[House Hearing, 106 Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
INTERNET POSTING OF CHEMICAL ``WORST CASE'' SCENARIOS: A ROADMAP FOR
TERRORISTS
=======================================================================
JOINT HEARING
before the
SUBCOMMITTEES ON
HEALTH AND ENVIRONMENT
and
OVERSIGHT AND INVESTIGATIONS
of the
COMMITTEE ON COMMERCE
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
ONE HUNDRED SIXTH CONGRESS
FIRST SESSION
__________
FEBRUARY 10, 1999
__________
Serial No. 106-3
__________
Printed for the use of the Committee on Commerce
U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE
55-147CC WASHINGTON : 1999
------------------------------------------------------------------------------
For sale by the U.S. Government Printing Office
Superintendent of Documents, Congressional Sales Office, Washington, DC 20402
COMMITTEE ON COMMERCE
TOM BLILEY, Virginia, Chairman
W.J. ``BILLY'' TAUZIN, Louisiana JOHN D. DINGELL, Michigan
MICHAEL G. OXLEY, Ohio HENRY A. WAXMAN, California
MICHAEL BILIRAKIS, Florida EDWARD J. MARKEY, Massachusetts
JOE BARTON, Texas RALPH M. HALL, Texas
FRED UPTON, Michigan RICK BOUCHER, Virginia
CLIFF STEARNS, Florida EDOLPHUS TOWNS, New York
PAUL E. GILLMOR, Ohio FRANK PALLONE, Jr., New Jersey
Vice Chairman SHERROD BROWN, Ohio
JAMES C. GREENWOOD, Pennsylvania BART GORDON, Tennessee
CHRISTOPHER COX, California PETER DEUTSCH, Florida
NATHAN DEAL, Georgia BOBBY L. RUSH, Illinois
STEVE LARGENT, Oklahoma ANNA G. ESHOO, California
RICHARD BURR, North Carolina RON KLINK, Pennsylvania
BRIAN P. BILBRAY, California BART STUPAK, Michigan
ED WHITFIELD, Kentucky ELIOT L. ENGEL, New York
GREG GANSKE, Iowa THOMAS C. SAWYER, Ohio
CHARLIE NORWOOD, Georgia ALBERT R. WYNN, Maryland
TOM A. COBURN, Oklahoma GENE GREEN, Texas
RICK LAZIO, New York KAREN McCARTHY, Missouri
BARBARA CUBIN, Wyoming TED STRICKLAND, Ohio
JAMES E. ROGAN, California DIANA DeGETTE, Colorado
JOHN SHIMKUS, Illinois THOMAS M. BARRETT, Wisconsin
HEATHER WILSON, New Mexico BILL LUTHER, Minnesota
JOHN B. SHADEGG, Arizona LOIS CAPPS, California
CHARLES W. ``CHIP'' PICKERING,
Mississippi
VITO FOSSELLA, New York
ROY BLUNT, Missouri
ED BRYANT, Tennessee
ROBERT L. EHRLICH, Jr., Maryland
James E. Derderian, Chief of Staff
James D. Barnette, General Counsel
Reid P.F. Stuntz, Minority Staff Director and Chief Counsel
______
Subcommittee on Health and Environment
MICHAEL BILIRAKIS, Florida, Chairman
FRED UPTON, Michigan SHERROD BROWN, Ohio
CLIFF STEARNS, Florida HENRY A. WAXMAN, California
JAMES C. GREENWOOD, Pennsylvania FRANK PALLONE, Jr., New Jersey
NATHAN DEAL, Georgia PETER DEUTSCH, Florida
RICHARD BURR, North Carolina BART STUPAK, Michigan
BRIAN P. BILBRAY, California GENE GREEN, Texas
ED WHITFIELD, Kentucky TED STRICKLAND, Ohio
GREG GANSKE, Iowa DIANA DeGETTE, Colorado
CHARLIE NORWOOD, Georgia THOMAS M. BARRETT, Wisconsin
TOM A. COBURN, Oklahoma LOIS CAPPS, California
Vice Chairman RALPH M. HALL, Texas
RICK LAZIO, New York EDOLPHUS TOWNS, New York
BARBARA CUBIN, Wyoming ANNA G. ESHOO, California
JOHN B. SHADEGG, Arizona JOHN D. DINGELL, Michigan,
CHARLES W. ``CHIP'' PICKERING, (Ex Officio)
Mississippi
ED BRYANT, Tennessee
TOM BLILEY, Virginia,
(Ex Officio)
(ii)
Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations
FRED UPTON, Michigan, Chairman
JOE BARTON, Texas RON KLINK, Pennsylvania
CHRISTOPHER COX, California HENRY A. WAXMAN, California
RICHARD BURR, North Carolina BART STUPAK, Michigan
Vice Chairman GENE GREEN, Texas
BRIAN P. BILBRAY, California KAREN McCARTHY, Missouri
ED WHITFIELD, Kentucky TED STRICKLAND, Ohio
GREG GANSKE, Iowa DIANA DeGETTE, Colorado
ROY BLUNT, Missouri JOHN D. DINGELL, Michigan,
ED BRYANT, Tennessee (Ex Officio)
TOM BLILEY, Virginia,
(Ex Officio)
(iii)
C O N T E N T S
__________
Page
Testimony of:
Blitzer, Robert M., Associate Director, Center for
Counterterrorism Technology and Analysis, Science
Applications International Corporation, and Former
Director, Counterterrorism Planning Section, National
Security Division, Federal Bureau of Investigation......... 43
Burdick, Brett A., Environmental Programs Manager, Department
of Emergency Services, Commonwealth of Virginia............ 34
Burk, Arthur F., Senior Safety Fellow, DuPont Company,
representing the Chemical Manufacturers Association, and
Member, Clean Air Act Advisory Subcommittee on Accident
Prevention................................................. 80
Burnham, Robert M., Section Chief, Domestic Terrorism,
National Security Division, Federal Bureau of Investigation 67
Eversole, John M., Chief Fire Officer and Commander,
Hazardous Materials Division, City of Chicago Fire
Department, and Chairman, Hazardous Materials Committee,
International Association of Fire Chiefs................... 46
Fields, Timothy, Jr., Acting Assistant Administrator, Office
of Solid Waste and Emergency Response, Environmental
Protection Agency.......................................... 63
Gablehouse, Timothy R., Chair, Jefferson County Local
Emergency Planning Committee, and Member, Clean Air Act
Advisory Subcommittee on Accident Prevention............... 37
Littles, Paula R., Legislative Director, Pace Workers
International Union........................................ 92
Monihan, E. James, Volunteer, Lewes Fire Department, and
Delaware State Director, National Volunteer Fire Council... 40
Orum, Paul, Coordinator, Working Group on Community Right-To-
Know....................................................... 84
Scannell, Jerry, President, National Safety Council, and
Member, Clean Air Act Advisory Subcommittee on Accident
Prevention................................................. 89
Additional material submitted for the record:
Fields, Timothy, Jr., Acting Assistant Administrator, Office
of Solid Waste and Emergency Response, Environmental
Protection Agency, undated letter, enclosing response for
the record................................................. 111
Gablehouse, Timothy R., Chair, Jefferson County Local
Emergency Planning Committee, and Member, Clean Air Act
Advisory Subcommittee on Accident Prevention, letter dated
March 18, 1999, enclosing response for the record.......... 107
Littles, Paula R., Legislative Director, Pace Workers
International Union, letter dated March 18, 1999, enclosing
response for the record.................................... 110
Orum, Paul, Coordinator, Working Group on Community Right-To-
Know, letter dated March 31, 1999, enclosing response for
the record................................................. 111
Scannell, Jerry, President, National Safety Council, and
Member, Clean Air Act Advisory Subcommittee on Accident
Prevention, letter dated March 19, 1999, enclosing response
for the record............................................. 109
Walsh, A. Robert, Legislative Counsel, Federal Bureau of
Investigation, letter dated March 25, 1999, enclosing
response for the record.................................... 105
(v)
INTERNET POSTING OF CHEMICAL ``WORST CASE SCENARIO'' DATA
----------
WEDNESDAY, FEBRUARY 10, 1999
House of Representatives,
Committee on Commerce,
Subcommittee on Health and Environment,
and the Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations,
Washington, DC.
The subcommittees met, pursuant to notice, at 10:30 a.m.,
in room 2123, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Michael
Bilirakis (Chairman, Subcommittee on Health and Environment)
and Hon. Fred Upton (Chairman, Subcommittee on Oversight and
Investigations) presiding.
Members present Subcommittee on Health and Environment:
Representatives Bilirakis, Upton, Greenwood, Burr, Bilbray,
Whitfield, Norwood, Coburn, Cubin, Pickering, Bryant, Bliley
(ex officio), Brown, Stupak, Green, DeGette, Barrett, Capps,
and Eshoo.
Members present Subcommittee on Oversight and
Investigations: Representatives Upton, Burr, Bilbray,
Whitfield, Blunt, Bryant, Bliley (ex officio), Klink, Stupak,
Green, McCarthy, and DeGette.
Staff present: Joseph Stanko, majority counsel; Tom
Dilenge, majority counsel; Eric Link, majority counsel; Chris
Wolf, majority counsel; Bob Meyers, majority counsel; Jason C.
Foster, legislative clerk; Alison Berkes, minority counsel; and
Edith Holleman, minority counsel.
Mr. Bilirakis. The hearing will come to order.
I would like to welcome our witnesses today, and especially
thank Chairman Bliley and Chairman Upton for their hard work in
making today's hearing a reality.
As members of the audience may or may not know, the Health
and Environment Subcommittee and the Oversight and
Investigations Subcommittee have a long history of working
together, particularly in Clean Air Act issues. Our
subcommittees have cooperated on a number of hearings and
investigative efforts involving the implementation of the Clean
Air Act and the Clean Air Act amendments of 1990. Today's
hearing continues this cooperation and will additionally serve
as an initial effort to determine if legislation in this matter
is necessary.
Although I have tried not to prejudge this issue, and look
forward to receiving testimony from all of our witnesses, the
relevant provisions of law in this matter appear to be fairly
clear. Section 112(r)(7) of the Clean Air Act requires, in
part, that risk management plans prepared by owners and
operators of stationary sources shall be registered with the
EPA and further made available to the public under section
114(C) of the act. Furthermore, legal opinion from the
Department of Justice and EPA indicates that EPA may be
required to make risk management plans public and in an
electronic format, if the information is submitted in that
format.
Clearly, then, there is a danger that even the best
intentions by EPA concerning the dissemination of sensitive
data may be overridden by new technology and the requirements
of black letter law. Internet access is not only a question of
speed, but the ability to search for specific information using
different variables and to perhaps rank and select targets of
opportunity. We must, therefore, be prepared. I think you all
would agree to weigh the goals of the Clean Air Act against the
competing considerations of national, community, and personal
security.
This will inevitably require a careful balancing, and I
will look to the testimony of our witnesses to help illuminate
our thinking and the proper balance between public information
and public threats.
Let me say initially, however, that while I fully respect
the need for individuals and communities to be informed of
risks to their health and for fire and emergency personnel to
have current, detailed information to ensure their safety, we
cannot simply ignore the potential of a competing threat
emanating from an anonymity of cyberspace.
If we can reasonably determine from this hearing, and from
our subcommittees' review of available information that there
is a real threat, I am unwilling to just wait and see what
happens.
One of the lessons of history is that we must never fight
the last war. Surely, we cannot depend on our enemies to not
use all the technology and all the resources that are available
to them.
All together, I would like to recognize again the hard work
of Chairman Bliley in bringing this matter to the attention of
the committee and, indeed, to the attention of the entire
Congress and the administration.
There is an old adage which says simply, ``Trust, but
verify.'' I think today's hearing will help us to verify
whether or not a targeted change to the law is required or
whether we can, indeed, trust that this new information will
not be put to tragic use.
The Chair now recognizes Mr. Brown of Ohio, the ranking
member of the Health and Environment Subcommittee, for an
opening statement.
Mr. Brown. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Bilirakis. Please proceed, sir.
Mr. Brown. I would like to thank both Chairman Bilirakis
and Chairman Upton for holding today's hearings on the
requirements in the Clean Air Act for providing information to
the public about the possible results of serious accidents at
chemical facilities.
I would also like to recognize two new members of the
subcommittee on our side, Lois Capps and Tom Barrett. They are
joining us in our first hearing.
The 1990 Clean Air Act amendments directed the EPA to
implement a program that would address the dangers of releasing
hazardous chemicals into the air. The program requires chemical
facilities to file risk management plans describing, ``worst
case scenarios'' with EPA, and for the information to be
publicly available so that communities can prepare adequately
for potential accidents.
Concerns have been raised that terrorists could use this
data to carry out acts of sabotage. The questions raised by the
FBI and others about the potential misuse of the ``worst case
scenario'' information certainly deserve our careful
consideration. We should not open our communities, obviously,
to new threats. However, it is important to maintain a balance
between concerns about terrorism and the usefulness of this
information to citizens.
It is worth noting that the ``worst case scenario'' data
that EPA has directed to collect and disseminate would give a
location and potential effects of an accident, but it would not
in any way provide a blueprint for terrorist attacks.
The risk management plans do not include specifics such as
tank locations, plant security systems, or methods of causing
an explosion or chemical release. Furthermore, potential
terrorists can already obtain information on chemical
facilities through a variety of public sources.
Communities have legitimate reasons to seek information
about chemical facilities in their vicinity. We are not talking
hypothetically when we talk about accidents at chemical plants.
In 1997, more than 38,000 chemical fires, spills, and
explosions were reported through the EPA's emergency response
notification system. Communities have the right to know what
risks are posed by facilities in their midst.
With the risk management plans in hand, emergency response
personnel can lay appropriate plans for handling accidents.
Workers and neighbors can approach the facilities to propose
improvements in safety at and around the site. Communities can
use the risk management plans as a basis for decisions on
zoning, for instance.
I understand that EPA and the FBI have held discussions on
how to balance concerns with terrorism about access to
information. I would encourage these agencies and other
interested parties to work out a solution cooperatively, as I
believe that they have begun to.
However, if my colleagues feel that we should consider
legislation on this issue, an additional hearing on the
specific legislative proposals would be essential. I would want
to review our legislative proposal carefully and to hear the
views of others to be certain that the underlying purpose of
effectively disclosing this information to the public is not
compromised.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for raising this important issue.
Mr. Bilirakis. I thank the gentleman from Ohio, Mr. Brown.
The Chair now recognizes the joint chairman of this hearing
and the chairman of the Oversight and Investigations
Subcommittee of Commerce, Mr. Upton, for an opening statement.
Mr. Upton. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and it is my pleasure
to jointly chair this with you and have the support of the full
committee chairman, Mr. Bliley, as well.
We are here today to review the manner in which the
Environmental Protection Agency plans to disseminate, to the
public, hazardous material reports that at least 66,000
facilities nationwide are required to file with the Agency
under the Clean Air Act. These reports include ``worst case
scenario'' information, such as what would happen if all risk
management plans failed and hazardous chemicals were released.
The ``worst case scenario'' data specifically include a
chemical-by-chemical analysis of the key accidental release
points within a facility, and an estimate of the impact of each
``worst case'' chemical release on the people living in nearby
communities.
The Clean Air Act requires the EPA to make this information
available to the public, but the statute does not specify the
method by which the information should be disseminated.
Let me make it very clear at the outset of this hearing; we
support the right of communities to know the risks of living
near facilities using hazardous materials, including potential
``worst case scenarios,'' and to let the right people know as
well.
Our purpose here today is not to question or limit the
rights of communities to this information. We are concerned,
however, that the widespread electronic dissemination of this
``worst case scenario'' information on the Internet will, in
fact, provide a roadmap for terrorists, putting communities
across the country in great danger from targeted terrorist
attacks planned with information provided in user-friendly
format by our own government.
The question before us today is how should EPA handle the
dissemination of this highly sensitive information to ensure
that communities continue to have the right to know about
potential hazards, but, to protect those same communities from
terrorists bent on wreaking havoc?
We have an impressive group of witnesses here to discuss
the matter from all sides of the issue. The first panel will
include experts in the field of law enforcement,
counterterrorism, and emergency response. We will discuss the
nature and extent of the terrorist threat posed by the
widespread electronic dissemination of a national database
containing ``worst case scenario'' information.
Our second panel will consist of officials from the FBI and
the EPA who have been attempting to resolve these security
concerns and agree upon a controlled public dissemination plan.
Finally, our third panel will include representatives from
the environmental, worker and public safety, and industrial
communities, including two members of the Public Advisory
Committee established by EPA to address the issue.
From an oversight perspective, I also believe that there
are serious questions about how EPA has, to date, dealt with
this issue--or I guess I should say how EPA has failed to deal
with this issue in a responsible or timely manner. It appears
that the EPA has only reluctantly come to the view that
Internet dissemination poses a security risk, and even then,
the Agency still has not come to terms with the third-party
access problem. In the meantime, the proverbial clock is
ticking with a statutory deadline for the facilities section of
this data only months away.
I hope to get some answers from EPA today on how we get to
this point, what the Agency plans to do about it, now that we
are in this difficult position, and I continue to oversee EPA's
implementation of this section of the Clean Air Act to make
sure that their actions remain consistent.
I might just add a point here at the end. Yesterday, I had
the opportunity to meet with a survivor or a spouse of a
wonderful man that was killed in the Oklahoma City bombing. She
was very supportive of the actions taken by these subcommittees
today. And as we chatted a little bit about it, I thought about
my own perspective of being at home working on the Internet
with my family; fifth grade daughter, first grade son. We
worry, as parents, about some of the things that get on the
Internet, particularly, pornography, and our efforts to make
sure that that does not come into our home. I never thought
that we would actually dream of the day when our Government
would, perhaps, put this same information on for terrorists--
who knows where in the world--to, perhaps, target some of our
best and brightest here within the United States.
And it is with that thought that I yield back the balance
of my time and look forward to this hearing.
[The prepared statement of Hon. Fred Upton follows:]
Prepared Statement of Hon. Fred Upton, Chairman, Subcommittee on
Oversight and Investigations
We are here today to review the manner in which the Environmental
Protection Agency plans to disseminate to the public hazardous material
reports that at least 66,000 facilities nationwide are required to file
with the agency under the Clean Air Act. These reports include worst-
case scenario information, such as what would happen if all risk
management plans failed and hazardous chemicals were released. The
worst-case scenario data specifically include a chemical-by-chemical
analysis of the key accidental release points within a facility and an
estimate of the impact of each worst-case chemical release on the
people living in nearby communities.
The Clean Air Act requires the EPA to make this information
available to the public, but the statute does not specify the method by
which the information should be disseminated.
Let me make it very clear at the outset of this hearing. We support
the right of communities to know the risks of living near facilities
using hazardous materials, including potential worst-case scenarios.
Our purpose here today is not to question or limit the rights of
communities to this information. We are concerned, however, that
widespread electronic dissemination of this worst-case scenario
information on the Internet will provide a road map for terrorists,
putting communities across this country in great danger from targeted
terrorist attacks planned with information provided in user-friendly
format by our own government. The question before us today is how
should EPA handle the dissemination of this highly sensitive
information to ensure that communities continue to have the right to
know about potential hazards, but to protect those same communities
from terrorists bent on wreaking havoc.
We have an impressive group of witnesses here to discuss this
matter from all sides of the issue. Our first panel will include
experts in the field of law enforcement, counter-terrorism, and
emergency response, who will discuss the nature and extent of the
terrorist threat posed by widespread, electronic dissemination of a
national database containing worst-case scenario information. Our
second panel will consist of officials from the FBI and the EPA, who
have been attempting to resolve these security concerns and agree upon
a controlled public dissemination plan. Finally, our third panel will
include representatives from the environmental, worker and public
safety, and industrial communities, including two members of the public
advisory committee established by EPA to address this issue.
From an oversight perspective, I also believe that there are
serious questions about how EPA has, to date, dealt with this issue--
or, I guess I should say, how EPA has failed to deal with this issue in
a responsible or timely manner. It appears that EPA has only
reluctantly come to the view that Internet dissemination poses a
security risk, and even then, the agency still has not come to terms
with the third-party access problem. In the meantime, the proverbial
clock is ticking, with a statutory deadline for facilities' submission
of this data only months away.
I hope to get some answers from EPA today on how we got to this
point, and what the agency plans to do about it now that we are in this
difficult position. I also plan to continue our oversight of EPA's
implementation of this section of the Clean Air Act, in order to ensure
that the agency's actions remain consistent with congressional intent
and do not threaten the safety of America's citizens and communities.
At no other time in our history has an invention transformed our
economy and our society as quickly as the development of the Internet.
Each day, millions of us use the Internet to access information, to
visit new places, and gain new knowledge. My 11-year-old daughter is
already web savvy. She uses our home computer to help with homework and
connect with friends.
As a parent, the greatest concern I used to have about the Internet
was porn and the other things that sickos would post . . . until this.
The thought that a terrorist could research devastation and terror
with little more than a web account and a mouse is troubling.
Information to help terrorize the people of St. Joseph or Kalamazoo,
Michigan, Richmond, Virginia, or West Palm, Florida should be made more
difficult to find, not easier. And to think that the federal government
could help make that happen is even a greater concern.
By posting this information, it seems that the Internet crosses the
line from helpful to harmful.
The Internet should be a place where 11-year-old girls can do their
homework, not terrorists.
I look forward to hearing from today's witnesses.
Mr. Bilirakis. I thank the gentleman.
Mr. Klink, the ranking member of the Oversight and
Investigations Subcommittee, my good friend from western
Pennsylvania.
Mr. Klink. I thank my friend for that kind introduction,
and I look forward to working with not only him but my good
friend, Mr. Upton, who worked on some environmental legislation
with me during the last Congress. We enjoyed working with him.
But we are not, I think, in some ways, getting off to the best
kind of start today. I know we have great affection for each
other, and we like to work together, but somehow I don't think
it has gotten down to our staff level. I think we need to work
on having our staffs be able to be a little bit better informed
about where we are going on these issues, because we begin the
work of the subcommittee in the new Congress by looking for a
solution to a problem that is not yet defined, will not be
defined at this hearing, and we don't whether or not it really
exists.
The congressionally mandated release of ``worst case
scenario'' impacts in an easily assessable format is to help
the public, relevant State and local officials, and industry
avoid and mitigate the results of the accidental release of
dangerous chemicals. At least for the majority's press purpose,
it has become a roadmap for terrorism.
Now yesterday, before a hearing was even held, before we
heard from a single witness, Chairman Bliley held a press
conference and announced that there was a problem and that he
would correct that terrorism threat by introducing legislation.
And I simply would ask, from the minority, if the majority has
a crystal ball that can tell us what this hearing and any
future hearings is going to discover, would they, please, share
that crystal ball with the minority, because we have not
predetermined what we are going to hear at these sessions, and
what the witnesses are going to tell us?
One of the real questions that we would like to address
today is: Will this information be accessible to all to help
avoid the 8,000 serious chemical releases and those 300 to 400
deaths every year that result from those releases?
Some witnesses today will call for changes in the Freedom
of Information Act, in which Congress apparently would create a
two-tier system of access to information, depending on where
you live and what media you get to get your information. We
have no evidence of why we should do this. We have seen no
draft language to consider. We have no FOIA expert before us,
or even an administration position.
Mr. Chairman, we hope that when we have draft language,
that it can be shown to us and that we will then have a hearing
on that piece of legislation.
Mr. Bilirakis. I would suggest, if the gentleman would
yield, that you, hopefully, would be a part of that draft
language if, in fact, there is going to be any need for draft
language----
Mr. Klink. I am glad to hear that.
Mr. Bilirakis. [continuing] which has not been determined,
as far as I am concerned.
Mr. Klink. Well, thank you. Because we heard yesterday
following the press release that, very shortly after this
hearing, a bill was going to be dropped, and we hadn't had a
discussion. And so that is the reason for some of this dismay.
I hope that we are going to be able to put behind us--and I
have spoken with Mr. Upton--some of the problems that existed
in the previous Oversight and Investigations Subcommittee as we
looked for crimes that really didn't exist. I am a little
bothered now that we are now searching for problems that may or
may not exist.
Terrorist scenarios are very popular fodder for the press,
for movies, for sci-fi writers, and for politicians.
Counterterrorism experts and centers are springing up
everywhere to make sure they get a part of the Federal largess.
But when my staff probed more deeply, we could not find any
documented evidence of increased threats to chemical plants. In
fact, we could not find any evidence worldwide that chemical
plants had been terrorist targets. Military targets, yes, as
demonstrated in the Sudan recently, when the U.S. attacked that
chemical plant. But terrorist target; we have seen no evidence.
The creation and release of information about chemicals at
industrial facilities in the United States was mandated by
Congress in 1990. The world had witnessed the terrible results
of releases from a chemical plant on humans in Bhopal, India,
and the frightening chemical releases from a sister plant in
Institute, West Virginia. There are, as I said, over 60,000
accidental releases every year, of which about 8,000 result in
significant human or property damage. Between 300 or 400
people, mostly workers and first responders, die every year.
This is the known documented danger that Congress has told the
Environmental Protection Agency to address by providing the
public with information they needed to force these facilities
to become safer.
Much information is now available from the Environmental
Protection Agency in various media and on the Internet about
these chemicals, where they are, and their effects when they
are released. Thousands of communities, investors, first
responders, medical people, workers, industrial safety
officers, and just plain citizens use that information every
day. Many ``worst case scenarios'' are already available
because they have been provided to the communities involved and
to the press.
There seems to be a consensus that this information has
reduced the threat of accidents, helped prepare first
responders, assisted companies in identifying and eliminating
or better handling their most dangerous chemicals, and helped
communities in planning decisions about the siting of schools
and residential facilities and the need for buffer zones
between those facilities and the chemical plants.
Now, right now, it is not difficult for you or I, or a
terrorist, to determine by observation and a little bit of
research where chemical facilities are, what they manufacture,
how close they are to residential facilities. One of the
witnesses is going to tell us today--and the world--that there
are a large number of chemical facilities near Wilmington,
Delaware, which he will describe as a potential ``terrorist
dream'' that would allow an attack of massive proportion. Well,
that is pretty public, making the statement here in a hearing.
And it didn't take the Internet or the EPA to figure it out. We
could find out that chemical plant was there simply by driving
down I-95 and opening our eyes.
So, what new threat are we looking for here today? What
would force us to rewrite our laws?
The chairman would have us believe--as he said yesterday--
that there are sophisticated, professional foreign terrorists,
as he said, ``from Los Angeles to Libya,'' who, only because of
access to this information, will move to the United States,
bomb chemical plants, and decimate entire population centers
nearby. What evidence do we have of this?
Well, we have a 1-month study that was done for the EPA's
Advisory Committee, which attempted to model the possible
increases in terrorist attacks on chemical plants caused by
putting ``worst case scenarios'' on the Internet, and you will
hear that study cited today. It has many faults.
This week, I am going to ask the General Accounting Office
to review the methodology, the credibility, and the reliability
of that study. But we already know that the modeling of the
study is questionable, because there was only one terrorist
incident involving chemical plants to provide a baseline. The
other one cited was actually a scam in which the owner of some
worthless chemicals in Virginia tried to blow them up to recoup
insurance money. The other involved a group of Ku Klux Klan
members who were going to blow up some tanks at a gas refinery
in Texas to create a diversion so they could rob an armored
car.
The contractor also assumed incorrectly that the industry
had done all it could to improve safety. The criteria used in
this study to define the type of information that would be
useful were from military organizations, not from terrorist
experts. Let me remind you, military organizations and
terrorists have completely different agendas, motives, and
resources available to them.
And without objection, Mr. Chairman, I would like to offer
up, for the record, an article from a recent foreign policy
issue by an Israeli historian of terrorism, who describes
extremely well the psychological and the other goals of
terrorists, based on actual events, and why he believes the
current discussions of terrorism threats are vastly overblown.
And I would ask----
Mr. Bilirakis. Without objection.
[The information article referred to follows:]
[Thursday, October 1, 1998--No. 112]
The Great Superterrorism Scare
By Ehud Sprinzak
Last March, representatives from more than a dozen U.S. federal
agencies gathered at the White House for a secret simulation to test
their readiness to confront a new kind of terrorism. Details of the
scenario unfolded a month later on the front page of the New York
Times: Without warning, thousands across the American Southwest fall
deathly ill. Hospitals struggle to rush trained and immunized medical
personnel into crisis areas. Panic spreads as vaccines and antibiotics
run short--and then run out. The killer is a hybrid of smallpox and the
deadly Marburg virus, genetically engineered and let loose by
terrorists to infect hundreds of thousands along the Mexican-American
border.
This apocalyptic tale represents Washington's newest nightmare: the
threat of a massive terrorist attack with chemical, biological, or
nuclear weapons. Three recent events seem to have convinced the
policymaking elite and the general public that a disaster is imminent:
the 1995 nerve gas attack on a crowded Tokyo subway station by the
Japanese millenarian cult Aum Shinrikyo; the disclosure of alarming new
information about the former Soviet Union's massive biowarfare program;
and disturbing discoveries about the extent of Iraqi president Saddam
Hussein's hidden chemical and biological arsenals. Defense Secretary
William Cohen summed up well the prevailing mood surrounding mass-
destruction terrorism: ``The question is no longer if this will happen,
but when.''
Such dire forecasts may make for gripping press briefings, movies,
and bestsellers, but they do not necessarily make for good policy. As
an unprecedented fear of mass-destruction terrorism spreads throughout
the American security establishment, governments worldwide are devoting
more attention to the threat. But, as horrifying as this prospect may
be, the relatively low risks of such an event do not justify the high
costs now being contemplated to defend against it.
Not only are many of the countermeasures likely to be ineffective,
but the level of rhetoric and funding devoted to fighting
superterrorism may actually advance a potential superterrorist's
broader goals: sapping the resources of the state and creating a
climate of panic and fear that can amplify the impact of any terrorist
act.
capabilities and chaos
Since the Clinton administration issued its Presidential Decision
Directive on terrorism in June 1995, U.S. federal, state, and local
governments have heightened their efforts to prevent or respond to a
terrorist attack involving weapons of mass destruction. A report issued
in December 1997 by the National Defense Panel, a commission of experts
created by congressional mandate, calls upon the army to shift its
priorities and prepare to confront dire domestic threats. The National
Guard and the U.S. Army Reserve must be ready, for example, to ``train
local authorities in chemical- and biological-weapons detection,
defense, and decontamination; assist in casualty treatment and
evacuation; quarantine, if necessary, affected areas and people; and
assist in restoration of infrastructure and services.'' In May, the
Department of Defense announced plans to train National Guard and
reserve elements in every region of the country to carry out these
directives.
In his 1998 State of the Union address, President Bill Clinton
promised to address the dangers of biological weapons obtained by
``outlaw states, terrorists, and organized criminals.'' Indeed, the
President's budget for 1999, pending congressional approval, devotes
hundreds of millions of dollars to superterrorism response and recovery
programs, including large decontamination units, stockpiles of vaccines
and antibiotics, improved means of detecting chemical and biological
agents and analyzing disease outbreaks, and training for special
intervention forces. The FBI, Pentagon, State Department, and U.S.
Health and Human Services Department will benefit from these funds, as
will a plethora of new interagency bodies established to coordinate
these efforts. Local governments are also joining in the campaign. Last
April, New York City officials began monitoring emergency room care in
search of illness patterns that might indicate a biological or chemical
attack had occurred. The city also brokered deals with drug companies
and hospitals to ensure an adequate supply of medicine in the event of
such an attack. Atlanta, Denver, Los Angeles, San Francisco, and
Washington are developing similar programs with state and local funds.
If the proliferation of counterterrorism programs continues at its
present pace, and if the U.S. army is indeed redeployed to the home
front, as suggested by the National Defense Panel, the bill for these
preparations could add up to tens of billions of dollars in the coming
decades.
Why have terrorism specialists and top government officials become
so obsessed with the prospect that terrorists, foreign or homegrown,
will soon attempt to bring about an unprecedented disaster in the
United States? A close examination of their rhetoric reveals two
underlying assumptions: The Capabilities Proposition. According to this
logic, anyone with access to modern biochemical technology and a
college science education could produce enough chemical or biological
agents in his or her basement to devastate the population of London,
Tokyo, or Washington. The raw materials are readily available from
medical suppliers, germ banks, university labs, chemical-fertilizer
stores, and even ordinary pharmacies. Most policy today proceeds from
this assumption.
The Chaos Proposition. The post-Cold war world swarms with shadowy
extremist groups, religious fanatics, and assorted crazies eager to
launch a major attack on the civilized world--preferably on U.S.
territory. Walter Laqueur, terrorism's leading historian, recently
wrote that ``scanning the contemporary scene, one encounters a
bewildering multiplicity of terrorist and potentially terrorist groups
and sects.'' Senator Richard Lugar agrees: ``fanatics, small
disaffected groups and subnational factions who hold various grievances
against governments, or against society, all have increasing access to,
and knowledge about the construction of, weapons of mass destruction .
. . Such individuals are not likely to be deterred . . . by the
classical threat of overwhelming retaliation.''
There is, however, a problem with this two-part logic. Although the
capabilities proposition is largely valid--albeit for the limited
number of terrorists who can overcome production and handling risks and
develop an efficient means of dispersal--the chaos proposition is
utterly false. Despite the lurid rhetoric, a massive terrorist attack
with nuclear, chemical, or biological weapons is hardly inevitable. It
is not even likely. Thirty years of field research have taught
observers of terrorism a most important lesson: Terrorists wish to
convince us that they are capable of striking from anywhere at anytime,
but there really is no chaos. In fact, terrorism involves predictable
behavior, and the vast majority of terrorist organizations can be
identified well in advance.
Most terrorists possess political objectives, whether Basque
independence, Kashmiri separatism, or Palestinian Marxism. Neither
crazy nor stupid, they strive to gain sympathy from a large audience
and wish to live after carrying out any terrorist act to benefit from
it politically. As terrorism expert Brian Jenkins has remarked,
terrorists want lots of people watching, not lots of people dead.
Furthermore, no terrorist becomes a terrorist overnight. A lengthy
trajectory of radicalization and low-level violence precedes the
killing of civilians. A terrorist becomes mentally ready to use lethal
weapons against civilians only over time and only after he or she has
managed to dehumanize the enemy. From the Baader-Meinhoff group in
Germany and the Tamil Tigers in Sri Lanka to Hamas and Hizballah in the
Middle East, these features are universal.
Finally, with rare exceptions--such as the Unabomber--terrorism is
a group phenomenon. Radical organizations are vulnerable to early
detection through their disseminated ideologies, lesser illegal
activities, and public statements of intent. Some even publish their
own World Wide Web sites. Since the 1960s, the vast majority of
terrorist groups have made clear their aggressive intentions long
before following through with violence.
Today's hype or tomorrow's nightmare?
We can draw three broad conclusions from these findings. First,
terrorists who threaten to kill thousands of civilians are aware that
their chances for political and physical survival are exceedingly slim.
Their prospects for winning public sympathy are even slimmer. Second,
terrorists take time to become dangerous, particularly to harden
themselves sufficiently to use weapons of mass destruction. Third, the
number of potential suspects is significantly less than doomsayers
would have us believe. Ample early warning signs should make effective
interdiction of potential superterrorists easier than today's
overheated rhetoric suggests.
the world's most wanted
Who, then, is most likely to attempt a superterrorist attack?
Historical evidence and today's best field research suggest three
potential profiles:
Religious millenarian cults, such as Japan's Aum Shinrikyo, that
possess a sense of immense persecution and messianic frenzy and hold
faith in salvation via Armageddon. Most known religious cults do not
belong here. Millenarian cults generally seclude themselves and wait
for salvation; they do not strike out against others. Those groups that
do take action more often fit the mold of California's Heaven's Gate,
or France's Order of the Solar Temple, seeking salvation through group
suicide rather than massive violence against outsiders.
Brutalized groups that either bum with revenge following a genocide
against their nation or face the prospect of imminent destruction
without any hope for collective recovery. The combination of
unrestrained anger and total powerlessness may lead such groups to
believe that their only option is to exact a horrendous price for their
loss. ``The Avengers,'' a group of 50 young Jews who fought the Nazis
as partisans during World War II, exemplifies the case. Organized in
Poland in 1945, the small organization planned to poison the water
supply of four German cities to avenge the Holocaust. Technical
problems foiled their plan, but a small contingent still succeeded in
poisoning the food of more than 2,000 former SS storm troopers held in
prison near Nuremberg.
Small terrorist cells or socially deranged groups whose alienated
members despise society, lack realistic political goals, and may
miscalculate the consequences of developing and using chemical or
biological agents. Although such groups, or even individual ``loners,''
cannot be totally dismissed, it is doubtful that they will possess the
technical capabilities to produce mass destruction.
Groups such as Hamas, Hizballah, and Islamic Jihad, which so many
Americans love to revile--and fear--do not make the list of potential
superterrorists. These organizations and their state sponsors may
loathe the Great Satan, but they also wish to survive and prosper
politically. Their leaders, most of whom are smarter than the Western
media implies, understand that a Hiroshima-like disaster would
effectively mean the end of their movements.
Only two groups have come close to producing a superterrorism
catastrophe: Aum Shinrikyo and the white supremacist and millenarian
American Covenant, the Sword and the Arm of the Lord, whose chemical-
weapons stockpile was seized by the FBI in 1985 as they prepared to
hasten the coming of the Messiah by poisoning the water supplies of
several U.S. cities. Only Aum Shinrikyo fully developed both the
capabilities and the intent to take tens of thousands of lives.
However, this case is significant not only because the group epitomizes
the kind of organizations that may resort to superterrorism in the
future, but also because Aum's fate illustrates how groups of this
nature can be identified and their efforts preempted.
Although it comes as no comfort to the 12 people who died in Aum
Shinrikyo's attack, the cult's act of notoriety represents first and
foremost a colossal Japanese security blunder. Until Japanese police
arrested its leaders in May 1995, Aum Shinrikyo had neither gone
underground nor concealed its intentions. Cult leader Shoko Asahara had
written since the mid-1980s of an impending cosmic cataclysm. By 1995,
when Russian authorities curtailed the cult's activities in that
country, Aum Shinrikyo had established a significant presence in the
former Soviet Union, accessed the vibrant Russian black market to
obtain various materials, and procured the formulae for chemical
agents. In Japan, Asahara methodically recruited chemical engineers,
physicists, and biologists who conducted extensive chemical and
biological experiments in their lab and on the Japanese public. Between
1990 and 1994, the cult tried six times--unsuccessfully--to execute
biological-weapons attacks, first with botulism and then with anthrax.
In June 1994, still a year before the subway gas attack that brought
them world recognition, two sect members released sarin gas near the
judicial building in the city of Matsumoto, killing seven people and
injuring 150, including three judges.
In the years preceding the Tokyo attack, at least one major news
source provided indications of Aum Shinrikyo's proclivity toward
violence. In October 1989, the Sunday Mainichi magazine began a seven-
part series on the cult that showed it regularly practiced a severe
form of coercion on members and recruits. Following the November 1989
disappearance of a lawyer, along with his family, who was pursuing
criminal action against the cult on behalf of former members, the
magazine published a follow-up article. Because of Japan's
hypersensitivity, to religious freedom, lack of chemical- and
biological-terrorism precedents, and low-quality domestic intelligence,
the authorities failed to prevent the Tokyo attack despite these ample
warning signs.
anatomy of an obsession
If a close examination reveals that the chances of successful
superterrorist attack are minimal, why are so many people so worried?
There are three major explanations:
Sloppy Thinking
Most people fail to distinguish among the four different types of
terrorism: mass-casualty terrorism, state-sponsored chemical- or
biological-weapons (CBW) terrorism, small-scale chemical or biological
terrorist attacks, and superterrorism. Pan Am 103, Oklahoma City, and
the World Trade Center are all examples of conventional terrorism
designed to kill a large number of civilians. The threat that a ``rogue
state,'' a country hostile to the West, will provide terrorist groups
with the funds and expertise to launch a chemical or biological attack
falls into another category: state-sponsored CBW terrorism. The use of
chemical or biological weapons for a small-scale terrorist attack is a
third distinct category. Superterrorism--the strategic use of chemical
or biological agents to bring about a major disaster with death tolls
ranging in the tens or hundreds of thousands--must be distinguished
from all of these as a separate threat.
Today's prophets of doom blur the lines between these four distinct
categories of terrorism. The world, according to their logic, is
increasingly saturated with weapons of mass destruction and with
terrorists seeking to use them, a volatile combination that will
inevitably let the superterrorism genie out of the bottle. Never mind
that the only place where these different types of terrorism are lumped
together is on television talk shows and in sensationalist headlines.
In truth, the four types of terrorism are causally unrelated.
Neither Saddam Hussein's hidden bombs nor Russia's massive stockpiles
of pathogens necessarily bring a superterrorist attack on the West any
closer. Nor do the mass-casualty crimes of Timothy McVeigh in Oklahoma
City or the World Trade Center bombing. The issue is not CBW quantities
or capabilities but rather group mentality and psychological
motivations. In the final analysis, only a rare, extremist mindset
completely devoid of political and moral considerations will consider
launching such an attack.
Vested Interests
The threat of superterrorism is likely to make a few defense
contracters very rich and a larger number of specialists moderately
rich as well as famous. Last year, Canadian-based Dycor Industrial
Research Ltd. unveiled the CB Sentry, a commercially available
monitoring system designed to detect contaminants in the air, including
poison gas. Dycor announced plans to market the system for
environmental and antiterrorist applications. As founder and president
Hank Mottl explained in a press conference, ``Dycor is sitting on the
threshold of a multi-billion dollar world market.'' In August, a New
York Times story on the Clinton administration's plans to stockpile
vaccines around the country for civilian protection noted that two
members of a scientific advisory panel that endorsed the plan
potentially stood to gain financially from its implementation. William
Crowe, former chair of the joint chiefs of staff, is also bullish on
the counterterrorism market. He is on the board of an investment firm
that recently purchased Michigan Biologic Products Institute, the sole
maker of an anthrax vaccine. The lab has already secured a Pentagon
contract and expects buyers from around the world to follow suit. As
for the expected bonanza for terrorism specialists, consultant Larry
Johnson remarked last year to U.S. News & World Report, ``It's the
latest gravy train.''
Within the U.S. government, National Security Council experts,
newly created army and police intervention forces, an assortment of
energy and public-health units and officials, and a significant number
of new Department of Defense agencies specializing in unconventional
terrorism will benefit from the counterterrorism obsession and
megabudgets in the years ahead. According to a September 1997 report by
the General Accounting Office, more than 40 federal agencies have been
involved already in combating terrorism. It may yet be premature to
announce the rise of a new ``military-scientific-industrial complex,''
but some promoters of the superterrorism scare seem to present
themselves as part of a coordinated effort to save civilization from
the greatest threat of the twenty-first century.
Morbid Fascination
Suspense writers, publishers, television networks, and
sensationalist journalists have already cashed in on the superterrorism
craze. Clinton aides told the New York Times that the president was so
alarmed by journalist Richard Preston's depiction of a superterrorist
attack in his novel The Cobra Event that he passed the book to
intelligence analysts and House Speaker Newt Gingrich for review. But
even as media outlets spin the new frenzy out of personal and financial
interests, they also respond to the deep psychological needs of a huge
audience. People love to be horrified. In the end, however, the tax-
paying public is likely to be the biggest loser of the present scare
campaign. All terrorists--even those who would never consider a CBW
attack--benefit from such heightened attention and fear.
counterterrorism on a shoestring
There is, in fact, a growing interest in chemical and biological
weapons among terrorist and insurgent organizations worldwide for
small-scale, tactical attacks. As far back as 1975, the Symbionese
Liberation Army obtained instructions on the development of germ
warfare agents to enhance their ``guerrilla'' actions. More recently,
in 1995, four members of the Minnesota Patriots Council, an antitax
group that rejected all forms of authority higher than the state level,
were convicted of possession of a biological agent for use as a weapon.
Prosecutors contended that the men conspired to murder various federal
and county officials with a supply of the lethal toxin ricin they had
developed with the aid of an instruction kit purchased through a right-
wing publication. The flourishing mystique of chemical and biological
weapons suggests that angry and alienated groups are likely to
manipulate them for conventional political purposes. And indeed, the
number of CBW threats investigated by the FBI is increasing steadily.
But the use of such weapons merely to enhance conventional terrorism
should not prove excessively costly to counter.
The debate boils down to money. If the probability of a large-scale
attack is extremely small, fewer financial resources should be
committed to recovering from it. Money should be allocated instead to
early warning systems and preemption of tactical chemical and
biological terrorism. The security package below stresses low-cost
intelligence, consequence management and research, and a no-cost,
prudent counterterrorism policy. Although tailored to the United
States, this program could form the basis for policy in other countries
as well: International deterrence. The potential use of chemical and
biological weapons for enhanced conventional terrorism, and the limited
risk of escalation to superterrorism, call for a reexamination of the
existing U.S. deterrence doctrine--especially of the evidence required
for retaliation against states that sponsor terrorism. The United
States must relay a stern, yet discreet message to states that continue
to support terrorist organizations or that disregard the presence of
loosely affiliated terrorists within their territory: They bear direct
and full responsibility for any future CBW attack on American targets
by the organizations they sponsor or shelter. They must know that any
use of weapons of mass destruction by their clients against the United
States will constitute just cause for massive retaliation against their
countries, whether or not evidence proves for certain that they ordered
the attack.
Domestic deterrence. There is no question that the potential use of
chemical and biological weapons for low-level domestic terrorism adds a
new and dangerous dimension to conventional terrorism. There is
consequently an urgent need to create a culture of domestic deterrence
against the nonscientific use of chemical and biological agents. The
most important task must be accomplished through legislation. Congress
should tighten existing legislation against domestic production and
distribution of biological, chemical, and radiological agents and
devices.
The Anti-Terrorism Act of 1996 enlarged the federal criminal code
to include within its scope a prohibition on any attempts, threats, and
conspiracies to acquire or use biological agents, chemical agents, and
toxins. It also further redefined the terms ``biological agent'' and
``toxin'' to cover a number of products that may be bioengineered into
threatening agents. However, the legislation still includes the onerous
burden of proving that these agents were developed for use as weapons.
Take the case of Larry Wayne Harris, an Ohio man arrested in January by
the FBI for procuring anthrax cultures from an unknown source. Harris
successfully defended his innocence by insisting that he obtained the
anthrax spores merely to experiment with vaccines. He required no
special permit or license to procure toxins that could be developed
into deadly agents. The FBI and local law enforcement agencies should
be given the requisite authority to enforce existing laws as well as to
act in cases of clear and present CBW danger, even if the groups
involved have not yet shown criminal intent. The regulations regarding
who is allowed to purchase potentially threatening agents should also
be strengthened.
A campaign of public education detailing the dangers and illegality
of nonscientific experimentation in chemical and biological agents
would also be productive. This effort should include, for example,
clear and stringent university policies regulating the use of school
laboratories and a responsible public ad campaign explaining the
serious nature of this crime. A clear presentation of the new threat as
another type of conventional terrorism would alert the public to groups
and individuals who experiment illegitimately with chemical and
biological substances and would reduce CBW terrorism hysteria.
Better Intelligence. As is currently the case, the intelligence
community should naturally assume the most significant role in any
productive campaign to stop chemical and biological terrorism. However,
new early warning CBW indicators that focus on radical group behavior
are urgently needed. Analysts should be able to reduce substantially
the risk of a CBW attack if they monitor group radicalization as
expressed in its rhetoric, extralegal operations, low-level violence,
growing sense of collective paranoia, and early experimentation with
chemical or biological substances. Proper CBW intelligence must be
freed from the burden of proving criminal intent.
Smart and compact consequence management teams. The threat of
conventional CBW terrorism requires neither massive preparations nor
large intervention forces. It calls for neither costly new technologies
nor a growing number of interagency coordinating bodies. The decision
to form and train joint-response teams in major U.S. cities, prompted
by the 1995 Presidential Decision Directive on terrorism, will be
productive if the teams are kept within proper proportions. The ideal
team would be streamlined so as to minimize the interagency rivalry
that has tended to make these teams grow in size and complexity. In
addition to FBI agents, specially trained local police, detection and
decontamination experts, and public-health specialists, these compact
units should include psychologists and public-relations experts trained
in reducing public hysteria.
Psychopolitical research. The most neglected means of countering
csw terrorism is psychopolitical research. Terrorism scholars and U.S.
intelligence agencies have thus far failed to discern the psychological
mechanisms that may compel terrorists to contemplate seriously the use
of weapons of mass destruction. Systematic group and individual
profiling for predictive purposes is almost unknown. Whether in Europe,
Latin America, the Middle East, or the United States, numerous former
terrorists and members of radical organizations are believed to have
considered and rejected the use of weapons of mass destruction. To help
us understand better the considerations involved in the use or nonuse
of chemical and biological weapons, well-trained psychologists and
terrorism researchers should conduct a three-year, low cost,
comprehensive project of interviewing these former radicals.
Reducing unnecessary superterrorism rhetoric. Although there is no
way to censor the discussion of mass-destruction terrorism, President
Clinton, his secretaries, elected politicians at all levels,
responsible government officials, writers, and journalists must tone
down the rhetoric feeding today's superterrorism frenzy.
There is neither empirical evidence nor logical support for the
growing belief that a new ``postmodern'' age of terrorism is about to
dawn, an era afflicted by a large number of anonymous mass murderers
toting chemical and biological weapons. The true threat of
superterrorism will not likely come in the form of a Hiroshima-like
disaster but rather as a widespread panic caused by a relatively small
CBW incident involving a few dozen fatalities. Terrorism, we must
remember, is not about killing. It is a form of psychological warfare
in which the killing of a small number of people convinces the rest of
us that we are next in line. Rumors, anxiety, and hysteria created by
such inevitable incidents may lead to panic-stricken evacuations of
entire neighborhoods, even cities, and may produce many indirect
fatalities. It may also lead to irresistible demands to fortify the
entire United States against future chemical and biological attacks,
however absurd the cost.
Americans should remember the calls made in the 1950s to build
shelters, conduct country-wide drills, and alert the entire nation for
a first-strike nuclear attack. A return to the duck-and-cover
absurdities of that time is likely to be as ineffective and
debilitating now as it was then. Although the threat of chemical and
biological terrorism should be taken seriously, the public must know
that the risk of a major catastrophe is extremely minimal. The fear of
CBW terrorism is contagious: Other countries are already showing
increased interest in protecting themselves against superterrorism. A
restrained and measured American response to the new threat may have a
sobering effect on CBW mania worldwide.
want to know more?
Brian Jenkins first makes his well-known argument that terrorists
want a lot of people watching, not a lot of people dead, in ``Will
Terrorists Go Nuclear?'' (Orbis, Autumn 1985). More recently, Jenkins
provides a reasoned analysis of weapons-of-mass-destruction (WMD)
terrorism in the aftermath of the Tokyo subway attack in ``The Limits
of Terror: Constraints on the Escalation of Violence'' (Harvard
International Review, Summer 1995). For a counter argument, see Robert
Kupperman's ``A Dangerous Future: The Destructive Potential of Criminal
Arsenals'' in the same issue. Ron Purver reviews the literature on
superterrorism and weighs the opportunities for, and constraints on,
terrorists considering a WMD attack in ``Chemical and Biological
Terrorism: New Threat to Public Safety?'' (Conflict Studies, December
1996/January 1997). Jerrold Post and Ehud Sprinzak stress the
psychopolitical considerations inhibiting potential WMD terrorists in
``Why Haven't Terrorists Used Weapons of Mass Destruction?'' (Armed
Forces Journal, April 1998). For a solid compilation of essays on
superterrorism, see Brad Roberts, ed., Terrorism with Chemical and
Biological Weapons: Calibrating Risks and Responses (Alexandria:
Chemical and Biological Arms Control Institute, 1997). Walter Laqueur
surveys the history of terrorism and finds an alarming number of
barbarians at the gate in ``Postmodern Terrorism'' (Foreign Affairs,
September/October 1996). John Deutch takes a counterintuitive look at
the subject in ``Think Again: Terrorism'' (FOREIGN POLICY, Fall 1997).
Finally, David Kaplan provides the best available study of Aum
Shinrikyo in his excellent book The Cult at the End of the World: The
Terrifying Story of the Aum Doomsday Cult, from the Subways of Tokyo to
the Nuclear Arsenals of Russia (New York: Crown Publishers, 1996).
The World Wide Web provides a number of resources for
superterrorism research. The Carnegie Endowment for International
Peace's Nonproliferation Project and the Henry L. Stimson Center
provide regular coverage of nuclear-, chemical-, and biological-weapons
issues, including terrorism. The Federation of American Scientists
publishes a wealth of government documents as well as excellent news
and analysis pertaining to weapons of mass destruction. And the State
Department's ``Patterns of Global Terrorism'' provides one-stop
shopping for information on some of the world's more notorious
organizations. For links to these and other Web sites, as well as a
comprehensive index of related articles, access www.foreignpolicy.com.
Mr. Klink. I thank the chairman.
Mr. Chairman, again, to you and my friend, Mr. Upton, I
hope that we have an ability to work better together on these
than we have on this instance.
And I think that this is an important issue. As I said
before, it may or may not be a problem, but we would like the
opportunity for our staffs to be involved with the majority
staffs in helping to put these hearings together on a little
closer basis.
[The prepared statement of Hon. Ron Klink follows:]
Prepared Statement of Hon. Ron Klink, a Representative in Congress from
the State of Pennsylvania
Today, we are beginning the work of the Subcommittee in the new
Congress by looking for a solution to a problem that is not yet
defined, will not be defined in this hearing and may not really exist.
The Congressionally mandated release of worst case scenario impacts in
an easily accessible format to help the public, relevant state and
local officials and industry avoid and mitigate the results of the
accidental release of dangerous chemicals has now--at least for the
majority's press purposes--become a ``road map for terrorism.''
Yesterday, before hearing even a single witness, Chairman Bliley held a
press conference and announced that there was a problem that he would
correct by introducing legislation.
The real question we should be addressing today is will this
information accessible to all help us avoid the 8,000 serious chemical
releases and those three to four hundred deaths every year that result?
We are not doing that. The hysteria about terrorism that the majority
is attempting to whip up may just be another in a long line of attempts
by the chemical industry to once again to avoid disclosures about the
very real risks their plants pose to communities. Some witnesses today
will call for changes in the Freedom of Information Act in which
Congress apparently would create two tiers of access, depending on
where you live and what media you use to get your information. We have
no evidence of why we should do this, no draft language to consider, no
FOIA experts before us or even an administration position. Mr.
Chairman, we expect that when you have draft language to show us, we
will have that hearing.
I spent most of the last Congress on this Committee looking for
crimes that didn't exist, so I should not be surprised that we are now
trying to solve problems that may not exist. Terrorist scenarios are
very popular fodder for the press, the movies, sci-fi writers and some
politicians right now. Counterterrorism experts and centers are
springing up everywhere to make sure they get part of the federal
largesse. But when my staff probed more deeply, we could not find any
documented evidence of increased threats to chemical plants. In fact,
we could not find any evidence worldwide that chemical plants had been
terrorist targets. Military targets, yes, as the U.S. demonstrated in
the Sudan recently; terrorist targets, no.
The creation and release of information about chemicals at
industrial facilities in the United States was mandated by Congress in
1990. The world had witnessed the terrible results of releases from a
chemical plant on humans in Bophal, India, and the frightening chemical
releases from a sister plant in Institute, West Virginia. There are
over 60,000 accidental releases every year, of which about 8,000 result
in significant human or property damage. Between 300 and 400 people,
mostly workers and first responders, die every year. This is the known,
documented danger that Congress has told the Environmental Protection
Agency to address by providing the public with information they needed
to force these facilities to become safer.
Much information is now available from the Environmental Protection
Agency, in various media--and on the internet--about these chemicals,
where they are and their effects when they are released. Thousands of
communities, investors, first responders, medical people, workers,
industrial safety officers and just plain citizens use it. Many worst
case scenarios are already available because they have been provided to
the communities involved and the press. There seems to be consensus
that this information has reduced the threat of accidents; helped
prepare first responders; assisted companies in identifying and
eliminating or better handling their most dangerous chemicals; and
helped communities in planning decisions about the siting of schools
and residential facilities and the need for buffer zones.
Right now, it is not difficult for you or I or a terrorist to
determine by observation and a little research where chemical
facilities are, what they manufacture, and how close they are to
residential facilities. One of the witnesses today will tell us--and
the world--that there are large numbers of chemical facilities near
Wilmington, Delaware which he describes as a ``potential terrorists'
dream'' that would allow ``an attack of massive proportions.'' That's
pretty public, and it didn't take the internet or EPA to figure it out.
We can see most of them from I-95.
So what new threat are we looking at here today that would force us
to rewrite our laws? The Chairman would have you believe that there are
sophisticated, professional foreign terrorists from ``Los Angeles to
Libya''--as he said yesterday--who only because of access to this
information will move to the United States, bomb chemical plants and
decimate entire population centers nearby.
What evidence do we have of this? A one-month study done for EPA's
advisory committee which attempted to model the possible increases in
terrorists' attacks on chemical plants caused by putting worst case
scenarios on the internet. You will hear that study cited today. It has
many faults. This week, I will ask the General Accounting Office to
review its methodology, credibility and reliability. But we already
know that the modeling is questionable because there was only one
terrorist incident involving chemical plants to provide a baseline. The
other one cited was actually a scam in which the owner of some
worthless chemicals in Virginia tried to blow them up for insurance
money. The other involved a group of Klu Klux Klan members who were
going to blow up some tanks at a gas refinery in Texas to create a
diversion so they could rob an armored car.
The contractor also assumed incorrectly that the industry had done
all it could to improve plant safety. The criteria used in this study
to define the type of information that would be useful were from
military organizations, not from terrorist experts. Military
organizations and terrorists have different agendas, motives and
resources. Without objection, I would like to put into the record an
article from a recent Foreign Policy issue by an Israeli historian of
terrorism who describes extremely well the psychology and goals of
terrorists based on actual events, and why he believes the current
discussions of terrorism threats are vastly overblown.
This, Mr. Chairman, is what we should be looking at--not trying to
make sensational headlines.
Mr. Bilirakis. I thank the gentleman.
The Chair now recognizes the chairman of the full
committee, the gentleman from Virginia, Mr. Bliley.
Chairman Bliley. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and I want to
thank the chairmen of both subcommittees for holding this very
important joint hearing today.
Back in 1990, Congress required an estimated 66,000
facilities to submit chemical accident prevention plans to the
Environmental Protection Agency that, ultimately, would be made
available to the public. Back then, Congress and the American
people surely never imagined that the EPA would ever propose
posting all of this information, including human injury
estimates of a ``worst case'' chemical release, in a worldwide
electronic database easily searchable from--as I said
yesterday--from Boston to Baghdad or from Los Angles to Libya.
Outside of a small group of researchers, no one even knew
what the World Wide Web was back then. Today, we now know that
the Internet has revolutionized information gathering and
communication on a global scale.
As Secretary of State Madeleine Albright recently stated
about the growing threat of worldwide terrorism, ``the advance
of technology has given us new means to counter terrorists, but
it has also enabled terrorists to development more powerful
weapons and to travel, communicate, recruit, and raise funds on
a global basis.''
It is against this dangerous background that we are here
today to consider the best method of distributing sensitive
information to the public, while also doing our very best not
to facilitate acts of terrorism against those who live near or
work in these facilities throughout our Nation.
In response to security concerns from the FBI, the CIA,
this committee, and others, EPA recently abandoned its original
reckless plan to put the ``worst case scenario'' data at every
terrorist's fingertips by posting it on the Agency's own
Internet website.
But EPA has yet to propose a suitable plan for providing
this sensitive information to third parties, despite being
aware of the potential danger for the last year, if not longer.
And now we are facing a June 21, 1999, deadline to correct this
problem. Because that is the date by which all these facilities
must submit their data to EPA.
Reasonable people can debate how much the terrorist threat
to these communities will be increased by posting ``worst case
scenarios'' on the Internet, but I believe the consequences of
just a single actual attack could be so deadly, so tragic, that
we cannot ignore even a small increased risk. We are talking
about the life or death of real people, fellow Americans.
In this regard, I was honored to meet yesterday Ms. Diane
Leonard, a remarkable woman who was married to a Secret Service
Agent killed in the Oklahoma City bombing, in April, 1995.
Since then, she has worked to help victims of terrorism and to
persuade legislators to take seriously the fight against
terrorism. We learned from her that our debate has a human face
and, with it, a human tragedy.
I would like to share with you what she told me yesterday.
I hope EPA is listening. She said, ``If any of those supporting
the dissemination of this information on the Internet could
step inside any of us who have lost loved ones to terrorism,
they would change their position on this issue. They could feel
the immense pain and the enormous hole that is left in your
heart. They would not want to take the slightest risk with the
lives of their husbands, wives, parents, children, or
grandchildren.''
Let me stress that no one here, including those in law
enforcement and the intelligence communities, is advocating
that we should keep this information locked up or away from
those communities that have these facilities located within
them or nearby. I, for one, certainly support making sure that
these communities have access to all information about the
risks associated with their facilities. But we also must ensure
that the way this information is provided does not end up
harming the very people that Congress intended to protect.
While no plan is foolproof, we certainly shouldn't do anything
to make it easier for those who want to harm our Nation and our
neighbors.
Because we can achieve both these goals without sacrificing
the other, I believe we must achieve both. We owe nothing less
to the American people.
I hope by holding this hearing today, we can persuade those
groups that seem intent on acquiring and spreading this
information to do so responsibly.
And, Mr. Chairman, I would like, at this time, to ask
unanimous consent to insert in the record a letter that I
received from the Assistant Director of the Office of Public
and Congressional Affairs at the FBI concerning this. And I
will quote briefly from it.
``This communication is sent in response to your letter
dated September 17, 1998. Publishing the Offsite Consequence
Analysis (OCA) data of the risk management plans on the
Internet would provide a targeting tool for a person planning a
terrorist or criminal act. The OCA contains the `worst case
scenario' information, which includes distance to endpoint
calculations detailing the size of an area affected in a
release.'' And it goes on from there.
And with that, Mr. Chairman, I ask unanimous consent to
make it a part of the record, and thank you for yielding me
this time.
Mr. Upton. Without objection, so ordered.
[The information referred to follows:]
U.S. Department of Justice,
Federal Bureau of Investigation,
October 9, 1998.
Honorable Tom Bliley
Chairman, Committee on Commerce
House of Representatives
Washington, DC 20515
Dear Mr. chairman: This communication is sent in response to your
letter dated September 17, 1998.
Publishing the Offsite consequence analysis (OCA) data of the Risk
Management Plans (RMP) on the Internet would provide a targeting tool
for a person planning a terrorist or criminal act. The OCA contains the
Worst Case Scenario information which includes distance to end point
calculations detailing the size of an area affected in a release. The
OCA information also provides the population affected which, stated in
another way, is the number of potential casualties from an attack on a
particular facility. Additionally, the RMP information could be
searched by zip code or address to target a particular area first, and
then by reviewing the available RMPs an attack could be tailored for
effectiveness.
EPA proposed placing all of the information on the Internet, while
including ``speed bumps'' in the system to slow down access. This
proposal has been reviewed within the FBI and the Intelligence
Community and has generally been determined to be an ineffective means
of protecting the information.
The FBI and the EPA have been working together to identify options
to the Internet distribution. The following mechanisms have been
identified, which would provide the information as directed in the
Clean Air Act and yet limit the potential for misuse of the information
for a terrorist or criminal act:
The RMPs, minus the OCA data, would be available on the
Internet. This would eliminate the targeting potential. This
would however provide individuals with registration information
regarding facilities in their area, Five Year Accident History,
Prevention Programs, and Emergency Response information. This
would be available in an open format.
State and local government agencies would have access to all
national RMP data via a closed computer system. This system may
have resource implications involved, however, this will allow
for up to date immediately available information to first
responders and emergency planning agencies while protecting the
information from improper dissemination.
A compact disk (CD) of the information could be created for
research and environmental organizations with all of the
comparison data, without the identifying or contact
information. This would allow for national trends and to be
analyzed and nationwide data to be studied, but would alleviate
the potential for targeting of particular facilities based on
this information.
These mechanisms should address all of the compliance issues facing
EPA regarding the implementation of the Community Right to Know
legislation and will also provide useful information to researchers and
environmental groups.
One issue left unresolved by these suggestions involves the re-
distribution of information on the Internet by private groups. The
information could be collected by private agencies through Freedom of
Information Act requests (FOIA). Current FOIA law would require release
of this information in an electronic format. EPA advised FBI that
environmental groups have stated they will acquire the information and
disseminate over their web sites if EPA does not provide the
information in its entirety via the Internet.
Sincerely yours,
John E. Collingwood,
Assistant Director, Office of Public and Congressional Affairs.
Mr. Upton. The gentleman from the great State of Michigan,
Mr. Stupak, is recognized for----
Mr. Stupak. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Upton. [continuing] an opening statement.
Mr. Stupak. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank you for
holding the hearing here today. First, let me say I look
forward to working with Chairman Bilirakis, again, on the
Health and Environmental Subcommittee. And I want to welcome my
colleague from Michigan, Mr. Upton, as Chair of the Oversight
and Investigations Subcommittee.
The Oversight and Investigations Subcommittee of the
Commerce Committee has a very distinguished history. I am proud
to work with my friend and colleague from Michigan and look
forward to him returning the Oversight and Investigations
Subcommittee to its proper role.
I know there are no shortages of work in areas like
healthcare, the environment, telecommunication, energy, and
securities. It is my hope we can examine many of these issues
to perform oversight on the Federal Government, State
government, and private industry.
As a former law enforcement official, I feel very strongly
about preventing terrorism and protecting our citizens. I
believe it is reasonable to question how the information
required by section 112(r) of the Clean Air Act should be made
available to the public and to emergency response units.
I want to hear from the EPA, the FBI, and other interested
stakeholders about its information. However, I also want to
keep ``our eye on the ball'' and not become hysterical. With
all due respect, I cannot understand why some members had a
press conference with the widow of a victim of the Oklahoma
City bombing about this very subject. I would point out that
under section 112(r), the Federal building in Oklahoma City
would not have had a file a risk management plan; hence, this
hearing does not involve the Oklahoma City bombing. To bring
forth this tragic event is wrong.
On the other hand, section 112(r) would have covered the
Ford plant that recently experienced an explosion in Detroit.
It is possible that information contained in the plan could
have assisted the emergency response team in extinguishing the
explosion and helping the many injured people there.
Section 112(r) was inserted into the Clean Air Act to
ensure that citizens had the ability to understand the dangers
in their community and to require industry plans for possible
disasters. I know of no incidents of terrorism where an
industrial facility was the target of a terrorist attack, but
can think of a number of industrial accidents where risk
management plans could have helped, and should have helped.
In Michigan, in my district, there has been intentional and
also accidental release of ``sour gas,'' better known as
hydrogen sulfide, from gas wells in Michigan. Over 30 people
have been hospitalized in the last 18 months; 9 of them in
October. Even the emergency response crews who tried to help
the injured were overcome by these fumes.
Finally, I cannot help but think all the publicity
surrounding this hearing is having an unintentional
consequence. Later on today, we will hear from a witness who
explains how the cluster of industrial facilities surrounding
Delaware City are vulnerable to terrorist attack.
Unfortunately, the testimony will paint exactly the type of
roadmap that he is concerned about, that the EPA will provide.
So what do we do then? His testimony will then go on to the
subcommittees' website and be made available to the public and
terrorists all around the world.
Mr. Chairman, I think we can have a reasonable discussion
today about how the information made available under section
112(r) should be made available to the public and emergency
response units. I have spent my life as both a law enforcement
officer and a public official concerned about protecting our
citizens.
I certainly think that preventing terrorism is an important
and urgent goal, but I don't think we should use rhetoric and
overstated fears in order to justify amending the Freedom of
Information Act.
I look forward to the witnesses and to the discussions that
will follow, and I look forward to working with both chairmen
today and in the future.
Thank you.
Mr. Bilirakis. I thank the gentleman.
Mr. Bryant, for an opening statement.
Mr. Bryant. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Mr. Chairman, and my
fellow members of the committee, good morning.
As a new member of the Commerce Committee, I just wanted to
say that I am looking forward to serving in this new capacity
and looking forward to working with you all.
I want to welcome our guests and witnesses who are with us
today and thank you for your time and your testimony this
morning.
The issue that we are addressing today seems to be
primarily about competing policy concerns; that is, keeping the
public informed of potential threats from chemical accidents,
and keeping the threat of terrorist attacks to a minimum. It
also seems to me that these two concerns are not mutually
exclusive.
I understand that there is a need for State and local
emergency and health officials to have access to the
information contained in the ``worst case scenarios,'' but
there should be a way--and maybe we will address this today--to
make certain that the parties who need to know all the
information they need can get that without creating security
risks.
That having been said, I will say that my primary concern
here today is that we do not make it easier for terrorist
entities or others in the United States or elsewhere in the
world to search for and target facilities with large supplies
of potentially dangerous chemicals.
I can tell you, too, that I would place a great emphasis on
what our professional law enforcement agencies opinions are,
and especially the Federal Bureau of Investigation.
But I do want to thank the chairmen today, both Chairman
Bilirakis and Chairman Upton, for holding this hearing. I think
it is an important issue and one that could impact millions of
Americans, and I look forward this morning to hearing the
different opinions represented here, and, hopefully, we will be
able to shed some light on this matter.
Again, I thank the chairmen.
Mr. Bilirakis. And I thank the gentleman.
Ms. DeGette, for an opening statement.
Ms. DeGette. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
First, Mr. Chairman, I would ask unanimous consent to
submit Congressman Green's opening statement for the record.
Mr. Bilirakis. Without objection.
[The prepared statement of Hon. Gene Green follows:]
Prepared Statement of Hon. Gene Green, a Representative in Congress
from the State of Texas
Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for holding this important hearing on the
distribution of disaster plans of companies by the Environmental
Protection Agency.
I support the original statue that would make these risk management
plans, including the ``worst-case'' scenarios, available to the public.
American citizens need have the right to know the risks of living
in a particular community and local officials need the information in
the event of an accident.
However, we must also balance this right to know with those dangers
with the need to prevent this information from being used to do harm to
our workers and community.
In the years since this law was passed, only two deliberate attacks
on facilities have occurred.
Meanwhile, over 1 million accidents have occurred. With this in
mind, I believe we should focus on ways to increase our response times
to these accidents and limit the amount of harm caused by them.
Posting or not posting this information on the internet will not
stop those who seek to attack these facilities. Making these plans more
widely available will, however, increase the safety of those who live
near the facilities where hazardous materials are produced, stored or
used.
Moreover, reducing the hazardous materials and potential danger
would reduce the incentive of potential terrorists to target these
sites.
In my district in east Harris County--Houston, Texas, I have
attended meetings for over a year with my local industry on the ``worst
case'' scenarios--we need coordination, and if a real problem exists
lets correct it without limiting our ``right to know'' laws.
My district, located in Houston, has many communities--Galena Park,
Channelview, Jacinto City, Pasadena--that sit side by side with large
petrochemical plants.
The residents of those communities deserve to have easy access to
this information, so that they can know what dangers are in their
backyards.
Any information that the EPA releases should not contain details of
the facilities' security measures or specifics of the layout. This
would also make targeting facilities more difficult.
I believe that, while there is the potential for this information
to be misused, the benefits of letting families know what hazards are
in their neighborhood should be our foremost concern.
If we reduce the amounts of chemicals being stored at these sites,
then we reduce the chance of a major disaster, whether caused by
accidental or deliberate actions.
Finally, it is my understanding that the EPA already has the power
to ensure that these facilities have an adequate level of security for
the materials that they store.
Just like we should develop security guidelines to protect our
embassies abroad, we should do the same for all potential domestic
targets.
It is worth noting that the embassies that were recently bombed did
not meet the suggested security guidelines.
Mr. Chairman, in our attempt to prevent terrorism, we should not
place our citizens' health at greater risk by withholding valuable
information.
Ms. DeGette. Thank you.
Mr. Bilirakis. The opening statements of all members of the
two subcommittees are made a part of the record.
Ms. DeGette. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Chairman, initially, let me say I am very pleased and
honored to welcome here a Colorado citizen and, also, a long
and dear friend of mine, Tim Gablehouse, who will be testifying
before this committee. Tim is a member of the Colorado
Emergency Planning Commission and serves as the chair of the
Governor's Interagency Advisory Group on Hazardous Materials.
He is also a member of the Clean Air Act Advisory Subcommittee
on Accident Prevention. And a little-known fact about Tim is he
was one of the prime authors of the brownfield legislation that
we passed in a bipartisan way in Colorado when I was in the
statehouse, which has now cleaned up scores of sites, and
businesses and environmental groups love this bill. So, I am
very glad that Tim is here today to lend us his expertise on
this particular area.
Mr. Chairman, under the Clean Air Act, section 112(r)
requires an estimated 66,000 facilities that use extremely
hazardous chemicals to alert workers and the public what could
happen in a chemical accident. And it is important to note that
this particular section is restricted to agencies that use
extremely hazardous chemicals. The scenarios are part of a
larger risk management plan and are designed to prevent
pollution and protect our communities.
Local agencies, like fire departments, benefit greatly from
access to these plans. But, also, people like school principals
who have schools located near a plant benefit greatly from
knowing what kind of evacuation plan they need to put in place
if there is an accident.
So, why are we here today to debate this? Because, we are
told terrorists might find the information and target
facilities? But is our concern so great today that we are
willing to shroud a veil of secrecy around these chemical
facilities and forsake the safety and health of families who
live in nearby neighborhoods, especially since the information
we are providing is not information that could give intimate
details that would give someone any better ability to undergo a
terrorist attack?
Broad public availability of these plans is essential to
provide communities with the most accurate and timely
information regarding toxic chemicals and offsite consequences
of accidents scenarios. This is information communities need to
have to make intelligent decisions on how to prepare for
chemical accidents.
Many of these communities are in rural areas with volunteer
fire departments, without the specialized equipment or training
to safety respond to hazardous waste and chemical fires.
Another thing I did when I was in the statehouse was we
recognized the need for legislation in places where you have
volunteer fire departments like this and other agencies, when
we passed--in a bipartisan, overwhelming way--legislation that
I authored which increased the access and streamlined the
access that these local agencies would have to risk management
plans. And those kinds of access are working very, very well in
many places. As far as I know, we haven't had one terrorist
attack on any of these facilities in Colorado. And we have
broadened the information available to local agencies and
neighborhoods.
Some industry groups are opposed to the broad public
availability of these plans on the Internet because of the
threat of terrorism. But, as I said, these plans do not provide
critical details such as security measures at the facility,
which would be essential to a terrorist attack. In fact, now,
any person can obtain information about the largest and most
dangerous chemical facilities without access to the Internet.
State-sponsored terrorists have many other tools to work at
their disposal. Local criminals or disgruntled workers
certainly are not going to need the Internet for their
nefarious deeds. You don't need to be a rocket scientist or use
the Internet to figure out how to wreak havoc on a facility.
The EPA has a legal obligation to make sure that accurate
information is available to the public. And I think that
whichever way they decide is the most important. We should
support that through this committee. And that is why last year,
in April, I wrote a letter to Carol Browner, the Administrator
of the Environmental Protection Agency, urging the EPA to fully
implement the risk management planning provision of the Clean
Air Act, to give communities full and open access to
information regarding toxic chemicals and accident scenarios.
And I would ask unanimous consent to submit my letter for
the record, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Bilirakis. Without objection.
[The information referred to follows:]
Congress of the United States,
House of Representatives,
April 24, 1998.
The Honorable Carol Browner
Administrator, Environmental Protection Agency
401 M Street, S.W.
Washington, DC 20460
Dear Administrator Browner: I am writing to urge you to fully
implement the Risk Management Planning provision in Section 112(r) of
the Clean Air Act to give communities full and open access to
information on toxic chemicals and accident scenarios. As you know, I
am committed to the protection of the public from the risks presented
by chemical storage and use, especially in the minority communities
within my district that have been unfairly subjected to these risks.
I believe that broad public availability of these plans is
essential in providing communities with the best and most timely
information regarding toxic chemicals and the off-site consequences of
accident scenarios. I am aware, however, that some industry groups are
opposed to the broad public availability of these plans on the Internet
because of the threat of terrorism. This concern is misplaced, however,
because Risk Management Plans do not provide critical details, such as
security measures at a facility, which could be used by terrorists.
The EPA has a legal obligation to make certain that accurate
information is made available to the public. Planning for a response to
a chemical incident demands the communication and cooperation of the
impacted public, first response agencies and facilities. Failing to
make the off-site consequence analysis available could promote
speculation and unnecessary confusion for the public. Therefore, I urge
you to go forward with this implementation.
Thank you for attention to this matter. If you have any questions,
please feel free to contact me or have your staff contact Nick
Karamanos at (202) 225-4431.
Sincerely,
Diana DeGette,
Member of Congress.
Ms. DeGette. Thank you.
Mr. Bilirakis. Please finish up.
Ms. DeGette. I am.
Mr. Bilirakis. Thank you.
Ms. DeGette. I accept the possibility, Mr. Chairman, though
very remote, that terrorists might try to use the risk
management plans. But I think that the benefit to communities
far outweighs this small risk, and, therefore, I think that
this provision of the Clean Air Act should be implemented in
the most fair and public way possible.
And I yield back the balance of my time.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Bilirakis. I thank the gentlelady.
Dr. Coburn, for an opening statement.
Mr. Coburn. I have no written statement, but I would make a
couple of comments.
Being from Oklahoma, we know what terrorism does. We are
very well aware of what it does. I, also, have in my district,
a company that had a fire that we did not have the knowledge
on. So, I understand, also, the importance on how to address
that.
As we go forward in this, it is very important that both of
those concerns be evaluated. I am tending to side, as I wait to
hear your viewpoints, on the fact that the information, in the
long run, will not hurt us and that it, in fact, may help us
despite the risk.
But, I do not believe that you can underestimate the risk
of potential terrorism with this information. And I have 180
families from Oklahoma that would gladly testify to that
effect.
So, please, do not carry it lightly, the potential impact
that information in the wrong hands can have, because when it
is used and made easy, people do die, and families are
disrupted.
And I yield back.
Mr. Bilirakis. I thank the gentleman.
Mrs. Capps, for an opening statement.
Ms. Capps. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I am very honored to be a part of this subcommittee and
look forward to working with you on this and other issues.
I want to let the witnesses know today that I have come
with an open mind; I want to learn about this. It is a new area
that we need to explore carefully, and for my part, with an
open mind.
I have long, in my community, been a part of disaster-
preparedness, task forces, and plans. And I can tell you some
chemical ``worst case scenarios'' that, in the fragile part of
the central coast of California where I live, where there is
one highway--just one--that goes up and down my district. That
being responsible for the health and well-being of a lot of
schoolchildren, we did have toxic spills, and we were faced
with some local disasters which I must keep in mind as I listen
carefully today.
Thank you very much.
Mr. Bilirakis. Thank you very much, and you are more than
welcome to this committee.
Mr. Blunt, the gentleman from Missouri. He is not here.
Mr. Bilbray, for an opening statement.
Mr. Bilbray. Yes, Mr. Chairman.
I would like to welcome our new member from California, and
let me just say, in the spirit that our new member brought up,
I would ask us not to take such hard-line positions one way or
the other. My background of--as I have stated before, coming
from the county of San Diego, with 2.8 million people, those of
us in California were addressing this issue not more than, you
know, probably 10 years ago. And the issue of, can you protect
the public from terrorism, at the same time protect them from
the dangers of uncontrolled and irresponsible handling of
hazardous waste, is something that we tried to balance in
California almost a decade ago.
I would just ask us to understand that there has got to be
a happy medium between giving the information that terrorists
can use, and as the gentleman from Oklahoma pointed out; it's
not a problem, and you do not realize it is a problem until it
is too late, and then everybody sort of strikes their breast
and says, ``Oh, how could we be so sinful to overlook this
problem?'' And the other side, though, we have got to be able
to balance the issue of making sure that we are not giving a
formula for terrorism, but also the fact of allowing the public
the right to know.
I think that there is the flip side of the right for trial
lawyers and, basically, people who would use psychological
terrorism on the community would use that information. But on
the flip side of those who are in the business community, who
would love to hide the fact, that maybe there are irresponsible
handling of hazardous materials.
I would just ask us to try not to get painted into one
corner or the other extreme, because the answer is that more
toward the middle. And, I think that the American people
deserve for us to talk about the facts and work out an answer,
rather than draw lines at one extreme to the other and be able
to throw problems at each other.
So, I would yield back my time, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Bilirakis. Ms. Eshoo, for an opening statement.
Ms. Eshoo. Mr. Chairman, I am not going to compete with the
bells, but what I will do is submit my opening statement for
the record and thank both of the ranking members and the
leaders of our subcommittees for having this joint hearing.
I think this is an issue that we all care about, and the
full disclosure of accidents and our analysis is really very
important to encouraging the right kind of information to come
forward.
I don't see this as a partisan issue. We need to bring the
best of what the Commerce Committee has been about, to help set
up a network and something that is going to work across the
Nation to serve all of our constituents.
Thank you.
[The prepared statement of Hon. Anna G. Eshoo follows:]
Prepared Statement of Hon. Anna G. Eshoo, a Representative in Congress
from the State of California
Thank you Mr. Chairman.
With passage of Section 112 of the Clean Air Act, Congress took a
giant step forward in the effort to prevent pollution, save lives and
protect property.
We acknowledged, with that bill, that full disclosure of accident
scenarios is critical to encouraging safer technologies and reducing
hazards associated with chemical spills.
Unfortunately, chemical accidents are not infrequent.
Every 15 minutes, a chemical fire, spill, or explosion occurs in
the U.S.
In my district alone, 78 chemical releases were reported to the
National Response Center last year. And those represent only the
reported incidents. Many incidents are never even reported.
We all want to ensure protection from chemical terrorism.
I was very pleased to see an additional $1.4 billion in the
President's budget for domestic defense against biological attacks.
However, a firm commitment to prevention of deadly chemical
releases is equally critical.
And the best way to ensure community safety--whether from
wrongdoing or ordinary accidents--is to reduce the inherent hazards of
chemical operations.
I am looking forward to hearing from all of the speakers on how we
might fashion a thoughtful solution to ensure community access to
critical chemical release data while not facilitating acts of
terrorism.
Mr. Bilirakis. I thank the gentlelady for her very wise
remarks. She is known as maybe the wisdom of this committee.
Mr. Burr, for an opening statement.
Mr. Burr. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and I will be extremely
brief.
Mr. Chairman, I remember the last time I had the
opportunity to meet with Shimon Peres here, and I remember
looking across the table to him and asking one question: What
do you see as our greatest threat in the future? And he looked
at me and he said, ``The disregard for human life. The ability
for somebody willing to give their life to make a political or
ideological statement by taking the lives of potentially
millions of people.''
This really isn't a difference that we have got about
public disclosure. It is a concern that exists between parties
about terrorist disclosure.
I want to read you one thing; it is Presidential Decision
Directive 39, PDD 39. The EPA is a listed, covered agency. The
general statement said that ``it should be the directive that
terrorism is both a threat to our national security as well as
a criminal act. The administration has stated that it is the
policy of the United States to use all appropriate means to
deter, defeat, and respond to all terrorist acts on our
territory and resources, both people and facilities. Wherever
they occur in support of these efforts, the United States
will''--and let me just read point one--``employ efforts to
deter, preempt, apprehend, and prosecute terrorists.''
I believe that this directive clearly states that we will
make it difficult, if not impossible, for terrorism on our
territory, not easier.
Clearly, I think that, Mr. Chairman, we need to exercise
common sense as we go through this. This is not a difficult
issue. But, clearly, there are differences between competing
agencies that they could solve, if they would just read this
directive.
And I yield back.
[The prepared statement of Hon. Richard Burr follows:]
Prepared Statement of Hon. Richard Burr, a Representative in Congress
from the State of North Carolina
Thank you Mr. Chairman. As a Member of both the Health and
Environment and Oversight and Investigation subcommittees, I am pleased
that we are having this hearing today. Since my first year in Congress,
we have spent a good deal of time looking at problems that arose out of
the Clean Air Act Amendments. Today the issue that we face is, in my
opinion, quite grave. In addition to sitting on the Commerce Committee,
I am fortunate to have a seat on the International Relations Committee.
On that Committee, we are very concerned about the activities of
international terrorists and our nation's ability to prepare for and
respond to terrorist incidents abroad. In the wake of the Oklahoma City
and World Trade Center bombings, it is important to realize that we
face both an external and internal terrorist threat. I believe this
hearing is an important step for this Committee and this Congress in
dealing with terrorist threats at home.
The witnesses we have assembled for today's hearing have varying
positions from 1) we should not gather worse case scenarios; 2) we
should have the worse case scenarios, but not allow them to be produced
in electronically reproducible formats; 3) we should post the scenarios
on the Internet for all to see; and 4) that this is public information,
and should be easily retrievable.
I personally have great concerns that the information on worst case
scenarios could fall into the wrong hands. If an individual or group
wants to do harm on American soil, this information could quickly and
easily point them to a location that is both environmentally sensitive
and would, if tampered with in some way or destroyed, have a pretty
good idea of how many people would be killed or injured.
Our country has a proud safety tradition. As our industries
continue to work to assure a safe work environment and a high community
safety record, does it really make sense to post how to cause the
greatest damage at these locations?
I believe making worst-case scenarios publicly available puts us in
the position of having to deal with a Bhopal-type chemical release that
could potentially kill and injure thousands of people. Only this time,
it would not happen in a far-away country, and it would not be an
accident.
I look forward to our exchange with our witnesses. I particularly
will be interested to learn what type of interagency review this
decision has undergone and to learn about any technological advances
that have been made to make sure that this sensitive information is
kept secure.
While we consider the very serious internet publication and
security questions that are before us today, I would also remind my
colleagues that we need to consider the business impacts upon those in
our communities who must comply with the risk management plan rules.
Specifically, it concerns me that the EPA, the agency charged with
protecting our environment, has included non-toxic fuels like propane
under this rule. But that is an issue for another day and another
hearing.
Again, thank you for holding this hearing and thank you to our
witnesses for their testimony.
Mr. Bilirakis. I thank the gentleman.
Mr. Barrett, for an opening statement.
Mr. Barrett. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Let me simply say it is a pleasure to be on the committee.
Mr. Bilirakis. Thank you; you are more than welcome.
Mr. Barrett. I know we have got a vote time--and I am
looking forward to hear the testimony.
Thank you.
Mr. Bilirakis. I thank the gentleman.
Mr. Greenwood, for an opening statement.
Mr. Greenwood. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I can only add that I think this is a technical question. I
think that we will yield to bare-minded reasoning, and I think
we ought to be about that business.
I yield back.
[Additional statements submitted for the record follow:]
Prepared Statement of Hon. Nathan Deal, a Representative in Congress
from the State of Georgia
Good morning and thank you, Mr. Chairman, for holding this hearing
regarding the proposed internet posting of chemical ``worst case''
scenarios.
Over the years, Congress has enacted numerous laws to ensure that
the public is protected from chemicals, and to give the public more
information about chemicals in their neighborhoods and on store
shelves. An element common to our environmental protection programs is
the government sets protection levels at a level that includes a large
margin of safety. For example, if a pesticide is being tested to
determine whether it is safe, margins of safety are built in when
considering the amount of pesticide that will be used, the number of
people who might be exposed, the amount that will remain on the crop
when it reaches the consumer, the amount the consumer will eat, and the
susceptibility of a given person to dangers from the pesticide. The
final limits set by the government may be 1,000 times more stringent
than necessary to be protective, all in the name of safety.
Generally, the same kind of safety precautions are built into
programs dealing with other chemicals. Regulators at the Environmental
Protection Agency and other agencies know that it is not enough to base
safety standards on the common man. They make sure our standards cover
the uncommon person who would be more susceptible. This not only
includes children, but also groups or individuals who because of
advanced age, genetic, cultural or other reasons may face greater
risks.
While these safety precautions are important, I am concerned about
the way the EPA is implementing the ``Risk Management Plan,'' which
contains, among other things, ``worst-case scenario'' data. The plans
to make this information available to the public in a searchable
electronic format could pose the potential threat of allowing foreign
companies to gain information about American industries. Law
enforcement officials have warned that such a format could give
terrorists blueprints to industrial facilities. I am quite concerned
that the EPA could not prevent third parties from gaining access to the
``worst case'' scenario data in electronic format and posting it on
their own websites. It could potentially cause real-life consequences
by putting information about the chemical industries on the world wide
web. Congress ought to pass laws to make people safer, not increase
risks.
I thank the Chairman for focusing on this issue, and look forward
to hearing from our witnesses.
______
Prepared Statement of Hon. Barbara Cubin, a Representative in Congress
from the State of Wyoming
I'd like to thank the two distinguished chairmen, Mr. Bilirakis and
Mr. Upton, for holding this important--and timely--hearing today on the
national security and public safety implications of electronic
dissemination of chemical release data. I see that we have several
panels of experts in the field of law enforcement and emergency
response who will focus on the extent of the problems which could arise
should this information be placed on the Internet. I look forward to
hearing their testimony.
In recent months, I have heard from numerous propane dealers in my
State of Wyoming regarding their concerns about the potential for
terrorist attacks on their facilities should the EPA disseminate the
Risk Management Plans to the public, including the worst-case scenario
data. I share their concern in that regard and believe that the threat
of terrorism far outweighs the public safety concerns.
The threat of terrorism is growing worldwide. We have witnessed far
too much of that here at home in recent years, with the Oklahoma City
bombing, the bombing of the World Trade Center in New York and attacks
on individuals with letter bombs by Theodore Kazinsky. We need not give
these terrorists additional means to impose their will upon the
citizens of this country.
It is my hope that today's witnesses will provide these
subcommittees with some concrete suggestions as to how to provide
communities with adequate information to respond to chemical accidents,
while avoiding the risk of making it easier for international
terrorists to obtain this potentially dangerous information on the
World Wide Web.
Thank you.
Mr. Bilirakis. All right. I appreciate the consideration of
part of the members. We do have a vote on the floor. I think
maybe the wise course at this point in time, since we have no
further opening statements up here, is to recess. We will run
over, make the vote, come back, and then we can start with you
good gentleman.
Thank you for your patience.
The Chair has recessed then for, let us say, 15 minutes or
so.
[Brief recess.]
Mr. Bilirakis. Can we have order, please?
The first panel consists of Chief John M. Eversole, Chief
Fire Officer and Commander, Hazardous Materials Division, city
of Chicago Fire Department; Mr. Robert M. Blitzer, Associate
Director, Center for Counterterrorism Technology and Analysis,
Science Applications International Corporation, McLean,
Virginia; Mr. E. James Monihan, Volunteer, Lewes Fire
Department, in his capacity as Delaware State Director; Mr.
Timothy R. Gablehouse, Chair of Jefferson County Local
Emergency Planning Committee, member of Clean Air Act Advisory
Subcommittee on Accident Prevention, Denver, Colorado, and Mr.
Brett Burdick, Environmental Programs Manager, Department of
Emergency Services, Commonwealth of Virginia, Richmond,
Virginia.
Welcome, gentleman. Chairman Upton and I look like we are
playing musical chairs up here this morning. You should know--
you probably have already guessed--that he is a member of the
Committee on Education, and they have a markup taking place in
the committee. Every time he shuffles out of here, he has got
to vote either on the floor or in committee.
Mr. Upton. Mr. Chairman, if I indulge, I am just glad I got
Mr. Greenwood to go with me because he is on the committee as
well, and it was by one vote that we prevailed.
Mr. Bilirakis. You prevailed by one vote.
Mr. Burr. Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Bilirakis. Yes, sir.
Mr. Burr. Could I ask for a unanimous consent request and
the indulgence of my colleagues on the other side to enter into
the record the GAO report, ``Combatting Terrorism,'' which is
where I quoted from, and I have been asked----
Mr. Bilirakis. Without objection, that will be done.
[The report, GAO/NSIAD-97-245, is retained in subcommittee
files.]
Mr. Brown. Mr. Chairman?
Mr. Bilirakis. Mr. Brown.
Mr. Brown. I also ask unanimous consent to enter into the
record, one, the opening statement for Mr. Dingell, then, a
letter to Mr. Waxman from the Environmental Health Coalition
and, also, a letter to Mr. Bliley from several groups; OMB
Watch and several others, if I could ask----
Mr. Bilirakis. Without objection, that will be the case.
[The prepared statement of Hon. John D. Dingell and the
letter referred to follow:]
Prepared Statement of Hon. John D. Dingell, a Representative in
Congress from the State of Michigan
Mr. Chairman, you piqued my interest with your catchy title for
this hearing: ``Worst-Case Scenarios: A Roadmap for Terrorists?''
That question certainly deserves an answer. But it also begs
another question: If worst-case scenarios are a ``roadmap for
terrorists,'' then what? Do we abolish the clear statutory requirement
for planning for ``worst-case scenarios'' at industrial facilities? Do
we restrict the public's access to this information? That will demand a
careful balancing of the public's need for this information against the
reality (and I hope we will carefully consider the reality) of
terrorist threat.
I know all too well, and all too recently, the devastation felt by
a community rocked by an industrial disaster. Nine days ago, an
explosion at Ford's River Rouge Plant in Dearborn, Michigan killed two
employees and injured thirty others, many of whom are in critical
condition.
We are virtually certain that this was no act of terrorism. It may
have been caused by something less intriguing, like natural gas, coal
dust, or other hazardous materials routinely kept on site--everyday
practices, for some reason, gone awry. An explosion caused by something
much more common than an act of terrorism can be just as deadly.
It was just these types of devastating daily occurrences that
section 112(r) of the Clean Air Act was designed to prevent. They range
in magnitude from the disaster at Bhopal to a relatively small plant
fire which causes no injury. I know that terrorism is a more newsworthy
topic, and one of policy and political interest to both parties. But in
this inquiry today, and anything that may result from it, we must not
lose sight of the important purposes of section 112(r), entitled
``Prevention of Accidental Releases.''
The intent of the drafters of this section is clear. The section
provides, ``It shall be the objective of the regulations and programs
authorized under this subsection to prevent the accidental release and
to minimize the consequences of any such release . . . of any substance
listed . . . or any other extremely hazardous substance.'' To achieve
this purpose, the facilities that handle threshold amounts of extremely
hazardous substances are required to implement risk management plans to
detect and prevent or minimize accidental releases, and to provide a
prompt emergency response to any such releases. An integral part of
this plan is the evaluation of worst case accidental releases--also
called the worst-case scenario. This is a statutory requirement, one
which Congress believed was necessary to provide first-on-the-scene
responders all information possible to save lives and property. But the
statute also provides that all of the information shall be available to
the public on an equal footing with the other recipients of this
information.
We may ask why the public needs this information. What can a
community do to prevent accidental releases at a facility in the
community, or 2,000 miles away? The answer is: plenty. The community is
likely comprised of workers at that facility who can talk to the
management about their handling of dangerous materials in the
community. The management could, in turn, implement better practices
nationwide. The community can put together plans for land use based
upon information that the facility gives them. Some small communities
do not have local agencies charged with emergency response planning, so
they need information to develop their owns plans for response. In
short, Congress saw the wisdom of enabling the community to minimize
risks to their own families. If the facility that stores extremely
dangerous substances listens to its workers and creates a safer
workplace, then the facility is less prone to accidents or terrorist
attack, and the intent of the statute has been met.
In making any decision as to whether we should create obstacles to
public disclosure, we must also consider this reality: anything we make
available to the public, we also make available to certain people who
intend to use it for unlawful purposes. The drafters of the Clean Air
Act may not have been sensitive to Internet issues, but we certainly
knew this inherent risk of a free and open society.
As to the particular mode of disclosure on the Internet, we should
ask several questions. If the worst-case scenario information is placed
on the Internet, is there any more risk of terrorist attack than if it
were available in print? What is contained in the worst-case scenario
that might provide a roadmap for terrorists? As I read the
requirements, there is no obligation that a facility disclose the exact
location of its on-site tanks, or the valves on those tanks. There
certainly is no requirement that the facility disclose the nature of
its security system. Is the information so much more attractive to
terrorists than that which already has been disclosed by these
facilities, that is already on the Internet, and that has not been
attractive to terrorists thus far?
I hope that we will carefully consider the answers to these
questions, and weigh these answers against the need to prevent and
minimize the consequences of the more common phenomenon of industrial
accidents like the tragedy in Dearborn.
As of yet, we have seen no legislative proposal from the Majority
on this issue, and indeed such a proposal would be premature prior to
our obtaining more information. I would hope that any legislative
proposal would be bipartisan in nature, and expect that it undergo a
full and fair legislative hearing.
______
Environmental Health Coalition,
San Diego, CA 92101,
February 9, 1999.
Rep. Henry Waxman
2204 Rayburn House Office Building
Washington, DC 20515
Dear Representative Waxman: I am writing today to tell you that the
California Risk Management Prevention Plan law has worked well to
reduce chemical accident hazards, without any incidents where publicly
available information was misused in any way.
The Environmental Health Coalition is an 18-year-old environmental
justice organization that works on toxic pollution in the San Diego-
Tijuana region. California's Risk Management and Prevention Plan
program was passed in 1987 and administered in San Diego County by the
County Department of Environmental Health. Since the first local RMPPs
were completed in 1990, EHC has watch dogged this program and reviewed
and commented on the draft public RMPP documents. In reading these
public documents we have made significant changes in their equipment,
operating procedures, and training in order to reduce their accident
hazard. We believe that knowing the RMPP will be publicly available is
a major motivating factor for the industries to undertake risk
reductions. This right-to-know aspect of the RMPP program is an
important way that the program achieves the objectives of reducing
accident risk. After reviewing the RMPP public documents, we have
recommended additional improvements to the industry's prevention plan,
which have often been accepted. Beyond this, the RMPPs have served to
educate us and the communities we serve about the extent of the
accident hazards from chlorine gas, ammonia, and other acutely toxic
materials. We are able to engage in more informed dialogue with RMPP
industries about their accident hazard to the community. At no time has
the information ever been used in California for any terrorist types of
acts. This is a completely bogus issue which is always raised when the
public's right to know is at issue.
In sum, the Right to Know always works to protect the public
health, and has never produced any of the negative consequences that
are feared from it. The RMPP program in California has reduced accident
hazards at many sites, without public hysteria, terrorist incidents, or
any other catastrophic outcomes.
Sincerely,
Joy Williams,
Community Assistance Director.
______
February 9, 1999.
The Honorable Thomas Bliley
Chairman, House Committee on Commerce
United States House of Representatives
Washington, DC 20515
Dear Chairman Bliley, As organizations committed to preserving the
public's right to know, access to government information, and the free
flow of information, we are writing to express our concern and
opposition to proposals to limit public access to concerning accidents
at chemical plants (EPA's unclassified Worst Case Scenarios data). It
is our understanding that you are considering the creation of a new
exemption to the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA), or amending the
Clean Air Act to exempt this information from the provisions of FOIA,
and have discouraged the EPA from using the Internet to provide public
access to this publicly available data.
FOIA was designed to allow the public to inquire about and monitor
government activities. Since its passage, individuals, journalists,
academics, community leaders have used FOIA to research, study, and
utilize public information created or collected by the government. FOIA
gave government the affirmative responsibility to make information
widely available to the public.
Three years ago, Senator Patrick Leahy's amendments to FOIA, EPOIA,
expanded the rights of individuals, assuring public access to
information in all media, and encouraged the use of the Internet for
the dissemination of government information. EPOIA ensured that the
public's interest in access to information would benefit from advances
in technology and that information could not be withheld simply because
it was in electronic form.
The Clean air Act, like FOIA, seeks to empower citizens by
providing information critical for communities to assess the safety of
companies operating in their midst by planning and comparing
information about their communities in order to make informed decisions
about their lives. the dissemination of information is critical to the
success of the Clean Air Act, giving individuals the ability to monitor
the toxins in their community.
The Internet and other digital media have given individuals an
unprecedented ability to access information and utilize their right to
know with ease and efficiency. Congress recognized, in passing EPOIA,
that technology has great power to ``foster democracy by ensuring
public access to agency information.'' The amendments expanded the
information actually--not just legally--available by making frequently
requested records more readily available ``through computer
telecommunications.'' Exempting specific information from the FOIA, or
any effort to set medium-based limits on the release of government
information to the public, has an impact on the public's right to
access information.
We urge you not to put forward such proposals or, at the very
least, to help ensure that there is a full hearing with input from all
of the affected communities including public interest groups,
journalists and other frequent FOIA requesters.
Sincerely,
American Association of Law Libraries.
American Civil Liberties Union.
Association of Newspaper Editors.
Center for Democracy and Technology.
Electronic Frontier Foundation.
OMB Watch.
cc: Chairman Steve Horn, House Subcommittee on Government Management,
Information and Technology; Representative Robert Goodlatte, Internet
Caucus Co-Chair; Representative Rick Boucher, Internet Caucus Co-Chair;
Senator Conrad Burns, Internet Caucus Co-Chair; Senator Patrick Leahy,
Internet Caucus Co-Chair; Representative W.J. ``Billy'' Tauzin;
Representative Michael G. Oxley; Representative Michael Bilirakis;
Representative Joe Barton; Representative Fred Upton; Representative
Cliff Stearns; Representative Paul E. Gillmor; Representative James C.
Greenwood; Representative Christopher Cox; Representative Nathan Deal;
Representative Steve Largent; Representative Richard Burr;
Representative Brian P. Bilbray; Representative Ed Whitfield;
Representative Greg Ganske; Representative Charlie Norwood;
Representative Tom Coburn; Representative Rick Lazio; Representative
Barbara Cubin; Representative James E. Rogan; Representative John
Shimkus; Representative Heather Wilson; Representative John B. Shadegg;
Representative Charles W. ``Chip'' Pickering; Representative Vito
Fossella; Representative Roy Blunt; Representative Ed Bryant;
Representative Robert L. Ehrlich, Jr.; Representative John D. Dingell;
Representative Henry A. Waxman; Representative Edward J. Markey;
Representative Ralph M. Hall; Representative Edolphus Towns;
Representative Frank Pallone, Jr.; Representative Sherrod Brown;
Representative Bart Gordon; Representative Peter Deutsch;
Representative Bobby L. Rush; Representative Anna G. Eshoo;
Representative Ron Klink; Representative Bart Stupak; Representative
Eliot L. Engel; Representative Thomas C. Sawyer; Representative Albert
R. Wynn; Representative Gene Green; Representative Karen McCarthy;
Representative Ted Strickland; Representative Diana DeGette;
Representative Thomas M. Barrett; Representative Bill Luther; and
Representative Lois Capps
Mr. Bilirakis. The Chair now will yield to Mr. Upton for--
--
Mr. Stupak. Mr. Chairman?
Mr. Bilirakis. I will yield to Mr. Upton, and then I am
sure he will yield to you, Bart.
Mr. Upton. And I just might say, Chairman Bilirakis and I
had a deal that I was going to race back and make the vote and
come back so the hearing could prevail, continue without any
stoppage, and I did my end of the bargain, Mike. I made it back
and forth to the floor, and then I found out that you had to
adjourn anyway.
Mr. Stupak.
Mr. Bilirakis. Good exercise.
Mr. Stupak. Mr. Chairman, I want to raise a point, a
parliamentary inquiry, if I may.
Under rule 11(G)(4), which requires all non-governmental
witnesses to submit a resume and disclosure of the companies'
contracts--I believe Mr. Blitzer works for SAIC and is
identified as working for SAIC. I have an entry form of SAIC's
web page which indicates that it has Government contracts, and
a number of them are described on the web page. On his
disclosure form, he answers the answer about grants and
contracts as, ``don't know,'' and I am sure that he probably is
not aware of some of them.
But my question is: Is this proper compliance with the
rule? Because it is, obviously, if you go to the web page, SAIC
does have a financial interest in the subject matter before
this hearing. So, I raise that as a point of order, and ask if
it is a proper compliance with the rule 11(G)4?
Mr. Upton. First of all, I thank the gentleman for his
inquiry, and I also thank him for the ``heads up'' that he was
going to raise this so we could be prepared. And I share his
concern, that the committee conduct its proceedings in
compliance with the applicable rules of the House. And, as I
understand it--and I will ask the witness to address this prior
to his testimony--Mr. Blitzer is here to testify in his
individual capacity and not as a representative of any
organization and association. And, therefore, so long as he,
himself, has not received any Federal grants or contracts as an
individual during the current fiscal year, or any of the
preceding 2 fiscal years, he has nothing to disclose in terms
of truth in his testimony.
I appreciate the inquire from my friend from Michigan.
Mr. Brown. Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Upton. The gentleman from Ohio.
Mr. Brown. I would just like to add that I hope that in the
next--in the ensuing 24 months and this 23 months that this
committee meets, that we will follow the same standards and be
consistent.
I remember with some regularity over the last couple of
years or less--4 years, really--we have seen not always evenly
applied standards on this issue. And your side has typically
brought this issue up, and I just hope that we can work this
out. And Mr. Bilirakis has always been very fair about things,
and I hope we can continue that.
Mr. Upton. I wish to assure the gentleman from Ohio and
Michigan that we intend to be consistent, absolutely consistent
with that policy, and look forward to working together on this.
Mr. Stupak. Mr. Chairman, just so the record is clear, I
raise it because I believe--and I am happy to submit the web
page to the record if you would like, but the SAIC had a
contract to do part of the security study for the EPA, and that
is what is being discussed here today, especially under Freedom
of Information Act and rule 112(r). So, I believe there is a
financial interest here. It is stated for the record, and I am
satisfied with that, but I want it clear for the record.
Mr. Upton. Thank you.
Mr. Stupak. Thank you.
Mr. Upton. Okay, at this point, we will move ahead.
We need a table back here.
Okay. Well, you are aware that this subcommittee,
gentlemen--you are aware that this subcommittee is an
investigative subcommittee and, as such, has had the long
practice of taking testimony under oath. Do you have any
objection to testifying under oath? Any of you?
[Witnesses indicate no.]
Mr. Upton. No? Then the Chair, then, advises each of you
that, under the rules of the House and the rules of the
committee, you are entitled to be advised by counsel. Do any of
you desire to be advised by counsel during your testimony
today?
[Witnesses indicate no.]
No? Let the record reflect that all said, ``No.''
In that case, if you would please rise and raise your right
hand, I will swear you in.
[Witnesses sworn.]
Mr. Upton. Each of you is now under oath, and you now give
a 5-minute summary of your written statement. I would note, for
the record, that your full statement will be printed in the
record in its entirety, and if you would like to summarize
that, that would be just fine.
And we will start with Mr. Burdick.
TESTIMONY OF BRETT A. BURDICK, ENVIRONMENTAL PROGRAMS MANAGER,
DEPARTMENT OF EMERGENCY SERVICES, COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA;
TIMOTHY R. GABLEHOUSE, CHAIR, JEFFERSON COUNTY LOCAL EMERGENCY
PLANNING COMMITTEE, AND MEMBER, CLEAN AIR ACT ADVISORY
SUBCOMMITTEE ON ACCIDENT PREVENTION; E. JAMES MONIHAN,
VOLUNTEER, LEWES FIRE DEPARTMENT, AND DELAWARE STATE DIRECTOR,
NATIONAL VOLUNTEER FIRE COUNCIL; ROBERT M. BLITZER, ASSOCIATE
DIRECTOR, CENTER FOR COUNTERTERRORISM TECHNOLOGY AND ANALYSIS,
SCIENCE APPLICATIONS INTERNATIONAL CORPORATION, AND FORMER
DIRECTOR, COUNTERTERRORISM PLANNING SECTION, NATIONAL SECURITY
DIVISION, FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION; AND JOHN M.
EVERSOLE, CHIEF FIRE OFFICER AND COMMANDER, HAZARDOUS MATERIALS
DIVISION, CITY OF CHICAGO FIRE DEPARTMENT, AND CHAIRMAN,
HAZARDOUS MATERIALS COMMITTEE, INTERNATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF
FIRE CHIEFS
Mr. Burdick. Thank you; good morning.
My name is Brett Burdick, and I work with the Virginia
Department of Emergency Services.
Mr. Upton. Speak a little bit more into the microphone so
all can hear.
Mr. Burdick. How is that? Thank you.
I work with the Virginia Department of Emergency Services,
and, in that position, I am in the Hazardous Materials Program
as the environmental programs manager. My background
encompasses both regulatory work and public safety activities.
I have worked in environmental regulatory programs as a first
responder to oil and hazardous materials releases and emergency
management and public safety programs, and currently involved
in addressing consequences of the criminal use of hazardous
materials throughout the commonwealth. My career experience
really spans nearly all of the issues germane to the 112(r)
discussion.
Let me begin by saying it is opinion that this is not a
clear black and white, clear-cut issue. Important interests
compete between free and open disclosure of information
important to public safety and the need for securing that
information which may be used by criminals and terrorists in
the furtherance of their activities.
Paradoxically, the goal, both of securing and of
disseminating this information, is exactly the same; that of
promoting public safety. Whether by establishing barriers to
free communication or by attempting to break these barriers
down, we are all on the same side here, and I think that is
important. In the final analysis, neither side is right or
wrong. It is merely a question of how we want to steer this
course to the common goal.
In any emergency response to hazardous materials
emergencies, incident managers drilled in the concept of
achieving desirable outcomes through balancing risks and
benefits. And the best scenario is, of course, is one where a
desirable outcome can be achieved by any low risk of high-
benefit action. Usually, though, that is not the case. As a
bottom line in guidance, accident managers need to seek
promising courses of action with an acceptable level of risk
relative to the benefit to be achieved. Balancing these risks
and benefits is how hazardous materials managers do our job.
I talk about these procedures because I think it is useful
to apply that sort of standard in this current issue. If we can
identify the risks and benefits of a particular course of
action, we can more objectively evaluate our decisions and
create those desirable outcomes.
Posting ``worst case scenario'' information on the Internet
does accomplish many commendable and desirable goals. It
conforms to the concepts of Government in the sunshine and free
access to information, both of which I believe in fully. It
allows easy access to the information by any interested citizen
who has access to a computer, and it may, in fact, increase
awareness of the population at large to these conceivable,
albeit unlikely ``worst case scenarios'' of chemical exposure.
There are some significant risks associated with that as
well. While easily accessible to private citizens, it is
equally available to those who may wish to use the information
for criminal purposes. Some ``worst case scenarios'' are a
virtual blueprint for assaulting the public safety. Information
would be equally available anonymously to anyone from Dallas to
Dahran, and, as Mr. Bliley said, ``from Boston to Baghdad.''
And the packaging of this information on the Internet could
allow almost effortless scrolling through ``worst case
scenarios'' simply by zip code. Individual areas could
conceivably be targets.
If we restrict posting the information on the Internet, we
risk some level of failure to share public safety information.
It is my opinion that this is not a decided infringement on
legitimate public right to know. Alternatives still exist, for
instance, Freedom of Information Act disclosures. While it is
less convenient and more cumbersome than ``surfing the Net,''
that sword cuts both ways. A FOIA request requires at least
supplying a return address. The anonymity issue goes away under
this system. That should not offend anyone legitimately seeking
information and may dissuade a potential criminal from using
that.
I do want to be absolutely clear; I don't argue that this
information should not be developed under 112(r). I think it is
important. And, I do not argue that it should not be shared
with first responders and the public at large, merely, that
reasonable and acceptable alternatives exist to dissemination
on the Internet.
I have heard arguments that posting this information will
result in significant benefit to hazardous materials response
teams. I think that that is basically true; it is not
exclusively true.
Most fire departments and teams already know the location
of facilities that store and use these hazardous substances.
Preplanning on the part of the departments takes this into
consideration. Most hazardous materials responders, for
instance, are fully aware that the rupture of a chlorine-
containing railcar might, under extremely adverse respond
conditions, yield to plume many miles, and perhaps tens of
miles, downwind. That is something we know. I think that, while
response organizations would undoubtedly benefit from being
supplied with facility-specific information, it should not be
on the Internet to be effective.
I think that the alternatives with FOIA are, in fact,
proven and successful. And based on all of this, the risk
benefit ratios, in my mind, I have come to the conclusion that,
in fact, the Internet posting is not the proper course of
action.
I thank you, sir.
[The prepared statement of Brett A. Burdick follows:]
prepared statement of brett a. burdick, virginia department of
emergency services
Good Morning. I am Brett Burdick with the Virginia Department of
Emergency Services where I work as the Environmental Programs Manager
in the Hazardous Materials Program. I appreciate the opportunity to
provide you with my testimony on the issue of posting 112(r) ``worst
case scenario'' information on the Internet.
My background encompasses both regulatory and public safety
matters. I have worked in environmental regulatory programs, as a first
responder to oil and hazardous materials releases, in emergency
management and public safety programs, and I am currently involved in
addressing the consequences of the use of hazardous materials in
criminal acts. My career experience has spanned nearly all of the
issues germane to the 112(r) debate.
Let me begin by stating that this is not in my opinion a clear-cut,
black and white issue. Important interests compete between free and
open disclosure of information important to public safety and the need
for securing that information which may be used by criminals and
terrorists in the furtherance of their activities. Paradoxically, the
goal both of securing and of disseminating this information is the
same--that of protecting public safety. Whether by establishing
barriers to free communication or by attempting to break these barriers
down, proponents on both side of the debate are climbing the same
mountain. In the final analysis, neither side is right or wrong. It is
merely a question of the proper course of action to accomplish this
common goal.
In the emergency response to hazardous materials emergencies,
incident managers are drilled in the concept of achieving desirable
outcomes through balancing risks and benefits. The best scenario, of
course, is one where a desirable outcome can be achieved by low risk,
high benefit actions. It is common that site conditions make these
decisions more difficult and we need to weigh carefully the risks we
must take. As bottom-line guidance, incident managers must seek a
promising course of action with an acceptable level of risk relative to
the benefit achieved. Balancing risks and benefits is how hazardous
materials managers make public safety decisions during emergencies.
I delve into this discussion of procedures because applying this
risk-benefit analysis is, I think, useful in deciding the appropriate
course of action in this matter. This particular risk-benefit model
allows us to codify the arguments and proceed through them in a logical
manner. If we can identify the risks and the benefits of a particular
course of action we can more objectively evaluate our decisions and
create desirable outcomes.
Posting ``worse case scenario'' information on the Internet does
accomplish many desirable goals. It conforms to the concepts of
``government in the sunshine'' and free access to information--both of
which I believe in fully. It allows easy access to this information by
any interested citizen who has access to a computer. It may increase
the awareness of the population-at-large to conceivable--albeit
unlikely--potential threats of chemical exposure.
Predictably, there are also some significant risks associated with
free dissemination of this information. While easily accessible to
private citizens, it is equally available to those who may wish to use
the information for criminal purposes. Some ``worst case scenarios''
are a virtual blueprint for assaulting the public safety. The
information would be equally available--anonymously--to anyone from
Dallas to Dhahran, from Boston to Baghdad, and the packaging of the
information could allow for almost effortless scrolling through ``worst
case'' information sorted by zip code.
If we restrict posting of the information on the Internet we risk
some level of failure to share public safety information. Fortunately,
I believe, this is not a decided infringement on legitimate public
right to know. Alternatives to information dissemination still exist--
for example through Freedom of Information Act disclosures. While it is
less convenient and more cumbersome than ``surfing the net,'' that
sword cuts both ways. In addition, a FOIA request requires, at least,
supplying a return address. This should not offend anyone legitimately
seeking information and may dissuade a potential criminal or terrorist
from acquiring these scenarios.
Please let me be clear. I do not argue that this information should
not be developed under 112(r) nor that it should not be shared with
first responders and the public at large--merely that reasonable and
acceptable alternatives exist to dissemination on the Internet. The
benefits of inhibiting malicious use of this information are great.
I have heard arguments that the posting of this information will
result in a significant benefit to hazardous materials response teams.
I think that, in reality, only a limited amount is to be gained by
hazardous materials response organizations. Most fire departments and
Teams already know the location of facilities that store and use these
hazardous substances. Preplanning on the part of response agencies
should already have been performed, and these should include worst-case
scenarios. Hazardous materials responders are fully aware that the
rupture of a Chlorine-containing rail car might, under extremely
adverse response conditions, yield a plume many miles, perhaps tens of
miles, downwind. While response organizations would undoubtedly benefit
from being supplied with facility-specific information it need not be
via the Internet to be effective.
The information regarding those types of industries caught within
the 112(r) net that are not required to report and plan under SARA--
such as bulk Propane storage, facilities that use Ammonia as a
refrigerant, and those water treatment facilities that use Chlorine as
a disinfectant--is already well known and available to emergency
responders. Arguably, some benefit may be gained from the existence of
additional information gathered under 112(r), but, again, absolutely no
public safety-first response benefit is gained by posting this
information on the Internet.
I believe that there already exists a sound and proven system
through which interested citizens of this nation can acquire this
information. Those with an interest can assume the personal
responsibility to educate themselves by requesting the information
available to them through disclosure to federal, state, and local
entities. There does not seem to be any compelling public safety reason
to post these ``worst case scenarios.''
When I weigh the risks and benefits of these differing courses of
action, I conclude that the posting of 112(r) ``worst case scenario''
information on the Internet falls into a high risk, low or moderate
benefit category. As a result I have concluded that it would not be
prudent to post this information. Others reviewing this same
information may conclude differently, as is their right. Within the
risk-benefit framework, however, there is compelling reason to avoid
this course of action.
I appreciate the opportunity to have addressed this body. Thank
you.
Mr. Upton. Thank you very much.
Mr. Gablehouse.
TESTIMONY OF TIMOTHY R. GABLEHOUSE
Mr. Gablehouse. Good morning, Mr. Chairman, members of the
subcommittees. Thank you very much for this opportunity to
testify.
I chair the Jefferson County Colorado Local Emergency
Planning Committee. I think it is important for you to
understand the realities that are faced in areas that are not
highly organized, do not have large and sophisticated fire
departments, do not have institutional emergency planning
activities, and, in fact, do not have member companies from CMA
and other highly responsible organizations.
Our reality is a lot different. The companies that we face
on a day-to-day basis do not necessarily know how to conduct
emergency management, don't know how to respond to accidents,
don't always understand how to utilize the chemicals they have
got. The fire departments that we have in our area are not
large and sophisticated hazardous materials teams. They do not
always understand what risks they are going into at a specific
facility. They simply don't have that information.
Local emergency planning committees in my part of the world
are organizations that are a function of the volunteer efforts
of their members. The members are the people that are doing
Internet searches for information. The members are the people
that are driving around town trying to identify facilities that
ought to be reporting under APRA, and potentially the 112(r)
program. These are people that perform these efforts just like
any other citizen of this country might perform these efforts.
I have supported putting this information on the Internet.
I, as a member of the advisory subcommittee, paid a lot of
attention to the debate we had. I am supportive of EPA's
decision not to put the offsite consequence information on the
Internet. That was a reasonable choice, given the decision
before them.
I believe the Agency is doing a good job in consulting with
the other agencies and coming up with administrative approaches
to keep this information in a manageable way. But you need to
understand that there are dramatic benefits to having this
information available.
In my written testimony I have given you a couple of
examples, but I think it suffices to say that we use this
information and be willing to trust the companies in reporting
facilities in our area, but we need to be able to verify the
information simply because we recognize that they don't always
understand what they are dealing with and the risks it
presents.
Having access on that broad scale to information that is
nationally based is important to our efforts at the local
level.
Creditability in discussing risks with communities is
essential. It is a waste of my time and the fire department's
time and other people's time if what we are doing is fighting
about accident scenarios and whether or not they are good, bad,
big enough, small enough, or whatever. We have here the
opportunity to create a national database that puts to rest a
lot of those issues.
What we face now, and what we will face undoubtedly in the
future, is debate, guesswork, inflammatory statements, all by
people who will put their information on the Internet,
undoubtedly. That conversation and that debate does not promote
risk reduction in the community. It does not promote the
capability of the local responders to plan for a terrorist
incident or chemical fire. We face these chemical incidents on
a daily basis. They routinely injure first responders. They
routinely cause property damage and economic losses. That
happens all the time.
Access to information that allows a community to better
prepare, that allows a community to verify the information they
are obtaining from other sources, by comparison to other
companies in other parts of the country and to other response
planning efforts in other parts of the country, are critical to
the credibility we need to support this effort in our
community.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
[The prepared statement of Timothy R. Gablehouse follows:]
Prepared Statement of Timothy R. Gablehouse, Chair, Jefferson County
Colorado Local Emergency Planning Committee and Member, Colorado
Emergency Planning Commission
Mr. Chairman and members of the subcommittees, I very much
appreciate this opportunity to testify regarding the interrelated
issues of emergency planning, emergency response and the public's
access to information. Regardless of whether the question is terrorism
or hazardous materials accidents, the burden and responsibility of
preparedness and the initial "first" response is on the men and women
who live in the communities of this nation. My comments today will
focus on the needs and concerns of these people.
I come from a state that will not seek delegation of the Clean Air
Act section 112r program. As with the Emergency Planning and Community
Right-to-Know Act, this means that the burden and responsibility of
understanding these programs falls to the people at the local level. It
is at this local level that Local Emergency Planning Committees
operate. I have been a member of the Jefferson County Committee since
it was formed in 1987 and have been its chair for almost four years.
In Colorado along with much of the nation the people that perform
these functions are volunteers. Whether they are interested citizens,
members of volunteer fire departments, or representatives of local
businesses, these people are not compensated to perform these
functions.
Today there will be testimony from representatives of the Chemical
Manufacturers Association and fire departments from large communities.
This is not our reality in Colorado and the mountain West. If emergency
preparedness was always conducted in conjunction with highly
responsible, experienced and responsible companies, and by well-trained
and equipped emergency response organizations, we would not face the
debate currently before us on whether or not the public at-large
deserves access to accident risk, prevention and response information.
Our reality is companies large and small that do not understand or
practice appropriate safety measures. Our reality is volunteer fire
departments without the specialized equipment or training to safely
respond even to structure fires and much less hazardous materials
incidents. Our reality is local governments not having the sort of
information they need for land use planning decisions that reduce the
risk of injury and property damage resulting from chemical accidents.
We can only learn and improve by looking outside our community. It
is important to understand the techniques used by other communities and
businesses similar to ours. It is important to understand what risks
have been identified and described in other communities. It is
important to understand the prevention and emergency response programs
practiced by businesses similar to ones in our community.
We use this information not only as an aid in planning and
preparedness. We use this information to aid local businesses in
complying with regulatory programs. We use it to aid local governments
in land use planning and zoning decisions. We use it to inform the
public about risks in the community and the roles they can play in
reducing risks.
Recently all of this information came into play in the debate
surrounding the siting of a new school in Congressman Udall's district.
Not far from the proposed location is an industrial area. This
industrial area is not within any city, nor is it within the boundaries
of any fire district.
The Local Emergency Planning Committee had to file suit against one
of the businesses in this area in order to enforce its requests for
information. The information was finally supplied, but that is not the
end of the story. The business was not sophisticated in preventing
accidents nor in emergency response procedures. They could not provide
us with descriptions of the risks they presented to the community. They
could not even provide adequate information or training to their
employees.
The LEPC used the Internet, as we frequently do, to educate
ourselves about the risks presented by the chemicals at this business.
We educated ourselves about the possible accident scenarios this
business presented and the implications of these risks to the proposed
school. Without government information from the Internet this task
would have been difficult if not impossible.
Many of the people providing testimony today seem to believe that
there is no legitimate reason for members of the public to know about
the accidents scenarios,prevention plans and emergency response
procedures practiced in the rest of the country or even the next
county. In my part of the country it is the public that is performing
the function of accident preparedness and prevention. It is the public
that are members of volunteer fire departments and local emergency
planning committees. There is no valid distinction between members of
the public at large and the people that perform these functions.
Let me turn now to Section 112r of the Clean Air Act. While I do
not want to minimize the terrible consequences of a terrorist incident,
I do not believe the risk that Section 112r information will be useful
to a terrorist is significant. On the other hand,we face an actual and
much greater risk from chemical accidents. The very real potential for
such incidents is a daily proposition.
I serve on the EPA advisory subcommittee that considered these
issues. I listened and studied the statements of the security experts
that testified before that group. I have listened to the statements of
the industry members concerned with this issue. I applied my own
experience in the fields of emergency response and law enforcement.
The fundamental truth, that is sometimes lost in this debate, is
that facilities are responsible for their own security and accident
prevention. The study I have conducted of this issue leads me to the
conclusion that there is nothing in the 112r program and potential
posting of information on the Internet that interferes with a
facility's ability to perform these functions. The information
submitted under the 112r program does not describe how to cause a
chemical accident. The information does not describe the security
systems that facilities have in place.
On the other hand these same facilities expect responders to come
when they have accidents. They expect the community to understand and
appreciate their accident prevention efforts. They expect the community
to tolerate whatever risk of a chemical accident the facility presents
in return for the benefits that facility provides to the community.
They expect the public to participate in emergency response and absorb
the institutional costs of this response.
Credibility is necessary to satisfying these expectations. Without
credibility all that happens is the never ending debate of whether or
not a company is too risky or inappropriate for the community. This
lack of credibility leads to the breakdown of neighborhoods and the
inability of a community to cooperate to better its situation.
Representative DeGette and I suspect all of the members of the
Subcommittees have been witness to the sort of community fights over
the siting or expansion of an industrial facility that comes from a
lack of trust and a failure of credibility.
EPA has decided not to post the off-site consequence information on
the Internet. The LEPC is prepared to live with that decision only
because the full information will still be available at the state and
local level. Even so, what will happen is that any number of people
will fill the vacuum created by EPA's action by posting their own
educated speculations or inflammatory guesses on the Internet. Instead
of focusing on accident prevention and response the LEPC will be drug
into the process of correcting misinformation.
I believe that EPA has and will continue to reach reasonable
compromise positions on the question of public access to information
under the section 112r program. It is important to recognize that this
information is useful to the public and is important to the reduction
of accidents. The information is desired and any vacuum will be filled.
I believe that it is more dangerous to promote misinformation than it
is to take the risk that someone will misuse accurate information.
Mr. Upton. Thank you very much.
Mr. Monihan.
TESTIMONY OF E. JAMES MONIHAN
Mr. Monihan. Good afternoon, Mr. Chairman, members of the
subcommittees.
I am E. James Monihan, former chairman and director, from
Delaware, the National Volunteer Fire Council, and I appreciate
this opportunity to give this testimony.
The National Volunteer Fire Council provides a voice for
the volunteer fire service, which is made up of 28,000
departments across the country, staffed by over 800,000 men and
women. We are the first responders, the frontline if you will,
in an emergency in our community, anything from a dog falling
through the ice who is drowning, through fires, auto accidents,
hazardous materials, chemical, and biological incidents, both
accidental and intentional. It is these people who must stand
alone until the sophisticated systems kick in and help arrives
in our communities.
To us, the information under consideration is vital;
however, our concern is the breadth of its distribution, beyond
those involved in the community. We were most alarmed when we
learned that the amendments in the Clean Air Act directed the
EPA to release detailed data on all these sites; however, we
are very gratified that the EPA has been very responsive to our
concerns.
Our concern is that, while we need to have information
available to protect our communities and ourselves, that same
information should not be used against the Nation and the very
persons it is intended to protect.
Since the amendments do not specify how this information
should be made available, we urge the method to disseminate the
data be carefully crafted to strike the proper balance between
the public's right to know and the need to maintain a safe
environment in our communities and reduce the probability of
attack using this information as a catalyst.
Our suggestion is that a mechanism be developed to allow
the release of information from the risk management plans on a
single site, accessible only to the citizens of the community
and the organizations necessary.
We are concerned that some individuals have expressed the
desire to obtain the information through Freedom of
Information, then, publish it on their own websites. We feel
this is unnecessary. It is wrong; it is dangerous, because we
see no reason to give terrorists a guide or, if you will, a
``Home Shopping Network'' to the most hazardous sites in the
country.
As several members have already mentioned, we do have, as
reflected in my written testimony, a complex in the State of
Delaware. This situation, however, is replicated across the
country. The point is that these sites exist, and to give a
detailed blueprint, to lead all the world to them, along with
consequences of each, is just not necessary.
In the middle of the--I'm sorry. Now if you understand the
information--as the title of this hearing says--is offsite
consequence analysis or ``worst case scenarios,'' can you
imagine what a person shopping the Internet with terroristic or
other damaging intents would think when they came across this
detailed information on all these sites. I don't think I need
to elaborate further on this matter. Quite frankly, in my 42
years in the fire service, I have been involved in explosions,
shot at, fallen through floors, and so forth, but to
contemplate this is quite scary.
Ladies and gentlemen, National Volunteer Fire Council has
always been an advocate in the patient's right to know about
hazards in this community. In fact, we use this information
ourselves, as I said in the beginning. The community is much
safer if the citizens are cognoscente of the risks surrounding
them. In this situation, however, we see no reason to
jeopardize the safety of the public and our personnel when
there are perfectly reasonable alternatives available.
Allowing access to the information in question on a single-
site basis only ensures that the information is available to
those who need it, while still maintaining the integrity of our
national security.
And it has been mentioned here earlier--and some people
don't see it that way, but it is a fact--we need only look to
the World Trade Center and Oklahoma City bombings to see the
mindset about which we are concerned. We can't afford to
approach this by trial and error, to wait and see what happens.
The National Volunteer Fire Council looks forward to
working with these committees and the EPA, as well as other
concerned groups, to develop a safe, secure mechanism that will
protect everyone involved.
Thank you for the opportunity to testify.
[The prepared statement of E. James Monihan follows:]
Prepared Statement of E. James Monihan, National Volunteer Fire Council
Director, State of Delaware
Mr. Chairman and members of the committee, my name is James
Monihan. I am the Delaware Director to the National Volunteer Fire
Council (NVFC) and firefighter in the Lewes Fire Department in Lewes,
Delaware. I have served as a volunteer firefighter for 42 years and
have had experience in all phases of the life of a first responder,
including chemical and hazardous materials incidents. On behalf of the
volunteer fire service, I appreciate the opportunity to present you
with the NVFC's concerns and suggestions regarding the dissemination of
chemical site Risk Management Plans (RMP) data. The NVFC works to
guarantee the safety of volunteer firefighters and the communities they
protect and we want to ensure that this data is distributed in a safe
and secure manner.
The NVFC represents the interests of the nation's more than 800,000
volunteer firefighters, who staff America's 28,000 volunteer fire
departments. These volunteers represent the first response to many
hazardous materials, biological, and chemical incidents, at which they
must stand alone until help arrives.
When the NVFC learned that the Environmental Protection Agency
(EPA) was directed by amendments to the Clean Air Act to collect RMP's
from approximately 66,000 chemical facilities across the U.S., we
supported the initiative. These RMP's contain data about potential
chemical release incidents and a given site's disaster recovery plans.
We believe that it is important for communities and public safety
officers to have access to this data so as to better protect
themselves. However, we are alarmed that certain parts of the RMP data
may be used against the United States and in turn harm volunteer
firefighters and the communities they protect.
Contained in the RMP data is information called ``Offsite
Consequence Analyses'' (OCA). The OCAs, also known as ``worst-case
scenarios'', reveal the worst possible environmental and explosive
consequences of releasing a particular site's chemicals. Additionally,
the OCAs provide an estimate of the damage, injuries, and deaths that
could result from an accident involving these chemicals. Finally, the
OCAs detail how the release of these chemicals can be triggered. The
NVFC is very concerned that this data, if easily accessible, could be
used by persons acting against the United States.
The Clean Air Act amendments state that the RMP data be ``available
to the public'', the Chemical Safety and Hazard Investigation Board,
and to state and local agencies. The amendments do not specify how this
information is disseminated. Originally, the Environmental Protection
Agency planned to release all of the RMP data, including the OCAs, on
an Internet site. A study by Aegis Research Corporation for the
Chemical Manufacturers Association stated that placing the OCA data on
the Internet would increase the risk of a terrorist attack on a
facility by seven-fold, which in turn increases the risk to first
responders and the communities they protect. However, we have since
learned that the EPA, acting on the advice of the FBI, CIA, and other
concerned groups, has decided not to release the OCA portion of the RMP
data on the Internet. The NVFC applauds the EPA for this decision. This
is an important step in ensuring that firefighters and citizens not be
subjected to an unnecessarily dangerous situation.
Unfortunately, the safety of first responders and their communities
is not yet assured. The NVFC is concerned that some private
organizations may obtain all of the RMP data by filing a Freedom of
Information Act request, and then post the RMP data, including the
OCAs, on their own Internet sites. The NVFC is vehemently opposed to
this. Allowing access to this information to anyone with a computer and
a phone line is exceedingly dangerous. We believe that this information
and its release to the public must be carefully controlled in order to
ensure that the risks associated with these chemical sites are not
multiplied.
The NVFC believes that the public has a right to obtain the
information about chemical sites within their communities. We believe
that educating the public about chemical risks is an important aspect
of accident prevention. However, we think that there are methods to
disseminate the RMP data that will strike the proper balance between
the public's right to know and the need to maintain a safe environment
for first responders and their communities. We recommend that a
mechanism be developed to allow the release of RMP data on a single-
site only basis. This will permit public safety departments and
citizens to access the RMP data on chemical sites within their
community while still maintaining control over the distribution of the
information. We see no reason to give terrorists a guided map to these
potentially dangerous sites.
Mr. Chairman, this situation is terrifying to me not only as a
firefighter, but as an ordinary citizen as well. In Delaware City,
which is located on the outskirts of Wilmington, there is an
arrangement of industrial sites that is a potential terrorists dream.
This major cluster of industrial structures, which is protected solely
by volunteers, includes several chemical plants, an oil refinery, and
an electrical generator. These sites, separated only by metal fences,
are located on a railroad line. Additionally, these sites are located a
quarter mile from the Chesapeake and Delaware Canal, which carries
shipping between Baltimore and Philadelphia, two major metropolitan
areas. If a terrorist were able to use a computer to search for
potential disaster sites, Delaware City would show up as one of his
best options. The release of these chemicals, coupled with the
potential destruction of the oil refinery, would not only affect
Wilmington's citizens, but also the entire region. The close proximity
of these industrial sites would allow for an attack of massive
proportions. The RMP data, in its entirety, would provide a terrorist
with all the information needed to calculate the potential
environmental and human casualties. Situations like that of Delaware
City are located all over the country. Why would we make this
information so easily accessible to someone who wants to harm our
country?
The NVFC has always been an advocate of the public's right to know
about hazards in their communities. A community is much safer if its
citizens are cognizant of the risks surrounding them. In this
situation, we see no reason to jeopardize the safety of firefighters
and citizens when there are perfectly reasonable alternatives
available. Allowing access to the OCAs on a single-site basis only
ensures that the information is available to those who need it while
still maintaining the integrity of our national security. We look
forward to working with the committee, the EPA, and other concerned
groups to develop a safe, secure mechanism that will protect everyone
involved. Thank you.
Mr. Upton. Thank you very much.
Mr. Blitzer.
TESTIMONY OF ROBERT M. BLITZER
Mr. Blitzer. Good afternoon, Mr. Chairman, members of the
committee.
I am pleased to have this opportunity to discuss the
electronic dissemination of chemical ``worst case scenarios''
by the EPA.
Just as a point for the record, I am not here representing
SAIC. I am here because of my past career with the FBI, and my
remarks really focus on my experiences there.
From January 1996, until I retired from the FBI at the end
of November, I served as Chief of the Domestic Terrorism/
Counterterrorism Planning Section of the National Security. In
this capacity, I was responsible for national oversight and
management of several important programs to include Domestic
Terrorism Operations--that is cases--Weapons of Mass
Destruction Operations--again, case, oversight--Weapons of Mass
Destruction Domestic Preparedness, Special Events Management,
and Civil Aviation Security.
I would just note to you, prior to that position, I held
several management positions in the international terrorism
arena. I helped manage the cases relating to PanAm 103, the
World Trade Center, the threat to bomb the tunnels in New York,
the threat to blow up airplanes over the Philippines in 1995,
and, of course, last but certainly not least, the Oklahoma City
bombing.
In December 1997, the FBI became aware, through the
Chemical Emergency Preparedness and Prevention Office of the
EPA, that section 112(r) of the Clean Air Act of 1990 required
the publishing of regulations focusing on the prevention for
chemical accidents. In an effort to comply with these
regulations, the EPA proposed to distribute risk management
plans via the Internet and CD-ROM. These plans would include
for each facility a number of things, including offsite
consequence analysis.
A number of meetings with representatives of the law
enforcement and intelligence communities were held during 1997
and 1998 to discuss security concerns relating to the making
available of all RMP data relating to the approximately 66,000
chemical sites within the United States. The proposed EPA
electronic distribution plans were discussed with these
agencies at great length.
Of greatest concern to the law enforcement and intelligence
communities, was the possible Internet dissemination of ``worst
case'' and alternate ``worst case scenarios,'' as set forth in
the OCA. Using the Internet, a terrorist, a criminal, or others
could identify these scenarios and fine tune an attack by
selecting ``worst case scenarios'' at facilities that were
within or adjacent to large civilian or military communities.
I must tell you, on a sidebar, the lack of intelligence on
a target doesn't mean it is not being targeted. In each of the
cases that I described to you that I helped manage over the
years, there was little or no intelligence. There was no
precursor information, indicating that a domestic or
international terrorist group was going to hit the World Trade
Center, for example, or, certainly, Oklahoma City. I think that
is an important point.
At the time we arrested the mastermind of the World Trade
Center case, Ramseh Yousef, he had in his possession a
computer. He was using a computer to plan the attack on the
aircraft.
I think that is an important point for all of you to
consider, because we saw more and more, over the past couple of
years, an increased use of computer technology by both domestic
and international terrorists. They are well-aware of how to use
computers; some of them are really experts. So, this was part
of our thinking at the time.
Based on our meetings, a number of interagency
recommendations were developed and were provided to EPA in a
letter dated October 30, 1998. The letter recorded interagency
agreement that OCA data not be included in RMP information
distributed via the Internet. Other data elements would be
accessible to the public on the Internet, and EPA agreed to
work with stakeholder groups to identify meaningful approaches
to make appropriate OCA information available to the local
community.
To ensure that State and local government agencies have
access to all national RMP data, it was recommended that the
EPA use a ``closed'' system, restricted to State and local
government agencies. This system should use secure password
protection and encryption technology.
Mr. Chairman, both the Department of Justice and the EPA
Legal Counsel advised the FBI--this was in the past--that
current Freedom of Information Act requires that EPA provide
the complete RMP information including the ``worst case
scenarios'' to a requestor. This is a potential problem for you
to consider. If this information is obtained and posted on
private Internet sites, the responsible steps taken by the FBI,
EPA, and its interagency partners would be negated.
The FBI and its interagency partners worked hard to strike
a reasoned balance to ensure public dissemination of important
information. I believe that the actions taken to prevent the
widespread Internet dissemination of ``worst case'' sensitive
chemical facility information was both prudent and necessary.
This concludes my remarks.
[The prepared statement of Robert M. Blitzer follows:]
Prepared Statement of Robert M. Blitzer, Associate Director, Center for
Counterterrorism Technology & Analysis, Science Applications
International Corporation
Good morning, Mr. Chairman and members of the Committee. I am
pleased to have this opportunity to discuss the electronic
dissemination of chemical ``worst case'' scenarios by the Environmental
Protection Agency (EPA).
From January 1996 until I retired from the Federal Bureau of
Investigation (FBI) at the end of November 1998, I served as Chief of
the Domestic Terrorism/Counterterrorism Planning Section of the
National Security Division. In this capacity I was responsible for
national oversight and management of several important programs to
include Domestic Terrorism Operations, Weapons of Mass Destruction
(WMD) Operations, WMD Domestic Preparedness, Special Events Management,
and Civil Aviation Security.
In December 1997 the FBI became aware, through the Chemical
Emergency Preparedness and Prevention Office of the EPA, that Section
112'of the ``Clean Air Act of 1990'' required the publishing
of regulations focusing on the prevention of chemical accidents. In an
effort to comply with these regulations the EPA proposed to distribute
Risk Management Plans (RMP) via the Internet and CD-ROM. These plans
would include for each facility a history of accidental releases, an
off-site consequence analysis (OCA); a prevention program inclusive of
company operating procedures, employee training, hazard evaluation and
emergency response programs to ensure that either facility employees or
public responders were prepared to deal with any accidents that might
occur and thus minimize the consequences.
A number of meetings with representatives of the law enforcement
and intelligence communities were held during 1997 and 1998 to discuss
``security concerns'' relating to the making available of all RMP data
relating to the approximately 66,000 chemical sites within the United
States. The proposed EPA electronic distribution plans were discussed
with these agencies. The plans would allow users to initiate Internet
searches by facility name, area of the country, zipcode, city, county,
and state. A modified search by chemical type would allow a person
using the EPA web site, to choose a portion of a city by zipcode and
tailor an attack by searching for certain chemicals. A search of this
nature could be accomplished from anywhere in the world. Additionally,
no record of such a query would be made. Further searches could be
tailored to developing information regarding chemical companies''
mitigation and safeguarding capabilities.
Of greatest concern to law enforcement was the possible Internet
dissemination of Worst Case and Alternate Worst Case Scenarios as set
forth in the OCA. Using the Internet a terrorist, criminal or
disgruntled employee could identify these scenarios and fine tune an
attack by selecting ``worst case scenarios'' at facilities that were
within or adjacent to large civilian or military communities.
Based upon the above meetings a number of interagency
recommendations were developed and provided to EPA in a letter dated
October 30, 1998. The letter recorded interagency agreement that OCA
data not be included in RMP information distributed via the Internet.
Other data elements would be accessible to the public on the Internet.
EPA agreed to work with stakeholder groups to identify meaningful
approaches to make appropriate OCA information available to the local
community. To ensure that State and local government agencies have
access to all national RMP data it was recommended that EPA use a
``closed system'' restricted to state and local government agencies.
This system should use secure password protection and encryption
technology.
It was believed that the creation of a CD-ROM encompassing EPA's
RMP database could be accomplished. However, the FBI recommended that
EPA not include facility identification and contact information on the
CD-ROM. This allows legitimate information retrieval for analysis,
however removes the ability of criminals and terrorists to use this
information for targeting purposes.
Mr. Chairman, both the Department of Justice, and the EPA Legal
Counsel advised the FBI that the current Freedom of Information Act
requires that EPA provide the complete RMP information including the
worst case scenarios to a requestor. This is a potential problem. If
this information is obtained and posted on private Internet sites the
responsible steps taken by the FBI, EPA and its interagency partners
would be negated. This is a pressing concern that I hope you can
address in an expeditious fashion.
The FBI and its interagency partners have worked hard to strike a
reasoned balance to insure public dissemination of important
information. Just last week Attorney General Janet Reno and FBI
Director Louis Freeh appeared before the United States Senate
Subcommittee for the Departments of Commerce, Justice, and State, the
Judiciary, and Related Agencies of the Committee on Appropriations.
Director Freeh gave an excellent overview of both the International and
Domestic terrorism threats we face at the present time and into the
future. He also spoke about a number of high profile investigations
that have occurred in the last several months. One key point that the
Director made was that--Terrorists, both abroad and at home, are using
technology to protect their operations from being discovered and thwart
the efforts of law enforcement to detect, prevent, and investigate such
acts.'' Computer technology is and will be a terrorist tool. I believe
that the actions taken to prevent the widespread Internet dissemination
of ``worst case'' sensitive chemical facility information was both
prudent and necessary.
This concludes my remarks. Thank you.
Mr. Upton. Thank you, Mr. Blitzer.
Chief Eversole--and you might move the microphone closer as
well. That would be terrific.
TESTIMONY OF JOHN M. EVERSOLE
Mr. Eversole. Good afternoon, Mr. Chairman, members of the
committee, ladies and gentlemen.
My name is John Eversole, and I am the commander of the
Hazardous Materials Unit to the Chicago Fire Department. I am
also the chairman for the International Fire Chiefs Hazardous
Material Committee.
And, I thank you for the time to allow me to come today to
summarize the statement that we have put into your record.
Let me assure you that I have both a personal and a
professional reason to care about this. We are very concerned
and have been very outspoken about the indiscriminate
dissemination of some very technical kinds of information that
may hurt our community. We believe in community right-to-know,
but I think that something has really been missed here.
The EPA designed and implemented what is called ``local
emergency planning committees.'' And they were to be in the
communities and to plan for their community how to best handle
emergency situations. And we think that that committee should
be used as a fulcrum for a balance between a community's right-
to-know and community's right for security and safety in that
community.
We think that sometimes just giving that information out to
everyone serves of no useful value. Certainly, we wouldn't want
to give the combinations to every bank out on the Internet
because I'd like to know. I don't think we have to consider
that we are The Enquirer and ``enquiring minds want to know.''
This is information that should be used to protect the very
communities in which the risks are.
I think it is important that we understand those things. I
think it is important that you understand that as, today,
representing the International Fire Chiefs, that we agree with
the FBI's concerns and the concerns of other policing agencies
about a potential terrorist threat.
I know that in my community our incidents of bombings are
up. And when you see some of the people that are doing
bombings, it is very interesting.
We have a valedictorian from a high school who decides to
impress his girlfriend. And, on the Net, he finds out how to
make these little bombs. So, he is just one step smarter, and
he figures how to etch the boxes with ``X's'' and ``O's.'' So,
he sets these boxes up on the front lawn of her home, and he
blows this thing up, and it really doesn't destroy anything,
but now there are ``X's'' and ``O's'' all across her lawn. She
was very impressed, we understand, but her parents were not,
and neither were the local police.
I think that there is sometimes that information is put out
that maybe the whole world doesn't have a right to know.
Let us take this information which is very good. We applaud
the EPA for having gathered this type of information for us so
that we can better plan in our communities. I sit there not
only as the chief of Hazardous Materials, I sit on the LEPC.
This information will help us to better protect our community,
but it should not be given out in indiscriminately because that
can only hurt us.
We are not exactly sure how to handle this. I would be the
last one to try to decide how to handle the Internet. I am not
sure anybody knows how to handle the Internet--and, soon,
probably, the Internet will handle us--but we need to take
common sense here and to allow local communities to use their
local emergency planning committees as that fulcrum to balance
between right-to-know and need for security of their community.
We thank you very much for your time and trouble. You can
read all the big, hard facts in our statement, but those are
the facts that we wanted to get to you today--the important
thing.
I would be happy to answer any questions that you may have.
Thank you very much.
[The prepared statement of John M. Eversole follows:]
Prepared Statement of Chief John M. Eversole on Behalf of the
International Association of Fire Chiefs
Chairmen, members of the subcommittees, I am John Eversole. I am a
Chief Fire Officer employed by the Chicago Fire Department. I am the
Commander of Chicago's Hazardous Materials Division and the Fire
Department's representative on the City of Chicago Local Emergency
Planning Committee.
I am present today on behalf of the International Association of
Fire Chiefs as its Chairman of the Hazardous Materials Committee. The
International Association of Fire Chiefs (IAFC) is a professional
association founded over 125 years ago to provide chief fire officers
and managers of emergency service organizations throughout the
international community with information, education, services and
representation in the effort to protect citizens from the devastation
of fire and other emergencies.
We very much appreciate the opportunity to appear before you today.
The issue of today's hearing is of vital importance to America's fire
and emergency services. We are the first responders to fires, medical
emergencies, hazardous materials incidents, technical rescues as well
as natural disasters and those caused by terrorists. The question
before the panel today is: Does posting chemical ``worst case''
scenarios on the internet create a roadmap for terrorists? We believe
it does.
The Clean Air Act requires the Environmental Protection Agency
(EPA) to implement a program to assist in the prevention of chemical
accidents. This is good law. EPA responded to this statute by
publishing its Risk Management Program rule in June 1996. That rule
requires some 66,000 facilities that store and use chemicals to develop
a Risk Management Plan (RMP) and file it with the EPA. Part of the RMP
is an Offsite Consequence Analysis (OCA) which includes worst case data
elements--or ``worst case'' scenarios. These worst case scenarios (WCS)
contain detailed information about the chemicals stored at the
facility. They provide estimates of injury and loss of life. They
reflect the damage to structures and the environment that can be
anticipated. They are a blueprint to what a disaster would look like.
The Clean Air Act further requires EPA to make this information
available to the public. Last year, we learned that EPA proposed to
make this information, including worst case scenarios, available to the
public on the internet. At that point the IAFC wrote a letter to EPA
Administrator Carol Browner. We expressed our concern, shared by law
enforcement and national security agencies, that making worst case
scenarios available on the internet will increase the risk of terrorist
attacks. In our letter of August 5th we stated:
``The IAFC cannot condone placing this highly detailed information
on the Internet. Foreign and domestic terrorists will have easy access
to it. Your agency's own security consultants have pointed out that
placing this information on the Internet will increase the risk of
terrorist attack. Our concerns go beyond the fact that by placing this
information on the Internet the federal government may be unwittingly
aiding and abetting terrorists in planning and carrying out attacks
against Americans. Our concerns for the EPA's plan are magnified by the
fact that firefighters are the first responders to incidents of
terrorism. EPA's plan significantly increases the already substantial
risks firefighters face each and every day.''
The IAFC and the American fire service were relieved late last year
to learn that the EPA had reconsidered its plan and agreed not to
distribute to the public offsite consequence analysis data elements on
the internet. This was a very responsible action by that agency and one
greatly appreciated by fire and emergency services. Now, a second and
equally important issue arises. It is still possible for private
citizens and organization to obtain the worst case scenarios from EPA
through Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) requests. These persons could
then put all of the worst case scenarios on the internet. Our concern
now is that even though the EPA has acted not to put worst case
scenarios on the internet, others are likely to do so.
Detailed worst case scenario information is vital to local
governments for emergency planning purposes. However, the Federal
Bureau of Investigation and other agencies concerned with national
security have expressed concerns that this information could be used as
a ``targeting tool'' by terrorist organizations or miscreants acting
alone. We concur that it is susceptible to misuse.
It is our understanding that a FOIA request would require EPA to
turn over the entire database in its existing format, be it a computer
database or on paper. We are concerned that EPA's decision to forgo
internet publication could be circumvented by others through a FOIA
request.
Given the importance of this information to local authorities and
yet our concern for its misuse, we would support Congressional action
that would allow EPA to grant requests for information on a restricted
basis. This would allow local emergency planners, fire and emergency
services professionals and citizens within a given community to obtain
this important information without creating a one-stop ``targeting
tool.'' It is important that any amendment be tailored to meet this
specific situation and not grant blanket exceptions to a citizen's
``right-to-know.''
In conclusion, I would like to restate the key points I have made
today.
1. The Offsite Consequence Analysis--or ``worst case'' scenario--is
very valuable information for fire and emergency service responders. It
is vital for our planning purposes.
2. The FBI has clearly stated that it believes the OCA data of the
Risk Management Plans when, placed on the internet, would provide a
targeting tool for persons or groups planning criminal or terrorist
acts.
3. We request that Congress review the current situation and act to
ensure that community ``right-to-know'' is maintained in a manner
consistent with appropriate security measures.
Thank you for allowing the International Association of Fire Chiefs
to explain its concerns to you today. I will be available to respond to
any questions you may have.
Mr. Upton. Well, let me just say that, as chairman of this
subcommittee, I appreciate my first panel living up to the
rules of our committee by submitting your testimony in advance.
Not all the panels have done that today, but at least the very
first panel has. And I know that I and other members of this
subcommittee appreciated receiving that, as I read through all
of your testimony last night and prepared some questions.
My intention is to have a 5-minute rule here. Each of us
will share, between Republican and Democratic side, a chance to
ask 5 minutes of questions. And, hopefully, we will not be
interrupted by votes.
But let me just say in terms of my 5 minutes--and the
timekeeper is working--that I think most of the members here on
this committee are probably members of the largest caucus in
the House, that being the Fire caucus. I have had the chance,
myself, to ride with departments back in Michigan, as well as
here in Washington, and I have a firefighter relative; my
sister-in-law is a firefighter in Colorado and I know very well
the hazards that she undertakes. And, I appreciate all of your
testimony for sure.
I guess my first question is--I look sort of at Chief
Eversole and Mr. Monihan--do you feel that, in your roles and
the departments that you have helped lead, that the
firefighters and folks responsible for emergency response have
a good understanding of the communities that they represent
without moving to the Internet? Is that a--has that been a
focus of their role, whether it be in a large community or a
small?
Mr. Eversole. Sir, truthfully, I think that that varies
from community to community. In some communities, they work
very hard and diligently to understand the big problem that is
in their community, to understand the risks that are in their
communities. And others have not been able to do such a good
job, primarily, because the LEPC's was an unfunded mandate. And
there is many places that--in my city, as big as it is, we
basically borrowed manpower, equipment, and everything else to
make it work. And it is very difficult to find the funding that
we would like to see to accurately do that.
And I think that the EPA could be a significant help to use
in helping local communities build their LEPC's to where they
were actually intended by EPA regulation.
Mr. Upton. Mr. Monihan.
Mr. Monihan. In the smaller communities--basically the same
thing as Chief Eversole just said is the case. In some places,
they are well-aware of what is in their community; other
places, not so. And I can't give you any kind of a reasoning
behind that.
In my own community, if you have heard of Maalox, Lewes is
where it starts, because magnesium oxide is extracted from
seawater at Lewes by a company, and some of the materials they
use are extremely caustic. We are aware of all these, but we
are fortunate; some other places are not.
It is really hit and miss across the country; it really it.
Mr. Upton. Mr. Blitzer, I understand through staff that you
might be prepared to talk about a planned bombing of a chemical
facility in Texas that you are aware of. And before you do, I
would like to--in my district just a couple of weeks ago, we a
couple of individuals convicted of trying to blow up a major
intersection, I-94, which crosses the State of Michigan, with
131, which is the north-south route which goes up to Grand
Rapids. Thank goodness, we were able to prevent that from
happening. And, as I understand it, these two individuals were
going to do that to divert the attention of the local law
enforcement so that they could cause quite a bit of damage and
had a couple of people on an assassination target, including
one of our Senators from Michigan, and a couple of other folks.
And, I would just like you to maybe relate some of the story
that I understand you are prepared to tell about Texas with a
chemical facility.
Mr. Blitzer. I would be glad to talk a little bit about
that.
Mr. Upton. Could you speak in the mic----
Mr. Blitzer. Yes.
Mr. Upton. [continuing] just a little closer, too.
Mr. Blitzer. Because that case is adjudicated. Everyone has
been convicted; they are in jail.
Essentially, what we had was a very fast moving
investigation of a Ku Klux Klan--and I think the minority
mentioned this this morning--a case we called the ``Sour Gas
case'' at the Bureau. And during that investigation, we learned
that this group, in order to appropriate money, had planned to
blow up a chemical facility, what they thought was a very
caustic chemical facility. And, they really didn't care how
many people were injured during that particular event because
they wanted it to cover an armored car robbery. But fortunately
for us, one of the people involved began to talk to us, and we
were able to prevent that before it occurred. I think that is
an important concept.
Someone mentioned--I think Mr. Burr--prevention; prevention
is so important in these cases, and the ability to prevent is
something that we always just can't do. It is difficult.
So, that was the case, and, certainly, a case to think
about.
As I mentioned in my testimony, there is a growth of
intelligence out there on these major cases that many of us
have lived through. And, the intelligence world--sometimes it
is good; sometimes it is not so good. And as we are looking
ahead--and I think this is what we tried to do between EPA and
the Bureau--we tried to look ahead. We tried to think about;
what are the possibilities?
We hear people out there in the terrorism world talking
about weapons of mass destruction, chemical and bio; we are
concerned about that. And I know in the recent testimony of the
Director and the Attorney General, they both touched very
heavily on this and a lot of the work that it has been doing,
fully supported by Congress, to prevent and deter this kind of
activity in our Nation. These are good targets.
And, so I just offer that as a response.
Mr. Upton. I appreciate that.
My time has expired.
I recognize the gentleman from Ohio, Mr. Brown.
Mr. Brown. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Gablehouse, there appears to be an impression that
``worst case scenario'' data and perhaps chemical quantity data
is somehow more attractive to terrorists than information that
is currently available to the public through SARA Title III or
State public right-to-know laws. Is that your impression?
Mr. Gablehouse. No, sir, it is not. In fact, I believe the
``worst case scenario'' portion of a risk management plan would
provide nobody with enough information to actually cause an
incident. ``Worst case scenarios'' are fundamentally
theoretical events; they can be calculated without reference to
almost any information about the actual physical configuration
of a facility.
I can obtain, today, quantity information on major
facilities handling extremely hazardous substances under the
Emergency Planning Community Right-To-Know Program. Many States
had that database available on their Internet servers, or you
can get it through various State access laws.
If I look at literature searches that can be conducted
today, I can find facilities that are a matter of great concern
in their community. I can find facilities that have experienced
accidents.
The research I spoke about during my testimony is conducted
based on the information available now. RMP information is not
there nor posted, but I can discover information about
chemicals. I can get into various databases, both private and
public, in the Internet and obtain information about location
of facilities in relationship to schools and other matters.
There is, you know, a great tendency to fill vacuums in
this country, and there is enough concern over chemical risks
and these sorts of hazards that various groups had filled those
vacuums. And, there is a great deal of information out there
today.
I do not believe that the risk management plan information,
will significantly increase a risk and misuse of that
information, even though it will serve to provide some
certainty and detail.
Mr. Brown. Thank you.
You had said at the beginning of your testimony that a good
many communities do not have functional local emergency
planning committees; correct?
Mr. Gablehouse. That is correct.
Mr. Brown. There seems to be little dispute that the local
emergency planning committee should have access to ``worst case
scenario'' information, even on the Internet. But, as you know,
there is a dispute over how the community at large should
receive this information.
A witness who will testify in a later panel suggested that
all ``worst case scenario'' information, as well as chemical
quantity information, be obtained by the community or the
facility, itself--the community through the planning committee
or the facility, itself. Does this give adequate access to the
information for the community, particularly when there is not a
functional local emergency planning committee, as you
suggested?
Mr. Gablehouse. There are many communities in the part of
the world I am familiar with--which is the mountain west--that
will not have access to information under that approach. We do
not have large companies that are able to help organize and
create local LEPC's in a variety of areas. If we have States
that don't participate in disseminating the information, you
are basically looking at local folks who are worried about
these issues--be they firefighters or citizens, or the planning
department of a local county or city worried about zoning
issues--that will have a great deal of difficulty in getting
access to this information unless there is some mechanism for
broad dissemination.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Upton. Thank you.
I recognize the chairman of the full Health and
Environmental Subcommittee, Mr. Bilirakis, from Florida.
Mr. Bilirakis. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
The words ``common sense'' have been mentioned here this
morning a few times. I would like to think they should pervade
all of us in terms of this situation, and every situation, I
might add, but certainly this situation.
I think I am convinced, based on what you people have said
and based on what I have known prior even to the hearing, that
the need for communities to be able to compare their ``worst
case scenario'' data with that of other communities across the
country is there. That makes sense to me, and, obviously,
Internet access is the easiest way to accomplish that goal.
But I think we have to ask ourselves, again, in a common-
sense way, is it the only way? Aren't there other ways we can
accomplish that beneficial goal without making this sensitive
data also available to terrorists all around the globe? And
that is a question that is just hanging there. And I think
Chief Eversole somewhat addressed it in his own way, a much
better way than I could.
Mr. Gablehouse, you stated in your testimony that you
applaud--I am not sure you used that word--but you applaud, you
supported the EPA's decision to not post this information on
the Internet; is that correct?
Mr. Gablehouse. I said I supported it, sir.
Mr. Bilirakis. Yes; you support it; right? You don't
applaud it, you support it?
Well, if you don't think EPA should put it on the Internet,
should it be on the Internet? EPA shouldn't put it on the
Internet, but should someone else be able to put it on the
Internet? Is it wise; is it good sense? Is it a good idea to
put it on the Internet? For someone to put it on the Internet,
whether it be EPA or whether it be whoever?
Mr. Gablehouse. I think the most important point to make
here, sir, is that regardless of the actions of this
subcommittee or EPA or anybody else, information will be put on
the Internet to fill a vacuum.
We have a choice; we can put information on the Internet
that promotes meaningful conversations in communities about
risk reduction, risk management, or we can allow speculation
and guesswork to fill that vacuum.
In my experience, credibility is important, and credibility
in those conversations I believe requires having reliable and
meaningful information available broadly to folks and the
people out there.
Mr. Bilirakis. All right. You have kind of danced around
the question, and I am not necessarily going to let you off the
hook there, because it is important that we know. First of all,
I am impressed with you. Diana DeGette is very impressed with
you; she gave you quite an introduction. And, I think it is
important that we know what your feeling is on this subject.
You talk about credibility. I like to think that Mr.
Monihan and Chief Eversole have some credibility, as well as
virtually everybody who is going to testify after this panel.
If State and local governments, communities, were given
access to all of the national RMP data through a secure,
Government-only Internet server, would that satisfy the
community right-to-know need?
Mr. Gablehouse. I have said I support EPA's decision not to
post offsite consequence information because my assumption is
that it will be available through some mechanism, either secure
or otherwise, to local governments, to States, to the agencies
that need this information for planning and other purposes. I
certainly support that; I think that is the appropriate way to
disseminate it in a practical matter.
As I pointed out to you, though, before, LEPC's are
creatures of the citizens that populate them. If we were all
served by the Chicago Fire Department Hazardous Materials Unit,
or if all the businesses in our areas were just CMA or National
Association of Manufacturers businesses that understand how to
deal with these problems, the concern of the citizens would be
much less.
In order to maintain credibility, LEPC's need to have
access. LEPC's are, in fact, creatures of the people that
populate them. Okay?
Membership is a very ad hoc sort of thing. I have almost 30
members on my LEPC of all different stripes and sorts. It is
very difficult, I think, to segregate.
Mr. Bilirakis. All right; so you can't directly respond
then to my last question--which I don't think is a very
difficult one? It is not as difficult as maybe the first one
regarding a secured Government-only Internet server, something
that could be expanded, if you will, to maybe to additional
groups other than communities, such as State and local
governments, et cetera.
Mr. Gablehouse. I am sorry; I didn't mean not to directly
respond. In fact, I would think that that is an acceptable
approach. However, I think there are other acceptable
approaches, and I believe the Agency is working with the other
agencies to try to identify those approaches.
But one thing I want to suggest to you is I don't think
there is any magic in a secure server sort of approach. Who is
going to discriminate between who ought to be allowed to get
access and who ought not be allowed to get access? I mean I
think that the implementation of that approach is the problem.
Mr. Bilirakis. Would you be willing to work with this
committee in helping us craft some sort of an approach if one
is necessary?
My time is up.
Mr. Gablehouse. Very happy to.
Mr. Bilirakis. Thank you.
Mr. Upton. Gentleman's time is up.
Mr. Stupak is next. Would you prefer to now for 5 minutes,
then, we will adjourn for the vote and come back?
Okay; the gentleman is recognized for 5 minutes, and when
you are done, we will break for the vote.
Mr. Stupak. Thank you.
I would like to bring us back to the focus here of this
hearing on are ``worst case scenarios'' for community planners
under section 112(r) of the Clean Air Act.
Under section 112(r), it talks about chemicals or
substances that are extremely hazardous and that will cause
greatest potential risk to human health. In fact, I believe
they are called, ``toxic endpoints.'' And the point I want to
make; does anyone know of the World Trade Center having--Mr.
Blitzer, I think you brought it up. Did they have toxic
endpoints they were releasing?
Mr. Blitzer. What that had, Mr. Stupak, was they found a
quantity of cyanide at the----
Mr. Stupak. No, no. Mr. Blitzer, maybe I didn't make my
question clear.
Mr. Blitzer. I am sorry.
Mr. Stupak. Before the bombing----
Mr. Blitzer. Okay.
Mr. Stupak. [continuing] did they have toxic endpoints
being released from the World Trade Center?
Mr. Blitzer. I don't think so.
Mr. Stupak. How about Oklahoma bombing? Did they have--that
building, the Murrah Building, did they have toxic endpoints
being released?
Mr. Blitzer. I am sorry; I couldn't hear.
Mr. Stupak. Sure.
The Murrah Building, the Oklahoma bombing building----
Mr. Blitzer. Right.
Mr. Stupak. [continuing] did they have toxic endpoints
being released?
Mr. Blitzer. I don't know. I mean I really don't know.
Mr. Stupak. Okay.
So, when we use those examples, that is not the examples
they are talking about under section 112(r); are they:
Mr. Blitzer. They are not, but they are mass casualty
examples that I though I should mention.
Mr. Stupak. Well, wait a minute, though. You are not
telling us that every building--because every building could be
subject to a terrorist attack; right?
Mr. Blitzer. Yes.
Mr. Stupak. So, you are telling me every building, under
section 112(r), has to have the ``worst case scenario'' for
something that might happen?
I mean section 112(r) is really after 100 chemicals and
substances that are highly dangerous to human health. In fact,
we list them: ammonia, hydrogen sulfide--that I mentioned. That
is what we are looking for; right?
Mr. Blitzer. Right.
Mr. Stupak. So, the facilities that come under section 112
are not World Trade buildings----
Mr. Blitzer. No, they are not----
Mr. Stupak. [continuing] or Federal courthouses?
Mr. Blitzer. [continuing] but they are facilities that down
the road may be a potential target.
Mr. Stupak. Well, anything is; right?
Mr. Blitzer. Sure.
Mr. Stupak. My house could be. This building could be.
Mr. Blitzer. Could be.
Mr. Stupak. So, the point is; what we are trying to do here
is deal with chemical and substances----
Mr. Blitzer. I understand that.
Mr. Stupak. [continuing] that are being released in the
community; right?
Mr. Blitzer. I understand that, but----
Mr. Stupak. Well, don't you think it is disingenuous to use
the Oklahoma building and the World Trade----
Mr. Blitzer. I don't think it is. I mean----
Mr. Stupak. It is or is not?
Mr. Blitzer. I don't think it is because, again, as I tried
to explain in my testimony, we had no warning before those
events happened. They were attractive targets for terrorists.
And, as we discussed these very issues for the law enforcement
and intelligence community and when they were brought to us by
EPA, we talked about these things----
Mr. Stupak. Yes, I agree with you.
Mr. Blitzer. We talked about these things being potential
targets.
Mr. Stupak. But these are also public buildings; right?
Mr. Blitzer. They are public buildings.
Mr. Stupak. Okay; so the balance we are trying to strike
here is for public right-to-know what is going on in their
communities that could be potentially hazard--not what if, but
are actually going on in their communities and are producing
substances that may be harmful to public health. And, that is
what the firefighters and the emergency medical people, and the
police need in case something does happen at these places that
are every day producing these chemicals----
Mr. Blitzer. Right.
Mr. Stupak. [continuing] which could be, either through
intentional or accidental release----
Mr. Blitzer. Right.
Mr. Stupak. [continuing] a threat to human health.
Mr. Blitzer. I understand that.
Mr. Stupak. Okay.
Mr. Blitzer. And I also----
Mr. Stupak. Yes; I just want to make sure we keep our focus
on what we are trying to do here. All these other things about
World Trade Centers and Oklahoma are really sort of not really
connected here until after something may happen. And I think we
can say that with any building, public or private, that
something may happen.
Correct?
Mr. Blitzer. Well, I go back to what I said. I look at
that; I look at the threat atmosphere, and we tried to give you
a good assessment.
Mr. Stupak. Okay. Well, even the chairman's situation of I-
94 and a possible----
Mr. Blitzer. Right.
Mr. Stupak. [continuing] assassination attempt on the
people really has nothing to do--they are not going to be
required to do a ``worst case scenario'' on a I-94----
Mr. Blitzer. I don't know, but I think it is an example of
the potential kinds of threats that are out there. A wide
spectrum----
Mr. Stupak. [continuing] little something----
Mr. Blitzer. I know, but I think it is an example of the
potential kinds of threats that are out there on a the wide
spectrum.
Mr. Stupak. Clean Air Act of 1990 talked about chemicals
and gas releases----
Mr. Blitzer. Right.
Mr. Stupak. [continuing] and things that we need to know in
our everyday life.
Mr. Blitzer. Right.
Mr. Stupak. And we all know that terrorism is out there.
Mr. Blitzer. Right.
Mr. Stupak. But do we start doing section 112(r)'s for
everything that exists?
Mr. Blitzer. No; I don't think we do section 112(r) for
everything.
Mr. Stupak. Okay.
Mr. Blitzer. I really don't; but these were, again,
examples of the kinds of events that can take place. And I
think in the threat atmosphere we are in today, we have to be
cognizant of it. We tried to deal with these things in the law
enforcement and intelligence community as we were assessing
the----
Mr. Stupak. And as we do it, let us be objective here, and
let us not play ``Chicken Little'' and ``the sky is going to
fall on our heads'' unless we do 112(r)'s for everything that
moves.
Mr. Blitzer. Well, I am trying to give you what is reality,
what it is realistic assessment, based upon a lot of things
that myself and others have been through over the last 10
years. It has been difficult----
Mr. Stupak. So, the reality is--and we will take your word
for it--the best we know is maybe one chemical plant may have
been subject to a planned terrorist attack, as you said, to get
at some armored car----
Mr. Blitzer. Right.
Mr. Stupak. To further some political agenda?
Mr. Blitzer. Right.
Mr. Stupak. So, that is the reality? Is one place----
Mr. Blitzer. That is the reality right now.
Mr. Stupak. Okay. And it never occurred? I mean--it was
foiled before it happened?
Mr. Blitzer. Because we got them.
Mr. Stupak. Right.
Mr. Blitzer. That is right.
Mr. Stupak. Okay; thank you.
Mr. Upton. Thank you, Mr. Stupak.
We will return when--there may be a final passage vote
after this; we are not quite sure. But we will return after
these votes.
[Brief recess.]
Mr. Upton. You might close those doors. People take their
seats. We are sorry; members are a little tardy. We ended up
having a couple of votes, and so we thought it was best
interest not to run back and forth more than once or twice.
I know that my good colleague from Colorado is here, and so
I think we will resume in just a moment.
I will ask unanimous consent to enter into the record two
letters; one from the city of New York Police Department to
Chairman Bliley and the other one from the International
Association of Chiefs of Police, again, to Mr. Bliley, the
chairman.
Without objection, we will enter those in the record.
[The information referred to follows:]
The City of New York Police Department,
New York, N.Y. 10038,
February 9, 1999.
Honorable Thomas E. Bliley
Chairman, Committee on Commerce
House of Representatives
Washington, D.C. 20515
Dear Mr. Chairman: On behalf of Police Commissioner Howard Safir, I
am writing to express the concern of the New York City Police
Department regarding the dangerous consequences of a contemplated
public dissemination of information regarding facilities maintaining
hazardous chemicals.
The Environmental Protection Agency's obligation to collect and
publicly disseminate ``Risk Management Plans,'' pursuant to the Clean
Air Act, must be reconsidered in light of the very real threat that
terrorists might use this information to target attacks throughout the
United States. Specific information contained in the ``Offsite
Consequence Analysis,'' including worst case scenarios, provides those
with criminal intent the means to calculate the most catastrophic
consequences to an attack and plan accordingly.
New York City has already experienced the horror of a terrorist
attack specifically designed to destroy as many lives as possible, the
bombing of the World Trade Center. It is inconceivable that the federal
government would be placed in the position of publishing on the
Internet what amounts to an invitation to terrorists to select sites
with the most devastating potential consequences. We submit that the
legislative intent behind the Clean Air Act and the Freedom of
Information Act does not mandate unfettered public knowledge where the
risk to public safety is so great.
We are advised of efforts on the part of the Federal Bureau of
Investigation to work with the EPA to strike a balance between public
safety and public knowledge. We applaud those efforts, but would also
urge a comprehensive legislative solution, amending the Clean Air Act
to explicitly prohibit public dissemination of Risk Management Plans
except to state and local government agencies. In this way, those
responsible for public safety may utilize necessary data for strategic
planning without compromising the very security sought to be
established.
Thank you for your interest and for the opportunity to comment on
this very critical issue.
Sincerely,
George A. Grasso,
Deputy Commissioner, Legal Matters.
______
International Association of Chiefs of Police,
Alexandria, VA 22914-2357,
February 3, 1999.
The Honorable Thomas Bliley
Chairman, Committee on Commerce
U.S. House of Representatives
Washington, D.C. 20515
Dear chairman Bliley: As President of the International Association
of Chiefs of Police (IACP), I am writing to express my concern over the
Environmental Protection Agency's (EPA) plan to publish worst case
scenario accident information pertaining to industrial chemical
facilities in the United States.
It is vitally important that local authorities be provided with
detailed, accurate information regarding chemical industrial facilities
in their communities. Only by knowing the threat that they face can
local law enforcement and other emergency services agencies prepare a
response plan which will allow their personnel to respond effectively
if necessary.
However, I am extremely concerned that making this same information
available for widespread distribution will provide terrorist
organizations with a ``target list'' of facilities in the United
States. While I understand the desire of the EPA to inform citizens
about the risks they face from chemical facilities in their
communities, this desire must be tempered by the reality that this
information could be used by those who wish to harm the very citizens
the EPA is trying to inform. In my opinion, the decision to release
this information should be left to the local authorities who are in the
best position to determine the needs of their communities.
It is my hope that a solution to this problem can be developed
which satisfies both the concerns of law enforcement and the public we
are sworn to protect.
Thank you for your attention to this matter.
Sincerely,
Ronald S. Neubauer,
President.
Mr. Upton. And at this point, we will recognize the
gentlelady from Colorado, Ms. DeGette, for 5 minutes.
Ms. DeGette. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I would just like to note that even though I am on
crutches, I got back here before any other members, except----
Mr. Upton. You did very well, and we will not take that
away from your time.
Ms. DeGette. Thank you.
First of all, I would like to ask a question of Mr.
Blitzer, because the scenario you describe is a scenario that
we all relive a lot in our worst nightmares. And I think it is
a real concern that we all have of these chemical facilities
being blown up by terrorists, either as in your situation, a
cover for another operation or just----
Mr. Blitzer. Just to do it.
Ms. DeGette. [continuing] purely for terrorism.
Mr. Blitzer. Yes.
Ms. DeGette. But the thing that I am wondering, given all
of the information that is on the Internet, is why you think
that this particular EPA regulation would worsen the situation?
Mr. Blitzer. Well, I think the basic feeling--and this just
wasn't me--this was----
Ms. DeGette. I am sorry, I can't hear you.
Mr. Blitzer. This just wasn't me; this was an interagency
discussion with intelligence services, as well as the Bureau
and other law enforcement agencies. This is one of a number of
potential targets out there. We are a target-rich environment
here in the United States. And for us, putting a ``worst case
scenario'' on the Internet was of concern because we felt, in
our assessment, that you could be sitting in Beirut, you could
be sitting Pakistan, you could be sitting literally anywhere in
the world and get some pretty significant targeting
information.
Ms. DeGette. Well, do you agree that much of this
information is available on the Internet now?
Mr. Blitzer. You know, I really don't know. During the time
I was discussing this particular issue, I was really focused
on----
Ms. DeGette. Okay.
Mr. Blitzer. [continuing] the ``worst case scenario.''
Ms. DeGette. I mean I think that is the kind of information
that would be useful to have, to see what this particular
regulation, how that would foster it.
Mr. Blitzer. I----
Ms. DeGette. Well, let me turn--I only have 5 minutes so--
--
Mr. Blitzer. I am sorry.
Ms. DeGette. [continuing] let me turn quickly----
Mr. Blitzer. Go ahead.
Ms. DeGette. [continuing] to a couple of other follow-up
questions.
Mr. Gablehouse, are there currently any Federal
requirements that facilities prepare risk management plans or
``worst case scenarios?''
Mr. Gablehouse. For Federal facilities or for in general?
Ms. DeGette. In general.
Mr. Gablehouse. Not specifically, no; although many LEPC's
ask for scenario information from facilities now. My LEPC, for
example, does that, as do many in Colorado, ask for scenario
information.
Ms. DeGette. So, a facility, if they have done this kind of
plan so far, they have either done it because of a local
requirement or voluntarily; is that right?
Mr. Gablehouse. If it exists today, for the most part, that
is correct.
Ms. DeGette. Okay.
So it seems to me that whatever a local emergency planning
committee might have received prior to this point, would be
difficult to utilize in terms of consistency from one facility
to another or one State to another, in terms of credibility.
Does that seem accurate?
Mr. Gablehouse. Absolutely accurate. The great advantage is
credibility.
Ms. DeGette. And so, do you think the risk management plans
required under section 112(r) will provide more consistency and
creditable information for planning purposes across
jurisdictional lines?
Mr. Gablehouse. Absolutely.
Ms. DeGette. Let me go a little further and follow up on
something that Mr. Bilirakis asked you. If you can tell me,
from a local perspective, why a local emergency planning
committee would want information from another State or
locality? Why is it that we need a Federal solution to
something that has been happening to some extent within local
or State governments?
Mr. Gablehouse. Two primary reasons. The first one is to
educate ourselves on what other communities are doing. As I
said during my testimony, if the whole world were the CMA
Association and large fire departments, it would be less of an
issue. But we have companies that don't understand how to do
this. We need to make ourselves smart, and accessed information
in other communities is the way you do that.
The other thing we need to do is verify the information we
are obtaining. We need to understand whether or not companies
owned by the same people in various States are telling the
local folks the same story in all those locations.
We also need to compare companies handling certain kinds of
chemicals should have similar sorts of scenarios, similar sorts
of prevention plans in other communities. It is good for us to
be able to compare what we are doing in our community to
similar communities with those kind of facilities.
So, there are a lot of reasons where it would be useful to
have that kind of information.
Ms. DeGette. If I may, just one more ``yes'' or ``no''
question, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Upton. Yes, you may have an extra minute.
Ms. DeGette. Thank you.
Do you think that to get that information that you think
would be useful we would need to amend the Freedom of
Information Act?
Mr. Gablehouse. No.
Ms. DeGette. Thank you.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Upton. Thank you.
The gentlelady from Wyoming, Ms. Cubin.
Ms. Cubin. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I would like to address my first question to Mr. Blitzer.
When you were in the FBI, did you review and discuss if you
could legally withhold--no, excuse me. Did you discuss with
others in the administration the question of FOIA and third act
says--I keep losing my place. Will you forgive me?
Mr. Blitzer. That is all right. I understand.
Ms. Cubin. And third-party access to ``worst case
scenario'' information?
Mr. Blitzer. Yes. We did discuss it, and at both the--with
the Department of Justice and with the EPA Legal Counsel. I
think it is in my testimony. And I am not sure that it was--the
kind of information in the ``worst case scenario'' could be
provided, given an appropriate FOIA request, which is a concern
for all us.
Ms. Cubin. Well, what advice did you receive?
Mr. Blitzer. At this point----
Ms. Cubin. Could you legally withhold the information?
Mr. Blitzer. At this point, if it came in, there was
nothing we could do because the law is on the books, and it
would be provided.
Ms. Cubin. But could you legally withhold the information?
Mr. Blitzer. I don't think we could.
Ms. Cubin. Okay. Also, is it true that the FBI--or that the
EPA sought the FBI's advice before it announced that its
proposal to post this information on the Internet?
Mr. Blitzer. It did; yes.
Ms. Cubin. And what was the advice from the FBI to the EPA
at that time?
Mr. Blitzer. Well, that is what really began the chain of
events which ended up in a lot of interagency discussion and
recommendations not to put the ``worst case scenario'' on.
Ms. Cubin. But they did go ahead with that for awhile,
right? Then----
Mr. Blitzer. I don't recall that. I don't know if--I don't
remember that.
Ms. Cubin. Okay. Do you feel that--well, then, if you don't
recall that, I don't think that follow-up question----
Mr. Blitzer. Yes.
Ms. Cubin. So, I would like to address this question to Mr.
Gablehouse.
I will grant from your testimony that all small communities
don't have--you know, I am from Wyoming; I represent the State
of Wyoming, and we don't have specialists in our towns of 100
people or 150 people to deal with this. And so I would grant
that there needs to be some way to dispense this information to
those communities. I absolutely know because I represent the
whole State of Wyoming, that the communities have the desire,
the will, and would gather that information. And I think that
it is possible to get it from sources other than the Internet,
and I believe that those people would. In fact, I would say
those small communities are threatened less, obviously, than
larger communities. But, I can't see why--I just can't
understand why you don't think that there is any jeopardy--
because to me, common sense says there is jeopardy by
releasing--by allowing this to be on the Internet, whether it
is released by the EPA or somebody else.
Mr. Gablehouse. Well, I do believe that the compromise that
EPA has reached by deciding not to post the offsite consequence
information is appropriate to address that concern.
I spend quite a bit of time in Wyoming dealing with the
local emergency planning committees in various places, recently
in Rock Springs and Lovell, for example. I think that the
people in those communities do want the information; they do
want to have access. Getting that kind of access and comparing
themselves to other communities is difficult, absent an
information source like the Internet. It is very difficult to
know who to get on the phone, to call, to talk to, to try to
get it. The Internet has proven to be a useful means of
acquisition of broad kinds of information.
You have also got in Wyoming, a lot of LEPC's that have
collected around them interested people of various stripes who
are interested in different sub-pieces of this problem. I think
the Internet is a very useful way for them to get that
information.
During my earlier testimony, I said I think that EPA has
struck a reasonable balance here. I think that the
administrative approaches to maintaining control over and
management of the information are appropriate, and I think the
Agency intends to continue to do that.
Ms. Cubin. Chief Eversole, then, you mentioned in your
testimony that your concern is the one-stop nature of Internet
dissemination of this information. Could you elaborate on that
a little bit? Because it seems to me that that is related to
what we just heard.
Mr. Eversole. Ma'am, I think that there is a lot of ways to
get information that are much more reasonable than putting it
on the Internet. In our LEPC, we regularly cleanse Freedom of
Information requests for things like the plant manager's home
telephone number. I think you are going to find a lot more
problems getting that kind of information if he knows that his
home telephone number goes all over the world. That information
is available. Earlier there had been a discussion about a
secured system, where an LEPC anywhere could contact another
LEPC or go right back to the Government and say, ``I need to
know about all of these kind of plants.''
You see, you are gathering a database that has never been
gathered before in this country. And there is some tremendous
information of significant importance. I just want to make sure
it is used for the right purposes, and not for some
catastrophic use by a person of different thinking.
Ms. Cubin. One real quick one, Mr. Chairman.
And this is for Mr. Blitzer. The opponents of your position
say that there is no evidence that terrorist attacks on these
type of facilities is a problem or that there is no evidence
that----
Mr. Blitzer. Right.
Ms. Cubin. [continuing] there is any greater chance of
risk. Will you just respond to that briefly?
Mr. Blitzer. Yes; I think one of the things that we have to
look at, as we are looking into the future, is that we have had
a series of mass casualty attacks since the beginning of 1989.
There is great concern, even in the White House, about
protecting our critical infrastructure of which, frankly, these
facilities are part. And as you look into the future--mass
casualty attacks, easy access, easy information--why would we
make it easier than it already is?
So I would say, again--and I think I mentioned this
earlier, or additionally--the lack of intelligence or the lack
of information doesn't really mean there isn't a threat out
there.
Ms. Cubin. So you would say that there is evidence----
Mr. Blitzer. I would say there is a threat.
Ms. Cubin. [continuing] that it creates a great risk.
Mr. Blitzer. And certainly, a great interest in chemical
and bio.
Ms. Cubin. Thank you.
Mr. Upton. Thank you.
The Chair would thank the witnesses for their testimony.
And the Chair would note that a number of members may have
additional questions for this panel which they may wish to
submit in writing. And, without objection, the normal process
is that the hearing record will remain open for 30 days for
members to submit written questions to you all and to place
their responses in the record.
And so, without objection, that will be ordered.
I want to thank all of you for your attendance today, for
your testimony as well. And I would also note that we are all
on a number of subcommittees and, with action on the floor, it
preempted a number of us from being here for the full time.
But, certainly, we appreciate the work that you have done and
look forward to hearing from you again.
You are dismissed.
At this time, I would like to call Mr. Robert Burnham,
Section Chief for Domestic Terrorism, National Security
Division of the FBI, and Mr. Tim Fields, Acting Assistant
Administrator, Office of Solid Waste and Emergency Response of
the EPA, forward.
I know you have been watching the testimony earlier today.
Sorry, we are a little delayed because of votes on the floor.
And I would ask each of you that, if you are aware that
this subcommittee is an investigative subcommittee, and, as
such, it has always had the long practice of taking testimony
under oath. Do you have any objection to such?
[Witnesses indicate no.]
The Chair would note the answer is, ``No.''
And I would advise each of you that, under the rules of the
House and the rules of this committee, you are entitled to be
advised by counsel. Do any of you desire to be advised by
counsel during your testimony today?
[Witnesses indicate no.]
Again, I would note, ``No.''
In that case, would you please rise and raise your right
hand?
[Witnesses sworn.]
Mr. Upton. Mr. Fields, why don't we start with you for 5
minutes. We will make sure that all of your testimony is
printed in the record, if you would like to summarize it. And,
please, don't take more than 5 minutes.
Thank you.
TESTIMONY OF TIMOTHY FIELDS, JR., ACTING ASSISTANT
ADMINISTRATOR, OFFICE OF SOLID WASTE AND EMERGENCY RESPONSE,
ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY; AND ROBERT M. BURNHAM, SECTION
CHIEF, DOMESTIC TERRORISM, NATIONAL SECURITY DIVISION, FEDERAL
BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
Mr. Fields. Mr. Chairman, and members of the subcommittees,
I am Tim Fields; I am responsible at EPA for managing the Risk
Management Planning Program under 112(r) of the Clean Air Act,
as well as being responsible for the Agency's Counterterrorism
Program and the associated coordination with other Federal
partners, State and local governments, and the private sector.
Under the RMP, or Risk Management Program, as mandated by
Congress, we are required to receive plans from 64,000
facilities by June 21, 1999. Those plans will describe how
those facilities will detect, prevent, or minimize releases of
hazardous substances and how those facilities will promptly
respond to any chemical accident due to those hazardous
chemicals. In addition, they will provide information about the
potential consequences of a ``worst case'' release and
alternative release scenarios.
Despite reports to the contrary, the information in these
reports does not include information that tells anyone how to
cause an accident; rather, the information describes the
effects of a possible accident on the surrounding population
and the environment.
Our primary concern in managing this congressional mandate
is to make sure that the public is served by providing
constructive environmental information while, at the same time,
making sure that appropriate national security concerns are
paramount.
For that reason, EPA and the FBI have already agreed that
the ``worst case scenario'' portion of this data will not be
made available on the Internet. All other RMP data will be made
available on the Internet. The RMP information that EPA
proposes to put on the Internet will not provide opportunities
for terrorists to target facilities.
EPA has been working with other Federal agencies to discuss
how to provide RMP data, including offsite consequence or
``worst case'' analysis data, to appropriate State and local
implementing agencies.
Based on our discussions, EPA will work with the other
Federal agencies, including the National Institute of Standards
and Technology to explore the feasibility of a ``closed''
system for sharing the OCA data with State and local government
partners.
Second, we will inform our State and local government
partners of EPA's decision not to post the OCA data on the
Internet and advise them on how they can maintain their data in
a secure way as well.
And, last, in working with State and locals, we will
explore the option of providing some State and local agencies
only that portion of the RMP data that is affecting those
facilities in their jurisdiction and immediate surrounding
jurisdictions that impact that State or local entity.
EPA is also working to identify places the local affected
public can go, to get local access to RMP data of interest to
them. EPA is considering options that include; using the
facilities themselves to provide the RMP data; State emergency
response commissions, local emergency planning committees; or
other organizations to identify local sources of RMP data. For
those citizens who call in, or write in and want the full
national database, EPA is exploring a variety of options to
assure that that information does not get posted on the
Internet, such as the possibility of a read-only computer disk
that could not be copied, duplicated, or posted on the
Internet. Software capable of providing this protection is in
the developmental stages; we are talking to firms now, and we
will work with the appropriate governmental and private experts
to determine the technical and legal feasibility of this
option.
In conclusion, EPA is not working independently as we
implement the Risk Management Planning Program. We will
continue to work with a variety of stakeholders, particularly,
the Federal national security organizations, as we implement
this program.
We are taking those steps that we believe are necessary to
ensure that offsite consequence analysis data are not posted on
the Internet. National security interests are paramount as we
carry out our congressional mandate on the 112(r) of the Clean
Air Act.
We believe that our job of protecting the American people
from risks posed by chemical-producing facilities includes
protecting them from the threat of terrorism as well. Our
future risk management planning implementation activities will
be carried out in close consultation with Federal national
security organizations.
Thank you very much for your time.
[The prepared statement of Timothy Fields, Jr. follows:]
Prepared Statement of Timothy Fields, Jr., Acting Assistant
Administrator for Solid Waste and Emergency Response, Environmental
Protection Agency
Mr. Chairman, and Members of the subcommittees, I am Tim Fields,
Acting Assistant Administrator in the Office of Solid Waste and
Emergency Response at the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency. My
office has primary responsibility for the Risk Management Program under
Section 112(r) of the Clean Air Act (CAA) and federal implementation of
several sections of the Emergency Planning and Community Right-to-Know
Act. I also am responsible for the Agency's counter terrorism program
and the associated coordination with other federal partners, State and
local governments, and the private sector.
I am pleased to have this opportunity to present information about
the importance of chemical safety, community right to know, and our
plan to balance these benefits with the continuing challenge of
protecting our nation's security.
In 1986, Congress enacted the first community right-to-know law
that gave citizens information to enable them to make decisions about
chemical hazards in their community. This law requires States to
establish State Emergency Response Commissions (SERCs) that, in turn,
appoint Local Emergency Planning Committees (LEPCs) to plan for
community responses to chemical accidents. The law also requires
facilities to report to the public, through the LEPC, their inventories
of hazardous chemicals and to participate in local emergency
preparedness efforts.
There are approximately 3,000 LEPCs throughout the country that act
as an ongoing forum for discussion and focus for action. Once citizens
know more about chemical hazards in their communities, the better
equipped they are to work with their local government to make decisions
and take actions that will better protect their families and their
neighbors from unacceptable risks.
Information Drives Action
As a result of chemical information being in public hands, we also
have seen a change in the way some facilities do business.
Public release of TRI data spurred facilities to voluntarily reduce
their emissions. For example, Occidental Chemical in Houston installed
a filtration system that reduced hazardous waste by 58 percent, while
in Dominguez, California, Rhone-Poulenc cut 75 percent of the sulfuric
acid wastewater going to the city treatment plant. Since the public
release of the first round of Toxic Release Inventories (TRI), reported
toxic chemical emissions have dropped by 50 percent.
The Emergency Planning and Community Right-To-Know Act enhanced
community planning and provided significant new information on chemical
handling and releases to the public. Because of chemical information
being available to the public, awareness of the potential danger from
accidental releases of hazardous chemicals has grown in communities
across the country and intensified further as a result of several major
accidents that resulted in the deaths of workers at plants, hundreds of
millions of dollars in property damage, and thousands of residents
evacuated from their homes. These accidents indicated a need for better
programs to prevent chemical releases.
In 1994, an explosion at a fertilizer production plant near Sioux
City, Iowa, killed four employees and injured 18 others. The blast
triggered an anhydrous ammonia release into the air, forcing the
evacuation of nearly 2,500 residents. An EPA investigation found that
the accident was caused by a lack of safe operating procedures and
safety practices. Interviews with employees indicated that they were
not aware of many of the hazards of ammonium nitrate, a chemical used
in the production of fertilizer, showing the continuing need for an
informed dialogue for safety.
Risk Management Program
Through passage of Section 112(r) of the CAA in 1990, Congress
recognized the need for facilities, such as the one in Iowa, to develop
or improve their planning and accident prevention programs in order to
prevent accidents. The law also recognized that citizens have a right
to know about the hazards these facilities present.
Under the chemical accident provisions of 112(r), facilities must
conduct hazard assessments, establish accident prevention programs, and
bolster emergency response planning. These requirements are implemented
by EPA's Risk Management Program regulations and are aimed at reducing
the likelihood and severity of chemical releases. Facilities that are
covered under these regulations must submit a Risk Management Plan or
RMP. Under the law, these plans, except for Confidential Business
Information, must be available to the public, the federal Chemical
Safety Board, and state and local officials involved in planning for
and responding to chemical emergencies.
Under EPA's regulatory requirements, by June 21, 1999, nearly
64,000 facilities that handle large quantities of very hazardous
chemicals will submit RMPs to EPA for the first time. In their RMPs,
facilities will describe how they will detect, prevent, or minimize
releases of hazardous substances and how they will promptly respond to
any chemical accident.
Facilities will report any serious accidental releases that have
occurred at their sites in the last five years and how they have
coordinated with local emergency responders. In addition, they will
provide information about the potential consequences of a worst-case
release and alternative release scenarios. Despite reports to the
contrary, the information in these reports does not include information
that tells anyone how to cause an accident. Rather, the information
describes the effects of a possible accident on the surrounding
population and the environment.
RMPs will improve chemical safety in two basic ways. First, they
will ensure that covered facilities identify and address the hazards
posed by their handling of very hazardous chemicals. Second, and
equally important, they will provide information to the public about
the risk of accidental releases and facilities' efforts to prevent and
mitigate any releases. The availability of RMPs is expected to
stimulate communication between industry, local governments, and the
public to improve accident prevention and emergency response practices.
Public opinion polls consistently show strong support for safety
and environmental protection. Section 112(r) is consistent with these
values and is one of several ``right-to-know'' laws that give citizens
the information they need to assess and promote public health and
environmental protection in their communities and across the nation.
Consistent with the purpose of Section 112(r), EPA provides
national leadership and assistance to communities so that they will
have the tools and expertise they need to receive, assimilate, and
analyze all chemical accident prevention data, and to take appropriate
measures to reduce accidental risk and toxic emissions at the local
level.
Electronic Submission/Access
To make information more useful, EPA was urged by stakeholders in
the chemical safety area to collect and distribute RMP information
electronically. Our experience with EPCRA implementation taught us that
this would not only be more efficient than paper submittals, but also
that it would improve data quality and allow State and local
governments to apply their limited program resources to use the
information to address chemical safety rather than to manage the data.
The Accident Prevention Subcommittee of the CAA Advisory Committee
(under the Federal Advisory Committee Act (FACA)) created the
Electronic Submission Workgroup in October 1996, comprised of 35
members representing State and local government, industry,
environmental and public interest groups, and EPA. The Workgroup was
charged with recommending how industry should submit their risk
management plans, and how EPA, State and local governments, and the
public should have access to this information.
The Workgroup completed its work in June 1997 with a final report,
which recommended that a data retrieval system be established to
provide access to RMPs for all stakeholders. The workgroup unanimously
agreed to make most of the RMP data available without restriction on
the Internet. However, the workgroup could not agree on whether the
Offsite Consequence Analysis, or OCA, data should be available on the
Internet. The OCA data includes information on a worst-case scenario
accident at a facility and estimates the area of a community and the
total population potentially affected by a release.
The Workgroup raised this issue to their parent Subcommittee, who
spent the next year and a half gathering data, evaluating the risks,
and debating the issue. In response to concerns about how EPA would
distribute the OCA portion of RMPs, the Agency continues to work with
appropriate agencies and interested parties to take reasonable steps
that would strike the appropriate balance between providing public
access to information about chemical risks and reducing the risk of
terrorism. On November 6, 1998, EPA announced that it would not post
the OCA data on the Internet; all other RMP information would be
available on the Web.
Balancing these risks continues to be a high priority and the EPA
is continuing to explore, with other relevant agencies, other means of
providing public access to OCA data that reduce the risk of terrorism.
EPA and the FBI have made great progress in this area.
Continuing Dialogue
In recent weeks, EPA has continued to meet with other Federal
agencies to discuss how to provide RMPs, including OCA data, to state
and local governments. Based on our discussions, EPA will:
Work with the National Institute of Standards and Technology
(NIST) to explore the feasibility of a ``closed'' system for
sharing the OCA data with State and local government agencies;
and
Inform our state and local government partners of EPA's
decision not to post OCA data on the Internet and strongly
encourage them to follow suit.
EPA is working with the RMP Implementation Workgroup of the
Accident Prevention Subcommittee to identify places the public can go
to get local access to RMP data of interest to them. The Subcommittee
is considering using the facilities themselves, the State Emergency
Response Commission, the Local Emergency Planning Committee (LEPC), or
other State and local government sources to identify local sources of
RMP data.
EPA also is discussing various ways to respond to public requests
for the national RMP database, including OCA data that balances the
public's right to know with the sensitivity of the data. Procedures EPA
will employ include:
Contacting each requestor to inquire whether the individual is
seeking the entire database and describing what information
already is publicly available, which is all RMP data except
OCA; and
Asking whether the RMP database without facility
identification information would suffice (researchers
interested in national trends, for example, may not require the
information).
For citizens who want the full national database, EPA is exploring
the possibility of a ``Read-only'' CD-ROM that could not be copied,
duplicated, or posted on the Internet. Software capable of providing
this kind of protection is in the development stage, and we will work
with appropriate governmental and private experts to determine its
technical and legal feasibility.
Conclusion
EPA is committed to providing citizens with RMP information that
will help them work with government and industry to protect themselves,
their families, and their communities from chemical accidents and to
make other informed decisions about their lives. EPA also is committed
to providing this information in a way that is responsible, and takes
into account the security concerns raised by the FBI and others. We
will continue to work with all interested parties to meet this
challenge.
Mr. Upton. Thank you, Mr. Fields.
Mr. Burnham.
TESTIMONY OF ROBERT M. BURNHAM
Mr. Burnham. Yes; Mr. Chairman, and members of the
committee, my name is Robert M. Burnham. I am the current
Domestic Terrorism Section Chief for the FBI, head of the
Domestic Terrorism/Counterterrorism Planning Section at FBI
Headquarters. My predecessor was just up here before, and that
was Mr. Blitzer. Prior to that, I served for 2 years--almost 2
years--as the Assistant Special Agent-in-Charge of the Memphis
Field Office.
As with Mr. Blitzer, my current responsibilities include
national oversight and management of the Domestic Terrorism
Operations, Weapons of Mass Destruction, and the Special Events
Management Programs.
I am pleased to have this opportunity to discuss the
potential effects of electronic dissemination of chemical
``worst case scenarios'' data.
The FBI is aware of the need to aggressively pursue
environmental crimes and fully supports the Clean Air Act and
the spirit of the community right-to-know legislation. We
understand the competing issues at stake here, between
providing the necessary information to community which allows
them to make informed decisions on local planning and
preparedness issues, and limiting the distribution of
information that can be used against those same communities in
a criminal manner.
The FBI has worked with the EPA to identify those sections
of the risk management plans, RMP's, that we believe can be
directly utilized as a targeting mechanism in a terrorist or
criminal attack. The FBI has recommended certain data from the
RMP, the ``worst case scenarios'' information, be distributed
via a secure electronic system to State and local government
agencies, and that the affected community be the final arbiter
of how to further disseminate the information in a manner
consistent with existing legislation.
On December 14, 1997, representatives of the FBI's Weapons
of Mass Destruction Operations Unit were invited to a meeting
at the EPA. It was that time that the FBI first became aware of
a plan by EPA to post the RMP, including the ``worst case
scenarios,'' also known as offsite consequence analysis, on the
Internet, in a searchable format. It was the FBI's
understanding that EPA believed this was the easiest and most
cost-effective method by which to comply with Federal
regulation which requires that RMP's be submitted to the EPA
and be made available to the public.
The FBI's representatives were, at first, unfamiliar with
the underlying legislation related to the RMP's. The FBI
representatives contacted other Federal law enforcement and
intelligence agencies, as well as the Environmental Crimes and
Terrorism and Violent Crimes Sections of the Department of
Justice to discuss issues raised by the EPA's Internet
distribution plans.
The FBI believes there are legitimate concerns about the
potential misuse of OCA data. Specifically, of great concern to
the FBI at that time, was a recent case that highlights the
potential danger associated with a criminal attack on a
chemical facility. I won't go into the details of that because
Mr. Blitzer has already addressed that. That is the Texas case.
It was actually code named ``Sour Gas.'' He has given the
details on that.
That was highlighted to point out that this was a real-life
incident, better than any other scenario we could create to
show or demonstrate how unfettered access to this information
could be used to facilitate a criminal or terrorist attack in
the U.S. because it was a chemical facility.
The FBI applauds the gains made in accident prevention and
chemical safety over recent years and encourages the
cooperation between industry and the communities that has
brought about this success. We believe that providing this
information to the communities in the appropriate manner
contributes to an increase in safety in those neighborhoods.
Through our discussion over the past year with EPA, other
Federal agencies, and affected parties, we have arrived at
recommendations we believe balance these concerns that gives
the communities, State and local agencies, and the academic and
research communities appropriate access to this information.
Those recommendations were provided to the committee in a
report submitted by the FBI in October of last year. However,
as EPA has discussed today, they have made no decisions on
those recommendations.
The FBI continues to work with EPA to assist in evaluating
these recommendations and will continue to participate in
discussions within the administration on a appropriate course
of action that balances the need to prevent criminal action
with the public's right to information.
Mr. Chairman, I thank you for the opportunity to appear
today, and I would be happy to answer any questions.
[The prepared statement of Robert M. Burnham follows:]
Prepared Statement of Robert M. Burnham, Chief, Domestic Terrorism
Section, Federal Bureau of Investigation
Good morning Mr. Chairmen and members of the Committee my name is
Robert M. Burnham, and I am the current Chief of the Domestic Terrorism
Section at FBI Headquarters. I previously served as the Assistance
Special Agent in Charge (ASAC) of the Memphis Field Office of the FBI.
I am pleased to have this opportunity to discuss the potential effects
of electronic dissemination of chemical ``worst case scenarios'' data.
The FBI is aware of the need to aggressively pursue environmental
crimes, and fully supports the Clean Air Act (CAA) and the spirit of
the Community Right to Know legislation. We understand the competing
issues at stake here, between providing the necessary information to
the community, which allows them to make informed decisions on local
planning and preparedness issues, and limiting the distribution of
information that can be used against those same communities in a
criminal manner. The FBI has worked with the EPA to identify those
sections of the Risk Management Plans (RMP) that we believe can be
directly utilized as a targeting mechanism in a terrorist or criminal
attack. The FBI has recommended that certain data from the RMP, the
``Worst Case Scenario'' information, be distributed via a secure
electronic system to state and local government agencies, and that the
affected community be the final arbiter of how to further disseminate
this information, in a manner consistent with existing legislation.
On December 14, 1997, representatives of the FBI's Weapon of Mass
Destruction Operations Unit (WMDOU) were invited to a meeting at the
EPA. It was at this time that the FBI first became aware of a plan by
EPA to post the RMP, including the ``Worst Case Scenarios''--also know
as the Offsite Consequence Analysis (OCA)--on the Internet, in a
searchable format. It was the FBI's understanding that EPA believed
this was the easiest and most cost effective method by which to comply
with federal regulation, which requires that the RMPs be submitted to
the EPA, and be made available to the public. The WMDOU representatives
were at first unfamiliar with the underlying legislation relating to
the RMPs. The WMDOU contacted other federal law enforcement and
intelligence agencies, as well as the Environmental Crimes and
Terrorism and Violent Crimes Sections of the Department of Justice, to
discuss issues raised by the EPA's Internet distribution plans.
The FBI believes there are legitimate law enforcement concerns
about the potential misuse of OCA data. Specifically, of great concern
to the WMDOU at the time, was a recent case that highlighted the
potential danger associated with a criminal attack on a chemical
facility. The FBI case, code named SOURGAS, involved four KKK members
who plotted to place an improvised explosive devise on a hydrogen
sulfide tank at a refinery near Dallas, Texas. The FBI was able to
infiltrate the group prior to the attack. A surveillance tape shows two
of the subjects discussing the potential death of hundreds of area
residents. At one point when the discussion turned to the children who
may have become victims, one subject turned to her husband and said
``if it has to be . . . it has to be''. This cold blooded killing was
to take place merely as a diversion for an armored car robbery the
group intended to commit on the other side of town.
This real life incident highlights better than any scenario we
could create, how worldwide unfettered access to this information could
be used to facilitate a criminal or terrorist attack in the U.S.
The FBI applauds the gains made in accident prevention and chemical
safety over recent years and encourages the cooperation between
industry and the communities that has brought about this success. We
believe that providing this information to the communities in the
appropriate manner contributes to an increase in safety in those
neighborhoods. Through our discussions over the past year with the EPA,
others federal agencies and affected parties, we have arrived at
recommendations which we believe balance these concerns and give the
communities, state and local agencies and the academic and research
communities, appropriate access to this information. Those
recommendations were provided to the committee in a report submitted by
the FBI in October of last year. However, as the EPA will discuss today
they have made no decisions on those recommendations. The FBI continues
to work with the EPA to assist in evaluating in these recommendations
and will continue to participate in discussions within the
Administration on an appropriate course of action that balances the
need to prevent criminal action with the public's right to information.
Mr. Chairmen, thank you for the opportunity to appear before you
today. I would be happy to attempt to answer any questions that you may
have.
Mr. Upton. Well, thank you both for coming up.
And when the first panel was here, all the participants
were able to submit their testimony in advance. You also set
the record that neither of you submitted your testimony within
the 24-hour notification. And, therefore, when I left the
office last night, I wasn't able to take your testimony home
with me.
And I know as a former OMB official, that was something
that we always worked hard on, to have a good relationship
with, then, Chairman Dingell to make sure that his testimony
was in advance.
And I would appreciate it if you would tell your superiors
down the line or the folks down at OMB that we would prefer not
to have that happen again. We wanted you to testify, for both
of you to participate. And, sadly, without the advance of your
testimony, it hurts us in terms of looking for some good
questions to digest this issue, as I am convinced that all of
the members on this subcommittee want to make sure that every
community is safe in the best possible way. And we have to, in
my view, have some type of balance in terms of what is
available and what is not.
And I guess, in that regard, Mr. Burnham--I know that as I
listened to your testimony today, it was the FBI that had heard
about a year ago, I guess it was, that the EPA was intending to
put this on the Internet. It is my sense, from your testimony,
that the FBI was very much opposed to the ``worst case
scenario'' data being put onto the Internet. And you were
successful--and based on Mr. Fields' testimony--to get EPA to
back off. Is that correct? Do I have the----
Mr. Burnham. That is correct. It is my understanding--
again, I wasn't here, but in reviewing everything, as part of,
as Mr. Blitzer has referred to--the interagency working group,
which had a number of intelligence agencies including, EPA, the
Department of Defense, the CIA, and others. We did object to
the OCA, ``worst case scenario'' information, going out
unfettered over the Internet and being released.
Mr. Upton. And the DOD and the CIA were in concurrence with
FBI?
Mr. Burnham. We are part of the working group.
Mr. Upton. Now my question, I guess for Mr. Fields is,
knowing that the EPA has pulled back or recognized the need not
to put the ``worst case scenario'' on the Internet, my question
to you--and which will last over to panel three--is if you
don't do it, are you opposed to having other third parties post
that information on the Internet?
Mr. Fields. Yes; I want to make clear that we definitely--
--
Mr. Upton. You are taking a position on that?
Mr. Fields. Right. We definitely oppose third parties
putting it--the OCA data--on the Internet. The other RMP data
we are obviously in support of, and the FBI, as well, has
supported it being on the Internet.
But the OCA portion of the database, we do not intend to
post it on the Internet, and we want to work with others to
ensure that they also do not post the nationwide OCA data on
the Internet.
So we intend to work with the FBI and other agencies to try
to make sure that does not occur. And the steps we are taking
in responding to the FBI and other recommendations are to
implement an RMP program that assures that ``worst case
scenarios'' are not available on the Internet. And that is the
advice we have gotten from the national security interests in
this country, and that is the advice we intend to carry out.
And we will work with others to try to ensure that within our
legal and technical capabilities.
Mr. Upton. Okay. I appreciate that, and I guess I may have
a question in a few moments, but I will recognize the gentleman
from Ohio, Mr. Brown.
Mr. Brown. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Fields, your degree is in industrial engineering, I
understand?
Mr. Fields. Yes, sir.
Mr. Brown. I know that doesn't make you necessarily a
terrorism expert, but given your background and your knowledge
of the specific information that will required in these ``worst
case scenarios,'' do you believe a terrorist will obtain
adequate information from these ``worst case scenarios'' to
know exactly how to sabotage a facility without need for
further information? Will the ``worst case scenarios,'' for
example, contain information on exact location of tanks, the
facility, those sorts of things which they might need to know?
Mr. Fields. The ``worst case scenario'' data will not tell
a terrorist how to cause an accident at an industrial facility.
The ``worst case scenario'' will include data about the largest
tank, for example, at a facility and the area of impact if that
tank happened to explode, the number of people that may be
impacted, but it would not tell that terrorist how to cause an
accident at that facility.
So, you are right in your questioning, which is that the
terrorist would have to need a lot more information than just
that to decide how to cause a terrorist event at that facility.
However, we do agree with the decision that we have made, which
is to not post it on the Internet, but a terrorist would have
to have more information than just that OCA portion of the
database.
Mr. Brown. But if it were posted on the Internet, it still
would not be sufficient information?
Mr. Fields. Not alone; that is correct.
Mr. Brown. Is there any database that tracks all industrial
accidents involving hazardous substances and, also, documents
the cause of each of those incidents?
Mr. Fields. We have several databases internally; we have
the National Response Center. I have been involved in emergency
response for about 15, 20 years at EPA, and we have several
databases that contain information about the number of
chemicals that get released a year; the National Response
Center. We have an emergency response notification system that
brings in data; we have an accidental release reporting system.
So, we have a lot of data systems that record chemical as well
as oil spill accidents that occur in this country annually,
what are some of the causes of these accidents, the quantities
that are being released, et cetera. So, we have quite a bit of
data on that.
Mr. Brown. Does it always, Mr. Fields--does it always
document the cause of each incident? Or----
Mr. Fields. Sometimes the causes are not always known or
are able to be found out, in terms of exactly why a particular
industrial accident did occur at a particular facility.
Mr. Brown. I assume, from other testimony, that from what
you have said and others, that there are significantly more
industrial accidents involving hazardous substances than
incidents involving terrorism. Could you give us some more
precise details and numbers?
Mr. Fields. Yes; we are not aware of any even actual
accidents that have involved terrorism. There have been two
potential incidents, one of which was referred to in the first
panel. We do know of at least two, one was the one in Texas
that was alluded to earlier, I think, in the previous panel, in
1997, where a group planned to blow up a facility. They were
caught because of an informant, and the terrorist act did not
occur. The only other incident we are aware of in the last 10
years was one in 1991, where six pipe bombs were found near the
Norfolk Naval Base, and we discovered the bombs before they
went off. They were removed and neutralized without incident.
So, those were two----
Mr. Brown. Was that one the one where the owner, in some
sort of insurance fraud, tried to blow up his own place? Is
that----
Mr. Fields. I am not aware of--we are hearing that was an
allegation; we are not sure if that----
Mr. Brown. Oh, okay.
Mr. Fields. [continuing] was accurate or not.
Mr. Brown. Counsel informs me the owner was convicted, so
it was----
Mr. Fields. Are you talking about the Norfolk Naval----
Mr. Brown. The Norfolk one, yes.
So, we are here today----
Mr. Fields. Those are the only two threats we are aware of.
Mr. Brown. And how many industrial accidents involving
hazardous substances have you documented?
Mr. Fields. Oh, thousands----
Mr. Brown. Okay.
Mr. Fields. [continuing] of industrial accidents.
Mr. Brown. So we are here today using----
Mr. Fields. I mean we have, you know, several thousand, you
know, chemical releases occur every year, and many accidents
occur; yes.
Mr. Brown. We are here today in this subcommittee,
sometimes scaring people a little by invoking Oklahoma City and
highway accidents and all kinds of potential terrorists--that
were real in the case of Oklahoma City, but some potential
terrorist accidents which don't fall into the jurisdiction of
this bill. There have been none that would, in terms of the
plan and all. And we have thousands of industrial accidents
that are very different, where communities need to know how to
deal with these kinds of industrial accidents?
Mr. Fields. That is correct. Some of the incidents that
have been referred to earlier, like Oklahoma City, would not
fall within the purview----
Mr. Brown. Right.
Mr. Fields. [continuing] of the risk management planning
regulations.
Mr. Brown. So, it is hard to think of any real reason for
legislation?
Mr. Fields. We think, as an administration, that it is
premature to talk about new legislation in this arena at the
current time. We believe that the security agencies and the EPA
and other stakeholders are working in a way that we probably
balance the need for public access under 112(r), the Clean Air
Act, and adequate protection of national security interests in
this country. We think it is premature to talk about new
legislation being needed to address this issue.
Mr. Brown. Thank you, Mr. Fields.
Mr. Upton. The Chair would recognize Chairman Bilirakis for
5 minutes.
Mr. Bilirakis. Mr. Burnham, how long have you been with the
FBI?
Mr. Burnham. Approximately 22 years----
Mr. Bilirakis. Twenty-two years.
Mr. Burnham. [continuing] as an agent.
Mr. Bilirakis. Mr. Fields, should we wait until there are a
number of chemical industrial terrorist acts before we take
this issue seriously? By the way, I want to express what I see
as really great cooperation on the part of the EPA in
discussing this with the FBI and the law enforcement agencies
over the years. But I do understand, also, that this concern
that you--having third parties using this information and
putting it on the Internet. And, again, I commend you for
expressing that. It is something that you have been working
on--the EPA has been working on--for quite some time?
I mean how much longer do we wait here? You say you don't
think there is a need for legislation--and I appreciate the
fact that EPA is working on this. However, a long time has gone
by. Apparently, the FBI has made some recommendations. You are
considering those recommendations; you are working toward that
end.
How close are you to coming up with something?
Mr. Fields. I think we are very close. As a matter of fact,
some actions that we have already taken, Congressman, have been
taken that will preclude the OCA data, offsite consequence
analysis data, from being put on the Internet. It has been a
great partnership with the FBI; we have been working real
closely together. I think we will know in the next 6 months.
I think we and the FBI would both agree that if we cannot
take all the necessary steps, we think that the plan we have
laid out, that we will only provide the information to State
and local implementing agencies in a closed, secure system,
secure ID's, and other mechanisms, will only provide--the
affected residents around the facility will get it from the
chemical industry, itself, and others.
Mr. Bilirakis. Yes.
Mr. Fields. We will provide--looking at read-only options
for response to FOIA requests. That is the kind of agenda we
are looking at. I think we will be able to know in the next 6
months whether we are able----
Mr. Bilirakis. Well, you don't have----
Mr. Fields. [continuing] to successfully----
Mr. Bilirakis. You don't have 6 months, really.
Mr. Fields. Right. Well, I think that the information will
come in June 21. It will be several months after that--2 or 3
months after that--before----
Mr. Bilirakis. Well, all right. Let me ask you this, sir.
Again, you know, I go back to common sense here.
Mr. Fields. Right.
Mr. Bilirakis. Darn it, I think we all want the same thing.
First of all, I think all the witnesses in the prior panel
indicated that they are for Community right-to-know and that
sort of thing. So, who are we? Are we bad guys up here because
we are concerned about, you know, risks and the health and
welfare of the American people, as far as terrorism is
concerned?
I think not, and I don't think we need to be at each
other's throats, Republicans and Democrats, on this kind of
issue. I think we all want the same thing.
But I, also, don't think we ought to wait until there might
be one or two or three types of industrial terrorism acts
involving chemicals--before we do something about it.
You have indicated that you think that EPA has taken the
right step in not putting it on the Internet. You have
indicated you don't think that third parties ought to be able
to indiscriminately put it on the Internet.
All right; what would be wrong with this Congress trying to
be helpful to EPA, to law enforcement, by working, on a piece
of legislation with your assistance and with the assistance of
some of the other gentlemen by June 21. So, that we can be
ready to go, rather than have a gap when something might happen
that we will be darned sorry for because we did not do
something about it.
Mr. Fields. Well, obviously, Mr. Congressman, if this
committee and the two subcommittees together work on
legislation, we will, obviously, be willing to provide
technical assistance and input to that.
All we are saying right now is we don't see the need for
new legislation. We believe that the implementation game plan
we have laid out will provide for adequate security of this
portion of the database that everyone agrees we don't want to
provide access to. And we believe that you could put in place
legislation that would preclude access to the people who are
right near the affected facilities.
Mr. Bilirakis. Well, but you would be----
Mr. Fields. We have got to be really careful here.
Mr. Bilirakis. You would be a part of crafting that
legislation, because that would not be the intent.
But let me ask you, Mr. Burnham; is the FBI concerned that
third parties will request the ``worst case scenario''
information from EPA in an electronic searchable format? Are
you concerned with this problem? And, do you have confidence
that EPA is going to solve that problem by the deadline that we
are talking about?
Mr. Burnham. Well, we are still working with EPA on that.
We are concerned on the OCA data getting out. We have made that
known and we have been working for months with them on that.
You know, I am sure we can probably work something out. You
know, one of the things that we have done is we have offered
the assistance of our NIPC, the National Infrastructure
Protection Center, to help them with assistance, as far as
encrypting the information. We have also--well, that was part
of one of the three recommendations last October that we made.
And we are still working with them on that.
But, again, you know, we would be opposed to the
information going out----
Mr. Bilirakis. Yes.
Mr. Burnham. [continuing] over the Internet and----
Mr. Bilirakis. But, again, the next question really--and
counsel is whispering into my ear, and that is not necessary.
But--and I have asked counsel this here, too--it looks like
that apparently the FBI, the EPA, the counsel up here, feels
that the current law--under current law--the EPA must provide
the ``worst case scenario'' information in an electronic
format. Would you agree with that?
Mr. Burnham. I am sorry; under current law now?
Mr. Bilirakis. Under current law that they must provide it
in an electronic format.
Mr. Burnham. That is not an issue that I have addressed. I
have dealt with just the threat assessment, with respect to the
data--the release of the data. As to whether--that is not an
issue I have looked at; that is not an issue that has been
addressed by our section, at this point. I know Mr. Blitzer
stated that he brought it up, and it was discussed. It is not
an issue that I have addressed.
Mr. Bilirakis. Well, but if--let me ask you then, if
current law is interpreted to require that it be done through
an electronic format, would that alarm you? Do you think, then,
that that current law should be changed? If it would----
Mr. Burnham. Well, it would depend.
Mr. Bilirakis. If it means that it has to be done through
a----
Mr. Burnham. Again----
Mr. Bilirakis. [continuing] by way of electronic format?
Mr. Burnham. Again, going back to the threat assessment--
going back to the threat assessment, we would be concerned
however it got out, that type of information, the ``worst case
scenario'' information, in any format.
Mr. Bilirakis. I am told--was this submitted into the
record? It was not?
It is a letter to Chairman Jerry Lewis, dated December 7,
1998, Mr. Brown, signed by a Robert Walsh, Legislative Counsel
Office of Public Congressional Affairs, Federal Bureau of
Investigation.
I would like unanimous consent that be inserted into the
record.
Mr. Upton. Without objection.
[The information referred to follows:]
U.S. Department of Justice,
Federal Bureau of Investigation,
Washington, DC,
December 7, 1998.
Honorable Jerry Lewis
Chairman, Subcommittee on Veteran Affairs, HUD, and Independent
Agencies
Committee on Appropriations
House of Representatives
Washington, D.C. 20515
Dear Mr. Chairman: The attached report is submitted as directed by
the Conference Report dated October 5, 1998, titled ``making
appropriations for the Departments of Veterans Affairs and Housing and
Urban Development, and for sundry independent agencies, boards,
commissions, corporations, and offices for the fiscal year ending
September 30, 1999, and for other purposes''.
If the FBI can be of any further assistance, please do not hesitate
to call.
Sincerely yours,
A. Robert Walsh,
Legislative Counsel, Office of Public and Congressional Affairs.
Enclosure
Honorable Louis Stokes
Ranking Member, Subcommittee on Veteran Affairs, HUD, and
Independent Agencies, Committee on Appropriations, House of
Representatives, Washington, D.C. 20515
As directed the FBI has compiled a list of recommendations for the
appropriate methods of public dissemination of the Risk Management
Plans (RMP) data submitted to the EPA pursuant to Clean Air Act section
112(r). These recommendations are the result of discussions with
representatives of other EPA, law enforcement and intelligence
agencies, as well as state and local Emergency Services and hazardous
Materials offices. The methods recommended below provide vehicles for
disseminating the information to the Federal, State and local
government agencies to plan for, and respond to, accidents at chemical
storage and production facilities. The methods recommended also provide
the bulk of the entire database to the research and academic community,
to enable them to do the necessary work of regional and national
comparative studies of facilities.
The FBI first became aware of EPA's intention to release the RMP
data on the Internet in December, 1997. At that time the FBI expressed
concern over the manner and the extent to which the information would
be disseminated. The FBI and the EPA have met several times since then
to discuss alternatives to the original plan. On September 17, 1998
representatives of the EPA's, Chemical Emergency Preparedness and
Prevention Office met with representatives of the Weapons of Mass
Destruction Operations Unit (WMDOU), Domestic Terrorism/
Counterterrorism Planning Section (DT/CPS), National Security Division,
FBIHQ and the Department of Justice, Terrorism and Violent Crimes
Section to make final recommendations regarding methods that EPA will
use to distribute case scenarios and alternate release scenarios
reported under the Risk Management Program. Those recommendations,
which have been coordinated with other Federal law enforcement and
intelligence agencies, were forwarded to EPA in a letter from the
Domestic Terrorism Section, FBI, in October of this year, and are
contained below:
The FBI recommended that all OCA data should be excluded in RMP
information distributed on the Internet. Specifically this would
include sections 1, 2, 3, 4 and 5 of the RMP. All other data elements
will be accessible to the public on the Internet. Other concerns have
arisen regarding the inventory quantity of chemicals, which are listed
in section 1 of the RMP. These concerns were raised at the open hearing
of the Accident Prevention Subcommittee on September 9, 1998. EPA
currently provides a plume modeling program for downloading over their
Internet site. If the quantities of the chemicals are provided as well,
the distance to and point and population affected could be derived from
the information EPA has already provided, regardless of whether the
other sections of the RMP are contained. There also still remains a
need to impose electronic speed bumps to allow for limited queries. The
FBI has agreed to work with EPA to assist in designing these controls.
To ensure that State and local government agencies will have access
to all national RMP data, the FBI recommended that EPA should use a
``closed system'' restricted to State and local government agencies.
FBI will continue to provide support to EPA as they put this system in
place utilizing secure password protection and encryption technology as
appropriate. It was acknowledged that this system may have resource
implications to be addressed which may include providing state and
local agencies with computer equipment to enable them to access the
closed system.
The FBI is still greatly opposed to the creation of a CD-ROM which
encompasses the entire database. FBI recommends that EPA create a CD-
ROM which contains all of the national data, except for the facility
identification and contact information. The CD-ROM could be used by
environmental groups and other organizations to study the nationwide
data and analyze national trends. This option would be offered as a
method to address terrorist risk by removing the ability to use the
information for targeting facilities.
One of the recurring concerns regarding the electronic submission,
is the Freedom of Information Act issue. Both Department of Justice and
EPA legal counsel have advised the FBI that the current FOIA laws would
require the EPA to provide the information in an electronic format, if
the information is submitted in that format. Further, the current FOIA
laws may require posting of the information in an electronic format
after the information has been requested twice. EPA has advised FBI
that certain organizations have stated that they will attempt to post
the complete information on private Internet web sites if the EPA fails
to post the information in its entirety. Current FOIA regulation do not
appear to provide a mechanism by which the EPA can deny requests for
information. Should these groups post the information, the other
efforts taken to protect sensitive information from world wide
distribution on the Internet would be negated.
In making these recommendations, the FBI has attempted to address
the spirit of the Community Right to Know sections of the Clean Air
Act, and as stated in the report, ``strike the appropriate balance
between methods of public dissemination and legitimate national
security and anti-terrorist concerns.'' As stated previously, FBI has
discussed these issues with EPA and have reached concurrence on most of
these recommendations. The FBI currently sees the electronic FOIA
concern as the most significant issue in dealing with the dissemination
of this information.
Mr. Bilirakis. And would call Mr. Burnham's attention to
page--the pages are not numbered here--a paragraph in here that
I am not going to take time to read because the red light is
on. But it says in effect that the FBI sees the current law as
requiring that it be issued by way of an electronic format.
Just to clarify that.
Mr. Upton. Mr. Brown has----
Mr. Brown. One comment, if I could, Mr. Chairman, just 10
seconds.
I don't think there is anybody--I mean no offense, really,
to Mr. Burnham or anybody else--I don't think we have really
had a Freedom of Information expert here. I mean in the former
panel, there was someone that was asked a lot of questions
about Freedom of Information Act, and I don't think any of us
that have practiced law in that area and know those issues real
well. I think the committee should note that in response to
some of these discussions about Freedom of Information.
Mr. Bilirakis. Well, Mr. Chairman, the letter that we put
into the record, by unanimous consent, would indicate that that
is the FBI opinion. I am not sure whether you have seen that.
Mr. Fields. Mr. Chairman, could I just add one appendix to
that issue? Just that we have had a discussion yesterday. The
Department of Justice and the Office of Legal Counsel is
exploring this issue, again, about the legal authorities under
the Freedom of Information Act, and so we should have a more
definitive position from the administration in the next few
weeks on that issue.
Mr. Upton. I want to say, again, we have a vote on, and I
think that I am going to make the point, again, that for
members that are not here and members that are here, we are
going to try to leave the record open for 30 days to ask
questions. If you would make yourselves available for that.
I ask unanimous consent to put in a report from the
Congressional Research Service, which I am sure we will get
copies to members.
[The information referred to follows:]
Congressional Research Service
Library of Congress Washington, D.C. 20540
January 22, 1999
Memorandum
TO: Honorable Tom Bliley, Chairman, House Commerce Committee
FROM: Morton Rosenberg, Specialist in American Public Law, American Law
Division
SUBJECT: Format accessibility Under the Electronic Freedom of
Information Act Amendments of 1996
Under the Clean Air Act amendments of 1990, the Environmental
Protection Administration (EPA) was directed by Congress to develop
regulations requiring certain facilities to implement a program focused
on the prevention of chemical accidents. On June 20, 1996, the EPA
published a ``Risk Management Rule'' requiring approximately 66,000
facilities nationwide to send a Risk Management Plan containing
detailed information regarding potential accidental chemical release
points and estimating the damages and injuries that could result from
an absolute worst-care scenario. It is anticipated that the submissions
will be transmitted electronically. The Act requires that EPA make the
plans publicly available except for those portions that contain trade
secrets the revelation of which would cause substantial harm to a
person's competitive position. 42 U.S.C. 7412r(6)(c)(iii);
(7)(13)(i)(ii)(iii); 7414(c)(1994).
You inquire whether public access to Risk Management Plan
submissions through the Freedom of Information Act, as amended, 5
U.S.C. 552 (Suppl II., 1996), includes electronic records, and whether
a FOIA requester may designate a particular format as a preferred
response. As amended by the Electronic Freedom of Information Act
Amendments of 1996, Pub.L. 104-231, 110 Stat. 3048, it is now quite
clear that FOIA covers an agency's electronic records, and it must
provide the record to a requester in any form or format requested as
long as the record is readily producible in that form or format.
The 1996 Amendments to FOIA were the product of several years of
legislative hearings and government-wide surveys by the Department of
Justice regarding agency practices in applying the FOIA to records in
electronic formats. Although the federal courts had long-recognized the
application of the FOIA to agency records in electronic formats, see,
e.g., Yeager v. Drug Enforcement Agency, 678 F. 2d 315, 321 (D.C.Cir.
1982), they had virtually no guidance from Congress regarding the
manner in which such matters as record searches and redaction should be
conducted in processing requests for such records. In one ruling,
Dismukes v. Department of the Interior, 603 F. Supp. 760, 763 (D.D.C.
1984), the court held that an agency has no obligation under the FOIA
to accommodate a requester's format preference.
Congress amended Section 552(f) to make it clear that the term
``record'' encompasses electronic records. It now states that ``
`record' and any other term used in this section in reference to
information includes any information that would be an agency record
subject to the requirements of this section when maintained by an
agency in any format, including electronic format.''
The 1996 amendments also provided that an agency, in making a
record available to a person in response to a FOIA request, ``shall
provide the record in any form or format requested by the person if the
record is readily reproducible by the agency in that form or format.''
Section 552(a)(3)(B). Congress thus overruled the above-noted Dismukes
ruling. Congress directed that each agency must ``make reasonable
efforts to maintain its records in forms or formats that are
reproducible'' for the purposes of this requirement. Id. But courts are
required to ``accord substantial weight'' to an agency affidavit
concerning the agency's determination as to whether a record is
``readily reproducible'' in the requested form or format. Section
552(a)(4)(B).
The amendments defined the term ``search'' to include a review of
agency records ``by automated means'' and provided that an agency make
``reasonable efforts'' to search for responsive records ``in electronic
form or format, except when such efforts would significantly interfere
with the operation of the agency's automated information system.''
Section 552(a)(3) (D) and (C).
Finally, Congress recognized the applicability of the FOIA's
segregability requirements in electronic contexts but made certain
accommodations: (1) the ``amount of information deleted shall be
indicated in the released portion of the record, unless including that
indication would harm an interest protected by the exemption in this
subsection under which the deletion is made,'' and (2) the amount of
the information deleted shall be indicated at the place in the record
where such deletion occurred if it is ``technically feasible'' to do
so. Section 552b.
House Report No. 104-795, which accompanied H.R. 3802, provides
very useful background on the development of the 1996 amendments and
Congress' purpose and intent with respect to this legislation.
Mr. Upton. And I will dismiss you, thanking you, again,
asking you next time to send your testimony in advance.
And I would announce to those here that we will reconvene
at 2:15 for panel three.
Mr. Burnham. Thank you.
Mr. Fields. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
[Brief recess.]
Mr. Upton. Welcome back. We are done for votes for the day,
not for the week.
And I want to recognize the last and final panel, panel
three.
Thank you for being with us today. Mr. Art Burk, senior
safety fellow, from the DuPont Company, representing the
Chemical Manufacturers; Mr. Paul Orum, coordinator of the
Working Group on Community Right-to-Know; Mr. Jerry Scannell,
president of the National Safety Council, member of the Clean
Air Act Advisory Subcommittee on Accident Prevention; and Ms.
Paula Littles, legislative director of PACE Workers
International Union.
Thank you. I think if you were here a little earlier, you
are aware that this subcommittee is an investigative
subcommittee, and as such, has had the long practice of taking
testimony under oath. Do you have any objection to such? Seeing
none, we move on.
The Chair, then, advises each of you that, under the rules
of the House and the rules of the committee, you are entitled
to be advised by counsel. Do any of you desire to be advised by
counsel during testimony today?
Again, saying, ``No.''
In that case, if you would rise and raise your right hand,
I will swear you in.
[Witnesses sworn.]
Mr. Upton. Again, I want to thank each of you for
submitting your testimony in a timely fashion; it was
appreciated last night.
We will start with Mr. Burk for 5 minutes. And, as with the
others, your testimony will be printed fully in the record, and
you are welcome to summarize. And, hopefully, you will not last
more than the 5 minutes given to you.
Mr. Burk.
TESTIMONY OF ARTHUR F. BURK, SENIOR SAFETY FELLOW, DUPONT
COMPANY, REPRESENTING THE CHEMICAL MANUFACTURERS ASSOCIATION,
AND MEMBER, CLEAN AIR ACT ADVISORY SUBCOMMITTEE ON ACCIDENT
PREVENTION; JERRY SCANNELL, PRESIDENT, NATIONAL SAFETY COUNCIL,
AND MEMBER, CLEAN AIR ACT ADVISORY SUBCOMMITTEE ON ACCIDENT
PREVENTION; PAUL ORUM, COORDINATOR, WORKING GROUP ON COMMUNITY
RIGHT-TO-KNOW; AND PAULA R. LITTLES, LEGISLATIVE DIRECTOR, PACE
WORKERS INTERNATIONAL UNION
Mr. Burk. Mr. Chairman, and members of both your
subcommittees, good afternoon.
My name is Arthur Burk, and I am a senior safety fellow
with the DuPont Company. I also am a member of EPA's Accident
Prevention----
Mr. Upton. If you would just--might move the microphone a
little closer, it would be helpful.
Mr. Burk. Okay; is that better?
I also am a member of the EPA's Accident Prevention
Subcommittee. I appreciate the invitation to testify on this
very important topic.
My bottom line is this; the RMP rule is a good regulation,
and it will be effective in helping to prevent chemical
accidental releases.
EPA's leadership in proactively and continually involving a
broad range of stakeholders was a key ingredient to a
successful rulemaking. However, the process clearly showed the
need to involve security agencies early in the debate and the
need to do a better job at balancing security risks with public
right-to-know.
EPA is making real progress on implementation of the Risk
Management Program rule, and we are committed to work with the
Agency to help ensure its successful implementation.
Even before the rule is final, DuPont is making the
information publicly available. The question is, and has been;
what is the best and safest way to do this?
There are two key issues remaining. First, some RMP
information should not be posted on the Internet. This is the
recommendation of security agencies, and we agree. The
information that should not be on the Internet are those
parameters which quantify, either directly or indirectly, the
consequences of an accidental or externally induced release.
This would include chemical quantity or inventory, distance to
irreversible health effect endpoint in miles, and residential
populations potentially affected.
The second key issue remaining is; what is the best way to
communicate offsite consequence analysis data to the public?
Guided by the recommendations from the FBI, EPA decided against
putting data which includes the above three parameters I
mentioned on the Internet. This does not mean the information
won't be available to the public. People have a right to know
this information. Clearly, an alternate approach of
communicating this data to the public must be found.
I wish I had the answer; I don't, but we continue to work
with the Agency, the FBI, environmental groups, local
officials, and others to find the answer.
In the meantime, I offer three guiding principles to keep
in mind moving forward. First, requests for local RMP
information from people in plant communities should be
processed through the local officials or through the specific
facility involved. Second, procedures for processing requests
for RMP information should be developed by EPA working closely
with Federal security agencies and local officials and response
groups. And, third, these procedures must respect the
legitimate community right-to-know, protect against potential
terrorist threats, and accommodate requests from academic and
other non-governmental organizations which may want to review,
study, and learn from the national RMP database.
Thank you for the opportunity to testify today.
[The prepared statement of Arthur F. Burk follows:]
Prepared Statement of Arthur F. Burk, DuPont Company, on Bealf of the
Chemical Manufacturers Association
Introduction
Good morning. My name is Arthur F. Burk. I am a Senior Safety
Fellow with the DuPont Company, with headquarters in Wilmington,
Delaware. I also am a member of the U.S. EPA's Accident Prevention
Subcommittee that is focusing on the issue of how best to disseminate
Risk Management Program (RMP) information, including worst case
scenario and other off-site consequence analysis information. I
appreciate the invitation to testify before these two House Commerce
Subcommittees on this very important topic. My testimony addresses the
following main areas:
Background--EPA's Risk Management Program Rule
Accident Prevention Subcommittee Activities
Key Ongoing Issues
Summary
The DuPont Company, along with many other companies in the business
community, supported the 1990 amendments to the Clean Air Act.
Specifically, we supported creation of the Risk Management Program. We
thought then--and continue to believe--that the program is a good idea.
Further, we believed then--and continue to believe--that information
collected under the RMP should be made public. And that includes worst
case scenario data.
My concern and that of many other companies has always been ``how''
the data will be made public, beyond the local community. Security
consultants have serious concerns that making worst case scenario data
available via the Internet would increase the risk of terrorist actions
against chemical facilities. We agree with these concerns. A critical
ingredient to determining ``the how'' is on-going dialogue between EPA,
other Federal Security Agencies who have responsibility for our safety
and security, Local Emergency Planning Committees (LEPC's) and other
local emergency responder organizations. We are pleased with the
dialogue established thus far by EPA and strongly encourage its
continuation.
Chairman Bilirakis, Chairman Upton, and other members of your
Subcommittees, DuPont and other companies are investing a great deal of
time and other resources to ensure that compliance with the RMP rule
goes smoothly--and, most importantly, that the information is
communicated accurately and effectively. For example just last Thursday
in the Houston area, the East Harris County Manufacturing Association--
held an RMP outreach meeting at the Pasadena Convention Center titled
Understanding Chemical Risk Management. Over 500 people attended the
evening session. From the reports I have received, people found both
the information and the dialogue very useful. Written material that was
distributed at the session will be made available to those who could
not attend the evening meeting. Already, additional meetings are
planned.
The reason that industry sponsors sessions like the one in Houston
is that we see a number of benefits in the RMP process for both the
public and for ourselves. We see the RMP process as one of many ways to
communicate with the public and to engage them in dialogue--about
mutual interests and concerns including:
the hazards of chemicals we handle and what is being done to
prevent and/or mitigate accidental releases, and
the important role of chemical products not only in local
communities, but in the nation as a whole.
The bottom line is: DuPont and others in industry including the
Chemical Manufacturers Association (CMA) firmly support the RMP; we
support making all the information public--including the worst case
scenario data. Our concern is with ``the how''.
Background: EPA's Risk Management Program Rule
Pursuant to section 112(r) of the Clean Air Act as amended in
November 1990, the EPA solicited the views of many in developing
accidental release prevention regulations. For more than 5 years, EPA,
CMA and other stakeholders, representing a broad diversity of views,
worked together in a spirit of cooperation to produce a regulation
titled ``Accidental Release Prevention Requirements: Risk Management
Programs under the Clean Air Act, section 112(r)(7)''. This regulation,
as promulgated on June 20, 1996, is soundly based. When fully
implemented by facilities, it will be effective in helping prevent
Accidental Releases.
EPA's Risk Management Program Rule requires that facility owners
who handle regulated substances in excess of the threshold quantity
prepare Risk Management Programs which include:
hazard assessment (or off-site consequence analysis) including
worst case scenario.
prevention activities
emergency response activities
In addition, the regulation requires that the facility owner
prepare a Risk Management Plan which summarizes the facility's Risk
Management Program and which must contain the following information:
executive summary
registration information (including chemical quantity for each
regulated substance in each covered process)
off-site consequence analysis (including worst case scenario
data such as chemical quantity released; distance to
irreversible health effect endpoint in miles; residential
population within that area)
five-year accident history
prevention program
emergency response program
certifications
The regulation further requires that ``the Risk Management Plan
shall be submitted in a method and format to a central point as
specified by EPA prior to June 21, 1999.''
During the summer of 1996, EPA, revealed that it was considering
posting Risk Management Plan information (including off-site
consequence analysis and chemical quantity data) on the Internet. This
position heightened concern about the access and use of such
information by potential terrorists. DuPont and others industry
companies support posting of all RMP information on the Internet, with
the exception of off-site consequence analysis data and chemical
quantity or inventory data.
Accident Prevention Subcommittee Activities
In September 1996, the EPA established the Accident Prevention
Subcommittee as part of the Clean Air Act Advisory Committee. I was
pleased to accept EPA's invitation to join the Subcommittee, as its
only member who directly represents one or more of the 66,000 regulated
facilities under EPA's Risk Management Program Rule. My experience in
this area spans 35 years within DuPont and includes a series of
manufacturing, project and technical assignments, which provided direct
experience in the safe handling of toxic, flammable and thermally
unstable materials. At the Subcommittee's first meeting on September
24, 1996, security from potential terrorism was raised as an issue.
In May 1997, Brent Greene, a member of the President's Commission
on Critical Infrastructure made a recommendation to the Accident
Prevention Subcommittee that EPA contract to have a security analysis
conducted to evaluate the risks, trade-offs, and cost implications of
making release scenario data available over the Internet.
During the summer of 1997, a Scope of Work for the security study
was developed by the Subcommittee. Aegis Research Corporation, ICF
Incorporated, and Scientific Applications International Corporation
were selected by EPA to conduct the Security Analysis.
Aegis Research Corporation described their security analysis study
to the Accident Prevention Subcommittee on December 17, 1997. The
Security Study report, titled An Analysis of the Terrorist Risk
Associated with the Public Availability of Off-site Consequence
Analysis Data, concluded that the CD-ROM and Internet dissemination
options under consideration by EPA would increase the risk of terrorism
from 3.5 to 7 times the risk of the baseline case (paper copies in the
local community). Although a number of my colleagues and I in industry
found the Aegis report compelling, others on the Subcommittee
disagreed, concluding that ``speed bumps'' could be devised that would
serve to protect against terrorists accessing sensitive information.
``Speed bumps'' are intended to either slow down access to information
or make access more difficult.
At its February 3, 1998, meeting, the Subcommittee decided to move
forward with putting off-site consequence analysis and worst case
scenario data on the Internet with limited ``speed bumps.''
During the September 9, 1998, meeting of the Subcommittee, a number
of people--Jim Meade, Department of Justice, Terrorism and Violent
Crimes Section; Basil Doyle, Federal Bureau of Investigation; Gerry
Scannell, President, National Safety Council; Jack Weaver, Director,
Center for Chemical Process Safety and I--expressed concerns and
recommended against posting off-site consequence analysis and chemical
quantity or inventory data on the Internet. The concern shared by all
of us was that posting of such information on the Internet would
provide valuable targeting information to potential terrorists.
On November 5, 1998, EPA announced that it had made a decision to
not post off-site consequence analysis data on the Internet. The off-
site consequence analysis data includes chemical quantity released,
distance to irreversible health effect endpoint, and residential
populations potentially affected. However, the Agency still plans to
post chemical quantities (inventories) as part of the registration data
on the Internet.
Key Ongoing Issues
Pursuant to the work of EPA and the Accident Prevention
Subcommittee over the last several years, two key issues remain to be
resolved prior to June 1999. They are 1) posting of sensitive
information on the Internet and 2) means of communicating off-site
consequence analysis data to the public.
1. Posting of Sensitive Information on the Internet--There are
three parameters within the Risk Management Plan data which quantify
(either directly or indirectly) the potential consequences of an
accidental or externally induced release. They are:
--chemical quantity or inventory
--distance to irreversible health effect endpoint (miles)
--residential populations potentially affected
Security consultants believe that these three parameters should not
be posted on the Internet. DuPont and other companies agree. The EPA,
by electing to not post off-site consequence analysis data on the
Internet, in essence has agreed to remove chemical quantity released,
distance to irreversible health effect endpoint and residential
populations potentially affected from Internet posting. We concur with
this action. However, the Agency continues to plan to post chemical
quantity (inventory) on the Internet as part of the RMP registration
data. The registration chemical quantity is defined as the quantity of
regulated substance in each covered process. The concern of security
consultants, one which we share, is that the posting of chemical
quantity in either place would provide critical targeting information
to potential terrorists. Accordingly, we recommend that the Agency not
post chemical quantities on the Internet, in either the registration or
off-site consequence analysis sections. Recognizing that the community
has a right to know this information, we recommend that it be
communicated to the public in the same manner as the off-site
consequence analysis data, described below.
2. Means of communicating off-site consequence analysis data to the
public--Since EPA decided to not post the off-site consequence analysis
data (which includes chemical quantity released, distance to
irreversible health effect endpoint and populations potentially
affected) on the Internet, and the community has a right to know this
information, an alternate approach of communicating this information to
the public is being pursued. We offer the following principles to guide
the development of such an alternate approach:
Requests for local RMP information from the local community
should be processed through the LEPC or through the specific
facility in question.
Procedures for processing requests for RMP information should
be developed by the EPA in close concert with Federal Security
Agencies with responsibilities for our safety and security,
LEPC representatives, and Local Emergency Responder
Organizations. The LEPC is a key entity in this process since
it is the organization which represents the local community
from an emergency planning perspective and it is the local
community which bears the ultimate risk and consequences of
terrorist activity. Such procedures should address community
right to know, and terrorist threat issues and also specific
requests from academic and other non-governmental organizations
which may want to review and study the national RMP database
for learnings.
Mr. Upton. Thank you.
Mr. Orum.
TESTIMONY OF PAUL ORUM
Mr. Orum. Yes; my name is Paul Orum. I have served for 10
years, as of February 20, as coordinator of the Working Group
on Community Right-to-Know. And, I also serve on EPA's
Electronic Submission Workgroup on this issue.
I appreciate the opportunity to provide testimony on the
importance of the public's right-to-know and freedom to
communicate about chemical accident hazards under the Clean Air
Act.
In general, I am going to point to four things today.
First, the importance of honoring the public's right-to-know;
second, the need to acknowledge areas of agreement exist here;
third, the need and opportunity to reduce real hazards----
Mr. Upton. Mr. Orum, if you wouldn't mind just using----
Mr. Orum. I am sorry.
Mr. Upton. [continuing] that microphone a little better.
Mr. Orum. [continuing] and, fourth, the need to adopt real
hazard reduction programs.
In overview, over a recent 10-year period, the Federal
Government, as compiled by the Chemical Safety Board, recorded
nearly a million chemical accidents from the everyday use of
toxic chemicals. In contrast, there is very little record of
terrorist threat to industrial facilities, and terrorist-caused
accidents involving the Internet are virtually unknown.
By some estimates, 40 million Americans live at risk from
nearby chemical facilities. The Clean Air Act was intended to
address these everyday hazards and not to address terrorism.
Community right-to-know is a very important tool for hazard
reduction. Consider the best known right-to-know law, the
Toxics Release Inventory. A dozen years ago, many in Government
and industry resisted the TRI, but, now, this simple program is
credited with a 50 percent reduction in releases as waste to
the environment. With full disclosure, I think we will see the
same kind of dramatic reductions in chemical accidents.
This hearing, though, only addresses half the hazard
equation, a very speculative and incremental increase in
terrorism. But anyone can get information, with or without the
Internet. People can drive by chemical plants, go to trade
shows, read trade journals and newspapers. They can look in the
phone book. Further, people have discussed and published
``worst case scenario'' vulnerability zones for years. In
addition, the risk management plans don't include the tank
locations; they don't include classified information. It is
prohibited to include that information. They don't include
technical data or plant security information.
Restricting public access to this information doesn't
change of this, but it will undermine the potentially dramatic
risk reduction benefits of full disclosure.
If chemical plants are targets for terrorists, then we need
regulations to reduce these chemical hazards, not just half
measures to impede the public's right-to-know. We need adequate
regulations to assure site security and the control of these
vast quantities of dangerous chemicals that are brought into
our communities. The security agencies, EPA, industry, and
Congress cannot point to the risk of terrorism and then simply
walk away without addressing the need for strict regulations to
control chemical hazards that pose targets for terrorists.
I will point to some key points in my remaining testimony.
Under honoring the public's right-to-know, clearly this is
important information for the public.
Citizen's need the information where they live, also, where
relatives live elsewhere, where they might move to, where
children might go to school if it is in a different
jurisdiction, and so forth.
National and local news media need information for
comparative stories and for ``day-of'' stories when there are
chemical accidents.
Investors need information to know whether their
investments are sound. You know the Securities and Exchange
Commission directs companies to report ``worst case scenarios''
that can affect the company's bottom line, as part of the year
2000 disclosure requirements. These are searchable; they are on
the Internet, searchable by company and by key word.
Local emergency planners need information on prevention
successes elsewhere so they can benefit from those.
I give other examples; let me skips ahead, though, to, you
know, acknowledging areas of agreement. In order to make
progress, we really need to do this.
One, all parties seem to accept that people do have a right
to know if they can be hurt in a chemical spill. Two, during
EPA workgroup discussions, all the participants agreed that
professional terrorists are savvy enough to access this type of
data regardless of Internet access. Third, no one claims the
Internet is necessary for criminal activity at a chemical
plant, and, therefore, the Internet is not the issue. It is
also important to remember that industry's legal duty to
operate safely include site security.
Environmental and labor organizations have sought for years
policies that would cut the potential for chemical accidents.
Consider these examples: as a result of New Jersey's Toxic
Catastrophe Prevention Act, scores of water treatment plants
have moved from chlorine to safer alternatives. I give other
examples in my testimony. Magnified over many facilities, this
is clearly of immense national benefit.
I will just finish briefly with my last section; the need
to adopt real solutions. As I said earlier, keeping information
off the Internet is a half measure. EPA has clear authority,
under section 112(r)(7)(a) to take real steps to reduce
hazards.
The FBI has an obligation to work with EPA on devising
strict regulations to harden facilities against potential of
terrorist attack. And the chemical industry should give us a
quantifiable plan and timeline to reduce actual hazards in
communities.
Congress should also look close to home. The Blue Plains
sewage treatment plant has a lot of chlorine onsite. A study in
1992 recommended looking at switching to sodium hypochlorite,
which is bleach. So, what is the best way to deal with this
hazard that can affect us right here where we are sitting? Is
it to stop talking about it, or to replace chlorine with safer
alternatives?
I did have an exhibit of an example from a newspaper that
was done in 1993, well before any of this program came up, that
might be typical of what you might see in newspapers when this
information is disclosed to the public.
[The prepared statement of Paul Orum follows:]
Prepared Statement of Paul Orum, Working Group on Community Right-to-
Know
My name is Paul Orum. I have served for ten years as coordinator of
the Working Group on Community Right-to-Know. I appreciate the
opportunity to provide testimony on the importance of the public's
right-to-know and freedom to communicate about chemical accident
hazards under the Clean Air Act, section 112(r). The Working Group
coordinates the right-to-know programs of some 1,500 public interest
organizations around the country, and works with other constituencies,
such as journalists, for timely access to government information. In
addition, I served on EPA's Electronic Submission Workgroup on public
access to Risk Management Plans.
Additional information is at www.rtk.net/wcs.
In general, I'm going to ask you to consider four things today:
First, the importance of honoring the public's right-to-know; second,
the need acknowledge areas of agreement; third the need and opportunity
to reduce real hazards; and fourth, the need to adopt real hazard
reduction programs.
Overview
Over a recent ten-year period, the Federal government recorded
nearly a million chemical accidents from the everyday use of toxic
chemicals.\1\ In contrast, there is little record of terrorist threat
to industrial facilities, and terrorist-caused accidents involving the
Internet are virtually unknown.
An estimated 40 million Americans live at risk from nearby chemical
facilities.\2\ The Clean Air Act's Accident Prevention program was
designed to address these everyday chemical hazards, not to address
terrorism.
Community right-to-know is an important tool for hazard reduction.
Consider the nation's best known right-to-know law, the Toxics Release
Inventory (TRI). A dozen years ago, some in government and industry
resisted TRI. Now, this simple program of public reporting is credited
with reducing reported toxic pollution released as waste to the
environment by some 50 percent. With full public disclosure, the same
thing will happen under the Clean Air Act, section 112(r)--we will see
dramatic reductions in chemical accident hazards.
This hearing, however, addresses only one part of the hazard
equation, a speculative incremental increase in terrorism. But anyone
can get information, with or without the Internet. People can drive by
chemical plants, go to trade shows, read trade journals and newspapers,
and look in the phone book. Further, people have discussed facility
worst-case vulnerability zones for years, described them in reports,
and published them in newspapers and on the Internet. In addition, Risk
Management Plans don't include tank locations, plant security,
classified information, or technical data about how to cause a worst-
case event. Restricting public access to portions of Risk Management
Plans changes none of this--but it will undermine the potentially
dramatic risk reduction benefits of full disclosure.
If chemical plants are targets for terrorists, then we need
regulations to reduce these chemical hazards, not just measures that
impede the publics' right-to-know. Without the right-to-know component
of the Clean Air Act, the alternative is command and control
regulations. We need adequate regulations to assure site security and
control the vast quantities of dangerous chemicals stored in our
communities. The security agencies, EPA, industry, and Congress cannot
point to the risk of terrorism and then simply walk away without
addressing the need for strict regulations to control chemical hazards
that pose targets for terrorists.
I. Honor the Public's Right-to-Know
The freedom to communicate about chemical hazards is essential to
reducing those hazards. The Clean Air Act, section 112(r) information
serves the publics' right-to-know in ways that promote real hazard
reduction.
1. Citizens need to know about potential chemical accidents in whatever
jurisdiction their families, friends, and relatives work, live,
go to school, or might move to. A citizen in Memphis has every
right to learn if a similar facility in Peoria uses a safer
process that has no potential off-site impact.
2. National and local news media need both timely information on the
day of a chemical accident for stories on deadline and
organized information across many jurisdictions for comparative
analyses of hazards and prevention efforts (e.g., all of the
RMP facilities along the Ohio River, other plants owned by the
same company, etc.).
3. Investors, insurers, and lenders need to know whether their
investments are sound. The Securities and Exchange Commission
directs companies to report worst-case scenarios that can
affect the company's bottom line as part of year-2000
disclosure requirements.\3\ Disclosing potential liabilities is
part of doing business.
4. The public, legislators, and others need national information to
hold EPA accountable for measuring results of the agency's
hazard prevention programs, as required by the Government
Performance and Results Act.
5. Local Emergency Planners need information on prevention successes at
similar facilities in other communities, and at facilities
operated elsewhere by particular companies.
6. Local communities need a low cost means of meeting Federal mandates.
7. Labor organizations need full chemical hazard information for safety
training.
8. Management needs to know too; on the day of the first release of TRI
data, Monsanto pledged to reduce TRI air emissions by 90
percent; clearly, public disclosure gets the attention of
corporate managers.
9. Researchers need complete national information to learn, for
example, whether certain hazardous industries are associated
with higher or lower unemployment, income levels, property
values, and minority populations, or to compare policies across
states and localities.
These are but a few examples. The public's right-to-know is
critical to hazard prevention. Congress must continue to honor the
public's legitimate right-to-know and act to prevent hazards.
II. Acknowledge Areas of Agreement
Please carefully consider the following facts.
1. All parties seem to accept that people have a right-to-know if they
can be hurt by a chemical spill.
2. During EPA workgroup discussions, all participants agreed that
``professional terrorists are savvy enough to access this type
of data'' regardless of Internet access.\4\
3. No one claims that the Internet is necessary for criminal activity
at a chemical plant; therefore, the Internet is not the issue.
4. Risk Management Plans do not include tank locations, plant security
information, classified information, or technical data about
how to cause a worst-case event.
5. Facility worst-case vulnerability zones have been discussed for
years, described in reports, published in newspapers, and put
on the Internet (e.g., http://augustachronicle, ``Planning for
the Worst Maps,'' October 1997.)
6. Industry's legal duty to operate safely (CAA, 112(r)(1)) includes
site security; nothing in a Risk Management Plan increases this
duty.
7. People can get information from many sources, including the phone
book, direct observation, trade shows, industry publications,
newspapers, public relations events, the Census Bureau, and
common sense, all without using the Internet.
8. Nearly 1,000,000 chemical accidents were reported to the Federal
government over a recent ten-year period.1 By comparison, we
don't have much information on chemical accidents caused by
sabotage, let alone any examples involving the Internet.
9. Claims of sabotage have proven inadequate. At Bhopal, India, in
1984, the company claimed sabotage; yet investigation showed
that five major safety systems were either inadequately
designed or at least partially failed.\5\ In Nevada, in 1997,
an explosion at Sierra Chemical killed four workers. The
company claimed sabotage, yet investigators contradicted this
claim, and faulted instead numerous aspects of the plant's
operations.\6\
III. Reduce Real Hazards
Environmental and labor organizations have long sought public
policies to cut the potential for chemical accidents.\7\ Consider these
examples of hazard reduction:
1. As a result of New Jersey's Toxic Catastrophe Prevention Act (TCPA),
scores of water treatment plants in the state have shifted from
chlorine to safer alternatives, such as sodium hypochlorite
(bleach).
2. Du Pont's Victoria, Texas, facility uses up methyl isocyanate--the
Bhopal chemical--as soon as it is produced, yielding low
potential for off-site impact. (Other chemicals at the plant
pose significant off-site hazards.)
3. The Local Emergency Planning Committee in Cuyahoga County, Ohio,
used vulnerability zone calculations and awards to encourage
safer technologies, such as award winner ALCOA, which ended on-
site storage of hydrofluoric acid and nitric acid.
Clearly, the potential benefits of a national program are immense.
(See attached list of quotes from industry about the success of the
Toxics Release Inventory.)
While RMP information is not yet public, anecdotal evidence
suggests that impending disclosure is already spurring interest in
reducing worst-case zones. For example, in 1997, only a handful of
companies signed up for an industry seminar on inherent safety in
Cleveland, Ohio. However, by 1998, with RMP disclosure looming, over
100 companies signed up for such a seminar in the same location.
IV. Adopt Real Solutions
If there is a problem from potential terrorism, then there is still
a problem if information is kept off the Internet. Keeping information
off the Internet doesn't reduce actual hazards. The security agencies,
EPA, industry, and Congress cannot identify a hazard and simply walk
away without doing anything other than impeding public access to
information. Secrecy does not address the problem. Secrecy invites
complacency. We need real programs to reduce hazards, regardless of
their proximate cause.
1. The U.S. EPA should use its clear authority under the Clean Air Act,
sections 112(r)(7)(a) and 112(r)(9) to establish an accident
prevention program that compels companies to reduce hazards as
part of the Risk Management Plan.\8\ Naturally, not all hazard
reduction activity originates at the Federal level, but we do
need Federal leadership.
2. The security agencies should work with EPA to devise strict
regulations that protect the most hazardous facilities against
terrorist attack.
3. The chemical industry should publicly commit to a quantifiable plan
and timeline to reduce hazards such that facilities no longer
threaten surrounding communities.
Congress should look close to home. In 1982, a Radian Corp. study
found that the Blue Plains sewage plant in Washington, DC, poses off-
site risks from chlorine many miles distant.\9\ This lead the
Department of Defense (due to nearby Bolling Air Force Base) to
complain in 1991 to the mayor of Washington, DC. The mayor commissioned
a feasibility study in 1992. The study recommended that Blue Plains
switch from chlorine to bleach. Yet we still have weekly shipments of
chlorine tank cars into Blue Plains. So if this is a terrorist target
in Washington, DC, then what is the best way to address it--by not
talking about it or by replacing the chlorine with safer alternatives?
Notes
1. Press Release, Chemical Safety and Hazard Investigation Board,
February 1, 1999.
2. Too Close to Home, U.S. Public Interest Research Group, July
1998.
3. Statement of the Securities and Exchange Commission Regarding
Disclosure of Year 2000 Issues and Consequences by Public Companies,
Investment Advisers, Investment Companies, and Municipal Securities
Issuers, August 4, 1998. A company must make this assessment as part of
its Management Discussion and Analysis ``if its year-2000 issues would
have a material effect on the company's business, results of
operations, or financial conditions, without taking into account the
company's efforts to avoid those consequences.'' Thus, disclosure is
required for the vast majority of companies.
4. Final Report of the Electronic Submission Workgroup to the
Accident Prevention Subcommittee of the Clean Air Act Advisory
Committee, U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, June 18, 1997. Section
2.B. Location of RMP*Info (Internet Issues). (www.epa.gov/swercepp)
5. The Encouragement of Technological Change for Preventing
Chemical Accidents, Nicholas Ashford, et. al., Massachusetts Institute
of Technology, 1993. At Bhopal, a refrigeration system was not
operating; a temperature indicator was not functioning; a vent gas
scrubber was inadequately designed and maintained; a flare tower was
not functioning; and water curtains could not reach the leaking gas.
6. Investigation Report, Sierra Chemical Company, U.S. Chemical
Safety and Hazard Investigation Board, January 7, 1998
(www.chemsafety.gov). The Board faulted the company's process hazards
analysis, training program, operating procedure, building design,
safety inspections, and employee participation, in addition to faulting
regulatory agencies for inadequate oversight.
7. For example, see public comments on 60 FR 13526 (EPA docket A-
91-73) and Too Close to Home, by the U.S. Public Interest Research
Group, July 1998. Safer technologies use less hazardous chemicals,
operate at ambient pressures or temperatures, reduce storage, require
fewer shipments, etc. Other safety improvements include secondary
containment, automatic shutoffs, alarms, fences, barriers, buffer
zones, etc.
8. The Clean Air Act, 112(r)(7)(a), authorizes the Administrator
``. . . to promulgate release prevention, detection, and correction
requirements which may include monitoring, record-keeping, reporting,
training, vapor recovery, secondary containment, and other design,
equipment, work practice, and operational requirements. Regulations
promulgated under this paragraph may make distinctions between various
types, classes, and kinds of facilities, devices and systems taking
into consideration factors including, but not limited to the size,
location, process, process controls, quantity of substances handled,
potency of substances, and response capabilities present at any
stationary source. Regulations promulgated pursuant to this
subparagraph shall have an effective date, as determined by the
Administrator, assuring compliance as expeditiously as practicable.''
9. Air Dispersion Model Assessment of Impacts from a Chlorine Spill
at the Blue Plains Wastewater Treatment Plant, Radian Corporation,
1982.
Mr. Upton. Thank you very much.
Mr. Scannell.
TESTIMONY OF JERRY SCANNELL
Mr. Scannell. Yes; good afternoon.
My name is Jerry Scannell; I am president of the National
Safety Council, located outside of Chicago. The National Safety
Council is an 86-year-old organization. It is non-profit, non-
governmental, and a public service organization that has been
chartered by Congress.
Before becoming president of the National Safety Council, I
served 15 years with Johnson & Johnson in New Brunswick, New
Jersey; 10 years as corporate director of Health, Safety, and
Environment, and the rest as a vice president of Safety and
Health. Also, from 1989 to 1992, I served as the assistant
secretary of labor for OSHA.
You know, initially, I wanted to see offsite consequence
analysis information duly posted on the World Wide Web with
minor security protection. And we, at the committee, used to
call that ``speed bumps'' or ``hurdles.''
And this is a critical point; many observers continue to
believe that the kind of sensitive information we are
discussing here, in fact, will find its way to the public
through the Web, through newspaper articles, SERC's, the
LEPC's, and other emergency management infrastructure. If we
accept this hypothesis, and it is a reasonable one, then the
question, then, becomes whether the Government, itself, should
knowingly make that information part of the Web, given the
inevitable balance between competing needs; national security
and community preparedness and safety.
It was not until I listened to the testimony from
representatives of the Federal Bureau of Investigation, that I
concluded that the scales, at least for now, and in wake of the
very real terrorism experiences this Nation has endured, and
the very real continuing threat it faces, weigh in favor of the
national security concerns.
Particularly compelling was the inability to secure online
sensitive data with current technology. The FBI's testimony
reinforced the conclusions of the security study conducted by
AEGIS Research Corporation for the EPA that a national online
database could easily aid terrorists in identifying targets of
opportunity.
I now want to comment, in particular, on the issues of
local access to RMP and, particularly, the offsite consequence
analysis information of concern to your committees. I believe
that the primary value of RMP data lies at the local level. We
know that the number of HAZMAT releases remains too high. We
also know that the right-to-know data has made a significant
contribution to reducing chemical hazards over the past 10
years. And, already, there is evidence to suggest that the RMP
data is contributing to improved dialog between chemical
facilities and their neighbors. However, in order for citizens
to participate in this process to safeguard their communities,
they need accurate and complete chemical hazard information.
I believe that the EPA has the resources and technology to
distribute LEPC-specific information to citizens at the local
level, and the data should be easy and understandable for the
citizens to use.
You know, another audience needing the national RMP dataset
will be the research community. The National Safety Council,
among other organizations, are committed to improving safe
handling of chemicals and to preventing incidents. To achieve
these goals, our researchers need the national data to
understand the complexity of these issues. And this information
can be distributed in a variety of ways to minimize the risk,
but the data must be made available.
As with so many areas involving sometimes conflicting
rights of citizens, right-to-know, and the reality of the
potentially dangerous world we live in, this is an area that
will demand close and ongoing scrutiny as it plays out and
practiced over the initial implementation phase.
Beyond all else, it is critical that your subcommittees, no
less than the local emergency responder or community planner,
recognize that the best interests of all will be served by
providing timely, creditable, and accurate information to those
most in need of it. That is the local citizens and their
emergency response infrastructure. Irresponsible information,
irresponsibly communicated, or irresponsibly over or under
communicated or interpreted, in the end, will serve no one well
in this effort.
Thank you very much.
[The prepared statement of Jerry Scannell follows:]
Prepared Statement of Jerry Scannell, President, National Safety
Council
Good morning, Mr. Chairman and Members of the House Commerce
Committee, Subcommittees on Health and Environment, and Subcommittee on
Oversight and Investigations.
My name is Jerry Scannell, and I am the President of the National
Safety Council, headquartered outside of Chicago, Illinois. The
National Safety Council is an 86-year-old nonprofit, nongovernmental
public service organization and a federally chartered organization
committed to working on behalf of public health and safety. Council
membership exceeds 18,500, and our member organizations employ more
than 30 million Americans.
Before becoming President of the National Safety Council in 1995, I
served for 15 years with Johnson & Johnson in New Brunswick--ten years
as Corporate Director, Health, Safety, and Environment, and five as
Vice President, Safety and Health. Also, from 1989 until 1992 I served
as Assistant Secretary for the U.S. Department of Labor for
Occupational Safety.
It is with my combined perspective through my years in public
service-- including my two years as a consultant on the House Committee
on Education and Labor from 1977 to 1979--the corporate community, and
now the nonprofit public service community that I welcomed the
opportunity to serve as one of 11 members on the Accident Prevention
Sub-Committee of the Clean Air Federal Advisory Committee.
Mr. Chairman, that experience, in the context of the
extraordinarily exciting ``information revolution'' we have seen
manifested most directly by the Internet and the World Wide Web, raised
some profound public information questions and riddles, that have come
to characterize this revolutionary new technology. Like the questions
this subcommittee must deal with each day, clear and unequivocal
answers--``bright lines,'' as they say--are often elusive, and
reasonable people in fact may disagree.
In my own case, the experience with the subcommittee proved to be a
highly valuable and very educational one. With most of the FACA
subcommittee members, I initially wanted to see the offsite consequence
analysis information duly posted on the World Wide Web with minor
security protection--the subcommittee referred to this as a speed bump.
I took that position in large part given my understanding--one that may
hold today just as it did then, by the way--that there is inevitable
momentum in this age of ``right to know'' and of citizen access to
information behind the data's being posted on the Web in any event.
Still, we must not understate the ever-present danger of hazardous
substances. The memory of the 1984 Bhopal, India, catastrophe remains
strong, and, according to the National Response Center, there were more
than 29,000 significant spills and releases reported in 1998.
This is a critical point. Many observers continue to believe that
the kind of sensitive information we are discussing here in fact will
find its way to the public through the Web, newspaper articles, SERCs,
LEPCs, and other emergency management organizations. If we accept that
hypothesis--and it is not an entirely unreasonable one--the question
then becomes whether the government itself should knowingly make that
information part of the Web given the inevitable balance between
competing needs: national security and community preparedness and
safety. It was not until I listened to the testimony from
representatives from the Federal Bureau of Investigation that I
concluded that the scales at least for now--and in the wake of the very
real terrorism experiences this nation has endured and the very real
continuing threat it faces--weigh in favor of the national security
concerns. Particularly compelling was the inability to secure online
sensitive data with current technology. The FBI's testimony reinforced
the conclusions of the security study conducted by Aegis Research
Corporation for the EPA that a national online database could easily
aid terrorists in identifying targets of opportunity throughout the
country. Although there is little data to determine the nature of the
security risk, we should exercise caution. I would recommend that EPA
periodically review this policy to assess whether the security risk
indeed outweighs the dangers of hazardous substances within our
communities.
I want now to comment in particular on the issues of local access
to the RMP and particularly, the offsite consequence analysis
information of concern to this subcommittee.
I believe that the primary value of the RMP data lies at the local
level. We know that the number of HAZMAT releases remains too high. We
also know that ``right to know'' data has made a signification
contribution to reducing chemical hazards over the past ten years. And
already, there is evidence to suggest that RMP data is contributing to
improved dialogue between chemical facilities and their neighbors.
However, in order for citizens to participate in this process--to
safeguard their communities--they need accurate and complete chemical
hazard information.
Currently, EPA does not have an assured method for distributing RMP
data to local citizens. Yes, EPA must work with state and local
emergency management organizations to distribute RMP data and, I
believe, that process is now underway. Nevertheless, the commitment and
capabilities of these largely voluntary organizations vary widely, and
Congress has provided very few, if any, resources to help with this
added burden. The Chemical Manufacturers Association has admirably
recommended to its membership that they voluntarily distribute RMP data
to their communities. But CMA members represent less than 15% of the
universe affected by the RMP. Citizens need ready access to the entire
RMP data set in their community to understand their risk.
I believe that the EPA has the resources and technology to
distribute LEPC specific information to citizens at the local level.
The data should be easy for citizens to obtain and use. What about the
security risk? According to Aegis Research Corporation, local
distribution of RMP data is far less a terrorist risk than a national
online database. Again, we need to balance the risks posed by terrorism
and those posed by hazardous chemicals.
Another audience needing the national RMP data set will be the
research community. The National Safety Council, among many other
organizations, is committed to improving the safe handling of chemicals
and to preventing incidents. To achieve these goals our researchers
need national data to understand the complexity of these issues. This
information can be distributed in a variety of ways to minimize risk,
but the data must be made available.
As with so many areas involving the sometimes conflicting rights of
citizens' ``right to know'' and the reality of the potentially
dangerous world in which we live, this is an area that will demand
close and ongoing scrutiny as it plays out in practice over its initial
implementation phase. Beyond all else, it is critical that the
subcommittee, no less than the local emergency responder or community
planner, recognize that the best interests of all will be served by
providing timely, credible, and accurate information to those most in
need of it: local citizens and their emergency response infrastructure.
Irresponsible information, irresponsibly communicated, or
irresponsibly over- or under-interpreted, in the end will serve no one
well in this effort.
Mr. Upton. Thank you.
Ms. Littles.
TESTIMONY OF PAULA R. LITTLES
Ms. Littles. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Chairman, members of the committee, my name is Paula R.
Littles. I am the citizenship-legislative director of the
Paper, Allied-Industrial, Chemical, and Energy Workers
International Union, formerly the Oil, Chemical, and Atomic
Workers and the United Papers Workers; we merged recently.
Also, I have worked at a petrochemical facility for the last 18
years, prior to assuming my present job.
We very much appreciate the opportunity to appear before
you today, because the question of full disclosure of RMP's is
a vital importance to our organization, our members, and the
communities in which they live.
The Clean Air Act requires EPA to implement a program to
assist in the prevention of chemical accidents. EPA developed a
Risk Management Program rule. This rule requires some 66,000
facilities that manage sufficient amounts of hazardous
materials to develop a RMP and file it with EPA. These
facilities include chemical manufacturers, refineries, water
treatment facilities, ammonia refrigeration, propane storage,
and semi-conductor fabrications. A project 85 million people
live and work within a 5-mile radius of an RMP facility.
The Clean Air Act also requires that EPA make this
information available to the public. Our organization became
very concerned in November when we discovered that EPA had made
a decision on November 6, 1998, to not allow full access to RMP
information.
Our main area of concern surrounding full disclosures are
members, their families, and the communities in which they
live. Our members are the first respondents to the site of a
manufacturing accident at their workplace. They also may work
at a site near an incident, next door, across the street, or 5
miles away, but near enough to be affected. Currently, not
enough effort has been placed on hazard reduction for our
organization to readily accept limited disclosure on hazardous
materials that our members work or live near.
There is also the issue of manufacturing security. It is to
our advantage as an organization that represents workers in
this arena that we can say to workers, their families, and the
community, that these facilities have nothing to hide. It would
also be to our advantage if we are able to tell workers that
these facilities are working toward reducing hazards and that
their RMP's are available in any form they need, electronic or
other, to provide the information needed to show that they are
really working toward hazard reduction. We believe that it is
not the knowledge that is harmful, but the lack of knowledge
that at times create mass hysteria and rushes to judgment.
We feel that if we are ever to have an effective, ongoing
hazard reduction, these plans must be fully disclosed to
encourage safer technologies, honor the public's right-to-know,
and overcome the institutional complacency that has overcome
the chemical industry, thereby, allowing them to produce no
serious quantifiable plan and timeline to reduce hazards.
Although numbers vary, depending on the source of
statistics and the period of time examined, there is no doubt
about the effects of chemical accidents on human lives. Year
after year, large numbers of people are killed or injured. In
addition, the numbers of those suffering from long-term
consequences of exposure must also be counted.
The Chemical Safety Board currently is reviewing 27
accidents in 20 States, as of February 3, 1998. And, also, in
the last 3 months of 1998, they began four incident
investigations. One investigation, 5 people were injured that
required medical treatment and the local residents were advised
to shelter in their homes; the other 3 investigations, 20
people were killed. Those were just the investigations that the
Chemical Safety Board began. That is a total of 20 workers that
were killed on the job in the last 3 months of 1998 that are
being investigated by the board.
These numbers are clear, and the message they send should
be equally clear; we need to work harder at reducing hazards,
and it is our belief that full disclosure is the beginning
step.
We believe that there are many valid and information uses
for RMP information by people who live, work, and conduct
business well beyond the immediate community where a facility
is located. RMP information can be useful in a number of ways.
Some ways we think that we could utilize it to assist our
members, the communities, and also people that aren't our
members that work in those areas, would be to help develop
studies on chemical hazards; effective accident prevention
programs; link other worker, safety, and public health
databases.
Just as we believe strongly that our members, their
families, and the communities they reside in would be made
safer by full disclosure, we do not believe that they are being
placed in any greater danger of sabotage and terrorism.
Risk management plans do not include any information about
how to sabotage an industrial facility, nor technical data
about how to create a ``worst case'' event, no tank locations,
no plant security information, and no classified information.
Chemical accidents respect no geographic boundaries, and we
must have the freedom to communicate concerning chemical
hazards.
Thank you for allowing me the opportunity to speak on
behalf of PACE to you this afternoon.
[The prepared statement of Paula R. Littles follows:]
Prepared Statement of Paula R. Littles, on Behalf of the Paper, Allied-
Industrial, Chemical and Energy Workers International Union (PACE)
Mr. Chairman, Members of the Committee, my name is Paula R.
Littles. I am the Citizenship-Legislative Director for the Paper,
Allied-Industrial, Chemical and Energy Workers International Union,
AFL-CIO (PACE). Our union represents 320,000 workers employed
nationwide in the paper, allied-industrial, chemical, oil refining, and
nuclear industries.
Our organization is deeply concerned over discussions surrounding
the issue of the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) not providing
full disclosures of Risk Management Plans (RMPs). We very much
appreciate the opportunity to appear before you today. The question of
full disclosure of RMPs is of vital importance to our organization, our
members, and the communities in which they live. We feel that if we are
ever to have effective, ongoing hazard reduction. These plans must be
fully disclosed to encourage safer technologies, honor the public's
right to know, and to overcome the complacency of the chemical industry
that has allowed it to produce no serious plan and timetable to reduce
hazards.
The Clean Air Act requires the EPA to implement a program to assist
in the prevention of chemical accidents. EPA developed the Risk
Management Program Rule. This Rule requires some 66,000 facilities that
manage sufficient amounts of hazardous materials to develop a RMP and
file it with EPA. These facilities include chemical manufacturers,
refineries, water treatment facilities, ammonia refrigeration, propane
storage, and semi-conductor fabrication. A projected 85 million people
live within a five-mile radius of a RMP facility.
The Clean Air Act also requires that EPA make this information
available to the public. Our organization became very concerned in
November when we discovered that EPA had made the decision on November
6, 1998 to not allow full access to RMP information. In joint
correspondence with other groups, we have expressed our concern to EPA
Administrator Carol Browner about EPA's ability to effectively deliver
full access to Risk Management Plans.
Our main area of concern surrounding full discourse is our members,
their families and the communities in which they live. Our members are
the first respondents to the site of a manufacturing accident at their
workplace. They also may work at a site near an incident, next door,
across the street, or five miles away, but near enough to be affected.
Currently, not enough effort has been placed on hazard reduction, for
our organization to readily accept limited discourse on hazardous
materials that our members work, or live near.
There is also the issue of manufacturing security. It is to our
advantage as an organization that represents workers in this arena that
we can say to workers, their families, and the community, that these
facilities have nothing to hide. It would also be to our advantage if
we are able to tell workers that these facilities are working towards
reducing hazards, and that their RMPs are available in any form they
need--electronic or other--to provide the information needed to show
that they are really working towards hazard reduction. We believe that
it is not the knowledge that is harmful, but the lack of knowledge that
has at times created mass hysteria and rushes to judgement.
We feel that if we are to ever have effective, ongoing hazard
reduction, these plans must be fully disclosed to encourage safer
technologies, honor the public's right to know, and to overcome the
institutional complacency that has infested the chemical industry,
thereby allowing them to produce no serious quantifiable plan and
timeline to reduce hazards.
Although numbers vary, depending on the source of statistics and
period of time examined, there is no doubt about the effects of
chemical accidents on human lives. Year after year, large numbers of
people are killed or injured. In addition, the numbers for those
suffering the long-term consequences of exposure must also be counted.
The Chemical Safety Board is currently reviewing or investigating
accidents in Arizona, Arkansas, California, Florida, Georgia, Idaho,
Iowa, Louisiana (3), Maryland, Michigan (2), Missouri, New Jersey (2),
New York, Ohio (2), Oklahoma, Oregon, Pennsylvania (2), South Dakota,
Texas, and Washington State (2), as of February 3, 1999. In the last
three months of 1998, the Chemical Safety Board began four incident
investigations. Of those four:
10-13-98: Five employees injured, local residents advised to
shelter in their homes;
10-24-98: Seven workers were killed;
11-25-98: Six workers were killed; and
12-11-98: Seven workers were killed.
That is a total of 20 workers who were killed on the job in the
last three months of 1998. These numbers are clear and the message they
send should be equally clear--we need to work harder at reducing
hazards and it is our belief that full disclosure is the beginning
step.
We believe that there are many valid and important uses for RMP
information by people who live, work and conduct business well beyond
the immediate community where a facility is located. RMP information
can be useful in the following ways:
To learn about vulnerability zones and prevention practices in
similar facilities in different states;
To verify reported information by comparing data submitted
elsewhere;
To hold government accountable for reducing hazards
nationwide;
To develop studies on chemical hazards;
To develop effective accident prevention programs;
To develop and conduct effective education and training
programs;
To link other worker safety and public health database; and
To determine which facilities might pose ``Year 2000'' risks.
Just as we believe strongly that our members, their families, and
the communities they reside in will be made safer by these full
disclosures, we do not believe that they are being placed in danger of
sabotage or terrorism.
In earlier discussions with EPA, the industry and everyone else
agreed that a ``professional terrorist'' would not be deterred by
keeping this information off the Internet. (For earlier discussion, see
www.epagov/swcrccpp/pubs/rmp-rpt.html--look under Section 2.B.
``Location of RMP* Info [Internet Issues]).
Risk Management Plans do not include any information about how to
sabotage an industrial facility, no technical data about how to cause a
``worst-case'' event, no tank locations, no plant security information,
and no classified information. Anyone can get readily available
information regarding the largest and most dangerous facilities that
store chemicals, without using the Internet. Also, keeping worst-case
scenarios off the Internet offers no real protection to communities.
Communities can only be protected when companies use safer chemicals,
reduce dangerous storage, widen buffer zones and provide full
information.
Chemical accidents have no respect for geographic boundaries. We
must have the freedom to communicate concerning chemical hazards, if we
are to have real hazard reduction. Only with full information,
disclosure, and opportunities to act can facilities, employees, and
communities reduce chemical hazards.
In conclusion, I would like to reiterate the following points:
The chemical industry should and must produce a serious
quantifiable plan and timeline to reduce hazards; and
Full disclosure of RMPs is the key tool needed to access the
impact of hazard reduction programs and activities.
Thank you for allowing me the opportunity to speak on behalf of
PACE today to explain our position on this important issue.
Mr. Upton. Thank you for coming, and we gave you a little
extra time because we spelled your name wrong. And so we are
fixing it.
Ms. Littles. Just an ``s.''
Mr. Upton. So, it is there.
Ms. Littles. That is okay.
Mr. Upton. I apologize for that.
Ms. Littles. That is okay; it happens all the time.
Mr. Upton. Mr. Burk, some groups claim that terrorist risks
associated with making the ``worst case scenario'' data
available via the Internet is, in fact, a red herring. In
giving your involvement with the Accident Prevention
Subcommittee since its inception, could you, please, recall for
this subcommittee how the issue of terrorism developed and how
the Accident Prevention Subcommittee addressed the issue?
Mr. Burk. Well, the issue of terrorism was raised at the
very first meeting of the Accident Prevention Subcommittee, and
that occurred in September 1996. There are 13 members on this
Accident Prevention Subcommittee representing a broad cross-
section of stakeholders. It was agreed that that issue would be
discussed at future subcommittee meetings, and I can say that
that issue was debated and discussed at each and every
subsequent meeting of that group and conference called of that
particular group.
With regard to your question of terrorist--could you just
repeat the first part of your question?
Mr. Upton. Terrorist risk associated with making the
``worst case scenario'' available on the Internet----
Mr. Burk. Right.
Mr. Upton. [continuing] being a ``red herring.''
Mr. Burk. Well, in the discussions, it became apparent
pretty quickly that Federal security agencies were against
posting sensitive information on the Internet such as distance-
to-endpoint, populations potentially affected, and chemical
quantity. And one of the reasons cited is that it facilitates
the targeting of--provides targeting information which would
help terrorists select targets.
Another example that was given by the Federal Bureau of
Investigation was that, in their experience, once the
information was posted on the Internet on how to produce bombs,
there was an increase in bombings and bomb threats. I will
acknowledge that there has been no evidence that posting
``worst case scenario'' on the Internet has caused any
terrorist threats, but we haven't yet done that either.
Mr. Upton. Mr. Scannell, I noted in your testimony, and you
write, ``The AEGIS Research Corporation for the EPA, that a
national online database could easily aide terrorists in
identifying targets of opportunity throughout the country.''
And you further add, ``According to AEGIS Research Corporation,
local distribution of RMP data is far less a terrorist risk
than a national online database.''
My sense, after listening to some of the testimony earlier
today, and reading yours last night, is that pretty much, we
are all in agreement that the local folks, fire folks that were
here today and other local leaders trained in that type of
response, do have the need and should have that information on
a local basis. But, putting it on online, for anyone, anywhere,
is the real problem. Is that your firm belief?
Mr. Scannell. Yes; that is the real problem. Where is the
action going to be taken? Where are we going to accomplish the
most? It is at the local level, and so the local community--
everyone in the local community there, whether it be the
schools, the fire department, and all--they need that data. And
that is where the dialog will take place, between the
community, the emergency responders, and the industry. And that
is where the progress will be made in reducing the risk to the
community.
You know, as I said, I was in favor of it originally, and I
became very concerned when I heard the FBI and other
organizations--although they weren't at the subcommittee
meeting, but they were involved--the CIA and others.
So, what don't just take it a little easy on this? Why
don't we move ahead slowly? Let us see how this works; let us
not do something that we would all look at and say, ``We should
never have done that. We should have been a little more
reasonable in approaching this issue.''
Mr. Upton. Mr. Orum, given that your organization has
already demonstrated the initiative to place information on the
Internet before any risk management plan has been made
available, and that is why you are sitting next to DuPont to
your right.
It is appropriate, as I understand it, about 10 DuPont
facilities have been placed. It is appropriate, I think, to
inquire about the intentions, what your intentions may be, with
regard to placing the ``worst case scenario'' data on the
Internet. And, if your organization was to receive the ``worst
case scenario'' data for all the reporting facilities in the
Nation and that that data was provided in the form requiring
minimal effort to post it, is your sense that your organization
would, in fact, do so?
Mr. Orum. I trust this light doesn't mean I am out of time
already?
Mr. Upton. No; as we started--as long as the question
starts, it gets to finish on the sought.
Mr. Orum. There are four things that we would want you to
understand.
First, newspapers who write about this, and their stories
will go on the Internet. LEPC's may make the decision to put
this on the Internet because it is the only cheap way to do it;
they don't have the funding. Industry, for community
responsiveness, may put their own ``worst case scenarios'' on
the Internet. I think that people will communicate this
information in a lot of different ways.
Second, the only party that, for sure, can keep their
information off the Internet is the decisionmakers who brought
these chemicals into the community in the first place. And this
is true, third, because, you know, regardless of whether you
have a Clean Air Act or not, people can post ``worst case
scenarios.'' They can find this information out. Much better
though, we think that the company do it themselves, in the
context of a hazard reduction program, because that is much
more likely to be successful.
And then, fourth, you know, for us, the Internet actually
is really not the issue. We need national data of the right-to-
know and hazard reduction, and a lot of other people do in the
same way. Whether it is on the Internet is less important than
meeting that need.
Mr. Upton. Thank you. I have a followup, but I will wait
until my turn.
Mr. Brown.
Mr. Brown. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Ms. Littles, you made a very compelling case, I thought,
for--I am sorry. You made a very compelling case for full
disclosure so that your members that work in chemical plants
really can know what they are working around.
Do you typically--do your members and local union officials
fairly often meet with management to talk about potential--
about chemical management practices and all that? Is that a
pretty frequent occurrence?
Ms. Littles. With some companies where you have fairly good
union management relationships; with other companies where we
don't have those relationships, then, it doesn't happen. I can
speak very well for the area that I came from. I was an officer
of a local union there, and we had eight--there were eight
companies in our union, eight different companies. There were
two companies that we had very good relationships with; we met
with them continuously. We were actually able to have
discussions with them to change some chemicals that they were
using to less hazardous chemicals, based on discussions we had
with people in other parts of the country, actually. We had
some smaller companies that we didn't have that type of
relationship with; they really were not interested in
discussing their managerial practices with us, and so we were
never able to work with them on any training or any other----
Mr. Brown. Would the ``worst case scenario'' information
have been useful to you in those discussions?
Ms. Littles. Yes, it would have; it really would have,
especially for some of our smaller plants.
Mr. Brown. Okay.
Mr. Orum, your testimony recalls some of the EPA workgroup
discussions, of which, I believe, the Chemical Manufacturers of
America and you both participated?
Mr. Orum. You are correct.
Mr. Brown. You mentioned that all participants agreed that
professional terrorists are savvy enough to access this type of
data, regardless of Internet access, and that no one claims the
Internet is necessary for criminal activity at a chemical
plant, therefore, the Internet is not the issue. So what is the
motivation? Why are we doing this today? I mean, if they all
kind of agreed that the Internet is not issue, what is this all
about?
Mr. Orum. Well, people clearly need access to national
information and for a variety of means. And I have been very
concerned all along that, in fact, the goal here of some
parties was, not so much to keep information off the Internet,
but to make sure that groups like ours couldn't get national
information, to put it that directly.
I mean, you need that information to hold Government
accountable, in the Government Performance and Results Act, for
example, which directs agencies to be able to set goals and
measure results. You need that national information to
prioritize correction of year 2000 computer safety problems, to
do social research, and many other needs.
That has been our primary interest here.
Mr. Brown. Thank you. One moment.
Okay; thank you.
Mr. Upton. Thank you.
The gentleman from Florida, the chairman of the Health and
Environment Subcommittee, Mr. Bilirakis.
Mr. Bilirakis. I would, first, like to place on record,
because it is unique and I think very much appreciated that Mr.
Gablehouse is still in the room. And I don't know that he has
learned anything that he didn't know before but it is always
appreciated when people want to pay attention to the entire
hearing.
And I also--we want to express our gratitude to the panel.
You have been very patient. The last panel is always the one
that has to be more patient than any others, and ordinarily you
don't have near the number of members here that you would have
during the earlier panels. So, it is always at a disadvantage,
to be on one of the later panels.
Mr. Scannell. You kept the best for the last.
Mr. Bilirakis. The best--that is very well put.
Well, Mr. Orum--Mr. Brown, with all due respect. Because I
tell you, I really value his friendship and his knowledge and
wisdom. But he said, ``The Internet is not an issue.'' Or,
everybody seems to say--I am not sure he meant it the way it
came out or it came into my ears.
Certainly, the Internet is the issue here, the way the
information is disseminated.
Anyhow, this hearing has been called and concern has been
expressed by the majority. It is not because we don't want
community right-to-know to work. We don't want people to know
what it is they should know about hazards in their community?
Why is it that we are concerned here? Why is it that we are
doing this? I mean, is it because we don't care about the
safety of Ms. Littles' workers--and by the way, you made a
compelling and a very interesting case.
But, why are we doing this, Mr. Orum? Why are we even
talking about maybe doing something? We haven't decided yet,
contrary to what, maybe was said earlier in some of the opening
statements.
Mr. Orum. By doing this, you mean making available----
Mr. Bilirakis. Why are we expressing concern here? Why are
we concerned about the way the information is disseminated? The
things that Mr. Scannell and Mr. Burk and the FBI and,
particularly, the law enforcement agencies and the fire people,
and what not, have expressed concern? Well, why are we doing
this?
Mr. Orum. As I understand it, you are expressing a concern
over the potential, incremental increase in terrorism that you
could see. What puzzles me, is the absence of the other half of
the equation. You are talking about things that would make it
harder for people to get this information.
Mr. Bilirakis. That very well----
Mr. Orum. But what about the other half of the question?
What are you going to do to make it harder to actually carry
out such an act? You know, what is being done to reduce these
chemical hazards in hardened facilities where----
Mr. Bilirakis. Well, but----
Mr. Orum. [continuing] you don't have that in the first
place?
Mr. Bilirakis. Yes, but the Clean Air Act is within our
jurisdiction, and this is, of course, why, you know, this comes
up. I mean there is an awful lot of ways to go about this.
Mr. Orum. There is----
Mr. Bilirakis. There is so much that can be discussed, in
terms of terrorism and in safety on the job and things of that
nature. You are right. But, the subject is what it is; why?
Because trade organizations have indicated that the FBI has
been working with the EPA and other people have expressed
concerns about third-party users and maybe the indiscriminate
use of this information being available.
Nobody up here is trying to keep community right-to-know
from working. You know, I think it would be so much more
responsible if we sat down and said, ``Hey, let us meet the
community right-to-know standard that was intended.'' Before
the days that Internet really took off, this committee played a
large part in writing the Clean Air Act. We are very much
concerned and supportive of community right-to-know. But
Internet was not in the picture at that time and a lot of
things were not contemplated.
Well, Mr. Scannell, can you explain to this committee,
whether you believe the right-to-know needs, as expressed in
the act, of chemical facilities workers, as expressed of Ms.
Littles, and the surrounding community will be met by local
distribution of risk management plan data?
Mr. Scannell. Yes; I mean it has to be well done and made
available to the workers. You are absolutely right; the workers
are the first ones that are affected by an incident.
Mr. Bilirakis. And can you envision this being done in such
a way that it will be very readily available to the workers?
Mr. Scannell. Well, EPA has a chore to determine how that
is to be done, but I think they are working on it, and I think
they will find a way, and the answer is, yes.
Mr. Bilirakis. All right. Thanks, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Upton. At this point, we will hear from a new member of
the subcommittee, Mr. Pickering; welcome.
Mr. Pickering. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Orum, I guess all of our objectives here are how to
maximize public safety. It is the common objective that I
think, whether it is the communities right-to-know--can that
type of information decrease the risk of ``worst case
scenarios'' and the public health associated with those
scenarios? And, at the same time, the concern expressed; would
it make it easier possibly for terrorism?
As you know, the President's budget has increased, he has
made a priority of counterterrorism initiatives. We are now
seeing increasing threats around the world related to terrorist
activities. And, so, it seems to me that part of our national
policy should be, or we should have a consistent policy across
the board. If we are going to have a counterterrorist
initiative that would try to reduce threats across the board
for public safety, it should be consistent.
But in that context, you raised the issue that we don't
know whether restricting that type of information in any way
will reduce a terrorist threat. A guess the counter, or the
other side of the coin, and question would be; can you cite any
specific evidence or example that, if this type of information
were made available in the past, it would have averted any type
of ``worst case scenario'' or would have provided any public
health benefit? Can you give us a specific example or benefit?
Mr. Orum. Yes; by comparison to our current best-known
national program, the Toxics Release Inventory, which is
created with having led to a 50 percent reduction in routine
releases as waste to the environment of toxic emissions that
are reported under that law. It was initially resisted quite a
bit, I think, by many in Government and industry, but has since
grown in popularity. I did include in my attachments, in the
very back page, a list of quotes from many industry people, in
particular, that were taken from newspapers indicating--that
characterize, that give a flavor of the impact of that law on
facilities, and what happens when, in fact, you do get the
corporate managers' attention through public disclosure.
Mr. Pickering. Would that benefit--and by your testimony, I
assume that that potential benefit of reduced risk outweighs
the cost of possible increase risks, as testified by the FBI
for terrorism.
Mr. Scannell seems to come with a reasonable approach to
say, ``Maybe we need to step back.'' These are legitimate
issues and concerns and see if we can work out a way where we
can meet both the appropriate right-to-know responsibilities
and disclosure, while at the same time building in safeguards
that would not put information out there that could help a
terrorist if he wanted to attack any type of facility in the
country.
Is there a process or a way that we can reach that common
ground or a balanced reasonable way to go here?
Mr. Orum. I suggested a number of areas in my testimony,
areas of agreement, that I though would help in that sort of
process. Yes, I think the potential benefits are dramatic. The
potential downside is quite incremental, and, at this point,
quite speculative. But, again, I think there is a third part of
the equation that is missing. EPA has clear authority under
112(r)(7)(a) to set regulations, to do real things to reduce
hazards in real places. That could include a two-part annex
attached to the Risk Management Program; first, a technology
options analysis, especially when you have big changes going on
in the plants of what are the safer alternatives and, then,
second, for those processes that don't have safer alternatives,
actual regulations, in terms of what needs to be done to make
those sites as safe as possible from a terrorist attack.
Mr. Pickering. Mr. Scannell, what process would you
recommend to try to come up with legitimate safeguards to
address both objectives and concerns raised by the FBI?
Mr. Scannell. Well, when the community gets all the
information that they should get and engages the industry,
meets with them--I mean it is a partnership. You are living in
the community; you have the right to ask questions. It was done
in companies that I had worked for in the past. And, those
questions need to be tough, and you are going to find that
industry is going to be responsive of it--not every company,
but virtually--I don't know of any CEO in this country that
wants to see his or her name in the paper that they have not
been responsive to the local community when they have an issue
of, you know, large quantities of chemicals being used or
storage is a question.
It is going to be solved at the local level; it is not
going to be solved at the national level. I mean, Paul can do
certain things with the data, but he is not going to get the
action that takes place at the local level as fast as the local
community can get it done.
Mr. Pickering. Could premature release of that type of
sensitive and, at times, fear-producing information, could it
actually work against those local partnerships if there is
premature release, if it not done in the proper context and the
proper partnership? For example, if you just had a ``worst case
scenario'' released to a community, without any dialog
established, could you create such fear that, then, you are not
able work together constructively in a partnership way?
Mr. Scannell. Me?
Mr. Pickering. I was addressing that to you.
Mr. Stupak. Okay; yes.
There are processes now in place, and there are regulations
in place. OSHA has the Process of Safety Management for Highly
Hazardous Chemicals. It is a blueprint for knowing how to
reduce hazards in the plant, for involving employees, change
management. The processes are there. Again, you know, we are
always facing large corporations versus small. Then, we discuss
this at the subcommittee meetings. How do we get to the small
community? There are processes to get to the small community
through organizations such as the Chamber of Commerce and
others who we have initiated discussions with and are willing
to develop the process to help the small chemical manufacturer.
And, so, yes; the processes are there, sir.
Mr. Pickering. My question is; would premature public
release of some of that type of sensitive information work
against such procedures and partnerships?
Mr. Scannell. Resentment and all, it could be, But I still
stand on getting the information to the local levels so they
can negotiate with the industry. If information is give
premature or if, you know, companies are blind-sided, they are
still going to react. CEO's are going to react, but, you know,
the best way to do it is through some collaborative effort with
the local community.
Mr. Pickering. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Upton. You are welcome.
The gentleman from Texas, Mr. Green.
Mr. Green. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I apologize for running
in and out, but we all know the schedules up here.
My district is in Houston and east Harris county, and I
know Ms. Littles knows it because she has recently moved from
Texas to Washington. Our loss is Washington's gain, Paula.
My district is the picture of a chemical area. I have
worked with my industries on the ``worst case scenario'' that
we are going through right now, the planning for it.
After looking at the testimony and the concern today--
because I also support the public's right-to-know, whether you
are at the plant and a worker, or whether you are on the fence
line like most of my district. I guess my concern is that I did
not realize until today that most communities, or a lot of
communities, didn't have a LEPC, a local emergency planning
committee, because, again, in an urban area, I think I have
four of them for different parts of my community, whether it is
on one side of the Houston ship channel or the other. And I
agree that local agencies could get involved--our EMS, our fire
departments, and everyone else.
But the public's right-to-know was a law passed long before
I got here--but I would have voted for it if I had been here.
And that is so important that I don't think any of us want to
give potential terrorists any information, but we also don't
want that to limit the people I represent from being able to
know what is across that fence or what they are handling if
they are working there.
Let me ask a question of Ms. Littles. As the representative
of the organization, in a new organization called PACE--and I
have to get used to PACE instead of OCAW--although I have paper
mills, too, in my area, who work at the facilities that handle
these substances and live in the community around it. It seems
to me that you would be most concerned about the risk
associated with that facility. Not only do they work there, but
they live close to it. And if a person who is speculating here
in Washington about somebody doing some terrible thing--and,
again, I want to react to that terrorism but I also don't want
to limit either your members or the constituents I represent
from getting that information--do you have some suggestions on
how we can deal with it?
Ms. Littles. Well, actually, what I was hoping was that----
Mr. Upton. If you could just move that microphone----
Ms. Littles. Sorry.
Mr. Upton. [continuing] a little closer.
Ms. Littles. It is a problem, and I recognize that. I have
listened to what everyone that spoke prior to me stated, and I
have listened to their concerns. I have listened to our
members, and I have listened to their concerns. I know what my
concerns were when I was working in a plant, and I know what
the communities' concerns are. And I also understand how our
membership around the country is interested in knowing what
other people are doing to make their work environment safer, so
that they can maybe benefit from that and have a safer work
environment by just trying to work with companies and changing
processes and in changing the chemicals that they use.
And, I honestly don't know what the answer is. In the past,
our discussions were always--our thought process was always
this was going to be on the Internet, the whole RMP's. We
would, then, be able to look at ``worst case scenarios,'' but
also would be able to look at what other companies were using.
We would be able to effectively go into facilities around the
country and sit down and try to have dialog with the company's
safety departments--their, our people or whatever--to try to
get them to maybe make the changes necessary for a safer work
environment for our members, which, in our opinion, would
actually spill over into the community because if we can get
one company to stop using chlorine and to change to something
that is safer, that is one RMP that won't have to be written.
Mr. Green. Yes.
Ms. Littles. And those were--that was just our thought
process. Then when it changed--we are here today really giving
our opinion and hoping that we can work with you all to come up
with the best workable solution so that we would have full
access and address the concerns that some others have.
Mr. Green. There is more of a likelihood of an accident--I
mean, I don't know, exponentially probably than a terrorist
attack.
Ms. Littles. That's true.
Mr. Green. And my limiting your ability to network and
plan, you know, that would cause even a bigger problem?
Ms. Littles. That is true.
Mr. Green. Mr. Chairman, I have one other question, and I
know the red light went on, but I would like to ask.
And I know there have been efforts, at least in--I am
familiar with the reduction in hazardous substances. And we
have had some success, at least in my district, because I
monitored them. And if we could just get as quick an answer as
possible from the industry about, you know, trying to reduce
some of these substances that are out there. Because, again, I
watched it for 15 years, and it is much better today than it
was 10 years ago.
Mr. Burk. Is that question to me?
Mr. Green. Yes.
Mr. Burk. Yes. Well, an integral part of the Risk
Management Program rule is the section called process hazards
analysis, which requires companies to systematically and
methodically identify the hazards, evaluate how you can lose
control of those particular hazards, and develop
recommendations to strengthen your process of safety management
at that particular process.
Another piece of the EPA regulation is the EPA suggested,
encouraged facilities to apply the principles of inherently
safer technology, and that would appear as you do a process
hazard unit developing recommendations. People would look at
substituting other materials, reducing inventories, things that
actually reduce the hazard on the facility.
Mr. Green. Okay. And I know that is what is in the law, but
I also know there is some success--and maybe, Mr. Orum, if you
could touch on that because in the reduction of those
substances that are available now.
Mr. Orum. It is very similar to a question Mr. Pickering
asked before which I answered by analogy, looking at the Toxics
Release Inventory, which, through public disclosure, is
credited with having great reductions in the release of routine
pollutions. In terms of the ``worst case scenarios,'' that
information isn't out there. It is the hope that there would be
similar dramatic reductions in vulnerabilities. So, if there
are 40 million people at risk this year, and 20 million people
are at risk 3 years from now, then you know you had a pretty
dramatic reduction.
Mr. Upton. We'll probably adjourn at that point.
But, Mr. Orum, I toured a plant in my facility earlier this
year. And it is a big facility, a major town on a river that
leads to Lake Michigan. And security is pretty tight; I had
never actually been in that particular facility before, but
there is a lot of barbed wire, a lot of cameras looking around.
It is a pretty complex operation, a lot of employees, and they
are very aware of the dangers that they all have, being very
careful. OSHA is there, and I am not aware of any major
accidents or problems that they have had. And I commented about
the security. They said, ``Well, we don't really want to be in
the press because, you know, we work well with our local folks.
If there is an accident, you know, we have got a good
relationship, people know what is going on. We really don't
want to get a lot of attention at all. We just want to sort of
be underneath that horizon.''
And, I am sure that if I went back to them next week when I
am back and said, ``How would you like being on the Internet so
that people, not only--anywhere in the country could all of
sudden see; all of sudden--you are that little beacon?'' And
they are a major source of--I think they are in the top five
utility users in the State of Michigan, which isn't bad when
you have to count Ford, GM, and Chrysler. You know about what
size that they might be.
But my guess is that they would say, ``We don't want to be
on the Internet. We have a very good relationship with a major
department here; it is Kalamazoo. And we are just fine; things
are going fine the way that they are now, and we have a feeling
that if, you know, if there is some problem we are going to do
the best we can under this scenario.''
And going back to sort of my question before we started at
this round; your organization has put some stuff online, maybe
before it was ready. I am not going to make a judgment on that.
But, you were here when you heard EPA, the administration, the
FBI, colleagues there at the table, indicate that they really
are against putting that for everyone to see. Not for the local
folks. They ought to be involved; they ought to be in the
planning. They ought to be able to figure out what might
happen, that they have got some prior planning.
But I didn't hear a, ``yes,'' or a ``no'' on my question
before, or even a ``maybe,'' in terms of what your thoughts are
if things go along without any change.
Mr. Orum. Well, I have been trying to disguise the fact
that I can barely manage Word on my desktop, let alone, you
know, putting up all manner of other----
Mr. Upton. I will send you my 10th grader because she is a
good little coach.
Mr. Orum. [continuing] information. I mean, yes, companies
oppose releasing ``worst case scenarios'' at all, let alone on
the Internet. Too, you know, again, the only party that can
guarantee, let alone me, anybody, putting anything on the
Internet--the only party that can guarantee the information
doesn't go on the Internet is the person who brings the
chemicals into the community, because they are the party, the
decisionmaker, who can make changes to take them out again.
And then, third, I can only point to examples like, from
the West County Times. This was created in 1993; it didn't use
any of this information. It used calculations that they made,
you now, that the newspaper made, themselves. And if that were
produced today, I am quite certain it would go on the Internet.
And yet, that is a vital--the publication dissemination of
information is simply a vital piece of the puzzle in getting
companies' attention, ending denial, and getting changes such
as real hazard reduction.
Mr. Upton. Well, I will leave it at that, I guess.
I don't know if anyone else has other questions.
You heard that the other panel, at the end of the day--for
those members that are not here or for members that are here,
we do have the right to ask you questions for 30 days for the
record. And I hope that you would accommodate us on that.
And I thank you, again, for your testimony, particularly,
in getting it here timely.
Thank you very much.
[Whereupon, at 3:19 p.m., the subcommittees were
adjourned.]
[Additional material submitted for the record follows:]
U.S. Department of Justice
Federal Bureau of Investigation
March 25, 1999
Honorable Ron Klink, Ranking Member
Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations
Committee on Commerce
House of Representatives
Washington, D.C. 20515
Dear Congressman Klink: The attached material is in response to
your letter dated March 17, 1999, requesting responses to questions
regarding Mr. Robert M. Burnham's testimony before your Subcommittee on
March 16, 1999.
If the FBI can be of any further assistance, please do not hesitate
to call.
Sincerely yours,
A. Robert Walsh
Legislative Counsel, Office of Public and Congressional Affairs
Enclosure
Question. Has the FBI ever quantified the risk of a foreign
terrorist attacking a U.S.-based chemical facility?
Answer. The FBI regularly provides assessments of the vulnerability
of potential targets. It is difficult, if not impossible however, to
quantify a threat from any terrorist without specific intelligence
regarding activities directed at a target or group of targets. The FBI
has an ongoing Nuclear Site Security Program in conjunction with the
Department of Energy in which our field offices around the country
conduct reviews of the security and potential vulnerability of DOE
facilities. The FBI field offices have also conducted these assessments
with the Department of Defense on U.S. Army chemical storage facilities
around the country. In addition, as part of the FBI's Special Events
Management responsibilities, the FBI conducts assessments of facilities
in locations involved in major special events, such as the upcoming
Olympics in Salt Lake City, and the recently completed Papal visit to
the U.S.
In addition to specific vulnerability assessments, the FBI is
involved in assessing the security of the Critical Infrastructure
within the U.S. to ensure that the potential targets which could have a
national impact, are properly identified and secured from terrorist or
criminal attacks. This is an ongoing program, and includes chemical
facilities.
In general, most terrorist attacks in recent years have been
planned and carried out by small cells or ad hoc groups which leave
very small footprints and are difficult to identify or track. Upon
reviewing the investigations of the World Trade Center and Oklahoma
City bombings, it became obvious that there may be no prior knowledge
or intelligence regarding some terrorist or criminal attacks of this
kind. By conducting these assessments and security reviews, the FBI
strives to protect targets that could be of interest to terrorists or
criminals even when no specific intelligence may exist at the time of
an imminent attack.
Question. Has the FBI quantified the increased risk of a terrorist
attack on a chemical facility based on the inclusion of the worst case
scenarios on the Internet or through any other means of public access.
Answer. As stated above, to attempt to attach a numerical indicator
to this type of an assessment, without data or specific intelligence,
would be speculative and would misrepresent the assessment as something
that can be statistically determined. Assessments or analyses of this
nature do not lend themselves to such a determination. Although many
advocate attaching some type of a number to these assessments, such as
a one in ten or a three in five chance, these numbers are normally not
derived through an actual statistical compilation but rather are simply
an attempt to provide an analyst's opinion in an easily communicated
format.
The FBI has not applied any analytical model to this issue. What we
have done is examine the terrorism and criminal cases in which chemical
or biological agents have been involved and determined that almost all
of the subjects have used the Internet in various ways. A majority of
the subjects have used the Internet to research recipes for chemical
and biological agents, techniques for staging attacks and designs for
devices and dissemination. Individuals and groups who have anti-
government views have sites where this type of information is regularly
shared, and are constantly surfing the Internet for new information
regarding these issues.
Question. Based on the experience with the Toxic Release Inventory
of a 50 percent reduction in routine toxic emission releases because of
the public's knowledge of what was being released, we can assume that a
similar reduction in hazardous chemicals--and the related accidental
releases--may occur after their existence is made public. Has the FBI
done an analysis of the benefits of fewer releases compared to the cost
of terrorist attacks on chemical facilities?
Answer. The FBI has provided a threat analysis regarding the
release of OCA, or Worst Case Scenario data in electronic format. In
doing so it should be emphasized that the FBI has stated that the
information should be shared with the public. The FBI is on record
repeatedly as supporting the ``Community Right to Know'' concept.
Moreover, as stated in recent testimony to committees in both the
Senate and the House of Representatives, the FBI applauds the gains
made in accident prevention and chemical safety through the Clean Air
Act, and wishes to assist the EPA and the interagency community in any
way possible in furthering this progress.
Question. A great deal of information about chemical facilities is
already available on the Internet. Does the FBI have any records of
attempts by terrorists to attack chemical facilities on existing
information about the facility obtained on the Internet or elsewhere
from these databases?
Answer. As stated earlier, currently the FBI does not have any
specific intelligence regarding terrorists acquiring information to
target facilities within the U.S. The FBI of course does not monitor
Internet sites to observe who is reviewing the sites or downloading the
information contained therein. The trend in terrorism, as illustrated
in the ``Leaderless Resistance'' concept, is the use of small, hard to
track groups. It would be impossible to state that we were aware of all
of the groups or individuals who may attempt to conduct an attack.
Consequently, when the FBI was asked to provide an assessment of the
security and terrorism issues related to the Internet distribution of
the Risk Management Plans, we attempted to suggest a reasonable and
responsible approach to providing the necessary information to the
public without releasing the information in a manner that would create
an unnecessarily adverse impact.
______
Jefferson County Local Emergency Planning Committee
Denver, Colorado
March 18, 1999
The Honorable Diana DeGette
Member, Committee on Commerce
1404 Longworth HOB
Washington, DC 20515
Dear Representative DeGette: In response to the question contained
in your letter of March 17th, I am pleased to respond in my capacity as
Chair of the Jefferson County Local Emergency Planning Committee.
Question. In a recent tragic incident near Allentown, Pennsylvania,
an explosion at a chemical plant killed four employees as well as a
worker visiting from a neighboring company. According to news reports,
the community responders and local citizens apparently were not aware
of the hazards posed by the plant. Do you believe that it would have
been reasonable for the local citizens to have had access to
information about the risks? Could information about ``worst case
scenarios'' have mitigated or even prevented this accident or others
like it? How could such scenarios have been helpful in reducing the
risk faced by workers, their families, communities, other companies and
the general public?
Response. The tragic accident in Allentown, Pennsylvania is an
example of the numerous chemical accidents that occur every year in
this country. In a recent report entitled ``The 600K Report'' the
United States Chemical Safety and Hazard Investigations Board indicates
that some 256 people are killed per year in chemical accidents. They
observe that these accidents have impacts well beyond those killed as
``Workers, companies, the public, emergency response organizations, and
all levels of government pay the figurative and literal price.'' It is
precisely this sense of community impact that is important to the
understanding of why chemical risk and accident scenario information in
the hands of the public and response agencies is so critical.
One can never know for certain that an accident could have been
prevented or a death avoided through the application of better
planning. Of course, without such an effort we can be certain that
prevention and avoidance are impossible. It is only through better
planning, which can only occur through the availability of better
information, that we have any opportunity to prevent chemical accidents
and reduce the severity of those that occur.
Better planning and response begins with better information.
Facilities depend upon public response agencies to protect them or at
least to support internal response efforts. Accordingly, information
about chemicals and risks must be in the hands of these agencies if
they are to be effective and protect the lives of their personnel.
Equally important, however, is the idea that the general public has a
role in the prevention and planning for accidents. This role is found
in community decisions such as planning and zoning, funding the
equipment a fire department should purchase, and the steps members of
the public should take in the event of an accident.
It is this last item that can be truly critical in the prevention
of injuries and death in the event of an accident. Many times the best
course of action for a citizen, school or neighboring business to take
in the event of an accident is sheltering in-place. This can be a
simple procedure involving closing doors and windows, and shutting off
ventilation systems. This technique can be taught to the public and
warning systems designed so that emergency response authorities can
quickly communicate the need to take action. Tornado warnings are an
excellent example of the sort of education and warning system that can
be put into place.
This sort of approach cannot be implemented in the midst of a
chemical accident. It can only result from preplanning and education.
Without information about the sorts of chemical risks and accidents
that can occur at facilities a preplanned system is impossible. The
emergency response agencies cannot begin to educate the public about
the steps they should take in the event of an accident unless there is
an understanding of the chemical accident scenarios faced in the
community.
This is not, however, a process that only involves the specific
community in which the facility is located. Through mutual aid
agreements it is likely that agencies from other communities will
respond. They need to have the same information to plan their response
and understand the equipment they may need.
Communities are not islands. We look to each other across the
country for advice and experience in handling the risks presented by
chemical accidents. It is critical that we be able to share information
about the risks similar facilities present in different communities as
well as the planning and response efforts that these communities have
adopted.
When fire agencies respond to the scene of a chemical accident they
must be careful and cautious. Obviously the safety of the response
personnel is critical. If these agencies do not have adequate
information about the nature of the accident it is very dangerous to
take direct action to halt the chemical release. This means that
critical time can pass before efforts to bring the chemical accident
under control can be taken.
Because of this problem response agencies routinely engage in
preplanning where they attempt to predict the sort of chemical
accidents they will face at a facility. This allows these agencies to
anticipate and practice their response. This also allows them to obtain
the appropriate equipment and practice its use. With preplanning these
agencies routinely are able to save lives and reduce property damage
because they are able to take offensive action to terminate the
chemical accident.
Access to information about chemical accident risk is critical to
this preplanning process. Without such information it is impossible to
predict scenarios for chemical accidents. EPA's risk management plan
regulation will make great strides in providing this sort of
information not only through worst case scenarios but also the
alternative scenarios. These scenarios will provide response agencies
with information critical to preplanning for chemical accidents.
It is important to recognize that many response agencies in this
country are volunteer organizations. It is difficult, if not
impossible, for such agencies to study facilities and develop scenarios
on their own. The owner or operator of a facility knows much more about
how it operates and the chemical accident risk they face. It is
necessary and appropriate for the facility to communicate this
information directly to the response agencies and the public. There is
simply no better way to manage the flow of information if our intent is
to prevent chemical accidents.
Each chemical accident is different in is cause, its immediate
impact and the long-term impact on the facility and community. It is
notoriously difficult to predict the impact of changed procedures and
information in 20/20 hindsight. Nonetheless, there are several things
of which I am certain.
1. No community can be prepared to respond to a chemical accident
unless it fully understands the chemicals present in that
community, the risk of accidents these chemicals present and
the accident impact scenarios they may face.
2. No community can take accident prevention and mitigation steps such
as zoning to keep dangerous facilities away from vulnerable
areas such as schools and hospitals unless they have this same
information.
3. No facility can prevent accidents unless it understands how
accidents can happen and the risks they face from the chemicals
in their facility.
4. No facility can properly plan to respond to a chemical accident
without understanding the accident scenarios they face.
5. No facility is an island--their accidents do have an impact beyond
the fence line. Chemical accidents kill and injure people that
live in these communities. Chemical accidents can devastate
local economies. Chemical accidents can damage or destroy
critical community services.
6. The prevention and mitigation of chemical accidents is a community-
wide problem. Without adequate information on chemical risks
and accident scenarios the community cannot participate.
I do believe that information access is central and vital to the
prevention of chemical accidents. It is likely that chemical accidents
in communities where there has been good preplanning will be fewer and
less severe. It is likely that such communities will experience fewer
injuries to the public and response agency personnel. Only facilities
can provide this information and the accident scenarios. They are part
of the community and depend upon the community for services and
support. It is their obligation to enhance the protection of their
communities by sharing information on chemical risks and accident
scenarios so that better planning can occur.
If I can add any additional information or answer any questions,
please let me know.
Best regards,
Timothy R. Gablehouse
cc: The Honorable Tom Bliley, Chairman
Committee on Commerce
The Honorable John D. Dingell, Ranking Member
Committee on Commerce
The Honorable Fred Upton, Chairman
Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations
The Honorable Ron Klink, Ranking Member
Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations
The Honorable Michael Bilirakis, Chairman
Subcommittee on Health and Environment
The Honorable Sherrod Brown, Ranking Member
Subcommittee on Health and Environment
______
National Safety Council
March 19, 1999
The Honorable Sherrod Brown
Subcommittee on Health and Environment
Committee on Commerce
U.S. House of Representatives
2125 Rayburn House Office Building
Washington, D.C. 20515-6115
Dear Congressman Brown: Thank you for your letter of March 17,
1999, asking me to elaborate on my testimony before the Subcommittee on
February 10 to the effect that the environmental ``right-to-know''
program has made a significant contribution to reducing chemical
hazards over the past 10 years. I am pleased to provide you that
elaboration.
Since Congress enacted the Emergency Planning and Community Right-
to-Know Act as Title III of the Superfund Amendments and
Reauthorization Act of 1986 (SARA), more than 3,200 local emergency
planning committees (LEPCs) have been established nationwide to provide
local contacts and local input into chemical safety issues in their
communities. Consisting of a broadly representative cross-section of
interested local groups--including, for instance, corporate and
citizens leaders and representatives, emergency response personnel, and
civic representatives--these volunteer committees in many cases have
proven exceptionally useful in assisting in chemical safety programs.
I must emphasize that as with any large number of organizations,
particularly when the participation is entirely voluntary, not all of
the LEPCs perform equally well. There clearly is room for improvement,
along with a need for additional resources and training, before the
LEPCs can consistently fulfill the obligations thrust upon them. But
despite that common reality, few would doubt that the LEPCs--working in
cooperation with their State and Tribal Emergency Response Commissions
(SERCs and TERCs)--have helped significantly to increase community
safety from chemical risks.
In addition to the work of many of the LEPCs and SERCs and TERCs,
it is useful also to point to the long-term trends in emissions of
industrial releases of toxics over the past decade or so. I am not
suggesting here that right-to-know alone deserves the credit for this
commendable trend: corporate and community commitments to ``best
management practices'' and the increased recognition that unnecessary
pollution carries with it high economic and social costs--these too
have been critical in forcing this trend.
At the same time, it is clear, as Congress clearly intended in
passing the right-to-know program and related Toxic Release Inventory
in the first place, that these other advances have been spurred and
accelerated by the right-to-know programs.
The U.S. Environmental Protection Agency in 1998, for instance,
reported that total TRI releases had declined by nearly 46 percent
since industry first started reporting its releases annually. Just
between 1995 and 1996, for instance, industries' TRI releases declined
by 100 million pounds--four percent.
These numbers of course vary from medium to medium, from air to
water for instance, and they vary also by industrial category. For
discharges to underground injection wells, for instance, the decline
came to 14.9 percent for the one year period, and reported air
emissions declined by seven percent for that year. For surface water
and land discharges, that one-year period actually showed an increase,
although releases to both surface water and land have declined--by 73
and 35 percent respectively--since the beginning of TRI reporting in
1988.
It would be naive, and wishful thinking, to infer from these
numbers that the decline in toxic release inventory emissions
necessarily correlates to a one-for-one decline in potential health
risks and hazards to our citizens. I emphasize that I make no such
suggestion here. However, it is equally important to emphasize the
clear correlation between reduced emissions and the resulting potential
for also reducing exposures to those chemicals and substances.
These stellar accomplishments are especially notable given the
strong economic growth and development we have been experiencing during
this same period.
Congressman Brown, when the Congress in 1986 passed the Superfund
reauthorization, Title III in many ways was just one small piece of a
very large and highly visible puzzle. Title III in fact attracted
relatively little attention either from the regulated community, from
environmental organizations, or from the news media.
In the interim, the Title III right-to-know program has been
referred to by many environmental professionals and scholars as being
akin to ``the mouse that roared'' or ``the little train that could'':
that analogy applies because of the impact of this program on helping
to reduce chemical risks, and doing so in a manner that is surprisingly
non-litigious and generally quite free of burdensome regulations.
As Congress recognized in passing the program initially, the
``light of day'' approach has worked in this case to help reduce
necessary risks. Having worked in both the government as Assistant
Secretary of Labor for Occupational Safety and Health and in the
private sector as vice president for health and safety for a major
pharmaceutical manufacturer, I can assure you of this, Mr. Brown:
Companies do not like seeing their name in a headline as, for instance,
``the county's largest single polluter''--or even as among the 10
largest or whatever. That kind of headline sends a real message through
corporate board rooms, and in many cases it's just such a message that
has led to emission reductions in subsequent years.
Thank you for the opportunity to provide more detail on my
testimony. I will of course be pleased to provide any additional
information you might need.
Sincerely,
Gerard F. Scannell
______
Paper, Allied-Industrial, Chemical &
Energy Workers International Union
March 18, 1999
The Honorable Gene Green, Member
House Committee on Commerce
U.S. House of Representatives
2125 Rayburn House Office Building
Washington, D.C. 20515-6225
Dear Representative Green: Following are answers to the additional
questions put forth in your letter dated March 17th concerning my
testimony before the Subcommittees on Health and Environment and
Oversight and Investigations regarding implementation of the Clean Air
Act's section 112(r) requirement for public release of chemical
facilities ``worst case scenario'' data:
Once chemical plants have submitted their Risk Management
Plans, the Environmental Protection Agency will have
information about worst case scenarios at chemical plants
across the nation. In implementing section 112(r),
Question #1: Do you believe that the availability of national data
to the public is important?
Answer. Yes.
Question #2: Should implementation of section 112(r) include
dissemination of national data to the public?
Answer: Yes.
Question #3: What is the value of a national database of
information about worst case scenarios to community responders, workers
and their families, local communities, the general public and others?
Answer: We believe a national database could and would be utilized
by community responders, workers, the general public and others in many
vitally important ways such as:
Learning about vulnerability zones and prevention practices in
similar facilities in different states;
Verifying reported information by comparing data submitted
elsewhere;
Holding government accountable for reducing hazards
nationwide;
Developing studies on chemical hazards:
Developing effective accident prevention programs;
Developing and conducting effective education and training
programs;
Linking other worker safety and public health databases;
Determining which facilities might pose ``Year 2000'' risks;
and
Using media access in responding to chemical accidents.
In addition to those listed above, I am certain there are numerous
other ways a national database of ``worst case scenarios'' information
could be used in responding to chemical plant accidents.
Please do not hesitate to contact me if you require additional
information.
Sincerely,
Paula R. Littles, Director
Citizenship-Legislative Department
______
United States Environmental Protection Agency
Offce of Solid Waste and Emergency Response
The Honorable Sherrod Brown
U.S. House of Representatives
Washington, D.C. 20515
Dear Congressman Brown: I am writing in response to your request
for additional information regarding my February 10, 1999 testimony
before the Subcommittees on Health and Environment and Oversight and
Investigations regarding implementation of the Clean Air Act's Section
112(r) and public access to ``worst case scenario'' data. I am
enclosing a response to your specific question. I appreciate your
interest in this important issue. Please do not hesitate to contact me
if you have additional questions.
Sincerely,
Timothy Fields, Jr.
Acting Assistant Administrator
Enclosure
Question: Based on the experience with the Toxic Release Inventory
of a 50% reduction in routine toxic emission releases because of the
public's knowledge of what was being released, we can assume that a
similar reduction in hazardous chemicals--and the related accidental
releases--may occur after their existence is made public. Has the EPA
done an analysis of the benefits of fewer releases compared to the cost
of terrorist attacks on chemical facilities?
Answer. Implementing a risk management program at a facility and
making risk management plan information public does not necessarily
result in a reduction of hazardous chemicals (although some inventory
reductions and process modifications are likely). However, EPA expects
a reduction in the severity and number of accidental chemical releases
through the RMP effort because facilities will have a greater
understanding of the hazards present in their processes and will take
action to prevent releases. In addition, sharing information with the
public about the hazards, past releases, and prevention efforts leads
to a greater awareness at the local level of the risks and action
necessary to address them through prevention, emergency preparedness
and response.
In the Economic Impact Analysis prepared for the RMP rule, EPA
showed that chemical accidents are very costly and disruptive but the
benefits associated with the RMP effort outweigh the costs of
prevention and making the information public. Although EPA has not
analyzed the costs of a terrorist attack, we presume the costs would be
similar to the costs associated with an equivalent chemical accident.
Consequently, making information public through the RMP should lead to
the same positive benefits; awareness by industry and the public of a
threat should lead to action to reduce the vulnerability to such an
attack (such as greater security measures and a reduction of hazards at
the facility that could be used as a target) and to greater
preparedness at the local level to respond and protect the public from
harm.
______
Working Group on Community Right-To-Know
Washington, DC 20003
March 31, 1999
The Honorable Henry A. Waxman
U.S. House of Representatives
2204 Rayburn House Office Building
Washington, DC 20515
Dear Mr. Waxman: Below are my responses to your questions about
right-to-know and hazard reduction under the Clean Air Act, section
112(r), of March 25, 1999. These questions and responses are consequent
to testimony before the Health and Environment and Oversight and
Investigations Subcommittees of the House Commerce Committee, February
10, 1999.
Question 1. Is information about worst case scenarios generally
available to communities? Are on-site company records about worst case
scenarios typically accessible to citizens who want access to them?
Does a reliable process currently exist for workers and citizens to
obtain this kind of information from facilities that handle listed or
extremely hazardous substances? Is there any process or readily-
available data to compare worst-case scenarios among facilities owned
by the same entity?
Answer. Most communities lack basic public information about the
potential worst-case harm of chemical fires, spills, or explosions at
chemical-using facilities in their midst. (A few large companies have
released such scenarios in anticipation of the Clean Air Act's legal
requirements to do so, and some newspapers have independently
calculated and published worst-case scenarios.) Currently available
Federal right-to-know information for chemical hazards does not include
companies' own estimates of worst-case chemical accident scenarios.
Thus there is currently no reliable process for the public to obtain
worst-case scenarios from facilities that handle listed or extremely
hazardous substances. Nor is there any organized process for creating,
compiling, and comparing worst-case scenarios among facilities owned by
the same entity. An accessible national database of worst-case
scenarios would enable people to hold companies accountable for
reducing chemical hazards in communities.
Question 2. The Administration will soon decide how to make
information about worst case scenarios available to the public. In one
potential scenario under discussion, the facilities would be required
to make information about worst case scenarios available to the public
on site at the facility. In your view, how would such a plan serve the
local community's interests and the national interests? Is such a plan
practically workable? Does sufficient enforcement authority and
resources exist for such a plan? Do facilities have, or are they
required to have, specific procedures and personnel to respond to such
requests?
Answer. The Clean Air Act, section 112(r), does not obligate
covered facilities to provide worst-case scenario information directly
to the public. Thus the law does not allow for this option. There is no
legal requirement for covered facilities to have either procedures or
personnel to respond to requests. There is no legal remedy for citizens
if companies refuse information. This option is cumbersome (at best)
for local residents, due to travel times and distances, hours of
operation, lack of transportation, multiple covered facilities, and
other barriers. The chemical industry has a poor record of responding
to citizen requests for information. In one survey, citizens were
unable to get answers to seven basic questions about chemical use and
accidents from more than 75 percent of chemical facilities.\1\ This
option is also inadvisable for local facilities, as small businesses
could spend unnecessary sums responding to citizen requests for
information that could be available in a simple database.
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\1\ U.S. Public Interest Research Group, Trust Us, Don't Track Us,
1998.
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Nor does this option meet national needs. This option prevents
people from readily learning about hazards in other jurisdictions where
relatives live or children are sent to school. It prevents people from
learning about safety improvements at similar facilities in other
communities. It prevents people from holding corporations accountable
for chemical hazards nationwide. It prevents people from identifying
the most serious potential consequences of year-2000 computer and
embedded chip failures that could trigger accidents. It prevents people
from verifying reported information by comparing data submitted
elsewhere. It prevents people from analyzing trends by geographic area,
chemical, company, or industry, etc.
Question 3. Are adequate steps currently being taken to achieve the
stated goal of section 112(r)? What additional measure could or should
be undertaken to achieve the purposes of section 112(r)? Would you
consider limiting public access to worst-case scenarios a reversal of
the policy established in section 112(r) to prevent accidental release?
Answer. The goal of section 112(r) of the Clean Air Act is to
prevent accidental releases of extremely hazardous substances. The law
provides two principle means to achieve this goal: 1) right-to-know
provisions (in Risk Management Plans), and; 2) release prevention
regulations. Risk Management Plans, including worst-case accident
scenarios, are due to U.S. EPA by June 21, 1999. However, proposals to
limit public access to the vital right-to-know component of RMP
information cast into doubt the right-to-know provisions of the law.
Without these right-to-know provisions the alternative is to reduce
hazards through release prevention regulations. Yet, the U.S. EPA has
never used its authority under section 112(r)(7)(A) to compel companies
to reduce chemical hazards. Thus nearly a decade after Congress passed
the Clean Air Act Amendments, steps to achieve the stated goal of the
act are plainly inadequate. At the same time, chemical accidents
continue unabated. A new report indicates that some 600,000 chemical
fires, spills, and explosions were reported to the Federal government
over a recent ten-year period.\2\
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\2\ Chemical Safety and Hazard Investigation Board, The 600K
Report: Commercial Chemical Incidents in the United States 1987-1996,
February 1999.
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Limiting public access to worst-case scenarios would clearly
reverse the accident prevention policy established in section 112(r) of
the Clean Air Act. Current efforts are failing to reduce accidents.
Additional measures are needed to reduce chemical hazards. Congress
should:
1) Ensure that EPA disseminates complete national RMP data on
schedule, particularly in order to identify, set priorities, and
correct potential ``year-2000 (Y2K) computer failures that can endanger
communities with chemical accidents;
2) Set a deadline by which EPA shall establish release prevention
regulations under 112(r)(7)(A), emphasizing the use of safer
technologies to prevent the possibility of a chemical accident;
3) Require the Federal Bureau of Investigation to work with EPA in
establishing release prevention regulations (or authorize the FBI to
close facilities that pose a high risk to surrounding communities and
that refuse to reduce hazards within a reasonable period of time);
4) Require covered facilities to report materials accounting
information in order to better track and control materials, assess
hazards, and develop and adopt safer technologies.
Question 4. Local Emergency Planning Communities (LEPCs) are
appointed by states to plan for community responses to chemical
accidents. How many LEPCs exist around the Country? Does every locality
have a LEPC or access to one? How are LEPCs generally funded? Do LEPCs
typically communicate effectively with the public about the risks at
chemical plants? Can the public always rely on LEPCs as a dependable
conduit of information about worst-case scenarios? The Administration
is considering various approaches to making information about worst-
case scenarios available to the public. In one proposal, the
information about scenarios would be made available to the LEPCs. Do
you believe that the public will always be able to obtain accurate
information from LEPCs about worst-case scenarios? Do you foresee any
difficulties with implementing the section in this manner?
Answer. On paper, there are an estimated 3,800 Local Emergency
Planning Committees (LEPCs) in the United States.\3\ These LEPCs are
unevenly distributed by state. Some states have many, such as New
Jersey with over 500 LEPCs. Some states have few, such as Oregon with
one statewide LEPC. According to one report, ``[t]he number of LEPCs in
the United States is not known; estimates vary between 3,000 and
4,500.'' The report continues: ``[m]any LEPCs exist only on paper, and
many others exist, but have not succeeded in meeting even their basic
responsibilities.'' \4\ A 1994 Nationwide LEPC Survey conducted by
George Washington University concluded that 21 percent of LEPCs were
``inactive,'' 39 percent were ``quasi-active,'' 16 percent were
``compliant,'' and 24 percent were ``proactive.'' \5\ Thus in many
communities there is no effective LEPC, and in many communities
institutional and resource constraints prevent LEPCs from carrying out
basic functions.
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\3\ Ruth Ellen Schelhaus, LEPC Information Exchange, How LEPCs are
Organized Across the U.S., 1999.
\4\ Resources for the Future, The Future of Local Emergency
Planning Committees, 1993.
\5\ George Washington University Department of Public
Administration, Nationwide LEPC Survey, 1994.
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Funding for LEPCs is poor and inconsistent. As of 1993, by one
estimate, only 22 states provided funding to their LEPCs.4
Further, some states that have fee systems for emergency planning do
not pass money to the LEPCs.\6\ Other sources of LEPC funding include
voluntary contributions from industry, Federal grants, and enforcement
settlements. Thus many LEPCs do not have a reliable ongoing source of
funding. Asking LEPCs to disseminate RMP information--the legal
responsibility of a Federal agency--is an unnecessary ``unfunded
mandate.''
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\6\ National Governors' Association, Emergency Planning and
Community right to Know Act: A Status of State Actions--1991-1992 (p.
5).
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Major studies show weak communications between LEPCs and the
public. The U.S. General Accounting Office identified three major
studies that show weak LEPC communication with the public:
Communicating With the Public About Hazardous Materials: An Examination
of Local Practice, U.S. EPA, 1990; Risk Communication and Community
Right-to-Know, Tufts University, 1991; and Nationwide LEPC Survey,
George Washington University, 1994.\7\
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\7\ U.S. General Accounting Office, Chemical Accident Safety; EPA's
Responsibilities for Preparedness, Response, and Prevention, 1996.
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For example, according to one analysis, ``[M]ost LEPCs have little
contact with the public or even with community organizations that could
introduce a citizens' perspective . . . Moreover, many members come
from emergency response backgrounds that stress one-way communications
with the public . . . and make little room for questioning or critical
analysis of options. Under these conditions, it is unrealistic to
expect LEPCs to attempt to foster public debate of environmental issues
or to focus on hazard reduction rather than emergency response.'' Due
to a variety of constraints in resources, programs, and communications
strategies most LEPCs ``have not made a concerted effort to bring
hazardous materials issues to public attention''.\8\
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\8\ Richard C. Rich, W. David Conn, and William L. Owens,
``Indirect Regulation'' of Environmental Hazards Through the Provision
of Information to the Public: The Case of SARA, Title III, Policy
Studies Journal, 21, No. 1, 1993 (16-34).
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In addition, the Clean Air Act does not require LEPCs to
disseminate Risk Management Plan information. There is no legal
mechanism in the Clean Air Act or the Emergency Planning and Community
Right-to-Know Act that citizens can currently use to obtain Risk
Management Plan information through LEPCs, if the LEPC fails to act.
Notably, LEPCs already have authority to request worst-case
scenarios from industry, under EPCRA, section 303(d)(3). However, very
few LEPCs have used this authority. Citizens have unsuccessfully
requested that their LEPC obtain worst-case scenarios from industry. In
some cases, citizen members have been forced off LEPCs after raising
concerns that others opposed.\9\
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\9\ Sunday Advocate (Baton Rouge, La.), Panels drop environmental
advocates, July 29, 1990.
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In summary, many communities do not have active LEPCs. Many LEPCs
lack funding. Few LEPCs communicate effectively with the public. The
LEPCs are not a reliable conduit for RMP information. The public will
not always be able to obtain accurate worst-case scenarios from LEPCs.
Disseminating RMP information is legal the responsibility of a Federal
agency. These are but a few of the many problems of relying on LEPCs to
disseminate RMP information.
LEPCs face many difficulties in planning for emergencies, and
should be one point of public access to RMP information, not the only
point of access.
Additional barriers created by dispersed access to worst-case
scenario information are set forth ``Ten Reasons for a National, Public
Data System for Risk Management Plans,'' an attachment to testimony of
February 10, 1999.
Thank you for your interest in right-to-know and chemical hazard
reduction.
Sincerely,
Paul Orum
Working Group Coordinator