Global
Trends
2015
Global
Trends
2010
Special
Products
Conference
Reports
Research
Supported by
the NIC
|
|
|
Global
Humanitarian Emergencies:
Trends and Projections, 2001-2002
Intelligence
Community Assessment
August 2001
This
paper is based on the coordinated views of analysts
and experts from agencies across the federal government.
It was produced by the National Intelligence Council
under the auspices of David F. Gordon, National
Intelligence Officer for Economics and Global
Issues.Queries should be addressed to Dr. Gordon
at the National Intelligence Council.
Information
available as of 15 August 2001 was used in preparing
this report.
The
photographs on the cover of this report are courtesy
of the US Committee for Refugees. The photographs
used in this report are not to be reproduced out
of the context of this publication.
This
assessment focuses on humanitarian emergencies
arising from manmade causes and major natural
disasters. We do not address situations in which
the need for development assistance or food aid
is due primarily to chronic poverty or environmental
degradation.
-
In
this assessment humanitarian emergencies
are defined as situations in which at least
300,000 civilians require international humanitarian
assistance to avoid serious malnutrition or
death. Our definition includes those situations
in which people need protection in order to
facilitate access to humanitarian aid.
-
The
manmade causes we focus on primarily are armed,
typically internal, conflict and repressive
government policies. Secondarily, we note
sudden economic emergencies and major technological
occurrences, such as a nuclear power plant
meltdown, as potential causes of humanitarian
emergencies.
The
timeframe for this assessment is through December
2002.
The
capacity and willingness of the international
community to respond to humanitarian emergencies
will continue to be stretched through December
2002. The overall number of people in need of
emergency humanitarian assistancenow approximately
42 millionis likely to increase:
-
Five
ongoing emergenciesin Afghanistan, Burundi,
Colombia, North Korea and Sudancause
almost 20 million people to be in need of
humanitarian assistance as internally displaced
persons (IDPs), refugees, or others in need
in their home locations. All these emergencies
show signs of worsening through 2002.
The
total number of humanitarian emergencies20is
down from 25 in January 2000. Of the current
emergencies:
-
Eleven
are in countries experiencing internal conflictAfghanistan,
Angola, Burundi, Colombia, DROC, Indonesia,
Russia/Chechnya, Sierra Leone, Sri Lanka,
Sudan, and Uganda.
-
The
remaining sixin Azerbaijan, Bosnia and
Herzegovina, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Somalia, and
Yugoslaviaare humanitarian emergencies
that have entered the transitional stage beyond
prolonged conflict, repressive government
policies, and/or major natural disasters.
-
The
primary cause of the emergency in Tajikistan
is drought. Several other countries currently
experiencing humanitarian emergenciesAfghanistan,
Eritrea, Ethiopia, North Korea, Somalia, and
Sudanalso are affected by major, persistent
natural disasters.
Current
Emergencies of Greatest Concern
Four
countries are of greatest concern because of the
scale and persistence of their humanitarian emergencies;
their significant impact upon continuing strategic
interests of major outside powers, including the
United States; and their importance for stability
in their regions.
-
In
Afghanistan, the humanitarian
situation, already serious, is likely to worsen.
Millions of people are at risk of famine as
a result of a three-year-long drought and
fighting, which has already forced some 3.6
million Afghans to flee to Pakistan and Iran.
The humanitarian situation will continue to
deteriorate due to a forecasted 1 million
ton grain deficit, continued fighting between
the Taliban and opposition forces, the Talibans
sporadic resistance to Western humanitarian
programs, formidable logistic challenges,
and donor fatigue.
-
In
Colombia, additional IDPson
the order of thousands per monthare
adding to the existing roughly 1.5 million
internally displaced persons.Attacks on civilians
are likely to continue unabated and will likely
increase, as paramilitary and insurgent groups
fight for territory and control of the countrys
resources. Conditions are likely to deteriorate
as a result of the absence of strong national
programs to provide sustained assistance and
the reticence of most international donors
to provide funds.
-
North
Korea will remain a significant humanitarian
challenge due to the severity of the food
deficit, restricted international access to
those in need, its collapsed economy and weakened
infrastructure, its exposure to frequent major
natural disastersboth drought and floodingand
the large number of people affected. Over
eight million peoplemore than one-third
of the countrys populationare
in need of food aid. Absent significant economic
reform, North Korea will continue to depend
on large-scale humanitarian aid, the bulk
of which will be provided by the United States,
South Korea, Japan and China through 2002.
Other
Current Emergencies
Other
current humanitarian emergencies are of concern
because of the scale and projected outlook for
the crisis, as well as the likelihood that the
emergency will spread and destabilize neighboring
countries and regions.
-
We
expect current conditions in Angola, Sierra
Leone, Somalia, Sri Lanka, and Uganda either
to remain about the same or deteriorate somewhat.
-
Humanitarian
concerns in Azerbaijan, Russias Chechnya
region, Eritrea, Ethiopia, and Indonesia are
likely to remain at or near current levels.
Sub-Saharan
Africa: Region at Risk
Sub-Saharan
Africa is the region at greatest risk
of a major new or significantly worse
humanitarian emergency through December
2002. Most of Sub-Saharan Africa suffers
from abject poverty, intense ethnic rivalries,
and grossly inadequate communications
and transportation infrastructureconditions
that make the region especially vulnerable
to humanitarian emergencies and hinder
response efforts. Genocidal conflicts
aimed at annihilating all or part of a
racial, religious, or ethnic group, and
conflicts caused by other crimes against
humanitysuch as forced, large-scale
expulsions of populationsare particularly
likely to generate massive and intractable
humanitarian needs. |
Potential
Emergencies
Through
2002, seven potential emergencies are of greatest
concern. We list them in order of their probability
of developing.
-
In
Zimbabwe, food shortages and
political violencefueled by high inflation,
unemployment, racial tensions and land reform
issuesin the run-up to the winter 2002
election could precipitate a humanitarian
crisis by spring 2002, causing refugee flows
into South Africa and elsewhere in southern
Africa.
-
In
Haiti, continuing economic stagnation,
political stalemate, and internal unrest,
if left unchecked, will raise political tensions.
A severe economic downturn and a resurgence
of serious human rights violations would lead
to a renewed outflow of thousands of people.
-
Kenyaalready
suffering one of its most serious droughts
in a half-centuryfaces rising political
and ethnic tensions in the run-up to presidential
elections in December 2002, which could prompt
large-scale refugee flows. Because much of
the humanitarian aid to Sudan and the Great
Lakes region in Central Africa passes through
the Kenyan port of Mombasa, instability in
Kenya and any resulting deterioration of the
infrastructure would affect the delivery of
humanitarian aid throughout the region.
Humanitarian
Response
We
judge that major donor countries will continue
to respond quickly and provide substantial amounts
of humanitarian aid in short-term emergencies
resulting from natural disasters and in severe
new emergencies caused by conflict or government
repression. Funding for humanitarian aid in long-lasting
crises, including many in Africa, will, however,
continue to fall well short of targeted needs
unless signs of achieving a settlement emerge.
Consensual
humanitarian responses will continue to be substantially
more numerous than forceful humanitarian interventions
against the will of a local government or local
combatants. Government and international humanitarian
agencies and nongovernmental organizations (NGOs)
often will attempt to deliver relief to civilian
groups at risk, but many governments will continue
to be highly wary of forceful humanitarian interventions:
Despite
some improvement in the responsiveness and capacity
of humanitarian agencies in recent years, limits
imposed by budgetary constraints and bureaucratic
competition among the major UN agencies and international
NGOsas well as the problems associated with
operating in conflict situationswill continue
to hamper the effective delivery of humanitarian
assistance.
-
In
the absence of adequate security, an increasing
number of UN agencies, the International Committee
of the Red Cross, and NGOs will withdraw,
at least temporarily, from particularly dangerous
humanitarian operations.
Figure
1
Current and Potential Humanitarian Emergencies,
2001-02
Figure
1 (continued)
Current and Potential Humanitarian Emergencies,
2001-02
Figure
1 (continued)
Current and Potential Humanitarian Emergencies,
2001-02
Figure
1 (continued)
Current and Potential Humanitarian Emergencies,
2001-02
Figure
1 (continued)
Current and Potential Humanitarian Emergencies,
2001-02
The
number of countries with current humanitarian
emergencies in which at least 300,000 civilians
require international humanitarian assistance
to avoid serious malnutrition or death has dropped
from 25 in January 2000 to 20 in mid-2001.
-
The
decrease in the overall number of emergencies
is attributable to improvement in Croatia
and some reduction of emergency humanitarian
need in Georgia, Haiti, Liberia[1]
and Rwanda. All these countries have transitioned
out of an earlier emergency status so that
fewer than 300,000 of their populations now
are in need of emergency relief.
Of
the current emergencies:
-
Eleven are in countries experiencing internal
conflictAfghanistan, Angola, Burundi,
Colombia, Democratic Republic of the Congo
(DROC), Indonesia, Russia/ Chechnya, Sierra
Leone, Sri Lanka, Sudan, and Uganda.
-
The
remaining sixin Azerbaijan, Bosnia and
Herzegovina, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Somalia, and
Yugoslaviaare humanitarian emergencies
that have entered the transitional stage.
-
The
primary cause of the current emergency in
Tajikistan is drought. Several other countries
currently experiencing humanitarian emergenciesAfghanistan,
Eritrea, Ethiopia, North Korea, Somalia and
the Sudanare also affected by major,
persistent natural disasters.
According
to previous US Intelligence Community and other
Government assessments, the number of ongoing
humanitarian emergencies reached a high of 24
in 1994, declined somewhat in 1996-1997, and peaked
again in 1999, before falling in 2000 to the current
level of 20 (see figure 2).
The
number of people in need of emergency humanitarian
assistance worldwideincluding internally
displaced persons (IDPs), refugees, and others
in refugee-like situationshas increased
from approximately 36 million as of December 31,
1998 to some 42 million as of December 31, 2000,
according to the 2001 report of the US Committee
for Refugees (USCR; see
figure 3). The apparent contradiction between
the roughly stable number of humanitarian emergencies
in April 1998 and August 2001, on the one hand,
and the increase by six million in the number
of people in need, on the other hand, can be explained
as follows:
Figure
2
Humanitarian Emergencies, January 1995-August
2001
-
The
increasingly violent and long lasting character
of internal conflictswhich makes them
resistant to settlementhas generated
a rapid increase in the number of IDPs in
such countries as Angola, Colombia, DROC,
and Sierra Leone.
The
total number of IDPs continues to exceed the number
of refugees, due to the persistence and violence
of internal conflicts and severe government repression
and to the growing unwillingness of many states
to host long-standing refugee populations.
Looking
Ahead
Emergencies Caused Primarily
by Conflict and
Government Repression
The
overall number of people in need is likely to
increase by December 2002, especially if humanitarian
conditions further deteriorate in populous countries
such as DROC or Indonesia. The total number of
humanitarian emergencies could also increase if
one or more potential emergencies occur (see
figure 4).
Figure
3
Estimated Number of the World's People Need of
Emergency Humanitarian Assistance, 1984-2000a
Defining
and Estimating Populations In Need
Definitions
of populations in need of emergency
humanitarian assistance used by the international
relief community are inconsistent. The
figures used in this assessment for the
total number of displaced people in need
of emergency humanitarian assistance worldwide
(as in figure 3) were provided by the US
Committee for Refugees. The USCR includes
refugees from the named country, people
in refugee-like situations, and internally
displaced persons in its definition of displaced
people in need.
In
addition to those included in USCRs
definition, the Intelligence Communitys
definition of persons in need of emergency
humanitarian assistance also includes others
requiring humanitarian aid in their home
locations due primarily to conflict and
government repression, often exacerbated
by natural disasters. Because our assessment
includes this additional population and
focuses only on those emergencies in which
300,000 or more people are in need, the
number of people in need listed for individual
countries will not equal the worldwide totaland
may not equal the individual totalsprovided
by USCR cited in this paper.
The
numbers cited in this assessment for people
in need in individual countries represent
the Intelligence Communitys best estimate
based on a review of information available
from the UN High Commissioner for Refugees,
diplomatic reporting, nongovernmental organizations,
and the media. They should be treated as
approximations, not precise numbers. A
change in the reported population in need
does not necessarily reflect a change in
circumstances but may be due to a change
in access to reliable information. |
-
Humanitarian
conditions in Afghanistan, Burundi, Colombia,
North Korea, Sudan, and Tajikistan are likely
to deteriorate further.
-
The
current conditions in Angola, DROC, central
and southern Iraq, Sierra Leone, Somalia,
Sri Lanka, and Uganda are expected to either
remain about the same or worsen.
-
Humanitarian
concerns in Azerbaijan, Russias Chechnya
region, Eritrea, Ethiopia, and Indonesia are
likely to remain at or near current levels.
Current
Emergencies Of Greatest Concern
Afghanistan,
Colombia, Iraq, and North Korea will be of greatest
concern because of the scale and persistence of
their humanitarian emergencies; their significance
for continuing strategic interests of major outside
powers, including the United States; and their
importance for stability in their respective regions.
The
Changing Character of Internal Conflicts
Post-Cold
War internal conflicts tend to be struggles
over control of exploitable resources and
access to wealth and political power more
generally. Ethnic and religious differences
often exacerbate or underlie such conflicts,
making them even more volatile. Under such
conditions, civilians are viewed either
as threats, in case they support the other
sideor as a potential source of new
supporters. Thus, civilians often are key
targets for combatants on all sides.
-
Combatants have little compunction about
employing vicious techniques of warfare,
including torture, demonstration killings
and maiming (as in Sierra Leone), or the
wholesale expulsion of civilians (as in
Kosovo). The violence of internal conflicts
is facilitated by the wide availability,
at modest prices, of an array of light
and medium weapons.
- Armed
groups are increasingly forcing child
soldiers to fight. The Stockholm International
Peace Research Institute estimated that
in 2000 about 10 percent of all combatants
worldwide were under age 18a trend
that is likely to increase in coming years.
-
Refugee and IDP camps have been used as
bases for operations by combatants in
countries such as Burundi, DROC, Liberia,
and Pakistan, increasing the risks for
camp populations and relief workers alike.
-
Contending forces in a number of conflicts
are using relief as a weapon of war.
In Somalia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Sudan,
and Sierra Leone, warring factions have
systematically regulated the flow of food
into specific areas to weaken public support
for their opponents or strengthen support
for their own side.
Genocidal
conflicts aimed at annihilating all
or part of a racial, religious, or ethnic
group, and conflicts caused by other crimes
against humanitysuch as forced, large-scale
expulsions of populationsare particularly
likely to generate massive and intractable
humanitarian needs:
-
Humanitarian emergencies generated by
such conflicts typically produce sudden
and especially large movements of refugees
and IDPs, with accompanying emergency
needs for food and shelter, as in Kosovo
and Rwanda.
-
Such conflicts evoke the most visceral
emotional responses from victims and perpetrators
alike; thus, the political, economic,
and social conditions that provoke such
conflicts are likely to be unusually persistent.
-
Most countries experiencing such conflicts
in the last decade have yet to restore
their pre-conflict growth, while reconciliation
between antagonists has proven elusive.
|
IDP
camp. Herat, Afghanistan, January 2001
-
In
Afghanistan, the humanitarian
situation, already serious, is likely to worsen.
Millions of people are at risk of famine as
a result of a three-year-long drought and
fighting, which have forced some 3.6 million
Afghans to flee to Pakistan and Iran. Afghans
will require emergency food assistance until
probably the next wheat harvest in June 2002.
A better harvest next year would improve the
outlook for the humanitarian situation somewhat,
but it will not be sufficient to offset increased
fighting between the Taliban and opposition
forces or possible shifts in the front lines,
the Talibans attempts to link sporadic
resistance to Western humanitarian aid programs
to political opportunity, formidable logistic
challenges, and donor fatigue.
Internally
displaced Colombian. May 2000
-
In
Colombia, additional IDPson
the order of thousands per monthare
adding to the roughly 1.5 million internally
displaced persons.Attacks on civilians are
likely to continue unabated and probably will
increase, as paramilitary and insurgent groups
fight for territory and control of the countrys
resources. Many cities will struggle to cope
with the thousands of internally displaced
persons living in slums with little access
to water, sanitation, and health services.
Conditions are likely to worsen due to the
absence of strong national programs to provide
sustained assistance and the reticence of
most international donors to provide funds.
Bogota will have to rely on a small number
of nongovernmental organizations for assistance.
-
In
Iraq, under the oil-for-food
program, per capita food imports have increased,
malnutrition among children under age five
has fallen, and health-care services have
improved. Conditions in central and southern
Iraq are unlikely to improve due to continued
manipulation of the UN oil-for-food program
by the government for political gain. Humanitarian
conditions in central and southern Iraq will
worsen to the extent that Saddam Husayn exercises
greater control over oil revenues. Conditions
in northern Iraq are likely to continue to
improve, since UN management of the aid program
will help ease the impact of any disruptions
caused by Baghdad.
-
North
Korea will remain a significant humanitarian
challenge due to the severity of the food
deficit, restricted international access to
those in need, its collapsed economy and weakened
infrastructure, its exposure to frequent major
natural disastersboth drought and floodingand
the large number of people affected. More
than eight million peoplemore than one-third
of the countrys populationare
in need of food aid. The infusion of massive
international food aid, combined with North
Koreas 2000 harvest of 3.0 million metric
tons, is expected to meet Pyongyangs
basic subsistence needs of 4.7 million metric
tons from November 2000 through at least March
2002. Even with this aid, however, widespread
malnutrition will persist. Absent significant
reform, North Korea will depend on large-scale
humanitarian aid, the bulk of which will continue
to be provided by the United States, South
Korea, Japan, and China through 2002.
Other
Current Emergencies of Concern
Humanitarian emergencies in other countries are
of concern because of the scale and projected
outlook for the humanitarian crisis, as well as
the likelihood that the emergency will spill over
and adversely affect neighboring countries.
-
In
Angola, humanitarian conditions
will remain about the same or worsen through
2002. The re-establishment of government
administration in long-abandoned areas of
the country in recent months has not markedly
improved relief agency access to more than
three million IDPs. An all-out victory or
negotiated settlement is unlikely through
December 2002. Thus, violence stemming from
UNITA guerrilla attacks and government counter-insurgency
operations will continue to displace people
from their homes, prevent large-scale resettlement
efforts, and hinder relief operations. Given
the intractability of this crisis, which has
now lasted since 1975, donor fatigue is likely
to exact a heavier toll on relief operations.
Contributions to UN and World Food Program
(WFP) appeals for Angola regularly fall short,
undermining food pipelines and forcing cutbacks
in relief distribution.
-
In
Burundi, the continuing struggle
between Bujumbura, Tutsi hardliners and the
Hutu rebel groups over power sharing and other
transition issues is likely to lead to increased
violence and a deteriorating humanitarian
situation through 2002.Relief agency access
to affected areas of the country is likely
to be hindered, and thousands more Burundians
are likely to be internally displaced or flee
to neighboring countries. Persistent attacks
on Tutsis by rebel forces also could compel
Bujumbura to revive its policy of forcing
Hutu civilians into regroupment centers as
a means to deprive the rebels of their support
base.
-
The
emergency in DROC has resulted
in the displacement of some 2 million people,
either as IDPs or as refugees in surrounding
countriesall of whom are in need of
emergency aid. Thus, even if the nascent
peace negotiations continue, humanitarian
conditions will not improve dramatically due
to the sheer scope of the crisis. The current
ceasefire has not stopped Rwandan counterinsurgency
efforts in eastern DROC, and intense fighting
between the Rwandan Army and Rwandan Hutu
rebels will complicate humanitarian assistance
efforts. Political missteps by either the
government or rebel forces could rekindle
the three-year-old civil war. Neighboring
countries have managed to absorb most refugees
generated by the fighting so far, but a massive
push by any of the forces toward populated
areas would be likely to send tens of thousands
of people across DROCs borders, destabilizing
the entire Great Lakes region and severely
straining relief agency resources.
-
Indonesia
will face continued humanitarian challenges
over the coming year. Some 900,000 persons
throughout the archipelago are now internally
displaced; this number could increase by several
hundred thousand IDPs as new flare-ups of
communal or secessionist tension further strain
Jakartas financial and military resources.
Nationalist tendencies in the new government
could spur ethnic violence and increase support
for separatist movements. Patterns of past
violence and other socioeconomic factors point
to the possibility of ethnic or religious
violence in at least twelve provinces. Intensified
fighting may also temporarily block relief
agency access to IDP camps or lead international
aid workers to pare back relief efforts as
they have in western Timor.
-
Humanitarian
conditions in Russias breakaway republic
of Chechnya will not improve
substantially over the next year, although
recent support from the European Commission
has eased problems associated with irregular
food supplies, lack of potable water, and
access to medical care. Other consequences
of the conflict, including destruction of
infrastructure and environmental degradation,
are long-term issues and not easily resolved.
Violence between Russian forces and Chechen
rebels will deter most displaced from returning
to their homes and will impede aid efforts
to mitigate hardship. Should the conflict
escalate sharply or expand beyond Chechnya,
relief agencies would be quickly overwhelmed,
and the UN would be forced to seek substantial
funding increases.
Destruction
in Groznyy. Chechnya, December 2000
-
In
Sierra Leone, the Revolutionary
United Front (RUF) has begun to cooperate
with UN Assistance Mission to Sierra Leone
(UNAMSIL) forces and currently appears to
be attempting to pursue a political deal with
Freetown. The RUF, however, has abrogated
numerous peace accords in the past and probably
will resume terror tactics if its political
strategy falters, curtailing relief agency
access and jeopardizing the safety of resettled
IDPs and returned refugees from Guinea and
Liberia. Either a deterioration of security
or a massive influx of returning refugees
would severely strain relief agency resources.
-
In
Sri Lanka, fighting between
government forces and Liberation Tigers of
Tamil Eelam (LTTE) rebels may lead to a further
deterioration in humanitarian conditions.
Regular rounds of fighting will repeatedly
trigger further population displacements.
NGOs have access to affected populations,
but movement of people and supplies isand
will likely remaincontrolled by the
government. Peace talks, if held, are unlikely
to produce an end to the conflict.
-
In
Sudan, either a breakthrough
in negotiations or a major shift in the military
balance between Khartoum and Sudan Peoples
Liberation Army (SPLA) forces is unlikely
through December 2002. Humanitarian conditions
are likely to worsen for more than four million
IDPs and others in need throughout the country.
Consecutive droughts have put at least 420,000
people in the west and 200,000 in the south
in dire need of food aid. Future fighting
is likely to intensify in the oil regions
and move south and west, further curtailing
delivery of emergency food aid to affected
areas by relief organizations.
Opposition
soldier. Eastern Sudan, May 2000
-
Although
many of the humanitarian difficulties in Tajikistan
wrought by the five-year civil war have dissipated,
the UN World Food Program assesses that drought
has severely damaged the countrys fragile
agricultural sector and could force some one
million people to require some sort of food
assistance through mid-2002.
-
In
Uganda, the security situation
will improve, provided that Kampala maintains
its current vigorous military campaign against
the insurgents. This would improve the humanitarian
situation insofar as relief agencies could
work more freely in areas that experience
chronic instability. Improved climatic conditions
should also reduce the number of people requiring
drought assistance, but insurgency and insecurity
probably will continue, at least in the north,
perpetuating instability and possibly restricting
relief programs.
Looking
Ahead
Situations
Transitioning from Humanitarian Emergencies
Transitioning
situations are those that have moved beyond either
prolonged conflict, repressive government policies,
or major natural or other types of disasters that
create large-scale humanitarian needs. However,
countries with such problems may still have at
least 300,000 people in need of targeted humanitarian
aid. They also will require other types of political
and economic assistance as they move into a more
normal state, whether continuing chronic
poverty or long-term development. Two transitioning
situations are of greatest concern because of
their effects on strategic interests of major
outside powers, including the United States; stability
in their regions; and the scale of outside assistance
provided, including in these cases the deployment
of US military forces to meet their remaining
humanitarian and other needs.
-
In
Bosnia and Herzegovina, aggressive
oversight of national property law implementation,
increases in interethnic police, and strengthened
communal ties in 2000 led to improved conditions
for ethnic minority returnsthe strongest
barometer of humanitarian conditions. Some
69,000 peopleprimarily Bosniaks, but
also Croats and Serbsreturned home in
2000, representing a 50 percent increase over
1999. However, some 800,000 remain unable
to return home550,000 displaced within
Bosnia and Herzegovina and 250,000 abroad.
Local resistance, sporadic violence against
minority returnees, and poor economic conditions
will most likely continue to complicatebut
as long as the Stabilization Forces (SFOR)
are deployed, not derailcontinued ethnic
minority returns.
In Serbia, greater access by aid
organizations in 2001 will bring more assistance
to some 480,000 internally displaced persons in
the country. Despite this gain, however, progress
in returning the displaced, as well as the roughly
190,000 refugees still outside Yugoslavia, to
their homes is expected to be slow through 2002.
Thus, continued international assistance will
be required.
Figure
4 (Foldout)
Ongoing, Transitionong, and Potential Humanitarian
Emergencies
In the Kosovo region, focused
international aid and reconstruction efforts will
continue to improve humanitarian conditions for
the ethnic Albanian majority, but existing ethnic
tensionsfurther enflamed by nearby ethnic
Albanian insurgencies in the Former Yugoslav Republic
of Macedoniasuggest security and humanitarian
conditions for Kosovos ethnic Serb and Roma
minorities will remain poor. Most of Kosovos
225,000 displaced people probably will remain
elsewhere in Yugoslavia well into 2002.
Other
transitioning situations are of concern because
of their potential for adversely affecting neighboring
countries and stability in their regions; the
scale of their remaining humanitarian and other
needs; and the existence of at least some opportunities
for an effective transition.
-
In Azerbaijan, conditions among
the approximately 800,000 IDPs generated by
the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict with Armenia
are poor, with IDPs living in make-shift shacks
and railroad cars. Azerbaijan is unlikely
to reach a formal peace agreement with Armenia
by December 2002. Thus, the humanitarian
situation is unlikely to improve. Should
a peace formula be found, the international
community appears ready to provide financial
and logistical assistance to resettle IDPs.
-
Eritreas
humanitarian situation has improved somewhat
as a result of the peace agreement with Ethiopia
and the presence of UN monitoring forces.
Such progress, however, will be offset by
the persistent effects of the severe multi-year
drought and the poor state of the Eritrean
economy. Eritrean grain production in 2000
was approximately one-fourth of normal levels,
ensuring that an estimated 1.8 million people
will need food assistance well into 2002.
-
In
Ethiopia, recent rains and a
favorable harvest in spring 2001 will help
relieve short-term food insecurity for some
4 million drought-affected and IDPs in the
north. More than 6 million othersespecially
pastoralists in hard-hit southern and eastern
areaswill continue to require food aid.
Internal distribution problems will complicate
marketing of grain from surplus areas in the
central, western and northwestern regions
to deficit areas in the north, south, and
east. The three-year drought has depleted
household assets of large segments of the
population. Agricultural production along
the border with Eritrea cannot resume until
landmines are cleared.
-
Somalia
will need little emergency food assistance
in 2001 because of its bumper 2000 grain harvest,
but access to food may be limited in regions
that did not benefit from favorable weather
in 2001. Poor rainfall in spring 2001 could
result in a 30 percent reduction of the Fall
2001 grain harvest, forcing tens of thousands
of people to require food aid in 2002. Additionally,
a surge in violence between warring factions
probably would lead to further population
displacement and the reemergence of crisis
conditions countrywide as aid operations are
disrupted.
Sub-Saharan
Africa: Region at Risk
Sub-Saharan
Africa is the region of greatest risk of
a major new or significantly worse humanitarian
emergency through December 2002. In no
other region is such a confluence of factors
likely to produce both manmade emergencies
and the inability to deal effectively with
natural disasters. Although there are pockets
of stabilitySouth Africa is the most
notablemost of Sub-Saharan Africa
suffers from abject poverty, intense ethnic
rivalries, grossly inadequate communications
and transportation infrastructure, and extremely
weak governmental institutions. Moreover,
the impact of these negative factors is
exacerbated by the prevalence of HIV/AIDS,
which affects the region more than any other
area of the world. |
Eritrean
IDP camp; June 2000
Looking
Ahead
Potential
Emergencies
In
addition to the current emergencies cited above,
several other major countries and regions may
experience conflict or government repression that
will lead to new or renewed humanitarian emergencies.
We estimate the probability of these
situations becoming major humanitarian emergencies
in which at least 300,000 people are at risk through
2002. We also estimate their potential
impact on strategic interests of major outside
powers, including the United States, on stability
in their respective regions, and on humanitarian
conditions in the affected country.
The
Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia
Probability:
Medium/High
Potential
Impact: Very High
An
escalation of ethnic conflict in western Macedonia
leading to full-scale civil war would be likely
to destabilize southeastern Europe by displacing
tens of thousands of Slavic Macedonians and sending
hundreds of thousands of mostly ethnic Albanian
refugees into neighboring countries.
Zimbabwe
Probability:
Medium/High
Potential
Impact: High
In
Zimbabwe, drought and mounting civil unrestfueled
by high inflation, unemployment, racial tensions,
disrupted agricultural production and land reform
issuesare likely to precipitate a humanitarian
crisis by spring 2002. Widespread food shortages
are likelyparticularly of corn, the primary
food stapleand it is doubtful that Harare
will be able to compensate for the deficit with
imports. A surge in political violence could
spur significant refugee flows into South Africa
and elsewhere in southern Africa.
Haiti
Probability:
Medium
Potential
Impact: High
In
Haiti, continuing economic stagnation, political
stalemate, and internal unrest, if left unchecked,
are likely to raise political tensions. A severe
economic downturn and a resurgence of serious
human rights violations would lead to a renewed
outflow of thousands of people. The size of the
outflow would depend to some extent on Haitian
perceptions of the likelihood that they would
be able to reach US shores.
Kenya
Probability:
Low-Medium
Potential
Impact: High-Very High
Although
subsequent rains have eased the situation somewhat,
Kenya remains affected by one of the worst droughts
of the past half-century, a deteriorating economy,
and internal unrest. President Mois second
term expires in December 2002, and ethnic violence
is likely to accompany the presidential election.
Despite constitutional prohibition to a third
term, Moi has hinted that he may remain in power.
Any combination of these elements could lead to
political instability, significant loss of life,
and large-scale refugee flows. Much of the humanitarian
aid to Sudan and the Great Lakes region in Central
Africa passes through the Kenyan port of Mombasa;
thus, deteriorating infrastructure and instability
in Kenya would also affect the delivery of humanitarian
aid throughout the region.
Côte
dIvoire:
Probability:
Low/Medium
Potential
Impact: High
Tens
of thousands of economic migrants and foreign
workers are likely to flee Côte d'Ivoire in the
coming months if the government resumes its attempts
to marginalize the opposition, much of whose support
comes from immigrants and Muslims. Even with
outside assistance, poor infrastructure and minimal
economic development would prevent neighboring
countries such as Mali, Burkina Faso, and Niger
from absorbing massive returns of their own nationals.
India-Pakistan
(Kashmir)
Probability:
Low
Potential
Impact: Very High
Renewed
conflict between India and Pakistan over Kashmir
could expand into a full-scale war that extends
along the border. Such a conflict probably would
spread to the Indian state of Rajasthan and the
Indian and Pakistani states of Punjab, displacing
well over one million people. Although unlikely,
it could also spark even more widespread communal
violence in other parts of India, pitting Hindus
against Muslims as it did at partition in 1947.
The potential scale of a humanitarian emergency
would be even greater in the unlikely event of
a nuclear exchange.
Nigeria
Probability:
Low
Potential
Impact: Very High
The
return to democracy has done little to ameliorate
Nigerias formidable challenges: its poor
economic performance, ethnic instability in the
Niger Delta, the maldistribution of oil wealth,
and the growing North-South divide over the implementation
of Islamic law. Although unlikely, a major incident
related to any of these problems could spark a
violent chain reaction, including large-scale
ethnic violence and massive population displacement.
Looking
Ahead
Humanitarian
Emergencies Caused by Natural Disasters
Natural
disasters often create humanitarian emergencies.
According to the International Federation of Red
Cross and Red Crescent Societies World Disasters
Report 2001, an average of 255 natural disasters
occurred throughout the world each year from 1991
to 2000.
-
The
number of geophysical disastersvolcanoes
and earthquakeshas remained fairly steady,
but the number of hydro-meteorological disastersincluding
droughts, windstorms, and floodshas
more than doubled since 1996 (see figure 5).
According
to the World Disasters Report, over the
last ten years an average of 211 million people
were affected by natural disasters each yearroughly
five times more than those affected by conflict.[2]
-
Over
650,000 people were killed by natural disasters
during the past decade; more than 90 percent
of those lost their lives in droughts, windstorms,
and floods.
-
Impoverished
and densely populated countries in East and
Southeast Asia are at especially high risk
of natural disasters. China experiences big
floods every year. Indonesia, North Korea,
Philippines, and Vietnam experienced a total
of more than 120 major typhoons, earthquakes,
and floods during the 1990s.
Many
countries and regions that are vulnerable to natural
disasters are poorly prepared to respond (see
figure 6).
-
The
Caribbean islands, Colombia, Peru, and Central
America also are especially vulnerable to
major natural disasters.
-
The
Horn of Africa, e.g., the Sahel and East Africa,
Ethiopia, Mozambique, Somalia, Sudan, and
Tanzania are particularly vulnerable to drought
and floods.
Many
of the worlds largest citiesthose
with ten million or more peopleare at risk
of natural disasters. Such cities include Calcutta,
Istanbul, Mexico City, Tianjin, and Tokyo. As
large cities have grown, populations have spread
along coastlines, flood-prone rivers, and fault
lines.
Most
of the populations living in these disaster-prone
areas are poor and lack sufficient housing, infrastructure,
and services that can mitigate the impact of a
disaster. Recent attempts to house growing populations
have resulted in a surfeit of substandard housing
in flood-prone and geologically unstable areas,
increasing the likelihood of massive casualties
in the event of a major natural disaster.
Figure
5
Natural Disasters Trends, 1991-2000
Efforts
by international aid agencies to build more resilient
structures following a natural disaster will reduce
somewhat the prospects for loss of life and structural
damage, but millions of people throughout the
developing world will remain vulnerable.
Looking
Ahead
Other
Causes of Humanitarian Emergencies
In
addition to emergencies caused by conflict and
government repression or by natural disasters,
other factors can cause or exacerbate humanitarian
emergencies.
Sudden
economic downturns can create a humanitarian
emergencyas happened in Indonesia and Russia
in 1998especially in poor countries lacking
the infrastructure and government capacity to
cope with them. These types of humanitarian emergencies
are often exacerbated by other factorssuch
as deep ethnic, social, and political fissuresraising
their costs and delaying their recovery.
Figure
6
Total Number of Reported Natural Disasters By
Continent and Type of Phenomenon, 1991-2000
Impact
of El Nio/La Niña
El
Niño/La Niña is a cyclic event within the
ocean-atmosphere system having important
consequences for weather around the globe.
During the El Niño phase, the trade
winds become lighter in the central and
western Pacific, leading to a rise in sea
surface temperature. Rainfall follows the
warm water eastward, potentially causing
destructive flooding and drought.
- For
example, the 1998 El Niño event may have
been responsible, according to some atmospheric
scientists, for unusual droughts in Australia
and flooding in California.
La
Niña is characterized by unusually cold
ocean temperatures in the Equatorial Pacific.
Global climate impacts of La Niña tend to
be opposite those of El Niño.
-
The effects of the current La Niña event
may have helped intensify the drought
in Kenya in 2000 during the countrys
most important rainy season and helped
amplify the fall floods last year in Cambodia
and Vietnam.
- In
both 2000 and 2001, the effects of La
Niña also contributed to the February
and March floods in Mozambique.
The
current three-year La Niña cycle has been
winding down since early 2001. Long-range
forecast models, developed by the National
Oceanographic Atmospheric Administrations
Climate Prediction Center, indicate a near
neutral phase will persist through the end
of 2001 and into early 2002. |
Damage
from the February and March 2000 floods in Mozambique
Additional
sudden economic emergencies may occur in developing
economies through December 2002. The global economy
is going through its greatest slowdown in decades,
and investor pessimism is especially strong for
the developing countries.
Technological
disasters can also generate humanitarian
emergencies. A massive, prolonged failure of
a national power grid system or another Chernobyl-like
nuclear accident brought about by failure to adequately
maintain aging infrastructures could not only
have serious consequences inside a country but
would also spill across national boundaries, especially
in the developed world. The tendency in the developing
world to less carefully control the handling of
chemicals and pesticides increases the risk that
an air or water-borne spillperhaps more
serious than the one experienced at Bhopal, Indiacould
lead to a large-scale humanitarian emergency.
Sudden
widespread outbreaks of certain infectious diseasesalthough
unlikely by themselves to trigger humanitarian
emergenciesare frequently a major factor
exacerbating such emergencies:
-
HIV/AIDS
takes years to cause deaths and thus does
not directly spur sudden humanitarian emergencies.
Nonetheless, should the incidence of HIV/AIDS
continue to climb in the most affected countries,
its cumulative impact on subsistence agriculture
and social stability could lead to social
collapse and a humanitarian crisis.
According
to the World Health Organization, about one-half
of all disease outbreaks of international importance
now occur as a result of humanitarian crises.
-
Refugees
or others who are displaced from their normal
supporting infrastructure have heightened
disease risks associated with lack of safe
water, inadequate sanitation, malnutrition,
and overcrowding.
-
Measels,
cholera, diarrheal diseases, and acute respiratory
illnesses are the principle causes of mortality
in these situations, especially in children
under the age of five. These diseases are
highly contagious and cause significantly
high death rates unless immediate medical
intervention is available.
The
provision of relief in international humanitarian
emergencies is carried out through a loosely organized
and loosely coordinated network of national governments
and social institutions, inter-governmental agencies,
and nongovernmental organizations (NGOs)both
international and local. To a significant extent,
the success or failure of relief operations hinges
on the capacity and willingness of local and national
authorities to mobilize their own resources and
to absorb other aid from abroad (see figure 7).
Through 2002, governments and relief organizations
will be challenged to respond to the ongoing and
potential humanitarian emergencies outlined above.
Humanitarian
Response
The
Willingness of Outsiders to Respond
A
response to a humanitarian emergency by outside
governments and international agencies can range
from consensual to forceful, depending on the
degree of cooperation from local governments or
opposing combatants.
Figure
7
Capacity to Respond to Current and Potential Humanitarian
Emergencies
Figure
7 (Continued)
Capacity to Respond to Current and Potential Humanitarian
Emergencies
On
the spectrum in between are humanitarian operations
where:
-
The
delivery of humanitarian aid is at least tolerated
by local authorities, but military protection
is required to prevent seizure by warlords
or other disruptive local elements, as in
Somalia in 1992-93.
-
Basic
law and order need to be re-established, as
in East Timor in the aftermath of the withdrawal
of Indonesian forces in 1999, in order for
relief to be delivered and a new country brought
into being.
Consensual
humanitarian responses have been and will continue
to be by far more numerous than forceful humanitarian
interventions against the will of a local government
and/or local combatants. Even in conflict situations,
however, government and international humanitarian
agencies and NGOs will often attempt to deliver
relief to civilian groups at risk.
Although
each countrys calculus is likely to be a
little different, a number of factors are likely
to figure prominently in an outside states
decision to respond in a humanitarian emergency,
including:
Donor
countries are not only wrestling with the issue
of which countries and conflict situations merit
the use of military force to intervene in humanitarian
emergencies but how long and how broad a military
or financial commitment they are willing to take
on. Protracted conflicts in such states as Afghanistan,
Angola, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Sierra Leone,
and Sudan defy short-term solutions, and restoring
security is just a part of a multifaceted humanitarian
response.
Public
and Political Support for Humanitarian Response.
Western governments will continue to face pressures
to respond to humanitarian emergencies, especially
when such outside assistance is by mutual consent:
-
The
revolution in information technologies and
the increased economic, cultural, and intellectual
permeability of national borders are eroding
the ability of inept or venal governments
to mask humanitarian emergencies and to escape
international attention.
-
These
factors enable disadvantaged groups in countries
suffering from internal conflicts, repression,
or natural disasters to press for better treatment,
self-determination, or outside assistance
and intervention.
-
he
spread of globalization, a widespread concern
for human rights, and the increasing numbers
and influence of nongovernmental organizations
around the world heighten public awareness
of humanitarian emergencies.
-
Humanitarian
emergencies provoked by genocide and other
mass killings, atrocities, and expulsions
will continue to evoke strong political, NGO,
and public pressures on outside governments
to intervene.
On
the other hand, the assertion of the right to
non-interference by many important G-77 governments
and their citizens will continue to act as a brake
on early action in a potential humanitarian emergency.
Humanitarian
Response
Military
Capabilities
Many
governments have marginally improved their military
capabilities for intervention in the past decade.
These unitsprimarily equipped for combat
and trained for peacekeeping and peace enforcement
missionsmay be made available to respond
to global humanitarian emergencies. The United
States, United Kingdom, France, Canada, Germany,
Ukraine, and Russia will remain the only countries
with the long-range military airlift capabilities
required to deliver bulk humanitarian aid in large,
sudden emergencies, or where humanitarian access
is denied to large populations.
-
Since
the early 1990s, military forces from the
United States, United Kingdom, France, Germany,
and Canada have participated in forceful humanitarian
interventions, such as Iraq in 1991, Somalia
in 1993, Bosnia and Herzegovina after 1994-95,
and Kosovo in 1999.
-
In
the more consensual operations, troops from
Europe, Australia, and New Zealand were active
throughout the 1990s; in 2000, they accounted
for more than one-third of the UNs peacekeeping
forces. Many of these governments cite humanitarian
actions as a justification for increasing
overall rapid response capabilities.
The
capabilities of the United States, the European
Union, and Australia to respond to humanitarian
emergencies could improve moderately in the near
future. In addition to US response capabilities,
the EU plans a rapid reaction force of 60,000
troops for missions ranging from the consensual
delivery of emergency assistance to civilians
to the separation of parties in combat by force.
The Australians are also developing rapid reaction
forces.
The
ability of other countries to participate in humanitarian
operations varies widely. Some countries, such
as Argentina, Bangladesh, Nigeria, and South Korea,
have all instituted programs to deploy forces
for multilateral peace operations. China also
has indicated that it intends to become more active
in peacekeeping endeavors. Most developing countries,
however, lack specialized logistic, transport,
and engineering capabilities, as well as medical
personnel, to sustain their infantry forces in
such operations.
In
the last few years, the United States, United
Kingdom, and France, among other states, have
launched training activities to enhance African
capabilities to respond to humanitarian crises
and peacekeeping challenges. The US African Crisis
Response Initiative (ACRI) seeks to train several
rapidly deployable, interoperable battalions from
stable, democratic countries in Africa to a common
standard based on NATO peacekeeping doctrine and
procedures.
The
efforts of the United States in Africa parallel
those of the United Kingdom, France and Portugal,
as well as similar bilateral efforts elsewhere,
such as Denmarks training activities with
the Baltic states. Overall, there are now about
22 national peacekeeping training centers worldwide.
Estimates
of Global Funding for Humanitarian Emergencies,
1992-2000
Year
$ US Billion
1992
>4.2
1993
>5.2
1994
>5.7
1995
>4.6
1996
>4.4
1997
>3.9
1998
>4.5
1999
>5.2
2000
>5.0
Source:
OECD Development Assistance Committee |
Humanitarian
Response
Financing Humanitarian Assistance
National governments provide the lions share
of financing for emergency humanitarian relief,
with OECD countries providing more than 80 percent
of total global funding in recent years (see textbox).
The willingness of donor governments to provide
financial support for humanitarian emergencies
will likely remain stable through December 2002,
given their continuing high level of involvement
with the Balkans and other ongoing humanitarian
priorities. A major new crisis would likely attract
new humanitarian aid at least for a time.
The
data on funding for humanitarian emergencies provided
by various international agencies is fragmentary
and sometimes contradictory, making the accurate
assessment of global funding levels and trends
difficult. After rebounding in the late 1990s
in response to high-profile emergencies in Kosovo
and Central America, global funding for humanitarian
emergencies declined slightly in 2000 but remained
higher than during the mid-1990s. Nonetheless,
the available data suggests that international
funding for humanitarian emergencies totaled more
than $5 billion in 2000.
The
funding of UN Consolidated Appealsa mechanism
of the UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian
Affairs and the Inter-Agency Standing Committee
in Geneva to coordinate agency budget requests
for a given emergencyhas provided roughly
25 to 30 percent of overall humanitarian funding
in recent years. On average, since 1992 the Appeals
have received only 69 percent of the funds requested
(see figure 8).
Funding
through the Appeals declined 20 percent in 2000
compared with 1999, mirroring donor concerns about
the efficiency and transparency of UN agencies,
a shift toward greater bilateral management of
humanitarian resources, and reliance on NGOs.
Most donors now channel at least a quarter of
their emergency assistance through NGOs.
Funding
by donors of specific humanitarian emergencies
tends to be heavily influenced by strategic concerns,
media attention, and geographic proximity.
In
2001, the UN hopes to shift donor attention back
toward longstanding crises in Africa and Asia
that have intensified during the past year
-
In
Asia, the UN nearly doubled the size of the
Consolidated Appeal for North Korea in 2001
to $386 million, making it the largest request
for any country this year, while the level
of assistance requested for Tajikistan has
more than doubled.
Who
is Paying?
The
European Union and its member states constitute
the largest single provider of humanitarian
assistance, while the United States ranks
as the top individual donor country:
•In
1999, the EU provided emergency assistance
totaling $677 million.
•Over
the past ten years, the US government has
provided substantial financial and in-kind
food aid in response to nearly every major
humanitarian crisis and ranks first among
individual countries as a humanitarian aid
donor.
The OECD
Development
Assistance Committee
Bilateral
Emergency Assistance, 1999
Country
$US Million
US
2619
Japan
402
Sweden
271
Netherlands
268
Germany*
266
|
|
Emergency
humanitarian aid from a few non-OECD
governments has been increasing over
the past decade but still accounts
for only a small fraction of the total.
Argentina, China, South Korea, India,
Pakistan, Russia, Saudi Arabia and
the United Arab Emirates have been
the main donors in this category.
Emergency
assistance from nongovernmental sourcesincluding
wealthy individuals, corporations,
foundations, and the general publichas
also increased and now accounts for
some 10 to 15 percent of total global
funding. |
*Much
of Germanys bilateral assistance is
spent on refugees within Germany. |
Funding
trends over the past decade show a growing reluctance
on the part of donors to provide assistance for
chronic emergencies with poor prospects for resolution,
suggesting that the UN will continue to have difficulty
attracting resources for longstanding crises such
as Afghanistan, Angola, DROC, and Somalia, barring
a breakthrough on the political or military front
or a sharp escalation in the number of lives at
risk. Donors have also shown a marked preference
for funding certain categories of humanitarian
aid.
-
Spending
on water, sanitization, shelter, transport,
and logistics has declined sharply in recent
years, however, while expenditure on reintegration,
repatriation, demobilization, resettlement,
and medical programs has increased, reflecting
donors interests in funding activities
that address underlying problems that fuel
humanitarian emergencies.
Figure
8
UN Consolidated Interagency Humanitarian Assistance
Appeals, 1992-2000
Humanitarian
Response
Availability of Food Aid
According
to the most recent United States Department of
Agriculture estimates, total world grain production
(wheat, coarse grains, and milled rice) for 2000/2001
will be 1.838 billon tons, down from last years
record harvest of 1.873 billion. This quantity
is still a bumper crop, with wheat at 581 million
tons, coarse grains at 858 million, and a forecast
rice crop of 400 million tons. World oilseed
production (soybeans, cottonseed, peanut oil,
sunflower seed oil, etc.) is forecast at a record
307 million metric tons (MMt).
The
UN Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) reported
that in calendar year 1999 food aid for both humanitarian
emergencies and for chronic food deficits totaled
14.0 million metric tons (MMt)up from 8.5
MMt in 1998 but well below the peak level of 17.3
MMt in 1993. Deliveries consisted of 12.2 MMt
of grains and 1.8 MMt of other commodities (see
figure 9).
-
The
overall increase in 1999 was due to a near-record
world grain harvest in 1998/99, higher stock
levels in donor countries, low grain prices,
and higher food aid needs, particularly in
Russia and Asia.
US
grain surpluses were responsible for virtually
all of the increase in global food aid in the
late 1990s.
-
In
1999, the United States was by far the largest
contributor of total food aid, providing nearly
10 MMt, valued at more than $2.4 billion to
82 developing and transitional countries.
Although
the overall number of malnourished worldwide is
falling, the demand for total food aid is rising
because growing populations are subject to natural
disasters and civil strife, and malnutrition is
intensifying in Africa.
People
targeted for emergency food aid in countries where
the host government either denies access to organizations
or diverts some of the aid for its own needs remain
most at risk.
-
Global
grain stocks will be sufficient to handle
projected humanitarian emergencies through
2002, although tightening global grain supplies,
particularly wheat, and the possibility of
reduced US surplus grain stocks may reduce
the availability of emergency food aid somewhat.
Humanitarian
Response
The Capacities of International
Humanitarian Agencies
The
overall capacity of international relief organizations
to respond to humanitarian emergencies has improved
over time, but problems are likely to persist.
-
Over
the last decade, the capacities of UN and
other multilateral humanitarian agencies for
pre-crisis preparedness and rapid response
have been strengthened somewhat. In recent
years, humanitarian agencies and NGOs have
developed several networks and interactive
databases that will continue to improve their
abilities to provide assistance.
Many
of the major international humanitarian NGOs currently
have a consultative status with the UN, which
gives them access to UN conferences and discussions.
They also frequently serve as implementing partners
of the UN humanitarian agencies, administering
their programs or delivering UN-funded relief.
The UN has tried for several years to establish
a code of conduct for UN-affiliated NGOs but so
far has not succeeded. However, these NGOs must
still meet certain criteria, including democratic
internal processes, financial disclosure, and
adherence to the purposes and principles
of the UN Charter.
Despite
these reforms, the limits imposed by budgetary
constraints and bureaucratic competition among
the major multilateral agencies and international
NGOs will continue to limit the effective delivery
of humanitarian assistance. The Office for the
Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) lacks
executive responsibility for and budgetary control
over the major humanitarian operating agencies
in the UN system. Thus it has had difficulty
establishing a coordinating role, despite the
1997 secretariat reforms which attempted to clarify
its role in humanitarian response.
Figure
9
Total Food Aid Deliveries,1988-99
Security
of Humanitarian Workers
During
the last decade, humanitarian aid workers have
increasingly been targeted by combatants when
they operate in conflict areas where there is
no clearly recognized governmental authority and
where they must negotiate access with multiple
parties, leaving them vulnerable to political
manipulation. Instances of killing, injury and
kidnapping of aid workers, as well as looting
and blackmail, are on the rise:
World
Food Program warehouse. Angola, June 1999
-
Since
1992, 200 UN civilian staff membersincluding
three murdered by rampaging militia groups
in western West Timor in the fall of 2000have
been killed by malicious acts, the majority
of them during humanitarian operations (see
figure 10). Of these, 150 were recruited
locally and 50 were recruited internationally.
Sixty four deaths occurred in 1994 alone:
the year of the genocidal civil conflict in
Rwanda and the peak of the conflict in Bosnia
and Herzegovina. As of August 2001, only
a handful of people responsible for any of
these deaths has been brought to justice.
-
Following
a sharp increase in the early 1990s, security
incidents remain a serious threat to ICRC
operations, with an average of 120-135 per
year since 1997. Nine ICRC workers were killed
in 1996more than any other year in the
ICRCs 135-year history. In April 2001,
six more ICRC employees were shot and hacked
to death in eastern DROC by unknown assailants
while attempting to deliver medicine and assess
health needs.
Refugees
from Kosovo receive medical assistance from
the ICRC in Macedonia
Insurgent
groups have kidnapped humanitarian workers from
both international agencies and NGOs in Chechnya
and Somalia, among other places, for their money
or equipment, and local soldiers have hijacked
relief convoys in Bosnia and Herzegovina, Tajikistan,
and Liberia. Organized crime and pilferingsuch
as the stealing of vehicles and supplies in Albania,
Somalia, Liberia and elsewherepose a similarly
serious threat to humanitarian personnel and relief
efforts.
In
areas of high insurgent activity, aircraft conducting
humanitarian relief operations become deliberate
targets of attacks if insurgents suspect the flights
are being used to support the ruling regime.
Two UN relief aircraft were shot down over Angola
within eight days of each other in December 1998/January
1999 with 22 UN personnel aboard, and UN aircraft
flying similar humanitarian missions have been
fired at on other occasions in the last few years.
As humanitarian relief workers are put at increasing
risk from local governments and political authorities
and outside states provide uneven security, many
aid workers have called for greater military force
to ensure their physical security. At the same
time, increasingly wary governments and publics
have become more insistent that their military
personnel, civilian officials, and humanitarian
relief workers be provided with substantial protection,
although security has been present only sporadically.
Relief
agencies received military protection in Somalia
after the introduction of the Unified Task Force
(UNITAF), and in Haiti, Bosnia and Herzegovina,
and Sierra Leone. They currently receive some
modest protection in East Timor.
Although
UN Secretary General Annan has been committed
to strengthening the Office of the UN Security
Coordinator (UNSECOORD), relief agencies have
come to doubt whether the UN, regional organizations,
or ad hoc coalition forces will provide adequate
security for ongoing humanitarian operations.
Therefore, most humanitarian organizations have
begun to prepare themselves better to work in
hostile environments.
Shifting
International Norms
In
recent years, the balance between the legal
principle of non-interference in the internal
affairs of sovereign states and various
legal justifications for international intervention
in response to threats to international
peace and security, genocide, grave violations
of human rights and international humanitarian
law, and crimes against humanity has been
shifting slowly, if tentatively, toward
the principle of international humanitarian
intervention. This shift is vigorously
contested, however, by many non-Western
governments and citizens in the developing
world.
Movement
toward accepting a principle of international
humanitarian intervention: the Pros.
-
Common
Article Threewhich appears
in all four of the ICRCs Geneva
Conventions of 1949calls for the
humane treatment and protection of civilians
in both international and internal conflict.
With 189 States Parties, the Geneva
Conventions are among the most widely
adhered to of all international agreements.
-
Article
2 of the UN Charter enshrines the principle
of non-interference in the internal
affairs of member states. At the same
time, Articles 55 and 56 call on members
to take joint or individual action to
promote observance of human rights,
and these are being defined more broadly.
-
In
various resolutions, among them the
1991 UN General Assembly Resolution
46/182 and the 2000 Security Council
Resolution 1296, the UN has endorsed
the general obligation of states to
allow the distribution of humanitarian
assistance and the obligation of combatants
to allow unimpeded access
for humanitarian personnel to civilian
populations.
-
Although
the UN Security Council has traditionally
taken action to authorize or endorse
peacekeeping or peace-enforcement missions
for the purpose of restoring international
peace and security to a country or region,
during the past decade the Council has
increasingly cited the need to ensure
delivery of humanitarian aid as an additional
justification for such operations.
Since 1997 it has cited, inter alia,
a humanitarian justification for peace
operations in such countries as Albania,
the Central African Republic, DROC,
East Timor, Guinea-Bissau, and Yugoslavia.
-
NATO,
the Organization on Security and Cooperation
in Europe (OSCE), and the Organization
of African Unity (OAU) have recognized
egregious humanitarian and human rights
abuses in their respective regions as
legitimate targets for collective response.
-
In
recent years, several world leaders,
notably UK Prime Minister Tony Blair
and UN Secretary General Kofi Annan,
have espoused the principle of international
humanitarian intervention that would,
where necessary, override the claims
of national sovereignty and non-intervention
in internal affairs.
Continuing
Resistance to a Principle of International
Humanitarian Intervention: the Cons
A
new principle of international humanitarian
intervention has been resisted by many though
not all developing countries, which are
determined to assert their often hard-won
sovereign right to non-intervention in their
own internal affairs. They also are often
suspicious of the political or economic
motivations of some Western states and humanitarian
organizations.
Moreover,
governments that tolerate or even provoke
a given humanitarian emergency are for various
political or economic reasons often reluctant
to admit the existence of IDPs, grant asylum
to refugees from neighboring countries,
or consent to the delivery of outside assistance,
unless they can exploit the humanitarian
relief operations for political or financial
gain.
|
-
Organizations
are buying thick-skinned vehicles, taking
security awareness and defensive driving courses,
hiring security directors from among retired
Western military officers, and acquiring more
security guards.
In
the absence of adequate security, increasing numbers
of UN agencies, NGOs and the ICRC sometimes temporarily
withdraw from particularly dangerous situations.
Over the past ten years, relief workers have withdrawn
for periods from Angola, Bosnia and Herzegovina,
Burundi, Chechnya, eastern DROC, Liberia, northwest
Rwanda, Sierra Leone, and Somalia due to increased
security risks.
Figure
10
UN Civilian Personnel Casualties 1992-98
The
overall number of people in need is likely to
increase through December 2002:
-
In
five ongoing emergenciesin Afghanistan,
Burundi, Colombia, North Korea and Sudanalmost
20 million people are currently in need, and
all show signs of worsening through 2002.
Although
somewhat less likely, the number of people in
need would grow sharply if one or more of the
relatively large number of potential emergencies
should materialize, particularly in a populous
country or region such as Nigeria or India and
Pakistan.
Counteracting
these negative factors somewhat, the current three
year La Niña cycle has been winding down, and
long-range US Government forecasts suggest it
will be in a near neutral phase through the end
of 2001 and into 2002.
On
the likely international response, we judge that:
-
Within
these constraints, major donor countries will
continue to respond quickly and continue to
provide substantial amounts of humanitarian
aid in short-term emergencies resulting from
natural disasters and in severe new emergencies
caused by conflict or government repression.
Funding of long-lasting crises, including
many in Africa, will, however, continue to
fall well short of targeted needs unless they
show signs of achieving a settlement.
The
National Intelligence Council
The
National Intelligence Council (NIC) manages
the Intelligence Communitys estimative
process, incorporating the best available
expertise inside and outside the government.
It reports to the Director of Central Intelligence
in his capacity as head of the US Intelligence
Community and speaks authoritatively on
substantive issues for the Community as
a whole. |
|
|
Chairman |
John
Helgerson |
|
|
Vice
Chairman
(concurrently Acting Assistant Director
of Central Intelligence for Analysis and
Production) |
Ellen
Laipson |
|
|
Director,
Senior Review,
Production,
and Analysis |
Stuart
A. Cohen |
|
|
|
|
|
|
National
Intelligence Officers |
|
|
|
Africa |
Robert
Houdek |
|
|
At-Large |
Stuart
A. Cohen |
|
|
Conventional
Military Issues |
John
Landry |
|
|
East
Asia |
VACANT |
|
|
Economics
& Global Issues |
David
Gordon |
|
|
Europe |
Barry
F. Lowenkron |
|
|
Latin
America |
Fulton
T. Armstrong |
|
|
Near
East and South Asia |
Paul
Pillar |
|
|
Russia
and Eurasia |
George
Kolt |
|
|
Science
& Technology |
Lawrence
Gershwin |
|
|
Strategic
& Nuclear Programs |
Robert
D Walpole |
|
|
Warning |
Robert
Vickers |
|
|
|
Footnotes
[1]
In Liberia, although less than 300,000 people
are in need, persistent fighting between dissidents
and government forces in northern Liberia will
continue to spur moderate population displacement
and hinder relief agency access.
TOP |
|
|