[House Hearing, 106 Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
H.R. 1838, THE TAIWAN SECURITY ENHANCEMENT ACT
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MARKUP
BEFORE THE
COMMITTEE ON
INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
ONE HUNDRED SIXTH CONGRESS
FIRST SESSION
__________
Tuesday, October 26, 1999
__________
Serial No. 106-111
__________
Printed for the use of the Committee on International Relations
Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.house.gov/international
relations
______
U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE
64-747 CC WASHINGTON : 2000
COMMITTEE ON INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS
BENJAMIN A. GILMAN, New York, Chairman
WILLIAM F. GOODLING, Pennsylvania SAM GEJDENSON, Connecticut
JAMES A. LEACH, Iowa TOM LANTOS, California
HENRY J. HYDE, Illinois HOWARD L. BERMAN, California
DOUG BEREUTER, Nebraska GARY L. ACKERMAN, New York
CHRISTOPHER H. SMITH, New Jersey ENI F.H. FALEOMAVAEGA, American
DAN BURTON, Indiana Samoa
ELTON GALLEGLY, California MATTHEW G. MARTINEZ, California
ILEANA ROS-LEHTINEN, Florida DONALD M. PAYNE, New Jersey
CASS BALLENGER, North Carolina ROBERT MENENDEZ, New Jersey
DANA ROHRABACHER, California SHERROD BROWN, Ohio
DONALD A. MANZULLO, Illinois CYNTHIA A. McKINNEY, Georgia
EDWARD R. ROYCE, California ALCEE L. HASTINGS, Florida
PETER T. KING, New York PAT DANNER, Missouri
STEVE CHABOT, Ohio EARL F. HILLIARD, Alabama
MARSHALL ``MARK'' SANFORD, South BRAD SHERMAN, California
Carolina ROBERT WEXLER, Florida
MATT SALMON, Arizona STEVEN R. ROTHMAN, New Jersey
AMO HOUGHTON, New York JIM DAVIS, Florida
TOM CAMPBELL, California EARL POMEROY, North Dakota
JOHN M. McHUGH, New York WILLIAM D. DELAHUNT, Massachusetts
KEVIN BRADY, Texas GREGORY W. MEEKS, New York
RICHARD BURR, North Carolina BARBARA LEE, California
PAUL E. GILLMOR, Ohio JOSEPH CROWLEY, New York
GEORGE RADANOVICH, California JOSEPH M. HOEFFEL, Pennsylvania
JOHN COOKSEY, Louisiana
THOMAS G. TANCREDO, Colorado
Richard J. Garon, Chief of Staff
Kathleen Bertelsen Moazed, Democratic Chief of Staff
Hillel Weinberg, Senior Professional Staff Member and Counsel
Jill N. Quinn, Staff Associate
C O N T E N T S
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WITNESSES
Page
Markup of H.R. 1838, The Taiwan Security Enhancement Act......... 1
APPENDIX
Prepared statements:
The Honorable Dana Rohrabacher, a Member of Congress from
California..................................................... 64
H.R. 1838........................................................ 40
Amendment in the nature of a substitute to H.R. 1838, offered by
Mr. Gilman and Mr. Gejdenson................................... 53
H.R. 1838, THE TAIWAN SECURITY ENHANCEMENT ACT
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Tuesday, October 26, 1999
House of Representatives,
Committee on International Relations,
Washington, D.C.
The Committee met, pursuant to notice, at 10:30 a.m. in
room 2172, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Benjamin A.
Gilman (Chairman of the Committee) presiding.
Chairman Gilman. The Committee on International Relations
will come to order. Will Members please take their seats.
The Committee on International Relations meets today in
open session, pursuant to notice, to take up H.R. 1838, the
Taiwan Security Enhancement Act.
This bill was introduced on May 18, by the distinguished
Majority Whip, the gentleman from Texas, Mr. DeLay, and a
bipartisan group of Members, including myself.
It was referred by the Speaker to the Committee on
International Relations and, in addition, to the Committee on
Armed Services, for a period to be determined subsequently by
the Speaker, in each case for consideration of such provisions
as fall within the jurisdiction of the committee concerned.
The Chair lays the bill before the Committee.
The clerk will report the title of the bill.
Ms. Bloomer. H.R. 1838, a bill to assist in the enhancement
of the security of Taiwan, and for other purposes.
Chairman Gilman. Without objection, the first reading of
the bill is dispensed with. The clerk will read the bill for
amendment.
Ms. Bloomer. Be it enacted by the Senate and House of
Representatives of the United States of America in Congress
assembled, this Act may be cited as the----
Chairman Gilman. Without objection, the bill is considered
as having been read.
[The information referred to appears in the appendix.]
Chairman Gilman. I have an amendment in the nature of a
substitute at the desk. The clerk will report the amendment in
the nature of a substitute.
Ms. Bloomer. Amendment in the Nature of a Substitute
offered by Mr. Gilman for himself and Mr. Gejdenson. Strike all
after the enacting clause and insert the following:
Chairman Gilman. I ask unanimous consent that the amendment
in the nature of a substitute be considered as having been read
and is open to amendment at any time.
Without objection, so ordered.
[The information referred to appears in the appendix.]
Chairman Gilman. I will now recognize myself to speak
briefly to the amendment in the nature of a substitute.
I am pleased to bring this measure before the Committee
today for consideration. I want to thank the Majority Whip, Mr.
DeLay of Texas, for introducing this legislation. I am also
appreciative of the cooperation between the staffs of the
Majority and the Minority and their work. We want to thank the
Senate Committee staff, particularly Mr. Doran on Foreign
Relations for his hard work in crafting this bill.
Along with Members of this body, I am increasingly
concerned about China's security policy and military
modernization efforts, including its burgeoning missile
deployment opposite Taiwan, the purchase of advanced Russian
fighters and submarines, Beijing's outright refusal to renounce
the use of force against Taiwan, its overwrought saber
rattling, and the deleterious effect all of this has had on
regional stability.
We are also equally troubled by the Clinton
Administration's handling of Taiwan policy in general,
including the pressure it has unwisely placed on Taipei to come
to interim agreements with the PRC regarding unification; its
unwillingness to sell some defensive weapons systems to Taiwan,
irrespective of China's military advances; its talk of a
strategic partnership with Beijing, the Three No's; and the
consequences these misguided actions have for peace and
stability in the region.
The United States should, without question, continue to
steadfastly meet its security commitments to Taipei as
stipulated in the 1979 Taiwan Relations Act. This means
assisting Taiwan in maintaining the balance of power across the
Taiwan Strait in the face of the PRC's unprecedented military
buildup. A failure to meet Taiwan's legitimate defense needs
will make China's military dominance of the Taiwan Strait a
reality. This would not be a welcome development in that part
of the world.
A failure to provide for Taiwan's legitimate defense needs
could lead to Beijing's misunderstanding of American interests,
foster perceptions of Taiwanese defense vulnerability, increase
the likelihood of Chinese miscalculation, and could ultimately
lead to a conflict with our Nation over its adventurism.
Ensuring and enhancing Taiwan's ability to defend itself
increases the prospects for continued peace and stability in
Northeast Asia and also supports our national interests.
The Congress, in the absence of decisive Administration
action, must act to make clear to Beijing that our Nation will
continue its long-standing commitment to a peaceful resolution
of the Taiwan issue. Accordingly, I support this legislation's
efforts to enhance Taiwan's self-defense capability.
I am proud to be a cosponsor of the legislation. It has an
impressive array of cosponsors on both sides of the aisle, and
we look forward to bringing it to the Floor for consideration
at an early date.
Those of you who have been following this bill know that
the sponsors have been working diligently to accommodate the
various concerns that have been expressed. Over a period of
months, we have worked with Mr. Bereuter, Mr. Cox, and other
independent Members to refine the language in the bill.
In addition, we have worked with Mr. Gejdenson and his
staff to come up with the amendment in the nature of a
substitute that is now before the Members of this Committee.
Mr. Gejdenson and I are pleased to offer the amendment
which we believe represents a consensus position within our
Committee regarding the future direction of U.S. security
relations with Taiwan. The amendment preserves the essence of
the bill as introduced. It no longer refers to sales of any
specific weapons systems to Taiwan, but in other respects it is
at least as strong, or stronger, than the bill as initially
introduced.
It continues to mandate that extra positions be reserved
for Taiwanese officers at U.S. military schools, that secure
direct communications be established between our Nation and
Taiwanese militaries for coordination in the event of a crisis,
and that the Congress be kept fully and currently informed of
the status of arms sales requests from Taiwan.
Mr. Gejdenson and I believe the amendment in the nature of
a substitute will meaningfully enhance the security of both our
Nation and of Taiwan. We strongly urge its adoption.
Do any Members seek recognition?
Mr. Gejdenson.
Mr. Gejdenson. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. At the conclusion
of my remarks, I am going to request that Stanley Roth, the
Assistant Secretary, be given an opportunity, if it is OK with
the Chairman, to express his concerns.
Mr. Bereuter. Would the gentleman yield?
Mr. Gejdenson. I will yield.
Mr. Bereuter. I wonder if I might be allowed, as a
Subcommittee Chairman, to make my remarks before Mr. Roth comes
forward.
Mr. Gejdenson. Without any doubt.
Chairman Gilman. Without objection.
Mr. Bereuter. Thank you.
Mr. Gejdenson. Obviously, any other Member I think who
would want to speak first, and then we would hear from the
Administration.
I disagree with the Administration's conclusion, but I
think they ought to have a chance to be heard. It is clear to
me that, as in many parts of the world, there is a constant
tension between democratic forces and nondemocratic forces. In
my time in Congress, there was a time when Taiwan's
representatives and people concerned about Taiwan could come to
me and I would feel no great need to speak out on their behalf,
because for a long time, Taiwan did not have democratic
institutions. But today, on the island of Taiwan, we have a
government that is a full-fledged democracy with opposition,
with opposition press, and it is confronted by the largest
totalitarian state in the world. I believe that Americans ought
to stand up very squarely in favor of these democratic
institutions.
Now, I understand the Administration's concerns that
somehow this is going to enrage the Mainland and they will do
something foolish. I think it would be a very foolish mistake
for the Mainland to recognize our commitment to democratic
institutions and our opposition to tyranny as an excuse for
some kind of military adventurism.
The Congress of the United States, I think, reflects the
feeling of the American people that Taiwan has gone from being
a nondemocratic nation to a democratic nation, to a nation that
has free and open debates, and that ought to be the model for
the Mainland, and not the reverse. It ought not be Taiwan that
has to mimic the kind of tyranny that exists today, everyday,
on the Mainland of China.
I believe the work the Chairman and others on this
Committee have done on this resolution brings forward a
balanced resolution that is not provocative but clearly states
America's concern for the democratic people and the democratic
institutions on the island of Taiwan. If the Mainland wants to
have that kind of support in Congress, it seems to me that they
can begin a process of establishing at least a minimum respect
for human life, to stop trafficking in organs of murdered
prisoners, and to start developing the democratic institutions
that are clearly the direction for the planet.
So I support the legislation and commend the Chairman for
his efforts.
Chairman Gilman. Thank you, Mr. Gejdenson.
Mr. Bereuter.
Mr. Bereuter. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I have some remarks that I hope my colleagues will follow,
and that I hope, presumptuously, might provide some
enlightenment here.
I think in my years here, except for legislation I have
introduced, I have not spent more time on any other bill than
on this legislation. I think that what we are doing here today
is very important. I think it is the most significant action,
in the foreign policy sense, that this Committee will take this
year.
I think that one should not underestimate the sensitivity
of U.S.-China relations when it comes to Taiwan, or the
complexity and sensitivity of the relationship between the PRC
and Taiwan. Those relationships, in combination, are very
complex and problematic.
I came to Congress in 1979. A couple of months later, we
passed the Taiwan Relations Act. I was not a Member of this
Committee in my first or second term, but I do remember, of
course, that there was a Democratic majority in both Houses of
Congress and that the Carter Administration was in power. Yet
Congress, on a bipartisan basis, decided it was important to
enunciate its policy with respect to Taiwan. We had, as a
result, in early 1979, the passage of the Taiwan Relations Act
over the objections of the Carter Administration.
There is an extraordinary degree of support in this country
for Taiwan. We have great respect and admiration for the
advances that they have made in democracy and, of course, for
their economic development as well. But we are particularly
impressed with the changes that have taken place with regard to
democracy in that country. It is the American policy that we
expect any reunification of Taiwan with the PRC only by
peaceable means. That is enunciated clearly, of course, in the
Taiwan Relations Act.
There is, I would say--and we need to be candid about
this--a high degree of scepticism about the Clinton
Administration and their handling of Taiwanese issues. We are
probably at a low point in our relationship with the People's
Republic of China in recent years. After spending a lot of time
with Mr. Cox and Mr. DeLay, and some time with the Chairman,
certainly a lot with his staff, I feel that the substitute
offered by the Chairman and the Ranking Member answers most of
the concerns that I had enunciated--not all of them, but most
of them. I want to review some of those concerns to tell you
why I think this is significant.
I thought that the original legislation was flawed in many
ways. In fact, it was factually inappropriate at times. If
Members have availed themselves of some of the most highly
classified briefing materials, they would understand that
certain aspects of the previous bill were not appropriate and,
in fact, would create additional problems.
We have had a security agreement with Taiwan since 1954
that was, in large part, mostly reversed with the passage of
the Taiwan Relations Act. There was a legitimate concern on the
part of the Administration that the Chinese would think that we
were, and in fact we were, trying to reimplement the Security
Agreement of 1954. I think that we have made revisions, through
the Chairman's substitute, which incorporate a lot of my
effort, and the efforts of other Members as well, to eliminate
reasonable attitudes that we are returning to the 1954
Securities Act. The findings sections, in my judgment, are
factual now.
I want to call Members' attention specifically to pages 5
and 6, where we have subsections 15, 16, and 17. I admit a
heavy hand in introducing these arrangements and these
findings. They were not a part of the original act, although
inherently they were a part of some of them.
I want to call my colleagues' attention to something Mr.
Hastings and I witnessed when we were members of Speaker
Gingrich's visit to the East Asia region. It was his first trip
to that region and his first trip as Speaker. It was a
bipartisan group, and you could, for example, ask Mr. Hastings,
or the senior Democrat, Mr. Dingell, about what I am going to
say. But I think that, despite all of the criticisms that some
of my colleagues have had with the Speaker, it was generally
thought that his visit to Asia was quite a success, that he
said some things that needed to be said, and that they were
appropriate in clarifying American policy.
For example, when we met with President Jiang Zemin, the
Speaker said, based upon a resolution that the House had
passed, that if China attacks Taiwan, the U.S. will come to
Taiwan's defense.
Now, we have been accustomed to receiving a tirade on
Taiwan from the PRC's highest officials for years, and we
expected an hour and a half tirade there. However, President
Jiang simply said, ``We don't intend to attack,'' and we went
on to other things.
Then when we visited Taipei a few days later, the Speaker
said to President Lee that Taiwan should understand that the
U.S. expects Taiwan not to take provocative actions for Taiwan
domestic reasons. The message was very clear at that time. That
was an appropriate kind of clarity, eliminating some ambiguity
on where the Congress of the United States at least, stood.
You will see in section 15, subsection 15 on page 5, it
says, and I am going to read this just so it is brought clearly
to your attention, ``It is in the national interest of the
United States to eliminate ambiguity and convey with clarity
continued United States support for Taiwan, its people, and
their ability to maintain their democracy free from coercion
and their society free from the use of force against them. Lack
of clarity could lead to unnecessary misunderstandings or
confrontations between the United States and the People's
Republic of China, with great consequences for the security of
the Western Pacific region.''
Then, in section 16 it does go into the possible
consequences of an ambiguity and the lack of clarity and
suggests that that was one of the reasons, perhaps the primary
reason, why the PRC, after President Lee's visit to the United
States, conducted military exercises, including live fire
exercises and two missile shots off the coast of Taipei.
Section 17 suggests where the Administration had made a
significant error in judging the attitude of the American
people and the Congress about our view that a person should be
able to return for honors to their alma mater. The Chinese,
given the assurance that President Lee would not be given a
visa, found that the Administration changed the view and issued
the visa, bringing about a confrontation that was dangerous.
I want to call your attention also to two of the areas
where originally it was said, I think with cause, that we were
returning to the 1954 mutual security agreement. Changes have
been made in that area, and I think have answered those
concerns wholly or largely.
Section 3, pages 6 and 7, relates to the training of
Taiwanese military officers. This is substantially different
from the original version, and I do want to call to my
colleagues' attention the fact that Taiwan receives as large an
allocation of slots in our military schools as any of our
allies. When we call for additional positions, we say ``make
every effort to reserve additional positions.'' I do not agree
with that. I thought it should have been worded slightly
differently.
We can expect Israel, Greece, and other countries to come
and say that they should have their quotas enlarged. All of
that will come out of American personnel who are not receiving
that training at West Point, Annapolis, or the Air Force
Academy. So I do point that out to you. But we have changed
this substantially. We do not talk about exchanges between
general officers and other similar issues in this substitute
version by the Chairman and the Ranking Member.
The other section that was particularly problematic and
suggested we might be returning to the 1954 security agreement
is related to communications. In section 5(d) on page 10, this
has been modified, but it does, in fact, include, and will
cause concern there is no doubt about it, an assurance
certifying to the four appropriate committees in Congress that
direct, secure communication exists between the armed forces of
the United States and armed forces of Taiwan. That is not
exactly how I would have written it, but it is a substantial
change and improvement in that respect.
Finally, I wanted to say that one of my concerns, and the
reason I have been, frankly, doing everything I could to delay
this legislation until we could make amendments, modifications
such as this substitute, is that I did not want to give the
Chinese an excuse for failing to reach an agreement with the
United States on WTO accession. Nor, frankly, I would say to my
Democratic colleagues, did I want to give the President an
excuse saying that Republicans were responsible by pushing this
legislation, and, therefore, the President failed to get a WTO
accession agreement.
The President should have agreed to Premier Zhu Rongji's
commercially viable offer in April. He ignored the advice of
his substantive advisors and went with his political advisors,
allegedly because of concerns that would be brought to the
attention and focus and front line again on Chinese espionage
and on alleged contributions from Chinese entities to his
presidential campaign. I believe that Congress would have given
permanent NTR after considerable debate, and continue to
believe that we should. But I think now it is clear that we are
not going to have a WTO accession agreement between the United
States and China, I say regretfully, before November 30, when
the new multilateral trade round begins in Seattle.
Since Congress is about to adjourn, if we are going to take
action on the Taiwan Security Enhancement Act, we have delayed
it to the point where the excuse by the Administration that
this action by us today, or on the House Floor later, is
responsible for the failure of the Chinese and the U.S. to get
together on a WTO accession agreement won't wash.
I thank my colleagues for listening, and I appreciate the
extra time, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Gilman. Thank you, Mr. Bereuter, and you got a
little extra time because you did not have the opportunity to
take it up in Subcommittee.
Mr. Lantos.
Mr. Lantos. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I have a great deal of difficulty with this piece of
legislation.
Let me stipulate at the outset that I welcome some of the
changes which the authors have incorporated, because they make
specific provisions of the proposed legislation somewhat less
objectionable. But I still believe that this is a piece of
legislation which is unneeded, counterproductive, and while it
does have some Democratic support, I don't think it is quite
accurate to refer to it as a bipartisan piece of legislation.
As the Ranking Democrat on the Asia Subcommittee, I have chosen
not to support the legislation, and I would like to explain
why.
The fundamental underlying assumption of this legislation
is that the Taiwan Relations Act is not working, it needs to be
fixed, and this is the way to fix it. Precisely the opposite is
true. The Taiwan Relations Act has worked extremely well for 20
years, it is working well today, and I believe that this
legislation was fundamentally crafted for partisan political
reasons and not because the objective conditions surrounding
our relations with Taiwan, China, or any other area in Asia
required it.
Let me be specific. Several of my colleagues have spoken
with high praise concerning the elimination of ``ambiguity.'' I
trust I need not remind anyone that the use of creative
ambiguity is as old as diplomacy itself, and to eliminate
ambiguity is not a virtue. To eliminate ambiguity creates
rigidities which the very fluid nature of this issue clearly
does not call for.
Now, I probably have developed, over the last 2 decades,
the reputation of being one of Taiwan's strongest supporters in
this body, and I am very proud to have that reputation. I am
somewhat amused that the amended proposal and my colleague's
observations--Mr. Bereuter's observations--refer to legislation
that I introduced in this body on page 6, point 17.
This is what the improved version says: ``An earlier
consequence of such ambiguity and lack of clarity was the
expressed surprise by the People's Republic of China that
Congress and the American people fully supported President Lee
Teng-hui's private visit to his alma mater, Cornell University,
necessitating House Concurrent Resolution 53, approved by the
House of Representatives by a vote of 390-to-0 on May 2, 1995,
and by the Senate by a vote of 97-to-1 on May 19, 1995, which
stated such support explicitly.''
Mr. Chairman, I would appreciate you turning off the light.
If the Chairman of the Asia Subcommittee could speak without
time limit, I wish to do so as well.
Chairman Gilman. Mr. Lantos, we gave extra time to Mr.
Bereuter because his Subcommittee----
Mr. Ackerman. Mr. Speaker, parliamentary inquiry.
Chairman Gilman. Will the gentleman withhold?
The Subcommittee did not have an opportunity to take it
before the Subcommittee. We have quite a bit of discussion on
this this morning, and I will extend to you an extra minute.
Please try to be brief.
Mr. Lantos. Mr. Chairman, I want to remind you that the--.
Mr. Bereuter. Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Rohrabacher. Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Gilman. Mr. Rohrabacher.
Mr. Rohrabacher. I would ask unanimous consent to give Mr.
Lantos an extra 2 minutes.
Mr. Ackerman. Mr. Chairman, parliamentary inquiry.
Chairman Gilman. The gentleman has a parliamentary inquiry.
Please state it.
Mr. Ackerman. My parliamentary inquiry is, should not the
Ranking Member of that same Subcommittee through which this
legislation escaped without notice also be granted the same
amount of time as the Republican nonpartisan Chairman?
Chairman Gilman. It is not a proper parliamentary inquiry.
I will be pleased to extend additional time to the gentleman
from California, Mr. Lantos.
Mr. Lantos. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
When I read on the front page of the New York Times that
the Administration was denying the President of Taiwan a visit
to his alma mater, I went through the roof, because I do not
view this country as a place where a distinguished leader of an
important country who received his Ph.D. at Cornell and is
reinvited to Cornell to receive an honorary doctorate should
not be allowed to enter the United States and visit his alma
mater. I was delighted to see that my colleagues, by a vote of
390-to-0, agreed with my position. This was very helpful,
because it pointed out to the Chinese that the Administration
has limits as to what it can agree to, and the Congress has a
voice in determining our policy vis-a-vis Taiwan, China, or any
other place.
Now, I have no doubt in my mind that the genesis of this
legislation is politically designed to embarrass the
Administration, which I don't think is an objective which is in
the national interest. If I felt that there would be a need for
fixing the Taiwan Relations Act, I would be happy to support
provisions to strengthen it. I believe that this legislation
makes the Taiwan Relations Act less effective. It mandates
making private military discussions between Taiwan and
ourselves public. It mandates reports that are unneeded,
redundant, unnecessary, and I believe it dramatically
circumscribes the flexibility needed by this, or any future
Administration, in conducting our foreign policy in this
unbelievably delicate arena of U.S.-China-Taiwan relations.
My hope, Mr. Chairman--and I realize I may be on the
nonprevailing side--my hope is that, both here and on the
Floor, we will have a full discussion and debate on this issue.
My commitment to Taiwan's security is unshakeable. We have
made that clear. We mobilized the fleet to make that clear, and
that mobilization had my full support. But I believe that we
are in danger of expressing positions which undermine our
ability to conduct U.S. foreign policy. This piece of
legislation does not stand by itself. We are not paying our
United Nations' dues. We are attempting to undo the
Antiballistic Missile Treaty. We are now creating an
unnecessary new problem with the Chinese. We have plenty of
problems with the Chinese, many of them, most of them of their
own making. But I believe that this piece of legislation is
ill-advised, unneeded, and politically motivated, and I shall
vote against it.
Chairman Gilman. The gentleman's time has expired.
Mr. Salmon.
Mr. Salmon. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I appreciate the
opportunity to speak.
First of all, I would like to congratulate the Chairman of
the Subcommittee for working diligently to improve the language
in this piece of legislation. But I would also like to
associate myself with the comments of the gentleman from
California, Mr. Lantos.
I think that I, for one, agree with your statement that
when it comes to Taiwan's security your credentials are
impeccable and nobody would ever question your commitment to
peace in that region.
I also have to wonder aloud, though, at the rationale for
this piece of legislation at this time. I think that, while it
is improved, I agree with Mr. Lantos that I believe that the
upshot of passage of this legislation would actually be
counterproductive, and I have been instructed by various
Members of the Committee staff that Taiwan's TECRO has not
asked for this legislation, so I have to wonder what the
motives behind the legislation at this particular time are as
well.
Mr. Lantos, you have your speculation, I hope that is not
the case, but I cannot understand the rationale at this given
point in time. When the relationship in that region, with the
bilateral relationship with China at an all-time low, I think
that we have a responsibility to do everything that we can,
first, to try to bolster that relationship, not giving away
anything. I think that my support of Taiwan--every time that we
have had a vote supporting Taiwan's defense, our alliance with
Taiwan, in the 5 years that I have been here, I have been there
every single time. On your measure to let Lee Teng-Hui visit
his alma mater, I was there. I have been there every single
time. I was a missionary in Taiwan from 1977 to 1979. I love
those people. This is not about support or no support of
Taiwan. This is about common sense, and this is the wrong time
for this piece of legislation.
I really believe that the Administration will raise some
valid points. This comes at a time when I think we could push
things over the edge. I have been in repeated conversations
with TECRO, as well as the Chinese embassy. They have all
assured me that there is no threat of China attacking Taiwan
unless Taiwan out and out votes for independence, and I do not
think that is going to happen. But I will go back and say that
I think that, as Mr. Bereuter mentioned with the Speaker's
trip, we have to be frank with both sides.
When I went to China 6 months ago to visit Tibet and to
work on issues regarding His Holiness the Dalai Lama and Jiang
Zemin, to try to get the two to talk and work toward a peaceful
resolution there, the issue came up of support for Taiwan. I
told the Minister of Foreign Affairs in China that our support
of Taiwan is unequivocal. If they attack Taiwan, we would be
their defender.
I think that the Taiwan Relations Act is clear. It is not
necessary to change it at this time. It has worked well for the
last 20 years, and I think that this is counterproductive. But
at the same time, while we tell our friends in China that if
they attack Taiwan we are there to defend, we also need to be
plain-spoken with the President of Taiwan and tell him to not
make irresponsible comments and talk about a state-to-state
relationship. That does not foster a positive trilateral
relationship, so we have to be forthright with both sides.
I congratulate you, Mr. Lantos. I thought I was going to be
a pariah here today. I appreciate the fact that I think like
you, because I have immense respect for your command of foreign
policy. I intend also to vote against this bill, not because I
don't support Taiwan, but because I do.
Thank you.
Chairman Gilman. Mr. Brown.
Mr. Brown. Mr. Chairman, thank you.
While I am pleased this Committee is considering
legislation to better enable the people of Taiwan to defend
themselves from outside aggression, I think we all recognize
the long-term solution to solving this problem is not whether
we give them more bombs or more tanks or more missiles. After
all, Taiwan has the best security guarantee in the world, that
being the U.S. 7th fleet, our hoard of intercontinental
bombers, the 7,000 or so nuclear warheads at our disposal, and,
as the news events of the last day have shown, the assistance
of a $280 billion U.S. defense budget.
Because, regardless of how many times the White House tells
China's dictators it respects the so-called ``One China''
policy, the realities of the Taiwan Relations Act, the law of
the land, require us to come to Taiwan's aid if it is attacked
by China. So, no matter how many threats the PRC makes, no
matter how many missiles it shoots across the Straits of
Taiwan, or no matter how many ships or planes it buys from
Russia, the simple fact is that a Chinese attack against Taiwan
would be, under U.S. law, the same as attacking the United
States.
But if we keep telling China's dictators that we support
their claim to Taiwan, if we keep telling them it is OK not to
renounce using force against Taiwan, then we are creating a
monster.
Mr. Chairman, I support H.R. 1838. However, while I
appreciate the effort that you, Ranking Member Gejdenson, and
Mr. Bereuter have put into this legislation, I think we know
that the best way to help Taiwan is not by reaffirming our
commitment to its security or instructing the White House to
give it missiles and ships. If we really want to guarantee the
long-term health and security of Taiwan, and the thousands of
our servicemen and servicewomen that are serving in East Asia,
we need, then, to recognize the obvious, and quit alienating
Taiwan from the international community simply because China
says it is not a state.
Taiwan's 22 million people have built a thriving,
prosperous democracy that respects the rule of law and the
human and political freedoms of its people. Its economy, as we
know, is one of the most advanced in the world, and by every
measure it should qualify that nation for membership in the
World Trade Organization, the World Health Organization, and a
variety of other international organizations.
Despite all of Taiwan's qualifications for statehood, and
despite the reality that its people do not want to live under
the autocratic rule of China's Communist masters, we still
cannot bring ourselves to face the obvious. Not because we do
not think that Taiwan deserves to be a state, but because in
this institution and in the Administration we too often cater
to a regime that shows nothing but contempt for internationally
recognized human political rights and for the rule of law. Many
of the same Members of Congress, including the prime sponsor of
this bill, who speak out strongly for arms to Taiwan, turn
around and lead the charge and twist the arms of Members, then
turn around and lead the charge and twist the arms of Members
to support Most Favored Nation status for China.
With that, Mr. Chairman, I urge my colleagues to support
H.R. 1838, but I also urge that we throw the One China policy
in the scrap heap of Cold War ideals, and quit affording
China's dictators more rights than we do our sister democracy
in Taiwan.
Chairman Gilman. Thank you, Mr. Brown.
Mr. Rohrabacher.
Mr. Rohrabacher. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
I rise in strong support of the Taiwan Security Enhancement
Act. I disagree, and strongly disagree, with my good friend,
Mr. Lantos, and I find his analysis to be serious and not at
all delusional.
So, with that said, Mr. Chairman, the Taiwan Security
Enhancement Act sends a necessary signal to Beijing, and to the
Executive Branch, that the Congress supports the Republic of
China and Taiwan. Indeed, if those in the Administration
responsible for implementing the original Taiwan Relations Act
had performed their responsibilities in good faith, the Taiwan
Security Enhancement Act would not be necessary. Unfortunately,
the Executive Branch's major concern in dealing with Taiwan's
security requirements has been, and seems to be, keeping China
happy, even if that means denying Taipei items that are deemed,
even by our own military, to be necessary for Taiwan's
security, even though, as we know, the Taiwan Relations Act
makes that perfectly acceptable, and it is part of the
agreement to provide defensive weapons systems to Taiwan.
The PRC now refuses to renounce the use of force, and in
recent years has built up its military forces, particularly its
ballistic missiles aimed at Taiwan. It is the Communist Chinese
who are threatening military action and, thus, threatening
world peace. We need to restate and reconfirm our determination
to see that Taiwan has what it legitimately needs as an
adequate defense and, thus, an adequate deterrent.
We ask for trouble when America is ambiguous. If we are
ambiguous on this point, we send a wrong message to
decisionmakers of a very powerful country who may be hostile to
our own interests, and are certainly hostile to what we view as
what is necessary for peace in the Pacific. Unless Taiwan has a
credible self defense capability, as envisioned by the Taiwan
Relations Act, we are promoting instability, and increasing the
chances that Beijing will employ force against Taiwan which
will drag in the United States to a conflict that we do not
need to have, and we do not want to have.
This is why I support the Gilman amendment to this bill.
There are several provisions in this bill that address our lack
of contact with Taiwan's military. Although mechanisms exist
for making arms sales and providing Taiwan intelligence within
the framework of our unofficial relationship, there has never
been a provision for assisting Taiwan's military on operational
matters and field training exercises. The Department of State
and others in the Administration forbid such contact. This bill
seeks to remedy that shortcoming.
The same is true for direct communication links. Direct
communication between Taiwan and CINCPAC is not a political
question but a military necessity. This bill will open up those
vital communications links that could save American lives in
the future.
For example, this bill, on page 9, opens up contact with
``senior'' American officers with their Taiwanese counterparts.
Today, our generals and admirals cannot work together with the
Taiwanese, with their Taiwanese counterparts, to develop plans
which will serve as a deterrent to Chinese Communist military
action. They should be developing plans, because that deterrent
is important to save American lives and maintain peace.
Much the same is true in the area of missile defense. The
leaders in Beijing are particularly agitated by the idea that
we might provide Taiwan's military with information on military
launches headed in their direction. Well, why shouldn't the
Taiwan military get this data about incoming missiles? For
Pete's sake, if the Chinese were sending missiles in that
direction, they have already broken the peace, and why can't
the United States play a role in providing this vital
information, thus ensuring that there is a deterrent to that
type of action on the part of China? The only answer that the
Administration can give us is that they are afraid that
Communist China will be upset if we make that our policy.
America needs to clearly state our positions and our
commitments concerning the Republic of China on Taiwan, and
what we intend to do, or not to do, in the Pacific. The Taiwan
Security Enhancement Act does just that, and is a reminder to
our own officials and to Beijing that U.S. policy, as
determined by the Taiwan Relations Act, is to be crafted by
both the Administration and the Congress. Congress needs to
play a role and not just leave this up to the Executive Branch.
I urge my colleagues to support the bill, which will push
American policy toward a more realistic stance to address most
of the serious challenges we confront in the Pacific today, or
the most serious challenge, I should say, that we confront in
the Pacific, and perhaps the world.
[The statement of Mr. Rohrabacher appears in the appendix.]
Chairman Gilman. Thank you, Mr. Rohrabacher. The
gentleman's time has expired.
Mr. Berman.
Mr. Berman. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. I do want to
commend you and Mr. Gejdenson, and Mr. Bereuter, for your work
on the substitute. I think you have put together a better piece
of legislation.
But I do want to take some objection to your opening
statement, because as you lauded the bipartisan consensus that
exists behind this revised piece of legislation, you made an
attack on the Administration that I don't think was well-
founded, in point of fact, and could have been straight from
Republican Congressional Campaign Committee talking points, to
essentially try and set up a political issue for the next
election campaign. That is a serious charge, but I say it with
some consideration and with the belief that it is really true.
We can't put together these bipartisan initiatives and then
watch people try to use those initiatives to launch into
partisan-based attacks. It doesn't augur well for the future of
bipartisan work on foreign policy.
Mr. Chairman, when you say in your opening statement that
the Administration forced and pushed Taiwan to reach some
specific agreement with China, what is the specific agreement?
What fundamental interest of Taiwan's did the Administration
push Taiwan to agree to with the Chinese? If you are going to
make the allegation, then justify it with some specificity. It
is a very serious charge. We are owed, the public is owed, the
Administration is owed, an explanation of what the thinking is.
Chairman Gilman. Will the gentleman yield?
You will recall in my statement I said it is pressure that
was unwisely placed on Taipei with regard to unification,
unwillingness to sell some defensive weapons systems to Taiwan,
irrespective of China's military advances. It was talk of a
strategic partnership with Beijing, and the Three No's, and the
consequences.
Mr. Berman. Mr. Chairman, you have left out a part of your
statement. You said in your statement, put undue pressure on
the Taiwanese to reach agreements, to reach certain agreements
with the Chinese. I want to know what agreements we asked them
to----
Chairman Gilman. If the gentleman will yield, the language
that I used was the Administration's handling of Taiwan policy
in general, including the pressure it has unwisely placed on
Taipei to come to interim agreements.
Mr. Berman. Yes. Which agreements?
Chairman Gilman. Then I went on to indicate some of those
agreements.
Mr. Berman. No, you didn't. You went on to indicate other
issues with Taiwan policy.
But my point is, while there is no doubt that this
Administration encouraged strong cross-straits dialogue and the
effort to achieve agreements that Taiwan would consider to be
in their interest, I am unaware of any specific agreement or
concession that this Administration asked Taiwan to make in the
context of negotiating agreements with the Chinese.
In a way, the gentleman from Ohio raised the right issue.
This resolution seeks to reaffirm that which I think most
people know, and the Speaker articulated very clearly back in
1996 in Beijing, that the United States is prepared to support
Taiwan should it come under attack.
What the gentleman from Ohio seeks to do is to
fundamentally challenge the One China policy. If that is the
goal here, then why not say that is the goal, instead of making
into a contentious partisan issue that which, I think, there is
a broad consensus to agree with.
I am going to read something the Administration probably
would not like to hear, but it is from the L.A. Times, dated
July 24, 1999, and I have never heard any disassociation of it:
``Over the past 3 years,'' Jim Mann writes in this issue of the
L.A. Times, ``the Clinton Administration has quietly forged an
extensive military relationship with Taiwan, authorizing the
Pentagon to conduct the kind of strategic dialogue with
Taiwan's armed forces that had not been permitted by any
previous Administration since 1979''--and if I recall, that is
two Reagan Administrations and one Bush Administration--
``according to U.S. and Taiwanese sources.''
The fact that some things aren't done with all of the
public fanfare that they might be done with, all U.S. policy
doesn't have to be Rohrabacher in a China shop.
Mr. Rohrabacher. Would the gentleman yield?
Mr. Berman. I would be happy to yield.
Mr. Rohrabacher. I think that this is an excellent point.
Again, even though I disagree with it, it is not delusional.
Let me just say to my good friend, we have a difference in
approach of how to maintain the peace.
Mr. Berman. I know.
Mr. Rohrabacher. In fact, what you just stated, I think, is
a formula for war with Communist China. Here we are
strengthening our ties below the visual level, while giving a
different impression to the Communist Chinese decisionmakers in
Beijing. There is no excuse for that type of policy. That
leaves them with the wrong impression of where we stand, and
could lead to conflict, couldn't it?
Mr. Berman. The fact is, though, as Chairman Bereuter
mentioned, as has been clear from press statements, as is clear
in our response to the missile crisis back in 1996, to that
which Mr. Lantos talked about, the U.S. interest in not letting
China threaten Taiwan's existence, I think, has been pretty
clear, and I don't think----
Mr. Rohrabacher. But what you just described is--.
Chairman Gilman. The gentleman's time has expired.
Mr. Berman. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Gilman. Mr. Campbell.
Mr. Campbell. Thanks, Mr. Chairman.
I have a few words, but before I do--so don't slam the
gavel down when I am done--but I have a parliamentary inquiry
to know the following: What I am tending toward is that, if I
have to vote on this, I will vote yes, but that I would rather
we not bring it up. So I am going to ask you and your counsel,
what is the correct parliamentary procedure for me to make a
motion, and at what time, to what we would say is move to table
or to postpone? Could I yield to the Chairman to inform me how
I would make such a motion and at what time?
Chairman Gilman. We will take that under advisement, and we
will discuss it with our Parliamentarian.
Mr. Campbell. All right. Let me reclaim my time, and I will
try to get counsel to find out how to do that.
Here is my take. I think it is essential that we be clear
that if Mainland China attacks Taiwan, we defend Taiwan. I
think there is an element of uncertainty on that point right
now in the following setting: If the attack comes following a
unilateral declaration of independence by Taiwan, it is
ambiguous, by my lights, whether the United States defends
Taiwan. Incidentally, I base that on the talks that we had, Mr.
Chairman, when I was privileged to travel with you to Asia this
summer, and that is the impression I got from talking with
leaders of other states in the region.
I would like to make that very clear, that whatever the
premise for an attack by Mainland China on Taiwan, we defend
Taiwan, even if that is in response to unilateral declaration.
Mr. Delahunt. Would the gentleman yield for just a second?
Mr. Campbell. I will be happy to yield, if you make it very
short.
Mr. Delahunt. I think that is a very good question, and I
think we should be very clear, because this is of such grave
consequence. The language on page 6, lines 2, 3, and 4,
``should assist in defending them against invasion, missile
attack, or blockade----
Mr. Campbell. I thank the gentleman.
Mr. Delahunt [continuing]. By the People's Republic of
China'', and that causes me concern.
Mr. Campbell. Reclaiming my time, I thank the gentleman for
his helpful intervention.
I want to say this to my dear friend--San Mateo County, and
San Francisco, of course, and the City and County of San
Francisco--that once in a while ambiguity is hurtful. I think
of Dean Acheson and April Glaspy, right? One from each party. I
don't know what party they are from, but each from different
Administrations. The comment that maybe Korea was outside of
the protective zone of the United States may have given
incentive to North Korea, the comment that the Iraq-Kuwait
issue was a border issue, and may have given incentive to
Saddam Hussein, I don't know, and there is debate over that. So
if we make it clear, any attack on Taiwan by Mainland China we
will defend, that helps, that helps. As my good friend from
Massachusetts says, or blockade, which is an act of war, a
blockade is an act of war.
But I am really troubled that we bring it up right here and
now. There is no area in the world I can think of, maybe North
Korea would be the only other one, where there is a potential
of a shooting war greater than this. Are we wise--are we wise
to weigh in right now?
So my feeling is no. If I must vote, I vote yes, because of
the clarity that the gentleman from Massachusetts referred to,
because of my sense that if this goes down, it will send a
worse message. If this goes down, it might send a message that
we are not standing with Taiwan. But I am not yet convinced
that we need to bring this up, and so at the right time I would
like to make whatever the appropriate motion is to table or to
postpone.
I thank the Chairman. I invite his advising me of that
right moment.
Chairman Gilman. The gentleman's time has expired.
Mr. Lantos. Mr. Chairman, parliamentary inquiry. May I
inquire as to what the Parliamentarian's decision is as to the
appropriateness of Mr. Campbell's tabling motion?
Chairman Gilman. We are exploring that with the
Parliamentarian right now, and we will make a decision on that
very shortly.
The Chair would also like to inform Members of the
Committee that we intend to report this measure by roll call
vote at the conclusion of our debate.
I now recognize Mr. Ackerman.
Mr. Ackerman. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Despite the way it started, this has been one of the most
interesting and substantive debates and discussions that we
have had. I do wish to congratulate Mr. Bereuter for his
opening statement. I thought it was very thoughtful, and there
was little, if anything, that he said that I might disagree
with.
Also, I want to agree and associate myself with the remarks
of Mr. Lantos, who, as usual, very succinctly summed up the
thoughts of a great many of us, and I include myself in that
area, especially thinking about what could the motivation of
this be, and listening to the usual, unfortunately, usual
partisan attacks on the Administration when we talk about a
foreign policy issue.
Like my friend Mr. Berman, I, too, wrote down, listening to
the Chairman's opening statement, trying to figure out what the
heck was meant by undue pressure, and I wrote those words down,
and I am sure that if you search through your statement and
read it again, Mr. Chairman, you might just find it. You said
undue pressure. I had no idea what you were talking about. But
when charges are made of that serious a nature, charging the
Administration with doing something provocative, I think
people, especially people in the positions of Members of
Congress, should be prepared to back up what they say.
The other thing that you said, three times during your
statement, and I only wrote it down once, but you said it three
times, the failure of the Administration to meet Taiwan's
legitimate defense needs. You said that three times.
I am unaware, Mr. Chairman, of any request made by the
Taiwanese to the Administration for their defense needs that
was turned down by the Administration. So I would be glad to
yield to you, Mr. Chairman, if you would like to be specific
and explain to me what request the Taiwanese made that was
turned down?
Mr. Bereuter. Would the gentleman yield?
Mr. Ackerman. I would prefer the Chairman to answer, if he
has any.
Chairman Gilman. Were you addressing your inquiry to me or
to Mr. Bereuter?
Mr. Ackerman. Chairman Gilman, yourself.
Chairman Gilman. I am sorry, we have been involved in a
parliamentary inquiry. Would you restate?
Mr. Ackerman. Yes, if it does not take from my time to
repeat it. You criticized the Administration three times by
using the phrase, failure to meet Taiwan's legitimate defense
needs. My question, Mr. Chairman, is what request did Taiwan
ever make, ever make, ever make to the Administration that was
turned down? I am unaware of any.
Chairman Gilman. Let me recite to you, there was a request
for submarines by Taiwan which the Administration turned down;
there was a request for early warning radar which the
Administration turned down----
Mr. Ackerman. If I might reclaim my time.
Chairman Gilman [continuing]. Long-range missiles, that was
requested.
Mr. Ackerman. If I might reclaim----
Chairman Gilman. Air defense missiles.
Mr. Ackerman. If I might refresh the Chairman's
recollection, there were discussions about that, but no request
for them was ever made, and none was ever formally turned down
by the Administration.
Chairman Gilman. That is not my understanding, Mr.
Ackerman. It is my understanding that there were requests, and
the Administration did not act positively.
Mr. Ackerman. I would make a unanimous consent request that
the record be kept open so that the Chairman might submit for
the record the copy of those requests.
Chairman Gilman. We will be pleased to do that.
[Note: This information is classified.]
Mr. Ackerman. This Administration has been very supportive
of Taiwan, as has this Congress. We all know that. We know that
there has been no lack of--no ambiguity in the response of the
Administration. After President Lee Teng-Hui's visit to Ithaca,
New York, the Chinese did lob missiles toward Taiwan. The
Administration responded by sending two aircraft career battle
groups. I don't know what more positive indication the Chairman
or anybody else would like to see about our commitment.
On the other hand, I will vote for this. I think that
inasmuch as it has been brought up, inasmuch as the major
concerns such as the explicitness of the--.
Chairman Gilman. The gentleman's time has expired.
Mr. Ackerman [continuing]. Of the material has been taken
out and compromised, which were the major concerns that most of
us have, we should be more concerned with how we treat
democratic nations than worrying about the reaction of
dictatorships who might throw a temper tantrum in order to
modify our behavior.
Chairman Gilman. The gentleman's time has expired.
Mr. Houghton.
Mr. Houghton. Thank you very, very much, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Chairman, I would favor Mr. Campbell's motion to table
and, absent that, then I am going to vote against this thing.
Just very briefly, I think one of the things that
characterizes this country always, is what works? What works?
The Taiwan Relations Act has worked.
Let me tell you about a conversation I had with Henry
Kissinger several years ago. When he was going over to China
and submitting the agenda of President Nixon and then the
Chinese submitted their agenda and then they, of course,
compromised on this and came up with a total one, which was
ultimately the agenda for the meeting, he was amazed, because
of all of the histrionics and all of the flamboyant statements
in the paper, that the item of Taiwan was about 18th on the
list of 20, and he said, why is this? They said, the only thing
we ask of you is do not embarrass us publicly on Taiwan. We do
not intend to attack. That is not our intent. We already have
the concept of the One China policy. Just don't embarrass us.
So I really feel that this tough guy, make-it-clear, spell-
it-out, let-them-have-it-straight approach, is wrong. It is
wrong and it is insensitive to the conditions of the times,
particularly when we are trying to establish a greater
relationship with China, understanding the Taiwanese people
know exactly what we are doing. Therefore, I would not support
H.R. 1838.
Thank you.
Mr. Bereuter. Will the gentleman yield?
Mr. Houghton. Yes.
Mr. Bereuter. I thank the gentleman for yielding on his
time.
I just did want to make it clear that, having listened to
every classified briefing necessary to understand the weapons
issue, I think I can say with confidence that the
Administration has met all requests from the Taiwanese and, in
fact, has gone beyond that in some instances. I want to say to
the gentleman from New York, Mr. Ackerman, I think he is right
in this respect.
For example, one of the things frequently mentioned was
diesel-powered submarines. We haven't produced a diesel-powered
submarine in this country for over 2 decades, and the U.S. Navy
will resist any commercial entity producing them because they
don't want to see them in their inventory at any time in the
future. This is not something that we can address directly.
The Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense--the chief
negotiator with respect to arms issues out in the audience--Mr.
Campbell, and I have tried to arrange classified briefings for
everyone who wants to hear, but, on this issue, I think the
Administration cannot be criticized.
Mr. Rohrabacher. Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Gilman. Mr. Rohrabacher.
Mr. Rohrabacher. Just to back up the Chairman's statement,
I have been to Taiwan on numerous occasions, and I have had
some very serious discussions with the Executive Branch and the
military in Taiwan, and I am sorry Mr. Bereuter has not had
these same discussions.
I want to make sure, Doug--I want to make sure I am
commenting on what you had to say, Doug, so I want to make sure
I am not doing it without you being able to hear. I am making a
comment on what you just said, and I want to make sure you
understand.
Having been to Taiwan on numerous occasions, and having
been in direct consultation with the highest levels of the
Taiwanese government and the Taiwanese military, on numerous
occasions they have talked about weapons systems they would
like from the United States. This is their way of making a
request. Just to be specific with you about it, how about an
upgraded missile defense system which they have repeatedly
requested in an unofficial way, and this Administration has
repeatedly turned them down in that request?
Mr. Bereuter. Will the gentleman yield?
Mr. Rohrabacher. I yield.
Mr. Bereuter. I cannot talk to you in this setting on that
issue.
Chairman Gilman. Mr. Sherman.
Mr. Sherman. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I don't think that this ought to be pictured as a Democrat
versus Republican issue. I note that in general, Congress has
been more pro-Taiwan than has any Administration. President
Bush has made some statements in favor of Beijing that I think
go beyond anything the current President has said, and it is
not surprising that in a discussion where American values and
support for democracy are on one side, and the geopolitics of
getting along well with big, powerful countries might be on the
other side of the argument, in every case I can identify where
there is a tension between those two principles.
Administrations and State Departments tend to be more
deferential to powerful nations and to the geopolitical
interests as they see them, and the Congress has been the
repository of American support for democratic values.
I think this is good legislation. I would point out that
Taiwan is secure in its friendship with the people of the
United States, and has apparently abstained from a nuclear
weapons development program. One can only imagine what a
Taiwan, feeling it had been abandoned by the United States,
would feel it necessary to do.
I would disagree with my colleague from Orange County when
he argues that our military-to-military contacts are somehow
secret, and discordant, and hidden from Beijing. I am confident
that they are able to purchase copies of the Los Angeles Times,
and I know that the article that Mr. Berman referred to in the
Los Angeles Times could not have been written, except for the
purpose, and with the consent of the Administration, with the
purpose of letting the world know that we are standing by the
people of Taiwan.
I think this is excellent legislation. I think we have been
sidetracked a bit on issues of whether it is appropriate to
criticize or to praise the Clinton Administration. We could
debate that all day. Fortunately, the debate on this resolution
will end more quickly, and the focus of this resolution should
be on what is the appropriate resolution for this Congress to
pass.
Having passed a very solid resolution on March 19, 1996, I
think it would be a mistake to retreat from this resolution,
and I would say that if there is an increase in tension in the
Taiwan Straits, it is wrong to blame the United States or to
blame Taipei. After all, it is Beijing which shot missiles over
those Straits. We, being a large continental country, can only
imagine how insecure it is to live on a small island and to
know that if ship owners feel that their ships are in danger,
then your island is effectively blockaded, and subject to
deprivation of anything that it cannot produce. I think that if
China once told America that Taiwan is 40th on their list, or
28th on their list, and all they ask is not to be embarrassed,
it would have been less embarrassing if Beijing had abstained
from firing those missiles.
Finally, I don't think we will ever be in a circumstance
where Taiwan does not request things that we say yes to
sometimes. It does not request things that we say no to.
Perhaps we have said no, informally, at times when we should
have said yes, or the other way around. But I think it would be
a dereliction of duty of the Taiwanese military establishment
not to at least informally ask for a little more than they
think they are going to get.
I am sure that while our Chairman may not be able to put in
the record an official request denied document, that the
gentleman from Orange County is correct. There must have been
informal denials. Yet, if there were no informal denials, then
we would have given Taiwan a blank check, or they would have
asked for too little from their own standpoint.
I think that this resolution, particularly as modified, is
one that we should move to the Floor.
Chairman Gilman. Thank you, Mr. Sherman.
Mr. Lantos. Parliamentary inquiry, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Gilman. The gentleman will state it.
Mr. Lantos. Has the decision been made with respect to
Congressman Campbell's request?
Chairman Gilman. Yes. Counsel has been in touch with the
House Parliamentarian, and I am going to ask Mr. Weinberg to
please recite the decision.
Mr. Lantos. Mr. Chairman, I ask unanimous consent that
after all Members who choose to express their views on this
issue and the Administration will have had a chance to express
its views on this issue, Congressman Campbell be allowed to
make his motion.
Chairman Gilman. You have asked for the Parliamentarian's
explanation. I am about to ask Mr. Weinberg to please recite
the Parliamentarian's decision.
Mr. Weinberg.
Mr. Weinberg. Mr. Chairman, the Parliamentarian has advised
that the motion to table would be in order, and also stated
that the motion to table would kill the amendment and the bill
permanently. The Parliamentarian has not, however, been able to
provide a--.
Mr. Lantos. Did I hear you say permanently?
Mr. Weinberg. As far as this bill, yes, sir. The bill would
be put on the table.
Mr. Gejdenson. Will the gentleman yield?
Mr. Lantos. I will yield.
Mr. Gejdenson. Just for my own curiosity, if the
gentleman's motion is to table--the Chairman has already placed
the substitute in order. So the gentleman's motion would be
against the substitute, which hasn't been voted on yet, so
then, if that were to pass, would we then vote on the
underlying bill?
Mr. Campbell. If the gentleman from California would yield.
Mr. Lantos. I will be happy to yield.
Mr. Campbell. Thank you.
I would be happy, of course, to follow counsel, but, as I
understand it, my motion to table should come after the
Committee has adopted the substitute, and before we vote on the
substitute, and I think Congressman Lantos's request was to
make sure I didn't get passed over in the train that might be
going at a high speed at that point, so I sure hope he renews
his unanimous consent.
Last, as I understand it, even though it is true that the
motion to table kills this, there is no parliamentary
impediment to an identical bill being introduced immediately.
If I am wrong on that, I would yield to the Chairman or to the
counsel to so inform me. In other words, let's not put to much
weight on the word ``permanently.''
Mr. Ackerman. Parliamentary inquiry, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Gilman. The gentleman will state it.
Mr. Ackerman. Might I address it to the Parliamentarian?
Chairman Gilman. Please.
Mr. Ackerman. Is it not true that a motion is in order to
remove from the table, which also requires the same majority
vote?
Mr. Weinberg. I was advised by the Parliamentarian that
unanimous consent would be required to take the bill from the
table if it had gone there.
Mr. Ackerman. If the gentleman would yield, Mr.
Parliamentarian, you can ask unanimous consent to remove it
from the table--and that can be done with anything--but is it
not so, that you can make a motion to remove from the table
which requires a majority vote?
Mr. Weinberg. I could ask the specific question,
Congressman, but the implication of the response that I
received from the Parliamentarian that said it would take
unanimous consent to get it off the table, I think was meant to
touch on your question as well as--.
Mr. Ackerman. Would you review that with the
Parliamentarian? If you review it in those terms, I think you
might get a different answer from the Parliamentarian.
Mr. Weinberg. I will do that.
Mr. Gejdenson. If the gentleman would yield again, while
this is all very interesting, of course, the motion to table is
not unlike a motion in opposition to the bill itself, although
there is a nuance of difference that should get approximately
the same results, unless there are some Members who don't want
to express themselves in opposition of the bill, but simply
want to put it over for additional time.
Mr. Campbell. If the gentleman would yield, on the record I
said I would vote for this bill, but I would prefer that we
not, so I am in exactly the situation that you say has no
elements, and I am one element.
Mr. Delahunt. Would the gentleman yield?
Mr. Lantos. I am most happy to yield to all of my
colleagues.
Mr. Delahunt. I think Mr. Lantos----
Chairman Gilman. Mr. Ackerman, if you will yield a moment.
Mr. Delahunt. Mr. Lantos has yielded to me, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Gilman. Mr. Lantos has the time? Will you yield,
please?
Mr. Lantos. I already yielded, but I will yield to you, and
then please line up so I may yield to the rest of you.
Chairman Gilman. I am asking our counsel to clarify the
request on the parliamentary questions, and I am going to ask
Mr. Rohrabacher if he would set forth his--or, Mr. Weinberg,
please set forth a clarification of the parliamentary
questions.
Mr. Weinberg. Mr. Chairman, the advice that I have received
is that the motion to table, once agreed to, is final and can
be reversed only by unanimous consent.
Mr. Campbell. Would the gentleman yield?
Mr. Lantos. I have yielded to Mr. Delahunt.
Mr. Delahunt. Mr. Chairman, I think----
Chairman Gilman. Mr. Delahunt.
Mr. Delahunt. I think the import of the intention of Mr.
Campbell was a mechanism, if you will, to allow for additional
time to inquire as to what is clearly a discrepancy in terms of
Members' understanding as to the facts. I think that is
certainly due, and owing those of us who are not as conversant
with these issues as Mr. Salmon, Mr. Bereuter, Mr. Lantos, Mr.
Ackerman, and others.
I find it interesting, listening to you, Chairman Gilman,
regarding three specific requests from the Taiwanese, and then
listening to Mr. Ackerman say that is absolutely not the case,
and he being supported by Mr. Bereuter, in terms of the
accuracy of Mr. Ackerman's statement. I think this is just too
serious in terms of its implications, internationally, and for
the United States, to move ahead at this point in time. Maybe
what we should have done here is to have a hearing so that we
could develop some evidence so that we could make some
rational, intelligent decisions.
I yield to Mr. Campbell, if I am correct in interpreting
his intent.
Mr. Lantos. To correct my friend, it is I who will yield to
Mr. Campbell.
Mr. Campbell. I would say, in candor, that you have a
different view, but that the two are worth consideration. My
view is that it is a dangerous time for us to be engaged in
this. This is a time where it is wiser for us to have a little
more discretion. But that if I am forced to, I would vote yes,
based on what I know.
The gentleman's point is, I think, a very helpful addition,
saying that there are more facts for you to find.
Since you have yielded to me, I do want to make clear,
nothing prevents--since Mr. Lantos yielded, nothing prevents
any Member from bringing back this identical resolution
immediately. The idea about tabling is that it is not the right
time. It is not a vote on the merits.
I yield back.
Chairman Gilman. I am asking Mr. Weinberg once again, he
has some additional information from the Parliamentarian with
regard to the inquiry on our procedure.
Mr. Weinberg.
Mr. Weinberg. Mr. Chairman, a motion to postpone to a date
certain would take the bill with it to the date certain. Such a
motion would be debatable, or the debate would be proper only
on the advisability of the postponement, that a motion to table
the motion to postpone would be in order, as would an amendment
to such a motion.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Lantos. Mr. Chairman, parliamentary inquiry.
Chairman Gilman. Mr. Lantos, on your parliamentary inquiry.
Mr. Lantos. Is it appropriate at this stage to offer a
motion that further debate on this matter be postponed until
after Subcommittee hearings on this subject?
Chairman Gilman. Are you referring to a date certain?
Mr. Lantos. As soon as Subcommittee hearings will have
concluded.
Chairman Gilman. In order to do that, I am informed we have
to have a specific date.
Mr. Lantos. My specific date is November 29.
Chairman Gilman. Apparently, what you want to do is to put
an obstacle in the path of getting this legislation considered
by this Committee. Of course, your proposal would be in order
if you have a date certain.
Mr. Lantos. November 29, Mr. Chairman. I so move, Mr.
Chairman.
Chairman Gilman. There is a motion before the Committee to
postpone consideration of this measure until November 29. The
motion is proposed by Mr. Lantos. It is a debatable motion.
Who seeks recognition?
Mr. Lantos. I seek recognition.
Chairman Gilman. Mr. Lantos.
Mr. Lantos. Mr. Chairman, as this wide-ranging discussion
has clearly demonstrated, many, if not all Members of the
Committee have doubts concerning certain factual
representations. It is the ordinary--there is no order in the
Committee, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Gilman. The gentleman is correct. May we have
order, please? May we have order so that the gentleman may be
heard? May we have order--.
Mr. Lantos. The ordinary modus operandi----
Chairman Gilman. The gentleman may proceed.
Mr. Lantos. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
The ordinary modus operandi of this body, particularly when
it comes to matters of such import, is to have extensive
Subcommittee hearings, that all the facts and arguments may be
presented, debated, analyzed, and then come to the Full
Committee with recommendation. This clearly has not been the
case in this instance, and I believe that my motion to postpone
debate is in the public interest.
I yield back the balance of my time.
Chairman Gilman. Mr. Bereuter, point of inquiry. Did your
Subcommittee hold any hearings on this issue?
Mr. Bereuter. We did hold a hearing specifically on this
issue in September.
Chairman Gilman. In September. At this point, since there
has been a question with regard to information that has been
disclosed to the Committee, I am going to ask Mr. Kurt
Campbell, who is here for the Administration, would you please
take the witness's seat?
Mr. Campbell, would you recite your title?
Mr. Campbell. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I am Kurt Campbell, Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense
at the Pentagon.
Chairman Gilman. Are you one of our government's chief
interlocutors with Taiwan on security matters? Is that correct?
Mr. Campbell. Yes, I am.
Chairman Gilman. In the course of your conversation with
Taiwanese officials, you have become familiar with the U.S.
weapons system that they are interested in acquiring?
Mr. Campbell. That is correct.
Chairman Gilman. In your opinion, has the government of
Taiwan expressed interest in acquiring from the U.S., for
example, the Aegis Air Defense System?
Mr. Campbell. Mr. Chairman, if I may, please, as I have
suggested to you in the past in previous hearings, the story of
requests from Taiwan, the story of the United States offering
various defense articles, is a complex one. I would recommend
that if we want to proceed in this, that we do it in closed
session. I think that would--we have offered this on several
occasions, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Gilman. Mr. Campbell, could you tell us just yes
or no, without getting into classified information? Has Taiwan
made a request for----
Mr. Lantos. Mr. Chairman, I think it is inappropriate to
bully an Administration witness.
Chairman Gilman. The gentleman is out of order.
Has the Taiwanese government expressed an interest in
acquiring the Aegis Air Defense System, yes or no?
Mr. Ackerman. Mr. Chairman, the gentleman said he would
like not to answer that question in open session, and I think
that he knows as much about security issues as anyone.
Chairman Gilman. The gentleman is out of order. The witness
did not make that statement. The witness has been asked for a
yes or no statement.
Mr. Ackerman. No, the Chairman asked for a yes or no
statement.
Chairman Gilman. I said the witness is being asked to
answer with a yes or no response.
Mr. Ackerman. And he answered, Mr. Chairman, that it would
be inappropriate in open session.
Chairman Gilman. The gentleman is out of order.
Would the witness please respond?
Mr. Campbell. Mr. Chairman, as I stated, my preference
would be to review the entire range----
Chairman Gilman. I am not asking for the entire range. Is
my request of you to classified for a yes or no response? Is
that a classified matter?
Mr. Campbell. Let me answer the question this way then, Mr.
Chairman. The Taiwanese have requested early warning
capability.
Chairman Gilman. How about an AMRAAM air-to-air missile
request?
Mr. Campbell. The U.S. Administration has agreed to provide
some form of early warning, and what we are working on now are
the technical issues associated with the provision of such a
system.
Chairman Gilman. I am referring to the Aegis system and the
AMRAAM system. Have they made a request for those systems? Just
yes or no.
Mr. Campbell. As I said, Mr. Chairman, I would prefer to go
through each one of these issues in----
Chairman Gilman. I am not asking for classified
information. All I am asking is has a request been made, Mr.
Campbell, for an air-to-air missile air defense system--the
Aegis system and the AMRAAM system.
Mr. Ackerman. Point of order, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Gilman. Yes, Mr. Ackerman. State your point of
order.
Mr. Ackerman. I believe it is not within the rules of the
Committee to badger a witness.
Chairman Gilman. I am not badgering the witness. All I am
asking is--the gentleman is out of order. The witness is not
being badgered.
Mr. Ackerman. He has given the same answer four times; and
when he is asked the fifth time, that is a badger, by
definition.
Chairman Gilman. You are out of order, Mr. Ackerman. We are
not badgering the witness. All we are asking for is a very
simple yes or no response.
Can you respond, Mr. Campbell? Has the Taiwan government
made a request for the Aegis system or the AMRAAM system?
Mr. Campbell. Mr. Chairman, I have tried to respond to
this. I would prefer to----
Chairman Gilman. I know what you said about preferring, but
can you answer with a yes or no answer?
Mr. Campbell. Mr. Chairman, I think it is in the interest
of this chamber, and the interest of the U.S. Government, for
us to continue this discussion in private hearings. I would be
happy to go into great detail about all aspects of the security
relationship with Taiwan. If I can say, we have been standing
by for 3 weeks to provide these briefings.
Chairman Gilman. Mr. Campbell, the Committee has been
accused of misleading our Members with regard to these
requests. Can you clarify whether such requests have been made?
Mr. Campbell. Mr. Chairman, I feel very confident that I
can clarify all issues associated with our security
relationship with Taiwan. I believe it is in the interest of
this body, and the U.S. Government, to do this in a private
hearing.
Chairman Gilman. Once again, I am asking, can you answer,
without breaching any confidential relationship, whether these
requests were made?
Mr. Ackerman. Parliamentary inquiry, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Gilman. The gentleman will state his parliamentary
inquiry.
Mr. Ackerman. Could the Chairman explain to us what
constitutes badgering?
Chairman Gilman. The gentleman is out of order. He is not
stating a proper parliamentary inquiry.
Mr. Delahunt. Mr. Chairman, a point of order.
Chairman Gilman. Please state it.
Mr. Delahunt. I wonder if the Chair could ask the
gentleman, rather than simply asking him for either-or,
whether, in his opinion, the question that the Chair is posing
is susceptible to a simple yes or no answer, or is it
necessary, in his opinion, in his role----
Chairman Gilman. The gentleman's request is reasonable.
Mr. Campbell, can you respond in that manner?
Mr. Campbell. I can, Mr. Chairman. Let me just say that the
arms sales process is classified. Every Administration since
the introduction of the Taiwan Relations Act has treated it as
such.
Second, it would be fair to say, Mr. Chairman, that there
had been a number of requests that Taiwan has made of us, both
unofficially and officially, which we have discouraged. There
has also been--let me go on, Mr. Chairman. There have also been
a number of suggestions that the U.S. Government has made to
Taiwan, in terms of process or arms sales that they should
consider, which they have also refused.
Furthermore--let me just go on, if I may, please. I am
trying to answer the question. Furthermore, there have been a
number of requests that Taiwan has made to the United States
which we have approved which they have sought not to pursue.
The reason that I give you this background, it is a much more
complex picture than a yes or no answer can assess at this
juncture.
I would suggest, Mr. Chairman, that if you look at the
major challenges that the Taiwanese face, anti-air, anti-
submarine, amphibious, each of those areas, the U.S. Government
believes that we have taken steps, early warning, that will
allow Taiwan to take appropriate defensive steps. We believe
that, frankly, we have taken extra efforts in the last several
years to fulfill our obligations under the Taiwan Relations
Act.
I am not attempting to avoid the question, Mr. Chairman. I
am simply stating that some of this information, I believe, is
in the interest of the Members to know. I also believe it is
not in the interest for us to be debating in public at this
time.
Chairman Gilman. Just one more question, Mr. Campbell, have
any defense systems requests that the Taiwan government has
made been turned down?
Mr. Campbell. I think I have already made my statement on
this issue in a more complex way, Mr. Chairman. I will just
stand by the statement I made.
Mr. Bereuter. Will the Chairman yield?
Chairman Gilman. Mr. Bereuter.
Mr. Bereuter. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I will just say, having looked at this in all of its
classified ramifications that I can determine, I think that
Deputy Assistant Secretary Campbell's response is a responsible
one. It is the only one he can give in this situation.
But I would also say to the Chairman that your and Mr.
Gejdenson's substitute has taken care of this problem because
you have eliminated specific references to the weapons system.
I think we have taken the right course here, and I think we
have gone as far as we legitimately can. If we were to hold
other hearings at the Subcommittee or Committee level in order
to really get to the heart of this issue, it has to be
conceptual.
Thank you.
Mr. Lantos. Parliamentary inquiry, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Gilman. Mr. Lantos.
Mr. Lantos. When will you call for a vote?
Chairman Gilman. We are about to do that. There is a motion
before us, and the debate is now only on the motion by Mr.
Lantos.
Mr. Manzullo is requesting time.
Mr. Manzullo. I just have a question on general debate
before you go to Mr. Lantos' motion, so my remarks are not
appropriate at this time.
Chairman Gilman. We are now, Mr. Manzullo, on the motion by
Mr. Lantos to postpone debate.
Mr. Salmon. Mr. Chairman?
I would just like to speak in support of the Lantos motion.
The reason that I do, as I think has been exemplified by the
last 20 minutes, the fact is, there has not been a thorough
going-over. The Administration has volunteered to provide
information to us, sensitive information that could not be
provided here in an open session, in a closed session. I am on
the Asia Subcommittee which Chairman Bereuter chairs, but
although we have talked many times about the policy regarding
Taiwan and China, this specific bill has never been marked up.
It has never been discussed in Subcommittee.
Let's do it appropriately. I am not asking for us to
overturn it at the present time. I think, let's be prudent
here, let's postpone it. I think that the Representative from
California's suggestion is a good one. This is so important.
Let's take the time to do it right, and let's get all of the
information we possibly can before we move ahead.
Thank you.
Mr. Delahunt. Mr. Chairman, I have a unanimous consent
request.
Chairman Gilman. What is the unanimous consent request?
Mr. Delahunt. I would ask if the gentleman from California,
Mr. Lantos, would consider, in light of the remarks by the
Chair of the Subcommittee, Mr. Bereuter, to amend his motion so
that any hearings on this particular issue would be done in
closed session.
Mr. Lantos. I hereby do so.
Chairman Gilman. That is an inappropriate motion. That has
to be decided by the Subcommittee Chairman by a vote in the
Subcommittee. House rules require that kind of vote.
Mr. Sherman. Mr. Chairman, I would reluctantly oppose Mr.
Lantos' motion. It seems like the only fact that is in
contention is whether the United States has denied particular
weapons requests from Taiwan. That is, at most, a sideline to
the resolution. Not only that, it is only the details of that
sideline that are in question.
I think we had reached agreement that certainly we said no
to Taiwan on occasion. Perhaps we haven't said no to a formal
request, but we have said no to an informal request. We have
said yes on occasion, and as the Administration representative
pointed out, sometimes we say maybe, or how would you like this
other weapons system that might meet your needs and/or meet the
diplomatic needs of the United States. I think that, with that
background, if we were to vote on this resolution that is
before us, and that is there are times when the United States
says yes and times when we say no, it could be the subject of
some other hearings in evaluating whether the Administration
has said yes or no to informal requests, but I don't think that
that needs to hold up the passage of this resolution.
Chairman Gilman. Mr. Rohrabacher.
Mr. Rohrabacher. First of all, I rise in strong opposition
of this motion. I consider it to be an obstructionist motion.
This is not being done in order to find out more information.
Mr. Lantos is fully aware that there is no major issue that
comes before this Committee. When I say major issue----
Chairman Gilman. Will you put the mike a little closer?
Mr. Rohrabacher. I rise in strong opposition to Mr. Lantos'
motion. There is no issue that comes before this Committee that
is a major issue, and an issue that is contentious, in which we
are all agreed on what the facts are. It is as simple as that.
This idea that we should postpone this decision today because
we are in disagreement over the facts is a joke. The fact is,
every time we come here and disagree, we have some contention
as to what the facts are. Now, how do we determine what the
facts are? We hold hearings at the Subcommittee level. Guess
what? There has been a hearing at the Subcommittee level. I
happen to be a Member of the Asia and Pacific Subcommittee. We
held that hearing on September 15th.
Let me note, in terms of what we just went through a few
moments ago, that Assistant Secretary Campbell, his statement,
has backed up the Chairman's contention. Listen very closely--
if you look very closely at his words, the Chairman's
contention that there have been some of requests made by Taiwan
that have been denied was backed up by exactly what the Deputy
Assistant Secretary said. Of course, we have also an agreement
for that. Mr. Sherman's statement acknowledges that that is par
for the course. We agree on some things and disagree on others
where we turn down some requests and accede to others.
Mr. Chairman, I would just say, before I yield to my good
friend, Mr. Gejdenson, I am a bit dismayed. I--having been a
Member of this Committee at a time when the Democrats
controlled this Committee, I don't remember a case where anyone
on this side of the aisle ever badgered Mr. Hamilton, as the
Chairman of this Committee, as we have seen today, and it seems
to be the standard operating procedure that has been coming
about. I don't like that. I don't think this is a gentlemanly
way to handle this type of business. We should agree to
disagree in a way that we respect each other's rights and
respect each other's opinions. But I think that badgering the
Chairman, as we have seen, really goes counter to that.
Mr. Gejdenson. Will the gentleman yield?
Mr. Rohrabacher. I would certainly yield to my good friend,
Mr. Gejdenson.
Chairman Gilman. Mr. Gejdenson.
Mr. Gejdenson. Thank you, Mr. Rohrabacher.
Mr. Chairman. I want to join Mr. Rohrabacher in that China
shop for a moment, and just say that I think we ought to defeat
the motion. We ought to pass the resolution. I believe that the
resolution has come to a proper balance of our concerns for
gratuitously creating tensions in the region but firmly stating
our support for a democratic government in the region.
The reality is that the language we have before us, as even
Mr. Bereuter agrees, is language that I think has struck a
solid balance in favor of democracy without being disruptive. I
would hope that Members would defeat the motion to table, and
that we could then listen to Mr. Roth or not listen to Mr.
Roth, as the Committee decides at that point, and then vote on
the bill in an expeditious manner.
Chairman Gilman. Thank you, Mr. Gejdenson.
Before yielding, I just want to associate myself with Mr.
Gejdenson's remarks. A great deal of time and effort and all of
the--both parties, Majority and Minority, have been fully
consulted and have worked on this bill. I would urge my
colleagues to defeat the motion and to move forward with
adoption of the measure so it can go to the Floor.
Mr. Ackerman.
Mr. Ackerman. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
First, I would like to apply to get a Rohrabacher
certificate as being nondelusionary, and I am not sure how to
apply. Absent that, I just want to--an interesting point was
made before when it was said that if we do not vote until we
have all of the facts before us we may be setting a very
dangerous precedent.
Some of the discussion that we have had concerning Taiwan's
defense needs over the last few minutes, I would just like to
clarify. The statement that Mr. Gilman made three times during
his opening statement--one word has escaped many of us during
the course of this discussion--he said, the Administration's
failure to meet Taiwan's legitimate defense needs. The
operative word is legitimate defense needs. It is quite
possible, Mr. Chairman, and I will concede that, that maybe
Taiwan has--and it is speculation on my part, because we have
not gone into closed session--that Taiwan made some request, as
every country does of us, that we might not have thought was a
legitimate defense need, and in considering that we have had
discussions with them.
The point that I took up, Mr. Chairman, was the
partisanship of continuing to harp on the Administration in the
partisan fashion to say that they have failed to meet Taiwan's
legitimate defense needs. Absent the witness from the Defense
Department, if the Chairman knows of any legitimate defense
needs that were made by Taiwan, as he recited three times, I
think we are still open, and I think the record is open to hear
that. But what you heard from the Administration, or from the
Department of Defense, I believe, said that there might have
been requests that they made formally or informally, that we
dissuaded because of whatever reasons, and I read that as maybe
they weren't legitimate requests, and I think that we should
hear that. But I do not think that the facts are in dispute at
all here, Mr. Chairman, and I suggest that we move forward.
Chairman Gilman. The question is now on the motion to
postpone the issue before the Committee to November 29, as
offered by Mr. Lantos. All those in favor, signify by saying
aye. Those opposed, say no.
Chairman Gilman. The noes have it.
Mr. Lantos. I ask for a recorded vote.
Chairman Gilman. A recorded vote is requested. All in favor
of a recorded vote, signify by a show of hands. A sufficient
number. A recorded vote is requested, and a recorded vote will
be taken.
The clerk will call the roll.
Ms. Bloomer. Mr. Gilman.
Chairman Gilman. No.
Ms. Bloomer. Mr. Gilman votes no.
Mr. Goodling.
Mr. Goodling. No.
Ms. Bloomer. Mr. Goodling votes no.
Mr. Leach.
[No response.]
Ms. Bloomer. Mr. Hyde.
[No response.]
Ms. Bloomer. Mr. Bereuter.
Mr. Bereuter. No.
Ms. Bloomer. Mr. Bereuter votes no.
Mr. Smith.
Mr. Smith. No.
Ms. Bloomer. Mr. Smith votes no.
Mr. Burton.
Mr. Burton. No.
Ms. Bloomer. Mr. Burton votes no.
Mr. Gallegly.
[No response.]
Ms. Bloomer. Ms. Ros-Lehtinen.
Ms. Ros-Lehtinen. No.
Ms. Bloomer. Ms. Ros-Lehtinen votes no.
Mr. Ballenger.
Mr. Ballenger. No.
Ms. Bloomer. Mr. Ballenger votes no.
Mr. Rohrabacher.
Mr. Rohrabacher. No.
Ms. Bloomer. Mr. Rohrabacher votes no.
Mr. Manzullo.
Mr. Manzullo. No.
Ms. Bloomer. Mr. Manzullo votes no.
Mr. Royce.
Mr. Royce. No.
Ms. Bloomer. Mr. Royce votes no.
Mr. King.
Mr. King. No.
Ms. Bloomer. Mr. King votes no.
Mr. Chabot.
Mr. Chabot. No.
Ms. Bloomer. Mr. Chabot votes no.
Mr. Sanford.
Mr. Sanford. Aye.
Ms. Bloomer. Mr. Sanford votes aye.
Mr. Salmon.
Mr. Salmon. Aye.
Ms. Bloomer. Mr. Salmon votes aye.
Mr. Houghton.
Mr. Houghton. Aye.
Ms. Bloomer. Mr. Houghton votes aye.
Mr. Campbell.
Mr. Campbell. Aye.
Ms. Bloomer. Mr. Campbell votes aye.
Mr. McHugh.
Mr. McHugh. No.
Ms. Bloomer. Mr. McHugh votes no.
Mr. Brady.
Mr. Brady. No.
Ms. Bloomer. Mr. Brady votes no.
Mr. Burr.
[No response.]
Ms. Bloomer. Mr. Gillmor.
Mr. Gillmor. No.
Ms. Bloomer. Mr. Gillmor votes no.
Mr. Radanovich.
Mr. Radanovich. No.
Ms. Bloomer. Mr. Radanovich votes no.
Mr. Cooksey.
Mr. Cooksey. No.
Ms. Bloomer. Mr. Cooksey votes no.
Mr. Tancredo.
Mr. Tancredo. No.
Ms. Bloomer. Mr. Tancredo votes no.
Mr. Gejdenson.
Mr. Gejdenson. No.
Ms. Bloomer. Mr. Gejdenson votes no.
Mr. Lantos.
Mr. Lantos. Aye.
Ms. Bloomer. Mr. Lantos votes aye.
Mr. Berman.
Mr. Berman. No.
Ms. Bloomer. Mr. Berman votes no.
Mr. Ackerman.
Mr. Ackerman. Aye.
Ms. Bloomer. Mr. Ackerman votes aye.
Mr. Faleomavaega.
[No response.]
Ms. Bloomer. Mr. Martinez.
[No response.]
Ms. Bloomer. Mr. Payne.
[No response.]
Ms. Bloomer. Mr. Menendez.
[No response.]
Ms. Bloomer. Mr. Brown.
Mr. Brown. No.
Ms. Bloomer. Mr. Brown votes no.
Ms. McKinney.
[No response.]
Ms. Bloomer. Mr. Hastings.
[No response.]
Ms. Bloomer. Ms. Danner.
[No response.]
Ms. Bloomer. Mr. Hilliard.
[No response.]
Ms. Bloomer. Mr. Sherman.
Mr. Sherman. No.
Ms. Bloomer. Mr. Sherman votes no.
Mr. Wexler.
Mr. Wexler. No.
Ms. Bloomer. Mr. Wexler votes no.
Mr. Rothman.
Mr. Rothman. No.
Ms. Bloomer. Mr. Rothman votes no.
Mr. Davis.
Mr. Davis. No.
Ms. Bloomer. Mr. Davis votes no.
Mr. Pomeroy.
[No response.]
Ms. Bloomer. Mr. Delahunt.
Mr. Delahunt. Aye.
Ms. Bloomer. Mr. Delahunt votes aye.
Mr. Meeks.
Mr. Meeks. Aye.
Ms. Bloomer. Mr. Meeks votes aye.
Ms. Lee.
Ms. Lee. Aye.
Ms. Bloomer. Ms. Lee votes aye.
Mr. Crowley.
Mr. Crowley. No.
Ms. Bloomer. Mr. Crowley votes no.
Mr. Hoeffel.
Mr. Hoeffel. No.
Ms. Bloomer. Mr. Hoeffel votes no.
Chairman Gilman. The clerk will call the absentees.
Ms. Bloomer. Mr. Leach.
[No response.]
Ms. Bloomer. Mr. Hyde.
[No response.]
Ms. Bloomer. Mr. Gallegly.
[No response.]
Ms. Bloomer. Mr. Burr.
[No response.]
Ms. Bloomer. Mr. Faleomavaega.
[No response.]
Ms. Bloomer. Mr. Martinez.
[No response.]
Ms. Bloomer. Mr. Payne.
[No response.]
Ms. Bloomer. Mr. Menendez.
[No response.]
Ms. Bloomer. Ms. McKinney.
[No response.]
Ms. Bloomer. Mr. Hastings.
[No response.]
Ms. Bloomer. Ms. Danner.
Ms. Danner. No.
Ms. Bloomer. Ms. Danner votes no.
Mr. Hilliard.
[No response.]
Ms. Bloomer. Mr. Pomeroy.
[No response.]
Chairman Gilman. How is Mr. Burr recorded?
Ms. Bloomer. Mr. Burr?
Mr. Burr. No.
Ms. Bloomer. Mr. Burr votes no.
Chairman Gilman. The clerk will report the tally.
Just a moment. Mr. Hastings. How is Mr. Hastings recorded?
Ms. Bloomer. Mr. Hastings is recorded as not having voted.
Chairman Gilman. Mr. Hastings?
Mr. Hastings. No.
Ms. Bloomer. Mr. Hastings votes no.
Nine ayes and 30 noes.
Chairman Gilman. The motion is not agreed to.
If there are no further amendments, without objection, the
previous question is ordered on the amendment in the nature of
a substitute.
The question is now on the amendment in the nature of a
substitute. All those in favor, signify by saying aye. All of
those opposed, say no.
The amendment in the nature of a substitute is agreed to.
The gentleman from Indiana, Mr. Burton, is recognized to
offer a motion.
Mr. Burton. Mr. Chairman, I move that the Committee report
the bill, as amended, to the House, with a recommendation that
the bill, as amended, do pass.
Chairman Gilman. The question is on the motion of the
gentleman from Indiana, Mr. Burton. Those in favor of the
motion, signify by saying aye. Those opposed, say no.
The ayes have it. A quorum being present, the motion is
agreed to.
Without objection, the Chair or his designee is authorized
to make motions under rule 20 with respect to a conference on
this bill or counterpart for the Senate.
Mr. Ackerman.
Mr. Ackerman. I request a recorded vote, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Gilman. A recorded vote is requested. All those in
favor, signify by a show of hands. A sufficient number having
been noted, a recorded vote is requested and ordered. The clerk
will call the roll.
Ms. Bloomer. Mr. Gilman.
Chairman Gilman. Aye.
Ms. Bloomer. Mr. Gilman votes aye.
Mr. Goodling.
Mr. Goodling. Aye.
Ms. Bloomer. Mr. Goodling votes aye.
Mr. Leach.
[No response.]
Ms. Bloomer. Mr. Hyde.
[No response.]
Ms. Bloomer. Mr. Bereuter.
Mr. Bereuter. Aye.
Ms. Bloomer. Mr. Bereuter votes aye.
Mr. Smith.
Mr. Smith. Aye.
Ms. Bloomer. Mr. Smith votes aye.
Mr. Burton.
Mr. Burton. Aye.
Ms. Bloomer. Mr. Burton votes aye.
Mr. Gallegly.
[No response.]
Ms. Bloomer. Ms. Ros-Lehtinen.
Ms. Ros-Lehtinen. Aye.
Ms. Bloomer. Ms. Ros-Lehtinen votes aye.
Mr. Ballenger.
Mr. Ballenger. Aye.
Ms. Bloomer. Mr. Ballenger votes aye.
Mr. Rohrabacher.
Mr. Rohrabacher. Aye.
Ms. Bloomer. Mr. Rohrabacher votes aye.
Mr. Manzullo.
Mr. Manzullo. Aye.
Ms. Bloomer. Mr. Manzullo votes aye.
Mr. Royce.
Mr. Royce. Aye.
Ms. Bloomer. Mr. Royce votes aye.
Mr. King.
Mr. King. Aye.
Ms. Bloomer. Mr. King votes aye.
Mr. Chabot.
Mr. Chabot. Aye.
Ms. Bloomer. Mr. Chabot votes aye.
Mr. Sanford.
Mr. Sanford. Aye.
Ms. Bloomer. Mr. Sanford votes aye.
Mr. Salmon.
Mr. Salmon. No.
Ms. Bloomer. Mr. Salmon votes no.
Mr. Houghton.
Mr. Houghton. No.
Ms. Bloomer. Mr. Houghton votes no.
Mr. Campbell.
Mr. Campbell. Aye.
Ms. Bloomer. Mr. Campbell votes aye.
Mr. McHugh.
Mr. McHugh. Aye.
Ms. Bloomer. Mr. McHugh votes aye.
Mr. Brady.
Mr. Brady. Aye.
Ms. Bloomer. Mr. Brady votes aye.
Mr. Burr.
Mr. Burr. Aye.
Ms. Bloomer. Mr. Burr votes aye.
Mr. Gillmor.
Mr. Gillmor. Aye.
Ms. Bloomer. Mr. Gillmor votes aye.
Mr. Radanovich.
Mr. Radanovich. Aye.
Ms. Bloomer. Mr. Radanovich votes aye.
Mr. Cooksey.
Mr. Cooksey. Aye.
Ms. Bloomer. Mr. Cooksey votes aye.
Mr. Tancredo.
Mr. Tancredo. Aye.
Ms. Bloomer. Mr. Tancredo votes aye.
Mr. Gejdenson.
Mr. Gejdenson. Aye.
Ms. Bloomer. Mr. Gejdenson votes aye.
Mr. Lantos.
Mr. Lantos. No.
Ms. Bloomer. Mr. Lantos votes no.
Mr. Berman.
[No response.]
Ms. Bloomer. Mr. Ackerman.
Mr. Ackerman. Aye.
Ms. Bloomer. Mr. Ackerman votes aye.
Mr. Faleomavaega.
[No response.]
Ms. Bloomer. Mr. Martinez.
[No response.]
Ms. Bloomer. Mr. Payne.
[No response.]
Ms. Bloomer. Mr. Menendez.
[No response.]
Ms. Bloomer. Mr. Brown.
Mr. Brown. Aye.
Ms. Bloomer. Mr. Brown votes aye.
Ms. McKinney.
[No response.]
Ms. Bloomer. Mr. Hastings.
Mr. Hastings. No.
Ms. Bloomer. Mr. Hastings votes no.
Ms. Danner.
Ms. Danner. Aye.
Ms. Bloomer. Ms. Danner votes aye.
Mr. Hilliard.
[No response.]
Ms. Bloomer. Mr. Sherman.
Mr. Sherman. Aye.
Ms. Bloomer. Mr. Sherman votes aye.
Mr. Wexler.
Mr. Wexler. Aye.
Ms. Bloomer. Mr. Wexler votes aye.
Mr. Rothman.
Mr. Rothman. Aye.
Ms. Bloomer. Mr. Rothman votes aye.
Mr. Davis.
Mr. Davis. Aye.
Ms. Bloomer. Mr. Davis votes aye.
Mr. Pomeroy.
[No response.]
Ms. Bloomer. Mr. Delahunt.
Mr. Delahunt. No.
Ms. Bloomer. Mr. Delahunt votes no.
Mr. Meeks.
Mr. Meeks. Aye.
Ms. Bloomer. Mr. Meeks votes aye.
Ms. Lee.
Ms. Lee. No.
Ms. Bloomer. Ms. Lee votes no.
Mr. Crowley.
Mr. Crowley. Aye.
Ms. Bloomer. Mr. Crowley votes aye.
Mr. Hoeffel.
Mr. Hoeffel. Aye.
Ms. Bloomer. Mr. Hoeffel votes aye.
Chairman Gilman. The clerk will report the tally.
Please call the absentees.
Ms. Bloomer. Mr. Leach.
[No response.]
Ms. Bloomer. Mr. Hyde.
[No response.]
Ms. Bloomer. Mr. Gallegly.
[No response.]
Ms. Bloomer. Mr. Berman.
[No response.]
Ms. Bloomer. Mr. Faleomavaega.
[No response.]
Ms. Bloomer. Mr. Martinez.
[No response.]
Ms. Bloomer. Mr. Payne.
[No response.]
Ms. Bloomer. Mr. Menendez.
[No response.]
Ms. Bloomer. Ms. McKinney.
[No response.]
Ms. Bloomer. Mr. Hilliard.
[No response.]
Ms. Bloomer. Mr. Pomeroy.
[No response.]
Chairman Gilman. The clerk will report the tally.
Ms. Bloomer. On this vote, there were 32 ayes and 6 noes.
Chairman Gilman. The motion is agreed to. The ayes have it.
A quorum being present, the motion is agreed to.
Without objection, the Chair's designee is authorized to
make a motion under rule 20 with respect to a conference on
this bill or a counterpart from the Senate.
Without objection, the Chief of Staff is authorized to make
technical and conforming and grammatical changes to the measure
adopted by the Committee.
The Committee stands adjourned.
[Whereupon, at 12:30 p.m., the Committee was adjourned.]
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A P P E N D I X
October 26, 1999
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