


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NAVAL DOCTRINE COMMAND
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Naval Doctrine ... From The Sea

by

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Introduction

Following their victories at Santiago in the Spanish-American War, Rear Admirals William T. Sampson and Winfield Scott Schley, USN, engaged in public debates and discussions over their conduct during the Battle of Santiago (July 1898). Spanish Admiral Pascual Cervera had outmaneuvered the American North Atlantic Squadron and managed to enter the harbor at Santiago, Cuba, where he maintained a fleet-in-being. The Americans attempted to and eventually drew out the fleet as a result of joint actions taken ashore and at sea, resulting in a battle in which Cervera was defeated.¹

The public debate over how the battle should have been fought went on for years and necessitated a Presidential order for it to cease. The acrimonious manner in which tactics and doctrine were questioned following the Spanish-American War poisoned the well in the U.S. Navy for subsequent frank and open debate and discussions of a doctrinal nature. Indeed, one can conclude that the Sampson-Schley debates virtually precluded the use of the word "doctrine" within the U.S. Navy for many years and biased generations of officers from claiming that doctrine could exist for the Navy.

In 1915, Lieutenant Commander Dudley W. Knox, USN, wrote a prize-winning essay in the U.S. Naval Institute *Proceedings* that attempted to resurrect the subject of doctrine as an issue of professional debate.² Although Knox failed in his attempt to again bring doctrinal debates into the open, doctrine itself did not disappear within the U.S. Navy. Doctrine was driven into the formal tactical publications, read primarily by the professional officer, as well as taking root in the unwritten, but extremely powerful, form of shared experiences derived from service at sea, exercises, and war college courses. Doctrinal debate took place mainly in the wardroom and the classroom--not primarily on the pages of professional journals.

By the time World War II was declared, there was a fully mature, formal, and centralized system of doctrine in the U.S. Navy that gave guidance, not orders, to the fleet commander on how to fight. The U.S. Pacific Fleet in World War II operated under centralized war instructions, centralized general tactical

¹ The views expressed by the author are his alone and do not necessarily represent those of the U.S. government, Department of Defense, or the U.S. Navy.

instructions, *U.S. Fleet Doctrine and Tactical Orders (USF-10)*, *Current Tactical Orders and Doctrine U.S. Pacific Fleet (PAC-10)*, and type doctrines and tactical orders prepared for each class of ship.³

The 1943 issue of *PAC-10* stated that the Navy had taken into account the experiences thus far in the war, and that commands should consider this regional doctrine as more up to date than the fleet-wide *USF-10*. Written fleet and multinational navy doctrine existed in the Atlantic Fleet as well. The wartime *Atlantic Convoy Instructions* were published by the Royal Navy but accepted as doctrine by the U.S. Navy. This written navy doctrine did not detract from our victory at sea during the war.

More recent examples of navy doctrine are a pamphlet by Admiral Arleigh Burke, USN, Chief of Naval Operations, *Origins of United States Navy Doctrine*, issued on 11 April 1960, and a similar one by Admiral J.L. Holloway III, USN, *Planning, Readiness and Employment Doctrine for U.S. Naval Operating Forces*, Prepared by the Chief of Information (OP-007). Neither of these publications are of the scope of the World War II doctrinal publications, which included the conduct of multi-carrier task forces in battle. Even more recently published formal centralized written navy doctrine, Naval Warfare Publication [NWP]-1, *Strategic Concepts of the U.S. Navy*, did not really tell fleet commanders how to fight.

This report will review the recent shift in the attitude of the U.S. Navy on military doctrine, provide a framework for understanding the Navy's current attitude on doctrine--to ensure that the reader of traditional military doctrine knows exactly where single-Service Navy and multi-Service naval doctrine fits in. The report will then provide some lessons learned from historical research of doctrine in navies--to illustrate that the Navy has done its homework and is entering the field of doctrine professionals as a fully-prepared player.

Recent Shifts in Attitudes on Navy & Naval Doctrine

Naval doctrine has existed since World War II in many, but often subtle, forms. Written naval doctrine existed in the form of naval (Navy and Marine Corps) components of joint and multinational doctrine as well as in existing Marine Corps Service-specific doctrine. Formal written functional doctrine applicable to the naval Services existed in the form of doctrine for amphibious warfare and various Navy and Marine Corps Service-specific naval warfare publications, tactical notes, and memos. The U.S. Navy also moved back to the bulk of its doctrine being found in the unwritten shared experiences of its officers.

Basic principles of beliefs and practices do not have to be written to be doctrine. Unwritten customary informal naval doctrine has also existed in the form of commander's intent, and the shared experiences of its admirals and commanders. There is a long history of the informal beliefs of the officer corps as U.S. Navy doctrine--which may have even been more powerful than the official written versions which coexisted. The parallel to unwritten doctrine in international law is law based upon custom and not on treaties. Both are equally valid but treaties are easier to change.

A new direction for the U.S. naval Services was identified in the Department of the Navy's white paper *...From the Sea*.⁴ *...From the Sea* steered the naval Services away from the open-ocean Maritime Strategy--associated with the Reagan administration--and focused future efforts toward development of naval expeditionary forces for joint and multinational operations in the littoral.

...From the Sea announced the creation of the Naval Doctrine Command under the direct supervision of the Commandant of the Marine Corps and the Chief of Naval Operations as the focal point for new doctrinal thinking. This new naval doctrine will more fully develop the strategic concepts outlined in *...From the Sea* and in subsequent Clinton-administration policy and programming documents.⁵ The newly issued *Forward...From the Sea* reaffirmed the basic tenants of the original white paper and made modest enhancements in some areas.⁶

At least one observer finds a connection between the 1986 Goldwater-Nichols Act and the Persian Gulf War and the renewed interest in naval doctrine. According to Colonel Pete Herrly, USA, on the faculty of the National War College, each of these events placed the Navy in the situation of having a potential gap in warfighting concepts. Herrly credits former Chief of Naval Operations, Admiral Frank B. Kelso, USN, with having recognized what was required and for taking the necessary action.⁷

The Naval Doctrine Command is the primary authority for the development of multi-Service naval concepts and integrated multi-Service naval doctrine as well as for Navy Service-unique doctrine. The command's missions include providing a coordinated Navy/Marine Corps voice in joint and multinational doctrine development and ensuring that naval and joint doctrine are addressed in training and education curricula and in operations, exercises, and war games.⁸ Priority is to be given to doctrine development that addresses the new geo-strategic environment and its associated changing threat; and to efforts which enhance the integration of naval forces in joint and multinational operations.

Since the Naval Doctrine Command stood up on March 12, 1993 at Norfolk, Virginia, it has begun articulating naval doctrine. Most importantly, the naval Services published their initial capstone publication, *Naval Warfare*, Naval Doctrine Publication-1.⁹ *Naval Warfare* was written during the command's first eight months, then reviewed by the Navy fleet and Marine forces commanders and appropriate specialists at the Naval War College and the Marine Corps Combat Development Command. The finished document was approved by the chiefs of the two Services in March 1994 and was distributed in June.

As a capstone document, *Naval Warfare* forms the bridge between the naval component of U.S. military strategy¹⁰ and naval tactics, techniques, and procedures. *Naval Warfare* addresses such topics as the employment of naval forces and the levels and principles of war. It forms the framework for the subsequent development and refinement of naval doctrine. *Naval Warfare* is the first step toward common understanding of naval warfighting.

The Navy and Marine Corps have identified and begun researching and writing the rest of the naval doctrine publication series of publications which will address naval intelligence, operations, logistics, planning, and command and control. After addressing the doctrinal issues associated with *...From the Sea* and *Forward...From the Sea*, the Naval Doctrine Command will begin to address doctrine for military operations other than war, sustained operations ashore, and traditional war at sea.

Doctrine for the U.S. Navy has been written and published for many decades over our long history. Now is the first time that the U.S. naval Services have attempted formal multi-Service naval doctrine but not the first time that doctrine for the naval Services has been formalized or written. Although the newly formed Naval Doctrine Command is the first multi-Service naval doctrine command, it is not the first military command which has written American naval doctrine. The doctrine division at the Marine Corps Combat Development Command and joint doctrine preceded the establishment of the Naval Doctrine Command by some years. Before that, doctrine was prepared at major naval commands and by Washington headquarters.

An excellent example of existing naval doctrine which was adopted by the new Naval Doctrine Command is that of "maneuver warfare." The concept of maneuver warfare had been clearly articulated in the Marine Corps doctrinal publication *Warfighting* by General Al Gray, USMC, in 1989.¹¹ Maneuver warfare has been adopted by the U.S. Navy in *Naval Warfare* and the Naval Doctrine Command will soon publish materials to fully outline the concept of maneuver warfare at sea. This action parallels recent investigation of maneuver warfare by the U.S. Air Force¹² and

adoption of some of its tenets by the U.S. Army.¹³ What remains to be seen is whether maneuver warfare will also be adopted as joint doctrine if it is eventually adopted by all four Services.

Naval Concepts of Doctrine

From an organizational perspective, doctrine is those shared beliefs and principles that define the work of a profession. Principles are basic truths, laws, or assumptions; rules or standards of behavior; or fixed or predetermined policies or modes of action. Professions are occupations and vocations requiring training and education in a specialized field--training and education in the doctrine of that profession. Doctrine is the codification of what a profession believes and practices whenever the profession's membership perform in the usual and normative way.

Like other professions, militaries have always had doctrine which defines how they do their job. Unlike some professions however, military doctrine does not have one standard approach nor common thread which can be found in all nations and in all military Services. In some cases, doctrine in the armed forces has been written and centralized. In other cases, and especially in navies, doctrine has been unwritten and decentralized.

There are two essential elements in all forms of military doctrine: how the military profession thinks about warfare and how it acts when in combat. Without each element, military doctrine would be incomplete. If it were merely how we thought about war, such a doctrine would merely be the unfulfilled wishes of the leadership. If it merely codified how we acted, without having created a theory, it might represent the documentation of mob violence.¹⁴

One starting point in the U.S. armed forces for an understanding of doctrine is the *Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms*, Joint Publication 1-02.¹⁵ According to this authoritative publication, there is [military] doctrine and there is also joint doctrine, a subset of all [military] doctrine. The key to understanding joint doctrine is that it is not joint doctrine until promulgated by the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Joint doctrine applies primarily to that level of warfare which can achieve strategic ends--the strategic and operational-levels of warfare.

Joint doctrine is primarily written for the combatant commanders, the Unified Commanders-in-Chief (CinCs). With the combatant commanders as the customers, and under the Goldwater-Nichols Act, the Services play an extremely important role, but do not have "veto power" over joint doctrine. Generally, the Services train and equip the military, but the Unified CinCs

fight the forces--recognizing the new role of the U.S. Atlantic Command and the special role that U.S. Special Operations Command play in training and/or equipping forces. The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff is the final arbiter of what eventually becomes joint doctrine. Service "input" to joint doctrine is done during the development process via the CinCs Service component, by comments from the Service themselves, and via Service officers assigned to the Joint and CinC staffs. Service and multi-Service doctrine commands and centers play an important role in that process.

Since it is possible that there may be occasions when military Services might desire to cooperate outside of the approval authority of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, provisions have been made for multi-Service doctrine to guide the employment of forces of two or more Services in coordinated action. Multi-Service doctrine is primarily designed for the operational or strategic-levels of warfare. Much of the thinking behind multi-Service doctrine is pre-Goldwater-Nichols.

A good example of cooperation between the Services to form multi-Service doctrine was the development of the AirLand Battle Doctrine. The Army Training and Doctrine Command and Air Force Tactical Air Command started the multi-Service Air-Land Forces Applications Agency in 1975--currently known as the Air-Land-Sea Application Center. Another example of multi-Service doctrine development is at the Center for Low Intensity Conflict, the Army and Air Force focal point for certain categories of military operations other than war. One might conclude that it will only be a matter of time before these types of organizations will be absorbed by the Joint Warfighting Center, but there are other views on the longevity of multi-Service doctrine.

Although one might question the need for multi-Service doctrine in this era of jointness, the two (joint and multi-Service) types of doctrine can coexist and benefit from each other. For the Navy currently, it is far more palatable to develop doctrine in the context of the familiar Navy-Marine Corps team rather than in the new joint environment where the other two Services, the Joint Staff, and all the commanders-in-chief have inputs.

There is obvious concern at multi-Service doctrine centers about their role and long-term viability. There are benefits for retaining such organizations. For example, sponsoring Services retain direct control over the operations of such agencies--generally outside of the formal joint process and without the required participation of the Joint Staff and the staffs from the joint commanders-in-chief. Multi-Service doctrinal activities offer sponsoring Services the ability to directly coordinate their input, generally at a lower level of activity. Also, multi-

Service doctrine offers a mechanism for coordinated doctrinal development in support of the participating Services.

With the formation of the Naval Doctrine Command (NDC), the Navy now has its first centralized command responsible for the publication of doctrine for the fleet. Since NDC is a multi-Service command and its naval doctrine publications bear the signatures of both the Chief of Naval Operations and the Commandant of the Marine Corps, it is obvious that some of the output of the NDC will be multi-Service doctrine. The Navy will simultaneously make NDC the central point of focus for Navy doctrine, while the Marine Corps has a separate doctrine division at the Marine Corps Combat Development Command.

Multi-Service naval doctrine serves as the bridge between higher-level policy documents and strategy and tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTPs). Just as there are some Joint TTPs there will also be some multi-Service naval TTPs dealing with the multi-Service naval environment. Individual Navy and Marine Corps Service-specific TTPs will remain the domain of the individual Services. Multi-Service naval doctrine, therefore, will primarily concern itself with the operational-level of warfare and it will influence both the strategic and tactical-levels. The Navy does not intend that doctrine replace the word tactics nor that naval doctrine extend into the tactical-level of warfare other than to shape and guide multi-Service naval or Navy and Marine Corps individual Service TTPs. Service-unique tactical-level Navy or Marine Corps doctrine exists one level below multi-Service naval doctrine.

Numerous Service documents promulgate Service-unique doctrine for specific tasks and missions. The individual military Services appear to have the primary responsibility for development of tactical-level doctrine but there may be some blurring of lines of responsibility. For example, U.S. Special Operations Command probably develops some tactical-level doctrine for special operations forces. Within the context of joint doctrine, the U.S. Atlantic Command is developing tactical-level doctrine for tactical-level joint task forces. Similarly, Services cannot help but intrude into the operational and even strategic-levels of warfare as they attempt to explain their roles in training and equipping forces. In turn, this means that Service doctrine cannot help but influence joint doctrine.

Service doctrine consistency with joint doctrine is an issue that is bound to be raised in the future, once the Services have fully published their own formal doctrine. At that time, there may be a struggle over inconsistencies, since Service doctrine is not supposed to be inconsistent with joint doctrine. One issue that some Services, in other countries, have had trouble with is which Service doctrine should dominate operations when a second Service is acting in support of another. In the Soviet Union in

the 1970-80s there existed a major literature debate over the role of Long Range Aviation acting in support of the Navy. The essential question was whether Air Force operational art (what they term doctrine) would continue to govern the behavior of specialized aircraft supporting the Navy or should it be naval operational art. Although a system of joint doctrine should preclude problems such as this, these will obviously be debating points while developing such doctrine.

Within each Service, various combat arms have their own individual doctrine; e.g. submarines operate under submarine doctrine, as well as combined arms doctrine where the different combat arms within an individual Service operate in a coordinated fashion; i.e. air, surface, and subsurface operating under a Navy combined arms antisubmarine warfare doctrine.

Since doctrine already accounts for more than one military Service, it should not surprise us that it also has a multinational dimension. The term multinational refers to anything international; i.e. bilateral, regional, global, ad hoc, standing alliances, etc. Multinational doctrine has always been important. During the Cold War, campaigns in and around Europe would have been conducted primarily in accordance with NATO combined doctrine, a multinational form of doctrine, rather than in accordance with any national military doctrine. Combined doctrine is but one type of possible multinational doctrine, although it is the most common. Combined doctrine does not necessarily have to be associated with NATO; indeed combined doctrine exists for other multinational defense arrangements outside of the NATO umbrella; e.g. with South Korea.

Multinational doctrine, in its many possible forms, has an extremely important role to play for the American armed forces. As we respond to crises under the auspices of some international organization, alliance, or ad hoc coalition, we will need some form of multinational doctrine to guide our actions. In the absence of formal multinational doctrine, it is entirely permissible to substitute some form of national military doctrine, including U.S. doctrine, as a temporary surrogate.

Tactical doctrine organizes tactics, techniques, and procedures--it is the "play book" from which tactics are chosen and ordered. Multinational tactical doctrine is created for multinational operations and is normally designed for use by national forces operating in a multinational context. Joint tactical doctrine is created for joint operations and is designed to be used normally by the joint tactical-level commander. Multi-Service tactical doctrine, created by multi-Service commands, such as the Naval Doctrine Command, for multi-Service operations or in support of other multi-Service concerns such as programming, is designed to be used by the individual Service tactical-level commander operating in a multi-Service environment

or in the absence of joint or Service-unique tactical doctrine. Service-specific tactical doctrine exists for use outside of joint or multi-Service environments or in their absence.

As an example of the relationship between tactical doctrine and tactics, the Navy has: (1) the functional antisubmarine warfare doctrine found in the *Allied Antisubmarine Warfare Manual*, Allied Tactical Publication [ATP]-28); the national navy doctrine expressing the relationship between the antisubmarine warfare commander and the overall composite warfare commander found in the *Composite Warfare Commander's Manual* (U) (Naval Warfare Publication [NWP] 10-1); and a variety of navy signals to execute antisubmarine warfare tactics found in the *Allied Maritime Tactical Signal and Maneuvering Book* (ATP-1, Volume II). Tactics is the selection and employment by the navy tactical commander of a particular employment and movement of forces from these three tactical doctrine "play books." The national navy commander routinely operates his task group's movements in accordance with general antisubmarine warfare guidance in ATP 28, signals executed in accordance with ATP-1, while still remaining within a national composite warfare commander structure outlined in NWP 10-1. Indeed, the U.S. Navy has no national joint, multi-Service, or Service counterpart to ATP-1 and thoroughly relies on this NATO tactical doctrine for its contents.

Doctrine provides the basis for commonality and standardization so that different types of forces can work together by building a common understanding and approach to the tasks they are given. The degree of desired standardization and consistency of Service and national doctrines really depends upon the degree of integration of the fighting forces involved. Where two Services routinely operate together, such as segments of the Navy and Marine Corps and Army and Air Force, one would expect to see a high level of standardization on doctrinal issues. Special doctrinal standardization difficulties exist between active component and reserve component ground forces.

When different national ground force units fight together, however, they often do not do so as an integrated whole. For example, ground forces in the Persian Gulf War did not operate under one multinational doctrine. Similarly, in the Pacific theater of World War II, the British Pacific Fleet was given its own area of operations in which they could operate in accordance with their own military doctrine. This model changed sometime after this war and today, British navy forces can operate as an integrated part of NATO fleets commanded by American officers and run in accordance with NATO navy doctrine. Navy forces may have more successful experience than ground forces in fully integrating multinational units to operate as a coherent whole.

Due to the complexity of the different types of doctrine, we must be very specific when discussing the type of military

doctrine to which we refer and, in addition, we may have to specify the level of warfare to which the doctrine applies. Naval doctrine is a form of multi-Service military doctrine that serves as an input to joint, multinational, and Navy and Marine Corps Service-unique doctrine.

Lessons of Navy Doctrine History

There are some excellent lessons to be learned concerning the development of military doctrine by navies in the world. The single most important message is that written navy doctrine has existed in the past--at least since 1270.¹⁶ Navy and multi-Service naval doctrine has existed, under other names, in all navies of the world throughout history. In addition to formal written naval doctrine, of which there is ample abundance, informal and unwritten customary naval doctrine has existed as a shared culture of fundamental principles of thought and actions in the minds of its admirals and commanders.

The following comprises the list of major lessons learned from an initial review of navy doctrine history.¹⁷ First, navies have studied each other's doctrine and borrowed from each other for years--just as we routinely borrow each other's technology. In part, this is what the U.S. Navy did when it learned about aircraft carriers from the Royal Navy and the Royal Navy did when it integrated their carrier force within the U.S. Pacific Fleet in World War II.

Second, important doctrinal lessons can be drawn from history, even from the age of sail. For example, from even a cursory study of the past, it is apparent that major current doctrinal issues have been debated during eras of greatly different technology. These include: (1), what is the principal form of attack; (2), what is the object of the attack--the escorted ships or its escorts; (3), how much of the attacking force should be withheld in reserve; (4), what is more important in defense--the protection of escorted ships (or an invasion force) or the defeat of an enemy's offensive fighting power; (5), how should navies fight in the littoral (most naval warfare has been here); (6), what should the command and control relationships be as naval forces project power ashore; (7), how to integrate allies and ad hoc coalition partners to achieve a single purpose; (8) how far should the combat commander on the scene comply with doctrine issued by bureaucracies ashore; how much should the commander rely upon enemy intentions versus capabilities? These are not new issues, but rather doctrinal issues of how to fight that cross national, geographic, and technology boundaries and have been debated for hundreds of years.¹⁸

Third, formal navy doctrine suffered a setback with the introduction of new technologies and the end of the Anglo-Franco wars during the age of sail. Navy doctrine was developed and frequently refined during the wars between Britain and France over hundreds of years. During the age of sail, there were long periods of warfare with essentially the same technology--hence improvements to navy warfare came via other avenues of advancement, such as in the area of doctrine. Debates over navy doctrine and the existence of written doctrine was normal practice. As navy doctrine advanced, so did combat potential.

From the time of the introduction of the ironclad, navy technology has changed so fast and so often that navies have not had the time to deal with doctrinal issues for forces on hand. Navies turned more of their attention to dealing with improvements to naval art and combat potential by improvements in technologies, programming, rather than how to fight "smarter." Once the wars between Britain and France ended, and the assumed adversary changed to other nations or no specific nation, the perceived need to refine the existing navy doctrine was no longer critical. Perhaps the degree of relative independence afforded navies at sea has contributed to the lack of a recent tradition of doctrinal development in print.

Fourth, pre-war doctrine cannot foresee all eventualities. No matter how well thought out military doctrine is before a war, it is very likely that forces will be used in a manner that has not been anticipated. This results in the primary roles of the combat leader, relative to military doctrine, to know doctrine and follow it and to know when to deviate from doctrine. If the commander chooses to deviate from established standards, he will then know that he has done so and know what that means. Our new Chief of Naval Operations, Admiral Jeremy M. Boorda, USN, made this exact point in an interview published in October 1994.¹⁹

Finally, centralized military doctrine should not be cast in stone and must be subject to the interpretation of local commanders. The operator in the field must be allowed sufficient latitude to use military doctrine to his advantage and to supplement that doctrine with his own best judgment. Inputs from the operators in the field are vital to ensuring that military doctrine does not become "doctrinaire." For any organization to remain doctrinally sound, it must be capable of questioning long-established principles and practices and of incorporating new ideas. When that ability is lost, the organization becomes intolerant and hidebound and doomed to ossify.

In the "Foreword" to *Current Tactical Orders and Doctrine U.S. Pacific Fleet (PAC-10)*, issued in 1943, the fleet Commander-in-Chief (CinC) stated that the document was "...not intended and shall not be construed as depriving any officer exercising

tactical command of initiative in issuing special instructions to his command...the ultimate aim is to obtain essential uniformity without unacceptable sacrifice of flexibility." In the body of *PAC-10*, the CinC further stated that: (1), "it is impractical to provide explicit instructions for every possible combination of task force characteristics and tactical situations;" (2), "attacks of opportunity are necessarily limited by the peculiarities of each situation, by the judgment of subordinate commanders, and by the training they have given their personnel;" and (3), "no single rule can be formulated to fit all contingencies."²⁰ These are good words to live by today as well.

In the "Introduction" of a 1934 book, *Infantry in Battle*, then-Colonel George C. Marshall, director of a collective authors from the Infantry School, stated that the purpose of the book was to: "...give the peace-trained officer something of the viewpoint of the veteran." The book was revised in 1938 and 1939.²¹ In the first chapter, the authors sought to deal with the question of "rules" in war. They stated that:

"The art of war has no traffic with rules, for the infinitely varied circumstances and conditions of combat never produce exactly the same situation twice...in battle, each situation is unique and must be solved on its own merits. It follows, then, that the leader who would become a competent tactician must first close the mind to the alluring formulæ that well-meaning people offer in the name of victory.

Every situation encountered in war is likely to be exceptional. The schematic solution will seldom fit. Leaders who think that blind familiarity with blind rules of thumb will win battles are doomed to disappointment. Those who seek to fight by rote, who memorize an assortment of standard solutions with the idea of applying the most appropriate when confronted by actual combat, walk with disaster."

The U.S. Army has studied the relationship of combat leadership to battlefield success in the tactical sphere of the European theater of World War II.²² The essential element which was found in each of the top-ten rated divisions was the overall superior quality of the division's top leadership. These top-rated leaders showed: (1), a great capacity for independent action; and (2), avoidance of a fixed pattern of action.²³ The previous head of the U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command emphasized that Army doctrine is not prescriptive. The complexities of attempting to deal with the uncertain future made this recently retired general officer less willing to state that their current doctrine is anything more than "as 'nearly right' as it can be."²⁴ Clearly there is a great deal of military and

naval history that supports the view that doctrine should be guidance and not firmly directive.

The Way Ahead

Today, we are witnessing changes in technology as well as the international security environment which will change how navies operate. We are also witnessing a major redirection in government priorities away from the military. The uses of naval forces will change in the future which will, in turn, require different types of hardware for the fleet and Fleet Marine Force. The operating environment may include less public understanding of what we are doing at sea, or with the military in general, and there may be less support for that effort. Under austere fiscal conditions, we may need the military doctrine first to justify why we want to buy various types of weapons systems. Naval doctrine can help us with all of these problems.

Even if we simply focus our initial doctrinal development on current capabilities, before we move on to more advanced concepts of warfare, the shift from open-ocean navy operations to joint littoral warfare will be as traumatic to Western navies as was the shift from the battleship to the aircraft carrier. ...*From the Sea* and the move within the U.S. armed forces to jointness are not business as usual--these are significant and major changes for the Navy. Despite early emphasis on not being perceived as a "revolutionary" organization, the Naval Doctrine Command cannot help but be perceived as such.

The Naval Doctrine Command will first document the naval doctrine of today with the obvious necessity to adjust from open-ocean operations to the joint littoral. Once that is done--no easy task--the next step will be to successfully internalize that doctrine within the fleet. Once the U.S. Navy demonstrates that it accepts formal written doctrine and that it has value, it will then be time to move into the development of doctrine for the future and the inevitable *entree* into the world of programming.

Naval doctrine has consciously avoided being embroiled in roles and missions debates. Doctrine takes from policy, strategy, and campaign concepts, where we will fight and with what resources. Naval doctrine then concentrates on developing ideas about how to fight within those given constraints.

Military doctrine is the starting point from which we develop solutions and options to address the specific warfighting demands and challenges we face in conducting military operations other than war. In a chaotic combat environment, military doctrine has a cohesive effect on our forces. It promotes mutually understood terminology, relationships, responsibilities, and processes, thus freeing the commander to focus on the overall conduct of combat. Military doctrine is conceptual--a shared way

of harmonious thinking that is not directive. Military doctrine guides our actions toward well-defined goals and provides the basis for mutual understanding within and among the Services and the national policy makers.

Naval doctrine is a common cultural perspective of how the naval Services think about war and military operations other than war and how they will act during time of war and military operations other than war. It is a shared way of thinking that is evolving and dynamic while simultaneously attempting to capture that which is enduring. By following naval doctrine, the leader can reduce human variables to a minimum and remain focused on the mission and not be sidetracked by immediate tasks.

Navy doctrine is the art of the admiral.²⁵ It is not an exact science and it primarily exists to support the combat actions and decisions of our flag and commanding officers. "Success in war [has] depended on the admiral's ability to organize a body of ships into a disciplined fleet, capable of obeying his instructions and signals. Only when his fleet was properly organized was he in a position to execute such tactics against the enemy...Nor could the admiral expect wholehearted support for a form of attack of which the captains did not approve or which they did not thoroughly understand."²⁶

Notes

1. E.[lmer] B.[elmont] Potter and Fleet Admiral Chester W. Nimitz, USN, eds., *Sea Power: A Naval History*, Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1960, p. 366-377; Joseph G. Dawson III, "William T. Sampson and Santiago: Blockade, Victory, and Controversy," *Crucible of Empire: The Spanish-American War & its Aftermath*, Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 1993, p. 54-55, 60-62; Harold D. Langley, "Winfield S. Schley and Santiago: A New Look at an Old Controversy," *Crucible of Empire: The Spanish-American War & its Aftermath*, Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 1993, p. 80-81; and Graham A. Cosmas, "Joint Operations in the Spanish-American War," *Crucible of Empire: The Spanish-American War & its Aftermath*, Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 1993, p. 108-110.

2. Lieutenant Commander Dudley W. Knox, USN, "The Rôle of Doctrine in Naval Warfare," U.S. Naval Institute *Proceedings*, 41, no. 2 (March-April 1915): 325-354. In the 1980s, the U.S. Army War College used this paper as part of its assigned readings on the concept of military doctrine. See, *Art of War Colloquium*, Carlisle Barracks, PA: U.S. Army War College, November 1983, p. 41-70.

3. Commander in Chief, U.S. Pacific Fleet, *Current Tactical Orders and Doctrine U.S. Pacific Fleet (PAC-10)*, Cincpac File

Pac-32-tk, A7-3/A-16-3/P, Serial -1338, June 10, 1943, Figure 1 and p. v.

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