[House Hearing, 106 Congress] [From the U.S. Government Publishing Office] COUNTRY REPORTS ON HUMAN RIGHTS PRACTICES FOR 1999 ======================================================================= HEARING BEFORE THE SUBCOMMITTEE ON INTERNATIONAL OPERATIONS AND HUMAN RIGHTS OF THE COMMITTEE ON INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES ONE HUNDRED SIXTH CONGRESS SECOND SESSION __________ WEDNESDAY, MARCH 8, 2000 __________ Serial No. 106-124 __________ Printed for the use of the Committee on International Relations Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.house.gov/international relations __________ U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE 65-719 WASHINGTON : 2000 ______ COMMITTEE ON INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS BENJAMIN A. GILMAN, New York, Chairman WILLIAM F. GOODLING, Pennsylvania SAM GEJDENSON, Connecticut JAMES A. LEACH, Iowa TOM LANTOS, California HENRY J. HYDE, Illinois HOWARD L. BERMAN, California DOUG BEREUTER, Nebraska GARY L. ACKERMAN, New York CHRISTOPHER H. SMITH, New Jersey ENI F.H. FALEOMAVAEGA, American DAN BURTON, Indiana Samoa ELTON GALLEGLY, California MATTHEW G. MARTINEZ, California ILEANA ROS-LEHTINEN, Florida DONALD M. PAYNE, New Jersey CASS BALLENGER, North Carolina ROBERT MENENDEZ, New Jersey DANA ROHRABACHER, California SHERROD BROWN, Ohio DONALD A. MANZULLO, Illinois CYNTHIA A. McKINNEY, Georgia EDWARD R. ROYCE, California ALCEE L. HASTINGS, Florida PETER T. KING, New York PAT DANNER, Missouri STEVE CHABOT, Ohio EARL F. HILLIARD, Alabama MARSHALL ``MARK'' SANFORD, South BRAD SHERMAN, California Carolina ROBERT WEXLER, Florida MATT SALMON, Arizona STEVEN R. ROTHMAN, New Jersey AMO HOUGHTON, New York JIM DAVIS, Florida TOM CAMPBELL, California EARL POMEROY, North Dakota JOHN M. McHUGH, New York WILLIAM D. DELAHUNT, Massachusetts KEVIN BRADY, Texas GREGORY W. MEEKS, New York RICHARD BURR, North Carolina BARBARA LEE, California PAUL E. GILLMOR, Ohio JOSEPH CROWLEY, New York GEORGE P. RADANOVICH, California JOSEPH M. HOEFFEL, Pennsylvania JOHN COOKSEY, Louisiana THOMAS G. TANCREDO, Colorado Richard J. Garon, Chief of Staff Kathleen Bertelsen Moazed, Democratic Chief of Staff ------ Subcommittee on International Operations and Human Rights CHRISTOPHER H. SMITH, New Jersey, Chairman WILLIAM F. GOODLING, Pennsylvania CYNTHIA A. MCKINNEY, Georgia HENRY J. HYDE, Illinois ENI F.H. FALEOMAVAEGA, American DAN BURTON, Indiana Samoa CASS BALLENGER, North Carolina EARL F. HILLIARD, Alabama PETER T. KING, New York BRAD SHERMAN, California MATT SALMON, Arizona WILLIAM D. DELAHUNT, Massachusetts THOMAS G. TANCREDO, Colorado GREGORY W. MEEKS, New York Grover Joseph Rees, Subcommittee Staff Director Douglas C. Anderson, Counsel Peter Hickey, Democratic Staff Director Nicolle A. Sestric, Staff Associate C O N T E N T S ---------- Page WITNESSES The Honorable Harold Hongju Koh, Assistant Secretary, Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights and Labor, U.S. Department of State.... 9 Ms. Elisa Massimino, Director of Washington, DC Office, Lawyers Committee for Human Rights..................................... 52 Carlos Salinas, Advocacy Director for Latin America, Amnesty International USA.............................................. 60 Nina Shea, Director, Center for Religious Freedom, Freedom House. 67 Alison DesForges, Consultant, Human Rights Watch/Africa.......... 72 APPENDIX Prepared statements: Hon. Christopher H. Smith, a U.S. Representative in Congress from the State of New Jersey, Chairman, Subcommittee on International Operations and Human Rights...................... 82 Hon. Harold Hongju Koh........................................... 86 Ms. Elisa Massimino.............................................. 96 Mr. Carlos M. Salinas............................................ 109 Ms. Nina Shea.................................................... 127 Dr. Alison DesForges............................................. 135 Additional material submitted for the record: Prepared statement of the Hon. George Radanovich, a U.S. Representative in Congress from the State of California........ 140 Insert from Amnesty International USA............................ 141 COUNTRY REPORTS ON HUMAN RIGHTS PRACTICES FOR 1999 ---------- WEDNESDAY, MARCH 8, 2000 U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, Subcommittee on International, Operations and Human Rights Committee on International Relations, Washington, D.C., The Subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 10:07 a.m., in room 2360, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Christopher H. Smith, (Chairman of the Subcommittee) presiding. Mr. Smith. The Subcommittee will come to order. Good morning. I am very pleased to convene this hearing of the Subcommittee on International Operations and Human Rights for the purpose of reviewing the country reports on human rights practices for 1999. Our distinguished witnesses this year include Assistant Secretary for Democracy, Human Rights and Labor, Harold Koh, and the representatives of four leading human rights organizations. Secretary Koh, I am particularly pleased to welcome you back to the Subcommittee, now that we have been successful in our effort to enact legislation requiring the State Department to spend at least $12 million per year more on the Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights and Labor. As you know, this almost doubles the Bureau's budget, but it is still less than one-half of 1 percent of the Department's salaries and expenses and just a little more than what the Department spends on its Public Relations Bureau. I know that as a State Department official, you strongly disapprove of such Congressional micro management, but I believe Congress occasionally needs to help the executive branch get its priorities right. One such occasion is when Congress finds out that the State Department is spending more on PR than on human rights. So this reordering of priorities was a long overdue step and we believe a necessary step, although certainly not a sufficient one, toward giving the protection of human rights the leading role it deserves in the foreign policy of the United States. This year's country reports have already been the subject of well deserved praise. Last year's reports were quite strong and this year's contain even more information and pull even fewer punches. I know this takes not only hard work, but also courage on the part of the people who work on the reports, especially when an honest and unvarnished statement of the facts might create difficulty for the Department or the Administration. For instance, the China report does not attempt to conceal the deterioration of the human rights situation in that country. More arrests of political and religious dissenters, more bad news for the people of Tibet and East Turkestan, more evidence of forced labor and complicity of government officials in sex trafficking, more forced abortions and forced sterilizations. All this cannot help but lend support to those of us who believe that 6 years of the Administration's constructive engagement policy have harmed rather than helped the long-suffering people of China. This pattern of honest reporting extended even to some of our strongest allies. For instance, the treatment of Northern Ireland is fair and even-handed, even when the approach requires scrutiny of our friend and ally, the British Government. In addition to describing acts of violence by the republican and loyalist paramilitary groups, the report also asserts that, ``members of the Royal Ulster Constabulary police force committed human rights abuses'' during this year. Similarly, when discussing the case of murdered defense attorney Rosemary Nelson, the text reports ``doubts about the RUC's impartiality'' in the investigation of Ms. Nelson's original harassment charges against the police. Unfortunately, there are still a few holdovers from the pattern of a few years ago, in which the country reports often appeared to be the product of guerrilla warfare between human rights advocates within the State Department and their colleagues whose primary interest was to avoid ``damaging the relationship'' between the U.S. and some horrible dictatorship. This old pattern is still strongly evident in this year's reports on Cambodia, Laos, and Vietnam. Although a careful reading of the Cambodia report makes clear that the government's human rights violations during 1999 were numerous and severe, the first few paragraphs of the report contain a number of positive statements about the government, most of them having little or nothing to do with human rights, which tend to deflect the reader's attention from the government's egregious human rights record. For instance, the report begins by saying that the new government headed by serial murderer Hun Sen has brought political stability to the country. Hun Sen and others like him around the world will be encouraged by the implication that there is an internationally recognized human right to political stability, but the object of the country reports on human rights practices should not be to encourage the likes of Hun Sen. The report then goes on to take the controversial position that despite numerous electoral irregularities and systematic harassment of opposition parties, up to and including murder, the formation of the new government reflected the will of the electorate, the report says. Finally, we are still in the first three paragraphs of the report. It states that Cambodia is an impoverished country and that the stagnant economy began to improve following the formation of the coalition government. Why does this statement about the government's economic accomplishments belong in a human rights report? Surely, the Human Rights Bureau does not intend it to excuse or perhaps mitigate the government's human rights record. At best it is distracting and irrelevant, and at worst it suggests that while the government of Cambodia may be breaking some eggs, it may also be making some tasty omelets. The Laos report is noteworthy not for what it says, but for what it omits. Among the most disturbing events in that troubled country during 1999 was the disappearance of two United States citizens, both members of the Hmong ethnic minority, near the border between Thailand and Laos. An eyewitness reported that he saw the two men cross into Laos in the company of a Lao government official, and there was another report that the Lao government had captured both men and executed one of them. Yet, the country report states only that there were conflicting accounts of the incident, without providing any further detail. Assistant Secretary Koh, I know you will agree that whenever a tyrannical government captures or kills an innocent person, it is absolutely predictable that there will be conflicting accounts of what has happened, because such governments tend to lie. Yet a human rights report issued by the U.S. cannot simply take the word of the alleged killers at face value and close the books with the case permanently unsolved. At the very least, the report should have given the details of the eyewitness accounts, along with the denial by the government of Laos. This year's Vietnam report reads a lot like the China report used to read back in the bad old days. It honestly states the facts about a wide range of human rights violations, but it follows each terrible fact with a gratuitous and exculpatory editorial comment, such as ``there have been improvements in some areas.'' If you slice your areas thin enough and have an optimistic outlook on life, you can always find improvement in some areas. The report also pays the government of Vietnam backhanded compliments such as that it exhibited greater freedom for different views on nonpolitical subjects than for political ones. Unfortunately, the Vietnam report also puts a spin on issues in which the Department or the Administration has a strong interest. For instance, as in prior years, this year's Vietnam country report repeats the conclusion of the UNHCR monitors that none of the thousands of people returned to Vietnam from refugee camps under the comprehensive plan of action were persecuted upon their return. In reaching this conclusion, UNHCR monitors had to decide what to do among thousands of returnees who were subjected to extensive interrogation by security police about their anti- Communist activities before and after leaving Vietnam, who were threatened with severe retribution if they engaged in similar activities after their return, and who were denied the household registration which we all know is necessary to receive basic necessities of life. Some of these people were imprisoned on return, allegedly for crimes they committed before they left, and at least one was executed. In every single case, the monitors decided either that such ill treatment did not constitute persecution or that it was inflicted for some nonpolitical reason. The State Department has been given information on a number of these cases, both by human rights organizations and by Members of Congress. Rather than uncritically repeating the UNHCR conclusions in future reports, I strongly urge the bureau to investigate these cases and decide whether these people are telling the truth about suffering serious harm upon return to Vietnam. In another particularly unfortunate mischaracterization, the report cites the creation by the Vietnamese government of a committee to govern the Hoa Hao Buddhist Church, as evidence of the improvement in religious freedom, although the report also notes that some Hoa Hao do not accept the committee as legitimate. I met with members of this denomination on a recent trip to Vietnam and I am informed that nearly all of the Hoa Hao believers reject the new committee. Its leader is a prominent communist cadre and its first acts were to prohibit various Hoa Hao ceremonies. If the U.S. Government were to organize an 11-member committee to govern the Catholic Church or the Methodist Church or any Buddhist Church, nobody would claim this enhanced freedom of religion for Catholics or for Methodists or for Buddhists. We should not make the same mistake in the case of the Hoa Hao. Vietnam, Laos and Cambodia are small countries in which U.S. diplomats are keen to build a better relationship with an egregious government. Because the United States business interests do not have the same economic stake in these countries as they do in China, severe and well publicized human rights violations may present a serious obstacle to the U.S. trade concessions, foreign assistance and other diplomatic building blocks. The argument that has worked in the case of China that the government consists largely of thugs, but that they will eventually stop being thugs if we only trade with them and trade some more, does not work for these countries and it doesn't work for China. We should send the same message day in and day out to every human rights violator in the world. If you abide by certain minimum standards of decency, then you will be welcomed by the United States as an equal member of the community of free and civilized nations, and good things will flow to you from the U.S. If you do not abide by these minimum standards, you will not receive these benefits. I have often quoted the remarks of a witness who represented Amnesty International at our first hearing of this Subcommittee under my chairmanship. He stated, ``Human rights is a island off the mainland of U.S. foreign policy,'' unconnected to anything else. Unfortunately, we still have a long way to go in order to integrate human rights into the mainstream of our foreign policy. We should start by denying Permanent Most Favored Nation status to China or to any other government that systematically brutalizes its own people. I'd like to yield to my good friend and colleague from Georgia, the Ranking Member of our Subcommittee, Cynthia McKinney. [The statement of Mr. Smith appears in the appendix.] Ms. McKinney. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I would like to thank you for convening this panel, as well as your strong leadership on the issue of human rights, particularly human rights practices in China. I am very pleased to welcome back our Assistant Secretary Harold Koh and I look forward to your presentation of this year's State Department Country Reports on Human Rights Practices. I also look forward to hearing from the representatives of the distinguished human rights organizations from whom we will also be hearing. I'd like to express my appreciation to those people not here today who contributed to the production of this report. In Secretary Koh's February 25th statement regarding the release of the 1999 country reports on human rights practices, he correctly points out that the simple act of human rights reporting is difficult and sometimes even dangerous work. Last year, this Subcommittee, under the leadership of Chairman Smith, reported out the Embassy Security Enhancement Act of 1999. I want to assure you that, working with the Chairman, we will continue to do our part to provide a safe and effective environment for your colleagues who are working on our behalf in embassies and consulates around the world. The issues with which the country reports deal are among the most important that our government faces in the conduct of its foreign policy. We have come to realize that governments that mistreat their own people are not likely to treat foreigners much better and, therefore, that it's both easier and safer to work with governments that respect human rights. We have also discovered that countries that respect labor rights tend to have effective, satisfied and productive workers. Observance of human rights has thus become not merely a lofty ideal for us to urge on others, but a very practical consideration in the way we do business. I want to begin my discussion of the particular reports by first drawing attention to the record on China and the report with respect to an issue that's before Congress, national normal trade relations status. I have seen administration after administration use the tired old excuse of constructive engagement for rewarding brutal and repressive regimes with everything from diplomatic recognition, taxpayer finance largess, arms sales, or as is now the case, Most Favored Nation trading status, based on the false promise of social change through engagement. Not once from the old apartheid regime of South Africa to the killing fields of Guatemala and El Salvador, to the burned ruins of East Timor, not once has engagement ever been constructive in bringing about anything other than more repression, a more entrenched oligarchy, more death, and more despair. Social change comes from the dedicated, persistent and often dangerous work of activists, working for social change, many of whom are in this room--never once from arms dealers and bankers who tout engagement as a sale for the public conscience over doing business with butchers. In addition, I would like to turn to the situation in Iraq and recognize two activists who have worked and sacrificed in the face of overwhelming odds for the lives and dignity of others. They are Hans von Sponik, the former humanitarian coordinator in Iraq, and Juta Burkhardt, the former Chief of the U.N.'s World Food Programme in Baghdad. Both resigned in protest over the continued sanctions on Iraq. Von Sponik's resignation follows his predecessor, Dennis Halladay, who also resigned in protest and has become one of the outspoken critics of the sanctions regime. To put the issue in perspective, the total number of Americans killed in war during the last century is less than the number of Iraqis that have died due to the sanctions regime. The sanctions themselves have become a weapon of mass destruction. I applaud and honor Mr. Von Sponik and Ms. Burkhardt for their courage, their conviction, and their humanity. It is time to bring an end to this dreadful episode in American foreign policy. I am also deeply disappointed by the situation in the Great Lakes Region. The territorial integrity of the Democratic Republic of Congo must be protected. The U.S. must become an honest broker in this war and should begin by severing any covert military relationships with the armed groups and factions that are committing crimes against humanity. The United States and its allies must be examples of transparency, democracy, respect for human rights, and sustainable development. Instead, Rwanda and Uganda continue to raid the Democratic Republic of Congo, occupying large amounts of that country's territory and stealing its resources. Has the United States condemned these actions? Will you condemn these actions today? Will you call for an immediate withdrawal of Uganda and Rwanda from the DRC? If not, then we are doing nothing more than hiding behind a policy that condones the partition of the Democratic Republic of Congo by African allies of the United States. In her opening statement to the U.N. Security Council, Secretary of State Albright cited an incident of 12 women who were buried alive in the eastern Democratic Republic of Congo. The U.S. Special Rapporteur on Human Rights in the DRC reported that these massacres perpetrated by Rwandan Rebels in 1998 and 1999, where more than 800 were killed, are the cruelest and most violent incidents of the war. These sorts of massacres are taking place in rebel-held areas of the DRC, as the U.S. lamely asserts that it doesn't support the rebels. In Rwanda, we know the Clinton Administration actively worked to prevent anyone from responding to pleas from the U.N. forces on the ground attempting to prevent or contain the 1994 Rwandan genocide. Both France and Belgium have taken an introspective look at what went wrong and why and the United States needs to do the same. This summer, Ugandans will vote on whether to establish democracy or continue the present arrangement, which your own human rights report in 1997 called a one-party state. The position of the Administration has been that it will support any result if the election process is fair. Human Rights Watch strongly argued that the one-party system violates basic human rights, such as freedom of expression and political association, principles to which the U.S. is rhetorically committed. However, Human Rights Watch made very clear that since mid 1997, the U.S. has been nearly silent on the issue. Shouldn't we care if Ugandans get to practice democratic freedoms and is it not true that the security problems of Uganda, Burundi and Rwanda won't be solved until they develop democratic institutions? In addition, I want to call particular attention to the close collaboration of the Colombian military with paramilitary groups that are responsible for massacres and widespread human rights violations against the civilian population. I question the Administration's plan to put more guns into the hands of known killers. Based on the State Department report on Colombia, it is clear that a massive influx of weapons will do nothing to quell the Colombian government's thirst for violence. I emphatically agree with the new universal sentiment of the NGO community on the generally high quality of the Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor's work. Although the Department has increased DRL's resources over the last few years, it is still inadequately funded. The budget should reflect the importance of the issues with which it deals, and I will continue to work with the Chairman until it does. Finally, Mr. Chairman, an aside. We all treasure the role and importance of the United Nations in the international community. It was created to rid the world of suffering, to prevent armed conflict, and, most important of all, to guarantee that never again would the world permit rogue states and mass murderers to commit genocide and crimes against humanity. But unfortunately, I regret to say that in the last 6 years, the United Nations has repeatedly failed the world. In April 1994, the U.N. turned a blind eye to genocide in Rwanda and allowed an estimated one million men, women and children to be exterminated in 100 days. Just 1 year later, in July 1995, the U.N. surrendered its own U.N. declared safe haven of Srebrenica to the Serbian Army and in the following week, an estimated 7,400 men and young boys perished. Then last year, in August-September 1999, the U.N. completely was ill-prepared to deal with violence in East Timor and the destruction of Dehli. With respect to each of these tragedies and only after considerable complaint from concerned people, the U.N. apologized for its abject failure. But weakly worded statements of regret are not enough for these grave injustices and violations of fundamental human rights. Just last December, in 1999, I facilitated a meeting between two Rwandan families in the U.N.'s independent inquiry into its handling of the 1994 Rwandan genocide. At that meeting, I heard the most extraordinary accounts from two families, for the first time in history, that U.N. troops themselves were accused of complicity and genocide. In one instance, U.N. troops remained at one of the houses and drank stolen beer while Rwandan Presidential Guard troops tortured a woman and her children. In each of these instances in Rwanda, Srebrenica and East Timor, the victims of the U.N. have been left to piece their lives back together again. Certainly, little that we discuss today will rival the colossal failures experienced in Rwanda, Srebrenica and East Timor. Just as we listen today about human rights conditions around the world, we should know that some of the greatest international crimes of the century are not to be found within these U.S. human rights documents. We still have a long way to go. Once again, I would like to express my thanks to Mr. Koh, to his staff and DRL, and to all the embassy officers whose consistent attention to human rights issues has made these reports possible. We are the only government that does this thing and in so doing, we make a strong statement about what we as a country are about. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Mr. Smith. Thank you for your statement. Before I yield to Mr. Tancredo, I want to associate myself with your remarks, because we have examined those issues in this Subcommittee over the last several years, and you have been right there in every one of those hearings and fact-finding trips and efforts to make a difference, whether it be in the former Yugoslavia or in Rwanda. As we all know, there was an early warning heads-up that the killing fields were about to erupt in Rwanda. Regrettably, the General who was in charge of peace keeping faxed Kofi Annan and his admonitions that action be taken were unheeded, and we held a hearing, heard from people, actually had the fax in front of us and read it, and it was another black mark in opportunity missed and, as a result, as you pointed out so well, the killing fields ensued. So I want to thank you for your very, very strong statement. Mr. Tancredo. Mr. Tancredo. I have no opening. Mr. Smith. Mr. Delahunt. Mr. Delahunt. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I welcome Mr. Koh here today. Your appearance here is timely, particularly given the context that this body will shortly be considering a rather large package of assistance to Colombia. There's been a lot of discussion during the course of the past several weeks about the package and recently there was an article that appeared in the Washington Post, written by Karen DeYoung, and I'm going to quote from that article, because my line of questioning would pursue the concerns that have been articulated by the human rights community regarding the package. It's quoting a Miguel Vivanco, who is Executive Director of the Latin American Division of Human Rights Watch. He is quoted as saying that ``Human Rights Watch is not calling for Congressional rejection of the $1.6 billion 2-year Colombian aid package.'' Rather, the report urges that strict new conditions be placed on all U.S. security assistance to Colombia, including the civilian prosecution of all military personnel implicated in human rights abuses and restrictions, and restrictions on intelligence sharing with Colombia Army units. My first question, and I would give you an opportunity to reflect on this, is your department, your division's, your bureau's involvement in the development of the package put forth by the Administration. I will ask you a series of questions regarding amendments that myself and other Members intend to offer during the course of the process as this package comes forward. I would also just ask one other question, and it was brought to my attention just recently by a member of my staff, who noted that while the FARC, the major guerrilla group within Colombia and the second major guerrilla group in surgency was in Colombia, the ELN, are both listed on the foreign terrorist organization list. The AUC, which is an umbrella group for paramilitary units within Colombia, headed by one Carlos Castanyo, is not listed and I would be interested in hearing why Mr. Castanyo and the AUC has failed to be listed on the foreign terrorist organization list. It would appear to me, upon reading the statute, that this particular organization meets all of the criteria. I yield back, Mr. Chairman. Mr. Smith. Thank you, Mr. Delahunt. Mr. Ballenger. Mr. Ballenger. I have no opening statement. Mr. Smith. Thank you. I would like to now present to the Subcommittee Harold Koh, who serves as Assistant Secretary of State for Democracy, Human Rights and Labor. Before his appointment, Mr. Koh served both as Professor of International Law and the Director of the Center for International Human Rights at Yale Law School. Assistant Secretary Koh, who earned both his BA and law degrees from Harvard University, has authored numerous articles on international law and human rights, and he is most welcome before the Committee. Please proceed as you wish. STATEMENT OF THE HONORABLE HAROLD HONGJU KOH, ASSISTANT SECRETARY, BUREAU OF DEMOCRACY, HUMAN RIGHTS AND LABOR, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE Mr. Koh. Thank you, Chairman Smith and Members of the Subcommittee, for holding this valuable hearing regarding the 1999 country reports on human rights practices. I have a written statement, which I offer for the record, which I would like to summarize. Mr. Smith. Without objection, your full statement will be made a part of the record. Mr. Koh. Thank you. Mr. Chair, over the course of my 15 month tenure as Assistant Secretary for Democracy, Human Rights and Labor, I have traveled to some 35 countries, some of them several times. I have testified before you regarding numerous human rights issues and I have developed a great respect for this Committee's bipartisan support for human rights. I hope that in the months ahead, we can continue to work together to promote freedom and human rights, wherever they are at risk. Simply put, the goal of these annual reports remains unchanged to tell the truth about human rights conditions around the world. We believe that these reports create a comprehensive, permanent and accurate record of human rights conditions worldwide in calendar year 1999. I recognize that these reports have been read very carefully, but we continue to believe that they are the most comprehensive, permanent, and accurate record of human rights conditions around the world, obtainable from any single source. These reports represent a massive official monitoring effort that involves hundreds of individuals, including human rights officers from each of our embassies, country desk officers from our regional and functional bureaus, officials from other U.S. Government agencies, and a wide range of foreign sources, including foreign government officials, opposition figures, journalists, nongovernmental organizations, dissidents, religious groups, and labor leaders. Let me pay special tribute to Secretary Albright, under whose leadership the coverage of the reports has greatly expanded, to include broader coverage of such key issues as religious freedom, trafficking in persons, women's rights, worker rights, violence against gays and lesbians, and the rights of the disabled. You have said that human rights are not in the mainstream of our foreign policy. I would question that and point directly to the personal commitments of Secretary Albright, who I think stands in everything she does and in every statement she makes with the centrality of democracy, human rights and labor as her core commitments. Let me also give very special thanks to the dedicated and splendid country reports team in my own bureau, a number of whom are here in the audience to back me up, and especially to thank the talented and committed director of that bureau, Mark Susser, and his deputy director, Jeanette DuBrow, for bringing this year's report to fruition with such care and integrity. Mr. Chair, you and the other Members of the Committee have highlighted some of the grim news in the report, but the news is not all grim. Because 1999 saw no defining human rights moment, like the fall of the Berlin Wall, few analysts noticed that 1999 saw as profound positive trend toward freedom as in 1989. Thanks to democratic elections in two of the world's most populous states, Indonesia and Nigeria, more people came under democratic rule in 1999 than in any other recent year. In addition, the NATO intervention in Kosovo and international intervention in East Timor demonstrated that the international community has the will and the capacity to act against the most profound violations of human rights. Yet, these significant gains in democracy and human rights cannot overshadow a number of profound challenges to human rights that arose last year. Serbia's expulsion of 850,000-plus Albanians, the Indonesian military's complicity in the military rampage through East Timor, and the horrors perpetuated by rebels in Sierra Leone all show the world still has a long way to go before it fully adheres to the precepts of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. Too many authoritarian governments continue to deny basic human rights to their citizens, including the all important right to democracy. Throughout these reports, we continue to resist requests to rank order countries, but because time is short, let me touch on a handful of the country reports in which Committee Members have expressed special interest. In China, authorities broadened and intensified their efforts to suppress those perceived to threaten governmental power or national stability. Citizens who sought to express openly dissenting political and religious views faced widespread repression. In the weeks leading up to both the tenth anniversary of Tienanman Square massacre and the 50th anniversary of the founding of the People's Republic, the government moved against political dissidents across the country, detaining and formally arresting scores of activists nationwide. Beginning in May, dozens of members of the China democratic party were arrested in a crack down and both leaders and followers of the Falun Gong movement faced harassment, beatings, arrest, detention and sentences to prison terms for protesting the government's decision to outlaw their practice. China continued to restrict freedom of religion and intensified controls on some unregistered churches, and for that reason, Mr. Chairman, last October, Secretary Albright designated China as one of five countries of particular concern under the new International Religious Freedom Act. Unapproved religious groups, including Protestant and Catholic groups, continue to experience varying degrees of official interference, repression and persecution. Some minority groups, particularly Tibetan Buddhists and Muslim Uighurs, were subjected to increased restriction of fundamental freedoms. Other segments of Chinese society also faced abuse. Coercive family planning practices sometimes included forced abortion and forced sterilization. Many women contended with domestic violence. The government continued to restrict tightly worker rights, and forced labor, particularly in penal institutions, remained a serious problem. Our report also sites instances of extra judicial killings, torture, forced confessions, arbitrary detention, lengthy incommunicado detention, and denial of due process. In many cases, particularly in political cases, the judicial system denied criminal defendants basic legal safeguards and due process. For these and other reasons, the Administration announced in January, earlier than ever before, it's intention later this month to pursue a resolution against China before the U.N. Human Rights Commission in Geneva. Similarly, Cuba's human rights record also deteriorated sharply over the past year. The Castro regime continued to suppress opposition and criticism and denied citizens freedom of speech, press, assembly and association. Cuban authorities routinely harassed, threatened, arbitrarily arrested and imprisoned human rights advocates. The government denied political dissidents due process and subjected them to unfair trials. Many remained imprisoned and after our report was released last week, one prominent dissident, Oscar Bissette, was sentenced to an unjust sentence of 3 years. Independent journalists faced internal travel bans, brief detentions, acts of repudiation, harassment, seizures of office equipment and repeated threats of prolonged imprisonment. As you know, Mr. Chair, in Russia, the seizure by armed insurgent groups from Chechnya of villages in the neighboring Republic of Dagestan escalated by years and into a full-fledged attack by Russian forces on Chechen separatists, including the Chechen Capitol of Groznyy. The Russian attack included air strikes and the indiscriminate shelling of cities predominantly inhabited by civilians. These attacks, which, in turn, led to house to house fighting, led to the death of numerous civilians and the displacement of hundreds of thousands more. There are credible reports of Russian military forces carrying out summary executions of civilians in Alkhan-Yurt, and in the course of the Groznyy offensive. Credible reports persist that Russian forces are rounding up Chechen men of military age and sending them to so-called filtration camps, where they are allegedly tortured. Chechen separatists also reportedly committed abuses, including the killing of civilians. We acknowledge that the Russian government has a duty to protect its citizens from terrorist attacks, but at the same time, the Russian Federation must comply with its international commitments and obligations to protect civilians and must not engage in extra judicial killing, the blocking of borders to prevent civilians from fleeing, and other violations in the name of internal security. As Congresswoman McKinney also pointed out, defenders and dissidents in Africa also faced severe challenges. In Sudan, the government continues to restrict most civil liberties, including freedom of assembly, association, religion and movement. Government security forces regularly tortured, murdered, disappeared, harassed, arbitrarily arrested and detained deponents or suspected government opponents. In the Democratic Republic of Congo, government forces lost control of more than half of the country's territory to rebels supported by troops from Rwanda and Uganda. Government security forces increasingly used arbitrary arrest and detention throughout the year and were responsible for numerous extra judicial killings, disappearances, torture, beatings, rapes and other abuses. Anti-government forces also committed serious abuses, including murder, robbery, harassment of human rights workers and journalists, and the recruitment of child soldiers. Mr. Chair, let me also discuss the human rights record of two allies that have received significant media attention these last few weeks. In Colombia, despite the Pastrana administration's efforts to negotiate and end hostilities, widespread internal armed conflict and the rampant political and criminal violence persisted. Government security forces, paramilitary groups, guerrillas and narcotics traffickers all continued to commit numerous serious abuses, including extra judicial killings and torture. Although overall human rights conditions remain poor, the government took important steps toward ending collaboration by some security force members with the paramilitaries. President Andre Pastrana and Vice President Gustavo Bell, who I met with twice in the last 2 months and again yesterday, have assured me that they will not tolerate active or passive collaboration by members of the security force or paramilitary groups. Last year, the President removed from service four generals and numerous mid level officers and noncommissioned officers for collaboration, for failing to confront paramilitaries aggressively, or for failing to protect the local population. In Turkey, which has an active and growing civil society movement, the government still continued to limit freedom of assembly and association and the police harassed, beat, abused and detained large numbers of demonstrators. In general, the government continued to intimidate, indict, and imprison individuals for ideas they had expressed in public forums. The Ecevit government did adopt a series of initiatives during the year designed to improve human rights conditions, including removing military judges from state security courts, increasing maximum sentences for torture or for falsifying medical records to hide torture, and passing legislation making it more difficult to close political parties. But only 2 weeks ago, a new cause for concern arose when three Kurdish mayors were arrested, charged and briefly removed from office, although they have recently been reinstated pending trial. These are only a few of the country situations of concern to the human rights community. I would be happy to answer any specific questions you might have about these and other country situations. But, Mr. Chairman, I cannot conclude without noting two points. First, today, March 8, is International Women's Day. While we honor the past and recognize the progress that's been made, we must also look toward the future and acknowledge how much needs to be done. In Afghanistan, for example, women continue to face the most serious women's human rights crisis in the world. Elsewhere, women daily face violence, abuse, rape and other forms of degradation. Female genital mutilation continues to be practiced in much of sub-Saharan Africa and to varying degrees in some countries in the Middle East. In Kuwait and elsewhere, women continue to be denied the right to vote and to seek election to the legislative bodies. Today, let me also reaffirm, Mr. Chairman, the Administration's unequivocal support for ratification of CEDAW, the Convention for the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women. Ratification of CEDAW is central to maintaining our position as a leading advocate for human rights. It would strengthen our global efforts to advance the status of women and we have proposed a number of reservations and declarations to ensure that the ratification complies with all U.S. Constitutional requirements. One hundred sixty-five countries have now ratified or acceded to the convention and the United States is the only country in this hemisphere, the world's only democracy and the only NATO nation that has not ratified the convention. Mr. Chair, it is now 5 years sine the Beijing Women's Conference. For the Senate to hold hearings on ratification and move swiftly to advise and consent to the ratification of CEDAW would be no more than simple justice. Second, International Women's Day reminds us of the deeply related problem of trafficking and persons. Trafficking, as Secretary Albright recently said, is a growing, ``global problem that each year robs millions of their rights, their loved ones, and often their very lives.'' It affects people from all walks of life, of every age, religion and culture, and nearly every country in the world is either a source, transit or destination country. As I have testified before this Committee, trafficking represents the anthesisis of universal declaration of human rights, where, by treating its victims as objects, it denies their very humanity. To highlight the U.S. Government's intensified focus on this problem, this year, for the first, the State Department established a separate section in each of the 194 country reports to highlight this pressing issue and to bring about efforts for reform. Mr. Chairman, let me close by saying that as the introduction to our report explains, the global right for human rights is a team effort in which the U.S. Government is only one player. The struggle requires creative partnerships that cross partisan religious, ethnic and public/private lines. I know that you and other Members of the Subcommittee share this Administration's deep commitment to promoting democracy, human rights, labor, and religious freedom worldwide. In the months that remain in my tenure, I pledge again to give my all to work with you and your Committee to continue strengthening these vitally important human rights partnerships. Thank you. I now am ready to answer any questions you might have. Mr. Smith. Thank you very much, Mr. Secretary, for your fine testimony and for the good work that you do and your staff. There's a great deal of respect for that on this Subcommittee on both sides of the aisle. I would like to raise a couple of questions on very specific countries, beginning with the People's Republic of China. In reading this voluminous report, which continually uses the word ``intensifies'' and words like that to indicate that the bad is actually getting worse in China, and it leads some of us who are concerned about the upcoming battle to make MFN permanent, which would take away all economic leverage that we might have, that the trend line is seriously going in the wrong direction, whether it be the issue of religious persecution, which is on the rise, as you pointed out. Falun Gong have been rounded up, they've been beaten, their noses have been broken, their legs have been kicked out, and they've actually killed a few of their practitioners. We know that there has been a roundup of Catholic believers, including Bishops and Priests and the Evangelical Church continues under siege. Tibetans, Buddhists, the iron fist continues to hurt them in a very, very serious way. Of course, the Uighurs, we had a hearing on this just a few days ago, spoke of the rising tide of repression against the Muslim Uighurs. In looking at the report, there was one thing that--a reference that I had not seen before, perhaps it was in another, talking about the high female suicide rate and points out that it's a serious problem. According to the World Bank, Harvard University and the World Health Organization, some 56 percent of the world's female suicides occur in China, about 500 per day, 500 Chinese women die from suicide a day, according to the country reports on human rights practices. That's outrageous, that's astonishing. The World Bank estimated the suicide rate in the country to be three times the global average among women and it's estimated to be nearly five times the global average overall. Research indicates that the low status of women, the rapid shift to a market economy, and the availability of highly toxic pesticides in rural areas are among the leading causes. Frankly, Mr. Secretary, what's missing from this, which I find to be a crass omission, is what many of us believe to be the real reason--or at least a major contributing reason--and that is the one child per couple policy in the People's Republic of China. I'd like to read you something that was in the New York Times on April 25, 1993. It was by Nicholas Kristoff. He states, ``She should be taking her 2-month-old baby out around the village now proudly nursing him and teaching him about life. Instead, her baby is buried under a mound of dirt and Li spends her time lying in bed, emotionally crushed and physically crippled. The baby died because under China's complex quota system for births, local family planning officials wanted Ms. Li to give birth in 1992 rather than in 1993, so then on December 30, when she was 7 months pregnant, they took her to an unsanitary first aid station and ordered the doctor to do the abortion.'' There at least ten million abortions per year, some say the number is even higher, 90 percent of which are coerced in some way, not unlike that woman who has been hurt by the government. The article goes on to say, ``Ms. Li's family pleaded, the doctor protested, but the family planning workers insisted. The result, the baby died, and the 23-year-old Ms. Li is incapacitated,'' and it talks about how emotionally she is totally distraught. I've had hearings at my Subcommittee, Mr. Secretary, where we have heard from women who were forcibly aborted, some of whom had the great fortune of making their way to the U.S., only to be incarcerated in Bakersfield because they came in on the Golden Venture or came in in some other way. They finally did get out, thankfully, but they told of the emotional trauma, the absolutely debilitating emotional trauma, and yet in the country reports, it notes ``highly toxic pesticides.'' And you would think that if it affects women, it would also affect men, and you would see a great increase in men killing themselves from pesticides. ``A rapid shift to a market economy.'' We're being told, especially with the upcoming Most Favored Nation status debate, that this is the greatest thing since sliced bread, that somehow China is going to matriculate into a market-oriented economy and that everybody will benefit, and yet that's being cited as a reason for the suicide rate. Then ``the low status of women.'' In China, as we all know, women have had an incredibly low status for a millennium, for several millennia. This is nothing new. Bound feet and all of the other terrible things that have been done against women over the years. Now we have something new. Ever since 1979, with the full complicity of the population and family planning community, including the United Nations Population Fund, you're only allowed one child, and women are fined, they have children on the run, there is a gross disparity between the births of boys versus girls, as we know, and that's pointed out in this document as well, and yet we see this alarming rise of female suicides. Obviously, there is a great emotional pain being felt by the women of China. Why was that left out? I would respectfully submit that there needs to be more research done on the real reasons, since one witness after another that we've had--and, again, let me just go back to that Nicholas Kristoff article. I raised that in 1994 with the head of the family planning program in Beijing and that family planning group with whom I met to run the program said Kristoff had made it all up, the New York Times was simply lying. Yet the evidence that we have gotten from one person after another--we had a woman who used to run a family planning program in Fujian Province, you might recall, Bill and Tom, last year, who testified she ran the program in Fujian, in one of their areas, for a dozen years. She self-described herself as a mother by night, a monster by the day, and talked about the emotional pain and suffering, not to mention this theft of children and the killing of children by way of forced abortion, but she talked about the emotional pain. I suggest that what's missing here is the fact that women are crying out, so much so that they're taking their lives, and this is glossed over in the report, it's glossed over by the population control community, who want to ascribe it to pesticides or some other situation like that. If you could respond to that, I'd appreciate it. Mr. Koh. Mr. Chairman, I think you've accurately painted the overall picture. As we said, the human rights situation deteriorated markedly throughout the year, and we highlighted in the report many of the points that you made, the increasing crack down on political dissent, the China democratic party, some 35,000 incidents against the Falun Gong, restrictions on religious freedom, not just with regard to Tibetan Buddhists, Muslim Uighurs, also Christians and, as you pointed out, the well publicized case involving the investiture of Catholic Bishops. We also pointed to forced and prison labor situations, arbitrary detention and internet restrictions. The issue of the status of women and the devaluation of women in Chinese society is something that we've reported on consistently over the years and the very issue that you mentioned, which is the coercive family policy, is one on which we have reported with great detail and indeed in which we've engaged the Chinese directly in our human rights dialogue Let me just read to you from pages 33 through 37 of the report, which address it. We say the government continued to implement comprehensive and often intrusive family planning policies--jumping ahead to page 34--these population control policies rely on education propaganda, economic incentives, as well as on more coercive measures, including psychological pressure and economic penalties. On the next page, we describe the policies in a number of the different provinces and then say intense pressure to meet family planning targets set by the government has resulted in documented instances in which family planning officials have used coercion, including forced abortion and sterilization, to meet government goals, and we go on and discuss this matter at considerable length in the remainder of the report. As you know, Congressman, when Gao Shoa Dwan, who has been testifying before this Committee about these practices and how they function, we have ourselves, in our bureau, taken a special interest in trying to reunite Gao with family members and to bring about a reunification of this issue. So this has not been something on which we believe there to be an omission in the report. The specific point that you raise, which is with regard to suicide rates, let me point out that we tried to put this in the context of a range of different factors which have created pressure and problems for women in Chinese society. I should also point out that the suicide rate among men has been very high this year, disturbingly high, but that in particular, challenges from economic restructuring have contributed to this problem and have created a situation in which the low status of women has been translated into them being particular victims of societal dislocation as the society starts to change. So my point would be that I have read the Kristoff article, that we understand the concerns that you raise. These are ones that we report on in considerable detail in our report. We believe that your overall statement of the human rights record rings true and indeed the statements you made both at the recent testimony on Tibet and your other recent hearing in the past few weeks on the relationship between human rights issues and other issues are ones which we think accurately reflect our report. But we would disagree that we have made some omission here. I think we have tried to put the grievous status of women 5 years after the Beijing women's conference into the context of a range of factors that have caused this, and those are outlined in considerable detail in the report. Mr. Smith. Let me ask you, again, Mr. Secretary, 500 women per day commit suicide in China, an absolutely staggering number, if these figures are accurate. Even if it's half of that, even if it's a third of that, it's a staggering number of lost lives due to incredibly emotional stress that has to be coming from somewhere. Forced abortion is absolutely pervasive in China--I've been fighting this for 20 years. I've been in Congress for 20 years, found about it in the first couple of years of my tenure in office, and I have been sickened by the international community's pooh-poohing of the issue, glossing it over, saying that that was yesterday, not today. There's always light at the end of the tunnel, even though the internal documents that we keep copies of, and the evidence that we see in the field shows that women are being dealt with so cruelly. A woman wants to protect her own baby. We also have heard from men who testified about the agony of seeing their sons or daughters killed by the family planning cadres and they couldn't do anything to stop it. When you can't protect your own family members that might lead one to commit suicide or to take some other drastic action. I think it is a serious omission when the only things that are mentioned are toxic pesticides, low status, and a shift to a market economy. That's missing the mark by a mile, it would seem to me. I've had close to 15 hearings, maybe even more, on the issue, focused exclusively or in part on the forced abortion issue. I think it's an outrage to women that they are so mistreated. That's why I argued against the Beijing venue for the Beijing women's conference. It could have been held somewhere else. Because I saw what happened there. They were touted in their own press as being somehow enlightened with regard to women. That is like having a civil rights conclave in South Africa during the height of Apartheid, and somehow suggesting that they were the beacon of hope for racial harmony. The same thing goes for China with regard to women and forced abortion and forced sterilization, breaking up families the way they do. To not look into this as a factor contributing to the suicide rate is a serious oversight. We've had so many people recount the terrible, deleterious, emotional consequences of this forced abortion policy and its impact on women. Its nowhere to be found. I would hope and I ask you, plead with you, to go back and check this. If the people that do the investigating are part of the population control community, forget it, you'll get a tainted report. They have been whitewashing the crimes against China for so long, I've lost count. I go back and I look at the hearings and--the floor statements--I do have a long memory when it come to this and whether it be Dr. Sadik of the UNFPA who said the Chinese Program is totally voluntary, or someone else. Wei Jingsheng, when he testified before us immediately after his release, said he was outraged when he saw the U.N. workers were working side by side with the family planning cadres in going after their families and forcibly aborting these women. Children are precious. Abortion is violence against children and it's also violence against women and when it's forced abortion, the emotional consequences are devastating. Please, this has to be fixed. Fixed with the facts, I would respectfully submit, because this doesn't tell the story of why those suicides occur. These women are the walking wounded and we need to at least accurately tell the world why they're wounded and there's ample evidence out there and we can put you contact with sources--and I'm sure you have your own. There is also something in the report dealing with---- Mr. Koh. If I can respond. Mr. Smith. Yes. Mr. Koh. Mr. Chairman, we admire your passion and commitment on this issue, which I think has done an important job in highlighting this issue and it's one on which we have devoted a lot of energy in our own bureau and in the department to investigating. I think the facts, as you say, are depressing. This is a very, very large country in which there is a very, very high suicide rate on the part of both men and women and we've tried to identify a number of the facts throughout the report. As we said, all of the population of China is living under a markedly deteriorating human rights condition. But I do think that when the question comes as to why 500 women commit suicide in an average day in the largest country in the world, as a lawyer and as someone who has to be very careful with the facts, I have to take care to make sure that I fully understand the causes before I assign causation to it. China is a closed society. We do not have as much information as we would like and I---- Mr. Smith. With all due respect, you have assigned causes here such as the low status of women in China. There has been a low status for women, like I said, for thousands of years, as women in other nations around the world have suffered from low status, which did not lead to mega suicides like we're seeing in China today. There is a reason to be found if an honest investigation is instigated, I believe, based on tons of anecdotal evidence that we have, including from victims. We had a woman testify who was being held, regrettably, by the administration in Bakersfield, we had to subpoena her to come and speak. She was a passenger on the Golden Venture, who said she found a baby girl who had been abandoned and that she was told by the family planning cadres that her time was up, that now she would be forcibly aborted and sterilized, because she had her one child. She broke down crying. She couldn't even finish her testimony, she was in such agony. Yet this goes unreported. You have ascribed reasons and I believe that they have missed the mark by a mile. We had a hearing just a few days on China, again, one in a long series. One of our witnesses took issue with the assertion. In direct answer to a question right out of the country reports that I quoted, that ethnic minorities, such as the Muslim Uighurs and the Tibetans, are subject to less stringent population controls. Those who testified, both on behalf of the Tibetans and the Muslim Uighurs, said that was absolutely false. What is the evidence to back that up? Mr. Koh. That's based on the best evidence we have. If it's something which is subject to challenge by your witnesses, we'd welcome more information. I would point out that the factors that you noted are ones that we said were among the leading causes and we obviously have to be careful, in my case, lawyerly, about what we assign as causes. I take your point, Congressman. We will endeavor to investigate the issue further and if we think that we can make an objective statement about both of these issues, the issue with regard to the Uighurs and the one that you have raised, then we will do so and correct it for the future report. Mr. Smith. Before I move on to another question, let meask--as a lawyer, do you find it obvious or somehow proven that, ``pesticides, toxic pesticides'' are more likely to cause suicide than forced abortion? Mr. Koh. The statement says research indicates that the low status of women, the rapid shift to a market economy and the availability of highly toxic pesticides are among the leading causes. I think that can mean that there are other causes as well, but that's what we have encountered as the leading examples and that's what we relied upon. Mr. Smith. But, again, who are the researchers? This is why we need an absolutely unbiased group of researchers to interview these women, and there are several in our own country. We've had many at our hearings, although that's anecdotal, but it's certainly very suggestive. Over the years, I've been in contact with many women who have had forced abortions. They break down and say that it's an agony that is almost unbearable when the state says the baby you're carrying must be destroyed because it doesn't fit into the quota system. The weakness, the sense of vulnerability that they couldn't even protect their own child and the state has stolen and killed their child is a major contributing cause to this, I believe, based on 20 years of dealing with the issue. Mr. Koh. I understand your point and with the help of the Committee and with the sources that you have, we'll try to move toward as full accuracy as we can obtain in these reports. Mr. Smith. My Chief Counsel makes a good point. We'd like to see the studies that led to that and see what was omitted and part of coming to that conclusion. I have, and you have it, as well, I'm sure, volumes of evidence to show the forced abortion policy is central policy. They say one thing to the public, for the crowd, so to speak, and for the international community, but the internal documents clearly say you have your one child, sometimes two, and that's it. Let me ask you another question, and then I'll yield to my colleagues and go to a second round. On Chechnya, in Russia, we've had some hearings in the Helsinki Commission, which I Chair. You are a distinguished commissioner on that, as well. Obviously, to many of us, it seems like dejavu all over again, as Yogi Berra said. Here it goes again. The United States has at least spoken out this time. We didn't do it last time with any real conviction. As a matter of fact, Al Gore, at a crucial time--and we actually convened a hearing on this-- said that it was an internal affair during that first Chechen war. Many people, including Elena Bonner, wife of Sakharov, Nobel Peace Prize winner, said at one of our Helsinki Commission hearings that that gave the green light to the Russians to commit the terrible crimes which led to about 80,000 people dead in Chechnya. There are many people in Russia, and this came out in our most recent hearings, who see a moral equivalence to what we did in Kosovo or in Serbia and actually don't feel they need to listen to the U.S., that our moral standing or stature has been at least tainted by the fact that when we bomb, it's OK, when they bomb, it's not. But right now, as you know, the atrocities the number of people killed, the number of displaced people are sickening. My question, bottom line, is do you think there needs to be a war crimes tribunal investigation to hold the Russians and the Chechens, anyone who has committed atrocities in that war, accountable? Mr. Koh. We think that there needs to be a full transparent and objective investigation leading to the punishment to those individuals who are responsible. Secretary Albright, today, in the Washington Post, on page A-31, says ``we have called for a full and transparent investigation with international observers and punishment for those responsible'' and has recounted her own discussions about this issue with acting President Putan and an issue that she raised directly with Foreign Minister Igor Ivinov in Lisbon last Friday. It has been the subject of intense discussion within our own bureau and, again, with the goal of trying to get to the bottom of these reports, particularly the reports of summary executions, indiscriminate shelling of civilians, massacres that have been recounted in Alkhan-Yurt. Last week, as you know, there was a videotape, whose authenticity is still under discussion, which purported to show mass grave sites and then, of course, the conditions in the filtration camps. The point, I think, is will the Russians themselves open up the situation and permit a full, transparent and fair investigation to go on. Acting President Putan has pointed Vladimir Kolomonov as his human rights ombudsman. He has invited Council of Europe observers, including the new Council of Europe Human Rights Commissioner Mr. Alvaro Hill Robles. I met with Mr. Hill Robles last Friday and we discussed this issue. They have now invited Mary Robinson, the U.N. High Commissioner for Human Rights, and also OSCE representatives to come to visit the region. Human Rights Watch Executive Director Ken Roth is on his way and I spoke to him last night. So my own view is that what is gradually happening is a shift in the Russian policy from a total exclusion of international observation and a statement that's only an internal affair, to a recognition that they do need to get to the bottom of the question. We have said repeatedly that we believe that this raises very fundamental questions of international humanitarian law and we believe that those investigations need to get to get to the bottom of those questions. Once those investigations get underway, only then will we have a sense of whether what has been unearthed is an example of a war crime or a crime against humanity. As you know, those are legal terms of art and we have to see where the evidence leads. Mr. Smith. I'd like to yield--thank you, Secretary Koh--to Cynthia McKinney. Ms. McKinney. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Assistant Secretary Koh, you lucked out, because my voice is giving out on me. I will be very brief. I'm just concerned about balance in the reporting. For instance, I have perused the Democratic Republic of Congo report and unfortunately, the situation in Eastern Congo I don't believe is given enough attention, where most recently Robert Geraton has actually used the words ``crimes against humanity'' as having been committed there. I understand that the United States has allied with Uganda and Rwanda, but it seems to me that in these reports, at least, we ought to be calling a spade a spade. In the Uganda report, you mention concerns about regional security causing the country's intervention in DROC. Why did you use the word ``intervention'' and not ``invasion?'' Mr. Koh. Let me say, Congresswoman McKinney, that we have struggled in all these reports to do exactly what you say, to call a human rights abuse a human rights abuse. I think we have made it clear in our own report on the Democratic Republic of Congo that rebel forces and their Rwandan backers have committed extra judicial killings, disappearances, torture, rape, and illegal detention, the point that I made in my opening statement. We've also pointed out that in rebel areas, observance of civil rights are often nonexistent. As I know you know from briefings that members of my office and bureau have given to your office, we have pressed on these with great detail, particularly in the case of the Moinga burials, the women who were buried alive, and also in relation to issues with regard to the Hema and Lindu fighting. The U.S. Government in this situation is committed, as you know, to trying to bring peace to what is really a genuinely volatile situation. In January, as you know, numerous Members of Congress were present when Ambassador Holbrooke held, in his Month of Africa, the Month of the U.S. Security Council leadership, an entire week that was devoted to discussion of issues in the DROC. President Kabila came and participated in those meetings and the question was how to move to enhance the Lusaka process to bring about real peace in this extremely troubled region. Now, I think we have made the point repeatedly that we will not tolerate human rights abuses by any side. We have publicly and privately denounced abuses. The situation on the ground is extremely difficult to determine because, as you know, many parts of the country are in open warfare. We've called for investigation of massacres, accountabilities for abuses in security and access for both humanitarian workers and for human rights monitors, where they occur. We work closely with human right NGO's, particularly Silomon Baldo of Human Rights Watch Africa, and Alison DesForges who will be appearing here later. I think our goal is not to make statements with regard to political actions, but simply to call human rights abuses human rights abuses, and that that is what we do in all of the reports, the DROC report, the Uganda report and the Rwanda report. I don't think we let anybody off the hook. Ms. McKinney. Have we called for an investigation of the plane crash in 1994 that set off the Rwandan genocide? Mr. Koh. I think that has been the subject of extensive examination and inquiry and still a lot of answers that have yet to be obtained. But I do think with regard to the DROC situation---- Ms. McKinney. Has it been the subject of substantive inquiry in the United States? Mr. Koh. I'm the human rights officer and this is a little bit out of my rubric. It was both before the time I came and it regards a situation in which I have not personally been engaged, but I do want to say that with regard to the Great Lakes Region and the entire set of human rights issues, we have been extraordinarily energetic on the question. I know that in your opening statement, Congresswoman, you said that our statements with regard to Rwanda were--I forget how you put it--but I remember quite a strenuous criticism of what we have done. But I do think that in this region, we recognize how volatile that situation is and we have devoted extraordinary energies in my time in office to what we have called atrocities prevention. Indeed, that was the entire purpose of the Month of Africa and the focus that was given by Ambassador Holbrooke on this issue with regard to Angola, Burundi, Sudan, Sierra Leone, and the Democratic Republic of the Congo. There was an effort to bring together those key political players to try to head off these disputes and prevent them from erupting into another genocide. I think particularly the case of Burundi, in which Nelson Mandela made an extraordinary appearance before the Security Council, where, in the URUSHA process, President Mandela has brought his huge moral authority to bear, where President Clinton participated by video link in an effort to try to bring the parties to the table and head off another round of killings. This is an area in which we are really trying to put our resources to prevent atrocities from breaking out. I went to Africa with Secretary Albright in November and the entire discussion was on these two issues. First, how to build democracy in the region, in countries such as Nigeria, support democracy in Mali, to hold peace together in fragile countries such as Sierra Leone, at the same time, how to prevent there from being future outbreaks of violence of this nature. Sometimes it's hard to prove an atrocity that's been averted, but I will say that this Administration has really given Africa, I think, unprecedented attention in an effort to really try to make Rwanda and similar kinds of events not happen again. Ms. McKinney. There have been recent revelations from a Canadian newspaper, Steven Edwards, of the National Post, about the goings on of the U.N. Rwanda tribunal. One of the things that was mentioned was the fact that there is currently an investigation underway to investigate the leaders, the current leadership of the government of Rwanda for having committed human rights abuses in the past, that there also is an investigation of the plane crash as well. Now, in the area of atrocities prevention, we know that Vice President Kagame was trained in the United States and we also understand that current members of the Rwandan military are receiving training in the United States. Do we know the extent to which they have subscribed to atrocities prevention curricula and whether or not our students have been involved in human rights abuses in Democratic Republic of Congo or in Rwanda? Mr. Koh. Congresswoman, I am a professor and have been a professor for the last 15 years. Many of my students have gone on to do things that I don't approve of and, frankly, I don't take the blame for all of that. I think I teach them well, and then they go off and do what they're going to do with the training we give them. Ms. McKinney. But, now, the question was are we making an effort to understand just exactly what it is that our students and former students are doing in Rwanda or Uganda, and for that matter, the Democratic Republic of Congo? Mr. Koh. We not only make it a point to know. We consider it to be a critical part of our legal duties in this regard. I know Congressman Delahunt has already signaled to me some of his questions with regard to all of our security assistance. We work as hard as we can on the question to try to make sure that human rights training is done, that those people who train in the United States have rigorous human rights training and understand those issues. What they go off to do, that is sometimes beyond our control. I understand the concerns that you have about the Rwanda tribunal. It has not functioned perfectly and on numerous occasions, we have pointed out the difficulties both in setting up the operation and for it to move into an effective tribunal for investigations and prosecutions. We're happy to get back to you on the specifics of the questions that you asked, but I will say that on this issue, we acknowledge the concerns that you have about the tribunal itself. We simply point to the fact that there is no alternative to a well functioning Rwanda tribunal, and we have to move as hard as we can to try to beef it up. There's a new prosecutor there, Carla Del Ponte, who has committed herself to make new commitments on the issues. There are new judges on the tribunal, including a new Sri Lankan judge, Justice Osaka Gunarwahduna, who is a person of considerable reputation. Our hope is that the Rwanda tribunal can move forward and start to deliver real justice in important cases. Ms. McKinney. It's my understanding that there are some people who are very fearful for their personal security as they conduct these investigations of events surrounding the plane crash and what happened in 1996 in Democratic Republic of Congo. What are we doing to make--to assure the protection of those investigators as they go about the important business of letting us know, letting the world know just exactly what indeed did happen there? Also, I have a question about the Gersoni report and I would like to know if you've read the Gersoni report and if you have, would you please make sure that I could get a copy of it? Mr. Koh. In fact, I do think the Gersoni report was something that we provided to your office through our legislative---- Ms. McKinney. I requested it, but we have not yet received it. Mr. Koh. I'm sorry. After the meeting that we had in your office with the members of my bureau, they were not able to get a copy of it because it has not yet been published. We will continue our effort to try to get that report and make it available to you. Ms. McKinney. And what is it that we're doing to protect those people who are conducting these investigations of very sensitive issues concerning the events in 1994 and 1996? Mr. Koh. I don't have the current information, so let me get back to you on that one. Ms. McKinney. I guess I'm done, Mr. Chairman. Mr. Smith. Thank you very much, Ms. McKinney. Mr. Delahunt. Mr. Delahunt. Yes. Mr. Secretary, my first question is, in terms of the assistance package that will be shortly considered by Congress relative to Colombia, could you describe your involvement? Not necessarily your personal involvement, but the engagement of your bureau in terms of the development of the package? Mr. Koh. Yes. It's consumed a very large part of my personal time and also the time of many members of my bureau. I think this is illustrated by the fact that yesterday, when we got together with Vice President Gustavo Bell, who is the point person for the Colombian human rights program. We probably had 15 members of my bureau in the room, each of whom had worked on some aspect of this. Let me go back. As you know, Congressman, I went to Colombia last April and spoke at a conference in Medellin, in which we outlined the five human rights concerns that the Administration has; first, the need to bring about peace; second, the need to end impunity, which I know has been a great concern of yours; third, the need to reestablish the rule of law; next, to protect human rights defenders; and then, critically important, to end paramilitary/military ties. At that conference, which was in April 1998, I called for the arrest of Carlos Castanyo, which, given that he was in Medellin, I don't think made me very popular and made the ride to the airport a very enjoyable one. Since then, the government of Colombia has come forward with Plan Colombia and it is a Colombian plan, but it is one on which they sought input from both the U.S. Government and from other foreign donors. As you know from hearings that Under Secretary Pickering has given up here, it's a massive plan. It's some seven billion plus of which the Colombian contribution is four billion and the U.S. contribution, depending how it would be measured and which is before this body on the aid packages, between 1.3 and 1.6 billion. Now, early on, identified was the need for both social and economic development to be part of this plan, which means nationwide; namely, building human rights institutions and the rule of law. The Fiscalea, the prosecutor's office, the Procuradorea, the creation of houses of justice, so-called cases judicias, and it was our bureau, particularly our office of democracy promotion, working together with the Agency for International Development, that developed what could be called the nationwide elements of the human rights, building of the human rights rule of law infrastructure and discussing this and relating it to the Plan Colombia Program. Mr. Delahunt. Now, let me interrupt, because there are aspects of the plan clearly that I think are very positive in nature, and your reference to them, the funding for alternative crop substitution, or I think a better way to describe it is economic development in rural areas, infrastructure needs, the funding for judicial reform, support for the attorney general's office, as well as the chief prosecutor. These are all very favorable. From my perspective and my opinion, they are very attractive. Mr. Koh. Right. Mr. Delahunt. And I think it's important to understand, too, that they, in many cases, are new to Colombia, because historically Colombian governments have not invested in the more rural areas. Only recently has the concept of alternative crop substitution been embraced by the government and that's under the leadership of President Pastrana. It has not existed. So we find these very attractive. But you are clearly aware of many of the concerns that have been articulated by the human rights community regarding the military, the security assistance package, and that's what I want you to address. I'm sure you're as familiar with those reports as I am. Mr. Koh. I may even be more familiar with them than you are, Congressman. Mr. Delahunt. I'm sure you are. Mr. Koh. Let me say this. The separate issue that you raise is the extent to which support for an increased counter- narcotics effort in the south part of Colombia, particularly the Putumayo and the Kakaita regions, will itself create or enhance human rights problems because of concerns that we have about the human rights record of the Colombian government, and that has been a primary concern for me, because, Congressman, I'm not going to be in this job for the rest of my life and for me, I am not going to participate in anything which I think makes the human rights situation in the country worse. Now, I think---- Mr. Delahunt. But don't we have--let me interrupt you again, Mr. Secretary, because I would suggest that if we strengthen, if you will, the conditions or we amend--if we subject the military, the security assistant to certain conditions, in fact, there is the potential to improve the record of the Colombian military. I have a variety of amendments that myself and other colleagues will be proposing, but I think there is an opportunity here to do something in terms of the military as an institution within the society, to strengthen it in terms of its record on human rights, which, until recently, has been poor, and that very well might be an overstatmenet. Some would describe it, I think appropriately, as abysmal. While I'm speaking here, I think it's important to know that really it has been the government of President Pastrana, as well as the leadership of General Tapias and General Mora and other certain selected members of the military that have made an effort, and I think it would be remiss of us not to know that they--that some progress has been made. But I think and I believe that we have an opportunity here, in fact, to move that agenda, the agenda of the respect for human rights by the military further if we strengthen, by a series of conditions, the proposal when it comes to security assistance. Mr. Koh. The first part of your statement, which is that we ought to work with the Pastrana government to try to promote their structural efforts to improve what we acknowledge is a poor human rights record, I couldn't agree with more. The question is whether the imposition of human rights conditions on aid is the best way to achieve that, and then there I think we may have differences. Let me go back, because, Congressman, I went with Secretary Albright to Carahania in January. I went with Under Secretary Pickering to Bogatah in February, just a few days before you got there. I met with the Plan Colombia team and the human rights elements of it, both when they came up here in mid February and I met again with Vice President Bell yesterday to go over a range of issues. I think the key is the extent to which the civilian leadership in Colombia, which has a demonstrated commitment to trying to address what they recognize is a problem, which is the persistent ties between the paramilitary and the military, and how they can move forward with a credible, practical program for severing those ties. Now, on February 25, Vice President Bell announced the creation of an interagency coordinating commission that would try to receive inputs about pending paramilitary activities and to try to head them off. Defense Minister Ramirez announced that there would be an effort to give to General Tapias, who I think we all agree is a man of great credibility in this effort, authority to clean house that would be parallel to that given to General Serrano, the head of the national police. Mr. Delahunt. May I interrupt? Because that happens to be exactly one of the amendments that I intend to offer in terms of this particular package is that the authority that was conferred upon General Serrano, which I suggest and submit has had a very positive impact as far as the Colombian national police, also be conferred on General Tapias. Mr. Koh. Congressman---- Mr. Delahunt. And I think that's an important condition prior to the delivery of any security assistance, Mr. Secretary. Mr. Koh. The question is, does that need to be an external condition, when I believe that that is an internal condition that will be imposed by Colombian law. The Colombian government has passed a military justice reform act and is moving to the passage of implementing legislation and decree authority has already been given, and I think the critical---- Mr. Delahunt. Again, I think you and I are on the same page, Mr. Secretary, but that hasn't been passed by the Congress. It's still pending and it has been pending for some time. Mr. Koh. I agree. Mr. Delahunt. And I, for one, am not ready to support a military assistance until that occurs, until that is done. Mr. Koh. You are---- Mr. Delahunt. You call it an external condition. These are American taxpayers' dollars and we need reassurance. Mr. Koh. I think the key condition is the one which is already there, which is the Leahy amendment, and which I think is designed to make sure that U.S. security assistance does not flow to forces that have not taken effective measures to prevent human rights abuse. I think that's been a salutary condition, it's been one that my office is devoted to monitoring and it's one that we continue to think is hugely important. My own view is that you don't have to sugar-coat the human rights record of the government, because our report does not do that. We call a human rights abuse a human rights abuse. But I think you can still conclude that the current conditionality regime, which is the Leahy amendment, coupled with the government's own stated commitments and efforts to modify and change domestic Colombian law, which include we are pressing them very strongly on the enactment of law enforced disappearances, implementing legislation to the code of military justice, we then create the internal conditions that make the imposition of these external conditions unnecessary. I think President Pastrana put it well when he said that the key condition is the condition within his own government, namely, his own no tolerance policy for human rights abuses, and my view is you can recognize that he has only gotten a certain amount of traction on these issues in his time in office and still say that our best hope of bringing real human rights change to Colombia is to support the Pastrana administration in bringing about a genuine human rights action plan to address these issues, and that's where I stand on the question. Mr. Delahunt. Again, I would just note for the record that in Colombia, we have an administration that merely has a little more than 2 years at this point in terms of its existence. What I'm concerned about, not so much as what the Pastrana government may do or not do, but after the Pastrana administration is concluded and legislation that cannot be changed by decree, I would suggest and submit to you, is absolutely essential. Mr. Koh. I happen to believe, Congressman, that most change of human rights has to come from within the country, driven by the domestic democratic process, and a commitment to this which is then embodied in the constitution and laws of that government. That's the way human rights change comes about here and that means both strengthening internal structures--namely, structures of internal military discipline--and external structures--namely, structures of prosecution and judicial independence and also rule of law questions, and I think that's where our resources need to go. My own view is that that will be the key. The point I think that you made very well, Congressman, is there is a problem with democracy in Colombia and it's not elections. They have elections regularly. It's that they simply do not have the kind of legal infrastructure and institutional infrastructure that we see in countries that have more well developed systems of checks and balances, judicial independence, the rule of law, and that's what they need to build. I think it's a very daunting challenge for the Pastrana government. I think they have a credible action plan as part of Plan Colombia to deal with it, both on a nationwide level and in regard to the particular concerns in the Putumayo and Kakaita and I think we ought to support them in that effort. I think that the conditionality of the Leahy amendment, coupled with the internal conditions that they are imposing on themselves through law, are, in our judgment, sufficient to meet the concerns that you and I share. Mr. Delahunt. I'm sure we'll be talking, and I'll yield back. Mr. Smith. Thank you very much. Mr. Tancredo. Mr. Tancredo. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. My concerns go back to, I think, some comments or reflect the kind of comments that have been made earlier in terms of not a concern about what is in the reports, the country report, but in this case, specifically Sudan, what is not there. I think that there is an absolutely egregious lack of information, an egregious fault here that has been characterized by a lack of attention to some of the most pressing, most incredible human rights violations that the world has ever seen. I know that that's a fairly dramatic statement and some might even call it bombastic, but the fact is that we are reaching proportions now with two million dead, over four million dispossessed people, and I think you can characterize the situation in Sudan in the kinds of terms that I have used. Certainly you could characterize the situation in Sudan in terms far more severe than were used in your country report. For instance, there is no mention of genocide. That term is often thrown around far too loosely, I believe, and in using it incorrectly, it tends to actually demean its real effect. In reality, this can be absolutely and accurately applied to what has been happening in Sudan, yet it does not appear in your report. Nothing in your report reflects the government, the Khartoum government attempt and successful attempts at blocking food aid. The fact is that this is perhaps one of the most significant parts of the problem there, causing more deaths than many other things in Sudan at the present time. Yet there is no mention of it, at least certainly not enough to actually bring it to the attention necessary, I think, for our Committee to reflect on it. There is no mention of the effect of the oil money that is now falling to Khartoum as a result of the pipeline that has been opened and the scorched earth policy that has been implemented by Khartoum around the pipeline. They are attempting, of course, to prevent attacks on the pipeline, but the money that is now coming into Khartoum, we see the effects of that. We have observed an increase in the number of incidents and in their severity. Not that bombings are new, but some of the characteristics here of the bombings in Sudan would indicate that there is a greater level of severity and a greater level of technological application here that could only come about as a result of the money that the Khartoum government is obtaining as a result of the pipeline. There is no condemnation of the companies running the pipeline, no condemnation of Talisman, no condemnation of the China National Petroleum Corporation for what they are doing there and what is happening as a result of the money that's flowing in to Khartoum. There is no mention, to the extent that I was able to review here, no mention of Joseph Coney and his Lord's Resistance Army, which has been responsible for large-scale abductions of children. The Khartoum regime has been harboring and supporting Mr. Coney. Children are forced to serve in his, ``army'' either as child soldiers, laborers or sex slaves. In the past, Coney has promised mass release of children, which never materialized. Is there anything that the United States can do to help secure the release of those children or help slow the pace of these awful kidnappings? I'm not surprised that this certainly wasn't mentioned in the report, but am I to gather that because you have chosen not to emphasize these things, not to accurately reflect the situation in Sudan, not to reflect the egregious outrages being perpetrated by Khartoum on the south, this is a reflection of Madeleine Albright's statement of September 15, 1999, where she said ``the human rights situation in Sudan is not marketable to the American people.'' Now, if that is the case, if that's the reason, then I would suggest to you that it is not proper and it is a flagrant admission of this Administration's policy of heating polls rather than facts. I would suggest to you that whether or not the human rights situation in Sudan is marketable to the American public should not be a criteria for the State Department, in terms of the way it addresses the situation there. It should address the situation in Sudan on the basis of the fact that we know genocide is actually going on and all of the other things that I have mentioned. So I am very, very concerned, of course, about first, the lack of emphasis that I think should have been placed on the situation there, and also maybe the reason for that lack of emphasis. I'd like you to comment. Mr. Koh. Congressman Tancreda, we share your deep concern about the human rights situation in Sudan. Secretary Albright and I have talked about it on many occasions and spent a particular amount of time in November, when we traveled to Nairobi, Kenya, met with members of Sudanese civil society, also met with members of the EGAD process, which is an effort to try to bring about this issue. Your former colleague, Congressman Harry Johnston, who I think we would all agree is a man of tremendous integrity and as the former chair of the Africa Subcommittee, extraordinarily knowledgeable about this, has come back to try to bring about peace in Sudan to end this 16-year civil war, which we acknowledge is one of the world's greatest humanitarian tragedies. It's claimed the lives, as you said, of some two million Sudanese civilians and internally displaced four million others. Where I would differ with you, Congressman, is about the statements that you say that we have not made. Blocking of food aid is something that we have discussed at tremendous length, as mentioned in Section 1G of our report. The scorched earth policy is discussed in Sections 1A, 1C and 1G of the report. Bombing of innocent civilians in Part 1A, 1C, 1G and 2C of the report. Joseph Coney and the Lord's Resistance Army, that whole situation came to light because of a Human Rights Watch report which was authored by the person who is now my special assistant. It's covered not only in Section 5, 6C, 6F, 6D and 1G of the report, but also at great length in the Uganda report, where we point out that the Lord's Resistance Army operates in the north from bases in southern Sudan, viciously abusing human rights, continuing to kill, torture, maim and rape, et cetera. Secretary Albright has herself--I think the context in which she made the statement, it is not marketable, was followed by the statement, but nevertheless, she will continue to mention it every turn. On February 16, after her meeting with Bishop Max Gossis, who I think many of you up here have met, who is the charismatic and courageous Bishop from the Nuba Mountains, we issued a statement in which the Secretary expressed her outrage at the Khartoum government's bombing of a school on February 8 and called on them to cease the aerial bombardment of civilian targets, pointing out that 14 young children and one teacher had been killed, and again committing ourselves to reenergize the EGAD process and to carry on the work of Harry Johnston. On these issues, the particular issues, slavery, religious persecution, blocking of humanitarian life lines, indiscriminate bombing of civilians, we have mentioned this at every turn. Now, the two points that you mentioned, the effect of oil money. We have read the Harker report from Canada, which just came out in February, and, therefore, is not discussed in our report for the simple reason that our report ends in December. It will be discussed in next year's report. It's also the subject of discussion by the special Rapporteur. We are very concerned about the extent to which U.N.--I'm sorry--that oil money will continue to fuel the conflict and it's something on which we have engaged with the Canadians already with regard to the Talisman energy issue. When we were in Cartahana, Secretary Albright met Foreign Minister Axworthy and discussed this issue with him. Foreign Minister Axworthy was here last week and she discussed it with him again. Obviously, the Chinese have not been as responsive to us on this question as they have on other human rights concerns, but it's nevertheless an issue that we raise with them. I think in the end, the one point on which you point is the question of genocide. Should we use the term genocide? And I think you yourself made the good point that it's a term that has both a legal and a political connotation. The legal connotation flows from the 1949 genocide convention, which the Senate ratified. As a Justice Department attorney, I worked on the ratification process. It's a standard which is met by any number of situations around the world. It's the intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a race or ethnic group. But I think what we also understand is that the political understanding of the term genocide is something that we reserve for extremely grave and egregious situations and the question is what does this mean, how should we respond, if we're going to use a term like genocide. I think that's something that we have been extremely concerned about. I think the question in the State Department is are we taking a hard tough look at our Sudan strategy and try to make it work better, recognizing the difficulties we have had up until now in having a real impact on the situation. I would say that I have been in meeting after meeting on the Sudan policy, some of them have been extremely difficult, but I think that Secretary Albright has made it clear that this is really one of her top human rights priorities and not because of welcome political and public attention to the question, not because it's marketable, but because it's something on which we as an Administration would really like to get some traction before the end of our time in office. Mr. Tancredo. Thank you, Mr. Secretary. Mr. Secretary, you mentioned you would like to get some traction on it and, of course, the Congress gave you an option in that regard. It gave you an opportunity, which you chose not to use, in terms of the ability to use food aid to support the south. I assume that you still believe that that is a correct path to follow, but I guess I wonder under what conditions do you consider. Would you consider that a change in your policy vis- a-vis the food aid to the south should be considered? Mr. Koh. As you said, this was an opportunity that was given to us that we are still contemplating how to act on and that I do think the question of how food aid can or should be used in an ongoing conflict is a subject of very extensive disagreement. I think that if you call humanitarian NGO's here and ask them about the impact of this and whether it would potentially have an impact on Operation Life Line in Sudan, they might give you questions that would raise concern for you as to whether this is the best way to go. I think in the end, our focus is on revitalizing the EGAD process and trying to bring the relevant parties to the table, trying to use special envoy Harry Johnston, who is a person of tremendous integrity, to try to deal with all sides of the issue, to try to call the SPLA on human rights abuses when they occur, and we've just had an incident with regard to John Gurang, where Secretary Albright called him last weekend to encourage him to relent from the signing of a memorandum of understanding which led a number of leading humanitarian organizations, including CARE and World Vision, to withdraw from the process, and to keep the public focus on the very issues that you've mentioned, slavery, religious persecution, interference with humanitarian aid, and the indiscriminate shelling of civilians. This is something that we're trying to do at the U.N. Human Rights Commission in Geneva, we're trying to do in all of our bilateral discussions, and it's an issue that we will not let drop. Mr. Smith. Thank you, Mr. Tancredo. I just have a few followup questions and my colleagues may want to pose a few more, and we do thank you for your generosity of time, Mr. Secretary. Last year, as you may know, the House of Representatives passed my resolution H. Res. 128, which condemned the murder of human rights lawyer Rosemary Nelson and specifically called on the British Government to launch an independent investigation into her murder, as well as a public judicial inquiry into the possibility of state collusion in the murder of defense attorney Patrick Finucane in 1989. Similarly, in Section 405 of our bill H.R. 3427, which the President signed, the State Department authorization bill, the full Congress expressed its concern about the violence or threat of violence against defense attorneys in Northern Ireland and, again, highlighted the murders of Rosemary Nelson and Patrick Finucane. Rosemary Nelson herself testified, as you know, before our Subcommittee in September 1998 and asked the U.S. Government to do more on behalf of attorneys like herself who continued to receive death threats for discharging their duties on behalf of those clients charged with political offenses. She said, and I remember she said this very clearly on the record, ``No lawyer can forget what happened to Patrick Finucane,'' and explained further that allegations of official collusion in his murder, which U.N. Special Rapporteur Param Cumaraswamy found credible, are particularly disturbing. Rosemary Nelson asked us to communicate to the British Government how important a public inquiry into the Finucane case would be to the peace process and for the rule of law in Northern Ireland. In response, several members joined me in writing Tony Blair, urging an independent public inquiry. We passed legislation calling on the British to do more for defense attorneys in the north and mandated a reform FBI/RUC police training exchange program, a vetting process. I see in the report much discussion about the Nelson and Finucane cases, especially the new developments in the Finucane case, which seem to substantiate the charges of RUC collusion in this murder. My question is, is the Administration now prepared to join the House and, in fact, the Irish Prime Minister Bertie Ahern who just 2 weeks ago called for an independent judicial inquiry into the murder of Patrick Finucane and, I would add, as well, Rosemary Nelson. Mr. Koh. Congressman, as you know, this has been something of great concern to me. We discussed it last time I was here for the country reports. This past week, and I was in Dublin at a gathering of human rights lawyers, in which this was very much the subject of discussion, I discussed it with Mr. Martin O'Brien, a leading human rights attorney there, Jane Winter of the Irish Human Rights Center has been here and has raised this issue with both of us. The Finucane and Rosemary Nelson killings were, in our view, a savage assault on the independence of lawyers and it was very clear that the Rosemary Nelson murder following 10 years on the death of Mr. Finucane, a still unsolved case, has only made the point again. I understand next week, Mr. Chairman, you're holding a hearing at the Helsinki Commission to hear from Mr. Finucane's widow on the range of issues that are raised by this. I think we believe that there must be an objective and independent investigation to the question. I think we have called on--we have identified in the human rights report our concerns about the independence of these issues in the past. Obviously, the peace process continues to be a prime concern. Jim Steinberg, the Deputy National Security Advisor, and Mr. Norland, are there now in Ireland on this question and as you know, Bertie Ahern and the other leading players in the peace process will be coming here on St. Patrick's Day for a major meeting at the White House. In our view, the range of issues to be implemented have to be folded into the peace process. You had a hearing before this Committee in which Chris Patton, who is now the Foreign Relations Commissioner of the European Union, appeared and he was discussing the results of his own report on policing. I know you will be hearing later this afternoon from Elisa Massimino from the Lawyers Committee on Human Rights, which has played a leading role on the question. I think our belief is in this process, we have to move toward getting to the bottom of these two cases, which are not only egregious cases in themselves, but have a broader significance, and to use the peace process in a way to energize the human rights process in Northern Ireland that will prevent such cases from happening again. Mr. Smith. Thank you very much for that and, hopefully, as a Commissioner, you will join us at that hearing. As I think we have had five hearings on human rights in the north of Ireland. We had, as you pointed out, Patten himself. Frankly, while he's a very clever and articulate diplomat, having read the report twice and made a number of notations in reading it, and then, more importantly, having asked him a number of questions, I was very, very disappointed in the fact that there will be no vetting whatsoever of those who may have committed atrocities, may have been a part of the collusion. Just for the record, our hearing will be held on Tuesday, March 14th. The Committee on the Administration of Justice, Martin O'Brien's group, will be part of that, Geraldine Finucane, as you pointed out, Rosemary's brother will also be here. So it should hopefully bring additional focus and we hope that the Administration will be very bold, as it has been on other Irish issues, in asking for that independent inquiry. There seems to be a cover-up, an unseemly cover-up, if you will, and the suggestion of that, we don't know for sure, came out during our hearing with Patten. Just why not, why not go wherever the evidence takes us on these cases. To think that people who may be very high in the RUC may have been complicity in these crimes and other crimes makes for justice denied, as well a perhaps other acts which could be committed in the future. Let me just turn our attention briefly to Peru. Although it doesn't reach a firm conclusion, the country report for Peru lays out the strong case for the unconstitutionality of President Fujimori's effort to win a third term. A recent report by the highly respected ombudsman, Jorge Santistevan, also suggests evidence of massive fraud and manipulation by the government officials on behalf of the Fujimori candidacy. In light of the Administration's frequently stated commitment to democracy in the western hemisphere, and it's a commitment we all share, what specifically is the U.S. Government doing to ensure free and fair elections, with the media being very heavily put upon? We know that the government controlled news media has attacked the ombudsman. There have been attacks on El Commercio, the newspaper that broke the story on the election fraud, and I know there are probably some people who think the opposition party shouldn't even participate rather than participate in a fraudulent election. What are we doing to ensure that this does not happen? We know that there was a Fuji coup before. Now, in daylight, we may be seeing something that is parallel to that by rigging the process. Mr. Koh. One of the themes of our introduction to our human rights report is about threats to Latin democracy that occurred in 1999 and efforts to deal with those. In Ecuador, in Paraguay, concerns that we have in Venezuela, and, of course, the issue of Peru. I think that we have said in our report that we're in a situation in which the separation of powers has been dramatically undermined. The executive branch dominates the legislature in the judiciary. Congress removed three judges so that the constitutional tribunal there is unable to function, and questions remain about openness and fairness of electoral process and about due process, the well known Lori Berenson case. We have also seen inhibitions of media freedom, continuing impunity, torture and poor prison conditions, and issues of arbitrary arrest and detention. In November, I went to Costa Rica for the 30th anniversary of the Inter-American Court of Human Rights, and there we engaged with the Vice Foreign Minister of Peru about the questions of the relationship between Peru and the Inter- American human rights system. As you might know, they have withdrawn from the Inter-American Court of Human Rights and we believe that this is an extremely negative trend. Recently I met with both the Vice Minister and the Foreign Minister--I'm sorry--the Justice Minister and the Foreign Minister, Mr. Bustamonte, and raised again our concern about these issues, and he actually commented about the meeting later in criticizing our human rights report. Now, we have been trying to deal with this by funding programs for electoral and democracy building in Peru and particularly we've funded pre-electoral observation missions that are run by the National Democratic Institute and the Carter Center and the funding of local observation and voter NGO education programs through approving NGO called Transparencia. We've also tried to build approving civil society organizations by funding them to promote voter education and turnout, especially in the rural areas, to build political participation among women and young people and promote greater debate about the issue of democratic reforms. U.S. programs have also been used to strengthen the program of the human rights ombudsman and to support the work of human rights NGO's. I think it's fair to say that Latin democracy, in many cases, is a fragile institution, as we've seen. Many times, the people prefer the strong leader to the strong democratic institutions, and it's a long-term struggle on which I think we need to unite hands and work on a bipartisan basis over the years to come. Mr. Smith. Thank you very much, Mr. Secretary. Hopefully, those organizations that you mentioned, the Transparencia and the Carter group and the Democratic Institute, will be very proactive, because it's not just--as we all know--the day of election. We've seen a growing theft, the growing evidence at least that there may be a theft of the presidency by President Fujimori. So hopefully more can be done. It's only a month away or so. April 8th, I believe is the date for the election. So that there is a real honest to goodness lead-up to and then actual casting of ballots. Mr. Koh. One of our most skilled Ambassadors, John Hamilton, a former Deputy Assistant Secretary for Western Hemisphere Affairs, has been posted to Lima and has been working these issues extremely aggressively. I spoke to him about this, about 2 weeks ago, and the embassy is deeply committed to pressing and working on the issue, as is everybody in the department. Mr. Smith. I appreciate that, and thank you for your statement. Let me ask, again, with regard to Peru, the country reports noted that there were serious charges of involuntary sterilizations in the Peruvian government's family planning program in 1997 and 1998, but it lists only cases involving offers of food or other benefits or which people were sterilized without being fully informed of the nature of the operation. Why does the report fail to mention even more serious charges, such as sterilization of women after caesarian sections without any attempt at all to get the woman's consent? You might recall, we had a hearing, at which time we heard from two women who had been sterilized against their will and at great risk to themselves, flew up here and spoke out, and also a doctor who was a whistleblower, who also made very strong statements with regard to Fujimori's war on poverty, which was to sterilize the poor, using denial of benefits and other--and then more coercive means of doing so. The report notes that the ombudsman has received numerous complaints of instances that are said to have occurred after March 1998, when the government stated that it was changing its policies to eliminate coercion. The country report notes that the ombudsman has continued to investigate these complaints. In light of the substantial U.S. cooperation with and support of the Peruvian government program, have we conducted our own investigation of these complaints? What have we concluded? What changes will result in our policy of cooperation with the Peruvian government if we discover that coercive practices are continuing in the program? Mr. Koh. Congressman, these were of concern to me at the time of my confirmation. You and I discussed this in your office when I first came up to meet you and it's something on which we've asked for special examination. On the specifics of this particular question, I prefer to take the question and give you a written answer. Mr. Smith. I would appreciate that. Let me ask you with regard to Mexico, again, and just staying with this issue of forced sterilization, which in our hemisphere, the southern hemisphere, in such close proximity. The report says, building on the reports of last year, that the largest number of complaints against health care institutions involved forced sterilization. This year's Mexico report states that there continue to be credible allegations of forced sterilization in the country. Has the United States taken any independent steps to investigate the extent of the forced sterilization problem in Mexico? On one fact-finding trip that I took, I asked the human rights groups, and, frankly, all of the human rights groups, while my words are being translated into Spanish, as they were being translated, were shaking their heads ``yes'' and then one right after another spoke of it. Yet our person from AID dismissed the whole thing and said, ``no, that's not a problem.'' I have raised that before with you. Last year's report did note that several NGO's monitored the family planning practices, and yet that's absent this year. Who are the groups that are monitoring? Are they the family planning groups themselves who always seem to deny that there is any coercion, or was it an independent, nonbiased, nongovernmental organization, like one of the human rights groups? And in light of this, especially since Mexico was a major recipient of U.S. Government population control money, what are we doing as a major donor to see that these practices end completely and no woman is sterilized against her will? Mr. Koh. Again, on the specifics and which groups are doing the monitoring, I would prefer to submit an answer, along with the Peruvian answer. I will say that we have an extremely robust bilateral human rights dialogue with the government of Mexico. It's been conducted over the last couple of years by my principal Deputy Assistant Secretary Leslie Gerson, who, unlike myself, is a Spanish speaker. It happens at the Deputy Assistant Secretary level, it happened last year in Washington. She went then to Mexico for a period of about 5 days, including trips to Chiapas and dealing with her opposite numbers there. I had discussions with Foreign Minister Rosario Green when I was in Costa Rica and saw her again at the Guatemalan Presidential inauguration in February and Secretary Albright met with Rosario Green and raised human rights issues, among others, in Wauhauka, in early January. Our Ambassador in Mexico, Jeff Davidow, is a former Assistant Secretary for Western Hemisphere Affairs and has made sure that these bilateral dialogues at the high departmental, inter-departmental level are carried forward on a day to day basis. Mr. Smith. I appreciate that. Let me ask you with regard to Cuba: There have been reports that there has been a crack down, especially with Elian's case being so high profile, on dissidents, using the cover of Castro's professed concern about family reunification, which would be very novel. But there's this crack down that we've had some evidence of. If you could speak to that, what do we know about that, of dissidents being rounded up? And, second, the Cuban report notes that under the terms of the May 2, 1995 U.S.-Cuba migration accord, the government agreed not to prosecute or retaliate against migrants returned from international or U.S. waters or from the U.S. Naval base as a consequence of their attempt to immigrate illegally. However, it does not say whether the Castro regime did, in fact, prosecute or retaliate against any of those returnees. Specifically, has there been any retaliation? I've seen reports that there has been. What is your finding? How many people did the U.S. return to Cuba during 1999 under that agreement? How many of the total number of returnees since 1995 are now in prison and how do we go about monitoring their treatment or mistreatment if they are indeed in prison? Mr. Koh. We'll be happy to supply you with the specific numbers. I think as you and your senior counsel know, I had represented Cuban refugees in litigation as a private attorney and this is an issue on which I feel very concerned because of the human rights conditions to which they are being returned. On the Ilion Gonzalez case, because of my responsibilities as the asylum--in our asylum office and dealing with asylum questions, there is a possibility that that case may come before me in a form in which I'm going to have to provide a legal opinion, and, therefore, I would prefer not to address it. I do think that the broader issue of Cuban human rights abuses is one that we discuss in great detail in the report, the continuing crack down on political dissent, the continuing detention of the four dissidents, of the dissident working group, including Marta Beatrice Roques, who is now very ill, Vladimir Roka, who is the son of the famous Mr. Roka, the leader of the--the original leader of the communist party and as I mentioned in my own original testimony, the sentencing of Oscar Bissette. There was a hope that the Ibero-American summit might give an opportunity for the Castro regime to let up and indeed during that summit, which was held in Havana, some nine delegations met with dissidents, including three heads of state, and I think it's telling that in the aftermath of that, the Cuban government, as opposed to letting up, has, in fact, continued its crack down, bans on journalists, as I recounted in my oral statement, new restrictions, harassment efforts, and that it is for that reason that we supported the Czech and Polish government in their introduction last year of a resolution on the human rights conditions in Cuba that passed and we believe that there will be another resolution this year. U.S. interest section personnel do visit returnees to monitor their condition. Vicky Huddleston, who is the principal officer in that interest section, is someone with whom I've worked closely. She has a deep commitment on these issues, as well as the head of our Cuba desk, Mr. Charles Shapiro. So we will be happy to get back to you on specific numbers. Mr. Smith. In that answer, could you say why the report doesn't say whether any harm has come to those returnees? Is it because there hasn't been any harm? Unless I missed something in the report, I didn't see any mention of that. Mr. Koh. We'll clarify that in our answer. Mr. Smith. Appreciate that. You mentioned Dr. Biscet. There was an Associated Press article on February 25, just a few days ago, talking about his recent arrest. The AP points out that he became an activist after protesting late term abortions at a government hospital where he worked and that he was eventually fired. There was a staff delegation that went down from the Senate and House about a year ago and one of their bottom line findings was that Cuban doctors say that the regime employs a policy of coercive abortion to eliminate social risk pregnancies and that some of the criteria include hypertension and even diabetes, and that accounts, according to the staff delegation report, why they seem to have a low rate of death among newborns, because they kill children who manifest any of these problems, like diabetes or the mother might have diabetes or some other problem. What can you tell us about the issue of coercive abortion and sterilization in Cuba? Because it has not gotten much attention in the past and yet there are people like Dr. Biscet, who is well known, very credible, who is very much of an activist against the policies of his Cuban government because of that very thing. Mr. Koh. I'm restricted in the sense that I cannot visit Cuba. That's something that we do not do at the Assistant Secretary level. I've been, of course, to Guantonamo Bay in my refugee capacity on numerous occasions, but I have not been to Havana. However, the head of our Office of Country Reports, in fact, the master editor of the entire volume, Mr. Mark Susser, and Susan Kovalich, who one of the officers in our country reports section, did visit Havana and have been looking into these issues and discussing the whole set of issues. Now, I know that they have the--I think--I'm not sure that they went down until after the staff delegation report was produced and so I'm not sure they have a chance to actually test and check the particular information that you have provided, but let me check with them and ask them to give me some information so I can give you an answer to that specific question. Mr. Smith. Let me ask briefly, and then I'll yield to my distinguished friend from Georgia, with regard to Burma. A recent editorial by Fred Hyatt in the Washington Post summarized this year's country reports on Burma as follows; ``Soldiers kill and rape, forced child labor, trafficking women and girls from China for prostitution, 1,300 political prisoners, universities closed since 1996,'' and it goes on and on and on and the report goes on and on as well in chronicling those abuses. Although we don't supply direct assistance, we do so, as we all know, through NGO's and through organizations like the UNDP, and we are concerned that there may be a new program that UNDP would like to undertake that would build roads, bridges, other kinds of infrastructure which would probably be of very great benefit to the military. Now, my question is whether or not that is something that is in the offing, whether or not that is under consideration, as far as you know? Will the U.S. use its influence to ensure that U.N. organizations and international financial institutions limit their activities to activities in Burma, that address the needs of the poor and do not assist the military or government in Burma, and will they work with the National League for Democracy and the National Coalition of Government of the Union of Burma, which all of us know ought to be the ruling government in that country? Mr. Koh. I think we have expressed on many occasions over the last 5 to 10 years our unqualified support for Onsunsu Shi and her efforts to bring democracy to Burma in the face of what is now the SPDC. My own engagement on the issue came from the fact that before I was in this position, I knew Onsunsu Shi's husband, Mr. Michael Aris, and the outrageous conduct of the Burmese government last year as he attempted to be reunited with her during the period when he was dying with something, I think, again shows the really appalling human rights insensibility of the regime. I think on this point, our strategy has been one of multi- lateral sanctions, working closely with our allies. We have suspended economic aid, we've ended GSP, and overseas private investment, we have blocked lending by international financial institutions, we banned new investment by U.S. persons, and we've worked to build a broad multi-lateral coalition. At the same time, I think we all understand that Burmese refugees, and particularly students, are the future of Burma and that it's important that when this all ends, that there be a cadre of civil society that's capable of supporting democracy, and for that reason we have earmarked some six and a half million dollars for democracy and humanitarian activities for Burmese refugees along the Thai border for scholarships for Burmese students and to support democracy-based activities inside Burma. When I traveled with Secretary Albright last March to Bangkok, I met there with a group of Burmese students who have been focused on this issue, were deeply supportive of Onsunsu Shi. Now, I know that there is a continuing concern about the question of humanitarian aid. One of my own students from Yale, who now works inside of Burma, has been talking to me about this question and raised the particular set of concerns that at what point should the multi-lateral sanctions regime need to be adjusted because of concerns about humanitarian impacts. I think this is obviously something that a multi-lateral sanctions regime has to adjust to try to make sure that they are smart sanctions, that they're not impacting negatively on the people, but at the same time, that they're actually affecting the regime that's the cause of the problem. Mr. Smith. But the specific concern is that the UNDP will be ratcheting up its support and there may not be the adequate check-offs by the people who care most intimately about what happens there. They have not had a stellar record in the past and there are concerns by myself and many of us that this will be aiding and abetting the military dictatorship. Mr. Koh. We have worked closely with them and I met with the Director, Mr. Mark Mallick Brown, in September. I think he has done an outstanding job with UNDP and is very focused on these questions. I can try to find out more about the specifics of the program and get back to you on that. Mr. Smith. Let me ask you about Indonesia. We have had a number of hearings, again, in this Committee. I have gone over there. My staff director, Joseph Rees, has also visited, just recently got back from East Timor. But one of the issues that we focused on was the government or military-to-military collaboration in the past and we understand that there may be a step in that direction again under the Wahid Administration. Could we get your feeling about the Wahid Administration's human rights record, whether or not the military to military is about to be resumed. We heard from Pius Lustrilanang one of the people who was tortured. He believes and we believe, although we can't prove it absolutely, he was tortured by the military. Under the JCET's Program, we were training members of the Kopassus in sniper training and urban guerrilla warfare at a time when ultimately there were people being killed in the street using those very tactics. There are deep concerns about, again, a vetting process and whether or not people we may be training again could be human rights abusers. Is there something that is going to be announced anytime soon, do you know, and is your bureau involved in the decision with DOD? Mr. Koh. Yes. I went to Indonesia actually the day that I took office in November 1998. I returned with Secretary Albright in March and then I returned again to both Jakarta, West Timor and East Timor in early October, both to look into the situation in Delhi and also to look into the plight of refugees in West Timor, and I know that you and your chief counsel Mr. Reese have played an important role in highlighting those issues and getting Congressional attention paid to them. I think everybody understands and acknowledges the role that the TNI had played in paramilitary abuses and the need for thorough military reform and for accountability. Indeed, our new Ambassador Bob Gelbard has been a leader on this issue, as has Assistant Secretary Stanley Roth, and Secretary Albright herself has designated Indonesia as one of her key priority countries for democracy issues for this year. In September 1999, the President suspended mil-mil relations or military to military relations, which were already restricted, including initiating new training under the expanded IMET Program. As was reported in the paper, there were some very small number of former IMET students are here, I think seven of them. They are allowed to continue and finish their training with non-IMET funds. Then the Leahy amendment conditions resumption of IMET on an important set of conditions which have been the guideposts for the executive branch's actions on this. I would say the U.S. has not initiated any IMET, EIMET Programs in fiscal year 2000, nor have we conducted DOD JSEP Programs with Indonesia, since they were frozen in 1998. I think the best thing we can say at this point is the Administration is going to continue to consult with Congress to determine when it would be appropriate to resume any kind of training and any plan for reengagement would be developed in response to concrete changes. I the government of President Wahid has faced huge challenges. This is the fourth largest country in the world. They have very little tradition of civilian government. They have a new cabinet, many of whom are new to government. Nevertheless--and they're facing not just East Timor, but also situations in Ochi, Ambonne, the Malucas, as well as domestic accountability issues, as now presented by both the international commission of inquiry report on East Timor and the domestic commission report. So they have their hands full. Only a few weeks ago, three of the ministers of Indonesia, the new attorney general, Marzuki Daruzmon, the new human rights minister, Mr. Hasbal Asad, and the minister for legislation, came over and we talked to them about how to address and deal with these human rights issues. In our bureau, we're trying to find ways to support the new human rights ministry under Mr. Asad's leadership and we're also looking for ways in which we can support the human rights monitoring effort of the U.N. transitional authority in East Timor, headed by Sergio Veradamela. So we are very focused on the challenges both in Indonesia and in its regions and our committed to keeping this country in the democratic column. Mr. Smith. Let me ask you briefly about Egypt. Nina Shea, in her testimony, makes a very important point with regard to the Coptic Church, and I have myself met with President Mubasak, raised the issue of Al Kosheh and we've recently had a number of Members who actually went to Egypt and raised the issue with high government officials. There seems to be a very serious deterioration of respect for the Coptic Church. It is a very, very large minority of Christians in the Middle East, and yet the violence is growing. There is not a prosecution strategy that we can see to get the perpetrators of these crimes, and the human rights report, as Nina Shea points out, asserts that the government's human rights record, we're talking about Egypt, again, improved somewhat over the previous year. This assessment carries great weight. She testifies or will testify, ``to our knowledge, it has been cited by asylum officials in two recent cases to deny Copts petitions. It is misleading in that it fails to take into consideration the fundamental fact that government-sponsored intolerance against a religious minority in the context of religious extremism.'' I have met with a number of Copts myself. I spoke to Bhoutros-Ghali, who was giving the opposite view, on behalf of the government, who made it sound like for the Coptic Church, everything was just dandy, and yet the evidence clearly points in the other direction in a profound way. What is your response to her testimony and those assertions, which are shared by this Chairman? Mr. Koh. We have concerns about the government of Egypt's treatment of Coptic Christians, and that has been a special subject for Ambassador Robert Seiple, our Ambassador at Large for International Religious Freedom, whose office is in our bureau. He's given it a lot of attention and has visited Egypt to discuss these issues. I have myself raised the issue with Ambassador Fami here. I know Secretary Albright has raised it with Foreign Minister Musa, and the Alkoush case obviously is, in both of its manifestations, one in 1998 and the more recent incident, a particularly troubling event. There is a particular issue with regard to this year's report, which is, again, we have to cutoff the report on December 1999. Some of the violence which started Alkoush two started on New Year's Eve, and it continued into the next year, and, therefore, we report on it in our introduction. It will be reported at great length, I'm sure, in this year's international religious freedom report, which will issue in September. In the meantime, Ambassador Dan Kirtzer and our embassy in Cairo continued to press on the issue and this is something on which the Commission for International Religious Freedom, on which Nina Shea sits, has done a good job in highlighting. We think that that issue will continue to receive a lot of well deserved attention. Mr. Smith. Can that information also be gotten to asylum officers, I'm not sure what your mechanism is, so they're not making decisions based on guidance that is either outdated or wrong? Mr. Koh. As we say, Mr. Chairman, I'm glad you mentioned that issue. We have a valiant staff of 12 who do human rights reporting. They now do a country report which, as you know, is, this year, 6,000 pages. They finished it at the end of February. They have to then move quickly to the international religious freedom report, which is then due in September. We have expanded reporting requirements on a number of issues. They also bear the burden of revising asylum profiles and, frankly, many of them are so exhausted that it's something that we really don't have a chance to update these profiles as much as we'd like. This is not for lack of commitment on the issue, and we do appreciate the enhanced resources that we have this year, but I think it's a continuing concern to us as to how we can keep handling new Congressionally mandated reports which really tax our resources and keep doing the job that we're supposed to do in so many different areas. Mr. Smith. I do have other questions, but I will yield. Congressman Radanovich has asked that his statement be made part of the record and he does ask about a constituent. He says, just briefly, ``I am primarily concerned with statements made by the State Department that 'there are no reports of politically motivated disappearance,'' and he's talking about Laos. ``You may be aware of the case of my constituent, Michael Vang, and his co-traveler.'' I wonder--and I raised this in my opening comments, Mr. Secretary--if you might touch on that, and then I'll yield to Cynthia McKinney. Mr. Koh. Yes. The case of the two Americans, Woa Li and Michael Vang, has been a great concern to us. When we first learned of the disappearances, our embassies in Laos and Thailand worked closely with the FBI to try and pursue all credible leads. We sent a joint fact-finding team to the border area twice, first in November 1999, then in November 1998 and July 1999, and were unable to reach conclusions. You mentioned this in your opening statement. There were conflicting reports and it was difficult to resolve them and the inconsistencies between them. We tried to get to the bottom of it. Our embassy raised the issue. Ambassador Seiple visited Laos and again raised the issue. Assistant Secretary Roth has pursued the question here in D.C., and Neil Silver, who is the head, the Office Director for our Laotian Affairs Bureau, has been pursuing this. The lead on this has been taken by our consular affairs bureau, which, of course, has responsibility for the whereabouts of all American citizens. The fact remains that the reported disappearances occurred in the Golden Triangle area, which is very rugged terrain. We have incomplete reports, which complicate the investigation. But it continues to be a very high priority for us in terms of resolving the issue. Secretary Albright has met with both the Lao Ambassador and also the Lao foreign minister to underscore the concern and our charge in Vientiane has repeatedly pressed on the question. We know that staff from this Committee and also from the Foreign Relations Committee went and have been trying to get to the bottom of the question. I'm happy to say that we are hoping that the next deputy chief of mission in Vientiane will be an alumnus of our own office and will, I'm sure, be taking this question on board. Mr. Smith. Thank you, Mr. Secretary. Cynthia McKinney. Ms. McKinney. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I just have a few questions. First of all, what is the position of the State Department with respect to a tribunal to investigate the crimes against humanity that have been committed in East Timor? Mr. Koh. I think we don't always move first to the question of international tribunal, if a credible domestic process can function. As you well know, Congresswoman, it was so difficult to create both the international tribunal for the former Yugoslavia and for Rwanda---- Ms. McKinney. Are you suggesting that a credible domestic opportunity exists to bring the Indonesian military to justice for the crimes that they have committed in East Timor? Mr. Koh. When the International Commission of Inquiry issued their report, which they did on January 31, on the same day, KPP Hahm, or so-called Komnisom, the National Human Rights Commission issued a report which was in many senses reaffirming and confirming the same information. That national report has now gone to the Attorney General's office, under Marzuki Darizmon, who as I mentioned, was here a few weeks ago. He is a former leader of the National Human Rights Commission and that office is currently exploring the question of whether prosecutions can be brought against some of these individuals. As I understand it, there are three issues at stake now; one is the extent to which these can be brought under existing Indonesian law, a second question about the new human rights law, which the Wahid government is attempting to enact. My understanding is that that law is in its eighth reading at the moment. Then there is the question of how to work together closely with the U.N. transitional authority to gather evidence and information. We have a number of staff people, including my own special assistant, who are in Jakarta and East Timor now working on the issue, and I think it's too early to say where all this evidence will lead. What I will say is that the new government is attempting to take the National Commission report, and use the information from that report to try to move to a credible process of prosecution, investigation and conviction. I think we ought to support them in that effort. Ms. McKinney. I'm interested in the attitude in the department as it relates to corporate behavior, U.S. corporate behavior. You very well know the activities of Chevron Oil Company in the Niger Delta and their complicity in massacres and in torture. What is the attitude of the department in the inclusion of corporate behavior in its human rights report? Mr. Koh. Ours is principally a report on the activities of governments. Also, we do mention behavior of corporate actors. You will see mention of this throughout the reports. I will say that our own view is that corporate actors are an important transmission belt for human rights values, the fact of the matter is that in many countries around the world, it is the corporations that have the lead and many corporate executives are committed on these issues. This was something that Kofi Annan raised in Dovos last year, and what we have done at the Department is to try to forge closer ties with corporations to try to bring their best practices to bear. One thing that was mentioned by Secretary of State Albright in Dovos on January 28 is an effort that we're trying to do to work with corporations, particularly U.S. corporations, on promoting higher standards and highlighting best practices in the extractive industries. I know my deputy Bennett Freeman came up and briefed you on this issue. There are three countries that we have identified, Colombia, Indonesia and Nigeria, on which we're going to be doing substantial work. Obviously, the situation in the Niger Delta is of grave concern and we have also met with members of Mosup, the Algoni people and particularly Owen Zwila, the brother of the martyr Ken Sarowiwa, to discuss those continuing concerns. But this is something in which we are trying to get corporations to agree to make a commitment on promoting the basic principals of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and, in particular, practices in the extractive industries, particularly with regard to their security arrangements, to make sure that they are part of the solution and not part of the problem. Mr. Smith. Mr. Delahunt. Mr. Delahunt. I mentioned in my opening remarks that I was going to ask you about the fact that both of the guerrilla groups, the ELN and the FARC, are listed on or named on the list of foreign terrorist organizations, and the AUC is not. Can you give me a response to that question? Mr. Koh. I think we're going to have to get back to you with the specifics about the terrorist list. I don't do terrorism, I do human rights, so that's really another part of the program, of the Department. I will say that with regard to paramilitary abuses, I think they're chronicled at great length in the report. Mr. Delahunt. Yes, and I applaud you on that and it's clear that the vast, the majority of human rights abuses are, in fact, committed by paramilitaries. They far exceed those committed by the insurgent groups and I think in the 1998 report, I don't know what the statistic is this year, but there was 3 percent was claimed that was committed by security forces. I presume those percentages haven't changed much, Mr. Koh. Mr. Koh. This is something in our report. We've looked at both reports of the NGO's, particularly the NGO Sinap. We've looked at the report of the Ministry of Defense and there are some discrepancies in the numbers. Where they all agreed is that extra judicial killings by paramilitaries last year were in the range of 700 to 850. Both the NGO's and the Ministry of Defense agree on those numbers, and those are higher than either abuses--extra judicial killings that were committed by the guerrillas or by the security forces. The number of killings were in the zero to 24 range, depending on who you believed. Mr. Delahunt. But you haven't incorporated within the report a specific percentage, I take it. I haven't had a chance to peruse the report. Mr. Koh. Again, it's a question of how we---- Mr. Delahunt. I'm sure these are estimates, also. I mean, I understand that. Mr. Koh. Sometimes---- Mr. Delahunt. But what I find disturbing, and I presume that there is a sound basis for not listing the AUC, but our own General McAfree has indicated that the flow of drugs into the United States is a threat to our national security and if it comes to the definition of definitions within that language, I presume that if, in fact, we consider the flow of cocaine and heroin into the United States to be in our national interest, that the reality is that the AUC, which has been described by DEA, INL and other agencies, as to be more implicated into the drug trade than even the guerrillas, that appropriately they ought to be listed, with the consequences that ensue by that listing. So I know that's not within your particular province, but I would ask that you take it back to the appropriate official and provide us with an answer, and, at the same time, encourage them to look at it with a liberal interpretation. Mr. Koh. We agree. Mr. Delahunt. Of the statutory language. Mr. Koh. We agree, Congressman, that both the paramilitaries and the guerrillas commit large-scale abuses of international human rights and humanitarian law and that they ought to be outlawed. I think they do have a difference in tactics. Paramilitaries more frequently engage in massacres of civilian groups, whereas the guerrillas have engaged in a variety of tactics, including kidnappings, massacres, extra judicial killings, recruitment of child soldiers and other kinds of abuses. I do think that both engage in profit from the drug trade and they're both part of the problem that the Pastrana government has to get on top of if they're going to bring this country into a new period in terms of human rights. Mr. Delahunt. I thank you, Mr. Secretary. I would ask, at this point in time, the Chairman, and I applaud him for having a hearing next week in terms of the situation in Northern Ireland, but I think it's particularly timely if we would consider to have--consider having a full hearing on the situation as it exists in Colombia. This is a--clearly, this package has multiple aspects of it, some of which I find very attractive, others concern me. But in particular, the area of human rights, I think it would be most timely to have a full hearing. I think it's important and I think it would assist a lot of Members to have the ability to ask some questions, not just from the Secretary, but from a variety of groups, both here in the United States and from Colombia. Mr. Smith. Thank you very much. We will look into that, but I understand that the Appropriations Committee is moving fast in terms of a markup. So it's something we ought to, as soon as we're done here today, talk about. There is another issue I'd just like to raise, and you've been very, very generous, Mr. Secretary, unlike some people who come down and speak before the House and always have to be somewhere else, so they're running out the door. You have been very generous and we deeply respect and appreciate that. Mr. Koh. It's my job and that's why I get the big bucks. Mr. Smith. You are a person who cares so much about it, as evidenced by your previous work and the fact that you are so infatigable in your efforts on behalf of human rights. Amnesty International, in their testimony, Carlos Salinas will be testifying momentarily, makes the point again. He calls you a good friend and has nothing but respect for you, as we all do, but the problem, as I said in my opening statement, is this idea of a compartmentalized approach--separating policy from the issue of reporting. He points out that when you scratch beneath the rhetorical surface, you find a complex substratum where human rights concerns are compartmentalized and rationalized out of key decisions. You might want to comment on that again, because I think that's our main problem. If you were running the show, I think we'd have very few questions about human rights being integrated with our overall foreign policy, which brings us to Turkey. I know I wanted to join you at the OSCE meeting. We unfortunately had a session of Congress and much work on our plate here and I couldn't join you. I know you did a good job there. But Amnesty points out and many of us have concerns about the Administration's apparent gearing up to provide an export license for four billion dollars for attack helicopters. We all know the incredible carnage that has been committed against the Kurdish minority. There were some human rights benchmarks that were laid out by the Turkish Prime Minister and our President in December 1997, and if you look at those benchmarks, it looks like they have not been realized and are not in the process of being realized, and maybe you have other information that you could provide to us on that. But what is the situation in Turkey in general and your view on this proposal to sell attack helicopters? Have those benchmarks been realized? Mr. Koh. As I understand it, the government of Turkey has narrowed the field in terms of the manufacturers who are still competing on that bid and so we're not at the point yet where they've selected an American bidder or an export license is actually being requested. I think it's pretty clear that if Turkey does choose a U.S. manufacturer, our export license decision is going to be based on the full range of considerations that are required by law, our arms export control policy, as well as a thorough review and evaluation of Turkey's progress on improving human rights. This has been one of the prime areas in which I have devoted my time. In August 1999, I went to Turkey for 10 days. I think that's the longest trip I've spent in any single country, including a number of days in the southeast. I went to Komlerfa, Diarbakur, the whole region in which the set of human rights concerns have been raised. I returned for the review conference in Istanbul and I returned with the President and Secretary Albright at the end of November. During that period, I opened up a human rights dialogue with the state human rights minister, Mehmet Ali Irtemcelik, with the justice minister, Mr. Sami Turk. I visited Layla Zana, Akin Birdal, and have continued to focus on these questions. You had a hearing of the Helsinki Commission on the road to Istanbul in which Mark Grossman, the Assistant Secretary for European Affairs, and I both testified in which I reviewed the human rights situation. You are correct that in 1997, in December, President Clinton and then President Ilmas did discuss the issue of attack helicopters and identified a number of important benchmarks with regard to decriminalization of freedom of expression, the release of journalists, prevention of future prosecution of journalists, addressing of the problem of torture and impunity, reopening of human rights NGO's, the implementation of the 1995 constitutional amendments regarding political participation, meaningfully ending the state of emergency in the southeast and allowing refugees of evacuated villages to go home. Now, I discussed a number of these in March 1999 when I testified before the Helsinki Commission and we have tried in our country reports to give the basis on which an assessment can be made in these areas. I think it's fair to say that with regard to torture, the government has announced some important polices, a no tolerance circular, but that, in fact, on the ground, there are serious continuing problems with regard to torture. President Demirel said, when President Clinton was there, we do have a torture problem, and just last week the parliamentarian in charge of the human rights commission there, Mrs. Selma Piskins, reported that there were, in a raid on a local police station, torture instruments discovered. In the area of freedom of expression, this continues to be a serious problem. There have been efforts to bring about legislative reform, particularly the lifting of Article 8 and 312, but, in fact, the net result has been two new laws with continuing restrictions. There have been raids on newspapers, harassment of journalists and a number of high profile journalists, particularly Andrew Finkel of Time Magazine and Nadira Mater, who is the author of a well known book about the plight of the southeast, have continued to be subject to continuing restrictions. With regard to NGO's, there have been a number of NGO's that have been reopened, but a number which continues to be closed, particularly branches of the human rights association in Malatya. The Mersin Migrants Association was, however, recently allowed to open. Mr. Birdal, who I met in Istanbul and I think we were helpful in securing his release, had been released on medical grounds, but he continues to face supervision. On the political participation question, I think the question of whether the government will seize the opportunity presented by the arrest of Mr. Ochelon remains very much up for grabs. Three of the Kurdish mayors from the Hadab party, particularly Mr. Ferdin Chellick, with whom I spent time in August, were arrested, and as I mentioned in my oral statement, were released, but are still pending trial. As I said when we released the country reports, we find this to be a very puzzling, very disturbing set of events. There are allegations that they were tortured while in detention. When there were protests about their detention, there were restrictions on freedom of expression. I think the general issue of the Kurdish question and the conditions in the southeast remain a very serious concern. We think that the government needs to move forward on this question, to recognize Kurdish language rights and cultural rights. The state of emergency has been lifted in the Province of Sert, but continues in five other provinces, and although a number of people have been evacuated forcibly, only a small percentage have been resettled. So I think we do have continuing concerns about these issues. I will say, as I said in my oral testimony, that the Ecevit government has had a number of important statements and recognitions of the need to address these questions. Foreign Minister Jihm, Ismael Jihm said that he was firmly of the belief that the Kurdish issue ought to be addressed. Sami Turk and the human rights minister have spoken out aggressively on the torture issue. I met with Prime Minister Ecevit in August and he is himself a former journalist who I think is committed to progress on this issue. I think the Helsinki, of which I and you are Commissioners, will continue to look into the question and make sure that the human rights record remains under careful review. Mr. Smith. The Chair recognizes Joseph Rees, the Staff Director, and Chief Counsel. Mr. Rees. I have what I hope will just be a couple of very brief questions. Assistant Secretary Koh, you mentioned the asylum advisory opinions, the asylum profiles that your office produces, and I think we've talked about these before. The last I checked--and I hope that things have changed since shortly after last year's hearing, when we looked into this--some of those profiles contained information that was years old. The quality of the profiles is not nearly as high as the quality of the country reports. Often, there is boilerplate that tends to talk about how many fraudulent cases there are. They really look, in some cases, like a recipe for denial in asylum cases. Specifically on the forced abortion cases from China, although these comments are not limited to that, there was information which has long since been discredited about how there aren't many forced abortions and so forth. If you could only do one thing in a timely way to eliminate the lag time between information that might tend to help asylum applicants that your office has--and I know you appreciate with this, with your own background--getting it into the hands of asylum officers and immigration judges should be a top priority, because it's not like nothing is happening while you're waiting to eliminate that lag time. People are being denied and it is of course, wrong for them to be denied on the basis of information which is not correct. I know that I speak for the Chairman in asking that you put in place, if you haven't already and maybe you already have, a system to ensure that outdated information will not be used to deny asylum claims if subsequent information in the possession of the bureau would tend to support those claims. Mr. Koh. Mr. Reese, you and I have both spent most of our careers representing asylum seekers, and so I completely share your sentiments. I do think that we, in our bureau and particularly the office of country reports and asylum, are struggling to deal with a massive workload, much of which is imposed on us by bills that have been passed by Congress, salutary bills, in many respects. But without a full awareness of the kinds of burdens that it imposes on us, and there are other bills that are pending which would impose new reporting requirements and, frankly, which make it difficult for us even to spend the enhanced resources that we have to do all the things that we need to do. On the China asylum profile, your point is something we completely accept, it's one that we have discussed in the past. We are sending one of our officers from the country reports and asylum team to China to make sure that all the information there reflects not just the country report, but also the most current information. But frankly, to be able to do this, with all of our asylum profiles and the tiny staff that we have, is extremely difficult. So we're really struggling to do everything we have to do. I don't exaggerate to say that this is the hardest working group of people I've ever worked with, the most committed, upon whom new mandates fall every day. When this bureau started in 1977, we had two mandates and we now have 55 mandates. Without a significant expansion of resources, I do think Secretary Albright has really committed herself to try to give us more resources, but as you know, the entire pie has been restricted and every day there is a fight for new resources. It's something that I didn't appreciate outside of the executive branch and now that I am here, it's, for me, one of the greatest challenges as to how to address this question. Mr. Rees. You ought to try working in the Legislative Branch. We're not trying to gainsay that, but frankly, as between sending out a wrong report and not just sending out a report at all, it would be better if you didn't send out a report at all. You mentioned the ratification of CEDAW. One of the concerns that the Chairman and other Members, primarily on the Republican side, and Senators have had is that some of the language in CEDAW might be used to create an international right to abortion. The Administration, although it supports abortion rights in domestic U.S. policy, has said that it does not favor the creation of an international human right to abortion. Yet, recently, this fear has become more than a fear, it's become a growing reality. When CEDAW commissions in country after country have been recommending, as part of their mandated recommendations, to countries, that in order to comply with CEDAW, those countries have to legalize abortion. Is that one of the reservations that the Administration has prepared to make sure, to make clear, that in order to comply with CEDAW, a country does not have to provide legal abortion? Mr. Koh. As you know, Mr. Rees, this is an issue that's addressed under our own constitutional law. I think it's the CEDAW issue and the package of reservations, understandings and declarations, under which it would be ratified, were really settled in 1994, when the Foreign Relations Committee reported the convention favorably to the whole Senate. At the time, Senator Helms proposed an additional understanding to clarify his concerns. At that moment, some 68 Senators, which is more than two- thirds, had written a letter to President Clinton, urging him to take the necessary steps to ratify the convention, but then later, because of a parliamentary motion, a hold was put on it and since 1994, the Senate has taken no additional steps toward ratification. Indeed, if the concerns that you have are ones that are widely shared, the best solution would be to hold hearings and let those concerns be vetted. But the fact of the matter is that there have been no further hearings on this question before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee. As I pointed out, 165 countries have ratified or exceeded to this convention and it's one I think that the UNICEF has issued a report in which they have chronicled all of the different countries in which it has been passed and the tremendously salutary impact that ratification of CEDAW has had. Let me put it bluntly. With regard to countries who have ratified, we look bad, because frankly we have better records on equality of rights, but we don't get the credit. With regard to the countries that don't ratify, we look bad because then we're put in their company. I think it's, something on which the Senate obviously has the lead because of its treaty ratification power. But on today, International Women's Day, it's a good day to say this is a treaty that ought to move, ought to be ratified, that we ought to be a part of. Frankly, it's embarrassing for me, as the executive branch representative, to go to meetings around the world and be asked why we haven't ratified it and to have no good explanation, other than the fact that people have concerns about it that have not been aired in new hearings in the last 6 years. I think if the concerns that you raise are legitimate, they ought to be aired by having hearings before the end of this Senate session and then to try to get this ratified, so we can join the vast majority of other countries who have ratified this convention and benefited by it. Mr. Smith. Mr. Secretary, thank you very much for your testimony. You've been here slightly in excess of 3 hours. We do appreciate it. I do hope you will join us on Tuesday at the Northern Ireland hearing as a Commissioner of the Helsinki Commission. Mr. Koh. Thank you very much and thanks for staying through the whole thing. Mr. Smith. I would like to ask our second panel, and I thank you in advance for your patience. Elisa Massimino, is the Director of the Washington, DC Office of the Lawyers Committee for Human Rights. Ms. Massimino, who earned her law degree from the University of Michigan, directs the Lawyers Committee's National Advocacy Program, with special focus on refugee issues. Next, we will hear from Carlos Salinas, who is the Advocacy Director for Latin America for Amnesty International USA. Mr. Salinas who has worked with Amnesty since 1986, earned his Master's degree in Latin American studies from Georgetown University. Next we will hear from Nina Shea, who is a Member of the United States Commission on International Religious Freedom, as well as the Director of the Center for Religious Freedom at Freedom House. A lawyer specializing in international human rights issues, for the past 12 years she has focused exclusively on the issue of religious persecution. Finally, we will also hear from Dr. Alison DesForges, who is a consultant to Human Rights Watch, who has undertaken some two dozen missions to the Great Lakes Region of Central Africa. She has provided expert testimony to the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda, as well as to judicial authorities in Canada, Belgium, and the United States. Trained as an historian at Harvard and Yale Universities, Dr. DesForges is the author of ``Leave None to Tell the Story,'' the definitive account of the Rwanda genocide, published last year by Human Rights Watch. Elisa, if you would begin. STATEMENTS OF ELISA MASSIMINO, DIRECTOR OF WASHINGTON, DC OFFICE, LAWYERS COMMITTEE FOR HUMAN RIGHTS Ms. Massimino. Thank you. Thank you, Chairman Smith and Members of the Committee, for convening this hearing and for asking us to share our perspective on this year's State Department country reports. We are deeply appreciative to you, your staff, and all of the Members of the Committee for your steadfast concern for these issues and your continued efforts to highlight human rights in the Congress. Mr. Chairman, I have a written statement which I would like to summarize for the record. Mr. Smith. Without objection, yours and all the other full statements will be made a part of the record. Ms. Massimino. Thank you. The Lawyers Committee for Human Rights works to protect and promote fundamental human rights, holding all governments, including our own, accountable to standards contained in the universal declaration of human rights and related international human rights instruments. We focus our work on how best to protect human rights in a lasting way, by advancing international law and legal institutions, by working to build structural guarantees for human rights in national legal systems, and by assisting and cooperating with lawyers and other human rights advocates who are the front line defenders of human rights at the local level. As Secretary Koh pointed out, it's especially fitting to hold these hearings today, Mr. Chairman, on International Women's Rights Day. Five years ago, women from around the world gathered together to affirm what to many might seem a truism: that women's rights are human rights. Yet today, as detailed in many of the reports before us, we are witnessing an increase in extreme violations of women's human rights--in political life, in the workplace, and in the home. As documented in the pages of these reports, women are beaten by their husbands, raped with impunity, denied the right to vote, denied basic health care and education, forcibly sterilized, driven, in China, as you pointed out, to suicide at an astonishing rate, sold into sexual slavery, and killed by their relatives to uphold family honor. These abuses are truly horrific. The State Department, under Secretary Albright's leadership, is to be commended for having given a much higher profile to defending the rights of women. But it is disturbing to us that the United States, which has exercised such leadership in advocating for the rights of women around the world, remains outside international consensus by failing to ratify the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women. Ratification of CEDAW will strengthen U.S. efforts to advance the rights of women throughout the world and will give the United States a greater voice in shaping national and international policies, as you pointed out, Mr. Rees, that affect the lives of women. The United States should not let another March 8th go by without becoming a party to this important human rights treaty. The State Department's reports cover 194 countries, but there is one country whose record is not analyzed in that document, and it's the United States. A couple of years ago, when we held this hearing, Congressman Houghton asked the question ``I wonder how other countries view our human rights performance?'' Since that time, the U.S. has conducted its own analysis of U.S. performance under the Convention Against Torture, and Secretary Koh is to be commended for his role in helping to produce that report. We have many problems of our own, and I didn't want today to go by without us talking a little bit about that. One of the pieces of legislation that this body will soon consider is an effort to address some of those problems; in particular, the problem of torture in this country. You see in the reports before us page after page after page of serious violations. We are rightly proud in the United States of our own human rights record in many, many areas, but there are some areas in which we fall short, and, regrettably, there are instances of torture in the United States. This legislation which is soon to be introduced would make torture, per se, a crime and prosecutable as a crime in the United States. Mr. Chairman, as you know, the quality and accuracy of the country reports have been of great concern to the Lawyers Committee since the Department of State was first mandated to present these reports to Congress almost 25 years ago. Beginning in 1979 and until 2 years ago, the Lawyers Committee published an extensive annual critique of the reports, and we continue to believe that they require and benefit from critical input by the nongovernmental human rights community. In recent years, we have witnessed a steady improvement in the objectivity and comprehensiveness of the reports and we commend Secretary Koh and his very able State Department colleagues for their professionalism and diligence in the production of these reports. One of the distinguishing marks of a good country report is the degree to which it reflects extensive consultation by U.S. embassies with local human rights advocates and NGO's. Today's hearing is an important forum in which U.S.-based NGO's can critique our own government's reporting and highlight needed changes in next year's edition of the country reports. We welcome this opportunity. I would like to single out three countries for special notice in my oral comments today. In doing so, I recognize that my very distinguished colleagues with whom I share this panel will cover many of the other countries. I am quite humbled being on a panel with such distinguished human rights experts as we have here before us today. China, Turkey and Mexico are the three countries which I would like to focus on. In each of these countries, widespread and persistent human rights violations continued throughout 1999. The conduct of each of these three states presents a serious challenge to the integrity of the international human rights treaty regime and of the institutions that the international community has established to enforce compliance with human rights norms, and, in each instance, the nature of the response by U.S. policy makers will have profound bilateral, regional and even global ramifications. With respect to China, the report includes an extremely thorough and generally accurate description of the downward spiral in China's human rights performance during 1999. The report properly focuses on the crack down on China democracy party leaders and highlights the fact that by year's end, ``only a handful of dissidents nationwide dared to remain publicly active.'' In addition, the report contains extensive information on government repression directed against religious practice. Chinese law and practice reveals a deep hostility toward ``unofficial'' religious belief, and those who seek to exercise their right to freedom of religion are frequently punished, in some cases severely. As China struggles with extraordinary economic, social and environmental challenges, nothing is more important to its future stability than the expansion of the right to freedom of association and the free development of critical voices in the nongovernmental sector. As such, an area of the State Department's report which continues to be disappointing is its discussion of regulations on the NGO sector in China. As the report notes, these impose a variety of new obligations on those seeking to register as nongovernmental organizations. The conclusion of this section of the report, ``preexisting groups report little or no additional interference by the government since the new regulations came into effect,'' is misleading. Indeed, in light of the statement later in the China report that ``there are no independent domestic NGO's that publicly monitor or comment on human rights conditions,'' it is astonishing that the discussion of NGO regulations fails to reach any opinion on the degree to which these restrictions impose unreasonable burdens on civil society in China or contravene existing international norms on freedom of association. Unfortunately, the superficial treatment of freedom of association, especially for domestic human rights advocates, remains a persistent weakness of many of the country reports. This is particularly disappointing in light of the adoption by the U.N. General Assembly recently of the Declaration on Human Rights Defenders, which breaks new ground in defining an international consensus on the content of the right to freedom of association. Future reports we hope will rectify this weakness. The report contains a detailed analysis of China's efforts to block the flow of information over the internet. China is trying to sustain expansion of the internet and other communications infrastructure, while also expanding restrictions on its content and use, a balancing act that seems destined ultimately to fail. Internet expansion may prove to be an arena where the line between an opening economy and political liberalization becomes blurred, and the United States should be doing all it can to promote this trend. In light of the detailed information contained in the report about widespread restrictions on internet use, the report misses an important opportunity by failing to describe how these restrictions, which include special internet police units, not only interfere with the right to private correspondence, the section in the report under which these restrictions are described, but have a negative impact on the exercise of many other core rights. The report devotes considerably more attention than in past reports to an analysis of numerous legal reforms, including the criminal law, the criminal procedure law, the administrative litigation law, the state compensation law, and the lawyers law, and makes an initial assessment of whether these reforms are leading to better human rights protections for Chinese people. Future reports should maintain their focus on the range of legal reforms, all of which, to the degree they are implemented, have the potential to enhance the rights of Chinese citizens vis-a-vis the state. This emphasis on systemic legal problems should serve as a model for all of the country reports. As China grapples with its ongoing legal reform process and as Chinese citizens acquire greater consciousness of their rights, a central question before the U.S. Government is how outsiders can best contribute to moving that process in the direction of greater compliance with international human rights standards. The report notes that China has had human rights dialogues with a large number of countries, but admits, frankly, that these dialogues ``have not produced significant improvements in the government's human rights practices.'' In light of this failure and in the face of serious violations, such as those that took place in 1999, these dialogues certainly cannot substitute for the traditional measures of external pressure, such as a resolution at the U.N. Commission on Human Rights. Despite the comprehensive nature of the report on China, it is marred in places by language that seems designed to blunt criticism of government practices. Particularly disturbing is what seems to be an increased use this year of reference to the motivations of the government in perpetrating abuses, as if somehow to excuse or minimize the violations. For example, after stating that ``the government continued to commit widespread and well documented human rights abuses in violation of internationally accepted norms,'' the report cites the government's ``fear of unrest'' as one of the reasons for these abuses. When ``communist party leaders moved quickly to suppress'' political dissidents, it was because ``they believed them to be organized challenges that threatened national stability.'' Finally, in a recitation of the ``positive trends in China,'' the report implies that the government suppresses only ``those perceived to be a threat to the government power or to national stability.'' Yet, as the report outlines, who are these people that are threats to national stability? They are a man who sought, in accordance with tradition, to sweep the graves of some students killed in Tiananmen Square, a man who seeks to worship as he pleases or a couple who longs for a second child. In her remarks on the release of the country reports, Secretary Albright noted that ``China is perhaps the most prominent example of a country with which we have substantial and well known differences on human rights, but with which we are also engaged on a wide variety of other issues.'' Now, this may be a simple and straightforward statement of fact or policy, but this oft-repeated refrain of the Administration reflects, I think, a fundamental and persistent error in U.S. policy toward China. The litany of abuses detailed in this year's report are not and should not be portrayed as merely differences in one aspect of a multi- faceted bilateral relationship. This year's report details profound and widespread violations by China of internationally recognized human rights norms, and these violations must--and must be seen by China to--affect every aspect of its relationship with the United States. This is not to say that promotion of human rights is necessarily served by disengagement with China. Quite the contrary. Further engaging China in the web of international agreements and norms could hold the potential to catalyze change in the long term. Legal reforms have new resonance in China in the context of an opening economy, and attempts to reform China's commercial legal system could provide a foundation for an independent judiciary and other essential elements of an accountable justice system. But this must be combined with consistent pressure for improvements from outside China. That is why the pursuit of a resolution condemning China's dismal human rights record at the Human Rights Commission is so important. We commend the Administration for pursuing this, as well as those in Congress who have consistently called for such a resolution. Although engagement may provide a framework in which to foster human rights improvements, engagement must be toward a purpose and will not of itself necessarily lead to any changes in China's human rights performance. Human rights concerns must permeate our interactions with China in all of the areas with which we engage the Chinese government. China should not be able to cutoff dialogue or avoid criticism by the United States about its human rights violations simply by refusing to meet with U.S. officials who carry a human rights portfolio. Human rights violations in China undermine U.S. strategic and economic interests there, and that judgment should be reflected in every high level meeting between U.S. and Chinese officials. Human rights should not be portrayed to the Chinese as an area where we will agree to disagree. The report on Turkey is comprehensive and well informed. This extremely thorough analysis reflects a serious commitment on the part of U.S. diplomats in Turkey and in the DRL bureau to follow human rights developments there. Detailed information, such as that found in the extensive section regarding torture, is in part available because U.S. representatives have been present at many high profile trials with a human rights dimension throughout Turkey. Torture, unfair trial and restrictions on nonviolent freedom of expression remain widespread problems, as the State Department report recognizes. These problems must be remedied, and this message has been delivered at the highest levels of the bilateral relationship, notably during President Clinton's visit to Turkey last November, including in his address to the Turkish Parliament. As the report rightly emphasizes, a climate of impunity for human rights abuse in the security forces is an enormous obstacle to improving Turkey's human rights record, particularly in the area of torture. In the few cases where prosecutions and convictions of police officers have occurred, such convictions were reversed on appeal. The report makes note of the directive issued by Prime Minster Ecevit on June 26, 1999, authorizing prosecutors to carry out unannounced inspections of detention facilities to monitor the well being of criminal suspects in detention. Although the report outlines the preliminary results of these inspections, it fails to note the remaining obstacles to resolving this serious problem. The June directive alone will not be sufficient to resolve the problem of torture in detention. We have looked at this problem quite extensively and have recently published a report entitled ``Obstacles to Reform,'' which I would like to share with you later, which details the steps we think need to be taken in order to remedy this situation. The report asserts, in its opening paragraph, and I think this is probably the most distressing part of the Turkey report, that ``the government generally respects the constitution's provision for an independent judiciary.'' Last year, in our testimony, we criticized the report for stating that ``the government respects the constitution's provisions for an independent judiciary.'' This year the report states that ``the government generally respects the constitution's provisions for an independent judiciary,'' and, again, this assertion is simply not borne out by the facts. State security courts try civilians accused of crimes against the state, including individuals accused of nonviolent actions. Many prosecutions in such courts appear to be politically motivated, such as those brought against leaders from the political Islamic movement, the mayor of Istanbul, and nonviolent political leaders associated with the Kurdish issue. Advocates such as Mr. Birdal, who you heard Secretary Koh mention he had met with, have been brought to trial before state security courts as a result of statements or publications criticizing the government's human rights practices. After miraculously surviving an assassination attempt, Mr. Birdal faces trial yet again this month, in just a couple of weeks, for speech the government found offensive. These prosecutions are not ``independent.'' Despite these obvious examples demonstrating the lack of independence in the judiciary, the State Department report fails to provide a forthright critique of the problem. Instead, we get confusing assertions, such as ``the constitution provides for an independent judiciary and, in practice, the general law courts generally act independently of the executive and legislative branches. However, various officials acknowledge the need for legislative changes to strengthen the judiciary's independence.'' In commenting on the NSC--that's the Turkish NSC-- directives identifying threats to the state, the report merely concludes that such communiques ``could be interpreted'' as instructions to the judiciary. As for the dominant role of the high judicial council and the appointment of judges, the report fails to speak in its own voice or even to take a position, reporting only that ``some observers assert'' that this arrangement might undermine judicial independence. Many sectors of Turkish society are now sending a clear message to the government that the mistakes of the past should not be repeated. For example, the chairman of the high advisory council of the Turkish Industrialists and Businessmen's Association, TUSIAD, said, on September 10, 1999, that ``the democratic transition can be delayed no more. We are telling our politicians to listen to society's voice.'' He noted in particular that in Turkey, ``we are way behind in matters of freedom of thought and expression, to the extent that it has become a threat to our national progress.'' A strong, clear and unwavering U.S. human rights policy toward Turkey is particularly essential now to ensure that the Turkish government capitalizes on this current climate of potential change. The State Department report on Mexico includes an extensive section on the prevalence of torture in the context of the criminal justice system. This section is quite forceful and accurately identifies many of the most serious issues relating to this problem, using clear, straightforward language. The report notes, ``the police regularly obtain information through torture, prosecutors use this evidence in courts and the courts continue to admit as evidence confessions extracted under torture.'' It doesn't get much clearer than that. We'd like to see that kind of language in many of the reports on countries where torture is a problem. The report also notes that this problem derives in part from the fact that police and prosecutors do not have proper training and equipment and so often rely on torture as an investigative tactic, and in this way the report highlights the fact that reliance on torture in criminal investigations not only constitutes serious human rights abuse, but is also not an effective crime-fighting technique. The report notes that ``police officers often attempt to solve crimes by rounding up likely suspects and then extracting confessions from them by force.'' In contrast to the section dealing with torture, however, in some other areas the report resorts to formulaic statements in order to avoid a more profound analysis regarding human rights problems in Mexico. For example, the report states that the judiciary is independent, while noting that it has, on occasion, been influenced by the executive branch. Yet the laws regarding appointments to the bench, which allow for heavy executive branch influence over this process, and the lack of lifetime tenure for judges, present real problems for the independence of the judiciary in both law and practice. The report also states that court hearings are open to the public, but this is misleading and does not reflect an understanding of the actual practice of hearings in Mexico. There are no courtrooms in Mexico. Generally, four or five hearings are conducted simultaneously before the same judge at several tables in a busy room. There is no opportunity for the public or press to actually hear what transpires in any of those hearings, nor is the judge generally present. In several cases, the report addresses serious human rights problems by stating, without taking a position of its own, that human rights organizations have criticized certain measures adopted by the Mexican government. For example, the report notes that the new Federal Preventive Police includes approximately 5,000 transferred military personnel. The report then notes that the inclusion of former military personnel led to criticism from some human rights NGO's. Yet the report makes no independent comment on this point. The report's reluctance to fully address this issue may have to do with the fact that the United States has encouraged military involvement in civilian law enforcement activities in Mexico as a strategy in the fight against drug trafficking. Similarly, the report notes that the military continues to handle cases of civil and human rights matters involving soldiers. The report then notes that calls for reform of the military justice system and criticism of it have increased. However, the report makes no comment about the need for these reforms. Similarly, the report states that the government respects the rights of assembly and association and that a wide variety of human rights groups operate largely without government restriction. This assertion is not borne out by the facts, even those set out in the report itself. As the report states, the government has been accused of harassing NGO's, especially in the state of Chiapas. The report also notes that PRODH, a noted human rights reporting and action center, members of which recently visited the United States, and other organizations are receiving death threats, and the investigations into these threats have not yet yielded any concrete results. Mexican law and practice, in fact, creates a disabling environment in which human rights defenders are frequently harassed and intimidated. The Lawyers Committee has recently published a briefing paper analyzing restrictions on Mexican NGO's and laying out a detailed plan for improvements by the Mexican government. United States policy toward Mexico, which tends to be driven largely by concerns about immigration and drug trafficking, should focus on pressuring the government of Mexico to adopt these reforms. In conclusion, these comments represent our initial reaction to the country reports, and we look forward eagerly to a more substantive discussion of the reports with Administration officials and interested Members of Congress once we have had the opportunity to carry out a more extensive review of their content. Nonetheless, even a brief examination of a few key countries makes apparent the general accuracy and professionalism of the country reports and their enormous contribution to our knowledge of human rights conditions around the world. The challenge remains, as always, to close the sometimes striking gap between human rights reporting and the realities of foreign policy decision making. Thank you. Mr. Smith. Ms. Massimino, thank you very much for your testimony. I think so much of what you said bears repeating, but the point that you made about ``abuses should not be passed off as differences,'' that's a very good spin that is used by the Administration and it certainly doesn't serve the cause of human rights, to just say that could be put over in this compartment. So I appreciate you underscoring that in your testimony. I'd like to ask Mr. Salinas to begin. STATEMENT OF CARLOS SALINAS, ADVOCACY DIRECTOR FOR LATIN AMERICA, AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL USA Mr. Salinas. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, Members of the Committee. It is our distinct pleasure to accompany you to help you assess the State Department's 1999 country reports. I think Ms. Massimino has really laid the challenge that we would like to address, which is that wide gap, that yawning gap, between foreign policy decision making and the information that the U.S. Government holds and knows to be true. Before I get to that, though, I would like to extend some words of thanks to all three of you for specific human rights actions you have taken in this past year. It's good to look at the reports, but it's also good to look at specific actions that have been taken. The information without action is essentially a tome that gathers dust on the shelf. Mr. Chairman, from your multiple hearings to what we consider to be a significant achievement that you deserve a great deal of credit for: the increase in the budget for the human rights bureau, although we know that we have to monitor that very closely to ensure that certain paper games aren't played and the budget really is increased, to your fight last year to add additional expertise to the Office of the Assistant Secretary for Human Rights. We disagreed with the voices that opposed that effort. We believe that it would have added something very valuable to your continued vigilance with these hearings. You provide an important forum for the human rights community, but also for Congress, to zero in and focus on this important issue. So we would like to thank you publicly for that. Congresswoman McKinney, you were and are an important leader in the issue of arms transfers. We supported the code of conduct, your version that you had here in the House of Representatives. You not only have been a leader also in the systemic issues, but also in the specific country regional issues, whether it be the Great Lakes in Africa, to, from what I understand from our human rights and the environment program folks, even contemplating some important work with the indigenous communities in Ecuador, and we thank you for that. Congressman Delahunt, you are the proverbial voice crying in the drug war wilderness of election year politics. Your leadership has been significant and it's particularly important as we are on the eve of what could be, in our opinion, a very disastrous choice by the U.S. House of Representatives. We thank you for being that voice for raising the issues that need to be raised and for trying to provide some balance to the discussions on Colombia. Of course, my own pet project that I would personally like to thank all three of you for is for your co-sponsorship of the Human Rights Information Act. With that, I would like to first introduce you all to our legislative priorities. The Human Rights Information Act, H.R. 1625, a bill to establish an orderly declassification process for human rights information, now enjoys 110 Members of the House as Co-sponsors and we are hoping for markup in the Subcommittee on Government Management, Information and Technology fairly soon, from what we understand from Chairman Horn and his staff. Five of the Members of this Subcommittee, in fact, are co- sponsors. We will continue to work to make sure that all the Members of the Subcommittee become co-sponsors. We are also pushing for the ratification of the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women. In the House, what we have called for is support for House Resolution 107, which tries to express the sense of the House that CEDAW is worthy of support, and I think it is an important topic for us to engage, for us to try to understand where the potential pitfalls may lay, so that we can achieve clarity and ratify this important human rights treaty. We also would like to achieve a simple majority in the House of Representatives for the Congressional Human Rights Caucus. We think that this is a no-brainer. We think that everyone should be, like you all, very active Members of the Congressional Human Rights Caucus. Finally, we would like to get continued Congressional work on our Special Focus Cases of prisoners of conscience, people that we are calling for their immediate and unconditional release. These include the Mexican Brigadier General Jose Gallardo, whose crime was to call for the creation of a human rights ombudsman in the Mexican armed forces. We call for the immediate and unconditional release of Turkish human rights activist Eber Yagmurdereli, whose crime has been to advocate for Kurdish human rights in Turkey. We call for the unconditional and immediate release of Peruvian student Mirtha Bueno Hidalgo, whose crime was to have class notes that the security forces misinterpreted as being subversive literature. We call for the immediate and unconditional release of the Chinese student Chen Yanbin, who was arrested at the age of 23 for protesting against the crack down that followed Tiananmen Square massacre and for being a pro-democracy activist. As we look at the specific action agendas, we have to come back to the country report, to the information the U.S. Government knows to be true, and ask why is there a gap between the knowledge and the action. As we look at that, we have to focus on some specific issues, and I think Ms. Massimino always does an incredible job in pointing out very important details that are actually quite relevant to the bigger macro picture that at first might seem not as important, but are very relevant. In general, we would say that one of the persistent, maybe even a chronic failure in the State Department's country reports is its failure to use its own voice. We believe that it's important to engage with NGO's on the ground, but we also believe that it's important that the U.S. Government make its own determinations about the allegations and issue some real determinations. I would meet the challenge Mr. Koh laid out in his opening remarks. We do believe that human rights is still an island off the foreign policy mainland. There is a gap between rhetoric and policy reality. Where could it be more clear than where I would like to focus: the failed Administration policy toward China, the incoherency of the foreign policy toward Colombia that's being proposed, and the possible irresponsibility of the Turkey policy. With regards to China, we welcome the fact that the Assistant Secretary announced early on the intention to introduce a resolution at the United Nations Commission on Human Rights and we believe that the general accuracy of the report will give him leverage. But not to be necessarily nitpicky, there was one omission that we found quite troubling. The report noted that business woman Rebiya Kadeer, her son, and her secretary, were detained in the Xinjiang region. It went on to state that Kadeer was detained on her way to meet a visiting foreign delegation and was charged in September for passing state secrets to foreigners. [Statement of Mr. Salinas appears in the appendix.] The report for some reason fails to mention the origin of this mysterious visiting foreign delegation. Mr. Chairman, Members of the Subcommittee, the foreign delegation was from the United States Congressional Research Service! This woman is in jail for meeting with Members of the Congressional Research Service. We cannot understand why a detail like that would be left off this report. One would assume that if U.S. Embassy officials would know anything, they would know about who U.S. officials are meeting with or failing to meet with. I would like to include for the record an Amnesty International report on this case and ask you all to ask the State Department for an explanation of this omission. Talking a little bit more about the gap between the information and policy, in about 20 minutes, we understand that President Clinton will be giving a speech on his China policy at Johns Hopkins University. We have a few questions that we would like to put forth. Will President Clinton's speech highlight the report's information or will this report lie dormant? Will President Clinton reflect the report's findings that China's poor human rights record deteriorated markedly throughout the year, as the government intensified efforts to suppress dissent? Will President Clinton demand that Ms. Rebiya Kadeer, who was arrested for meeting with Congressional Research Service, be released and thus call on Congress to endorse and pass the concurrent resolution calling for the same? Will President Clinton demand that the Panchan Lama be released? Will President Clinton demand that the crackdown on underground churches and ongoing religious persecution be stopped? Will President Clinton demand that forced abortions and sterilizations be stopped? Will President Clinton announce that he'll re-link human rights benchmarks to the normal trade relations debate that we'll engage in within Congress? These are some questions to consider as we try to understand what is the role of this information into policy. With Colombia, first, I'd like to say that I urge you all to consider the proposal that Mr. Delahunt has just made that a hearing be held. We do realize that the House is moving on a very fast track and, in fact, on Monday, Amnesty International and several other organizations following developments in Colombia issued a letter to House and Senate leadership asking that given the ramifications of this aid package, given the enormity, given the potential for a human rights and humanitarian catastrophe, that ample consideration and ample time be given to address all the many issues that have been raised in the context of this proposal. We have been going to the hearings, we have been observing the hearings. We've been amazed by the amount of questions that are remaining unanswered and these questions are coming from all sides, not just those who, like you, have an expressed interest in the human rights dimension, but from all different sides. We don't see clear answers coming from either the Clinton Administration or the Pastrana Administration. While the report is very forthright about paramilitary/ military links, there are important omissions. One key omission is a July counter-attack in Puerto Lleras by the Colombian army and the air force against an attack from the FARC. The counter- attack had a devastating impact on the civilian population and this is not discussed in the country report. The civilian population was subjected to what are probably violations of international humanitarian law by the Colombian security forces. Not only is this troubling, but the human rights report does, in fact, refer to this very same attack by pointing out the very real problem of child soldier recruits by the FARC. So they point out the dead children who were members of the FARC, that resulted from this attack, but for some reason, there is no mention of the civilian casualties that took place during this counter-attack at the hands of the government forces. Furthermore, there is a very troubling news account that U.S. personnel may have participated in the counter-attack in a support capacity. I would like to ask you all to followup on the report that was issued by the Dallas Morning News in August and I'd like to offer that for the record. I just talked to the journalist, who is a bureau chief for the Dallas Morning News for South America, and was formerly foreign correspondent for the Washington Post. He is a person with very high standards, certainly it's never easy for me to pitch him a story. When I spoke with him, he made it very clear that he stood by his story 100 percent. So I think this is very troubling and needs to be followed up. Unfortunately, this is not the only troubling allegation involving the U.S. Government in Colombia policy. Just last week, Amnesty International called on the Department of Defense to explain a 1997 special forces training of Colombian personnel that took place at a location very close to a massacre cite, and we understand from Defense Department records and from Defense Department correspondence that there were special forces deployments both right before and right after the massacre that took place. We also understand from Defense Department correspondence that the Colombian unit trained immediately after the massacre was, the one whose personnel was implicated in this massacre and we would ask you all to please look into this. Senator Leahy and Congressman Jesse Jackson, Jr. have been making inquiries, but I think they could certainly use more support. Among the many issues, it can be raised that the correspondence that was sent to Senator Leahy listing the special forces deployments doesn't quite correspond to the information that was reported to Congress by the Defense Department on special forces deployment. So there is a discrepancy in what the Defense Department is conveying to Congress and somehow we have to get to the bottom of which dates are the correct dates and what did take place and what did not take place. But in the meantime, we continue to document one paramilitary massacre after another in Colombia. You may wonder what's the connection here and the connection is simply this: that you all will be asked to vote on an aid package with many unresolved questions, more than likely. We hear a lot about the creation of new rapid response mechanisms by the Colombian government. However, we would just like to see a response. In the San Jose de Apartado massacre on February 19, it was a massacre that took place over 25 minutes. The Colombian 17th Brigade was called within 6 minutes of the first killings or the first shots. They took three and a half hours to arrive there. What's further disturbing are credible allegations that it may have been members of the 17th Brigade itself that committed this atrocity. On the 29th of February, paramilitary members entered a community, finding that all the inhabitants had been wise enough and had fled, and proceeded to burn the village to the ground. What's telling is that the paramilitary presence had been denounced repeatedly to the Colombian authorities and the paramilitaries camped out for a full month about two miles from the Colombian army detachment, Heroes of Saraguro Battalion. So it's very hard to understand how a new layer of bureaucracy will help when the basics aren't being met. You will more than likely encounter or have probably encountered Vice President Bell from Colombia. He is certainly a very pleasant and articulate diplomat and he will try to convince you that the Pastrana government has the political will to tackle effectively the human rights situation. I would like to say to you what you would probably hear from many other human rights organizations that follow Colombia closely. The question of Colombia is not a question of a lack of resources, it is not a question of a lack of information, it's not even a question of a lack of credible information. It's a question of political will. I would venture to say that what the Pastrana government needs to do is fulfill its unimplemented mandates and its promises. I will tell you about four of these. For instance, he should establish the search block. President Pastrana first promised this in October 1998. He decreed the creation of this to go after paramilitaries. This search block wasn't an invention unique to the Pastrana administration. It was first announced by the Barco administration in 1989 and each successive administration, has when pressed about the paramilitary groups, stated, ``oh, we're going to create the search block to go after the paramilitaries.'' If you ask Vice President Bell about this, you may get an involved treatise on the importance of nation building, as we did when we met with him on Monday. The Pastrana government needs to enforce the close to 400 outstanding arrest warrants and detention orders issued by the attorney general's human rights unit. The majority of these arrest orders are on paramilitary members. However, if you ask Vice President Bell about this, you may yet vague numbers about new detentions, you may get one or two real concrete cases. But if you happen to ask for a time table and benchmarks on the enforcing of these arrest warrants, you may get, as I did, a blank stare. The Pastrana government also needs to pass a law for ``disappearances,'' a law which has been repeatedly vetoed, President Pastrana no exception, since the administration of President Gaviria when it was first introduced. If you ask Vice President Bell about this, you may get contradictory excuses, as a large group of human rights organizations did on Monday. You may perhaps get fumbled attempts to explain legislative failings that did not happen, or principles that were not flagged early enough. You may even ask about what the government's strategy is to pass the legislation and he may tell you that they will be calling the legislators as soon as they return to session. One could go on. The key is that the problem is one of political will. We are now being told that a new layer of bureaucracy is being created. A very good example of how resources upon resources won't necessarily lead you to effective human rights protection is not only this Colombian case, which has a very vast and complex and well funded human rights bureaucracy, but the Mexican case and its National Commission on Human Rights. Because of the clear failings of the Colombian administration of President Pastrana and of the Clinton Administration, we call on you to stop the rush into what will probably turn out to be a humanitarian and human rights catastrophe, with a not so desired, but clearly visible ``made in USA'' label. We ask that you please do what you can to make sure that these unanswered questions are addressed. Finally, on Turkey, I think Mr. Koh was every eloquent when he went through the list of the benchmarks. I think it is very clear that the benchmarks have not been met and we hope that you ensure that the Administration vetoes or rejects the four billion dollar export license for further attack helicopters for essentially what will be further carnage. Thank you all very, very much. Mr. Smith. Thank you, Mr. Salinas. Mr. Delahunt has to leave, but asked if he could pose a question to you. Mr. Delahunt. Thank you, Mr. Salinas, for your generous words. In the Human Rights Watch, there is language that--let me quote it. It says ``Colombia's civilian investigative agencies, in particular the attorney general's office, are capable of sophisticated and hard-hitting investigations.'' That's from their language. Do you agree with that statement? Mr. Salinas. Absolutely. Mr. Delahunt. You have confidence in that. Mr. Salinas. Yes. In fact, the problem is not so much their investigations. The problem is that when they do issue a detention order, they're not enforced. The security forces are not enforcing them. Mr. Delahunt. I had an opportunity in my last visit to have an extended conversation with Hami Bronow. I have yet to have had an opportunity to have a conversation with Mr. Gomez. It was a very good conversation. He is not a member of the president's party. Am I correct in that particular statement? Mr. Salinas. I'm not sure, sir. Mr. Delahunt. I think he's a liberal as opposed to a conservative. He is also, I understand, very much involved in the peace process, specifically as it relates to the ELN, and has taken a leadership role there. I ask these questions because earlier I had asked-- requested a hearing and you alluded to it in your remarks, by this Subcommittee, because as we know and as the Chair and my friend and colleague and Ranking Member from Georgia know, any legislation is a process. It's static at times and it's very dynamic at other times. I would anticipate that this will be a process that will, despite the fact the reality that it is scheduled to be in a fast track, hearings still are important to inform and to educate. I would think that if we extended an invitation, Mr. Chairman, to the attorney general, that he would be a very credible witness for us to hear and possibly we could encourage him to come to Washington and give us his perspective, because I found it very informative. Much of what he had to say about the Pastrana administration was positive, I think I should note that for the record, but the reason that I did specifically seek to have a conversation with him was based upon a statement by a Colombian General, Mestor Ramirez, in Miami, relative to the attorney general and Mr. Gomez being an enemy of the state. That caused me great concern, but I think it's best if I yield back my time, and since I have another appointment. But I would ask you again to consider that request. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Mr. Smith. Thank you, Mr. Delahunt. Ms. Shea. STATEMENT OF NINA SHEA, DIRECTOR, CENTER FOR RELIGIOUS FREEDOM, FREEDOM HOUSE Ms. Shea. Thank you, Mr. Chairman and Members of the Committee, for holding these important human rights hearings and for inviting me to testify. I am appearing today on behalf of Freedom House and I'm also a Member of the U.S. Commission on International Religious Freedom, an independent panel created by Congress to review U.S. Government policies regarding religious persecutors, and will be commenting for them, as well as Freedom House, on the countries of China, Russia and Sudan. These were the three countries that are the primary focus of the Commission during its first year. Before beginning, Mr. Chairman, I also want to express our deep appreciation for your personal dedication to ensuring that human rights concerns remain a force in U.S. foreign policy. This year's country reports reflect a monumental effort on the part of Assistant Secretary Harold Koh and his Bureau for Democracy, Human Rights and Labor, they and all the American foreign service officers who contributed to the reports deserve to be commended. As the reports have become comprehensive, they have come to be relied on by many policy makers, immigration officials and judges, the media and human rights defenders, precisely because the reports are viewed by many as authoritative, this exercise of providing critiques to continuously fine-tune and improve the reports is essential and not a matter of mere quibbling. Many of the reports, those on Pakistan, India, Burma, Afghanistan and North Korea, for example, provide excellent summaries of the status of religious freedom. Others need revision. As my colleagues who have already spoken have pointed out, the biggest problem with the reports is that their findings do not always correspond to American policy action. While there are various underlying explanations, part of the problem is attributable to the reports themselves. The reports contain an overwhelming and unselective compilation of facts and information, without reaching definitive conclusions or conveying a sense of priority. Fundamental human rights problems are lost sight of in a welter of detail. Severe violators are hidden in an avalanche of information. In some cases, this may be an attempt to downplay abuses and avoid making embarrassing conclusions about the conduct of valued allies and trading partners, reporting that might lead to calls for sanctions. I regret that Mr. Koh, in his remarks this morning, said that they will continue to resist attempts to rank or order these country reports. There is a real need to give focus and priority designation in a report of this magnitude and type and it's the best way of ensuring that appropriate focus and concerted attention is given. The world should know who is carrying out genocide and who are committing crimes against humanity. I'm not suggesting that the State Department undertake anything as elaborate as Freedom House's own systematic ranking of countries in its Freedom in the World Survey and our forthcoming Global Survey on Religious Freedom; however, a more selective listing of the most egregious human rights violators and violations is needed somewhere in this report. A model for this might be provided by the International Religious Freedom Act, which called for an annual report, as well, and also a designation of egregious religious persecutors as ``countries of particular concern'' and articulation of policy regarding those ``countries of particular concern.'' The country critiques that I'm going to talk about today are examples of where critically important religious freedom problems are cited in the reports, but are swamped by a bewildering mass of unselective and unprioritized data. In a number of country reports, a consequence of obscuring important points of focus is that the wrong conclusion is reached about the overall status of religious freedom. Now, I turn to the reports of the three countries with respect to which I speak on behalf of both the Commission and Freedom House. Regarding China, a crucial point that the report fails to emphasize is that control of religion is manifestly a policy of the central authorities. Exercise of religion is tolerated only insofar as it serves the purposes of the state. Since the passage of the State Council regulations in 1994, requiring registration of all religious groups, China has shown a determination to ``manage'' exercise of religion according to law. In compliance with that policy, local authorities throughout the country have drafted restrictive regulations pertaining to the exercise of religion, while the degree of zeal with which the policy is implemented varies from province to province. The principle that religion must serve the state inherent in the Chinese communist party's Marxist ideology is promulgated through law and propaganda by the communist party. This fundamental fact should be highlighted, not mentioned, only--and not only mentioned on passing as one among hundreds of other facts in the 67-page China report. Similarly, it bears emphasizing in the 77-page report on Russia that the largest pending issue there is the status of the significant number of religion organizations that were not able to re-register before the December 31 deadline. Up to half of Russia's religious groups remain unregistered and according to the 1997 law, are now subject to liquidation. This month, for the first time to our knowledge, a local court has used the liquidation procedures to terminate a church and is now threatening to liquidate up to 13 others. Though this information became available only after the State Department report was published, many of the religion organizations have been and continue to be in an insecure legal situation that probably will not be resolved until after the Presidential elections in late April. The registration problem is fundamental to understanding religion freedom in Russia, for it points to the lack of legal and institutional security for religion in Russia. In addition, conspicuous in its absence is any discussion of the clearest harbinger of future religion persecution, the government's use of anti-Muslim language in its propaganda campaign to stir up support for its conflict in Chechnya. These facts merit priority treatment and analysis in the report. Essential facts are lost in the report on Sudan, to such a degree that it possibly qualifies as the weakest of the reports in the whole compilation, and this is--this country of Sudan is probably the worst human rights hell on earth, from my perspective. While the report mentions that two million people have died in the conflict, it fails to give a real sense of the scale and intensity of the government's prosecution of the war. At times, the report is erratic and unclear, even about the basic fact that religious persecution is at the core of the conflict. Tucked into the middle of a paragraph about press freedom is the critical finding, ``in the context of the Islamization and Arabization drive, pressure, including forced Islamization--on non-Muslims remained strong. Fears of Arabization and Islamization and the imposition of the Shari'a fueled support for the civil war throughout the country.'' I was disappointed to see that Secretary Koh, in his remarks this morning, only devoted one sentence in his testimony, in his written testimony, to this situation, the conflict in southern Sudan. His remarks address extra judicial killings and disappearance, but doesn't scratch the surface of what is actually happening there and certainly doesn't sound any alarms about the scale of what's happening. As you know, the House of Representatives passed a resolution last June which characterized the Sudanese regime of ``deliberately and systematically committing genocide.'' The Catholic bishops of East Africa made a similar assessment last August. The Nobel Laureate and Holocaust survivor Elie Wiesel, after reviewing the facts in many human rights reports, wrote to President Clinton in a letter, which is published in the current issue of the Jewish intellectual journal Sh'ma, that ``I am haunted by what I know of Sudan,'' also calling it a genocide. So Congressman Tancreda was not the only one to call it a genocide this morning. He's in very good company. The Commission met with the Ambassador at Large for War Crimes, Mr. David Scheffer, just last week and he said that the--he told them that he has never looked into whether there is genocide occurring in Sudan because no one in the State Department has ever requested it, which seems to belie Secretary's Koh's comments that they were concerned about it and had so many meetings about it. The Commission on International Religion Freedom is apparently the sole genesis for such an overdue inquiry and we are at this point eagerly waiting for the state's determination or work product on this investigation. The report neglects to underscore the significance of the government's routine blocking of international, including American food aid to south Sudan, though they mention it. In what Senator Bill Frist calls ``calculated starvation.'' This strategy has killed hundreds of thousands Sudanese civilians in 1998 alone and is unquestionably the most lethal weapon of war in this conflict. The report also fails to make the critical connection between new oil development by Khartoum and the unfolding human rights tragedy. Recent assessments by Secretary of State Madeleine Albright, the U.N. Special Rapporteur on Sudan, and the Canadian Government have all found an inextricable link between the actions of the Khartoum regime and the Greater Nile oil project. Since the oil pipeline revenues began flowing several months ago, the Khartoum regime has escalated its ruthless assaults on southern civilian populations. Targeted with particular savagery are those areas immediately surrounding the pipeline itself, where, as the report finds, the Sudanese military is now carrying out a scorched earth devastation. The international press, late last year, as well as a recent report commissioned by the Canadian Government, have reported that the resources of the Greater Nile partners, including their roads, airstrips and aircraft, are being used directly for military purposes. Helicopter gun ships and Antonov bombers, key elements of the Khartoum regime's war on civilians, had access to the extraordinarily well positioned airstrip of the partners. Two days ago, the compound of the Irish aid group, CONCERN, was bombed by the Sudanese air force, and on March 1, the Khartoum regime bombed the Samaritan's Purse hospital, run by the family of Rev. Billy Graham, in Lui, near Juba in southern Sudan, where four American doctors have treated over 100,000 patients since 1998, and at least two patients we know of were killed in that attack. Then last month, the government had deliberately bombed a Catholic primary school in the Nuba mountains, killing 19 children. Without a doubt these planes, these Antonov bombers, are being fueled by oil from the Greater Nile project. In addition to facilitating the Khartoum regime's war effort through direct enrichment and resources, as Secretary of State Albright made clear several months ago, it is the prospect of new unimpeded oil revenues that convinces the otherwise bankrupt Khartoum regime that it can acquire the military means to win the war outright. A war that the Congress has declared to be genocidal, will continue unless oil development and revenues are removed as the means for the regime to insulate itself economically. This was precisely Secretary Albright's point in Nairobi back in October, when she criticized the involvement of Talisman Energy, a 25 percent partner in the Greater Nile oil project. The Sudanese government's oil joint venture was itself especially designated as a sanctioned entity by the U.S. Treasury Department on February 16, though the individual partners, such as Talisman, the Chinese oil company, were not sanctioned. The Petro China, a front company for the Chinese oil company involved in Greater Nile, which, at 40 percent partnership, is the largest shareholder, has already applied to enter the U.S. equity markets and is soon expected to be approved by the SEC. So why doesn't the report draw the link between the oil and the escalating conflict--the genocidal conflict? Why is the Administration permitting this IPO to go through? This concludes my joint statement on behalf of the U.S. Commission on International Religion Freedom and the Freedom House. Now, on behalf of the latter, I wish to briefly comment on several other countries. As you pointed out earlier today, Mr. Chairman, that lost in the Egypt's report myriad of detail is the fact that the Coptic Christian minority, the largest Christian minority in the Middle East, is relegated to second class status by official policy which fosters an atmosphere of intolerance that has given way to patterns of violence, both by the militants and government security forces. This fundamental fact is epitomized in the continuing Al Kosheh crisis of the past 2 years, a tragedy that is only given sketchy treatment in the report and a tragedy that continued throughout 1999 by virtue of the fact that there was a failure of justice in the case, no one was ever convicted. In fact, a government press report says that those who were implicated were exonerated and given cash awards. That the NGO's have been restricted across the board and that the head of the largest human rights group, the EOHR, was charged, after he brought forward facts about the Al Kosheh incident, and is now in exile, as far as we know. As I point out in my written testimony, this assessment by the State Department that somehow the human rights record in Egypt has again improved somewhat over the past year, is being used by asylum officers to deny Coptic Christians asylum. The Vietnam report is also deeply flawed in its assertion that in some respects, conditions for religion freedom improved during the year. In view of the extensive April 1999 decree on religion, which is barely acknowledged in the report, as well as other developments, it can be more persuasively argued that in important respects, religious freedom saw setbacks in 1999. Under this new decree, all religious properties confiscated by the communist authorities after 1975 have become the permanent property of the state and government agencies are empowered to determine which religions are authorized in the appointment of religious dignitaries and publication of religious matter are subject to the prime minister's approval. So the key to understanding the status of religious freedom in Vietnam is the fact that the regime claims the right to control religion, that a government-created Hoa Hao committee directed by the well known communist cadre Mudi Ton was given official recognition and was able to hold a festival, is consistent with this fundamental fact of government control and is not a sign that religious freedom is expanding. The independent Unified Buddhist Church of Vietnam remains severely persecuted with its organization and legal activities banned and top leaders in detention under close police surveillance. Throughout July and August, police and religious official broke into pagodas throughout the country and conducted midnight raids. Unlike the government-controlled Hoa Hao, the independent Buddhists had to hold their Congress last May overseas in California. Christians in the Hmong region and tribal areas were the most severely prosecuted of the Christian groups, as the report states. This, too, can be explained by the fact that government bloc committees and surveillance agents can and do more readily intimidate and harass Christians in developed regions within the government's reach, whereas far-flung rural villages are largely outside the government's ability to control on a regular basis. Finally, regarding Saudi Arabia, the report gives credence to misleading government claims that private non-Muslim worship is permitted. Public worship by Christian Jews and other non- Muslims is, in principle, a capital offense and the religious police have in the past year, as in previous years, entered private homes searching for evidence of private worship by non- Muslims. In recent years, non-Muslims have been flogged, imprisoned and reportedly killed for private worship. Last October and again in January of this year, private homes have been raided and the Filipino Christians conducting worship services inside, including children, were thrown in jail for up to 40 days without consular access, some of whom were threatened and abused by police before being deported. That concludes my statement. Thank you. Ms. McKinney [presiding]. Thank you. Ms. Shea. Madam Chairman, I'd like to mention that I'm going to have to be leaving in 10 minutes to pick up my children from school. Ms. McKinney. All of us will, as well. So I would really like to hear Ms. DesForges. STATEMENT OF ALISON DESFORGES, CONSULTANT, HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH/ AFRICA Ms. DesForges. Thank you, Madam Chairman. I think the persistence and endurance of this particular Subcommittee in the intensity of its examination of this issue is indeed one of the reasons why we have seen such steady improvement in the country reports. The Congressional oversight and insistence upon the importance of human rights has obviously played a large role in focusing the attention of the State Department on this central issue. I would like to address quickly some important points about the reports dealing with the Great Lakes Region of Africa, before moving on to what is essentially the most important part of my testimony, some concrete recommendations about how exactly we can move to integrate better those concepts which we all honor into an effective foreign policy. Several speakers this morning and members of the panel, as well as Members of Congress, have indicated important omissions in various country reports. Nowhere is this more glaring than in the treatment of the Great Lakes of Africa, where, for example, the role of Ugandan troops in the DRC is barely mentioned. There is no discussion whatsoever of possible human rights violations by these troops. The conflict between the Hema and the Lindu, for example, is examined, but nowhere is there any mention of the role of Uganda in politicizing and militarizing this conflict. This is all the stranger given the underlying context of much of U.S. policy in the Great Lakes and, in fact, of much of human rights focus in the Great Lakes, which is exactly what Mr. Koh described this morning as atrocity prevention. The prevention of atrocities is increasingly narrowly defined as atrocities which could potentially happen to those people who are Tutsi or Tutsi-related. So that in the section dealing with the DRC, for example, there is extensive and absolutely justified discussion of anti-Tutsi sentiment on the part of the Kabila government, but in those scanty sections dealing with rebel factions and their backers, there is no mention whatsoever of anti-Hutu sentiment. So it's important to recognize that the distortions which we see here are a result not simply of questions of political alliance, which are, of course, important, but of this continuing fundamental sentiment of overwhelming guilt which results from the failed U.S. policy at the time of the Rwanda genocide. We're always trying to prevent that horrible past from happening again and until we come to terms with that, as Congresswoman McKinney has suggested, through an open investigation of our own role, we are going to continue chasing our tail in an attempt to make not happen what has, in fact, already happened. In addition to important omissions in dealing with Uganda and Rwanda in particular, there is another spin given to the material, similar to the spin that other panelists have also mentioned in other parts of the world: an attempt to minimize, soften in some way the presentation of data. Yes, they put it out there, but they then qualify it in one way or another to attempt to reduce its impact. So that when dealing with reports of killings by Rwandan troops in the DRC, for example, it is several times these reports are cushioned with statements questioning the credibility of these reports? Yes, of course, when you're assessing reports of human rights abuses, you must look for confirmation, but once you have the confirmation, you report what is, in fact, confirmed and you let the rest drop. There is no need to keep reminding us that many reports are not credible. Of course, that is true everywhere. In addition, the killings of Rwandan troops and their attacks on civilian populations are put very much in the context of self-defense. The chapter on the DRC, for example, states that Congolese Tutsi, as well as the governments of Burundi, Rwanda and Uganda, all relied on the Rwandan military presence for protection against hostile armed groups operating out of the eastern part of the country. That's putting a tremendous burden on the Rwandan military establishment and it does, in fact, seem to serve as a justification for whatever abuses it might then be accused of committing. In a similar vein, whenever Rwandan attacks and massacres are mentioned, they are also preceded by the information that this was a response to what somebody else did. So here, again, the attempt to give it a spin, to make it less awful than it really is. Let me point out, too, some very interesting comparisons between the chapters on Rwanda and the chapters on Burundi, where the difference in language clearly reflects the degree of closeness to the current government. So that when discussing ethnic discrimination in Rwanda, the chapter says at the start that yes, there is ethnic discrimination, but later in the chapter it softens this by saying that some Hutu accuse the government of discrimination, again without taking a position. Whereas the chapter on Burundi, where you have a very similar situation, but where we have not the same closeness to the Burundi government, there is a clear statement: state discrimination against Hutu affects every facet of society, but most particularly higher education and certain branches of government, such as the armed services and the judicial system. Similarly, in discussing the judicial system, in the Rwandan chapter, we're told that there are no reports of political prisoners in Rwanda. Human Rights Watch has delivered a number of cases directly to the door of the embassy, but here we're told there are no cases of political prisoners in Rwanda, while in the Burundi chapter, we're told that there are some clearly identifiable political prisoners. In talking about the Rwandan judicial system, as well, the Rwanda report concludes that the ``vast majority of trials met international standards,'' yet earlier in the chapter it says 50 percent or fewer than 50 percent of the accused had access to legal counsel. In what way then does this meet international standards? Similarly, when discussing the proposed reform of the judicial system to create popular justice, the popular justice system of gacaca, the report says that lawyers will not be permitted to ``participate officially.'' That's not so. Lawyers will not be permitted to participate in any form whatsoever. So these details indicate a spin on the report which is a very important one. Another case: the mention of villagization is passed over very quickly in the context of the report, simply saying that some observers believe that residents were compelled to move to these government designated villages. This gives no sense of the fact that thousands of people have been forced to destroy their own homes and to move to government designated sites, where they are now living in shelters made out of sticks and grass and banana leaves, some of them for 2 years, because the government has imposed this policy of forced villagization. The reports on the DRC and on Rwanda make the point many times that it is difficult to get information, and in fact, this is a problem. But if embassy personnel were more open to receiving information from local human rights organizations, they would find themselves relatively well supplied with what they need. Of course, this information would need to be critically assessed, but the point is the information is there. All we need to do is make adequate use of it. Let me go on to some concrete recommendations which could perhaps help to bridge the gap between that island of human rights and the mainland of general policy. First of all, as the reports indicate, the allegations of massive crimes against humanity in the DRC have never been investigated. The U.S. initially supported the idea of a U.N. investigation, but backed off when the Kabila government and the Rwandan authorities said no. In the recent U.N. Security Council resolution establishing the peace keeping operation in the Congo, the U.S. has once again endorsed the prospect of an investigation of these massacres. We would urge the Subcommittee to keep that on its agenda and to ensure that the Administration understands the vital importance that this time that investigation be done, be done well, promptly and thoroughly. Uncovering the truth of crimes is not enough. We also have to have accountability and---- Mr. Smith [presiding]. Ms. DesForges, would you mind yielding just for a minute? The gentle lady from Georgia had a question. Ms. McKinney. Yes. I do need to go vote. But, Dr. DesForges, I would just like to request that I can call you and we can discuss some issues later, since I've got your number here. But you were about to go into the issue of accountability, and you might even answer my question. I will just say that I have concerns for all of you about the accountability of the United Nations, the accountability of the United States itself, and about U.S. corporations and U.S. corporate behavior and their accountability. So why don't you go ahead and finish on the accountability and then I will pose my question, because I want to hear what you have to say. Ms. DesForges. Just as a side light, let me mention that the OAU report on responsibility for external actors during the Rwandan genocide will be published shortly and should provide an opportunity to call once again for a United States investigation into its own behavior. If the pattern of impunity is to be broken, these kinds of crimes must be dealt with in something other than simply a truth-telling kind of mechanism. The international criminal tribunal for Rwanda, which is a very, very flawed structure in many ways, is perhaps the best we're going to get in the short term. We need to exploit it to its maximum, including insisting that its mandate be extended, so that it parallels the mandate of the tribunal for former Yugoslavia. That is, it becomes an open ended mandate, which allows it to deal with events that happened after the end of 1994, and which would allow it to deal with events that happened also by all parties in the DRC. Similarly, the establishment of a separate chamber to deal with Burundi would allow it for the first time to deal with the unresolved issue of accusations of genocide and crimes against humanity in Burundi. Those charges were made by a U.N. Security Council commission of investigation and they were let drop completely. The connections in this region are too complex to permit partial justice; that is, justice for one party and not another, justice in one country and not another. Even with the best possible functioning of international justice, we also need to support development of judicial systems within these various nations. The United States is now well placed to do this, with the Great Lakes justice initiative, and I would encourage you to support the efficient administration of that fund so that, for example, in Burundi, money can be directed to helping to redress the gross ethnic imbalance there by providing immediate short-term training to Hutu jurists so that they can enter into the court system and perhaps to allowing for the temporary recruitment of foreign jurists to lend greater credibility to judgments in those courts. In the Rwandan context, support for the new gacaca process is, of course, a valuable idea, but it's one which we should permit only if we do not sacrifice our own standards of due process, and that means particularly allowing accused to have the right to legal defense, particularly if the consequence of their condemnation will be a life in prison. Local human rights groups have been mentioned several times this morning as important sources of information. Supporting them financially and politically is of the greatest importance. In the Rwanda chapter, there is a mention that local human rights groups are weak because they have very few resources. Yes, indeed, and USAID has refused to give any money to those local human rights groups, up until very recently, when, after we made a vigorous protest, they decided to look at local human rights organizations as a possible recipient of funds. The Members of the Congressional Friends of Human Rights Monitors have played in the past a very important role and need to continue playing that role, being alert to possibilities of persecution and danger for our colleagues on the ground. When on missions, we've heard how often you all travel, a great deal obviously, on those missions, your being in touch with local activists rather than simply with official types gives those people a small measure of protection and an enormous amount of encouragement. Ms. McKinney. Let me thank the Chairman. I think I've just about given up my opportunity to go and vote. But for all of you--maybe this is just a vent right now--the United Nations has apologized three times in Rwanda, Srebreneca, and East Timor, for their failings. They said I'm sorry. My question is, is I'm sorry enough? As I watch the Rwandans, the Srebrenecans and the East Timorese try to put their shattered lives back together and in the case of Rwanda and East Timor, trying to put countries back together, I'm sorry just doesn't seem to be enough. Since you represent the legal community, maybe you could help with, under the face of the staggering culpability by the United Nations, what's out there for victims of U.N. complicity in human rights violations. But let me continue with the United States and accountability on the part of the United States. As we learn and continue to learn even today about U.S. military ties to other militaries, we see that our own troops, our own people are complicit in human rights abuses, and in some cases, even worse situations with respect to Rwanda, I believe. So what is it that keeps the United States accountable and for those people who are victims of U.S. military behavior and policy, Mr. Salinas, you talked in your piece about good information, but bad policy. To whom do the victims of U.S. bad policy turn for redress and holding the United States accountable, and then with U.S. corporations? Oil companies and our diamond people, we see that oil and diamond are used as excuses for fueling wars and the commission of human rights abuses. How is it that we hold our U.S. corporate community accountable for the human rights violations that they participate in as well? Ms. Massimino. There's a lot there to respond to and all of them very, very good points. I'd like to make a couple of points in response to that. There had to be a lot of ``sorries'' on the part of the U.S., on the part of the United Nations, over many, many years, and this is a big problem, the U.S. participation in human rights abuse, the U.S. standing by watching human rights abuse and then deciding to act when it's too late to prevent. I guess I would say there are a number of steps that could be taken to help make sure we are not in a position of having to say only ``sorry.'' Again, one is--and Mr. Salinas can talk more about this, but one is the importance of making sure that people know that the conduct of their own government and their participation in human rights violations is going to be made public, and that's why the Human Rights Information Act is such an important idea and such an important vehicle, because if people know, if bureaucrats know that their actions, that the basis on which they are making their decisions, their involvement in the human rights violations of other governments, to the extent that's documented, is going to be made public, that's a huge deterrent. On the issue generally of accountability---- Mr. Smith. Ms. Massimino, would you mind suspending just briefly. Ms. McKinney and I both have a second in a series of votes and now they're only 5 minute votes and this is on a bill. I have several additional questions, but one with regard to North Korea, which has been noticeably absent in much of this discussion. When Ambassador Seiple was here and appeared before our Committee and named the countries of particular concern, he left out North Korea. I asked him couldn't we presumptively list it, even though we may not have access to detailed information? How do you get a delegation on the ground? Reporting is minimal, nil to none, and yet we know that there is severe repression that ought to presumptively qualify North Korea in that list. You might want to touch on North Korea. Mr. Rees, who is our chief of staff, will keep the hearing open, and your answers will be looked at very carefully by all of us, and we thank you so much for coming. I hate to leave, but there is a whole series of votes coming up. Ms. Massimino. Thank you. Mr. Rees. Perhaps you could briefly finish the answer to the other question and then answer the question about the absence of information in North Korea. Ms. Massimino. The other point I wanted to make on accountability is this. One thing that was striking to me, it was in Secretary Koh's introductory remarks, on the release of the report. He talks about accountability a lot and one of the things he says is that there is no international consensus on the need for an international criminal court. Happily, that's not true. There is a strong international consensus that we need this international criminal court, a standing body to address the kinds of abuses that have had to be addressed in the various ad hoc tribunals. The problem is that the U.S. is standing outside of that international consensus and that's terribly distressing and a part of U.S. policy that we hope to see changed in the future. Mr. Rees. Does anyone have an answer to the North Korea question? I think the focus of the Chairman's question on North Korea was that--and it's not only North Korea, it's also notable in the Laos report, the Burma report--where you can't get information, where there are reports, particularly from exiles, who say, ``well my relatives in the country or my friends tell me that this terrible thing is going on,'' and then the report either doesn't mention those things or it says, there were reports, but there was no way to confirm it. Does the worst government win? In other words, the more successful you are at blocking transparency, at keeping human rights organizations out, at keeping information from getting out, do you get a pass in the human rights report because of that? What is the solution? Ms. Massimino. That's a difficult problem and we face it ourselves. If we were to sit down and talk about countries where we don't get access and, therefore, can't publish reports and can't--all we can do is hold press conferences or issue statements saying that they won't let us in. Cuba, North Korea, Syria, there are a number of countries. Now, usually those are countries that are not getting a ``pass'' in terms of U.S. policy toward them, because they are denounced as pariah governments and aren't getting aid so that---- Mr. Rees. Laos and certain regions of Vietnam are utterly inaccessible. Terrible things are said to happen there, and it's arguable that those countries are getting a pass in terms of U.S. policy. Maybe other countries, as well. Ms. Massimino. Yes. I guess what I would say is that what we have to do in countries like that and what we urge the country reports to--the approach to take is to state specifically all of the allegations about abuses and to make a bigger point of not assuming that access will be denied, but make--this is what we do--make requests, get denied, press again and document the denial of access as prima facie evidence of their being something to hide there. It's a hard problem and we face it, too. Mr. Rees. Anybody else on that question? Mr. Salinas. I think part of it is to look at it in terms of whether or not you allow the countries that do not permit access to get a free pass. In a way, this is kind of answering the question of the Ranking Member, ``who holds the U.S. Government accountable?'' The answer is you all. It's the role of Congress, it's the oversight, it's the checks and balances on the executive branch, it's why we're so focused on Congress with this Colombia aid package. You are the ones that can get the information. You are the ones who can pass a bill to set up an orderly process to have clarity, and you are also the ones that can help nudge the administration to make it clear to countries that do not offer access, make it clear to them, so that they understand, that there is a price to pay for that. So we're not just left with an omission, it's not just a gap in the reporting, you make a big deal out of it. You make it clear that this is unacceptable and you keep insisting. Mr. Rees. Dr. DesForges, this example in the context of North Korea, other Asian nations, recalls the situation in Eastern Congo, then Zaire, in 1996, when Refugees International, UNHCR, and other groups were saying that there were over 100,000 missing refugees somewhere who might be being killed. As far as I know, the international community has--the bodies that like to cal themselves the international community--have never come to terms with that. They've never said ``yes, too bad, they got killed,'' or ``no, they didn't.'' You might be more familiar with the end game on that terrible situation, about the lack of information and how the lack of information and perhaps the deliberate failure to search for information generated policy. Ms. DesForges. Yes. I think that's the important distinction, when is lack of information a true lack? It's like we're finding increasingly that famine is never really famine, it's all politically determined. It's not a lack of food, it's a question of policy. I think it's not a lack of information, it's a question of policy. As in the case you mentioned, the information was there. The U.S. had satellite surveillance. The information was there. It was that one part of the U.S. Government was not about to share that with human rights defenders because of certain policy interests. I would suppose that even in a case like North Korea, that there is a substantial amount of intelligence available if there were a human rights culture that infected our intelligence service and if they also believed that this was something that their information should reflect. My guess is there would be a way that that information could be gotten and passed to the country reports people. It's just that that, as we have bemoaned all day long, has not yet happened. We're creeping up on them. But I think there is also the question of time. As my colleagues have stressed, it's not enough to be refused once. You have to keep trying, and things do change. No situation is set in concrete and no group of abusers, no abusive government is homogeneous. There are always factions within any government and at some point, they will start to see that the costs of continuing to stonewall on these issues is such that it might be better to give in and allow for some closer examination. I think it's a question of publicity. For example, the Mwenge incident, which has now become so famous that Secretary Albright mentioned it at the United Nations, 15 people were massacred. How many times have 15 people been massacred in Eastern Congo? Now, obviously, this was a particularly gruesome incident that caught people's imagination, but it was simply the fact that that was picked up and talked about over and over and over again, that finally led those local authorities to get in touch with people like us to say wouldn't you please come and investigate, because we would really like to have the world know what happened at Mwenge. Of course, then you're subject to manipulation once you get there and you have to be alert to that. But the point is that over time, with sufficient pressure, cracks develop in those edifices and then you can scoot on through. Mr. Rees. In accordance with the Chairman's order, the hearing is now closed. 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