[Senate Hearing 107-1033]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
S. Hrg. 107-1033
RAILROAD AND MARITIME SECURITY
=======================================================================
HEARING
before the
SUBCOMMITTEE ON SURFACE TRANSPORTATION AND MERCHANT MARINE
OF THE
COMMITTEE ON COMMERCE,
SCIENCE, AND TRANSPORTATION
UNITED STATES SENATE
ONE HUNDRED SEVENTH CONGRESS
FIRST SESSION
__________
OCTOBER 2, 2001
__________
Printed for the use of the Committee on Commerce, Science, and
Transportation
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SENATE COMMITTEE ON COMMERCE, SCIENCE, AND TRANSPORTATION
ONE HUNDRED SEVENTH CONGRESS
FIRST SESSION
ERNEST F. HOLLINGS, South Carolina, Chairman
DANIEL K. INOUYE, Hawaii JOHN McCAIN, Arizona
JOHN D. ROCKEFELLER IV, West TED STEVENS, Alaska
Virginia CONRAD BURNS, Montana
JOHN F. KERRY, Massachusetts TRENT LOTT, Mississippi
JOHN B. BREAUX, Louisiana KAY BAILEY HUTCHISON, Texas
BYRON L. DORGAN, North Dakota OLYMPIA J. SNOWE, Maine
RON WYDEN, Oregon SAM BROWNBACK, Kansas
MAX CLELAND, Georgia GORDON SMITH, Oregon
BARBARA BOXER, California PETER G. FITZGERALD, Illinois
JOHN EDWARDS, North Carolina JOHN ENSIGN, Nevada
JEAN CARNAHAN, Missouri GEORGIA ALLEN, Virginia
BILL NELSON, Florida
Kevin D. Kayes, Democratic Staff Director
Moses Boyd, Democratic Chief Counsel
Mark Buse, Republican Staff Director
Jeanne Bumpus, Republican General Counsel
------
Subcommittee on Surface Transportation and Merchant Marine
JOHN B. BREAUX, Louisiana, Chairman
DANIEL K. INOUYE, Hawaii GORDON SMITH, Oregon
JOHN D. ROCKEFELLER IV, West TED STEVENS, Alaska
Virginia CONRAD BURNS, Montana
JOHN F. KERRY, Massachusetts TRENT LOTT, Mississippi
BYRON L. DORGAN, North Dakota KAY BAILEY HUTCHISON, Texas
RON WYDEN, Oregon OLYMPIA J. SNOWE, Maine
MAX CLELAND, Georgia SAM BROWNBACK, Kansas
BARBARA BOXER, California PETER G. FITZGERALD, Illinois
JEAN CARNAHAN, Missouri JOHN ENSIGN, Nevada
JOHN EDWARDS, North Carolina
C O N T E N T S
----------
Page
Hearing held October 2, 2001..................................... 1
Statement of Senator Boxer....................................... 20
Statement of Senator Breaux...................................... 1
Statement of Senator Cleland..................................... 25
Statement of Senator Hollings.................................... 3
Statement of Senator Hutchison................................... 30
Statement of Senator Inouye...................................... 19
Statement of Senator Kerry....................................... 2
Statement of Senator Rockefeller................................. 14
Statement of Senator Smith....................................... 27
Prepared statement........................................... 27
Statement of Senator Snowe....................................... 22
Witnesses
Cox, Joseph J., President, Chamber of Shipping of America........ 41
Prepared statement........................................... 43
Crye, J. Michael, President, International Council of Cruise
Lines.......................................................... 37
Prepared statement........................................... 38
Hamberger, Edward R., President & CEO, Association of American
Railroads...................................................... 34
Prepared statement........................................... 35
Underwood, Admiral James W., Director of the Office of
Intelligence and Security...................................... 4
Prepared statement........................................... 7
Warrington, George D., President & CEO, National Railroad
Passenger Corporation.......................................... 30
Prepared statement........................................... 32
Appendix
Welch, Edmund B., Legislative Director, Passenger Vessel
Association, prepared statement................................ 57
RAILROAD AND MARITIME SECURITY
----------
TUESDAY, OCTOBER 2, 2001
U.S. Senate,
Subcommittee on Surface Transportation and Merchant Marine,
Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation,
Washington, DC.
The Subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 10:15 a.m. in
room SR-253, Russell Senate Office Building, Hon. John B.
Breaux, Chairman of the Subcommittee, presiding.
OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. JOHN BREAUX,
U.S. SENATOR FROM LOUISIANA
Senator Breaux. The Subcommittee will please come to order.
We thank all of our witnesses who will be appearing, and also
our guests who are here this morning. We will be joined shortly
by some of our Ranking Members on the Republican side who have
a great interest in this matter as well.
I have called the hearing this morning to focus on what is
being done to maintain an increased security on our nation's
railroads and also ships. What we are not doing is holding this
hearing in any way to scare the public or overly alarm the
public as to any potential risk. However, in the aftermath of
the September 11 terrorist attacks we need to explore what
steps our Government and also the private sector are taking and
have taken to prevent future acts of terrorism and to explore
what further steps can be taken in order to better protect the
public.
If any of our witnesses that we have appearing with us this
morning feel that line of questioning in any way jeopardizes
any aspects of security that do not need to be made public, I
would certainly like for them to indicate so and to refrain
from public comment.
I also would like to announce hearings which we will be
scheduling, have scheduled and have approved now on October 10
at 9:30 in the morning for this Subcommittee to also look at
the security of bus and truck operations in the United States.
A great deal of attention, obviously, has been focused in the
news on the transportation in particular of hazardous
materials, much of which runs also by trucks, and that needs to
be looked at, and we will be doing that on October 10.
I will abbreviate the rest of my opening statement and just
point out that about one-third of terrorist attacks around the
world reportedly target transportation and transportation
systems, so obviously this is an area that has to be given a
great deal more security than perhaps we have done in the past.
Securing the safety of passengers in these modes of
transportation is a key goal that we all share. Amtrak, for
example, provided passenger service for more than 22.5 million
passengers just last year. Also, the question of cargo that is
shipped both by rail and by ship is very essential to this
nation's internal and national security, and needs to be
considered.
The United States has over 1,000 harbor channels, 25,000
miles of inland intracoastal and coastal waterways which serve
over 300 ports around this country, with more than 3,700
terminals that handle both passenger as well as cargo movement.
All of these, I think, today are being looked at with a great
deal more security than perhaps they were before September 11.
Most of our seaports, obviously are located in major urbanized
areas, and obviously present in that sense special problems and
special concerns.
We do not bring up, as I said before, these issues lightly,
but also we do not intend to infer that our transportation
system, and particularly rail and passenger ships, are not
secure and are not safe. The intent of the hearing is to find
out what we have and are currently doing, and the prospects for
additional and better security in the future.
With that, do I have any comments from any of our
colleagues? If not, we would like to welcome our first
witness--excuse me, Senator Kerry.
STATEMENT OF HON. JOHN F. KERRY,
U.S. SENATOR FROM MASSACHUSETTS
Senator Kerry. I cannot stay that long. I wanted to make a
couple of comments, if I can, just very quickly.
First of all, I want to thank you for proceeding on this
hearing. We had a discussion about this a couple of weeks ago,
and I think it is critical look at these areas. An awful lot of
people have commented that as we beef up our airports, which we
need to do, there are clearly other pressure points where
potential mischief becomes more attractive, and so we need to
deal with that, but I wanted to just comment on a couple of
things.
For a long time now, some of us have been focused, through
the narcotics trafficking, on the question of ports and port
inspection and cooperation from foreign countries. There have
been some discussions, I know, in Singapore recently about port
security. The prime minister was here. One of the main topics
of discussion was how we are going to look at things before
they come into the United States, because of the difficulties
of inspecting once packed containerized and so forth, and the
obviously better place is their point of departure. I think,
Admiral, we would welcome your comments and thoughts how we may
engage in this new global effort to try to be smarter about
inspecting.
It is not just terrorism, it is also narcotics trafficking,
and frankly evasion of other kind of market rules by which we
are supposed to play.
Mr. Chairman, we need to also recognize that, I think it
was a fellow at the Foreign Relations Committee, Coast Guard
Commander Flynn, who wrote an article in the New York Times
last week about how trying to get some of this stuff is like
trying to catch a minnow at the base of Niagara Falls, it is an
extraordinarily difficult task, and in fact airline security is
like Fort Knox compared to the security on trains and other
modes of transportation today, so it is particularly important
that we focus on how we make tunnels safe. What is the traffic
situation going to be like on Amtrak? Amtrak, to our pleasure,
has had an enormous ridership increase, 10 percent increase in
the wake of the September 11 attacks on the Accela Express,
which prior to September 11 was capturing about 42 percent of
the New York-Washington business. Reservations are up 40
percent, and as a result of this Amtrak has added 608 seats
during the peak periods on the Northeast Corridor.
But Mr. Chairman, it should not escape the notice of this
Committee that Amtrak's ridership in the West is up 8 percent,
and business on long haul trains is 15 percent greater than
normal, and these figures indicate that passenger rail safety
and security needs to be a priority for the members of this
Committee, which is the vast majority of this Committee--the
Northeast is not.
Amtrak is seeking an additional $3 billion in funding for
much-needed security and safety improvements, and I support
that, and I hope we can get them that, but they need also to
have additional concerns addressed by this Committee with
respect to the other security issues.
And finally, Mr. Chairman, I would like to thank the Coast
Guard for their help in activating the 307th Port Security Unit
at St. Petersburg and sending the 147-man unit to augment the
security of Boston Harbor. That is one of only six reserve port
security units nation-wide, and on 1 day's notice they got
their Boston Whaler patrol boats hauled from Florida on flatbed
trucks launched in Boston, available for 24-hour coverage, and
that raises an issue of concern to us in Boston.
There have been no weekly shipments of liquid national gas
to Boston since September 11, and nearly 20 percent of the
natural gas needs of New England and the Port of Boston come in
via double-hulled tankers. We would not, if we chose to build a
facility today, build it where it is, in Everett, near housing,
but I think we can provide adequate security. I am grateful to
the Coast Guard for the meetings we have had to do that. The
Governor has said it is not a question of if they will come in,
it is a question of when, and I want to commend the Coast Guard
for their efforts in pulling together a broad coalition of
people to help analyze the situation, to move forward on it,
and we are very grateful to you for doing that.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Senator Breaux. I would just comment on the Senator's
statement. The LNG tanker that was going to Boston was actually
diverted to Louisiana. It was, I think 33 million gallons of
LNG that was for your area was diverted because of security
questions.
We have been joined by our distinguished chairman of the
full Committee, if he has any comments.
STATEMENT OF HON. ERNEST F. HOLLINGS,
U.S. SENATOR FROM SOUTH CAROLINA
The Chairman. Well, the cylinders for that natural gas
containment, bringing them out of Algeria, are manufactured by
General Dynamics in Charleston, in the port there, and we would
be glad to send you both as many as you wish.
Mr. Chairman, thank you very much for this hearing. It is
important for many reasons, but let us get just one comment
about security.
I am glad to see the hearing led off by Admiral Underwood,
which in addition to airport security we have got railroad
security, the tunnels, and Grand Central Station, and in
addition, as Senator Kerry has just mentioned, the ports bill
that we have got out on the floor, and the bill right now for
airport security contemplates a Deputy Secretary of
Transportation in charge of security, that he will have all of
these responsibilities, that it must be professionalized, and
that is enough said.
Thank you very much.
Senator Breaux. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman, and with
that we would like to welcome our first witness, who is Admiral
James Underwood, who is Director of the Office of Intelligence
and Security with the Department of Transportation.
Admiral we have your testimony. If you would like to
summarize, we would proceed to questions.
STATEMENT OF ADMIRAL JAMES W. UNDERWOOD,
DIRECTOR OF THE OFFICE OF INTELLIGENCE AND SECURITY
Admiral Underwood. Thank you, Chairman Breaux, Chairman
Hollings. Thank you for the opportunity to appear before you on
the critical topic and area of concern for our entire nation.
First, I want to express and extend my deepest sympathy to
the families of the victims of the tragedies of September 11, a
day that marked a change in the comfort and confidence of our
American citizens in our security and safety.
While aviation was clearly the immediate focus for
everyone, we realize there is a broader threat to our critical
assets and our population. We must now reexamine some of our
basic security assumptions and address potential threats. On
September 11, Secretary Mineta acted quickly and decisively. In
response to the unprecedented attacks, the Secretary shut down
the entire United States air space for all civil aviation. The
Federal Aviation Administration has been slowly bringing the
civil aviation system back in studied increments.
As you know, before the Secretary allowed our airports to
reopen, and air carriers to resume operations, airports and air
carriers had to meet stringent new security measures. As
President Bush has articulated, at all airports increased
numbers of uniform and plain clothes security, law enforcement
officers and canine officer teams have been deployed to provide
greater deterrence, surveillance, and response in the case of
an emergency.
Access points to secured areas of airports have been
reduced to the operational minimum, and airports have increased
random security checks and ID checks through their entire
terminal areas. We will continue to work to improve technology,
the workforce, industry vigilance, and our own awareness of
possible new access issues.
This brings me to today's topic. Secretary Mineta has been
adamant that aviation is not the only key transportation asset
of the United States, and that we must work now to protect the
critical infrastructure elements of our railways, roads,
transit systems, pipelines, and waterways. Much has been done,
with some restrictions and precautions starting the very day of
the attack. To date, most have been voluntary, or coordinated
action taken under local and state authority. The private
sector has been largely responsible for assuring its own
infrastructure and business security practices. We have
developed a trusted partnership with the transportation
industry and state and local authorities that transcends
economics and politics, and acknowledges that our ultimate goal
is to protect our country, its people, and our freedom.
In light of September 11, we must consider how to assure
the long-term consistency and sustainability of these security
measures. To that end, on September 17, Secretary Mineta
created the National Infrastructure Security Committee at the
Department of Transportation to focus on intermodal
transportation security issues in the new threat environment.
This Committee is in the process of identifying high-value,
high-consequence transportation assets and current protection
strategies, developing a set of national standards that address
a prudent level of protection for our most critical
transportation assets, and identifying and addressing the
strategic gaps between the current and desired level of
protection for the most critical of these assets. Secretary
Mineta also formed two rapid response teams on airport and
aircraft security, and is currently weighing their
recommendations.
On September 24, Secretary Mineta established a Maritime
Direct Action Group to evaluate the need for enhanced port
security measures, and we appreciate this Committee's
recognition of the importance of this effort. Formation of this
action group builds on the United States Coast Guard efforts
with homeland security and maritime domain awareness. The
coordination and responsiveness by the transportation community
and the initiation and implementation of additional measures
have been exemplary during the past 3 weeks. Let me offer a
snapshot of the activities within the Department's operating
administrations that have occurred since September 11, starting
with railroads.
FRA has been coordinating with freight, intercity
passenger, and commuter railroads and industry groups such as
rail labor organizations, the Association of American
Railroads, the American Shortline and Regional Railroad
Association, and the American Public Transportation Association
to review current security programs in light of the recent
terrorist threats to determine whether enhanced security
measures may be needed to maintain the security of the railroad
industry.
The freight railroad industry has established a task force
to study security threats to their physical assets, train
operations, information technology systems, hazardous material
transportation, and national security shipments.
Individual rail companies already increased inspections and
surveillance at sensitive locations such as tunnels bridges,
interlockings, and terminals. Amtrak and the commuter railroads
have taken immediate measures to enhance security at stations
and at critical points on their routes, and APTA has
established a special passenger security task force to examine
issues unique to their needs, and to determine the need for
further improvements.
The Federal Highway Administration has increased efforts to
heighten security and surveillance of critical highway
infrastructure elements, including vital connectors to our
ports, railroads, and military bases. The Federal Motor Carrier
Safety Administration is taking swift action to ensure that
hazardous materials in the transportation system cannot be used
as a potential weapon by terrorists.
Over-the-road bus companies and other commercial passenger
carriers are cooperating with the federal motor carriers to
heighten security, reviewing baggage checks and ticketing
passengers, consulting security professionals, and as much as
possible avoiding locations that might pose security risks to
passengers.
The Federal Transit Administration is providing assistance
to help improve the preparedness level of transit agencies
across the country, and in order to improve pipeline security,
the Research and Special Programs Administration immediately
issued threat advisories to pipeline companies, and continues
to review security measures of major pipeline companies working
with the department's state regulatory counterparts.
Contingency response plans are being outlined at all levels
for all modes of transportation. Let me assure you that we are
continuing to identify critical transportation assets, and
define potential or current countermeasures and assurance
measures to protect them.
America's waterways, like air transportation, are a key
element of the critical transportation infrastructure. The
United States Coast Guard acted promptly to ensure the security
of the waterways, exercising its full authority to identify,
examine, and control ships and watercraft in and near critical
assets and populated areas. Since September 11, Coast Guard
boarding officers and support personnel in the major ports have
been inspecting commercial vessels arriving in the United
States to ensure that their purpose is legitimate and their
cargoes are safe.
In New York Harbor and elsewhere, crews have been working
12-hour shifts 7 days a week to establish and enforce security
zones, while making sure commerce continues to flow. They are
working together as a seamless force of active duty, reserve,
civilian, and auxiliary members. In fact, over 2,700 Coast
Guard reservists have been called up to active duty to augment
our forces and to enable the deployment of the port security
units Senator Kerry referred to. Major Coast Guard cutters have
been positioned in the approaches of all our major ports, while
Coast Guard aircraft perform flights for logistics and patrol
duties.
Employment of these assets in homeland security is a superb
example of the Coast Guard's multimission agility. In this
case, pulling resources from its fisheries enforcement, aids to
navigation, drug and migrant interdiction missions without
diminishing its traditional search and rescue responsibilities.
We must now rigorously test the effectiveness of the
established and newly implemented security procedures across
all modes. We must also enhance our efforts at physical
security vulnerability assessments. Our capabilities to make
these assessments are not consistent across all modes, and we
are working on plans to address this disparity. We must examine
the security measures implemented with confidence in the
aviation industry, and move to attain comparable levels of
security competence in the other modes in all areas, such as
employee verification, access control, awareness, inspection,
and protection.
Last, I want to address the issue of commitment. I am proud
of the commitment of the workers of all of the operating modes
of the Department of Transportation in addressing this clear
and present danger. In addition, I applaud the commitment of
the transportation community to identify their own
vulnerabilities, address them, and work with Government to go
the next step and achieve what Secretary Mineta has called a
new normalcy.
Thank you for this opportunity to present my thoughts
before you. I welcome your comments and questions.
[The prepared statement of Admiral Underwood follows:]
Prepared Statement of Admiral James W. Underwood,
Director of the Office of Intelligence and Security
Thank you for the opportunity to appear before you on this critical
topic and area of concern for our entire nation. I want to express my
deepest sympathy to the families of the victims of the tragedy of
September 11, a day that marked a change in the comfort and confidence
our American citizens have in their security and safety. While aviation
was clearly the immediate focus for everyone, including the Department
of Transportation and national security offices, we realize there is a
broader threat to our critical assets and our population. The
possibilities we now face are driven by the deliberate attack on our
society that most could not have imagined prior to September 11. We
must now reexamine some of our basic security assumptions and address
potential threats.
I am here to report, first: with confidence that we have been doing
just that for transportation, second: with some concern that it is not
yet enough in all areas, and third: with commitment that we will
continue to identify all vulnerabilities and address them.
On September 11, Secretary Mineta acted quickly and decisively. In
response to the unprecedented attacks, the Secretary shut down the
entire United States airspace for all civil operations. The Federal
Aviation Administration (FAA) has been slowly bringing the civil
aviation system back up in studied increments. As you know, before the
Secretary allowed our airports to reopen and air carriers to resume
operations, airports and air carriers had to meet stringent new
security measures through a certification process. I must tell you that
we have had an unprecedented level of cooperation between the Federal
Government and airport operators and air carriers to implement these
procedures so quickly and effectively. Also, we have been working and
will continue to work closely with the intelligence community and all
components of the aviation industry to identify and address other
possible threats. For example, we grounded crop dusters until we could
be certain that measures were in place to address their potential use
as a means of distributing chemical or biological agents on a populated
area.
As President Bush has articulated, at all airports, increased
numbers of uniformed and plainclothes security, law enforcement
officers, and canine officers have been deployed to provide greater
deterrence, surveillance, and response in the case of an emergency.
Access points to secured areas of airports have been reduced to the
operational minimum, and airports have increased random security checks
and ID checks throughout their entire terminal areas. All cutting
instruments, including knives, box cutters, scissors, and straight-
edged razors, are banned from carry-on luggage and may no longer be
sold in ``sterile'' terminal areas--those areas beyond the security
checkpoints. We have increased the number of Federal Air Marshals
flying on select flights and we will continue to expand that program.
We will continue to work to improve technology, the workforce, industry
vigilance, and our own awareness of possible new access issues.
This brings me to today's topic. Secretary Mineta has been adamant
that aviation is not the only key transportation asset of the United
States and we must work now to protect the critical infrastructure
elements of our railways, roads, transit systems, pipelines, and
waterways. Just yesterday, Secretary Mineta traveled safely to
Philadelphia by train. Much has been done, with some restrictions and
precautions starting the day of the attack. To date, most have been
voluntary or coordinated as action taken under state and local
authority. The private sector has been largely responsible for assuring
its own infrastructure and business security practices. We have
developed a trusted partnership with the transportation industry and
state and local authorities that transcends economics and politics and
acknowledges that our ultimate goal is to protect our country, its
people and our freedom. In light of September 11, we must consider how
to ensure the long-term consistency and sustainability of these
security measures.
To that end, on September 17, Secretary Mineta created the National
Infrastructure Security Committee (NISC) to focus on intermodal
transportation security issues in the ``new'' threat environment. NISC
is in the process of identifying high-value, high-consequence
transportation assets and current protection strategies; developing a
set of national standards that address a prudent level of protection
for our most critical transportation assets; and identifying and
addressing the strategic gaps between the current and desired level of
protection for the most critical of these assets. Secretary Mineta also
formed two Rapid Response Teams on Airport and Aircraft Security, and
is weighing their recommendations. On September 24, Secretary Mineta
established a Maritime Direct Action Group (MDAG), to evaluate the need
for enhanced port security measures. We appreciate this Committee's
recognition of the importance of this effort. Formation of the MDAG
builds on the United States Coast Guard's efforts with Homeland
Security and Maritime Domain Awareness.
Because of the recognized need for heightened security,
coordination and responsiveness by private industry in the initiation
and implementation of additional measures have been exemplary the past
3 weeks. We have been working on identifying and promulgating best
practices across all modes. The Federal Railroad Administration (FRA)
plays a liaison role between the Department's security office and the
railroad industry. FRA's broad safety authority and expertise in
railroad safety and operational issues give it a significant role to
play in helping to analyze and address security threats in the rail
mode. Since September 11, FRA has been coordinating with freight,
intercity passenger, and commuter railroads and industry groups, such
as rail labor organizations, the Association of American Railroads, the
American Short Line and Regional Railroad Association, and the American
Public Transportation Association (APTA), to review current security
programs in light of the recent terrorist threats to determine whether
enhanced security measures may be needed to maintain the security of
the railroad industry. The freight railroad industry has established
task forces to study security threats to their physical assets, train
operations, information technology systems, hazardous materials
transportation, and national security shipments. Individual rail
companies have already increased inspections and surveillance at
sensitive locations such as tunnels, bridges, interlockings, and
terminals. Amtrak and the commuter railroads have taken immediate
measures to enhance security at stations and at critical points on
their routes, and APTA has established a special passenger security
task force to examine issues unique to their needs and to determine the
need for further improvements.
The Federal Highway Administration (FHWA) has increased efforts to
heighten security and surveillance of critical highway infrastructure
elements, including vital connectors to our ports, railroads, and
military bases. An Emergency Preparedness and Response Team will
identify areas of potential vulnerability and operational concerns.
This team is examining such issues as vehicle size and weight limits,
intermodal coordination, and coordination with the Military Traffic
Management Command (MTMC). FHWA Division offices are currently working
with state and local DOTs to assess risks to critical infrastructure
and countermeasures. Over the next 2 weeks, recommendations will be
made to the field offices for initiatives to maintain the flow of
commerce, protect and restore critical facilities, and monitor the
movement of hazardous materials. Division offices will work with state
DOTs on implementation of an appropriate public notification system,
such as the New York City DOT website which updates the closed/open
status of all transportation activities--roads, bridges, tunnels,
transit, ferries--on one website. The Team will also be identifying
technology solutions for priority movement of military and emergency
resources, as well as public notification.
The Federal Motor Carrier Safety Administration (FMCSA) is taking
swift action to ensure that hazardous materials in the transportation
system cannot be used as a potential weapon by terrorists. FMCSA's
field staff in every jurisdiction are making security visits to
trucking companies that transport hazardous materials to urge
heightened vigilance and the creation of security plans. Companies are
being asked to carefully look for potential vulnerabilities in every
aspect of their operations--from package control to en-route protection
to communications--and to devise ways to strengthen safety. Particular
stress is given to conducting thorough background checks on drivers and
being alert for suspicious behavior from drivers, shippers, consignees
or the public. Trucking associations and hazardous materials transport
associations are helping out by contacting their members and passing on
suggestions for improving security measures.
Our partners in state safety enforcement have joined the effort by
giving greater priority to hazardous materials enforcement at the
roadside and stepping up driver inspections and license verification
for hazardous materials carriers.
FMCSA has been cooperating closely with the Federal Bureau of
Investigation and other law enforcement agencies to check on drivers
who hold licenses to transport hazardous materials. In the past 2
years, the FMCSA has dramatically increased its scrutiny of state
licensing agencies to root out corruption in commercial licensing.
Over-the-road bus companies and other commercial passenger carriers
are cooperating with FMCSA to heighten security, reviewing baggage
checks and ticketing procedures, consulting security professionals,
and, as much as possible, avoiding locations that might pose security
risks to passengers.
The Federal Transit Administration is providing assistance to help
improve the preparedness level of transit agencies across the country.
Contingency response plans are being outlined at all levels for all
modes of transportation. Let me assure you that we are continuing to
identify critical transportation assets and define potential or current
countermeasures and assurance measures to protect them.
America's waterways, like air transportation, are a key element of
the critical transportation infrastructure. Considering that 95 percent
of all overseas products move through seaports, the Department of
Transportation is especially interested in detecting cargo and people
that may arrive aboard ships having the intent to harm the United
States. Equally important, we are working hard to identify persons
operating clandestinely on the water, with the intent of protecting
ports from disruption and damage. We are working cooperatively with
other federal agencies and maritime industry groups to share
information and resources for a common purpose.
In order to improve pipeline security, the Research and Special
Programs Administration immediately issued threat advisories to
pipeline companies, continues to review the security measures of major
pipeline companies, and is working with the department's state
regulatory counterparts to relay security advice to intrastate pipeline
companies.
We must now rigorously test the effectiveness of the established
and newly implemented security procedures across all modes. We must
also enhance our efforts in physical security vulnerability
assessments. Our capabilities to make these assessments are not
consistent across all modes, and we are working on plans to address
this disparity. We must examine the security measures implemented with
confidence in the aviation industry and move to attain comparable
levels of security and confidence in the other modes in all areas, such
as employee verification, access control, awareness, inspection and
protection.
We are examining how we can initiate and require measures to
protect all transportation assets nationwide, and protect sensitive
security information across all modes. This specific authority is now
available to the FAA and the Coast Guard but not to the Secretary of
Transportation or other modal administrators. Voluntary measures will
not provide the systematic and ongoing security level the Department
seeks and the United States requires.
Lastly, I want to address the issue of commitment. I am proud of
the commitment of the workers of all of the operating modes of the
Department of Transportation in addressing this clear and present
danger. For example, the Department's Crisis Management Center was
immediately operational at 9 a.m. on September 11, and was operated
around the clock by employees, including many volunteers, from
virtually every DOT agency. In addition, I applaud the commitment of
the transportation community to identify their own vulnerabilities,
address them, and work with the Government to go the next step and
achieve what Secretary Mineta has called a ``new normalcy.''
Thank you for this opportunity to present my thoughts before you. I
welcome your comments and questions.
Senator Breaux. Thank you very much, Admiral Underwood.
Thank you for your statement, and also thank you for the things
that have been going on within the Department of Transportation
with regard to new things, and procedures that have been put in
place.
When we were preparing for the hearing and talking with the
staff, I set out an analogy, or a possibility that I think
highlighted the potential for problems with regard to the rail
passenger system in this country. I pointed out that under the
old system, that I or someone who wanted to do grave damage to
the passenger system could take a suitcase, load it with
explosives, and roll it over to Union Station, where I would
buy a ticket on an automatic ticket machine, and then roll that
suitcase onto a passenger train and set my case right behind
the engine, perhaps, and then walk right off the other side of
the train, and the train leaves, and the horrible, inevitable
would happen. What, if anything, from a procedural standpoint
has now been set up that would prevent that, or likely prevent
that from happening?
Admiral Underwood. Mr. Chairman, since September 11 the
Amtrak police force has stepped up their patrols. They are now
working 24 hours, 7 days a week, 12 on and 12 off shifts. They
have increased the amount of security in the stations, in the
major stations. They are checking passenger ID's at the point
of issuing tickets. They are requiring a photo identification
at that point.
Senator Breaux. Suppose you buy your ticket on an automatic
ticket machine. Can you still do that?
Admiral Underwood. They will check the identification on
the train.
Senator Breaux. Do you have a passenger manifest list of
the passengers riding?
Admiral Underwood. They do not have a passenger manifest of
the people that are riding. However, they do have a list of the
people we are looking for, and are checking that photo ID
against that list. This is the list we have been provided by
the FBI that we have also shared with the other modes of
transportation.
Senator Breaux. Is there any thinking in terms of baggage
inspection on passenger trains, or is that something that has
been considered, and what are the parameters?
Admiral Underwood. That is one of the items we are still
considering.
Senator Breaux. Can you elaborate about the pros and cons?
What are people saying of what should be done and what should
not be done?
Admiral Underwood. As you know, our rail system, a very
important piece of the transportation system, does have a much
different--it is not analogous to an airport. It does not have
the same security checkpoints. The access to the airport is
much more controlled than it is to a rail station, and so there
are a lot of difficulties in putting something like that in
place. There are a lot of stations in our country that are
not--that passengers can still get on-board trains.
Senator Breaux. Can we to any degree of certainty guarantee
the safety of a rail passenger system without preinspecting
luggage that is brought onto trains?
Admiral Underwood. I think the steps that the Amtrak chief
of police has implemented since September 11 are a dramatic
increase in the level of security that we are providing to the
rail passenger industry. The same steps are being mirrored in
the commuter rail by the local----
Senator Breaux. You do not envision any requirement or move
towards inspection of carry-on baggage on passenger trains?
Admiral Underwood. Sir, I think that is still one of the
items that is under consideration.
Senator Breaux. Just from a timing standpoint, do you think
you are going to have a decision on that in the near future, or
what?
Admiral Underwood. I do not have a sense of the timing on
that, Senator.
Senator Breaux. Let me ask a question about the subject
matter that Senator Kerry brought up, with the LNG, dealing
with the ports. There are a lot of other questions I want to
get into on passenger ships as well, but liquified natural gas,
a tanker that was going into Boston Harbor was diverted from
Boston Harbor, eventually I guess was sent to Lake Charles. Can
you elaborate on that, and is that what happened, and if so,
what made Lake Charles a secure port and Boston an insecure
port?
Admiral Underwood. My understanding is that the tanker
MATTHEWS is the one that was diverted from Boston, and that it
is mooring in Savannah, Georgia today.
Senator Breaux. It did not go to Louisiana?
Admiral Underwood. It did not go to Louisiana.
Senator Breaux. What made Savannah a safe port and Boston
an unsafe port?
Admiral Underwood. Savannah had the security apparatus in
port set up and ready to receive the LNG tanker. There was some
concern that in Everett that security force was not capable at
that point to receive it. There are, as were mentioned, some
broad meetings going on across agencies, and with the
communities that Admiral Nacarra is putting together in the
First Coast Guard District to address improved and enhanced
security.
Senator Breaux. Let me ask about the general nature of the
security from the Department of Transportation, and this will
be my last question about particularly the railroad security.
You are an Admiral with a distinguished career in the Coast
Guard, but I take it now that you are also overseeing security
for railroads, which is certainly a whole different area.
The Federal Railroad Administration I take it has
responsibility for safety but not security. I am not sure what
the difference is there. How is this structure going to work?
Are you going to be overall responsible for security as well as
safety? We are going to have people stumbling over each other
if we do not get the procedure straight, and a working
framework about how this is to be handled from the question of
ship passenger security, rail security, both for passengers and
cargo. How is all of this going to work? Are we going to be
stumbling over each other? What are we going to do?
Admiral Underwood. In the National Infrastructure Security
Committee that Secretary Mineta has formed those are exactly
the kind of issues that are being addressed and being brought
to the table so that we can examine that and determine what
that recommended structure would be.
With respect to my being a Coast Guard Admiral and suddenly
being a security expert on the railroads, I can assure you I
have had a lot of help from the railroad industry, getting to
the point that I am as knowledgeable, as limited as that might
be, but that the railroad police have a fine organization, and
they work very closely with the International Association of
Chiefs of Police in developing what those right security
measures are.
Senator Breaux. But am I correct in that railroad security
in the past has pretty much been left up to the private sector,
the owners and operators of the transportation system?
Admiral Underwood. Yes, you are correct.
Senator Breaux. Senator Hollings.
The Chairman. Well, tell them, please, they have got to get
on the ball, start moving and not wait for all of this
planning, let us go to airline security, Admiral. Of course,
you were not involved in this, but right after this occurred on
9/11 I gave the Secretary Mineta over a week's notice of a
hearing that we were going to have, suggested at the time, to
secure those doors, and I have yet to see it--you talk about
rapid response.
Once you get a secure door like they have at El Al, whether
it is steel or Kevlar or whatever else--and they have got
doors. If I ran an airline I would not dare want to fly any
more airplanes unless I had a secure door, and once the door is
made secure, and never to be opened in flight, that in reality
more or less stops all of this airline takeover and using
domestic flight for a weapon of mass destruction.
If you know that you cannot get into the cockpit, you can
start cutting some people up or start a fight back in the
passenger cabin, but once that starts the plane will be landed
and the FBI will be waiting, so--you can start a fight in this
room if you want to, if I am a terrorist or whatever, but
somehow, somewhere they have all studied it, and they said
rapid response. Tell that crowd they are not rapid, and they
are not responding.
Once you get that door secure at Reagan Nation, that ends
it. There is no difference between Reagan National and Dulles.
You cannot--will the pilot guide the plane into the White
House? That is done. That problem is solved. You have got to
check your pilots, they are checked now. They have got all good
records. Tell them, let us get going.
On rail security, let us assume I am a terrorist and I want
not to blow up anybody, nor get to the tunnel or anything else.
All I would have to do is take a crowbar, and work at the dark
of night to really twist that rail around, undo the pins and so
forth like that, and derail it. How do you stop that?
Admiral Underwood. We have in the rail industry they have
examiners that go out and look at the track on a regular basis,
and the one night, overnight, I would defer that question to
the next panel.
The Chairman. We have to figure out some way, and I know
they have electronic signals and everything else of that kind.
Admiral Underwood. Well, if the track is not in place we
could tell.
The Chairman. You could tell if the track is not in place?
Admiral Underwood. If it is broken, yes, they could tell.
The Chairman. They could tell that immediately at some
central point?
Admiral Underwood. They have the capability of doing that.
The Chairman. Well, good. That educates me. That is why I
am asking, to try to find out, because everybody is talking
about the tunnels, but I want to derail a train before it gets
in the tunnel or whatever it is, or before it goes across the
pass, or the river, or whatever else.
Admiral Underwood. Without going into a lot of details,
that can be overridden.
The Chairman. That can be overridden?
Admiral Underwood. By somebody who understands the system,
so there is a need for stronger legislation, criminal
legislation against people that would do that, would wreck
these trains, and I think the FRA has proposed some legislation
on a number of occasions.
The Chairman. On the maritime, Admiral, we have been
working at the Committee level and have the bill reported for
port security, and we found out that the Customs said, oh no,
the Coast Guard was in charge. The Coast Guard said, oh, no,
the DEA checks that, and the DEA said no, the Port of Bayonne,
New Jersey checks that, and everybody was putting it off onto
the next one.
Under the law, the Captain of the Port--now, this is
something you know about--is the responsible officer, is that
not correct?
Admiral Underwood. That is correct.
The Chairman. And have you have any difficulty in this
coordination, because I take it you folks are moving, not just
waiting on legislation to secure the ports.
Admiral Underwood. There has been nothing but absolute
cooperation with all of our fellow Government agencies and
industry in the wake of September 11.
The Chairman. When you say absolute cooperation, how about
security checks for the personal working the port?
Admiral Underwood. Enhanced security across the port. Now,
the Coast Guard has not taken on the personnel security for the
people on the land side.
The Chairman. Who takes that on?
Admiral Underwood. I don't have that answer.
The Chairman. Well, I think if you have got the overall
security, you had better fix it, and we have got to know that,
Admiral, because that is one of the hangups, I think.
Senator Breaux. You do not know who does security at the
ports?
Admiral Underwood. On the land side?
Senator Breaux. You do not know who does that?
The Chairman. You get the land side, the Coast Guard and
the Customs----
Senator Breaux. I am astounded you do not know the answer
to this question.
The Chairman. This dance has been going on for years. That
is why I asked the question. I am trying to get a fix--you
know, life has changed after 9/11, and you folks have got to
get together and lead, and not keep appointing committees and
plans. I think the captain of the port under the law he has got
that authority, therefore he has got that responsibility, and
you have got to require it on the land side. The captain of the
port is not out in the water, he is land side.
Thank you, Admiral.
Senator Breaux. Senator Rockefeller.
STATEMENT OF HON. JOHN D. ROCKEFELLER IV,
U.S. SENATOR FROM WEST VIRGINIA
Senator Rockefeller. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I want to
pick up a little bit where Chairman Hollings left off on
railroads, and the whole question of private action. I am
having it checked out now so that what I say--I feel about 95
percent sure about it, but I am not 100 percent sure, but I
know that I was told by somebody that does not mislead me that
on the airline situation, that Boeing said right after
September 11 that yes, we could do those doors on all of our
new airplanes, but we cannot do them on the ones that exist. It
is too expensive. It takes too much time.
Now, I say that not to say anything about Boeing, which
makes great aircraft, but to say that when you rely on the
private sector to do something and it goes right up against
their bottom line, whether subsidized by the Government or not,
I get nervous. It strikes me that railroads are far more
vulnerable in many ways than are airplanes, and it has been
fascinating to me to watch this nation come to grips with how
it is that we make airlines more secure, and we are going to do
that under Chairman Hollings' leadership this week, at the end
of this week, but I just--when you say, we are working with
them and we are going to follow their lead, or they are going
to do it, I just want to go on record that makes me very
nervous.
Second is that the whole concept of interaction between
agencies. The two classic agencies that do not interact are the
two on security measures which ought to interact the best, and
that is the Central Intelligence Agency and the FBI. There is a
long history there. It does not need to be gone into, but the
point is, you know, September 11 would not have not happened if
they had been cooperating. It would have happened anyway
because of the nature of the very simplistic approach that the
terrorists took, but when people talk about cooperating, I also
get nervous.
Now, that is not fair 2 weeks out from the event. It is not
fair to you. People have to sort of grope around because there
is--it is like when Rumsfeld was trying to take on the Joint
Chiefs of Staff and he lost. I mean, maybe he is winning now
because of September 11, but they overrode him, because people
do not want to cooperate. Everything is turf.
You get into DOT, DEA, all kinds of other places, it does
not change, and so I guess my first question to you is, why do
you have confidence, other than simply the saying of it, that
aggressive, dynamic, specific plans are beginning to be made? I
do not ask that the plan be here by this time--it would be too
early to be good planning--but that the instinct to get
together and roll up the shirtsleeves and forget all about
territory, how do you have confidence that is active in the
Department of Transportation as it relates to other agencies?
Admiral Underwood. With respect to other agencies, Senator,
or with respect to the industry?
Senator Rockefeller. Other agencies is my question.
Admiral Underwood. I have confidence because even before
September 11 we were working closely with the other agencies
that would have a very significant use of what we are currently
doing, and subsequent to that time, the efforts that have been
redoubled, the amount of communication, the active working on
work groups and task forces that are looking at those very
specific issues is taking place.
The plans are being made, definitions and common
understandings across agencies, and within industry, so that we
understand when we are at various levels of threat and how to
communicate those levels of threat across the agencies and with
industry, I am very confident that what we have, the makings of
now is much more robust than what we had before, and we are
working in that direction.
Senator Rockefeller. Let me make my point a different way.
It is hard for me to buy into that answer, with all due respect
to you.
When Sam Nunn and Jim Woolsey testified on Dark Winter, and
they took a country that was hit by chemical, nerve,
biological--various scenarios, and Nunn becomes president, and
then they do this through with computers in war rooms and the
whole thing, and it turns out to be an absolute disaster,
showing that the public health--nobody is prepared. Absolutely
nobody is prepared for any of this.
And from that comes a suggestion that it really ought to be
done by states. Each Governor in a state ought to have a
pretend, so to speak, biological, nerve, you know, other type
of disaster to find out if states themselves have any idea how
to handle this, but more importantly to alert people so that
the so-called interagency planning process, which I do not
think the American people have a lot of confidence in. This
Senator does not at this point--at this point--and so that the
American people are aware of what the stakes are here.
Again, when Chairman Breaux talked about checking baggage,
is there anything more than that? Well, not for the moment. We
are thinking about that. That is incredible. I mean, why would
not one check baggage going onto a train, if one checks it
going onto an airline, why would that be a matter of
discussion, and I can think of a couple of good reasons. One is
resources, and other sorts of things, but it seems to me that
is what you ought to be telling us, not that we are not sure if
it is a good idea or not. You know it is a good idea.
And those are just two forms of public transportation,
railroads and airlines, and there is so much more, but that is
what you ought to be telling us, and then telling us, it seems
to me, that yeah, we think it is a good idea, but we cannot
afford to do it, or we think it is a good idea but we do not
have the legislative authority to do this.
You talk about criminal penalties. We are talking about
security legislation here. What do you need from us? And this
is kind of the emphasis that I would like to make in my
comments to you, and you can respond if you would like.
Admiral Underwood. I understand, and I will take that back
to the Secretary. Yes, sir, absolutely, those are the things we
are looking at.
Senator Rockefeller. I was asking for your own response.
Admiral Underwood. Senator, my response is that with
concern to all of those areas in the national transportation
security, the need to be elevated to find that new normalcy
that the Secretary is referring to, we need to examine across
the board and to come up with the solutions, and understand
what those are.
I am not sure that just piecemeal, or finding one that we
think is the right one in a particular area to approach, and
then saying that is where we are going to throw all the
resources to handle that, without looking at the entire fabric
of our transportation system--because it is so intermodally
linked, and because there are so many pieces to it that require
that same level of attention.
Senator Rockefeller. Well, I certainly agree with that.
Senator Breaux. Your time has expired. We are going to go
in the order of appearance. Senator Kerry is next, followed by
Senators Inouye, Boxer, and Snowe. Senator Kerry.
Senator Kerry. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
Admiral you are here testifying on behalf of the Department
of Transportation, and you acknowledge that you have had to
sort of build the expertise with respect to some of the service
components of that, but I am very concerned that the rhetoric
of the last weeks is far outstripping the response. War
footing, war against terrorism--on Sunday, Attorney General
Ashcroft delivered a fairly sober warning, and I know many
people in many parts of the country called me. In Massachusetts
I heard from people, what is the threat tomorrow, what is the
level, what should we be doing.
I am very wary of outpacing the response by the rhetoric,
and I am particularly weary of sowing the seeds of any kind of
panic or alarm that are not merited, and I feel to some degree
there is a contradiction here a little bit. If a train--I mean,
a train has so many capacities to be used as a terrorist tool.
I assume you could hijack it, conceivably, in which case you
want to run it into something, or you might have people
prearranged to help move a switch and target something
conceivably, another train coming, who knows. Or, as Senator
Breaux said, you take high explosives on in some bag that has
not been inspected in a high volume station, or somewhere, and
it blows up. There are not too many other ways in which one
could script a scenario for a valuable terrorist tool in that
context, but it seems to me the answers that we have been given
is that neither of those scenarios are at this point adequately
protected against.
Admiral Underwood. If I could address the first scenario, I
think that my conversations and understanding of the system is
such that is not a likely scenario. Although there are 220,000
miles of trackline across the United States, these tracks are
controlled by the rails, and that the trains on those tracks
are under the control of operating centers, so that they can
tell when a track has been tampered with in most cases and
divert trains around that situation. They can stop trains, they
can reroute trains.
Senator Kerry. Stop a train that is under their control,
but they cannot stop a train that is not under their control
without diverting it into something else, so it would stop
rather suddenly, I would assume.
Admiral Underwood. That is correct.
Senator Kerry. I know they did a good job of managing a
train that was left unattended with the throttle on, and I
gather it ran for some 4 or 5 hours until they finally were
able to get somebody on board who stopped it, so clearly they
have some control, but we are talking about a train which has
been altered out of its normal control configurations, if,
indeed, it is subject to some kind of takeover. I mean, that is
what I am trying to get at.
Are you telling this Committee that it is foolproof, that
somebody could not in fact board the locomotive and take
control of the train?
Admiral Underwood. I would never tell the Committee that
something is foolproof. However, I would say that the scenario
that you created is highly unlikely that someone can, and
knowing that has occurred, the end result, what can they do,
and I think there were other steps that can be taken after
that, if that had not worked to regain control of that train.
Senator Kerry. I understand that, but if you are dealing
with people who are prepared to lose their lives driving into a
building, are you not dealing with people who are prepared to
lose their lives driving into a station?
Admiral Underwood. They would have controlled the train
before it got to the station.
Senator Kerry. They can do that?
Admiral Underwood. They can do that.
Senator Kerry. So in other words, that is not a threat.
That is the simple answer.
Admiral Underwood. It would still derail the train. They
can derail the train, force derailment.
Senator Kerry. Is there a reason the Department has not
moved more rapidly on the question of baggage inspection? Is
there any particular reason we should be aware of?
Admiral Underwood. I think there is some serious resource
constraints, as were mentioned, on the ability to carry out
that function. There is also the area of threat.
Senator Kerry. People are measuring the threat, in other
words and making the judgment?
Admiral Underwood. Measuring the threat against the
vulnerability. The vulnerability is there. The threat has not
been there for our passenger trains in the United States.
Senator Kerry. Well, I understand, and I appreciate that. I
mean, obviously you cannot protect against every crowded event.
You cannot protect against everyone, but you can take sort of
the minimal level of precautions that most Americans are going
to believe is reasonable, and the question is, I suppose, is it
reasonable to expect to get on a moving vehicle with a sense
that the other passengers on that vehicle do not have a weapon
or some capacity to terminate your capacity to get where you
are going. Is that a reasonable expectation for every American,
is the question, and if it is, do we not have to take steps to
guarantee it?
Let me come to one other point with respect to that. There
are 2 billion tons of freight that come into our ports and
harbors every year. Prior to September 11, only slightly more
than 1 percent of all of those cargo containers are inspected
by either the Coast Guard, Customs or Immigration and
naturalization officials, less than 1 percent of 2 billion tons
of freight. Is that a threat to the United States?
Admiral Underwood. It is the threat that existed before
September 11 as well.
Senator Kerry. But is that a threat? There are a lot of
things that existed before September 11 that we now know cannot
be allowed to continue.
Admiral Underwood. We do not have a specific threat as
such. In that regard there is concern. There is concern that
there could be that threat.
Senator Kerry. Let me express something to you, Admiral,
and I think this is the feeling of a lot of people in the
Senate, that the rules have changed.
Admiral Underwood. Yes, sir.
Senator Kerry. And a lot of us were very upset with the
level of focus on this with respect to the so-called drug war
and the trafficking in human beings. There are people who have
been in those containers, people who were brought in basically
for slave trade, and there are countless amounts of drugs that
come in, and that has been tearing this country apart, and many
people have said for a long period of time we have been
resource-constrained, you and the Coast Guard.
I mean, I am the chairman of that Committee. We have been
fighting to get you decent ship capacity. You have just told me
now, and this Committee, that we are going to have to reduce
our fishing oversight, our aids to navigation oversight, and
there was a third one, I forget which it was.
Admiral Underwood. The law enforcement.
Senator Kerry. Those are going to have to now be reduced to
pay attention to the security one.
Now, you know we are going to have to face up to the fact
that some of these things are going to cost us some money, but
I think the American public is prepared to pay a $5 or $4 or $3
surcharge on a ticket to know they can get to their family at
the other end of that ride, or that they are not going to lose
their lives, or their kids are not going to in the in-between,
and somehow the bureaucracy seems to be kind of just, gee, we
do not know if we can do this, or this is a resource.
We are not acting like this is a war, and I think we have
got to kind of get some proposals on the table and do what is
necessary to make the American public safe, and that is how you
are going to fill the trains and the aircraft and get the
economy moving again. Until people do--I was on a plane the
other day. The business people were flying because they have
to, but the economy section was three-quarters empty.
So thank you.
Senator Breaux. Senator Inouye.
STATEMENT OF HON. DANIEL K. INOUYE,
U.S. SENATOR FROM HAWAII
Senator Inouye. Thank you very much.
Admiral as you are well aware, less than 4 percent of our
international cargo is carried on American bottoms. Over 96
percent on foreign bottoms. We have two cruise ships, American
bottoms. The rest are all foreign bottoms, and in the State of
Hawaii we have one railroad company, narrow gauge. It runs
about a mile and a half and carries tourists, and so my concern
is maritime transportation.
The laws that we enact here will have very little impact
upon the security practices in, say, Yokohama or Hong Kong, or
in China, or Manila, or for that matter in Arabia or the
Persian Gulf, and these are the ships that come to Hawaii. How
do we project our security requirements abroad? I know that
there is an international maritime organization that sets
standards, but those standards are meaningless because we are
not there to enforce them.
Admiral Underwood. I think one of the things we are looking
at very closely, and I know that Admiral Loy has testified
before the full Committee on the issue of domain awareness, in
particular maritime domain awareness, and that is, having all
of the information of the databases that are currently
available to us, databases that are developed oversees,
databases that are developed within the agencies of the United
States Government, to have those compiled and cross-matched, so
that as much information can be gleaned on a particular vessel,
on its crew, and on the cargo, all three of these things being
able to give a better picture of what is actually coming into
our nation, what is actually departing other nations to arrive
on our shores, but then having the capability, in this domain
awareness, to interact with that vessel long before it reaches
our ports, and those areas where it has some suspicious cargo
or a member in the crew that we believe is suspicious of some
nature.
Additionally, the Maritime Administration is working with
other nations to develop that kind of sharing of information,
international agreements, best practices.
Senator Inouye. I do not want to give any suggestions to
anyone but as you know, Indonesia is the largest country with
the largest Islamic population, and apparently today we are
involved with men and women of the Islamic faith, a very few of
them. However, if there is a ship from Indonesia, and there are
several that come to Hawaii carrying oil, and that cargo
contains certain electronically controlled explosives, how can
we counter that, and it is set up in Jakarta?
Admiral Underwood. I have not seen anything that gives me
that scenario as a threat against which we are working right
now. What we are doing is looking at the ships. We are looking
at known shippers, known routes. We are looking at the crew
manifest. The Coast Guard is submitting a rule to extend the
24-hour notification to a 96-hour notification so that we have
enough time to review those lists of who is in the crew to
determine whether or not these individuals want to do us harm
or are part of a larger terrorist organization or not.
Senator Inouye. Well, you do not have to be a member of a
crew to place an explosive in anything. In fact, none of the
hijackers were members of the crew, and so I hope we come up
with something that I can assure the people of Hawaii, because
the Port of Honolulu has surrounding them within a 10-mile
radius about \1/2\ million people, and I want to be able to
assure them that the security that is necessary is being
carried out, but from what I gather today, I am not able to
assure them.
Admiral Underwood. Well, I would suggest that the captain
of the port in Hawaii is taking all of those precautionary
measures to enhance the security of the port, and that he is
where necessary stopping vessels before they arrive in the port
to examine them, to look at them. There has been an increased
amount of the cargoes that are being inspected. These are
extraordinary measures that are now being done.
Senator Inouye. Are we stopping cargo before they reach our
ports today?
Admiral Underwood. In some cases they are stopping the
vessel before they arrive in the port and going aboard with
boarding teams to inspect the vessel and the cargo.
Senator Inouye. Thank you very much.
Senator Breaux. Thank you, Senator.
Senator Boxer.
STATEMENT OF HON. BARBARA BOXER,
U.S. SENATOR FROM CALIFORNIA
Senator Boxer. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you, Admiral.
A couple of times in answer to one question by Senator Kerry
and now Senator Inouye, you basically said, we do not know of
any specific threat here. You were discussing the railroads and
also the port, and I just think if there is anything we
learned, it is that there is no specific threat that anybody
would take an airplane and turn it into a missile and sacrifice
all the people inside, so I think an answer, we do not know of
any specific threat, just does not sit well with a lot of us
who are concerned that we do not know what to expect, so
therefore we should almost expect everything.
Now, why do I say that? We had the Attorney General in a
very frank way tell us, tell the whole nation that we should
expect other terrorist attacks. I mean, it was rather stunning
and candid and frank. It was not sugar-coated. The President
has not sugar-coated anything. None of our leaders have.
So it seems to me, knowing that, we need to not say, gee,
we do not owe him anything, but what we need to say is, we are
preparing for everything. Now, I know that is hard to do, and
from what I have gathered from your testimony, I feel better
about the situation of how many miles of track--what did you
say, 220,000, did you say, miles of track?
Admiral Underwood. Yes.
Senator Boxer. Because it seems to me we have the
technology, from what you have said, to spot if there is a rail
that is displaced, and the ability to take control of the
train, and that is very helpful.
The thing that I am very concerned about after listening to
you is the baggage checks, because--let me just say, I think we
have an opportunity here, colleagues, because if we were to do
a baggage check we just might get some people who are up to no
good. It is an opportunity for law enforcement to check who is
going on these trains, and again you say there is no specific
threat, do not expect it to come that way. I do not think it is
going to, because there are a lot of cells in this country, and
plans may already be in place and we do not know it. You may be
right, it may be nothing to do with cargo or trains. It may
come in some other form, but we need to do everything we can.
Can we stop everything? Maybe not, but I want to know, as
Senator Inouye does, that I can look at my constituents and
say, we have anticipated everything. How many members of the
Amtrak police force are there?
Admiral Underwood. I would have to defer that to the Amtrak
chief of police.
Senator Boxer. Is he here now? Is it possible, Mr.
Chairman, I could find out? I am trying to find out how many
members of the Amtrak police force there are.
Senator Breaux. He will probably be able to address that
with the next panel.
Senator Boxer. If I could just have an answer.
Admiral Underwood. There are 325.
Senator Boxer. And I do not know exactly how many stations
we have, but I am assuming that may not be enough.
Mr. Chairman, I think what has come out so far, at least
for me, in the rail issue--and I have not really spent as much
time as I should on the cargo, and I am going to work with
Senator Inouye and follow his lead on that--is that what you
said at the outset, this baggage claim idea, that we need to do
more.
Now, we have about 325 Amtrak police, and it may not be
enough to do this, and one of the things I have been checking
on is how we could use National Guard and reserves, and there
was an opinion written by Judge Rehnquist back in the seventies
that it does not violate posse comitatus to use them. Then we
have actually under 49 U.S.C. section 224 the clear ability to
use, at least for air safety, so we may have to do something on
train safety, but if we need to do something, my closing point
I want to make is just one I made to Mr. Mineta, Secretary
Mineta, is that what I would want to see from you, knowing that
you do not have the resources, clearly, to do everything you
want, if you could just tell us, say, if you want to do
everything you can, Senate Commerce Committee, to make this as
safe as it can be, the rail, the cargo, we would need A, B, C,
D to Z, and then let us see how we can work to make it happen,
that would be very helpful, rather than, it seems to me, what
is happening is you are working within your constraints, and
you are being a good soldier on that point, but I would feel
better knowing what it is you need to do.
In other words, to inspect every bag--just tell us what it
is. It may be prohibitive, maybe we cannot, but I certainly
would appreciate having that information. If you could go back
and get us that information, then at least I could go fight for
it. If I did not win the fight, but I need to know what it is
you need and I need your premise to be that we could have an
attack, not that you do not think there would be, but if we
wanted to prepare for one, what it would take. I think it would
help us both sides of the aisle.
We may have an argument over what is the best way to go. We
may have different philosophies about life, about how much you
can protect people, but I would like to know that if you could
go back and work those numbers up for me. Is that possible?
Admiral Underwood. Senator, I would say that what we are
working on at the Department is to provide that kind of
information for the Secretary through the National
Infrastructure Security Committee and through the various task
groups.
Senator Boxer. When will you have that?
Admiral Underwood. I do not have the date or the time for
that.
Senator Boxer. Maybe I am missing something. I thought we
were at war.
Admiral Underwood. This is something that is a top priority
for the Secretary.
Senator Boxer. But we need it very soon. We do not have so
much of a window. We have the Attorney General saying we could
conceivably be hit again, and so we cannot wait, and he said,
especially if we retaliate, and that could happen soon. We do
not know what our President is, Godspeed, thinking of doing,
and so we need to have the information faster than we are
getting it. That is my opinion.
I do not mean to be confrontational with you. I thank you
for all your work. I just think we need to act a little more
swiftly, and I thank you for bringing us together today.
Senator Breaux. Thank you. Next will be Senator Snowe,
Cleland, and Senator Stevens.
STATEMENT OF HON. OLYMPIA J. SNOWE,
U.S. SENATOR FROM MAINE
Senator Snowe. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you for
holding this hearing today, and thank you, Admiral Underwood,
for being here. I know it is under some very difficult
circumstances, and obviously we have to think differently in
light of the unspeakable horrors that occurred on September 11
that has propelled us into a new era. It has sounded an alarm
bell throughout the country, and so obviously we have to begin
to reexamine the way in which we conducted ourselves and did
business before September 11, and now how we are going to do it
in the aftermath of the terrorist attacks.
I took the opportunity to speak with some of my local
transportation officials in Maine, and particularly in the City
of Portland, Maine, and they described to me various examples
of the things that occurred on that day, and the days since
September 11, not only with respect to aviation, but also with
respect to rail and maritime procedures, and in fact they
recommended to me--and I since have introduced legislation,
because I really think it is a great idea. That is, to
coordinate within the Department of Transportation all the
agencies and all transportation-related activities in response
to a national emergency similar to what the Federal Emergency
Management Agency does in response to natural disasters. We
need to have a coordinated response, not an ad hoc response to
a national emergency.
Now, I want to give you some examples of what occurred with
them, and how they responded, because what they did was take
local procedures, either local or state plans in place, and
responded because they did not hear from federal agencies
during that time, other than of course the FAA with the
airport. With respect to other modes of transportation, I think
if our country is going to be secure, we obviously have to be
mobile, we have to protect our passengers, we have to protect
our freight, we have to protect our infrastructure, because we
now know various modes of transportation could be used for
targets and for vehicles for violence. Therefore, I think we
have to look at the gamut of transportation issues and begin to
address them.
Let me just mention a few points. First of all, they said
that in time of crisis we should be all operating from the same
page, that it is imperative that all parties at the federal,
state, and local level are kept abreast of the information,
sharing information not only at the time of the national
emergency, but even up to that point, with regular information,
because it is important that they have the same information,
and that it is shared among all agencies and among all levels
of Government.
They said that the city was unable to get any official word
from federal channels regarding the extent of the threat as it
was unfolding. Twelve hours after the incident the city had yet
to receive any official communication regarding the status or
extent of the threat, and even 24 hours later, local
transportation officials still had not received any official
notification of threat assessments or security level from any
federal agency.
Another example. Local officials employed their own local
existing incident response planning, shared information based
on existing relationships at the local level, and responded to
the situation as best they could.
On September 11, approximately 14 trains passed through the
City of Portland with little attention. The rail cars included
chemical cars. The city has no authority to stop their
movements. The local transportation officials eventually met
with the Coast Guard as inbound vessels were scheduled, but no
specific federal guidance or directives had come to the local
offices from regional or Washington sources.
On September 12, a cruise ship arrived at the harbor
entrance. The vessel was detained at the harbor entrance while
the Coast Guard, Immigration and Customs worked out a policy on
the spot, in the absence of federal guidance.
So--it was mentioned on the 12th that a second vessel, a
cruise ship, arrived at the harbor entrance. The vessel was
detained at the harbor entrance, while the Coast Guard and
Immigration and Customs worked out policy on the spot. In fact,
they told me what happened in Boston, at the Port of Boston,
was different than what would happen in the Port of Portland
with respect to the passengers, with respect to the cargo, with
respect to the cars that are on these cruise ships, and so
obviously we are going to need some uniformity of response and
standards. And this is not critiquing the past. What happened
before September 11 is obviously entirely different.
We are in a whole new era, and obviously things have to
change, and what they are saying is, that we not only need to
have a coordinated and all-encompassing focus on the entire
transportation network, but that emergency response also does
require a federalized standard for nation-wide logistics, as
well as coordinating the information for all agencies and for
all levels of Government, and I think that would be one way of
addressing this problem.
For example, rail cars that are rumbling through
communities that have tankers of hazardous waste, or other
chemicals could represent a threat. We obviously have to
determine how we are going to scan all the containers on these
cargo ships, and in fact one has suggested maybe having an
identifying marker that cannot be removed from the containers
when they come into the port.
Trucks are obviously another issue as well, but I think for
the purposes of this hearing today, I would hope that you and
the Department of Transportation would begin to think about
this proposal of coordinating all of the transportation-related
responsibilities and obligations and agencies to create a
uniform federal response to a national emergency.
Admiral Underwood. Senator Snowe, if I may, on 30 August of
this year the Department of Transportation held an exercise
that was designed to take every operating administration to the
limit of a mass terrorist attack, and to develop their response
and test their response plans for such an event.
As you know, this was 12 days before the actual event
occurred. The reason we were able to stand up a crisis
management center within 12 minutes and have every one of the
operating administrations represented at that crisis center
with the right people was because of that kind of advance
thinking and forward-looking in the Department.
Prior to that, we had been sending out on a biweekly basis
a transportation security and terrorism review, and that is
about a two-page open source information sheet that we provide
to all modes of transportation for further delivery to
communities or to public transit systems, the industry
throughout the country.
We also provide a transportation security information
report, which is a very specialized report. When we have an
incident or know of a specific incident so that we can target
exactly who receives that information, as well as in some cases
on a very broad basis, and we have been providing those both
before and since September 11.
Senator Snowe. I appreciate your response, Admiral. I just
think the time has come that we are going to have to move
differently in a synchronized fashion, just as we do in
response to natural disasters. I really do think we have to
coordinate in a different way. The standards are going to be
known, and the procedures, regularized in respect to sharing of
that information. It needs to be standardized and pulled
altogether, I think under one agency within the Department of
Transportation, called the Federal Emergency Transportation
Agency, similar to FEMA, so that we have this coordinated
response and everybody is operating off the same page.
I appreciate the work you are doing. No doubt it has been
under some very arduous circumstances. I just think we are all
going to have to think differently in terms of what happened on
September 11, so I thank you for being here.
And I also should say the Coast Guard did work very well
with our people in Maine, and I met with Admiral Nacarra, who
is the regional commander, and he came to Maine and apprised us
of what they had done, and they have done an excellent job
under some very difficult circumstances.
Senator Breaux. Thank you, Senator.
Senator Cleland.
STATEMENT OF HON. MAX CLELAND,
U.S. SENATOR FROM GEORGIA
Senator Cleland. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
Admiral, thank you for joining us today.
Anthony Cordesman, with the Center for Strategic and
International Studies here in Washington, says that, ``the next
time they attack they will not be using aircraft.'' The
likelihood, he says, is they will use a different weapon,
something to break up the predictability. He went up to say,
``it could be mass transit, or it could be public utilities,
historical sites, or the media.'' Tightening security in one
area will tend to push terrorists in other directions. One act
of mass terrorism does not predict the next occurrence.
If we are going to look for biological and chemical attack
next time, Admiral, let me just observe here, I understand the
Department of Transportation is working with the FAA to
identify explosive detection technology that can be used in the
passenger rail environment. The current project apparently is
focusing on using this technology on Amtrak's high speed Accela
train which covers the Northeast Corridor. In addition,
apparently DOD has entered into a partnership with the
Department of Energy to develop chemical agent detection
systems in the underground transit environment. The Washington
Area Metro System is currently a testbed.
I would just like to observe that Georgia Tech, in my home
state, has developed a small little glass chip just this size
which can detect almost infinitesimal amounts of biological or
chemical agents, and I pass that on to you so that your staff
might want to contact Georgia Tech.
Admiral Underwood. We do have an office set up in the
Research and Special Programs Administration to bring in just
that type of information so that they can prioritize it.
Senator Cleland. Within a couple of hours of the Pentagon
attack, the FAA brought down all aircraft, which is a
remarkable achievement. Do we have any kind of train control
like that? If an attack happens on a train in America, do we
have some centralized system that can respond to some
coordinated strike, terrorist strike on the U.S. rail
infrastructure?
Admiral Underwood. I understand your question, and that is
one of the questions I had initially with the industry, and I
am convinced that having a one set, stop all trains, is
probably not in the wisest fashion good for security. My
understanding of the rail industry is such, the dynamics of it
is such that ordering trains to be stopped, just to stop them
wherever they are, could possibly create worse targets than if
you allow certain operations to continue, some to stop, some to
be rerouted, and it is a very robust system. It requires just
the kind of work they are currently putting into it.
Particularly, I look at the hazardous materials and where
those are being transported around the country, what rails, do
we want to divert these off the really good rail we have now
off to some side rail that maybe has not been inspected in a
recent fashion and would then create an even greater hazard. We
look at that. We are working closely--I am on a 24-7 call with
the NSC. They have my number, and likewise I have a number to
contact at the American Association of Railroads to get the
same kind of threat information when we need to heighten the
level of security.
So from that perspective, I would just offer that as one of
the things we are doing.
Senator Cleland. Thank you. That is good thinking. Thank
you.
The Coast Guard, I am fascinated, the Coast Guard is in
peacetime under the aegis of the Department of Transportation,
but in times of war it is brought into the Navy. Do you see any
kind of a role for the Coast Guard here under times of an
emergency such as we are facing here, for the Coast Guard to be
either supplemental to the Navy, or the Coast Guard to have a
special mission, maybe tracking interception and so forth? Is
there a way to use that framework to strengthen homeland
defense and alleviate some of the stresses placed on Coast
Guard resources?
Admiral Underwood. Senator, the Secretary has directed the
Coast Guard and the Coast Guard is responding with their study
group on homeland security. What this current force laydown is
requiring of us, what the losses to the Coast Guard are in
other mission areas, and what we need in order to regain those,
and with respect to specifically our work with the Department
of the Navy, the United States Navy, it is a longstanding one
of daily interaction.
We have been working side-by-side with our Navy
counterparts for as long as I have been in the Coast Guard in
various missions. We have Coast Guard forces assigned to naval
commands as I speak, and likewise naval forces working for the
Coast Guard at various times, and all of this in an effort
right now, they are joined in this Noble Eagle operation to
bring security to our ports and waterways.
Senator Cleland. Well, the USDOT administers the emergency
preparedness grants program which helps state and local
governments train police and firefighters to respond to an
emergency situation involving hazardous materials. Now,
currently that program is funded at only $12 million, but that
amount of money can only train about 120,000 emergency
personnel a year out of a pool of some $3 million. Do we, under
this emergency situation, need to increase that, increase our
aid to local firefighters and police in handling hazardous or
chemical problems?
Admiral Underwood. One of the areas that my office is most
focused in is in the prevention aspect, as opposed to the
consequence management. We are more in the crisis management
end of that, so I am not as qualified to respond to that as I
would like to be.
I do know we have worked very closely with the state and
local, as well as the national agencies that do oversee that
program to ensure that they are getting training and the
funding and the equipment. There is a concern that, while these
are local and state first responders, that some of the
responders in government such as the U.S. Coast Guard, which is
in most of these local jurisdictions often a first responder,
as a local arriving on a maritime event may not be receiving
the same amount of equipment and training.
Senator Cleland. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Senator Breaux. Thank you, Senator.
Senator Smith.
STATEMENT OF HON. GORDON SMITH,
U.S. SENATOR FROM OREGON
Senator Smith. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank you for
having this hearing. I would ask that an opening statement of
mine be included in the record.
Senator Breaux. Without objection.
[The prepared statement of Senator Smith follows:]
Prepared Statement of Hon. Gordon Smith,
U.S. Senator from Oregon
I want to begin by thanking Chairman Breaux for holding today's
hearing. I know at this time we are all concerned about the security of
our nation's transportation infrastructure. It is reported that 40
percent of terrorist attacks worldwide are targeted at transportation.
The tragic events of September 11 have focused new attention on
land, air, and sea transportation safety and security. In the short
time since the horrible attacks on our nation, two things have become
very clear: (1) we must do more to protect the safety of the nation's
traveling public and ensure the efficient movement of cargo, and (2) we
must not allow the actions of any extremist to force fear into the
traveling public.
Following the terrorist attacks, trains were stopped, ports were
closed, and as we all know, airplanes were grounded nationwide.
However, these actions were brief and in most cases lasted only as long
as it took to check systems and execute prearranged plans for higher
security. Today, cargo and passengers are moving safely.
According to the Bureau of Transportation Statistics, our nation's
transportation system carried more than 14.8 billion tons of cargo and
transported passengers more than 4.1 million miles in 1997, the last
complete year for which they have statistics. Today those numbers are
much larger and are expected to increase further as the volume of
imports and exports continues to grow. With that volume of traffic,
ensuring safety and security would seem to be an almost insurmountable
task.
Admiral James Loy, Commandant of the U.S. Coast Guard, wrote in a
recent article on homeland security challenges, ``If the number of
actors who conceivably threaten the U.S. homeland is daunting, the
number and range of potential tools at their disposal is far more so.
The number of differing means of attack is one of the principal
difficulties in addressing Homeland Security.'' I agree with Admiral
Loy that ensuring the safety of our homeland, and specifically our
transportation system, is difficult, hut would add, not impossible.
As I just noted, plans were already in place throughout our
nation's transportation system to deal with major events, such as those
of September 11. While these plans may not have anticipated a terrorist
attack on two of the greatest symbols of our country's strength, they
were designed to ensure the continued safety and security of the
transportation system regardless of the target or means of attack.
While I am pleased with the quick response, not only from the
Administration, Secretary Mineta and the Department of Transportation,
but also the transportation industry itself, I know there is more we
can do. To date, the primary focus of our discussions and new security
measures has been on the aviation industry. This is completely
understandable given the direct impact that the transportation sector
suffered during the terrorist attacks. However, I believe it is time we
broaden our view to ensure that every reasonable thing is being done to
prevent further disruptions to the transport of passengers and cargo
both domestically and internationally.
Today we are going to hear from witnesses from the railroad and
maritime industry on the status of transportation within those two
industries. I look forward to hearing from our witnesses on what steps
their industries have taken to ensure the safety and security of both
cargo and passengers in our nation's transportation system.
Again, thank you, Chairman Breaux, for holding this hearing. I am
pleased to note that the Subcommittee will soon hold additional
hearings to look at the security and safety of other modes of
transportation.
Senator Smith. Admiral, thank you for appearing here. You
are going to hear a lot of mixed messages today, but I think
clearly the central message is, we need to do business
differently. We need more security.
But I also note for the record that, if you do everything
that has been suggested here, we will have a police state and
you still will not be able to assure 100 percent security. It
behooves all Americans to be part of a security apparatus, and
to be watchful and mindful, and it seems to me that if we want
to interdict a lot of the terrorism that can come here, we had
better do it before it gets to our shores, because we have got
too many tracks and too many ports, and I cite an instance, an
example that Senator Ensign shared with some of us this
morning.
The FAA has had a few more procedures at airports. In his
home town of Las Vegas, after the attack, their occupancy rate
to Las Vegas had dropped 20 to 30 percent. This weekend, it was
back to 100 percent, and to clear security it was costing, in
time, 5 hours per passenger. I have got to tell you, that is at
cross-purposes with our effort to get airlines up and going
again.
We are sending you mixed messages--be secure, but keep
things moving--so I want you to know some of us are hearing
there are mixed messages going on here. We need more security,
but we also need efficiency so as not to slow down our economy
and retard some of the commerce that we are depending upon as a
country to help get our economy moving again, so that is the
predicate of what I wanted to tell you here today, but I also
do have some specific questions.
Can you tell me, since September 11th, given the procedures
you have put into place, what has it meant in terms of timing
and moving commerce through our ports? Is there a backlog
beginning to develop, as we are beginning to see at some
airports?
Admiral Underwood. I have heard of backlogs at specific
areas, primarily at the international borders, for cargoes
coming into the United States, and those are across the land
borders for heightened security reasons.
Senator Smith. I do not want to tell you to lower security,
so I want to ask you, can you maintain these higher rates of
security but also decrease the time with which it is done? What
do you need to accomplish that?
Admiral Underwood. That is a matter of personnel and hours
in the day.
Senator Smith. As Senator Boxer was saying, I want to know
what you need. I am reiterating that. I really want to know how
you get the security without the inefficiency that is going to
be built into this unless we really get you the money and the
resources and the personnel to do the job.
I would like to follow on to Senator Hollings question
about port security. The Interagency Commission on Crime and
Security in its findings reported that control of access at our
seaports is part of our fundamental lack of security, and can
you describe for this Committee in general terms what land-side
security is in place at our seaports? Do we have some?
Admiral Underwood. Well, to borrow a phrase from the
airports, if you have seen one seaport, you have seen one
seaport. Each seaport is different. Within particular seaports
terminals are different, and are provided different levels of
security. The State of Florida has most recently passed some
fairly comprehensive legislation on seaport security,
particularly from a land base that prescribes physical
requirements to enhance the security, as well as other measures
to ensure that personnel working within that port framework are
not a detraction from the security environment.
The same measures, or similar measures were part of the
President's Port Security Commission, and a broad discussion of
that and a lot of the things that are captured in Senator
Hollings' bill, 1214, drive toward that. When we testified back
in May in favor of legislation to enhance port security, I did
so from a perspective that if we can eliminate the elements
that bring crime into our ports, we also are working against
those elements that could bring terror to our ports.
I think in light of the events of September 11, I have to
reassess not the vulnerability of our ports--the vulnerability
remains high. It was high before--but the threat to our ports,
which was at that time considered low. I have to reevaluate
that threat based on the events and on the new information that
we currently have.
Senator Smith. Will part of that evaluation include
background checks for individuals employed or seeking work at
our nation's seaports? Is that one of the recommendations?
Admiral Underwood. That is what is generally contemplated.
Senator Smith. And what is going to be done? Do you need
more authority from us to do that, or is this something you can
do without an action of Congress? I mean, I think that we ought
to have security and background checks on every employee, and I
think that is going to have to be part of our dragnet, if you
will, to find out if our seaports are, in fact, safe.
Those who are working there I am sure would like to know
that they are working with people who are not security risks to
them and our country as well, so I would strongly urge that
quickly be done, otherwise I think it is easy for some of us
who are not as schooled in this as you, we can poke holes in
the security we have in our seaports.
Mr. Chairman, my time is up. Thank you.
Senator Breaux. Admiral Underwood, thank you. Thank you,
Senator Smith, and we will look forward to working with you as
we further pursue different opportunities.
We would like to welcome our next panel, which consists of
Mr. Ed Hamberger, President and CEO, Association of American
Railroads, Mr. George Warrington, President and CEO of the
National Railroad Passenger Corporation, Mr. Joseph Cox,
President of the Chamber of Shipping of America, and Mr.
Michael Crye, President of the International Council of Cruise
Lines.
Gentlemen, welcome. Thank you very much. While we are
letting you take your seats and prior to your testimony I want
to recognize Senator Hutchison for an opening comment, since
she was not able to make them previously.
STATEMENT OF HON. KAY BAILEY HUTCHISON,
U.S. SENATOR FROM TEXAS
Senator Hutchison. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and I am going
to have to make my comments and then leave, and I will come
back if I can. I wanted to make a statement because I am very
concerned about the proposals that are being put forward by
Amtrak. As you know, Mr. Warrington, I have been the strongest
supporter of Amtrak in the United States Senate, and have
always said the reason I support Amtrak is because I believe in
a national passenger rail option for America. Recent events
have proven that if there is a viable option, that people will
take the train, but this means that trains have to be
reasonably predictable, and there should be a reasonable,
stable base.
Now, I have gone along with the huge capital subsidies of
the Northeast Corridor. The reason that the Northeast Corridor
is more successful and more mature is because Congress has
given capital subsidies through the years. The rest of the
Amtrak system has been starved today. After all of our work and
after all of the pronouncements that Amtrak would be a national
system, I see a request for $3.2 billion in emergency funding
to improve security and increase capacity. Approximately $471
million of this sum would be devoted to immediate security
improvements such as security personnel, surveillance cameras,
and bomb-sniffing dog patrols. I support that.
Unfortunately, of the remaining $2.78 billion will be, only
7 percent able to be used outside of the Northeast Corridor.
Instead of requesting funding to build service and capacity for
a national system designed to help move passengers between
cities across the country and provide alternatives for
travelers who usually fly on short-haul routes nation-wide, you
have used this opportunity to focus entirely on the Northeast
Corridor, and I think you have neglected the national rail
system, and I cannot support that. Unless we start evening out
the federal subsidies so that there can be a skeleton of a
national system that works, I am not going to continue to
support Amtrak, and I want Amtrak, I want passenger rail, but I
have to question your sincerity when you come up with a $3
billion package mainly for the Northeast Corridor, when they
have had the lion's share of the subsidies in the past, and
that is why they are better.
So I am willing to go to bat for Amtrak as a national
system, and to really try to infuse it. I think the long-term
future is for Amtrak to have its own tracks so that you are not
under the control of freight railroads, and I think it will
take capital improvements to do that, clearly, but you are
about to lose your second or third best supporter of Amtrak if
you do not show that this is a national system. I am not going
to continue to subsidize the Northeast Corridor without seeing
the commitment to the national system.
Senator Breaux. Thank you, Senator Hutchison, and lest we
lose the moment, let us start with you, Mr. Warrington.
STATEMENT OF GEORGE D. WARRINGTON, PRESIDENT & CEO,
NATIONAL RAILROAD PASSENGER CORPORATION
Mr. Warrington. Let me make my statement, then I would like
to address----
Senator Breaux. Yes, summarize your statement, and if you
can get to Senator Hutchison's points it might be helpful.
Mr. Warrington. In the context of this morning's
discussion, the first thing I would like to say is that on
September 11 Amtrak took an extraordinary set of actions across
the system. This morning there was considerable concern about
the pace with which some of the security issues have been
addressed as a matter of national policy. I want to be very
clear and unambiguous that the entire network, the system, the
transportation system subsequent to these events is clearly
vulnerable. I think we all clearly understand that. I want you
to know that Amtrak has taken extraordinary actions over the
past 2 to 3 weeks to begin to address a number of those
vulnerabilities.
I will tell you, Senator Hutchison, I think you know that I
am a very strong supporter of the national system. I will tell
you also that this entire security package was focused around
dealing with what really is a critical emergency need. It is
focused around the tragedy that occurred on September 11. It is
not intended in any way to signal a lack of interest, necessity
or commitment to fully invest both capital and other resources
in the national system to which we are all deeply committed to.
The construction of that package and the concerns I heard from
this Committee today have to do with pace. That package was put
together very quickly in response to this Congress' concerns
about immediate safety and security and capacity issues that
could be accomplished and accommodated rapidly.
One billion dollars of that package is devoted immediately
to overcoming the decades-old problem of life safety,
ventilation and the like in New York's Penn Station tunnel
complex, the Baltimore tunnel complex, and the Washington Union
Station tunnel complex. The Baltimore tunnel complex was built
in 1873, and the New York tunnel complex was built between 1911
and 1932. It is an aged complex. The Inspector General of the
USDOT has highlighted this on many occasions over the last
number of years, and we have been capital-constrained about
addressing those kinds of issues.
With respect to the security and equipment package, Senator
Hutchison, it is an investment around the entire system. It is
a very balanced investment around the entire system. With
respect to the equipment aspect of that package, which is
roughly $500 million, I will tell you that 50 percent of the
overhauls associated with that program are on our long distance
train network. We have plugged within that program $420 million
to give us flexibility to acquire new and additional equipment
because it requires a long lead time on equipment procurements.
When I went through our bookings this morning, I was advised,
we are about 27 sleeper cars short for our long distance train
network, based upon the booking levels that we have seen, not
just to date, but through Thanksgiving. I agree with you
completely that we need to be balanced; we need to be
responsive to those needs.
The immediate emergency need, though, Senator, is primarily
around the Northeast Corridor, and the life safety, capacity
and reliability issues there. The security program is across
this entire National System as is the equipment overhaul
program. I can break those numbers out for you subsequently.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Warrington follows:]
Prepared Statement of George D. Warrington,
President & CEO, National Railroad Passenger Corporation
Mr. Chairman and Members of the Committee, thank you for the
invitation to join you here today for this very important discussion.
I am also proud to introduce you to Chief Ernest Frazier, Chief of
the Amtrak Police Department. The APD has been, for more than a decade,
a nationally accredited police force, led and staffed by people with
many years of experience. It works very closely in coordination with
all of the relevant local, state and federal law enforcement agencies
across the country, including the FBI Terrorism Task Force.
Like all Americans, we at Amtrak are enormously saddened by the
horror of the tragedies in New York, Washington and Pennsylvania. But
also like all Americans, we are taking greater precautions and doing
everything we can to help our country cope. I am proud of all the hard
work that has been done by Chief Frazier and the 24,000 men and women
of Amtrak during the past 3 weeks. It hasn't been easy, but I believe
we have risen to the occasion, and we remain committed as always to
keeping America moving forward.
I want to emphasize that the safety and security of our guests and
facilities is our number one priority. The national passenger rail
system has a good record on this issue. And we are going to consult
with our colleagues, study every angle, and take every appropriate
measure to counter threats to our security and safety.
We face several unique challenges in this endeavor. The foremost
challenge is the relatively open and intermodal nature of the passenger
rail system. For example, on an average weekday, New York's Penn
Station handles about 30,000 Amtrak passengers a day. But at least
300,000 additional passengers go through the station on the Long Island
Railroad and New Jersey Transit. Thousands more use the station to
transfer to New York City subways.
And Penn Station is not unique. For more than 20 years,
transportation policy has encouraged an open, intermodal environment in
virtually every train station in the country.
Further, I would point out that in Europe, Japan and other
countries with a longer history of dealing with terrorism, you see much
the same: open, intermodal passenger rail systems.
The other major challenge is that the majority of tracks we operate
on are owned by the freight railroads. So we are working closely with
the Association of American Railroads' task forces on physical
infrastructure, operational security and information security--and we
will continue to develop new policies and procedures with them as
needed.
As I mentioned before, Amtrak has been operating on maximum alert
since September 11. Within moments of the tragedy, we suspended all
Amtrak service nationwide to allow for a top-to-bottom security sweep.
All trains, tracks, bridges, tunnels, stations and other facilities--
including those controlled by others--were inspected within hours, and
security personnel remain stationed at all facilities 24 hours a day, 7
days a week. Entrances and exits are being patrolled, and access is
being restricted.
Last week, we implemented a new policy requiring Amtrak guests to
present valid photo IDs and answer security questions when purchasing
tickets or checking baggage.
We have created a computer program that automatically cross-checks
ticket purchases and reservations--whether they are made at a ticket
counter, a QuikTrak machine or online--against the FBI watchlist on a
real-time basis.
Very shortly, we will be suspending on-board ticket sales in the
Northeast Corridor between Washington, New York and Boston--which means
that every guest that boards a Northeast Corridor train will have been
reviewed for security purposes.
We believe these policies strike the right balance between
providing greater security and maintaining the kind of open, intermodal
design that underpins virtually every rail system in the world.
Going forward, we are committed to doing everything necessary and
reasonable to improve our security further. We at Amtrak have created
an internal task force with representatives from our police,
operations, safety and engineering departments--all of whom are working
very hard to develop and implement additional measures.
In response to Congressional requests, we have submitted a $3.1
billion September 11 Response Package, which breaks out like this:
First, about $1 billion is devoted to bringing railroad
tunnels in the New York, Washington and Baltimore regions up to
modern standards for fire- and life-safety protection.
Second, about $531 million is devoted to deterrence,
vulnerability reduction and emergency response efforts. This
will include new lighting, fencing, security cameras and
access-control systems; the hiring of additional police and
security officers and K-9 units; improvement of our command-
and-communications systems; additional training in anti-
terrorism and security measures; and hazmat detection and
response systems.
Third, about $949 million is needed for Northeast Corridor
capacity and reliability measures, to handle the increased
traffic we are experiencing and to improve passenger flow; and
Finally, $660 million is devoted to equipment repairs,
upgrades and acquisitions to handle increased demand
nationwide.
Mr. Chairman, these are steps that we are confident we can
implement quickly to further enhance the security, safety and capacity
of our passenger rail system. The benefits of this package would be
very significant:
We will reduce risks and meet higher public expectations
about the security of our passenger rail system;
We will speed the installation of critical ventilation,
fire- and life-safety systems in our tunnels, bringing them up
to modern standards; and
We will build a more reliable, flexible fleet to accommodate
changing consumer demand.
Before closing, I would like to spend just a moment explaining some
of the immediate steps we took in response to the national emergency.
As soon as we determined that our system was safe on September 11, we
began putting every available piece of equipment back into service and
accepting the airline tickets of stranded travelers. For several days,
we were one of the only transportation options around the country.
As you may have seen in the media, our ridership has jumped by 10
percent to 15 percent on a national basis since the attacks. Ridership
on the high-speed Acela Express is up by as much as 45 percent; and
long-distance trains are up about 12 percent. As we go forward, we
believe there are several factors that are likely to cause a sustained
increase in demand.
In addition to helping thousands of ordinary travelers, we were
honored to provide free transportation to the families and friends of
many of the victims; and to firefighters, police officers, medical
teams, airline crews and public officials. We've delivered relief
supplies for the American Red Cross. We've even carried hundreds of
extra carloads of U.S. Mail.
Mr. Chairman, in closing I want to reiterate that the passenger
rail system has a good record on security issues, but we also have some
unique challenges. And it is my commitment to you and to every American
that we will work with our colleagues in the transit and freight
railroads, and everyone involved in this enterprise, to do what is
necessary to provide every guest on our trains a safe, comfortable
traveling experience.
Thank you, and I will be happy to answer your questions.
Senator Hutchison. Mr. Chairman, I thank you for letting me
speak. I do have to leave.
Senator Breaux. Do you want to follow up?
Senator Hutchison. Frankly, we have subsidized the
Northeast, and I cannot support something until I see a full
package, with a full commitment in one package.
Thank you.
Senator Breaux. Mr. Hamberger.
STATEMENT OF EDWARD R. HAMBERGER, PRESIDENT & CEO,
ASSOCIATION OF AMERICAN RAILROADS
Mr. Hamberger. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. On behalf of the
AAR members, thank you for the opportunity to appear today, and
I would like to extend the condolences and the sympathy of the
AAR and its members to the families and friends of the victims
of the terrorist attack on September 11. We heard here this
morning the admonitions from Chairman Hollings for rapid
response, and from Senators Rockefeller and Snowe for dynamic
long-term planning. I would like to address my comments in
those two areas.
The freight railroads did react swiftly to the events of
September 11, in full cooperation with the Government
authorities. In the immediate aftermath of the attacks we
tightened security, restricted access to important facilities,
reduced speeds, intensified track inspections across the
system, added additional guards at key locations, and rerouted
selected trains.
I would like to take a moment to salute our own internal
police forces and our chiefs of police who have been working
around the clock since September 11. Today, rail has remained
in 24-hour, 7-day-a-week communication with the U.S. Department
of Transportation intelligence and security personnel, the FBI,
the National Security Council, and state and local law
enforcement officials, and I would like to thank Admiral
Underwood for the leadership he has exhibited at DOT in
providing the needed intelligence data to the industry so that
we can assess the risk and deploy our assets.
We still have enhanced surveillance of operations and fixed
assets. We have increased patrols. We have restricted access to
our facilities. We have increased track inspection. We have
restricted information available over the Internet regarding
military movements and hazardous material movements, and we of
course have had enhanced security briefings, turning over
200,000 railroad employees into sets of eyes and ears gathering
intelligence in the field.
Turning to the longer term, in light of September 11 the
AAR board of directors, on September 19, I might add, 8 days
later, established five critical action teams. I want to
emphasize that each of those has the full participation of our
Canadian and Mexican members, as well as representation of the
shortline rail industry. The five teams are, information
technology and communications, examining the security of
communications and control systems and information systems,
including cyber threats; physical infrastructure, which is
addressing the security of the physical assets, such as
bridges, dispatch centers, tunnels, as well as cross-border
issues; operational security, addressing issues to minimize
exposure to unplanned occurrences while trains are actually
moving; hazardous materials, which cuts across several of these
Subcommittees, but so important we formed a special team that
is working with the chemical industry and tank car
manufacturers to examine additional security options, including
surveillance, routing, remanufacturing and packaging with an
emphasis on materials that pose the greatest potential safety
risk; and fifth is military liaison, building on close existing
working relationships with the Department of Defense to meet
the capacity, security, and specialized equipment of military
requirements.
Each team is assessing short-term and long-term
vulnerabilities in the area of people, process, and technology.
I am sorry Senator Cleland left, because we are looking for new
technologies to assist us in this area. The teams will develop
an array of countermeasures which will be assessed for their
effectiveness to prevent and mitigate a terrorist attack.
To assist us in this effort, Mr. Chairman, we have retained
a group of former U.S. military and civilian security and
intelligence experts who will help us evaluate our security
systems from the perspective of a terrorist. Notwithstanding
all of our efforts there is no 100-percent guarantee against
terrorist assaults. Fortunately, railroads already have long-
established programs and procedures to protect our employees
and the communities in which we operate, as well as to sustain
the flow of freight.
These include emergency response plans for hazardous
materials incidents, operational redundancy, and the training
of rail employees and public emergency response personnel.
These programs and procedures can and will be invoked if there
is a terrorist attack involving railroads, but let me
reemphasize, the total focus of the effort is to detect and
prevent terrorist attack. Again, let me emphasize the
importance of intelligence in being able to do that.
We have a weekly meeting with our CEOs, who are, as you may
know, not in the habit of meeting for meetings' sake. We begin
each meeting and end it with a question, are we safer today
than we were yesterday? That is our focus, and we will continue
to work in that regard, and Mr. Chairman, I thank you for
addressing this important issue and, having this Committee
hearing. We are saddened by the events that precipitated it,
but appreciate your leadership in addressing the important
issues before us.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Hamberger follows:]
Prepared Statement of Edward R. Hamberger,
President & CEO, Association of American Railroads
On behalf of our members, thank you for the opportunity to meet
with you today to discuss the important issue of railroad security. The
Association of American Railroads (AAR) represents the major North
American railroads, which account for the vast majority of rail
mileage, employees, and revenue in Canada, Mexico, and the United
States.
The AAR and its members join the rest of our great nation in
extending our sympathy and condolences to the victims of the terrorist
attacks on September 11, to their families, and to their communities.
We offer our thanks and support to those who have been working so
diligently in search and rescue operations, and we express our firm
hope and confidence that all of the perpetrators of the attacks will be
found and punished.
The rail industry reacted swiftly to the events of September 11, in
full cooperation with government authorities. In the immediate
aftermath of the attacks, railroads tightened security and intensified
inspections across their systems. Major railroads, which maintain their
own police forces to help assure the security of employees, property,
and freight, put enhanced security plans in place. Access to important
rail facilities was restricted. Movement of freight to the New York
area was suspended completely until the immediate threat was over.
At the same time they were attending to security issues, though,
railroads realized they had a responsibility to keep our nation's vital
rail-transport link open, and they have done so. Full service has been
resumed as quickly as the railroads, in cooperation with the U.S.
Department of Transportation, determined it could be. Even in the hard-
hit area around New York City, freight trains are again doing what they
do every single day of the year--moving the raw materials and products
that sustain our nation's economy. The entire rail industry--passenger
and freight, front line employees and management, customer and
carrier--all reacted with courage and resolution.
Today, railroads remain in 24 hour/7 day a week communication with
U.S. Department of Transportation intelligence and security personnel,
the FBI, the National Security Council, and state and local law
enforcement officers, and have plans in place to respond immediately to
credible threats to our transportation network.
To further address significant security-related issues, the AAR
Board of Directors has established five critical action teams, each led
by a senior railroad or AAR executive and each involving the full
participation of AAR members, including our Canadian and Mexican
members. The overarching focuses of these critical action teams, which
are outlined below, are (1) to ensure the safety of our employees and
the communities in which we operate; (2) to protect the viability of
national and regional economic activity; and (3) to ensure that
railroads can play their vital role in the military mission of our
nation. In addition, freight railroads will cooperate fully with the
critical action team dealing with rail passenger security.
LThe five critical action teams established by the AAR are:
1. Information Technology and Communications
This critical action team is examining the security of
communications, control systems, and information systems for
the industry, including redundancy and data confidentiality. An
ongoing examination of issues related to cyber security has
been folded into this effort.
2. Physical Infrastructure
This critical action team is addressing the security of
physical assets such as bridges, buildings, dispatch centers,
tunnels, storage facilities, and other structures. The team is
also addressing cross-border and port ``gateway'' physical
security issues.
3. Operational Security
This critical action team is addressing issues to minimize
exposure to unplanned occurrences while trains are in
operation. The team is analyzing potential types of
occurrences, their probability, and their consequences, as well
as addressing the issue of fuel supply.
4. Hazardous Materials
This critical action team is working with the chemical
industry and tank car manufacturers to examine the transport of
hazardous materials by rail--including surveillance, routing,
remanufacturing, and packaging--with emphasis on materials that
pose the greatest potential safety risk.
5. Military Liaison
This critical action team is augmenting the already existing
close working relationship between railroads and the Department
of Defense to determine immediate and ongoing military traffic
requirements and to identify capacity, security, and equipment
needs of the industry to meet military demand. Railroads are
confident that, if called upon, they will be able to match
their performance during the Persian Gulf War, when they and
other transportation providers accomplished one of the greatest
mass movements in history in a way that was ``so smooth it is
almost as if there isn't a war going on,'' according to a
spokesman from the Army's Military Traffic Management Command
at the time.
Each of the critical action teams described above is working
quickly but carefully. They are assessing short-term and long-term
vulnerabilities in the areas of people, process, and technology and are
developing an array of additional countermeasures. These
countermeasures will be deployed to prevent, detect, and mitigate any
terrorist attack. To assist us, we have retained a group of former U.S.
military and government security experts who bring a valued perspective
to our evaluation. The analyses and action plans generated will form
the basis for additional measures deemed necessary to enhance the
security of our nation's freight rail network.
Notwithstanding all of our efforts, experts will tell you there is
no 100 percent guarantee against terrorist assaults. Fortunately,
railroads are accustomed to operating in adverse conditions. In order
to respond to, mitigate, and minimize the impact of dangerous and
unusual incidents, railroads have established and practiced programs
and procedures to protect the communities we serve and our employees,
and to sustain the fluid flow of freight on which our economy depends.
These programs and procedures include the establishment of emergency
response plans for hazardous materials incidents and natural disasters,
operational administration redundancy, and the training of rail
employees and public emergency response personnel. These programs and
procedures can and will be invoked in the event of a terrorist attack
involving railroads.
Finally, a terrorist action against railroads could have ruinous
consequences for the railroad industry itself, thereby jeopardizing the
critical role railroads play in our economy. AAR member freight
railroads have already been notified by their insurance companies
following the events of September 11 that the railroads' liability
insurance premiums will be increased substantially and some coverage
may be eliminated when renewals come up. As a result, the rail industry
notes with interest the insurance assistance and the limitations on
liability afforded the airline industry in the recently enacted ``Air
Transportation System Stabilization Act.'' We believe that railroads,
as common carriers, should be afforded similar liability protections
and insurance relief.
We are deeply saddened by the events that precipitated this
hearing, but we commend this Committee's leadership in addressing the
important issues before us.
Senator Breaux. Thank you. Mr. Crye.
STATEMENT OF J. MICHAEL CRYE, PRESIDENT,
INTERNATIONAL COUNCIL OF CRUISE LINES
Mr. Crye. Good morning, Mr. Chairman, Senator Smith. My
name is Michael Crye. I am the president of the International
Council of Cruise Lines. I have a rather lengthy prepared
statement that I would like to ask to be inserted into the
record.
Senator Breaux. Without objection. You may summarize it.
Mr. Crye. The cruise industry's highest priority is to
ensure the safety and security of its passengers and crew, and
we are working very closely on a daily basis with federal,
local, and state authorities to ensure the highest level of
safety for our passengers and crew. The cruise industry in the
United States is roughly an $18-billion a year industry, and
257,000 American jobs are created by the industry.
A cruise ship is inherently secure because it is a
controlled environment with limited access, one way on, one way
off. Security plans on cruise ships have been in place since
1986, when the International Maritime Organization adopted
measures to prevent unlawful acts against passengers, and again
in 1996 when the United States Coast Guard issued federal
regulations with respect to passenger terminal and passenger
ship security in the United States.
All of the membership of the International Council of
Cruise Lines, which I represent, have security plans on file
with federal agencies and with the Coast Guard. The security
plans are reviewed every year by the Coast Guard and by the
National Maritime Center of the Coast Guard. These particular
security plans have automatic levels of threat assessment
involving vulnerability assessment, and have different levels
of requirements for security.
The three levels of security are low, medium, and high, and
the industry is currently operating at level three, the highest
level. The protection of all ships in port is provided by a
combination of several law enforcement agencies, including
federal, state, and local. The Coast Guard is responsible for
the overall security and safety of the port, and has designated
some of the responsibility to local port authorities as well,
and in some cases terminal operators.
All of our ships have on-board security staff that are
fully trained and are oriented to the IMO safety requirements
as well as the Coast Guard regulations. Today, on board a
cruise ship you will expect to find exactly the same kind of
screening process that you will experience going on and off an
aircraft. You will need positive identification, 100 percent of
your luggage and carry-ons will be searched either by X-ray or
by dogs, or hand searched.
You will have to pass through a metal detector. All
supplies coming off and on-board the ships are screened and
inspected for any type of security threat. We are communicating
by conference call on a daily basis. The first call occurred
the afternoon of September 11--with all of our member lines'
chief executive officers participating. The next morning we
also began daily conference calls with our security managers,
as well as our operations folks. Those particular security and
operational calls have continued on a daily basis ever since
September 11. The Coast Guard, the Department of
Transportation, the Immigration and Naturalization Service are
participating in those calls.
We began a coordinated approach to try to establish a
uniform national requirement for security, but each Coast Guard
captain of the port has some delegated responsibility to take
unilateral action above what is required on a national basis.
Various captains of the port have, in fact, established
additional security requirements.
At the Port of Portland, Maine that Senator Snowe mentioned
earlier, that particular Coast Guard captain of the port is to
be congratulated for establishing additional requirements on
the spot that he felt were necessary to achieve the appropriate
security levels in that particular port. Those particular
security levels and security requirements he established were
communicated immediately to the cruise ship industry and the
various cruise ships that were trying to sail into Portland.
We also have open lines of communication through our
security management system with the Federal Bureau of
Investigation, the Department of Defense, the Department of
State, and Customs. We have high-tech communications and
separate communications systems that are available to ensure
that there are alternate means of communications with all of
these federal agencies that are concerned with security. Again,
our highest priority is to ensure the safety and security of
our passengers and crew, and we believe that we have done a
good job of addressing these issues in the past several weeks.
Thank you, sir.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Crye follows:]
Prepared Statement of J. Michael Crye,
President, International Council of Cruise Lines
Mr. Chairman, my name is Michael Crye, and I am the President of
the International Council of Cruise Lines (ICCL). I am pleased to
appear before the Subcommittee today to discuss the increased security
efforts that have been implemented by the cruise industry in response
to the terrorist attacks on September 11. With me here today is Captain
Ted Thompson, the Executive Vice President of the ICCL. His duty
involves coordination of security and operations for our membership. We
are shocked and deeply saddened by the attack on America and the
tremendous loss of life that resulted from this national tragedy. In
light of these recent events, we have heightened our already strict
levels of security even further, and our cruise lines have been working
on a daily basis with all appropriate federal, state, and local
agencies to ensure that traveling Americans are protected to the
maximum extent possible.
ICCL is a non-profit trade association that represents the
interests of l6 of the largest cruise lines operating in the North
American cruise market and over 73 Associate Member companies that are
cruise industry business partners and suppliers. ICCL member cruise
lines serve major ports in the United States and call on more than 400
ports around the world. Last year, ICCL's member lines carried more
than 7 million passengers on 95 vessels.
We welcome the opportunity to appear before the Subcommittee today
to review and discuss our industry's efforts to ensure the safety and
security of all of our passengers and crew. The cruise industry's
highest priority is to ensure the safety and security of its
passengers. A cruise ship is unique in that it is inherently secure
because it is a controlled environment with limited access. However, in
order to maintain this secure environment, cruise lines have
established strict and highly confidential ship security procedures
that cannot, for obvious reasons, be discussed in detail. These
procedures are, in part, outlined in measures set forth by the
International Maritime Organization (IMO), and the regulations
established by the U.S. Coast Guard (USCG). In the United States, the
USCG oversees the enforcement of these security measures. Regulations
address both passenger ship and passenger terminal security and outline
methods to deter unlawful activities onboard passenger vessels.
In l986, the IMO adopted Measures to Prevent Unlawful Acts Against
Passengers and Crew. These measures address restricting access to
authorized personnel onboard the ship and at the passenger terminal,
and monitoring the flow of materials and consumable supplies brought
onboard a ship. Security procedures within these measures include
inspection of all carry-on baggage and the use of metal detectors for
embarking passengers. Strict passenger screening to prevent
unauthorized entry or carriage of weapons onboard is only one component
of the security procedures implemented to deter unlawful acts on board
and to provide for the safety of all passengers.
In l996, the USCG implemented an Interim Final Rule on Security for
Passenger Vessels and Passenger Terminals, which was finalized in
October of l999. This rule sets three levels of security (low, medium,
and high) based on the nature of the threat received and requires
vessel operators and port terminal operators to adjust security levels
accordingly. These regulations also require ship operators to submit
Comprehensive Security Plans to the USCG for review and acceptance. All
ICCL member lines have submitted the required security plans. These
plans have been accepted by the USCG and are audited annually. The
security plans, which are sensitive law enforcement documents and
therefore not available to the public, include the following major
components:
Identification of three levels of security and specific
procedures to follow at each level
Prevent unlawful acts on board
Prevention and deterrence of weapons and other unauthorized
items onboard
Prevention and deterrence of unauthorized access to vessels
and restricted areas
A security officer onboard every passenger vessel
Security training for all crew members
A security plan that is coordinated with the terminal
security plan
Reporting of violations and unlawful acts
Annual security audits for each ship and reviews by the USCG
Passenger vessel security plans and their amendments are reviewed
by the USCG National Maritime Center and inspections are conducted by
the Captain of the Port to verify that all security practices and
procedures are effective and up-to-date.
The U.S. Department of Transportation Office of Intelligence and
Security and the USCG Commandant direct the implementation of
nationwide and local security levels. Domestic threat advisories are
provided to the industry summarizing the nature of the security threat
and specifying changes to security levels both locally and nationally.
As a result of the attacks in September, implementation of Level III
security was directed by the U.S. Coast Guard at U.S. ports. ICCL
member operators reported that they implemented Level III security
measures even before it was ordered by the USCG.
Security Level III is the highest level of security set by Coast
Guard Passenger Vessel Security regulations. At U.S. cruise terminals,
passenger vessel security measures include passenger screening
procedures similar to those found at airports. This includes l00
percent screening of all passenger baggage, carry-on luggage, ship
stores and cargo, and also includes higher levels of screening of
passenger identification. Official passenger lists are carefully
reviewed and proper identification is ensured before anyone is allowed
to board the vessel. Even before the attacks of September 11, all
passenger lists were made available to the INS and Customs for
screening. Passenger identification is now subject to even stricter
scrutiny and the industry is working closely with the INS and other
federal agencies to ensure that those passengers suspected of being on
the INS ``Prevent Departure'' list are reported to the federal
authorities for further action.
Another component of Level III Security requires ship operators to
restrict access to authorized personnel and to identify restricted
areas on the vessel that require positive access control such as
intrusion alarms, guards, or other measures to prevent unauthorized
entry. Restricted areas on a vessel will include the bridge, the engine
room, and other areas throughout the ship where operations are
conducted. Other onboard security measures, not generally discussed for
obvious reasons, are employed to maximize shipboard security and to
deter unauthorized entry and illegal activity. Every vessel has a
trained security staff responsible for monitoring activities and
responding to any suspicious activity that may jeopardize the safety of
the passengers and crew.
For many years, the cruise industry has been pro-active in
developing effective security measures and has looked for ways to
increase passenger safety. In fact, most ICCL member lines now utilize
advanced technologies to control access to our vessels. The Passenger
Access Control System, that has been installed on most of our member's
vessels, utilizes a passenger identification card that takes a picture
of the passenger at the time of boarding and scans the picture into an
onboard computer. During the course of a cruise, the identification
card is presented each time a passenger departs or boards the vessel.
The picture appears on a computer screen that is matched against the
person's face for identification purposes before they are allowed to
board the ship. This new technology is part of an overall onboard
security system that further enhances the proper identification of all
passengers and crew boarding the vessel.
Since l998, ICCL and its member operators have been members of the
U.S. Interagency Task Force on Passenger Vessel Security. This group
meets every 60 days to discuss emerging security issues, receive
updated threat information, and address specific security concerns.
Since September 11, the ICCL Security and Operations Committee members
have efficiently communicated and resolved problems in daily conference
calls with all of the appropriate federal agencies. This information
exchange has proven to be valuable both to our member lines and the
federal agencies involved as we mutually address matters impacting both
ship operations and security. We are committed to providing the highest
levels of security for our passengers and to working with appropriate
federal agencies to address additional security measures that may
become necessary.
Mr. Chairman, we in the cruise industry, believe that our security
plans and working relationships with regulatory agencies are
accomplishing many of the goals of the Port and Maritime Security Act
of 2001. The collaboration and cooperation of all agencies and industry
exhibited since the events of September 11 are also accomplishing many
of the goals of this legislation. Of course all of the additional
security measures that we have put in place are consuming resources and
money at a rapid pace. I would urge you to ensure that there is
adequate funding that comes with any additional mandates that you place
on agencies, ports or industry in this legislation. These are
challenging times, but our industry pledges its cooperation in working
as partners to maintain the outstanding safety record of the cruise
industry. As I stated before, the highest priority of the cruise
industry is to provide a safe and secure vacation experience for our
passengers.
This country can and will unite to exercise one of our most
cherished freedoms, the freedom to travel. It is up to us to ensure
that we protect not only the freedom, but to ensure that those whose
goal it is to disrupt our way of life are not successful. We, in the
cruise industry, will do everything possible to protect those who
choose this outstanding and safe vacation option.
Thank you for the opportunity to appear before you today.
GOD BLESS AMERICA.
Senator Breaux. Thank you, Mr. Crye. Mr. Cox.
STATEMENT OF JOSEPH J. COX, PRESIDENT,
CHAMBER OF SHIPPING OF AMERICA
Mr. Cox. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. With your permission, I
will submit my testimony for the record and make some
extemporaneous remarks. Thank you.
Mr. Chairman, the Chamber of Shipping of America is the
American Shipowners' Association. We trace our roots back to
1917, and we represent all types of vessels, including crude
and product tankers, container ships, chemical tankers, ro-ro
ships, and bulk carriers.
The first thing we would like to do, Mr. Chairman, is
through your Subcommittee offer our deepest sympathy to the
family and friends of those who have been terrorized through
these acts. Not only the victims and the families have been
victimized, but we ourselves, as the American people, have been
victimized. The day following the attacks the Chamber of
Shipping of America received letters of sympathy from our
international colleagues at the Baltic and International
Maritime Council, the International Chamber of Shipping and
Intercargo. Together, those organizations and ourselves
represent probably 90 percent of the world's ships.
Mr. Chairman, CSA is involved in both U.S. domestic and
international trade issues, and two key points we would like to
place before the Subcommittee is that the maritime is a basic
tool of trade for the United States, and in that trade we are a
world leader in establishing policies to be followed. What we
do in our country as a result of these actions is going to have
repercussions around the world, not just in the United States,
and the volumes of trade involved have to be appreciated by the
American public. Two aspects of that trade are oil and
containers that carry our general cargoes in and out of the
country.
With respect to oil, the United States consumes somewhere
near 18 million barrels a day, and a barrel is 42 gallons, and
so we are consuming somewhere about 750 million gallons of oil
a day. We import around 8 million barrels of that via ships.
Gasoline and heating oil move along our coasts on vessels, and
Alaska itself contributes about a million barrels a day of oil
to our nation's needs.
With respect to containers, there are approximately 18
million or so containers that are imported and exported from
the United States. Our imported containers number around 11
million. Average a day would be about 30,000, but I think that
average is misleading, given that there are some ports with
extremely large numbers of containers crossing the dock within
a period of time.
Mr. Chairman, Committee members, the primary focus of ship
operations has been, and I think will continue to be, an
efficient movement of the cargo, and that efficiency has inured
to the benefit of the American public and the world's public.
Whatever changes we have to make, we have to absorb within that
trading system.
The industry characteristics have shifted quite
dramatically in the past 25 years. We no longer have a world
maritime trade which is dominated by a few major maritime
nations. We have a maritime community where the shipowner can
be of one nationality, the vessel could be another nationality,
the mortgage bankers can be a third nationality, the actual
operator of the ship, the people on board the ship as officers
and the people on board as crew could all be different
nationalities.
Two present actions can be seen as ship-specific, that is
utilizing the ship as a mechanism for damage or seeing the ship
as a target from outside. I think both have to be viewed in
terms of what the potentials are. The single answer that we
have today is stepped up vigilance and scrutiny of our
operations. The maritime community does not operate in a
regulatory vacuum. We operate with a great amount of federal
oversight. We also operate with a great amount of commercial
oversight over these transactions that take place with ships.
We have to make everyone in that process aware that they have
to be watching for aberrations in the system, and no longer
just wonder what is happening, but ask questions about it.
Last week, we were very active with a request from the
United States Coast Guard that vessels send in their advance
notice of arrival 96 hours in advance versus the 24 hours that
is in the regulations now. The Coast Guard indicated that they
are working on a regulation. We understand that, but we have
instituted a voluntary practice of trying to get those crew
lists and the advance notice to the Captain of the Port as soon
as possible. We have asked ships, and they have told us, that
they are controlling access to their vessels in foreign ports
to the extent that they can, limiting it to business personnel.
We have recommended that the ships maintain a watch not
only in foreign ports but in our ports on the water side. Ship
communication should always be open. We think that the U.S.
pilots who do an excellent job moving these vessels, very large
vessels, I might point out, into our ports should maintain some
type of constant shore contact. We believe they do. We believe
that can be built upon in terms of our protection.
We think the VTS monitors many aspects of trade in and out
of the United States. The Vessel Traffic Service should be
enhanced. Agents and other shore personnel should be
questioning what happens. Ports and terminals should limit
access of personnel to the port and terminals that have
business to be there.
The oil terminals, we understand, in this country have a
closed gate policy now. If you do not have business on that
ship, you are not going to be in there, and if you do have
business, you are going to have to prove what that business is,
and also the identification of yourself.
We should also at the same time take care not to put undue
burdens on American citizens manning our tankers and cargo
ships plying along our coasts. Those are the very people we are
going to have to rely upon should there be an escalation that
necessitates actions in maritime.
Mr. Chairman, I am going to conclude by saying we must have
national uniformity, including activities on our public and
private terminals, and we certainly want to work with our
administration and the U.S. Coast Guard to that end.
I want to thank you for the opportunity to testify, and we
certainly are here to respond to any questions. Thank you.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Cox follows:]
Prepared Statement of Joseph J. Cox,
President, Chamber of Shipping of America
Thank you Mr. Chairman. It is a pleasure to testify before your
Subcommittee on this important topic.
I am Joseph J. Cox, President of the Chamber of Shipping of America
(CSA). The Chamber represents 21 U.S. based companies that own, operate
or charter oceangoing tankers, container ships, chemical tankers and
other merchant vessels engaged in both the domestic and international
trades. The CSA also represents other entities that maintain a
commercial interest in the operation of such oceangoing vessels.
Before starting my testimony on the subject, I would like to take a
few moments to express the deep sympathy of the maritime community to
the victims and families and friends of victims of these terrorist
attacks on American soil. We watched in horror, as virtually all the
nation did, as the World Trade Center towers collapsed. Many of our
friends and colleagues worked in or near the disaster and we were
relieved when we heard reports of the safe exit of many; we mourn and
pray for those who are lost. The day following the terrorist attacks,
CSA received letters of condolence and support addressed to the U.S.
maritime community from our international colleagues at the Baltic and
International Maritime Council, the International Chamber of Shipping
and Intercargo. We thank them on behalf of our industry. Every day as
we commute past the Pentagon, we are reminded of the damage and loss of
life. Pictures do not do justice.
Today, CSA has been asked to discuss security issues within the
maritime industry. We will start with a brief description of the types
of vessels involved, the trades and terminals. We will then describe
ship operations, company activity and interface with government
agencies. This will be followed by a general description of cargo
movements and we will conclude with a description of steps being taken
and some recommendations.
Chamber of Shipping of America--International and Domestic
Responsibilities
CSA traces its roots back to 1917 and the development of the first
international treaty on maritime safety. Since that time, the U.S. has
had extensive dealings with the international community on maritime
matters. We mention this because it is critical to recognize two very
important points: the maritime industry is the basic tool of
international trade and the U.S. has been one of the leaders in the
development of policies for this industry for decades. At the same
time, we have an extensive trade in our waters among U.S. companies.
The needs of the U.S. for a secure waterfront will have an impact on
our ships and the ships of our trading partners. We should recognize
that ships are the critical mechanism for the United States in its
world trade leadership. Ships are the lifelines of trade from other
nations to the U.S. and from the U.S. to the rest of the world.
Types of Ships
CSA represents all types of ships that carry cargo. These include
container ships, tankers, both crude and product tankers, roll-on roll-
off ships, integrated tug-barge units and large coastwise barges. Our
members are involved in operating ships, chartering ships, arranging
for crew and pilotage, government inspections, insurance surveys,
complying with laws and regulations, responding to customer requests
and generally keeping the maritime commerce of the country on the move.
Container ships, which are a U.S. invention, are designed to carry
intermodal containers. An intermodal container can be one of a number
of lengths although the most prevalent is the 40-foot container. This
is recognized by probably all Americans as the standard truck size that
we encounter on our highways. Many of the trucks encountered by the
U.S. driving public are actually containers that were only a short time
previous on an ocean voyage. The efficiency of the system is based on
the ease with which a container can be dropped off at a loading point
inland, loaded by the manufacturer, sealed, transported to a port,
loaded onto a ship, transported across the sea, unloaded at another
port, transported to the inland destination where the seal is broken by
the recipient and the container unloaded. Container ships vary in size
and are referred to by the number of containers they carry. The
carrying capacity is ``20 foot equivalent units'' or ``TEU''s. The 20
foot container was the prevalent size when container ships were being
developed. These containers carry the vast majority of the U.S. trade.
In 2000, there were over 17 million TEU's moved across U.S. docks. If
domestic containers are counted, the figure is well over 20 million.
Container ships have grown in size over the years in the drive for more
efficiency. The ultimate recipients of the benefits of that efficiency
are the public.
Tankers are the primary source of transporting the crude oil the
U.S. imports and provide a substantial amount of the transport needs to
move products such as gasoline and heating oil. Crude oil is both U.S.
produced and purchased from foreign sources. Our foreign purchased
crude can be what is referred to in the business as long-haul or short-
haul crude. A short-haul, for example would be from Venezuela and a
long haul would be, for example, from the Arabian Gulf. At present, the
U.S. consumes a bit over 18 million barrels per day of crude oil. (The
oil industry refers to oil in terms of barrels. A barrel is 42 gallons
so the 18 million barrels per day consumption is over 756 million
gallons.) Approximately 18 million barrels of this production is
domestic. The remainder comes from a variety of sources including the
Gulf. The latest figures show 2-3 million barrels, or 11 to 15 percent
of our consumption from the Gulf. Most of the imported crude arrives on
Very Large Crude Carriers (VLCCs). VLCCs are too large for U.S. ports
so when they arrive, they are lightered so that they can enter a port
or they may be completely lightered and not physically enter port.
Lightering is the act of transferring oil to smaller tankers, which
can enter the port at a shallower draft, for movement into the
terminal. Both the VLCC and the smaller tanker are most often foreign
flag. A common size VLCC holds around 2 million barrels so, on average,
there are three VLCCs completely unloaded every day in or near our
territorial waters. In actuality, since the lighterings can take a
week, there is a larger number of VLCCs near our coast than the barrel
delivery number would indicate. There is a considerable amount of oil
moved from our Alaska fields amounting to nearly 1 million barrels per
day. Since this is a domestic movement, U.S. flag tankers do that
carriage. The movement of gasoline and heating oil along our coasts is
performed by smaller size product tankers and ocean-going barges. These
are also U.S. flag vessels.
Other types of ships call at our ports such as bulk ships which
most frequently call at our nation to load our bulk exports including
grain, coal and fertilizer. Chemical tankers are a smaller tanker than
their crude oil cousin and are specially designed to carry various
chemicals in bulk.
The ships carrying our trade are in the main foreign flagged. From
the time trade began, ships have been registered in a particular
nation. When registered, the ship then flies the flag of that nation at
its stern. This told the rest of the world what laws the ship was
operating under relative to mortgage laws, seafarer rules and other
national regulations. Not too many years ago, the nationality of the
owner of the ship, the operator and the crew were the same. As it has
developed, we must be aware that the reality today is that the
beneficial owner may be one nationality, the operating company another
nationality, the officers on board can be a mix of nationalities and
the unlicensed crew still another mix. Throughout all the trade and
logistic changes throughout the industry, there has been an increase in
concern with safety and environmental protection and development of
technology to protect the asset. The number of ship loss incidents has
decreased dramatically in the past 25 years and the efficiency of the
system has had an equally dramatic rise. This situation is the reality
we work with today.
Ship Commerce
As we look at ships in our ports and harbors, it will be helpful to
understand the number of people involved and, from there, consider what
responsibilities various parties have. A ship loads at one or a number
of foreign ports and, whether on a strict schedule or otherwise, at
some point, takes a departure from the final port and heads to the U.S.
On board will be the cargo with proof of ownership and other
documentation that is a part of the commercial world. The ship itself
will have on board a number of documents issued by the flag state
attesting to compliance with international requirements. Every seafarer
on board, and the number will vary by ship type, will have a seaman's
document issued by the nation of registry. As the ship approaches the
U.S., it will send an arrival notice to the U.S. Coast Guard and will
contact an agent or, if the company is large enough, a company
employee, to make the arrangements to have a state licensed pilot meet
the ship to bring it in, arrange for U.S. Customs Service clearance,
quarantine inspections, Immigration and Naturalization Service
clearance and handle vendors and suppliers of goods for the ship. After
picking up the pilot at the entrance to the port or harbor, the ship
enters under the direction of the pilot who has the capability of a
direct link with the harbor communications system that is separate from
the ship's communications gear although he will use the ship's gear in
most instances. The speed of the ship at this point will vary according
to circumstances as directed by the pilot although in very few
instances will this approach the full speed capability of the ship. In
many harbors, the movements will be monitored by the vessel traffic
system which may be manned by government or private company personnel.
As the ship nears the dock, tugs may be used to assist. Once along
side, the activity of clearance begins.
What is occurring now?
Present Actions
We see two aspects for concern relative to ships: problems
emanating from within the vessel and outside actions directed at the
ship. Although ship operators have more control over the first, we have
comments on the roles of various participants involved in our ship
operations.
Ship operators should be aware of the potential for use of
the ship as a mechanism of terrorist activity and take
appropriate safeguards in foreign ports particularly the last
foreign port of call and limiting access to personnel with
ship's business. The operator should take special care in
reviewing the seafarer documents of newly hired crew. At the
dock in the U.S., or at anchor, the ship should maintain a
watch at the waterside and report questionable activity to the
Coast Guard. The master should limit access to the ship by
personnel allowing only those who have business with the ship.
Ship operators should comply with the U.S. Coast Guard's
request that a crew list and a list of other persons on board
be transmitted to the Coast Guard at least 96 hours before
arrival at the U.S. (The current regulation, now under review
for change, has a 24 hour timeframe.)
American pilots should ensure that masters are fully aware
of the intended track of the ship. The pilot should also
consider maintaining separate communications with responsible
shore personnel.
Where VTS is presently operating, the VTS controllers should
be vigilant about traffic being monitored/controlled and other
traffic nearby.
Agents, who are usually American companies, should review
ship's documents closely for non-conformities and resolve
issues prior to ship arrival.
Ports/terminals should limit access to their facilities to
only those persons having business with the facility and who
can adequately identify themselves with photo identification.
They should cooperate with the Master in limiting access to the
ship. Ports/terminals and ships should agree on methods to
accommodate crew changes and visits by vendors to chandler the
ship or effect necessary repairs.
Lightering--We understand the lightering community has
initiated some additional steps including adding a deck watch,
exercising the piracy part of the ship's plan, keeping the
radar active, more frequent patrols of the operator by small
boat and maintaining communications with the Coast Guard.
We are working with various government agencies and are
encouraged with the cooperation among them. Last week, we
addressed a problem and were able to talk directly to Customs
and INS as the agencies had placed personnel in each other's
offices. This coordination must continue as nationwide
uniformity is necessary for the maritime industry to operate
efficiently and safely. The Coast Guard, in addition to working
with other federal agencies, should work with state and local
governments and public and private terminals to ensure that
regulations and requirements are uniform nationwide.
Mr. Chairman and Committee members, much of the above is
maintaining a heightened awareness of the circumstances and ensuring
that communication links are open and accessible. Some operations, such
as a marine terminal at a refinery, may have additional safeguards. In
any port/ship interface, there is a need for the knowledgeable persons
to communicate with each other. We believe this is taking place at oil
terminals.
In closing, we must make our industry secure and we must continue
to operate. These goals are not incompatible.
This concludes by testimony. I would be pleased to answer any
questions.
Senator Breaux. Thank you, gentlemen.
Mr. Warrington, let us start with you.
Senator Breaux. Mr. Warrington, you may have heard my
questions in the beginning to Admiral Underwood with regard to
the hypothetical I outlined. If someone leaving where we are
today have to roll a large suitcase over to Union Station,
purchase a ticket on an electronic ticket machine, and bring
that luggage loaded with explosives onto an Amtrak passenger
train, and then after placing it on the train, step off right
before the train departs and have the unthinkable happen
somewhere between here and New York, or whatever.
What steps have been taken to assure this is not a
potential threat, or is it possible to guarantee that it never
would be? What is different today than it was September 10 with
regard to that type of a scenario, if anything?
Mr. Warrington. Let me talk about all the checked baggage
and carry-on baggage issues. First of all, the package which we
have put together significantly increases both security, police
presence, and technology and surveillance at all of our checked
baggage facilities across the system. That includes the
acquisition of hand-held explosive detection devices. This
package includes the acquisition of 1,000 of those units at
$4,000 apiece, along with X-ray capability at all of our
baggage facilities around the country.
In addition, those facilities and all of our mail and
express facilities around the system will be patrolled with
bomb-sniffing dogs. Across this system today we have eight
dogs. This package includes the acquisition of 19 additional
dogs and handlers for deployment across the system.
Senator Breaux. Let me interrupt you on that point. Between
here and New York, obviously you have a lot of stops, and a lot
of people coming on and getting off. Is the concept to have
baggage inspected at each stop where people come onto the
train?
Mr. Warrington. There is very little checked baggage,
virtually no checked baggage on the Northeast Corridor itself.
Most of it is carry-on baggage, and as Senator Cleland
mentioned earlier, we have been engaged, prior to this
incident, in discussions with the FAA about technology
transference of on-board explosive detection devices and other
hand-held devices that could be immediately installed in our
equipment.
The technology is not quite proven, but we believe, and we
have included in this package that we could and should move
forward on that front. That is one of the most important things
I think we need to do in order to deal with the concern that
you raised this morning.
Senator Breaux. Do you know of any other passenger train
systems in other parts of the world which have a system where
carry-on baggage is inspected?
Mr. Warrington. There is a much bigger set of policy issues
here as a matter of national transit and transportation
security. Mr. Chairman, this has to do with the evolution over
decades of encouraging the design of facilities and the
operation of this entire transit system as an integrated mass
transportation system. Inherent in that design, is facilitating
the free flow of people on and off and to and from the entire
network.
In Penn Station, New York, for example, Amtrak carries
30,000 passengers a day, but the Long Island Railroad and New
Jersey Transit feed another 300,000 passengers through that
facility. In addition there are transfers going on with tens of
thousands of New York City Transit Authority subway passengers.
As a practical matter, the ability to gate, screen, metal-
detect or technologically screen every package, suitcase,
briefcase, and piece of luggage in an open facility like that,
as a practical matter does not exist. If you look across the
world, on all of the transit and high speed systems, including
those in Israel, Germany and France, other than the Chunnel
system between Paris and London, it is a very closed system for
a whole host of reasons. The basic systems are open. There are
varying degrees of either ad hoc or spot-checking, but it is
very difficult to close the system.
If Amtrak were to choose to close the entire system, one of
the difficulties we would confront is access by literally
thousands of commuter trains and commuter customers with
briefcases using the Amtrak system and in those Amtrak
terminals, including the Metro system right here in Washington
which feeds into Washington Union Station.
We have had discussions with the American Public Transit
Association. In fact, we talked about this past Saturday night.
They have put together a very important internal task force
across the transit industry, and they have invited us to
participate to deal with this important question.
Senator Breaux. Well, I guess what you are saying is that
it is almost physically and humanly impossible to operate a
closed system as you described it for passenger rail systems in
this country.
Mr. Warrington. I think that is the case, but there are a
lot of things we could do and that we are doing today. With the
package we have proposed, we believe it significantly minimizes
the risk and the vulnerability about access of undesirables or
undesirable packages or baggage on board the Amtrak system.
Senator Breaux. Thank you.
Mr. Hamberger, we are talking about federalizing the air
traffic security system, inspection and security at airports,
inspection of passengers boarding the airliners, and all
departures in the United States.
The railroads are unique in the sense that their security
has been the responsibility of the owners and operators of the
rail system. Should that continue? What is the proper role of
federal oversight? I mean, I think a lot of people are going to
be saying, look, we are concerned about the railroads, and for
them to say, well, we are doing it, do not worry about it,
there wants to be a degree of knowledge that there is someone
supervising what is being done. Can you comment on that?
Mr. Hamberger. Yes, sir. I think where we need to head
would be to reach a protocol with the FRA or the Department of
Transportation Security Office, or whatever would be the proper
federal participant, that would say that when we get to certain
levels of threats, however those would be defined, DEFCON 1 or
2, 3, 4, however they would go up, that there would be specific
actions that the industry would take, that posting guards at a
tunnel or bridge might be appropriate at one level of threat,
but not in others.
So as the threat level increases, as the specificity and
credibility of the threat increases, then the response would
increase, and that is something that I think we need to be
working toward with Admiral Underwood's Office to come up with
a protocol that addresses the threat and has a proper federal
role in it, but yet leaves the responsibility of implementing
it in the private sector.
Senator Breaux. Senator Hollings and I were talking about
track interruptions, and his concern, I think, was how do you
know when a track has been disrupted along the route. There is
an electronic monitoring system, is there not?
Mr. Hamberger. Well, there is and there is not. There is an
electronic signalling system, where there is an electric
current that runs up one rail and comes back the other and
completes the circuit, so that if there is a break in the rail
it is detectable. There are many miles of track, generally in
unsettled areas, where there is not a signalling system in
place, what they call dark territory.
We are working right now at TTCI in Pueblo, Colorado on a
fiber optic cable that could be strung along the rail all over
the country that would detect even in dark areas if there is a
rail break, but in urban areas, where a lot of the traffic is
occurring, there is the electric system.
Senator Breaux. Is that system along the Amtrak tracks?
Mr. Warrington. Mr. Chairman. First of all, in the
Northeast Corridor we have a whole host of safeguards and
protections built into the system, both the electrical system
and the signal system, to stop a train literally in its tracks
if it is a rogue train. That includes a whole number of items
that I would rather not discuss here publicly, but we certainly
do have that capability.
You should be aware also that every passenger train that we
run across this system, every car has an emergency brake
application, so a conductor in communication with an engineer
that is in any kind of difficulty has the ability in every car
of that train to immediately apply an emergency application.
In addition, on the Northeast Corridor we control remotely
every signal and every switch that is operated on that
railroad. The engineer does not choose his own route and
remotely from a location in either Boston or New York or
Philadelphia our power dispatchers and our trained dispatchers
can display a slow approach, an approach or stop signal at any
time that requires a train to come into conformance. If that
train gets beyond that stop signal, the emergency braking
system will automatically be triggered.
Senator Breaux. Thank you.
Mr. Crye, let us talk a little bit about ships, and
passengers on board ships. Obviously, the ships that ply the
seas, many of which originate in U.S. ports, carry literally
thousands and thousands of passengers on board the ships, and I
was pleased to hear the amount of an inspection that is now
being done on the passengers that are boarding.
I have somewhat of a concern about the crew of the ships.
Most of the crews, because they are foreign vessels, are
foreign crew members, not citizens of the United States. How do
you secure the fact that these foreign sailors and crew members
are not suspected terrorists or in fact they are who they say
they are, that they originate from where they say they are
coming from? Simply, how do you go about security with regard
to the crew members, which I take it are sometimes as large as
the number of passengers on the ships themselves?
Mr. Crye. Sir, that is a several-faceted question. Let me
try to take each issue one by one. Number one, in the process
of hiring for crew members for the membership of the
International Council of Cruise Lines, we generally hire
through recognized manning agencies. The recognized manning
agencies are those that have been certified in many cases in
compliance with ISO 9000, or who have a history of providing
quality personnel.
There is a background check, or there are credential checks
for criminal records, in local jurisdictions, and they also
have to get U.S. visas in order to be able to enter the United
States. The visa application process requires the certification
of the individual that they are who they say they are, and that
their background has been checked within the means of the local
communities.
The cruise industry also has a practice of hiring people
that have a tradition of hospitality, and a tradition of sea-
going service. Many times the cruise industry has
multigenerational families that have hired on and worked for
the industry.
The lists of personnel on board the vessels, not only the
passengers but the crew, are provided to the INS and to
Customs, and now, in addition, it appears the Coast Guard wants
all of those lists during and prior to the embarkation, or
prior to the return of a ship to the United States port, and so
we are providing those lists sometimes to three or four
different agencies in the process of the vessel leaving a
United States port or coming back to a United States port.
The INS is sharing a do-not-depart or prevent-departure
list with the cruise industry, and we are checking the list of
passengers and crew against those names, and we are also
certifying back to the INS any people that have a name that
appears to be questionable, and in addition, we provide them
with a list of all the passengers and crew that are on board,
they are checking those names also.
Senator Breaux. Do you know, Mr. Crye, if Panama's maritime
authority is one of the groups that supply employees for the
cruise industry?
Mr. Crye. The maritime authority?
Senator Breaux. Yes, the AMP.
Mr. Crye. I do not know, sir.
Senator Breaux. The reason I ask is because an
investigation into the corruption of Panama's maritime
authority--I am reading from a document--in April of this year
revealed the country is employing up to 1,000 unqualified
sailors who are working under false documents. The scandal was
uncovered when an official paid $4,500 for a Panamanian first
officer's license, despite having absolutely no qualifications
or any shipping experience.
The reason I raise this is because of the importance of
knowing? You are hiring mostly foreign crew members. I mean, if
you are hiring them from Panama's maritime authority you do not
know who they are.
Mr. Crye. Mr. Chairman, I would tell you that we also had
an incident in the United States very similar to that, where
there were some documents that issued with United States
credentials, so unlawful acts can occur anywhere, but I can
tell you that my understanding is that the Government of Panama
has undertaken a wide-scale investigation to determine that
everyone that they have issued documents to----
Senator Breaux. It sounds like the investigation found out
they have got one huge problem.
Mr. Crye. Those types of issues you have several different
means of being able to evaluate the crew members and who they
are. You also have classifications----
Senator Breaux. Is the ship checked beyond the fact that
they have a sailor who wants to work on their ship who has a
Panamanian work permit? I mean, do you not just accept that
permit? You do not do any real checking further than that, do
you?
Mr. Crye. There is a real difference between officers'
credentials and crew members' credentials, number one. The
officers on board the ICCL member vessels are generally either
Norwegian or U.K. Dutch or Greek or Italian. They may obtain an
alternate licensure through a Government such as Panama, but
these countries are our allies, the deck and engine officers
are hired through the countries that have very strong national
traditions.
Senator Breaux. For the officers and engineers that run the
ship, I understand that, but I am concerned about the thousands
of individuals who work on the ship in a nonofficer,
nonengineer capacity. How do we verify--not to be overly
critical, but how do you verify who in the heck thousands of
foreign sailors are carrying these passengers?
Mr. Crye. Many of the cruise lines have training schools as
well, and they hire through recognized manning agencies. When
an individual comes to get a United States visa to work on
board a cruise ship to be able to come to this country, they
must certify they are who they say they are and show
identification.
Senator Breaux. I am sure they are always certified that
whatever it takes to get on the ship.
Mr. Crye. There is also--as you know, no system is
completely fail-safe, and I think that the practices and
procedures that the cruise industry employs has various
mechanisms to determine and to ensure that the people are who
they say they are.
Senator Breaux. Well, I really would like to further
explore that. Now is not the time to do it, but there has got
to be some kind of verification of the name in the passport and
the fact that they are not on some suspected list of potential
terrorists, or what-have-you, because that is an awful lot of
people on each ship that we ought to be concerned about who
they are.
Mr. Crye. Senator, through employment records you have a
history of an individual, whether they are reliable employees,
whether they are doing the job that they are supposed to be
doing, there are 100 percent checks that the people who are on
board the vessel are who they say they are, so I believe we
have taken a lot of measures to ensure the identity of the
passengers as well as the crew on board the vessels.
Senator Breaux. Thank you.
Mr. Cox, what is the biggest threat to the carriers that
you have to deal with? I mean, if you have got an LNG vessel or
the VLCC crude carrier, is the biggest threat at sea, is the
biggest threat in the harbor, or is the biggest threat an
internal threat or is it an external threat to the security of
that ship?
Mr. Cox. Mr. Chairman, it is a personal opinion of mine--
CSA's Committee is meeting next week, and we will put together
responses to these types of questions, but listening to what
was testified to today, and the questions from your colleagues
on the Subcommittee, I think that from a vessel standpoint what
we should worry about in the United States perhaps as the first
question is would a vessel be used to interdict the
transportation infrastructure of the United States? Could a
ship be used to block Long Beach Harbor? Could it be used to
block the Mississippi River or the Port of Houston?
I think that there are instances in the past where this has
happened. From a commercial standpoint there has actually been
a legitimate problem on board a ship that caused it to block
the channel. A recent occurrence just this year was in the Port
of Lake Charles, where a ship sunk and actually blocked access
to St. Charles for a number of months.
Senator Breaux. Tell me about it!
Mr. Cox. I did not mean to hit home on that too much, but
it is certainly an indication of what can happen, but I think
from the standpoint of terrorist activity, that is an
interdiction of transportation mechanism, and therefore an
attack on our economic structure.
Senator Breaux. So in the harbor activities, it is
potentially vulnerable, as opposed to being in the open sea?
Mr. Cox. I think if someone were to take some action with
respect to a vessel, that harbor entrances and the way into the
harbor would be where the action could be taken which would
truly damage the transportation in that particular port.
Senator Breaux. Are you satisfied with the Coast Guard's
assistance in keeping nonapproved vessels away from your
carriers while they are either in the harbor or exiting or
coming into a harbor? That is a problem where our military
vessel was in the harbor and they just ran a boat loaded with
dynamite right into it--that was a military vessel--and killed
a number of sailors, but are we protected enough, and are they
off-limits for other vessels coming around a supertanker or an
LNG carrier, for instance?
Mr. Cox. Well, certainly I think there are two levels of
protection there that we have to key in on. One is the
vigilance of the vessel itself, and I must admit that on
September 10 we probably would not have thought of many of
these questions, but ships have those questions now, and we
certainly think they ought to be vigilant and report any
activity close to their vessel which they feel looks anywhere
near questionable.
The Coast Guard has instituted some port security measures
and patrolling the harbors. I cannot comment on the efficacy of
that. They are certainly operating with a knowledge base on
security that we in the commercial industry do not possess.
At the same time, I am concerned that the Coast Guard is
taking those assets from the other things they are supposed to
be doing, and if we do not think about how we have to plus-up
the Coast Guard to perform these actions, then we are going to
lose the coverage in some other areas.
Mr. Chairman, if I might talk about the new issue that you
were talking with my colleague Mr. Crye about, we have those
same concerns, of course.
Senator Breaux. You have much smaller crews.
Mr. Cox. But we have the exact same concerns, and that is
the person presenting themselves to us as a qualified crew
member indeed qualified, and today we have an additional
question, is that person presenting themselves as a sailor when
they are not, they are actually something else?
I think we have too--the reason I wanted to say something
is we have another mechanism check available to us, and that is
that the officers and the unlicensed crew on a cargo ship all
have to have documentation from the flag state, that is, the
country whose flag is on the stern of that ship that they are
qualified seafarers, and the standards of training
certification and watch-keeping international treaty will come
into force in February of 2002 in a new, more direct way with
respect to the qualification of those people.
The United States certainly has the opportunity and can
probably do so today, to check back with those flag states with
our list of crew members, so not only are we using the crew
lists and getting it over to the FBI and INS and Customs, we
are taking a look and seeing if we are getting some truly bad
actors coming in on ships, but we have an opportunity to double
check with the flag states.
Senator Breaux. Well, be careful when you are dealing with
Panamanians.
Mr. Cox. Mr. Chairman, I think that every shipowner has to
be extremely concerned with fraudulent certificates, and I
would agree with you that if someone has shown that there are
some improprieties with regard to their processes, then I think
it is incumbent upon them to prove that their processes have
been patrolled.
Senator Breaux. Senator Smith.
Senator Smith. Mr. Cox, to follow up on Senator Breaux's
question, the report he read with respect to corruption and the
operation of the Panama Canal, has that affected your ability
to operate through that passageway?
Mr. Cox. Senator, I think the safety and security of the
Panama Canal of course now is under the control of the
Panamanian Government. I think from a U.S. vessel's standpoint
there is substantially less usage of the Canal than perhaps in
the past, mainly because the ships that carry international
trade have gotten so large that they cannot pass through the
canal, so virtually--I should not say all, but much of our
trade is coming in on very large container ships which come
into the West Coast, and if there is a necessity to move those
containers, then they are probably done by train.
On the tanker side, the tankers are certainly much too
large to go through the Canal, and because of the structure of
oil distribution within the United States, fortunately we have
an Alaska, where we can serve our West Coast, and we have
importation of foreign oil into the Gulf of Mexico and on the
East Coast, so there is very little through the Panama Canal.
Senator Smith. That would not be true of the cruise ship
business though, would it, Mr. Crye?
Mr. Crye. No, sir. We transit the canal quite a bit,
seasonally more than anything else in the fall and in the
spring. Our experience with the Panama Canal is that it is
being operated very efficiently, and they are making
infrastructure improvements.
I think Senator Breaux's question was with respect to
licensure, a licensure issue, or a documentation issue for
certain documents.
Senator Smith. But it did highlight some corruption, and I
wonder if it affects how you have to operate there.
Mr. Crye. Any time you operate internationally, any time
you operate with various Governments you must make sure that
you are being prudent and that you are taking every measure to
safeguard your passengers and your crew, so it is incumbent on
the vessel owners to make sure that their ships are being
operated safely.
Senator Smith. Thank you.
Mr. Warrington, you are requesting over $3 billion of
emergency needs for Amtrak, and I wonder how many items that
involves? How many emergency needs are there within this
request? Is it hundreds, or is it just a few?
Mr. Warrington. There are literally hundreds of elements in
this package, and I could summarize them in a couple of ways.
The first is effectively dealing with the tunnel complexes,
particularly New York, Baltimore and Washington. The largest
one and the most longstanding problem area are the six tunnels
leading under the Hudson and East Rivers. There are four
tunnels under the East River, two tunnels under the Hudson
River, and the entire complex itself at ground level, which
requires ventilation standpipes and the like.
Senator Smith. Is it fair to say a third of your request is
for these?
Mr. Warrington. Just for the tunnels, that is right.
Senator Smith. How long have these been identified as a
problem, a security problem?
Mr. Warrington. Frankly, for decades.
Senator Smith. And has anything been done to address this
nearly $1 billion need?
Mr. Warrington. Frankly, I will tell you, Senator, when I
was with New Jersey Transit in the mid 1980's, the tunnel into
and out of New York's Penn Station were identified as a set of
issues that needed to be dealt with. The difficulty has always
been access to capital. Unlike equipment, you cannot finance
these types of investments.
Senator Smith. Does the $1 billion you need for the tunnels
represent your 20 percent usage of these tunnels?
Mr. Warrington. No. As the owner of the asset and in the
end the responsible party and the liable party for that asset
and its operations, this dollar amount equals the complete
value of the investment.
Senator Smith. I guess I am uncertain, then, why we are not
sharing some of this cost with other railroads, that use these
tunnels, specifically Long Island and New Jersey Transit.
Mr. Warrington. Historically we have cost shared with the
Long Island Railroad, not with New Jersey Transit. There may be
some room there for that kind of discussion, but frankly----
Senator Smith. But your use is only 20 percent.
Mr. Warrington. We use about 20 percent of the existing
capacity.
Senator Smith. But the taxpayers are asked to pay 100
percent.
Mr. Warrington. We manage this entire asset, Senator, this
entire asset, as a matter of national interest, across the
entire region, from Washington to Boston.
Senator Smith. I am not saying it is not a national
problem, but I am wondering, as an Oregon Senator, is there
anything in this $3 billion for Oregon?
Mr. Warrington. Absolutely. Let me try to deal with this
question.
Senator Smith. In the spirit of Senator Hutchison's earlier
questions, look, I want to help, but I also know that you are
using 20 percent of these tunnels, and we are being asked to
pay for 100 percent, and it is all Northeast Corridor, and I am
all for the Northeast Corridor. I just wonder if there is
anything in this for the rest of the nation.
Mr. Warrington. And we should do a better job of breaking
that out for all Members of the Committee, because a
significant portion of the security investment extends across
the entire system. I will tell you that included within this
package is about $500 million for equipment overhauls and
acquisition of new equipment. Now, we have not made the
decision about where that equipment should be acquired for. It
is conceivable some of it would be on the Northeast Corridor.
It is conceivable some of it would be, for example on the
Cascades Corridor out West. Some of it could be based upon our
booking demand right now for acquisition of new long distance
sleeper cars and dormitory-type cars.
That decision about which equipment, when and where, is
premature to make right now. What this package includes enables
us to have the flexibility to be able to move rapidly when we
understand where this market is going and where the demand is
clearly sustained.
I will tell you our most extraordinary growth corridor
across the system, as you well know, is in Oregon and
Washington, in our Cascades Corridor. We have a terrific
partnership with BNSF and the states there.
I will tell you as well, and I meant to mention this to
Senator Hutchison, that on the Northeast Corridor 34 of our 134
long distance Amtrak trains originate or end in Washington or
New York, but are destined for points all around this country.
They traverse the Northeast Corridor every day enroute to or
from Chicago, Florida, and New Orleans.
So I will tell you that while the physical investment
occurs in the Northeast Corridor and in a complex like Penn
Station, New York, the benefit associated with the security,
the benefit associated with the safety, and the benefit
associated with the capacity and reliability extends far beyond
that Northeast Corridor operation to many of our long distance
trains across this network.
Senator Smith. But if September 11 had not occurred, what
would have been done about these emergencies?
Mr. Warrington. I would have been muddling through
inadequately, and what we have been doing on these tunnels is
collectively over the past 5 or 6 years $161 million, so
frankly we have elevated this as a matter of policy discussion
every year. In fact, Chairman Wolf on the House Appropriations
Committee last year, and Ken Mead, the U.S. DOT Inspector
General, have elevated this as a major concern. But Senator,
frankly, we have never been capitalized to do it right.
Senator Smith. What do you think is the life of these
assets if we do not respond to this emergency, the life of the
tunnels?
Mr. Warrington. Well, the tunnels themselves are
structurally sound and secure. The difficulty here is that in
the event of an incident, whether it is sabotage, terrorism, or
other related incident like an equipment fire, egress, access,
lighting, communication, and ventilation of smoke is difficult,
if not impossible to fully secure today.
Senator Smith. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Senator Breaux. Gentlemen, thank you. Thank you, Senator.
Thank you very much for being on our panel. There may be some
followup which we would submit from Members who are not here,
but with that, this will conclude this hearing, and thank you
for being with us.
The Subcommittee stands adjourned.
[Whereupon, at 12:45 p.m., the Subcommittee adjourned.]
Appendix
Prepared Statement of Edmund B. Welch, Legislative Director,
Passenger Vessel Association
The Passenger Vessel Association the national trade association
representing U.S.-flag passenger vessels of all types--submits this
statement for the record to the Senate Committee on Commerce, Science
and Transportation on the subject on maritime security.
Security of terminals, vessels, and passengers and vehicles on
board has always been of concern to the U.S.-flag passenger vessel
fleet, but the terrorist attacks of September 11 have prompted our
Association and its members to examine this problem as never before.
U.S. routes, U.S. crew, U.S. owners
Virtually all of the crew members of U.S.-flag passenger vessels
are U.S. citizens. Section 8103(b) of Title 46, United States Code,
requires that a seaman aboard a U.S.-flag vessel must be a U.S. citizen
or (to a limited extent) an alien lawfully admitted for permanent
residence. Section 8103(a) of Title 46 requires that the master, chief
engineer, radio officer, and officer in charge of a deck watch or
engineering watch must all be U.S. citizens.
Nearly every U.S.-flag passenger vessel is eligible to participate
in the U.S. coastwise trades. As a result, the owner must be a U.S.
citizen. If the owner is a corporation, then 75 percent of the stock
must be held by U.S. citizens.
The vast majority of itineraries of U.S.-flag passenger vessels
occur entirely in domestic waters. Only a very few vessels sail on
international voyages, nearly all to Canada or Mexico.
Finally, a large percentage of vessels in the domestic fleet have a
``single point'' of departure and arrival (that is, the vessel departs
and arrives at the same facility, without intervening stops). This
creates a much easier security environment than if a vessel travels
from one port to one or more additional ports.
Thus, the first line of security for the U.S.--flag passenger
vessel industry is the fact that the vessels are (U.S.-manned and U.S.-
owned and that they sail predominantly within U.S. navigable waters.
Diversity within the U.S.-Flag Passenger Fleet
Within the U.S.-flag passenger fleet, there exists a wide range of
vessel types, sizes, and functions.
Overnight cruise ships range from large vessels accommodating 1,000
or more passengers in Hawaii to smaller vessels carrying from 50 to 225
passengers in Alaska, the Pacific Northwest, the Atlantic Coast, the
Great Lakes, and on inland rivers.
Ferries of all sizes serve urban areas, remote islands, and river
crossings. The ferry vessel may take from only a few minutes to more
than a day to traverse its route. The vessel may accommodate passengers
only or both passengers and vehicles.
Hundreds of vessels offer sightseeing, excursion, or dinner
cruises. Windjammers attract passengers eager to experience a
traditional sailing vessel. Numerous operators offer whalewatching
excursions or other types of eco-tourism. Gaming vessels, particularly
on inland lakes and rivers, attract customers to this form of
recreation.
In some instances, a vessel may engage in more than one function.
For example, a vessel may operate as a ferry during the work week and
offer whalewatching cruises on the weekend.
This staggering diversity within the U.S.-flag passenger fleet
means that there can be no one-size-fits-all approach to security. Nor
is it correct to assume that measures that may be necessary for a
foreign-flagged, foreign-crewed cruise ship carrying thousands of
passengers departing a U.S. port for foreign destinations are
appropriate for U.S. flagged passenger vessels of different types
routes and sizes.
What We Are Doing
Immediately after the terrorist attacks, the Passenger Vessel
Association took steps to urge and assist its members to evaluate and
improve security in their operations.
PVA had previously provided to its members a document entitled PVA
Bomb Threat Guidelines advising a vessel operator how to respond to a
bomb threat. By electronic communication, PVA reminded members about
this tool. To ensure that all members had it, we distributed it again.
PVA told the Coast Guard that we would make this document available to
any passenger vessel operator, not just to PVA members.
On September 12, PVA arranged for an initial conference call on
security matters between Coast Guard Headquarters officials, PVA staff,
and individuals representing approximately two dozen PVA companies. The
call enabled the Coast Guard to communicate its concerns about security
in passenger vessel operations and allowed vessel operators nationwide
to share their security questions and procedures with one another and
the Coast Guard.
Subsequently, Coast Guard officials and PVA staff have been
conducting regular conference calls to review the implementation of
security measures within the industry and to address any problem areas
that may arise in specific locations.
PVA has distributed three Special Member Updates on Security
electronically and by fax, the first on September 12. They emphasize
steps PVA operators should consider to enhance security. Copies are
enclosed as a part of this statement.
Each year, PVA conducts regional meetings. This year, PVA will
include a security seminar and discussion at each of its five regional
meetings. The first of these meetings, the Western Region, conducted
its meeting on September 28-29 in Portland, Oregon with over 100
attendees. The other four meetings, each with a security presentation,
will occur between now and the end of November.
PVA intends to take the information and knowledge obtained from its
conference calls with the Coast Guard and from the security sessions at
the five regional meetings and develop a PVA Security Guidelines
document (similar to the PVA Bomb Threat Guidelines).
The program at PVA's Annual Convention in February 2002 in Biloxi
will feature one or more presentations on security matters.
Legislation
PVA notes that S. 1214, the Port and Maritime Security Act,
authorizes loan guarantees and grants to enhance security at seaports.
Many PVA members operate from seaports within the purview of S. 1214,
and many of them have their own terminal and shoreside facilities. We
believe that S. 1214 would permit these members to seek such loan
guarantees and grants to enhance their security by the installation of
fencing, lighting, alarms, cameras, scanners, and the like. We
recommend that the Senate confirm this understanding as it develops its
legislative history on the bill.
Special Circumstances
In at least three metropolitan areas--New York, Baltimore, and
Washington, D.C.--PVA operators have incurred substantial economic
losses due to Coast Guard-imposed security measures. These losses flow
directly from Coast Guard orders. In each of these jurisdictions, the
Captain of the Port closed the waterways to all vessel traffic for a
period of as much as a week. Thus, operators of dinner cruises,
sightseeing vessels, and others were prevented from conducting their
business by government order. PVA does not take issue with the action
of the Coast Guard, but we believe that these operators should be
compensated for their losses. These operators are in exactly the same
situation as the commercial airline companies; a specific government
order prevented them from doing business. We ask that Congress
acknowledge that these private entities--several of them small
businesses--should not have to absorb these costs that were incurred as
a direct result of a government order for a public benefit.
Conclusion
The Passenger Vessel Association continues to act
affirmatively in cooperate with the Coast Guard to ensure the
highest level of security for U.S.-flag passenger vessels and
their terminals.
Our industry's characteristics of U.S. owners, U.S.-citizen
crews, and U.S. routes is a good foundation on which additional
security measures may be taken.
Because of the diversity of vessel types, sizes, and uses
within this industry, there can be no one-size-fits-all
application of security measures.
We hope that Congress will approve Seaport Security
legislation that makes domestic passenger vessel operators
eligible for loan guarantees and grants to enhance security and
will also recognize that compensation is appropriate for U.S.-
flag passenger vessel operators who could not operate their
businesses because of Coast Guard-ordered closures of specific
waterways.
Edmund B. Welch
Legislative Director
Passenger Vessel Association
1600 Wilson Boulevard, Suite 1000A
Arlington, VA 22209
______
Friday, September 28, 2001
Special PVA Member Update
Published Biweekly by Passenger Vessel Association
1600 Wilson Blvd., Ste 1000A
Arlington, VA 22209
800-807-8360 Fax 703-807-0103
www.passengervessel.com [email protected]
PVA and Coast Guard Confer on Security
On September 21, and again on the 24th, PVA staff conducted
conference calls with the Coast Guard which included key Coast Guard
officials from the Washington D.C. headquarters, the Atlantic Area
command, and the Pacific Area command to discuss heightened security
aboard U.S.-flag passenger vessels.
These calls were very successful in that they established a solid
communication channel for PVA and the Coast Guard to discuss current
nationwide security issues and to demonstrate that PVA members are
actively implementing appropriate heightened security measures aboard
vessels and at terminals.
Over the past several weeks, PVA members have expressed some
concern that they have received mixed or confusing messages from
Captains of the Port (COTP) regarding specific security initiatives in
their ports has raised an alarm. It appeared that many Captains of the
Port (COTP) around the country were receiving mixed signals or even
misinterpreting the directives emanating from Coast Guard headquarters
in Washington D.C. and the Area commands.
The conference calls confirmed that the COTP's were being given
wide latitude to assess imminent security threats and then to implement
immediate security measures for passenger vessels in ports throughout
the country. While COTP's were given this broad authority, confusion
was created because, in some cases, the directives did not require or
dictate any specific security measures.
PVA pointed out that where there was early Coast Guard
communication or consultation, PVA members felt that they were included
in the decisions concerning heightened security and therefore, felt
that the resulting Coast Guard security directives were for the most
appropriate, effective and efficient. Where the Coast Guard acted
unilaterally, many of the security directives increased security-
related activity but did very little in terms of actually improving
security.
PVA reinforced its position that early consultation is appropriate
and follow up communication between PVA and the Coast Guard is
essential to ensure that the goal of thwarting potential terrorist acts
is achieved. The Coast Guard agrees with this opinion.
If you feel that the Coast Guard has imposed security measures that
are inappropriate for your operation or that can be accomplished by
other means, please notify your local Coast Guard COTP.
Also, please contact PVA at 1-800-807-8360 if you have any
security-related questions or need assistance of any kind.
We wish to commend the PVA members throughout the country who are
working hard to enhance security measures aboard their vessels and, in
turn, contributing to the protection the traveling public and the
nation's transportation infrastructure. PVA has stressed the need for
the Federal Government to provide security training and other security
resources to the passenger vessel industry if it wishes to adequately
and effectively improve security.
Photo ID checks, package inspection, manifests and employing armed
guards are just a few of the measures that the Coast Guard has
considered mandating. All of these measures could be appropriate in
specific situations but they are not universal in their effectiveness
or employability. Following are some examples:
Photo ID checks that have no security aspect required for
issuance provide no terrorism deterrent.
Presentation of IDs without reference to some list of
identified or suspected persons is also non-productive.
Examination of packages without trained personnel and some
description of material prohibited would seem to be without
purpose.
Lacking authority to prohibit or seize property would make
the examination of packages meaningless and potentially
confrontational.
Manifests are not practical in mass transit or any service
that relies on walk up or spontaneous decision customers.
The use of armed guards may introduce other safety issues
and focuses on response rather than prevention.
A special seminar on security issues will be held this week during
the PVA Western Region Meeting in Portland, Oregon, and similar
sessions will be held at subsequent PVA region meeting this year.
Information gathered from these interactive seminars will be used to
develop a new training manual on security for member use.
For a complete schedule and program/registration materials for all
upcoming PVA region meetings, access the PVA web site:
www.passengervessel.com, or call PVA at 1-800-807-8360.
______
Friday, September 14, 2001
Special PVA Member Update
Published Biweekly by Passenger Vessel Association
1600 Wilson Blvd., Ste 1000A
Arlington, VA 22209
800-807-8360 Fax 703-807-0103
www.passengervessel.com [email protected]
PVA Members Heighten Security Measures
In the aftermath of the terrorist attacks on the World Trade
Center, the Pentagon, and U.S. airliners, security issues are of utmost
concern to everyone, including the domestic passenger vessel industry.
The Passenger Vessel Association is applying its resources to help
its members meet the security challenges facing them. On Wednesday,
September 12, PVA sent out a Special Member Update on security and
followed that on Friday, September 14 with another Special Member
Update to vessel members reminding them of the usefulness of the PVA
Bomb Threat Guidelines. A member in New Jersey experienced an actual
bomb threat the day after he received and reviewed the PVA Bomb Threat
Guidelines. He reported that the document was invaluable in helping his
people respond to the bomb threat. As a reminder, the PVA Bomb Threat
Guidelines is found in your PVA Risk Management Manual (the blue
manual), on the PVA web site: www.passenqervessel.com or you can
contact PVA Headquarters at 1-800-807-8360 to request that a copy be
sent to you by email or fax. The PVA Bomb Threat Guidelines is another
membership benefit that was produced by PVA volunteers and staff and
that is free to PVA members.
PVA/Coast Guard Conference Call on Vessel Security
On September 12, over 20 individuals from PVA member companies
participated in a conference call with staff of Coast Guard
Headquarters in Washington, D.C., to ``compare notes'' as to what their
companies were doing to respond to the need for increased security.
What You Can Do . . .
The following checklist summarizes security issues discussed during
the conference call. We strongly recommend that you refer to this
outline in reviewing your own security measures.
Restricted Access to Pilot House
Only authorized employees should be permitted into the
pilothouse.
There should be signage posted at appropriate places
emphasizing that the pilothouse is off limits to passengers.
There should be a strong door and secure lock at the
pilothouse entrance.
The vessel operator should consider a policy of requiring
that the pilothouse door be locked while the vessel is underway
and/or at the dock.
Restricted Access to Engine Room
Only authorized employees should be permitted into the
engine room.
There should be signage posted at appropriate places
emphasizing that the engine room is off limits to passengers.
There should be a strong door and secure lock at the engine
room entrance.
The vessel operator should consider a policy of requiring
that the engine room house door be locked while the vessel is
underway and/or at the dock.
Communications Equipment
The vessel operator should regularly check the vessel's
radio and other communications equipment to ensure that it is
in working order.
The operator should consider the advisability of providing
the captain and the crew with one or more cell phones for
emergency communication.
There should be in the pilothouse a list of appropriate
phone numbers to be contacted in the event of an emergency
(owner, terminal, Coast Guard, harbormaster, police, fire
department, emergency health responder, etc.)
Access to Terminal and Landside Facilities
Secure fencing should surround the premises.
Public access should be directed through specified points.
The facilities should be locked when vessel operations are
not taking place.
The operator should evaluate the need for 24-hour security
measures, including (where appropriate) guards or watchmen,
security cameras, adequate lighting, and alarms.
Certain areas should be off limits to all but appropriate
employees, and measures should be taken to ensure such limited
access.
Identification of Passengers
The vessel operator should evaluate the need for requiring
passengers to display photo ID in their operation.
Inspection of Parcels, Baggage
The vessel operator should evaluate the need for either
spot-checking the contents of carry-on or checked baggage
(Note: Coast Guard officials in some ports are requiring either
spot-checks of baggage; in some locations, they are requiring
that all baggage and carry-on items be checked.
Inspection of Vessels
For car ferries, the operator should evaluate the need for
spot-checks or complete checks of vessels to be carried on
board.
Sweeps of Vessel and/or Terminal Facilities
The vessel operator should consider the need for personnel
to ``sweep'' the vessel for suspicious items prior to and after
each voyage. Similarly, the operator should evaluate the need
for regular ``sweeps'' of docks, terminals, fuel farms, etc.
Increase Presence of Local Law Enforcement Officials
The vessel operator may wish to request that local police
``step up'' their patrols in the vicinity of landside
operations.
Review of Vessel Route
The vessel operator should review routes followed by the
vessel to determine what facilities or other infrastructure
along the way might be of special risk to the public if the
vessel were to strike them.
General Alertness
Every operator should evaluate security risks and exposure
and then review the company contingency plans. Take advantage
of resources such as the PVA Risk Guide found on the Coast
Guard's web site: www.uscq.mil/hg/q-m/risk (under
``Activities'') or on PVA's web site: www.passengervessel.com.
The vessel operator should emphasize to all employees that
security is of high priority. All employees should be vigilant
for anything or anyone that arouses suspicion and should report
such observations to their superiors. The operator should
establish policies regarding the acceptance of packages from
those unfamiliar to the employees.
If you have any questions, please contact PVA at 1-800-807-8360 or
send an email to [email protected].
______
Wednesday, September 12, 2001
Special PVA Member Update
Published Biweekly by Passenger Vessel Association
1600 Wilson Blvd., Ste 1000A
Arlington, VA 22209
800-807-8360 Fax 703-807-0103
www.passengervessel.com [email protected]
Important Message on Passenger Vessel Security
The Passenger Vessel Association is sending this Special PVA Member
Update regarding security concerns arising from yesterday's terrorist
attacks. PVA is in direct contact with Coast Guard Headquarters in
Washington, D.C. about efforts by the domestic passenger vessel
industry to address security issues.
U.S. Secretary of Transportation Norman Mineta has ordered that a
heightened degree of security be put in place for all modes of
transportation nationally, including marine transportation.
Coast Guard Headquarters in Washington has instructed each Captain
of the Port that he or she has discretionary authority to assume
control of or direct vessel navigation in areas of their
responsibility. Therefore, you may hear directly from your local
Captain of the Port about any necessary instructions.
Certain portions of the Code of Federal Regulations may provide
guidance for vessel and terminal security. Title 33 CFR Section 120
addresses security issues on certain passenger vessels over 100 gross
tons, but it also may provide a useful reference for any passenger
vessel operator. Title 33 CFR Section 128 addresses security
regulations for marine terminals.
PVA recommends that each member company review:
PVA guideline entitled ``Bomb Threats''. This guideline is
located in your blue PVA Risk Management Manual. If you do not
have this, please contact PVA;
All of your company's contingency plans. For assistance in
writing one, please see the ``Contingency Planning Guide'',
again, located in your blue PVA Risk Management Manual;
Your company policy on ensuring Pilot House security;
Your company policy on ensuring engine room security for
both manned and unmanned engine rooms;
Your company's passenger boarding policy;
Your company's policy on loading passenger luggage, cargo,
and unattended or attended vehicles, and the passengers in
them;
Your company's policy on inspection of all docking
facilities. Please ensure that the vessel's docking or lay-up
area has an unobstructed view and cannot be approached by
unauthorized personnel;
Your vessels' communications and navigation equipment to
ensure that it is in proper working order.
The Passenger Vessel Association recognizes that our nation is
facing an extraordinary challenge. We will work closely with the Coast
Guard to ensure that our vessels, passengers, harbors, and waterways
are safe. If you have any questions, please contact us at 1-800-807-
8360 or [email protected].