Strategic
Reactions to American Preeminence:
Great Power Politics in the Age of Unipolarity
G. John Ikenberry
28 July 2003
The National
Intelligence Council recently engaged a group
of leading international relations theorists in
a series of discussions about �power politics�
in the �age of unipolarity.�
At the end of the discussions, the group�s
chair, Professor John Ikenberry of Georgetown
University, drafted a paper on strategic reactions
to American preeminence.
The views in this paper are Professor Ikenberry�s
alone and do not represent official US Government
positions or views.
INTRODUCTION
American global power � military, economic, technological, cultural,
and political � is one of the great realities
of our age. Never before has one country been
so powerful and unrivaled. The United States began
the 1990s as the world�s only superpower and its
advantages continued to grow through the decade.
After the Cold War, the United States reduced
its military spending at a slower rate than other
countries and its economy grew at a faster pace.
The globalization of the world economy has reinforced
American economic and political dominance. No
ideological challengers are in site. More recently,
in response to terrorist attacks, the United States
has embarked on a massive military buildup. In
the recent National Security Strategy, the Bush
administration has articulated an ambitious and
provocative global military role for the United
States in confronting new-age threats. Overall,
American power advantages are multidimensional,
unprecedented, and unlikely to disappear any time
soon.
The world has taken notice
of these developments. Indeed, the post-Cold War
rise of American power -- what might be called
the rise of American �unipolarity� -- has unsettled
world politics. Governments everywhere are worried
about the uncertainties and insecurities that
appear to flow from such extreme and unprecedented
disparities of power. The shifting global security
environment � triggered by the terrorist attacks
of September 11th �also has conspired
to upset old relationships and expectations. The
American invasions of Afghanistan and Iraq have
put American power on display and raised far-reaching
questions about the use of force, alliances, weapons
of mass destruction, sovereignty and interventionism.
The world is in the midst of a great geopolitical
adjustment process. Governments are trying
to figure out how an American-centered unipolar
order will operate. How will the United States
use its power? Will a unipolar world be built
around rules and institutions or the unilateral
exercise of American power?
This global worry about how a unipolar
world will operate � in which the most basic questions
about the character of world politics are at stake,
namely, who benefits and who commands � is the
not-so-hidden subtext of all the recent controversies
in America�s relations with the rest of the world.
The question posed in this report is: how are the major countries
around the world responding to American global
preeminence? Overall, strategies and policies are mostly still in flux around
the world. Responses up to now have been mostly
ad hoc. Governments are learning, adapting, negotiating,
and reacting � thus it is not possible to identify
fixed �strategies of response.� This report seeks
to help us understand these evolving responses
in two ways: first, it will provide conceptual
tools to identify and track strategic responses
by major states to American preeminence, and second,
it will offer some preliminary characterizations
of the patterns of response, particularly by Western
Europe, Russia, and China. This report might be seen as a sort of �field
guide� to global reactions rather than a definitive
theoretical and empirical statement on the subject.
I begin by offering a summary of the findings. After this, I look
at the rise of American unipolar power and the
variety of ways that American power is �experienced�
around the world.
In the next section, I survey the deeper
sources and multifaceted character of American
unipolar power.
Next I explore the limits of the basic
strategies of response to concentrated power �
balancing, bandwagoning and binding. In the next
section, I explore some of the emerging strategies
that are appearing among the major countries.
Finally, in the conclusion I return to the issue
of unipolar power and rule-based order.
SUMMARY OF FINDINGS
1. American unipolar power is unlikely to trigger
a full-scale, traditional balance of power response.
The major powers � Russia, China, Germany, France,
Britain and Japan � will attempt to resist, work
around, and counter American power -- even as they also engage and work with American power. But they
are not likely to join in an anti-American countervailing
coalition that will break the world up into hostile,
competing camps. The balance of power is the most
time-honored way of thinking about politics among
the great powers. In this classical view, when
confronted with a rising and dominant state, weaker
states flock together and build an alternative
power bloc. The circumstances for this type of
dramatic, order-transforming move do not exist
-- and they are not likely to exist even if American
power continues to rise relative to other major
states and even if American policy antagonizes
other states in the way that is has recently over
the Iraq war.
There are a variety of reasons why this is so. One is simply that
a bloc of major states with sufficient power capabilities
to challenge the United States is not possible
to assemble. Another is that American power itself
is not sufficiently threatening to provoke a counter-balancing
response. To be sure, American power � and the
policies and roles that this power enables � does
worry other major states. Responding to it is
their major geopolitical challenge. But counter-balancing
responses � manifest in separate and competing
security alliances and systematic policies of
opposition � are both not feasible and not responsive
to the distinctive challenges posed by unipolarity.
What troubles the other major countries about
American power cannot be remedied by the classic
geopolitical tool of the balance of power.
2. Governments are adjusting and learning � as
they are trying to figure out how to deal with
American unipolar power. A world with a single
superpower is new. We do not have a great deal
of historical experience and policy relevant theories
that states can use in making strategic decisions
in how to deal with the United States. The big
question that the major states are asking is this:
will a unipolar America abandon its postwar approach
to global leadership-- leadership that operated
through multilateral rules and institutions and
close partnerships?
Scholars might pose the question this way:
is unipolarity inconsistent with rule-based international
order? Some French and other European foreign
policy officials, for example, believe that the
rise of American unipolarity has triggered a radical
break in America�s global leadership approach.
The United States will increasingly resist entanglements
in formal rule-based institutions and move instead
toward a freer and more imperial grand strategic
orientation. Others
� such as the Japanese � think that there is more
continuity in the American global posture. The
big question in all the major capitals is: is
a unilateral, neo-imperial turn emerging in American
foreign policy, and if so, is it rooted in deep
forces of power or the result of more circumstantial
(and therefore passing) factors? Overall, the
judgments by foreign officials about how the rise
of American unipolarity does or does not alter
America�s grand strategic orientation are critical
for how major states around the world think about
their strategies of response.
3. A variety of strategies are emerging. Scholars
of international relations tend to think about
two basic strategies that are available to states
as they confront a predominant state: balancing
and bandwagoning. One is the classic strategy
of counter-balancing alliance. The other is the
strategy of appeasement and acquiescence. But
today, strategies for coping with a preeminent
America tend to fall in between these extremes.
Specifically, there are two basic types of strategies.
One type are strategies of resistance
-- which entail policies that seek to loosen
ties and undercut or block American power and
policy. The other type are strategies of engagement
� which entail building cooperative ties in the
hope of gaining opportunities to influence how
American power is exercised. Most of the major
states are pursuing both strategies at the same
time. But these states also differ in their assessment
of the relative merits of the strategies.
4. Although the major states are not attempting
to directly confront or balance against American
unipolar power, domestic political opinion in
many of the major countries has shifted dramatically
against the United States � and this new circumstance
of world public opinion is perhaps the most important
unknown dynamic that could quickly and unexpectedly
lead to dramatic shifts in state strategies toward
the United States. Recent public opinion data
gathered from dozens of countries indicates that
while many people around the world admire America
� its ideals and open society � they have growing
misgivings about its policies and role in the
world. Anti-Americanism also has become part of
presidential elections in various parts of the
world. Election
victors Schroeder in Germany, Lula in Brazil,
and Roh in South Korea all drew upon themes that
involved opposition to the United States and its
policies. Political leaders in key countries increasingly
have opportunities to use opposition to the United
States in domestic politics. How this new situation
will spill over into the �high politics� of America�s
unipolar order is still unknown.
5. The United States has a great capacity to influence
how other states respond to its unipolar power.
In particular, the more that the United States
signals that it intends to operate through mutually
agreed rules and institutions, the more other
countries will choose to engage rather than resist
the United States. The more that the United
States signals that it will disentangle itself
from rule-based order and act unilaterally on
a global scale, the more other countries will
choose to resist rather than engage the United
States. That is, the United States has two basic
approaches to international order today. One might
be called hegemony with �liberal characteristics.�
This is international order built around multilateralism,
tight alliance partnership, strategic restraint,
cooperative security, and agreed-upon institutions.
The other might be called hegemony with �imperial
characteristics.� This is international order
built around unilateralism, coercive domination,
and a reduced commitment to shared commitment
to mutually agreeable rules of the game. How the
outside world responds to American power will
depend on which of these two alternatives the
United States tends to emphasize.
6. The emerging politics of unipolarity will entail
a distinctive mix of power politics and a security
community. It seems likely that the United States will
not choose to go very far down a neo-imperial
path � the costs are too great and it is ultimately
not an unsustainable grand strategic orientation
for the United States. It seems also likely that
the basic character of the order that exists between
the democratic great powers � Western Europe,
the United States, and Japan � will persist even
under conditions of unipolarity. That is, these
countries will continue to inhabit a �security
community� where the disputes between them will
ultimately be settled peaceful. In a security
community the resort to violence or war is unthinkable
as a tool of policy between countries within the
community. Even the worst disputes between the
United States and, say, France are not ones that
will spiral toward war. At least within the �democratic
core� of great powers, the responses to unipolarity
will be consistent with the general characteristics
of a security community. But relations among these
democratic countries are also likely to be more
hard-nosed and infused with power politics. Without
the common Cold War threat of the Soviet Union,
disagreements � and how they are handled � are
likely to be more intense than in the past. American
power does generate or reinforce differences between
the United States and the outside world. So the
�politics of unipolarity� is likely to be a new
form of power politics played out within a foundation
of security community. The United States has a
huge opportunity to influence what the rules of
the game will be for this unipolar order.
THE RISE OF AMERICAN UNIPOLARITY
The United States has turned into a unipolar global power without
historical precedent. The 1990s surprised the
world. Many observers expected the end of the
Cold War to usher in a multipolar order with increasingly
equal centers of power in Asia, Europe, and America.
Instead the United States began the decade as
the world�s only superpower and proceeded to grow
more powerful at the expense of the other major
states. Between 1990 and 1998 the United States�
GNP grew 27 percent, Europe�s 16 percent, and
Japan�s 7 percent. Today the American economy is equal to the economies of Japan, United
Kingdom, and Germany combined. The United States
military capacity is even more in a league of
its own. It spends as much on defense as the next
fourteen countries combined. It has bases in forty
countries. Eighty percent of world military R&D
takes place in the United States. What the 1990s wrought is a
unipolar America that is more powerful than any
other great state in history.
Various factors intensify these power disparities. First, the other
great powers have all lost ground in the last
decade. Russia collapsed after the Cold War and
now has an economy the size of a medium sized
European country. China is still a developing
country with the political and economic problems
that come with modernization. Japan has had a
decade of economic decline. Western Europe has
been focused inward on integration and the resulting
political controversies.
Second, the loss of the Cold War threat has removed bipolar restraints
on American power. During the Cold War, the United
States had to restrain itself for two reasons.
One was that it needed its alliance partners in
the global bipolar struggle, so it had to attend
to the interests and preferences of alliance partners.
It was more willing than it needs to be today
to make concessions � adjust its policies, make
commitments, and listen closely to alliance partners�
views � than it needs to today where the allies
are (arguably) less critical to American security
and the realization of its interests. Second,
the Soviet Union also disciplined the exercise
of American power because the risks of war were
so high. The United States needed to worry about
Soviet reactions and acted accordingly. With the
collapse of the Soviet Union and the end of bipolarity,
there is no other great power that threatens the
United States and less need for alliance cooperation.
These disciplining restraints on American power
have fallen away.
Third, there is no other rival global ideology to the American liberal
vision. Other countries may not like specific
features of America�s ideological commitment to
democracy, open markets, and the globalization
of the world system, but alternative worldviews
are not yet in sight. No other state offers a
vision of world order that would facilitate the
creation of a counter-American global coalition.
Fourth, the recent exercise of American military power � in Afghanistan
and Iraq � has shown the world how extraordinary
and effective that power is. In effect, the exercise
of power has created even more power � or at least
revealed that power to the world. The United States
can take down entire regimes without sustaining
high costs of manpower or national treasure. The
cost of war has gone down, particular in the areas
where war is most likely. This expands the realms
in which American military power can be projected.
The inability of other great powers to do the
same further intensifies the power disparities.
Finally, although the Cold War is over, the American system of client
states and security ties is still in place across
Europe and East Asia. Many of these security protection
agreements grew out of the bipolar struggle with
the Soviet Union, but they were not disassembled
with the collapse of the Soviet Union. This means
that there is an entire global system of formal
and informal security ties that continue to make
states dependent on the United States for protection.
These states � who exist in all regions of the
world � have reasons to remain tied to the United
States. There are no good substitutes for military
junior partnership. Japan is a good example. It
may not like to be so tied to the United States
for security protection but it is in a security
box. All the other alternatives are more risky
and costly. This legacy of the Cold War reinforces
the structure of hierarchy inherent in a unipolar
order.
The main conclusion to draw from this discussion is two-fold. First,
the global distribution of power can rightly be
described as unipolar. The disparities of power
between the lead state and the secondary powers
are extreme and multifaceted.
Second, this is a unique power distribution.
The modern state system � which dates to 1648
� has never seen such a configuration of power.
It is not surprising, therefore, that states � including the United
States -- are in a process of assessing and adjusting
to this new power reality. It is in this context that we look more closely
at the components of American power and the ways
in which this power is �experienced� around the
world.
CHARACTERISTICS OF AMERICAN POWER
At the outset, we can make four general observations about American
unipolar power. These observations help frame
the discussion of how major states around the
world are perceiving and responding to American
power.
First, the United States is a unique sort of global superpower.
That is, it has a distinctive cluster of capabilities,
institutions, attractions, and impulses. Indeed,
American power is manifest in complex and paradoxical
ways. For example, during the 20th
century, the United States was the greatest champion
of rule-based order. It pushed onto the global
stage a long list of international institutions
and rules � the League of Nations, the United
Nations, GATT, human rights norms, and so forth.
But the United States also has been unusually
ambivalent about actually operating itself within
legal and institutional constraints. Also, the
United States has used military force more than
any other state in the last fifty years (with
and without UN or NATO backing). Yet it also has
an anti-imperial political culture and a strong
isolationist tradition.
My point here is that it is difficult for
other countries to simply decide that American
power is manifest in any one way. American power
is sometimes menacing, but at other times it helps
provide global public goods and at other times
it turns inward. American power is sufficiently
complex and multifaceted that it is difficult
for countries to simply decide to counter or work
against US power. American power is complex
and because of this there are reasons for other
states to have complex views of and strategies
for dealing with the United States.
Second, countries and peoples �experience� American unipolar power
is different ways. A threat to some is an opportunity
to others. This
is true across states � some states find American
power more useful and easy to accommodate than
others. For example, Japan finds America�s security
role in East Asia more useful to it than France
finds America�s security role in Europe. Likewise,
people in particular states see American power
differently. In most states there is a range of
views, and these views can be directed at American
policy or more generally at America as a global
power.
Third, in this regard, it is useful to distinguish at least three
levels or types of American power that are generating
reactions around the world. At the most basic
level, American power is manifest as the underwriter
of American capitalism and globalization.
This is where America gets implicated in the protests
over the WTO and the IMF. At another level, American
power is manifest as the leader of a global
political and military alliance system. This
is where people in countries such as South Korea
or Germany seek to push the United States out
of their country. Some people attack or oppose
the United States because it is the alliance partner
that is supported by their own government. American
power is challenged because that power � in some
countries such as Pakistan or Saudi Arabia � helps
perpetuate unwanted regimes. A final level of
American power is manifest in specific policies
or issues. For example, some people � such
as South Koreans -- oppose the United States because
of specific Status of Forces agreements in their
country that protect American soldiers from local
justice. Others
oppose the United States because of its decisions
on the use of force, such as in the recent invasion
of Iraq. Governments and peoples can oppose the
United States because of its new doctrine of preemption.
Fourth, the �face� that the United States shows the world matters.
I would argue that there are two general faces
that the United States can show. One is American
hegemonic power with �liberal characteristics.� This is America as it promotes order organized around multilateralism,
close alliance partnerships, strategic commitment
and restraint, and extensive jointly agreed upon
institutions and rules for managing relationships.
Another face is American hegemonic power with
�imperial characteristics.� This is America as
it acts unilaterally against the goals and interests
of other states, engages in coercive domination
to get its way, and degrades global rules and
institutions.
My hypothesis is that the greater the United
States tilts toward liberal hegemony, the greater
the incentives these states will have to engage
in cooperative behavior with the United States.
The greater the United States tilts toward
imperial hegemony, the more incentives states
will have to resist or move away from the United
States.
Finally, most of the great power responses to American unipolarity
seem to be falling between the extremes of balancing
and bandwagoning. States can resist without balancing
and they can engage without simply acquiescing. During the Iraq war, British Prime Minister
Tony Blair pursued a strategy of getting as close
as possible to the Bush administration.
The strategy was to be so close and supportive
of the American exercise of power that Britain
would ultimately get some say in how policy unfolds.
French President Chirac pursued a different policy
� attempting to build an opposing political coalition
to the Bush administration�s Iraq policy. Both
were attempting to deal with a difficult reality:
the United States was powerful enough to go on
its own. How to get some leverage over American
exercise of power is the challenge. The two
leaders chose different strategies. In the aftermath
of the war, the effectiveness of the two strategies
are being debated across Europe. How this debate
unfolds will say a lot about the future resort
to the strategies. Again, it is useful to see the present moment
as one where governments are making judgments,
experimenting with strategies, learning lessons,
and adapting their behavior.
FOUR FACETS OF AMERICAN POWER
Four facets of American power reinforce unipolarity and undercut
incentives to resist or balance against the United
States. These four facets of power are: traditional
power assets; geography and historical timing;
democracy and institutional restraint; and modernization
and civic identity. Together these multiple dimensions
of American power suggest that unipolarity is
likely to persist and that the other major states
are likely to continue to have incentives to engage
and work with the United States -- even as they
devise new strategies to cope with unipolarity.
Traditional Power Assets
The first facet of American power is its traditional power assets
� material capabilities that allow it to pursue
its objective and get other states to go along
with it. One aspect of material capabilities is
the sheer size of the American military establishment.
As mentioned earlier, American military expenditures
are greater than the next fourteen countries combined
� and if current trends continue, the United States
military expenditures will be equal to the rest
of the world combined by 2007. The advanced technological
character of much of this military power makes
this power disparity even greater.
This mass of military power makes it difficult if not impossible
for a group of states to develop capabilities
that could balance or counter the United States.
But other considerations further increase the
difficulties of organizing a counter-balancing
coalition. First, there are collective action
problems. States might like to see the formation
of a counter-unipolar coalition but they would
prefer other states do the work of organizing
it and covering its costs. This is the problem
of �buck passing� � the collective action problem
that makes it less likely that a coalition will
form. There is also the problem of regional blocking
problems. If particular great powers do decide
to amass greater military power to challenge the
United States, other major states in their region
are likely to be threatened by this move and challenge
it. For example, if Japan were to undertake military
mobilization to counter the United States, it
would find a hostile East Asian neighborhood awaited
it. These considerations make counter-balancing
unlikely.
Other material power assets also work to America�s advantage � namely,
security protection, markets, and nuclear weapons.
Alliance security protection that the United States
has the capacity to extend to states in all four
corners of the world provides a positive incentive
to cooperate with the United States. This incentive is of two sorts. One is simply
that American security protection reduces the
resources that these countries would otherwise
need to generate to cover their own protection.
It is a cost-effective way to deal with the elemental
problem of national security. If it means working
with the United States and not offering opposition
to it, the forgoing of this option of opposition
is a cost that is more than compensated by the
value of the security protection itself. The second
benefit of security protection, at least for some
states, it that it means that these states won�t
need to face the regional challenges that might
come if they provided for their own security.
Germany and Japan are the best examples of this.
By positioning themselves under the American security
umbrella, Germany and Japan were able to reassure
their worried neighbors that they would not become
future security threats to their respective regions.
The United States is able to provide security
to so many countries because it has the economic
and military capabilities to do so on a worldwide
basis. Indeed, it might well be that economies
of scale exist for a versatile and high-tech military
power such as the United States.
Another aspect of American material power is its large domestic
market. Both Europeans and East Asians depend
mightily on access to the American market. Of
course, the United States relies heavily on both
regions for its own economic prosperity. But the
simple point here is that East Asia and Western
Europe have incentives not to resist American
unipolarity in such a way as to break apart the
open markets that cut across the Pacific and Atlantic.
American unipolarity is also sustained by nuclear weapons. Even
if the other major powers wanted to overturn the
existing order, the mechanism of great-power war
is no longer available. As Robert Gilpin has noted,
great-power war is precisely the mechanism of
change that has been used throughout history to
redraw the international order. Rising states
depose the reigning � but declining � state and
impose a new order. But nuclear weapons make this
historical dynamic profoundly problematic. On
the one hand, American power is rendered more
tolerable because in the age of nuclear deterrence
American military power cannot now be used for
conquest against other great powers. Deterrence
replaces alliance counterbalancing. On the
other hand, the status quo international order
led by the United States is rendered less easily
replaceable. War-driven change is removed as an
historical process, and the United States was
lucky enough to be on top when this happened.
Geography and Historical Setting
The geographic setting and historical timing of America�s rise in
power also have shaped the way American primacy
has been manifest. The United States is the only
great power that is not neighbored by other great
powers. This geographical remoteness made the
power ascent of the United States less threatening
to the rest of the world and it reinforced the
disinclination of American leaders to directly
dominate or manage great power relations. In the
twentieth century, the United States became the
world�s preeminent power but the location and
historical entry point of that power helped shaped
how this arrival was greeted.
When the United States was drawn into European power struggles,
it did so primarily as an offshore balancer. This was an echo of Britain�s
continental strategy which for several centuries
was based on aloofness for European power struggles,
intervening at critical moments to tip and restore
the balance among the other states. This offshore
balancing role was played out by the United States
in the two world wars. America entered each war
relatively late and tipped the balance in favor
of the allies. After World War II, the United
States emerged as an equally important presence
in Europe, Asia, and the Middle East as an offshore
military force that each region found useful in
solving its local security dilemmas. In Europe,
the reintegration of West Germany into the West
was only possible with the American security commitment.
The Franco-German settlement was explicitly and
necessarily embedded in an American-guaranteed
Atlantic settlement. In Joseph Joffe�s apt phrase,
the United States became �Europe�s pacifier.� In East Asia, the American
security pact with Japan also solved regional
security dilemmas by creating restraints on the
resurgence of Japanese military power. In the
Middle East a similar dynamic drew the United
States into an active role in mediating between
Israel and the Arab states. In each region, American
power is seen less as a source of domination and
more as a useful tool.
Because the United States is geographically remote, abandonment
rather than domination has been seen as the greater
risk by many states. As a result, the United States
has found itself constantly courted by governments
in Europe, Asia, and elsewhere. When Winston Churchill
advanced ideas about postwar order he was concerned
above all in finding a way to tie the United States
to Europe. As Geir Lundestad has observed,
the expanding American political order in the
half century after World War II has been in important
respects an �empire by invitation.� The remarkable global reach
of American postwar hegemony has been at least
in part driven by the efforts of European and
Asian governments to harness American power, render
that power more predictable, and use it to overcome
their own regional insecurities. The result has
been a durable system of America-centered economic
and security partnerships.
Finally, the historical timing of America�s rise in power also left
a mark. The United States came relatively late
to the great power arena, after the colonial and
imperial eras had run their course. This meant
that the pursuit of America�s strategic interests
was not primarily based on territorial control
but on championing more principled ways of organizing
great power relations. As a late-developing great
power the United States needed openness and access
to the regions of the world rather than recognition
of its territorial claims. The American issuance
of its Open Door policy toward China reflected
this orientation. American officials were never
fully consistent in wielding such principled claims
about order and they were often a source of conflict
with the other major states. But the overall effect
of this alignment of American geo-strategic interests
with enlightened normative principles of order
reinforced the image of the United States as a
relatively non-coercive and non-imperial hegemonic
power.
Democracy and Institutional Restraints
The American unipolar order is also organized around democratic
polities and a complex web of intergovernmental
institutions � and these features of the American
system alter and mute the way in which hegemonic
power is manifest. One version of this argument
is the democratic peace thesis: open democratic
polities are less able or willing to use power
in an arbitrary and indiscriminate manner against
other democracies. The calculations of smaller
and weaker states as they confront a democratic
hegemon are altered. Fundamentally, power asymmetries
are less threatening or destabilizing when they
exist between democracies. American power is �institutionalized�
� not entirely, of course � but more so
than in the case of previous world-dominating
states. This institutionalization of hegemonic
strategy serves the interest of the United States
by making its power more legitimate, expansive,
and durable. But the price is that some restraints
are indeed placed on the exercise of power.
In this view, three elements matter most in making American power
more stable, engaged, and restrained. First, America�s
mature political institutions organized around
the rule of law have made it a relatively predictable
and cooperative hegemon. The pluralistic and regularized
way in which American foreign and security policy
is made reduces surprises and allows other states
to build long-term, mutually beneficial relations.
The governmental separation of powers creates
a shared decision-making system that opens up
the process and reduces the ability of any one
leader to make abrupt or aggressive moves toward
other states. An active press and competitive
party system also provide a service to outside
states by generating information about US policy
and determining the seriousness its seriousness
of purpose. The messiness of democracy can frustrate
American diplomats and confuse foreign observers.
But over the long term, democratic institutions
produce more consistent and credible policies
than autocratic or authoritarian states.
This open and decentralized political process works in a second
way to reduce foreign worries about American power.
It creates what might be called �voice opportunities�
� it offers opportunities for political access
and, with it, the means for foreign governments
and groups to influence the way Washington�s power
is exercised. Foreign governments and corporations
may not have elected officials in Washington but
they do have representatives. Looked at from the
perspective of the stable functioning of American�s
unipolar order, this is one of the most functional
aspects of the United States as a global power.
By providing other states opportunities to play
the game in Washington, the United States draws
them into active, ongoing partnerships that serve
its long-term strategic interests.
A final element of the unipolar order that reduces the worry about
power asymmetries is the web of institutions that
mark the postwar order. After World War II, the
United States launched history�s most ambitious
era of institution building. The UN, IMF, World
Bank, NATO, GATT, and other institutions that
emerged provided the most rule-based structure
for political and economic relations in history.
The United States was deeply ambivalent about
making permanent security commitments to other
countries or allowing its political and economic
policies to be dictated by intergovernmental bodies.
The Soviet threat was critical in overcoming these
doubts. Networks and political relationships were
built that -- paradoxically -- both made American
power more far-reaching and durable but also more
predictable and malleable.
Modernization and Civic Nationalism
American power has been rendered more acceptable to the rest of
the world because the United States �project�
is congruent with the deeper forces of modernization.
The point here is not that the United States has
pushed other states to embrace its goals and purposes
but that all states are operating within a transforming
global system � driven by modernization, industrialization,
and social mobilization. The synchronicity between
the rise of the United States as a liberal global
power and the system-wide imperatives of modernization
create a sort of functional �fit� between the
United States and the wider world order. If the
United States were attempting to project state
socialist economic ideas or autocratic political
values, its fit with the deep forces of modernization
would be poor. Its purposes would be resisted
around the world and resistance to American power
would be triggered. But the deep congruence between
the American model and the functional demands
of modernization both boost the power of the United
States and make its relationship with the rest
of the world more harmonious.
Industrialization is a constantly evolving process and the social
and political characteristics within countries
that it encourages and rewards --- and that promote
or impede industrial advancement -- change over
time as countries move through developmental stages.
In this sense, the fit between a polity and modernization
is never absolute or permanent. Industrialism
in advanced societies tends to feature highly
educated workforces, rapid flows of information,
and progressively more specialized and complex
systems of social and industrial organization.
These features of industrial society -- sometimes
called late-industrialism -- tend to foster a
citizenry that is heterogeneous, well educated,
and difficult to coerce.From this perspective it is
possible to see why various state socialist and
authoritarian countries � including the Soviet
Union � ran into trouble as the twentieth century
proceeded. The old command order impeded industrial
modernization while, at the same time, industrial
modernization undercut the old command order.
In contrast, the American polity has tended to
have a relatively good fit with the demands and
opportunities of industrial modernization. European
and Asian forms of capitalist democracy also have
exhibited features that seem in various ways to
be quite congruent with the leading edge of advanced
industrial development. The success of the American
model is partly due to the fact that it used its
postwar power to build an international order
that worked to the benefit of the American style
of industrial capitalism. But the success of the
American model � and the enhanced global influence
and appeal that the United States has experienced
in recent decades � is also due to the deep congruence
between the logic of modernization and the American
system.
The functionality between the United States polity and wider evolutionary
developments in the international system also
can be traced to the American political identity
-- which is rooted in civic nationalism and multi-culturalism.
The basic distinction between civil and ethnic
nationalism is useful in locating this feature.
Civic nationalism is group identity, which is
composed of commitments to the nation�s political
creed. Race, religion, gender, language, or ethnicity
are not relevant in defining a citizen�s rights
and inclusion within the polity. Shared belief
in the country�s principles and values embedded
in the rule of law is the organizing basis for
political order and citizens are understood to
be equal and rights-bearing individuals. Ethnic
nationalism, in contrast, maintains that an individual�s
rights and participation within the polity are
inherited - based on ethnic or racial ties.
Because civic nationalism is shared with other Western states it
tends to be a source of cohesion and cooperation.
Throughout the industrial democratic world, the
dominant form of political identity is based on
a set of abstract and juridical rights and responsibilities
which coexist with private ethnic and religious
associations. Just as warring states and nationalism
tend to reinforce each other, so too do Western
civic identity and cooperative political relations
reinforce each other. Political order -- domestic
and international -- is strengthened when there
exists a substantial sense of community and shared
identity. It matters that the leaders of today�s
advanced industrial states are not seeking to
legitimize their power by making racial or imperialist
appeals. Civic nationalism, rooted in shared commitment
to democracy and the rule of law � provides a
widely embraced identity across most of the American
hegemonic order. At the same time, potentially
divisive identity conflicts � rooted in antagonistic
ethnic or religious or class divisions � are dampened
by relegating them to secondary status within
civil society.
THE LIMITS OF BINDING AND BALANCING
There are two extreme strategies for coping with concentrated power.
One is to balance against it and the other is
to bind that power to rules and institutions.
Balancing entails resisting, pulling away, and
forming a counter-concentration of power in cooperation
with other weak states. By pulling away from the
dominant state, the weaker states remove themselves
from the direct reach of the powerful state. By
forming a counter-coalition, the dominant state�s
power is checked by the aggregation of countervailing
power. Binding is the opposite strategy. The power
of the dominant state is made less threatening
to weaker states by embedding that power in rules
and institutions that channel and limit the ways
that power is exercised. In most historical times
and places, power binding has not been an option
because the conditions of anarchy make restraints
on power non-credible. Some practical restraints
may exist � custom, domestic politics, geography,
etc. � but they do not have the geopolitical heft
to provide the ultimate protections against a
dominant power. Balance of power is the most enduring
mechanism to restrain power because it is the
most reliable; power checks power.
These strategies, of course, are themselves varied and complex.
There are many ways that balancing can be manifest
and a rich theoretical and historical literature
reveals these complexities. Alliance-based, war-time
coalitions that seek to stop the territorial aggression
of a dominant state � such as the one that eventually
took shape to confront Napoleonic France in the
early 19th century -- is one manifestation.
Balancing coalitions that seek to deny geopolitical
influence of a dominant state through resistance
and the organizing of counter-spheres of influence
is another manifestation. Binding can also vary.
The dominant state can be bound to weaker states
and the international/regional order in more or
less formal ways. German power is tied to Europe
in various layers of formal regional and Atlantic
mechanisms � including monetary union, the wider
EU order, and NATO. The dominant state can be
bound in looser ways. The United States is party
to a growing array of multilateral treaties and
agreements. In the trade area, American
economic power is disciplined by the rules and
institutions of the WTO. Binding might also be
manifest in informal, political ways, such as
through consultations, ad hoc bargaining, and
the continuous pulling and hauling of inter-state
relations.
But there are limits to these ideal-typical strategies. As a rich
literature on balance of power politics shows,
balancing is not easy or automatic � even in the
face of overwhelming and threatening power.First, it is often costly to
mobilize a counter-coalition, particularly when
the threat is not that of immediate territorial
conquest. There is a tendency to engage in buck-passing. Collective action problems
reinforce this constraint. Second, balancing can
be costly by disrupting economic gains that flow
from linkages with the powerful state.
Third, it can be dangerous. If balancing
is attempted but fails, a cost comes from reprisals.
Fourth, even if balancing is successful � and
a counter-coalition is created � it might not
solve the problem. If the threat is not from the
dominant state�s hard power but its cultural,
economic, or political influence, military balancing
is not necessarily the appropriate strategy. How
do you balance against soft power? Finally, balancing
may actually be impossible. William Wohlforth
argues that American unipolarity is so extreme
there is not a realistic combination of states
that could combine to produce a counter-hegemonic
bloc.
Behind these limits on traditional security balancing are other
considerations. The presence of nuclear weapons
and deterrence alter the logic of balancing among
the great powers � it changes the character of
the threats that are manifest. If territorial
conquest is not a serious security issue among
the major states, the most important reason to
balance is taken away. American unipolar power
may be threatening to China, Russia and other
states, but this does not include the fear of
invasion or direct imperial domination. In this
sense, American power is less worrisome to the
other major states than dominant states in the
past who were less powerful than the United States
is today but more threatening to their neighbors.
The balancing logic also must confront a second background condition
that is emphasized by realist theories of hegemonic
stability. Powerful states are not just threats
but they can also be providers of international
public goods. Robert Gilpin�s work reminds us
that at least in the age of liberal hegemonic
states, the dominant power tends to seek mutually
beneficial trade and economic relations. It also
can identify its own interests with the provision
of stable and open relations. This logic can even
lead the hegemonic state to make security calculations
� whom to protect in security partnerships � with an eye to the trade and economic growth
implications of the security order. The United
States may continue to offer security protection
to Europe and East Asian partners if it calculates
that the resulting system of indivisible security
ties reinforces open economic relations and facilitates
domestic economic gains.
Finally, another background consideration is the wider structure
of convergent and divergent interests. If the
threat of territorial conquest and direct political
domination is taken out of the system, the question
is what are the remaining interest-based rivalries.
Presumably, the great powers worry not just about
American power but about the interests that are
pursued with that power. On the one hand, it is
possible to argue that the range of divergent
interests between the United States and the other
major powers is actually quite narrow by historical
standards. Certainly, this is true between the
advanced democratic countries. On the other hand,
the rise of unipolar power itself has created
new, divergent interests. For example, the sheer
size of the American economy � and a decade of
growth unmatched by Europe, Japan, or the other
advanced countries � means that the United States�
obligations under the Kyoto protocol would be
vastly greater than those of other states. In
the security realm, the United States has global
interests and security threats that no other state
has. Its troops are more likely to be dispatched
to distant battlefields than those of other major
states � which means that it would be more exposed
to the legal liabilities of the International
Criminal Court (ICC) than others. The United States
must worry about threats to its interests in all
parts of the world. American unipolar power makes
it a unique target for terrorism. It is not surprising
that Europeans and Americans make different threat
assessments about terrorism and rogue states seeking
weapons of mass destruction than American officials
do.
There are also limits and constraints on the binding strategy. The
big problem, of course, is that the leading state
may not agree to bind itself to rules and institutions.
The attraction of this strategy for weak states
is that it allows them to realize all the advantages
of interacting with the dominant state without
risking domination or exploitation. The dominant
state operates within a framework of rules and
institutions that limit the ways in which that
power can be exercised. Arbitrary and indiscriminate
actions by the powerful state are reduced. But
when the leading state agrees to operate in a
multilateral or rule-based order, it is agreeing
to reduce its freedom of action. But why would
it ever do this? The answer is that there must
be something it gets in return. What the other
states can offer the lead state is not always
clear, particularly when the binding restraints
on the powerful state relate to the way it pursues
core security and national interests. The United
States may be willing to reduce its policy autonomy
is trade and other �low politics� realms through
commitments to the World Trade Organization (WTO)
and other multilateral economic regimes, but it
is more reluctant to cede any real autonomy in
the areas of arms control and the use of force.
Moreover, weaker states also have to calculate
what they are willing to give up in order to gain
some concessions from the unipolar state. Finally, again, in the background is the question of whether binding,
rule-based institutional commitments are ultimately
credible. If institutional bargains are too easily
violated or overturned, the binding strategy loses
its viability.
The usefulness of the binding strategy to both strong and weak states
hinges on their assessments of particularly trade-offs.
The United States has to ask: how much entanglement
in rules and agreements is it worth enduring to
get other states organized and locked into a
predictable rule-based system? Such an
order would be desirable at the right price. The
United States also has an interest in not driving
other states to abandon cooperation with the dominant
state and move toward a strategy of resistance
or balancing. If the acceptance of some binding
constraints reduces this possibility, this too
is desirable � again, at the right price. These
are continuous rather than dichotomous variables.
The United States is most likely to agree to be
bound to rules and institutions that create loopholes,
veto rights, weighted voting, and escape clauses.
The more it needs cooperative and predictable
behavior from other states, the more it presumably
will be willing to tighten up these opt-out conditions.
The WTO is a good example of this. Weaker states,
in turn, need to determine whether loose and conditional
binding by the United States nonetheless provides
sufficient reduction in the threats of arbitrary
and indiscriminate actions to make the compromise
of their policy autonomy worthwhile. In the background,
these weaker states also need to ask: is the overall
reduction in threats and dangers from American
power dominance sufficient and credible enough
to justify their compliant participation within
the order?
The limits and constraints on both balancing and binding strategies
suggest that the actual choices and options of
the great powers as they confront American unipolar
power will be varied and fall in between these
extremes. States will need to pursue a variety
of strategies depending on the specific situation.
They will both resist and engage the United States.
STRATEGIES OF RESISTANCE AND ENGAGEMENT
Strategies are emerging among the major states to deal with American
unipolar power. In particular, it is possible
to identify strategies that move in two different
directions � either toward resistance and the
loosening of ties to the unipolar state or
toward engagement and cooperation. At the
extremes are the two strategies that we have just
discussed: balancing and binding. These strategies
are not mutually exclusive � and indeed it is
the mix of these strategies pursued by the major
states that is the hallmark of today�s unipolar
order.
Buffering
This strategy entails reducing exposure to the lead state through
the development of alternative regional political
spheres. The idea is to loosen and reduce direct
interaction with � and therefore control by �
the lead state. The strategy can be structural:
pulling away from and creating an alternative
regional order organized around competing ideas
and agendas. A state or group of states can try
to construct an alternative and separate realm
of international order. The strategy can also
be more limited: creating regional infrastructure
and independent capacity that allows the weaker
states to strengthen their ability together to
interact with the dominant state.
Regarding structural buffering, some scholars have depicted the
post-World War I communist movements in Russia
and China as great global ruptures that were driven
by vanguards seeking to remove their societies
from modern Western development. Japan�s East
Asian Co-Prosperity Sphere was an extreme version
of regional order building undertaken to counter
and protect against the encroachment of a dynamic
West. These great historical projects may have
been driven in part by calculations by elites
that their countries could not compete with or
within the Western order. There is no evidence
today of anything similar to this type of order-building
dynamic.
Another version might simply involve the creation of some independent
regional security or political capability. The
case being made inside of Europe for a non-NATO,
independent security identity is driven in part
by a desire to loosen dependence on American military
protection. There is no serious proposal
on the European table for a completely separate
and equal military force that would allow Europe
to end the NATO pact and act as a free-standing
regional entity. But proponents of a strengthened
European defense capability do seek to gain capacity
for independent action and some enhanced ability
to influence American security policy. This is
the view of Chris Patten, the EU commissioner
for external relations, who has argued: �We [Europeans]
have to, as football coaches say, dig deeper,
. . . if we�re going to be a credible ally and
an occasional counterweight.�
Buffering can take the form of strengthening more limited and functional
groupings. The ASEAN plus 3 forum is an example
of an effort by East Asian countries to establish
some regional identity and capacity so as to reduce
the economic vulnerabilities that intrude from
the wider global economy. At least some of the
inspiration for this nascent grouping came from
the Asian economic crisis of 1997-98 that saw
the United States resist Japanese efforts to establish
a so-called Asian Monetary Fund. The recently
released ASEAN plus 3 vision statement advances
a notion of regionalism that is compatible with
global economic and political institutions � and
close American economic and security ties � but
which provides a greater measure of regional self-governance.
Baiting
Another strategy entails developing counter-regional or functional
groupings that are designed, at least in part,
to lure the dominant state into interaction with
� and ultimately conformity with � this regional
or functional grouping. The strategy is to develop principles and institutions
that establish international standards or best
practices that over time will become universal
in scope. The leading state may resist the initial
establishment of the regional or functional grouping
but over time it will find it increasingly difficult
to avoid or circumvent that alternative cooperative
arrangement.
The decision by the Europeans to go forward with the ICC is one
example. There are at least some ICC proponents
who argue that over time a successfully functioning
ICC will be harder for the United States to resist.
Change in the American position may come from
a shift in administration or from evolving views
of the ICC based on experience. The Europeans
and other governments also have moved forward
with the Kyoto protocol on climate change. There
may be less anticipation in this case that the
United States will eventually join the agreement
but by moving forward with the implication of
the Kyoto agreement proponents of this approach
to global warming seek to keep pressure on the
United States to do something.
Bargaining
The most obvious and prevalent strategy for dealing with the untoward
consequences of American unipolarity is simply
to bargain with the United States. The United
States is preeminent but it is not omnipotent.
The power disparities are extreme but the other
major states do have assets and some leverage
over the United States. This strategy entails
attempting to alter the policies of the dominant
state through carrots and sticks and it can take
a variety of forms.
One is simply to engage in old-fashioned pulling and hauling. Governments
can play the bargaining game through inter-governmental
channels and working with like-minded domestic
groups and politicians in the dominant state.
In most policy areas, the entire weight of American
power is not on the line. The issues and relative
bargaining advantages are more proximate and this
means that the outcome will reflect a variety
of inputs � the cogency of arguments, the quality
of the expertise, the determination of the participants,
etc. In effect, this is great power politics under
conditions of �complex interdependence.�
Second, major states can also play a slightly harder-edged game
by threatening to withhold cooperation. This is
the main source of leverage for weaker countries
facing the United States. In various policy areas,
the United States needs the active cooperation
of other states to achieve its goals. In the war
on terrorism, the United States needs other governments
for intelligence sharing and law enforcement.
One British member of the House of Lords recently
argued that the way to show the Bush administration
that there is a cost of acting unilaterally is
to withhold cooperation on intelligence sharing
in the war on terrorism. �I would switch off U.S.-U.K.
intelligence cooperation for three days to make
the point of how important cooperation is,� remarked
Lord William Wallace. Withholding cooperation can
move from the symbolic to the more tangible and
consequential. Saudi Arabia, for example, has
threatened restrictions on the basing rights of
American forces in military operations aimed at
Iraq. Threatening to deny the United States use
of a strategic asset is a way of getting some
leverage into Washington policy making.
Third, weaker states can use economic tariffs and embargoes as a
tool to gain some political leverage over American
policy. The European response to the American
decision to impose high tariffs on imported steel
in the spring of 2002 involved EU threats of massive
retaliation. Moreover, the proposed counter-tariffs
were targeted on American exports from politically
sensitive states. Some observers saw this aggressive
response as a message to the United States not
just on steel tariffs and trade policy but on
the Bush administration�s more general unilateral
foreign policy.
Fourth, bargaining can take the form of old fashioned log rolling.
This variation entails seeking to work with the
dominant state to seek opportunities for joint
gain. Weaker states do not resist the politics
of the dominant state but try to adapt them in
local circumstances for local advantage. For example,
Russian President Putin offered support for America�s
Iraq policy in exchange for American acquiescence
in Russian policies toward its minorities. More
generally, governments around the world have sought
to find ways to connect their policy agendas to
America�s war on terrorism and thereby gain support
from Washington.
Finally, bargaining may also involve an attempt by weaker states
to use a more diffuse source of leverage � the
threat to withhold legitimacy for an American
action. This is most relevant in the area of the
American use of force. The United States is clearly
sensitive � some officials in the Bush administration
more than others � to the general acceptability
of its use of military force. While insisting
that it has the right to act unilaterally to preemptively
attack threats in Iraq and elsewhere, the administration
is also sensitive to the views of other allied
governments and � at least to some extent -- foreign
public opinion. American domestic opinion is also
sensitive to the legitimacy of its use of force
and domestic support for such actions when they
are seen as generally acceptable by the outside
world. In this way, the �legitimacy pressure�
is felt indirectly through domestic politics.
This sensitivity about the legitimacy of American
power � and the use of force � is what ultimately
led the Bush administration to seek U.N. Security
Council support for its confrontation with Iraq.
And it is here that the views of Russia, China,
Britain, and France take on more importance than
would otherwise be the case.
Bandwagoning
Bandwagoning is a strategy that can encompasses a wide range of
state behavior but it essentially entails policies
that support and accommodate the dominant power. Weaker states seek to work
with rather than resist the dominant state � and
they look for opportunities to advance their interests
without directly challenging the dominant state.
Bandwagoning can take various forms � ranging
from simple appeasement to more active attempts
to work with and manipulate the policies of the
leading state.
Today, in one way or another, all the major
states � including Russia and China � are pursuing
a bandwagoning strategy toward American unipolar
power.
In its simplest form, bandwagoning is appeasement. It is a strategy
of non-resistance where weaker states accommodate
the dominant state by seeking to remove sources
of conflict in their relations. In classical European
diplomacy, as Gordon Craig and Alexander George
note, appeasement referred to �the reduction of
tension between [two states] by the methodical
removal of the principal causes of conflict and
disagreement between them.� This strategy is particularly
useful to the major states that confront the United
States if the sources of their conflict are primarily
secondary and out of area � such as in the case
of American policy toward Iraq. They can soften
their opposition or simply get out of the way
without compromising their core interests. They
are also able to make a calculation that in appeasing
the United States they are not encouraging the
United States to expand its unipolar ambitions. This strategy might be used
in several ways. One is to play for time until
the power disparities change � or until there
is a leadership change in Washington. A more sophisticated
strategy might involve using appeasement in an
effort to alter the domestic coalitions in the
dominant state � and thereby alter the policy
position of the state itself.
A more general strategy of bandwagoning entails finding ways to
gain advantages within an international order
dominated by the lead state. This seems to be
an attractive option when the lead state is a
mature, status quo power that pursues a restrained
and accommodating grand strategy. Again, these
conditions appear to hold today.
In the last several years, for example, China has moved from a strategy
of resistance to a strategy of bandwagoning. As
one reporter noted recently, �Exhibiting new self-confidence
and unprecedented acceptance of US power in the
world, China has embraced a more moderate, engaged
foreign policy than ever before. . .� Through the 1990s, China articulated
a foreign policy that at least in formal, rhetorical
terms called for resistance to American �hegemonism.�
Summit meetings with Russian and other leaders
often culminated in public statements of opposition
to a one superpower world. A variety of factors
may explain Chinese movement toward more willing
acceptance of American unipolar power, including
the decision by Russian President Putin to seek
closer ties with the West. With Russia in a near-alliance
with the United States, a Chinese policy of resistance
was increasingly costly � and ultimately not viable.
The search for economic growth through expanding
trade and investment with the West was also a
lure. The opportunities presented to Beijing in
the wake of September 11 to align itself with
the United States in the war on terrorism and
thereby gain great room for maneuver within its
own neighborhood might also be a factor. Bandwagoning
is all the more attractive to Beijing if it calculates
that long-term economic and strategic trends favor
China.
Bonding
Another version of bandwagoning might be called bonding � where
leaders of weaker states develop close personal
and policy ties with the American president. The
goal is to become so close, so loyal, and so indispensable
that the United States effectively incorporates
them into the inner circle of decision making.
British Prime Minister Tony Blair is the best
example of this strategy. The British leader has
tied himself to the American anti-terrorist plan
but in doing so he has made it an Anglo-American-based
campaign. By bonding itself to the superpower,
Britain gains a stake in the struggle but also
a voice in the policy.
Promoting Hierarchy, Specialization and Division of Labor
Another engagement-oriented strategy of secondary states in a unipolar
order is to seek niche specialties in military
and economic realms that make it harder for the
dominant state to ignore or exploit these states.
Even if weaker states cannot alter their overall
position within the international order, they
can develop some special capabilities and assets
that the dominant state might find useful and
necessary. In hierarchical orders, after all,
there is a division of labor � the subordinate
actors in such an order have secondary functions
but their functions and specialties are nonetheless
indispensable to the operation of the hierarchical
order. The strategy is not to resist subordination
or to seek to match the dominant state�s power
capabilities, but it is rather to promote division
of labor and the sharing of functions.
When the European members of NATO agreed recently to develop a NATO
rapid reaction force that would give the alliance
capacities useful to the war on terrorism, they
were attempting to keep themselves relevant to
American security operations and make it more
difficult for the Pentagon to by-pass the alliance. By creating assets that Washington finds useful,
they are creating incentives for the United States
to operate and use force within an alliance-based,
multilateral framework where their voices will
be heard. At a more operational level, British
special forces are also said to have capacities
that the United States cannot fully duplicate
� and this gives the British a role � and voice
� in some American-led military operations.
CONCLUSION: RESTRAINTS ON UNIPOLAR POWER
In evaluating the emerging great power reactions to unipolarity,
the first question that must be asked is: what
precisely are the threats that concentrated American
power present to the other major states? The fact
that the United States does not seek territorial
conquest or direct domination of the other states
� either because it has no incentives to do so
or because nuclear weapons and other factors make
it very costly or impossible � sets the parameters
for thinking about the reactions to unipolarity.
As noted at the beginning, it can be argued that the greater the
willingness of the United States to exercise its
power through multilateral, rule-based mechanisms
and institutions the less the likelihood of systematic
great power resistance to American unipolar power.
This hypothesis brings us back to the question
posed earlier: to what extent does unipolarity
create incentives and pressures for the United
States to reduce its willingness to operate in
multilateral, rule-based ways? Does the distribution
of power increasingly �select� for unilateralism
in American foreign policy? Is the United States
doomed to act unilaterally and exercise its power
in increasingly arbitrary and indiscriminate ways
or to act in a coercive and imperial manner? To
answer these questions is to determine whether
great power reactions to American unipolarity
will move in the direction of resistance and loosening
of ties or in the direction of engagement and
bandwagoning.
There are at least three sources of rule-based, multilateralism
in American foreign policy that serve as counter-pressures
to unipolar unilateralism. One is simply the functional
demand of cooperation in the face of growing economic
interdependence.
The more economically interconnected that
states become, the more dependent they are for
the realization of their objectives on the actions
of other states. �As interdependence rises,� Robert
Keohane argues, �the opportunity costs of not
co-coordinating policy increase, compared with
the costs of sacrificing autonomy as a consequence
of making binding agreements.� Rising economic interdependence
is one of the hallmarks of the contemporary international
system. Over the postwar era, states have actively
and consistently sought to open markets and reap
the economic, social, and technological gains
that derive from integration in the world economy.
If this remains true in the years ahead, it is
easy to predict that the demands for multilateral
agreements � even and perhaps especially by the
United States � will increase and not decrease.
American support for multilateralism can also stem from a grand
strategic interest in preserving power and creating
a stable and legitimate international order. This
logic is particularly evident at major historical
turning points -- such as 1919, 1945, and after
the Cold War -- when the United States has faced
choices about how to use power and organize inter-state
relations. The support for multilateralism is
a way to signal restraint and commitment to other
states thereby encouraging the acquiescence and
cooperation of weaker states. This has been a strategy that
the United States has pursued to a greater or
less degree across the 20th century
� and it explains the remarkably durable and legitimate
character of the existing international order.
From this perspective, multilateralism � and the
search for rule-based agreements � should increase
rather than decrease with the rise of American
unipolarity. It predicts that the existing multilateral
order � which itself reflects an older multilateral
bargain between the United States and the outside
world should �rein in� the Bush administration
� and it suggests that the current administration
should respond to general power management incentives
and limit its tilt toward unilateralism.
A final source of American multilateralism emerges from the United
States polity itself. The United States has a
distinctive self-understanding about the nature
of its own political order -- and this has implications
for how it thinks about international political
order. To be sure, there are multiple political
traditions in the United States that reflect divergent
and often competing ideas about how the United
States should relate to the rest of the world.
These traditions variously council isolationism
and activism, realism and idealism, aloofness
and engagement in the conduct of American foreign
affairs. But behind these political-intellectual
traditions are deeper aspects of the American
political identity that inform the way the United
States seeks to build order in the larger global
system. The enlightenment origins of the American
founding has given the United States an identity
that sees its principles of politics of universal
significance and scope. The republican democratic tradition
that enshrines the rule of law reflects a deeper
American view that polities � domestic or international
� are best organized around rules and principles
of order. America�s tradition of civil nationalism
also reinforces this notion � that the rule of
law is the source of legitimacy and political
inclusion. This tradition biases American foreign
policy toward multilateralism.
These considerations allow us to specify a variety of mechanisms
that reinforce restraint in the exercise of American
unipolar power. One restraint mechanism is simply
the bi-product of functional bargaining with other
states. The United States may be preeminent but
it is not omnipotent. It needs other states; thus
the United States and the other major states will
seek bargains that allow them to achieve mutual
gains. Another restraint is a bi-product of the
sensitivity of the United States to its international
legitimacy. The United States has a great incentive
for other states to willingly accept America�s
preeminent position rather than resist it. It
is not in America�s interest to be the lead state
in a coercive order built around the exercise
of naked power. The decision by the Bush administration
to go back to the UN Security Council to get support
for its confrontation with Iraq shows how even
an administration that is skeptical of the UN
understands the benefits that come from the legitimate
use of force. A third mechanism of restraint comes
from the inter-government pulling and hauling,
which is facilitated, by democracy and global
institutions. Even a unipolar state is embedded
in a larger structure of ongoing political relations
and interactions.
A final mechanism of restraint is the deeper processes of modernization.
States are not simply interacting power packages
� or billiard balls, to use the term of art --
they are also societies undergoing long-term transformations
driven by the forces of industrialization and
modernization. In this regard, the functionality
between the United States and the wider evolutionary
developments in the international system will
be critical in determining the degree of congruence
and incongruence between it and the other major
states. To the extent that the United States continues
to be at the leading edge of modernization, the
other major states will ultimately find reasons
to work with and engage the United States. If
the United States falls off the cutting edge of
modernization and becomes a huge backwater that
seeks only to protect its existing gains, great
power conflicts will likely re-emerge. American
unipolar power built on a 21st century
version of the �iron and rye� coalition will have
a different foreign policy and global presence
than one built on leading edge, internationally
oriented socioeconomic interests and coalitions.
The world reacts not just to American power but
also to its purpose and functionality within the
larger system.