The U.S. Embassy in Rangoon reports, based in part on inferences from published GOB economic data, that the amount of forced labor exacted for large infrastructure projects has declined from the peak it reached in 1995-96. This appears to be due to GOB purchases of earth-moving equipment, which have been used on projects instead of forced labor.⁽¹⁷⁸⁾ Soldiers appear to have replaced forced laborers on railroad construction; although not on road and irrigation projects.⁽¹⁷⁹⁾ The Chairman of the SLORC announced in June 1997 that military labor should be used on the full range of public works projects, not just railroads.⁽¹⁸⁰⁾ Previous announcements such as this have not always led to continued use of soldiers instead of forced laborers.⁽¹⁸¹⁾

The apparent reduction in the use of forced labor and the increase in the use of soldiers in central Burma appears to have had at least one unfortunate side effect for some villagers: it has been reported that villagers have been forced to contribute food, firewood and other goods and services to the soldiers doing the work.⁽¹⁸³⁾

II. Forced Labor to Support Military Operations

Forced portering to support military operations is the most notorious use of forced labor. Civilians have been conscripted to serve as military porters from all States and Divisions in Burma.⁽¹⁸⁴⁾ People have been forced into service as porters at all ages; men, women and children are all reported to have worked as porters.⁽¹⁸⁵⁾ Some people have served as forced porters repeatedly. Amnesty International reported the case of a man who claimed that he was forced to serve as a porter as many as 10 times in one year, for periods ranging from 10 days to two months. Eventually he fled Burma.⁽¹⁸⁶⁾

Porters usually carry supplies for soldiers on regular patrols, and the Burmese military almost never travels without them.⁽¹⁸⁷⁾ During campaigns against ethnic opposition groups, porters have often been forced to go to the very front lines of combat.⁽¹⁸⁸⁾ Although unarmed themselves, they have been placed at the head of columns to detonate mines and booby traps, and to spring ambushes.⁽¹⁸⁹⁾ Another disturbing aspect of forced portering is the practice of sometimes using civilian porters as human shields.⁽¹⁹⁰⁾

The Special Rapporteur on Burma reports that some of the most serious human rights abuses have occurred in the context of forced portering.⁽¹⁹¹⁾ Soldiers commonly beat porters with sticks and rifle butts if they cannot continue to work.⁽¹⁹²⁾ Most porters are subject to physical abuse from the moment they are pressed into service, and many have witnessed other porters being killed by the troops they served.⁽¹⁹³⁾ At night, men and women porters are separated from each other, and it has commonly been reported that women porters have been repeatedly raped by SLORC soldiers.⁽¹⁹⁴⁾

Porters are forced to work for long hours without sufficient food, water or rest.⁽¹⁹⁵⁾ Porters suffer a wide range of injuries and illnesses, including wounds received in battle, or while sweeping for mines or carrying heavy loads.⁽¹⁹⁶⁾ Despite this, porters rarely receive medical attention. Porters who can no longer work are often either abandoned without medical care or assistance,⁽¹⁹⁷⁾ or executed.⁽¹⁹⁸⁾

Forced Labor in Construction and Maintenance of Military Facilities

In addition to forcing civilians to serve as porters, military battalions often require villagers to provide labor in other areas. Villagers were reportedly forced to work on the construction of military barracks at Heinze Island⁽¹⁹⁹⁾ and for the border police in Arakan State.⁽²⁰⁰⁾ They are also forced to provide sentry duty, dig trenches, erect fences, maintain or clean barracks, repair roads between military camps, look after livestock, dig bunkers, clean latrines and wash soldiers' uniforms.⁽²⁰¹⁾

Forced Labor for Commercial Ventures to Benefit Military Officers

Commanding officers of military battalions have reportedly been involved in a variety of their own private commercial ventures, including shrimp cultivation, paddy and fish-pond operations, tree-planting, timber cultivation, rubber plantations, rice farming and brick making.⁽²⁰²⁾ Local villagers have been required to work in these enterprises as forced laborers. The U.S. Embassy in Rangoon has reported cases involving whole villages of people forced to cultivate and harvest crops to feed local military garrisons. In many cases, the cultivated land was also confiscated from villagers by the garrison.⁽²⁰³⁾ As many as 13,000 Karens were reportedly forced in 1995 to work without pay on a large rubber plantation, and in the construction of a dike for shrimp farming operations.⁽²⁰⁴⁾ Commercial ventures operated by the military are frequently reported to be funded by the exaction of "porter fees" imposed on local villages.⁽²⁰⁵⁾

III. The Yadana Natural Gas Pipeline

The most controversial infrastructure development project in Burma is the Yadana natural gas pipeline because of repeated allegations that the GOB has used forced labor, and that troops providing security have used forced porters, on a project which includes several international oil companies as investors.⁽²⁰⁶⁾ Additional allegations include forced relocations of villages near the pipeline and claims that the Ye-Tavoy railway, on which the GOB is widely acknowledged to have used forced labor, bears some relation to the Yadana project.⁽²⁰⁷⁾ The U.S. Embassy has reported that the Ye-Tavoy railway is being constructed in order to facilitate Burmese army operations in the pipeline area because the existing highway's utility was limited during the wet season.⁽²⁰⁸⁾ It also reported that "during the past two years, diverse press and Internet reports, often based on refugee sources in Thailand, repeatedly alleged that this extension of the GOB rail is being built with an amount and harshness of forced labor that is unusual even by contemporary Burmese standards."⁽²⁰⁹⁾ Construction purportedly took place twenty-four hours a day during the dry season.⁽²¹⁰⁾

The oil companies vigorously deny that forced labor has occurred on the Yadana project and maintain that there is no connection between the pipeline and the Ye-Tavoy railroad.⁽²¹¹⁾ The GOB, which has acknowledged using uncompensated labor to construct at least one other gas pipeline project,⁽²¹²⁾ calls allegations of forced labor on the Yadana project "totally unfounded."⁽²¹³⁾

Background

In 1982, large natural gas deposits that were to become known as the Yadana field were discovered in the Andaman Sea, approximately fifty miles south of Burma's Irrawaddy Delta region.⁽²¹⁴⁾ Thailand's demand for energy and a desperate revenue shortage in Burma led the GOB to consider developing this resource in the late 1980s.⁽²¹⁵⁾ The GOB solicited commercial support for a proposal to construct a pipeline that would deliver natural gas from the offshore Yadana field to Thailand, across southern Burma's Tenasserim Division.

In late 1991, the GOB reached a preliminary agreement with the Petroleum Authority of Thailand to deliver gas from the Yadana field to Thailand.⁽²¹⁶⁾ Insurgencies along much of the southern part of the Burmese-Thai border posed serious security risks to the proposed route.⁽²¹⁷⁾ At the time, the World Bank advised that the pipeline be rerouted "away from the Burmese-Thai border where conflicts between Rangoon and the minority Karen group still continue."⁽²¹⁸⁾

Although several alternative routes were considered,⁽²¹⁹⁾ Burmese and Thai authorities agreed by mid-1992 that the pipeline should follow a route similar to the one originally proposed.⁽²²⁰⁾ The route ultimately chosen crosses the Thai-Burmese border at Nai Ei Taung where less than 40 miles separate the Thai border from the Andaman Sea. Ethnic insurgents have held much of the inland hills along that border since Burma's independence in 1948.⁽²²¹⁾

Because Nai Ei Taung and the Zinba River valley below it were inhabited by ethnic Karen and had been held by the Karen National Union (KNU) since the 1960s, the chosen pipeline route required the GOB to assert effective military control over the region before construction across the inhospitable terrain could begin. Improved logistical and transportation infrastructure was needed to establish such control in the region, as the only means of transportation along the coastal plain other than dirt "bullock-cart" tracks was one spottily paved road running north-south.⁽²²²⁾

In July 1992, the French oil company Total signed a production-sharing contract with Myanmar Oil and Gas Enterprise (MOGE), Burma's state-owned oil production company, for evaluating, developing and producing gas from the offshore Yadana field.⁽²²³⁾ The U.S. company Unocal joined the project as a co-venturer in January 1993, and the national oil company of Thailand, the Petroleum Authority of Thailand Exploration and Production Public Company, Ltd. (PTTEP) joined the project in early 1995.⁽²²⁴⁾ The pipeline is to be 36 inches in diameter throughout its 416 mile length, which includes 215 miles underwater in the Andaman Sea, 39 miles overland in Burma, and 161 miles in Thailand.⁽²²⁵⁾ The project is scheduled to begin delivering gas in 1998⁽²²⁶⁾ and is expected to raise approximately $164 million per year from gas sales alone.⁽²²⁷⁾ Estimates of the GOB's total revenues including dividends and taxes on the project range as high $400 million per year.⁽²²⁸⁾

Allegations of Forced Labor on the Pipeline and Associated Facilities

Allegations of human rights abuses, particularly of forced labor in the construction of the pipeline and associated infrastructure, have been vigorously denied by the oil companies. They have stated that all workers on the project were not hired by the army and that they were voluntary employees who were paid well for their work. The oil companies have also emphasized their role in the development of local communities along the pipeline route.⁽²²⁹⁾

Although expatriate staff were recruited to build the actual pipeline itself, evidence suggests that Burmese nationals built the majority of support facilities for the pipeline including:

-- the pipeline center (PLC), or base camp, with about 60 buildings to house expatriates and Burmese nationals, completed in October 1995.⁽²³⁰⁾ The PLC is surrounded by layers of chain-link barbed fences separated by "a clear field of fire" with two underground bunkers in the center of the camp;⁽²³¹⁾

-- A dirt landing strip near the PLC, completed in January 1996;⁽²³²⁾

-- A temporary logistical base or "flying camp" to support construction that was accessible only by air, located near the mid-point of the pipeline;⁽²³³⁾

-- A jetty on the western bank of the Heinze River estuary, just north of the PLC;⁽²³⁴⁾

-- At least a dozen helipads, including two at the base camp.⁽²³⁵⁾

According to Unocal, "The Total affiliate, as project operator, is responsible for all day-to-day operations relating to the pipeline, including hiring all labor . . . The Government of Myanmar does not provide or arrange for personnel to work on the pipeline."⁽²³⁶⁾ However, during a January 1996 visit to the pipeline, an Embassy officer reported that, "Total officials stressed that Total pays these local workers directly, even though they are hired by the army."⁽²³⁷⁾ The Embassy added that Total's own briefing materials indicate that, between February, 1995 and mid-January, 1996, 463 villagers were "hired" by Burmese Infantry Battalions (I.B.) 273, 401, 403, 407, and 409 and quartered in those battalions.⁽²³⁸⁾ The same Total briefing materials indicate that Total supplied weekly a food ration to the villagers "in the batallions."⁽²³⁹⁾

Refugees interviewed by the Karen Human Rights Group claim that they were forced to build project facilities including: a helipad near Migyaunglaung used by civilian helicopters transporting westerners and construction supplies;⁽²⁴⁰⁾ and barracks for I.B. 408 between Kanbauk and Ohnbinkwin.⁽²⁴¹⁾ These refugees were also allegedly forced to collect porter fees for "pipeline loke-are-pay"⁽²⁴²⁾ by I.B. 404 at Hpaung Daw.⁽²⁴³⁾ Human Rights Watch and other groups have reported similar interviews with individuals claiming they were forced to clear sections of the pipeline corridor or to build other facilities to support the pipeline.⁽²⁴⁴⁾ The Embassy reports that the work was being performed in an area that poses a significant risk of harm to the workers. According to the Embassy's report, on March 8, 1995, five Burmese nationals contracted by Total to survey the pipeline route were killed in an ambush conducted my members of the main Karen insurgent group. The attack took place only about two kilometers north of the base camp.⁽²⁴⁵⁾

In January 1996, a Singapore-based Unocal official responsible for monitoring the treatment of workers on the pipeline told an Embassy officer that laborers were paid directly by Total and "that the rate at which these workers run away has decreased sharply since the start of the project."⁽²⁴⁶⁾ By definition, workers can cease voluntary laborer when they desire to change jobs or cease working altogether. The statement that workers on the project had to "run away" may constitute an acknowledgment that at least some persons worked under coercion.

Although reports of forced labor related to security operations continue to emerge, most evidence of forced labor used on construction of the pipeline and associated facilities covers the period prior to late 1996. Both Embassy reports and the Total documents to which they refer lend credibility to refugee accounts of forced labor on pipeline project facilities during this timeframe, and a survey of allegations published by various human rights groups reveal few allegations of forced labor on project facilities after 1996. The decline in reports of forced labor past that date is consistent with observations of U.S. Embassy personnel in February 1998⁽²⁴⁷⁾ and a Unocal-sponsored fact finding mission in early 1998.⁽²⁴⁸⁾

Forced Labor Allegations Related to Pipeline Security

Human rights groups and ethnic opposition groups have reported a significant increase in the number of Burmese army battalions stationed in the pipeline area since 1993,⁽²⁴⁹⁾ suggesting that the purpose of this buildup was to provide security for the pipeline.⁽²⁵⁰⁾

While the pipeline was under construction, a military facility was built on Heinze Island which is allegedly used to provide off-shore security for the pipeline.⁽²⁵¹⁾ The U.N. Special Rapporteur on Burma reports that the military ordered 200 civilians to go to Heinze Island for two weeks in May 1995 in order to clear ground, build a helicopter pad and construct several buildings. The civilians did not receive any compensation for their work and had to pay the fuel bill for the boat that took them to the island.⁽²⁵²⁾ Troops in the area have also been accused of forcing civilians to build army bases⁽²⁵³⁾ and of pressing local villagers to serve as porters and provide other support for their security operations.⁽²⁵⁴⁾

The Embassy reported that there is no free egress from the Total base camp: "The camp has three chain-link perimeter fences topped with barbed wire. The two interior fences are about five meters apart. The exterior fence is separated from the others by a clear field of fire, possibly mined, about 20 meters wide. In the center of the camp are two underground bunkers. A squad of Burmese army infantry and another of local-national Total security personnel were stationed at the dual gatehouses of the compound's only entrance."⁽²⁵⁵⁾

It is possible to identify the specific battalions that provide security for the pipeline through the report from a 1996 visit to the pipeline by a U.S. Embassy officer⁽²⁵⁶⁾ and a Burmese army map photographed during a January 1998 tour of the pipeline by a reporter for the San Francisco Chronicle.⁽²⁵⁷⁾ A comparison of the two documents indicates that as of 1996, five battalions (I.B.s 273, 403, 404, 408 and 409)⁽²⁵⁸⁾ were assigned to the area. The map indicates that the location of these units directly on the pipeline corridor remains basically unchanged, however, the number of battalions stationed directly along the route has increased to six, with two other battalions operating just above and below the corridor.⁽²⁶⁰⁾ The 1998 map indicates that the battalions currently providing security for the pipeline are I.B.s 273, 282, 401, 406, 407, 408, 409 and 410. The presence of these battalions is consistent with reports by NGOs and opposition groups in the area.

Refugees interviewed by Amnesty International and other groups have identified many of the same battalions identified by Total as having "hired" civilians to work on infrastructure development projects and serve as military porters in the area of the pipeline.⁽²⁶¹⁾ Transcripts of interviews published by the Karen Human Rights Group include similar allegations of forced labor and forced portering.⁽²⁶²⁾ The U.N. Special Rapporteur for Human Rights in Burma has received accounts of abuses by these units from refugees fleeing Ye Pyu Township, who claimed that soldiers from I.B. 408 conducted several executions in August 1994.⁽²⁶³⁾ The Special Rapporteur also received allegations that troops from I.B. 410 raped five women from Ta Yoke Taung village in Ye Township.⁽²⁶⁴⁾

Forced Relocations along the Pipeline

Burmese army units have also allegedly relocated villages in the area of the pipeline.⁽²⁶⁵⁾ Officials from the oil companies, while not denying charges that the GOB forcibly relocated villagers, have told U.S. officials that "such relocations were without the direction and knowledge of the oil companies."⁽²⁶⁶⁾ A Unocal brochure claims that "since the production-sharing contract was signed in 1992, no villages in the vicinity of the pipeline have been relocated."⁽²⁶⁷⁾

Credible evidence exists that several villages along the route were forcibly relocated or depopulated in the months before the production-sharing agreement was signed.⁽²⁶⁸⁾ Villagers in the vicinity of the pipeline told U.S. Embassy officials of relocations that occurred in 1991.⁽²⁶⁹⁾ Several villages close to the pipeline were ordered to relocate and their residents either fled to refugee camps or complied with the relocation order.⁽²⁷⁰⁾ Residents of one village told U.S. Embassy officials that their village was ostensibly relocated for security reasons, but that with the assistance of Total, they were able to petition the government to allow them to return.⁽²⁷¹⁾

The Electrical Generating Authority of Thailand paid for an advertisement in the Bangkok Post in 1995 that stated, "Myanmar has recently cleared the way by relocating 11 Karen villages that would otherwise obstruct the passage of the gas resource development project."⁽²⁷²⁾

The Ye-Tavoy Railway

The nearly completed Ye-Tavoy railway will run from north to south for 110 kilometers between the coastal towns of Ye and Tavoy and will cross the pipeline, which runs from east to west, near Kanbauk. As indicated above, the U.S. Embassy in Rangoon noted widespread reports in 1996 that the Ye-Tavoy railway was being built "with an amount and harshness of forced labor that is unusual even by contemporary Burmese standards."⁽²⁷³⁾

Although there is no evidence that suggests the railway was designed to support actual construction of the pipeline, Embassy reports have suggested that military operations, including pipeline security, could be facilitated by the railway.⁽²⁷⁴⁾ There is evidence that the original route of the railway reflected military, rather than economic or engineering properties. Embassy reports described road access to the pipeline area during the wet season as "limited" and noted that "pipeline security could be materially facilitated by the railway now under construction between Ye and Tavoy."⁽²⁷⁵⁾ The urgency of building the railway, which at one point involved 24 hour construction by forced laborers,⁽²⁷⁶⁾ and the fact that the railway was scheduled to become operable at approximately the same time as the pipeline, suggest that the military placed a high priority on access to the pipeline provided by the railway.

The only merit to the original route of the railway was that it gave the military full access to areas where armed opposition groups traditionally operated -- the rainforest hills along the Burmese-Thai border. The original route bypassed local population centers and was abandoned after being washed out twice by rainwater flowing down the sides of the hills during the annual monsoons. The railway was then rerouted through flat lands closer to population centers further west, although the U.S. Embassy noted that the new route "may be less useful in combating insurgents from the rain forest to the east."⁽²⁷⁷⁾

Conclusions

The preponderance of available evidence warrants several conclusions about the use of forced labor on the pipeline project. For the early phases of the Yadana pipeline project, refugee accounts of forced labor appear to be credible in light of Embassy reporting about the pipeline and the Total documents to which it refers. These sources indicate that Total relied extensively on manual laborers recruited by the army during the early phases of the project through at least January 1996, including the construction of infrastructure to support subsequent pipeline construction. These workers were housed and fed in army battalions, but were paid "market wages" directly by Total officials. This does not prove that Total used forced labor on the pipeline, but it is consistent with and lends substantial credibility to the refugees' allegations. At the very least, Total's documented practice of using manual labor recruited by the army and quartered in army battalions demands explanation. The ILO's Commission of Inquiry looked at the allegations of forced labor associated with the pipeline and Total's denials, and generally concluded that it could make no finding as to the conflicting evidence presented because the Commission was denied access to Burma.⁽²⁷⁸⁾

In any event, by 1998, in the final stages of the project, it appears Total had stopped using manual labor recruited by the army, as is indicated by Embassy Rangoon reporting based on visits to the pipeline sites by Embassy staff. This is consistent with 1998 Total/Unocal public relations documents stating that the Yadana project does not use labor recruited by the army.

The urgency of building the Ye-Tavoy railway, which at one point involved 24 hour construction by forced laborers in 1996,⁽²⁷⁹⁾ and the fact that the railway was scheduled to become operable at approximately the same time as the pipeline in 1998, suggest that the military placed a high priority on access to the pipeline provided by the railway and that there is some relationship between these two projects.⁽²⁸⁰⁾

Although the on-shore segment of the pipeline is now complete, allegations of forced labor related to it continue to emerge.⁽²⁸¹⁾ Some reports suggest that forced labor is used to build support facilities integral to the operation of the pipeline, others that forced labor is used to support operations of the military. The U.S. Embassy notes that "given the high priority the regime has attached to pipeline security, reports of an enlarged military presence and the potential for forced porterage and forced labor to support the expanded military presence in the region are plausible."⁽²⁸²⁾ Because the GOB has refused to permit independent observation of the area,⁽²⁸³⁾ and because transportation to the corridor can only be facilitated by the oil companies which can provide access to the necessary helicopter transportation,⁽²⁸⁴⁾ it remains impossible to verify or refute these current allegations.

OTHER FORCED RELOCATIONS

Forced relocation of villagers in Burma started before 1988, but it appears to have escalated significantly since then. In some areas it has increased significantly since 1996.⁽²⁸⁵⁾ Forced relocations take two forms: as part of urban redevelopment programs, or in the context of counter-insurgency campaigns.⁽²⁸⁶⁾ Thus, both rural and urban people are affected by forced relocations.⁽²⁸⁷⁾ Estimates of the number of people moved since 1988 vary from 100,000⁽²⁸⁸⁾ to 1.5 million.⁽²⁸⁹⁾ Forced relocations are a common contributing cause of refugee flight.⁽²⁹⁰⁾

People are usually ordered to relocate by troops, and commonly receive only a week or ten day's notice that they must move. In some cases villagers have reported that they were told they would be shot if they did not comply with the order. Villagers are not compensated for their property when they move.⁽²⁹¹⁾ Villagers must take all their possessions, but often there is insufficient time to move them, and soldiers confiscate them. The areas to which villagers are forced to relocate are commonly ill-prepared, if at all. Villagers must buy or build new accommodations on arrival, and there are often no facilities for water, sewage or health care.⁽²⁹²⁾ The relocation sites are often tightly controlled by the military, and in some cases villages have reportedly been required to seek passes to leave the site and return.⁽²⁹³⁾

As noted, forced relocation occurs either as part of urban redevelopment, or in association with counter-insurgency campaigns. Villagers are usually required to relocate to specific sites. It has been reported that villagers have then been subjected to forced labor. It does not appear that the reason villagers are relocated is to create available pools of forced laborers. It is possible, however, that the locations to which villagers have been moved were selected for their proximity to projects on which forced labor was subsequently used.⁽²⁹⁴⁾ Villagers in Taungoo District were reportedly ordered to move to "Army labor camps" after January 1996.⁽²⁹⁵⁾ Shan and Karenni refugees interviewed by DOL reported that they were ordered to vacate their villages and to move to specific camps, which also served subsequently as forced labor sites.⁽²⁹⁶⁾

Relocations have occurred in many parts of Burma, particularly in the Kachin, Karen, Kayah (Karenni), Mon and Shan States.⁽²⁹⁷⁾ Forced relocations have also taken place in Arakan Sate, where they may have been motivated by a desire to alter the ethnic balance by moving the Muslim Rohingyas.⁽²⁹⁸⁾ Forced relocations have also occurred in the Tenasserim Division. Five villages in the Kywe Thone Nyi Ma village tract, of Ye Pyu Township, were reportedly ordered to move in February 1997.⁽²⁹⁹⁾

Kayah (Karenni) State has been particularly affected,⁽³⁰⁰⁾ as have the central and southern parts of Shan State, where "[a]lmost every village away from towns and major roads has reportedly been forced to move."⁽³⁰¹⁾ The U.S. Embassy in Rangoon has reported that in this area "tens of thousands of villagers have been displaced or herded into the equivalent of 'strategic hamlets.'"⁽³⁰²⁾ Six hundred villages in central and southern Shan State were reportedly ordered to relocate in June 1996, affecting 20,000 people.⁽³⁰³⁾ More recently, Amnesty International estimates that at least 300,000 people in the Shan State have been forced to flee their homes in the past two years, some having been relocated three or four times.⁽³⁰⁴⁾ One hundred villages in Kayah State were reportedly ordered to relocate between April and June 1996,⁽³⁰⁵⁾ and 98 villages in Karen state were reportedly forced to relocate in June 1996.⁽³⁰⁶⁾

Rohingya villagers from many townships in Arakan State have been forced to relocate to Maungdaw and Buthidaung. Thousands were forced to relocate between July 1994 and February 1995.⁽³⁰⁷⁾ Buddhist Rakhine villagers in Mrauk-Oo, Arakan State were reportedly relocated in March and May 1996.⁽³⁰⁸⁾ Three thousand Muslim villagers were ordered to move from their homes in Pike Thee village tract in March 1995.⁽³⁰⁹⁾ Human Rights Watch/Asia and Refugees International have reported that orders to Muslim villagers to relocate from Kyauktaw to Maungdaw and Buthidaung may have been the cause of some refugee flight to Bangladesh in early 1997.⁽³¹⁰⁾

There have been reports that forcibly relocated villagers have then been subjected to demands for forced labor. In some cases, relocated villagers have reportedly been forced to work on construction projects.⁽³¹¹⁾ The U.N. Special Rapporteur reported in 1997 that refugees he had interviewed in Thailand had been subjected to forced labor while living in relocation camps. One member of each family was required to do work for the military, such as building its compounds. Other tasks the villagers had to perform for the military included guarding the relocation site, cleaning the military compound, or building fences.⁽³¹²⁾

CHAPTER 3

Freedom of association, the right to organize and the right to bargain collectively, are protected by many international human rights instruments. ILO Conventions 87 (freedom of association and protection of the right to organize)⁽³¹³⁾ and 98 (right to organize and collective bargaining)⁽³¹⁴⁾ are the core ILO instruments protecting trade union rights.⁽³¹⁵⁾ The Universal Declaration of Human Rights,⁽³¹⁶⁾ the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights,⁽³¹⁷⁾ and the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights also protect these freedoms.⁽³¹⁸⁾

Burma ratified Convention 87 in 1955, and is bound as an ILO member to apply the principles of freedom of association.⁽³¹⁹⁾ Burmese laws in place which should protect these rights are inconsistent with international standards, and are ignored in practice. There are no independent labor unions, and there is no right to collective bargaining. Workers who try to form or join unions in Burma are liable to be arrested and jailed, and may be tortured. Burmese seafarers who contact international unions over their working conditions are harassed and punished, including by having their right to work at sea and their passports revoked. Largely because there are no independent unions in Burma, there is no collective bargaining in the country. Military and civilian authorities intervened during a recent case of labor unrest in the apparel sector, the largest source of imports to the United States from Burma.⁽³²⁰⁾

THERE ARE NO INDEPENDENT LABOR UNIONS, IN LAW OR IN PRACTICE

Several Burmese laws relate to freedom of association and union organizing, but each is inconsistent with Convention 87 and none is applied in practice. The Trade Unions Act of 1926 inhibits organizing⁽³²¹⁾ and restricts the choice of union officials.⁽³²²⁾ The 1964 Law Defining the Fundamental Rights and Responsibilities of the People's Workers' Councils⁽³²³⁾ established a compulsory, hierarchical system of people's workers' councils under the direction of the BSPP.⁽³²⁴⁾ It was amended in the 1970s to allow workers to join a union, but it required all workers to join a single union, the Asiayone, which the BSPP established and controlled.⁽³²⁵⁾

The Asiayone was disbanded after the SLORC took power, but neither the Trade Unions Act 1926 nor the Law Defining the Fundamental Rights and Responsibilities of the People's Workers' Councils was repealed. According to the GOB, a re-drafted version of the Trade Unions Act was reviewed by the Attorney General in 1994, prior to approval by the Laws Scrutiny Central Body.⁽³²⁶⁾ It appears that no draft has been published. A GOB Ministry of Labor publication explains the legal situation this way:

Due to dismantling of Workers Asiayone (Labor Union) after the advent of the State Law and Order Restoration Council in 1988, at the moment there are no Trade Unions in Myanmar. This has been pointed out at the ILO Annual Conferences. However, a new Trade Union Law is being drafted to replace the existing one. The technical assistance of the ILO has been sought in this regard.

At the present time, in place of Trade Unions, Worker Welfare Committees have been formed throughout Myanmar. These Welfare Committees consist of managers and workers' representatives [sic]. They look after the welfare of workers.⁽³²⁷⁾

As noted previously, the ILO has condemned Burma's record of denying freedom of association, contrary to Convention 87, for over 40 years. This criticism increased after the military coup in 1962, and intensified even more following the GOB's suppression of the pro-democracy movement in 1988.⁽³²⁸⁾

In 1966, the ILO Committee of Experts⁽³²⁹⁾ repeated observations it had voiced previously that the Trade Unions Act is inconsistent with Article 2 of Convention 87 which guarantees the right to establish unions without previous authorization. The Committee noted that the requirement for a union to have 50% of the employees is a major obstacle to a union "furthering and defending the interests" of its members. It would also result in prohibiting the establishment of a new trade union whenever one union already existed in an establishment.⁽³³⁰⁾

The ILO commented further in 1971 that the Trade Unions Act establishes a compulsory system for worker representation and concluded that Convention 87 "has ceased to be applied in practice."⁽³³¹⁾

After several more years of similar criticisms by the ILO, the GOB responded in 1989 to both the Committee of Experts and the Committee on Application of Standards of the ILO Conference that major political changes were under way in Burma. In particular, the GOB claimed that the former single-party system was in the process of being transformed into a multi-party system. The GOB thus concluded that there was no point in responding to the ILO's requests for information about steps taken to implement Convention 87 as the situation [denial of freedom of association] no longer existed.⁽³³²⁾

The GOB reasserted these claims to the ILO Conference in 1991 by stating that with the abolition of the one-party political system, the unitary trade union structure had automatically become defunct.⁽³³³⁾ The Conference Committee on the Application of Standards took note of assurances made to the ILO that the GOB was committed to a process of change in the country's legislation that would guarantee trade union rights. The Committee recalled that previous such assurances had not been realized and consequently "expressed its deep concern and firmly urged the GOB to adopt, in the very near future, the necessary measures in legislation and practice to guarantee to all workers and all employers without any distinction and without prior authorization the right to organize even outside the existing trade union structure should they so wish."⁽³³⁴⁾

The ILO supervisory bodies again expressed their regret in 1994 that, despite assurances made by the GOB to the effect that it was involved in the process of changing legislation in order to guarantee trade union rights, no tangible signs of improvement had been observed.⁽³³⁵⁾

In 1995, the ILO Committee of Experts recalled that, "it has been commenting upon the serious incompatibilities between the GOB's law and practice, on the one hand, and the Convention, on the other hand, for 40 years." In turn, the 1995 Conference Committee expressed concern that the GOB had not acted on the observations of the Committee of Experts over many years and that no trade unions in the true sense of the term existed. It urged the GOB to adopt, as a matter or urgency, the necessary measures.⁽³³⁶⁾

The Conference Committee noted in its 1996 report that the GOB representative only repeated, as in previous years, the Burmese Government's intention to implement Convention 87 without specifying any tangible developments. The Committee "deeply regretted the fact that very serious and persistent violations of the fundamental principles of the Convention were continuing in Burma." The Committee observed that there are "no trade unions in the country whose objective is the defense and promotion of the interests of workers in the sense of Convention 87."⁽³³⁷⁾

The Committee of Experts once again expressed its "profound regret" in 1997 that the GOB representative to the ILO had only repeated what had been said over previous years without being able to indicate that any specific positive developments had occurred in law or practice.⁽³³⁸⁾ Likewise, the Conference Committee deplored the total absence of progress in the application of the Convention.⁽³³⁹⁾

Despite the intense interest and criticism of the ILO supervisory bodies relating to Burma's application of Convention 87, the Government had much the same response in 1998. And, as it had every year since 1995, the Conference Committee highlighted the case of Burma in a special paragraph of its report, this time noting that it was "once again obliged to express its profound regret that serious divergencies between the national legislation and practice, on the one hand, and the provisions of the Convention, on the other, continued to exist and [that it] deplored the absence of cooperation on the part of the Government in this regard." Extremely concerned over the total absence of progress in the application of this Convention, the Committee once again strongly urged the Government to adopt, as a matter of urgency, the measures and mechanisms necessary to guarantee freedom of association. The case was further singled out, for the third consecutive year, as one of "continued failure to implement" a ratified convention.⁽³⁴⁰⁾

The U.N. Special Rapporteur on Burma has noted that the GOB denies freedom of association to its citizens, that "workers and trade unionists who criticize the Government would risk interrogation and arrest,"⁽³⁴¹⁾ and called on the GOB to cooperate more closely with the ILO in order to comply with its obligations under Convention 87.⁽³⁴²⁾

THE GOB DOES NOT RECOGNIZE THE FEDERATION OF TRADE UNIONS, BURMA

Although no labor unions are recognized by the GOB within Burma, there is a functioning Burmese union organization. The Federation of Trade Unions, Burma (FTUB) is the umbrella organization, or union central, for labor unions in Burma. According to Amnesty International, the FTUB "is not legally recognized in [Burma], where independent trade union activity is completely prohibited."⁽³⁴³⁾ The repression of the FTUB, its officers and members is part of the complete denial of freedom of association, expression, thought and opinion in Burma.⁽³⁴⁴⁾ The remaining opposition political parties, for example, are subject to "intense and constant monitoring" by the GOB,⁽³⁴⁵⁾ and their gatherings "are routinely repressed . . ."⁽³⁴⁶⁾ The position of the FTUB and its officers was summed up by the U.N. Special Rapporteur in his interim report to the General Assembly in October 1997:

The Free Trade Unions of Burma [sic] is not allowed to function in the country, and workers identified with it [are] under constant surveillance by the police and the military intelligence agency in permanent fear of arrest and torture.⁽³⁴⁷⁾

The FTUB was formed in 1989, and has offices in Washington, D.C., Bangkok, and Sydney. Its affiliates include the Burma Miners Union and the Seafarers Union of Burma. The FTUB states that it has "an extensive network of organizers, educators and leaders who share the common goal of developing a democratic trade union movement inside of Burma."⁽³⁴⁸⁾ Through this network, which operates in Thailand, India, Bangladesh and Burma, the FTUB documents the situation inside Burma, and advocates for basic workers' rights. Although it is not affiliated with the International Confederation of Free Trade Unions (ICFTU),⁽³⁴⁹⁾ the FTUB has been supported by the international labor movement as the legitimate voice of labor in Burma. Recently, for example, the FTUB participated as part of the ICFTU team which presented evidence during hearings held by the ILO Commission of Inquiry concerning forced labor in Burma.⁽³⁵⁰⁾

According to the FTUB, the legal reason why it cannot register and operate in Burma is the operation of SLORC Law 6/88, the Law on the Formation of Associations and Organizations.⁽³⁵¹⁾ Under the terms of this law, some organizations may not be registered, including those involved in activities which might disrupt the State. The list of these activities is so broad that it would probably cover most union activities in support of workers' demands.⁽³⁵²⁾ Any organization which does not register under the Associations Law is an illegal organization, and must not continue to exist.⁽³⁵³⁾ Any person who participates in the activities of an illegal organization, or who assists an illegal organization is liable to imprisonment for doing so.⁽³⁵⁴⁾

In June 1997, two members of the FTUB executive committee were arrested and charged with treason, apparently as a result of their activities supporting a democratic trade union movement. Myo Aung Thant was arrested at Mingaladon international airport in Rangoon, by personnel of the National Intelligence Bureau, on his return from Thailand. His wife and children were reportedly arrested at the same time. U Khin Kyaw and his wife were arrested later that day at their home in Rangoon. Myo Aung Thant is a member of the All Burma Petro-Chemical Corporation Union, which was formed during the 1988 pro-democracy movement. U Khin Kyaw is a member of the Seafarers' Union of Burma, and was President of the All Burma Workers Union during the democracy uprisings in 1988. Both men were documenting worker rights violations in Burma, including the widespread use of forced labor, and passing the information to the international trade union movement.

At a press conference held on June 27, 1997 Lt. Gen Khin Nyunt, (then Secretary-1 of the SLORC, and now Secretary-1 of the SPDC) asserted that Myo Aung Thant and U Khin Kyaw were involved in terrorist activities. He claimed that the two men attended a meeting in Ranong, in southern Thailand, on June 4, 1997, convened by U Maung Maung, General Secretary of the FTUB. Khin Nyunt alleged that the purpose of the meeting was to plan terrorist attacks, including bombings of the Chinese and Indonesian embassies in Rangoon, and the assassination of an unnamed SLORC leader. According to Khin Nyunt, the plot was foiled when Myo Aung Thant was seized at Rangoon airport, and explosives were seized at Kawthaung, which is 600 miles away at the southern tip of Burma. U Maung Maung has repeatedly and publicly denied the allegations against him.⁽³⁵⁵⁾

Myo Aung Thant was tried at Insein Special Court for breaches of the Unlawful Associations Act, and the Emergency Provisions Act.⁽³⁵⁶⁾ According to Amnesty International, unofficial sources indicated that the trial took less than ten days, and was held in closed session. As Amnesty International pointed out, the defendant in political trials in Burma is often not allowed the counsel of his or her choice, and most of the basic requirements of a fair trial according to international standards are not met.⁽³⁵⁷⁾ Myo Aung Thant was sentenced to 20 years' imprisonment for high treason, 3 years' imprisonment for breaching the Unlawful Associations Act, and 7 years' imprisonment for breaching the Emergency Provisions Act.⁽³⁵⁸⁾

When Amnesty International published this report in August 1997, it was unaware of the fate of U Khin Kyaw, and remains concerned for his safety.⁽³⁵⁹⁾ According to the FTUB, both Myo Aung Thant and U Khin Kyaw were sentenced to "life plus a term of years."⁽³⁶⁰⁾ The 1998 report of the U.N. Special Rapporteur on human rights expressed concern that both FTUB executives and their detained family members might be subject to torture or other ill-treatment during their present detention.⁽³⁶¹⁾

FORCED MEMBERSHIP OF THE USDA

According to general principles on freedom of association, no one may be compelled to join an association.⁽³⁶²⁾ ILO Convention 87 does not make specific mention of this freedom, but a country may choose to legally protect the right of individuals not to join an association against their will. This protection is consistent with Convention 87.⁽³⁶³⁾

The GOB frequently breaches this principle by compelling people to join the Union Solidarity and Development Association (USDA) and to participate in its activities. Within two years of its formation in September 1993, the USDA's membership had reportedly grown to 2.5 million,⁽³⁶⁴⁾ and is now more than 6 million. The USDA has branches in every state and division, and is represented in 90 per cent of Burma's wards and villages. Membership is open to anyone over the age of 10, "but the 11 to 25 year age group, representing roughly one third of the population, is the focus of recruitment efforts."⁽³⁶⁵⁾ High schools are fertile recruitment areas, and members of the military and the public service, who are prohibited from joining political parties, are 'encouraged' to join.⁽³⁶⁶⁾ In fact, high school students are threatened with losing their places at school if they do not join. Once they do join, they are subject to indoctrination:

The USDA particularly targets children and youths, with the intention of instilling in them loyalty to the nation and respect for the armed forces, and creating a 'patriotic youth force'.⁽³⁶⁷⁾

The U.N. Special Rapporteur summarized the position in his report to the Commission on Human Rights in 1997:

. . . the Special Rapporteur has received reports that most members of the USDA have joined the organization against their will. Civil servants are said to have their names automatically registered on USDA rosters, and village and township level authorities are reportedly expected to register at least one USDA member per household. According to reports, students in some areas must join the USDA if they want to pass their matriculation exams.⁽³⁶⁸⁾

COLLECTIVE BARGAINING AND LABOR UNREST

Although there is some machinery in place for collective bargaining in Burma, in practice no collective bargaining occurs. One obvious reason is that there are no recognized labor unions, and that workers who participate in labor union activities are actively persecuted by the GOB. Sixteen workers were recently dismissed for participating as members of a strike committee at an apparel factory in Pegu. The incident (discussed further below) shows it is a simple matter for an employer to inform military authorities about a labor dispute, and to arrange for them to exert pressure on the workers.⁽³⁶⁹⁾

A Government Central Arbitration Board exists, but it is not active. There are township-level labor supervisory committees to address minor labor concerns. According to the GOB:

a systematic and effective machinery has been established under the Ministry of Labor for settlement of trade disputes. There are also ways and means for preliminary negotiation and conciliation at the township level.⁽³⁷⁰⁾

The Trade Disputes Act, appears still to be in force, and it establishes a range of different dispute settlement mechanisms. These may be the mechanism to which the GOB's 1996 publication refers.

As noted, there are no recognized unions in Burma and attempts to organize any are suppressed. Moreover, the predominance of self-employment and unpaid family work, the average size of workplaces, and government control of large and industrial workplaces all limit the prospects for union organizing to occur. In Burma most workers are in the agricultural sector, where a large majority work for themselves or as unpaid family laborers.⁽³⁷¹⁾ Most people who are employees work in small workplaces where the likelihood of union organizing is usually lower than in large workplaces.⁽³⁷²⁾ Most large workplaces, however, are operated by the GOB which actively opposes union organizing⁽³⁷³⁾ and sets working conditions unilaterally. Union organizing is more likely to occur in industrial workplaces where there is a greater chance that workers do similar work, but these enterprises are overwhelmingly owned by the government.⁽³⁷⁴⁾

Wages and Hours

According to the GOB, "wages and salaries of workers in the private enterprise are usually fixed on mutual agreement between the employers and the workers."⁽³⁷⁵⁾ There is no official minimum wage in the private sector. In the case of foreign joint ventures, however, the government pressures joint venturers not to pay salaries higher than those of ministers or high level government employees. Some joint venturers circumvent this with supplemental pay, allowances, or payments in foreign exchange certificates, as well as through incentive and overtime pay and other benefits.⁽³⁷⁶⁾ According to the Free Trade Union of Burma (FTUB), the GOB has a fixed ceiling on factory wages of less than $3 dollars a day.⁽³⁷⁷⁾

Working hours in the apparel industry are said to approach 60 hours a week. Average shopfloor wages are reported to be about 2,000 kyat ($16 at the market exchange rate) per month, nearly double the average cash wage of central government civilian employees, but without the side benefits (subsidized housing and food, supplemental cash welfare payments).⁽³⁷⁸⁾

There is a legally prescribed 5-day, 35-hour work week for public sector employees and a 6-day, 44-hour work week for private and parastatal employees, with overtime for additional work. The law also allows for a 24-hour rest period per week and workers have 21 paid holidays a year.⁽³⁷⁹⁾

Private sector workers are entitled to 6 days of casual leave, 30 days of medical leave, 10 days of earned leave and 21 paid public holidays.⁽³⁸⁰⁾ In addition to these entitlements, women who work in enterprises covered by the Social Security Act are entitled to maternity benefits. In reality, such provisions affect only a small proportion of Burma's labor force⁽³⁸¹⁾ and are largely ignored by most employers.

The main law in Burma regulating working conditions is the Factories Act of 1951.⁽³⁸²⁾ Other relevant laws include the Oilfields (Labor and Welfare) Act, 1951 and the Shops and Establishments Act, 1951. The Workmens Compensation Act, 1923 ⁽³⁸³⁾ and the Social Security Act, 1954⁽³⁸⁴⁾ regulate compensation for workplace injuries, illness and death. In practice, these laws are rarely enforced. Penalties for infractions of labor laws are minor and are insufficient to have much of a deterrent effect.⁽³⁸⁵⁾

Apparel Sector

Although there are no recognized unions and no formal collective bargaining, recent events in the apparel sector suggest that some workers are unsatisfied with their wages and working conditions and are prepared to organize at the local level to express their grievances.

During November and December 1997, a work stoppage over labor conditions was reported at the "Hong Kong UMEH" apparel factory in Pegu.⁽³⁸⁶⁾ This strike was eventually resolved in favor of the workers. The following account of the incident is based on FTUB information.

Hong Kong UMEH is a joint venture between a Hong Kong firm, Yan Xi Kyan, and the Union of Myanmar Economic Holdings, a military-owned company. In November 1997, an elected 11 member committee led a work stoppage to demand better working conditions for the 1,337 employees.⁽³⁸⁷⁾ During a second work stoppage on December 2, factory managers decided to meet with the strike committee and agreed to their demands⁽³⁸⁸⁾

Later the same day, the factory's Chinese advisors held a meeting with the administration manager and rescinded the agreement. The workers committee responded by calling a strike⁽³⁸⁹⁾ and began a sit-down picket in front of the factory the following morning, December 3, at 6:30 am. At 9:00 am, the General Manager of the factory arrived and had an argument with the workers over his attempt to cross the picket line.

Several government officials arrived that afternoon, including representatives of the Military Intelligence, the Police Special Branch, the Township Labor Department, and the Social Welfare Department. They held a meeting with the striking workers, and detained and removed the 11 members of the strike committee. The strike committee members were taken to the local SLORC/SPDC office, where they were interrogated individually by Military Intelligence, the township police and the Police Special Branch. All of them were dismissed from their jobs.

The next day, December 4, both the strike and the picket line continued. On December 5, another 5 strike leaders were dismissed. On December 6, the Deputy Director of the Labor Department came to the factory and met with the striking workers, who refused to withdraw their demands and insisted that their dismissed colleagues be reinstated. The strike continued on December 7 and 8. Factory management finally declared on December 8 that all demands would be met. On December 12, the dismissed workers were allowed to return to their jobs.

According to the FTUB, workers at other apparel factories have been dissatisfied with their working conditions, and in one case took action to express their concerns.⁽³⁹⁰⁾ On December 12, 1997, workers at the "Cherry Garment Factory" in North Okkalapa, Rangoon, reportedly staged a sit down strike to protest impending closure of the factory and loss of their jobs. The factory management confirmed that the plant would close, but agreed to give the workers three months' advance pay, and that all of them would be able to transfer to jobs at a new location.

Workers at large apparel factories which were recently taken over by the military have also reportedly been dissatisfied with working conditions. The Thamaing factory, in Rangoon, the Paleik factory, in Paleik (Magwe Division) and the Shwedaung factory in Swe Taung (Pegu Division) each employs more than 3,000 workers. At each plant, workers are unsatisfied that wage levels have not been increased to keep pace with inflation.⁽³⁹¹⁾ Workers are also unhappy with strict military-style supervision that was introduced when the military took control of the factories. Members of the military have taken over all levels of factory management, even to the level of foreman.⁽³⁹²⁾

These events take place in a sector which represents the largest source of imports to the United States from Burma, despite the fact that the United States did not renew its textile trade agreement with the GOB in 1990. Statistics from the U.S. Department of Commerce show that the value of total U.S. imports from Burma increased from $17 million in 1989 to $115 million in 1997. Apparel accounts for most of these imports, growing from $7 million in 1989 to approximately $86 million in 1997.⁽³⁹³⁾ U.S. imports of Burmese manufactured products, such as garments, have been targeted by an active and growing "Free Burma" consumer boycott movement in the United States.⁽³⁹⁴⁾

SEAFARERS ARE HARASSED AND PUNISHED FOR CONTACTING UNIONS

It is has been reported that Burmese seafarers work for much lower pay, and in far worse conditions than most other seafarers. They are vulnerable to exploitation by unscrupulous ship owners, particularly those which operate under the flag of convenience vessels.⁽³⁹⁵⁾ In 1993, there were over 28,000 Burmese seafarers registered with the GOB, and over 11,000 of these were working on foreign flag ships.⁽³⁹⁶⁾ One reason Burmese seafarers will work for low wages is that there are few opportunities to earn a good living in Burma. An added advantage is that seafarers' earn their wages in hard, foreign currency.

A significant reason why Burmese seafarers are vulnerable, however, is that the terms of their employment contracts prohibit them from contacting labor unions to address their grievances. In particular, the contract prohibits them from contacting the International Transport Workers Federation (ITF), which operates internationally (including via its national affiliates) to protect the basic rights of seafarers. This contractual term is imposed and enforced by the GOB. The GOB has punished Burmese seafarers who have contacted labor unions by revoking their seamens certificates and confiscating their passports. In one case it published a list of 14 seafarers, naming them as troublemakers who should not be hired.

Burmese seafarers can only get work through a GOB agency, the Seafarers Employment Control Division (SECD), which is part of the Department of Marine Administration. Seafarers' employment contracts are overseen by the SECD. When a Burmese seafarer finds work through the SECD, he or she is required to sign an affidavit agreeing not to contact the ITF for any reason, or to participate in its activities. The affidavit includes a statement that if the ITF wins an award of back-pay for a worker, the payment will be returned to the ship's master or crew. This applies regardless of whether or not a Burmese crew-member contacts the ITF. In 1993 the ITF lodged a complaint concerning these contracts, and GOB retaliation against seafarers who contacted the ITF, with the ILO's Committee on Freedom of Association (CFA).⁽³⁹⁷⁾

In its complaint,⁽³⁹⁸⁾ the ITF accused the GOB of flagrant violations of human and trade union rights, through its oppression of seafarers serving on foreign flagships. It detailed several incidents in which the GOB retaliated against Burmese seafarers who had complained to the ITF about their working conditions. It alleged that making seafarers sign affidavits undertaking not to contact the ITF, and to return back-pay, was a breach of their trade union rights. The complaint was compiled with the assistance of the Seafarers' Union of Burma (SUB). The SUB is affiliated to the ITF, and to the FTUB, but it is not recognized by the GOB.

The allegations in the ITF complaint centered on five distinct incidents. This description of the incidents is based on the CFA report on the case.⁽³⁹⁹⁾

• In March 1987, the MV Albatross docked near New Orleans. Burmese seafarers sought ITF assistance to resolve grievances on board the ship, including late payment and under-payment of wages and poor living conditions. After the ITF became involved, the ship-owner contacted the GOB Ambassador in Washington, and within hours the dispute was over. The crew members maintained that they were threatened and intimidated by the Ambassador.⁽⁴⁰⁰⁾
• In the MS Cape Hope incident, (which also occurred in 1987) a seafarer (with ITF assistance) sought back pay in a labor court in Germany. Each pay day, the seafarer had been forced to sign two pay lists: one for the ITF, and a much lower one for the SECD. A representative of the GOB Embassy in Bonn learned of the case, and visited the ship in port. The GOB representative persuaded the seafarer to sign papers indicating that he no longer wished to pursue the case. The case continued without him, however, and the court awarded over $44,000 in back pay.⁽⁴⁰¹⁾
• In the case of the MV Trans Dignity, 14 Burmese seafarers contacted the ITF affiliated Swedish Seamen's Union in September 1988. Among other things, the ship was operating two sets of books, and requiring seafarers to certify that they received more pay than they really had. Union pressure forced the ship owner to sign a new agreement which included a settlement for back pay. After this, the Burmese crew members returned to Bangkok where GOB authorities confiscated their passports and Thai authorities declared them illegal immigrants. Those who returned to Burma had their passports confiscated and their registration as seafarers canceled.⁽⁴⁰²⁾
• In the MV Chemical Harmony case, an ITF affiliated union inspector discovered in March 1991 that 14 Burmese crew members did not appear on the ship's records. The names of 14 Korean seafarers who were not on the ship had been substituted. The Burmese were being paid much lower wages than the Koreans through a double-bookkeeping system. The crew members pressed for and received a settlement for back pay, and then returned at their own risk to Thailand and Burma.⁽⁴⁰³⁾
• The MV Angelic Faith incident occurred in June 1993. While the ship was docked in an Australian port, 11 Burmese seafarers won a settlement for nearly $100,000 back pay with the assistance of the ITF affiliated Maritime Union of Australia (MUA). The MUA arranged for their repatriation to Thailand via Singapore. On arrival in Singapore, they were forced to return to Burma and were reportedly to have been placed under house arrest.⁽⁴⁰⁴⁾

The ITF also relied on some public comments by the Director-General of the SECD, to show that there were no union rights for seafarers. The then Director-General, Dr. U Tin Hlaing, had stated that in the absence of a labor union, it was the SECD which looked after the welfare and interests of Burmese seafarers. The SECD, according to Dr. U Tin Hlaing, was solely responsible for ensuring that seafarers received their wages and worked under decent conditions. Dr. U Tin Hlaing had confirmed that seafarers had to sign a contract which included a clause requiring them not to "let down the State's dignity." He also confirmed that disciplinary measures could be taken for breach of this agreement, including confiscation of the seafarer's discharge book.⁽⁴⁰⁵⁾

The GOB did not respond directly to the allegation that it required seafarers to sign affidavits restricting their right to contact the ITF. It did admit, however, that seafarers had to pledge to "conduct themselves as good citizens of the Union of Myanmar and also . . . abide by the rules and regulations for Myanmar seamen."⁽⁴⁰⁶⁾ The GOB reported that four of the 14 seamen (from the MV Trans Dignity incident) who were the subject of a campaign labeling them as troublemakers had been traveling with false passports, and had not registered as seafarers. As to the 11 seafarers alleged to have been kidnapped, (the MV Angelic Faith incident), the GOB asserted that they had merely been repatriated by the shipowners according to the terms of their contracts. No harm befell them on their return to Burma, although their registrations as seafarers were canceled. According to the CFA, the GOB:

. . . claims that the SUB does not represent the seamen of Myanmar. Those who belong to this self-styled SUB are a handful of seamen who have violated the laws, rules and regulations of the country. This small group of seamen left the country for various reasons and chose to stay abroad. They are involved in illegal and clandestine business. The SUB is not recognized by the Government of the Union of Myanmar.⁽⁴⁰⁷⁾

The CFA concluded it was "amply clear" that in most of the incidents the GOB authorities, either directly or indirectly, had exerted pressure of various types on the seafarers involved once they had reached a settlement with ITF assistance.⁽⁴⁰⁸⁾ It noted that the GOB had not responded to the allegations about the affidavits, and concluded that they were true.⁽⁴⁰⁹⁾ The CFA emphasized that workers' organizations should not be prevented from affiliating with international organizations. In this case, it was the workers themselves who were prevented from contacting the international organization. But the CFA was satisfied that it was only because the SUB operates from Thailand that it is not recognized by the GOB.⁽⁴¹⁰⁾ The CFA reminded the GOB that governments may not decide which organizations represent workers: they have the right to form and join organizations of their own choosing. It remarked:

. . . the evidence . . . in this case is yet another example of the way in which the government denies the right to freedom of association to its citizens. The Committee deplores that this case illustrates that the Government similarly denies the same fundamental rights to Myanmar seafarers.⁽⁴¹¹⁾

The CFA called on the GOB to refrain from interfering with seafarers' rights to pursue their grievances through the ITF and/or its affiliated unions.⁽⁴¹²⁾ In its recommendations the Committee called on the Government (1) to stop requiring seafarers to sign affidavits waiving their rights to contact the ITF, (2) to respect the right of seafarers to form and join an independent union if they wished, and (3) to refrain from acts of anti-union discrimination against those who contacted or were involved in the ITF.⁽⁴¹³⁾

In 1995, the GOB informed the ILO that it was so concerned about the recommendations in the CFA report, that the SECD had revoked the requirement for seamen to sign an affidavit before leaving the country, effective from February 9, 1995.⁽⁴¹⁴⁾ Both the SUB and the ITF, however, report that the GOB still requires seafarers to sign a sworn statement which prevents them from contacting the ITF or becoming involved in its activities or from accepting back-pay won for them by the ITF, and requires them to return to the ship's master any back-pay won for them by the ITF.

The SUB provided a copy of a sworn statement dated November 30, 1996.⁽⁴¹⁵⁾ It obliges the seafarer not to involve the ITF in any activities, to accept any sums of money that the ITF might obtain for the worker, and to return to the owner or master any such sum of money obtained by ITF assistance (whether the ITF was brought in by the worker or by any other crew member).

The SUB reports that it is still not recognized by the GOB, and therefore is based in Bangkok. While it claims to have some registered members it is very difficult to contact them without a base inside Burma. Because the GOB does not recognize the SUB, workers generally will not contact or join the union for fear of consequences for themselves and their families. A senior ITF official confirmed that most Burmese seafarers are too scared of the GOB to seek ITF assistance. Even in cases where ITF inspectors are able to board ships with Burmese crew-members, and the conditions are obviously below standard, the Burmese are usually unwilling to explain their situation, or to get involved in any effort to redress their grievances.

Two documents provided by the SUB confirm that Burmese seafarers are afraid of government retaliation if they contact the ITF, and that the GOB threatens such retaliation. In a recent incident in Vancouver, Canada, the Burmese crew of a vessel contacted the ITF for assistance. In their letter seeking assistance in resolving their grievances, the crew concluded:

We don't want to mention our names in the letter because our company might send our names to our government. That will be great danger for us. Please don't mention about this to our company. We really need your help.⁽⁴¹⁶⁾

The other letter is from the SECD dated October 13, 1997 addressed to a number of striking seafarers. (The number of strikers and the name of the vessel do not appear from the accompanying English translation). It is signed by Captain Ye Myint Tun, Deputy Director of the SECD and reads:

You are advised to make a halt because striking onboard is not allowed by our department. We also heard that you comrades were trying to contact with ITF. You are urged not to make contacts with ITF. Otherwise, our department will take strong action against you.⁽⁴¹⁷⁾

CHAPTER 4

Child labor appears to be common in Burma, and is associated with a lack of investment in education for primary school age children and with widespread poverty. Despite a compulsory education law, almost 40 percent of children never enroll in school, and only 25 to 35 percent complete the 5-year primary school course.⁽⁴¹⁸⁾ Many families cannot afford to pay the numerous fees for primary school education, which together impose substantial costs. Children working in the urban informal sector in Rangoon and Mandalay often start work at young ages.

Exploitative and dangerous forms of child labor in Burma have been widely reported.⁽⁴¹⁹⁾ Children often participate when forced labor is demanded, and have been taken to work as military porters. The Burmese army reportedly includes child soldiers as young as 12 years old,⁽⁴²⁰⁾ some of whom are conscripts. Burmese women and girls are trafficked into Thailand's sex industry. The U.N. Special Rapporteur on human rights in Burma, the ILO, and the U.N. Committee on the Rights of the Child have all called for these forms of child labor to be stopped immediately.

International standards which address child labor include ILO Convention 138 (minimum age for employment),⁽⁴²¹⁾ the Convention on the Rights of the Child,⁽⁴²²⁾ and the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights.⁽⁴²⁴⁾ The ILO is currently drafting a new convention targeting the worst forms of child labor.⁽⁴²⁵⁾ Other relevant international instruments include the Convention for the Suppression of the Traffic in Persons and of the Exploitation of the Prostitution of Others⁽⁴²⁶⁾ and the Slavery Convention.⁽⁴²⁷⁾

Burma has ratified the Convention on the Rights of the Child,⁽⁴²⁸⁾ and apparently supports the adoption of a new instrument on child labor by the ILO.⁽⁴²⁹⁾ Burma has signed but not ratified the Convention for the Suppression of the Traffic in Persons.⁽⁴³⁰⁾ Burma is bound by the Slavery Convention and its optional protocols.⁽⁴³¹⁾

The latest constitution and domestic laws in Burma address childrens' right to education,⁽⁴³²⁾ and childrens' work.⁽⁴³³⁾ Particular provisions set the minimum age at which children may work,⁽⁴³⁴⁾ types of work they may do at different ages,⁽⁴³⁵⁾ and the maximum hours they may work.⁽⁴³⁶⁾ The use of some forms of child labor is punishable as a crime.⁽⁴³⁷⁾ GOB and other sources suggest, however, that these laws are not applied in practice.

FORCED CHILD LABOR

Forced labor in Burma is endemic,⁽⁴³⁸⁾ and there have been many reports that children are required to participate.⁽⁴³⁹⁾ The U.N. Committee on the Rights of the Child urged the GOB to end child forced labor,⁽⁴⁴⁰⁾ as has the U.N. Special Rapporteur on Burma. Daw Aung San Suu Kyi has said: "It is the forced labor of children that is building SLORC's new Burma."⁽⁴⁴²⁾

Indeed, labor gangs that Embassy officers report having seen on roads and on irrigation facilities were composed disproportionately of young girls and old women. This is a predictable outcome of a state policy of (a) requiring uncompensated labor, and (b) accepting any people regardless of age or sex as satisfying a household's or a village's labor quota obligation.⁽⁴⁴³⁾

Forced child labor on infrastructure development

Villages often spread the burden of meeting demands for forced laborers by a rotation system: each household provides one (or sometimes more) forced laborers.⁽⁴⁴⁴⁾ Households can and do send children for such work. Human Rights Watch/Asia has reported that 12 year olds were among those forced to work on the Ye-Tavoy railroad; it also reported that children were forced to work in Mrauk-Oo, Arakan state, to clean up the town in advance of a visit by Lt. Gen. Khin Nyunt.⁽⁴⁴⁵⁾ UNICEF has reported that children as young as 10 and 12 can be found in road construction.⁽⁴⁴⁶⁾

One woman told DOL officials that while she was doing forced labor in 1993, she often took the 3 or 4 eldest of her 8 children to help her fill her regular quota of clearing 120 square feet of bamboo. She said that many other people had children with them at work.⁽⁴⁴⁷⁾ But children do not only work as helpers: they are often sent to make up the required number of forced laborers. At important times in the crop cycle village men may stay to do work in the fields, rather than attend forced labor duties. At these times, it is more common to see children doing forced labor in place of adults, or helping women who have gone to work instead of men.⁽⁴⁴⁸⁾

Forced child labor for the military

Soldiers often send demands to nearby villages to provide workers for their camp. This may involve major work such as construction of barracks, or building fences around the camp. Often it involves a range of menial chores within the camp including cooking, cleaning, general maintenance and upkeep, and water carrying.⁽⁴⁴⁹⁾

Children may be involved in any or all of these forms of work, and it is common for children to be sent to do the smaller chores.⁽⁴⁵⁰⁾

Forced child labor as military porters

Human Rights Watch/Asia has reported that boys as young as 14 have been taken to work as porters, particularly during major offensives when the demand for porters is greatest. At these times the military is less discriminating about who it takes, and it is not uncommon for women and girls to be taken as well. In a major offensive against the KNU in early 1993, "scores of women and girls were taken to the front-line and kept there for the entire three months. . ."⁽⁴⁵¹⁾

It has been reported that soldiers surround schools and take boys away to be porters.⁽⁴⁵²⁾ Children forced to work as military porters must carry ammunition and food supplies to the front lines, or while soldiers are on patrol, sometimes in areas controlled by ethnic minorities. Portering is dangerous work for adults and children alike: "Many children are extrajudicially or accidentally killed while working as porters, and all are subject to cruel, inhuman and degrading treatment."⁽⁴⁵³⁾ The U.N. Committee on the Rights of the Child was gravely concerned about reports of child porters, and recommended that the practice be abolished.⁽⁴⁵⁴⁾

Forced child labor as sentries

Villagers are sometimes forced to work as guards or sentries, particularly in areas where the GOB does not have complete control.⁽⁴⁵⁵⁾ The sentries commonly have to spend the night on a designated section of road. If anything happens on their section of the road, such as an incursion by ethnic insurgents or the planting or explosion of a land mine, GOB troops hold them responsible the next day. This sort of work disproportionately affects women and girls, and children are often forced to participate because they are in the care of women who are made to do the work.⁽⁴⁵⁶⁾ According to Human Rights Watch/Asia, this sort of forced labor by civilians is a breach of Art. 38 of the Convention on the Rights of the Child which requires countries to respect the norms of international humanitarian law.⁽⁴⁵⁷⁾

CHILD SOLDIERS

Reports indicate that there are child soldiers, some of them conscripts, in both the Burmese army and the ethnic insurgent forces.⁽⁴⁵⁸⁾ Heavily-armed teenagers reportedly can be seen in Mandalay and Rangoon, as well as in the border areas where most combat occurs.⁽⁴⁵⁹⁾ Under the Convention on the Rights of the Child, the minimum age for soldiers is 15,⁽⁴⁶⁰⁾ and anyone younger than 15 should not participate in hostilities.⁽⁴⁶¹⁾ Sources differ on whether the legal minimum age for soldiers in Burmese law is 16 or 18.⁽⁴⁶²⁾ The U.N. Committee on the Rights of the Child recommended that the GOB "should absolutely refrain from recruiting under-aged children . . . [and] All forced recruitment of children should be abolished . . .".⁽⁴⁶³⁾

Conscripted child soldiers

There have been reports from all parts of Burma that the army conscripts child soldiers,⁽⁴⁶⁴⁾ in a process "guaranteed to bring [the army's] presence into every community in the country."⁽⁴⁶⁵⁾ In many areas of Karen state, villages are required to "donate" one boy from each ward for military service.⁽⁴⁶⁶⁾ Similar forced recruitment reportedly occurs among the Naga people in Sagaing Division.⁽⁴⁶⁷⁾

An escaped soldier from Karen State told Human Rights Watch/Asia that he had joined the army when he was fifteen years old. The army had demanded ten "volunteers" from his quarter of the town.⁽⁴⁶⁸⁾ Another former soldier described how his township conducted a lottery to meet the army's demands each year, and that the only way to avoid serving was to pay a bribe of 10,000 kyats.⁽⁴⁶⁹⁾ These two former soldiers reported that many other soldiers were around their age; one stated that it is common to see 10 to 15 year old boys serve as rank and file soldiers.⁽⁴⁷⁰⁾

Explicit or regular demands on village headmen are apparently not the only method of conscription. In an incident in August 1997, 11 village headmen in Chin State were accused of collaboration with the Chin National Front and detained. They were to be released only when their villages each provided a recruit.⁽⁴⁷¹⁾ In another incident in November 1995, forty or fifty students, who were part way through their examinations, were arrested as they left school. They were sent to a stadium overnight, and then to Mingaladon military base the following day for training. Neither they nor their parents were told anything about where they were going or what would happen to them.⁽⁴⁷²⁾

Non-conscripted child soldiers

Not all child soldiers in Burma are conscripts. The Burmese army grew from 180,000 in 1988 to over 300,000 in 1993. It appears that this expansion was facilitated in part by the recruitment of younger boys.⁽⁴⁷³⁾ In many cases, poverty and lack of education make the possibility of joining the army seem attractive to boys: the "disadvantaged circumstances in which Burmese children find themselves play a large part in encouraging their early entry into military service."⁽⁴⁷⁴⁾ There are powerful incentives to enlist in the army: soldiers' families pay lower taxes, and are exempt from forced labor.⁽⁴⁷⁵⁾

Former child soldiers have reported that it is easy for boys as young as 14 to join the army, as long as they give their age as 18.⁽⁴⁷⁶⁾ In some cases, they were encouraged to lie about their age by the officers recruiting them.⁽⁴⁷⁷⁾ Some child soldiers joined the army as young as 12.⁽⁴⁷⁸⁾

Human Rights Watch/Asia has interviewed former soldiers who were 13 when they joined, and who had seen active duty from age 14. In September 1995, Human Rights Watch/Asia encountered a 10 year old who claimed to have joined the army at age 7.⁽⁴⁷⁹⁾

Ye Nyunt Army recruitment schools

Some boys reportedly join the army from a military training scheme called the "Ye Nyunt Youth." UNICEF officials have described a process of "informal conscription" for boys as young as 14.⁽⁴⁸⁰⁾ They have also identified a residential military camp in Kengtung, Shan State, where boys from the age of 7 were recruited for a future life in the Burmese army.⁽⁴⁸¹⁾ Human Rights Watch/Asia has reported that boys younger than 14 "are 'adopted' by the army and institutionalized as military recruits by the time they reach the age of fourteen."⁽⁴⁸²⁾

Many Ye Nyunt "recruits" are orphans, or boys who have been abandoned in front-line villages; others are street children or children captured from enemy positions. These boys reportedly receive political training, and instruction in loyalty to the government and the military. Eventually they are assigned to work in the army, either in intelligence units, or as security for high-ranking officers.⁽⁴⁸³⁾ In June 1997, a former student of a Ye Nyunt school at Khamti township, in Sagaing Division, described a system of strict discipline, regular studies and military training. The military closely controlled the education system: poor students received less schooling and joined the army as rank and file soldiers, while better students continued their schooling, and entered the army at higher levels.⁽⁴⁸⁴⁾

A child soldier's work and working conditions

It appears that child soldiers perform the same duties as adult soldiers. Human rights groups report that children serve in the front lines for much of their tenure in the army, and see military action by ages 14 or 15.⁽⁴⁸⁵⁾ Child soldiers have been ordered to round up porters and forced laborers, and to guard porters or prisoners. Former child soldiers have reported being ordered to beat and kill porters who could no longer work,⁽⁴⁸⁶⁾ and to execute villagers who were suspected of collaborating with enemy troops.⁽⁴⁸⁷⁾ One former child soldier estimated he had seen over 200 porters killed by soldiers while he was in the army.⁽⁴⁸⁸⁾

Child soldiers who disobey, or fail to carry out orders, may be severely beaten.⁽⁴⁸⁹⁾ Young soldiers are also beaten if they cannot keep up, if they are ill or injured, of if they cannot perform heavy work. "In extreme cases, child soldiers [have been] summarily executed . . ."⁽⁴⁹⁰⁾ Another abuse to which child soldiers are subjected is being drugged before going into battle. Some have reported receiving amphetamines, tranquilizers and alcohol before being sent to fight.⁽⁴⁹¹⁾

In addition to their ordinary duties, child soldiers commonly have to work on projects such as brick making which make private profit for their officers.⁽⁴⁹²⁾ Brick making for private profit is only one example of the widespread corruption in the military which has a severe impact on child soldiers. Many child soldiers report that their pay was constantly reduced.⁽⁴⁹³⁾ In some cases, officers reportedly charged "medical fees," yet most child soldiers report that medical care in the army is very poor. For example, child soldiers have reported officers ordering that wounded soldiers, often young men or boys, be left behind or killed.⁽⁴⁹⁴⁾ One reason for poor medical care is that officers in some units sell medicines on the black market.⁽⁴⁹⁵⁾ Corruption in the army also affects the availability of both food and clothing.⁽⁴⁹⁶⁾

These conditions of work often compel child soldiers to attempt desertion. This is doubly dangerous, as they may be followed by their own troops, or they may encounter enemy troops.⁽⁴⁹⁷⁾ Some child soldiers simply commit suicide:

"There were 2 or 3 suicides during that time, of boys who had been hospitalized and finally shot themselves. One guy went out at midnight to use the toilet and just stuck the barrel of the gun in his mouth and pulled the trigger with his toes."⁽⁴⁹⁸⁾

OTHER FORMS OF CHILD LABOR IN BURMA

As Burma's economy has deteriorated in recent years, child labor has become increasingly visible. Few children work in the formal sector, but children can often be seen working alongside their parents in the informal sector.⁽⁴⁹⁹⁾ A joint GOB and UNICEF study published in 1997 examined children's work in the urban informal sector, without attempting to quantify it. Most people live in rural areas, and "most child laborers are engaged in agricultural production."⁽⁵⁰⁰⁾ There is very little information on whether children work in prostitution or other sexual employment such as pornography.

There is little reliable data on the number of children working in most countries. The data which is available primarily relates to economic activities by 10 to 14 year olds.⁽⁵⁰¹⁾ Burma's 1983 census reportedly showed 533,800 children aged 10 to 14 in the labor force.⁽⁵⁰²⁾ Its 1990 labor force data show 710,000 children aged 10 to 14 in the labor force.⁽⁵⁰³⁾ In 1992, UNICEF estimated that as many as 4 million of a total 11.8 million children aged 6 to 15 could have been working in Burma.⁽⁵⁰⁴⁾

Formal sector employment

Very few children work in the formal sector. There are many able-bodied adults available to work, and labor laws either prohibit or regulate childrens' work in the formal sector.⁽⁵⁰⁵⁾ According to the GOB, child workers employed in "departments" covered by the Social Security Act 1958, are entitled to the benefits of the scheme.⁽⁵⁰⁶⁾ The formal sector, however, plays a relatively small role in the overall economy.⁽⁵⁰⁷⁾

Child labor in urban areas

In urban areas, older boys are commonly employed as waiters, and in masonry and construction work. They are also hired as apprentices in small workshops, where they often receive meals but no wages. Both girls and boys are employed in Mandalay's lacquer industry. Children as young as 6 or 7 are involved in a range of other work including domestic labor, rubbish collection, recycling and selling in markets, along railway lines and on street corners.⁽⁵⁰⁸⁾

The joint GOB/UNICEF report provides recent baseline information about working children in the urban informal sector in Rangoon and Mandalay.⁽⁵⁰⁹⁾ Children were found to be working mainly in food processing, selling, refuse collecting, light manufacturing and as tea shop attendants. In a survey of 700 households, the study found that 313 of a total 1,191 children were working full-time. Only 6.7 per cent were not doing any work at all. This report claims that almost 59 per cent of the children were attending school and only 8.3 per cent had never enrolled.⁽⁵¹⁰⁾ Other sources, however, indicate that almost 40 percent of children never enroll in school.⁽⁵¹¹⁾ The GOB/UNICEF report also indicates that most working children were found to have had their jobs for between one month and two years, and to have no other source of income: ". . . they can be considered full time members of the informal sector workforce."⁽⁵¹²⁾

According to the study, the main reason children work is "family economic need."⁽⁵¹³⁾ However, households with working children were found to be amongst the most economically depressed.⁽⁵¹⁴⁾ Poverty was cited as the main reason children were not in school: 57.6 per cent of the households could not afford primary education. Children were contributing 20 to 30 per cent on average of household incomes, and in some cases as much as 50 per cent. The vast majority of child workers were receiving no benefits other than wages,⁽⁵¹⁵⁾ although some were being fed by their employers. One woman told the researchers:

"My son got a job in a food stall last year. His salary is 300 kyats a month, but the salary is not important. He can eat sufficient food at the stall which is impossible at home."⁽⁵¹⁶⁾

The study concluded that many children were working in the urban informal sector at ages much younger than allowed by ILO Convention 138, or by Burmese labor laws.⁽⁵¹⁷⁾ Most working children were aged between 10 and 14.⁽⁵¹⁸⁾ However, more than half of all working children in Rangoon had started to work at age 11 or younger.⁽⁵¹⁹⁾ Children involved in refuse collection and in selling often had started work between the ages of 5 and 9.⁽⁵²⁰⁾

Children were also found to work longer hours than Burmese labor laws permit. Most children worked more than 8 hours a day, for 7 days a week, and at any time of the day. In general, children in unpaid family work did as many hours of work as their counterparts in paid employment.⁽⁵²¹⁾ Insufficient enforcement of laws regulating childrens' work hours was found to be the biggest obstacle to improving their working conditions.⁽⁵²²⁾

Enterprises hired children through networks of friends and family, and believed they were giving children a job opportunity. Employers reported that children did good quality work, gave enterprises more stability, and made them more economical.⁽⁵²³⁾ Although two-thirds of enterprises did not intend to hire more child workers,⁽⁵²⁴⁾ most did not intend to substitute adult workers. Enterprises that did plan to hire more child workers generally planned to hire 10 or more child workers, which "implies that larger enterprises are more likely to continue hiring children without fear of government reprisal . . ."⁽⁵²⁵⁾

The study recommended targeted enforcement campaigns to try to improve performance in the area of minimum age for employment,⁽⁵²⁶⁾ and emphasized that enforcement of laws relating to working hours for children is critical. This is in line with the GOB's stated priority of prohibition of children from sectors of the economy damaging to their health or development, and regulation of work which is non-hazardous.⁽⁵²⁷⁾ Although the existing Shops and Establishments Act has limited coverage in the area of health and safety, a new "Establishment Act" has apparently been drafted, which includes health and safety regulations, and "guidelines for child workers especially."⁽⁵²⁸⁾ The study recommended a range of other programs, and notes that compulsory education is one of the best solutions.⁽⁵²⁹⁾

Rural child labor

In rural areas child work is common. From the age of 10 children help cultivate the land, tend orchards and animals, or fetch water and look after younger children.⁽⁵³⁰⁾ Interviews with UNICEF officials, human rights NGOs and others based in Thailand, confirm that child work in agricultural areas is a widespread practice throughout Burma. It is reported to be particularly common in the ethnic minority areas, where government education is much less common and, if it exists, far worse administered than elsewhere.

Most of this work is within family or village structures, rather than exploitative child labor,⁽⁵³¹⁾ although children working in commercial or cooperative farming may be subject to exploitation, or performing hazardous work.⁽⁵³²⁾ There are reports that children work with their families in opium production. It is unclear whether children are engaged in other rural industries, such as logging, gem extraction, hunting or fishing.⁽⁵³³⁾ Interviews in parts of Shan State in 1992 indicated that from the age of 10 children were given work tasks essentially suited to adults, and were more likely to be employed outside the family.⁽⁵³⁴⁾

The GOB/UNICEF report states that children contributing in the context of traditional family agricultural work in Burma is normal. Agricultural families have been the basic unit of production, and small family owned farms "form the backbone of the nation's agricultural sector. Children in these settings are necessarily a valuable part of the production force."⁽⁵³⁵⁾

Child Trafficking

There are documented reports of trafficking of adults and children from Burma to Thailand. More Burmese traverse established trafficking routes in the Mekong subregion than people from any other country.⁽⁵³⁶⁾ Some trafficked children become beggars and hawkers.⁽⁵³⁷⁾ Many of the women and girls are trafficked into the commercial sex industry.⁽⁵³⁸⁾ It is estimated that of the 60,000 illegal workers in the Thai commercial sex industry, the vast majority are Burmese women.⁽⁵³⁹⁾

Typically, young women and girls from poor villages are lured by brokers with promises of well paid jobs in Thailand. The women and girls usually leave with the consent of their families, and intend to support them with their earnings. In some cases, they set out for Thailand independently and are lured into the sex industry after they arrive. In a few instances, particularly around the town of Ranong, women have been forcibly abducted.⁽⁵⁴⁰⁾

In 1993, Human Rights Watch/Asia found that Burmese women in the Thai sex industry typically worked 10 to 18 hours a day, and serviced between 5 and 15 men a day. They generally worked for 25 days a month. Health care and birth control measures were limited, if available at all. Women who became pregnant were reportedly forced to have abortions, or to keep servicing men until late into their pregnancies. Fifty to 70 per cent of the women contracted HIV/AIDS.⁽⁵⁴¹⁾ In 1992, UNICEF reported an incident in which 19 teenage prostitutes from Shan State were rescued from a brothel in Chiang Mai. Seventeen were found to be HIV positive.⁽⁵⁴²⁾ There have been reports that girls found to be HIV positive were forcibly repatriated to Burma and shot by the army, or given lethal injections in Thailand.⁽⁵⁴³⁾

Human Rights Watch/Asia reported that brokers trafficking women and girls into the sex industry generally made an initial payment of 10,000 to 20,000 Thai Baht⁽⁵⁴⁴⁾ to their family, typically as the woman or girl crossed the border. This payment became a debt, commonly compounded with as much as 100% interest, and the women and girls had to work in to pay it off.⁽⁵⁴⁵⁾ Payment of the debt was one of the biggest reasons the women stayed, in spite of their working conditions. If they tried to escape they might have been beaten, and often they were intimidated by threats of retaliation against their family. In some cases girls who tried to escape were killed, and their bodies dumped in public places as a warning to others.⁽⁵⁴⁶⁾ Like all illegal Burmese workers in Thailand, they may be arrested at any time by the Thai authorities.

Deportation back to Burma is also reported to be dangerous. In some cases women have been sexually abused or assaulted by members of the Thai or the Burmese authorities.⁽⁵⁴⁷⁾ Some have been returned by brokers to brothels in Thailand.⁽⁵⁴⁸⁾ In Burma, there is the possibility of prosecution: it is an offence to leave Burma without permission, and prostitution is also illegal.⁽⁵⁴⁹⁾ If a woman or girl manages to return to her village, she may be shunned because of her involvement in prostitution. If she is HIV positive, she may be blamed if the virus spreads.⁽⁵⁵⁰⁾ The reaction may depend, however, on the community. UNICEF reported in 1992 that in some parts of East Shan State it was common for young girls and women to go to Thailand to work as prostitutes, and that when they returned they had no trouble finding a husband.⁽⁵⁵¹⁾

Trafficking of people to destinations within Burma is also common. The former U.N. Special Rapporteur on Sale and Trafficking of Children noted in 1995 that trafficking of children for prostitution both to and from South East Asian countries, including Burma, is an increasing problem.⁽⁵⁵²⁾ According to a UNICEF report, child trafficking has a long history in Burma: traditionally poor families deliver their children into domestic servitude for richer families.⁽⁵⁵³⁾ There have been reports that hill tribes such as the Akha sell children to pay off opium debts.⁽⁵⁵⁴⁾

There is relatively little information available on the sex industry within Burma. A representative of a Thai based human rights NGO who recently visited Rangoon reported that it is easy to get girls as young as 13 years old as prostitutes: they are available from taxis outside the Hong Kong Club. In 1992 UNICEF found "significant evidence of child prostitution" in Rangoon,⁽⁵⁵⁵⁾ where prostitutes were interviewed who had begun work at the age of 12.⁽⁵⁵⁶⁾ The GOB reported to the U.N. Committee on the Rights of the Child that prostitution is both legally and socially regulated in Burma, that those found to be earning a living from prostitution are prosecuted, and that the women are handed or transferred to the responsibility of the Social Welfare Department.⁽⁵⁵⁷⁾

Human Rights Watch/Asia and UNICEF have reported abuses of a traditional form of adoption in Burma, which leads to cases that approach bonded domestic labor.⁽⁵⁵⁸⁾ It is not uncommon for wealthy families to adopt orphans or children from poorer backgrounds. These children have few rights and may end up as permanent domestic workers in their adoptive homes, where they may be subjected to other abuses.⁽⁵⁵⁹⁾

The U.N. Committee on the Rights of the Child expressed its concern about these reports, and the fact that these children are apparently not legally protected in any way.⁽⁵⁶⁰⁾ It recommended that the GOB amend its legislation relating to child labor to cover children working in such domestic services. It also recommended that the GOB take "all necessary measures to combat, by legal or any other appropriate action, the exploitation of adopted children, including through labor."⁽⁵⁶¹⁾

PROFILE OF THE EDUCATION SYSTEM

The availability, cost and quality of basic education influence whether children work or go to school. Despite a compulsory education law, almost 40% of children never enroll in school, and only 25 to 35% of those children who do enroll complete the 5-year primary school course.⁽⁵⁶²⁾ A 1992 GOB study estimated that 80% of enrolled primary school students drop out before completing high school matriculation.⁽⁵⁶³⁾ Work is the reason some children do not attend, and it is an important contributory factor in the 5 to 9 age group, when children should be enrolling in primary school.⁽⁵⁶⁴⁾

Apart from poor enrollment and completion rates, the quality of education has dropped dramatically: "Against [a] backdrop of conflict and economic decline, education standards have plummeted throughout Burma."⁽⁵⁶⁵⁾ The U.N. Committee on the Rights of the Child has urged the GOB to address rates of school drop-out and repetition, and to allocate resources for translation of school materials into minority languages.⁽⁵⁶⁶⁾ The GOB/UNICEF report describes the current situation:

Overall, only 27% of children complete primary school, while 34% drop-out or [sic] 39% never enroll at all. Repetition rates are very high ... 25% of rural students and 22% of urban ones repeat a grade each year. Although the primary school cycle is only 5 years (Kindergarten-Grade/Standard 4), on the average it takes 12.2 years to produce one primary school graduate.⁽⁵⁶⁷⁾

The GOB/UNICEF report acknowledged that while primary school education in Burma is "nominally free . . parents incur significant costs . . .These costs include textbooks, exercise books, stationery, a yearly contribution to the Parent Teach [sic] Association (PTA) fund, and ad hoc contributions to school improvement."⁽⁵⁶⁸⁾ A 1994 study found that the declining value of the kyat had led some PTAs to increase charges, in some cases beyond the legal maximum.⁽⁵⁶⁹⁾ The single highest cost of educating children at all levels is usually uniforms, with the next highest cost being for "transport and pocket money."⁽⁵⁷⁰⁾

One report suggests that local authorities commonly require parents to pay "fees" for various facilities and services. Examples include fees for desks, or for sports events. Commonly the parents pay the fee but do not receive what they supposedly paid for.⁽⁵⁷¹⁾

Another common cost of education is payment for private tutoring in addition to regular schooling. A 1991 study found that over 90% of grade 9 and 10 students, and over 65% of grade 5 to 8 students were receiving private tutoring. In the case of the grade 9 and 10 students, the average cost was 100 kyats a month per subject: 10 times the rate set in a 1984 law. Some paid as much as 300 kyats a month per subject. For 5 subjects this is 1,500 kyats per month, or 13,000 kyats a year; at the time average annual incomes were 36,000 kyats.⁽⁵⁷²⁾

A factor which contributes to the prevalence of private tutoring is that teachers generally cannot survive on their government salaries, so they are forced to moonlight.⁽⁵⁷³⁾ Some teachers may require students to attend the private lessons, for example as a pre-requisite for taking necessary public exams. As the World Bank noted:

"When children are given private tutoring by their regular teachers, an element of blackmail is commonly involved because at least some teachers provide only the bare minimum during school hours and reserve the real teaching for their private classes. This seems a dismal and exploitative situation . . .".⁽⁵⁷⁴⁾

A significant factor parents take into account when considering whether to send a child to school in Burma is the opportunity cost of foregoing the wages the child could earn. A 1994 study found that children aged 11 to 15 earned 14 - 20 kyats a day, or 5,000 - 7,300 kyats a year, while annual household incomes averaged 19,100 to 22,066 kyats. There was a strong correlation between paid child labor and non-enrollment in school, and between paid child labor and dropout rates.⁽⁵⁷⁵⁾ The recent GOB and UNICEF study of working children in the urban informal sector reached similar conclusions.⁽⁵⁷⁶⁾ The World Bank observed "In such circumstances it is no surprise that the poorest households have simply found that they could not afford the direct and indirect costs of school attendance."⁽⁵⁷⁸⁾

Although parents and children place a high value on education, they often do not see it as a way of improving their situation or securing better work in the future. One study found that primary education was viewed not as an investment, but as a means of improving status and being able to function better in society.⁽⁵⁷⁹⁾ The recent GOB and UNICEF study found similar attitudes among the households of Rangoon and Mandalay.⁽⁵⁸⁰⁾

Education is simply too expensive for many people in Burma. The GOB/UNICEF study found that cost was the single biggest factor in children not enrolling in school: 57.6% of households could not afford the cost of education.⁽⁵⁸¹⁾ The cost of high schooling in 1990 was estimated at 15.6% of household incomes, or 26.8% if the student was taking lessons from a private tutor.⁽⁵⁸²⁾ In 1994 the average cost of primary schooling to villages households was estimated at 2.6% to 4.2% of household income.⁽⁵⁸³⁾ Although this is a much smaller proportion of household budgets, the expenditure is still significant: "in Myanmar households . . . even the most negligible financial costs associated with primary education may be of critical significance."⁽⁵⁸⁴⁾

The contribution from households can also be significant proportion of the overall cost of education. A 1994 GOB study of primary school education in Sagaing Division estimated that education costs borne by households accounted for as much as 30% of the overall cost of primary school education.⁽⁵⁸⁵⁾

CHAPTER 5

CONCLUSION

1. A description of the research methodology for this report and the sources consulted is provided in Appendix I.

2. In 1989, the military goverment changed the name of the country in English to the Union of Myanmar. The United States Government, however, continues to use the prior name of the country in English as well as the long form name, Union of Burma. Other nations and the United Nations have recognized the change and refer to the country as Myanmar. For this reason, the name Myanmar appears in some of the materials quoted in this report.

3. In 1993, Burma ranked 133rd out of 174 countries on the "human development index," a composite index of achievement in the areas of health, longevity, education and standard of living. Source: ILO/Asian Development Bank, based on GOB and International Financial Institution data. (Canada ranked 1st and Niger 174th. Neighboring countries ranked similarly to Burma: Cambodia 156, Laos 138 and China 108). The U.N. Fund for Children (UNICEF) ranks countries (from worst to best), according to their mortality rate for children under the age of 5 (U5MR). In 1992, Burma ranked 45th out of 145 countries measured. In 1995 Burma's U5MR increased, and it fell to 29th of 150 countries. Source: UNICEF State of the World's Children Reports, 1995, 1997.

4. Because of worker rights abuses, the United States suspended Burma's eligibility for GSP benefits in July 1989. The European Union suspended Burma's GSP benefits for industrial and agricultural products in December 1996, and Canada suspended GSP tariff preferences for imports of Burmese origin in August 1997.

5. The European Union has also banned transfers of military and arms equipment, and there are no EU military attaches in Burma.

6. The World Bank has not approved new loans to Burma since 1987 (interview with World Bank official, on file). The Asian Development Bank has not approved any loans since 1986, and has not provided any technical assistance since 1987 (Asian Development Bank, Annual Report, 1996, p. 145.)

7. Department of State, Conditions in Burma and U.S. Policy Toward Burma for the period March 28, 1997 - September 28, 1997, Plan for Implementation of Section 570 of Public Law 104-208, Submitted to Congress December 2, 1997.

8. Selective purchasing laws were first implemented in the 1970s as part of the campaign to end apartheid in South Africa.

9. The other cities are: Berkeley, CA; Madison, WI; Santa Monica, CA; Ann Arbor, MI; Oakland, CA; Carrboro, NC; Takoma Park, MD; Boulder, CO; Chapel Hill, NC; Santa Cruz, CA; Quincy, MA; Palo Alto, CA; Newton, MA; West Hollywood, CA; Brookline, MA; and Somerville, MA.

10. These groups include the Karen, Mon, Karenni, Shan, Chin, Naga, Wa, Lahu and Rohingya.

11. Ethnic minorities may form the majority of the population in as much as half of Burma's land area. See Anti-Slavery International, Ethnic Groups in Burma, (London, 1994) (Hereinafter: Ethnic Groups), at 17.

12. Economic data show significant problems began much earlier. From 1962 to 1977, for example, real GDP growth barely kept pace with population increases. World Bank, Myanmar - Policies for Sustaining Economic Reform, p. 1.

13. Id. The regime declared that certain large denomination banknotes were no longer legal tender, possibly as a way of suppressing border trade controlled by ethnic groups seeking autonomy. Average citizens as well as black market traders lost money as a result. Students were angered because many of their families held savings in what became valueless banknotes and were therefore unable to pay tuition and board charges.

14. Article 19, Burma: Beyond the Law, (August, 1996) (Hereinafter: Beyond the Law), at 7.

15. See eg, Report of the Special Rapporteur on Burma, (1995), UN Doc. E/CN.4/1995/65, paragraph 8.

16. Id.

17. Id., para. 9.

18. The takeover was promulgated in Announcement No. 1 of 1988.

19. Janelle M. Diller, The National Convention in Burma (Myanmar): An Impediment to the Restoration of Democracy (for: International Centre for Human Rights and Democratic Development, Montreal, Quebec, & The International League for Human Rights, New York), April, 1996, p. 1. General Saw Maung, then chairman of the SLORC, described the position on January 24, 1992: "Today the country is being governed by martial law. Martial law means no law at all." Speech of General Saw Maung, January 21, 1992, broadcast on Voice of Myanmar Television, Rangoon, January 21, 1992. See BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, available in LEXIS file FE/1286/B/1.

20. This was promulgated in Announcement No. 2 of 1988, dated September 18, 1988.

21. Ethnic Groups in Burma, p. 27., p. 27.

22. See Freedom of Association chapter.

23. Winner of the 1991 Nobel Peace Prize, and daughter of General Aung San, a hero of Burma's independence movement.

24. The NLD delegates were barred from returning, and the National Convention continued its work until it stopped in March 1996.

25. Martin Smith, Burma: Ethnicity and the Politics of Insurgency, p. 199.

26. Ethnic Groups in Burma, p. 28., p. 28.

27. Id.

28. Id., p. 29.

29. Report of the Special Rapporteur on Burma, (1995), UN Doc. E/CN.4/1995/65, paragraph 142.

30. Id., para. 153.

31. See, e.g. Bill McAllister, Asian Drug Lord Indicted as Major Heroin Pusher--Golden Triange Figure has "Private Army." Washington Post, March 16, 1990, p.A39. See also U.S. Department of State, International Narcotics Control Strategy Report-1997. Available on the WWW at http://www.state.gov/www/global/narcotics_law/1997_narc_report/seasi97.html.

32. The fourth round of cease-fire talks collapsed in January 1997. U.S. Department of State, Country Practice Reports, (1997).

33. On March 15, 1998 the Washington Post reported an assault by 1,000 Burmese troops on a KNU position near the Thai border.

34. See The State Peace and Development Council Notification 1/97, Nov. 15, 1997.

35. Human Rights Watch, World Report, 1997.

36. The primary schools were not re-opened until September 1997.

37. Laws which restrict peoples' freedom of movement are enforced in other parts of the country but Muslims are reported to suffer more than most. Under a law introduced by the BSPP, for example, each household must report to the local authorities the number of people sleeping there each night. Originally this law determined the quantity of basic commodities which the household could buy from cooperatives which supplied household necessities. Today, however, it has the effect of making each person report their whereabouts to the local authorities if they are not in their own home. The law is also used by local authorities to justify searches of homes. Daw Aung San Suu Kyi, Letters from Burma, Penguin, 1997, p. 52.

38. See e.g., Interim Report of the Special Rapporteur on Burma (1997), UN Doc. A/52/484, para. 113 (the Special Rapporteur had been informed that between 5,000 and 25,000 refugees fled to Bangladesh in the first half of 1997); Human Rights Watch/Asia, Update on the Rohingya situation in Bangladesh and Burma, October 6, 1996 (new arrivals to October 1996 numbered around 10,000), Human Rights Watch/Asia, Rohingya refugees in Bangladesh -- the search for a lasting solution, August, 1997 (10,000 to 15,000 new arrivals in the first half of 1997), and Amnesty International, Myanmar/Bangladesh -- Rohingyas -- the search for safety, September 1997 (estimates of the number of new arrivals in the first half of 1997 vary between 2,000 and 20,000).

39. Burmese Border Consortium, Burmese border camp locations with population figures, January 1998.

40. Stern, Thailand's Migration Situation and its Relations with other APEC Members and Other Countries in Southeast Asia, Asian Research Centre for Migration Studies, Institute of Asian Studies, Chulalongkorn University, (January 1998) (Hereinafter: Stern), p. 24.

41. Archavanitkul, Jarusomboon and Warangarat, The Complexities and Confusion of Cross-Border Migration into Thailand, Institute of Population and Social Research, Mahidol University, Nakon Pathom, Thailand, 1997, p. 16. Burmese workers comprise over 87% of registered illegal workers in Thailand (Stern, supra, p. 19), so Burmese probably account for about 850,000 of the 970,000 illegal workers in Thailand.

42. Beyond the Law, p. 72., p. 72.

43. See for example Lawyers Committee for Human Rights, Summary Injustice: Military Tribunals in Burma (April 1991), and International Commission of Jurists, The Burmese Way: To Where? Report of a mission to Burma, (December 1991.)

44. Beyond the Law, pp. 3, 4., pp. 3, 4.

45. This makes any study of the legal system difficult. Id.

46. In March 1996, the Burmese Ambassador to the U.N. reported that 151 laws had been repealed because they were "not . . . in conformity with the present situation" and that 35 "old" and 78 "subsidiary" laws had been repealed and replaced. Memorandum of Observations submitted by the Burmese Ambassador to the United Nations, to the UN Assistant Secretary-General for Human Rights, UN Doc. E/CN.4/139, dated March 21, 1996, referred to in Burma: Beyond the Law, supra, at p. 4. The Ambassador's reference to 151 laws replaced appears to be a reference to the total number of laws repealed by The State Law and Order Restoration Council Law for the Repeal of Old Laws, SLORC Law No. 1/92, (February 19, 1992), published in the Working People's Daily February 20, 1992 (137 laws repealed), and The State Law and Order Restoration Council Law for the (Second Time) Repeal of Old Laws. SLORC Law No. 4/93, (March 31, 1993), published in the Working People's Daily April 1, 1993 (14 laws repealed). In November, 1993, the UN Special Rapporteur on Burma was given lists of: (1) the 99 laws enacted by the SLORC between August 18, 1988 and November 12, 1993, (2) the 186 laws repealed by the SLORC and (3) the 93 laws that were under review by the Laws Scrutiny Central Body. Report of the Special Rapporteur (1994) UN Doc. E/CN.4/1994/57, para. 21.

47. Notification No. 33/91, dated July 17, 1991., dated July 17, 1991.

48. The GOB's cooperation with the international community is sporadic. It allowed the U.N. Special Rapporteur, then Professor Yozo Yokota, to visit in 1993 and 1994, but has not allowed the current Special Rapporteur to visit, despite repeated requests. Burma refused to allow either the ILO Commission of Inquiry or the European Commission to conduct fact finding on forced labor inside the country. It has received some missions on behalf of the U.N. Secretary General. As noted, the GOB did not grant visas to a joint DOL/State Department research team planning travel to Burma for this report.

49. Beyond the Law, p. 21., p. 21.

50. From 1990 to 1992 the Commission on Human Rights received confidential reports via a special rapporteur to its Subcommission on the prevention of discrimination against minorities.

51. Interim Report of the Special Rapporteur on Burma, (1996), UN Doc. A/51/466, paragraph 4.

52. Id.

53. See Reports of the Special Rapporteur on Religious Intolerance, (1995, 1996), UN Doc. E/CN.4/1996/95, paragraphs 42, 46, 48 to 50, 55; UN Doc. E/CN.4/1995/91, and UN Doc. E/CN.4/1995/91/Add.1, paragraph 18 (which reproduces a lengthy response from the GOB on its policy toward Muslims.)

54. See Reports of the Special Rapporteur on Extrajudicial, Summary or Arbitrary Executions, (1994 to 1997), U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/1994/7, para. 447 to 455; U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/1995/6, paras. 227 to 230; U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/1996/4, paras. 327 to 334; U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/1997/60/Add.1, paras. 349 to 355.

55. See Reports of the Special Rapporteur on Torture, and other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment (1994 to 1997), UN Doc. E/CN.4/1994/31, paras. 399 to 401; UN Doc. E/CN.4/1995/34, paras. 493 to 500; UN Doc. E/CN.4/1996/35, paras. 113, 114 and UN Doc. E/CN.4/1996/35/Add.1; and UN Doc. E/CN.4/1997/7/Add.1 paras. 336 - 344.

56. See Reports of the Special Rapporteur on the Sale of Children, Child Prostitution and Child Pornography (1994, 1996, 1997), UN Doc. A/49/478, paras. 46, 146, 147, and 192(d) and (I); UN Doc. E/CN.4/1996/100, para. 34; UN Doc. E/CN.4/1997/95.

57. Report of the Representative of the Secretary-General, (1995), UN Doc. E/CN.4/1995/50, para. 85.

58. See Report of the Working Group on Arbitrary Detentions, (1996), UN Doc. E/CN.4/1996/40; and the decisions of the Working Group: Nos. 52/1992, 38/1993, 38/1993, and 62/1993.

59. The ILO was created by the Treaty of Versailles, at the end of World War I. In 1946, it entered into a cooperative arrangement with the newly created United Nations and is the oldest specialized agency of the U.N. system. It is also unique in that its tripartite membership includes government, worker and employer representatives from member nations.

60. See Appendix II for a full list of ILO Conventions ratified by Burma.

61. Burma ratified Conventions 29 and 87 on March 4, 1955. Other core ILO conventions include the Abolition of Forced Labor Convention (No. 105), the Discrimination (Equality of Opportunity in Employment) Convention (No. 111), the Right to Organize and Collective Bargaining Convention (No. 98) and the Minimum Age for Employment Convention (No. 138).

62. ILO members report regularly on their labor laws and practices, in areas covered by Conventions they have ratified. The reports are reviewed by the Committee of Experts on the Application of Conventions and Recommendations, a group of independent experts in international and labor law. The Committee of Experts has repeatedly expressed its concern that Burma's labor practices are inconsistent with Conventions 29 and 87. In serious cases mentioned by the Committee of Experts, Governments are called to explain the situation before the Committee on the Application of Standards of the International Labor Conference.

63. International Labor Conference, 83rd. Session, (1996), Provisional Record, p. 14/74.

64. Projects in place in 1991 were completed. There were standards-related ILO missions in 1994 and 1995 specifically dealing with freedom of association. Burma is currently participating in a joint ILO/Asian Development Bank project for regional training assistance on employment promotion and training in the greater Mekong sub-region. ILO Country Briefing Note, Myanmar, Bangkok, November, 1997, p. 7. UN agencies which continue to operate in Burma include UNDP, UNHCR, UNDCP, UNICEF, WHO, WEP and FAO. Some international non-governmental organizations operate in Burma, including World Vision, Swiss Aid, Medicins Sans Frontieres, Save the Children (U.K.), Save the Children (U.S.) and World Concern. In 1995, the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) closed its office in Rangoon after the failure of negotiations with the SLORC on allowing the ICRC regular and confidential access to security detainees. See, e.g. Human Rights Watch, World Report, 1996. The ICRC was unable to negotiate its return in 1997. Department of State, Country Practice Reports (1997).

65. See International Labor Conference, Provisional Record for 1993, 1995, 1996, 1997 and 1998. The Committee on the Application of Standards has also discussed this case for several years and in 1996, "expressed its profound regret that serious divergences between the national legislation and the Convention continued to exist ... and deplored the fact that the Government (of Burma) failed to cooperate." Special paragraphs were also adopted on Convention No. 29 in 1995 and 1996.

66. Id.

67. The complaint was submitted under Article 24 of the ILO constitution.

68. The complaint was submitted under Article 26 of the ILO Constitution. For a full statement of the worker delegates' case concerning forced labor as a breach of Convention 29, see ICFTU, Supplementary Evidence to the Complaint Submitted Under Article 26 (October 1996).

69. The relevant conference report language to the Foreign Operation, Export Financing, and Related Programs Appropriation Act of 1997 specifically asked that this report address allegations concerning the forced relocation of laborers, and the use of forced labor to support tourism and construction of the Yadana gas pipeline.

70. 1947 Constitution, Art. 19.

71. Id.

72. Villages Act, 1908, s. 8(1)(g) (obligation of headmen to furnish porters), s. 10 (liability of headman to fine for failure to perform obligations, s. 11 (obligation of village residents to perform public duties including assisting the headman in providing porters), and s. 12 (liability of village residents to punishment for failure to carry out public duties). Towns Act, 1907 s. 7(1)(l) (obligation of headman to furnish porters), s. 9 (obligation of ward residents to perform public duties including assisting the headman in providing porters) and s. 9A (liability of ward residents to punishment for failure to carry out public duties)., 1908, s. 8(1)(g) (obligation of headmen to furnish porters), s. 10 (liability of headman to fine for failure to perform obligations, s. 11 (obligation of village residents to perform public duties including assisting the headman in providing porters), and s. 12 (liability of village residents to punishment for failure to carry out public duties). Towns Act, 1907 s. 7(1)(l) (obligation of headman to furnish porters), s. 9 (obligation of ward residents to perform public duties including assisting the headman in providing porters) and s. 9A (liability of ward residents to punishment for failure to carry out public duties).

73. Penal Code, s. 347., s. 347.

74. Convention 29 requires countries to suppress all forms of forced or compulsory labor within the shortest possible period (Art. 1). Some forms of forced labor are permitted to continue including compulsory military service, normal civic obligations (such as jury duty), prison labor, service in times of national emergency, and traditional minor communal services (Art. 2(2)). The imposition of forced labor should be a criminal offense, and governments should see that offenders are appropriately penalized (Art. 25).

75. Countries must not used forced labor: (1) for political coercion, (2) to mobilize labor for economic development, (3) as a means of labor discipline, (4) to punish participants in strikes or (5) as a means of racial or other social discrimination (Art. 1). Countries must take steps to secure the immediate and complete suppression of all those forms of forced labor (Art. 2).

76. Art. 5 (countries must take measures to ensure that forced or compulsory labor does not develop into slavery or conditions analogous to slavery.)

77. Art. 1(a) (countries must ensure the complete abolition of debt bondage and serfdom.)

78. Art. 1(1) (countries to punish anyone who procures, entices or leads away another person for prostitution, or exploits the prostitution of another person) and Art. 2 (brothel keepers and others must also be punished).

79. Art. 4 (no one shall be held in slavery or servitude).

80. Art. 8(2) (no one shall be held in servitude), Art. 8(3) (no shall be subject to forced or compulsory labor, although this does not prohibit prison labor or work required by a court order, compulsory military service, work required in case of emergency or calamity, or work which is part of normal civic obligations).

81. Signed March 14, 1956.

82. Report of the Special Rapporteur on Burma, 1998, UN Doc. E/CN.4/198/70, Section IV.A.

83. International Labor Organization, Report of the Commission of Inquiry appointed under Article 26 of the ILO Constitution to examine the observance by Myanmar of the Forced Labor Convention, 1930 (No. 29), (1998), para. 543, p. 160.

84. Id., para. 539, pp. 158-159.

85. ILO, Constitution of the International Labor Organization (1992), Article 29, para. 2.

86. Id., Article 33.

87. See: ILO, Report of the Committee set up to consider the representation made by the International Confederation of Free Trade Unions under article 24 of the ILO Constitution alleging non-observance by Myanmar of the Forced Labor Convention, 1930 (No. 29), ILO Doc. GB.261/13/7, (November 1994), (Hereinafter: Article 24 Report), para. 24; ILO, Report of the Committee on the Application of Standards, (1995), p. 24/62; ILO, Report of the Committee on the Application of Standards, (1996), p. 14/56; GOB, Progress report on measures taken by Myanmar Government to abolish recourse to Forced Labor, September 30, 1996 (submitted pursuant to Art. 22 of the ILO Constitution), (Hereinafter: Article 22 Report), paras. 3 and 12; GOB, Memorandum on [sic] Rebuttal of the Union of Myanmar on allegations of forced labor practices, submitted to the European Union, (March 14, 1996) E.U. Doc. SPG/4/96, (Hereinafter: E.U. GSP Response), paras. 32 to 34; ILO, First report: Complaint concerning the observance by Myanmar of the Forced Labor Convention, 1930 (No. 29), made by delegates to the 83rd (June 1996) Session of the Conference under article 26 of the Constitution of the ILO, ILO Doc. GB.268/15/1, para. 20(a).

88. See, for example, Report of the Special Rapporteur on Burma, (1996), UN Doc. E/CN.4/1996/65, para. 30 (the Secretary-One of the State Law and Order Restoration Council advised the Special Rapporteur that stories about forced labor were untrue: the people were of the Buddhist faith, and willing to contribute voluntarily to development projects.)

89. Article 24 Report, paras. 20, 21., paras. 20, 21.

90. Union of Myanmar, "Rebuttals of the Allegations made in the Report on the Situation of Human Rights in Myanmar by Professor Yozo Yokota," (New York: Union of Myanmar Mission to the United Nations, February 26, 1993).

91. Article 24 Report, para. 40., para. 40.

92. Nyan Htet, "Myanmar's Tradition of Labor Contribution," Working People's Daily, October 18, 1992, p. 5.

93. See, e.g., Agence France Presse, Burma hails ASEAN entry with street clean-up campaign, August 4, 1997.

94. The U.N. Special Rapporteur on Burma was provided with copies of certain secret directives concerning the practice of forced labor, during the course of his visit in 1995. Report of the Special Rapporteur, (1996), UN Doc. E/CN.4/1996/65, add. 2, 3.

95. June 2, 1995

96. April 27, 1995

97. Report of the Special Rapporteur on Burma, (1996), UN Doc. E/CN.4/1996/65, para. 141.

98. EU GSP Response, paras. 14, 15., paras. 14, 15.

99. EU GSP Response, para. 16, para. 19 ("The Government has allotted funds for the village and township development projects and people in the communities have to supplement the fund with the contribution of labor, cash or kind."), para. 16, para. 19 ("The Government has allotted funds for the village and township development projects and people in the communities have to supplement the fund with the contribution of labor, cash or kind.")

100. EU GSP Response, para. 20. See section on the "Yadana Natural Gas Pipeline" later in this chapter for further discussion on the Ye-Tavoy Railway., para. 20. See section on the "Yadana Natural Gas Pipeline" later in this chapter for further discussion on the Ye-Tavoy Railway.

101. Article 22 Report, para. 14., para. 14.

102. Id., para. 15.

103. EU GSP Response, para. 29., para. 29.

104. Collections of orders translated into English have been published by human rights groups. See, e.g. Karen Human Rights SLORC Orders to Villagers: Set 97-B, Central Karen State, (September 14, 1997), KHRG # 97-10; Set 97-A, Chin State, (March 16, 1997), KHRG #97-04; Set 96-F, Central Karen State, (December 10, 1996), KHRG # 96-35; Set 96-B, Taungoo District, (February 23, 1996), KHRG #96-09; Set 96-C, Ye-Tavoy Railway, Dooplaya District, (May 27, 1996), KHRG #96-22; Set 96-E, Central Karen State, (July 31, 1996), KHRG #96-30; Set 96-D, Karenni State, 1995, (July 29, 1996), KHRG #96-29; see also Images Asia, All Quiet on the Western Front - The Situation in Chin State and Sagaing Division, Burma, (January 1998), (Hereinafter: All Quiet).

105. Karen Human Rights Group, Forced Labor - Submission to the ILO, (August 1997), (Hereinafter: KHRG/ILO), p. 5.

106. 0 For a general account of the practice of forced portering see for example Amnesty International, Myanmar: The Climate of Fear Continues - Members of ethnic minorities and political prisoners still targeted, AI: ASA 16/06/93 (October, 1993), (hereinafter: Climate of Fear), pp. 13 - 21; Human Rights Watch/Asia, Abuses Linked to the Fall of Manerplaw, (March 1995) (Hereinafter: Manerplaw), p. 12.

107. 0 Anti Slavery International, Ethnic Groups in Burma, (1994), (Hereinafter: Ethnic Groups), p. 111 (mothers and pregnant women have been forced to work as porters); Images Asia, No Childhood At All: A Report on Child Soldiers in Burma (May 1996), (Hereinafter: No Childhood), p. 6 (children have worked as porters); Human Rights Watch/Asia, Burma: Children's Rights and the Rule of Law, (January, 1997), (Hereinafter: Children's Rights), p. 20.

108. KHRG/ILO. .

109. Human Rights Watch/Asia, Burma - Entrenchment or Reform? Human Rights Developments and the Need for Continued Pressure, (July 1995), (Hereinafter: Entrenchment), p. 15.

110. Report of the Special Rapporteur on Burma, (1995), UN Doc. E/CN.4/1995/65, para. 230.

111. Ethnic Groups, p. 84; for maps depicting different construction projects in Myanmar which are being carried on using forced labor, see Australian Council for Overseas Aid, Slave Labor in Burma - an examination of the SLORC's forced labor policies, (May, 1996), Appendices A and B., p. 84; for maps depicting different construction projects in Myanmar which are being carried on using forced labor, see Australian Council for Overseas Aid, Slave Labor in Burma - an examination of the SLORC's forced labor policies, (May, 1996), Appendices A and B.

112. Several elderly ethnic Shans and Karens who fled Burma told DOL interviewers that they remember the army began to use forced labor after seizing power in 1962. They remembered forced labor being used to repair roads damaged in the rainy season but that in the 1990s they saw a vast expansion of the practice as the army started building new roads, railroads and airports. Interviews with DOL, March 1998.

113. Seven years, pp. 25-26; Article 19, Paradise Lost? The Suppression of Environmental Rights and Freedom of Expression in Burma (September 1994) (Hereinafter: "Paradise Lost"), p. 6., pp. 25-26; Article 19, Paradise Lost? The Suppression of Environmental Rights and Freedom of Expression in Burma (September 1994) (Hereinafter: "Paradise Lost"), p. 6.

114. Entrenchment, p. 15., p. 15.

115. Beyond the Law, p. 49; Climate of Fear., p. 49; Climate of Fear.

116. US Committee for Refugees, USCR Site Visit to Bangladesh (June 20 - July 1, 1996) (Washington, DC, 1996) (recent arrivals in Bangladesh from Arakan state report Rohingyas are disproportionately subject to forced labor, Beyond the Law, pp. 46-49; Denied, pp. 15 - 17.

117. 0 Paradise Lost, p. 19.

118. See, for example, Paradise Lost, p. 20.

119. 0 The U.N. Special Rapporteur on Extrajudicial, Summary or Arbitrary Executions has expressed concern at "persistent reports of arbitrary and excessive use of force by members of the security forces, who seem to enjoy virtual impunity." UN Doc. E/CN.4/1994/7.

120. 0 Entrenchment, p. 15.

121. 0 Id.

122. 0 Ethnic Groups, p. 113.

123. See, for example, Entrenchment, p. 15 (a large number of people reportedly died of malaria during forced labor on a road construction project at Putao.)

124. 0 In an interview published in the Bangkok Post of 18 October 1992, Lieutenant-Colonel Than Han of the Border Areas Development Programme explained that hill tribe people suffer from the climatic change when they come down to work on the plains: "They sweat a lot, they lose weight and they have some health problems." Ethnic Groups, p. 88.

125. U.S. Embassy Rangoon, Foreign Economic Trends Report: Burma, 1997, (September 1997), (Hereinafter: FETR), p. 82.

126. In 1995, the GOB claimed a "contribution of labor" by the people on seven new railroad projects. Letter dated 18 March 1996 from the Permanent Representative of the Union of Myanmar to the United Nations Office at Geneva, Memorandum of observations and comments concerning document E/CN.4/1996/65 of 5 February 1996 pertaining to the Union of Myanmar, UN Doc. E/CN.4/1996/139, (March 21, 1996), (Hereinafter: Memorandum of Observations), p. 21.

127. The Secret Directives are described earlier in this chapter, in the section on "How Forced Labor is Exacted from the Civilian Population."

128. See, for example, The Union of Myanmar, Review of the Financial Economic and Social Conditions for 1995/96, Ministry of National Planning and Economic Development, 1996.

129. FETR, p. 79.

130. A list of projects reported to have been undertaken with contributions of voluntary labor is attached as Appendix III. Articles in the GOB press frequently printed figures for numbers of unpaid workers on specific projects. While the sum of all unpaid workers printed in the state press exceeds five million, it is not possible to determine whether this number represents five million separate individuals, or whether some people worked on more than one project without pay and were thus counted more than once.

131. See for example, Human Rights Documentation Unit, National Coalition Government of the Union of Burma, Forced Labor testimony for the Public Hearing on Forced Labor in Burma, Jun. 27, 1997, at 7-8 (list of 83 infrastructure projects ongoing during 1996 which were using forced labor. Fewer than ten were also identifiable in GOB state press as using "voluntary labor.")

132. Interim Report of the Special Rapporteur on Human Rights in Burma, UN Doc. A/50/568, para. 12 (para. 25 of the summary of allegations submitted to the GOB) ("[M]any of the measures that the government has taken to prepare the country for foreign tourists reportedly constitute violations of human rights. Forced labor has reportedly been used to restore some of the tourist sights (e.g., Mandalay Palace) and to upgrade the infrastructure (e.g. railways, roads and airports)." See also "Burma Using Forced Labor on Tourist Projects", New York Times, 17 July, 1994; Burma Action Group-UK, Burma: The Alternative Guide, 1995.

133. Hobson & Leung, Hotel Developments in Myanmar, Cornell Hotel & Restaurant Quarterly, Vol. 38, p. 60, Feb. 1997. Available in Lexis/Nexis News; curnws directory.

134. Id.

135. Id.

136. Embassy Rangoon, para. 64., para. 64.

137. See, e.g., The Bangkok Post, 22 January, 1995

138. "Mandalay celebrates completion of renovation of moat, ring road," The New Light of Myanmar, May 1, 1994, at 1.

139. Id., para. 67.

140. The Guardian, London, 12 July, 1994., London, 12 July, 1994.

141. The Working People's Daily, January 13, 1994. , January 13, 1994.

142. The Working People's Daily, January 3, 1994., January 3, 1994.

143. Burma: The Alternative Guide..

144. Philip Sherwell, "Children toil on the road to Mandalay," The Daily Telegraph, June 21, 1996, p. 20. Available in Lexis/Nexis News;curnws library.

145. U.S. Department of State Unclassified Cable from U.S. Embassy Rangoon, No. 030924Z, February 3, 1998, (Hereinafter: Embassy Rangoon, 2/3/98), para. 64. See also, "Secretary-2 inspects extension of Yangon-Mandalay highway," The New Light of Myanmar, March 3, 1995, p. 1.

146. Agence France Presse, Burma hails ASEAN entry with street clean-up campaign, August 4, 1997.

147. The Government of the Union of Myanmar, Ministry of National Planning and Economic Development, Statistical Yearbook, 1997, Tables 3.02-3.05. These statistics, which are based on a 1990 labor force survey, do not include unpaid family workers. The CIA's 1997 World Factbook estimates that 65.2% of the workforce is engaged in agricultural work; these latter numbers appear to include estimates for unpaid family workers.

148. UNHCR, Bulletin, June 1995, cited in Human Rights Watch Asia, Burma: The Rohingya Muslims, Ending a Cycle of Exodus? September 1996, at 28.

149. Human Rights Watch Asia, Burma: The Rohingya Muslims, Ending a Cycle of Exodus? September 1996, at 28.

150. Physicians for Human Rights/Denmark and DANCHURCHAID, Violations of Human Rights in Burma, Report of a Fact-finding Mission, November 1997, at 13.

151. ILO, Report of the Committee of Experts, (1995), para. 2, p. 109 (the GOB reporting "799,447 working people" as contributing "voluntary labor" on the Aungbon - Loikow railway); Beyond the Law, p. 49 (hundreds of thousands affected); Ethnic Groups, p. 84.

152. Entrenchment, p. 14., p. 14.

153. New Light of Myanmar, 15 December, 1993, as cited in Entrenchment, p. 15 (reporting 921, 753 people contributing labor to build the Pokokku-Manywa railway); Working People's Daily of 8 May 1992 reporting that over 300,000 people had contributed "voluntary labor" on the Aungbon - Loikow railway., 15 December, 1993, as cited in Entrenchment, p. 15 (reporting 921, 753 people contributing labor to build the Pokokku-Manywa railway); Working People's Daily of 8 May 1992 reporting that over 300,000 people had contributed "voluntary labor" on the Aungbon - Loikow railway.

154. KHRG/ILO..

155. See, for example, GOB, Review of the Financial, Economic and Social Conditions for 1996/97, Ministry of National Planning and Development, 1997, (Hereinafter: GOB Review), p. 69. Table 35, Rural Development Works. They include (1) agricultural and land reclamation, (2) roads and bridges, (3) village water supply, (4) health, (5) education and (6) miscellaneous social services. Until 1993/94 they also included co-operative and collective works, and farm mechanization.

156. Id.

157. Agricultural and land reclamation accounted for 154.2 million kyats (39.5 million of which was people's contributions) and roads and bridges for 235.3 million kyats (people's contribution: 125.3 million kyats) of a total budget for rural development works of 419.5 million kyats.

158. Table 1 uses GOB financial data that is not adjusted for inflation nor adjusted to reflect the real market value of the uncompensated labor contributions so it is of little value in determining the real value of forced labor over time. However, precisely because the data reflects the GOB's assigned value for day labor times the number of persons contributing labor, it is useful both as a proxy for the relative use of forced labor during this period and to calculate the average number of persons contributing labor.

159. 1997 FETR, p. 79. "Since the "people's contributions" are, by definition, uncompensated, the GOB statistics evaluating them must be based on a GOB-assigned shadow price for contributed labor. The shadow price used for this purpose appears to be the official GOB government contract price for day labor, which was 10 kyat per day before 1988, 15 kyat per day from 1988 to 1993, and has been 20 kyat per day since 1993."

160. 1997 FETR, pp. 80-81, 151.

161. GOB Review, Table 36, p. 70., Table 36, p. 70.

162. 1997 FETR, pp.80-81.

163. 1997 FETR, p. 82.

164. Embassy Rangoon, 2/3/98., 2/3/98.

165. The GOB does state that "People's Contributions" include labor, cash and "inkind" contributions. While the bulk of the contributions appear to be labor, an estimate of man-days of forced labor based on the value of "People's Contributions" would appear to overstate forced labor by including cash and "in-kind" contributions. However, "in-kind" contributions frequently appear to involve forced labor contributions as for example, when the military orders villagers to provide bamboo for building barracks: the villagers must go into the forest, cut the bamboo and return it to the military. Also, cash exactions for "porter fees" or forced labor fees are ostensibly used to reimburse persons for service exacted by the government. However, forced labor, even when compensated, is prohibited by ILO Convention 29 and other provisions of international law.

166. FETR, p. 79., p. 79.

167. Id.

168. FETR, p. 81., p. 81.

169. Id.

170. Id.

171. Id. ". . . both anecdotal evidence and casual observation indicate . . . the use of uncompensated labor in these projects were similar to those employed in the local rural development works . . ." The similarity is important because the data on forced labor for local projects is more precise than the data published on the much larger national projects. Insofar as the observed trends are in both local and national projects are similar, the more precise local data can be used draw inferences on the scale of forced labor on national projects. However, because national projects have become increasingly capital intensive (i.e. relied more on heavy equipment) compared to local projects, inferences about forced labor on a national scale based on the data from local projects are increasingly unreliable after FY 1994/95.

172. Id.

173. 14 billion kyats in 1993/94, 23 billion kyats in 1994/95, and 43 billion kyats in 1995/96. Id.

174. Id.

175. Id., p. 82.

176. Id., p. 82, n. 40. (The text of the note refers to "person hours" of labor. DOL has confirmed with the report's author that "days" was intended and that the error is typographical.)

177. Id.

178. Id., p. 81.

179. Id.

180. Id. See also Embassy Rangoon, 2/3/98, para. 6 (commented on promise of Regional Commander in Arakan state to stop forced labor by saying: "we have learned that the promises and denials of [GOB] officials are not worthy of trust.")

181. The Mon Information Service (MIS) reported in December, 1996 that military labor had replaced forced labor on the Ye Tavoy railroad.⁽¹⁸²⁾

182. - " "

183. Embassy Rangoon, 2/3/98, para. 49.

184. 0 Ethnic Groups, p. 91.

185. KHRG/ILO..

186. 0 Amnesty International, Myanmar: "No Place To Hide": Killings, abductions against ethnic Karen villagers and refugees, AI: ASA 16/13/95 (June 1995) (Hereinafter: No Place to Hide), p. 25.

187. KHRG/ILO. .

188. 0 Ethnic Groups, p. 89.

189. 0 For example, an elderly Karen headman from Thaton district lost a leg after SLORC troops tied him to a rope and forced him to try and find a path through a mine field. Ethnic Groups, pp. 29-30.

190. 0 Beyond the Law, p. 50. For example, as part of SLORC's offensive against the Karen National Union and the Mong Tai Army between November 1994 and June 1995, thousands of porters were reportedly taken to the front line, and hundreds died. Entrenchment, p. at 21.

191. 0 Reports of the Special Rapporteur on Burma, (1995) UN Doc. E/CN.4/1995/65; (1994), UN Doc. E/CN.4/1994/57, para. 49; (1996), UN Doc. E/CN.4/1996/65, paras. 114, 115; (1993), UN Doc. E/CN.4/1993/37, paras. 79 to 84, 101 to 104, 135 to 138, 222, 228, 229, 231-233. See also Report of the Special Rapporteur on Torture and other forms of Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, (1994), UN Doc. E/CN.4/1994/31([hereinafter: Report of the Special Rapporteur on Torture), para. 401. Report of the Special Rapporteur on Extrajudicial, Summary or Arbitrary Executions, (1994), UN Doc. E/CN.4/1994/7, para. 448. Climate of Fear.

192. 0 Report of the Special Rapporteur on Torture, para. 20.

193. 0 Entrenchment, p. 21. The following account by a former porter of the death of another porter, a neighbor from his village, is illustrative of the treatment meted out to porters by SLORC troops: "I heard Tun Shwe say to the soldier behind him, a private from Battalion 531, `Sir, don't kill me. I will try to do my best to reach your destination. Now I cannot carry, cannot walk, but I will try. Don't punish me, don't kill me.' After Tun Shwe exclaimed `I cannot carry, cannot walk' the soldier shot him dead, one bullet from a G-4 at a distance of about four meters, in his back so his insides came out. After the shooting nothing happened, no-one could say anything. The soldiers just said to the other porters `complete your duty, go on, go on' as if he was driving cows." No Place to Hide, (June 1995), p. 29.

194. 0 Climate of Fear, pp. 20-21 (16 and 17 year old girls of ethnic groups taken as porters and raped). One human rights group which interviewed a number of refugees in a camp in Thailand reported that women who had worked as porters commonly alleged that they had been raped: "Four victims, aged 17 to 42, said they had been seized in or near their homes in Kammamaung township. They said that troops had raped them during a 22-day tour of compulsory labor duties carrying artillery shells to the front for the Tatmadaw assault on Manerplaw." Ethnic Groups, p. 113.

195. 0 See, for example Amnesty International, Myanmar: Human rights after seven years of military rule, AI: ASA 16/23/95 (October 1995), (Hereinafter: Seven Years), pp. 24-25; No Place to Hide, p. 27; Amnesty International, Human rights still denied, AI: ASA 16/18/94, (November 1994), (Hereinafter: Denied), pp. 14 - 21.

196. Physicians for Human Rights/Denmark & DANCHURCHAID, Violations of Human Rights in Burma, November 1997

197. 0 See, for example, Asia Watch, Burma: Forced Labor and Religious Persecution in North Arakan State, (1992), p. 3.

198. KHRG/ILO, at 2.

199. Earth Rights International and Southeast Asian Information Network, Total Denial (July 1996), p. 33. See also Ethnic Groups, p. 84.

200. Human Rights Watch/Asia, Rohingyas: Repatriation or Refoulement?, p. 29.

201. 0 See, for example, Amnesty International, Myanmar: Human rights violations against Muslims in the Rakhine (Arakan) State, AI: ASA 16/06/92, (October 1992), (Hereinafter: Human Rights Violations), p. 6. See also generally, KHRG/ILO.

202. Although commanding officers have reportedly been involved in such commercial ventures, there is no evidence to suggest that military holding companies such as the Union of Myanmar Economic Holdings (UMEH) have been involved in such ventures.

203. Embassy Rangoon, 2/3/98, para. 45., 2/3/98, para. 45.

204. 0 N. Chan, "A Culture of Coercion", Burma Issues, January 1995, pp. 2, 3.

205. See for example, KHRG/ILO.

206. See, e.g., International Federation of Human Rights Leagues (FIDH), Burma, Total and Human Rights: dissection of a project, Nov. 1996 [hereinafter FIDH], (alleging that the pipeline "gives occasion to large-scale, repeated and documented violations of human rights [and.]...that without the pipeline, all, or at least some, of these violations would not have occurred."); EarthRights International and Southeast Asian Information Network, Total Denial, July 1996, [hereinafter Total Denial]. ("Forced labor is occurring on the pipeline itself; forced portering for the military responsible for the pipeline security is widespread and [company personnel] have at times been present when these abuses are taking place."); Mergui Tavoy Information Service, Karen National Union, Report the Facts: The Yadana Gas Pipeline Construction in Tavoy District, Tennasserim Division, 1995 [hereinafter Report the Facts]. See also, e.g.Karl Schoenberger, The Human Rights Pipeline; Charges of Slave Labor in Myanmar Lead to Ballot at Unocal, Los Angeles Times, April 11, 1994, at D1. (Shareholders allege forced labor and forced relocation caused by pipeline). International Federation of Human Rights Leagues (FIDH), Burma, Total and Human Rights: dissection of a project, Nov. 1996 [hereinafter FIDH], (alleging that the pipeline "gives occasion to large-scale, repeated and documented violations of human rights [and.]...that without the pipeline, all, or at least some, of these violations would not have occurred."); EarthRights International and Southeast Asian Information Network, Total Denial, July 1996, [hereinafter Total Denial]. ("Forced labor is occurring on the pipeline itself; forced portering for the military responsible for the pipeline security is widespread and [company personnel] have at times been present when these abuses are taking place."); Mergui Tavoy Information Service, Karen National Union, Report the Facts: The Yadana Gas Pipeline Construction in Tavoy District, Tennasserim Division, 1995 [hereinafter Report the Facts]. See also, e.g.Karl Schoenberger, The Human Rights Pipeline; Charges of Slave Labor in Myanmar Lead to Ballot at Unocal, Los Angeles Times, April 11, 1994, at D1. (Shareholders allege forced labor and forced relocation caused by pipeline).

207. Id.

208. Department of State Unclassified Cable from Embassy Rangoon, No. 00220. January 22, 1996. (Hereinafter referred to as Rangoon 1996/00220), para. 24.

209. Id.

210. Id.

211. See, e.g., Unocal, Labor Conditions in Burma at the Yadana Pipeline, Statement of Unocal Corporation, Submission for the Hearing Record for the U.S. Department of Labor, Bureau of International Labor Affairs Hearings Regarding The International Labor Organization Inquiry on Labor in Burma, July 7, 1997; Yadana: Updated Statistics, February 1998; Commission for Peace and Justice, Humanitarian Report: Yadana Project, January 28, 1998.) Unocal, Labor Conditions in Burma at the Yadana Pipeline, Statement of Unocal Corporation, Submission for the Hearing Record for the U.S. Department of Labor, Bureau of International Labor Affairs Hearings Regarding The International Labor Organization Inquiry on Labor in Burma, July 7, 1997; Yadana: Updated Statistics, February 1998; Commission for Peace and Justice, Humanitarian Report: Yadana Project, January 28, 1998.)

212. See Secretary-2, Ministers attend voluntary labor camp opening ceremony, The New Light of Myanmar, January 17, 1994, at 1 (State press reports villagers contributing "voluntary labor" to build Ahpyauk natural gas pipeline in western Burma).

213. See ILO, First report: Complaint concerning the observance by Myanmar of the Forced Labor Convention, 1930 (No. 29), made by delegates to the 83rd (June 1996) Session of the Conference under article 26 of the Constitution of the ILO, ILO Doc. GB.268/15/1, Appendix: Observation of the Government of Myanmar on the initial complaint and supplementary evidence made by 25 Worker delegates to the 83^rd Session of the International Labour Conference under article 26 of the ILO Constitution, February 5, 1997.

214. See Unocal, Unocal in Myanmar (Burma): The Yadana Project, March 1997, at 2.

215. International Gas Report (Financial Times) "Pros and cons in the Pacific Rim" April 18, 1991.

216. David Hayes, "Gas Import Review Takes on Urgency," Gas World International, April 1992, at 34.

217. David Brunnstrom, Risks Foreseen in Total's $1 Billion Burma Venture, Reuters, October 27, 1992.

218. "International Gas Report, (Financial Times), Thai-Burmese hiccups," April 4, 1991. The Petroleum Authority of Thailand had asked the World Bank to fund the project.

219. David Hayes, "Gas Import Review Takes on Urgency," Gas World International, April 1992, at 34.

220. Ibid.

221. Martin Smith, Burma: Ethnicity and the Politics of Insurgency.

222. New railroad for regional development, The New Light of Myanmar, June 25, 1995. ("Transportation has been difficult in [Tavoy] township...though there is a motor road from Dawei [Tavoy] to Yay [Ye] only about six cars ply the road in one day.") The New Light of Myanmar, June 25, 1995. ("Transportation has been difficult in [Tavoy] township...though there is a motor road from Dawei [Tavoy] to Yay [Ye] only about six cars ply the road in one day.")

223. N. Chan, "A Culture of Coercion", Burma Issues, January 1995, pp. 2, 3.

224. To build and operate the pipeline, the co-venturers formed a corporation with a distribution of equity ownership identical to that of the Yadana field production consortium. That entity, the Moattama Gas Transportation Company (MGTC) was incorporated in December 1994 with a Total affiliate holding 31.24% ownership, a Unocal subsidiary holding 28.26%, PTT Exploration and Production Public Co., Ltd. (PTTEP) owning 25.5% and the GOB's Myanmar Oil and Gas Enterprise (MOGE) holding the remaining 15%.Unocal, Statement of Unocal Corporation: For the Department of Labor Report to Congress, Labor Conditions in Burma at the Yadana Pipeline, February 1998, at 1.

225. Unocal, Unocal in Myanmar (Burma): The Yadana Project, March 1997, at 2.

226. Rangoon 1996/00220, para. 7.

227. Yadana Natural Gas Project, The New Light of Myanmar, September 13, 1995, at 3. ("Myanmar will earn 4900 million US dollars in thirty years for the sale of gas and this is about 450,000 US dollars a day."), The New Light of Myanmar, September 13, 1995, at 3. ("Myanmar will earn 4900 million US dollars in thirty years for the sale of gas and this is about 450,000 US dollars a day.")

228. Rangoon 1996/00220, para. 7. The uncertainty about the GOB's total revenues from the project stem from secrecy surrounding its contractual terms.

229. See, e.g., Unocal, Labor Conditions in Burma at the Yadana Pipeline, Statement of Unocal Corporation, Submission for the Hearing Record for the U.S. Department of Labor, Bureau of International Labor Affairs Hearings Regarding The International Labor Organization Inquiry on Labor in Burma, July 7, 1997; Yadana: Updated Statistics, February 1998; Commission for Peace and Justice, Humanitarian Report: Yadana Project, January 28, 1998. Unocal, Labor Conditions in Burma at the Yadana Pipeline, Statement of Unocal Corporation, Submission for the Hearing Record for the U.S. Department of Labor, Bureau of International Labor Affairs Hearings Regarding The International Labor Organization Inquiry on Labor in Burma, July 7, 1997; Yadana: Updated Statistics, February 1998; Commission for Peace and Justice, Humanitarian Report: Yadana Project, January 28, 1998.

230. Rangoon 1996/00220, para. 16.

231. Id.

232. Id.

233. Id.

234. Id.

235. Id.

236. Unocal, Statement of Unocal Corporation: For the Department of Labor Report to Congress, Labor Conditions in Burma at the Yadana Pipeline, February 1998, at 1. ("The Total affiliate, as project operator, is responsible for all day-to-day operations relating to the pipeline, including hiring all labor...The government of Myanmar does not provide or arrange for personnel to work on the pipeline"). To build and operate the pipeline, the co-venturers formed a corporation with a distribution of equity ownership identical to that of the Yadana field production consortium. That entity, the Moattama Gas Transportation Company (MGTC) was incorporated in December 1994 with a Total affiliate holding 31.24% ownership, a Unocal subsidiary holding 28.26%, PTT Exploration and Production Public Co., Ltd. (PTTEP) owning 25.5% and the GOB's Myanmar Oil and Gas Enterprise (MOGE) holding the remaining 15%. Unocal, Statement of Unocal Corporation: For the Department of Labor Report to Congress, Labor Conditions in Burma at the Yadana Pipeline, February 1998, at 1.

237. Rangoon 1996/00220, para. 28. (emphasis added)

238. Id., para. 22.

239. Id., para. 27.

240. Karen Human Rights Group, Effects of the Gas Pipeline Project, KHRG #66-21, May 23, 1996, at 13-16.

241. Id. at 17-18.

242. Id. "Loke-are-pay" literally means "to give voluntary labor," which is a euphemism commonly used by the GOB when referring to forced labor.

243. Id. at 20.

244. Human Rights Watch/Asia, Labor Practices in Burma. Submission to the U.S. Department of Labor, February 6, 1998. See, also, e.g., FIDH, supra; Total Denial, supra .

245. Rangoon 1996/00220, para. 17.

246. Id., para. 28.

247. Rangoon 1998/00302.

248. See R.W. Timm and K.M. Subhan, "Humanitarian Report: Yadana Project, January 28, 1998.

249. See e.g., Mergui Tavoy Information Service, Karen National Union, Report the Facts: The Yadana Gas Pipeline Construction in Tavoy District, Tennasserim Division, 1995 (reporting two battalions in general area of the pipeline in 1991). Compare, All Burma Students Democratic Front, Terror in the South: Militarisation, Economics and Human Rights in Southern Burma, November 1997, at 20 (reporting 27 battalions in the area, five of which are stationed directly alongside the pipeline). Accord Rangoon 1996/00220, supra n. 101, at paragraph 22 (reporting five battalions stationed along or in the immediate vicinity of the pipeline, citing Press Briefing material annexed to Rangoon 1996/00220). Mergui Tavoy Information Service, Karen National Union, Report the Facts: The Yadana Gas Pipeline Construction in Tavoy District, Tennasserim Division, 1995 (reporting two battalions in general area of the pipeline in 1991). Compare, All Burma Students Democratic Front, Terror in the South: Militarisation, Economics and Human Rights in Southern Burma, November 1997, at 20 (reporting 27 battalions in the area, five of which are stationed directly alongside the pipeline). Accord Rangoon 1996/00220, supra n. 101, at paragraph 22 (reporting five battalions stationed along or in the immediate vicinity of the pipeline, citing Press Briefing material annexed to Rangoon 1996/00220).

250. See, e.g. Burma--SLORCS ensure security for gas pipeline laying, Bangkok Post, January 30, 1997. Reprinted in PERISCOPE DAILY DEFENSE NEWS CAPSULES, January 30, 1997.

251. See, e.g., Total Denial, at 28. Total Denial, at 28.

252. Interim Report of the Special Rapporteur on Burma, (1996) UN Doc. A/51/466, paragraph 135; see also Total Denial, at 28.

253. See FIDH. (Alleging forced labor in construction of military barracks.)

254. Id. at 31.

255. Rangoon 1996/00220, para. 18.

256. Id., para. 22, which reports on pipeline security and notes five battalions stationed along the pipeline route.

257. See Burma Army, Infantry Battalion 409 Operation `Tayinaung' mapsheet, photographed by San Francisco Chronicle, on file with the Department of Labor. See also, Sandy Barran, Gas Pipeline Carves Ugly Scar Across Burma; Villagers tell of shotgun-labor tactics, San Francisco Chronicle, March 21, 1998 (Hereinafter Barran), at 1.

258. Infantry Battalion 403 in the Kanbauk region, Infantry Battalion 408 east of Kanbauk, Infantry Battalion 409 in the Tavoy River Valley, Infantry Battalion 404 in the upper Zinba River Valley, and Infantry Battalion 273 possibly in a series of forts along the ridge at Naing Ei Taung⁽²⁵⁹⁾

259. See Total, "Socio economic [sic] unit (T.M.E.P.)."Jan. 1996. Press Briefing Material annexed to Cable # 221101Z from U.S. Embassy Rangoon, Jan. 1996. (List of personnel hired by Total to provide medical, educational and development assistance to villagers in the area including entries for "Doctor in Pyingyi and battalion 408, " "Doctor in Eindayaza and battalion 403," "Doctor in Tavoy river crossing (Battalion 409…" and "Doctor in Hilipad [sic] 5 With 404 battalion." See also Total, "Socio eco unit T.M.E.P.". Press Briefing Material annexed to Cable # 221101Z from U.S. Embassy Rangoon, Jan. 1996. (Outlines structure of socio-economic unit and doctors assigned to Battalion 403 at Pyingyi, Battalion 409 at the Tavoy River crossing as well as doctors assigned to Battalions 408 and 404 at unspecified locations.)

260. The map indicates that the operations area for Infantry Battalion 273 is west of Kanbauk to the coast (including Hpaung Daw, Daminseik, Zadi, Kadeik and Kywe Thon Nyi Ma villages), Infantry Battalion 409 east of Kanbauk (including Eindeyaza and Migyaunglaung villages), Infantry Battalion 408 in the Tavoy River Valley, Infantry Battalion 405 in the lower Zinba River Valley, Infantry Battalion 401 in the upper Zinba River Valley, and Infantry Battalion 282 is in a series of forts along the ridge at Naing Ei Taung. In addition to the six battalions stationed directly on the pipeline, the map indicates that Infantry Battalion 407 is stationed just north of the pipeline security zone and Infantry Battalion 406 is posted just to the south.

261. Amnesty International, Myanmar: Human rights after seven years of military rule, ASA 16/23/96, October 1995, at 23. (I.B.s 104, 405, 408 and 409 using forced labor in Ye and Ye Pyu townships).

262. Karen Human Rights Group, Effects of the Gas Pipeline Project, KHRG #66-21, May 23, 1996, at 13.

263. Yozo Yokota, Report of the Special Rapporteur of the Commission on Human Rights on the Situation of Human Rights in Myanmar, A/50/568, October 16, 1995, at 15.

264. Id. at 21.

265. See, e.g., Total Denial, pp. 41-43; Rangoon 1996/00220, para. 20. pp. 41-43; Rangoon 1996/00220, para. 20.

266. Rangoon 1998/00302, para. 82.

267. Id.

268. Id., para. 79. (Regarding relocations "in preparation for clearing the pipeline route...[o]n a recent visit to the pipeline, officer was told by village[r]s that relocations did occur." See also, Interview with refugees from Shintabi and Migyaunglaung villages by U.S. Department of Labor officials, Ban Dong Yang, Thailand, February 1998.

269. Rangoon 1998/00302.

270. See Mergui Tavoy Information Service, Karen National Union, Letter to the Department of Labor, Further information re the pipeline from original documents of 1991/92, KNU Mergui Tavoy District (Reporting relocations from or depopulations of seventeen villages in pipeline area and headcount and destination of families who complied, fled and whether people were able to return subsequently). On file with DOL.

271. Rangoon 1998/00302, para. 80.

272. Myanmar Gas for Ratchburi Power Plant: The good impact of the Salween Dam, [advertisement], Bangkok Post, April 17, 1995. [advertisement], Bangkok Post, April 17, 1995.

273. Rangoon 1996/00220, para. 25.

274. Id., para. 24.

275. Id.

276. Id.

277. Id., par. 25.

278. International Labor Organization, Report of the Commission of Inquiry appointed under Article 26 of the ILO Constitution to examine the observance by Myanmar of the Forced Labor Convention, 1930 (No. 29), (1998), pp. 504-510.

279. Id.

280. Id.

281. Human Rights Watch Asia, Labor Practices in Burma, Submission to the U.S. Department of Labor, February 6, 1998 (Interview with villager "forced to work as a porter for the army guarding the security of the Yadana gas pipeline."); and Barran, (Refugees in Thailand report that they did forced labor "on pipeline-related projects such as helipads.")

282. Rangoon 00302 (1998), para. 78.

283. Rangoon 00302 (1998), para. 88. (Request for independent visit to pipeline "flatly denied" by the GOB.)

284. Rangoon 00302 (1998), para. 88. GOB informed that visit to the pipeline "would have to be approved by the Ministry of Oil and Gas (MOGE), and would only be approved in conjunction with an invitation by one of the oil companies involved in the project."

285. Interim Report of the Special Rapporteur on Burma, (1997), UN Doc. A/52/484, para. 73.

286. Id. See also: Report of the Special Rapporteur on Burma, (1997), UN Doc. E/CN.4/1997/64; Beyond the Law, p. 46.

287. Embassy Rangoon (1998), para. 55. (1998), para. 55.

288. Interim Report of the Special Rapporteur on Burma, (1996), UN Doc. A/51/466, para. 119.

289. Ethnic Groups, p. 79, referred to in Beyond the Law, p. 46., p. 79, referred to in Beyond the Law, p. 46.

290. See for example Physicians for Human Rights/Denmark & DANCHURCHAID, Violations of Human Rights in Burma, November 1997, p. 14. (Forty-seven of 98 Shan, Karenni and Karen refugees surveyed in camps in Thailand reported having been forcibly relocated from their home villages. Two thirds reported GOB counterinsurgency campaigns as the reason for relocation.)

291. Report of the Special Rapporteur on Burma, (1997), UN Doc. E/CN.4/1997/64.

292. Interim Report of the Special Rapporteur on Burma, (1996), UN Doc. A/51/466, para. 119; Beyond the Law, p. 47; International Commission of Jurists, The Burmese Way: to Where? Report of a mission to Burma (December 1991), p. 70.

293. Interim Report of the Special Rapporteur on Burma, (1996), UN Doc. A/51/466, para. 122.

294. Interview with Human Rights Watch/Asia researcher, March 1998, on file; interview with Karen Human Rights Group researcher, February, 1998, on file. KHRG/ILO, p. 9. (Alleging collection of forced laborers for Aungban-Loikaw railroad a major reason for well documented relocations in Karenni State).

295. Karen Human Rights Group, SLORC Orders to Villages, Set 96-B, Taungoo District, February 23, 1996, KHRG #96-09.

296. Interviews with Karenni, Shan and Karen refugees in Thailand by U.S. Department of Labor officials, February 9 -- March 6, 1998.

297. Report of the Special Rapporteur on Burma, (1997), UN Doc. E/CN.4/1997/64; see also: Beyond the Law, p. 47.

298. Ethnic Groups, p. 81., p. 81.

299. Karen Human Rights Group, Relocations in the Gas Pipeline Area, April 20, 1997, KHRG # 97-06.

300. Interim Report of the Special Rapporteur on Burma, (1997), UN Doc. A/52/484, para. 73.

301. Interim Report of the Special Rapporteur on Burma, (1996), UN Doc. A/51/466, para. 121.

302. Embassy Rangoon (1998), para. 60. (1998), para. 60.

303. Id., para. 75.

304. Amnesty International, Myanmar: Atrocities Worsen in Shan State, April 15, 1998.

305. Id., para. 76.

306. Interim Report of the Special Rapporteur on Burma, (1996), UN Doc. A/51/466, para. 120.

307. Report of the Special Rapporteur on Burma, (1995), UN Doc. E/CN.4/1995/65.

308. Human Rights Watch/Asia, Burma: The Rohingya Muslims - Ending a Cycle of Exodus?, (September, 1996), p. 30.

309. Id., p. 31.

310. Human Rights Watch/Asia and Refugees International, Bangladesh/Burma: Rohingya Refugees in Bangladesh - The Search for a Lasting Solution, (August, 1997), p. 13.

311. Ethnic Groups in Burma, p. 81., p. 81.

312. Report of the Special Rapporteur on Burma, (1997), UN Doc. E/CN.4/1997/64.

313. Workers and employers may join and establish organizations of their own choosing (Art. 2), which must not be subject to dissolution by administrative authority (Art. 4), and must be allowed to draw up their own constitutions and rules, to elect their representatives "in full freedom", and to choose and implement their own activities and programs (Art. 3(1)). Workers' and employers' organizations must be allowed to join federations and confederations, and to affiliate with international organizations (Art. 5). Countries may limit the freedom of association of police and members of the armed forces (Art. 9).

314. Workers must not be pressured not to join a union, or to give up union membership, as a condition of employment (Art. 1(2)(a)), and must not be dismissed (or prejudiced in employment) for participation in union activities (Art. 1(2)(b)). Public servants involved in the administration of the State are not covered (Art. 6), and countries may limit the freedom of association of police and of the armed forces (Art. 5). Workers' and employers' organizations should be independent, and free from interference in each others' activities (Art. 2). The right to organize should be protected (Art. 3), and voluntary collective bargaining promoted (Art. 4).

315. Conventions 87 and 98 are among the ILO's core human rights conventions. For a complete list of other ILO instruments on freedom of association and collective bargaining, see ILO, General Survey on Freedom of Association and Collective Bargaining, (1994), (Hereinafter: Freedom of Association, paras. 9 to 11. Burma is bound by only one of these other instruments: the Right of Association (Agriculture) Convention, 1921 (No. 11) which the United Kingdom ratified in 1923. Convention 11 provides that agricultural workers should have the same rights as industrial workers.

316. Art. 20(1) (rights of peaceful assembly and association) and Art. 23(4) (right to form and join trade unions for the protection of workers' interests).

317. Art. 21 (right of peaceful assembly) and Art. 22(1) (right of association, including the right to form and join trade unions). Countries may limit the freedom of association of police, and members of the armed forces (Art. 22(2)), but may not use the Covenant to derogate from the ILO Convention 87 (Art. 22(3)).

318. Art. 8(1)(a) (right to form and join the trade union of one's choice, according only to the rules of the organization); Art. 8(1)(b) (right of unions to join federations and confederations, and to affiliate internationally); Art. 8(1)(c) (unions' right to operate freely, subject only to national law); Art. 8(1)(d) (right to strike, provided it is exercised lawfully). Countries may limit the freedom of association of police and the armed forces (Art. 8(2)), but may not use the Covenant to derogate from ILO Convention 87 (Art. 8(3)).

319. To back this up, a special ILO supervisory procedure examines complaints against governments which do not guarantee the rights of freedom of association. Freedom of Association, para. 19.

320. Apparel accounted for approximately 75% of all U.S. imports from Burma in 1997, or $86 million of a total $115 million. Data obtained from the Office of Korea and Southeast Asia, International Trade Administration, U.S. Department of Commerce, based on statistics collected by the U.S. Bureau of the Census.

321. It requires 50% union membership in a workplace before a union can be registered (s. 4). The 1966 ILO Report of the Committee of Experts on the Application of Conventions and Recommendations states that the requirement of a union to have 50% of the employees is inconsistent with Article 2 of Convention 87 which guarantees workers the right to establish unions without previous authorization.

322. Union officers may not belong to a political party, and must be employees where the union is established (s. 6(h)). According to the ILO, regulation of union amalgamations is also "excessively strict": it requires a 50% turnout in a ballot of the members of each union that wants to amalgamate, and a 60% majority in favor of amalgamation (s. 24).

323. Which did not repeal the Trade Unions Act.

324. ILO, Report of the Committee of Experts, 1971, p. 116.

325. ILO, Report of the Committee of Experts, 1980, p. 111.

326. This is the body which apparently has responsibility for reviewing most of Burma's laws to consider whether they continue to be appropriate to present conditions. For further discussion of the Laws Scrutiny Central Body and of law in Burma generally, see the Background Chapter.

327. GOB, Aspects of Labor Laws in Myanmar, (February, 1996) p. 15. Although the GOB says it has sought technical assistance from the ILO, under current circumstances, it is not clear that the ILO would provide such assistance. The ILO has run no new programs in Burma since 1991. In 1995 the GOB canceled a technical mission after ILO officers had arrived in Bangkok from Geneva, and the Conference Committee on the Application of Conventions and Recommendations resolved that the office could use its own discretion in the future about providing technical assistance. Another mission in May 1996 was also cancelled by the GOB. See ILO, Report of the Committee of Experts on the Application of Conventions and Recommendations, 1995, pp. 85-87 and 1996, pp. 73-75.

328. See Background, p. 14.

329. ILO Report of the Committee of Experts on the Application of Conventions and Recommendations, 1966, p. 96.

330. Id.

331. ILO Report of the Committee of Experts on the Application of Conventions and Recommendations, 1971, p. 116.

332. ILO Report of the Conference Committee of Experts on the Application of Conventions and Recommendations, 1989, p. 135; ILO Report of the Conference Committee on the Application of Standards, 1989, pp. 32-34.

333. ILO Report of the Conference Committee on the Application of Standards, 1991, pp. 48-49.

334. Id.

335. ILO Report of the Committee of Experts on the Application of Conventions and Recommendations, 1994, pp. 216-217; ILO Report of the Conference Committee on the Application of Standards, 1994, pp.92-94.

336. ILO Report of the Committee of Experts on the Application of Conventions and Recommendations, 1995, pp. 180-181; ILO Report of the Conference Committee on the Application of Standards, 1995, pp. 85-87.

337. ILO Report of the Conference Committee on the Application of Standards, 1996, para. 166 and pp. 73-75.

338. ILO Report of the Committee of Experts on the Application of Conventions and Recommendations, 1997, p. 182.

339. ILO Report of the Conference Committee on the Application of Standards, 1997, pp. 88-90.

340. ILO Report of the Conference Committee on the Application of Standards, 1998, paragraphs 212 and 215-216.

341. Report of the Special Rapporteur on Burma, (1995), UN Doc. E/CN.4/1995/65, para. 124.

342. Interim Report Special Rapporteur on Burma, (1997), UN Doc. A/52/484

343. Amnesty International, Myanmar - a Challenge for the International Community, AI Index: ASA 16/28/97 (Hereinafter: Challenge.)

344. The U.N. Special Rapporteur concluded in 1997, on the basis of "virtually unanimous reports . . . that there is no freedom of thought, opinion, expression or association . . .". Interim Report of the Special Rapporteur on Burma (1997), UN Doc. A/52/484, para. 149.

345. Id., para. 15.

346. Id., para. 19.

347. Id.

348. FTUB, Labor Practices in Burma, Submission to the U.S. Department of Labor, February 1998, (Hereinafter: FTUB Submission.)

349. The ICFTU is the international umbrella group for trade union centrals.

350. See Chapter 2 of this report on Forced Labor and Forced Relocations.

351. September 30, 1988.

352. Organizations involved in "undermining the prevalence of law and order, local peace and security, and smooth and secure operation of transport and communications" (Art. 5.B.) or in "undermining or stopping the operation of state administrative machinery" may not register (Art. 5.C). Also prohibited are organizations "composed of members of the state administrative machinery" including members of the army or the police, and "public service organizations, state boards and corporations, or personnel earning a monthly salary from the state", if they "accept the influence of a political organization" or have contact with one (Art. 5.D).

353. Law on Associations, Art. 3.C.

354. Law on Associations, Art. 7.

355. Challenge, and the Bangkok Post, July 30, 1997., and the Bangkok Post, July 30, 1997.

356. SLORC Information Sheet No. a-0095 (I/L), August 17, 1997, as reported electronically in Burmanet.

357. Challenge. .

358. Id.

359. Id.

360. FTUB Submission, p. 1., p. 1.

361. Report of the U.N. Special Rapporteur on Burma, 1998, UN Doc. E/CN.4/1998/70, Section II.D.3.

362. See, for example, Art. 20 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, ("No person may be compelled to join an association").

363. Freedom of Association, para. 100; ILO, Digest of Principles on Freedom of Association, (1996), paras. 321 - 330., para. 100; ILO, Digest of Principles on Freedom of Association, (1996), paras. 321 - 330.

364. Human Rights Watch/Asia, Burma: Childrens' Rights and the Rule of Law, (Hereinafter: Children's Rights, p. 17.)

365. Commonwealth of Australia, The New Aseans, Vietnam, Burma, Cambodia & Laos, ISBN 0642 27148 8, Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, June, 1997.

366. Id. (quotation marks in original)

367. Childrens' Rights, p. 17., p. 17.

368. Report of the Special on Burma, (1997), UN Doc. E/CN.4/1997/64.

369. This is common practice, according to a number of human rights NGOs interviewed recently in Thailand. ( Interviews on file.)

370. GOB Internet Home Page, link to information on trade and labor, available at www.myanmar.com/gov/trade/lab.html.

371. GOB Labor Force data from 1990/91 (the most recent available) show that 56.5 per cent of workers were employed in the agricultural sector. Of all employees, however, 35.3 per cent were "own account workers" and 32.6 per cent were unpaid family workers. Source: GOB, Department of Labor and UNFPA, A Manual of Human Development Resource Indicators, (1997), p. 45.

372. Over 93% of all enterprises over the last three fiscal years employ less than 10 workers; only 0.01% employ more than 100 workers. GOB, Labor Market Information Indicators for the Subregional Labor Information Network, (October, 1997), Table 11.

373. Eighty per cent of enterprises with more than 100 employees are state enterprises. Id.

374. Under the BSPP most industry was nationalized, and the GOB controlled virtually the entire non-agricultural economy. World Bank, Myanmar - Sustaining Policies for Economic Reform, (1995), p. 1. Although the SLORC has endeavored to liberalize the economy, it has had little success at privatization of government businesses, so the situation remains largely the same. "From 1963 to the present, most of the industrial sectors are owned and controlled by the government. . ." FTUB Submission.

375. GOB Website: www.myanmar.com/gov/trade/lab.html. (9/96)

376. Embassy Rangoon..

377. FTUB Submission, p. 3., p. 3.

378. Commercial Guide, 1996, U.S. Department of State.

379. Id., para. 20.

380. Id.

381. Embassy Rangoon, para. 20., para. 20.

382. The Factories Act covers any workplace with 20 employees, and workplaces with 10 or more employees if they are engaged in a "manufacturing process" using power. It does not appear to cover self-employed workers, work in agriculture, or transport machinery. It requires cleanliness in the workplace, adequate work space, whitewashing of factory walls, supply of potable water (and cool water in hot weather), and adequate sanitary facilities. An employer is responsible for ventilation of fumes (ss. 15, 16 and 38) and guarding of dangerous machinery (ss. 23, 30 to 32, 37, 85). Precautions must be taken when adjusting operating machinery, for work in confined spaces, for safety of lifting devices, and to prevent fires and explosions (s. 24). Workers are bound by certain obligations, but do not have any particular rights (s. 104). Employers must display safety provisions (s. 99). See BLS Study, p. 50, and ILO, General Survey on Safety at Work,(1987), paras 45, 96, 197, 207, 219, 231, 240, 279, 612.

383. Employers are liable for injuries and illnesses arising out of or in the course of work, unless the cause is the employee's (1) their own use of alcohol or drugs, (2) wilful disobedience or refusal to follow safety rules or (3) tampering with safety devices. GOB Labor Laws, p. 9, para. 33, and BLS Study, p. 50. It does not apply to agricultural workers on plantations with less than 25 employees, to casual laborers, members of the armed or police forces, or to employees living in their employer's household BLS Study, p. 50.

384. Employers with more than 5 employees must contribute to a scheme which provides medical benefits, maternity, injury, liability and survivor benefits. Id.

385. Embassy Rangoon..

386. Department of State Unclassified Cable from Embassy Rangoon, No. 030924Z, February 3, 1998; FTUB Press Release, January 2, 1998.

387. The demands included: 1) a wage increase; 2) no forced overtime on Government holidays, and no wage deductions for not working on holidays; 3) medical assistance to be provided by the company for workers injured at work; 4) fines and deductions from workers' salaries to be made public; 5) workers to be allowed to take governmental exams; 6) special allowance to be paid to workers using chemicals; and 7) factory rules and regulations to be made public so that all workers could understand them.

388. The agreement included the following conditions: 1) new employees will receive a training wage of 55 kyats a week, and the regular monthly salary will increase to 1,800 kyats from the beginning of 1998; 2) workers may decide whether to work on holidays, and the company will discuss its needs with workers if it needs more workers on holidays. Penalties will be discussed by the Administration Manager and supervisors; 3) medical fees will be "issued" by the factory, and will be made public; 4) fines and penalties will be cleared on time; 5) workers will be allowed to enter government examinations officially; 6) workers handling chemicals will receive a special allowance; 7) rules and regulations will be made public; and 8) the workers may form a six member permanent workers committee.

389. They issued a statement that workers from Hlegu and Indakaw townships (where 80% of the workforce lived) would not enter the factory until the demands were met.

390. FTUB Press Release, January 2, 1998.

391. From December 1995 to December 1996, consumer price inflation as measured by the Rangoon Consumer Price Index accelerated to 31.5%. Foreign Economic Trends Report: Burma, 1997, U.S. Department of State, p. 56.

392. Source: FTUB press release.

393. Data obtained from the International Trade Administration, U.S. Department of Commerce.

394. National Labor Committee (NLC), Press Releases dated June 13, 1997 and October 10, 1996. The NLC has denounced several U.S. apparel companies for purchasing garments from Burma. The NLC targeted companies such as Disney, Ralph Lauren, Macy's, Lee, J. Crew, Arrow Shirts, London Fog, Columbia Sportswear and Oshkosh B'Gosh for continuing their production or purchase of clothing in Burma throughout 1996. Most of these firms subsequently announced their decision not to purchase apparel from Burma. As of June 30, 1998, the U.S. companies that may continue to source apparel in Burma include: Cluett Peabody & Co. (Arrow), Capital-Mercury Shirt Corp., Consolidated Stores Corp. (Kay Bee Toy & Hobby Stores), and Salmor Import Export Corp. Amongst the U.S. companies that have announced their decision to stop sourcing apparel from Burma are: Bradlees Inc., Braun's Fashions Inc., Columbia Sportswear, Dayton-Hudson Corp., Disney Co., Federated Department Stores (Macy's), J. Crew, Kellwood Co., Kmart Corp., Leslie Fay Cos. Inc., Levi Strauss, Liz Claiborne Inc., London Fog Corp., Oshkosh B'Gosh Inc., Spiegel Inc. (Eddie Bauer), Supreme International Corp. and Venture Stores. See Multinational Business in Burma (Myanmar), Investor Responsibility Research Center, June 1998.

395. Interview with John Sansone, ITF representative, March 1998, on file.

396. Statement by the Deputy Minister of Transport, U Than Wai, at a press conference on October 8, 1993 (broadcast on Rangoon Radio). See Case No. 1752 (Myanmar): complaint against the Government of Myanmar presented by the International Transport Workers Federation (ITF), 295th Report of the Committee on Freedom of Association, ILO Doc. GB.261/3/5, Geneva, November 1994, (Hereinafter: Seafarers' Case), para. 102.

397. The CFA is different from the ILO's other supervisory mechanisms because it "examines complaints containing allegations of violations of the Conventions on freedom of association, regardless of whether or not the countries concerned have ratified those instruments." Freedom of Association, para. 19. (emphasis in original).

398. Lodged on December 17, 1993. CFA Case No. 1752. Definitive conclusions and recommendations adopted in November 1994. 295th CFA Report, ILO Official Bulletin, Vol. LXXVII, 1994, Series B, No. 3, paragraphs 87-119.

399. Seafarers' Case, paras. 92 - 101., paras. 92 - 101.

400. Id., paras. 92, 93.

401. Id., paras. 94 - 96.

402. Id., paras. 97, 98.

403. Id., para. 99.

404. Id., paras. 100, 101.

405. Id., para. 102.

406. Id., para. 108.

407. Id., para 109.

408. Id., para. 112.

409. Id., para. 113.

410. Id., para. 114.

411. Id., para. 116.

412. Id., para. 118.

413. Id., para. 119.

414. ILO, Report of the Conference Committee on the Application of Standards, (1995), p. 24/86.

415. A copy of this sworn statement is attached as Exhibit IV.

416. See letter attached as Appendix IV.

417. See a translation of this letter attached as Appendix V. (Copy of original on file)

418. U.S. Department of State, Burma Country Report on Human Rights Practices for 1997, Section 6.d.

419. UNICEF, Possibilities for a United Nations Peace and Development Initiative for Myanmar, (Draft for Consultation, 16 March 1992).

420. Images Asia, No Childhood at All: A Report on Child Soldiers in Burma (May 1996), p. 28, interview with "Sein Myint" in December 1995 (name changed to protect identity), (Hereinafter: No Childhood).

421. ILO Convention 138 it obliges countries to pursue a national policy to eliminate child labor, and progressively raise the minimum age for admission to employment (Art. 1). For hazardous or morally harmful work the minimum age should be 18, or 16 with proper protection and training (Art. 3(1)). The general minimum age should be 15 (or higher if the minimum age for compulsory schooling is higher) or 14 in developing countries (Art. 2). Children aged 13 to 15 (12 to 14 in developing countries if the minimum age is 14) may do light work that is not harmful, and doesn't interfere with school (Art. 7(1)). The Convention does not apply to vocational training and apprenticeships (Art. 6). Countries may exclude some types of non-hazardous work where there are particular difficulties (Art. 4). Developing countries may exclude some economic sectors, including family and small scale agricultural holdings which produce mainly for local consumption, and do not regularly hire employees (Art. 5(1)).

422. Art. 32 (1) (right to be protected from economic exploitation, hazardous or harmful work, and work that interferes with education), Art. 32(2) (specify a minimum age (or ages) for employment, regulate hours and conditions of employment and enforce these laws), Art. 34(protect children from sexual exploitation and abuse including unlawful sexual activity,⁽⁴²³⁾

423. Id., Art. 34(a).

424. Art. 10(3) (children should be protected from economic and social exploitation; use of child labor in hazardous or harmful work, and employment of children below set minimum ages should be punishable as crimes).

425. The first discussion on a new Convention on the Worst Forms of Child Labor was held during the 1998 International Labor Conference. Adoption is expected during the 1999 International Labor Conference. If adopted, the new instrument will not replace Convention 138, but separately address the most intolerable forms of child labor. These potentially include slavery and similar practices, sale and trafficking of children, forced or compulsory labor, including debt bondage and serfdom, child prostitution and pornography, production of or trafficking in drugs or other illegal activities, hazardous or morally harmful work, and work by very young children, especially girls. See ILO, Child Labor - Targeting the intolerable, (1996), pp. 20, 114, and Child Labor, (1998), p. 173.

426. Art. 1(1) (countries to punish anyone who procures, entices or leads away another person for prostitution, or exploits the prostitution of another person, Art. 2 (brothel keepers and others must also be punished).

427. Art. 2 (countries to take steps to prevent the slave trade and to bring about an end to slavery in all its forms).

428. Burma signed the Convention on July 16, 1991, and ratified it on August 15, 1991: UN Doc. CRC/C/8/Add.9, para 21. Burma lodged reservations to Art. 37 (prohibition on use of torture and inhumane treatment) and Art. 15 (freedom of association and assembly), but subsequently withdrew them.

429. The GOB recently informed the ILO that it favors adoption of a new Convention (supported by a Recommendation) containing measures for immediate suppression of the most extreme forms of child labor, and that it favors regional co-operation to combat child labor. It also reported it would have problems ratifying a new instrument if it applied to everyone under 18, as existing laws would need to be modified. See ILO, Child Labor, (1998), pp. 1, 11, 17, 22, 73 and 165.

430. Signed March 14, 1956.

431. Slavery Convention, completed September 25, 1926, Geneva, entered into force March 9, 1927.

432. Children have the right to free primary level education at State schools, provided by the Ministry of Education, which must also ensure regular attendance at schools, reduce untimely drop-out rates, and ensure literacy of children who cannot attend State schools (Child Law s. 20). See also 1974 Constitution, Arts. 152.a and 152.c (right to education, made mandatory by law) and 1947 Constitution Arts. 33, 34 (right to free compulsory education; obligation of the State to promote education of the young). However, the ILO reported in 1981 (its most recent general survey on child labor conventions) that there was no compulsory schooling in Burma (ILO, General Survey on Minimum Age for Employment, (1981), Table IV, p. 64 (Hereinafter: Minimum Age.)

433. Children have the right to work voluntarily and in accordance with the law; the Ministry of Labor must ensure childrens' safety at work, and ensure their rights are protected (Child Law ss. 24(a)(I) and (b)). See also the 1947 Constitution, Art. 37 (the State must protect children from abuse, and ensure that economic need does not force them into unsuitable work) and Art. 39 (the State must take special care of people's health, particularly that of youth).

434. The general minimum age for work is 13, small factories excepted (Factories Act, ss. 75, 76 or 79, Oil Fields (Welfare of Workers) Act, ss. 52 or 53, Shops and Establishments Act, s. 8(1)). It may be possible to exclude some types of work from the general minimum age (Sources: Minimum Age, Table II, p. 43; Myanmar Department of Labor and UNICEF, Report on Working Children and Women in Myanmar's Urban Informal Sector, (1997), Table 68, p. 110 [Hereinafter: GOB/UNICEF], U.S. Department of Labor, Bureau of Labor Statistics, Labor Law and Practice in the Union of Burma, 1964 [Hereinafter: BLS Study].)

435. Children may not do dangerous work in general (Factories Act, s. 52(b). If children are imprisoned, they must not be employed in "rigorous labor" (Child Law, s. 52(d)). Particular jobs are prohibited under specified ages: age 18 for work near machinery in motion (Factories Act, s. 24), as a trimmer and stoker (Merchant Shipping Act, s. 37(c)(1)), or underground in a mine (Mines Act, s. 26(1)); age 15 for work near machines not in motion (Factories Act, s. 29), lifting heavy weights (Factories Act, s. 36), or above-ground work at a mine (Mines Act, s. 26(1)). (Sources: Minimum Age, Table II, p. 43; Table V, p. 102.)

436. Children have the right to hours of work, rest, leisure and "other reliefs" provided for by law (Child Law, s. 24(a)(ii)). Until age 15, the maximum is 4 hours' work per day (Factories Act, s. 79(1)(a), Oil Fields (Workers and Welfare Act), s. 52), or 5 hours with breaks (Factories Act, s. 75). Children may not work between 6:00 pm and 6:00 am (Factories Act, s. 76 or s. 79(1)(b), Oil Fields (Workers and Welfare) Act, 1951 s. 53) and must have a minimum of 10 hours' rest between work sessions (Factories Act, s. 79(1)(a)). Children must not work on weekly rest days or holidays (Factories Act, s. 79(1)(b)). (Sources: Minimum Age; GOB/UNICEF, Table 68, p. 110 - discrepancies are due to differences between these secondary sources.)

437. Applicable criminal offenses under the Child Law include: employing a child to do physically hazardous or morally harmful work (s. 65(a)), employing a child as a beggar (s. 66(c)), purchasing property from a child, unless the child earns a livelihood by selling (s. 65(e)), allowing a girl under the age of 16 to earn a living in prostitution (s. 66(a)), allowing a child under guardianship to live or consort with a person who earns a living in prostitution (s. 66(b)), and using a child in pornographic cinema, video, television or photography (s. 66(f)). Offenses under the Penal Code include selling or hiring out a person under the age of 18 into prostitution (s. 372), and buying or hiring a person under the age of 18 for prostitution (s. 373). (Source for Penal Code: GOB, Trafficking in Women: A Myanmar Perspective, (November, 1997), pp. 9, 10).

438. See Chapter 2, supra. (Forced Labor and Forced Relocations)

439. The U.N. Special Rapporteur on Burma has received reports that children have been forced to work: Report of the Special Rapporteur on Burma, (1996), UN Doc. E/CN.4/1996/65, para. 42. UNICEF remarked on forced child labor in infrastructure development in its 1997 World Report: UNICEF, The State of the World's Children, Focusing on Child Labor, 1997, p. 35.

440. Reports of "abuse and violence" against children raised "grave concerns" for the Committee, particularly the "numerous documented cases . . . of children systematically being forced into labor, including as porters."⁽⁴⁴¹⁾

441. Concluding Observations of the Committee on the Rights of the Child: Myanmar, dated January 24, 1997. UN Doc. CRC/C/15/Add.69, para. 21.

442. Interview with Daw Aung San Suu Kyi, July 1996, referred to in No Childhood, p. 7.

443. 1996 FETR.

444. See Chapter 2, supra. (Forced Labor and Forced Relocations)

445. Human Rights Watch/Asia, Burma: Childrens' Rights and the Rule of Law, (January 1997), (Hereinafter: Children's Rights), p. 25.

446. UNICEF, Myanmar Children in Especially Difficult Circumstances, (1992), (Hereinafter: Myanmar Children), p. 23.

447. Interview at Tham Hinh refugee camp by U.S. Department of Labor officials, February 9, 1998.

448. See, e.g., Karen Human Rights Group, Forced Labor in Burma - Submission to the International Labor Organization Commission of Inquiry, August 1997 (Hereinafter: KHRG/ILO).

449. Id.

450. Id.

451. Childrens' Rights, p. 20., p. 20.

452. Interim Report of the Special Rapporteur on Burma, (1996), UN Doc. A/51/466, para. 140.

453. Id.

454. CRC Report, paras. 21, 42. paras. 21, 42.

455. Childrens' Rights, p. 21.s, p. 21.

456. Id.

457. Id.

458. Children's Rights, p. 22., p. 22.

459. No Childhood, p. 3., p. 3.

460. Convention on the Rights of the Child, Art. 38(3). When recruiting 15 to 18 year olds, armies should give priority to the eldest. Id.

461. Id., Art. 38(2). In addition, although ILO Convention No. 138 does not specifically reference the age of soldiers, Article 3 of the Convention does require that, "the minimum age for admission to any type of employment or work which by its nature or the circumstances in which it is carried out is likely to jeopardize the health, safety or morals of young persons shall not be less than 18 years."

462. The Child Law, 1993 does not address the issue. Other sources diverge: according to Human Rights Watch/Asia applicable regulations specify a minimum age of 16 years, (Children's Rights, p. 22), while an expert on Burma's military reports that the age is 18 (Selth, Transforming the Tatmadaw: The Burmese Armed Forces Since 1988, (1996), (Hereinafter: Transforming the Tatmadaw, p. 50.)

463. CRC Report, para. 42., para. 42.

464. "Since 1993 . . . there have been persistent reports that every district and village in Burma has been required to provide at least one recruit for the army." Transforming the Tatmadaw, p. 51, referring to Anti Slavery International, Ethnic Groups in Burma, (1994) (Hereinafter: Ethnic Groups), pp. 118-119, and "Burmese Army to conscript youths", Asian Defence Journal, May, 1993, p. 86.

465. Ethnic Groups, p. 119., p. 119.

466. Children's Rights, p. 22., p. 22.

467. Images Asia, All Quiet on the Western Front? The Situation in Chin State and Sagaing Division, Burma, (January 1998), (Hereinafter: All Quiet), p. 51. Interview conducted by the authors of the report, May 1997.

468. Id.

469. No Childhood, p. 28, interview with "Sein Myint" (name changed to protect identity), December, 1995., p. 28, interview with "Sein Myint" (name changed to protect identity), December, 1995.

470. Id.

471. All Quiet, pp. 26, 27, quoting a report from the Chin Human Rights Organization, August 1997. At that time, only one had managed to find one by collecting money within the village to pay him to serve., pp. 26, 27, quoting a report from the Chin Human Rights Organization, August 1997. At that time, only one had managed to find one by collecting money within the village to pay him to serve.

472. The name of the interview subject has been changed to protect his identity. No Childhood, p. 28.

473. It has also been reported that admission standards have been lowered. Before 1988 up to 50% of applicants were rejected as medically unfit. "To all intents and purposes this practice has now been abandoned." Transforming the Tatmadaw, p. 50, referring to T.D. Roberts, et al, Area Handbook for Burma (American University, Washington, 1968), p. 333.

474. No Childhood, p. 8. Other reasons given by former child soldiers include to support family (Id., p. 31, interview with "Aung Soe"), because they did not really understand what they were doing, and soldiers offered a great life in the army (Id., p. 29, interview with "Thein Mya"), so soldiers would not beat his father any more (Id., interview with "Khaing Soe Aung" ), to help his village, where many people had been beaten and taken to be porters (Id., interview with "Kyaw Hla" ), because soldiers offered food, clothing and money (Id., interview with "Aung Tay") , and to save a brother from going when his name was drawn in the village lottery. (Id., p. 30, interview with "Maung Soe Min"). , p. 8. Other reasons given by former child soldiers include to support family (Id., p. 31, interview with "Aung Soe"), because they did not really understand what they were doing, and soldiers offered a great life in the army (Id., p. 29, interview with "Thein Mya"), so soldiers would not beat his father any more (Id., interview with "Khaing Soe Aung" ), to help his village, where many people had been beaten and taken to be porters (Id., interview with "Kyaw Hla" ), because soldiers offered food, clothing and money (Id., interview with "Aung Tay") , and to save a brother from going when his name was drawn in the village lottery. (Id., p. 30, interview with "Maung Soe Min").

475. Myanmar Children, p. 24. p. 24.

476. No Childhood, p. 27; Childrens' Rights; All Quiet; Transforming the Tatmadaw,p. 50 (SLORC has accepted recruits as young as 15)., p. 27; Childrens' Rights; All Quiet; Transforming the Tatmadaw,p. 50 (SLORC has accepted recruits as young as 15).

477. No Childhood, pp. 9, 30. , pp. 9, 30.

478. Id., p. 10.

479. Children's Rights, p. 22., p. 22.

480. Myanmar Children, p. 23., p. 23.

481. Ethnic Groups, pp 118, 119., pp 118, 119.

482. Childrens' Rights, p. 2., p. 2.

483. No Childhood, p. 31., p. 31.

484. Id., pp. 32, 33. Interview with "Khaplang" (name changed) conducted by FTUB, June, 1997. In Images Asia's report, the place is described as Kan Tee township, in Chin State - the typographical error was pointed out to the DOL by the authors.

485. No Childhood, p. 35; Childrens' Rights, p. 2., p. 35; Childrens' Rights, p. 2.

486. No Childhood, p. 36, interview with "Sein Myint" (name changed), December, 1995., p. 36, interview with "Sein Myint" (name changed), December, 1995.

487. Id., interview with "Maung Hlaing" (name changed), April, 1995.

488. Id., p. 37, interview with "Aung Tay" (name changed), December, 1995.

489. Id., interview with "Kyaw Hla" (name changed), June, 1995.

490. No Childhood, p. 39. The preceding description of the reasons for and frequency of beatings and abuse draws generally on the same source, at pp. 38, 39. In another case, a former child soldier reported that a drunk officer shot three sleeping youths who did not wake up when he called them. Id., p. 39. The preceding description of the reasons for and frequency of beatings and abuse draws generally on the same source, at pp. 38, 39. In another case, a former child soldier reported that a drunk officer shot three sleeping youths who did not wake up when he called them. Id.

491. Id., p. 49.

492. Interview with Karen Human Rights Group (KHRG) researcher, February, 1998 (On file). See also No Childhood, interview with "Maung Tin Sein" (name changed) interview conducted by KHRG, August, 1994.

493. No Childhood, pp. 51, 52., pp. 51, 52.

494. Id., p. 49.

495. Id., p. 47.

496. Id., p. 52.

497. "They followed us and shot at us. We hid in a ditch. . . He rushed ahead like a panicked cow. Boom! I turned and he was down. . . Finally I left him to get help. At last I ran into a patrol of (ethnic) soldiers. We went back to get my friend, but by the time we arrived he was dead." No Childhood, p. 56. Interview with "Soe Hla Baw" (name changed), December, 1995.

498. Id., p. 39. Interview with "Zaw Gyi" (name changed), December, 1995.

499. Department of State Unclassified Cable from Embassy Rangoon, No. 030924Z, February 3, 1998, (Hereinafter: Embassy Rangoon, 2/3/98.)

500. Myanmar Children, p. 22. , p. 22.

501. DOL, By the Sweat and Toil of Children, Volume IV: Consumer Labels and Child Labor, DOL/ILAB, 1997, p. 3.

502. Myanmar Children, p. 22., p. 22.

503. The data available do not disclose the precise meanings of the terms "labor force" and "labor force participation rate". Nor do they disclose why the age-group 10 to 14 is reported, given that the general minimum age for employment is 13. The answer may be because Apprentices may be recruited at age 10: GOB/UNICEF, p. 32.

504. Myanmar Children, p. 22. According to UNICEF, surveys show that roughly 30 to 40% of children aged 6 to 15 work (sometimes part time while they attend school) in poor countries with largely rural populations. The estimate of working in children is simply this proportion of the population group. , p. 22. According to UNICEF, surveys show that roughly 30 to 40% of children aged 6 to 15 work (sometimes part time while they attend school) in poor countries with largely rural populations. The estimate of working in children is simply this proportion of the population group.

505. Although as the GOB/UNICEF study found, these laws are little enforced.

506. GOB report to the U.N. Committee on the Rights of the Child, (1995), UN Doc. CRC/C/8/Add.9, para. 111(a).

507. Embassy Rangoon, 2/3/98., 2/3/98.

508. Myanmar Children, p. 22., p. 22.

509. The informal sector was defined as "small-scale, private, and largely unregulated by labour laws," and characterized by low skill, low paying, labor intensive work which is frequently household based. The study did not seek to measure the prevalence of child labor, either in the urban informal sector or at a national level. 175 households were surveyed in Rangoon (Hlaingtharyar and South Oakkalarpa) and Mandalay (Chanmyatharzi and Pyigyitagon), GOB/UNICEF, pp. 9, 11 and 15.

510. Id., pp. 60, 65.

511. State Department Human Rights Report, 1997, Section 6.d.

512. GOB/UNICEF, p. 69., p. 69.

513. Id., p. 46.

514. Id., pp., 43, 46.

515. Id., p. 82.

516. Id., p. 81.

517. Although the GOB/UNICEF report considers that Burma's laws generally comply with Art. 7(1) of Convention 138, which regulates light work by children below the generally applicable minimum age for employment.

518. Overall, 62% of working children were aged between 12 and 14, while at the other end of the scale, 12.5% were aged younger than 10. The mean age of children working was 13 years, and over 90% of those working had not attended school.

519. Id., p. 96. Selling: 58.1%, Refuse collection: 50%, Food processing: 36.9%, Manufacturing: 26.1% (although most of these are said to be apprentices), and Tea shops: 17.8%. GOB/UNICEF, p. 132.

520. Id., p. 132.

521. About 40% of children work 8 to 11 hours a day, although some children work up to 16 hours a day. In some areas a work day of 5 to 9 hours is common, while in services it can be up to or beyond 12 hours a day. Id., pp. 97, 111.

522. Id., p. 136.

523. Id., p. 93. Children are hired at lower wage rates to do the same work as adults: Embassy Rangoon, para. 32.

524. The authors of the study consider that this number may be affected by the fact that there were government officials present when the survey was carried out.

525. Id., p. 109.

526. Id., p. 148.

527. Id., p. 110.

528. Id., p. 149.

529. Id., p. 146.

530. Myanmar Children, p. 22., p. 22.

531. UNICEF, Myanmar Children, p. 22.

532. In 1992 the ratio of commercial and cooperative farming to subsistence agriculture was not known. Id.

533. Id.

534. Id.

535. GOB/UNICEF, p. 45., p. 45.

536. See Archavanitkul, Extracts from a forthcoming ILO/IPEC report on trafficking in children in the Mekong Basin Countries, (1/31/98) (Hereinafter: ILO/IPEC Extracts), p. 4-1. This is consistent with Burmese making up the vast majority of illegal migrant workers in Thailand.

537. ILO/IPEC Extracts, p. 4-1. It is not unusual for children aged 15 and older to cross the border looking for work. Id., p. 4-13., p. 4-1. It is not unusual for children aged 15 and older to cross the border looking for work. Id., p. 4-13.

538. ILO/IPEC Extracts; Archavanitkul and Gertsawang, Migrant Women from Thailand's Neighboring Countries in Thailand's Commercial Sex Trade, Institute of Population and Social Research, Mahidol University, Nakon Pathom, Thailand (Hereinafter: Migrant Women); Human Rights Watch/Asia, A Modern form of Slavery - Trafficking of Burmese Women and Girls into Brothels in Thailand (1993) (Hereinafter: Modern Slavery); Reports of the U.N. Special Rapporteur on the Sale of Children, Child Prostitution and Child Pornography, (1994, 1996, 1997), UN Doc. E/CN.4/1997/95; UN Doc. E/CN.4/1996/100; UN Doc. A/49/478. Extracts; Archavanitkul and Gertsawang, Migrant Women from Thailand's Neighboring Countries in Thailand's Commercial Sex Trade, Institute of Population and Social Research, Mahidol University, Nakon Pathom, Thailand (Hereinafter: Migrant Women); Human Rights Watch/Asia, A Modern form of Slavery - Trafficking of Burmese Women and Girls into Brothels in Thailand (1993) (Hereinafter: Modern Slavery); Reports of the U.N. Special Rapporteur on the Sale of Children, Child Prostitution and Child Pornography, (1994, 1996, 1997), UN Doc. E/CN.4/1997/95; UN Doc. E/CN.4/1996/100; UN Doc. A/49/478.

539. Migrant Women; Modern Slavery, p. 25, referred to in Aaron Stern, Thailand's Migration Situation and its Relations with other APEC Members and Other Countries in Southeast Asia, Asian Research Centre for Migration Studies, Institute of Asian Studies, Chulalongkorn University, Jan, 1998, (Hereinafter: Thailand's Migration Situation), p. 25.; Modern Slavery, p. 25, referred to in Aaron Stern, Thailand's Migration Situation and its Relations with other APEC Members and Other Countries in Southeast Asia, Asian Research Centre for Migration Studies, Institute of Asian Studies, Chulalongkorn University, Jan, 1998, (Hereinafter: Thailand's Migration Situation), p. 25.

540. Modern Slavery, p. 45., p. 45.

541. Modern Slavery, p. 4., p. 4.

542. Myanmar Children, p. 20., p. 20.

543. Id.

544. US $225 to $450.

545. Modern Slavery, p. 3., p. 3.

546. Myanmar Children, p. 18. , p. 18.

547. Modern Slavery, p. 6., p. 6.

548. Myanmar Children, p. 19., p. 19.

549. Report of the U.N. Special Rapporteur on the Sale of Children, etc, (1997) UN Doc E/CN.4/1997/95, para. 76.

550. ILO/IPEC Extracts, p. 4-13., p. 4-13.

551. Myanmar Children, p. 19., p. 19.

552. Vitit Muntarbhorn: "International Perspectives and Child Prostitution in Asia," U.S. DOL, Forced Labor: The Prostitution of Children (1996), p. 22.

553. Myanmar Children, p. 17., p. 17.

554. Id. The price was said to be 3,000 to 3,500 kyats in 1991.

555. Id., p. 23.

556. Myanmar Children, p. 17. It also noted that regional research indicates that children as young as 8 are commonly involved; the majority of girls, however, were between 15 and 25. Id., p. 17. It also noted that regional research indicates that children as young as 8 are commonly involved; the majority of girls, however, were between 15 and 25. Id.

557. GOB Report to the U.N. Committee on the Rights of the Child, (1995), UN Doc. CRC/C/8/Add.9, para. 113(a).

558. Childrens' Rights, p. 19; Myanmar Children, pp. 16, 17. , p. 19; Myanmar Children, pp. 16, 17.

559. Myanmar Children, p. 17. Domestic work by children, particularly by young girls, is a common form of exploitative child labor, and is often associated with sexual abuse of the children. , p. 17. Domestic work by children, particularly by young girls, is a common form of exploitative child labor, and is often associated with sexual abuse of the children.

560. CRC Report, para. 23. , para. 23.

561. Id., para. 43.

562. 1997 Human Rights Report, U.S. Department of State.

563. Ministry of Education/UNDP/UNESCO, Education Sector Survey, (1992), p. iii, referred to in No Childhood, p. 6.

564. Myanmar Children, p. 21., p. 21.

565. Ethnic Groups, p. 106., p. 106.

566. CRC Report, para. 39., para. 39.

567. GOB/UNICEF, pp. 50, 51. It refers to an earlier UNICEF paper: Children and Women in Myanmar: A Situation Analysis, (1995), as the source for this data., pp. 50, 51. It refers to an earlier UNICEF paper: Children and Women in Myanmar: A Situation Analysis, (1995), as the source for this data.

568. GOB/UNICEF, pp. 56, 57., pp. 56, 57.

569. Counting the Full Cost, p. 21. A 1984 law limits the fee to 10 kyats per child per year, up to a maximum of 20 kyats a year for parents with more than one child. Id., p. 21. A 1984 law limits the fee to 10 kyats per child per year, up to a maximum of 20 kyats a year for parents with more than one child. Id.

570. Id., p. 26.

571. Interview with Karen Human Rights Group researcher, February 1998, on file.

572. Counting the Full Cost, p. 15. , p. 15.

573. Martin Smith, Burma: Ethnicity and the Politics of Insurgency, p. 99. Alternatively, in many cases villages must make contributions to supplement the teacher's salary, either with cash or in kind, generally in the form of rice. Another consequence is that many teachers abandon their jobs. Interview with KHRG researcher, February 1998, on file.

574. Counting the Full Cost, p. 17., p. 17.

575. Counting the Full Cost, pp. 28, 29. , pp. 28, 29.

576. GOB/UNICEF, p. 57. It found that children's wages contributed 20% to 30%, and in some cases as much as 50% of household incomes, and that parents considered the opportunity cost of foregoing this income in deciding whether to send a child to school (p. 42.) The study also found that many working children had either never attended school, or had dropped out.⁽⁵⁷⁷⁾

577. The survey of 129 enterprises, which employed a total of 191 child workers, revealed a mean age of 13 for the child workers, and 90% of them had never attended school. GOB/UNICEF, p. 96.

578. Counting the Full Cost, p. 46., p. 57. It found that children's wages contributed 20% to 30%, and in some cases as much as 50% of household incomes, and that parents considered the opportunity cost of foregoing this income in deciding whether to send a child to school (p. 42.) The study also found that many working children had either never attended school, or had dropped out.⁽⁵⁷⁷⁾

577. The survey of 129 enterprises, which employed a total of 191 child workers, revealed a mean age of 13 for the child workers, and 90% of them had never attended school. GOB/UNICEF, p. 96.

578. Counting the Full Cost, p. 46.

579. Counting the Full Cost, p. 46., p. 46.

580. GOB/UNICEF, p. 38 (children see themselves in the future doing the same work they now do), p. 56 (children who have been to school often do not see the content of education as relevant to their lives) and p. 84 (even where children would like to go to school, they do not see it as the way out of their situation; an attitude which is reinforced by their parents.), p. 38 (children see themselves in the future doing the same work they now do), p. 56 (children who have been to school often do not see the content of education as relevant to their lives) and p. 84 (even where children would like to go to school, they do not see it as the way out of their situation; an attitude which is reinforced by their parents.)

581. GOB/UNICEF, p. 56., p. 56.

582. Counting the Full Cost, p. 40. , p. 40.

583. Id., p. 40.

584. Counting the Full Cost, p. 46., p. 46.

585. Counting the Full Cost, p. 32., p. 32.

APPENDIX I

APPENDIX II

APPENDIX III

APPENDIX IV

APPENDIX V

APPENDIX VI

APPENDIX VII