[Senate Hearing 108-208]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
S. Hrg. 108-208
SUCCESSES AND CHALLENGES FOR U.S. POLICY TO HAITI
=======================================================================
HEARING
BEFORE THE
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS
UNITED STATES SENATE
ONE HUNDRED EIGHTH CONGRESS
FIRST SESSION
__________
JULY 15, 2003
__________
Printed for the use of the Committee on Foreign Relations
Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.access.gpo.gov/congress/
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COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS
RICHARD G. LUGAR, Indiana, Chairman
CHUCK HAGEL, Nebraska JOSEPH R. BIDEN, Jr., Delaware
LINCOLN CHAFEE, Rhode Island PAUL S. SARBANES, Maryland
GEORGE ALLEN, Virginia CHRISTOPHER J. DODD, Connecticut
SAM BROWNBACK, Kansas JOHN F. KERRY, Massachusetts
MICHAEL B. ENZI, Wyoming RUSSELL D. FEINGOLD, Wisconsin
GEORGE V. VOINOVICH, Ohio BARBARA BOXER, California
LAMAR ALEXANDER, Tennessee BILL NELSON, Florida
NORM COLEMAN, Minnesota JOHN D. ROCKEFELLER IV, West
JOHN E. SUNUNU, New Hampshire Virginia
JON S. CORZINE, New Jersey
Kenneth A. Myers, Jr., Staff Director
Antony J. Blinken, Democratic Staff Director
(ii)
C O N T E N T S
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Page
Biden, Hon. Joseph R., Jr., U.S. Senator from Delaware, opening
statement...................................................... 3
Coleman, Hon. Norm, U.S. Senator from Minnesota, prepared
statement...................................................... 20
Dodd, Hon. Christopher J., U.S. Senator from Connecticut,
prepared statement............................................. 70
Farmer, Dr. Paul, founding director, Partners In Health; co-
director, Program in Infectious Disease and Social Change,
Department of Social Medicine, Harvard Medical School,
Cambridge, MA; chief, Division of Social Medicine and Health
Inequalities, Brigham and Women's Hospital, Boston, MA......... 29
Prepared statement........................................... 32
``Unjust Embargo of Aid to Haiti,'' article reprinted from
The Lancet, Feb. 1, 2003................................... 41
Responses to additional questions for the record from Senator
Biden...................................................... 82
Forester, Steven David, Esq., senior policy advocate, Haitian
Women of Miami, Miami, FL...................................... 45
Prepared statement........................................... 47
Responses to additional questions for the record from Senator
Biden...................................................... 83
Responses to additional questions for the record from Senator
Feingold................................................... 85
Grossman, Hon. Marc, Under Secretary of State for Political
Affairs, Department of State, Washington, DC................... 4
Prepared statement........................................... 7
Responses to additional questions for the record from Senator
Biden...................................................... 76
Lugar, Hon. Richard G., U.S. Senator from Indiana, opening
statement...................................................... 2
Moise, Dr. Rudolph, president and CEO, Haitian Broadcasting
Network, Miami, FL............................................. 56
Prepared statement........................................... 58
Nelson, Hon. Bill, U.S. Senator from Florida, letter from the
Congressional Black Caucus, July 14, 2003, to Senators Lugar
and Biden, submitted for the record............................ 68
Taylor, Hon. John B., Under Secretary of the Treasury for
International Affairs, Department of the Treasury, Washington,
DC............................................................. 9
Prepared statement........................................... 11
Responses to additional questions for the record from Senator
Biden...................................................... 81
(iii)
THE SUCCESSES AND CHALLENGES FOR U.S. POLICY TO HAITI
----------
TUESDAY, JULY 15, 2003
U.S. Senate,
Committee on Foreign Relations,
Washington, DC.
The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 10:06 a.m. in
room SD-419, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Hon. Richard Lugar
(chairman of the committee), presiding.
Present: Senators Lugar, Chafee, Brownback, Coleman, Dodd,
and Bill Nelson.
The Chairman. This hearing of the Senate Foreign Relations
Committee is called to order.
Today, the committee meets to examine the United States
policy toward Haiti. We are pleased to have two impressive
panels to discuss this issue. On the first is Under Secretary
of State for Political Affairs, Marc Grossman, and Under
Secretary of the Treasury for International Affairs, John
Taylor, who represent the administration.
On our second panel we will hear from Dr. Paul Farmer,
founding director of Partners In Health, co-founder of the
Program in Infectious Disease and Social Change of the Harvard
Medical School, and chief, Division of Social Medicine and
Health Inequalities; Mr. Steven Forester, the senior policy
advocate for Haitian Women of Miami; and Dr. Rudolph Moise,
president and CEO of the Haitian Broadcasting Network based in
Miami, Florida. We welcome our witnesses and look forward to
their testimony.
In recent months, this committee has examined the problem
of failed States and the risk they pose to the United States'
national security. We have held hearings on Afghanistan and
post-conflict Iraq that underscored how these nations could
become incubators of terrorism if reconstruction efforts do not
succeed. We also know that failed States can have negative
consequences for international security beyond any direct links
to terrorism. As we have observed in Somalia, Bosnia, Rwanda,
and Sierra Leone, failed States usually lead to violence,
humanitarian crises, immigration and refugee flows, and illicit
economic activity.
In our own hemisphere, Haiti stands out as a continuing
tragedy. Its prospects for advancement have been marred by
depredations of authoritarian rule, interspersed with periods
of chronic political instability and violence.
Haiti is the poorest country in the hemisphere, with an
annual per capita income of only $225. According to World Bank
statistics, life expectancy in Haiti was just 52.4 years and
dropping. The Haitian political system has proved incapable of
dealing with problems that deepen poverty, such as the spread
of AIDS, severe environmental degradation, and illiteracy.
Haiti's ongoing political crisis has debilitated the State,
undermined respect for human rights, and exacerbated an already
worrisome humanitarian situation.
For two centuries, the American and Haitian peoples have
had a close relationship. In contemporary times, this
relationship has been driven by the hundreds of thousands of
Haitians living and working in the United States. Haitian
Americans are making vital contributions to our society and to
our economy. Each year, Haitians living in the United States
send more than $700 million back to their home country, an
amount that equals an estimated 20 percent of Haiti's gross
domestic product.
Although Haiti is a small nation, its troubles have
consequences for the United States. Corruption, drug
trafficking, and illegal migration are areas of deep concern
for our two countries. Mass migration has the potential to
create instability in the region and undermine efforts to
improve border control.
The people of Haiti have suffered long, and their chances
for improved conditions are slim as long as Haiti's protracted
political crisis continues. The current political crisis began
with flawed legislative elections in May 2000, where the
results of seven Senate contests were decided under
questionable circumstances. Subsequent Presidential elections
in November 2000 were boycotted by the opposition.
The international community, led by the United States, has
designed a guide for Haiti to resolve the latest political
crisis. That guide is contained in OAS Resolution 822, which
lays out specific steps the government of Haiti and other
political actors must take to fulfill the promise of true
democracy in Haiti.
This hearing is intended to give the committee an
opportunity to examine in depth ways that the U.S. Congress and
our government can contribute to positive changes in Haiti.
Among other issues, I look forward to insights into the current
Haitian political crisis, United States humanitarian aid to
Haiti, the role of the OAS and the international financial
institutions in Haiti, and how we can deter illegal immigration
while being humane and fair.
The consequences of failing in Haiti are potentially
severe. We must work with our neighbors to prevent a further
slide to social and political disintegration in Haiti. I look
forward to examining these issues with our witnesses and with
the members of this committee.
[The opening statement of Senator Lugar follows:]
Opening Statement of Senator Richard G. Lugar
Today, the Foreign Relations Committee meets to examine U.S. policy
toward Haiti. We are pleased to have two impressive panels to discuss
this issue. Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs, Marc
Grossman, and Under Secretary of the Treasury for International
Affairs, John Taylor, will represent the administration. On our second
panel we will hear from Dr. Paul Farmer, co-founder of the Program in
Infectious Disease and Social Change at the Harvard Medical School; Mr.
Steven Forester, the senior policy advocate for Haitian Women of Miami;
and Dr. Rudolph Moise, president and CEO of the Haitian Broadcasting
Network based in Miami. We welcome our witnesses and look forward to
their testimony.
In recent months, this committee has examined the problem of failed
States and the risks they pose to U.S. national security. We have held
hearings on Afghanistan and post-conflict Iraq that underscored how
these nations could become incubators of terrorism if reconstruction
efforts do not succeed. We also know that failed States can have
negative consequences for international security beyond any direct
links to terrorism. As we have seen in Somalia, Bosnia, Rwanda, and
Sierra Leone, failed States usually lead to violence, humanitarian
crises, immigration and refugee flows, and illicit economic activity.
In our own hemisphere, Haiti stands out as a continuing tragedy.
Its prospects for advancement have been marred by the depredations of
authoritarian rule, interspersed with periods of chronic political
instability and violence. Haiti is the poorest country in the
hemisphere with an annual per capita income of only $225. According to
World Bank statistics, life expectancy in Haiti in 2001 was just 52.4
years and dropping. The Haitian political system has proved incapable
of dealing with problems that deepen poverty, such as the spread of
AIDS, severe environmental degradation, and illiteracy. Haiti's on-
going political crisis has debilitated the State, undermined respect
for human rights, and exacerbated an already worrisome humanitarian
situation.
For two centuries the American and Haitian peoples have had a close
relationship. In contemporary times this relationship has been driven
by the hundreds of thousands of Haitians living and working in the
United States. Haitian-Americans are making vital contributions to our
society and economy. Each year, Haitians living in the United States
send more than $700 million back to their home country, an amount that
equals an estimated 20 percent of Haiti's gross domestic product.
Although Haiti is a small nation, its troubles have consequences
for the United States. Corruption, drug trafficking, and illegal
migration are areas of deep concern for our two countries. Mass
migration has the potential to create instability in the region and
undermine efforts to improve border control.
The people of Haiti have suffered long, and their chances for
improved conditions are slim as long as Haiti's protracted political
crisis continues. The current political crisis began with flawed
legislative elections in May 2000, where the results of seven Senate
contests were decided under questionable circumstances. Subsequent
Presidential elections in November 2000 were boycotted by the
opposition.
The international community, led by the United States, has designed
a guide for Haiti to resolve the latest political crisis. That guide is
contained in OAS Resolution 822, which lays out specific steps the
Government of Haiti and other political actors must take to fulfill the
promise of true democracy in Haiti.
This hearing is intended to give the committee an opportunity to
examine in depth ways that the U.S. Congress and our government can
contribute to positive change in Haiti. Among other issues, I look
forward to insights into the current Haitian political crisis, U.S.
humanitarian aid to Haiti, the role of the OAS and International
Financial Institutions in Haiti, and how we can deter illegal
migration, while being humane and fair.
The consequences of failing in Haiti are potentially severe. We
must work with our neighbors to prevent a further slide to social and
political disintegration in Haiti. I look forward to examining this
issue with our witnesses and the members of this committee.
The Chairman. When Senator Biden comes to the hearing, of
course, he will be recognized for an opening statement, if he
wishes to give one at that point. But at this stage, I would
like to welcome our first panel.
[The opening statement of Senator Biden follows:]
Opening Statement of Senator Joseph R. Biden, Jr.
Mr. Chairman, I commend you for convening this hearing on Haiti. I
also want to acknowledge the longstanding focus of Senator Dodd on
Haiti, who has been working to address the political, economic, and
social situation in that country for many years.
It is important that we are holding this hearing, and even more
critical that we take action on these issues. Haiti is in bad shape.
Unemployment and poverty have worsened in recent years. Eighty percent
of Haitians are unemployed, and less than half the population has
access to potable water. The average per capita income is $250 per
year--less than one-tenth of the average in Latin America.
Furthermore, Haiti is being devastated by HIV/AIDS. The United
Nations Joint Programme on HIV/AIDS cites that Haiti accounts for 90
percent of the HIV/AIDS infections in the Caribbean--with prevalence
reaching up to 10 percent of the Haitian population in urban areas.
The Bush Administration and Congress recently committed to fighting
global HIV/AIDS, and Haiti is a country that is designated to receive
significant attention and support under this initiative.
I am interested in hearing recommendations from our witnesses as to
how we can effectively fight HIV/AIDS, and the many other health
crises--such as tuberculosis, malnutrition, and high infant and
maternal mortality rates--that Haitians are suffering.
I am concerned that even given the economic and health calamities
in Haiti, relations with multilateral lending institutions have not
normalized and the United States continues to withhold direct aid to
Haiti until President Aristide acts on a series of political, judicial
and economic reforms--several of which require financial resources to
implement.
I agree that President Aristide needs to undertake significant
reforms. But as we continue to withhold funds, while pushing for
reforms, the Haitian people continue to suffer. We need to find a way
to get out from under this apparent impasse. The Haitian people can't
wait any longer.
I am encouraged by the administration's recent decision to increase
food assistance to Haiti by $6 million this year, bringing the total to
$69.8 million. I applaud this decision--but an increase in food aid is
only a small part of the work that needs to be done.
We need a comprehensive and sustainable approach to resolving
Haiti's political and economic crises. I understand that last week
there was some movement on this issue of the Inter-American Development
Bank releasing the $146 million dollars in development loans that have
been approved for Haiti when Haiti paid $32 million in arrears to the
bank. That's good news--but the development loans are not flowing yet.
We have to make sure that the funds are disbursed.
In short, we need an effective policy toward Haiti. The
administration does not appear to have such a policy. I hope this
hearing will help bring increased attention and focus on this
beleaguered country, and bring us closer to that objective.
The Chairman. Our witnesses on the first panel are the
Honorable Marc Grossman, Under Secretary for Political Affairs,
Department of State; and the Honorable John B. Taylor, Under
Secretary, International Affairs, Department of the Treasury.
Gentlemen, would you please give your testimony in that
order? Your full statements will be made part of the record.
Please proceed as you wish.
STATEMENT OF HON. MARC GROSSMAN, UNDER SECRETARY OF STATE FOR
POLITICAL AFFAIRS, DEPARTMENT OF STATE, WASHINGTON, DC
Mr. Grossman. Mr. Chairman, thank you very much. On behalf
of Under Secretary Taylor, we are both delighted to be here.
Senator Coleman, we are delighted to be part of this hearing.
We are thankful for this opportunity to appear before the
committee to talk about the administration's policies in Haiti.
May I just say, Mr. Chairman, on behalf of both of us, we
think this ought to be the beginning of a conversation, since,
as you have said, this is going to be a continuing matter of
interest for the Congress, for the Senate, and for the
administration, as well. So we look forward to more of this
interaction with the Senate.
As I said, Mr. Chairman, while much energy has been spent
since September 11, 2001 focused on the war on terror, focused
on looking at failed States, we have remained deeply engaged as
an administration in the hemisphere. Since September 11,
President Bush has made five trips to the region, has received
nine leaders from the region, and the Secretary of State, as
you know, sir, has also been very active, having taken 10 trips
to the region.
I also want to take a minute to thank the committee, and if
I could, the Senate as a whole, for acting promptly on the
nomination of Ambassador-designate James B. Foley to Haiti. The
committee also moved expeditiously on the nomination of
Ambassador Roger Noriega as the Assistant Secretary for Western
Hemisphere Affairs, and we look forward to working with the
Senate to complete the confirmation process.
Mr. Chairman, as you said, the United States of America is
connected to Haiti by geography, by history, and by values. As
you also pointed out, hundreds of thousands of Haitians live
and work in the United States, making a vital, as you said,
contribution to our economy and to our society. Next year,
Haiti will celebrate the bicentennial of its independence,
reminding us all that Haiti was the second republic to be
formed in the hemisphere.
As you have asked in your opening statement, Mr. Chairman,
we have some questions, too: What will it take to help Haiti
become a peaceful, democratic country that respects human
rights and the rule of law? How can the United States support
Haiti in building an economy with opportunities for its people
to lift themselves out of poverty, out of illiteracy, and
hunger? How can we help settle the political crisis that you
referred to that was made so much worse by the flawed election
of 2002? How can we safeguard our own national security from
the dangers posed by illegal migration and narcotics
trafficking?
As you all have discussed on a number of occasions, these
challenges are severe. Success with them will require
engagement, consistent policies, and clear priorities. If I
might, Mr. Chairman, just talk about four priority areas for
the administration's Haiti policy today.
First, as you said in your opening statement, we support
the full implementation of OAS Resolution 822. Our support for
that has included a $2.5 million financial contribution to the
OAS Special Mission to Strengthen Democracy in Haiti.
We should all remember that the Government of Haiti joined
consensus at the OAS on Resolution 822, and therefore committed
itself to a series of actions that would promote a climate of
security and confidence for free and fair elections to be held
in 2003. Although the Government of Haiti has taken some steps,
we believe it has not complied with many of the most important
commitments that it made under Resolution 822, particularly
those that would contribute to a climate of security.
So together with the Organization of American States, the
United States has repeatedly and consistently urged the
government of Haiti to meet the commitments of Resolution 822.
Our efforts have included participation by President Bush's
Special Envoy for Western Hemisphere Affairs, Otto Reich, in
the High-Level Delegation to Haiti, a joint OAS-CARICOM
delegation that went to Haiti in March.
It is also important to note, as that delegation did, that
we remind the opposition and civil society that they also must
participate in forming a credible, neutral, and independent
provisional electoral council once the government of Haiti
takes concrete steps in good faith toward meeting its
commitments.
But I think all of us can sense--and we certainly sense
from reading the report of the OAS Special Mission--that
hemispheric patience is running out. OAS Resolution 1959, which
was adopted by the OAS General Assembly in June, calls for the
Secretary General to provide an assessment by September of the
ability of the OAS Special Mission to fulfill its mandates
under what they call ``the circumstances of delay and
resistance.''
So we will continue to consult with you, with our European
partners, and our partners in the hemisphere; but I bring to
your attention, as I know that you have seen Secretary Powell's
statement in Santiago, we have called for a reevaluation of the
OAS role in Haiti if by September the Government of Haiti has
not created the climate of security essential to the formation
of a credible, neutral, and independent provisional electoral
council.
Second, a key part of our policy, we are focused on the
plight of the Haitian people and maintaining assistance
programs to meet their humanitarian needs. As my colleague,
John Taylor, will testify, the realization of full normal
relations with the international financial institutions took a
big step forward when Haiti, on July 8, paid its arrears to the
Inter-American Development Bank.
The United States remains the largest donor to Haiti. Our
aid is distributed through U.S.-based and Haitian-based
nongovernmental organizations, and it supports programs in food
assistance, health, democracy, education, economic growth, and,
very importantly, HIV/AIDS, which--I have a report from
Ambassador Curran this morning--has really sparked interest
among the Haitian people.
I have some examples, Mr. Chairman, in my prepared
statement which I hope I can submit for the record. But this
aid works. Let me give a couple of useful examples.
Our economic growth programs in 2003 focused on credit for
microbusinesses and marketing help for small farmers, and have
supported thousands of Haitians and their families. Our health
programs support over 30 local health organizations that serve
an estimated 2.5 million Haitians.
Interestingly, in those areas where these organizations are
at work, child immunization is up and malnutrition is down.
Obviously, the first two of these priorities are connected,
because our assistance won't work unless there is a political
solution; so a key element for progress on the AIDS side is
obviously for the Haitian authorities and people to act to
embrace the need for good government and inclusive competitive
markets.
Third, Mr. Chairman, a key priority that you mentioned in
your opening statement is the question of the flow of narcotics
through Haiti to the United States.
Sadly, narcotics-related corruption is pervasive in the
Haitian National Police, and our efforts to combat that
corruption center now on visa revocations and pressure on the
highest level of the government of Haiti to remove corrupt
officers. We believe this has raised the level of awareness in
the government about the importance of this issue to us.
As you know, Haiti was decertified in 2002 because it
failed to adhere to international narcotics agreements and to
take counternarcotics measures required by U.S. law.
As you also know, President Bush granted a national
interest waiver of sanctions which, if not imposed, would have
required withholding important types of United States
assistance. We believe it is important to continue to work with
those elements in the Haitian National Police, most notably the
Coast Guard, that we can rely on. The Drug Enforcement
Administration continues to focus on this area with some
positive results, but more work needs to be done.
Fourth, Mr. Chairman, the other item that you mentioned,
illegal migration, is an important U.S. security concern. We
want to deter illegal migration while treating migrants in a
fair and humane fashion. We support legal migration from Haiti.
In fact, about 15,000 immigrant visas are issued to Haitians
every year. But, as you said, illegal migration from Haiti is a
very sensitive challenge for us, and does respond to changes or
perceptions of changes in U.S. policies regarding repatriation
and parole into the community pending resolution of asylum
claims.
Mr. Chairman, thank you very much for the chance to be at
this hearing. I look forward to your questions, and I hope that
these four priority areas, as supplemented by Under Secretary
Taylor's testimony, will give you a view of what the United
States is doing in this important but troubled country.
The Chairman. Thank you very much, Secretary Grossman.
[The prepared statement of Under Secretary Grossman
follows:]
Prepared Statement of Hon. Marc Grossman, Under Secretary of State for
Political Affairs, Department of State
Mr. Chairman, I thank you and other members of the committee for
this opportunity to appear before you and testify about the
Administration's policies in Haiti.
While much energy since September 11, 2001 has focused on the war
against terror, we have remained deeply engaged in the Hemisphere.
Since September 11, President Bush has made six trips to the region.
The President has received in Washington nine leaders from the region.
The Secretary of State has also been active, making 10 trips to the
Hemisphere.
I want also to thank the committee, and the Senate as a whole, for
acting promptly on the nomination of Ambassador-designate James B.
Foley to Haiti. The committee also moved expeditiously on the
nomination of Ambassador Roger Noriega as Assistant Secretary for
Western Hemisphere Affairs. We look forward to working with the Senate
to complete his confirmation process.
The United States is connected to Haiti by geography, history, and
values. Hundreds of thousands of Haitians live and work in the United
States, making important contributions to our economy and society. Next
year, Haiti will celebrate the bicentennial of its independence--an
historic event reminding us that Haiti was the second republic to be
formed in the Hemisphere.
What will it take to help Haiti become a peaceful democratic
country that respects human rights and the rule of law? How can the
United States support Haiti in building an economy with opportunities
for its people to lift themselves out of poverty, illiteracy, and
hunger? How can we help settle the political crisis made worse by the
flawed elections in 2002? And how can we safeguard our own national
security from the dangers posed by illegal migration and narcotics
trafficking?
These are difficult challenges. Success will require engagement,
consistent policies and clear priorities.
Here are four key parts of the Administration's Haiti policy:
First, we support full implementation of OAS Resolution 822. Our
support has included a $2.5 million financial contribution to the OAS
Special Mission to Strengthen Democracy in Haiti.
The Government of Haiti joined consensus on Resolution 822; it
committed itself to a series of actions that would promote a climate of
security and confidence for free and fair elections to be held in 2003.
Although the GOH has taken some steps, it has not complied with
many of its most important commitments under Resolution 822,
particularly those that would contribute to a climate of security.
Together with the OAS, the U.S. has repeatedly and consistently
urged the Government of Haiti to meet its commitments under Resolution
822. Our efforts have included participation by Presidential Special
Envoy for Western Hemisphere Affairs in the High-Level OAS/CARICOM
delegation to Haiti in March.
We also remind the opposition and civil society that they must
participate in forming a credible, neutral, and independent Provisional
Electoral Council once the Government takes concrete steps in good
faith toward meeting its commitments.
Hemispheric patience is running out. OAS Resolution 1959, adopted
by the OAS General Assembly in June, calls for the Secretary General to
provide an assessment by September of the ability of the OAS Special
Mission to fulfill its mandates under the circumstances of delay and
resistance.
We will continue to consult with our partners in the hemisphere and
in Europe regarding next steps in Haiti. Secretary Powell, speaking in
Santiago, called for a reevaluation of the OAS role in Haiti if by
September the Government of Haiti has not created the climate of
security essential to the formation of a credible, neutral, and
independent Provisional Electoral Council.
Second, we are focussed on the plight of the Haitian people and
maintaining assistance programs to meet humanitarian needs. As my
colleague Treasury Under Secretary John Taylor will testify, the
realization of full normal relations with the IFIs took a big step
forward when Haiti on July 8 paid its arrears to the Inter-American
Development Bank;
The U.S. remains Haiti's largest bilateral donor. Our aid,
distributed through U.S.-based and Haitian non-governmental
organizations, supports programs in food assistance, health
(including substantial programming to stem HIV/AIDS),
democracy, education, and economic growth.
For example, economic growth programs--totaling $7.8 million
in FY 2003 and focusing on credit for micro-businesses and
marketing help for small farmers and artisans--have provided
support for thousands of Haitians and their families. And a
network of over 30 local health organizations serves an
estimated 2.5 million Haitians. In those areas where these
organizations work, child immunization is up and malnutrition
down. On family planning and HIV/AIDS, U.S. aid programs have
increased prenatal consultations and use of contraceptives.
Our aid programs can help, but as with the political
situation, the key element for progress is the willingness of
the Haitian authorities and people to act, and to embrace the
need for good governance and inclusive, competitive markets.
Third, we must stem the flow of narcotics through Haiti to the U.S.
Sadly, narcotics-related corruption is pervasive in the
Haitian National Police.
Our efforts to combat corruption center on visa revocations
and pressure on the highest levels of the Government of Haiti
to remove corrupt officers. These steps have certainly raised
awareness in the Government about the importance of this issue
to us.
Haiti was decertified in 2002 because it failed to adhere to
international narcotics agreements and to take counter-
narcotics measures required by U.S. law. President Bush granted
a national interest waiver of sanctions, which if imposed would
have required withholding of certain types of U.S. assistance.
It is important that we continue to work with those elements
in the Haitian National Police, most notably the Haitian Coast
Guard, that we can rely on. The Drug Enforcement Agency has
mounted joint operations with its Haitian counterparts with
some positive results, but others have been compromised by
corrupt officials.
Fourth, illegal migration is an important U.S. security concern. We
want to deter illegal migration while treating migrants in a fair and
humane fashion. And we support legal migration from Haiti:
approximately 15,000 immigrant visas are issued to Haitians every year.
Illegal migration from Haiti is very sensitive to changes or
perception of changes in U.S. policies regarding repatriation
and parole into the community pending resolution of asylum
claims.
For example, in November 1991, a month after the coup that
removed President Aristide from power, Haitians took to the
seas in an effort to reach the U.S. U.S. policy at the time was
not clearly established--most were taken to Guantanamo Bay for
asylum processing but about one-third were paroled into the
U.S. The result was a wave of Haitian migrants, nearly 38,000
from the end of 1991 to June 1992.
After the first President Bush ordered the direct
repatriation of boat migrants, almost all of whom were found to
be intending economic migrants, not political refugees, the
number dropped to 2,404.
We support Department of Homeland Security policies designed
to deter illegal migration from Haiti by promptly repatriating
migrants interdicted at sea who have no legitimate fear of
persecution and by detaining those who are successful in
reaching the U.S. while their claims are processed.
The Department of Homeland Security interviews all migrants,
whether interdicted at sea or detained in the U.S., who
establish a credible fear of persecution, to determine whether
or not they have a well-founded fear of persecution.
People detained in the U.S. who meet the well-founded fear
threshold are granted asylum here; those who are interdicted at
sea and are found to require protection are resettled in third
countries.
These policies have been successful in deterring migrant
flows, which have leveled off to approximately 1,300 to 1,400
per year over the past three years while providing protection
to those who need it.
Thank you again, Mr. Chairman, for including me in today's hearing.
I will be happy to respond to any questions you or other members of the
committee may have.
The Chairman. Under Secretary Taylor.
STATEMENT OF HON. JOHN B. TAYLOR, UNDER SECRETARY OF THE
TREASURY, INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS, DEPARTMENT OF THE TREASURY,
WASHINGTON, DC
Mr. Taylor. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman and other
members of the committee. Thank you for inviting Under
Secretary Grossman and myself to testify on developments in
Haiti and humanitarian needs for that country.
As you indicated in your opening remarks, Mr. Chairman, the
people of Haiti are deeply impoverished. Per capita income is
only one-fifth the average of Latin America and the Caribbean,
one-fifth the average of an area which is well below the United
States already. Per capita income is 40 percent less than the
second poorest country in our hemisphere, Nicaragua; 40 percent
less than Nicaragua.
The people of Haiti have been impoverished for a long time.
Per capita incomes have been declining for the last 40 years,
where they have been rising through most of the world. Infant
mortality, about 8 percent; illiteracy, 50 percent; clean water
access, only 54 percent.
Years of economic mismanagement, political instability, and
weak rule of law have produced this tragedy. Fiscal policy
mistakes, monetary policy mistakes, have created uncertainty
and high inflation rates. Poor infrastructure and corruption
have created poor investments. The most basic needs--education
health, security--have not been met.
Were it not for this instability, I think it is clear that
the Haitian people would have been able to raise their living
standards significantly. Indeed, Haitians outside of Haiti--
Haitians in the United States--have done just that. They have
still sent back remittances to their families and relatives
back in Haiti equal to a fourth of Haiti's GDP, a tremendous
amount of support.
Foreign aid alone could not overcome these obstacles. The
policies in Haiti must change. A poor policy environment has
undermined the effectiveness of foreign aid in Haiti for a
number of years. Just last year, the World Bank analyzed its
own activities in Haiti in the 1990s. It concluded these
activities had a negligible impact. To take one example, a $50
million project designed to provide regular road maintenance
did not achieve its aims. In fact, funds were wasted and
diverted elsewhere.
We must commit ourselves, therefore, to avoiding such
mistakes. We need to focus our economic development assistance
in places where the policies are good so they can help the
people raise their living standards. That is the concept behind
President Bush's Millennium Challenge Account.
Now, we have been working and talking with the people from
the Government of Haiti quite a bit in the last year. We have
had many meetings with officials from the Finance Ministry. I
am happy to report that the Government of Haiti has recently
taken some strong steps to rein in the fiscal deficit, restrain
some of the inflationary financing, and eliminate wasteful
subsidies.
We welcome these important actions. The Government of Haiti
is cutting its fiscal deficit and money growth by about a half
right now as we speak. The Finance Ministry is going to be
given more control over the execution of the budget. There will
be a consolidation of separate ministerial accounts. There will
be external audits of public enterprises.
These pledges helped launch a 1-year International Monetary
Fund [IMF] program in the last few months. With this IMF
program in place, we are also pleased to announce, as Marc
Grossman just indicated, that last week Haiti cleared the
arrears of $32 million to the Inter-American Development Bank
[IDB]. The IDB can now move forward on a number of projects. It
can discuss future lending with the Government of Haiti. Next
week we expect that the IDB will approve a $50 million loan,
and disburse $35 million of that loan right away.
The IDB can also begin disbursing on $146 million of
previously approved project loans for education, for health,
for water and sanitation, and for road maintenance.
With substantially better policies in Haiti, we believe
that Haiti could tap other development assistance from the
international financial institutions. Right now, Haiti's 3-year
IDA allocation from the World Bank is only $6 million, $6
million over 3 years; but with improvements in Haiti's policy
performance, that allocation could rise significantly. It could
expand. That in itself would help Haiti clear arrears and
actually use those funds from the World Bank for economic
development.
Haiti is not now eligible for President Bush's grants
initiative from the World Bank, except possibly in the HIV/
AIDS-related projects. We are going to work hard with the
international community to make sure a substantial portion of
Haiti's assistance from the World Bank and the IDB in the
future will be provided in the form of grants.
I think it is good news that the Haitian Government has
taken positive first steps in improving its economic policies;
but, clearly, fundamental challenges remain. The Government of
Haiti must now take steps needed to lay the foundations for a
more sustained growth, growth in the private sector, which is
going to be the only way to improve living standards for
people. The United States is committed to helping people of
Haiti in this effort.
At the same time--and let me underline what Under Secretary
Grossman has said--the United States is continuing to provide
substantial humanitarian support for the Haitian people. The
United States has delivered more than $120 million in
humanitarian assistance over the last 2 years. Haiti is now
eligible for assistance to fight HIV/AIDS, malaria, and
tuberculosis under President Bush's emergency initiative.
Mr. Chairman, let me conclude my opening remarks and ask
that my written remarks be put in the record, and say that I am
quite willing to answer any questions you may have. Thank you.
[The prepared statement of Under Secretary Taylor follows:]
Prepared Statement of Hon. John B. Taylor, Under Secretary of the
Treasury for International Affairs, Department of the Treasury
Chairman Lugar, Ranking Member Biden, and other members of the
Committee, thank you for inviting me to discuss the Administration's
efforts to promote economic development in Haiti and to help address
the most critical humanitarian needs of the Haitian people.
the economic situation in haiti
The people of Haiti are impoverished. Per capita GDP in Haiti is 1/
5th the average for the Latin America and Caribbean region as a whole
and 40% lower than the second poorest country in the hemisphere,
Nicaragua. Haiti has been poor for many years. Real per capita income
in Haiti has actually fallen over the past four decades. Other
indicators tell a similar story. Infant mortality stands at 79 per
1,000 live births. Illiteracy is near 50 percent. And 54 percent of
Haiti's population lacks access to clean water. These facts explain why
Haiti was ranked 150th out of 175 countries on the UNDP's Human
Development Index in 2002.
Years of economic mismanagement, political instability, and weak
rule of law have produced this tragedy. Fiscal and monetary policy
mistakes have fed economic uncertainty and produced high inflation.
These macroeconomic factors combined with poor infrastructure,
irregular supplies of electricity, corruption, and customs delays to
create a poor investment climate. The most basic needs of the Haitian
people in the areas of education, health, and personal security have
not been met. Were it not for the violence and instability that have
characterized life in Haiti, the Haitian people would have been able to
apply their energies to successfully build a better future for
themselves and their children. Indeed, Haitians outside of Haiti have
done just that, sending back remittances to relatives that total as
much as 1/4th of Haiti's GDP per year.
As experience all over the world has shown, chronic, unsustainable
public deficits, misallocation of public resources, corruption, and
instability strangle growth and increase poverty. Aid cannot overcome
these obstacles. The Haitian government must be accountable for its
performance. In the absence of good policies, development assistance
does not improve the lives of the poor.
In fact, a poor policy environment has undermined the effectiveness
of World Bank assistance in Haiti. In 2002, the World Bank's Operations
Evaluation Department analyzed the World Bank's activities in Haiti in
the mid-1990s. It concluded that these projects had a negligible impact
on improving the lives of Haitians. To take one example, a $50 million
Road Maintenance and Rehabilitation Project--designed to address the
urgent lack of regular road maintenance in Haiti--suffered from waste
and diversion of funds to other projects. Even the improvement of roads
that did take place under the project was judged unlikely to be
sustainable, due to the lack of institutional reform at the public
works ministry and failure to establish a fund for regular repairs.
We must commit ourselves to avoiding the mistakes of the past. We
need to deliver our humanitarian assistance so that the people of Haiti
actually benefit from that assistance. And we need to focus our
economic development assistance so that it can help the Haitian people
raise their living standards and achieve the benefits of long-term
economic growth.
This Administration seeks to help countries pursue policies that
create the conditions for increased economic growth, higher living
standards, and lower poverty. This is the concept behind President
Bush's Millennium Challenge Account (MCA). MCA assistance is designed
to reward those countries that are ruling justly, investing in people,
and promoting economic freedom.
The Government of Haiti has recently taken strong steps to reign in
the fiscal deficit, restrict monetary financing of the government, and
eliminate wasteful subsidies. The United States welcomes these
important actions. At the same time, Haiti has a long way to go in
creating an environment conducive to investment, entrepreneurial
activity, and growth of the private sector.
Establishing greater political stability, improving governance and
reducing corruption are central to this effort. Improved governance has
political, legal, and administrative dimensions, which others have
noted today. Rule of law is also critical if people are to put their
capital at risk. Haiti needs to take steps to establish the integrity
of the police and the judicial system for matters both criminal and
civil. On the administrative side, improving governance entails steps
to make the government bureaucracy more effective and responsive in
meeting the needs of the public, whether in the area of education,
health, or other basic services. A key part of this is implementing
better and more transparent tracking of government spending, to ensure
that public resources are used for their intended purposes.
Outside donors can provide assistance in strengthening governance
in Haiti. For example, the international financial institutions are
encouraging Haiti to undertake audits of public enterprises so that the
managers are accountable for the resources under their control and the
resources are used in ways that serve public not personal interests.
Progress on these critical issues will not only create a foundation
for the revitalization of economic activity in Haiti, it will also help
attract foreign investment. Foreign direct investment fell from $30
million in 1999 to about $5 million in 2002. The United States is
committed to helping the Haitian government put in place a framework
that will allow the country to promote the private investment needed to
raise living standards.
recent progress
I am pleased to report that progress has been made recently. The
Government of Haiti has taken important actions to strengthen public
finances and create conditions for greater macroeconomic stability.
The Haitian government amended the draft budget for FY2002/03 to
cut the fiscal deficit by half, limiting central bank financing of the
government. Broad money growth is targeted to decelerate to 10% during
the period April-September 2003, down from 26% from October 2002-March
2003. This helped launch a one-year Staff Monitored Program (SMP) with
the IMF that outlines a framework to help stabilize Haiti's economy,
increase accountability and improve economic governance.
The Haitian government has also committed to steps to give the
finance minister more control over budget execution, so that he can
implement the budget as passed by the legislature and reduce
corruption. The plan envisages the consolidation of separate
ministerial accounts, which have undermined spending control.
Furthermore, the Haitian government has agreed to conduct external
audits of the five major public enterprises during the next year, to
ensure that resources within these public concerns are being used
appropriately.
The Staff Monitored Program gives Haiti an opportunity to
demonstrate its ability to implement economic policies designed to
promote macroeconomic stability. Finance Minister Faubert Gustave has
stressed the importance of the program for improving economic policy
and budgetary control in Haiti. We very much want the IMF and
multilateral development banks to support those in Haiti who are
working to strengthen its institutions.
To this end, we are pleased that Haiti took a crucial step forward
last week when it cleared arrears of $32 million to the IDB. With
arrears to the IDB cleared, the IDB can now move forward with a number
of projects already in train, and can reengage with Haiti to discuss
future lending. The IDB is strongly committed to working with Haiti and
in late July will send a staff team to remain in Haiti as long as
needed to outline a transitional lending program.
Next week we expect that the IDB will approve a $50 million
Investment Sector Loan and disburse the first portion of that loan in
the amount of $35 million, which the Haitian government will use to
repay the loan provided by the central bank to clear IDB arrears. We
also expect the IDB to begin disbursing in subsequent weeks on $146
million in previously approved project loans for basic education,
reform of the national health system, rehabilitation and maintenance of
roads, and investments in water and sanitation systems. These funds
would go directly to suppliers and would disburse over time as progress
is made under each project.
With substantially better policy performance and financial
accountability, Haiti could tap into other development assistance as
well. Policy performance and governance are rightly key determinants of
the allocation of World Bank IDA resources, the World Bank's window for
the poorest countries. The World Bank role in Haiti has been sharply
constrained by persistent expenditure monitoring and control problems.
The World Bank has not been able to ensure that project assistance and
budget assistance will be used for their intended purposes. Haiti's
three-year IDA allocation is only $6 million. With major improvements
in Haiti's policy performance, Haiti's IDA allocation could expand
considerably and enable Haiti to more easily clear its arrears to the
World Bank.
Haiti is not now eligible for the President's grants initiative in
IDA-13, except possibly for HIV/AIDS-related projects. We will work
with the international community for a substantial portion of Haiti's
assistance from the World Bank and IDB to be provided in the form of
grants in the future.
One final point must be made in connection with assistance to Haiti
from the IMF and multilateral development banks. It stems from
legislation passed in 2000 related to trafficking in persons. Haiti's
failure to take sufficient action to address trafficking in persons has
placed it in the Tier Three category for which sanctions apply. The
United States has urged Haiti to make a more concerted effort in this
area, but barring progress by Haiti before October 1 or a presidential
waiver, the U.S. Executive Directors would be required to vote ``no''
and use their best efforts to deny lending or other assistance to Haiti
by the international financial institutions. In the case of the IDB, a
``no'' vote from the United States would block assistance to Haiti.
The Haitian government has taken positive first steps in improving
its economic policies. Fundamental challenges remain. The Government of
Haiti must now take the steps needed to lay the foundations for
sustained economic growth and improved living standards for its people.
Consistent with OAS Resolution 822, U.S. policy does not link economic
and financial support for Haiti from the international financial
institutions to resolution of Haiti's political issues. Rather, our
objective is to encourage the Haitian government to take the economic
policy actions needed to form the basis for effective engagement by the
international financial institutions in support of economic development
in Haiti. The United States is committed to helping Haiti in this
effort.
u.s. humanitarian assistance to haiti
At the same time, the United States has continued to provide
substantial humanitarian support to the Haitian people in recent years
through periods of political turbulence. Working through non-
governmental organizations in order to avoid misuse of funds, the
United States has delivered more than $120 million in humanitarian
assistance over the last two years and remains Haiti's largest donor.
The United States has provided more than $900 million in assistance
since fiscal year 1995. Between fiscal years 1995 and 2001, the U.S.
provided 28 percent of total external assistance to Haiti, more than
three times the second-largest bilateral contribution from Canada.
U.S. humanitarian assistance efforts are geared toward alleviating
the dire conditions experienced by the Haitian people. In the past year
the United States delivered more than $3 million in emergency
assistance to respond to communities affected by droughts and flooding.
U.S.-backed health projects provide maternal and child health services,
child immunizations, and assistance in the prevention of HIV/AIDS,
including expansion of a voluntary counseling and testing network to
prevent mother-to-child transmission of HIV. The U.S.-supported network
reaches approximately 2.7 million Haitians.
Haiti is one of two Caribbean countries eligible for assistance to
fight HIV/AIDS, malaria, and tuberculosis under the President's
Emergency Initiative, as embodied in the recently passed HIV/AIDS
authorization legislation--this assistance will supplement the funds
provided to Haiti from the Global Fund to Fight AIDS, Tuberculosis &
Malaria.
next steps
The United States will continue to work closely with Haiti and
other key players to help the Government of Haiti lay the basis for
economic growth and poverty reduction. Agreement on an IMF Staff
Monitored Program and the expected resumption of IDB assistance signal
progress in breaking the logjam in relations with the international
financial institutions created by Haiti's overdue payments. With
arrears cleared at the IDB, concrete backing for development efforts
can now move forward.
We will work hard with Haiti's government to maintain this positive
momentum. The pace of re-engagement with the international financial
institutions is largely in the Haitian government's hands. For our
part, we will work to ensure that the international community provides
maximum incentives for rapid policy progress in Haiti.
The Chairman. Thank you very much.
As I mentioned earlier, the full statements for Secretary
Grossman and Secretary Taylor will be made part of the record.
I would like to note that we have several Senators present
for the testimony and the question period today, so we will
start with a 5-minute period, and another round will proceed
after that.
Let me begin by noting that you have given four foreign
policy objectives for the United States, Secretary Grossman,
two of which are democracy and humanitarian needs, but then you
have noted the unfortunate flow of narcotics and illegal
immigration.
How severe is the narcotics problem? We have come into this
frequently in Plan Colombia with a discussion of the Andean
region, but what role does Haiti play in the narcotics
situation?
Mr. Grossman. Mr. Chairman, we estimate that about 9
percent of the total cocaine flowing into the United States
comes through Haiti.
The Chairman. Nine percent?
Mr. Grossman. Nine percent. It is a substantial problem.
Haiti is mostly a transit point from places that grow and
process the cocaine. It comes to Haiti in fast boats and is
then transferred on the island. It comes into the United States
perhaps on freighters, on other go fast boats, and on aircraft.
So that is why the DEA has focused so hard on trying to assist
the Haitian Coast Guard.
The Chairman. How does the illegal immigration come about?
How do illegal immigrants come to the United States from Haiti?
Mr. Grossman. There are two parts of this, I think, that
are very important. First, as I said in my testimony, the
perception of United States policy on immigration and what we
are doing with those people who come to the United States
illegally is very important to defining for Haitians what it is
they decide to do.
The vast majority of people try to come by water and are
interdicted mostly by the United States Coast Guard and the
United States Navy. We have done a review over the years of the
spikes in this number. It is always interesting, to me, anyway,
that the spikes come when there is a confusion about what the
policy is in the United States.
For example, in 1991, a month after the coup that removed
President Aristide from power, Haitians, if you remember, took
to the sea in large numbers. The result was a wave of migrants,
over 38,000 from the end of 1991 to June 1992. Then, when the
first President Bush was clear about issues of repatriation,
that number went back down.
So that is why, Senator, that we are supporters of the
policy that the Department of Homeland Security pursues, which
is to interdict people, to deter illegal migration from Haiti
by repatriating migrants interdicted at sea who have no
legitimate fear of persecution, and by detaining those
successful in reaching the United States while their claims are
processed.
I think the Department of Homeland Security does a very
good, credible job in trying to find out who has a legitimate
claim here, trying to make the right decisions. But it is clear
that our objective is to hold people from Haiti and send people
back.
I would say one other thing. Our embassy in Haiti has done
an excellent job in getting the word out through the radio and
through fliers and other means of communication to the Haitian
people about what our policies are.
The Chairman. Presently, 15,000 visas are given to Haitians
each year. Is that the----
Mr. Grossman. Immigrant visas, yes, sir. As I said in my
testimony, we support legal immigration. We give about 15,000
immigrant visas each year.
The Chairman. What is your estimate of how many illegal
immigrants now from Haiti live in the United States?
Mr. Grossman. Illegal? I don't know. I would have to come
back to you, sir. I know that the interdictions over the past
few years are in the 1,300 and 1,400 range for 2001 and 2002,
and thus far in 2003 the number is about 1,854. But I owe you
an answer on the number living in the United States.
[The following information was subsequently supplied.]
The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) reports that there are
approximately 23,000 Haitians at large in the United States under final
orders for deportation, and an additional 21,000 who are in the
deportation pipeline. Most of these are immigration violators, but
about 1,000 have other criminal convictions.
DHS does not have an estimate of how many Haitian nationals may
reside illegally in the United States.
The Chairman. I raise the question because clearly the
number of legal immigrants from other countries is very
substantial, and currently there are a large number of people
from Mexico, for example, in our country illegally who do not
have the problem, I suspect, of coming by sea; they come often
by land, across the river. In any event, this is a sizable
phenomenon in most States, not only those that border upon
Mexico or southern States that would be most likely.
I noted that in my own statement about $700 million is
being remitted by Haitians to Haiti, which is one-fifth of the
entire economy. Obviously, the compelling economic need of many
cases to get to the United States is there. I presume to remit
money to support their families is a substantial item that may
impel some of this immigration.
What is your own analysis of that problem, the economy and
the economic effects of the remittances?
Mr. Grossman. That is absolutely right. All of the analysis
that has been done shows that in these interviews that the
Department of Homeland Security does, by far the overwhelming
reason for people to risk this journey is to do better for
themselves and to do better for their families.
The Chairman. Thank you. I will call now upon Senator
Nelson from Florida.
Senator Nelson. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Chairman, I had requested that you have this hearing. I
want to thank you personally for it. The subject matter is not
only important to the United States, but it is particularly
important to my State, because often when things go bad in
Haiti, there is the tendency of the outmigration that often
ends up in Florida. So thank you, Mr. Chairman, for calling
this hearing.
With regard to the migration, I want to tell you an
experience I had last year. Senator Graham and I persuaded the
head of the Immigration Service to come down because we wanted
him to see what we consider a double standard in the way that
we treat immigrants.
We had, in this particular case, a group of 50 Haitian
women that had been detained, at that particular time, about 8
months. They were detained in a maximum security prison which
was contracted by the Immigration Service.
After having gone and visited there with the head of INS,
what was curious was that we saw there were other women in this
maximum security facility--which, by the way, has been taken
care of, and the detainees are put in much more appropriate
circumstances and settings now--but what was curious to me was
that there were other women of other nationalities in there;
but when I inquired as to how long each of them had been there,
the Haitian women had been there 8 months, the Chinese women
had been there 2 weeks, and the other women of other
nationalities had been there in a matter of weeks.
Could you explain the administration's position to the
committee, as we do our oversight of the executive branch, as
to why this double standard exists with regard to detaining
Haitians?
Mr. Grossman. Senator Nelson, failure on my part--which I
will readily admit--I certainly can explain to you the double
standard, or as you might consider it, the different standard
between Haitians and Cubans. Where it comes to Chinese or
others, I apologize to you, I cannot do that. I will certainly
submit an answer for the record.
[The following information was subsequently supplied.]
We do not believe that there is a double standard. All intending
illegal migrants apprehended in U.S. territory, except for Cubans
because of their unique circumstances, are placed in removal
proceedings. They may be detained during their legal process at the
discretion of the Department of Homeland Security's Bureau of
Immigration and Customs Enforcement (BICE) and the Department of
Justice.
In expedited removal proceedings, under U.S. law, even if an
individual establishes a credible fear of persecution, the Attorney
General and BICE retain the authority to detain individuals without
bond while their asylum hearings and any appeals take place.
Individuals may be released for humanitarian reasons at the discretion
of BICE.
Decisions on the terms and conditions of detention of illegal
migrants in the United States are made by the Departments of Homeland
Security and Justice; however, the Department of State supports
policies that reinforce the foreign policy objective of deterring
illegal migration.
Lengths of stay in detention may vary for reasons unrelated to
nationality. The Department of Homeland Security maintains statistics
on foreign nationals pending deportation/removal, but does not keep
separate statistics for those who are boat migrants, illegal entrants
by air, and legal residents subject to removal based on a felony
conviction. In the case of Haiti, DHS reports that the proportion of
Haitian detainees who are legal immigrants having committed crimes in
the United States is substantial. These individuals tend to fight their
removal through legal appeals, and this raises average lengths of
detention.
Senator Nelson. Let's talk about that. Clearly, the United
States has an interest in protecting its borders. If we think
that someone is going to get out and become an illegal
immigrant, we have a right--indeed, a duty--to protect our
population and protect our borders.
In practice, what happens is that the other nationalities
are released into the custody of families, when in practice
Haitians are not. I would like you to discuss that?
Mr. Grossman. Yes, sir. I think, from my perspective, the
answer to that question is--as I tried to answer Senator
Lugar's point--a question of perception. It is the question
that what we do in the United States to people who come to the
United States illegally, interdicted at sea, is reflected back
into Haiti. I would speculate that we don't have the same
problem with China, we do not have the same problem perhaps
with other countries.
Again, if you look at the numbers, in 1991, in 1992, in
1994, where the perception of people in Haiti was that they
would quickly and easily come into the United States, the
numbers went way up for people who tried to get in. So it is
the decision of the administration, it is the decision of the
Department of Homeland Security--which we support--to pursue
the policy that you described so the vast majority of the
people from Haiti recognize that if they come to the United
States, if they are interdicted at sea, if they do not have a
well-founded claim to persecution, then they will be returned
to Haiti. The reason for that, Senator, is to keep people in
Haiti.
Senator Nelson. That was what was articulated at the time.
I will say it in my own words, and you tell me if this is the
policy of the administration: the policy of the administration
is that, by detaining the Haitian immigrants, not releasing
them to the custody of their families, it would send a signal
to those who wanted to leave Haiti, and therefore deter them
from leaving Haiti to try to come to the United States
illegally.
Mr. Grossman. Yes, sir.
Senator Nelson. Is that the policy of the administration?
Mr. Grossman. Yes, sir.
Senator Nelson. Mr. Chairman, I am just getting on a roll,
so I will come back in another round.
The Chairman. Pursue it if you wish, if you are in the
midst of a question there, for a moment, at least.
Senator Nelson. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Well, I think if you examine the treatment between other
nationalities and Haitians, there is a distinct difference.
Now, let me ask you, if that is the policy of the
administration, has it worked?
Mr. Grossman. I believe it has. If I might just--so I get
the statistics right--refer to some documents here.
The three spikes in illegal seaborne immigration from Haiti
to the United States, as I said to you, sir--in 1991, 1992,
1994, the number of Haitian migrants intercepted by the U.S.
Coast Guard at sea remained around 2,000 to 4,000 from 1984 to
1990, and less than 2,000 from 1996 on. In 1991, however, the
number of interdictions leapt to 10,087, followed by 31,000 in
1992. Interdictions then dropped in 2000 to 404 in 1993,
followed by a third spike to 25,069 in 1994, and then a drop
down, as I have reported to you.
Our belief is that expectations and perceptions of changes
in U.S. immigration policy had been the spark for all three of
these large-scale migrations. So when I report to you, sir,
that over the last 3 years our numbers have been 1,400, 1,300,
1,800, then yes, sir, I conclude that this policy has some
effect.
Senator Nelson. Mr. Chairman, in my next round of
questioning I would like to pursue that I think that the most
important policy of the U.S. Government in stopping the
outmigration from Haiti is the policy with which we approach
the Government of Haiti and the NGOs of Haiti in trying to
bring about economic and political stability in that country,
so there is not the surge, the urge to want to leave the
country. I will pursue that in the next round of questioning.
Thank you.
The Chairman. Thank you.
Mr. Grossman. May I say, Mr. Chairman, that in advance of
that, we both look forward to that line of questioning, because
of course that would be something we completely agree with. So
I do not want my answers to the Senator to be left here that
the only policy that we have in Haiti is a policy on migration.
So we very much look forward to that, Senator.
Senator Nelson. Get ready for my question: Why did it take
you 2 years to do it?
The Chairman. You have been forewarned.
Senator Chafee.
Senator Chafee. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I had the
opportunity to live in south Florida in the Pompano Beach area
in the early eighties and in my neighborhood there were many
Haitians living there. They were just terrific people. I know
we have enormous challenges ahead of us.
From what I understand from your questioning, Senator
Nelson, you were asking, why are Haitians treated differently
than other undocumented migrants. Did I hear an answer to that?
Why are they treated differently? Or are they, first of all?
Mr. Grossman. I apologize to the Senator. I said I was
prepared to answer the question in terms of why they were
treated differently than Cubans. I owe you and other members of
the committee a further answer about other undocumented aliens.
I don't know, and I don't want to pretend that I do.
Senator Chafee. Thank you.
Also, to followup on the same line of questioning, are you
comfortable with the treatment that these undocumented aliens
are receiving? I see from the briefing papers there was a story
in the Sun Sentinel from down in south Florida about the poor
treatment of the incarcerated Haitians as they await
deportation.
Are we confronting that? Do you disagree with the article,
if you are familiar with it at all?
Mr. Grossman. I am not familiar with it, Senator. But from
our perspective--again, part of the answer, of course, now
comes from the Department of Homeland Security--but my
understanding is that they interview all migrants, whether
interdicted at sea or detained in the United States, to
establish a credible fear of persecution and determine whether
or not they have this well-founded fear. People who are not
granted asylum are returned to Haiti.
As I say, I would be glad to look into any of these stories
that you wish, but I am not familiar with the one to which you
refer.
Senator Chafee. OK.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
The Chairman. Thank you very much, Senator Chafee.
Senator Coleman.
Senator Coleman. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you for
having this hearing. Thank you, Senator Nelson, for your
passion and focus. I felt this hearing was important to the
full committee and the subcommittee. Senator Nelson has been
very insistent that we have that discussion. Thank you for
raising that.
Mr. Chairman, I have a more complete statement I would like
to enter into the record.
The Chairman. Your statement will be placed in full in the
record.
Senator Coleman. I would note, similar to my colleague,
Senator Chafee, I grew up in Brooklyn, New York, the first half
of my life and lived over in Eastern Parkway. It was part of a
very vibrant Haitian community, a very entrepreneurial, active
community.
It pains me as I sit here to listen to what the chairman in
his opening statement talked about, the tragedy and failed
States and corruption, and all of the terrible things and the
challenges we are facing that we are trying to correct. We
should be doing better. The Haitian people deserve better. The
question is, how do we get there?
Mr. Chairman, in your line of questioning you talked a
little bit about the issue of narcotics trafficking. Secretary
Grossman, in your testimony you note that, sadly, narcotics-
related corruption is pervasive in the Haitian National Police.
I understand that Haiti has seen a revolving door of police
chiefs, none of whom seem to stay in the position long enough
to make substantial improvements in Haiti's security.
I am wondering, what is it that we are doing--what role can
we play? You can't have economic security without national
security. Haiti clearly does not have national security. What
is the United States doing to improve security in Haiti and
help professionalize the Haitian police force?
Mr. Grossman. Senator, thank you very much. I know that
John Taylor would agree, too, that one of the tragedies here,
as Under Secretary Taylor testified to, is that Haitians are so
successful around the world, and certainly in the United
States. That is one of the reasons to have hope that this is
possible, with the right economic and political and security
policies.
Let me make a general comment about the police, if I could,
since, as you say, it is extremely important that the police
piece of this come out right. You will see, I think, in
Resolution 822 and in the report of the Special Mission that
went from the OAS, and in our own comments, that focusing on
the police is extremely important. I actually think that one of
the reasons that we have not been successful in Haiti over the
past few years is precisely because there are not enough
police. You find us, No. 1, rhetorically supporting 822,
supporting the Special Mission, supporting the need for serious
police efforts in Haiti.
Second, we are also trying to make sure that whatever
assistance we can give, either to the Coast Guard or those
parts of the Haitian National Police in terms of training, goes
to people who are actually then going to do their jobs.
The other side of this, as I said in my testimony, is we
have also focused in on visa revocations for high-level police
people and also others who are involved. We have revoked about
15 visas over the past couple of years, to try to get people's
attention.
So all of these areas are extremely important to us. When
you talk about the revolving door, it has always seemed to me
that one of the best examples of why the Government of Haiti
has not yet met its obligations under Resolution 822 is the
appointment--and then 2 weeks later the resignation--of the
police chief some months ago.
As you know, from the podium--and from Secretary Powell as
well--we condemn that whole business. That man was not allowed
to do his job, to make his decisions, to have his budget.
Senator Coleman. If I may followup, then, one further
question on the security issue. Secretary Powell's comments
reflect your testimony, Secretary Grossman. You remarked if by
September the Government of Haiti has not created the climate
of security essential to the formation of a credible, neutral,
and independent provisional electoral council, we should
reevaluate the role of the OAS in Haiti.
Is the OAS the appropriate vehicle for pressing improvement
in Haiti? Help me understand what our vision is as to the role
of OAS as a partner in dealing with the security concerns.
Mr. Grossman. We have very much supported the role of the
OAS in all of what they do. I have great admiration for what
they have tried to accomplish. If you read Resolution 822,
first of all, and then the report of the Special Mission, the
followup reports of the Special Mission, I think that the OAS--
the Caribbean countries and the OAS Secretariat are trying to
do their very best.
Yes, sir, I would continue to work very strongly with the
OAS; because this is not just a problem for the United States,
it is a problem for the region and a problem for the Caribbean.
So the fact that the Special Mission was a joint CARICOM
mission was a very good thing.
Secretary Powell made that statement in Santiago precisely
because, like this hearing, we would like to get people's
attention to what is going on in Haiti, and to say to people--I
am not prepared to say we will do this or we will do that as
part of a reevaluation; but to get people's attention that
there is a sense that patience is running out and that more
needs to be done, both by the government and often by civil
society, as well. We just can't continue to do the same things
over and over and over again.
We hope it will be something the people will lift up their
heads and say, Oh, Powell said something important; this
hearing is important.
We need a reevaluation in September. What we reevaluate I
think will be a matter of consultation in the hemisphere, and
certainly a matter of consultation with this committee.
Senator Coleman. Thank you, Secretary Grossman.
Mr. Grossman. Thank you, sir.
[The prepared statement of Senator Coleman follows.]
Prepared Statement of Senator Norm Coleman
Haiti is the second-oldest country in the Western Hemisphere, just
thirty years younger than the United States. During its two hundred
years of independence, Haiti has had a particularly tumultuous history.
Hopes were high in 1994, when the U.S. led a multinational force to
Haiti to reinstall the democratically-elected President Aristide, who
had been deposed by a military coup. While many hoped this would
inaugurate a new era of democracy, Haiti's problems have continued.
A series of disputed elections have brought politics in Haiti to
its current impasse. The lack of effective authority has meant that
Haiti today is a dangerous place, an impoverished country, and a major
drug-transit location. Haiti's per capita income is the lowest in the
Western Hemisphere, at just $225 per year. The government of Haiti was
also singled out in a recent State Department report, for failing to
make sufficient efforts to combat human trafficking.
For some time the Organization of American States (OAS) has been
involved in efforts to restore a functioning democracy in Haiti.
Unfortunately, little progress is evident. Secretary Powell suggested
last month that if progress is not made in creating an atmosphere
suitable for the formation of a credible, neutral and independent
electoral council, the U.S. should ``reevaluate the role of the OAS in
Haiti.'' The OAS is not responsible for the problems in Haiti, but
neither is the OAS approach succeeding in bringing about real change in
Haiti.
Compounding the challenges facing Haiti is the AIDS crisis.
Infection rates in Haiti, 6 percent of the population between the ages
of 15 and 49, are the highest outside sub-Saharan Africa.
Appropriately, Haiti is one of two countries in this hemisphere
targeted to receive assistance under the Global AIDS bill as signed by
the President.
The U.S. cannot afford to ignore Haiti's humanitarian needs. I
strongly support the assistance we will be providing under the
President's AIDS initiative, as well as the food aid and other programs
now in place.
In this hearing, I'm sure we will take a look as U.S. immigration
policy concerning Haiti. Already there are over 400,000 Haitians living
in the U.S. While I believe our nation should continue to provide
refuge to people at risk, I worry that a further breakdown in Haiti
could lead to more than we can handle. This is why it's so important to
look at what U.S. policy can do to improve conditions inside Haiti--
supporting fair elections there, strengthening institutions,
professionalizing the police force, and supporting economic
development. Given the correlation between surges of Haitian refugees
on our shores and the cycles of political crises in Haiti, it's easy to
see why it is directly in the U.S. interest to be engaged in Haiti.
I look forward to discussing with the witnesses ways the U.S. can
help the people of Haiti to share in the democracy and prosperity that
so many other countries in this Hemisphere have come to enjoy.
The Chairman. Thank you, Senator Coleman.
Senator Brownback, we are in the 5-minute round of
questioning, the first round. I would like to recognize you.
Senator Brownback. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. I
appreciate you doing that. I appreciate you holding this
hearing on Haiti. Welcome to our guests.
Secretary Taylor, if I could ask this question of you--and
it is as much in the form of a comment, because we have been
working with the administration a lot on this--one of the areas
that I have had concern about regarding Haiti is a lack of
respect for private property rights there.
As I note in your testimony, talking about the Millennium
Challenge Account--which you would think Haiti would be a good
candidate for--but it is to be applicable to those countries
that are ruling justly, promoting economic freedom, and
investing in people.
I have a specific situation of a group, Bridges Farms, farm
operations. It is a not-for-profit group based out of the
United States. It is to create employment in Haiti. Yet, they
have consistently had difficulties getting the Haitian
Government to recognize their title to the land. The government
itself has been building buildings on the edges of the
property, and also not allowing the people to use the airstrip
that they have on their property, as well.
The Haitians have ignored various requests, despite the
fact that the U.S. Government has come to them, and I have
presented requests to them. The whole reason for the operation,
Bridges Farms, is to provide employment for Haitians.
That is a terribly impoverished country. Yet, I look at
this narrow, specific example and I'm thinking, if we are
wanting to provide additional support for Haiti, if we want it
to grow, and we do, and we want greater economic opportunity,
and we do, yet they are not willing to recognize private
property rights--and in particular for a nonprofit group that
is just trying to create employment there--I am not sure that
they are anywhere near meeting their end of the bargain of what
we would think of if we get the Millennium Challenge Account
established and moving forward.
I would hope they could respect the private property rights
so there can be growth taking place in the country. I don't
know if you know about this particular case. If you don't, I am
happy to have made you familiar with it. I hope we could get it
resolved. But to me it is indicative of a governmental system
not yet willing to do the things that it can do to be able to
allow the people to grow and prosper.
Mr. Taylor. Senator, I would like to learn more about that
particular example. It is just the kind of example that shows
the problems with poor respect for property, poor rule of law,
and how that holds the people of Haiti back and it holds
foreign investment back. Those are just the kind of policies
that we would like that government to change so that prosperity
can begin to grow in Haiti.
We are just beginning to see some positive changes that I
emphasized in my testimony on the transparency side of the
budget. But there is a long, long way to go in this respect.
Your example just points to that.
Right now, the Millennium Challenge Account holds out some
very specific things for countries to achieve. Ultimately, of
course, we say we would like every country to qualify, but
countries like Haiti have a long way to go.
Right now, there are some things that Haiti can do to get
more assistance by improving its policies just directly from
the World Bank. The World Bank has a performance allocation
method where, as countries improve their policies, they get
more funds. Right now, Haiti is quite down low on the list with
respect to the amount it gets. If it improves the policies--
just as the kind you are indicating: better certainty about
private property, better rule of law, better transparency,
better ways to deal with corruption--it will get more financial
assistance; and, more importantly, that financial assistance
will be more valuable to the people, so growth will improve.
Senator Brownback. I would like to see us help Haiti. I
would like to see us do the Millennium Challenge Account. But
if they can't get some of these basics right, I don't think
these are wise investments on our part. I don't think they are
ready yet.
So I am really hopeful that the Haitians take your points
and those from the World Bank and others to heart, because for
us to help them, they have to be willing to help themselves. It
appears to me from the information that I have that they have
not been willing to take those steps that they need to yet.
Mr. Chairman, thank you.
The Chairman. Thank you, Senator Brownback. We will have
another round of questioning of the panel.
Let me begin by saying that Secretary Powell--in comments
that you have already mentioned, Secretary Grossman--has stated
that if the Haitian Government has not created the security
climate necessary for performing a credible electoral council
to have elections by September 2003, then we should reevaluate
our policy to Haiti, and that of the OAS.
I would appreciate some discussion of what the right
security climate would be. What are the elements that would be
required to have a credible election? I suppose, beyond that,
there is the dilemma that seems to me to be posed as we try to
work with Haiti to do the right thing. Yet, at the same time,
there are the overwhelming circumstances in the country that
seem to lead to adverse results or responses to most of these
pleas, which then leads our response to be adverse to Haiti or
to the people.
There is sort of a revolving dilemma here: How do you get
some bedrock stability, or at least some minimal stability, so
that Haiti can be forthcoming, as opposed to censured? I don't
say this as criticism of either the Haitians or Secretary
Powell, but just an observation.
We are discussing, very delicately, the fact that this
country has very, very little income per capita, very little
going for it economically and politically. People are trying to
flee to get to the United States to support their loved ones
back home. This doesn't negate the fact that people might want
to have a fairer electoral system. Indeed, they might do so in
the midst of this gross poverty and the difficulties that you
have described.
Yet as a practical measure, how do we help? Is it enough
for us to be involved? How does the OAS fit into this? Is the
OAS taken more credibly than comments by even our own Secretary
of State?
Mr. Grossman. Mr. Chairman, we hope that the OAS'
credibility is helped by the comments of the Secretary of
State, and vice versa, that the Secretary of State is
attempting to put focus on the importance of the OAS.
Let me answer your question in a couple of ways, if I
could. First, I think all of the things that you have said to
describe Haiti and the challenges of Haiti are right. But I
think also what has come out in this hearing, both from the
testimony and the questioning, is that countries have choices
to make. Haiti has some choices to make. In this case, they are
not mysterious choices to make.
If we were having a hearing and it was unclear about what
the path forward was or what should be done next, I would have
a harder time answering your question. But there are choices
out there, and those choices, it seems to me, are extremely
well delineated in the report of the Special Mission of the
OAS, for example. They are extremely well delineated in
Resolution 822. In fact, if you go back a couple of years, they
are extremely well delineated in the eight points President
Aristide signed, first with President Clinton, and then were
reaffirmed by President Bush.
So if you ask me for a list, what list do I give you? I
don't say this is a complete list.
First, there is going to have to be an independent,
neutral, and credible central electoral commission that will
run this election. Now, I don't say--because I agree with you--
that only having an election is the answer to all problems.
There is the rule of law, a free market, the rights of
property. But the election is very important, it seems to me,
in moving this process forward.
The first thing is a real electoral commission.
The second thing is, think of the other four or five things
in the Special Mission's reports to the OAS: to finish paying
off the people who were hurt on the 17th of December; to arrest
some of the people who are out currently, with real impunity,
in Haiti, and to make some arrests; to follow some of the
judicial process to deal with people who are murdering
journalists and labor leaders.
There also has to be--when you talk about what is the
fundamental basis for security, there has to be an end to these
government-sponsored and party-sponsored gang attacks. There
was a terrible one just the other day on July 12 in which
members of the diplomatic corps and members of our embassy were
involved. Our Ambassador reported to me that they were lucky to
get out unharmed.
So there is a list out there. It is not a mysterious list.
I think if the Haitian Government and the Haitian people would
commit themselves to ticking off the things that were provided
to them by the Special Mission of the OAS and CARICOM, there
would be a way forward here.
The Chairman. Thank you very much.
Senator Nelson.
Senator Nelson. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I want to pick up
where I left off with regard to detainees.
Last October the whole world saw--by means of television--a
boat coming in on Key Biscayne, which is just south of Miami
Beach, and all of the Haitian migrants jumping out into the
water and trying to come to America in that way, which we
clearly have tried to discourage. We certainly should try to
discourage that.
But the question is, here we are now in July, and a number
of those people are still being detained without being released
on bond in their application for seeking political asylum;
whereas, the standard procedure is that you release someone on
bond. I am not talking about migrants from Cuba, because there
is a special law that deals with them. I am talking about all
others.
Could you explain the policy of the administration with
regard to the detention of those from October?
Mr. Grossman. Yes, sir. Again, because of our view that
there is a perception question back in Haiti, as I understand
it, there is the capacity of the Department of Justice and the
Department of Homeland Security to continue to detain people
before they go back, and to continue to detain people without
the posting of bond.
That is a choice that the Attorney General and the
Department of Homeland Security has made in this case; and, I
would say, with our support. I am not pushing this off, because
our belief is that the numbers show that when there is
confusion, it is a magnet.
Senator Nelson. Then you need the feedback from the south
Florida community that there is a difference with regard to the
origin of the migrant and the perception that is there.
One of the purposes for which I wanted this hearing, and
there are many--and again, I thank the chairman and the
chairman of the subcommittee for doing this--is that that
perception needs to be cleared up. You have to be proactive in
doing it. I am telling you, it took Senator Graham and me four
times requesting that the INS head come to Miami to see the
conditions firsthand. Since then, we have absorbed the INS into
parts of Homeland Security, but still that has been a problem.
Let's go on to the question of the IDB. Now, there are a
lot of problems in Haiti. There are a lot of problems with the
Government of Haiti. That is what is clearly in our interest to
stabilize politically and economically. It is in the interest
of the United States. Clearly, it is in the interest of Haiti.
But just until recently, for 2\1/2\ years, the IDB had not
decided to clear the arrears so that Haiti could become
eligible for additional loans. What happened was--additional
loans for what? For potable water, for basic living kinds of
things.
The cycle got more vicious and vicious. The IDB, which is
clearly influenced by the U.S. Government, said, Well, we can't
give anymore loans unless you clear the arrears. But this was
not a normal situation, so the problem got worse and worse.
In a bipartisan way, there have been some Senators up here
raising cain about it. This Senator is one. Senator DeWine of
Ohio is another one. So now the IDB finally, 2\1/2\ years
later, has started the process of making these loans available.
Could you explain the administration's policy as to why it
has taken 2\1/2\ years?
Mr. Taylor. Senator, one of the principles of our policy is
to provide support for economic development where the policies
are conducive to making that work, as I tried to indicate in my
testimony. To make a program like the IDB has to offer work,
there has to be some basic fiscal stability, monetary
stability, accountability with respect to the accounts and the
way the moneys are used, and the overall fiscal stability in
the country.
As I also indicated, we have been working with the
Government of Haiti. In the last year and a half, we have had
many meetings--and they intensified late last year and early
this year--many meetings with the Finance Minister explaining
how important it was to get the policies in a position where
the IMF could have a program, and thereby the IDB could arrange
for this program of arrears clearance.
We worked with them and they developed, as I indicated, a
substantial change in their fiscal policy, their monitoring
policy, their accountability with respect to their accounts.
Once they did that, the IMF staff worked out this staff
monitoring program. Once that was put in place, the process of
doing the arrears was ready to go.
As soon as it was there, in very short order, I believe,
the technical arrangement for the arrearage was done, which was
to borrow money from the central bank so the arrearage would
clear, so the next disbursement of the loans--which we hope
will be next week--can be used to just offset that, and more
additional loans can come from that.
So it seems to me this follows a policy of focusing on
rewarding or working with countries that are following good
policies, making sure those are in place before we proceed. I
just might add, I think that the more Haiti can do to have
better policies, the more funding will be there. I can give
examples from the World Bank and the IDB that will illustrate
that.
Senator Nelson. Mr. Chairman, I will wait until the next
round of questioning. I just want to say that I appreciate the
public service of these two representatives of the
administration. This has nothing to do personally with you all.
I just want you to know, because of bipartisan surfacing of
this issue, this Senator feels that something is finally
getting done, because the policy toward Haiti has been adrift
for 2\1/2\ years. I am glad to see that something is happening.
Thank you all for contributing to it.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
The Chairman. Senator Chafee, do you have further
questions?
Senator Chafee. No, thank you.
The Chairman. Senator Coleman, do you have further
questions?
Senator Coleman. If I could, just one question, Mr.
Chairman.
Secretary Taylor, you have talked about some of the
progress that is being made; but in your testimony you have
mentioned the concern about narcotics trafficking, and that
barring progress by October 1, that you may be in a position
where Haiti would not be able to receive some assistance. What
do you mean by ``progress?'' What are we looking for here?
Mr. Taylor. The particular things are to have laws in place
that are not in place now, as I understand it, against these
activities; some better enforcement of those laws once they are
in place; and basically a concerted effort to deal with this
problem of trafficking.
The legal situation for us, if those are not in place--the
State Department has an apparatus to make the judgments about
those. But if those are not in place, we are obligated to vote
against the programs of assistance from the international
financial institutions. That is by law.
Senator Coleman. Secretary Grossman.
Mr. Grossman. To further what Under Secretary Taylor said,
I don't want you to think that we have left the Government of
Haiti guessing as to what is required. We have been in touch
and given them essentially a 90-day set of ideas about what
might be possible, given their circumstances and given their
resources, to move back or to stay with tier 2.
Senator Coleman. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
The Chairman. Senator Nelson, would you complete your
questioning?
Senator Nelson. Yes, sir. Then I have a question that I
need to ask for Senator DeWine, who is not a member of this
committee. Thank you.
Under the Haitian Refugee Immigration Fairness Act, it
requires people to reapply for asylum status if they turn 21
while their case is pending. We recently had a case that has
caused a good bit of a stir in south Florida.
If a child comes to the United States with his or her
parents, and the application is for asylum when that child is
18 and less than 21, he is considered. But if for some reason
that child has not applied and is there with the parents and
passes his 21st birthday, then the child has to apply and go
back all through the procedures, and is subject to deportation.
Could you address what appears to be a technical flaw in
the law?
Mr. Grossman. It is not an answer you are going to
appreciate, Senator. But asylum--these questions go to Homeland
Security and Immigration. I would be glad to take the question
and give you an administration response. I apologize. As I said
to others, I won't pretend that I know the answer to that
question.
Senator Nelson. As with the other cases in the past, we
have deemed it to be appropriate public policy to keep families
together. In this particular case, it looks like the
technicality of the law is keeping the families apart.
Mr. Grossman. I will be glad to take that question, sir.
[The following information was subsequently supplied.]
The Haitian Refugee Immigration Fairness Act allows certain Haitian
nationals and their dependents residing in the United States to become
lawful permanent residents. The children of applicants qualify for
similar treatment, but under the law have to be under 21 years of age
at the time legal permanent residency is granted. If the child of an
applicant turns 21--``ages out''--before a parent's application is
approved, he or she remains eligible as an unmarried son or daughter 21
years of age or older, provided that he or she has been continuously
present in the United States commencing not later than December 31,
1995. An unmarried son or daughter who cannot meet this physical
residence requirement may still be eligible for adjustment of status
under other provisions of the Act, but is not eligible for HRIFA
benefits. This requirement reflects U.S. immigration law.
Senator Nelson. OK.
Now, for Senator DeWine, he, along with my support, has
introduced the Haitian Economic Recovery Opportunity Act of
2003. What this is is that some favored treatment of other
Caribbean nations--indeed, African nations, as well--allows
textiles to be exported into the nation, and then they can be
value-added by making those textiles into garments, and that
can be shipped to the United States duty-free or with lessened
duties.
So the theory is if we are going to help Haiti get itself
on its economic feet, then this is something we can do. If we
are doing that with regard to other nations in Africa or the
Caribbean, why wouldn't we do that with Haiti?
So Senator DeWine has filed this bill. The administration
has not taken a position on the bill. Is the administration
going to take a position? When will that be, and what will it
be?
Mr. Grossman. Yes, we will take a position. I hope it will
be soon. I don't know what it will be yet. I think the reason
is obvious, sir. I could not agree with you more in all of this
conversation, that we need to do everything we can to make sure
that there is success in Haiti for Haiti.
But we are trying to balance in the Treasury Department,
the State Department, and other parts of government--exactly
the point that you made--the interests of those people in the
United States who are interested in textiles, because it is not
an insubstantial part of our economy, and our interests in
making sure we are open to free trade, and doing things in
Haiti or Africa, as you described, that will help people.
All I can give you is a status report today, but that is my
status report.
Senator Nelson. I will look forward to receiving the answer
to that so that I can pass it along to Senator DeWine. Thank
you.
[The following information was subsequently supplied.]
Promoting private investment and job creation in Haiti are goals
that we share with the bill's sponsors. However, we need to consider
the bill in the context of our overall trade strategy. Given these
factors, relevant agencies are discussing the issue with a view to
establishing an Administration position. It would be premature to
speculate about the outcome of those discussions.
The Chairman. Thank you very much, Senator Nelson. We thank
both of you, Secretary Grossman and Secretary Taylor, for your
testimony and your responses to our questions.
Senator Chafee.
Senator Chafee. Thank you for your patience. I was just
skimming through some of the subsequent testimony. I know Dr.
Farmer has some rather scathing testimony about IDB,
International Development Bank, loans.
Have you had a chance to look at his testimony? I know you
will be leaving after this session. The Inter-American
Development Bank, IDB loans--Secretary Taylor, do you know the
status of these?
Mr. Taylor. I haven't seen the testimony that you are
referring to.
Senator Chafee. Dr. Farmer will succeed you in the next
panel.
Mr. Taylor. I have not seen that; but as I indicated in my
testimony, now that the arrears have been cleared with the IDB,
they are prepared to begin making loans again.
Next week, we hope there is approval of $50 million and
then a quick disbursement of $35 million. After that, there is
a total of $146 million in loans for roads, health, education,
water and sanitation, which then can go in the works. On top of
that, there will be a dialog between the IDB and the government
about what other kinds of assistance there can be.
So that process as of July 8, when the arrears clearance
was completed--and that was following the IMF program--things
are on track now to move ahead.
Senator Chafee. That sounds positive. Thank you.
The Chairman. Thank you, Senator Chafee. Once again, I
thank the witnesses.
We will call now upon the second distinguished panel. That
will include Dr. Paul Farmer, co-founder of the Program in
Infectious Diseases and Social Change, Department of Social
Medicine, Harvard Medical School, Cambridge, Massachusetts; Mr.
Steven Forester, senior policy advocate for Haitian Women of
Miami, Florida; and Dr. Rudolph Moise, president and CEO,
Haitian Broadcasting Network, Miami, Florida.
We welcome the second distinguished panel. I will ask you
to testify in the order I introduced you, which would be first
of all Dr. Farmer, then Mr. Forester, and then Dr. Moise.
Dr. Farmer, let me indicate to you and to the other
panelists that your full statements will be made part of the
record. You need not ask for that to occur. You may proceed to
either summarize or to present your testimony any way you wish.
STATEMENT OF DR. PAUL FARMER, FOUNDING DIRECTOR, PARTNERS IN
HEALTH; CO-DIRECTOR, PROGRAM IN INFECTIOUS DISEASE AND SOCIAL
CHANGE, DEPARTMENT OF SOCIAL MEDICINE, HARVARD MEDICAL SCHOOL,
CAMBRIDGE, MA; CHIEF, DIVISION OF SOCIAL MEDICINE AND HEALTH
INEQUALITIES, BRIGHAM AND WOMEN'S HOSPITAL, BOSTON, MA
Dr. Farmer. Thank you very much.
Mr. Chairman, This invitation is a great privilege. I
actually have come up from Haiti for this occasion. I would
like to thank Senator Chafee, and, having grown up in Florida,
want to tell you, Senator Nelson, that it is an honor to meet
you.
I would also like to thank the other Senators, members of
this committee, for allowing an American citizen who has been
living and working in Haiti for 20 years to testify as a
physician. In addition to directing a hospital in Haiti, I am
also a professor at Harvard Medical School, and have been going
back and forth between these two places, Harvard and Haiti, for
20 years. I am given, I am told, 5 minutes, so I'm going to
make five points very briefly.
The Chairman. You may take longer than that.
Dr. Farmer. Professors always do.
Senator Chafee mentioned that part of my testimony was
scathing. You will see shortly why that might be.
Senator Nelson was kind enough to mention that it took 2\1/
2\ years to unblock these humanitarian development assistance
loans to Haiti--if they are indeed unblocked; that remains to
be seen. That means loans for potable water, health, education,
and roads have been denied to those most in need. As a doctor,
I am the person who cleans up the messes that result from these
blocked loans.
Rural Haiti has one doctor for every 20,000 people. I
happen to be one of them. I am very proud to be counted in that
number, but it has been a very difficult 2\1/2\ years. I
believe that is why it is important to underline--as Senator
Dodd did on the Senate floor some time ago last year--that it
is political maneuverings that have blocked these loans and
not, as is often said, the question of arrears. I will go into
some detail on that, if I am allowed.
The first thing I would like to say before I testify as a
doctor is that the United States and Haiti are the two oldest
countries in this hemisphere, so we have a more intertwined
relationship than any other two countries. I think that is an
important fact. It is certainly important in Florida, where I
grew up. These two countries have had very divergent paths, of
course. I have my own special relationship with Haiti. I was
born in the world's most affluent and powerful country, and now
work as a doctor in one of the poorest places in the world.
I have, of course, lived through the Duvalier family
dictatorships, the military juntas that were mentioned earlier,
and also the democratic regimes that get such bad press here in
Washington. I would like to speak a bit in the first person
about the enormous difference there has been for me as a
physician trying to work for poor people in Haiti during those
three periods of Haitian history.
What is it like to be a doctor in central Haiti? I live in
a squatter settlement that was created by a development
project, a hydroelectric dam, so I will turn to the World Bank
and its policies in a second.
Just to give an example of the adverse impact of recent
U.S. policies, when we see children come into our clinic--and
some of you have been good enough to visit us down in central
Haiti--we see the results of bad policy. Allow me to give the
example of a boy whom I was able to introduce to a U.S.
congressional delegation a that came to central Haiti. This 15-
year-old boy, Isaac, had typhoid fever. Bacteria had drilled
holes in his intestine. He went to the operating room and
underwent the correct procedure, but we knew he wasn't going to
make it. A few days later, after the congressional delegation
left, Isaac died.
We doctors call those children ``IDB kids,'' now. We feel
deeply about this blocked humanitarian assistance because we
believe lives could and should be saved. I am the only American
doctor there; the others are Haitian.
Every day it is the same--hundreds of patients and scant
resources--but we have nonetheless managed to do a great deal.
That is the other message I would like to give today: that a
great deal can be done in Haiti. The current circumstances are
the best, certainly, in the 20 years that I have been working
in Haiti, not only for health care but with regard to
government, respect of law, human rights, and certainly freedom
of the press.
I can give personal experiences from the past 20 years but
I would like to focus, instead, on how we can move forward, and
make progress in terms of bringing Haiti out of its epic
poverty.
I work through a group that is sometimes called a
community-based organization or a non-governmental organization
[NGO]. Some people think of us as a faith-based organization,
so you would perhaps expect me to argue on behalf of funneling
American aid through such organizations. I may surprise you by
saying that I think that is exactly the wrong thing to do.
Haiti does receive assistance from the United States--and
from the European Union and Canada and Japan also--but the
total amount of aid has been reduced by about two-thirds since
1995. The growing health care crisis that I describe in my
testimony--a resurgence of polio, declared eradicated from this
hemisphere; a resurgence of death from measles; death from HIV
and tuberculosis--has all happened in the face of declining
overall contributions to Haiti as it tries to struggle out of
180 years of dictatorship.
Our country, my country, has cut its donations to Haiti by
more than half since 1999. The United States contributes about
$50 million a year. None of it goes to the Haitian Government,
however, except to the Coast Guard--both boats of it--as they
are being called upon to help interdict refugees and cocaine
trafficking.
Now, this is not the way to help Haiti. The way to move
things forward is to work with the Haitian Government, as my
organization does. We work with the Ministry of Health, and
also, to a certain extent, with the Ministry of Education. In
doing so, especially over the last few years, we have started,
for example, the world's first integrated HIV prevention and
care project, which has been declared a success. Haiti was the
first country in the world to receive money from the Global
Fund to Fight AIDS, Tuberculosis, and Malaria--the direct
result of a public-private partnership with the Haitian
Government.
I could give story after story of our own work with the
Haitian Government around reducing maternal mortality,
increasing rates of vaccination for children, and reducing
malnutrition in central Haiti. Each and every time we've tried,
we can claim a success. We are very proud of that. It is
because we work with the Haitian Government. However, no NGO
has national reach. I think it is very important that this
committee and the Senators present--and also people like
Senator DeWine, who has been a great friend of Haiti--push
forward the idea of public-private partnerships that really do
include the public part.
One last word about the IDB loans, and then I will close,
knowing that my written testimony is appended. The reason that
the IDB loans may flow at all is because last week Haiti did
something very frightening, even to a doctor who does not claim
expertise in economic matters. The government depleted its
national treasury by 90 percent. They spent $32 million, I
believe, to pay the arrears--many of them accumulated
illegally, as I have laid out in my testimony--because of,
again, a U.S. memo that blocked these loans after they were
already approved by the IDB's executive board and by the
Haitian Government.
Now, the charter of the IDB states that that should not
happen and may not happen. I am not a lawyer, though I am a
doctor. I would like to go back to my clinic. What we would
like to see in our clinic and hospitals, actually, is no need
at all for many of our services. We don't want to see these
children and adults with preventable and treatable diseases who
are dying unnecessarily.
So as a physician and as an American, I would ask members
of this committee to set just policies toward Haiti, which will
necessarily include working with the elected Government of
Haiti. The responsibility is on us, as well as on the Haitian
Government. If the World Bank, for example, looks back on its
own performance and gives a dismal report, I am not sure why
that should reflect poorly on the Haitians. I think the World
Bank should look a little harder at its own practices and
reassess those, as well.
We need to move forward a human rights-based culture for
the rule of law in Haiti. That can only be done by working with
the NGOs, who are the targeted beneficiaries of huge amounts of
money, and the Haitian Government, which is not. For example,
the Bush plan would allocate $15 billion for AIDS. Haiti is in
that group of countries that would receive funds. To spend that
money wisely, to be accountable, we are going to have to rely
on public-private partnerships and not try to skirt the public
sector.
That, of course, will also lead, we believe, to increased
respect for the rule of law--which, granted, is very difficult
in such a poor setting--and also lead to greater respect for
human rights, including the right to health care.
Thank you all, especially you, Mr. Chairman, for the
privilege of testifying.
[The prepared statement of Dr. Farmer follows:
Prepared Statement of Dr. Paul Farmer, Presley Professor, Harvard
Medical School, Boston, Massachusetts and Medical Director, Clinique
Bon Sauveur, Cange, Haiti
First, allow me to thank Senator Lugar for this invitation, Senator
DeWine for his longstanding commitment to Haiti, and Senators Kerry,
Kennedy, and Dodd for having suggested that I be afforded this
opportunity to comment on the current health situation in Haiti.
Haiti and the United States are the two oldest independent
republics in the Western hemisphere. And Haiti, our oldest neighbor, is
living a true health crisis. This means, of course, that our neighbors
are dying because of a health crisis. This health crisis can be
described concisely. It has many causes but none of them are
mysterious. This crisis has solutions that are well within our reach.
Because some of what I say will be contentious, I will do two things
today. First, and very briefly, I make mention of my own acquaintance
with the health problems of Haiti. Second, I will document extensively
all of my remarks and am making this documentation available for those
of you here today and for the Congressional Record.
I am a professor at Harvard Medical School but for the past 20
years have had the good fortune of spending at least half of my time in
central Haiti, where I direct a large charity hospital. This past year
alone we have seen over a quarter of a million patients and done our
best to provide modern medical services to a population living in dire
poverty. Indeed, the hospital I direct sits in a squatter settlement
and it would be difficult, I suspect, to find a more impoverished site
in which to build such a facility. I've called this settlement home
since 1983. During the past two decades, I've lived under the rule of
dictatorships, military juntas, and elected governments. Our clinical
facility has remained open during almost all of these long and often
violent years, and we have developed strong feelings regarding the
difference between working with unelected versus elected governments.
These views are less political than pragmatic because doctors, nurses,
and community health workers tend to be a pretty pragmatic bunch: we
want to help our patients get well or, even better, to prevent them
from getting sick. Our group, I should add, is a church-affiliated but
ecumenical non-governmental organization, and it's been our privilege
to work extensively, especially in recent years, with the Haitian
Ministry of Health.
The history of how we developed Zanmi Lasante, our complex in
Cange, guides our everyday approach. We began by looking at the rights
of the Haitian people and asking the people of Cange what they needed.
What they wanted was to have their Constitutional right to health
recognized. So we set up a clinic which grew into a socio-medical
complex. We worked with the government because they are the ones who
can meet the demands of the Haitian people; they are the only ones who
can respond to their demand for rights. Our patients' assertion of
rights is codified in the Cange Declaration which is their patients'
Bill of Rights. Using this approach, we have worked to put children in
school, improve the water supply, and tackle new health challenges,
some of them deemed--incorrectly, it transpires--intractable. None of
the problems I will discuss today, from AIDS to malnutrition among
children, are intractable.
Finally, I'll note for the record that I have written several books
and dozens of scholarly articles about health conditions in Haiti. In
short, I've spent my entire adult life worrying about the topic we're
here to discuss today and feel well-placed to comment on Haiti's health
crisis, its causes, and--most importantly--what we might all do to help
our neighbor overcome this crisis.
1. health conditions in haiti today
Describing the current situation is the easy part: put simply,
health conditions in Haiti are among the worst in the world. This part
of the story is undisputed and should, in and of itself, trigger
immediate action from anyone well-placed to help a neighbor in need.
All of Haiti's public health indices are bad. Life expectancy, for
example, is the lowest in our hemisphere. I rely mostly on data from
either the Pan American Health Organization or the World Health
Organization, but if our own CIA's Web site is to be believed, Haiti is
the only country in the hemisphere in which life expectancy at birth is
under 50 years and falling.\1\ As elsewhere in the world, infant
mortality rates fell fairly slowly but steadily over the course of the
past few decades, but in Haiti some of these trends have been reversed
and infant mortality now stands at 80.3 per 1,000 live births.\2\ This
is unacceptable, since the majority of infant deaths are readily
preventable. Juvenile mortality rates, similarly, are the worst in the
region, in large part because of malnutrition, low vaccination rates,
and other by-blows of poverty. Maternal mortality rates are--no other
way to put this--appalling. Even the low-end estimates (523 per 100,000
live births) \3\ are the worst in the hemisphere, and one community-
based survey conducted in the 1980s pegged the figure at 1,400 per
100,000 live births.\4\ For a sense of scale, those same figures in the
United States, Costa Rica, and Grenada are 7.1, 19.1, and 1.0 per
100,000 live births, respectively.\5\ \6\ \7\
Losing one's mother is a nightmare for any child, but for children
living in poverty it all too often means that they too are doomed to
penury and premature death. When food and water are in short supply,
who is there to fight for the survival of infants and toddlers if not
their mothers? Orphans who do survive are often pressed into servitude,
where their childhood years are filled with abuse and, as often as not,
cut short by AIDS or some other dreadful side effect of poverty.\8\
What, then, of infectious diseases, my own specialty? Polio,
announced eradicated from the Western hemisphere in 1994,\9\ resurfaced
on the island in 2000.\10\ This unexpected resurgence occurred because
of a sharp decline in vaccination rates under military rule. Haiti's
self-appointed leaders had scant interest, it would seem, in public
health. National vaccination rates for measles and polio reached their
lowest point ever, with one PAHO survey suggesting that, in 1993, only
30% of Haitian children had been fully vaccinated for measles, polio,
mumps, and rubella.\11\ It was only a matter of time--in this case, a
few months to a few years--before these diseases came back. The measles
epidemics came quickly, as we documented in central Haiti.\12\ But even
polio, deemed vanquished forever, could and did return. The strain of
polio that spread was actually derived from a vaccine, I should point
out: but a strain fully capable of causing paralysis and death and able
to spread only because so few children had been vaccinated during the
early nineties.\13\
You know already that AIDS is a serious problem in Haiti, perhaps
the only country in this hemisphere in which HIV stands as the number-
one cause of all adult deaths.\14\ The Haitian epidemic has been
described as ``generalized,'' since it affects women as much as or more
than men; is not confined to any clearly bounded groups; and has spread
from urban areas to the farthest reaches of rural Haiti, such as the
villages in which I work. What's worse, HIV not only kills 30,000
Haitians each year and orphans 200,000 more,\15\ it has also aggravated
an already severe tuberculosis epidemic. In one careful survey
conducted in an urban slum in Port-au-Prince, fully 15% of all adults
were found to be infected with HIV.\16\ Stunningly, the rate of active
and thus potentially infectious tuberculosis among these HIV-positive
slum dwellers was 5,770 per 100,000 population. Again, for a sense of
scale, the number of Americans with active TB is pegged at 5.6 per
100,000 population.\17\ For Jamaica, Haiti's neighbor, the number is 5
per 100,000 population;\18\ for Cuba, rates of active TB are only
slightly higher than those registered in Jamaica.\19\ Only 8 of every
100,000 Israelis are sick with active tuberculosis.\20\
You get the picture, I'm sure. I could go on, telling you about
anthrax, which in Haiti is a zoonosis associated with unvaccinated
livestock. As one Haitian veterinarian explained wearily, Haitians are
victims of a sort of bioterrorism linked to poverty--in this instance,
a failure to vaccinate goats, itself a symptom of our failure to share
the fruits of science with the poor, including our very closest
neighbors.
In poor countries, doctors must also take an interest in
education--not merely medical education, but the education of women and
children. We know from many studies, including some conducted in poor
regions of Mexico, that good health outcomes among poor children are
related ``independently'' to the educational status of the mother.\21\
That is, poverty is far and away the primary predictor of poor health
outcomes for Mexican children, but even poor mothers who are better
educated can hope to do a better job protecting their children. Whether
this association holds true in far poorer countries, such as Haiti, has
not yet been demonstrated.\22\ But the fact remains that Haiti's
illiteracy rates are the highest in Latin America,\23\ which is why the
Haitian government has declared its alphabetization campaign the top
public priority. All those interested in the health of the Haitian
people would do well to support these efforts.
As for food and water, again the story is grim. According to the
World Bank, Haiti is the third hungriest country in the world,\24\ the
only hungry country located close to our shores. The water story is
even worse: a group in the U.K., the Centre for Ecology and Hydrology,
recently developed a ``water poverty index'' and carefully surveyed 147
of the world's countries for supply and quality. Haiti was ranked in
147th place.\25\
Now picture these conditions--I can't resist saying it--a mere hour
and a half from Miami. From door to door, Harvard to central Haiti, my
monthly journey takes only 12 hours, and a third of that is spent
jolting along in a Jeep. This brings me to one last point about current
conditions: Haiti's roads are a threat to public health and have a
horrific impact on health care.
Allow me to share the story of Isaac Alfred, a boy who came to
Cange in January of this year. Isaac contracted typhoid by drinking
unclean water. Isaac traveled eight hours from his village near
Thomazeau to Cange. The journey was much longer than needed because of
roads much more treacherous than most of us in the United States can
imagine. Microbes had borne holes through his intestines and when he
was at the clinic, hooked up to morphine and antibiotics, he was in
excruciating pain. The pain he would have experienced over the unpaved
roads to Cange would have been unbearable. By the time Isaac reached
Cange, he received medical treatment, but it was too late. Isaac died a
few days later. Isaac died because of unsafe water and Haiti's often
impassable roads. The story that is even closer to home is that of an
AIDS patient at the Zanmi Lasante. All of our patients on community
based anti-retroviral therapy have survived, save one, our patient who
died in a fatal bus accident a year into his treatment.
So far, I've mentioned roads, public health, water, and education
and I'm doing so on purpose. These disparate factors are linked
together. One must ask who is to blame for these problems. Are the
Haitian authorities blind to the obvious need for urgent action in each
of these arenas? Do they care nothing for their own people? Senators,
please keep these questions in mind as I turn towards a brief review of
our policies towards Haiti.
2. policies healthy and unhealthy
Our own country is the richest in the world, and encompasses a
third of the world's GDP. It's also, the world's superpower. Having
established that Haiti, our oldest neighbor, is the poorest country in
this hemisphere, it stands to reason that U.S. policies towards that
country have an overwhelming influence. This too should be an
undisputed claim.
Has the influence of our policies been a good one? Here, of course,
is where the dispute comes in. I wish to argue the case as a doctor
might; I'm not a politician, nor do I have any wish to leave my clinic.
What I want to see is a healthy Haiti, and I believe--I need to
believe--that this desire is shared by all of us in this room today.
I will not dwell on what some non-Haitians would call ``ancient
history'' (that is, anything that occurred prior to the 21st century),
but can't resist noting that while the Haitians willingly sent troops
to aid us in the Battle of Savannah, in 1779,\26\ our own response to
their appeal for assistance in their war of independence was to support
the slave owners. And when, against all odds, the Haitians defeated the
French on the battlefield--which led, according to John Adams and to
many others, to the Louisiana Purchase--we continued to behave
ungraciously. From 1804 until 1862, when Lincoln changed our policy, we
simply refused to recognize the existence of ``the Black Republic.''
\27\ Worse, we later pressured other countries in the hemisphere not to
recognize Haiti's sovereignty.\28\ Our policies did not improve much
during the late 19th century, and in the early 20th century we invaded
and occupied Haiti militarily.\29\ In fact, the modern Haitian army,
which would later come to be the bane of my medical staff's existence,
was created right here in this city, by an act of the United States
Congress.\30\ Evidence shows that our past policies towards Haiti were
remarkable for their consistently antidemocratic tilt. Modern U.S.
historians agree on this, as do the Haitians.
More recent policies may appear, to the untrained eye, a bit more
haphazard. But there have been discernible trends. As of today, almost
all U.S. aid to Haiti goes through NGOs or through what are now called
``faith-based organizations'' rather than through the Haitian
Ministries of Health, Education, or Public Works. Some of you here
today will applaud this situation, and you'd think I would, too: after
all, I represent an NGO, belong to a faith-based organization or two,
and am not part of any government.
But I do not applaud this trend, not at all. I think these policies
are unhealthy. I think these policies are unfair and poorly
conceptualized because in a country like Haiti, that has suffered from
180 years of poor governance, we need to build a human rights culture.
It is a long process and one that is far too long overdue. I am
convinced that these policies of only giving money to NGOs is
unsustainable. These policies cannot succeed.
First, allow me to note, since my Haitian patients invariably do,
that during the reign of both the Duvalier family dictatorship, which
lasted almost 30 years, and the military juntas that followed, the
United States was unstintingly generous through official channels.\31\
\32\ That is, hundreds of millions of our dollars went to and through
these Haitian governments, such as they were. If the aid was supposed
to better the lot of the Haitian poor, it wasn't very efficiently
targeted, I'd say. But you don't have to trust me: in 1982, the U.S.
General Accounting Office summed up its own activities as follows:
``The United States has provided Haiti about $218 million in food aid
and economic assistance. After 8 years of operating in Haiti, AID
[Agency for International Development] is still having difficulty
implementing its projects.'' \33\
This report appeared at almost exactly the same time that I arrived
on the scene, your typical young American do-gooder. I did not have a
lot of preconceived notions about how best to do health and development
work, but as an American I was of course suspicious about working with
dictatorships, and I didn't like the way the Duvalier kleptocracy
siphoned off such significant fractions of all aid for
``extrabudgetary'' activities of their own. Again, the assessments of
officialdom (the GAO, as mentioned, but also the World Bank, USAID, and
most of the large multilateral agencies that dominated, and still
dominate, the international health scene) were grim enough. And the
verdicts of the rural poor with whom I cast my lot--they were even more
scathing. ``Why does your government support the dictators and
military?'' they asked me, politely enough. I was then a young medical
student and so I replied, ``I don't know. I'm just a young medical
student.''
But this was a disingenuous response, and I knew it. It was
important for me to come to understand what was going on if I, a U.S.
citizen, were ever going to be able to defend the policies of my own
country.
That proved impossible, frankly. When you hear this, it will be
July 15th. But I am writing this on July 4th, since I am taking the day
off and using it to prepare these remarks. I thus refer you to another
July 4th speech, made in 1985, my third year in Haiti. One month
earlier, the Haitian Parliament had unanimously passed a ``political
parties law,'' allowing political parties to exist as long as their
statutes recognized ``Baby Doc'' Duvalier as President-for-Life.\34\
The same law gave the army and the Ministry of the Interior the
unconstrained power to recognize and suspend parties. Three days
previously, the Haitian Constitution had been amended to give this
President-for-Life even greater powers, including the right to
designate his successor. These changes were approved by a referendum on
July 22, 1985. According to ``official'' statistics, 90% of voters
turned out and 99.98% voted ``yes.'' \35\
Being at the time a young medical student on summer break, I was in
Haiti on July 4th, 1985, when, in a speech, U.S. Ambassador Clayton
McManaway called the political parties law ``an encouraging step
forward.'' Newsweek quoted an unnamed U.S. State Department official as
saying, ``With all of its flaws, the Haitian government is doing what
it can.'' \36\ A generous assessment, and the State Department also
added that ``the press in Haiti has known a growing freedom of
expression in recent months.'' \37\ (I should add here that the only
free ``Haitian'' press at the time was that published in New York,
Miami, and Montreal; and all of these newspapers have since relocated
to Haiti.) The U.S. administration then certified to Congress that
``democratic development'' was progressing in Haiti, allowing more than
$50 million in military and economic aid \38\ to flow to the
government, if that's the word we want.
Being a medical student at the time, I assumed these matters were
beyond me. Better to stick to pathophysiology and clinical medicine
rather than to seek to understand why this all seemed like complete
garbage. There was, no doubt, a reason for it.
Let's flash ahead to 2001, when such excuses deceived nobody, least
of all myself. By then I'd been in Haiti for the better part of two
decades, before and after getting my M.D., and was weary of seeing
children die of diarrheal disease, adults of typhoid and tuberculosis
and AIDS, and everyone of road accidents. I was a doctor tired of
seeing children unable to attend school because they could not pay
tuition or buy uniforms--even in ``faith-based'' schools that should've
done better. And so in 2001 I looked into a series of four humanitarian
and development loans that had been blocked. Many other international
financial institutions had also cut off aid to Haiti, but I focused on
the Inter-American Development Bank, since these loans, I learned, had
already been approved by the Haitians and by the Bank's board of
directors. And it seemed only fitting that an American doctor should
inquire, as one loan was for health care, another for education, one
for potable water, and one for road improvement. And they'd been
blocked for some time--for ``political reasons,'' I'd been told. Haiti
had held local and parliamentary elections in May 2000, and eight
senatorial seats were disputed, requiring run-offs. And I'd heard, from
sources both Haitian and American, that it had been the United States
that had asked the Inter-American Development Bank to block the loans
until these electoral disputes had been worked out.
Again, I was tempted to assume that, as a doctor, I couldn't
possibly fathom the reasons that would lead my country, the world's
richest and most powerful, to try and block humanitarian assistance to
one of the world's poorest. But as a boy who'd grown up in Florida and
had followed recent electoral problems there (my mother, who lives near
Orlando, was sending me reams of material), I must admit that I was
angry. Angry, as a doctor, that the Haitian government, with a national
budget smaller than that of the Harvard teaching hospital in which I'd
trained, could not have access to credit in order to clean up water
supplies and revitalize its public health system. And angry about our
shouting down the Haitians for elections that didn't seem all that bad
compared to some of the problems my family in Florida described.
Besides, the Haitian senators occupying the disputed seats had all
resigned, and the loans were still blocked.
So this time I did try to find out more, and I encouraged others to
help me do so--my students from Harvard, research assistants, and
influential friends in business who are donors to our charity. Anyone I
could find.
Of course I also tried to go directly to the source. I asked to
meet with staffers from the Inter-American Development Bank. One of
them shouted at me, in a very public forum (again, right here in this
city), but the others were very courteous and kind. Still, they told
discrepant stories. One told me, in 2001, that Haiti owed arrears,
whereas another told me that no, Haiti had paid its arrears. However,
the Haitian authorities said they had paid $5 million for arrears owed
(they were current on their payments at that time) and had been
promised that the loans would be disbursed immediately. Despite this,
the IDB did not release the loans and the government of Haiti fell into
arrears again. It was clear that the decision to withhold the loans was
a political malfeasance that was brought upon by pressure from the U.S.
government to block the loans. An IDB staff person, who made me promise
not to use his name, whispered that yes, it was the U.S. government
that was blocking the loans. I even called a nice fellow at the U.S.
Secretary of the Treasury, since I was told that that's where the
levers were pulled. And he informed me that, yes, such matters were in
the hands of the State Department. But when I asked how I, a doctor,
might help to get clean water to the Haitian poor, I couldn't get a
straight answer anywhere. This went on and on and was very time-
consuming. And I needed to get back to our patients.
On July 8, 2003, in a move applauded by the international
community, the government of Haiti paid the IDB $32 million to satisfy
the outstanding arrears owed the Bank. It is outrageous that the
government was forced to pay these arrears because it was the
malfeasance of the U.S. which helped to create them. I am told that
this move by the government will pave the way for lending to resume
with Haiti. I ask this Senate body to help us to ensure that the U.S.
will not stand in the way of future loans from the Bank to Haiti.
A friend of mind, a famous American writer, promised to look into
the blocked loans. ``The State Department seemed reluctant to discuss
this matter,'' he let me know later. ``I was granted an interview with
a senior department official only on condition that I not use his name.
He told me it wasn't just the United States that had wanted to block
the IDB loans to Haiti, that the Organization of American States (the
OAS) was also involved. It was `a concerted effort,' the official said,
and went on to explain that the legal justification for blocking the
loans originated at an OAS meeting called the Quebec City Summit, which
produced something called the Declaration of Quebec City. But that
document is dated April 22, 2001,\39\ and the letter from the IDB's
American executive director asking that the loans not be disbursed is
dated April 8, 2001. So it would seem that the effort became concerted
after it was made.''
I wasn't surprised. The fact is, a concerted effort has long been
underway to upset the Haitian people's efforts to build an egalitarian
society. It began in 1791, and the only independent country in the
hemisphere, our own, weighed in on the side of the slave owners, as
noted. And so it has gone on for years, as Haiti grew poorer and we
grew richer. In fact, few Americans know much about Haiti but few
Haitians can afford to not know about our country. These blocked loans
do not surprise the Haitians, but do surprise the good people with whom
I speak up here in the country of my birth. Why on earth, family and
friends and medical colleagues asked, would we want to block assistance
to Haiti?
Why indeed. But it's possible to make a long list of embargoes
against Haiti, and I recently did so for a British medical journal, The
Lancet.\40\ It is an article which seeks to document the unsurprisingly
bad impact of blocking water assistance to the thirsty, education to
the unschooled, and health care to the sick. I did my best to argue
that such policies are not only illegal--an argument of limited value,
I'm told--but also noxious. Deadly. Morally atrocious. I submit this
Lancet article to you in the hopes that it too might become a part of
the Congressional Record.
In any case, I know the discussion could go 'round and 'round. And
that would make us all dizzy and I'd be the only one here, besides
Senator Frist, qualified to resuscitate you should you collapse in
Senate chambers. But since I am a doctor, I hope you will permit me to
use medical language. These are sick policies. They have a long
history. And I hope I will not be dismissed as ``playing the race
card'' when I argue that our sick policies towards Haiti are rooted in
our own country's shameful past. Again, this is easy to prove. One has
only to look, again, to the U.S. Congressional Record. On the Senate
floor, in 1824, Senator Robert Hayne of South Carolina declared, ``Our
policy with regard to Hayti [sic] is plain. We never can acknowledge
her independence. . . . The peace and safety of a large portion of our
union forbids us even to discuss [it].'' \41\
But now, thank God, we are allowed to discuss it. Unacknowledged or
not, these are the roots of our unhealthy policies toward Haiti. And
one does not have to be a neurologist or a psychiatrist to know that
there are many reasons that some forget and others remember. We
Americans have forgotten because we can afford to forget.
3. towards a healthier haiti: some success stories
I do not wish to squander your generous invitation by focusing only
on the negative. Many good things are happening in Haiti, and surely
the most important of these is the transition, however painful, from
dictatorships to democracy. There are medical victories, as well--and
most of them are the result of genuine public-private partnerships.
That means groups like ours working with the Haitian public sector.
Allow me to give a couple of success stories. First, I mentioned
that the island was the site of the hemisphere's first polio outbreak
since the disease was declared eradicated from our half of the world.
But did polio's resurgence or huge measles epidemics in Haiti
constitute insuperable problems? Not at all. PAHO and UNICEF worked
with the Ministry of Health in order to launch a massive campaign to
eradicate polio and stop epidemic transmission of measles. I'm proud to
say that we too were part of this movement and prouder still to report
that it worked.
What about AIDS, the world's latest rebuke to optimism? Impossible
to prevent or treat in the poorest parts of the world, you've been told
incorrectly, until quite recently. Here again, Haiti is more of a
success story than one might imagine. First, NGOs working closely with
the Ministry of Health have spent a decade developing culturally-
appropriate prevention tools, providing voluntary counseling and
testing, and working to improve care for people living with HIV. Could
these efforts be among the reasons why the predicted ``explosion'' of
HIV did not occur in Haiti? That is, the situation is grim and AIDS is,
as noted, the leading killer of young Haitian adults. But
seroprevalence studies suggest that the Haitian epidemic is slowing
down. Again, Haiti formed a public-private partnership, one of the
strongest in the world, in order to pull together a successful proposal
to the Global Fund for AIDS, Tuberculosis, and Malaria.\42\ The
National AIDS Commission is chaired by the First Lady, Mildred
Aristide, who has made AIDS and the rights of poor children her primary
concerns as a public figure. As I stand before you, Haiti is probably
the one country in the poor world with the most promising integrated
AIDS prevention and care project already up and running. Over the past
year, our project has hosted scores of visitors from as far away as
Zambia, South Africa, Uganda, and even Japan.
What about maternal mortality? Can nothing be done to prevent this
horror? Again, PAHO is engaged in efforts to make childbirth safer and
so are we--and we all work with the Haitian government. There is, as
noted, a huge challenge before us. And yet modern medicine has made it
possible to make childbirth safe, even in the very poorest corners of
the world. In part of central Haiti, where we work with traditional
birth attendants and community health workers to offer at-risk women
high-quality obstetric services (for example, cesarean sections or
treatment of eclampsia), maternal mortality is under 200 per 100,000
live births and dropping. We still have a long way to go, granted, but
we're moving in the right direction. Again, this success owes much to
our close ties with the Ministry of Health which, though flat broke,
has assigned publicly-trained nurse-midwives to assist us. UNICEF has
supplied many of our traditional birth attendants with birthing kits.
We are also vaccinating our staff against hepatitis B and making sure
they have gloves and aprons and other supplies. If we were to work
assiduously with the Ministry of Health, how difficult would it be to
replicate these practices throughout a country about the size of the
state of Maryland?
We are proud of our work in Cange because our methods incorporate a
community-wide approach that focuses on the Haitian people's right to
health. This sets us apart from the other NGOs that are operating in
Haiti. Zanmi Lasante is a successful public/private partnership which
supports poor Haitians' demands upon the government for the right to
health and further develops a strategy with them to engage the
government and civil society so their demands are respected and can be
met. We have a proven success rate using the human rights based
approach, rather than the framework of handouts by rich countries and
donors that most NGOs in Haiti work under. This human rights approach
to development, not only in the health sector, is a model that can be
and should be used by other NGOs to build sustainable solutions.
4. a few conclusions
Everyone who speaks today will tell you that the situation in Haiti
is awful. And so it is, especially from the point of view of a
physician who serves the poor. But there is so much that could be done.
Permit me to continue speaking to you as a doctor. First, we need a
diagnosis. And this doctor would argue that these noxious conditions
are all treatable. What is the etiology of these problems? Haitian
culture, as some have argued? Ridiculous--this has nothing to do with
Haitian culture. Nor is bad governance the problem. How on earth could
we say this when we were so willing to fork over hundreds of millions
of dollars to the Duvaliers and the Haitian army, which in over a
century had known no enemy other than the Haitian people? What is even
more horrendous is that the Duvalier regime was well known for its
human rights abuses internationally. Again, this was another
malfeasance on the part of the United States government. It has led to
an enormous and odious debt to the international community, much of
which has not been repatriated from the Duvaliers. Considering this, it
is appropriate for the U.S. government and the international financial
institution to pursue debt forgiveness for Haiti's odious debt.
The problem in Haiti is poverty and, alas, we have failed to do our
best to help our neighbors rebuild their ravaged country. But we can
certainly start doing so.
Rebuilding Haiti will require resources. The Haitians have a
saying: you can't get blood from a rock. It is critical that capital
begins to flow once again to Haiti's public sector in order to stay the
human rights and humanitarian crises I've described. But this capital
cannot go only to groups like ours--to NGOs or ``faith-based
organizations.'' It must be spent well using new approaches that
provide Haiti's poor the ability to demand health, to demand potable
water, to demand nutrition and have those demands met. That is
precisely what building the environment and culture that respects the
full spectrum of human rights is about. We're proud of our work in
central Haiti, but that's where we live and work: in a circumscribed
bit of central Haiti. Only the Haitian government has both national
reach and a mandate to serve the Haitian poor.
Haiti still receives assistance from the United States and the
European Union and Canada and Japan and various United Nations
organizations. But the total amount of aid has been reduced by about
two-thirds since 1995. Our country has cut its donations by more than
half since 1999. The United States contributes about $50 million a
year, but none of it goes to the Haitian government \43\--except for a
small amount to Haiti's coast guard, both boats of it, given in the
hope that this might help prevent refugees from disembarking for
Florida and cocaine-shippers from getting their product to the same
destination. Again, for a sense of scale, recall that the U.S.
government pumped an estimated $200 million through the Haitian
military government in the 18 months following February 1986.\44\ The
World Bank, the self-proclaimed lead agency addressing world poverty,
has shut down all future lending to this hemisphere's poorest country.
It has, in fact, closed its Haiti office, leaving behind only an
administrator and a chauffeur. Hardly an impressive strategy for
poverty alleviation.
As the United States continues to ramp up spending for global AIDS,
TB and malaria, both through the Presidents emergency AIDS initiative
and the millennium challenge account, it is important to consider the
application of those spending packages. Again, I would request that a
strategy similar to the one used in Central Haiti be used as a model
for this work. This model works in Haiti and can work in other
developing countries and resource poor settings.
Haiti needs our help. Haiti needs resources. But Haitians need us
to remember some of the things we forget all too expediently. Technical
assistance is also of great importance, but we need to be respectful of
our Haitian partners. In 1804, Haiti taught the world a great lesson,
perhaps the greatest lesson ever. Haiti taught us that slavery, the use
of other humans as chattel, is a crime against humanity. The French
claimed to have done this in 1789, but every Haitian knows that it was
Napoleon himself who in 1801 sent 40,000 troops to reconquer Haiti, and
reclaim it as France's most valuable slave colony. Napoleon failed. And
where were we, Haiti's only neighbors at the time? Where were we who
should have helped Haiti rebuild an island devastated by a decade of
war? The answer: Haiti had no friends. There was no assistance.
That was then and this is now. We now have a chance to make up for
past errors. How are we doing? Poorly. Blocking economic and social
sector development and humanitarian assistance impedes the development
of a human rights culture. With holding health, water and sanitation,
education and transportation funding is a terrible tactical and moral
error; it is also a medical and epidemiological error. And this error
could be corrected, almost effortlessly, by the U.S. government. If I
were you, I would not listen to a lot of palaver about arrears or other
technicalities. The United States has the power to unblock aid to Haiti
in a heartbeat.
That was my final medical metaphor, I promise. In closing, I would
ask the members of this committee to call for a formal reexamination of
our policies towards Haiti. I would ask that we acknowledge, as a
people, our errors and that we try for a fresh start. We certainly have
all that is necessary to do so. Call it a ``Marshall Plan for Haiti,''
call it reparations, call it whatever you want. But let us, at long
last, do the right thing. And then we will know the gratitude of our
neighbors. Certainly, you will know the gratitude of a doctor who would
like to see everyone have the chance to live full and happy lives. And
although I care deeply for all my patients, I think you will forgive me
for wishing this most ardently for the Haitian people.
Thank you for the privilege of testifying.
footnotes
\1\ United States Central Intelligence Agency. The World Factbook
2002. Available at: http://www.cia.gov/cia/publications/factbook/geos/
ha.html.
\2\ Infant mortality in Haiti has actually risen since 1996, when
it was 73.8 per 1,000 live births; PAHO attributes this rise to
increasing poverty, the deterioration of the health system, and HIV.
See Pan American Health Organization. Country Profiles: Haiti. 2003.
Available at: http://www.paho.org/English/DD/AIS/be_v24n1-haiti.htm.
\3\ Pan American Health Organization. Country Profiles: Haiti.
2003. Available at: http://www.paho.org/English/DD/AIS/be_v24n1-
haiti.htm. These numbers are likely to be even higher if one measures
maternal mortality at the community level.
\4\ The only community-based survey done in Haiti, conducted in
1985 around the town of Jacmel in southern Haiti, found that maternal
mortality was 1,400 per 100,000 live births. See Jean-Louis R.
Diagnostic de l'etat de sante en Haiti. Forum Libre I (Medecine, Sante
et Democratie en Haiti) 1989: 11-20.
During that same period, ``official'' statistics reported much
lower rates for Haiti, ranging from a maternal mortality rate of 230
for the years 1980-1987 and a maternal mortality rate of 340 for 1980-
1985 to a higher estimate in the years that followed, 1987-1992, of 600
maternal deaths per 100,000 live births. See United Nations Development
Programme. Human Development Report, 1990. New York: Oxford University
Press for UNDP, 1990; and World Bank. Social Indicators of Development.
Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1994; respectively.
For additional maternal mortality data from that period, see World
Health Organization. Maternal Mortality: Helping Women Off the Road to
Death. WHO Chronicle 1985; 40: 175-183.
\5\ Pan American Health Organization. Country Health Profile:
United States. 2001. Available at: http://www.paho.org/English/SHA/
prflUSA.htm.
\6\ Pan American Health Organization. Country Health Profile: Costa
Rica. 2001. Available at: http://www.paho.org/English/SHA/prflCOR.htm.
\7\ United Nations Development Programme. Human Development
Indicators 2003: Grenada. Available at: http://www.undp.org/hdr2003/
indicator/cty_f_GRD.html.
\8\ Mildred Aristide has recently published an excellent overview
of the problem of children who become ``domestic servants,'' grounding
this phenomenon in its historical context and at the same time
revealing the enormous social cost of such abuse. She writes, ``It is
clear that Haiti's rural development and the faltering road to a
national public education system have been and remain at the center of
the propagation of child domestic service in the country. This explains
why the prototypical image of a child in domestic service is one of a
child from the impoverished countryside seeking an education, working
in the city.'' See Aristide M. L'Enfant En Domesticite en Haiti:
Produit d'un Fosse Historique (Child Domestic Service in Haiti and Its
Historical Underpinnings). Port-au-Prince, Haiti: Imprimerie H.
Deschamps, 2003; p. 89-90.
\9\ Centers for Disease Control and Prevention. International notes
certification of poliomyelitis eradication--the Americas, 1994.
Morbidity and Mortality Weekly Report 1994; 43(39): 720-722.
\10\ Centers for Disease Control and Prevention. Outbreak of
poliomyelitis--Dominican Republic and Haiti, 2000. Morbidity and
Mortality Weekly Report 2000; 49(48): 1094, 1103.
\11\ Pan American Health Organization and World Health
Organization. Haiti--L'Aide d'Urgence en Sante. Port-au-Prince: Pan
American Health Organization, 1993.
\12\ Farmer PE. Haiti's Lost Years: Lessons for the Americas.
Current Issues in Public Health 1996; 2(3): 143-151.
\13\ Kew O, Morris-Glasgow V, Landaverde M, et al. Outbreak of
poliomyelitis in Hispaniola associated with circulating type 1 vaccine-
derived poliovirus. Science 2002; 296 (5566): 269-70.
\14\ Pan American Health Organization. ``Haiti.'' In: Health in the
Americas 2002: Vol. II. Washington, D.C.: Pan American Health
Organization, 2002: 336-349.
\15\ Joint United Nations Programme on HIV/AIDS. Epidemiological
Fact Sheets on HIV/AIDS and Sexually Transmitted Infections: Haiti.
2002. Available at: http://www.unaids.org/hivaidsinfo/statistics/
fact_sheets/pdfs/Haiti_en.pdf.
\16\ Desormeaux J, Johnson MP, Coberly JS, et. al. Widespread HIV
counseling and testing linked to a community-based tuberculosis control
program in a high-risk population. Bulletin of the Pan American Health
Organization 1996; 30(1): 1-8.
For a more comprehensive overview of Haiti's burden of treatable
and preventable infectious diseases, see Farmer P. Infections and
Inequalities: The Modern Plagues. Berkeley, CA: University of
California Press, 1999.
\17\ Centers for Disease Control and Prevention. Reported in
Tuberculosis in the United States, 2001. Atlanta, GA: U.S. Department
of Health and Human Services; 2002. Available at: http://www.cdc.gov/
nchstp/tb/surv/surv2001/content/T1.htm.
\18\ United Nations Development Programme. Human Development
Indicators 2003: Jamaica. Available at: http://hdr.undp.org/reports/
global/2002/en/indicator/indicator.cfm?File=cty_f_JAM.html.
\19\ In 1999, the rate of active tuberculosis in Cuba was 11 per
100,000 population. See United Nations Development Programme. Human
Development Indicators 2003: Cuba. Available at: http://hdr.undp.org/
reports/global/2002/en/indicator/indicator.cfm?File=cty_f_CUB.html.
\20\ United Nations Development Programme. Human Development
Indicators 2003: Israel. Available at: http://hdr.undp.org/reports/
global/2002/en/indicator/indicator.cfm?File=cty_f_ISR.html.
\21\ For a review of these studies in Mexico, see LeVine RA, LeVine
SE, Richman A, et al. Women's schooling and child care in the
demographic transition: A Mexican case study. Population and
Development Review 1991; 17(3): 459-496. See also Cleland J and van
Ginneken J. Maternal education and child survival in developing
countries: The search for pathways of influence. Social Science and
Medicine 1988; 27: 1357-1368.
\22\ Educational status is so tightly linked to social class in
Haiti that it difficult to know whether or not educational status is an
independent predictor of better outcomes for children. But relevant
data from Haiti indicates that of mothers who had received at least a
primary school education, 94% received prenatal care and 74% were
vaccinated against tetanus. Among women with no formal schooling, on
the other hand, only 53% received prenatal care and 58% received
vaccination against tetanus. See Pan American Health Organization.
``Haiti.'' In: Health in the Americas 1998: Vol. II. Washington, D.C.:
Pan American Health Organization; 1998: 316-330.
\23\ Only 50.8% of adults over age 15 are literate. See United
Nation Development Programme. Human Development Indicators 2003: Haiti.
Available at: http://www.undp.org/hdr2003/indicator/cty_f_HTI.html.
\24\ United Nations Food and Agriculture Organization. The State of
Food Insecurity in the World. United Nations Food and Agriculture
Organization: Rome, 2000. Available at: http://www.fao.org/FOCUS/E/
SOFI00/img/sofirep-e.pdf.
\25\ Sullivan CA, Meigh JR, and Fediw TS. Derivation and Testing of
the Water Poverty Index Phase I. Centre for Ecology and Hydrology:
Wallingford, 2002. Available at: http://www.ciaonet.org/wps/suc01/
suc01.pdf.
\26\ Madeline Diaz, in the U.S. Consulate's Haiti newsletter,
describes the event this way: ``. . . Haitian soldiers fought and died
on a Georgia battlefield to help the United States gain its
independence from England. About 1,500 volunteers from their country,
then a French colony, joined forces with the Americans to fight the
British in the 1779 Siege of Savannah.'' See Diaz MB. Haitians seeking
recognition of war effort in U.S. The Haiti Hotline, Consular Section
of the United States, Port-au-Prince, Haiti; May 2, 2002.
\27\ Lawless R. Haiti's Bad Press. Rochester, VT: Schenkman Books,
1992.
\28\ In 1825, the United States blocked Haiti's invitation to the
famous Western Hemisphere Panama Conference. See Lawless R. Haiti's Bad
Press. Rochester, VT: Schenkman Books, 1992.
\29\ Heinl R and Heinl N. Written in Blood. Boston: Houghton
Mifflin Co., 1978.
\30\ See the account of Gaillard R. Hinche Mise en Croix. Port-au-
Prince, Haiti: Imprimerie Le Natal, 1982. This book is part of a seven-
volume overview of the U.S. occupation of Haiti.
\31\ Hancock G. Lords of Poverty: The Power, Prestige, and
Corruption of the International Aid Business. New York: Atlantic
Monthly Press, 1989.
\32\ Lawless R. Haiti's Bad Press. Rochester, VT: Schenkman Books,
1992.
\33\ United States General Accounting Office. Assistance to Haiti:
Barriers, Recent Program Changes, and Future Options. Washington, D.C.:
United States General Accounting Office, 1982; p. i.
\34\ Americas Watch. Haiti: Human Rights Under Hereditary
Dictatorship. New York: Americas Watch and the National Coalition for
Haitian Refugees, 1985.
\35\ Americas Watch. Haiti: Human Rights Under Hereditary
Dictatorship. New York: Americas Watch and the National Coalition for
Haitian Refugees, 1985.
\36\ Cited in Americas Watch. Haiti: Human Rights Under Hereditary
Dictatorship. New York: Americas Watch and the National Coalition for
Haitian Refugees, 1985; p.30.
\37\ Cited in Americas Watch. Haiti: Human Rights Under Hereditary
Dictatorship. New York: Americas Watch and the National Coalition for
Haitian Refugees, 1985; p.32.
\38\ Hooper M. ``Haiti's Despair.'' The New York Times 27 August,
1985.
\39\ Declaration of Quebec City, Third Summit of the Americas.
United States State Department, 2001. Available at: http://
usinfo.state.gov/regional/ar/summit/declaration22b.htm.
\40\ Farmer P, Smith Fawzi MC, and Nevil P. Unjust embargo of aid
for Haiti. The Lancet 2003; 361: 420-423.
\41\ Cited in Schmidt H. The United States Occupation of Haiti,
1915-1934. New Brunswick, NJ: Rutgers University Press, 1971; p. 28.
\42\ For information on Haiti's proposal to the Global Fund, see
http://www.globalfundatm.org/proposals/round1/fsheets/haiti.html.
\43\ United States Agency for International Development.
Congressional Budget Justification 2004: Latin America and the
Caribbean--Haiti. Available at: http://www.usaid.gov/policy/budget/
cbj2004/latin_america_caribbean/haiti.pdf.
\44\ Farmer PE. The Uses of Haiti. Monroe, ME: Common Courage
Press, 1994.
[Reprinted with permission from Elsevier.]
(The Lancet, Vol. 361, 420-423, February 1, 2003)
viewpoint
Unjust Embargo of Aid for Haiti
(Paul Farmer, Mary C Smith Fawzi, Patrice Nevil)
Many analyses suggest that social and economic inequalities have
deepened most quickly between rich and poor countries over the past
three decades.\1\ Adverse health effects of social inequalities are
obvious in wealthy countries,\2\ and are matters of life and death for
vulnerable populations in many least developed countries, where life
expectancy has dropped in these same decades.\3\ Some negative health
trends are caused by HIV/AIDS and other emerging threats; war and
social disruption can be to blame. Indeed, many of the growing health
problems of the world's destitute sick are now regarded as humanitarian
crises, and to address these, large international aid bureaucracies
have emerged over the past half century.
Although most public health and disaster relief experts have argued
against the politicisation of aid, most bilateral, and much
multilateral, aid remains tied to the political aims of wealthy
countries. Such linkage can be subtle (eg, aid will be disbursed only
if specific economic policies or political systems are adopted). \4\
Here, we consider the health consequences of less subtle forms of the
politicisation of humanitarian and development aid--ie, embargoes and
blockades.
In the minds of Haitians, modern-day embargoes against their
country are linked to the long string of those in their nation's
history (panel). However, we believe that the present freeze of
humanitarian aid is especially unjust. For the past 18 years, we have
delivered health services in Haiti's central plateau. Social conditions
in this region are deteriorating, mostly because resources and medical
personnel are scarce, and because there is a growing burden of disease.
There are many reasons for worsening conditions, but it is important to
assess the connection between unnecessary suffering, increased
mortality, and an aid embargo which has greatly diminished the ability
of the public-health system to respond to the needs of the Haitian
people.
Although the Haitian government mismanaged foreign aid during the
Duvalier family dictatorship, generous aid continued to flow during
much of that time, mainly from the USA.\5\ \6\ \7\ During the early
1990s, with Haiti under military control after a violent coup d'etat,
the UN imposed a trade embargo on Haiti to push forward the restoration
of the nation's first democratically elected president, Jean-Bertrand
Aristide. However, US political commitment to this embargo was, at
best, tenuous. The US National Labor Committee was later able to report
that, ``In 1992, despite the OAS [Organization of American States]
international embargo, U.S. apparel firms and retailers--`under a
loophole benefiting US-owned exporters'--imported $67,629,000 worth of
clothing sewn in Haiti.'' \8\ An embargo on petroleum was openly
flouted, with a tanker from Texas delivering oil in full view of the
international bodies charged with enforcing the embargo against the
military regime.
On Aristide's return to office in 1994, the USA, other ``donor
nations'', and multilateral organisations promised US$500 million
dollars over 2-3 years in development aid to rebuild Haiti's battered
health, education, and sanitation infrastructure, and to stimulate what
had become one of the weakest economies in the world. Most of this aid
has been withheld, thus further crippling Haiti's new democracy.
For example, three loans totalling US$146 million--intended for
health sector improvement, education reform, potable water enhancement,
and road rehabilitation--were approved through the Inter-American
Development Bank (IDB) and by the Haitian government. But these loans
have been blocked by a US veto in response to alleged irregularities
during national parliamentary elections held in May, 2000.
According to the OAS, seven legislators elected should have gone to
run-off elections. Six months after this election, presidential
elections were held and Aristide, was again elected with a landslide,
was inaugurated in February, 2001. Despite the fact that the
legislators in question have stepped down, the USA continues to block
the IDB loan on the grounds that Haiti has not shown adequate
commitment to democratic governance.
What are the public-health implications of withholding $500 million
in development assistance and blocking $146 million in loans for water,
health, and education? Clearly, Haiti is highly vulnerable to external
economic determinants, especially those coming from the USA. During the
military rule in the early 1990s, Haiti's public health situation
deteriorated greatly. Causality is hard to establish because the
noxious effects of a leaky embargo and the consequences of military
rule cannot be disentangled. The effect of the military coup was severe
in the short term, with thousands of people killed and hundreds of
thousands displaced. In view of a striking, yet unsurprising, absence
of commitment to public health on the part of the Haitian army, and
also severe repression of the population, there was a sharp fall in the
quality and coverage of services for Haiti's poor. For example, child
mortality doubled in a population-based sample in the central plateau
(Maissade area) from 1991 to 1992.\9\ This rise was related to a
measles outbreak--itself a consequence of the deterioration of the
public health infrastructure during that time--as well as to shortages
of food, medicine, and other supplies. Furthermore, many parents,
especially fathers, were in hiding during those years and in this time
of great insecurity, crops were not planted. In 1992, some 22% of child
deaths in Maissade were associated with severe malnutrition or
kwashiorkor, a higher death rate related to malnutrition than in the
years before the military coup.\9\ Other evidence exists of the
deterioration of public health and healthcare infrastructures during
the early 1990s.\10\ \11\ For example, maternal mortality was estimated
to be as high as 450 per 100,000 births in 1994, a rise of 29% from
that reported in 1989.\11\
Elsewhere in central Haiti, we documented worsening social and
economic conditions, and a paradoxical decline in the number of
patients seen; our clinic was threatened during the military occupation
of the country.\12\ In our catchment area, the decline in health status
during the 3 years after the coup was catastrophic: epidemics of
measles and other vaccine-preventable diseases were reported, as were
outbreaks of dengue fever.\13\ \14\
beyond haiti: embargoes and healthcare
During the past 10 years, evidence has accumulated, showing that
economic sanctions and embargoes are most harmful to the vulnerable
populations within countries that are targeted.\10\ Sanctions and
economic embargoes have been associated with declines in health status
in Cuba, Iraq, the former Yugoslavia, and Nicaragua\15\ For example, in
southern and central Iraq, mortality in children aged less than 5 years
rose after sanctions from 56 per 1000 live births to 131 per 1000 live
births.\16\ The long-term effects of the Gulf War might also be
contributing to this increased mortality. Daponte and colleagues\17\
investigated the effects of economic sanctions on Iraq and noted that
even before the war, child mortality increased strikingly during 6
months of sanctions.
After UN sanctions were imposed on Yugoslavia, UN agencies,
including the UN High Commissioner for Refugees and WHO, reported a
rapid rise in tuberculosis rates, a tripling of mortality in mental
institutions in less than a year, a drop in immunisations rates, and
deaths because of a shortage of fuel to transport patients to
hospital.\18\ Cuba has a highly functional health-care system, but the
US embargo has nevertheless exacerbated difficulties in importing
medication. Several drugs became unavailable after the embargo was
tightened in 1992 when the US government passed the Cuban Democracy
Act. Since then, the cost of many medical supplies has increased
because of restrictions placed on medical suppliers. In 1994 there was
an outbreak of Guillain-Barre syndrome in Havana linked to water
contaminated with Gampylobacter spp, but chlorination chemicals were
not available for water purification.\19\
health status and poverty
An important difference between Haiti and countries such as Iraq
and Cuba is that severe poverty is pervasive in Haiti. The baseline
economic situation should be taken into account if we are to understand
the health effects of an economic or aid embargo on a specific country.
The $146 million in IDB loans that are blocked by the US administration
are urgently needed. During the past 2 years, we have seen further
deterioration in regional public health infrastructure and worsening
health status of patients and people living within and beyond our
catchrnent area.
The decline in health status has had an effect on the 80-bed
hospital we direct in the lower central plateau. With a staff of ten
Haitian physicians and a large body of community health workers, Zanmi
Lasante is one of the largest community-based charity hospitals in
Haiti. Our financial support comes largely from private donors and
foundations rather than bilateral or multilateral aid from institutions
such as the IDB.
In our clinic we have enough staff to receive 35,000 visits per
year, but in 2002, we saw almost 200,000 ambulatory patients--a more
than three-fold increase from the previous year. Meanwhile, other
nearby private and state-run facilities have very few patients;
although they remain open, they sell or prescribe medications at prices
that are too high for most people in Haiti, over 80% of whom live in
poverty.\20\
We have noted a rise in the number of trauma cases attributable in
large part to road accidents. The sequelae of accidents are more
serious than they would be in other settings because patients have to
travel long distances to receive care, and many need but do not receive
the care of orthopaedic and trauma surgeons. Malaria also remains a
major contributor to anaemia, and is the most frequent sole diagnosis
during the rainy season from May to October. Deaths from this disease
continue, even though Haiti has not yet registered chloroquine-
resistant cases. Access to care has deteriorated during the present
embargo and remains the main obstacle in delivery of health-care.
Poliomyelitis, which was thought to have been eradicated from the
western hemisphere, has resurfaced on the island.\21\ Whether a wild-
type or vaccine-related strain, poliovirus will continue to spread if
national vaccination efforts are not supported through ministry
programmes, since national coverage is imperative. We have also noted
outbreaks of other infectious diseases such as anthrax, meningitis, and
drug-resistant tuberculosis.\22\ The degree to which these pathogens
can be contained will depend largely on the capacity of the public
health system to respond.
Outside our hospital's expanding catchment area, there has been an
overall decline in the population's health during the past 2 years.
There has also been a notable reduction in availability of potable
water, especially in Port-au-Prince ($54 million of the blocked IADB
loan was intended for improvement of water treatment). This situation
is similar to that seen after the military coup in the early 1990s
when, in that city, 53% of the population had access to potable water
in 1990, but this rate fell to 35% in 1994.\10\
embargoes and collateral damage
During the past several years, average life expectancy has dropped
in Haiti to 49-6 years at birth.\23\ Although the fall cannot be
attributed directly to the embargo, humanitarian assistance is being
withheld while the country's health profile is deteriorating.
Furthermore, aggressive humanitarian aid could have an immediate and
beneficial effect if it were channelled through institutions with
national reach--namely, the public health system. Increasingly,
however, aid has been reduced or directed to non-governmental
organisations that make only local contributions.
Even when embargoes are judged to be legitimate, provision of
humanitarian aid is necessary and consistent with the implementation of
sanctions and embargoes in other settings. For example, the UN Security
Council implemented the oil-for-food programme in Iraq to address
humanitarian needs of the population, irrespective of changes in the
political situation. This programme resulted in a slight improvement in
child mortality in northern Iraq.\15\ UN agencies and other
multilateral organisations, therefore, need to provide humanitarian
assistance to vulnerable populations in Haiti to mitigate the effects
of the US-advocated aid embargo. Better yet, promised aid should be
released to Haiti, for these sanctions are in many ways worse than
those in other countries. In most embargoes (eg, Haiti 1991-94, and
Iraq), the suffering of ordinary citizens is termed collateral damage,
an undesired result justified by the greater good of removing the
target, an unpopular dictatorship. However, when sanctions are levelled
against an elected government, there is no collateral damage; ordinary
citizens, who made the ``wrong'' choice at the polls, are the targets.
Their suffering and the social discord that necessarily ensues seem to
be the intended result.
We have seen US aid flow smoothly and generously during the
Duvalier dictatorship and military juntas that followed. As health care
providers, we believe that the present embargo enforced during the
tenure of a democratically elected government is immoral. Such policies
are both unjust and a cause of great harm to the Haitian population,
especially to those living in poverty.
Conflict of interest statement
None declared.
Acknowledgments
We thank Juan Salazar, Laura Tarter, Nicole Gastineau, Brian
Concannon, and Daniel Baudin for their help in preparation of this
manuscript; and the medical staff of Zanmi Lasante.
references
\1\ Galbraith KJ. A perfect crime: global inequality. Daedalus
2002; 131: 11-25.
\2\ Wilkinson RG. Unhealthy societies: the afflictions of
inequality. London: Routledge, 1997.
\3\ Stephenson J. Apocalypse now: HIV/AIDS in Africa exceeds the
experts' worst predications. JAMA 284: 556-57.
\4\ Kim JY, Millen JV, Irwin A, Gershman J, eds. Dying for growth:
global inequality and the health of the poor. Monroe, Maine: Common
Courage Press, 2000.
\5\ Farmer P. The uses of Haiti. 2nd edn. Monroe: Common Courage
Press, 2002.
\6\ Lawless R. Haiti's bad preas. Rochester: Schenkman Books, 1992:
56.
\7\ Hancock G. Lords of poverty: the power, prestige, and
corruption of the international aid business. New York: Atlantic
Monthly Press, 1989.
\8\ National Labor Committee. Haiti after the coup: sweatshop or
real development. http://www.nlcnet.org/Haiticoup.hrm (accessed Sept.
17, 2002).
\9\ Chen L, Berggren G, Castle S, Fitzgerald W, Michaud C,
Simunovic M. Sanctions in Haiti: crisis in humanitarian action. In:
Program on human security, working papers series 93-07. Cambridge:
Harvard University Center for Population and Development Studies, 1993.
\10\ Chelala C. Letter from Haiti: fighting for survival. BMJ 1994;
309: 525-26.
\11\ Gibbons E, Garfield R. The impact of economic sanctions on
health and human rights in Haiti, 1991-94. Am J Public Health 1999; 89:
1499-1504.
\12\ Farmer P. Haiti's lost years: lessons for the Americas. Curr
Iss Pub Health 1996; 2: 143-51.
\13\ Pan American Health Organization and WHO. Haiti: Aide
d'urgence en sante. Geneva: World Health Organization, 1993.
\14\ Centers for Disease Control and Prevention. Dengue fever among
US military personnel: Haiti: September-November 1994. MMWR Morb Mortal
Wkly Rep 1994; 43: 845-48.
\15\ Garfield R, Devin J, Fausey J. The health impact of economic
sanctions. Bull NY Acad Med 1995; 72: 454-69.
\16\ Ali M, Shah IH. Sanctions and childhood mortality in Iraq.
Lancer 2000; 355: 1851-57.
\17\ Daponte BO, Garfield R. The effect of economic sanctions on
the mortality of Iraqi children prior to the 1991 Persian Gulf War. Am
J Public Health 2000; 90: 546-52.
\18\ Black ME. Collapsing health care in Serbia and Montenegro. BMJ
1993; 307: 1135-37.
\19\ Barry M. Effect of the US embargo and economic decline on
health in Cuba. Ann Intern Med 2000; 132: 151-54.
\20\ Central Intelligence Agency. The world factbook 2001. http://
www.cia.gov/cia/publications/factbook/index.html (accessed Aug. 27,
2002).
\21\ Kew O, Morris-Glasgow V, Landaverde M, et. al. Outbreak of
poliomyelitis in Hispaniola associated with circulating type 1 vaccine-
derived poliovirus. Science 2002; 296: 356-59.
\22\ Farmer P. Infections and inequalities: the modern plagues.
Berkeley: University of California Press, 1999.
\23\ Central Intelligence Agency. The world factbook 2002. http://
www.odci.gov/cia/publications/factbook/geos/ha.html (accessed Jan. 2,
2003).
The Chairman. Thank you, Dr. Farmer, for coming all the way
today for this testimony. It was very important to us and we
appreciate it.
Mr. Forester.
STATEMENT OF STEVEN DAVID FORESTER, ESQ., SENIOR POLICY
ADVOCATE, HAITIAN WOMEN OF MIAMI, MIAMI, FL
Mr. Forester. Thank you, Mr. Chairman and Senators. I first
want to thank especially Senator Nelson for having focused the
committee's attention on two of the key points I will focus on:
our really draconian indefinite detention policies; and on the
need for Congress to remedy, with a fix-it bill and as
unfinished business, defects in the Haitian Refugee Immigration
Fairness Act of 1998 [HRIFA], as a result of which families are
in deep peril.
First, there are alternatives to our detention policies.
National security would be better served by passing Senator
DeWine's Haiti trade bill. It puts people to work, enables them
to feed their families, creates hope, and discourages illegal
immigration and the concommitant diversion of Coast Guard,
Border Patrol, and detention resources which our country needs
to fight terror.
Similarly, meaningful in-country refugee and immigrant
processing in Port-au-Prince and other towns, and regionally in
the Dominican Republic and in Bahamas, would provide--as it
does in Cuba--a regulated means of immigration for a
predetermined number of persons, and it would act as a safety
valve against illegal sea voyages and the diversion of our
Coast Guard and other resources.
To the same end, we should definitely also include Haitians
in any guest worker program that may be adopted. I deal in my
written testimony with that. We should prevent unnecessary
deportations to ensure the continuing flow, now and in the
future, of the remittances which--Mr. Chairman and others--you
have alluded to that are so incredibly important, and vastly
outweigh foreign aid to Haiti; and remittances on which so many
Haitians rely for their subsistence.
We also should find creative ways to make absolutely sure
that Haiti's people receive the millions in aid that would
alleviate their suffering; and to make sure, as Dr. Farmer was
alluding to, that these loans really should be released.
Conversely, our security is ill-served by unprecedentedly
harsh, indefinite detention policies which waste our resources,
divide our communities, and demean our values as people.
Cuba, ironically, is one of the few countries on our
government's list of States that sponsor terrorism, but we
don't detain the Cubans. There is no mass outflow from Cuba. We
don't detain Cubans, but we do detain indefinitely all arriving
Haitians. Haiti isn't even on that list of States that sponsor
terrorism. Haitians fit no terrorist profile, and there is no
substantiated evidence of any terrorists in Haiti.
Alternatives like the trade bill and in-country and
regional refugee and immigrant processing would deter illegal
departures and render harsh detention practices unnecessary. We
indefinitely detain, at tremendous expense, Haitian infants,
children, and mothers--for example, this 3-year-old and her
mother and sister--for 6 long months, at tremendous expense.
We detain even Haitians who have won political asylum from
immigration judges, as about one-quarter of them have. Most
have been released; but some, as their cases are pending on
appeal, are still detained. That has never happened before.
When judges granted bonds, upheld on appeal, the Attorney
General this spring overruled them across-the-board, and all of
those people remain detained months later, despite those bonds
and despite, of course, willing family sponsors.
For the first time, we are detaining and prosecuting
Haitian airplane refugees. They have been coming since about
1981, which ensures their imprisonment back in Haiti under
life-threatening conditions, because they have the criminal
alien label when they are deported. They get thrown in those
prisons.
Detention means expedited hearings with no or limited
access to counsel. In December, a few dozen detained Haitians,
unable to get counsel, were denied asylum and ordered deported
without counsel in shortened, expedited hearings. It means
trauma, despair, transfer to locations remote from family and
legal help. There are people who have been sitting in other
States for months without legal help. Money for isolation
cells, but not for adequate attorney visitation space.
My written testimony documents an unfortunate history of
discrimination dating back 26 years, but I want to now focus on
the HRIFA need.
We are deporting to Haiti the parents of U.S.-born American
children. These parents own houses and businesses. They work,
pay taxes, and they have been sending those remittances to
Haiti that are so crucial. These parents have been here for at
least 8 years, because HRIFA's eligibility date was pre-1996.
Most of these people came between 1997 and 1993, so they
have been here 10 to 15 years. They fled when President Clinton
was saying, of Haiti's military regime, and it is a quote,
``They are chopping people's faces off.'' Or they fled in the
eighties, under prior dictators.
Their exclusion from HRIFA was an unintended result,
ironically, of trying to treat Haitians like differently
situated Nicaraguans who fled over land borders, and who had
benefited from a more generous bill a year earlier.
Now, the question, of course, for these U.S.-born children,
should they wave goodbye as their parents are deported; or
should they move to Haiti, a land they have never known, giving
up, of course, the promise of their birthright as Americans? As
Senator Bob Graham has said, we should do everything possible
to fulfill our commitment under HRIFA and to keep these
families from being torn apart.
Last, HRIFA permits the adjustment--this is the aging-out
question that I believe was raised earlier--the adjustment to
permanent residents of the children of approved HRIFA
applicants. But delays in processing their parents'
applications have already caused hundreds of children to reach
the age of 21 and to age out of eligibility.
More than 3 years after the March 31, 2000, filing deadline
under HRIFA for principals, nearly 28,000 applications--nearly
three-quarters of the applications under the 1998 law--still
remain unadjudicated. At that rate, approvals may take up to
another decade, and hundreds more will age out and face removal
proceedings to Haiti, even as their parents are eventually
approved to remain here. Senators, Haitian Americans live in
all of your States, and they appeal to your sense of right to
protect these families.
Before I conclude, if there is still a moment, I would like
to add something, briefly, because there is something that the
Secretary on the prior panel mentioned that really cries out to
be addressed.
The only rationale for any detention policies--and I would
like to remind the committee, if I may, that in the late 1990s,
when our detention policies were much less severe, there was no
mass outflow from Haiti. How in heaven's name it helps our
country and deters anyone to detain infants and children for 6
months, at great expense, is beyond me.
The Secretary alluded to spikes in outflow in 1991, 1992,
and 1994, but there was a really glaring omission in that
testimony. I deal with this in great length in my written
testimony, which I hope you may allude to. I referred to it
earlier when I quoted President Clinton as saying they were
chopping people's faces off back in 1994.
What happened in 1991, 1992, and 1994, there was a brutal
coup on September 30, 1991. It was estimated that at least
3,000 people were murdered. That is why the people were flowing
out. There has always been a correlation between political
instability--and here we are talking about the most incredible
repression one can imagine.
So perhaps I should leave it at that. I wish to say that
this idea of a perception question I believe is much overdrawn
given that reality, that those spikes occurred under conditions
of persecution and repression that were really immense, and
that I document in my prepared statement. Thank you.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Forester follows:]
Prepared Statement of Steven David Forester, Esq., Senior Policy
Advocate, Haitian Women of Miami, Miami, FL
Senators, there are Haitian-Americans in Indianapolis, Minneapolis
and all of your states. They are decent, hardworking people with
families and are concerned about their people and homeland.
Our detention policy is draconian. There are constructive
alternatives which better serve our need to deter illegal emigration
from Haiti. My testimony discusses each of these in turn: the Haiti
Economic Recovery Act (HERO), S. 489, H.R. 1031; meaningful in-country
and regional refugee and immigrant processing; and a guest worker
program. We need to adopt all of these measures.
But I begin with an issue which has received far too little
attention recently: \1\ the ongoing and imminent deportations of the
long-resident parents of U.S.-born American children who don't speak
Creole and have never been to Haiti.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ Not so in the past. See e.g., ``Haitian Immigrants in U. S.
Face a Wrenching Choice,'' New York Times (top of front page), March
29, 2000; ``No room for 5,000 Elians'', San Francisco Chronicle lead
editorial, April 3, 2000; NBC Nightly New with Tom Brokaw, April 6,
2000; ABC Evening News, July 4, 2000; ABC's Nightline with Ted Koppel
(full program entitled ``Equal Justice?''), May 25, 2000; ABC's
Nightline with Ted Koppel (segment during Miami townhall meeting on
Elian), April 7, 2000; ``A cruel choice for Haitian parents', Tampa
Tribune editorial, April 10, 2000; ``Elian's Case Should Shed New Light
on Haitians' Plight'', op-ed by nationally syndicated columnist Mike
Harden, Columbus Dispatch, April 12, 2000; ``Haitian parents facing
deportation fearful for U.S.-born children'', Sun-Sentinel (front page
of local section), April 16, 2000; Tavis Smiley show, Black
Entertainment Television (full hour), April 24, 2000; ``Haitian Parents
of U.S. Kids Deserve to Remain Here Together,'' Miami Herald lead
editorial, May 4, 2000; ``Protect 5,000 American Children, Don't Deport
Parents'', op-ed, Miami Herald, May 5, 2000.
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The Need for a Bill to Remedy Defects in the Haitian Refugee
Immigration Fairness Act of 1998 (HRIFA) \2\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\2\ P.L. 105-277.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
To begin I must go back to an earlier time, perhaps exemplified by
something which occurred during a June 15, 1994 hearing of the House
Judiciary Committee's Subcommittee on International Law, Immigration,
and Refugees. The hearing concerned how well--or poorly--we were
screening Haitians for refugee status. Representative Nadler of New
York, a subcommittee member, had set up on display an extremely
explicit graphic which he used to cross-examine our government
officials who testified. It spoke a thousand words.
It was the photo of the mutilated face of a young Haitian youth
leader, Omann Desanges, whose case had been well-documented.\3\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\3\ ``How U.S. error sent Haitian to his death,'' Miami Herald,
April 18, 1994.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Omann's fate is extremely relevant to the tragic dilemma faced by
hundreds of wonderful American families. Permit me to explain.
Like hundreds of thousands of his compatriots, Omann had been
ecstatic during the brief period leading up to the December 1990
elections and until the September 1991 coup which ousted President
Aristide. Like him or not--virtuous or flawed--Aristide back then was
adored by literally millions of Haitians, kind of like JFK, to use a
very inexact analogy. Haitians all over the country--illiterate or
not--plastered their homes with his photograph; young people everywhere
formed youth groups. They met regularly, discussing excitedly all kinds
of desired local projects, like building roads, etc., things which for
lack of funds rarely came to fruition. Exiled Haitians love to talk
politics, but those in Haiti had never been able to speak freely; now,
for the first time in their lives, euphoric, they could, and they
``came out of the woodwork'' in support of Aristide's candidacy and
then during those few months of hope before the coup.
It was grassroots democracy in action.
And then came the coup. The military had been there, waiting in the
wings, and they knew exactly who to target, everywhere, all over the
country. No one knows how many they killed; some said 3,000, some said
more. But there was lots of blood. Repression by the Tonton Macoutes
under Duvalier, and by their various incarnations--``Zenglendo'' was
one--under the military dictators who followed him in the late 1980's,
Namphy and Avril, had always been bad; historically Haiti had been a
kleptocracy, a government by thieves, and the Macoutes and their
followers, in exchange for supporting the current dictator, had always
had carte blance to steal, rape and kill vendors and other common poor
people when they hadn't gotten their way.
But the post-coup repression was, quite literally, systematic,
because the military knew exactly who to go after. Thousands of people
went into hiding and fled any way they could.
Omann Desanges was one of them. From 1981 to mid-1994, the U.S.
Coast Guard had been interdicting and repatriating virtually every boat
person, with the brief exception of the immediate post-coup period, and
even then it returned two-thirds of them.\4\ Desanges, a simple youth
leader in his twenties, had managed to get to Guantanamo during that
brief period, but we erroneously sent him back to Haiti, where after
hiding for nearly two years, he was found, arrested, tortured and
killed in the most extreme manner imaginable.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\4\ ``Between 1981 and 1991, the U.S. Coast Guard interdicted and
forcibly returned only Haitians. During those 10 years, out of 24,558
interdicted Haitians, INS shipboard screeners allowed only 28 persons
to pursue their asylum claims in the United States. . . . Those
Haitians who managed to register asylum claims during the 1980s (the
time of Duvalier and other dictators) had the lowest asylum approval
rate of any nationality, 1.8 percent. By contrast, Soviet asylum
approvals at that time were 74.5 percent.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
``In May 1992, for the first time in our history, the United States
began forcibly returning interdicted asylum seekers with no screening
whatsoever--Haitians only. . . .
``[In contrast,] from the 1960s to the present, hundreds of thousands
of Cubans have been paroled in and, after a year, allowed to adjust
automatically to permanent resident status. . . . the `Guantanamo
Cubans' were paroled in under much more favorable conditions that the
Haitians [and] the Haitians not the Cubans--were required to pass a
`credible fear' screening before being paroled from Guantanamo and--
two-thirds were returned to Haiti. . . .''
Bill Frelick, Senior Policy Analyst, U.S. Committee for Refugees,
``Most Favored Refugees?,''Washington Post, April 20, 1998.
Now for the relevance of his story. Since at least 1981, when
President Reagan initiated our Coast Guard interdiction and
repatriation policy, Haitians had been fleeing by air to avoid it.
Since dictators don't give travel papers to those they want to repress,
they were obliged to get false papers as the only way to get on the
airplane. This manner of exit is well recognized in asylum and
international law and tradition; one of the few persons we made an
honorary U.S. citizen is Raoul Wallenberg, for helping Jews escape
Nazi-occupied Hungary with phony identity papers.
When the Haitians who fled this way arrived at Miami International
Airport, they invariably gave their real names, disclaimed the document
and indicated their need for asylum. They were promptly paroled into
the community, where they got work and formed families, and their
exclusion and asylum hearings proceeded apace, much like their boat
person compatriots who, unlike Omann Desanges, had managed to get here.
Ironically, it is the more bona fide refugee--the soldier sought by
the military for refusing to shoot unarmed demonstrators, the union
member shot by the military, the sister of activists slain when
soldiers invaded their common home--who was forced to flee this way:
the more real and bona fide the threat of repression, the more suicidal
it would have been for the person to flee by boat, since the Coast
Guard, even during the worst periods of repression, was continuing to
promptly sail interdicted boat persons back to Port au-Prince, handing
them over on the docks to uniformed and armed soldiers of the Haitian
military regime we were simultaneously so roundly condemning.\5\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\5\ In 1994 President Clinton accurately said, ``They're chopping
people's faces off, killing and mutilating innocent civilians, people
not even directly involved in politics.'' He referred to them in his
September 1994 television address justifying U.S. intervention.
Secretary of State Christopher on July 10, 1994 said Haiti's military
was raping the wives of Aristide supporters, and respected human rights
groups documented the regime's use of rape as an instrument of
political terror. Assistant Secretary of State John Shattuck wrote:
Beginning last summer, politically motivated killings in
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Port-au-Prince rose sharply, . . .
Human rights abuses have qualitatively and quantitatively
worsened in recent months. Soldiers and armed thugs stage
almost nightly raids on neighborhoods where many Aristide
supporters, live, raping the wives and children of
political activists and critics of the regime, abducting
young people, and disfiguring victims' faces.
Raids have been conducted on clergy, fires set in private
homes, and the bodies of men shot with their hands tied
behind their backs are appearing on the streets of Port-au-
Prince, part of a new practice designed to terrorize the
people.
A delegation from the IACHR [Inter-American Commission on
Human Rights] has identified 133 cases of extrajudicial
killings between February and May alone, and attributed
full responsibility for those and other atrocities to the
de facto authorities, i.e. the military and their
supporters. The US government fully shares this conclusion.
Haiti today presents a picture of brutality and
lawlessness--in the unaccountability of the regime and its
wide scale violations of human rights. . . .
``Human rights abuses in Haiti worsen,'' op-ed, Miami Herald, July 14,
1994 (emphases added).
Another irony: if Omann had been brought here instead of being
repatriated, he would eventually have been covered by HRIFA; it is only
his ``airplane refugee'' compatriots, who fled by air to avoid such a
fate as his, who tragically have been excluded from coverage by an
ironic, unintended error.
It is on their behalf--on behalf of their U. S.-born children,
their families, and on behalf of their extended families in Haiti who
rely on the remittances they've been sending to them for years--that I
appeal to this august Committee to support a ``HRIFA fix-it'' bill to
prevent the deportation of these parents and the destruction of these
families.
As HRIFA's champion and your colleague, Senator Bob Graham of
Florida, said about their plight:
I was pleased to read your May 4 editorial ``Haitian parents
of U.S. kids,'' about a problem that threatens to tear apart
innocent families. . . . We shouldn't punish Haitians who fled
tyranny and came here seeking refuge, freedom, and justice. To
ensure that they have the opportunity to embrace these
protections, Congress passed HRIFA in 1998. . . . We should do
everything possible to fulfill our commitment and keep families
from being torn apart.
Senator Graham, letter to the editor, Miami Herald, May 13, 2000.\6\
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\6\ Indeed, HRIFA's intent and purpose was to end ``two decades of
discrimination against the Haitians,'' as others of your colleagues
stated, 144 Cong. Rec. S 13003 (Nov. 12, 1998), and to finally provide
a semblance of equal treatment to Haitians, following the enactment a
year earlier, in 1997, of the Nicaraguan Adjustment and Central
American Relief Act (``NACARA'), from which Haitians had been excluded.
In South Florida today, they are facing deportation; some have
already been deported, leaving behind forfeit houses and devastated
families. An immediate administrative deportation halt is needed to
protect them pending enactment of a solution to their plight in a HRIFA
``fix-it'' bill.
These otherwise-HRIFA-eligible ``airplane refugees'' have been here
for at least eight years, and most for an average of ten to fifteen
years. They own houses and businesses, work and pay taxes, send
remittances to Haiti, and love and support their families.
What are their U.S.-born American-citizen children to do if their
parents are deported? These children are the promise and future of
their communities. They've never been to Haiti and don't speak Creole
very well if at all; they are going to school here and pursuing their
young lives. Are they to waive goodbye as their beloved parents are
deported so that they may remain behind to pursue their birthright to
the American dream? Or should they voluntarily move to Haiti to join
their families, forfeiting that birthright and dream, so as to be able
to grow up with their mothers and fathers? What would each of us do
faced with such a wrenching and un-American dilemma?
There is another irony about the airplane people, namely that their
exclusion from HRIFA was an unintentional consequence of trying to
treat Haitians like the Nicaraguans who had benefited a year earlier
from the Nicaraguan Adjustment and Central American Relief Act of 1997
(NACARA). What happened was that a ``one-size fits all'' approach left
the Haitian airplane people ``in the lurch.''
The Nicaraguans had fled Haiti surreptitiously over land borders;
they hadn't needed to have any papers, so exclusory language in NACARA
for persons using such papers never mattered to them and has never been
an issue for them. But the identical exclusion grafted onto HRIFA in an
attempt to treat the two groups the same has had this devastating
consequence because of the completely dissimilar geography and Coast
Guard policies which faced these Haitians back during the coup years
and earlier.\7\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\7\ NACARA granted residence to Nicaraguans present in the U. S.
before December 1995. HRIFA restricted eligibility to those paroled in,
or who had filed for asylum, in both cases before 1996. All of the
otherwise-eligible Haitian ``airplane refugees'' therefore by
definition fled Haiti before that date, the vast majority ten to
fifteen years ago.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The deportation of these persons, and the devastation of the lives
of their children, unless HRIFA's vitiated purpose is restored in a
HRIFA ``fix-it'' bill, should haunt us. And it will destabilize Haiti,
adding more mouths for that country to feed, and depriving many
extended families of the remittances on which so many rely for
subsistence.
Deserving Children ``Aging Out'' of HRIFA for whom a ``fix-it'' bill is
also needed
HRIFA provides for the adjustment to legal permanent resident
status of the children under age 21 of approved HRIFA applicants. But
according to the GAO, only 9,555 of 37,295 HRIFA applications had been
approved as of March 31, 2003--three years after HRIFA's March 31, 2000
filing deadline for principal applicants.\8\
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\8\ U.S. General Accounting Office, Subject: Immigration Benefits:
Ninth Report Required by the Haitian Refugee Immigration Fairness Act
of 1998, April 21, 2003.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
This means that nearly three quarters or 28,000 of the applications
still remain unadjudicated today, since very few have been finally
denied, a fact of enormous significance for the minor children of
eventually successful applicants.
At that rate, it will take nearly another decade for all of the
applications to be adjudicated. Hundreds of deserving minor children
have already reached the age of 21 and therefore ``aged out'' as a
result of this tardy processing--some have already been placed in
removal proceedings and all are so threatened \9\--and many hundreds if
not a few thousand more will ``age out'' and face removal proceedings
and deportation to Haiti long before their parents' HRIFA applications
are eventually approved some years from now, unless the problem is
remedied legislatively.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\9\ Conversations with attorney Michael Ray, Esq., other attorneys,
and an immigration official, Miami, Florida, July 2003.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
These delays are only the latest which contributed to this problem:
HRIFA did not become law until October 1998, a full year after NACARA;
applicants had to wait nine months more, to mid-1999, before they could
begin applying; and final HRIFA rules were not published until
literally the week before the March 31, 2000 HRIFA filing deadline.
Unless fixed, the converse of the ``airplane refugee'' dilemma will
occur: the parents will have obtained legal permanent residence under
HRIFA, but their ``aged out'' children tragically will be deported.
There are ways to fix this problem. The Child Status Protection Act
fixed ``aging out'' problems in other contexts, but not in this one; a
second reason a HRIFA ``fix-it'' bill is needed is to fix the problem
in this context.
Now I wish to turn to the plight of current Haitian migrants and
refugees.
Current Unprecedentedly Harsh Indefinite Detention Policies
Our security is disserved by unprecedented and harsh policies which
waste our resources, divide our communities and demean our values as a
people. Discrimination against Haitian refugees is nothing new.\10\ But
today's detention policies violate internationally accepted legal
norms. And they are unnecessary, given meaningful alternatives--the
Haiti Economic Recovery Act, ``in-country'' and regional refugee and
immigrant processing, a guestworker program--each of which would deter
illegal emigration.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\10\ See footnote 4, supra. Between 1977 and 1991 at least ten
federal court decisions in class actions described our violations of
their rights. Haitians were unlawfully denied their statutory and
treaty rights to a hearing before an immigration judge in exclusion
proceedings on their claims for political asylum. Sannon v. United
States, 427 F. Supp. 1270 (S.D.Fla. 1977) vacated and remanded on other
grounds, 566 F.2d 104 (5th Cir. 1978). They were unlawfully denied
their right to notice of the procedures that the government intended to
use against them in exclusion proceedings. Sannon v. United States, 460
F. Supp. 458 (S.D.Fla. 1978). They were unlawfully denied the right to
work during the pendency of their asylum claims. National Council of
Churches v. Egan, No. 79-2959-Civ-WMH (S.D.Fla. 1979). They were
unlawfully denied access to information to support their asylum claims.
National Council of Churches v. INS, No. 78-5163-Civ-JLK (S.D.Fla.
1979). They were unlawfully denied the right to be heard on their
asylum claims and subjected to a special ``Haitian Program'' designed
to expeditiously deport them in violation of their basic rights.
Haitian Refugee Center v. Civiletti, 503 F. Supp. 442 (S.D.Fla. 1980),
aff'd as modified sub nom. Haitian Refugee Center v. Smith, 676 F.2d
1023 (5th Cir. Unit B 1982). They were unlawfully denied their right to
counsel and to fair process in their exclusion hearings by being
shipped like cattle to remote areas of the country and subjected to a
``human shell game.'' Louis v. Meissner, 530 F.Supp. 924, 926 (S.D.Fla.
1981). They were singled out and discriminated against in their
incarceration where they remained for over one year while being
subjected to physical abuse and substandard medical care that resulted
in the suicide of a named plaintiff; a panel opinion described that
discrimination as ``as stark as that in Gomillion . . . or Yick Wo.''
Jean v. Nelson, 711 F.2d 1455, 1489 (11th Cir. 1983). Although the
Court of Appeals en banc later vacated this decision on the ground that
Haitians had no constitutional rights, it never disturbed the panel's
factual findings. Haitians were denied the right to a ``meaningful
opportunity to be heard'' in the amnesty program. Haitian Refugee
Center v. Nelson, 694 F.Supp. 864, 879 (S.D.Fla. 1988), affirmed sub.
nom. McNary v. Haitian Refugee Center, Inc., 498 U. S. 479 (1991). See
also Haitian Refugee Center, Inc. v. Baker, 789 F.Supp. 1552 (S.D.Fla.
1991), vacated on jurisdictional grounds, 949 F.2d 1109 (11th Cir.
1992).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The Attorney General cites ``national security'' to justify the
practices described below. But Haitian migrants fit no terrorist
profile, nor is there any substantiated evidence of terrorists in
Haiti. He argues that Pakistani or other terrorists might try to sneak
into the U.S. by joining groups of fleeing Haitian boatpersons, but the
two groups are entirely dissimilar and easily distinguishable, and a
former CIA head of counter-terrorism has said that Haiti is not a
favorable environment for suspected terrorists.\11\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\11\ As here, this section relies in part on Florida Immigrant
Advocacy Center, ``Detention of Haitian Asylum Seekers,'' late May,
2003.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Ironically Cuba, whose refugees have always received better
treatment,\12\ is one of only seven countries our government lists as a
state sponsor of terrorism, but we detain no Cubans and all Haitians--
indefinitely--although Haiti isn't on that list.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\12\ See footnote 4, supra.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Even without the alternatives discussed below, there was no mass
outflow from Haiti in the late 1990's, when detention of Haitians was
much less severe; and there is no such outflow from Cuba, whose
nationals we do not detain.
Haitian asylum seekers in the Miami District have been
discriminated against and routinely denied release from detention since
December 2001.\13\
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\13\ Prolonged detention is accompanied by another extreme policy,
the summary return by the U.S. Coast Guard of interdicted Haitians with
no routine screening of their asylum claims unless a person loudly and
explicitly expresses a fear of return (the ``shout test''); while
Creole interpreters are rare, this is not so for interdicted Cubans and
Chinese, who are informed of their rights in their native languages.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
We indefinitely detain at great expense (at the inappropriately-
named ``Comfort Suites Hotel'') Haitian infants and children and their
mothers. For example three-year old Cherlande and her mother, Zilia
Mileus, and Cherlande's 14-year old sister were detained for six long
months. Children under six years old like Cherlande and adults over 18
remain confined in their rooms with no access to recreation,
activities, fresh air or sunshine. There have been as many as six
persons per room, and the detainees have had to go weeks or even months
without haircut, change of underclothes, and deodorant. Medical care
has been inadequate, interpreters often unavailable.
For the first time we are detaining Haitians even after immigration
judges have granted them political asylum, while the government is
appealing their grants.
When immigration judges last Fall granted bonds to detained
Haitians after ruling that the person was neither a flight risk \14\
nor a threat to the community, the government refused to release any of
them, appealing every case; when the Board of Immigration Appeals ruled
favorably this Spring in the lead case, that of 18-year old David
Joseph, that the government must release those Haitians for whom bonds
had been set, the Attorney General on April 17, 2003 intervened,
overruled his own tribunals, and ruled across-the-board that no Haitian
may bond out of detention, even while conceding that David posed no
security risk. All of this was unprecedented; months later all of these
persons remain locked up.\15\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\14\ Recent Executive Office of Immigration Review (EOIR)
statistics in the Miami district indicate that Haitians have a higher
than average court appearance rate. See footnote 11, supra.
\15\ See ``Illegal Aliens Can Be Held Indefinitely, Ashcroft
Says,'' New York Times, April 26, 2003; ``More Illegal Immigrants Can
Be Held,'' Washington Post, April 25, 2003.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Our practices in South Florida vis-a-vis current Haitian airplane
refugees are similarly new, and they imperil lives. Haitians have been
arriving by air with altered documents since at least 1981, when
President Reagan initiated our Coast Guard interdiction and
repatriation policy. As indicated earlier, on arrival at Miami
International Airport they invariably give their real names, disclaim
the document, and indicate they want asylum, and until last Fall they
were not detained but rather promptly paroled into the community, where
their chances in their asylum hearings were similar to those of their
boat-person compatriots.
Last Fall in South Florida we began not only detaining but
criminally prosecuting them, wasting the resources of federal detention
officers, federal prosecutors, federal public defenders, and federal
court personnel. Such detentions and prosecutions jeopardize their
chances of winning asylum and insure that, on deportation to Haiti--now
with a ``criminal alien'' label--they will be imprisoned in the abysmal
and life-threatening conditions which characterize Haiti's prisons--and
where prisoners may languish indefinitely and die.
Our indefinite detention policy entails expedited political asylum
hearings with little or no access to counsel, jeopardizing basic legal
rights and norms; last December at the Krome detention facility outside
Miami, a few dozen Haitians were denied asylum and ordered deported
without counsel in shortened, expedited hearings. It is well documented
that one's chances of prevailing are vastly better with competent
counsel able to prepare the case, and many might have won if so
represented.\16\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\16\ Of about 214 Haitian boat persons caught October 29, 2002 off
Key Biscayne in Florida, about fifty-three (53)--about one in four--
have won their asylum claims, an unprecedentedly high rate, indicating
the importance of counsel in these cases.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Trauma and despair are common. There have been at least two Haitian
suicide attempts at Krome since June of last year. Many of the Haitian
women detained at the Broward Transitional Center have become anxious
and despondent.
When facilities like Krome, which primarily houses non-Haitian
criminal aliens, are overcrowded, the efforts of pro bono legal service
providers are rendered more difficult. Overcrowding has resulted in
regular transfers of asylum seekers to out-of-state county jails far
from South Florida, where many have family. For example, a Haitian
woman and her infant child were transferred to rural Pennsylvania after
arriving by boat in December 2002, where they have been unable to
secure pro bono legal representation. This increases feelings of
hopelessness and jeopardizes the Haitians' rights to claim asylum and
to counsel.
Thus detaining asylum seekers jeopardizes their rights to counsel
and to a meaningful hearing on their claims. Their detention as a
deterrent is illegal under international law: there must be an
individualized analysis of the need to detain a particular individual;
when detention is used as a general deterrent, as currently, it is not
based on such an individualized analysis and violates these
principles.\17\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\17\ Advisory Opinion, United Nations High Commissioner for
Refugees, April 15, 2002.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Indicative of misguided priorities re Haitians, recently costly
state-of-the-art isolation cells were completed at Krome, but no funds
apparently are available to increase the number of attorney-client
visitation booths to facilitate the right to counsel, as has been often
requested. During busy periods attorneys have sometimes had to wait
hours to see their clients.
Detention, as indicated earlier, is of questionable efficacy as a
deterrent. By nationality, more Ecuadorans were interdicted than
Haitians in fiscal year 2002, and as of about June 1, 2003, the Coast
Guard had caught more Dominicans than Haitians. Only 1486 Haitians were
interdicted in fiscal year 2002, which was slightly higher than the
1391 Haitians interdicted in fiscal year 2001. In January and February
2002, no Haitians were interdicted, although the indefinite detention
policy had not yet then been made public; between March and July 2002,
just after it became public, 628 Haitians were interdicted.
Now I will discuss three alternatives to the detention policy,
alternatives which serve our national security goals as well as our
values.
Alternatives: The Haiti Economic Recovery Act
Improving conditions in Haiti creates hope, alleviates despair, and
decreases the likelihood of illegal emigration and the concomitant
diversion of Coast Guard, Border Patrol and detention resources needed
to fight terror.
Haiti is the poorest country in the Americas. 80% live in abject
poverty, 70% have no formal employment. More than half of her 8.2
million people are illiterate. Infant mortality is the highest in our
hemisphere: one in four children under age five are malnourished.
The trade bill would correct an oversight in U.S. trade law that
recognized the special needs of Africa's least developed countries but
not those of our hemiphere's poorest land--Haiti.
The U.S. generally promotes free trade but maintains very high
tariffs and restrictions on apparel and textiles. Although the garment
industry is an ideal ``stepping stone'' industry for undeveloped
countries--because it is not capital intensive--current U.S. law
requires Haiti's manufacturers to use cloth--and even yarn--made and
spun in the U.S. to avoid these prohibitive duties. HERO would relax
these restrictions, which have impeded the development of Haiti's
apparel sector and kept factories idle and Haitians unemployed.
Specifically, HERO would amend the ``Trade and Development Act of
2000'' to grant duty-free status to Haitian garments made of fabrics or
yarns from countries with which the U.S. has a free trade or regional
agreement. It is not a ``handout'' and would enable Haiti to become a
garment production center, create jobs, improve conditions, and
discourage emigration.
HERO would have minimal impact on U.S. jobs and actually encourage
job transfer from Asia to our hemisphere, including the U.S., because
most Haitian foreign exchange earnings, unlike in the Far East, are
used to buy U.S. products.
Haitian apparel accounts for only 0.38% of all apparel imports into
the U.S., and the bill would cap duty-free imports made of fabrics or
yarns from the designated countries at 1.5 percent growing modestly
over time to 3.5 percent. The ``Trade and Development Act of 2000''
already includes strong safeguards against transshipment of garments
produced in non-beneficiary countries.
Since the cap begins at 1.5 percent of all such imports, Haitian
imports could increase about four-fold to take up the full initial
quota. Since the cap increases to 3.5 percent, for this number to be
reached in the future Haitian exports could have to increase ten-fold,
representing increases in exports from the 2002 value of $216 million
to an ultimate $2.16 billion, which was the extent of Dominican
Republic exports to the U.S. in 2002. Expressed differently, employment
could increase to over 200,000 or approximately 5% of persons of the
working age in Haiti.
On the basis expressed by Haitian observers that one formal job in
Haiti feeds 6 mouths, such employment could conceivably support over
15% of the entire population.
Haiti has the capacity to reach these caps. The quality of such
enterprises is high; there exists good U.S.-educated management with a
style readily conducive to the formation and continuation of business
with a few major U.S. companies. The availability of under- and
unemployed labor combined with the fact that Haitians are hard-working
and easily trainable means that that there are workers to produce more.
HERO is a small measure which could lead to important improvements
in Haitians' lives, giving them hope and decreasing the desperation
which contributes to illegal emigration. This kind of market-based,
private sector development is also crucial to promote the growth of the
Haitian middle class of entrepreneurs, a key ingredient to democratic
political development.
Alternatives: In-Country and Regional Refugee and Immigrant Processing
We do not detain arriving Cubans, yet there is no mass outflow from
that country. One deterrent is the U.S.-Cuba Migration Accord, under
which up to 20,000 Cubans annually since 1994 have been resettled in
the U.S. We should have something similar for Haiti.
A meaningful program in Haiti and regionally would act as a
``safety valve'' against illegal emigration, thereby preserving our
resources; and it would learn from the processing lessons of the past
and present.
``In-country'' processing in Haiti in the early 1990's was poorly
conceived and understaffed. From February 1992 to mid-1994 it rejected
98% of applicants, denying 76% of them even an interview. A requirement
that the would-be refugee be ``high profile'' blocked most applicants
from consideration and ignored the systematic repression of non-
prominent dissidents. Applying was dangerous, especially in the
program's early days, when the only processing site was located across
the street from the national headquarters of the Haitian police, easily
observable by soldiers and paramilitary, who monitored and frequently
harassed persons seeking access to the processing office.
But it did offer protection to about 1,500 refugees who were
allowed to proceed to the U.S. with the help of voluntary agencies with
expertise in resettlement.
More effective in-country and regional processing of Haitian
refugees and of the beneficiaries of immigrant petitions would offer an
alternative to risky illegal sea voyages. It would also facilitate our
ability to meet the target goal of 50,000 refugee admissions in FY
2003, a goal that is currently eluding the resettlement system in the
face of security issues and other concerns. Inherent in resettlement
are thorough security clearances before one may proceed to the U.S.
Many Haitians are in the Dominican Republic and the Bahamas. Both
countries have expressed concerns about Haitians there, and regional
processing would alleviate some of these pressures and possibly
increase the tolerance of their authorities and public for hosting some
Haitians.
There is no meaningful refugee protection in either country. In the
Dominican Republic, Haitians are vulnerable to police harassment;
children are typically deprived of an education; and families often end
up homeless and living on the streets of Santo Domingo.
Past in-country processing in Haiti was hindered by requiring
multiple in-person interviews in Port-au-Prince and the completion in
writing of complex application forms, which rendered illiterate
Haitians virtually ineligible for resettlement. Once a person was
identified as eligible, there were often long delays before the
person's actual transfer to the U.S.
The process was significantly improved when U.S. resettlement
agencies, known as Joint Voluntary Agencies (JVAs), were used to
identify potential resettlement candidates and assist in their
processing. These included the U.S. Conference of Catholic Bishops and
World Relief. The International Organization for Migration facilitated
processing in Port-au-Prince.
Such agencies conducted initial screenings and intakes; assisted
Haitians in preparing for their actual refugee interviews; helped
Haitians complete asylum applications (I-589s); and arranged travel for
those Haitians accepted for resettlement.
Since that experience, several successful initiatives have
facilitated resettlement in other parts of the world that build upon
the expertise of international and local NGOs. In Pakistan, the
International Rescue Committee has partnered with local NGOs in an
effort to discreetly identify those Afghan refugees most in need of
resettlement. In Nairobi, the Hebrew Immigrant Aid Society is working
with UNHCR, relief agencies and others to identify refugees in the
region appropriate for resettlement. Working with local NGOs and others
alleviates the risk of overburdening the system with clearly ineligible
applicants. Such efforts have precedents in Haiti, where the JVAs
frequently took referrals from local rights groups.
Processing sites should be located not only in Port-au-Prince but
in outlying areas. In the 1990s, processing sites eventually set up by
the JVAs in Cap Haitien and Les Cayes alleviated the need for
applicants to make the arduous and often risky trip to the capital to
access resettlement processing.
Processing and interview sites might be located in facilities where
other activities are also taking place and in various locations away
from government offices.
A resettlement program in Haiti could take advantage of pilots
implemented in places such as Pakistan under which Afghan refugees are
referred for resettlement through NGOs working at the community level.
Efforts should be made to limit the number of times an applicant
must appear in-person. In the 1990s about four appearances were
required before an applicant was accepted or rejected. This was quite
burdensome to applicants who had to travel each time to the processing
site.
To facilitate quick transfer to the U.S., refugee security
clearances of approved applicants should be prioritized and conducted
quickly.
Many of these recommendations would also apply to regional
resettlement initiatives.
Significant groundwork has been laid in Africa and other program
sites through the use of biometric data to address concerns about
fraud. This can be replicated in Haiti.
In-country refugee and immigrant processing is available in Cuba,
not Haiti, although it would act as a significant deterrent to illegal
emigration from that country. We should implement a meaningful,
effective and thoughtful program which in a controlled and regulated
way will simultaneously protect refugees, ease the path of qualified
beneficiares of immigrant petitions, diminish the incentives for people
to flee illegally, preserve our Coast Guard and other resources and
heal community divisiveness by establishing more equal treatment
between Haitians and Cubans.
But even if resettlement becomes available, identifying refugees
interdicted at sea should be facilitated through the assignment of
Creole speaking officers on Coast Guard vessels that are patrolling off
Haiti. The officers should at minimum inquire as to whether an
interdicted Haitian has concerns about returning to Haiti and should
whenever possible interview each person individually rather than in
groups, so that a refugee can more comfortably raise concerns about
returning home. And interdicted Haitians should be informed about the
availability of in-country processing if they are repatriated.\18\
Alternatives: Include Haitians in a Guestworker Program
Our vibrant market economy is of course a magnet for desperate
people seeking economic opportunity. We need not fear this. The pages
of our history are filled with the stories of ambitious immigrants
coming here in search of a better life. In turn, their dynamism, hard
work and fresh perspectives have largely drive our own prosperity and
freedom. Historically, immigration to the United States has been a
tremendously successful anti-poverty program--one grounded in freedom
and opportunity, not handouts and dependency.
Many Haitians don't wish to immigrate but rather wish to work here
temporarily to help their families at home and save money for their
return. This too is good for our country; it is a win-win situation
while they are here and helps to export our values when they leave.
Those who return do so with a strong education in how free markets and
democratic governance work and higher expectations for self-government
at home.
I am encouraged by guest worker legislation currently being
discussed, particularly Senator John Cornyn's Border Security and
Immigration Reform Act of 2003 (S. 1387) in the Senate and Congressman
Jim Kolbe, Jeff Flake and Sylvestre Reyes's Land Border Security and
Immigration Improvement Act in the House. These bills would deflect
major portions of the flow of illegal entrants and bring millions of
undocumented workers out from underground and into the legal market.
Such measures would be humane and economically beneficial and would
enhance our national security and respect for the rule of law.
I would urge the members of the Committee to follow the progress of
these bills and ensure that Haitians are included in them.
Conclusion
There is an urgent need to introduce and enact a HRIFA ``fix-it''
bill to protect deserving individuals and families, including U.S.-born
children, and to prevent the destruction of families. Our current
detention policy is unprecedentedly harsh and unnecessary, given its
lack of efficacy and the existence of appropriate measures which would
more effectively serve our security goals: HERO, in-country and
regional refugee and immigrant processing, and a guest worker program.
--------------------
\18\ Thanks to the Women's Commission for Refugee Women and
Children for specific ideas regarding appropriate refugee processing.
The Chairman. If I could just help complete that thought,
was that true also in 1992 and 1994?
Mr. Forester. Absolutely.
The Chairman. Were there conditions there, coups, or
specific political events in Haiti that you believe were the
proximate causes for the immigration?
Mr. Forester. The coup was September 30, 1991. Our
restoration of President Aristide was in the fall of 1994. At a
subcommittee hearing in the House at which I testified in
1994--indicative of how severe the repression was at that time
and throughout the coups years--Representative Nadler of New
York had had a blown-up poster made of the mutilated face of
one of the victims who we had returned from Guantanamo, even
during the brief period immediately following the coup. We
returned two-thirds of those people. He was one of them, a
youth leader.
To understand how severe that was requires very briefly an
understanding of what, like him or not, Aristide meant to the
Haitian people back then. After decades of oppression, finally
there was an election. For 7 months, whatever it was, people
came out of the woodwork, euphoric, and joined youth groups;
illiterate people. They plastered Aristide's photo on their
houses.
When the coup occurred, the military knew who to target. In
the following couple of years, they really systematically did
this. The State Department, the Secretary of State and others
at that time, said that. You need not take my word, I am
quoting from them. So that is what occurred in those 3 years.
The Chairman. Thank you.
Dr. Moise.
STATEMENT OF DR. RUDOLPH MOISE, PRESIDENT AND CEO, HAITIAN
BROADCASTING NETWORK, MIAMI, FL
Dr. Moise. Good morning, Mr. Chairman, members. For the
record, I would like for the ``Mr.'' before my name in the
agenda to be changed to ``Dr.'' I am a physician, a Haitian-
American physician in south Florida. I am also an attorney, an
entrepreneur, and I am also a lieutenant colonel in the United
States Air Force Reserve, where I serve as flight surgeon for
the 482nd Fighter Squadron in Florida.
I would like to thank Senator Nelson and everybody for
being here, and thank you for the opportunity to talk about
Haiti. Before I proceed, allow me to say thank you to Dr. Paul
Farmer as a colleague for going to Haiti to do this great
medical work. We thank you.
As was discussed in the first panel, for the past 3 years
Haiti has been involved in a political, economic, and social
crisis stemming from the 2002 elections. The OAS has tried
numerous times to mediate the conflict. Unfortunately, it has
met with very little success.
The U.S. policy has been one of benign neglect and
containment, rather than engagement. It has been hopeful that
the U.S. process will succeed so we will not have to get
directly involved. As most Haiti watchers would agree, however
this policy is wishful thinking, at best; cynical, at worse,
and simply not acceptable.
In preparation for this visitation, I traveled to Haiti
last week and met with several organizations in the civil
society, the opposition, government, U.S. Embassy staff, the
private sector, and Haitian Americans. It is without
exaggeration that I describe the situation as extremely tense
and desperate, with a high level of frustration. There is a
general consensus that something must be done now to avoid the
needless human tragedy.
A few words on security. The Government of Haiti has had
numerous opportunities to resolve the situation. Unfortunately,
it has not done so. The Government of Haiti will argue that,
due to lack of funds, they were not able to meet some of the
conditions in Resolution 822. For example, the security force--
Haiti has only a 4,000 police force for a population of 8
million, as opposed to the Dominican Republic, which has a
28,000 security or law officer personnel.
What the Government of Haiti has to understand is that as
long as the national police is an arm of the government, we
will always have this problem of political violence. The
national police should be a professional institution working
for the security of all citizens.
This climate of political recriminations and violence has
caused an increase in violence and human rights abuses. Human
rights groups such as Amnesty International, Human Rights
Watch, Committee to Protect Journalists, and the National
Coalition for Haitian Rights have documented extrajudicial
killings, arbitrary arrests and detention, violent reactions to
peaceful demonstrations, and intimidation of journalists, human
rights activists, members of the political opposition, the
private sector, and judges, which caused them to flee the
country in fear of their lives.
All of you have been familiar with what happens in a
country that has had a war. Iraq is one of them. All of you are
also aware of what happens with a country after a natural
disaster, as what happened with Andrew in south Florida. But
Haiti has had neither; however, it looks like a war zone. The
country's infrastructure is almost nonexistent, due partly to
lack of funds and partly to the bad governance on behalf of
government.
We thank the administration which has increased aid for
AIDS. However, the aid was strictly for humanitarian purposes.
As of, I guess, September of this year, the amount of funds for
the economy--part of it has actually been reduced from $3
million to actually $1 million, so there needs to be a balance.
In immigration, as Mr. Forester has just described it,
there is the double standard. Senator Nelson, as a Haitian
American from Miami and as a member of the United States Air
Force who swore to fight and defend his nation's ideals of
equality, freedom, and justice for all, I cannot end this
testimony without taking the U.S. Government to task for the
obvious discrepancy and blatant discrimination in the treatment
of my compatriots.
Secretary Grossman stated earlier that the detentions will
deter Haitians from coming to this country. I disagree.
Haitians are high risk-takers. They may deter a few, but not
the majority. There is no mass exodus. They are not coming
right now just because they hope that something positive will
happen. We will have a mess with this when we have something
like what Mr. Forester mentioned, like a coups or serious
political violence. Right now there have been only 1,500 to
2,000 immigrants a year that have been coming to south Florida.
Recommendations. This administration has a unique
opportunity to do what no other administration has done in the
past: to work with Haitians, Haitian Americans, and the
international community to assist in Haiti's long-term
development. It is obvious that a prosperous Haiti is in
America's--and obviously Florida's--best interests.
How do we do this? We should first of all get out of the
current situation. The United States should pressure directly
all parties to come to the table and remain there until a
satisfactory compromise has been reached. The deadline for this
should be October 1, 2003, for obvious reasons. Next year, it
will be realized to be beyond that issue, so they can start a
new process.
The United States should take the leadership in creating an
international police force composed of OAS, European Union, and
CARICOM member States to provide a climate of security for
campaigning and elections.
No. 2, the United States should be involved in nation-
building in Haiti, strengthening the civil institutions. An
investment now will cause a great return. From interviewing
some in Haiti and asking, what will it take for an institution
to be strengthened? Fifteen to $20 million a year for the next
10 years would be a great boon for this area.
Money alone is not enough. I think the United States should
also help in recruiting Haitian Americans. We have a pool of
Haitian American professionals with expertise that will also
help in the rebuilding of Haiti.
Immigration policy. Mr. Forester had mentioned the
institution he is with and what it supports. The passing of the
Haitian Economic Recovery Act should be done this year as a
gift to the bicentennial. It will create 160,000 jobs in the
service industry and also in the textile industry, and will
support approximately 1 million people. It has bilateral
support. I think it should be passed this year.
Finally, I would like to say a word about the contribution
of the Haitian American community in this Nation. Our community
has produced individuals such as Pierre Richard Prosper, the
U.S. Ambassador-at-Large for war crimes; Dr. Rose-Marie
Toussaint, the first African American woman to head a liver
transplant service in the world; Dumas Simeus, chairman and CEO
of Simeus Foods International, the largest black-owned business
in Texas and one of the top in the country; Mario Elie, the
power guard that helped lead the Houston Rockets to back-to-
back championships in the 1990s; and Edwige Denticat, the
award-winning author.
We also have officials in the civil institutions in
Florida. I hope that in the future we will have one in
Congress, as well.
Mr. Chairman, thank you, for the opportunity. I will go to
any questions.
[The prepared statement of Dr. Moise follows:]
Prepared Statement of Dr. Rudolph Moise, President and CEO, Haitian
Broadcasting Network, Miami, FL
introduction
Good morning, Mr. Chairman and Members of the United States Senate
Foreign Relations Committee. My name is Dr. Rudolph Moise, and I am a
Haitian-American physician residing in South Florida. I am also an
attorney, an entrepreneur and a Lieutenant Colonel in the United States
Air Force Reserve where I serve as a Flight Surgeon for the 482nd
Fighter Wing in Homestead, Florida. I would like to thank you for the
opportunity to testify here today before you in this matter of the
deteriorating political situation in Haiti.
overview, context and analysis
Mr. Chairman and members of the Committee, as you have heard from
the other distinguished presenters here today, for the past three
years, Haiti has been gripped by a political, economic and social
gridlock stemming from flawed elections in May 2000. This crisis has
wreaked appalling devastation on what is already the poorest nation in
the Western hemisphere. Although the Organization of American States
(OAS) has been trying to mediate this conflict and bring about new
parliamentary elections, the more than 20 negotiation trips made and at
least three resolutions passed over the last 38 months have met with
very little success, but rather with the further polarization and
entrenchment of both sides.
The United States, through a contradictory policy of neglect and
containment rather than engagement, has been hopeful that the OAS
process would succeed so that it would not have to get directly
involved. As most Haiti watchers would agree, however, this non-policy
is wishful thinking at best, cynical at worst, and simply untenable. In
the next few moments, I will offer some thoughts about the most useful
role that the United States government--prodded by this committee and
supported by its allocations--can and should play to help bring Haiti
out of this morass. To contextualize my comments and have a realistic
sense of the challenge facing Haiti, Haitians and the international
community, however, I would like to provide the Committee with an
historical perspective as well as brief overview of the current state
of affairs in Haiti.
In preparation for this presentation, I traveled to Haiti last week
and met with several individuals and organizations, including members
of civil society, the opposition, government, U.S. Embassy staff, the
private sector and Haitian Americans. It is not without exaggeration
that I describe the situation as extremely tense and desperate, with a
high level of frustration on all sides and a general consensus that
immediate action must be taken in order to avert a needless human
tragedy.
Historical Roots of Crisis
Jean-Bertrand Aristide's Lavalas movement swept Haiti's first
democratic elections in 1990. The movement was initially a broad-based
coalition of progressive political parties and grassroots organizations
from around the country, most of whom had banded together in the anti-
Duvalier movement in the mid 1980s. Much hope was placed on this
administration to permanently change the repressive and anti-democratic
traditions practiced by successive Haitian governments. Importantly,
during the first seven months of this regime, the flow of those trying
to flee to the United States or elsewhere trickled to almost zero.
Aristide was deposed on September 30, 1991 in a military-led coup.
A reign of terror was quickly resumed and, with the help of the well-
organized paramilitary organization FRAPH, the repression of Aristide
supporters lasted through October 1994. During this time, over 4,000
Haitians were killed, 300,000 became internal refugees, thousands more
fled across the border to the Dominican Republic, and more than 60,000
took to the high seas in search of protection from the rampant human
rights abuses that were characterized by the UN and OAS as gross and
systematic violations.
U.S.-led efforts returned President Aristide to power in October
1994 to complete his term in office. He quickly abolished the military,
replacing it with a civilian police force, and hopes ran high, but the
loose Lavalas coalition soon began to fragment. When Aristide's
successor, Rene Preval, was elected in the 1995 elections, a divisive
element had taken hold within the party. One year later, Aristide
visibly withdrew his support from Preval, and broke off from his own
Lavalas party (called OPL--Organisation Politique Lavalas) to create a
new party with a closer faction of supporters, called Lafanmi Lavalas,
or the Lavalas Family.
Political turmoil began in earnest early the following year when
disputes of the 1997 legislative elections erupted between Lafanmi
Lavalas and OPL. Problems in which unfilled seats in parliament and the
inability to come to a negotiated settlement resulted in Preval's
January 1999 decision to rule--unconstitutionally--by decree. This
action was severely criticized both in Haiti and without as highlighted
in the U.S. State Department Country Report on Human Rights Practices
in 1999. In addition, armed groups that began calling themselves
``popular organizations'' (OP) loyal to Aristide began to stage violent
protests against the Preval government. Amid the social chaos, the
Prime Minister resigned, leaving the post unfilled for nearly 18
months.
In early 1999, an opposition coalition to both OPL and Lafanmi was
formed to seek a consensus among the executive branch, certain
opposition parties and members of civil society about setting up
elections, although there was still no functioning legislative branch.
It was called the Espace de Concertation pour Ia Sauvegarde de Ia
Democratie (Space for Concord for the Safekeeping of Democracy) and
represented a range of political views, including former Aristide
proteges.
These elections--deemed critical to unblocking a three-year old
stand off--were postponed 5 times due to violence, technical
ineptitude, sabotage and allegations of tampering and were finally held
on May 21, 2000. The tension rose with each successive postponement,
raising the stakes each time. The incidence of electoral violence rose
at an alarming rate, and most sources recognize at least 15 politically
motivated assassinations during this time. This statistic does not
include the numerous other abuses that took place such as
disappearances, non-fatal shootings, lynchings and the burning down of
houses, businesses and party offices. Many of the victims were
outspoken critics of the Lavalas government and on several occasions,
this abuse took place under the eyes of the police. Although it was
rare that any group would claim responsibility for these actions, it
was widely attributed to the so-called popular organizations, or OPs,
in the name of Lavalas.
By the time the OAS declared the elections free but not fair
because the method of tabulation was not done according to regulation,
a larger and more eclectic political opposition calling itself the
Convergence Democratique (CD) had formed. Its members included a wide
range of parties across the political spectrum, all in opposition to
the tally of the vote in the May elections, and they boycotted the
presidential elections held in November 2000, which brought President
Aristide to power for a second time. Their criticism of the Lavalas
party and its leaders intensified during this period as did the
backlash from sectors close to the government.
On February 7, 2001, when President Aristide was sworn into office,
the Convergence made a public declaration that they would not accept
the election of Aristide since the previous elections had not been
resolved, and declared that they were naming a parallel president to a
parallel government. Since then, government and opposition have been
locked in a political stale-mate in which neither side recognizes the
legitimacy of the other. Both sides have also rebuffed serious
negotiations despite the intervention of the OAS to settle the dispute.
The policy of ``zero tolerance'' introduced by President Aristide
in June 2001, which legitimizes the lynching of delinquents or those
accused as such, has been used as a pretext for many OPs to threaten
and harass anyone perceived as a menace to Lavalas. This was taken to
the extreme on December 17, 2001, the day of the attack on the National
Palace, branded as a coup attempt by the Aristide government. Less than
two hours after the attack, around Port-au-Prince and in various
locations around the country, bands of armed Lavalas supporters,
occasionally accompanied by elected Lavalas officials, attacked and
burned down the homes and offices of Convergence party members and
supporters, attacked journalists and began to force censorship of the
independent Haitian media reporting these incidents.
Beginning in November and throughout December 2001, journalists and
human rights defenders were threatened and attacked on a daily basis.
One journalist sympathetic to the Convergence named Brignol Lindor was
lynched and assassinated on December 2nd by a crowd who claimed to be
getting revenge for an anonymous attack on a Lavalas supporter a few
days earlier. Shortly afterward, approximately 30 journalists,
particularly those from radio stations who did not auto-censure their
broadcasts after the attacks, fled Haiti. In addition, since the
beginning of 2002, a small number of high profile judges, social and
political activists have continued to flee Haiti as pressure,
harassment and attacks against person, family and property continue.
Following an investigation of the December 17th attack by the
Inter-American Commission for Human Rights of the OAS, a report was
issued on July 1st, 2002, which concluded that the attack was not a
coup attempt and that the violent mobs had to have had advance
knowledge of what was expected of them in order to retaliate in such a
manner.
On September 4, 2002, the OAS unanimously agreed to Resolution 822
as a roadmap for resolving Haiti's political impasse. It called for new
elections, disarmament, increased security, and normalization of
economic relations between Haiti and the international financial
institutions such as the Inter-American Development Bank (IDB) and
reparations to the victims of the December 17th attacks.
The resolution and the OAS Special Mission attempting to assist in
implementing it on the ground in Haiti have had little success. Only a
few of the conditions have been met by the government (reparations for
the damages caused by pro government groups against properties of
members belonging to the opposition). The other key conditions--the
arrest of Amiot Metayer, a gang leader, criminal and supporter of
President Aristide; progress on the professionalization of the Haitian
National Police; a meaningful campaign to disarm gangs and other
illegal groups--have witnessed only cosmetic attempts with President
Aristide regularly missing opportunities to fulfill his promises.
It takes two to tango, however, and the opposition has, in some
regards, been equally as intransigent, often pursuing an agenda that
speaks to dialogue while remaining committed to seeing President
Aristide removed from office. One example of this doublespeak is the
CD's agreement to work for elections but refusal to cooperate in
contributing to the composition of the CEP (provisional electoral
council). In addition, they sought to commandeer the leadership of
several massive anti-government demonstrations in recent months. While
the vast majority of these protests were clearly driven by the general
dissatisfaction of the populace at the country's deteriorating
conditions, much of the government's opposition seized on this trend to
declare that the protests were in support of their efforts and
vigorously renewed their calls for the ouster of President Aristide.
This needless politicizing of the Haitian people's very real and valid
frustrations by both sides over the past three years has only
exacerbated the situation.
Recently, there have been indications from the opposition that they
are truly prepared to get serious about compromise. They have dropped
their demands for President Aristide's ouster and promise to cooperate
with negotiations if President Aristide fulfills the requirements of
OAS Resolution 822, especially regarding the issue of security.
Security, Rule of Law and Human Rights
When one speaks of violence and a ``climate of insecurity'' in
Haiti, it is important to distinguish between political violence and
acts perpetrated by the criminal element that exists in any society.
This is key because the two types of violence have different geneses
and require different solutions. In other words, a 50,000-person strong
police force could sharply curtail criminal activity. Numbers alone,
however, would do nothing to improve the reign of impunity in Haiti and
might actually serve to further facilitate the repression of human
rights.
Haiti currently has a police force of about 4,000 police officers
for a population of 8 million people. In addition, most of this force
is concentrated in Port-au-Prince and a couple of other urban centers,
leaving much of the country with no functioning police presence and
effectively no rule of law. The security implications of such a paltry
force are self-evident.
Beyond the numbers, however, are the pervasive politicization and
corruption of the Haitian National Police which more often than not
acts as an arm of the government rather than as an impartial,
professional institution working for the security of all citizens
regardless of political affiliation. This has been evident with
documented cases of police officers attacking anti-government
protesters at rallies. In addition, the free reign of violent ``popular
organizations'' (OPs) that claim to act in support of the government
and Fanmi Lavalas while others who have spoken out against the
government's policies have been harassed, arrested or killed (with rare
investigations carried out), calls into question the role of political
will in determining how police resources are utilized.
This general climate of political recriminations has, not
surprisingly, been accompanied by a sharp escalation in violence and
human rights abuses. Human rights groups such as Amnesty International,
Human Rights Watch, Committee to Protect Journalists, and the National
Coalition for Haitian Rights have documented extrajudicial killings;
arbitrary arrests and detention; violent reactions to peaceful
demonstrations; and intimidation of journalists, human rights
activists, members of the political opposition, the private sector and
the judiciary, with scores of journalists, investigating judges and
other targets of the government leaving the country for fear of their
lives. The brutal, Christmas Day assassination attempt on Michele
Montas, head of Radio Haiti Inter and widow of Jean Dominique, that
resulted in the death of her bodyguard, Maxime Seide; the continuing
attacks which forced the indefinite closing of the station; the
December murders of three brothers in Carrefour in which an
investigation revealed the involvement of several police officers who
have yet to be brought to justice; and the sudden resignation and self-
imposed exile of Jean-Robert Faveur, the ex-police chief who has
accused the Haitian government of interference--are all high-profile
examples of the endemic nature of the problem.
Social Conditions and Humanitarian Concerns
The most recent report of the United Nations Development Program
(UNDP) paints a desperate and bleak picture of a country that, based on
its human development indices, resembles one that has experienced a war
or natural disaster, although neither has taken place in Haiti.
Beginning particularly in the fall, there has been a breathtaking rise
in the cost of living, with a precipitous decline of the gourde and
resulting increase in prices of everyday goods and services, such as
gasoline and public transportation. The country's infrastructure, never
very strong, has been further weakened by the government's inability--
due partly to lack of funds and partly to bad governance--to develop
and sustain projects for sanitation, transportation, education and
health, etc. Dr. Paul Farmer has already spoken (or will speak)
eloquently about the HIV/AIDS crisis in the country. And the United
States is preparing for a looming humanitarian crisis in Haiti by
already approving an increase of more than $10 million in the budget of
USAID for food and other emergency humanitarian assistance programs.
Immigration
Senators, you have heard (or will hear) from Mr. Steve Forester
about the latest iteration of U.S. immigration policy that treats
Haitian asylum seekers differently solely on the basis of their
nationality. As a Haitian-American from Miami, however, and as a member
of the U.S. Air Force who is sworn to fight for and defend this
nation's ideals of equality, freedom and justice for all, I cannot
conduct this testimony without noting the obvious discrepancy and
blatant discrimination of the treatment of my compatriots.
Since December 2001, U.S. immigration officials have applied a
policy of mandatory detention to Haitian asylum seekers with evolving
justifications, beginning first with a desire to 1) ``save Haitian
lives'' by deterring them from getting on the high seas then 2) to
avert a ``mass exodus'' and now 3) the latest Attorney General decision
in April citing national security concerns with the reference of Haiti
serving as a staging ground for third-county nationals, such as
Pakistanis. The various rationales cannot blunt the ugly truth,
however, that our government, my government is 1) keeping children and
mothers and brothers and sons who have been convicted of no crimes
jailed in degrading conditions for months at a time; 2) subjecting
individuals to expedited proceedings at which they often have not had a
chance to consult with an attorney or even received language
assistance; and 3) deporting asylum seekers--after such sham
proceedings--back to a country that even the State Department
acknowledges is gripped by political upheaval and social, violent
unrest.
In spite of the country's tenuous political situation and
subsequent deterioration, however, there is still no evidence to date
to support the US government's fear of an imminent ``mass exodus.'' The
number of Haitians interdicted over the past few years has been
increasing slightly, but it still averages between 1,500 to 2,000 a
year, according to the Coast Guard's own figures--certainly nothing
like the tens of thousands in the early 1980s and early 1990s. And
while from an analytical stand point, the circumstances that spurred
the earlier waves do not currently exist in Haiti (no formal state
repression mechanism as under Jean-Claude Duvalier or military coup as
under General Raoul Cedras), we should all be clear that without a
rational, consistent and respectful U.S. policy of engagement now,
conditions in Haiti will eventually demand a much more forceful and
intense involvement from this country later.
recommendations
Given these challenges, the United States--and this administration
specifically--has an unprecedented opportunity to do what no other
administration has successfully been able to do: work with Haitians,
Haitian-Americans and the international community to contribute
meaningfully to a holistic, sustainable policy to assist in Haiti's
long-term development. And while this is clearly the right and moral
thing to do, it is self-evident why a democratic, stable and prosperous
Haiti is undeniably in America's--and certainly Florida's--best
interests. Although this may sound like a monumental task, with the
United States playing the proper role, it is very achievable.
Meaningful Engagement
The most constructive action that the U.S. government can take to
resolve the crisis in Haiti is to pressure directly all parties to come
to the table and remain there until a satisfactory compromise has been
reached. To break through the impasse, it will be helpful to consider
all options, including those suggested by other actors in Haiti, such
as a power-sharing proposition developed by various sectors--labor,
business, clergy, etc.--within civil society. This decision should be
made by October 1.
The upcoming re-evaluation of the OAS role by the U.S. in September
will be an important test. But even if there is a determination that
the OAS is the most appropriate major international body to remain in
Haiti; direct, high-level, bilateral engagement by the U.S.,
accompanied by a coherent, pragmatic and humane policy, is long-
overdue. This policy should be guided by the goal of first creating a
climate of security which can lead to unimpeded campaigning and
legitimate elections. While bringing about such a climate will be
difficult to achieve, an international police force composed of OAS,
European Union and CARICOM member states provides the best hope for
success. Additionally, sufficient resources (financial, human and
other) need to be provided to the OAS and other institutions to ensure
that their objectives of strengthening institutions are met this time
around so that democracy can truly take root and flourish.
Strengthening of Civil Institutions
Haiti's most endemic problem is the weakness of its institutions,
which are easy to manipulate, as has been evidenced by the increased
politicization of the police and judiciary. Beyond professionalizing
and reforming these government institutions, however, there is an
important role for civil society institutions to play in building the
capacity of the populace to hold the government to account and
participate actively in civic life. While these organizations--business
associations, peasant cooperatives, human rights organizations, women's
groups, labor unions, etc.--have enormous potential to bring about
substantive change and have already started to make an impact, they are
still quite fragile and will require significant support in order to
thrive. In the past, the U.S. has only funded political parties (2.4
millions through USAID) and not civil institutions. An infusion now of
$15 to $20 million a year over the next 10 years into these groups can
make a significant difference.
I want to make it clear, however, that money alone, particularly
the way that it has been invested in Haiti before, will not solve the
country's problems. While sufficient financial resources are an
indispensable ingredient, the United States can and should also
facilitate the flow of a great amount of technical assistance to Haiti
by working with Haitian-Americans and other experts to build a cadre of
competent and skilled Haitian leaders to combat the country's long-
standing ``brain drain'' predicament. Although we send almost $1
billion dollars annually back to Haiti and are uniquely poised to bring
much more substantive change to Haiti, the Haitian-American Diaspora's
potential has never been fully utilized by the international community.
Given the appropriate structural mechanism and logistical support,
however, perhaps through the establishment of task forces composed of
Haitians and Haitian-Americans, the Diaspora can make an extraordinary
impact not only on the governance of the country but also on its
economic and social growth. Haitian-American organizations engaged in
international policy work, such as the National Organization for the
Advancement of Haitians (NOAH) and the National Coalition for Haitian
Rights (NCHR) to name two with which I have worked closely, should be
supported in this work.
Immigration Policy
As mentioned earlier, the double standard treatment of Haitian
asylum seekers is simply unacceptable and must end now. My community is
not asking for special treatment, but for fairness, due process, an
honest opportunity to make a claim and the respect accorded other
asylum seekers. A few suggestions for the Committee to consider in
addressing the plight of these Haitian asylum seekers include: ensuring
humane conditions for those in detention; directing DHS to adopt
alternatives to detention, including supervised parole; the possibility
of in-country refugee processing; regional resettlement and appropriate
on-board screenings during interdiction.
HERO Act
The U.S. Congress should pass the Haiti Economic Recovery
Opportunity (HERO) Act this year. This bill would extend certain
preferential trade treatment for Haiti in the apparel industry,
providing an incentive for foreign companies to invest in Haiti and
allowing companies already in Haiti to expand their operations. In a
study sponsored by USAID, the impact of this legislation is estimated
at the creation of approximately 80,000 jobs in the manufacturing
industry, with an added 80,000 in the service industry. Assuming that
each employed person has an average of five dependents, this act could
potentially support approximately I million people.
The HERO Act enjoys widespread bipartisan support, and if passed
this year will be a fitting gift to Haiti on the eve of its
bicentennial.
conclusion
Finally, I would like to say just a little about the Haitian-
American community and its contributions to this nation. Our community
has produced individuals such as Pierre-Richard Prosper, the U.S.
Ambassador-at-Large for War Crimes Issues; Dr. Rose-Marie Toussaint,
the first African-American woman to head a liver transplant service in
the world; Dumas Simeus, chairman and CEO of the Simeus Foods
International, the largest black-owned business in Texas and one of the
top in the country; Mario Elie, the power guard that helped lead the
Houston Rockets to back-to-back NBA championships in the 1990s; Edwige
Danticat, the award-winning author.
We are elected officials--Marie St. Fleur of the Massachusetts
House of Representatives; Phillip Brutus and Yoelly Roberson of the
Florida House of Representatives; and Joe Celestin, Mayor of North
Miami. We are doctors, taxi cab drivers, lawyers, home health aides,
journalists, entertainers, artists and executives, like the Board Chair
of the National Coalition for Haitian Rights, Eddy Bayardelle, First
Vice President for Global Philanthropy at Merrill Lynch. We are a
people who make an extraordinary impact wherever we land in this
country, and the local community is enriched for it. On the eve of our
bicentennial, there is simply no reason that Haiti and Haitians should
always, always, always be treated with disrespect and disdain by the
United States government.
Mr. Chairman, again, I thank you for this opportunity to address
the Committee today. I look forward to learning of your initiatives as
a result of this hearing.
The Chairman. Thank you very much, doctor, for your
testimony.
Let me begin by saying that this committee has been
challenged to try to work with the administration to provide
more funds for international assistance, for humanitarian
assistance, for economic development. We have worked in a
bipartisan way, with substantial support.
Many of the statements that I have made, which are not
unique, have pointed out that systematically for many years our
country cut back its foreign assistance. This trend continued
without exception throughout the last 10 or 15 years, as we
have traced it now.
In this particular budget cycle we have fought for--and
been successful during the budget process--the restoration of
even the $1 billion, $150 million that had been clipped out of
the budget, so that we could have the Millennium Challenge
Account idea plus other situations. That has been supported by
the Senate as a whole.
Our authorization bill for the State Department is in limbo
for the moment due to other issues that have come before the
Congress, but I have sought assurance from our leaders, Senator
Frist and Senator Daschle, that they sincerely believe, as we
do, that this is important.
So I ask, in a way, for your advocacy; it is important.
Clearly, the means for our country to respond more generously--
whether it be in Haiti or elsewhere--are going to be curtailed
in the event that we are not successful as a matter of national
policy, so we can be prepared to spend more of our national
budget in these ways.
Having said that, Haiti is the focus of the hearing today--
and you have paid tribute, as I do, to Senator Nelson, who has
brought Haiti before us; and Senator DeWine, in the
introduction of his HERO Act and other activities, including
visits to Haiti. Senator Chafee has visited Haiti, as I think
has been acknowledged.
Thus there is personal interest on the part of members of
this committee, as well as of others in the Senate, which will
sustain, whatever our State Department is prepared to do, or
whatever we are successful in doing in our legislative
initiatives.
I would just ask a couple of technical points.
Dr. Moise, in your testimony you suggested an international
police force of sorts. I wonder, first of all, if you could
please share with us your sense of the sensitivity as to the
sovereignty of Haiti in accepting such an idea. Theoretically,
having persons from other nations--for instance, in Iraq now,
to take a different situation altogether--to provide security
after the aftermath of that conflict is one idea which the
international community is entertaining. Yet people are not
rushing to help unless this may in fact occur. In your
suggestion, you thought that this might include even those, I
gather, from the European Union or from other agencies.
Would this be, as you foresee it, a temporary situation
providing security up to an election that therefore might be
seen by Haitians, as well as the international community, as
free and fair and legitimate? Or can you outline in more detail
your reasoning for this suggestion?
Dr. Moise. Mr. Chairman, you have done my job. You have
answered the question. That was it exactly, to provide a safe
environment to go to elections.
Right now, some of the members from the conventions and the
opposition--they are just afraid to go and participate and
campaign safely, for fear that they might get killed. So by
providing an international police force, that will provide the
environment to do that; not to wait until after the elections,
but before, starting now, and the elections will be afterwards.
But this is just on a temporary basis, just for the elections
to happen.
The Chairman. Will the Government of Haiti invite this?
Would it accept this? What is the position of the government
with regard to these external police officers coming in?
Dr. Moise. I think that, as I am mentioning, the government
is limited in terms of resources for national police. I think
that they will, based on my opinion, welcome such a force on a
temporary basis to allow for the elections to happen.
The Chairman. Do you have a thought about this, Dr. Farmer?
Dr. Farmer. I do. I live in rural Haiti, as you know. I
have found Haitians to be a very peaceful people. Actually, the
crime rate in Haiti is quite low compared to Boston--no offense
to my adopted State.
But Haiti has clearly expressed its willingness to welcome
a temporary external police force--the Government of Haiti, in
fact, has already invited 100 police force members from the
CARICOM nations. The issue has been funding.
Also, if I could be permitted just one moment of analysis,
the modern Haitian army was created in this very city by an act
of U.S. Congress during the time that we occupied Haiti
militarily. That army has known no enemy other than the Haitian
people, in all of the years of its existence. The dissolution
of the army was, in fact, roundly cheered by the people I serve
in central Haiti, the poor, who keep voting again and again for
Aristide.
Believe me, the members of the Democratic Convergence--the
opposition--they may fear for their safety, but their fears
should be what is going to happen in the next election. They
will certainly be massacred at the polls, meaning by the vote,
and they are going to lose again and again. They are not
popular.
The police force needs the tools to do its job. There is a
culture of military violence to change. The Haitian Government
has integrated the police force with women. The chief of police
is a woman. The government has as I said, disbanded demobilized
the army, and it is going to take a long time to build national
institutions like a police force.
I heard in this room earlier today, about bad governance in
Haiti. Bad governance compared to what? To the Duvalier
kleptocracy that stole hundreds of millions of dollars, that
had allowed no free press? After the Duvalier governments came
again, the military juntas whose acts were described by Mr.
Forester wrecked havoc among the democratic forces--and I
happened to be living in Haiti at that time, too, and can tell
you, again, that I am one of the people who was trying to sew
these people back together.
So in answer to your question, Mr. Chairman, I think the
Haitian people are a very hospitable people. They are also very
proud of their sovereignty. Certainly, as their 200th
anniversary comes up--making it, again, the second-oldest
republic in this hemisphere--the subject of police assistance
has to be broached delicately. But the current Haitian
Government has certainly been very open, in my view.
The Chairman. I appreciate that response. I am not
skeptical or antagonistic to the idea; but it is an unusual
idea for a sovereign country to have an external police force,
and the conditions under which that occurs or how it is to
happen are important.
You touched upon this Dr. Moise, in an earlier
recommendation you made. You were talking about the
negotiations and all the parties coming together, everybody
around the table. Describe for us again who all ought to be
around the table. In other words, who are the parties that need
to come to grips to make a settlement?
Dr. Moise. I am more than happy to do this. Members of the
civil society, members of the convergence bodies, members of
the government should be allowed to be at the table, along with
OAS and obviously the United States, definitely, as a referee,
to make sure that things are done the way they are supposed to
be done.
The Chairman. Around this table are the parties politically
in the country, but also the OAS and the United States; and
from these kinds of negotiations then would come down the road
specifications of how things are to proceed so that there can
be elections or improvement in governance, improvement in the
economy, all of these things?
Dr. Moise. I would also include some representatives from
the Haitian American community as well, all that to make sure
that the progress is done, what is expected from everybody, so
it can meet the deadline to make things happen.
The Chairman. Thank you.
Senator Nelson.
Senator Nelson. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I am glad our
colleague, Senator Dodd, has joined us, because he has been a
guiding light for me on this issue. We have discussed it many
times. Basically, I have been helping carry your water here
until you arrived, and I am delighted.
Let me just say, Dr. Moise and Mr. Forester and Dr. Farmer,
you all have given just valuable testimony for the record here.
As you were speaking, I just remember this incredible
population with a great deal of dignity in one of the worst
slums that I have ever seen, Cite Soleil. I went there three
times.
In the midst of the most deprived conditions, I saw people
with dignity and pride and orderliness; in the midst of
enormous poverty, little shacks that were kept, Mr. Chairman,
immaculate; in the midst of an open running sewer, efforts by
charities--by our own colleague, Senator DeWine, who has
generously given to one of the charities--where they are not
only teaching the kids to read and write, but they are teaching
the parents of the kids to read and write.
So, I mean, I was impressed. There is an opportunity, with
a little help, for a population to pick itself up by the
bootstraps, if we can break the shackles of this political and
economic repression that has gone on for years and years and
years. Dr. Moise testified something as little as $15 million
to $20 million a year could help Haiti rebuild themselves.
We are helping the Caribbean through the Caribbean Basin
Initiative. We helped the African nations more generously
through that initiative, but Haiti was excluded. So we ought to
pass Senator DeWine's bill giving them the additional incentive
to manufacture--since their labor is so cheap--those garments
and export them.
Dr. Moise, what do you think about this?
Dr. Moise. I think this is an excellent idea. As you say,
the Haitians are a proud people. We are not looking for a
handout, just an incentive, something to help us move forward.
So yes, I think that is an excellent idea and we support that.
Senator Nelson. Mr. Chairman, Haiti has the greatest
infection rate in the Western Hemisphere of HIV, and yet Haiti
is making progress. Dr. Farmer, tell us about that. It was a
Dr. Papp that I talked to in Port-au-Prince. Tell us about
that.
Dr. Farmer. Dr. William Pape is a great man. He is Haiti's
chief AIDS expert. I have mentioned earlier the public-private
partnership that our two organizations, working with the
Haitian Government, put together, Mr. Chairman, in order to
develop one of the first successful proposals to the Global
Fund to Fight AIDS, Tuberculosis, and Malaria. I would add
that, according to members of the Technical Review Committee,
of the 300 applications received, Haiti ranked among the top
ten in terms of its scientific validity and feasibility.
Some years ago an explosion of HIV was predicted for Haiti.
That has not come to pass--again because in recent years
especially, concerted efforts--largely public-private
partnerships, such as the one that you saw in Port-au-Prince--
have promoted HIV prevention in addition to the developing
world's first integrated prevention and care project.
We have had visitors to our project from across Africa,
from Asia--imagine coming to a squatter's settlement in central
Haiti in order to learn how to properly care for people with
advanced HIV disease. Of course, this is a Haitian-run project,
and my colleagues are very proud of it. I think it is a model,
especially for the rest of the developing world.
What we need to do, if I may be permitted to add--and this
is something Senator Dodd has said--is to depoliticize aid to
Haiti. There cannot be all of these ``conditionalities.'' This
became so ridiculous that, at one point when the World Bank and
other partner institutions, including our own government, were
planning a Caribbean Basin AIDS plan, there were zero dollars
allocated to the one country with 80 percent of the total
burden of disease in the Caribbean.
That is absurd. You cannot politicize aid in that manner
and expect to have good results.
Senator Nelson. Mr. Chairman, I will conclude by saying
that we are here invested with our constitutional
responsibility to look out for the interests of the United
States. Here is an example where, with a minimum of investment,
we can so much further the interests of the United States by
furthering the interests of the people of Haiti.
The IDB loans that have just been granted--they have not
materialized yet, they have been announced that they have been
granted--for potable water, for health care, for education, and
for roads, the kind of return we will get from that--you can't
get commerce going if you have to go over those roads that are
almost impassible. I went to the north end of the island. With
a little bit of investment, the interests of the United States
can be served so very, very well.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for having this hearing. The
Congressional Black Caucus has asked me to enter this in the
record, and I would ask unanimous consent that their letter on
this issue be inserted in the record.
The Chairman. The letter from the caucus will be published
in full.
[The letter referred to follows:]
United States Congress,
Congressional Black Caucus,
1632 Longworth HOB,
Washington, DC, July 14, 2003.
Hon. Richard G. Lugar, Chairman,
Committee on Foreign Relations,
United States Senate,
SD-450,
Washington, DC.
Hon. Joseph Biden, Ranking Member
Committee on Foreign Relations,
United States Senate,
SD-450,
Washington, DC.
Dear Chairman Lugar and Ranking Member Biden:
We are writing to thank you for scheduling a Senate Foreign
Relations Committee hearing on U.S. policy toward Haiti. We appreciate
your holding the hearing and look forward to working with you on U.S.-
Haiti policy.
As you may know, the Congressional Black Caucus (CBC) has had a
historical relationship with Haiti for more than thirty years. Over the
past two years, in particular, the CBC has engaged the Bush
Administration on various aspects of U.S. policy and made a specific
effort to work with the Administration to delink their de facto
political sanctions from the disbursement of desperately needed
economic assistance. Most recently, we were pleased to learn that the
U.S. Department of the Treasury has worked out an agreement with the
Haitian Government to pave the way for financial disbursements from one
of the multilateral development banks. This was made possible when the
Haitian Government recently concluded an agreement with the
International Monetary Fund (IMF). Subsequently, Haiti also fulfilled
its obligations to the Inter-American Development Bank (IDB) by paying
off its arrears and is now eligible for over $200 million in
development loans in 2003. Notwithstanding, we remain dismayed that the
World Bank still does not have representation in Haiti and worse yet,
does not have any program designed to deliver development assistance in
the future. We hope that the Committee's hearing will examine the root
causes of this problem and identify several solutions to help re-engage
the world's largest development institution with one of the world's
poorest counties.
On the political side, we remain very concerned about the Bush
Administration, and specifically the State Department, over its role at
the Organization of American States (OAS) and in the bilateral context
with regards to Haiti. Nearly three years ago, the OAS began to
facilitate a dialogue between Haitian authorities and the main
opposition parties based on the need to foster a run-off election to
replace seven Senators who won seats in parliament under questionable
balloting circumstances in May, 2000.
Since that time, the OAS negotiations have drifted into a prolonged
process where the OAS and its member states, including the U.S., have
imposed an increasing number of conditions on the parties and, as such,
have made very little progress toward ending the political stalemate
that keeps the country in turmoil. This situation has become
particularly worrisome to the CBC since it appears that the U.S.,
having led much of the effort, continues to favor the non-compliance of
the opposition. We believe that this unbalanced approach continues to
signal to the most obdurate parties in Haiti that there is no penalty
for undermining democracy in the western hemisphere.
In January 2004, the elected terms of most of the Haitian
parliament, all of the House of Deputies and one-third of the Senate,
will expire with no scheduled elections in sight. If an expedited
process is not created soon, Haiti could meltdown into constitutional
crisis. We believe that this situation is avoidable if Haiti and the
international community act together in the next few months to
establish a Provisional Electoral Council (CEP) and the attendant
infrastructure to facilitate viable elections. This is a very crucial
point and one that can have far reaching implications if not addressed.
We hope, therefore, that this hearing will examine the current
status of the negotiating process and ways to complete the process
soon. We also hope that the Committee can identify the primary
obstacles to getting democracy back on track and methods to hold
successful elections in the near term and to discuss ideas to return
balance and equity to U.S.-Haitian policy.
Lastly, we would like to suggest that your Committee look closely
at the HIV/AIDS pandemic in Haiti and what President Bush's Global HIV/
AIDS proposal will do to address the spread of the disease in a nation
that now produces over 90% of all newly infected patients in the entire
Caribbean. We have been informed by several State Department officials
that the current U.S. policy is to work only with non-government
organizations (NGOs) and not through government departments such as the
Haitian Ministry of Health. We believe this to be poor judgment and a
policy decision that should be corrected immediately. We do not believe
that NGOs can replace national governments in building infrastructure,
training health workers and ensurng nationwide implementation of
programs.
To the contrary, many NGOs and other foreign governments are
working very closely with Haitian government officials with great
success, and so should our government. For example, it was through a
public-private partnership that Haiti wrote the HIV/AIDS strategy that
was submitted to the Global Fund several months ago. Haiti received one
of the highest commendations for the content of its presentation, and
subsequently one of the largest first initial installments of funding
from the Global Fund. The example underscores the need to find ways to
work with all entities in Haiti to address the myriad of problems that
keep Haiti in dire needs.
The Congressional Black Caucus' position on U.S. policy toward
Haiti is clear: Haiti is a democratic government in our hemisphere, and
the U.S. should continue to identify ways to work with all parties to
sustain democracy and to alleviate poverty and misery wherever they
exist. We should not become an obstacle to progress, peace or
development. We hope that this hearing will probe these issues and we
look forward to discussing the results with you at some time in the
future.
Thank you again for holding this important hearing. We sincerely
appreciate it.
Sincerely,
Elijah E. Cummings,
Chair, CBC.
Barbara Lee,
Co-Chair, CBC Haiti
Taskforce.
The Chairman. I'm going to recognize my colleague, Senator
Dodd.
Let me mention that there will be, I understand, a rollcall
vote at 12:15, so we will plan to recess the hearing a few
minutes before that. I mention that so Senators will know prior
to that time why we should ask our questions and take advantage
of the panel, because at that point we will bring the hearing
to a conclusion.
Senator Dodd. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. My
apologies to you and the other witnesses for not being here
earlier. I have a 22-month old daughter; enough said. So this
morning priorities were elsewhere. I am deeply apologetic to
the witnesses from the State Department, and also the various
distinguished panels that have been here. I thank my colleague
from Florida for his very kind remarks.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for focusing on this subject
matter and holding a hearing at this level, where your
involvement and participation says a great deal, again, about
your leadership of this committee, that you would be here
yourself and involve yourself in this subject matter.
Haiti is a small country. But as Senator Nelson has pointed
out and I'm sure others have made the point during this hearing
this morning, it is deplorable, to put it mildly, that a nation
200 miles from our coastline has ranked near the bottom of the
world for living conditions. The range of problems runs
literally the gamut. It is hard to know where to begin, the
problems are so pronounced.
Mr. Chairman, I ask unanimous consent that this statement
can be included in the record.
The Chairman. It will be included in full.
[The prepared statement of Senator Dodd follows:]
Prepared Statement of Senator Christopher J. Dodd
Mr. Chairman, I want to commend you for holding this hearing today
on the current situation in Haiti. You have invited some very expert
witnesses this morning who should help the committee members better
understand what is happening in Haiti today and what we might do about
it.
As one who has been an observer of the Haitian situation for some
time, I am deeply concerned by recent developments in that country. The
political and economic climate have gone from bad to worse--anyone who
has visited Haiti in recent years knows what I mean. People living less
than 200 miles from our shores are desperately poor beyond imagination,
have life expectancies of less than 50 years, suffer from malaria,
diarrhea, and even polio, which has reemerged on the island. Haiti
ranks as one of the lowest on the U.N. survey of living conditions. Out
of 176 countries ranked by the UN--Haiti was near the bottom of the
ladder--34th from the bottom.
Mr. Chairman, Haiti is sinking deeper and deeper into irreversible
poverty. The extent of the heartache now being endured by the Haitian
people is simply unspeakable. Their suffering is devastating and it is
far reaching. In some places there is no potable water, there are no
sewers, there are no basic medicines on hand to treat disease, no
medical infrastructure in place to ward off otherwise easily
preventable diseases.
As we know from our consideration of the HIV/AIDS legislation,
Haiti has the highest infection rate in the hemisphere, its people are
being devastated by this disease and more than 200,000 of its children
made orphans.
There are a lot of reasons for the sorry state in which we find
Haiti today. Clearly the Haitian Government must be a key actor in
meeting the needs of its people. That it is failing to do so is self-
evident. There are many reasons for that--some are within that
government's power to address--others are not.
Frankly, we need to be honest and acknowledge that until very
recently the United States and other members of the international
community bore a measure of responsibility for the worsening of
conditions in that country.
I am speaking of U.S. decisions to stop all bilateral assistance to
Haitian Government agencies and to join with other OAS members in
blocking Haiti's access to InterAmerican Development Bank resources.
Both have contributed to making a dire situation worse. While it is
true that the United States is a substantial donor of food to Haiti,
that is simply a holding pattern to keep people from dying from
starvation and does little or nothing to address the systemic problems
confronting the Haitian economy and Haitian institutions.
I have been extremely critical of the decision by the U.S. and
others to tie Haiti's access to IDB resources to a political settlement
of the disputed May 2000 elections, because I thought that was mixing
apples with oranges.
The IDB is supposed to be the premier regional development
institution in this hemisphere, charged with alleviating poverty and
promoting development.
It should not have been politicized as was the case with respect to
Haiti. If there is any country in the region that needs the IDB's help
more than Haiti, I don't know which country that would be.
I believe that it should be the people of Haiti who are in the
forefront of our concerns as we make policy decisions to restrict aid
resources to that country. At long last, it would appear that the U.S.
Government and the international community share that view. Haitian
authorities have reached an agreement with the IMF and have paid off
the arrears owed to the IDB.
Next week the president of the InterAmerican Development Bank will
visit Haiti and sign an agreement with the Aristide government which
will allow for the quick disbursement of some $35 million in technical
assistance. Shortly thereafter, an additional $146 million in stalled
IDB project assistance will be available to help address deficiencies
in the areas of health, water, roads and education.
That's good news.
Finally we seem to have an international strategy for dealing with
some of the economic challenges confronting Haiti. I would also hope
that the Bush administration would re-engage with Haitian agencies on a
bilateral basis as well--particularly in the areas of health and
security. There is no way that there is going to be any measurable
improvement in either area unless the U.S. re-engages in these sectors.
So too the OAS needs to re-engage on the political front. For more
than two years, I supported the efforts of the OAS Secretary General to
end the political crisis that is rooted in earlier flawed elections. I
believe that a proposal tabled last year by Luigi Einaudi, the
Assistant Secretary General of the OAS, which provides for a series of
steps leading ultimately to elections, made a great deal of sense. It
still does.
The Aristide government supports the OAS plan--some elements of the
opposition have not. This has caused an impasse. That impasse has meant
that there has been virtually no progress on the political front. I am
concerned that lack of progress at some point is going to produce a
major crisis.
By the end of this year, the electoral terms of the entire Haitian
Congress and one-third of the Haitian Senate will have expired. How is
the Haitian Government supposed to function in the absence of a
functioning legislature?
To be kind, the OAS seems to be in a holding pattern. But in Haiti,
there is no such thing as the status quo. The ongoing political
stalemate has fostered even greater divisions in Haitian society--
positions continue to harden, making compromise even more difficult
than it would have been six months ago. I am concerned that neither the
U.S. administration nor the leadership of the OAS seems to have
developed a strategy for what is likely to come next in Haiti if OAS
Resolution 822 is not successfully implemented soon.
Last month during the OAS annual meetings, Secretary of State Colin
Powell announced that in September the United States would be reassess
its support for the OAS efforts, including the OAS mission in Haiti.
I will be very interested to hear from Secretary Grossman exactly
what Secretary Powell meant by those words. It is not clear to me that
either the U.S. administration or the OAS leadership has any game plan
for helping Haiti resolve the political impasse it finds itself caught
in--namely wanting and needed to have elections either by the end of
the year or shortly thereafter--but not being able to get all the
players to join with the government in those elections.
Mr. Chairman, the Haitian people are a proud people--they love
their families and they love their country. Next year, Haiti will
celebrate its bicentennial anniversary of independence making it the
second oldest independent nation in our hemisphere. This should be a
time of joy and celebration. It is not going to be so in the current
climate of mistrust and insecurity.
I look forward to hearing from our witnesses this morning what they
think should be done on the economic and political fronts to address
the many challenges which confront Haiti so that the upcoming 200th
Haitian anniversary of independence can be more than a date on the
calendar.
Senator Dodd. Let me raise a few questions that I am told
by Janice O'Connell, my staff person, were not raised, or not
terribly fully.
First of all, on the HIV/AIDS issue--again, let me preface
the comments--and Senator Nelson has set the table well with
his description of the country and the conditions there. In
trying to expand the Global AIDS Project to include other
islands in the Caribbean, we made the point that Guyana and
Haiti were obviously included.
Eighty thousand children in the non-designated countries in
the Caribbean were already orphans. I know my colleagues were
shocked to hear that that many children in these various other
countries throughout the Caribbean were living in orphan
status, and that 500,000 people on these small islands of the
Caribbean were infected with AIDS, with little or no health
care.
To put it in perspective, Haiti has the highest rate of
HIV/AIDS in the hemisphere, about 6 percent; now probably
higher than that. Dr. Farmer would know that figure. But
200,000 are orphans in Haiti. There are 80,000 for the rest of
the entire region, and 200,000 on half of the island or one-
third of the island of Hispaniola; so you get some sense of it.
I think you responded to this in part, and to Senator
Nelson. But just to quickly frame it, if we could, I wasn't
clear whether or not you thought that these were Haitian
authorities or nonprofits that were functioning or actively
engaged in attempting to prevent and treat HIV/AIDS on the
island.
Dr. Farmer, is the Haitian Government involved in that, or
is it really more the nonprofits that come offshore through
international organizations that are getting the job done?
Dr. Farmer. First of all, Senator, thank you for the
question. It is critical that this be addressed explicitly. The
Haitian Government has definitely been very involved. This is a
true public-private partnership. That is why it succeeded.
The chair of the National AIDS Commission is the First
Lady. She has written and testified extensively on this
project. She can even tell you the dosing of AZT to prevent
mother-to-child transmission..
Senator Dodd. Mrs. Aristide?
Dr. Farmer. Yes. She is deeply involved in AIDS work in
Haiti. In fact, when we hosted the first human rights-based
AIDS conference in rural Haiti 3 years ago--we already had many
patients on therapy. Mrs. Aristide drove on those deplorable
roads that Senator Nelson mentioned in order to be there to
testify along with the patients, people living with HIV.
So the idea that there is not adequate political will on
the part of the Haitian Government on AIDS is just not true.
Dr. Pape would second me very roundly, were he here.
Furthermore, the Haitian Government has put in investments,
human investments. That is, they have no money. You missed the
part about what happened to the national treasury last week: 90
percent of it went to the IDB. Ninety percent of Haiti's public
wealth was transferred from Port-au-Prince to Washington last
week in order to pay arrears that were accumulated in the
bizarre fashion that you, Senator Dodd, pointed out on the
Senate floor last year.
So there is no money in Haiti, but there is political will.
There is also staff. The government is providing physicians,
nurses, midwives. We benefit enormously from the Ministry of
Health and its support. What they are able to give us, we get.
These are true public-private partnerships, as i said
previously.
I have to say, Senator Dodd, that my colleagues and I
believe this model is the way forward in Africa as well. That
is one reason why we in Haiti have hosted so many African
visitors. Haiti, obviously, wants to help its own citizenry,
but it also wants to help other countries that are behind it in
progress toward reducing the impact of infectious diseases such
as AIDS and tuberculosis. And one of the reasons they look to
Haiti is because of the Haitian Government's considerable
assistance in this effort.
Senator Dodd. Two other quick questions in this context.
Briefly here, what is the United States and the
international community doing to assist in this effort as well?
Dr. Farmer. I have to say that I think the future looks
very bright. The bill passed recently by the Senate to build--
if I could use Senator DeWine's words--a shell of money so we
can have an architecture, as it were, in order to do the right
thing. Now we have to make sure that money goes for both
prevention and treatment of HIV. These have been arbitrarily
pulled apart by many policy makers. No physician or nurse
working in this field would agree that you can make this
artificial distinction between prevention and care.
When we started treating HIV correctly in Haiti, we saw a
profound decline overall in the number of hospitalizations, but
also a sharp rise in people's interest in being tested and
interest in the subject matter at large. Yet, right now most
U.S. assistance goes to prevention and monitoring, not to
treatment.
Senator Dodd. To what extent is there government-to-
government or agency contacts?
Dr. Farmer. At this point it is almost nil, unfortunately.
At this time the government works through groups like ours. And
that is a mistake.
Of course, we are grateful for U.S. largesse--as an
American, I am very grateful but it is a tactical error. As Dr.
Moise has pointed out, it won't help bring Haiti forward. We
have to help build these institutions over time by engaging
directly with the government. It can't just be through groups
like ours; it has to be through the Ministry of Health and the
Ministry of Education. They have zero dollars now. What money
there is, is all going through NGOs and faith-based
organizations.
Senator Dodd. I wanted to expand on the point that Senator
Nelson and you made. I don't know how anyone--despite whatever
disagreements there are, obviously, on the politics of Haiti,
holding hostage very sick people is just unbelievable to me.
This is not my America.
The disagreements with President Aristide, considering the
ones that we ought to have with others, are relatively minor. I
am hopeful they can resolve their political differences. But
why in the world we are asking innocent civilians in that
country to pay the price because we are unwilling to share a
little bit of our largesse with a nation suffering as much as
Haiti is is beyond me.
It has gone on way too long. It is more than embarrassing;
it is mortifying to me. My anger with the IDB has relaxed to
some degree. But the fact that even that international
organization would succumb to pressure and deny that kind of
economic assistance, where the IDB historically has tried to
stay away from those kinds of pressures, has been terrible.
They are doing a better job, but it has been terribly
disappointing.
Last, I am concerned about the increased violence. It
didn't get much reporting, but last Saturday there was some
violence when a civic organization, the Group of 184, as it is
called, marched through the city of Soleil, the very area my
colleague described so accurately. This was known as the St.
Simone under the Duvalier government going back. I have known
that area for 40 years. I served as a Peace Corps volunteer on
the border between Haiti and the Dominican Republic. I spent
time in Haiti. This is as poor an area as you could find
anywhere in the world.
This Group of 184 marched into that area and there was
violence that occurred. This was against the Aristide
government, the Group of 184. What do you think was the
intention of this organization? It struck me as being sort of
like the marching season in northern Ireland, where
particularly people go and march right through the very
neighborhoods where you know you are going to have the
predictable response.
Why would you possibly do that in one of the poorest
neighborhoods or barrios in Haiti?
Dr. Farmer. Since I am the one member who came up here from
Haiti, I would like to comment on that. I, of course, wasn't
there; I was doing my own work, which is medical. But my
response was identical to yours.
Just for those who are not familiar with the arcane
vocabulary of Haitian politics, the Group of 184 is seen quite
correctly and sociologically as the elite: the middle class and
beyond. I have very little experience as a physician, of
course, with that population since I live in rural Haiti.
``Civil society'' is very often a code word in Haiti for the
elite. There is, of course, with this extreme poverty--I'm sure
Senator Nelson knows, and I know you have witnessed, Senator
Dodd--with such grotesque indices of social inequality there
are quite necessarily conflicts. There is conflict all the
time.
I am just amazed at how pacific and thoughtful and kind the
Haitian people are, and how rarely they do resort to violence,
given these violent conditions in which they live. That there
was only a question of rock throwing still astounds me. To walk
through a neighborhood of the poorest part of town in a way to
taunt the local people living in the slum--who are, as is well
known, largely supporters of the elected government--to me it
is asking for trouble.
Now, maybe everyone should have the have the right to walk
through neighborhoods like that. I don't do it in Boston,
frankly. I don't do it in Los Angeles. I think that there are
serious problems in all of our cities. The fact that Port-au-
Prince is a city of 2 million people with a tiny police force,
and still has less violence than one would imagine, is
astounding to me, and again, another marker of the dignity and
peaceful nature of the Haitian people.
Senator Dodd. I have asked questions of all of you.
Let me ask Mr. Forester or Dr. Moise if they have any
comments on anything I have raised, or if they would like to
add to this discussion.
Dr. Moise. Yes, I do. In correction of what Dr. Farmer
said, the Group of 184 includes the elite and also others,
peasant cooperatives and women's groups, as well. It is not
just elite.
Senator Dodd. What were they doing marching in the Cite
Soleil? You know the reaction that that would have.
Dr. Moise. I believe that peaceful demonstrations can take
place anywhere in Haiti. The government would argue that this
is a provocation, but take your pick.
I would say, based on my conversations when they were
planning on doing this, this is the fact, that Haiti is Haiti.
They should be able to have a peaceful demonstration wherever
they go. That was the opinion.
Senator Dodd. I don't want to dwell on it.
Do you think we ought to be lifting the U.S. ban on
financial aid to Haiti? Should we lift the financial ban on
economic aid to Haiti, the United States?
Dr. Moise. Yes. Yes.
Senator Dodd. What about government-to-government support
on the HIV/AIDS effort? How about doing that, as well?
Dr. Moise. Yes, I think we should.
Senator Dodd. Mr. Forester, any comments?
Mr. Forester. I concur. I could not have stated it better
than you did yourself, Senator, and Dr. Farmer. That is my
personal belief.
Senator Dodd. I appreciate that.
Mr. Chairman, I feel very grateful to you for letting me
have a little extra time. I thank our witnesses. I may have
some additional questions which I will submit in writing.
Dr. Moise, I appreciate your candor, as well and your
expression of views on the subject matter. Hopefully, we can
break the cycle a bit. As I say, with 200,000 children as
orphans and a staggering number of people, 6 percent of that
nation and growing, with HIV, although there has been some
success.
I am glad you said that there is some brighter light there.
You can get awfully depressed about the conditions there, but
there have been some positive signs that things are moving in a
better direction. I commend your work there. Thank you, Dr.
Farmer, for your commitment and that of your colleagues.
I know many in the archdiocese that I live in in
Connecticut have dedicated themselves to Haiti, and the Norwich
Diocese in Connecticut. A very good friend of mine who is a
dentist who started that clinic on that remote peninsula.
It is just unbelievable what these people do; and doctors
in the United States who go down periodically, take turns,
spend a week or two at a time, and just do remarkable work.
They rarely get recognition, they don't read their names in the
press or paper every day, but that is the America I am familiar
with. While we don't hear about these people very often, I know
the Haitian people appreciate the efforts of yourselves and
others.
I feel hopeful the day will come shortly when we get beyond
this problem we have with not liking President Aristide and
realize a lot of people are being hurt as a result of that
terribly myopic, almost adolescent attitude about a country
that deserves a lot better. Thank you.
The Chairman. Thank you very much, Senator Dodd.
I would express my appreciation again, as you have, for the
extraordinary testimony we have had. We appreciate each one of
you coming and being so forthcoming in your responses.
I appreciate my colleagues and their devotion, really, to
not only this subject but--likewise Senator Dodd, Senator
Nelson--to all affairs with regard to our hemisphere. They have
been persevering. We appreciate these opportunities, really, to
have colloquy with people who have been there, as you have.
I appreciate the fact that the hearing has been well
attended by a public that believes that this is important. We
appreciate your attendance.
Having said that, the vote is under way, and the hearing is
adjourned.
[Whereupon, at 12:20 p.m., the committee adjourned, to
reconvene subect to the call of the Chair.]
----------
Responses to Additional Questions Submitted for the Record
Responses of Hon. Marc Grossman, Under Secretary of State for Political
Affairs, Department of State, to Additional Questions for the Record
Submitted by Senator Joseph R. Biden, Jr.
Question 1. Secretary Powell recently commented that if the Haitian
government has not created the security climate necessary for forming a
credible electoral council by September 2003, ``we should re-evaluate
the role of the Organization of American States (OAS) in Haiti.'' That
date is quickly approaching, and I understand that the opposition is
still not fully committed to establishing a provisional electoral
council as outlined in Resolution 822.
How likely is it that the government of Haiti and the opposition
will have agreed upon an electoral council by September? How does the
OAS intend to bring the opposition into the process?
Answer. OAS Resolution 822 provides the means for bringing the
opposition into the process. It offers a clear guide for resolving the
political impasse through free and fair elections. The Government of
Haiti joined consensus at the OAS when Resolution 822 was adopted in
September 2002. In doing so, it committed itself to a series of steps
designed to build confidence for the participation of all political
parties in free and fair elections. Resolution 822 clearly stated what
these steps were--an end to impunity, disarmament, an independent and
professional police force, and a climate of security conducive to the
formation of a credible, neutral, and independent Provisional Electoral
Council (CEP) as the essential first step toward elections.
We have made clear to the opposition and civil society that they
must participate in formation of the CEP when the government takes
concrete steps in good faith to comply with Resolution 822. Primary
responsibility for breaking the political impasse must lie with the
Haitian government. We cannot expect the opposition to participate in
forming the CEP without government action to establish a climate of
security, given the numerous acts of repression and intimidation that
have occurred during the current political crisis.
The likelihood of agreement by September on forming the CEP will
depend on the success or failure of the Haitian government in acting to
establish the necessary climate of security.
Question 2. What are we, the United States, doing to support the
creation of an electoral council?
Answer. The United States supports a Provisional Electoral Council
(CEP) that is credible, neutral, and independent, formed with the full
participation of the opposition and civil society. Elections managed by
any other CEP, most especially one that is formed by the government
acting alone, will not be considered as free and fair.
The U.S. and its hemispheric partners in the OAS and Caribbean
Community (CARICOM) support the formation of a credible CEP by
insisting on the process laid out in Resolution 822. This process
requires the Government of Haiti to establish a climate of security as
the means to generate confidence among the opposition for its full and
willing participation first in forming the CEP and then in free and
fair elections. A joint OAS/CARICOM high-level delegation that visited
Haiti in March, on which the U.S. was represented by Ambassador Otto J.
Reich in his capacity as Presidential Special Envoy for Western
Hemisphere Initiatives, delivered a strong message to President
Aristide about the importance of meeting commitments and laid out a
series of concrete steps the Government needed to take. The high-level
delegation urged the opposition and civil society to participate in
forming the CEP once the Government took these steps.
The U.S. assists the process established in Resolution 822 by
continuing to provide political and financial support for the OAS
Special Mission to Strengthen Democracy in Haiti.
The OAS Special Mission was formed in January 2002 by agreement
between the Government of Haiti and the OAS. Its original mandates were
assistance to the Haitian government in democracy, human rights,
governance, and security for elections. Resolution 822 expanded the
role of the Special Mission to include supporting and monitoring the
efforts of the Haitian government to comply with commitments it made in
the Resolution. Pursuant to that expanded role, the Special Mission has
negotiated Terms of Reference for assistance to the government on
disarmament, electoral security, elections, and creating a professional
police force.
The Special Mission, with a staff of only fifteen, has endeavored
to fulfill its important role with limited financial resources. The
U.S. has contributed $2.5 million of the approximately $5.3 million
received to date, with Canada being the other major contributor.
Question 3. What are the prospects for elections to be held in the
near future in Haiti?
Answer. It appears unlikely that elections will be held in 2003, as
called for in Resolution 822. Under the Haitian constitution, local and
legislative elections are due to take place in 2004.
Question 4. Do we know what the costs of [Haiti's] elections will
be? Do we intend to provide financial assistance for the elections?
Answer. The U.S. Embassy has estimated the costs of national
legislative elections in Haiti at $24 to $35 million. Of this, we would
look to the Haitian government to absorb $8 to $11 million in local
salaries and operations costs, leaving $16 to $24 million to be
financed by the international community.
Whether we would provide financial assistance for the elections
depends primarily on our having confidence that the elections could be
free, fair, and credible. The Government of Haiti has yet to take steps
that would give us such confidence.
Question 5. The Organization of American States (OAS) has been
repeatedly frustrated in its efforts to mediate a resolution to Haiti's
prolonged political dispute since 2000. At the beginning of this year,
the U.S. delegation to the OAS said that ``. . . time is running out .
. . My delegation urges the Government of Haiti to act, and to act
today.'' (Address by U.S. delegation, Jan. 16, 2003.)
Can you describe the current state of the OAS negotiations efforts
in Haiti? Do you believe the role of the Organization of American
States Special Mission in Haiti should be altered in any respect?
Answer. OAS efforts to mediate a settlement through direct
negotiations ended in July 2002 when talks between the ruling party
Fanmi Lavalas (FL) and the opposition coalition Democratic Convergence
(CD) collapsed. OAS Resolution 822, adopted by consensus with the
support of Haiti by the OAS Permanent Council in September 2002,
provides the framework for resolution of the political crisis through
free and fair elections.
Resolution 822 expanded the role of the Special Mission to include
supporting and monitoring the efforts of the Haitian government to
comply with commitments it made in the Resolution. Pursuant to that
expanded role, the Special Mission has negotiated Terms of Reference
for assistance to the government on disarmament, electoral security,
elections, and creating a professional police force. The Special
Mission this year is deploying 30 international command-level police
officers who are attached as observers and advisors to the offices of
top officials in the Haitian National Police.
Changes in the role of OAS Special Mission should be considered if,
as Secretary Powell stated at the OAS General Assembly in June 2003,
the Haitian government has not by September created a climate of
security essential to formation of a credible, neutral, and independent
Provisional Electoral Council (CEP).
Question 6. Has the Administration set a deadline for Haiti to
comply with commitments it made to resolve its political crisis under
Organization of American States' Resolutions 806 and 822? Do these
resolutions, and the conditions put forth in them, still serve as
viable tools to addressing Haiti's political and economic crises? Or do
we need to reevaluate their use?
Answer. At the OAS General Assembly in June, Secretary Powell said
that the role of the OAS in Haiti should be reevaluated if by September
the Government of Haiti (GOH) has not created a climate of security
essential to formation of a credible, neutral and independent
Provisional Electoral Council (CEP).
Resolution 822 laid out a process for resolving the political
crisis through free and fair elections. It also addressed the economic
situation by expressing support for normalization of Haiti's relations
with the International Financial Institutions (IFIs)
There has been substantial progress in re-establishing normal
relations with the IFIs. Haiti paid its arrears to the Inter-American
Development Bank (IDB) on July 8, and IDB loan programs should resume
in the near future.
The Administration believes, along with its partners in the OAS and
the Caribbean Community (CARICOM), that Resolution 822 is the best way
to resolve the political crisis. The problem is not with the OAS
process, but with the failure of the GOH to meet its commitments under
the resolution. The question is whether under these circumstances the
OAS Special Mission will be able to carry out the ambitious mandates
the OAS member states have given it.
Question 7. Talk to me about what the United States' role has been
in supporting the Organization of American States' mediation efforts.
Has there been any consideration of forming a ``Group of Friends'' to
support the organization's efforts, along the lines of a similar group
which the United States is leading to address Venezuela's political
impasse?
Answer. A ``Friends of Haiti'' group already exists. Formed in
October 2001 by the OAS Secretary General, it consists of OAS member
states Argentina, Bahamas, Belize, Canada, Chile, Dominican Republic,
Guatemala, Mexico, the U.S. and Venezuela; and France, Germany, Norway,
and Spain in their role as OAS Permanent Observers.
The Friends of Haiti is an informal group advising the Secretary
General about, and providing support for, activities mandated in OAS
resolutions. It has functioned effectively in conveying the concerns of
the OAS and international community to the Haitian government (GOH).
Friends of Haiti ambassadors meet regularly in Port-au-Prince and have
conducted joint demarches on the GOH.
The U.S. also participated in a joint OAS/CARICOM high-level
delegation that visited Haiti in March of this year. The delegation,
which included Ambassador Otto J. Reich in his capacity as Presidential
Special Envoy for Western Hemisphere Initiatives, delivered a strong
message to President Aristide about the importance of meeting
commitments and laid out a series of specific steps the Government
needs to take. The delegation also urged the opposition and civil
society to participate in forming the CEP once the Government takes
these steps.
Question 8. The United States has encouraged the Haitian government
to introduce a new law prohibiting child trafficking. Yet the Haitian
Ministry of Social Affairs says it no longer employs monitors to
oversee the welfare of these children because of lack of funding.
What resources does Haiti have to enforce a law prohibiting child
trafficking? Have you seen a willingness on the part of the Haitian
government to address this issue?
Answer. Haiti currently has eight monitors--four funded by the
government, four by an NGO--who staff a hotline to counsel and
facilitate rescue of child domestics trapped in abusive situations.
Child domestics who live with the family that employs them number
between 250,000 and 300,000, according to UNICEF, and constitute by far
the largest category of trafficked persons in Haiti.
The Government of Haiti (GOH) has also established a Brigade for
the Protection of Minors of the Haitian National Police. The U.S. is
considering a program to assist the new brigade to recognize Haitian
children who are at-risk of being trafficked and to aid those
trafficked to be resettled in the community.
According to the State Department's 2003 Trafficking in Persons
report, the Government of Haiti is not making significant efforts to
combat trafficking. While government officials already work with local
NGOs to resettle trafficked children, in 2002 only about 100 were
resettled. The GOH passed a law in May to prohibit child trafficking,
but has no law to prohibit trafficking of adults. The GOH has sponsored
a seminar series and publicity campaign to discourage trafficking and
mistreatment of children, but has neither prosecuted child traffickers
nor enforced laws regulating child domestic labor.
The U.S. has encouraged the GOH to devote more resources to prevent
and punish all forms of trafficking in persons. GOH resources are
limited, but we believe it can increase its antitrafficking efforts by
re-allocating existing resources.
Question 9 Does any portion of U.S. aid go to addressing this issue
through human rights or other social welfare groups in Haiti?
Answer. Yes. To address trafficking of children, the U.S. in FY
2002 funded a project for a comprehensive campaign against child
slavery and trafficking. Campaign components include research, public
education, coalition-building, supporting passage and enforcement of
anti-trafficking laws, and monitoring implementation of relevant laws.
The National Coalition for Haitian Rights (NCHR), in implementing this
project, published a booklet in 2002 on trafficking of children in
Haiti for domestic servitude and provided specific recommendations of
actions that could be taken by the Government of Haiti and other actors
to eliminate the practice. To date, the GOH has acted on four of the
NCHR's 11 recommendations.
Question 10. I understand that the Haitian police force is
currently only about 3500 men and women for a population of 8 million
and that Haiti has been required to significantly reform the police and
judicial systems.
How is it possible to hold high standards for police and judicial
reform when we know that Haiti does not have resources to meet those
reforms and we are not willing to provide financial support to the
government?
Answer. The standard to which we are holding Haiti in terms of
police and judicial reform is one that Haiti itself committed to last
September when it joined the consensus of the Organization of American
States in adopting OAS Permanent Council Resolution 822. Haiti
participated significantly in the drafting of the resolution, and it
was welcomed by the Government of Haiti at the time. This standard was
again endorsed in OAS General Assembly Resolution 1959, unanimously
adopted in June, again with extensive participation of the Government
of Haiti (GOH).
The reforms required of the Haitian government are not costly. What
they require is political will. Resolution 822 clearly states what
these steps are--an end to impunity; disarmament; and allowing the
police force to operate professionally, independent of political
interference, to promote a climate of security conducive to the
formation of a credible, neutral, and independent Provisional Electoral
Council (CEP) as the essential first step toward elections.
A joint OAS/CARICOM high-level delegation, which visited Haiti
March 19-20, reiterated the need for the GOH to implement Resolution
822 and laid out specific concrete steps that the GOH could take as
evidence that it was doing so. Rather than undertaking these steps, the
GOH has acted in a manner contrary to their intent.
The international community, including the U.S., is ready to
support Haiti if it undertakes reforms. But the key to police and
judicial reform is political will on the part of the Haitian government
and its leaders.
Question 11. Are we assisting Haiti in any way--through any non-
governmental or civil society organizations--to bolster public security
efforts such as police training or support for drug interdiction
efforts?
Answer. Yes. The USG assists the Government of Haiti (GOH) to
bolster public security and drug interdiction efforts in several ways.
The U.S. is the largest supporter of the OAS Special Mission for
Strengthening Democracy in Haiti. We have provided $2.5 million of its
total $5.3 million funding. The Special Mission has worked with the GOH
on security issues since it arrived in March 2002. In June 2003, the
Special Mission began providing 30 international police monitors to be
attached as observers and advisors to the offices of top police
officials. In addition, the U.S. supports the efforts of the OAS
InterAmerican Drug Abuse Control Commission (CICAD) to improve the
capacity of the Haitian Drug Control Commission to oversee
implementation of Haiti's national anti-drug plan and to coordinate
with other drug control agencies and NGOs.
The U.S. cooperates with the Haitian National Police (HNP) on
counternarcotics pursuant to a Letter of Agreement (LOA) signed May 15,
2002. U.S. Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) officers attached to
the U.S. Embassy work with HNP units with counternarcotics
responsibilities. DEA vets officers assigned to those units, using
polygraph testing, to ensure that corrupt officers are removed. DEA
also organizes joint counternarcotics operations.
Under the LOA, the State Department has allocated $680,000 in
funding for counternarcotics support to the HNP. In addition, the USG
provided $440,000 in FY 2003 to fund military equipment and training to
support the Haitian Coast Guard, an HNP unit that works with us on
interdictions both of drug traffickers and illegal migrants.
Additionally, our Embassy maintains an ongoing dialogue with the
GOH on counternarcotics issues, provides the GOH an annual list of
steps it should undertake to demonstrate its cooperation in the fight
against drug trafficking, and monitors GOH counternarcotics efforts.
One recent success was the GOH expulsion of a notorious indicted drug
trafficker to the U.S.
Question 12. In its annual narcotics certification report, the Bush
Administration acknowledged two important steps taken by the Aristide
Administration to combat narcotics trafficking: putting into force a
bilateral maritime narcotics interdibtion agreement, and establishing a
financial intelligence unit.
Talk to me about the bilateral maritime narcotics interdiction
agreement. What are its principal elements? Has it gone into effect? Is
it working?
Answer. The bilateral maritime narcotics interdiction agreement
entered into force September 5, 2002. The agreement mandates the
fullest possible cooperation in maritime counternarcotics efforts
between our two coast guards. It allows for U.S. Coast Guard (USCG)
vessels to conduct counternarcotics operations in Haitian territorial
waters with a Haitian Coast Guard (HCG) officer on board or without an
HCG officer when in pursuit of a suspect vessel and no HCG ship or
officer is available. USCG may investigate, board, search, and detain a
suspect vessel, except that searches of Haitian vessels located in the
Haitian territorial sea are reserved for the HCG or its officers. USCG
aircraft may also overfly Haitian territory and seas for law
enforcement operations and relay landing orders to suspect aircraft.
The HCG is granted reciprocal privileges.
The agreement also provides that the USCG may board, inspect,
search, and detain suspect Haitian-flagged vessels beyond Haiti's
territorial sea without seeking case-by-case approval from the GOH.
U.S. Coast Guard vessels have acted pursuant to the agreement
several times since it was put into force, undertaking pursuit into
Haitian territorial seas and boardings at sea. From the USG
perspective, the agreement is working very well. The USCG has an
excellent working relationship with the HCG. The agreement was last
invoked in June 2003 on the M/V Lady Margo.
The GOH also signed the Caribbean Regional Maritime Agreement in
April 2003, which provides a multi-lateral framework for
counternarcotics cooperation very similar to that established by the
bilateral agreement. By signing this Agreement, the GOH has taken a
step toward contributing to a regional approach to combating drug
smuggling.
Question 13. What about Haiti's Financial Intelligence Unit? What
is its purpose? What are its resources, in terms of finances and
personnel? Is it up and running? When will it begin its work?
Answer. Haiti's Financial Intelligence Unit (FIU) reports to the
National Committee for the Fight against Money Laundering, under
Haiti's Ministry of Justice. It was established pursuant to Haiti's law
against money laundering, adopted in February 2001, which complies with
the UN Convention Against Transnational Organized Crime. Its purpose is
to detect, track, analyze and report suspicious transactions, make
recommendations for enforcement of money laundering laws in Haiti.
While the FIU may eventually be functional, and is headed by a
respected lawyer, it has not yet taken effective action to help
implement or enforce Haiti's money laundering laws and guidelines. The
FIU is not yet fully staffed and lacks basic information technology and
software that would enable it to analyze suspicious activity reports.
The USG is considering a request to provide such equipment. The FIU
currently has three professional staff members.
Even were the FIU to become fully operational, it would not meet
international standards for FIUs, as currently the FIU must forward its
analyses to a politically-appointed national committee rather than
directly to law enforcement agencies for investigation and possible
prosecution. Unless this situation is rectified, neither the USG FIU,
nor the other 88 operational FIUs, will share confidential financial
information with, or respond to requests for information from Haiti's
FIU.
Haiti is not considered an offshore financial center, but is a
country of primary concern for money laundering because of the
existence of drug trafficking and lax financial controls. Haiti
recently became a member of the Caribbean Financial Action Task Force.
The U.S. Embassy will continue to work to help ensure that the FIU
becomes an effective force against money laundering.
______
Responses of Hon. John B. Taylor, Under Secretary of the Treasury for
International Affairs, to Additional Questions for the Record Submitted
by Senator Joseph R. Biden, Jr.
Question 1. As you are aware, the $146 million in Inter-American
Development Bank loans that have been approved for Haiti have not been
disbursed for several reasons, including the failure of the Haitian
Government to meet conditions required by the loans, and Haiti's
arrears with the lnter-American Development Bank.
Talk to me about the conditions required for the disbursement of
the loans. Many of us are concerned with the linkage of these
conditions and aid that is meant to address the needs of the Haitian
people. Are the conditions within Haiti's capacity to meet? How many of
the conditions require financial resources to meet?
Answer. Loan conditions play an important role in helping to make
sure that development assistance does address the needs of the Haitian
people. Prior conditions provide for the adoption of financial controls
to prevent diversion of funds to other uses.
Now that Haiti has cleared its arrears to the IDB, loan
disbursements for the reactivated loans can begin once the Haitian
Government completes the prior conditions. IDB staff has advised us
that many prior conditions have been met. The Haitian Government must
still complete additional technical measures before the first
disbursement can be made, including:
Provide evidence that the necessary operating regulations
for project implementation have come into force.
Designate officials responsible for contract execution.
Provide the Central Project Execution Unit's initial report,
implementation plan and current account codes.
Choose experts that will be accountable for account audits.
IDB staff has advised us that both IDB staff and the Haitian
Government do not see major obstacles in the government's completion of
these remaining conditions.
Haiti must also provide evidence of counterpart funds--the
government's contribution to the project that supplements the IDB loan
funds. Experience has shown that the counterpart financing provided by
the borrowing country is an important incentive for strong country
ownership of the project, which is needed for successful execution.
Haiti qualifies for the minimum 10 percent share for counterpart
financing. The IDB has helped Haiti find a donor to contribute most of
Haiti's counterpart financing for the roads project and is seeking
donors to help Haiti with the 10 percent counterpart financing on the
water, education and health loans. In addition, the IDB has agreed that
Haiti will provide most of its counterpart financing ``in kind.''
IDB staff is also working with Haitian authorities to develop
specific benchmarks to evaluate performance using measures such as the
number of kilometers of roads constructed, jobs created, increased
access to services like education and health facilities, and reduced
transportation costs. Each program will then be closely monitored
throughout implementation, with future disbursements linked to
specified benchmarks and regular program auditing. The IDB will work
with the Government of Haiti to assist it in meeting the agreed loan
conditions.
Question 2. Now that Haiti has paid $32 million in arrears to the
Inter-American Development Bank, as of last week, will the loans be
disbursed? What else needs to happen for the funds to go forward?
Answer. Now that Haiti has cleared its arrears to the IDB, the IDB
has reactivated the four pending project loans. Disbursements will
begin once Haiti satisfies the remaining prior conditions on the loans
as discussed above. These requirements are normal technical conditions
that apply to IDB borrowers. IDB staff believes that Haiti can complete
the prior conditions in short order and without problems. Once Haiti
satisfies the prior conditions, IDB will transfer to its country
representative in Haiti an advance of a portion of the funds for each
of the project loans. The IDB's country representative will disburse
funds directly to suppliers to reimburse them for the work performed on
each project. Project loans disburse over a period of years as work is
performed on each project and as the Government of Haiti meets the
defined technical conditions for subsequent disbursements. These
conditions are used to monitor the implementation of each program and
will have been agreed upon by both the Government of Haiti and the IDB.
Question 3. What are we doing to assist in finding a mechanism to
ensure that the loans are released?
Answer. Treasury has worked extensively with the IMF and IDB to
facilitate the reactivation of these loans. Treasury staff has met
directly with IDB program staff to address concerns and outline a
framework for moving ahead. Treasury will continue to consult with the
IDB on the specific measures used to monitor project progress.
______
Responses of Dr. Paul Farmer, Presley Professor, Harvard Medical School
and Medical Director, Clinique Bon Sauveur, Cange, Haiti, to Additional
Questions for the Record Submited by Senator Joseph R. Biden, Jr.
Question 1. I realize that the United States is the largest
international donor of aid to Haiti, yet I have concerns about our
policy of providing humanitarian assistance through non-governmental
organizations, rather than directly to Haiti. I'd like to hear your
thoughts on this issue.
Answer. I share these concerns, Senator, even though I am the
representative of a non-governmental organization. There are many
reasons to conclude that NGOs cannot function effectively without the
Haitian public sector, the first of them long experience: I've been
working in Haiti for 20 years, and I know that the only NGOs able to
make a difference on a large-scale or ``population'' level are those
who work closely with the Haitian public sector. Take the AIDS issue
again. We are very proud of our integrated AIDS prevention and care
project in central Haiti, but have no hope of making our services
available to more of those in need of them unless we work with the
Ministry of Health. And since our group reached, however tardily, this
conclusion, our work has taken off--to the benefit of all. We have
already scaled-up these efforts to 3 public clinics with as many more
in the works.
There are other reasons to eschew this NGO-only approach. Not a
single NGO has been elected to do this work; we don't have a mandate
from the Haitian people, whereas others do have this mandate. Also,
years of undermining the public sector by the international financial
institutions and also our own aid structures have had, along with great
poverty, the expected effects on the governmental institutions--they
are all cash-poor and lacking the tools necessary to do a good job. We
could remediate this by insisting that U.S. assistance be channeled
through Haitian structures. If we do this, other funders will follow
suit. In due time, the public infrastructures would be strengthened in
many ways.
Question 2. What are your recommendations as to how the U.S. aid
program to Haiti should be structured? Would providing aid directly to
the government increase or decrease its effectiveness in alleviating
Haiti's humanitarian crises?
Answer. My biggest recommendation would be to stop trying to bypass
the public sector, for the reasons mentioned above. The U.S. might be
the largest donor to Haiti, but virtually none of our largesse now goes
through the Haitian public sector. It goes through NGOs, with varied
motivations, skill sets, and commitments. If you'll pardon the
expression, we NGOs are a motley crew. There's very little coordination
and although Haiti's so poor that it's impossible to speak of
duplication of services, we can certainly refer--with embarassment, if
we're humble about it--to the extreme lack of coordination between
NGOs. So in answer to your question, Senator, giving aid directly to
the Haitian Government would, in my view, be the best way to end the
humanitarian crisis. Imagine vaccine delivery without the public health
sector's involvement--if the international community continues to
isolate Haiti, that's where we're going.
Question 3. How does providing aid to non-governmental
organizations impact delivery of medical services, and particularly in
regards to HIV/AIDS prevention and treatment programs?
Answer. There's no doubt that NGOs have their place in Haiti and in
other poor settings where there's a lot of work to do. NGOs have
certain strengths--a suppleness that public institutions often do not
have. We can be at the vanguard of some trends, and HIV prevention and
care programs are a good enough example. But relying wholly on NGOs
means, ultimately, that services will be fractured and
``unstandardized.'' NGOs are all over the map in terms of what they
know how to do. We learned this decades ago with tuberculosis and also
vaccine-preventable illnesses. We need to learn it very rapidly with
AIDS.
Question 4. What role do you see the international community,
including the international financial institutions, playing in this
effort?
Answer. The international community could do a great deal to
support the renaissance of Haiti, about to celebrate its bicentennial.
But this would require a significant shift in the rules of engagement.
As I mentioned in my testimony, money from the international financial
institutions and also USAID flowed freely into Haiti during the years
of the Duvalier dictatorships and ensuing military governments. It's
the democratically elected governments that seem to bother the IFIs. In
my testimony, I cited the example of the Inter-American Development
Bank, which for three years blocked already-approved loans for potable
water, health care, education, and road improvement. Careful study of
this whole affair leads me to conclude that this was done for political
reasons rather than the stated ones about arrears. How on earth can
blocking assistance for water, health care, education, and roads help
the Haitian people, who so desperately need these things? Our oldest
neighbors deserve better than this and it's my hope that our country
will reconsider its own policies and lead the way to a dignified re-
engagement with Haiti that is based on genuine solidarity. That would
be a first, and welcomed by the majority of Haitians struggling to
survive.
______
Responses of Steven David Forester, Esq., Senior Policy Adviser,
Haitian Women of Miami, to Additional Questions for the Record
Submitted by Senator Joseph R. Biden, Jr.
Question 1. I'd like to address the difference in treatment between
Cuban and Haitian immigrants whom the Coast Guard intercepts at sea
(commonly referred to the ``wet foot-dry foot policy'').
I understand that Cubans and Haitians who do not reach the shore
are returned to their home countries unless they cite credible fears of
persecution. Critics of U.S policy maintain that there is a
significantly greater opportunity for Cubans to demonstrate credible
fear of persecution than for Haitians; hence, it is ``easier'' for
Cubans to remain in the United States.
Can you give us your take on this issue? Is the criticism of U.S.
immigration policy and procedures valid? What do we have to do in order
to give just attention to Haitian asylum seekers, without compromising
U.S. national security interests?
Furthermore, Cuban immigrants who successfully reach the shore
(``dry foot'') are generally permitted to stay in the United States and
adjust under the Cuban Adjustment Act the following year; however, no
parallel adjustment act exists for Haitians.
Answer. The criticism is valid. Nothing similar to the Cuban
Adjustment Act exists for Haitians, and virtually all interdicted
Haitians are summarily returned. The history of our treatment of
Haitian refugees is deplorable. Please see my Senate testimony at
footnote 4, in which I quote respected refugee expert Bill Frelick as
follows:
Between 1981 and 1991, the U.S. Coast Guard interdicted and
forcibly returned only Haitians. During those 10 years, out of
24,558 interdicted Haitians, INS shipboard screeners allowed
only 28 persons to pursue their asylum claims in the United
States. . . . Those Haitians who managed to register asylum
claims during the 1980s (the time of Duvalier and other
dictators) had the lowest asylum approval rate of any
nationality, 1.8 percent. By contrast, Soviet asylum approvals
at that time were 74.5 percent.
In May 1992, for the first time in our history, the United
States began forcibly returning interdicted asylum seekers with
no screening whatsoever--Haitians only . . .
[In contrast,] from the 1960s to the present, hundreds of
thousands of Cubans have been paroled in and, after a year,
allowed to adjust automatically to permanent resident status. .
. . the ``Guantanarno Cubans'' were paroled in under much more
favorable conditions that the Haitians [and] the Haitians not
the Cubans--were required to pass a ``credible fear'' screening
before being paroled from Guantanamo and . . . two-thirds were
returned to Haiti. . . .'' Bill Frelick, Senior Policy Analyst,
U. S. Committee for Refugees, ``Most Favored Refugees?,''
Washington Post, April 20, 1998.
See also footnote 10 of my testimony, in which I cite nine class
action suits documenting the discrimination over a period of many
years.
U.S. policy towards Haiti also disserves U.S. national security
interests. I suggest in the second half of my testimony three
measures--enacting the Haiti Economic Recovery Act; in-country and
regional refugee and immigrant processing; and including Haitians in
any guestworker program--which would discourage illegal emigration and
the consequent diversion of U.S. resources by putting people to work
and/or giving them a ``safety valve''. But the Administration isn't yet
supporting any of these measures.
Instead, it is gearing up to deprive desperate Haitians of the only
support which keeps thousands of them in Haiti. Let me explain.
Senator Lugar opened the July 15 SFRC hearing on Haiti by stating
that Haitians in the U.S. send $700 million annually in remittances to
Haiti. Those monies are crucial to the subsistence of their relatives
there. Without those remittances hundreds of thousands would be even
more desperate, and many would take to the sea, further taxing our
Coast Guard and Border Patrol resources. Preserving the flow of
remittances should be a primary U. S. interest.
Instead, as I explain in the first ten pages or so of my SFRC
testimony on the need for a HRIFA ``fix-it'' bill (through footnote 9),
the Justice Department is deporting and/or detaining for deportation
and gearing up to deport Haitian refugees who have been living legally
in the U.S. for at least eight and most of them for ten to fifteen
years; who have U.S.-born American-citizen children and dependent
spouses; who own houses and often businesses; and who--relevantly to
our national security--send thousands of dollars each year to their
relatives in Haiti.
This is morally and politically senseless and possible only because
of the relative political weakness of the Haitian-American community.
For example: As I was typing this answer, a Haitian refugee called
me in response to an appeal I made on a Creole television program a few
days ago for persons who would benefit from a HRIFA ``fix-it'' bill.
The caller has lived in the U.S. since 1993 (during the worst
repression in Haiti), has a dependent wife and two (2) U. S.-born
children, owns his own house, and sends $150 per month to Haiti on
which ``seven or eight'' of his relatives depend for their survival. He
has a final order of deportation.
If he is deported to Haiti, the United States will add one more
mouth to feed there and vastly increase the likelihood that those
``seven or eight'' persons will ``take to the seas'' in desperation,
causing a concomitant diversion of the Coast Guard and Border Patrol
resources we need to fight terror. (Not to mention depriving two small
American children of their father.)
Multiply this example by a few thousand. What you have is the
Administration speaking from both sides of its mouth. Our stated
rationale for our current unprecedentedly draconian detention policy
towards Haitians (see my testimony following footnote 9)--e.g.
detaining three-year old little girls and their mothers for six months;
continuing to detain persons who have been granted political asylum by
immigration judges while the government appeals their cases, e.g. a 55-
year old man granted asylum in February: all costing the U.S. taxpayer
tens and hundreds of thousands of dollars in detention costs)--as
stated at the July 15 SFRC hearing by Under Secretary of State for
Political Affairs Marc Grossman, is to ``send a message'' to Haitians
to stay in their country: to prevent the otherwise necessary diversion
of Coast Guard and Border Patrol resources needed to fight terror.
But by deporting a few thousand extremely deserving and productive
long-resident refugees who should have been covered in the first place
by HRIFA, we will deprive a few tens of thousands of persons still in
Haiti of one thing which keeps them there: those critical remittances.
(Not to mention destroying the families of American-citizen children
who are the future of their communities.)
Question 2. What would be the ramifications of treating Haitian
asylum seekers as Cubans are treated? Is this a policy that we should
consider, given the plight of Haitian immigrants? Or will it encourage
more Haitians to take to the seas and risk their lives attempting to
reach the United States?
Answer. Our U.S.-Cuba Migration Accord enables up to 20,000 Cubans
annually to come to the U.S. as refugees or the beneficiares of
immigrant petitions. Having a similar program vis-a-vis Haiti would in
a controlled and regulated way act as a ``safety valve'' discouraging
illegal flight by desperate refuges and other deserving immigrants and
the concomitant diversion of our Coast Guard and other resources. It
would also do very much to remedy the correct perception that our
policies vis-a-vis Cuban and Haitian refugees discriminate against the
Haitians, which exacerbates community tensions.
Similarly, enacting the Haiti trade bill would put people to work
and discourage illegal flight.
There is no indication that our current draconian and unprecedented
detention policies deter emigrants. Haitians flee Haiti because of the
desperate political and economic conditions there. Under Secretary
Grossman cited the years 1991, 1992, and 1994 as supposedly showing
that emigration increases when our detention policies are laxer. He
neglected to say--I had the opportunity to correct him during my
comments--that those were precisely the coup years during which, as
President Clinton correctly said at the time, ``they're chopping
people's faces off.'' (My testimony documents at length the systematic
repression in Haiti during those years as stated by State Department
officials.) There was no large emigration during the late 1990s, when
our detention policies were nowhere near as bad as they are now.
Our Administration's desire to deport a few thousand long-resident
Haitians who should have been covered by the Haitian Refugee
Immigration Fairness Act of 1998, and a few thousand other children in
danger of ``aging out'' of eligibility (see my testimony)--and who
would be covered by a HRIFA ``fix-it'' bill soon to be introduced at
least in the House--and its failure to support the Haiti trade bill and
in-country and regional processing, measures which would serve our
national security by discouraging illegal emigration, reveal that
current Administration policies toward Haitians and Haitian refugees
are inconsistent, shortsighted, wasteful, disserving of national
security and at minimum disingenuous. They are also immoral and
threaten the welfare and future of American families and communities.
______
Responses of Hon. Marc Grossman, Under Secretary of State for Political
Affairs, Department of State, to Additional Questions for the Record
Submitted by Senator Russell D. Feingold
Question 1. Despite efforts by the international community,
especially by the Organization of American States (OAS), to pressure
the Aristide government to respect human rights, the human rights
situation appears only to be deteriorating in Haiti. Just yesterday,
pro-government demonstrators attacked and injured more that 30 people,
who were members of an umbrella opposition group that had gathered for
a meeting. NGOs and government officials accuse the Haitian government
of extrajudicial killings, organized lynchings by mobs and repression
of the free media. In addition, the State Department's recently
released Trafficking in Persons Report states that child trafficking is
rampant in Haiti and that the government is not making serious efforts
to eliminate it. What can the United States do to encourage greater
adherence to human rights by the Aristide government? What are our best
leverage points for demanding reform?
Answer. We encourage greater adherence by pursuing a multifaceted
strategy on human rights. Our strategy focuses on promoting the rule of
law (especially steps to combat the impunity enjoyed by human rights
violators), encouraging Government action against trafficking in
persons, urging the Government to create a secure environment for the
free exercise of political and civil rights, and increasing local
capacity to monitor the human rights situation and advocate for change.
We join with our partners in the Organization of American States (OAS)
to support the work of the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights,
whose reports--along with those of the U.N. Special Rapporteur for
Haiti--heighten international awareness of Haiti's serious human rights
problems. Our best leverage point for improving human rights in Haiti
is to remain actively engaged in pursuing all aspects of this strategy.
The U.S. Embassy in Port-au-Prince has issued frequent public
statements deploring acts of political intimidation and repression of
journalists. As a show of support, the Ambassador and other mission
personnel have personally visited journalists and members of civil
society against whom acts of intimidation have been perpetrated or
threatened. We have repeatedly urged the Government to end impunity by
arresting notorious human rights violators and vigorously prosecuting
politically-motivated murders. Continuing to send strong messages on
protecting basic rights will remain a key part of our strategy.
Ending impunity will help greatly to establish a climate of
security. With our hemispheric partners in the OAS and Caribbean
Community (CARICOM), we are insisting that the Haitian government meet
its commitments under OAS Resolution 822, and are providing political
and financial support for the OAS Special Mission to Strengthen
Democracy in Haiti. In addition to ending impunity, Haiti's commitments
under Resolution 822 include disarming gangs and local officials,
creating a professional police force that operates free of political
interference, and fostering national dialogue.
While we are demanding that the Haitian government fulfill its
commitments under Resolution 822, we are also working with them on a
plan to improve efforts to combat trafficking in persons. The plan
contemplates implementing and expanding Haiti's new anti-TIP
legislation, investigating and controlling trafficking of women from
the Dominican Republic into Haiti, and curbing the movement of Haitian
children into the Dominican Republic.
We directly support human right groups and journalists through
U.S.-funded training and technical assistance programs. One program
conducts civic education programs for grassroots civic organizations.
Another seeks to create political parties that can develop platforms
and offer real electoral alternatives. The Independence of the Media
Program fosters dialogue on freedom of the press through public fora on
issues confronting journalistic liberties, and also provides
broadcasting equipment to radio stations.
Question 2. Of an estimated 1.8 million people living with HIV/AIDS
in Latin America and the Caribbean, Haiti and the Dominican Republic
account for 87 percent of the infected population in the Caribbean.
Approximately 250,000 adults and children in Haiti are living with HIV/
AIDS (about 6.1 percent of the adult population). What types of
programs will be implemented to address HIV/AIDS with the money
appropriated by Congress under the H.S. Leadership Against HIV/AIDS,
Tuberculosis, and Malaria Act of 2003 (P.L. 108-25; H.R. 1298, S.
1009)? How do we ensure that this money is spent appropriately?
Answer. Haiti is one of 14 countries targeted by the President's
$500 million International Mother and Child HIV Prevention (PMTCT)
Initiative and the President's $15 billion Emergency Plan for AIDS
Relief. The new Global AIDS Coordinator, when confirmed, will determine
and oversee future activities under the Emergency Plan. The PMTCT
initiative will be incorporated into the activities of the President's
Emergency Plan.
Current planning for the PMTCT initiative is being conducted by an
interagency steering committee, led by the White House Office of
National AIDS Policy, with senior-level representation from USAID, HHS,
and the Department of State. Under the leadership of the steering
committee and about 100 days after the fiscal year 2003 appropriation
was received, all 14 countries received PMTCT funding using a new
Federal management system that will increase accountability, improve
coordination, and assure effective use of funds in preventing maternal
to child transmission of HIV. Activities under the PMTCT initiative
already have begun and will be officially launched in Port-au-Prince on
July 21.
In Haiti, heterosexual contact is the most common means of
transmission, closely followed by mother-to-child transmission. Barring
any intervention, 30 percent of babies born to HIV-positive women will
contract HIV. In response, the Ministry of Health and its partners
designed and are implementing a three-year prevention of mother-to-
child transmission (PMTCT) pilot project to target 400 HIV-positive
pregnant women in three sites nationwide. Preliminary results in two of
the three sites show that this pilot program reduced the vertical
transmission rate from 30 percent to 9 percent. The PMTCT pilot program
is part of a larger five-year National Strategic Plan to fight against
HIV/AIDS in Haiti that calls for the eventual provision of PMTCT
services to all pregnant women. The strategic plan will be supported
through activities under the President Bush's PMTCT Initiative and a
grant from the Global Fund to Fight AIDS, Tuberculosis and Malaria.
USAID is currently providing support for the installation of a
nation-wide network of clinical reference centers, providing a full
range of Voluntary Counseling and Testing (VCT), reproductive health,
tuberculosis and selected AIDS care, including PMTCT services. Under
the President's PMTCT Initiative, USAID and HHS will develop and
provide nationwide access to 27 VCT/PMTCT reference centers supported
by 21 subregional VCT/PMTCT centers for a total of 48 centers and
related referral arrangements, which will provide coverage in each of
Haiti's 10 regional health departments. The planning for the
President's PMTCT Initiative has specifically taken account of Global
Fund activities in determining in which regions to invest.
Current USAID planning for assistance to public and private
facilities includes support for training, equipment, renovation,
interim personnel and other related activities. In addition, USAID
supports community mobilization activities and expanded community-based
care and support of people living with HIV/AIDS.
Current HHS support to Haiti is provided through the Global AIDS
Program. The Program supports HIV/AIDS prevention, care and treatment,
as well as infrastructure and capacity development. Through the
Program, HHS and its agencies provide technical assistance to 27 public
and private health institutions for comprehensive PMTCT services. HHS
is also providing financial and technical support, as well as
purchasing commodities, for the implementation of voluntary counseling
and testing (VCT) in 15 public sector VCT centers. Further, HHS has
provided financial and technical support to conduct a national HIV
sentinel surveillance survey, sampling 7,200 pregnant women from 21
sites nationally.
Haiti's two-year, $24.4 million Global Fund grant provides support
for limited expansion of the pilot PMTCT program, with a goal of
reaching a total of 700 women across Haiti. The two Primary Recipients
have received their first allotment of funding and have disbursed funds
to sub-recipients. To coordinate the different funding mechanisms,
USAID and HHS will continue to participate in monthly donor
coordination meetings. Haiti's PMTCT steering committee is comprised of
representatives of the Ministry of Health, bilateral and multilateral
donor organizations (including USAID and HHS), and non-governmental
organizations active in the fight against HIV/AIDS in Haiti.
Question 3. As of now, the United States is largely providing
foreign assistance through NGOs and not the Haitian government. The
Bush Administration has stated it will not provide aid to the
government until President Aristide fulfills his promises of political,
economic and judicial reforms. How effective is this assistance
approach? How capable are the NGOs on the ground in providing
humanitarian assistance and promoting government reform? How do we
strengthen the governmental institutions necessary for peace and
stability through this policy?
Answer. The first and foremost requirement for reform and
improvement in governmental institutions is political will on the part
of the government. Experience has shown that absent such will,
assistance aimed at government reform is unlikely to succeed. We have
consistently advocated, both directly and through multilateral
institutions such as the OAS, that the Government of Haiti (GOH)
implement reforms that would contribute to Haiti's peace and stability.
A number of these reforms are embodied in OAS Resolution 822, adopted
by consensus, with the support of the GOH, on September 4, 2002. The
U.S. has supported the OAS Special Mission to Strengthen Democracy in
Haiti both politically and financially. Unfortunately, despite help
from the Special Mission, the GOH has failed to implement most of its
commitments under Resolution 822.
Making assistance to governmental institutions contingent on
evidence of GOH commitment to reforms is one of the best incentives to
promote needed government actions. An example of this has been the
positive GOH response to the U.S.'s Trafficking Victims Protection Act
of 2000, which requires the U.S. to withhold non-humanitarian, non-
trade related assistance from countries that do not do enough to
prevent trafficking in persons. In response to U.S. embassy warnings,
the GOH passed a law prohibiting trafficking of minors, organized a
police unit to enforce the law, and began interagency cooperation to
help victims of trafficking.
The U.S. provides predominantly humanitarian aid to improve health
and nutrition, particularly of the most vulnerable segments of the
Haitian population. The NGOs in Haiti which administer U.S. assistance
are carefully chosen for their experience and efficiency in delivering
assistance.
Other U.S. assistance programs promote sustainable agriculture,
microfinance, and training for political parties and independent media.
By supporting economic growth and democratic governance, these programs
contribute to Haiti's peace and stability.
Finally, the USG provides direct assistance to GOH institutions in
which we have confidence. For example, we provide equipment and
training to the Haitian Coast Guard, unit of the Haitian National
Police, which cooperates with U.S. Coast Guard on interdiction of
migrants and drug traffickers. Building these institutions can provide
and incentive for reform to other elements of the GOH.
Question 4. Since Aristide's ``re-election'' on November 26, 2000,
the U.S. government has pressured him to implement democratic reforms.
Why have our efforts not worked? How can we pressure Aristide more
persuasively to take care of his population?
Answer. President Aristide has demonstrated neither the will nor
the leadership to resolve the political crisis.
OAS Resolution 822 offers a clear guide for resolving the political
impasse through free and fair elections. The Government of Haiti joined
consensus at the OAS when Resolution 822 was adopted in September 2002.
In doing so, it committed itself to a series of steps designed to build
confidence for the participation of all political parties in free and
fair elections. Resolution 822 provides a roadmap and establishes steps
that need to be taken--an end to impunity, disarmament, an independent
and professional police force, and a climate of security conducive to
the formation of a credible, neutral, and independent Provisional
Electoral Council as the essential first step toward elections. The
Haitian government has not taken these steps.
The Government of Haiti understands fully what it must do under
Resolution 822. But it will not be able to take the necessary steps
without strong leadership from President Aristide. The U.S. and the
international community--most notably the OAS and the Caribbean
Community--must maintain consistent and strong pressure on the Aristide
government to meet the commitments it made to the hemisphere in
Resolution 822. The potential cost of not complying for President
Aristide and Haiti was stated by Secretary Powell at the OAS General
Assembly in June--if by September the Government has not created a
climate of security essential to the formation of a credible, neutral,
and independent Provisional Electoral Council, we should reevaluate the
role of the OAS in Haiti.
Question 5. Can the United States play a greater role in reducing
governmental corruption [in Haiti]?
Answer. Fighting corruption and promoting transparency are critical
to democracy and development and are important goals for the U.S. in
Haiti, as they are around the world. We work toward these goals in
several ways.
For example, we continue to press the Government of Haiti (GOH) to
take specific steps against corruption, such as dismissing officers of
the Haitian National Police (HNP) engaged in drug trafficking,
activating the Justice Ministry's Financial Intelligence Unit (FIU),
and undertaking independent audits of public utilities and other
government-owned businesses. U.S. DEA Agents stationed in Haiti have
used polygraph testing to obtain dismissal of corrupt officers from the
HNP counternarcotics unit and the U.S. has provided support for the
FIU.
We also support the efforts of multilateral institutions to reduce
corruption in Haiti. For example, the USG supports the engagement of
the International Monetary Fund, which reached agreement with the GOH
in May on a Staff Monitored Program that includes conditions for
increasing transparency and improved controls over government accounts.
Similarly, we support the Special Mission of the Organization of
American States (OAS) in Haiti, which operates a program providing
international police monitors attached to the offices of top police
officials.
The USG also makes assistance to governmental institutions
contingent on evidence of commitment to reform, providing direct
assistance only to GOH institutions in which we have confidence. For
example, as noted in response to your previous question, we provide
equipment and training to the Haitian Coast Guard. In all cases, we
ensure that the assistance we provide is used for the purposes for
which it is intended.
While these efforts have succeeded in limited areas, official
corruption remains a major problem in Haiti. Greater success in this
effort requires changing attitudes among Haiti's political leadership,
or may require change of some leaders themselves. Ultimately, the key
to reform, transparency, and the fight against corruption in government
is political will on the part of the Haitian government and its
leaders. To date, the Aristide Government has failed to demonstrate
such will, except in isolated cases such as the June 18 expulsion of
indicted drug trafficker Jacques Ketant.
Question 6. How can we better support the efforts of the OAS to
negotiate a settlement between the Fanmi Lavalas party of Jean-Bertrand
Aristide and the political opposition parties of the Democratic
Convergence?
Answer. OAS efforts to mediate a settlement through direct
negotiations ended in July 2002 when talks between Fanmi Lavalas (FL)
and Democratic Convergence (CD) collapsed. OAS Resolution 822, adopted
in September 2002 by unanimous consent of the OAS Permanent Council
including Haiti, is intended as a framework for resolution of the
political crisis through free and fair elections.
We can best assist the process established under OAS Resolution 822
by continuing to provide political and financial support for the OAS
Special Mission to Strengthen Democracy in Haiti. At the same time, we
need to express clearly the view that results will dictate our future
course of action. At the OAS General Assembly in June, Secretary Powell
called for a reevaluation of the OAS role in Haiti if the Government
had not acted by September to create the climate of security essential
to formation of a credible Provisional Electoral Council, the crucial
first step toward free and fair elections.
The OAS Special Mission was formed in January 2002 by agreement
between the Government of Haiti and the OAS. Its original mandates were
assistance to the Haitian government in democracy, human rights,
governance, and security for elections. Resolution 822 expanded the
role of the Special Mission to include supporting and monitoring the
efforts of the Haitian government to comply with commitments it made in
the Resolution. Pursuant to that expanded role, the Special Mission has
negotiated Terms of Reference for assistance to the government on
disarmament, electoral security, elections, and creating a professional
police force.
The Special Mission, with a staff of only fifteen, has endeavored
to fulfill its important role with limited financial resources. The
U.S. has contributed $2.5 million of the approximately $5.3 million
received to date, with Canada being the other major contributor.
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