[Senate Hearing 106-565]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
S. Hrg. 106-565
RUSSIAN INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES DIRECTED AT THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE
=======================================================================
HEARING
BEFORE THE
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS
UNITED STATES SENATE
ONE HUNDRED SIXTH CONGRESS
SECOND SESSION
__________
FEBRUARY 10, 2000
__________
Printed for the use of the Committee on Foreign Relations
Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.access.gpo.gov/congress/
senate
U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE
64-654 CC WASHINGTON : 2000
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS
JESSE HELMS, North Carolina, Chairman
RICHARD G. LUGAR, Indiana JOSEPH R. BIDEN, Jr., Delaware
CHUCK HAGEL, Nebraska PAUL S. SARBANES, Maryland
GORDON H. SMITH, Oregon CHRISTOPHER J. DODD, Connecticut
ROD GRAMS, Minnesota JOHN F. KERRY, Massachusetts
SAM BROWNBACK, Kansas RUSSELL D. FEINGOLD, Wisconsin
CRAIG THOMAS, Wyoming PAUL D. WELLSTONE, Minnesota
JOHN ASHCROFT, Missouri BARBARA BOXER, California
BILL FRIST, Tennessee ROBERT G. TORRICELLI, New Jersey
LINCOLN D. CHAFEE, Rhode Island
Stephen E. Biegun, Staff Director
Edwin K. Hall, Minority Staff Director
(ii)
?
C O N T E N T S
----------
Page
Carpenter, Hon. David G., Assistant Secretary of State for
Diplomatic Security, Department of State....................... 2
Prepared statement of........................................ 7
(iii)
RUSSIAN INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES DIRECTED AT THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE
----------
THURSDAY, FEBRUARY 10, 2000
U.S. Senate,
Committee on Foreign Relations,
Washington, DC.
The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 2:37 p.m., in
room SD-419, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Hon. Rod Grams
presiding.
Present: Senator Grams.
Senator Grams. I would like to bring this hearing to order.
Thank you very much for coming.
Mr. Carpenter, thank you for coming and testifying here
today.
Now, in just a brief opening statement, I just wanted to
say, you know, first and foremost, that we have worked closely
together during the last year to secure an Embassy Construction
and Counter-Terrorism Act to improve the security of our
diplomatic facilities abroad, and I also hope that we can
continue to work closely together now to tighten security at
the State Department itself.
I think we can all agree that given that we have a security
system that has been porous to the extent that the Russians can
rip out a piece of molding in the State Department on the very
floor that contains the Secretary of State's offices and to
replace it with a similar one that contained a bug, I think we
have got a major problem.
I do not want to imply that the Bureau of Diplomatic
Security [DS] has not tried to impose stricter security
measures. You have, but I believe that you have been fought
every step of the way by the diplomats and policymakers.
I am concerned that the State Department has become a soft
target for foreign intelligence services, because of a lack of
security consciousness in the State Department culture.
For example, controlling access at the State Department is
a contentious issue. Diplomatic Security's first attempt to
restrict access to the State Department's corridors in 1998 met
with failure.
The mandate for all visitors to be escorted at all times
was rescinded 6 days after it was issued due to complaints from
senior Department officials at the State Department.
In addition to creating the opportunities for espionage,
the lack of access control makes it difficult to determine when
the Russian listening device was installed and by whom. There
is speculation that the Russians planted the bug in the
conference room before the access control policy was reinstated
9 months later. Now, I hope we can clear up some of that
speculation as well today.
Another issue in question is the question of access to
sensitive systems by individuals who do not have appropriate
clearance.
Now, according to a report by the GAO, dozens of foreign
citizens, including British, Chinese, Pakistanis and
Ethiopians, were given access to sensitive computer systems at
the Federal Aviation Administration without undergoing security
checks. Comparable concerns have arisen regarding DOE's
Stockpile Stewardship Program.
Now, I am concerned that similar security lapses could have
occurred at the State Department. And I am particularly
disturbed that Secretary Albright, in response to my questions
on Tuesday, indicated that she believed all foreign citizens
who work at the State Department, including all contractors,
have to go through background checks.
Now, you and I know that that is not the case. Commercial
contractors are given unsupervised access during regular
business hours and do not all have security clearances. In
fact, clearances are not required for contractors to perform
sensitive computer hardware or software work in the building.
And I am sure you share my concerns that DS is not
necessarily informed of the type and location of work that is
being done by these contractors.
Now, in addition to the top-to-bottom security review that
you are doing right now for the Secretary, I want to make sure
that she is being adequately briefed in this area, because this
should be attended to, and it should be attended to at the
highest levels. We cannot safeguard our national interests, if
we cannot safeguard our Nation's secrets.
So, again, I want to thank you very much, Mr. Carpenter,
for coming and your willingness to testify today. So if you
have an opening statement, I would like to take the opportunity
to hear it.
STATEMENT OF HON. DAVID G. CARPENTER, ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF
STATE FOR DIPLOMATIC SECURITY, DEPARTMENT OF STATE
Mr. Carpenter. I do, Mr. Chairman. And I would like to
thank you for the opportunity to appear before this committee
today and for the committee's past and continuing interest in
and support for the counterintelligence and security programs
at the Department of State.
As you no doubt understand, the Department's operational
counterintelligence responsibilities are vested within the
Bureau of Diplomatic Security.
The responsibility for protecting the Department of State
facilities in the United States and the facilities and
personnel of nearly all U.S. Government agencies assigned
abroad also is assigned to our Bureau.
We have a number of programs designed to counter an array
of security challenges presented by elements ranging from
common criminals to terrorists and spies.
In the context of counterintelligence, these programs
include safeguarding classified and national security
information, security investigations, security awareness
programs, and the conduct and coordination of counter-espionage
and counterintelligence investigations.
We closely coordinate all of our security and
counterintelligence activities with our colleagues within the
Department and the law enforcement and intelligence
communities.
On August 11, 1998, 4 days after the bombings of our
Embassies in Africa, my recess appointment was confirmed by the
U.S. Senate. Necessarily, my immediate focus and nearly all of
my attention was on the bombings and our efforts to prevent
further similar tragedies.
Indeed, in those first few months following the bombings,
most of the Bureau's resources were focused in one way or
another on terrorism matters.
As the weeks and months progressed and the press of daily
business resumed its normal, albeit all consuming, course,
requiring DS resources for other responsibilities such as
dignitary protection, criminal investigations, physical
security, technical security, and, yes, counterintelligence, I
began to see firsthand just how superb the Bureau's employees
perform.
I also saw firsthand just how much the State Department's
budget had been cut and, to my regret, how hard those budget
and personnel cuts had hit Diplomatic Security and its ability
to provide the type of protection I believe to be required for
the Department's facilities and employees.
I found that DS had people in all areas of its
responsibilities who, in my experience, were second to none in
other similar agencies who had--but who had precious little
support in terms of tools to do their jobs. That is to say, to
use a sports analogy, we had no bench strength.
Bureau employees pointed out to me that, following the fall
of the Soviet Union, DS was authorized to hire only a handful
of agents, engineers, and Civil Service security personnel.
The budget cuts were so severe that DS imposed a 5-percent
reduction in the worldwide guard program.
I was told that a number of positions had been abolished,
and rules and regulations concerning security were loosened to
the point that holding employees accountable for serious
security issues became difficult at best.
I was told that during those years, budget and personnel
cuts had essentially permitted the Bureau to conduct properly
only the most essential services.
We had reached the point that if there were a major peace
conference in the U.S. requiring DS to conduct large-scale
protection, numerous operations, including counterintelligence,
would be virtually shut down to support it. In some respects,
this type of scenario still continues to this day.
Among the offices affected during the period of cuts was
our Office of Counterintelligence. The number of positions was
reduced from 41 to 26. The funding for the program was cut from
$225,000 to $65,000.
Our technical countermeasures programs suffered a similar
fate, and limited funding forced the Bureau to decide to fund
other programs rather than to invest in upgrading its
countermeasures equipment within main State.
In essence, the Department appeared to have been reacting
to both fiscal constraints and a general sense after the fall
of communism that the world was a better place and that the
cold war had ended.
I was not with the Department during those years, but I
believe that the Bureau's priorities reflected this thinking.
Since 1997, the Bureau's hiring has picked up considerably.
And while it appeared that we were making strides in restaffing
DS to the point of making it ready to meet its challenges, the
bombings occurred in 1998. Nearly all of the new positions
acquired since that time have been directed at overseas
staffing and with antiterrorism in mind.
Other programs such as counterintelligence, dignitary
protection and domestic facility security continue to be
largely understaffed.
But I want to make it clear that the President and the
Secretary's budget submission before you is moving to correct
this inadequacy.
I have given you a very general view of where DS has been
in terms of resources over the past few years. And with that as
a general backdrop, I will take a few minutes to discuss the
reason for being here today, the Russian bugging of the
seventh-floor conference room.
Major security incidents generally are not spontaneous.
They take planning. Planning involves time, which perpetrators
use to study vulnerabilities, security defenses, and to learn
anything that will help them in their efforts.
This is true of common burglars who case a home, terrorists
who blow up buildings, kidnappers who abduct people, and
intelligence officers who operate against the U.S. Government.
I have told you of how, as a newcomer to the Department, I
quickly learned that our security programs had been weakened in
the early post-cold-war years. It takes very little imagination
for one to surmise that the Russian intelligence service took
advantage of our posture.
How relaxed were we? Let me first talk about the access to
the Department.
In 1982, the Department established a required escort
policy for 31 countries.
As the cold war was won, that number was whittled down so
that in 1992, 10 years later, the remaining three countries
were taken off the list.
One of my first comments to my senior staff after assuming
my Assistant Secretary's duties was to question this lack of an
escort policy. During my Secret Service career, I had been in
many buildings containing sensitive information and had never
seen one without some reasonable escort policy for non-cleared
visitors.
In keeping with Secretary Albright's instructions to me to
thoroughly review and improve where necessary all aspects of
the Department's security program, I had my senior staff give
me an overview of this escort policy as well as their
perception of the general attitude toward security at State.
Their comments confirmed my initial uneasiness about the
lack of an effective escort policy and solidified my resolve
that we needed to implement more stringent escort procedures.
On November 17, 1998, we issued a new policy requiring for
the first time in the history of the Department of State that
all visitors, with the exception of U.S. Government agency
personnel with photo identification, be escorted at all times
when in the Department of State.
Literally, within minutes of the policy's announcement, my
office received word that there was concern that the policy had
not been vetted or cleared properly throughout the Department.
We rescinded the policy in order to do the necessary spade
work.
Completely separate from the escort issue, but running
relatively parallel to the escort policy review, our
counterintelligence division was engaged in a sensitive and
classified effort, which gave us an additional concern
regarding access to the Department by uncleared persons--
uncleared and unescorted persons.
With this additional information in hand, we decided to
renew our efforts to implement the escort policy.
Our counterintelligence agents briefed all the executive
directors of the various Department Bureaus and the
Undersecretary for Management, and there was universal
agreement that a required escort policy would have to be
established.
On August 6, 1999, the escort policy was implemented. Do we
wish that it had been implemented earlier? Certainly. But I
cannot undo the problems caused by this past mistake. We can
only move forward and not make similar errors in the future.
I have attached to this statement a copy of the
Department's current policy together with related information.
As you know, several months ago, the FBI detected Russian
Intelligence Officer Stanislav Gusev on the street near the
State Department. His behavior appeared unusual, and a plan was
implemented to surveil him.
It was noted that the Russian visited the immediate
vicinity of the State Department twice or more per week, walked
the streets, and fussed about in his car.
Sensitive technical countermeasures later revealed the
presence of a listening device located in the Oceans and
International Environmental Scientific Affairs', OES,
conference room.
Further investigation revealed that this was, indeed, a
Russian intelligence operation directed against the Department.
Confirmation in hand, agents of DS and the FBI arrested Gusev
on December 8, 1999. He was subsequently asked to leave the
country.
I have attached to this statement an unclassified
chronology of the case for your use. If the committee needs the
specific dates showing the developments in this case, we can
give you the classified chronology.
The FBI, assisted by DS, is leading the investigation into
how the device was placed in the OES conference room, which we
believe was picked as a target of opportunity.
Additionally, we are in the process of jointly conducting a
damage assessment.
In response to many questions we have had regarding the
device, I must refer you to the FBI regarding the
sophistication of the device itself, but I can tell you that it
was a very cleverly installed and concealed device.
Also, while I would be pleased to answer any questions that
the committee may have concerning the investigation leading up
to the discovery of the device and subsequent arrest of Mr.
Gusev, I must refer any questions concerning the continuing
aspects of this case to the FBI.
The escort policy that I have referred to is now in place
and, though not perfect, it has improved our access procedures.
The policy does require more effort on the part of the
Department's non-security personnel but, to date, we have had
excellent cooperation in its implementation.
We are also looking to improve our security in other
respects and are currently talking in-house about what
resources we would need if we are to upgrade the Department's
access control systems and to install enhanced access control
devices in the most sensitive areas of the Department.
We all need to beef up our counterintelligence division.
That division is responsible for protecting the Department's
and tenant agencies' most sensitive information and
communications at over 260 facilities in the United States and
abroad.
Unfortunately, it is still underfunded. This year's
operational budget is $113,000, barely half of what it was at
its peak.
Further, the division remains woefully understaffed; and
far too often I have to task them with other duties, usually
dignitary protection, totally unrelated to their
counterintelligence mission. This cannot continue.
Again, I must state that the current budget submission is a
welcome improvement to that problem.
We have learned from construction of the new embassy in
Moscow, which is due to open soon, how resource intensive it is
for our counterintelligence efforts to be successful in the
most aggressive environments.
Now, we have similar projects planned for other countries
who are known to have ongoing, aggressive programs aimed at
gaining intelligence information via technical or human means.
We simply must find a way to give that division the
resources it needs to do its job. And we must find a way of
doing this without taking resources from our domestic life
safety programs.
These programs are also underfunded and understaffed, and
we cannot take risks with the lives of traveling dignitaries or
with the lives of my employees who are sworn to protect them.
In other words, we must continue building the missing bench
strength that I referred to earlier for counterintelligence,
and other important programs, a process we have already begun
in this year's budget.
Finally, let me say a few words about inter-agency
cooperation. While the down side of this affair is obviously in
terms of potential compromises of information, there are a
couple of positives that came out of it.
This clearly was a U.S. counterintelligence success story,
and the Secretary has acknowledged the superb investigative
work of the FBI throughout this operation.
In her view, the successful resolution of this case is a
classic example of what can be accomplished when law
enforcement agencies cooperate with each other.
I want to add my own praise for the FBI's work in this
matter and want to assure the committee that the close
cooperation in this case will continue and that Neil Gallagher,
Assistant Director for National Security Division, and others
at the FBI continue to be in frequent touch with me on this and
other matters.
I am pleased to report to you that the sort of close
cooperation exhibited in this case is reflective of our
cooperation on other sensitive investigative matters.
A second benefit of this case, coming on the heels of other
widely publicized espionage cases, is that it puts to rest in
the Department the notion that since the cold war is over, we
can let down our guard against espionage.
While most acknowledge that so-called economic espionage
flourishes, this case is proof positive that the more
traditional targets are still ripe and of interest to foreign
intelligence services.
I am certain that my colleagues in the intelligence
community would agree that the boldness of this operation
illustrates that the technical threat faced here in the United
States is real and cannot be ignored.
Given the resources, we intend to reinvigorate our own
counterintelligence awareness programs and urge the rest of the
government to follow suit.
In summation, I know that we have much work to do in the
counterintelligence and security arenas.
The major challenges for us are twofold. First, we must
make the case for, obtain, and manage additional resources to
improve our counterintelligence program across the board.
The President and the Secretary have taken a positive step
in this direction with the budget that is currently before you.
Second, once we obtain the necessary resources and put them
in place, we have to guard vigilantly against reallocating them
to other areas.
DS must have, obtain and retain sufficient resources for
its broad range of security programs, and break the cycle of
its responding to the most recent crisis at the expense of
other programs.
Mr. Chairman, thank you for your interest. And I would be
happy to answer any questions you or the committee may have.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Carpenter follows:]
Prepared Statement of Hon. David G. Carpenter
introduction
Mr. Chairman and Members of the Committee:
I would like to thank you for the opportunity to appear before the
committee today and for the committee's past and continuing interest in
and support for the counterintelligence and security programs of the
Department of State. As you no doubt understand, the Department's
operational counterintelligence responsibilities are vested within the
Bureau of Diplomatic Security. The responsibility for protecting
Department of State facilities in the U.S. and the facilities and
personnel of nearly all U.S. Government agencies assigned abroad also
is assigned to our Bureau. We have a number of programs designed to
counter an array of security challenges presented by elements ranging
from common criminals to terrorists and spies. In the context of
counterintelligence, these programs include safeguarding classified and
national security information, security investigations, security
awareness programs and the conduct and coordination of counterespionage
and counterintelligence investigations. We closely coordinate all of
our security and counterintelligence activities with our colleagues
within the Department and the law enforcement and intelligence
communities.
the state of ds
On August 11, 1998, four days after the bombings of our embassies
in Africa, my recess appointment was confirmed by the U.S. Senate.
Necessarily, my immediate focus and nearly all of my attention was on
the bombings and our efforts to prevent further similar tragedies.
Indeed, in those first few months following the bombings, most of the
Bureau's resources were focused in one way or another on terrorism
matters. As the weeks and months progressed and the press of daily
business resumed its normal, albeit all consuming, course requiring DS
resources for other responsibilities such as dignitary protection,
criminal investigations, physical security, technical security, and,
yes, counterintelligence, I began to see first hand just how superb the
Bureau's employees perform. I also saw first hand just how much the
State Department's budget had been cut and, to my regret, how hard
those budget and personnel cuts had hit DS and its ability to provide
the type of protection I believe to be required for the Department's
facilities and employees. I found that DS had people in all areas of
its responsibilities who, in my experience, were second to none in
other similar agencies but who had precious little support in terms of
tools to do their jobs. That is to say, to use a sports analogy, we had
no bench strength. Bureau employees pointed out to me that, following
the fall of the Soviet Union, DS was authorized to hire only a handful
of agents, engineers, and civil service security personnel. The budget
cuts were so severe that DS imposed a 5% reduction in the worldwide
guard program. I was told that a number of positions had been
abolished, and rules and regulations concerning security were loosened
to the point that holding employees accountable for serious security
issues became difficult at best. I was told that during those years,
budget and personnel cuts had essentially permitted the Bureau to
conduct properly only the most essential services. We had reached the
point that if there were a major peace conference in the U.S.,
requiring DS to conduct large-scale protection, numerous operations,
including counterintelligence, would be virtually shut down to support
it. In some respects, this type of scenario still continues to this
day.
Among the offices affected during that period of cuts was our
Office of Counterintelligence. The number of positions was reduced from
41 to 26, and funding for the program was cut from $225,000 to $65,000.
Our technical countermeasures programs suffered a similar fate and
limited funding forced the Bureau to decide to fund other programs
rather than to invest in upgrading its countermeasures equipment within
Main State. In essence, the Department appeared to have been reacting
to both fiscal constraints and a general sense after the fall of
communism that the world was a better place and that the ``cold war had
ended.'' I was not with the Department during those years, but I
believe that the Bureau's priorities reflected this thinking.
Since 1997, the Bureau's hiring has picked up considerably, and
while it appeared that we were making strides in restaffing DS to the
point of making it ready to meet its challenges, the bombings occurred
in 1998. Nearly all of the new positions acquired since that time have
been directed at overseas staffing and with antiterrorism in mind.
Other programs such as counterintelligence, dignitary protection, and
domestic facility security continue to be largely understaffed and
underfunded.
the ``bugging'' of a conference room
I've given you a very general view of where DS has been in terms of
resources over the past few years and with that as a general backdrop,
I'll take a few minutes to discuss the reason for my being here today--
the Russian ``bugging'' of the 7th floor conference room.
Major security incidents generally are not spontaneous--they take
planning. Planning involves time, time which the perpetrators use to
study vulnerabilities, security defenses, and to learn anything that
will help them in their efforts. This is true of common burglars who
``case'' a home, terrorists who blow up buildings, kidnappers who
abduct people, and intelligence officers who operate against the U.S.
Government. I've told you of how, as a newcomer to the Department, I
quickly learned that our security programs had been weakened in the
early post cold war years. It takes very little imagination for one to
surmise that the Russian intelligence service took advantage of our
posture.
How relaxed were we? Let me first talk about access to the
Department. In 1982 the Department established a required escort policy
for 31 countries. As the Cold War was won, that number was whittled
down so that in 1992 the remaining three countries were taken off the
list. One of my first comments to my senior staff after assuming
Assistant Secretary duties was to question this lack of an escort
policy. During my Secret Service career, I had been in many buildings
containing sensitive information and had never seen one without some
reasonable escort policy for non-cleared visitors. In keeping with
Secretary Albright's instruction to me to thoroughly review and
improve, where necessary, all aspects of the Department's security
program, I had my senior staff give me an overview of the escort policy
as well as their perception of the general attitude towards security in
State. Their comments confirmed my initial uneasiness about the lack of
an effective escort policy and solidified my resolve that we needed to
implement more stringent escort procedures. On November 17, 1998, we
issued a new policy requiring for the first time in the history of the
Department of State that all visitors, with the exception of U.S.
Government agency personnel with photo identification, be escorted at
all times. Literally within minutes of the policy's announcement, my
office received word that there was concern that the policy had not
been vetted or cleared properly through the Department. We rescinded
the policy in order to do the necessary spade work.
Completely separate from the escort issue, but running relatively
parallel to the escort policy review, our counterintelligence division
was engaged in a sensitive and classified effort which gave us
additional concern regarding access to the Department by uncleared
persons. With this additional information in hand, we decided to renew
our efforts to implement an escort policy. Our counterintelligence
agents briefed all of the executive directors of the various Department
Bureaus and the Undersecretary for Management, and there was universal
agreement that a required escort policy would have to be established.
On August 6, 1999, the escort policy was implemented. Do we wish that
it had been implemented earlier? Certainly, but we can't undo the
problems caused by past mistakes. We can only move forward and not make
similar errors in the future. I have attached, to this statement a copy
of the Department's current policy together with related information.
As you know, several months ago, the FBI detected Russian
Intelligence Officer Stanislav Gusev on the street near the State
Department. His behavior appeared unusual, and a plan was implemented
to surveil him. It was noted that the Russian visited the immediate
vicinity of the State Department twice or more per week, walked the
streets, and fussed about in his car. Sensitive technical
countermeasures later revealed the presence of a listening device
located in the Oceans and International Environmental Scientific
Affairs' (OES) conference room. Further investigation revealed that
this was indeed a Russian intelligence operation directed against the
Department. Confirmation in hand, agents of DS and the FBI arrested
Gusev on December 8, 1999, and he was subsequently asked to leave the
country. I have attached to this statement an unclassified chronology
of the case for your use. If the committee needs the specific dates
showing the developments in the case, we can give you the classified
chronology.
The FBI, assisted by DS, is leading the investigation into how the
device was placed in the OES conference room, which we believe was
picked as a target of opportunity. Additionally, we are in the process
of jointly conducting a damage assessment. In response to the many
questions we've had regarding the device, I must refer you to the FBI
regarding the sophistication of the device itself, but I can tell you
that it was very cleverly installed and concealed. Also, while I'd be
pleased to answer any questions that the committee may have concerning
the investigation leading up to the discovery of the device and
subsequent arrest of Mr. Gusev, I must refer any questions concerning
the continuing aspects of the case to the FBI.
the future--enhanced vigilance
The escort policy that I've referred to is now in place, and,
though not perfect, it has improved our access control procedures. The
policy does require more effort on the part of the Department's non-
security personnel, but, to date, we've had excellent cooperation in
its implementation. We are also looking to improve our security in
other respects, and are currently talking in-house about what resources
we would need if we are to upgrade the Department's access control
systems and to install enhanced access control devices in the most
sensitive areas of the Department.
We also need to beef up our counterintelligence division. That
division is responsible for protecting the Department's and tenant
agencies' most sensitive information and communications at over 260
facilities in the United States and abroad. Unfortunately, it is still
underfunded. This year's operational budget is $113,000, barely half of
what it was at its peak. Further, the division remains woefully
understaffed, and far too often I have to task them with other duties--
usually dignitary protection--totally unrelated to their
counterintelligence mission. This cannot continue. We have learned from
construction of the new embassy in Moscow, which is due to open soon,
how resource intensive it is for our counterintelligence efforts to be
successful in the most aggressive environments. Now we have similar
projects either planned for or started in other countries with ongoing,
aggressive efforts to steal information via technical or human means.
We simply must find a way to give that division the resources it needs
to do its job. And we must find a way of doing this without taking
resources from our domestic life safety programs. Those programs are
also underfunded and understaffed, and we cannot take risks with the
lives of travelling dignitaries nor with the lives of my employees who
are sworn to protect them. In other words, we must continue to build
the missing bench strength that I referred to earlier for
counterintelligence and our other important programs, a process we have
already begun in this year's budget.
Finally, let me just say a few words about inter-agency
cooperation. While the down side of this affair is obvious in terms of
potential compromise of information, there were a couple of positives
coming out of it. This clearly was a U.S. counterintelligence success
story, and the Secretary has acknowledged the superb investigative work
of the FBI throughout this operation. In her view, the successful
resolution of this case is a classic example of what can be
accomplished when law enforcement agencies cooperate with each other. I
want to add my own praise for the FBI's work in this matter and want to
assure the committee that the close cooperation in this case will
continue and that Neil Gallagher, Assistant Director of the National
Security Division, and others at the FBI continue to be in frequent
touch with me on this and other matters. I am pleased to report to you
that the sort of close cooperation exhibited in this case is reflective
of our cooperation on other, sensitive investigative matters.
A secondary benefit is that this case, coming on the heels of other
widely publicized espionage cases, puts to rest in the Department the
notion that since the Cold War is over we can let down our guard
against espionage. While most acknowledge that so-called economic
espionage flourishes, this case is proof positive that the more
traditional targets are still ripe and of interest to foreign
intelligence services. I'm certain that my colleagues in the
intelligence community would agree that the boldness of this operation
illustrates that the technical threat faced here in the United States
is real and cannot be ignored. Given the resources, we intend to
reinvigorate our own counterintelligence awareness programs and urge
the rest of the government to follow suit.
In summation, we know that we have much work to do in the
counterintelligence and security arenas. The major challenge for us is
twofold: First, we must make the case for, obtain, and manage
additional resources to improve our counterintelligence program across
the board. Second, once we obtain the necessary resources and put them
in place, we have to guard vigilantly against reallocating them to
other areas. In other words, DS must obtain and retain sufficient
resources for its broad range of security programs and break the cycle
of its responding to the most recent crisis at the expense of its other
programs.
Mr. Chairman, thank you for your interest. I'd be happy to answer
any questions you or the committee may have.
[Attachments]
[UNCLASSIFIED]
Russian ``Bugging'' of State Department Case Chronology
Gusev arrives Washington, D.C. March 1999.
The FBI informed the Department's Bureau of Diplomatic
Security of concern that Gusev had been making regular and
suspicious appearances in the vicinity of the US State
Department.
After observing the Russian during the summer, specifically
his activities in terms of parking and positioning of his car,
peculiarities with respect to his walking patterns, and his
general behavior while in the vicinity of the Department,
agreement was reached that he may have been conducting some
sort of technical operation.
Investigators eventually determined that he was manipulating
some type of technical device in his shirt pocket.
Subsequently, DS and FBI agents met and planned a course of
action which included a survey of the Department to ascertain
possible target offices of any technical attack against the
building.
Eventually, DS and FBI technical operations located a
signal, which apparently was transmitting from a conference
room on the 7th floor in the Bureau of Oceans, Environment, and
Science and Technology.
On December 8, the Russian Intelligence Officer, Stanislav
Gusev, was arrested while in the act of receiving classified US
Government information transmitted by the device implanted in
the conference room. He was subsequently released to the
Russian Embassy and expelled from the U.S.
Investigation continues into other aspects of this case,
including how the device was implanted. Our security officials
are also conducting a damage assessment as to what, if any,
classified or sensitive information may have been lost.
To date, approximately 300 people have been interviewed by
DS and the FBI. There are a number of investigative leads which
are being pursued.
______
Escort Policy Materials
1. Department Notice dated November 17, 1998, New Visitor Escort
Requirements
2. Department Notice dated August 6, 1999, New Visitor Escort
Requirements
3. Notice to the Press, dated November 18, 1999, Modifications to
State Department Access Policy
4. Two 1992 Memoranda Regarding Countries on Required Escourt List
U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE
Department Notice
All Employees: State AID USIA ACDA
November 17, 1998
Office of Origin: DS/CIS/DO
new visitor escort requirements
The Bureau of Diplomatic Security (DS), with the approval of the
Under Secretary of Management, is adopting new access control policies
for persons visiting the Department of State (Main State) and other DOS
facilities at which classified information is processed or stored. All
visitors, with the exception of active U.S. Government (USG) agency
personnel who display proper photo identification, shall be escorted at
all times. USG employees shall continue to be telephonically cleared
into facilities prior to admittance. This change will not affect DOS
facilities that have more stringent visitor escort policies. The
National Foreign Affairs Training Center is also exempt. This policy
shall take effect on November 23, 1998.
Background
Many employees have expressed security concerns following the
recent bombings in Africa and the continued threat of both
international and domestic terrorism. Additionally, within the past
twelve months there have been at least two serious security incidents
within the Department. One involved the Secretary's suite and resulted
in extensive media coverage. These incidents resulted in the
unprecedented Town Meeting hosted by Ambassador Thomas Pickering, Under
Secretary Bonnie Cohen and senior DS representatives. The message was
clear. We must better protect our employees and the sensitive
information entrusted to the Department.
Surveys were conducted at other USG agencies handling sensitive and
classified materials here in the United States and the Ministries of
other countries. Based on these surveys and the requirement to better
protect our employees and information, the Department has decided to
adopt an escort policy for non-USG employee visitors to DOS facilities.
Other physical security enhancements will soon be implemented at Main
State.
Who Can Escort?
Escorts must be DOS or contract employees who possess a security
clearance. Personnel who have been issued one of the following
permanent DOS building passes may escort:
I. A blue border.
2. A gray border with a red diagonal stripe.
3. A red border with a red diagonal stripe.
Visitor Procedures:
Visitors shall identify themselves to the receptionist or Uniformed
Protection Officer (UPO) and provide approved photo identification.
They shall identify the person or office they wish to visit. The
receptionist or UPO will telephonically notify the person/office to
inform them of the visitor's identity. When authorized access by a
cleared DOS or contract employee, the visitor shall be signed in.
Visitors producing current USG employee identification will be
issued a visitor pass and authorized access without escort. Access
procedures for retired DOS employees are unchanged. Retirees from other
USG agencies must be escorted.
Non-USG visitors will be issued a pass that requires an escort.
These visitors shall await the arrival of an authorized escort at which
time the visitor will be allowed to enter the facility.
Pre-Admittance Authorization:
Employees/contractors having escort authority may obtain a Pre-
Admittance Authorization Form (DS-1867) from the C Street entrance
receptionist. The completed form should be returned to the
receptionist. When the visitor arrives, the receptionist will notify
the receiving office of the arrival and request an escort for non-USG
visitors. USG employees shall be granted access.
Escort Responsibilities:
Escorts shall report to the receptionist or UPO and identify
themselves. Escorts are responsible for the visitor at all times and at
no time shall the visitor be left alone or unescorted. Escorts shall
ensure the visitor properly wears the visitor pass at all times.
Upon completion of the visit, the office shall provide an escort to
accompany the visitor out of the facility or to the next location of
business. The succeeding office then becomes responsible for visitor
escort. The office at the site of the visitors final appointment is
responsible for escorting the visitor to the facility exit and that the
visitors pass is turned into the receptionist or UPO.
Construction or repair personnel must also follow the same
procedures as outlined for visitors. At Main State, all construction
and repair personnel shall enter at the Service Entrance. Remember that
these persons are NOT cleared and MUST be escorted at alltimes.
Cleaning Personnel:
There is no change to the policies of cleaning personnel access.
Employees are again reminded, with few exceptions, these persons do not
have a security clearance and must be escorted at all times while in
office space.
Conclusion:
The Department understands that some inconvenience may arise due to
these new procedures. However, based on the surveys conducted, we
believe the inconvenience will be minimal. The responsibilities to
provide a safe environment for our employees and guests and to
safeguard sensitive information outweigh the inconvenience. These
escort procedures are more consistent with the policies long in place
at other Intelligence Community facilities and many other federal
agencies.
This notice supercedes any conflict between this publication and
the Building Pass Identification Card Handbook. Necessary FAM changes
shall be made to conform to these new policies. Any questions should be
directed to the DS Special Events Section. Your cooperation in making
this important program successful is greatly appreciated.
Escorts may usher no more than ten visitors at a time. Additional
escorts shall be provided by the sponsoring office for groups exceeding
ten. Large group access should be coordinated with the Special Events
Section of the DS Office of Domestic Operations, Security Support
Division at 647-5925 or 5305.
VIP Visitors:
There is no change to the current policy for VIP visitors. VIP
visitors are defined as Cabinet level or foreign equivalents and
Ambassadors. Other exceptions are considered on a case by case basis.
Escorts shall normally meet the VIP at the C Street Diplomatic
Entrance. VIP's are not issued a visitor pass and shall be provided
with a courtesy escort at all times by the office to be visited. VIP
escorts are required to wear their DOS building pass and a DS
authorized lapel pin that signifies they are escorting a VIP. All VIP
requests must be coordinated through the DS/SSD Special Events Section
as soon as it is known the visit is to occur. DS lapel pins may be
obtained from the Special Events Section.
American and Foreign Press:
There is no change to the current policy. However, employees are
reminded that neither foreign nor domestic press representatives have
unrestricted access to the Department. Press representatives are
restricted to the press office and briefing room, the public lobbies,
cafeteria and basement garage. They are required to have scheduled
appointments and must be escorted in order to be in any other part of
the building. If a press representative arrives at an office uninvited
or without escort, employees should advise DS/SSD Uniformed Branch at
647-0099 and the PA Office of Press Relations (PA/PR) at 647-2492.
Delivery Personnel:
Delivery personnel must follow the same procedures as outlined for
visitors and shall be escorted at all times. At Main State, all
deliveries shall be made at either the Service Entrance or the Loading
Dock located on the 21st Street side of the building.
______
U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE
Department Notice
All Employees: State AID USIA ACDA
August 6, 1999
Office of Origin: DS/CIS/DO
access control for main state
The Department is Implementing upgraded access control procedures
for Main State. This policy, in concert with physical security
enhancements, will result in a safer and more secure facility.
Beginning August 23, 1999, all visitors to Main State shall require
escort at all times. The only exception to this policy are current U.S.
Government personnel and DOS retirees who display proper photo
identification.
Who Can Authorize Visitor Access/Escort?
DOS or contract employees who possess a security clearance
and who have a permanent DOS building pass with either a blue
border or a gray border with a red diagonal stripe can
authorize visitor access and provide escort. Red border
building passes (no security clearance) with the red diagonal
stripe are no longer authorized to sign-in or escort visitors.
Visitor Procedures
Visitors will identify themselves to the receptionist or
Uniformed Protection Officer (UPO), provide photo
identification, and identify the person or office they wish to
visit. The receptionist or UPO will notify the person/office to
inform them of the visitor's identity. Once authorized access
by a cleared DOS or contract employee, the visitor shall be
signed in and issued a visitor building pass.
Visitors displaying current USG identification and retired
DOS employees will be issued a visitor pass and allowed
unescorted access. Retirees from other USG agencies may use
their official retirement credential for identification, but
will require escort.
Visitor pre-admittance authorization forms (DS-1867) may be
completed in advance and are available from the C Street
entrance receptionist.
Escort Responsibilities
Escort personnel are responsible for meeting visitors and
ensuring visitors have been issued the ``Escort Required''
building pass. Cleared escorts are also responsible to ensure
that visitor(s) are under escort at all times and are granted
access to authorized areas only while in the building.
Escorts will identify themselves to the receptionist or UPO
who shall identify the visitor(s). If a visitor is escorted to
a second office, the succeeding office is then responsible for
visitor escort. The office of the visitor's final appointment
is responsible for escorting the visitor to the exit and
returning the visitor's pass to the UPO.
Escorts may accompany no more than 10 visitors at a time.
Additional escorts are required for groups exceeding 10. Large
group access should be coordinated with DS' Office of Domestic
Operations (DS/CIS/DO) at 647-5925 or 647-5305.
Special Events & VIPs
Escort requirements for conferences and special events,
members of Congress, the Cabinet, their foreign equivalents,
ambassadors, and other VIP visitors remain unchanged. All
visitors are required to undergo security screening unless
exempted by DS/CIS/DO.
Members of the Press
There is no change to the current policy. Employees are
reminded that press representatives are restricted to the
second floor press office and briefing rooms. They must have an
appointment for access to all areas except for the cafeteria,
post office, banks, concessionaires, barbershop, dry cleaners
and the Foreign Affairs Recreation Association office and
basement garage. If a press representative arrives, at an
office uninvited, employees should advise the PA Office of
Press Relations at 647-2492 and DS/CIS/DO at 647-0099.
Miscellaneous Visitors
Vendors, delivery, construction, and repair personnel
require escort. Custodial personnel require escort while inside
office space. Employees are reminded that with few exceptions,
these personnel ARE NOT CLEARED.
If you have any questions on access control, contact DS/CIS/
DO at (202) 647-5925 or 647-5305.
______
U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE
Office of the Spokesman
[For Immediate Release--November 18, 1999]
Notice To The Press
modifications to state department access policy
On Monday, December 6, 1999 the State Department's Bureau of
Diplomatic Security will institute the following access policy for
members of the press.
Press Facilities
Press representatives who do not/not have a State Department
building pass:
8 a.m.-4 p.m. Monday through Friday, except holidays--Press
are cleared through security at the 23rd Street lobby.
All other times--Press are cleared through security at the C Street
entrance and admitted by a Uniformed Protective Officer via the west
Mezzanine staircase.
Press will have unescoried access to
the Office of Press Relations (room 2109),
the Press Briefing Room (room 2118),
the Correspondents Room (room 2310), and
the Mezzanine balcony (east and west sides).
Access to any other area of the building will be granted only when
escorted by a State Department employee.
Press representatives with a valid building pass:
7 a.m.-7 p.m. Monday through Friday, except holidays--Press
may enter or exit through a turnstile at any entrance. Press
building pass holders have access to facilities on the second
floor or below (cafeteria, newsstand, barber shop, post office,
etc.) without escort by swiping their building pass through
card readers installed on doors leading to those areas. As is
the case under current policy, all journalists and technicians
who have appointments with Department officials must be
escorted by someone from that office to and from the meeting.
All other times: Building pass holders may enter or exit
through the turnstile on the west Mezzanine staircase.
Press Events
The pickup point for press representatives participating in media
events (photo opportunities, press availabilities, etc.) will be as
follows:
8 a.m.-4 p.m., Monday through Friday, except holidays--Pick-
up point will be the 23rd Street lobby.
All other times--Pick-up point will be the C Street lobby.
The collection point for media events will always be specified in
the State recorded public schedule, available by telephoning (202) 647-
2497.
State Department Building Pass
For details on eligibility and procedures for obtaining a State
Department Building Pass, please call Press Officer David Denny, Office
of Press Relations, (202) 647-2492.
______
United States Department of State
bureau of diplomatic security--uniformed protection branch
Number: C92-o4
Effective Date: April 3, 1992
Distribution: Appropriate Posts
Originating Unit: DS/PRD/DF
Expiration Date: May 3, 1992
Circular
Subject: escort of bulgarian diplomats no longer required
Effective immediately Bulgarian Diplomats no longer require an
escort while in DOS facilities.
They will be processed the same as any other visitor. This leaves
two countries, the Soviet Union and Romania, on the required escort
list.
Donald E. Blake, COR
______
United States Department of State
bureau of diplomatic security--uniformed protection branch
Number: C92-19
Effective Date: June 24, 1992
Distribution: Appropriate Posts
Originating Unit: DS/PRD/DF
Expiration Date: June 19, 1993
Circular
Subject: escort of russian and romanian diplomats no longer needed
Effective immediately Russian and Romanian Diplomats no longer
require an escort while in DOS Facilities.
They will processed the same as any other visitor. This leaves no
countries on the required escort list.
Donald E. Blake, COR
Senator Grams. Mr. Carpenter, thank you very much for your
testimony and, again, thank you for your willingness to appear
before the committee and take questions.
Just some background: As we know, the United States has a
long history of being the target of a very aggressive Soviet
and, subsequently, Russian electronic surveillance program.
That happened during the cold war and--and then we even
discovered a bug in our Ambassador's office during the cold war
in Moscow that was concealed in a wooden replica of the Great
Seal of the United States.
And we now know that Soviet intelligence had a remote
control radio operating bugging device installed in the seat of
a chair in the Senate Foreign Relations Committee meeting room
in 1969, which operated for at least 4 years.
We even are aware of another instance when the signal from
a bug was being monitored from an embassy car with an antenna
built into the windshield.
Well, the Russians, as we know, have inherited the Soviet
intelligence apparatus and are also putting it to use.
So given that information, given that we know the Russians'
modus operandi, so to speak, should we not have been more
vigilant about the potential for this particular kind of
attempted espionage?
Mr. Carpenter. The answer to that question is clearly yes.
Senator Grams. Well, that is a good answer.
Knowing that, why do you think--and you mentioned in your
testimony, ``Maybe because we thought the cold war was over,
maybe we let our guard down a little bit.'' But you did mention
the State Department budget had been cut.
Where was it cut and by whom? Was it a congressional cut?
Was it inside the Department, the reallocation of funds to deal
with this type of security measures, or what were you referring
to specifically?
Mr. Carpenter. It is my information that those cuts were a
combination of all the things that you mentioned.
Senator Grams. Yes.
Mr. Carpenter. The Department as a whole was forced to
reduce its numbers of personnel and its programs. DS, being one
of the Bureaus within the Department, had to take a
corresponding cut.
Some of the reductions that DS took, I have to be very up
front with you, are self-induced. In other words, DS had to
impose priorities within its own Bureau, place importance where
it felt importance needed to be placed.
I would have to say, counterintelligence was one of those
areas following the cold war, that the consensus was to risk
manage, and reductions were made.
Senator Grams. So along with the budget cuts, of course,
the position allocations or the positions that you said,
personnel cuts, was, again, a part of that----
Mr. Carpenter. Yes, sir.
Senator Grams [continuing]. Result?
Mr. Carpenter. Yes, sir.
Senator Grams. November 17, 1998, the Department noticed--
or a Department notice stated that ``All visitors, with the
exception of active U.S. Government agency personnel who
display proper photo-identification, shall be escorted at all
times.''
Now, this mandate was rescinded, as we have noted, just 6
days later. Having all visitors escorted seems to be common
sense and a prudent measure to take. Now, again, you mentioned
in your statement that it was revoked because it did not go
through the process in the bureaucracy.
If that is true, why did it take some 10 months to get it
reinstated?
Mr. Carpenter. It was----
Senator Grams. Well, first, was it revoked because of some
complaints by agency personnel? Was that the reason it was
revoked? And then the question is: Why did it take so long to
get it reinstated?
Mr. Carpenter. Well, let me go back to the first part of
your question. I think this was a common sense approach, and a
prudent step to take.
I had been at the Department for 3 months at the time that
this brilliant idea occurred to me. I was told that this could
be done relatively easily. I asked my staff to make sure that
the proper vetting had been done.
In other words, the State Department has never had an
escort policy in its history.
Senator Grams. Yes.
Mr. Carpenter. This was a radical change to the way it
operated domestically. Overseas, we have a totally different
set of standards that are adhered to. But domestically, there
never had been a complete escort policy at the Department.
The day that the escort policy was issued and being
distributed, I was called to answer why this had not been fully
vetted in the Department, and why the geographic Bureaus who
are, quite frankly, a majority of the personnel in the State
Department, were not aware of this. And they would be the ones
that, quite frankly, predominantly would have to bear the brunt
of this escorting.
I was a little bit shocked, and I must say I will take some
responsibility for the fact that this had not been vetted by
those whom, it is my understanding then and it is my
understanding now, would be the recipients of the majority of
the work. So we rescinded it. And we went back to the drawing
board to get a better program together.
Questions such as ``How are the press to be handled? How
are special visitors and how were diplomats to be handled? How
are contractors to be handled? How are the cleaning crews to be
handled,'' had not been, to my satisfaction, properly vetted.
That process unfortunately took about 9 months before we had
convinced the Department of the necessity for it.
The Department signed on to it. There was some grumbling as
one could imagine in any type of change of this degree.
But I must say, after it went into effect in August, it has
gone very, very smoothly with very few problems and has
received the collective support of the entire Department.
Senator Grams. Now, you have not mentioned who complained.
I do not know if you want to say that. But the question is--I--
I would have maybe--why did they complain again, maybe just
because of the change, inconvenience? Was that basically the
reason?
Mr. Carpenter. I think ``inconvenience'' would not be the
right word. I think that the sense was that due to the number
of visitors to the Department, which we estimate to be about
1,000 a day, that the geographic Bureaus who, in most
instances, may have only had one secretary to answer phones,
would have to have her leave her phone duties, go down and act
as an escort on a frequent basis.
Senator Grams. Yes.
Mr. Carpenter. And that just seemed unworkable. We looked
at other alternatives, such as hiring escorts. All these had
financial obligations.
We felt very strongly that we could do this without
incurring additional financial responsibilities, because we did
not have the finances to put toward this.
Senator Grams. If it was not for this incident to, say,
maybe jar this loose, do you think there would still have been
opposition, you know, to the escort?
In other words, you know, it was--would it have not--would
it have been in position right now if it had not been for the
problem we are addressing here today, and that is the Russian
bug that was found in the seventh-floor conference room?
Mr. Carpenter. It is my belief that once properly vetted
within the Department, this escort policy would have been
initiated absent this bug.
Senator Grams. Yes. OK.
Mr. Carpenter. And I think the proof positive of that is
the escort policy went into effect prior to the bug being
discovered.
Senator Grams. Yes. Now, has the State Department's failure
to put in place an escort policy before the August 1999 date
made it more difficult to determine who planted the bug for
Russian intelligence and how long it had been there?
And, as you said, there had been no policy up until--up
until this time; so we are not here trying to point fingers at
anybody, but basically to find out how can we better protect
national security.
So was it more difficult to determine, as I mentioned, who
planted this bug because we do not have this policy in place?
Mr. Carpenter. Clearly, the field of suspects is much wider
when you do not have an escort policy. So the answer to your
question is: Of course, it would have potentially made the
investigation easier, or at least narrowed the field of
possible suspects.
Senator Grams. Mr. Carpenter, we talked about contractors
and the access of contractors to the building, commercial
contractors who do work throughout the State Department, even
though they are not technically Government employees.
Can you explain for us exactly what the policy is regarding
security clearances for these workers?
Mr. Carpenter. I will try, Mr. Chairman.
Senator Grams. OK.
Mr. Carpenter. It is a little bit uneven as you go through
different categories. All personnel having permanent passes to
the Department of State, working on classified systems have
full background investigations up to the ``top secret'' level.
Certain contractors and temporary fill-ins for the day do
not have a background investigation.
If the duration of their duties at the State Department
allows us to run name checks and those types of simpler police
checks, we do that. But if you are not working on classified
projects and you do not need access to classified areas of the
Department, there are no background checks done routinely.
Senator Grams. Is that going to change?
Mr. Carpenter. We are examining this to see if it needs to
be changed.
The the procedures that we go through to clear people, I
believe, need to be reviewed.
And I am in the process of working with my former
colleagues at the Secret Service and the highest levels at the
FBI and CIA to put together a team to come in and look at our
programs and see what can be done to answer some of the
questions that I personally have about our policies and
procedures.
Senator Grams. Contractors are performing some very
sensitive work on computer hardware, even software, inside the
building. Why are they not required to go through a security
clearance?
Mr. Carpenter. A contractor working on a classified project
would be required to have a security clearance.
Senator Grams. OK.
Mr. Carpenter. A contractor working on a non-classified
system or software would not, as of now, require a security
clearance.
Senator Grams. OK.
Mr. Carpenter. We are looking at the wisdom of that
procedure.
Senator Grams. Now, given that we are discussing a Russian
spy scandal, is it possible under the current practice for
Russian nationals to have been given access to computers at the
State Department?
Mr. Carpenter. Yes, it is, to an unclassified system. They
would not be allowed access to classified areas, as of August
1999, without being escorted.
Senator Grams. OK. Should the DS be informed of all the
work, which is being done in the location of the contractor
personnel which is doing that work? Should you have that kind
of information ahead of time? And, again, at least you have got
a trail then of information.
Mr. Carpenter. It certainly makes sense that DS be included
in that chain.
Senator Grams. Are you right now or are you not?
Mr. Carpenter. It appears that it is a little bit uneven.
Senator Grams. Yes. Yes.
Mr. Carpenter. It has been uneven over the years. A
majority of the time we are, but there are clearly times when
we have not been in that chain.
Senator Grams. Now, I was a former news anchor in the media
for many years. And I am sympathetic to the need for access by
the press, of course.
But I understand the security problems by--created by
allowing the press corps access to all public areas in the
State Department building as well. And I do not know if we can
include foreign press in this as well, but we do know that the
agents of foreign governments use press credentials as cover
for their activities.
Are you considering any changes at all in the regulations
governing press access? I know you mentioned a little bit about
this in your statement, but is that another area of
consideration?
Mr. Carpenter. With the introduction of the escort policy,
press do not walk around unescorted within the building into
any areas other than those areas designated for them to be in,
that is their own specific press areas, the cafeterias, barber
shop and other public areas of the Department. Any other time
they have to be escorted.
To be very candid, we are looking at the wisdom of the
process by which we credential foreign press to see if we need
to revise it.
Senator Grams. OK. Dealing with State Department personnel,
there are concerns that a foreign agent could gain access to
the State Department with a State Department badge.
The current system has no biometrics such as the thumb
print or photograph recognition. In this area, has there been
any progress in updating the I.D. system that the State
Department is using, or are there plans to update it in the
near future?
Mr. Carpenter. There are clearly plans to update it. We
clearly need a security system redundant to the current system
that exists, whether that be biometrics, pin number or some
other technological improvement.
And as part of the study that I am asking the other
agencies to participate in, we are seeking the best assessment
of what type of equipment we do need.
Senator Grams. What would be a timetable on this?
Mr. Carpenter. We hope to have that recommendation within
90 days.
Senator Grams. And then implementation?
Mr. Carpenter. Implementation as quickly as funds to
procure that equipment can be obtained.
Senator Grams. I was going to say that I imagine it depends
on budgeting.
Mr. Carpenter. Yes, sir.
Senator Grams. Unlike Senate personnel, the possessions of
State Department employees--their possessions like briefcases,
suitcases and purses, they do not have to be, I understand, x
rayed when they enter the building right now. Is that correct?
Mr. Carpenter. Employees do not, that is true.
Senator Grams. That does not make sense from a security
standpoint. Are you looking to change that policy as well?
Mr. Carpenter. We, as recently as yesterday, had an in-
depth discussion about this. While there are security
adaptations and enhancements I would like to make, the
atmosphere and the environment of that building make it very
difficult. The physical setup of that building also makes that
a very difficult undertaking.
And, as I alluded to it earlier, any sort of security
enhancement is going to require consultations, because it could
be, in some instances, very, very confining, to say the least,
and cause huge backups at a very busy facility.
But we are undertaking that and we will have a decision on
it in 90 days.
Senator Grams. What are the number of visitors a day to the
State--to the building? I mean, talking about personnel,
workers, just visitors.
Mr. Carpenter. Well, there are 8,500 personnel, and about
1,000 visitors a day.
Add that to construction workers and other contracting, and
the number easily would exceed 10,000 people that pass through
the doors of the State Department daily.
Senator Grams. So when you are talking about the number of
people that needed to be escorted, would you say that is maybe
around 1,000? That is a high number. I mean, that is a lot of
people.
Mr. Carpenter. The number, actually, comes down to about
300 a day who require escorts.
Senator Grams. OK.
Mr. Carpenter. That is our best estimate at this point
since employees of other agencies visiting the building do not
require escorts.
Senator Grams. And would they be mainly just visitors or
people that are on business that would need to be escorted
because of lack of credentials, or a mixture?
Mr. Carpenter. A mixture.
Senator Grams. Moving on to the damage assessment itself
and the Bureau of Oceans and International Environmental and
Scientific Affairs, the conference room--it would be a lot
easier to refer to it as the OES as we did.
But your ability to conduct an accurate damage assessment
appears to have been hampered, I think, by a lack of respect
for security procedures by the State Department personnel.
What is the policy regarding keeping log-in books for the
conference rooms, and does the OES Bureau have a log of all the
meetings which have taken place in that room that are of
concern to the dates that you have?
Mr. Carpenter. First, let me respond to your first
statement. We found that since the arrest on December 8 of Mr.
Gusev, the Department employees that had come in contact with
the OES conference room or had had meetings in the conference
room over more than the past year, have been very forthcoming.
Senator Grams. Yes.
Mr. Carpenter. Other individuals who have had no contact
with the OES conference room since the bugging have come
forward with leads about other suspicious activities they have
seen in the Department.
So I would suggest that the Department has been extremely
forthcoming and cooperative in an effort to find out who, in
fact, put this in place.
It should be understood that the conference room in
question, the OES conference room, is not what we would
consider a secure conference room.
Senator Grams. Yes.
Mr. Carpenter. It is simply one of the many conference
rooms in the Department of State that various and sundry people
use. The log that we are looking at goes back to January 1999.
It was incomplete in that it did not list every person that
has gone into that room, nor does it show after-hours enterings
of the room. The log is only an attempt at scheduling meetings
in the room. It is a scheduling device versus an accountability
device.
Now, this has to be compared to other conference rooms in
the building designated for the discussions of classified
information, top secret and SCI information, for which very
complete logs are kept.
Senator Grams. Yes.
Mr. Carpenter. Access is not through a badge swipe system.
Senator Grams. So you said this was an unclassified area?
Mr. Carpenter. It is a non-secured conference room.
Senator Grams. Non-secure.
Mr. Carpenter. It is also an unclassified----
Senator Grams. Yes, non-secure area.
Mr. Carpenter. Yes. Yes, sir.
Senator Grams. But recognizing that, could there have been
any chance that there was ever classified information that was
discussed in the room, just because of convenience, that it
was, you know, in an area where people could get into, or the
logs?
So even though it was a non-secure, could there have been
or was there, to your knowledge, any classified information
discussed in the room?
Mr. Carpenter. There was classified information and
sensitive information discussed but none was at the top secret
or SCI level.
Senator Grams. All right. Now, there were a lot of jokes
about the poor Russians who had to listen to the boring
meetings of the OES, and that is nothing against the good
people who work there or the meetings they had.
But was it not also used by other Bureaus, such as
Intelligence and Research? Now, again, you said not above a
certain level.
Mr. Carpenter. Yes. Records show that INR had used the
conference room one time for a briefing, at which no
information at the top secret and SCI level was discussed.
Senator Grams. But again, getting back to the fact that
this conference room was very easy to access, the log books
were incomplete, I understand that it was even used by the
seventh floor cleaning crew on break.
Does not all this make it more difficult to assess the
damage or damages assessment, or whatever you----
Mr. Carpenter. Yes. Yes, it does.
Senator Grams. So this makes the whole investigation a
little bit incomplete?
Mr. Carpenter. It complicates it.
Senator Grams. Complicates it.
Mr. Carpenter. Yes.
Senator Grams. Budget cuts, to go back, I think again, to
what you alluded to in your opening statement: From 1993 to
1995, diplomatic security asked the State Department for funds,
was refused those funds necessary for an active technical
countermeasures program.
Now, knowing this, do you believe that the Russian
activities would have been detected earlier had the State
Department been able to fund the request of the DS at that
time?
Mr. Carpenter. That is a very hard question to answer, Mr.
Chairman. I would suggest that the more complete the
counterintelligence division of DS was, the more personnel they
had to devote to their duties, the less vulnerable we would
have been.
But there are so many factors that go into a strong
counterintelligence program, including the physical design of
the building and security policies and procedures, that a much
stronger counterintelligence unit in and of itself would not
have been sufficient. I think that is the crux of my statement.
Senator Grams. Yes.
Mr. Carpenter. Across the board, we are lacking and forced
to make tradeoffs, like many other parts of the Department, I
might add.
The stronger the program, clearly the less likely it is
that this would have happened. But at the same time, in the
absence of an escort policy, even the strongest of
counterintelligence program would have had difficulty.
Senator Grams. I see you brought some charts. Is there a
way you can maybe give us a better idea of exactly where it
happened----
Mr. Carpenter. Certainly.
Senator Grams [continuing]. Where the Russian involved
would stake out the building, so to speak, and the number of
times during the week that he would appear?
Mr. Carpenter. I would be glad to, sir.
The first chart is an aerial overview of the State
Department. The lower part of the screen, is the C Street side
of the Department.
Senator Grams. Yes.
Mr. Carpenter. D Street is----
Senator Grams. Is this the main entrance normally, down
here? [Indicating]
Mr. Carpenter. The main entrance is----
Senator Grams. Right there, yes.
Mr. Carpenter. It is right there, yes.
Senator Grams. OK.
Mr. Carpenter. The park is there. The area outlined in
yellow is State annex three. That is Virginia Avenue running
along that direction.
Senator Grams. Yes.
Mr. Carpenter. Below it, outlined in blue is the park in
which Mr. Gusev had been sitting on a bench and observing.
And let me go to the conference room on the seventh floor;
the OES conference room was right in that area. [Indicating] As
you can see, the Virginia Avenue side is where he parked his
car to monitor the device in the room.
All had to be in line of sight of the seventh floor
conference room.
Senator Grams. That is the way the signal was being
transmitted; in other words, it had to be a line of sight in
order to receive the signal?
Mr. Carpenter. Yes, it did. Yes, it did.
Senator Grams. OK.
Mr. Carpenter. If you would go to the next chart.
Thank you.
This is a schematic diagram of the seventh floor at main
State. Again, this is D Street side and the red indicates the
OES conference room.
To try to dispel rumors that this conference room was
adjacent to or even in the close proximity to the Secretary's
suite, we have outlined in blue the Secretary's suite. This is
a city block away from where the bugging took place.
Next are two pictures. First is what you see upon walking
into the OES conference room. Do not be alarmed by the
equipment there. That was set up for another conference. But
this is walking in the door.
The top shows you this is not a large conference room.
Senator Grams. Yes.
Mr. Carpenter. I draw your attention to the plant, the
curtain and that window there. This is the D Street side of the
building.
Senator Grams. Yes.
Mr. Carpenter. That is----
[Pause]
Mr. Carpenter. The plant in the upper picture, and the
drapes were concealing the chair molding. And I have with me a
sample of this type of molding. This is not the molding the
device was secreted in, but this was the type of board that was
used to plant the device.
Senator Grams. Yes.
Mr. Carpenter. The bottom picture, again, shows a like
piece of chair rail. That was the area in which it was found by
our countermeasures sweep.
Senator Grams. So there had to be more than one visit to
that room in order to map out the strategy and how the device
was going to be planted, measurements, and then access to be
able to install it and remove it. So that had to mean, you
know, access without anybody else present. So----
Mr. Carpenter. Correct. That is our assumption----
Senator Grams. OK.
Mr. Carpenter [continuing]. That this was done on multiple
visits to the OES conference room.
Senator Grams. OK.
Mr. Carpenter. And this simply shows more clearly the view
looking out of the OES conference room onto the Virginia
Avenue, D Street side. The top picture is looking slightly to
the right.
Senator Grams. So we are inside the building now, inside
the conference room looking out on Virginia Avenue?
Mr. Carpenter. We are inside the OES conference room
looking out at the park back where the red light is.
Senator Grams. Yes.
Mr. Carpenter. That is where Gusev did a lot of his
relaxing, and his vehicle was parked in and around this area.
And the lower diagram is Virginia Avenue. And that is State
annex three that we had outlined on the first diagram.
Senator Grams. Yes.
Mr. Carpenter. And he also chose to park his vehicle, space
available, along there. [Indicating] And once we realized what
he was doing, space was always available.
Senator Grams. In order to oversee his activities?
Mr. Carpenter. To oversee his activities.
Senator Grams. Yes. Getting back to the issue then of the
OES conference room, just one thing I would like to clear up,
one point for the record: If the OES conference room is not
secure, looking back at it, should any classified information
have been discussed--whether it was confidential or secret, any
kind of level information, should that room have been used for
that?
Mr. Carpenter. Clearly, there needs to be a greater
awareness of discussing any type of secure information outside
designated secure areas.
Senator Grams. Yes.
Mr. Carpenter. That is a part of our review. Just to put
this in context, secure information, classified information is
discussed daily in my office. It is not a designated SCIF. We
are moving to have my conference room made into a SCIF, so that
we are not victimized.
I think the escort policy goes a long way to ensure that we
are not victimized. However, we do clearly have to take a
better look at what areas should be made available for the
discussion of classified information.
Senator Grams. Now, Mr. Carpenter, while you are still
conducting a damage assessment--I am assuming it is still
ongoing.
Mr. Carpenter. Yes, it is, sir.
Senator Grams. The preliminary word seems to be that no
highly classified information was lost, is that correct? We
could assume that?
Mr. Carpenter. Yes, we can.
Senator Grams. Is it fair to say that we barely dodged a
bullet, perhaps?
Mr. Carpenter. I think that is a fair assessment, yes, sir.
Senator Grams. And, again, you know, talking about whether
any information should be discussed in this conference room or
not, I mean, that is--you cannot have information or knowledge
of every meeting going on, but this would be a policy that you
think should be instituted, and everybody is aware of, and
areas of the building in which those conversations should be
conducted.
Mr. Carpenter. Yes.
Senator Grams. So, again, it is----
Mr. Carpenter. But I must add, Mr. Chairman, I think that
it has been a universally held opinion by people at State that
our vulnerabilities in the United States are not what they are
in the overseas arena. So there has been a much more relaxed
attitude about this. Clearly, this serves notice that that
needs to be re-thought.
Senator Grams. Yes.
Mr. Carpenter. And I am confident that there are many in
the Department who are rethinking that. And their posture has
become much more attuned and aggressive about where they
discuss classified information. Constantly, I am asked by
people, ``Where can we go to discuss this information.''
So this has sent a positive message. I mentioned a couple
of benefits. That is, clearly, the level of awareness about the
potential threats brought about by this bugging have had a
positive impact on the Foreign Service in general, and on the
employees of the United States State Department.
Senator Grams. So not just at this building, but at other
sites as well?
Mr. Carpenter. Not at just this building, but throughout
the world, quite frankly.
Senator Grams. Now, if I overstate this, you can correct me
on this. But the access control policy at the State Department
seems to have been a matter of confrontation between the
foreign policy establishment at State and the DS for a number
of years, even before your arrival.
Do you believe that the culture at the State Department
inhibits your ability to provide this secure environment?
Mr. Carpenter. I think that is an excellent question. I
think that is at the crux of what, quite frankly, has brought
us here. There is always going to be a divide. There has always
been a divide, not just at State, but throughout the society--
--
Senator Grams. Yes.
Mr. Carpenter [continuing]. Between those persons who want
a work environment to be open, friendly and inviting, and the
security elements who want to secure it.
Senator Grams. Yes.
Mr. Carpenter. The irony of that is: Overseas, that gap is
almost non-existent. There, policies and procedures are well
understood. The threat is well understood.
And I think we have excellent programs overseas, programs
and policies. Those programs and policies have not translated
well domestically where, absent incidents of this nature, we
clearly have reduced our awareness.
The culture at State Department is, quite frankly, in the
overseas arena, very aggressive toward security. It is very
responsive. Like I say, I have only been at the Department a
year and a half, but I have been impressed by that
aggressiveness in the overseas arena.
I must say that that same attitude is starting to form
since this bugging in the Department. But prior to having a
visual aid or a guide or an incident like this, it was a very
difficult sell, because such incidents have not been occurring
regularly. The threat of this was rated to be low.
Senator Grams. Yes.
Mr. Carpenter. I would suggest ``low'' does not mean
``no.'' ``Low'' means ``low,'' and you have to take appropriate
measures. I think our baseline may have been below ``low.''
I would have to say in my personal experience, and I have
been there since bombings and that type of activity at State,
that there has been a very solid response on the Department of
State toward these issues.
They have asked questions. But someone questioning me or
not agreeing with my suggestions for security does not, in and
of itself, mean that they are anti-security.
That simply means they have got questions about it. I need
to be a better salesman. I need to market my idea. And I did
market it throughout the building. That is laborious. That is
frustrating. But that is the way it has to be done.
Senator Grams. Yes.
Mr. Carpenter. We are growing with this. I have had
tremendous support from the foreign service community in
getting this done.
We have had some setbacks. We have had to go back and do
our homework a little bit better, but collectively, I think the
State Department is much better than it was when I came a year
and a half ago. And a year and a half from now, it will be much
better than it is today.
Senator Grams. I want to go back also. You said the
counterintelligence, I believe you mentioned this, portion of
DS is about a third of the size that it was at the end of the
cold war. Is that correct?
Mr. Carpenter. That----
Senator Grams. And in that context, do you think that the
counterintelligence agency has been undervalued then by the
State Department over these years, cold war over?
Mr. Carpenter. ``Undervalued'' may not be the right word,
but I think on a risk management continuum, when you look at
the risk, it was rated at low. It received a proportionate
amount of support which was low.
Senator Grams. Yes.
Mr. Carpenter. And that caused us to be behind where we
would like to be, where we once were.
Senator Grams. To go back again and talk about maybe this
division or this line that might be between State and DS, Booz,
Allen and Hamilton, as you know, a consulting firm, recently
conducted an audit on the State Department's ability to respond
to both terrorist and counterintelligence threats.
And it has been reported that one of the recommendations
made in the report was to elevate the role of the Bureau of
Diplomatic Security.
Do you believe that the role of DS should be elevated, and
that DS should report directly to the Secretary of State? Would
that be a step in the direction of ensuring greater security?
Would you advocate it?
Mr. Carpenter. I was and am supportive of the
recommendations made by the Booz, Allen and Hamilton study.
I currently have an informal reporting relationship to the
Secretary, in that I brief her every morning relative to
security problems and hot spots around the world, issues that
are important for her to know about.
Senator Grams. Yes.
Mr. Carpenter. But, again, that is informal. I believe that
that should be formalized. And it is currently under study for
decision by the Secretary as to whether to formalize that
relationship and what form that formalizing would take.
Senator Grams. So there has been no decision made as of
yet. It is still a consideration or a recommendation?
Mr. Carpenter. It has moved from a recommendation so that
the decisionmaking is, we think, forthcoming, relatively soon.
Senator Grams. OK. In the near future?
Mr. Carpenter. In the near future, yes, sir.
Senator Grams. All right. And, probably, my last question
then, Mr. Carpenter, is kind of an open-ended question, and
that is: What changes need to be made to enhance the ability of
DS to engage in security and counterintelligence activities?
If you had the ability to make those requests, what would
be probably a couple of top priorities you would have?
Mr. Carpenter. Mr. Chairman, I would suggest that for
everyone that comes before you that the solution to their
problem is, ``I need more people. I need more finances,'' and
quite frankly I----
Senator Grams. You have been in my office then. That is
what I----
Mr. Carpenter. I am no different than the rest.
I would only say this: In my 28 years in the security and
intelligence field, I have never seen a department where people
have been so tired, where they are burning the candle literally
at both ends to try to meet the challenges.
I would be less than responsive to their needs if I did not
say that we do need more personnel.
Senator Grams. Yes.
Mr. Carpenter. I do believe that the President and the
Secretary's budget that is up here addresses that. And we are
starting to see the response that we need. And quite frankly I
applaud that.
I think this is a tremendous step in the right direction.
It acknowledges the problem and is an attempt at satisfying it.
Within the Diplomatic Security Service, we have the expertise.
Senator Grams. Yes.
Mr. Carpenter. We do. We do not need to turn to other
agencies for this expertise. We simply do not have the
personnel to allocate out appropriately.
Senator Grams. Yes.
Mr. Carpenter. We have additional needs for finances for
some technical enhancements of the most sensitive nature that
are available out there. We simply, at this time, do not have
the finances to go procure those, install them, and be, quite
frankly, cost effective.
One of our goals, both after the bombings in East Africa
and after the bugging, is to see that the taxpayers are getting
the best bang for the buck.
And it takes awhile to sort through all of the options to
do that, and we would hope to continue to work with you and
this committee to satisfy that and make available any and all
information that you might need to support us in that effort.
Senator Grams. OK. I just wanted to make a comment here
that I think a lot of your efforts and activities in security
might be underappreciated.
Most of the time, you are kind of the silent group there,
that as long as you do your job well, we do not hear anything.
But, whether it is the security at State, whether it is
security in our foreign embassies, whether it is security in
our office buildings throughout the Capitol, but until we have
the bombings like in East Africa, until we have the shooting
deaths of two of our officers here at the Capitol, or even, the
incident here at the State Department before this was really
brought to light, so I know we appreciate that, as employees
here, you try to make that security as least painful as
possible in order to facilitate the flow of people in and out
of the building.
We appreciate the work you do. And, again, it was my
pleasure to have you here today and to testify and offer us
this information.
And I would also like to say that we had to steal one of
your people from State to be my chief of staff here recently.
Gary Russell, who worked for the State Department for a number
of years is now working in my office. And so any time you want
to come and frisk him and pat him down, that would be fine.
Mr. Carpenter. I would be glad to, Mr. Chairman.
Senator Grams. Thank you very much, Mr. Carpenter, for
being here. I appreciate your testimony. Thank you again.
Mr. Carpenter. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Senator Grams. This hearing is complete.
[Whereupon, at 3:35 p.m., the hearing was adjourned.]
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