

## Development Issues for Multinational Navy Doctrine<sup>1</sup>

by  
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As a result of the downsizing of the U.S. armed forces, started by President George Bush in 1990, the American military will not be capable of successfully acting in a unilateral manner in any future major contingency or crisis response. Put into programmatic terms, the U.S. armed forces must have host nation support and some sort of alliance, coalition, or other multinational partnership if it is to act in a major regional contingency (MRC). Although lesser regional contingencies (LRCs) normally should be able to be conducted on a unilateral basis, they might be conducted more efficiently and with more ease with such support. An LRC might be consciously conducted on a multinational basis in order to lend legitimacy. Presence and strategic nuclear deterrence will not require any similar arrangements.

There are many foreign policy implications of this inability to act unilaterally at the operational-level of warfare, none of which will be addressed herein. Rather, this report will explore the issues that must be faced by the U.S. Navy in the future development of multinational navy "doctrine." Multinational navy

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doctrine is essentially a description of how navies intend to operate together as a multinational force and it is also a form of guidance for actions to the operational commander.<sup>1</sup> If the U.S. Navy is unable to perform its tasks at the operational-level of warfare without multinational partners, then it stands to reason that multinational navy doctrine is extremely important and the development of such doctrine must be a high priority today.

This report will address a series of issues related to the development of multinational navy doctrine in the context of the current international situation. By "multinational" the author intends that this include all forms of international cooperation; including bilateral between two nations; alliance between partners in a formal alliance; coalition that includes specific partners engaged in standing military organizations; ad hoc coalitions formed without any prior existing political agreements; regional; international; etc.

Although the author uses the term "navy" to refer to organized seaborne or seafaring warfighting forces of the state, navies in the world often also include other military or military-type force at sea, such as revenue services, constabulary forces, and coast guards. In some nations, naval aviation missions are performed by air forces--these forces are included by the author in his use of the term "navy." The author will use the term "maritime" to expand from navies to forces that generally perform non-warfighting tasks at sea--fishery regulation, law enforcement, transportation, etc. The term "naval" is reserved to concerns of both navies and marine corps/naval infantries.

This report will first consider the need for multinational navy doctrine and existing models to follow. Next, the report will turn to major developmental issues related to the actual writing of such doctrine. These issues are administrative, bureaucratic, and substantive. Third, the report will consider issues related to testing and making operational multinational navy doctrine in the field. Finally, the report will address those emerging issues that will eventually need to be addressed by navies in such doctrinal development. Although this report is intended for a wide variety of audiences, including foreign navies, its context is development of multinational navy doctrine from the perspective of the one superpower navy in the world--the U.S. Navy.

This report will not provide recommendations for the development of multinational navy doctrine--although certain obvious conclusions will be compiled at the end. Rather this report is designed to ensure that all of the issues related to multinational navy doctrine development are aired with

appropriate choices highlighted. It will be the task of the serving officers assigned to prepare the doctrine to understand the choices that they face and to make the appropriate decisions.

### Why Multinational Navy Doctrine is Needed

Following the end of World War II, the U.S. Navy issued a doctrinal publication entitled *Principles and Applications of Naval Warfare: United States Fleets, 1947*, USF-1.<sup>2</sup> Signed out by then-Chief of Naval Operations Admiral of the Fleet Chester W. Nimitz, USN, this publication set forth the "general instructions to the naval service in the preparation for and conduct of future wars." The publication stated that it drew upon the lessons of World War II. Chapter 9 of USF-1 is labeled "Cooperation with Allied Nations." This chapter specifically addressed the preparation for and conduct of future wars with multinational partners.

Despite the desire of more recent American administrations to appear "tough" by stating that they will act unilaterally, if necessary, to ensure the attainment of national security and national military objectives, since World War II, the U.S. has not engaged in what is now termed an MRC without host nation support and some sort of multinational arrangement. The examples of previous MRCs include the Korean War, the Vietnam War, and the Persian Gulf War. With the downsizing of the U.S. armed forces starting with President Bush, the U.S. focused on the ability to handle two MRCs nearly simultaneously. Today, it is apparent that there will be difficulty in even meeting this requirement and that a more realistic goal will be to handle the two MRC scenarios sequentially.

In any case, the assumptions behind an MRC clearly include host nation support. The two MRCs generally addressed by the Bush and Bill Clinton's administration are Southwest Asia (SWA) and Korea. In each of these cases, the assumption is that American forces will fly into a benign environment and, from their land and off-shore positions, project power. The downsizing of the U.S. Navy has resulted in an inability to provide sufficient numbers of navy ships in both SWA and Korea and still meet its presence requirements elsewhere. Recent revisions to the Joint Staff *Universal Joint Task List* (UJTL) reveal significant interest in the participation of multinational partners in providing combat forces, combat service support, transportation, host nation support, etc. in any activity undertaken by the U.S. armed forces overseas.<sup>3</sup> The recently published *National Military Strategy of the United States of America* specifically highlights recent efforts to strengthen allied doctrine as a means to improve readiness.<sup>4</sup>

The force structure associated with the two MRC scenarios has appeared widely in the press, in journals, and in academic writings.<sup>5</sup> A future MRC in Korea would require around five carrier battle groups (CVBGs) and at least three others are needed in SWA. Former Chief of Naval Operations (CNO) Admiral Frank B. Kelso, II, USN, told Congress in February 1991 that a 450-ship U.S. Navy with thirty percent of the fleet deployed could provide two CVBGs anywhere in the world within thirty days. Additional U.S. Navy documents reveal that it would take sixty days to assemble the additional forces necessary to meet a single MRC.

Since the U.S. Navy is not going to field 450 ships,<sup>6</sup> it is obvious that the Navy will have difficulty meeting these previous goals associated with the Bush administration's Base Force. The U.S. Navy will still have to bring all of the large-deck aircraft carriers to any MRC, but will it be able to provide all of the escorts, logistical and support vessels, and minor combatants associated with other forms of warfare at sea? If multinational partners were required with the 450-ship fleet, they are required even more now that the U.S. Navy is headed toward lower numbers.

It is possible to meet the two-MRC scenario (Southwest Asia and Korea) and presence requirements if the MRCs include the participation of multinational partners or if multinational partners can temporarily supplement U.S. Navy ships performing presence missions elsewhere. An example of the latter would be NATO forces from the Atlantic temporarily filling U.S. presence requirements in the Mediterranean while U.S. Sixth Fleet assets went to Southwest Asia to handle an MRC. If our multinational navy partners are to act together at sea, there must be doctrine that guides their actions.

One possible solution to the need for multinational navy doctrine would be to release existing NATO navy doctrine to non-NATO nations. Certainly this could be a quick solution, assuming that all sixteen NATO nations agreed. This problem is exacerbated when it comes to the release of classified NATO doctrine. Current efforts to prepare generic tactical-level signaling books, etc.<sup>7</sup> based upon existing NATO doctrine is insufficient--released NATO doctrine cannot provide all of the multinational doctrine that is needed.

This use of existing NATO doctrine is really only be a temporary substitute for more robust multinational navy doctrine designed for all forms of multinational navy interactions. Doctrine designed specifically for the North Atlantic Alliance might not be appropriate for multinational actions elsewhere--just as alliances formed for one purpose have not proven to be necessarily the appropriate vehicle to deal with different political issues in non-treaty areas. Hence, just as the U.S.

Navy is currently preparing national operational-level naval doctrine and contributing to operational-level national joint doctrine, operational-level multinational navy doctrine is also needed and its preparation has been ordered by the Chief of Naval Operations.<sup>8</sup>

### Preparation of Multinational Naval Doctrine

There are many ways to approach the preparation of multinational navy doctrine. At one extreme, the U.S. could assume that the United Nations would take over the supervision of navies--indeed this recommendation appears in journals from time to time. Despite the initial views of the Clinton administration to embrace U.N. control over peacekeeping operations, it is clear that the American public is not ready to support a transfer of command or significant amounts of control to the U.N. and this option is not currently realistic.

Existing regional organizations could be used to prepare multinational navy doctrine--indeed there are many existing NATO tactical-level doctrinal publications on which to draw. Although much of these doctrinal publications are classified, unclassified versions are being prepared. These publications, however, do not address all of the tasks that need to be faced by navies currently and they also were primarily designed for a European-centered war within a standing alliance with decades of experience operating together. Would such doctrine be appropriate in other theaters with non-NATO partners? Although one could argue that separate regional doctrines would complicate naval interaction, the U.S. Navy has a long history of working under NATO doctrine one day, national doctrine the next day, and under special bilateral arrangements the next. It also has a long history of differing doctrine, tactics, techniques, and procedures in the Atlantic and Pacific Fleets.

It would seem that what is needed is more generic navy doctrine that can be used by all nations and navies--including former enemies--in non-European contexts. The overarching framework of operational-level doctrine is also needed in addition to the tactical-level signal books, tactics, techniques, and procedures. In short, despite existing NATO doctrine, something else is needed.

### The Same Doctrine for All Navies?

Dealing with the issue of multinational navy doctrine outside of NATO will be new for the U.S. Navy. It is not new, however, for nations who field medium-power navies. Rear Admiral J.R. Hill, RN (Ret.) prepared an excellent study on the role of medium-power Western navies during the mid-1980s, when such navies were struggling to understand their role via-a-vis the

U.S. Navy when there were national missions to be performed that would not automatically involve the U.S. Hill described medium powers as those which lie between the totally self-sufficient and the insufficient. Medium powers "try to create and keep under national control enough means of power to initiate and sustain coercive actions whose outcomes will be the preservation of its vital interests."<sup>9</sup> The keyword defining a medium power's aspirations is autonomy.

A medium-power navy, therefore, is a navy in a nation-state that can use the sea in order to manipulate power to its own advantage--primarily in order to preserve national autonomy. The most important issue facing a medium-power navy is its relationship to a superpower navy. There was no way that a medium-power navy could successfully challenge the navy of a superpower in combat during the Cold War-era--hence alliance with a superpower was axiomatic.<sup>10</sup> The self-identity of a medium-power navy was determined during the Cold War not only by its ethnocentric view, but also by its relationship to the superpower with which it was allied.

During the Cold War, the U.S. Navy saw itself primarily in relation to the Soviet Navy. Force structure was determined by how well the U.S. Navy was doing relative to the Soviets. Comparisons with other potential threat navies was not as important, since any MRC that the U.S. Navy would face would be considered a lesser included threat. Today the U.S. Navy takes on a much more complicated threat picture with emphasis on using the fleet against the shore, although some still express the ranking or capability of the fleet with comparisons to the Russian Navy.

Comparisons with friendly navies during the Cold War was in the context of their contribution to the shared effort against the Soviet Navy. It was always understood that the U.S. Navy would be in a position of leadership, since it brought to the table the major implements of war at sea. The self-identity of the U.S. Navy, however, was not expressed in terms of its relationship to allied and friendly medium-power navies. Rather, the self-identity of the U.S. Navy was determined by its relationship with its major competitor.

Under today's international security environment, it is not necessary to give primacy to the Russian Navy for determination of the role or status of the U.S. Navy. The U.S. Navy is the one superpower navy just as the U.S. is the sole remaining superpower in the world. Hence the self-identity of the U.S. Navy should now more properly be seen in relation to those medium-power navies with which it intends to operate rather than its position vis-a-vis any assumed or potential enemy. This new relationship with medium-power navies could be one of equality, but frankly the U.S. Navy is in a class by itself and it is likely to assume an

international position of leadership more than anyone else. Leadership, however, does not imply a role of world policeman--as has been repeatedly stated in numerous U.S. policy pronouncements since the end of the Cold War.<sup>11</sup>

Is There a Precedent?

There is an existing and mature model for this new relationship that has been on-going for many decades--that defining the relationship of the U.S. Navy to the U.S. Coast Guard. The U.S. Coast Guard is one of the world's largest "navies" and fields one of the largest "naval air forces." In fact, it is a medium-power "navy." Its status outside of the Department of Defense means that the U.S. Navy has had to face questions of the division of labor and the integration of the Coast Guard as a separate Service within the U.S. Navy during wartime. This same status, however, means that international diplomatic issues, problems of intelligence sharing, etc., are not problems between the U.S. Navy and Coast Guard. On the other hand, there are many medium-power navies which are more capable of interoperability with the U.S. Navy and share a dedication to warfighting, and not constabulary, tasks--hence the model is not perfect.

At a minimum, this relationship with the U.S. Coast Guard should be studied and form the basis of how we might approach the role of the U.S. Navy vis-a-vis other medium-power navies. That is not to say that the U.S. Navy and U.S. Coast Guard relationship ought to define the U.S. Navy's relationship with medium-power foreign navies. The Coast Guard precedent, however, should not be ignored since most of the issues involved with the preparation of multinational navy doctrine have already been addressed therein. Creative parallels may need to be drawn between such issues as the difficulties in creating multinational rules of engagement (ROEs) and the difficulties in training the U.S. Coast Guard in both civilian law enforcement standards, such as the "use of force continuum" dealing with a suspect who has not exhibited manifest intent to harm, and military combat ROEs designed to deal with "hostile intent" prior to actual hostile action.

#### Writing the Doctrine: Administrative and Bureaucratic Issues

The U.S. Navy *Principles and Applications of Naval Warfare: United States Fleets, 1947*, USF-1, addressed a number of issues that can cause difficulties when operating with multinational partners. There were the obvious problems of: "different supply specifications, difference communications, lack of common language, national pride, different standards of living, different personal relationships," but there were also more substantive issues. These included "different tactics and

techniques, extra time required for the establishment of integrated commands and staffs, and lack of knowledge of capabilities."<sup>12</sup> One way to overcome these latter problems is to publish doctrine.

Doctrine defines how a profession thinks about itself as well as providing guidance on how it will actually act. The U.S. Navy develops tactical-level navy doctrine at the Naval Doctrine Command. The Naval Doctrine Command also develops operational-level multi-Service naval doctrine in conjunction with the U.S. Marine Corps. There is value in considering how the U.S. Coast Guard currently participates in the preparation of naval doctrine.

Generally the U.S. Coast Guard does not officially participate in the preparation or review of U.S. Navy or multi-Service naval doctrine. A major exception exists in the area of search and rescue. The U.S. Coast Guard influences the development of U.S. Navy and naval doctrine via a liaison officer attached to the Naval Doctrine Command and with the assignment of a flag officer to the Naval Doctrine Review Board (NDRB). The Commandant of the Coast Guard, however, does not review or sign U.S. Navy or naval doctrine. The U.S. Coast Guard does not have its own formal written doctrine but is currently reviewing the need.

At the Naval Doctrine Command, there are also liaison officers from the U.S. Army and U.S. Air Force. These officers bring their considerable capabilities and assist the naval Services in the preparation of naval doctrine--but neither their Services nor they have an official say on the preparation of U.S. Navy or naval doctrine. U.S. Navy doctrine need only be approved by the U.S. Navy and naval doctrine is signed by both the CNO and the Commandant of the Marine Corps (CMC). We should also consider the participation of the U.S. Coast Guard in the development of U.S. joint doctrine.

Joint military doctrine is primarily, but not totally, focused at the strategic and operational-levels of warfare. The development of joint military doctrine primarily includes Department of Defense (DoD) activities and agencies: four U.S. military Services, all Commanders-in-Chief (CinCs) of the U.S. unified commands, and the Joint Staff in the Pentagon. Joint military doctrine is official once it is signed by the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and, in theory, this signature can be obtained despite the non-concurrence of a military Service or CinC. Joint doctrine does not need the approval of any non-DoD agency or activity--such as the U.S. Coast Guard.

The U.S. Coast Guard role in the preparation of joint military doctrine is as the lead agency for search and rescue and

it chairs the Interagency Committee for Search and Rescue (ICSAR). Other joint doctrine is prepared by DoD activities. The U.S. Coast Guard routinely reviews joint military doctrine--copies of draft publications are provided to the Office of Defense Operations, at Coast Guard Headquarters, where it is staffed to appropriate Coast Guard offices. Although the Commandant of the Coast Guard is invited to deliberations of the Joint Chiefs of Staff when Coast Guard matters are discussed, he does not have an official say on joint military doctrine.

In addition to these formal processes, the U.S. Coast Guard influences the development of the various forms of military doctrine via liaison officers assigned to various military Service and joint commands, many of which are outside of the Washington DC headquarters area. Coast Guard liaison officers review draft doctrine being staffed at their host commands and request comments from various Coast Guard commands where the doctrine might affect routine Coast Guard roles or tasks. Where draft doctrine addresses roles and tasks outside of mainstream Coast Guard activities, staffing is less necessary. For example, the Coast Guard would have little interest in staffing doctrine dealing with the operation of land-based strategic nuclear missiles.

Yet despite the lack of a full role in doctrine development, when the U.S. Coast Guard is transferred to the U.S. Navy during wartime, or when it routinely operates alongside of U.S. armed forces during peacetime, this medium-power "navy" is expected to understand and operate in accordance with U.S. Navy, naval, and/or joint military doctrine. At the tactical-level, most U.S. Coast Guard operators will be more familiar with their own tactics, techniques, and procedures than with doctrine, published by the DoD. The U.S. Coast Guard may review DoD doctrine, but it does not normally train to these standards in peacetime. What then are the parallels with multinational doctrinal development?

#### Applying the Coast Guard Precedent

International liaison officers also populate many U.S. military commands charged with the development and review of military doctrine. Five such officers are in residence at the Naval Doctrine Command. Similar arrangements exist for U.S. officers assigned to combined staffs. All of these foreign officers have been requested by the U.S. armed forces and they bring a wealth of experience and talent which contributes to the development of U.S. military and multinational doctrine. The influence of these foreign and combined staff liaison officers, however, does not extend to having formal review authority.

The U.S. is currently in the process of developing *Joint Doctrine for Multinational Operations*, Joint Pub 3-16. This publication, like all joint doctrinal publications, was not

officially staffed by any foreign governments, although it is likely that foreign liaison officers attached to U.S. commands did review the draft. The draft Joint Pub 3-16 addresses substantive issues during the planning and execution of multinational operations. It also says that U.S. forces should "expect to respond to crises as part of a multinational force."<sup>13</sup> The assumption must be that this U.S. doctrinal document will govern U.S. behavior and should also be understood by multinational partners who intend acting with us.

One possible way to develop multinational navy doctrine is to build upon this joint model by use of existing U.S. Navy or multi-Service naval doctrine. It would be offered to foreign nations or international organizations, such as Joint Pub 3-16 apparently will be. Although this would appear to be an easy plan, it might not be once nations more carefully consider the sources of any U.S. doctrine.

Military doctrine is derived from various national considerations, such as: government policy, available national resources, national strategy and campaign concepts, existing doctrine, national views of the threat, history and lessons learned, strategic and Service culture, fielded and/or emerging technology, geography and demographics, and types of government.<sup>14</sup> It is extremely hard to see how many foreign governments would allow U.S. joint military, or even multi-Service naval, doctrine, at the strategic or operational-levels, to totally govern the behavior of their own national military forces.

More likely, foreign governments would prefer to participate in the creation of any operational-level doctrine that would govern how their forces would behave in a multinational scenario. Foreign navies can, and should, assist in the preparation of doctrine in many specific areas where they have demonstrated expertise. On the other hand, for some nations, such as Japan, there may be constitutional limitations on the type of combat or other actions that they are allowed to explore.

The creation of tactical-level doctrine, techniques, and procedures would likely be reviewed as a professional military matter not requiring political oversight--hence it might be possible to simply transfer some existing U.S. joint (or other) doctrine at this level directly to a medium-power navy. The one stumbling block here might be as U.S. joint doctrine takes on more of a prescriptive tone, it may be rejected out of hand by foreign navies which have no requirement nor desire to have a doctrine which must be followed except in "exceptional" circumstances.<sup>15</sup>

Standing multinational military doctrine does already exist, primarily in the form of combined and most often specifically

NATO doctrine. For navies, most of this doctrine is at the tactical-level of warfare and concerns tactics, techniques, and procedures. The "softer" issues of agreed-upon views of the threat, alliance political and campaign goals, etc. are handled by the Military Committee and NATO political organs. Without such political and political-military agreements at the strategic and operational-levels, however, tactical-level military doctrine would be sterile. In the case of the U.S. Coast Guard, the shared political agreement precludes this problem.

When the *Principles and Applications of Naval Warfare: United States Fleets, 1947*, USF-1, was issued, it addressed the need for standardized communications capabilities: "allies of this nation should standardize with us..."<sup>16</sup> Unwritten is the assumption today that U.S. Navy doctrine is the standard to which medium-power navies will have to adapt if they desire to be fully integrated with a U.S. Navy that continues to evolve with costly new technology. If they are unable to fully integrate, such as with some navies within NATO, then a separate command structure and area of operations provides them an opportunity to perform tasks under national military doctrine.

Whereas U.S. Service-unique and multi-Service military doctrine should be in conformance with joint military doctrine, no such parallel exists in the U.S. Coast Guard or in the multinational world. U.S. Coast Guard doctrine, when it is prepared, does not need to be in conformance with joint, multi-Service naval, or U.S. Navy doctrine. U.S. joint doctrine does not need to be in conformance with combined NATO doctrine or the military doctrine for combined operations in Korea. The U.S. Coast Guard would maintain its own separate doctrine as a military Service within the U.S. Navy if it transferred to the U.S. Navy in wartime. The record of "wars" since World War II strongly suggests that the U.S. Coast Guard will operate alongside the U.S. Navy in major regional contingencies (MRCs), etc., rather than being incorporated within the U.S. Navy and having to sort out the type of doctrine that governs actions.

Hence, it is possible to have a medium-power navy operate successfully in support of the U.S. Navy without fully integrated doctrine. It is entirely possible that U.S. armed forces might have one doctrine when operating in a national environment and another while a combined force. During the 1980s, the U.S. Army and Air Force pursued the AirLand Battle doctrine under national auspices while U.S. Army and Air Force officers assigned to NATO commands developed the different doctrine for Follow-on Forces Attack (FOFA). FOFA and the AirLand Battle were not the same.

It is also possible for a medium power navy to be the lead agency on doctrine for which the U.S. DoD military Services operate in a supporting role. The U.S. Coast Guard is the lead

agency for search and rescue, environmental disasters, alien migration interdiction operations (AMIO), etc. Many foreign

Coast Guard, but capable of working together toward a common political goal.

It is also possible for a medium-power navy to operate successfully in a multinational context totally integrated with U.S. Navy. The U.S. Coast Guard attempts to do this. A nation which desires to influence U.S. political decision-making may strive for such a degree of interoperability in order to ensure that they are represented "at the table."

Many medium-power navies, however, can be interoperable with the U.S. Navy but might not be fully interoperable with their national air forces. Given the choice of being joint with their own national military Services or interoperable with the U.S. Navy, many medium-power navies might opt for the latter since it is probably less expensive and provides a higher payoff to that navy.

In addition to a wide diversity of possibilities with medium-power navies within NATO, there exists the need to consider operations with other medium-power and smaller navies outside of the NATO environment or North Atlantic Treaty-approved areas of operations. Although the smaller navy will have more difficulty in integrating with the U.S. Navy, it will have less problems with the U.S. Coast Guard and navy forces operated by the U.S. Special Operations Command (USSOCOM), since their missions are not dissimilar to those of the U.S. Coast Guard or USSOCOM.

From the perspective of the smaller navy, and some medium-power navies, the preferred "navy" with which they might desire to operate is not the U.S. Navy, but rather the U.S. Coast Guard. Indeed, in many medium-power and smaller navies, there are no such artificial distinctions between the navy, constabulary, and special operations forces. Since the U.S. Navy maintains such distinctions, it is necessary for medium-power and smaller navies to have a relationship with the U.S. Coast Guard and USSOCOM in addition to one with the U.S. Navy. This suggests that multinational navy doctrine also must have an interagency component.

### Staffing Issues

In addition to these more philosophical considerations, there are the very real and more mundane problems associated with where should multinational navy doctrine be written, how should it be staffed, and how should it be published? Although it might appear logical that the U.S. Naval Doctrine Command should be the place where the doctrine should be written, there are a number of considerations which may impact on that decision. First, the Naval Doctrine Command is not funded for the production of multinational navy doctrine and would need an increase in

resources in order to accomplish this task. Second, the Naval Doctrine Command does not have liaison officers from every navy of the world. If the opinion of other navies is to be sought, then there will need to be a mechanism to ensure that such navies receive drafts for comment.

Currently the Naval Doctrine Command is proceeding down the path of the development of multinational navy doctrine as follows. The Center for Naval Analyses is completing a series of studies on the experience of past multinational naval cooperation.<sup>18</sup> The existing foreign liaison officers will use the lessons of this experience to prepare a draft "capstone"-level multinational navy doctrine publication which will be made available for comment by navies of the world. This effort is designed to demonstrate the U.S. commitment to multinational navy cooperation.

From this first draft effort, interested navies will be invited to participate in various working groups where multinational navy doctrine will be further refined and developed. Although working toward international consensus, the publisher of this doctrine, the U.S. Navy, will be the ultimate editor for content.

There is a very real problem associated with the foreign perception of various terms that are taken for granted in the U.S. For example, the term "power projection" may be viewed as threatening to some nations whose governments might not allow their navies to cooperate with any doctrinal development that uses such words. Although "expeditionary" is a term used frequently, and for many years, by U.S. armed forces, European navies might be reluctant to embrace such concepts for fears of being associated with colonialism.

Similarly, "ballistic missile defense," whether it be against tactical, operational, naval, or strategic missiles, is a loaded term that has association with the Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI), still commonly referred to as "Star Wars" by foreign nations. Despite successful U.S. efforts to distance theater ballistic missile defense efforts from "Star Wars," this subtlety is lost on some foreign governments who will reject any participation in such doctrinal development. As U.S. joint military doctrine and emerging naval doctrine embrace such terms, they will be more difficult to "sell" to foreign governments.

One possible alternative to centralized multinational navy doctrine development would be for the Naval Doctrine Command to create general doctrinal guidance and U.S. Navy Fleet CinCs to publish more comprehensive and detailed regional doctrine fine-tuned for such national considerations. Such a system was used by the Royal Navy for years with centralized navy doctrine issued by

the Admiralty and regional doctrine prepared by the on-station CinCs that reflected their own local needs.<sup>19</sup> Regionally-issued multinational naval doctrine, in conformance with Naval Doctrine Command-issued naval doctrine, would have the additional benefit of increasing the involvement of the U.S. Navy Fleet CinCs in the creation and ownership of multi-Service naval doctrine. It might also be more credible to foreign navies who might view centralized doctrine for all navies of the world as an unworkable concept.

Staffing multinational navy doctrine can be done via a variety of methods. At one extreme, the U.S. could request formal inputs from each navy that it intends use the doctrine. At the other extreme would be that the U.S. Navy prepare and issue such doctrine using its own national resources to best understand how to operate in a multinational environment today. In this case, other navies would be free to accept the doctrine when operating with the U.S. Navy or to request modifications on a bilateral basis. From iterative bilateral modification requests, the U.S. Navy could eventually prepare revised multinational navy doctrine that would be more acceptable to all navies.

There are obvious cases between these extremes that parallel the current methods of the development of U.S. Navy and multi-Service naval doctrine that would be used by medium-power navies and the U.S. Coast Guard. Informal reviews by foreign liaison officers, attaches, and officers from foreign navies studying at U.S. war colleges, etc. are obvious alternatives. There might also be a hierarchy of types of foreign reviews based upon the degree to which the U.S. Navy expects to, and must, operate with various medium-power navies. Current U.S. government policy denies the U.S. Navy permission to develop multinational doctrine or even exercise with the Royal New Zealand Navy, yet in combat involving the ANZUS alliance, it is very likely that both navies would be expected to operate together. Does the U.S. Navy need to "chop" draft multinational doctrine with any such smaller navies at all?

It would appear that the U.S. Navy has the only capability to actually publish, maintain, and update multinational navy doctrine. Such an undertaking is also beyond the original charter of the Naval Doctrine Command and would require an increase in resources to accomplish. Should there be a "tax" of the use of Partnership for Peace or other international training and education funds for such doctrinal development?

A small point, but one that should not be overlooked, is that there are already a number of U.S. Navy organizations which have an on-going relationship with other navies. Some of the activities by organizations other than the Naval Doctrine Command might be considered doctrinal in nature. For example, the U.S.

Third Fleet has six foreign liaison officers engaged in the development of tactical-level tactics, techniques, and procedures publications. At another extreme, the Naval War College has an on-going relationship with a number of foreign navies which include the academic investigation of issues that are now categorized under the heading of doctrine.<sup>20</sup> In some cases, foreign navies perform doctrine development within their war colleges and will not automatically look at the Naval Doctrine Command as their peer.

During the years of the Cold War, the U.S. Navy placed greater emphasis on national doctrine and operating procedures--exercising NATO doctrine procedures generally only during specific NATO exercises. There will be some skepticism on the part of medium-power navies that the U.S. Navy is serious about the development of new multinational navy doctrine. This skepticism will need to be consciously addressed and defused. Simply put, the U.S. Navy has decades of its behavior to overcome.

#### Writing the Doctrine: Substantive Issues

Assuming that one can get beyond these difficult, but essentially administrative and bureaucratic issues, there remain a series of very difficult substantive issues that will need to be resolved. Again, a review of the *Principles and Applications of Naval Warfare: United States Fleets, 1947*, USF-1, can be instructive since the U.S. had just fought a coalition war on two fronts and had ample experience with multinational partners. Admiral Nimitz highlighted difficulties associated with "differences of national aims and involvement."<sup>21</sup>

The draft *Joint Doctrine for Multinational Operations*, Joint Pub 3-16, states: "that the national objectives of participating forces may interfere with or limit how their military contingents participate [and]...National mandates may differ when forces are committed to a multinational operation, even if the nations are in agreement with respect to the ultimate objective."<sup>22</sup> Whereas a current U.S. task force or task group commander might have as his objective the attainment of a U.S. military objective, it is clearly the political objective of some governments of medium-power navies today to use their fleets to influence U.S. behavior. This is generally accomplished by having their fleets integrated into American forces and by attempting to stake out staff and subordinate command positions.

An extremely good example of this is the continuation of submarine forces by many navies of the world who might otherwise not find them cost-effective. Although there might not be a viable combat mission for submarines by many medium-power navies, the mere possession of such forces entitles the government

concerned *entree* into world of underwater traffic management. This is an extremely important method of learning about what is going on not only in distant international waters, but also one's own exclusive economic zones (EEZs), archipelagic waters, straits transit lanes, etc. With no need to declare submerged transit through these waters, an effective way to learn about submerged transit, and perhaps influence planned transits, is to be a player at the table of subsurface operations.

The fact that navies of the world actually train together today on a routine basis is not a commitment to actually fight together in any MRC which their government chooses to oppose. If the U.S. government allows medium-power navies to become so integrated with the U.S. Navy that the U.S. will not be able to operate on its own, we may find ourselves unable to provide a unilateral LRC combat capability. Although the size of the U.S. Navy will probably not shrink to that level, it must have a balance between the ability to operate under joint and alternatively under multinational navy doctrine so that national tasks are not precluded.

The governments of medium-power navies determine whether their navies are sent to MRCs or LRCs merely to be seen as participating or to actually participate in combat. Some will be sent merely to be seen as having participated--casualties are neither expected nor desired. The draft Joint Pub 3-16 recognizes this problem.<sup>23</sup> Yet it may be necessary from a purely U.S. perspective to have foreign forces participate in a crisis response. Hence, multinational navy doctrine is not only needed to account for how to fight together, but also how to ensure that the forces of some navies are perceived as participating but not actually placed in harm's way--without it looking like that.

Indeed, the draft *Joint Doctrine for Multinational Operations*, Joint Pub 3-16, states that:

"It may be necessary to divide the force according to national and/or political considerations. For example, in an environment in which hostilities become likely, a portion of the multinational force (those nations authorized the full range of forces) may be assigned to offensive operations, a second group (with more political constraint) may be assigned to support and to protect lines of communication in the theater, while a third (with greater constraint) may be assigned to interdiction operations on the periphery of the theater."<sup>24</sup>

Multinational naval doctrine will need to both provide navies with honorable options to operate in a multinational environment as a fully-integrated member of a U.S.-led task group

and as a foreign-led separate task group operating in separate waters. Although the current group of medium-power navies probably views full integration as the only honorable alternative, this will become increasingly difficult as the U.S. Navy adds even more costly technologies to the fleet, thus precluding full integration even by the U.S. Coast Guard.

During World War II, the British Pacific Fleet (BPF) operated in a separate sector and not as an integral part of the U.S. Pacific Fleet even though fully-integrated forces were in the Atlantic. The BPF had even adopted U.S. Navy doctrine and aircraft. Yet its aircraft carrier design and lack of integrated logistical train precluded the BPF from fully-integrated operations. In the Atlantic, convoy escort duty had less difficulties in integrating forces from a variety of nations. There was no less honor due to the Royal Navy because the BPF operated on its own. Perhaps it is time to remember that in history, navies from different nations have rarely operated in a fully-integrated manner.

Unfortunately, by acknowledging the sector option as an honorable alternative, the U.S. Navy would undermine the argument made by medium-power navies to their governments that they need additional technology or more capable forces. In turn, this might affect the sale of technologies or hardware to these countries. The unintended consequences of multinational doctrine development might not be apparent to officers whose primary expertise is with the various combat arms.

Although no one will desire it, eventually foreign navies operating under some multinational context will eventually come up against multinational tasking that conflicts with their own national policy. An example might be the deliberate testing of the right of innocent passage or the sailing of ships into waters considered "closed" to non-littoral nations. If a foreign warship is operating with a U.S. task group that has been asked to perform such a mission and that ship's government opposes such a move, procedures will need to be established to provide a face-saving way out. This does not appear to be insurmountable, but should be addressed before it happens so that standing doctrine can guide behavior in the fleet. More complicated will be the handling of national missions that are intended to be carried out while operating as a part of a multinational force--for example the gathering of intelligence.

Rules of engagement (ROEs) are another area of problem for multinational naval operations. ROEs do not drive doctrine, hence the inability to agree before hand on them does not preclude the development of multinational navy doctrine.<sup>25</sup> The problems associated with ROEs themselves are not insurmountable and navies have demonstrated the ability to operate in highly complex

environments, where ROEs might actually change during the flight of naval aircraft launched from an aircraft carrier but operating under the tactical control of some other organization.

Again turning to the *Principles and Applications of Naval Warfare: United States Fleets, 1947*, USF-1, for a precedent, we should note that this document stated:

"It has been the practice of this government to recognize and to require the right of communications, and if necessary of appeal, through national channels in order to allow:

(1) Notification to a government by its national commander if he considers that his force is in danger of reduction that would imperil its further effectiveness for the purposes of its own government.

(2) Protest to a government by its national commander if he considers that his force is being subjected to unusual or discriminatory action"<sup>26</sup>

The current draft *Joint Doctrine for Multinational Operations*, Joint Pub 3-16, states that:

"US units normally maintain a direct line of communication to an appropriate US headquarters-- normally the theater combatant commander. Other participants in a coalition can be expected to maintain similar lines of communication."<sup>27</sup>

#### Levels of Preparation for Warfighting

Most medium-power navies cannot afford to be provided with capabilities for both the high end of warfighting and also for constabulary national missions. Over time, the U.S. Navy has evolved and been expected to provide certain capabilities to the medium-power navy--thus eliminating the need for the governments of such navies to provide them for themselves. For example, the U.S. Navy provides to most medium-power navies: modern aircraft carriers with fixed-wing aircraft capable of a full-range of missions, nuclear-powered ballistic missile submarines (SSBNs) and nuclear-powered attack submarines (SSNs), a power projection across the beach capability, various intelligence sources and capabilities, and certain training facilities.

From a doctrinal standpoint, the U.S. Navy provides the bulk of the expertise at the higher ends of warfighting--power projection. On the other hand, medium-power navies have provided things that the U.S. Navy does not normally concern itself with. This has included: escorts, diesel-electric submarines, patrol

craft, mine warfare capabilities, and expertise in operations other than war (OOTW). Again, the U.S. Coast Guard is an excellent parallel. The U.S. Coast Guard is maximized for performance at the lower spectrum of conflict and recently has divested itself of certain open-ocean antisubmarine warfare capabilities and offensive surface warfare missile systems.

There are a number of substantive questions that stem from this current division of labor. Is doctrine one of those things that the superpower navy should provide to other navies of the world? Although this is the general pattern of behavior between the U.S. Navy and the U.S. Coast Guard, the latter often takes the lead in substantive matters that have traditionally been outside of the self-identity of the former. Hence, the U.S. Coast Guard has the lead on joint search and rescue even though its Commandant is not an official member of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Furthermore, U.S. joint doctrine on search and rescue has essentially been adopted as the international standard.

Where other nations have demonstrated expertise in various individual aspects of combat or OOTW, should the U.S. Navy ask them to take the lead on the development of multinational navy doctrine? If not, is there an alternative way to gain their expertise so that the U.S. Navy need not "reinvent the wheel?" Since destroyers and frigates are capital ships in many medium-power navies, we might find that some doctrine for the employment of these forces has been more fully developed in foreign navies than it has in the U.S. Navy. The current group of foreign liaison officers at the Naval Doctrine Command does not include officers from some nations where we know national expertise in certain areas, such as operational art, exceeds that in the U.S. Navy.

Although there have been many attempts to more fully understand and rank navies over the years,<sup>28</sup> such an effort is clearly necessary for the current development of multinational navy doctrine. Do all the navies of the world share the U.S. Navy's list of the principles of war? If not, what is the significance of the differences? Not all navies are capable of all missions that can be performed by the U.S. Navy. On the other hand, medium-power and smaller navies routinely perform tasks that are not performed by the U.S. Navy.

Hence, in the development of the U.S. *Universal Joint Task List* (UJTL), not all multinational navy tasks will be listed. Hence, do we need to develop a real universal task list that accounts for the maritime tasks performed by navies other than the U.S. Navy? The UJTL drives the creation of Joint Mission Essential Tasks Lists (JMETLs) and various mission training plans, which in turn drive joint training. If the U.S. is moving toward a system of training primarily to tasks found in the CinCs

JMETLs and fleshed-out in mission training plans, then medium-power navies must accept that jointly-sponsored training will move away from areas not approved by these lists and used by the U.S. Navy. Will this drive the medium-power navy to more training, instead, with the U.S. Coast Guard? In fact, many of them are already doing this and any attempts by the U.S. Navy or the joint system to enhance training for foreign navies must take into account these already ongoing relationships with the U.S. Coast Guard.

Can navies train equally well for both the high end of warfighting and OOTW? Although the theoretical answer is yes, the demonstrated behavior of the U.S. Navy is that it prefers to dominate the high end and to "subcontract" OOTW to the U.S. Coast Guard. The U.S. Coast Guard routinely provides detachments aboard U.S. Navy warships to handle OOTW functions for which U.S. Navy officers have not been trained. Similarly, the U.S. Coast Guard has moved away from being able to be fully interoperable with the U.S. Navy in offensive and undersea warfare at sea. Such an approach does not appear to be a problem--both the U.S. Navy and U.S. Coast Guard appear to be comfortable in their roles and self-identities.

Such a division of labor is liable to have unintended consequences for medium-power navies with histories that include significant combat at sea. The self-identity of most navies is still of a combat force. The more that navies are forced to move into the area of OOTW, the less likely that they are going to seek and be successful at combat at the higher end of the warfighting spectrum. Naturally, most medium-power navies will have the opportunity to retain warfighting skills at commensurate levels of capability. Navy officers may resent being considered only "good enough" to handle the medium/lower end and OOTW. Yet the reality of future hardware procurement by many governments that field medium-power navies is that they will be increasingly specialized out of the higher ends of combat.

As younger navy officers in some medium-power navies, with more self-identity with constabulary and other OOTW tasks, advance into leadership positions in their own navies, they will probably embrace these roles for their own navy, thus changing their Service culture. Today the self-identity of the U.S. Coast Guard is more akin to the policeman rather than the combat warrior. The U.S. Coast Guard protects its non-combat roles from "mission creep" by the U.S. Navy.

Perhaps medium-power navies could provide detachments, like the U.S. Coast Guard, in multinational scenarios for OOTW areas of expertise that are not developed by the U.S. Navy. Currently this is done by the U.S. Coast Guard, but neither the U.S. Navy nor Coast Guard have a sufficiently trained cadre of foreign area officers (FAO)--an area of expertise that might be better

provided by multinational navy partners rather than turning to the U.S. Army for FAO support. Navy detachments offer the ability of a foreign government to advertise their presence and participation in a multinational crisis response at far less cost than sending even one small ship. They also offer these governments an opportunity to influence U.S. behavior and extremely low-visibility when they do not desire to advertise participation.

Visibility is another area that can be highlighted or reduced, depending upon the political desire. When a nation does not desire to advertise its support for a multinational effort, it can do so with assistance in the areas of communications, intelligence, transportation, logistics, etc. "Stealthy" support could be used by the U.S. when it is not in the best interests of the attainment of the political objective to send in a U.S. warship. In such cases, multinational navy partners can provide the visible presence while the U.S. operates behind the scenes, essentially invisible to the world press. There are other ways to interact multinationally other than to send a ship.

#### Testing and Making the Doctrine Operational

Training and exercising the new multinational navy doctrine also bears considerable analysis. Who should teach the new doctrine? Clearly each individual nation would have to take this on itself, but will the U.S. provide teams prior to exercises? Would that be a responsibility of the Naval Doctrine Command or should that burden be assumed by the various Fleet CinCs? If multinational naval doctrine, like U.S. naval doctrine, is guidance and not dogma, how will it be viewed by the U.S. Atlantic Command (USACOM) whose charter includes training U.S. forces based in the continental U.S., but who would normally be expected to train to joint doctrinal standards? Will USACOM even consider using multinational naval, and not joint, doctrine for joint exercises in which significant multinational navy elements participate? Whose responsibility will it be to translate the doctrine into other languages for use by navies whose officers are not generally fluent in English?

Once training in the new doctrine is accomplished, it should also be exercised. Currently, there are a series of international naval exercises that are holdovers from the Cold War-era. As the U.S. defense budget gets even smaller, there will be more competition for fewer resources and eventually someone will ask why these exercises are being held or if they might be made more efficient. We might also see the governments of medium-power navies respond better to requests for exercises if they were framed in the context of efficiency and doctrinal development.

In short, rather than holding wargames and exercises for their own sake, it is time to make doctrine the glue which holds

the exercise program together. Multinational doctrine can be developed first, then this would be the justification for wargames and exercises--to validate the doctrine and to practice the ability of various navies to achieve common objectives. Search and rescue seems to be an obvious and non-contentious method to start such a program--moving on to more complex tasks once confidence has been built with success at a lower level. Of course this would mean a major role for a non-DoD agency, the U.S. Coast Guard.

Training and exercises should also be coordinated with foreign policy objectives. If it is U.S. foreign policy to reduce the threats in various regions from nations which have a limited, but credible, regional power projection capability, then the development of power projection doctrine and exercises in power projection capabilities should not be undertaken. For example, if Western nations do not want to see Russia with an ability to project power from the sea to the shore, then it would seem illogical to be holding exercises with the Russian Naval Infantry in which such capability is practiced. Perhaps the Russian Naval Infantry should be exercised in humanitarian assistance.

#### Emerging Issues that Complicate the Writing of Doctrine

Assuming that the U.S. Navy continues to take the lead in the preparation of multinational navy doctrine, there are a number of emerging issues for the U.S. Navy that will eventually affect these efforts. Each of these is in a state of flux, with the eventual resolution uncertain. Each bears watching by those charged with the development of multinational navy doctrine.

The first of these issues is "maneuver" warfare. Championed by the U.S. Marine Corps, "maneuver" warfare has also found itself in U.S. naval doctrine--thus it has been accepted by the U.S. Navy without the consultation of medium-power navies. The navy aspects of "maneuver" warfare have not been fully identified and are currently on-going. Thus far, it appears that the most comprehensive existing treatment of this subject can be found in the writings of Admiral Raoul Castex, in his five volumes of *Theories stratégiques*, published in the inter-War years.<sup>29</sup> Full analysis of *manoeuvre* warfare has not been completed, but it will affect the behavior of the U.S. Navy since it is already approved doctrine. It will therefore have an affect on the development of multinational navy doctrine since it is the doctrine of the U.S. Navy.

Will "maneuver" warfare be considered too "risky" for some nations? The current draft *Joint Doctrine for Multinational Operations*, Joint Pub 3-16, states that:

"US joint doctrine stresses rapid, agile operations emphasizing ingenuity, creativity and improvisation within the guidelines provided by the overall commander's intent. Some nations may regard this approach as too risky."<sup>30</sup>

Other internal U.S. Navy concepts are being considered for revision. The current Composite Warfare Commander (CWC) and his relationship to the Officer in Tactical Command (OTC) may be revised. Internal U.S. Navy doctrine can change relatively easily in this regard, but what will the effect be on existing NATO navy doctrine and new multinational navy doctrine?

The U.S. Navy is also considering the elimination of the "anti-" emphasis of various warfare commanders subordinate to the CWC.<sup>31</sup> Thus anti-submarine warfare might become subsurface warfare, and anti-air warfare might become air warfare, etc. This may be a semantics change, but the emphasis on the offensive in doctrine might prove troublesome to medium-power navies whose governments tend to view their navies as defensive in orientation.

U.S. Navy warfighting concepts are changing due to the influence of on-going developments in joint doctrine. For example, it is likely that an afloat Joint Forces Air Component Commander (JFACC) will be developed. Since many naval aviation air assets could be multinational, JFACC will either need to be accepted by foreign navies or a sector approach used to separate U.S. from non-U.S. airpower. Similar problems exist in the creation of a Joint Air Defense Commander. Is such joint doctrinal development going on without thought to the multinational navy context?

Both joint and U.S. Navy doctrine will eventually expand into the world of doctrinal support for programming. Such efforts are routinely done by the U.S. Army, but will be new for others. Will there be a parallel role for multinational navy doctrine that guides the programming of nations? What lessons can we learn from such efforts by NATO? During the Cold War, the generally established shared political conviction resulted in the U.S. having the ability to play a leading role in supporting foreign navies efforts at programming. In the absence of a political consensus, can the U.S. still influence foreign governments to field fleets of various capabilities? Would doctrine help? Can we use doctrine to shape the development of foreign navies in support of U.S. foreign policy goals? Would foreign governments use multinational navy programming doctrine to shape the future development of the U.S. Navy?

The U.S. Naval Doctrine Command has the lead on the creation of joint doctrine for interagency operations cooperation.<sup>32</sup> Such

operations extend outside of the Department of Defense (DoD) and are typified by the creation of the Joint Interagency Task Forces (JIATF), East and West, to replace the former DoD Joint Task Forces (JTFs) that deal with drug problems. As the U.S. armed forces come to grips with routine operations with non DoD agencies and private, non-governmental, and voluntary organizations, a parallel effort will need to be made in multinational navy doctrine. Since many medium-power and smaller navies have extensive expertise in this area, they might be a logical source of expertise which should not be ignored.

Medium-power and smaller navies already have an established relationship with the U.S. Coast Guard and do not always understand our division of labor. The U.S. Navy and U.S. Coast Guard need to present a unified position to foreign navies in the area of doctrinal development. This review strongly suggests that the U.S. Coast Guard will need to provide its own written doctrine in order to fully support multinational naval doctrine development.

Further along is the concept of information warfare. All of the U.S. military services are exploring this concept and it may prove to be an extremely expensive arena of operations. The role for navies, let alone the role for navies that do not buy the technologies associated with information warfare, has yet to be determined. The very essence of advanced command and control warfare (C<sup>2</sup>W) may be an anathema to the multinational aspects of alliances and coalitions where decision-making may prove far too complex to adapt.

Similarly, the shift of enemies from state-sponsored navies to "warriors" loyal to charismatic, religious, or other non-state leaders will probably provide new doctrinal challenges for navies.<sup>33</sup> This type of challenge is not new for fleets; they have a long history of coordinated actions against piracy. Are there lessons to be learned from these past experiences and will navies fund the basic research necessary to extract these lessons?

A final area of emerging interest in the U.S. Navy is that of combat leadership doctrine. Resulting from research into leadership literature is the conclusion that cultural differences matter in how various national military forces lead and command. Simply put, the national style of leadership is different in different countries and what is taken for granted in one country may not be at all appropriate in others.

For example, one of the essential elements of leadership doctrine in the Israeli armed forces is that the lowest level of command will take immediate action when confronted with a situation.<sup>34</sup> The relationship of this combat leader to his superior is such that, when a report is made up the chain of

command, the senior asks the junior what it is that he can do to assist him. By having the senior officer ask what he can do to help, the effect is that decision-making is forced down to the lowest levels of the chain of command and juniors do not look up for guidance or solutions to their dilemmas. Would such a leadership style work in the U.S. armed forces or the armed forces of other multinational partners? What would happen if an Israeli subordinate reported in such a manner to a non-Israeli senior while involved in a multinational naval operation--but the non-Israeli senior did not respond as anticipated?

### Conclusions

The U.S. Navy stands at the crossroads of national doctrinal development and multinational leadership. The U.S. Navy is fully cooperating with the development of U.S. joint doctrine and is a partner with the U.S. Marine Corps in the development of multi-Service naval doctrine focused upon warfare in the littorals. The U.S. Navy, on the other hand, has the ability to act as the inspirational leader of the navies of the world with the development of multinational navy doctrine that may be equally as important as the development of joint and naval doctrine.

Rather than develop multinational naval doctrine from the perspective of a blank screen and a blinking cursor, the existing relationship of the U.S. Navy to the U.S. Coast Guard appears to be a model that has some relevance for the development of multinational naval doctrine and should be consulted first for applicability. That is to say, we need not develop multinational naval doctrine exactly the same way that we develop joint, multi-Service naval, or U.S. Navy doctrine with limited U.S. Coast Guard participation, but rather there is an existing model that should be consulted as we seek a basis for any relationship that the U.S. Navy has with any medium-power navy. After all, if we end up treating some medium-power navy better than we treat our own U.S. Coast Guard, it will not go unnoticed by the U.S. Coast Guard.

Many medium-power navies might be more willing to embrace multinational navy doctrine rather than becoming joint within their own nation. The U.S. Navy has no choice but to be both joint and multinational. If the U.S. government and armed forces count on multinational navies for the attainment of U.S. national security and military objectives, then the development of multinational navy doctrine for navies that are not also joint is also a priority. Doctrine is needed for both navies that can fully integrate with the U.S. Navy and those that must cooperate without full integration.

The development, publication, and maintenance of multinational navy doctrine appears to be well within the capabilities of the Naval Doctrine Command, if additional

resources are provided. The existing cadre of foreign liaison officers assigned to the Naval Doctrine Command is insufficient to ensure that development meets the needs of all medium-power and smaller navies. There is also the significant issue of a Eurocentric bias at the Naval Doctrine Command that might be alleviated by the participation of officers from other Asian nations.<sup>35</sup>

If the U.S. Navy desires to get into the business of providing multinational navy doctrine to other countries, there are a series of extremely sophisticated political and diplomatic issues of substance that will need to be addressed. This strongly suggests that expertise in areas other than actual combat arms is required for such doctrinal development and, if not made available to the Naval Doctrine Command, might result in unintended international repercussions.

Many nations which field medium-power navies do not have stand-alone doctrine commands or centers. They do, however, have some dozen or so academics which are interested in navies and in some countries a group of political retired navy officers. These individuals have an extraordinary ability to influence force development and policy in these nations. The U.S. Navy would probably be well served by a continued dialog with such academics and retired officers so that the major issues that have been raised in this report are fully discussed with such influential individuals. Discussions only with navies is not a satisfactory manner to deal with the operational-level of multinational navy doctrine.

None of these issues are insurmountable. All require careful analysis and deliberate political and military decision-making. Having decided where it would like to go, and how to best support U.S. foreign policy, the U.S. Navy is capable of exercising leadership in the development of multinational navy doctrine and enhancing our national security and national military objectives in the maritime environment.

#### Notes

1. For an extensive treatment of the definition of doctrine and its various forms, see James J. Tritten, "Naval Perspectives on Military Doctrine," *Naval War College Review*, 48, no. 2 (Spring 1995): 22-38.
2. Admiral of the Fleet Chester W. Nimitz, USN, *Principles and Applications of Naval Warfare: United States Fleets, 1947*, USF-1, Washington, DC: Office of the Chief of Naval Operations, 1 May 1947.
3. Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Manual, *Universal Joint Task List* (UJTL), Version 2.1, JSM 3500.04, 15 May 1995.

4. General John M. Shalikashvili, U.S. Army, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, *National Military Strategy of the United States of America*, Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, February 1995, p. 18.
5. James J. Tritton, *Our New National Security Strategy: America Promises to Come Back*, Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1992, p. 22-25, 41, 117.
6. The revised goal for ships is now 346 ships. See: General John M. Shalikashvili, U.S. Army, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, *National Military Strategy of the United States of America*, Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, February 1995, p. 17.
7. Commander Barry Coombs, USN and Commander Les Sim, RN, "The Russians Are Here," U.S. Naval Institute *Proceedings*, 121, no. 3 (March 1995): 69, discusses the creation of an unclassified NATO publication, *Maritime Maneuvering and Tactical Procedures* (Experimental Tactic [EXTAC] 768) and a bilateral set of terms based upon the *Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms*, Joint Publication 1-02, shared with the Russians.
8. Vice Admiral Leighton W. Smith, USN, Deputy Chief of Naval Operations (Plans, Policy and Operations)(N3/N5) Memorandum for the Chief of Naval Operations 3146 Ser N525/3U604333 of 1 October 1993, with concurrence of the Chief of Naval Operations dated 6 October 1993.
9. Rear Admiral J.R. Hill, RN (Ret.), *Maritime Strategy for Medium Powers*, Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 1986, p. 31. Admiral Hill has stood by his definition at a recent maritime conference. See his "Do We Need a New Definition of Medium Maritime Power?" *Maritime Forces in Global Security*, Ann L. Griffiths and Peter T. Haydon, eds., Halifax, Nova Scotia: Centre for Foreign Policy Studies, Dalhousie University, 1995, p. 262.
10. Obviously even smaller navies have successfully challenged medium-power navies in operations other than war (OOTW)--the 1976 Icelandic/British "Cod" War being an excellent example.
11. For example, see: William J. Clinton, *A National Strategy of Engagement and Enlargement*, Washington, DC; U.S. Government Printing Office, February 1995, p. 7.
12. Admiral of the Fleet Chester W. Nimitz, USN, *Principles and Applications of Naval Warfare: United States Fleets, 1947*, USF-1, Washington, DC: Office of the Chief of Naval Operations, 1 May 1947, p. 9-4 and 9-5.

13. Joint Chiefs of Staff, *Joint Doctrine for Multinational Operations*, draft Joint Pub 3-16, dated March 1995, p. I-3.
14. James J. Tritten, "Naval Perspectives on Military Doctrine," *Naval War College Review*, 48, no. 2 (Spring 1995): 26-31.
15. Lieutenant General Walter Kross, USAF, memorandum for the Chiefs of Services and Unified Commanders-in-Chief, MCM-135-94 of 25 November 1994 and memorandum for the Operations Deputies of the Services, DJSM-1233-94 of 25 November 1994: "The guidance in this publication is authoritative; as such, this doctrine (or JTTP [joint tactics, techniques, and procedures]) will be followed except when, in the judgment of the commander, exceptional circumstances dictate otherwise."
16. Admiral of the Fleet Chester W. Nimitz, USN, *Principles and Applications of Naval Warfare: United States Fleets, 1947*, USF-1, Washington, DC: Office of the Chief of Naval Operations, 1 May 1947, p. 9-6.
17. Captain Bruce B. Stubbs, USCG, "The U.S. Coast Guard: A Unique Instrument of U.S. National Security," *Marine Policy*, no. 18, 1994, p. 513, documents a number of instances of use of the U.S. Coast Guard to show U.S. resolve but with a force that has a humanitarian and law enforcement image.
18. Thomas J. Hirschfeld, *Multinational Naval Cooperation Options: Final Report*, CRM 93-44, Alexandria, VA: Center for Naval Analyses, March 1993. There are a number of additional publications in the final stages of preparation.
19. James J. Tritten, "Doctrine and Fleet Tactics in the Royal Navy," NDC [Naval Doctrine Command] Technical Report 3-00-004, Norfolk, VA: Naval Doctrine Command, November 1994.
20. The International Seapower Symposium held at the U.S. Naval War College is a good example of such on-going efforts that cannot be ignored. The symposium is attended by many chiefs of service or very senior officers from navies around the world. Proceedings of these symposia are prepared by the Naval War College and provide a basis for understanding the discussions held between professional naval officers on multinational subjects.
21. Admiral of the Fleet Chester W. Nimitz, USN, *Principles and Applications of Naval Warfare: United States Fleets, 1947*, USF-1, Washington, DC: Office of the Chief of Naval Operations, 1 May 1947, p. 9-5.
22. Joint Chiefs of Staff, *Joint Doctrine for Multinational Operations*, draft Joint Pub 3-16, dated March 1995, p. I-14, IV-1 and IV-2.

23. Joint Chiefs of Staff, *Joint Doctrine for Multinational Operations*, draft Joint Pub 3-16, dated March 1995, p. I-14.
24. Joint Chiefs of Staff, *Joint Doctrine for Multinational Operations*, draft Joint Pub 3-16, dated March 1995, p. IV-2.
25. Joint Chiefs of Staff, *Joint Doctrine for Multinational Operations*, draft Joint Pub 3-16, dated March 1995, p. IV-4 states that: "complete consensus or standardization of R[ules] O[f] E[ngagement] should be sought, but may not be achievable.
26. Admiral of the Fleet Chester W. Nimitz, USN, *Principles and Applications of Naval Warfare: United States Fleets, 1947*, USF-1, Washington, DC: Office of the Chief of Naval Operations, 1 May 1947, p. 9-3.
27. Joint Chiefs of Staff, *Joint Doctrine for Multinational Operations*, draft Joint Pub 3-16, dated March 1995, p. I-14. See also Figure II-2, p. II-7, with chain of command lines from various national forces to and around the multinational force commander.
28. The most recent well-developed typology, or ranking, for navies can be found in Eric Grove, *The Future of Sea Power*, Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 1990, p. 236-240. Other discussions on typologies can be found in: Captain John E. Moore, RN (Ret.), ed., *Jane's Fighting Ships, 1973-74*, New York, NY: McGraw-Hill Book Co., 1973, p. 73; Mark W. Janis, *Sea Power and the Law of the Sea*, Lexington, MA: Lexington Books, D.C. Heath and Co., 1976, p. 63-64; Ken Booth, *Navies and Foreign Policy*, New York, NY: Holmes & Meier Publishers, Inc., 1979, p. 119-121; and Rear Admiral J.R. Hill, RN (Ret.), *Maritime Strategy for Medium Powers*, Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 1986, p. 14-27; Michael A. Morris, *Expansion of Third World Navies*, London, UK: Macmillan, 1987, p. 269; Nien-Tsu Alfred Hu and James K. Oliver, "A Framework for Small Navy Theory: The 1982 U.N. Law of the Sea Convention," *Naval War College Review*, 41, no. 2 (Spring 1988): 37-48; and Lieutenant Commander S.W. Haines, RN, "Third-World Navies: Myths and Realities," *Naval Forces*, vol. IX, no. IV/1988, p. 14-25. Two other ways to create such a list are: (1), to reviews wars in which navies played central or peripheral roles--then apply this criteria for the future; and (2), to review which navies can exclude others from their waters. See, for example, James Cable, *Navies in Violent Peace*, New York, NY: St. Martin's Press, 1989, p. 16-31, 82-86, 102-111.
29. Admiral Raoul Victor Patrice Castex, *Theories stratégiques*, in 5 vols., Paris: *Société d'Éditions Géographiques, Maritimes et Coloniales*, 1929-1935. These books have been summarized and translated as *Strategic Theories*, edited, with an introduction by Eugenia C. Kiesling, Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 1994. Of note is that fact that Professor Kiesling uses the phrases

"second-place fleet" (p. xv), "second-class fleet" (p. xliii), and "second rank" (p. xliv) in her introduction to indicate Castex's conscious design of doctrine for a French Navy which could not hope to compete with the first-rank Royal Navy. This typology fits well into the previous literature on ranking of fleets and introduces the idea of different doctrine for different ranked fleets.

30. Joint Chiefs of Staff, *Joint Doctrine for Multinational Operations*, draft Joint Pub 3-16, dated March 1995, p. III-10 and III-11.

31. Rear Admiral R.D. Tucker, USN, "Pro-Warfare: A Modern Culture for a New Strategy," U.S. Naval Institute *Proceedings*, 121, no. 1 (January 1995): 78-80.

32. The publication will be called *Interagency Coordination During Joint Operations*, Joint Publication 3-08.

33. Ralph Peters, "The New Warrior Class," *Parameters*, 24, no. 2 (Summer 1994): 16-26.

34. Interview with Brigadier General Howard T. Prince II, U.S. Army (Ret.), Professor and Dean of the Jepson School of Leadership Studies, University of Richmond, Richmond, VA, February 8, 1995.

35. The current group of liaison officers only includes one (Australia) from Asia. The remaining liaison officers from Canada, France, Great Britain, and Italy, as well as the U.S. staff at the Naval Doctrine Command can all be assumed to share a general "Eurocentric" bias.