that they are developing to make available for NATO reaction forces, and in particular—and each of them have identified units that they are focusing their resources and attention: For example, professionalizing the ranks so that they will be ready for NATO deployment, if not next year, then at least in some cases, 2006, 2007.

Mr. BEREUTER. Thank you very much, Mister Secretary. I yield to the gentlewoman from California, Ms. Lee.

Ms. LEE. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. And I want to thank the panel also for your presentations, which I think were very clear, very succinct, and very straightforward in terms of what to expect out of NATO enlargement.

I guess a couple of questions I would just like to ask. I believe General Ralston talked about the mission as being essentially the same: Defending member states and deterring attacks.

And I am wondering, with the enlargement now, is NATO looking at its enlargement within the context of its ability now to help reduce tensions throughout the world, such as in the Middle East or Africa, given some of the historical relationships? Or are we still looking at the mission in its narrowest terms at this point, even with the enlargement?

I guess Secretary Bradtke, would you be able to give us some insight on that?

Mr. BRADTKE. Let me respond in this way. When I said that the fundamental mission of NATO was to defend its members and deter attack on them, that is the same mission we now face on new threats. And how we carry out that mission is the challenge that NATO will face at Prague, how we carry out this fundamental mission.

NATO needs to be able to respond, as General Ralston said, to threats to NATO members that come from anywhere in the world,

and that is why we need some of the capabilities that Secretary Brzezinski mentioned. At the same time, I don't think we see NATO as a global policeman, going and intervening anywhere in the world, taking on any crisis. We see NATO's fundamental mission still as defending its members and deterring attack on them.

Now, NATO has been able to do things, and I think the General alluded to some of them, through the Partnership for Peace to help build democracy, help promote reform in areas in Central Asia through the Partnership for Peace.

So again, I see NATO's mission in those terms of function in defending and deterring attack on its members and in focusing on how we do that in the atmosphere we have today of new capabilities—of new threats. Excuse me.

Ms. LEE. Just to follow up with that. But I guess now with Russia and its alignment now with NATO, I think it presents NATO, and really the world, with an opportunity to utilize that relationship in terms of just where conflicts may be brewing in the world. And is that just a role that NATO cannot play, more of a political conflict resolution role prior to attacks and threats and all of the horrific kinds of events that we don't want to see to occur? Or is it strictly a reactive kind of mode that we are in with NATO, or that NATO is in?

Mr. BRADTKE. I think one of the questions, whenever it comes to outside involvement in any conflict, is the desire of the parties to that conflict to have outside involvement. And so I think that would certainly be a question for some of the areas of the world that you mentioned. And we certainly work with our NATO partners to exchange views on how we can coordinate our political and diplomatic strategy in dealing with conflicts. Our closest partners in dealing with, for example, the crisis in South Asia have been our NATO allies, and we have tried to work very closely with them to coordinate our diplomatic strategies.

But if you were talking about deploying forces using troops in some fashion, I don't see a role in some of the areas that you mentioned right now.

You mentioned our work with Russia. That is certainly very important. And if I may just come to the point that Mr. Sherman raised here, which I think is an important one and I feel I should say something about. He mentioned concerns in Russia about the enlargement of NATO. And I would simply say that we are in the process of building a very different kind of relationship with Russia, both bilaterally and with NATO. We have made the point to the Russians that they should not see enlargement as a threat to them. That it brings security and stability to their western border is actually in Russia's interest. And we have established this new NATO/Russia Council to see how we can work cooperatively together to address issues, but working on very specific projects to build a pattern of cooperation.

So to address his concern, I think that this new relationship with Russia is a very positive development. I do not think that we should delay or slow down the enlargement of Russia because—of NATO because of concerns in Russia. We have made clear, and the Russians understand this, that they have no veto over the enlargement of NATO; and I think they have reached the realization that

the NATO enlargement is going to go ahead, and that we should concentrate our efforts on building this new relationship on the NATO/Russia Council.

Mr. BRZEZINSKI. Ms. Lee, if I may add to your question. And let me give you a real world example of where NATO acted proactively. Fifteen months ago we had a war about to erupt in the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia. But here was a case where the European Union, OSCE, and NATO acted together to bring diplomatic pressure, economic pressure, backed up by military, if necessary, to preempt an active conflict. And as I said in my statement, we are not out of the woods yet, but we are a lot better off today than we were 15 months ago. And this was a case of NATO acting proactively.

Ms. LEE. Thank you.

Mr. BEREUTER. The time for the gentlelady has expired, and I think it is my turn in any case.

Thank you very much, gentlemen, for your testimony. It is very helpful to the Subcommittee. Several of you made mention of the Gerald B.H. Solomon Freedom Consolidation Act which I introduced, called the General Consolidation Act. But I do want to say to Mr. Brzezinski that your effort on behalf of bringing us great bipartisan, ideologically diverse support from the Senate when you were a staffer there was crucial to its passage, too. It did, however, take an upcoming visit of President Bush to Europe to finally remove the last holds on the legislation so we could move ahead with that authorization bill.

NATO countries must focus much more effectively, through coordination and changes in their legislation enforcement, on two subjects: The war on terrorism, and the non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. I am hoping that in fact this is one of the focuses of the Administration's intention when they are assessing the aspirant countries' commitments and capabilities.

Secretary Bradtke, you highlighted the problems of corruption, and I think the strengthening of the legal and judicial systems, dealing with conflicts of interest, and the transparency of decision-making really are crucial. For many of the aspirant countries, this is the major challenge. It is not too much on those two gentlemen's shoulders; it is on the State Department's shoulders to bring the resources of Justice, USAID, and your own resources to bear there to assist.

In some aspirant countries the majority of the judges, who really are not committed to dealing with the problems of corruption, of inter national criminal syndicates, the drug problems, that make economic growth in those countries and the attraction of foreign direct investment difficult, if not nearly impossible.

Additionally, I hope that the State Department will focus a lot of attention on Slovakia. It was part of the Visegrad. Slovakia fell out at the Madrid Summit, for reasons that we don't need to make explicit here. This is a very sensitive issue as to how you avoid having that same thing happen again because if they are committed to democracy and all the attendant kinds of attributes of such a system, then we certainly want Slovakia to be a member of NATO.

A special degree of attention needs to be given to this country in the upcoming months, but I understand how sensitive it is.

Finally, Mr. Brzezinski mentioned the percentage of GNP devoted by the three most recent new members and compared it to the non-U.S./NATO countries. However, if you subtracted out of that group Turkey, Greece, and the U.K., the levels of support as presented through GNP from those other European or Canadian members is pretty pathetic, and that capabilities gaps keeps enlarging, which has all the attendant problems of inoperability.

My questions to you, gentlemen, are to what extent are you assessing the problems and the capabilities that deal with terrorism and nonproliferation of weapons of mass destruction; and what can you do to address the Secretary General's continued concerns about the lack of commitment for reducing this capabilities gap by some of our European allies?

Mr. BRZEZINSKI. Sir, your point on terrorism and the need to focus more on the threat posed by weapons of mass destruction is when it hits home with the Administration. The first element of our new capabilities initiative is defenses against weapons of mass destruction. And if there is a silver lining, if one can be found on the war on terrorism, is that it has heightened, I believe, European awareness of the need to be more prepared to deal with this new threat, this increasingly urgent threat.

And Secretary Rumsfeld, when he was at the MAP-D in Brussels gave a very hard-hitting briefing on the nexus of weapons of mass destruction and terrorism and states that support terrorism. And there was a briefing that I think I can say hit hard on allies and it was well received by allies. That is why it gives me cautious optimism that their willingness to move forward on a more focused capabilities initiative, emphasizing improvements in those four areas I mentioned—defenses against weapons of mass destruction, communications interoperability, weapons systems, and strategic lift—is something that we have I think reason to believe that the Europeans will make more of an effort than in the past to upgrade those areas so that they can be more prepared themselves to work with us in the war on terrorism.

Mr. BEREUTER. Thank you.

Secretary Bradtke, do you wish to respond?

Mr. BRADTKE. If I could just add a couple of points on the non-proliferation question as well.

We have made clear to all the aspirant countries, there is probably nothing that could damage their candidacy more than for us to learn that their country had either provided or been a transit country, a willing transit country for some weapon of mass destruction or some exportation of sensitive technology. We have made this point, as I say, to all the candidate countries, and we have seen some positive steps in that regard, countries that are strengthening their licensing procedures, that are beefing up their customs and their border controls. We saw in the case of Bulgaria a passage of a new export law and, in the case of Bulgaria, an agreement that they have reached with us to dismantle their old SS-23s that could have become a proliferation of concern.

So we see some positive development there. But we have made very clear that this is a priority issue, and this is one where these countries must take their responsibilities very seriously.

I again will just reiterate that on the corruption issue that we share very much your point of view. This is a critical issue and one that will receive very close attention as we get closer to Prague, and that all the candidate countries need to do as much as they can in that regard. And on Slovakia, I would simply say that we obviously will watch very closely the course of events there prior to Prague.

Mr. BEREUTER. General Ralston, my time has expired; but we would welcome your response to any part of the question.

General RALSTON. Yes, sir. If I could just add on the need for the European allies to do a better job in contributing to their defense, Lord Robertson, as the Secretary General, has been unrelenting in every meeting that we have had with the nations on the problem and how to fix it.

I might add that the aspirant countries in many cases are doing a better job than some of the older members are doing in that regard, and I think that is a cause for optimism. But we never fail to try to bring that point home every time that we have meetings with the various nations.

Mr. BEREUTER. Thank you, General. And, Secretary, the General has reminded us that we need to reform our Export Administration Act, too, as part of our element in this bargain.

The gentleman from Michigan, Mr. Smith, is recognized for 5 minutes.

Mr. SMITH. Did I understand in your testimony that you said that the NATO agreement was instrumental in the support of many of these NATO countries coming in with their assistance, their help after September 11th?

General RALSTON. Mr. Smith, that is exactly right. And one of the things that NATO did on September 12th was invoke Article V, meaning an attack against one member was an attack against all. The NATO allies then did everything that the United States asked. The United States asked specifically for eight things, and all eight were immediately granted in terms of overflight rights, in terms of basing rights.

Mr. SMITH. And this is by all 19 countries?

General RALSTON. This is by all 19 countries. In terms of port visits, the NATO AWACS which came back to the United States, which was more than a symbolic and more than a political statement, it was real combat capability. The United States of America can only deploy about 11 AWACS when you talk about our test airplanes and our schoolhouse and the ones that are in depot and so forth. NATO sent seven deployed NATO AWACS back to the United States. They flew over 4,000 hours.

Mr. SMITH. As we look at this new, if you will, broader challenge, rather than the original goal of protecting European security, is NATO becoming obsolete in terms of having more countries involved and being directed against such things as terrorism? Help me understand. Is there a treaty in—between the United States, Canada, Mexico, South America? Do we have a treaty obligation if Canada is attacked in some way, or vice versa?

General RALSTON. Let me try that slightly—Canada is a member of NATO, so it is one of the 19 nations and is a member of the treaty in that regard. Canada is also involved as part of NORAD. They are one of the two countries, the United States, for the defense of North America. But we work very closely, and I think it is fair to say that the 19 NATO nations are part of the treaty which we work not only that—the standard defense, if you will; but today in this war on terrorism, 14 I believe of the 19 countries are involved with us in Afghanistan using NATO doctrine, NATO procedures.

Mr. SMITH. How about Mexico? No, no.

I am just saying, do we have alliances in other parts of the world that have the similar protection and potential of helping each other that should be expanded? How about Mexico? How about South America if they are attacked? Are there treaties that exist there?

Mr. BRADTKE. We have a variety of arrangements, bilateral arrangements with different countries and regional arrangements. There is through the OAS a certain kind of regional security arrangement. I would be honest with you, the last thing I want to do is make statements about our regional security arrangements for Latin America. My colleagues in that part of the State Department would probably not forgive me.

But I think the point I would make is that NATO is very important in the war against terrorism, is very important in dealing with these new threats. But there are other organizations, other relationships, that will contribute to this effort. We have heard discussion of the idea that the mission will determine the coalition. We will look to other countries. I think our NATO allies, as General Ralston said, we are going to find are very frequently at the core of that coalition. But we want to bring in other countries. We want to have the help of countries in other parts of the world. This is not a NATO against—

Mr. SMITH. I mean, we are looking at expansion other than threats from neighboring countries. So, therefore, it is reasonable to look at a broader NATO, not just the North Atlantic nations, it would seem like.

Mr. BRADTKE. NATO as a treaty is bound geographically to Europe. But that doesn't preclude arrangements with the Philippines, with countries—

Mr. SMITH. Let me ask a question. Will reported corruption in Romania and Bulgaria preempt those countries from being accepted into NATO if it isn't somehow resolved or significant progress isn't made?

Mr. BRADTKE. I would reiterate what I said in my statement; namely, that this is a problem in not just Bulgaria and Romania, but in other aspirant countries; that it is a serious problem, and in many ways, in my view, one of the most serious problems. All the countries need to do more in this regard. The Romanians and Bulgarians, since you mentioned them, have been working with us after the visit that we made in February to Sofia and to Bucharest. Both governments came to us with kind of an action plan, things they know they need to do, not just because they want to become members of NATO, because it is the right thing to do for their own countries. And so they recognize the seriousness of this problem. They have outlined steps that they want to take to deal with this

problem. And we need to see progress, we need to see real genuine commitment at the highest levels of their governments.

As I said, it is probably not realistic to think that all corruption in Romania, Bulgaria, any other country, including some NATO country, could be completely eliminated in 6 months. But we need to see that genuine progress and resolution and determination to deal with this problem.

Mr. SMITH. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. GALLEGLY. [Presiding.] The gentleman from Louisiana, Mr. Cooksey.

Mr. COOKSEY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And we are glad to have all of you here as witnesses.

General Ralston, I was an Air Force captain when you were an Air Force captain. You got a few more promotions than I did. I am most impressed that you were a Wild Weasel pilot. That means you were either a very brave, a very skilled pilot, or else you were very crazy and very lucky, or all of the above. But, anyway.

As the Supreme Allied Commander of Europe, I would like you to address this question. There is obviously a large gap between the military capabilities of a lot of the original members of NATO and these aspirant members. And my question is, and in reviewing your statements, your written statement, you addressed this partially. But do you think that this gap can be overcome to the point that these new members or aspirant members can be effective members of NATO in carrying out the original mission of NATO, will they just be takers or will they be givers? If the answer is no, what will it take to bring them up to the level of military preparedness capability that the U.S. is at, that some of the other original NATO members are at?

General RALSTON. Yes, sir. First of all, let me emphasize that the United States, in a bilateral sense, and the military European Command is working with each of the aspirants to try to help in every way we can for them to reform their military and to do a better job. And before I get too critical of the others, let me say, by the way, that we are working very hard to reform the military of the United States as well. So this is something that we all have to do. It is not just the new members.

Let me give you a couple of examples of why I believe that the aspirants can add capability to NATO. Let's talk about Bulgaria. Bulgaria volunteered to guard the NATO headquarters in Bosnia. Now, before I automatically accepted that, I said let's go and evaluate this outfit that Bulgaria is going to send forward; and, are they capable of doing that? We did the evaluation; they were very good. Today, Bulgaria has a company guarding that headquarters. Lieutenant Jones Sylvester, the S-4 commander, the NATO commander there, who is on his third tour of duty in Bosnia, by the way, wrote me a letter that this Bulgarian country that is guarding the S-4 headquarters is the finest company he has seen in Bosnia in three tours there. That says something to me.

Let's talk about Latvia for a moment. We think of Latvia as a small country with a small military, but one of the things that I think we need to work hard is on NSH capabilities. Latvia has a unique capability. Because of history, they have had to deal with unexploded ordnance their entire lives because of previous wars in

the area. They have a world class explosive ordinance disposal capability. That is something that I think they can contribute to the Alliance. Whenever we need explosive ordinance troops—and we always need them—then here is a capability that a small country, because they are very well trained professionally, can offer real capability to the Alliance.

I could go around each of the aspirants and give a capability similar to that; but they are contributing, every one of them today, in the Balkans using NATO doctrine, NATO tactics, and NATO procedures and doing an extraordinarily good job.

Mr. COOKSEY. Well, that is reassuring. But for some of those of us that were in the military during the Cold War, it is too easy to remember that Bulgaria did a lot of the dirty work of the KGB. Hopefully, that era is passed and it is over and they are on our team.

For the State Department, the two of you from the State Department, you know, it is my understanding that the original mission of NATO was to defend its members and deter attacks on them or on us. Is there a mechanism to exclude or to kick out or to reform or to punish a new member of NATO, or even an old member of NATO, if they give up these basic tenets of private property rights, democracy, rule of law, or worse yet, if they should prove to be involved with some of these terrorists and terrorist activities and terrorist-supporting nations, such as Iraq, Iran, and even some of those that are supposed to be our allies that had 15 of the 19 people flying those planes that day?

Mr. BRADTKE. The NATO Treaty does not have a provision that provides for members to be expelled from the Alliance. And I think that there are actually some good reasons why that is actually the case. The countries that join NATO make a truly fundamental commitment to each other's defense, and it is a commitment that I think is—in my view needs to be made without some mental reservation that, yes, we will take you in, but we might kick you out some day later. It is such a fundamental commitment that, in making that commitment, we need to be sure when we bring those countries in that they are confident that they will stay on the right path, that they will remain democracies, that they will carry out their responsibilities as allies.

So, the treaty, as I say, does not allow for this. And it is partly the nature of the Alliance itself that I think would make that kind of provision difficult and controversial.

I would also say that I wouldn't want to see us weakening the standards, if you will; that if we knew that we could expel a member, that then we might be tempted to say, well, that country is not quite there, or we have some doubts; but so what? Let's take them in, and then we will worry about it later. We can always kick them out later. As I say, I think this would undermine the strength of the obligations that NATO members make to one another.

I would also say that there are cases in the past where a NATO country has run into problems. And I don't necessarily want to get into them here, but I think what the experience that we had showed was it was better to have the country in the Alliance, where we could try to deal with the problem, so to speak, within the family, than to have pushed them out and isolate them.

So, again, this is a problem we don't want to see happen. It is a problem we need to avoid by having the highest standards we can when we bring Alliance members in, and to see that we don't bring in a member that we will find later has some problem which will cause us to have difficulties with the Alliance.

Mr. COOKSEY. Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. GALLEGLY. Thank you, Mr. Cooksey. I know Mr. Bereuter has a couple more questions. I made a commitment we would be wrapped up by noon. I do have one quick question, if I could ask General Ralston, and then we will defer to Mr. Bereuter who has some important questions to ask.

General, some strategic thinkers of NATO are advocating that NATO create its own rapid reaction spearhead force of some 25,000 deployable mobile troops, trained and equipped to react to external threats anywhere in the world, basically at a moment's notice. Do you believe this is a necessary force to deploy?

General RALSTON. Mr. Chairman, let me answer the question this way. I believe that NATO needs to improve its capability to move troops rapidly wherever they need to be moved, whether it is within the area of the Alliance or should it be somewhere else.

Now, NATO has taken some steps to do just that. Several months ago, the NATO member countries started standing up high-readiness force headquarters. These are land core headquarters, deployable combined air operation centers, and deployable high-readiness force maritime headquarters, all under a combined joint task force, should it be necessary. We are in the process of evaluating these land headquarters now. One of them has already met and been certified for its final operational capability. We have five others that will be certified by the end of this year, assuming they pass their evaluations. And I believe this is a very positive step forward for the Alliance so that you can rapidly deploy combat forces wherever you need them and do it quickly.

Mr. GALLEGLY. But you don't see an exact number, an arbitrary number of 25,000?

General RALSTON. No, sir. I think the Alliance needs to have whatever forces we need. And I wouldn't restrict it to 25,000. We have got over 50,000 serving in the Balkans today. So, I think we need to have the capability to have the proper command and control and the proper headquarters to do that, and we'll add those forces as necessary.

Mr. GALLEGLY. Thank you, General.

The gentleman from Nebraska.

Mr. BEREUTER. Thank you, Chairman. I noted with some interest that Amber Fox is being extended through October, and I am glad that the North Atlantic Council has decided to do that. It was at the request, of course, of Former Yugoslavia Republic of Macedonia and the President.

I am wondering to what extent that may be the assessment that the European Union's force, the ESDP, is not ready. If you want to comment on that, that is fine. However, I think the most important question that I need to address to you relates to the new NATO-Russia Council.

As we debate the legislation that Chairman Gallegly will be introducing in this Committee, and as the Senate takes up its ratifi-

cation responsibilities for the decisions on accession for the amendment of the NATO Treaty, I think this is a subject that will be of some controversy and debate. We need to establish at this hearing a legislative record of what you three experts believe we should consider with respect to the creation of the new NATO-Russian Council which formed in May. I might say that I am supportive, based on my experience, but I do think we need a record of your best thoughts about this subject.

That would be my last question, but I think it is one we need to address from you.

General RALSTON. Mr. Bereuter, let me address it from my perspective this way. I have watched for the last 5 years, when we had the Permanent Joint Council from the NATO/Russia Founding Act of 1997. And I might say that while from a military perspective, our relationship between NATO military and Russian military has progressed quite well and we are serving side by side, as you know, in Bosnia and Kosovo and have been for a number of years, and I am very pleased with that activity, and I have a Russian general at my headquarters, and we work very closely together.

On the political side, the Permanent Joint Council I think came up short of where its intentions were. And I use as a measure of merit that in every Permanent Joint Council meeting that I ever attended, when people left the room they were more upset than when they entered the room. And if you do that for 5 years, that is not good in the long term.

So I think the attempts at the NATO/Russia Council at 20 certainly is a step in the right direction, and I am hopeful that it will be in the right direction.

I would like to add one other thing, though, to put it in perspective. And let me go back to a meeting that we had 2 weeks ago of defense ministers in Brussels. We started that meeting in the morning by setting the table for 18 people. And those are the 19 NATO members, minus France, because France, as you know, is not a member of the integrated military structure, and we discussed military issues among those 18.

Once that was completed, we reset the table at 19 places. France rejoins, and you discuss the political issues and the issues of the Alliance.

We then reset the table at 20, and Russia joined. And the agenda had already been agreed by the 19 NATO members or else the subjects didn't come up, and the issues were discussed at 20. And, I might add, it was done in a much better atmosphere than the Permanent Joint Council had been done before.

And then the table was reset at 19, plus 27, with the 27 members of the partner—the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council had 46 ministers of defense around the table discussing the issues. I think it was a very positive development.

So the NATO/Russia at 20—and the reason for my long story here is not just every time that NATO meets, it meets at 20; NATO meets at 18, it meets at 19, it meets at 20, it meets at 46. And each of those are, I think, useful forum—a useful forum for discussion.

Mr. BEREUTER. Thank you. Secretary Bradtke.

Mr. BRADTKE. I would just add a couple of points on the NATO/Russia Council. I think one of the things that impressed me in the

process of negotiating the NATO/Russia Council, and that makes me somewhat optimistic about the prospects for it being a productive council and doing some important work, is the spirit in which it was negotiated.

The ministers in December of last year tasked themselves with putting this Council together. That, I thought, was a very ambitious tasking. And for some of us who were involved and worried about how we were going to carry out this tasking, we were wondering whether they had put too short a deadline in, saying it will be ready by the ministerial in May at Reykjavik, and in fact, because of the constructive approach on the NATO side and the Russian side, we were able to come up with the formula for the Council, its organization, a work program, and its rules and procedure. So I think that is a very good sign for future accounts.

I will just echo some of the General's comments; namely, that NATO still, of course, protects its rights, its prerogatives to act at 19. It still has the ability to carry out Article V without a Russian veto. The subject of enlargement that we have talked about here today is not a subject that will be discussed by the NATO/Russia Council or decided by the NATO/Russia Council.

So the focus of the NATO/Russia Council and the measure of its success will be how well we work together on specific projects. And we have a work plan that was agreed at Reykjavik and then formally approved in Rome, in areas like counter-terrorism, weapons of mass destruction, missile defense, civil emergency preparedness, search and rescue. And if we can make progress in working together on these specific areas, we can build those patterns of cooperation that I think will serve very well the development of NATO and Russia relations.

You raised Macedonia. I would just touch on it briefly to say that at Barcelona earlier this year, the European Union said it would be prepared to take on the mission of Amber Fox provided—or on the understanding, I should say, that the elements that are in place for cooperation between NATO and the European Union. As we sit here today, those elements are not in place. There needs to be more work on those elements.

We also from our perspective—and General Ralston is certainly in a better position to address this point, but we need to be sure that if there is an EU mission in Macedonia, that the command arrangements are such that it fits seamlessly with the fact that NATO has a presence in Macedonia. So that is another concern of ours that we would want to see satisfied before we would be prepared to see a NATO—an EU mission in Macedonia.

Mr. BEREUTER. I think that is a proper step to take, to be sure that it is ready. It is not a very auspicious start for the European Union.

Secretary Brzezinski, you have probably heard about and thought about Russian-NATO relations all of your life. What are your thoughts on this?

Mr. BRZEZINSKI. Sir, I guess I would add to my two colleagues the emphasis that Bob put on practical initiatives. And what I tend to do when talking about the NATO/Russia Council and the new relationship that is evolving between NATO and Russia is compare

what was signed at Rome last month to what was signed back in Paris in 1997.

Back in 1997, it was a well-intentioned initiative, but was an initiative that focused on, I guess, priorities that are global in nature. They generated expectations that were extraordinarily high. You may recall the long list of some 56 issues that were going to—or initiatives that were going to be undertaken by the NATO/Russia relationship. And the resolve was expectations that rose high, but there was very little follow-through, particularly on the Russian side. And this whole cathedral collapsed into a ruin of disillusionment, disappointment, and resentment.

And what is different about the initiative undertaking this time around is the Administration and the Alliance is trying to focus it very much on a limited set of practical bits of cooperation. My colleague mentioned a number of them. It is only about a dozen. And the idea is to have projects that have a beginning and an end, have been accomplished, and that are measurable; because, if you can do that, you can thereby have the foundation blocks for a relationship based on accomplishment, and accomplishment can lead to more trust, and then maybe on to higher end issues.

That is why I am somewhat more optimistic about this initiative than the previous one.

Mr. BEREUTER. Thank you, gentlemen.

Mr. GALLEGLY. Thank you, gentleman from Nebraska.

I want to thank all the Members of this Committee for their participation today. It certainly was better attended than our others. We have had three very informative hearings on NATO expansion, and the participation of the Committee was much appreciated today. Particular appreciation to the gentleman from Nebraska. I look to him for counsel on a regular basis.

I want to thank the witnesses. General Ralston, again, thank you for the trek. Secretary Bradtke—and I am going to have to live with that one for a while. Secretary Brzezinski, it is an honor to have you on the other side of the table. Thank you very much for your participation. And, with that, the Subcommittee stands adjourned.

[Whereupon, at 12:13 p.m., the Subcommittee was adjourned.]

