[House Hearing, 108 Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
HOMELAND SECURITY JURISIDICTION: THE PERSPECTIVES OF COMMITTEE LEADERS
=======================================================================
HEARING
before the
SUBCOMMITTEE ON RULES
of the
SELECT COMMITTEE ON
HOMELAND SECURITY
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
ONE HUNDRED EIGHTH CONGRESS
SECOND SESSION
__________
MARCH 24, 2004
__________
Serial No. 108-42
__________
Printed for the use of the Select Committee on Homeland Security
Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.access.gpo.gov/congress/
house
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__________
SELECT COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND SECURITY
Christopher Cox, California, Chairman
Jennifer Dunn, Washington Jim Turner, Texas, Ranking Member
C.W. Bill Young, Florida Bennie G. Thompson, MississPpi
Don Young, Alaska Loretta Sanchez, California
F. James Sensenbrenner, Jr., Edward J. Markey, Massachusetts
Wisconsin Norman D. Dicks, Washington
W.J. (Billy) Tauzin, Louisiana Barney Frank, Massachusetts
David Dreier, California Jane Harman, California
Duncan Hunter, California Benjamin L. Cardin, Maryland
Harold Rogers, Kentucky Louise McIntosh Slaughter, New
Sherwood Boehlert, New York York
Lamar S. Smith, Texas Peter A. DeFazio, Oregon
Curt Weldon, Pennsylvania Nita M. Lowey, New York
Christopher Shays, Connecticut Robert E. Andrews, New Jersey
Porter J. Goss, Florida Eleanor Holmes Norton, District of
Dave Camp, Michigan Columbia
Lincoln Diaz-Balart, Florida Zoe Lofgren, California
Bob Goodlatte, Virginia Karen McCarthy, Missouri
Ernest J. Istook, Jr., Oklahoma Sheila Jackson-Lee, Texas
Peter T. King, New York Bill Pascrell, Jr., North Carolina
John Linder, Georgia Donna M. Christensen, U.S. Virgin
John B. Shadegg, Arizona Islands
Mark E. Souder, Indiana Bob Etheridge, North Carolina
Mac Thornberry, Texas Ken Lucas, Kentucky
Jim Gibbons, Nevada James R. Langevin, Rhode Island
Kay Granger, Texas Kendrick B. Meek, Florida
Pete Sessions, Texas Ben Chandler, Kentucky
John E. Sweeney, New York
John Gannon, Chief of Staff
Stephen DeVine, Deputy Staff Director and General Counsel
Thomas Dilenge, Chief Counsel and Policy Director
David H. Schanzer, Democrat, Staff Director
Mark T. Magee, Democrat, Deputy Staff Director
Michael S. Twinchek, Chief Clerk
______
Subcommittee on Rules
Lincoln Diaz-Balart, Florida, Chairman
Jennifer Dunn, Washington Louise McIntosh Slaughter, New
F. James Sensenbrenner, Wisconsin York
David Dreier, California Bennie G. Thompson, Mississippi
Curt Weldon, Pennsylvania Loretta Sanchez, California
Porter Goss, Florida Zoe Lofgren, California
John Linder, Georgia Karen McCarthy, Missouri
Pete Sessions, Texas Ben Chandler, Kentucky
Christopher Cox, California, ex Jim Turner, Texas, ex officio
officio
(II)
CONTENTS
----------
MEMBER STATEMENTS
The Honorable Christopher Cox, Chairman
Oral Statement................................................. 4
Prepared Statement............................................. 6
The Honorable Diaz-Balart, a Representative in Congress, From the
State of Florida, and Chairman of the Subcommittee on Rules
Oral Statement................................................. 1
Prepared Statement............................................. 3
The Honorable Louise M. Slaughter, a Representative in Congress,
From the States of New York.................................... 20
The Honorable Bennie G. Thompson, a Representative in Congress
From the State of Mississippi.................................. 10
The Honorable Jim Turner, a Representative in Congress, From the
State of Texas................................................. 9
The Honorable Curt Weldon, a Representative in Congress, From the
State of Pennsylvania.......................................... 7
WITNESSES
Committee on Agriculture
The Honorable Bob Goodlatte, a Representative in Congress From
the State of Virginia, and Chairman
Oral Statement................................................. 29
Prepared Statement............................................. 32
The Honorable Charles W. Stenholm, a Representative in Congress
From the State of Texas, and Ranking Member
Oral Statement................................................. 34
Prepared Statement............................................. 36
Committee on Appropriations
The Honorable C.W. Bill Young, a Representative in Congress From
the State of Florida, and Chairman
Oral Statement................................................. 133
Committee on Energy and Commerce
The Honorable Joe Barton, a Representative in Congress From the
State of Texas, and Chairman
Oral Statement................................................. 44
The Honorable John D. Dingell, a Representative in Congress From
the State of Michigan, and Ranking Member
Oral Statement................................................. 48
Prepared Statement............................................. 50
Committee on Financial Services
The Honorable Michael G. Oxley, a Representative in Congress From
the State of Ohio, and Chairman
Prepared Statement............................................. 123
The Honorable Barney Frank, a Representative in Congress From the
State of Massachusetts, and Ranking Member
Prepared Statement............................................. 123
Committee on Government Reform
The Honorable Tom Davis, a Representative in Congress From the
State of Virginia, and Chairman
Oral Statement................................................. 64
Prepared Statement............................................. 66
The Honorable Henry A. Waxman, a Representative in Congress From
the State of California, and Ranking Member
Oral Statement................................................. 68
Committee on International Relations
The Honorable Henry J. Hyde, a Representative in Congress From
the State of Illinois, and Chairman
Prepared Statement............................................. 121
The Honorable Tom Lantos, a Representative in Congress From the
State of California, and Ranking Member
Prepared Statement............................................. 121
Committee on the Judiciary
The Honorable F. James Sensenbrenner, Jr., A Representative in
Congress From the State of Wisconsin, and Chairman
Oral Statement................................................. 92
Prepared Statement............................................. 95
Committee on Science
The Honorable Sherwood Boehlert, a Representative in Congress
From the State of New York, and Chairman
Prepared Statement............................................. 118
The Honorable Bart Gordon, a Representative in Congress From the
State of Texas, and Ranking Member
Prepared Statement............................................. 119
Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure
The Honorable Don Young, a Representative in Congress From the
State of Alaska, and Chairman
Prepared Statement............................................. 77
The Honorable James L. Oberstar, a Representative in Congress
From the State of Minnesota, and Ranking Member
Oral Statement................................................. 80
Prepared Statement............................................. 81
The Honorable John Mica, a Representative in Congress From the
State of Florida, and Chairman of the Subcommittee on Aviation
Oral Statement................................................. 76
Committee on Ways and Means
The Honorable William M. Thomas, a Representative in Congress
From the State of California, and Chairman
Oral Statement................................................. 114
Prepared Statement............................................. 115
The Honorable Charles B. Rangel, a Representative in Congress
From the State of New York, and Ranking Member
Prepared Statement............................................. 131
Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence
The Honorable Porter Goss, a Representative in Congress From the
State of Florida, and Chairman
Oral Statement................................................. 12
Prepared Statement............................................. 14
The Honorables Jane Harman, a Representative in Congress From the
State of California, and Ranking Member
Oral Statement................................................. 15
Prepared Statement............................................. 17
HOMELAND SECURITY JURISDICTION: THE PERSPECTIVES OF COMMITTEE LEADERS
----------
Wednesday, March 24, 2004
House of Representatives,
Subcommittee on Rules,
Select Committee on Homeland Security,
Washington, D.C.
The subcommittee met, pursuant to call, at 12:59 p.m., in
Room 2237, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Lincoln Diaz-
Balart, the chairman of the subcommittee presiding.
Present: Representatives Dunn, Weldon, Goss, Cox (ex
officio), Sensenbrenner, Slaughter, Lofgren, McCarthy and
Turner (ex officio).
Mr. Diaz-Balart. We would like to welcome Members of the
subcommittee and the Chairman of the Intelligence Committee as
well as Chairman Cox who is here from the full committee today
with us.
While this is our first hearing of this year, our staff has
been working very hard to continue the important work of this
subcommittee. As you all know, we have been authorized and
directed to conduct a thorough and complete study of the
operation and implementation of the Rules of the House,
including Rule X, with respect to the issue of Homeland
Security. And we will submit our recommendations to the House
Rules Committee by September 30th.
Today's hearing will serve as an additional step in that
process. In the summer and fall of 2003, we heard testimony
from some the foremost experts on Congress. These witnesses
included five academics from various institutions, two former
committee chairmen with superior knowledge of the House rules,
two former Speakers of the House, and the very first Secretary
of Energy. This was a very distinguished bipartisan group of
witnesses.
These witnesses have very different experiences to qualify
them as experts on the Congress, yet they all share a common
belief. And that belief is that the Select Committee on
Homeland Security should be made permanent. Speakers Gingrich
and Foley have both endorsed a permanent standing committee
with primary legislative jurisdiction, and both have called for
a joint statement from Speaker Hastert and Minority Leader
Pelosi announcing their intent to make the committee permanent
as soon as possible.
Speaker Gingrich explained, in part, his rationale for a
permanent committee with the following words, ``Congress cannot
meet its Constitutional responsibilities unless it shows the
same courage as the President in forcing through a real
reorganization that does not entangle the Department of
Homeland Security in a web five times more complex than the
Department of Energy deals with. It is urgent that Congress
also reorganizes its own structure now.''
Former Speaker Gingrich went on to say, ``In fact, being
effective at homeland security could prove to be, literally, a
matter of life and death in terms of the security and freedom
we have grown accustomed to as Americans. Life and death is not
a rhetorical term. It is conceivable some of the threats of the
21st century could kill many times the 3,000 who were killed on
September 11, 2001.''
Both former members, Lee Hamilton and Bob Walker also
supported the creation of a permanent standing committee. Mr.
Hamilton explained his rationale with the following statement,
``The issue of Homeland Security is not temporary. The threat
of terrorism is long term, as are the related challenges that
will confront our government. Thus, necessary oversight cannot
be supplied on an interim basis nor can it be effectively and
efficiently disbursed among the current 13 full committees and
60 subcommittees in the House.''
While some may give less weight to the opinions of
academics as not practical, these four men served in this
institution with distinction and honor. They have a unique
perspective having served in Congress but are no longer caught
up in the day-to-day struggles of committee jurisdictions.
Secretary Schlesinger also gave a very poignant testimony
before our committee. As the Director of Central Intelligence,
Secretary of Defense and the first Secretary of Energy,
Secretary Schlesinger has a very clear understanding of what a
department or agency needs from Congress in the form of
oversight and resources to be successful, especially a newly
created department.
Here are just a few of Secretary Schlesinger's words from
when he testified, ``A new Government department does not
spring like Athena from the brow of Zeus, full blown and ready
for action. Organizing the department is not instantaneous. It
takes time. There are many organizational challenges and
organizational gaps, especially in the early days of a new
department. The Department of Homeland Security is in a sense a
start-up organization. Contrary to the expectations of too
many, there will be unavoidable growing pains as the overall
organization gradually comes together. Anything that the House
can do to help the new Department rather than promote
additional perches from which the Department can be criticized
would serve the national interest.''
These five men, all of whom were very clear, and all of our
other witnesses made compelling cases for the permanency of the
Committee on Homeland Security.
However, our study, obviously, is not complete. Today, we
will hear testimony from committee leaders, each with a very
unique understanding of their committee jurisdictions.
I am open--and, I am sure, all Members of this committee--
to any option as long as it will help the fledgling Department
of Homeland Security succeed in its mission of protecting
American lives.
I am open to any suggestion, as long as it will help the
House of Representatives to be as prepared as possible to act
in the case of a future terrorist event. The effectiveness of
this House and the Department of Homeland Security must be our
primary goal.
I would like to thank you, Chairman Goss, Ranking Member
Harman, as well as all of the witnesses who will honor us with
their testimony today.
When Ms. Slaughter arrives I will ask if, at the
appropriate time, if she has an opening statement. And I would,
at this point, yield to any members who may wish to make an
opening statement.
PREPARED STATEMENT OF THE HONORABLE LINCOLN DIAZ-BALART, CHAIRMAN
I would like to welcome the members of the Subcommittee and the
Chairmen and Ranking Members that will be testifying before us today.
While this is our first hearing of the year, our staff has been working
behind the scenes to continue the important work of our subcommittee.
As you all know, we have been ``authorized and directed to conduct
a thorough and complete study of the operation and implementation of
the rules of the House, including rule X, with respect to the issue of
homeland security,'' and we will submit our recommendations to the
House Rules Committee by September 30, 2004. Today's hearing will serve
as an additional step in that process.
In the Summer and Fall of 2003, we heard testimony from some of the
foremost experts on Congress. These witnesses included five academics
from various institutions, two former committee chairmen with superior
knowledge of the House Rules, two former Speakers of the House, and the
very first Secretary of Energy. This was a very distinguished
bipartisan group of witnesses.
These witnesses have very different experiences that qualify them
as experts on the Congress, yet they all share a common belief. They
all believe that the Select Committee on Homeland Security should be
made permanent.Speakers Gingrich and Foley have both endorsed a
permanent standing committee with primary legislative jurisdiction, and
both have called for a joint statement from Speaker Hastert and
Minority Leader Pelosi announcing their intent to make the committee
permanent as soon as possible.
Speaker Gingrich explained, in part, his rational for a permanent
committee with the following words:
``Congress cannot meet its constitutional responsibilities unless
it shows the same courage as the President in forcing through a real
reorganization that does not entangle the Department of Homeland
Security in a web five times more complex than the Department of Energy
deals with. It is urgent that Congress also reorganizes its own
structure now.''
Speaker Gingrich went on to say:
``In fact being effective at Homeland Security could prove to be
literally a matter of life and death in terms of the security and
freedom we have grown accustomed to as Americans. Life and death is not
a rhetorical term. It is conceivable some of the threats of the 21st
century could kill many times the 3,000 who were killed on September
11, 2001.''
Both former Members Lee Hamilton and Bob Walker supported the
creation of a permanent standing committee.
Mr. Hamilton explained his rational with the following
statement:``The issue of homeland security is not temporary. The threat
of terrorism is long-term, as are the related challenges that will
confront our government. Thus necessary oversight cannot be supplied on
an interim basis, nor can it be effectively and efficiently disbursed
among the current 13 full committees and 60 subcommittees in the
House.''
While some may give less weight to the opinions of academics as not
practical, these four men served in this institution with distinction
and honor. They have a unique prospective of having served in Congress,
but are no longer caught up in the day to day struggles of committee
jurisdictions.
Secretary Schlesinger also gave very poignant testimony before our
Subcommittee. As the Director of Central Intelligence, Secretary of
Defense, and the first Secretary of Energy, Secretary Schlesinger has a
very clear understanding of what a department or agency needs from
Congress, in the form of oversight and resources, to be successful,
especially a newly created department. Here are a few of Secretary
Schlesinger's words from when he testified before us:
``A new government department does not spring, like Athena from the
brow of Zeus, full blown and ready for action. Organizing the
department is not instantaneous; it takes time. There are many
organizational challenges and organizational gaps, especially in the
early days of a new department. The Department of Homeland Security is,
in a sense, a start-up organization. Contrary to the expectations of
too many, there will be unavoidable growing pains--as the overall
organization gradually comes together.''
He went on to say that,
``Anything that the House can do to help the new department, rather
than provide additional perches from which the department can be
criticized would serve the national interest.''
These five men, and all of our other witnesses, have made
compelling cases for the permanency of Select Committee on Homeland
Security. However, our study is not complete. Today we will hear
testimony from Committee Leaders, each with a very unique understanding
of their committees' jurisdictions.
I am open to any option as long as it will help the fledgling
Department of Homeland Security succeed in its mission of protecting
American lives. I am open to any suggestion as long as it will help the
House of Representatives to be as prepared as possible to act in the
case of a future terrorist event. The effectiveness of this House and
of the Department of Homeland Security must be our primary goal.
I would like to thank all of our witnesses for testifying today,
but before we begin, I would ask Ms. Slaughter, my distinguished
Ranking Member if she would like to make an opening statement.
Mr. Cox. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, first, for holding this
hearing today and, second, for your sustained work in this
area, which is an important portion of the charter of the
Select Committee on Homeland Security.
We are to report to the Rules Committee and to the House
this September on our recommendations for going forward with
both authorization and oversight of the Department of Homeland
Security and the House of Representatives.
I agree with you that we need to hear directly from the
other chairmen of House committees as to how they think the
issue of Homeland Security should be handled from a
congressional, legislative and oversight perspective. And I
thank all the chairmen and ranking members who have agreed to
testify today, beginning with Porter Goss and Jane Harman, who
will be our first witnesses. And I thank those who have
submitted written testimony as well.
This is our fourth hearing on this topic. Previously, we
have received testimony from former House leaders, as you point
out Mr. Chairman, including speakers from both parties, as well
as outside experts on congressional accountability, on the
subject of how Congress should best organize itself, and on the
subject of the terrific barriers to sensible oversight and
authorization of the new Department because of turf jealousy in
the Congress.
And we have heard from Executive Branch officials, such as
James Schlesinger, the first Secretary of Energy and a former
CIA Director and Secretary of Defense, about the difficulties
of creating a new cabinet department with national security
responsibility and the risks to the country of balkanized and
diffused authorization and oversight in Congress. All of these
witnesses--without exception, Republicans and Democrats--
supported reforming the current House rules to create a
permanent Committee on Homeland Security with primary
legislative and oversight responsibility for the new Department
of Homeland Security.
Today, I am certain we will hear some on the other side. It
is important to strike the right balance between the
jurisdictional responsibility of a new Homeland Security
Committee and the very legitimate jurisdictional interests of
more than a dozen committees that have historically had
jurisdiction over the 22 legacy agencies transferred to
Homeland Security.
There is in place a good congressionally-created road map
to jurisdictional reform. It is the Homeland Security Act. That
act, focused as it is on the structure, organization,
capabilities and mission of the Department, itself offers a
blueprint. Just as important as ensuring accountability by
having one committee responsible for authorization and
oversight of Homeland Security is ensuring that both the
Department and the committee overseeing it are strictly limited
in their mission to prevent terrorist attacks, reduce our
vulnerability to terrorist attacks, and prepare for and respond
effectively to such attacks.
By reconsidering the jurisdiction and responsibility of the
Department, we can best rationalize the jurisdiction and
responsibility of committees in the Congress. For example, we
don't need a Homeland Security Committee looking at how FEMA
responds to floods and tornados.
We don't need a Homeland Security Committee looking at how
the Coast Guard clears ice from waterways or supports
recreational boating. And we don't need a Homeland Security Act
looking at immigration quotas or citizenship rules.
This is true despite the fact that all of these functions
were transferred into the Department of Homeland Security.
Considerable expertise with respect to those issues resides in
the current standing committees of the Congress, and there is
no reason to recreate it elsewhere.
But we do need a Homeland Security Committee looking at the
fusion of foreign intelligence, domestic intelligence, domestic
and foreign watch lists and the Federal and State and local law
enforcement response to this information.
We do need a Homeland Security looking at the integration
of several border security entities that were transferred into
the Department last year from multiple Federal departments. We
do need a Homeland Security Committee looking at the
effectiveness of information-sharing on infrastructure threats
and vulnerabilities both within the Department and between the
Department of Homeland Security and other Federal, local and
State governmental entities, as well as within the private
sector.
We do need a Homeland Security Committee looking at the
integration of the myriad of terrorist and other law
enforcement and intelligence databases within DHS and across
the Federal Government. We do need a Homeland Security
Committee looking at how best to fund, prepare, train and re-
equip our first responders in the battle against terrorism, and
we do need a Homeland Security committee to ensure that the sum
of the various parts of the Department of Homeland Security
adds up to something much greater, much more focused than a
collection of legacy agencies, doing what they have always
done.
Most important, we need a Homeland Security Committee
looking at the development of a comprehensive and dynamic
threat and vulnerability analysis to guide strategic Homeland
Security planning, resource allocation and infrastructure
protection. The Congress must look at the Department as a
unified whole in order to set congressional priorities and give
congressional direction through a regular annual appropriations
process and authorization process.
But currently, in each of these areas, jurisdiction is
scattered among many House committees, and in some cases, it is
nonexistent.
Imagine if the Department of Defense did not have a primary
authorization and oversight committee?
If we are talking about the security of the United States
of America, the most essential function of our national
Government, to give Homeland Security the attention it demands
from us as a separate Department in the Executive Branch of
Government and an entirely new discipline, Congress, too, must
be restructured.
Chairman Bill Young of the Appropriations Committee noted
in his written testimony today that when he created a single
Homeland Security Appropriation Subcommittee, quote, ``The
imperative for the committee and the Department presumably from
the outset was to provide a structure for the legacy agencies
to coalesce into a single department with a coordinated unified
mission.''
He also states that his committee, quote, ``Would find it
equally difficult to provide consistent oversight and
appropriate funding levels if the myriad of the departments,
programs and activities were scattered across seven
subcommittees.''
It was obvious to me early that we needed to reorganize to
provide structure to ourselves and for the new Department that
we were to oversee and fund. If this makes eminent sense, Mr.
Chairman, for the appropriations side, which I believe it does,
then it makes equally good sense for the authorization and
oversight side.
I look forward to exploring these issues today with our
witnesses and to working with them as this year progresses.
Thank you Mr. Chairman.
PREPARED STATEMENT OF THE HONORABLE CHRISTOPHER COX
Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for holding this hearing today. I, too,
think that we need to hear directly from the other chairmen of House
committees as to how they think the issue of homeland security should
be handled from a congressional legislative and oversight perspective.
And I thank all of the chairmen that have agreed to testify today and
those that have submitted written testimony as well.
This is our 4th hearing on this topic. Previously, we have received
testimony from former House leaders, including Speakers from both
parties, as well as outside experts in Congressional accountability, on
the subject of how Congress should best organize itself. . .and the
terrific BARRIERS to sensible oversight and authorization of the new
department because of turf jealousy. And, we heard from Executive
Branch officials, such as James Schlesinger, the first Secretary of
Energy, and a former CIA, Sec. Def. about the difficulties of creating
a new cabinet department with national security responsibility, and the
risks to country of Balkanized and diffused authorization and oversight
in Congress. All of these witnesses, without exception, Republicans and
Democrats, supported reforming the current House rules to create a
permanent Committee on Homeland Security with primary legislative and
oversight responsibility for the new Department of Homeland Security.
Today, we will hear from the other side.
Crafting the right balance between the jurisdictional
responsibility of a new Homeland Security Committee and the very
legitimate interests of the > dozen committees that have historically
had jurisdiction over the 22 LEGACY agencies transferred to Homeland
Security. But, the congressionally created road map to jurisdictional
reform--the Homeland Security Act--that focuses on the structure,
organization, capabilities, and mission of the Department itself,
offers a blueprint.
Just as IMPORTANT as insuring accountability by having ONE
committee responsible for AUTHORIZATION AND OVERSIGHT of Homeland
Security, is insuring that BOTH the department and the Committee
overseeing it, are STRICTLY LIMITED in their mission to prevent
terrorist attacks, reduce our vulnerability to terrorist attacks, and
prepare for and respond effectively to such attacks.
By reconsidering the jurisdiction and responsibility of the
Department, we can best rationalize the jurisdiction and responsibility
of Committees in the Congress. For example, we don't need a homeland
security committee looking at how FEMA responds to floods or tornados
We don't need a homeland security committee looking at how the Coast
Guard clears ice from waterways or supports recreational boating. And
we don't need a homeland security committee looking at immigration
QUOTAS or citizenship procedures. at backlogs in the processing of
legal immigrants or other immigration services. This is true, despite
the fact that all of these functions were transferred into DHS.
Considerable expertise with respect to those issues resides in the
current standing committees of the Congress, and there is NO REASON to
re-create it ELSEWHERE.
But we do need a homeland security committee looking at the fusion
of foreign intelligence, domestic intelligence, domestic and foreign
watch lists, and Federal, state and local law enforcement response to
this information. Integration of the several border security entities
that were transferred into the Department last year from multiple
Federal departments. We do need a homeland security committee looking
at the effectiveness of information sharing on infrastructure threats
and vulnerabilities, both within the Department and between DHS and
other Federal, state, and local government entities, as well as with
the private sector. We do need a homeland security committee looking at
the integration of the myriad terrorist and other law enforcement and
intelligence databases within DHS and across the Federal Government. We
do need a homeland security committee looking at how best to fund,
prepare, train and equip our first responders in the battle against
terrorism. And, we need a homeland security committee to ensure that
the sum of the various parts of DHS adds up to something much greater,
much more focused, than a collection of legacy agencies, doing what
they always have done.
Most important, we need a homeland security committee looking at
the development of a (comprehensive and dynamic) threat and
vulnerability analysis to guide 1. strategic homeland security
planning, 2. resource allocation, and 3. infrastructure protection. The
Congress must look at the Department as a unified whole, in order to
set congressional priorities, and give congressional direction through
a regular ANNUAL authorization process.
Currently, in each of these areas, jurisdiction is scattered among
MANY House committees, and in some cases it is non-existent. Imagine if
the Department of Defense did not have a primary authorization and
oversight committee. Yet we are talking about the security of the USA,
the most essential function of our National Government. To give
homeland security the attention it demands from us as a separate
DEPARTMENT in the Executive branch of Government, and an ENTIRELY NEW
DISCIPLINE, Congress must be structured so as to give it sustained and
expert attention.
Chairman Bill Young of the Appropriations Committee noted in his
written testimony today that, when he created a single homeland
security appropriations subcommittee:
``The imperative for the Committee (and the Department presumably)
from the outset was to provide a structure for the legacy agencies to
coalesce into a single department with a coordinated, unified mission.
. .''
He also states that his committee: ``would find it equally
difficult to provide consistent oversight and appropriate funding
levels if the myriad of the department's programs and activities were
scattered across seven subcommittees. It was obvious to me early that
we needed to reorganize--to provide structure to ourselves and for the
new agency that we were to oversee and fund.''
If this makes eminent sense for the appropriations side--which I
believe it does--then it must also make good sense for the
authorization side.
I look forward to exploring these issues today with our witnesses
and to working with them as this year progresses to rationalize and
improve this House's homeland security oversight and legislative
activity.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Diaz-Balart. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Weldon?
Mr. Weldon. Thank you Mr. Chairman. I don't have a prepared
statement, but I would like to make a few comments.
I think this is the most important task that we will
undertake this year. And I am overwhelmingly in favor of
creating a full permanent committee, as I said before the Rules
Committee last year when I testified or, actually, last session
when I testified before the Rules Committee on the House
Republican Policy Committee on the need to have an individual
authorization and appropriation committee in both the House and
the Senate. We have taken the first step with the select
committee, but it hasn't solved the problem.
As my colleagues and as you have pointed out Mr. Chairman,
it is impossible, it is unthinkable to have one agency report
to--and if my staff will put the chart up on the easel--88
committees and subcommittees in the House and the Senate.
If you add up all of the membership of these 88 committees
and subcommittees, you will find out that there are 505 Members
of Congress who can claim jurisdiction over Homeland Security.
How in the world can one agency answer the phone calls, the
staff inquiries and the other efforts to inquire with 505
Members of Congress claiming they have jurisdiction over this
or that issue in Homeland Security?
It is absolutely unthinkable we would have this kind of
arrangement, and we wonder why the Homeland Security Department
spends the bulk of their time answering questions for the
Congress as opposed to doing their number one problem and
priority, which is protecting the homeland.
And there are some very specific things that have happened
over the past 2 years, Mr. Chairman, I would like to focus on
as examples of what we are talking about. We had the Homeland
Security Technology Transfer Bill. When it was introduced, it
was referred to four to six committees and the Select Committee
with expertise on the matter.
Four to six of the five different House committees that
this bill was referred to, each one of them refused to act on
it because they know collectively that none of them will be
able to--or all of them won't be able to act on it before the
end of the session, so therefore, none of them act on it.
Meanwhile, the Senate, with one committee, has already
passed the bill. We will not act on that bill this year. We
look at the Select Committee not being given important
jurisdiction.
And I see my good friend Jane Harman is here. And a good
example is the bill that she and I introduced on Homeland
Emergency Response and Operations or the HERO bill. She knows
full well that one of our distinguished authorizing committees
will not allow this committee to have any say on that very
important subject, which is the number one priority for our
first responders and that is public safety frequency spectrum
allocation. Another example of where we will not act this year,
yet we have this jurisdiction.
A third is the first-responder bill, which the Chairman has
done a fantastic job on in a bipartisan way with Congressman
Turner, we have marked up the bill. It is referred to three
other committees, and there will probably not be enough time to
pass the bill this year.
So we have to be very careful not to offend other
committees when we draft it, and some of the provisions still
will be removed before the bill finally moves to the House
floor.
Mr. Chairman, I can tell you that I have worked closely for
the past 18 years with the first-responder community. I have
been to all 50 states. I have spoken to all of their groups.
They consider me one of them because I used to be one of them.
Every first-responder group in America, every one, supports
one committee for authorization. Now, I would think the people
who we task to protect the homeland know best. The
International Association of Fire Chiefs, the International
Association of Fire Fighters, the National Volunteer Fire
Council, the State Fire Marshals, International Arson
Investigators, the National Fire Service Instructors, all of
the other myriad of groups who represent the 1.2 million men
and women who respond to our homeland security situations, all
have gone on record and have said we need one authorization
committee.
Well, then why then can't we move it? Perhaps, we will hear
in this hearing today the reasons. But I would argue and I
would make the point, Mr. Chairman, that I am going to be
listening to the people who want the Homeland Security
Department to respond to their needs. And they unequivocally
and overwhelmingly say we should do on the authorization side
what Bill did on the appropriations side and have one committee
of jurisdiction. And I hope that our hearings will, in the end,
be able to allow us to make that recommendation. Thank you.
Mr. Diaz-Balart. Thank you, Mr. Weldon.
I ask unanimous consent that all written statements of our
witnesses today as well as those chairmen and ranking members
who could not be here to testify, be included as part of the
hearing record.
Being no objection, so ordered.
PREPARED STATEMENT OF THE HONORABLE JIM TURNER
I have said previously and will repeat again today: If you take
homeland security seriously, you must reach the conclusion that there
needs to be one Committee in the House of Representatives with
oversight and legislative jurisdiction over the functions of the
Department of Homeland Security.There are a number of reasons I have
reached this conclusion.
First, we need to do whatever we can in the Congress to help the
Department of Homeland Security to be successful. Right now, we have
dozens of full committees and scores of subcommittees overseeing the
Department. We call senior Department officials to duplicative
hearings. And we push the Department in multiple, sometimes conflicting
policy directions.
Congress is making the Department's substantial challenges more
difficult.
Secretary Ridge agrees. At a hearing before our Committee he said,
``I think it goes without saying that a streamlined process of
oversight and accountability, in my judgment, would do both the
executive branch and the legislative branch a world of good.
Let me provide one example. The Department launched an initiative
called ``One Face At the Border,'' which attempts to merge the
functions of the former customs and former immigration inspectors at
our ports of entry. Without a Homeland Security Committee, the Ways and
Means Committee and Judiciary Committee would both have jurisdiction
over that small program, as would the Appropriations Committee and
possibly the Government Reform Committee as well. The people who run
``One Face At the Border'' have to deal with many faces here in
Congress.
My second main reason for advocating for a permanent Homeland
Security Committee is that I do not believe effective oversight over
the Department can be accomplished with multiple Committees having
responsibility for different sections of the Department. To illuminate
this, let me describe the effort of the Select Committee, under
Chairman Coxs leadership, to do a thorough review and authorization of
the Department of Homeland Security's budget. This is a very important
task, especially for a new Department.
Who would do this if we don't have a single homeland security
committee? Who would look at the tradeoffs that every Department must
make when developing a budget? Who would look at the cross-cutting
issues that affect the Department at large rather than individual
components--issues such as developing a comprehensive threat and
vulnerability assessment? Who would focus on the serious management
challenges facing the Department, such as those pointed out by the
Department's Inspector General today? The answer is, frankly, no one.
It appears to me that the witnesses today who argue that a new
Committee is not necessary are disregarding the decision made by
Congress and the President to create a Department of Homeland Security.
This decision reflected a determination that it was critically
important to bring diverse agencies under the direction of a Secretary
whose focus--24/7--would be on security. Even though the Attorney
General had tremendous expertise in immigration, and the Treasury
Department had tremendous experience with customs, and the
Transportation Department had tremendous knowledge of aviation
security--these functions were placed in the Department of Homeland
Security. For Congress to approve this reorganization, and the
philosophy behind it, but fail to reorganize itself to deal effectively
with the new reality, would be, to put it bluntly, the height of
hypocrisy.
Does this mean that committees with years of experience and
expertise in areas such as bioterrorism or aviation security should be
stripped of any influence over these subjects? No. There are ways to
have shared jurisdiction over issues where more than one committee has
something to contribute. This is accomplished in many other areas.
Jurisdictional arrangements can also be made for how Congress should
handle non-homeland security responsibilities of the new Department.
Finally, I would like to deal head on with the idea that has been
put forward that homeland security could be handled through a
subcommittee on the Government Reform Committee. I served on the
Government Reform Committee so I am familiar with the tremendous work
it does on oversight and issues that affect government operations
across the board. But I see no reason why we should consolidate
jurisdiction over homeland security in the Government Reform Committee
any more than we should provide it jurisdiction over health care,
highway construction, or education.
Such a consolidation has not occurred in the Governmental Affairs
Committee in the Senate and we have no way to predict whether it will.
Rather than trying to mimic an illogical approach that may or may not
happen in the Senate, I believe it would be far better to lead the way
with the right approach. I also believe that if we create a strong
Committee on Homeland Security in the House, the Senate will have no
choice but to follow suit. This is exactly what happened with respect
to the Appropriations Committee. The House took the right step of
creating a separate appropriations subcommittee for the Department of
Homeland Security. The Senate soon did the same thing.
I also want to express some skepticism about another idea--
continuing the Select Committee in its current form for another
Congress. While I believe we have made a positive contribution this
year in a number of ways, this structure is not a permanent solution.
In some ways, by creating yet another committee to which the new
Department must report, we are part of the problem this year rather
than the cure. And without meaningful authority and jurisdiction, the
Select Committee is hamstrung in its efforts to legislate and conduct
oversight.
I am certain that the right thing to do for the national security
of our country is to create a permanent Homeland Security Committee.
That Committee should have oversight with respect to all homeland
security activities of the Federal Government. It should also have
legislative jurisdiction over the full range of the Department of
Homeland Security's operations. While I will not be serving in the next
Congress, I do fear that if the Congress fails to take decisive action
on this topic, and we suffer additional terrorist attacks in the United
States, Congress will be held accountable for this failure.
PREPARED STATEMENT OF THE HONORABLE BENNIE THOMPSON
I greatly appreciate the opportunity to express my views on the
future of the Select Committee on Homeland Security. It has been said
time and time again that we now live a new age. . .an age of
uncertainty. We have come face-to-face with terrorism and must prepare
our homeland for future engagements. There is no doubt that this is a
challenge of the greatest magnitude. In fact, the argument can be made
that this is one of the greatest and most unique challenges that faces
our great nation. We face an enemy that is unquestionably dedicated to
the destruction of this free nation. Given this fact, we continue to be
unquestionably dedicated to protecting freedoms and principles on which
this nation was founded.
On September 11, 2001, people around the world wept and grieved
deeply over the lives lost on that tragic day. On that same day our
nation and many of our allies vowed to go the distance in bringing
those who carried out the horrible attacks on September 11th. As our
military continues to carry out our nation's campaign against terrorism
it is incumbent upon the house to do its part to ensure that such
ferocious attacks never again take place.
After the attacks of September 11, and after considerable pressure,
President Bush finally understood the need for a unified national
homeland security effort. After understanding the wisdom of this course
of action, the president approved the consolidation of 22 domestic
agencies into the Department of Homeland Security. The idea behind the
consolidation of nearly two dozen domestic agencies would breath life
into the national goal of fighting terrorism, foreign and domestic,
create a greater harmony between the agencies, and reduce the chances
of future attacks. The decision to create the Select Committee on
Homeland Security was a solid first step towards better preparing the
country to defend against terrorism.
We, as a deliberative body, must resist the temptation to continue
in a ``pre-9/ll'' mind set that creates unfathomable scenarios that
could severely limit our effectiveness to combat terrorism in the
legislative arena. As representatives of the people, it is our
responsibility to contribute to the war on terrorism through effective
legislation and oversight. Unfortunately, some in this body and on this
panel have failed to see the benefits to consolidating the legislative
and oversight responsibilities into one committee. A number of
congressman and congresswomen have voiced strong concerns stating that
the Select Committee on Homeland Security has done its job and should
be dissolved. Some have even suggested that the committee be allowed to
continue its existence without the needed legislative and oversight
authority. They contend that myriad committees would be better suited
to deal with the special needs of Homeland Security. They site
legislative and institutional experience as the reason other committees
would be more effective in the realm of homeland security oversight and
legislation. Given these claims, one must ask the question, ``Where
were the legislative and institutional experience and the preventative
accomplishments on and leading up to 9/11''
It is possible to make the argument that the many committees and
subcommittees that have legislative and oversight jurisdiction over the
Department of Homeland Security lacked the vision and foresight to
effectively legislate against a terrorist attack.
The same committees that claim that they should be gifted with this
incredible responsibility have not produced for the American people.
How can so many different committees and subcommittees promise the
American people that they will commit effective resources and time to
the issues of homeland security when their committees have other
important responsibilities. It is irresponsible to allow this
decentralized legislative and oversight responsibility. Anything less
than a centralized legislative and oversight body with authority has
the potential to indirectly assist terrorist and make preventing
terrorist attacks more difficult. A single legislative committee must
exist, not only to provide effective oversight and legislative action,
but also to ensure accountability. The authority must not ebb and flow
between committees and subcommittees with the changing of the political
wind. The American people deserve better than that. They deserve
greater protection from terrorists, political opportunism, and turf
battles. Responsibility and accountability must come from concrete, not
liquid, authority. Decentralized authority means decentralized
accountability.
It is crucial that Members of Congress understand what the nation
already understands and that is how real and how imminent these threats
are. In the eyes of the terrorist, September 11th was just an example
of their hatred.
Creating a single legislative body to deal with horrible events is
consistent with congressional responses. I strongly endorse making the
current Select Committee on Homeland Security a permanent committee
with clear legislative and oversight jurisdiction over the Department
of Homeland Security. The ability of the House to engineer
comprehensive legislation in advance and in response to crisis, over
see the administration of laws and carry out our constitutional
responsibility to represent the people of the United States people
depends a great deal upon the organization and management of the
committee system. The only way to ensure that the Department of
Homeland Security is effectively addressing the nation's needs with
respect to terrorist threats is to make the committee permanent and
give it all of the legislative and oversight authority as traditional
standing committees.
PREPARED STATEMENT OF THE HONORABLE LOUISE M. SLAUGHTER
I thank the many Members who are taking the time out of their full
schedules to speak with us today. There are many demands on everyone's
time, not the least of which this week is the Federal budget for FY05.
Your time and insights are greatly appreciated.
The creation of the Department of Homeland Security has raised many
issues. Congress has a responsibility over the new department itself,
and Congress has a heightened responsibility to respond to the threat
of terrorism. The question that this subcommittee continues to consider
today is what structure is best for the House and best for the nascent
department.
Some structural changes have already been made. The Appropriations
Committee created a homeland security appropriations subcommittee. The
Senate has incorporated its homeland security duties into its
Government Affairs Committee, instead of creating a separate homeland
security committee.
Last year this subcommittee heard from a series of distinguished
scholars, former Members, former Speakers, and others. consensus seemed
to emerge from those hearings that the House should have a A committee
on homeland security. These recommendations are helpful, but not
conclusive. Parliamentary and practical issues, such as committee
jurisdiction, referral, oversight, legislative authority, and subject-
matter expertise, are important parts of the equation in determining
the utility, necessity, and desirability of a homeland security. This
is where your experience and expertise is invaluable to the
subcommittee's deliberations.
The big questions continue to be debated. Should the House have a
homeland security committee? Should it be permanent, select, or
permanent select? Should it have oversight jurisdiction over the
Department of Homeland Security? Should it also have legislative
authority for the Department? Should the committee have jurisdiction
over homeland security programs or jurisdiction over all of the
entities that have been moved into the Department?
I look forward to hearing from the distinguished panelists today.
The Chairmen and Ranking Members of the committees with jurisdiction
over programs and entities within the Department of Homeland Security
will be able to provide special insight into the daily workings of the
House and our collective response to terrorism and the creation of the
Department of Homeland Security.
Mr. Diaz-Balart. Chairman Goss and Ms. Harman, thank you so
much for being here today. I would ask that you proceed with a
summary of your written statements, and we will stick to the 5-
minute rule.
Mr. Diaz-Balart. We will begin with Chairman Goss. Welcome.
STATEMENT OF THE HONORABLE PORTER GOSS, AND CHAIRMAN PERMANENT
SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE
Mr. Goss. Thank you very much Mr. Chairman. I have A formal
statement for the record which I would ask be included, and I
would summarize very briefly.
Mr. Diaz-Balart. Without objection.
Mr. Goss. First of all, the issue before us: Is the House
organized efficiently to handle Homeland Security oversight
including the department of Homeland Security? Should there be
a Homeland Security committee?
I believe the answer is, of course, yes. We are going to
have Homeland Security, and we have to have oversight and
authorization, and we have to have knowledgeable people doing
the advocacy for that. So there is no question that in my view
that decision has been made.
What it is going to look like is really what the issue is
about, I believe. And I can argue that, under Rule 10, there
are advantages to proceeding to set up a regular standing
committee or I could say a permanent select committee patterned
on the template that we use in our Intelligence Committee might
work as well. I think there are pluses and minuses to both. I
am not going to dwell on the how to. It is just that it needs
to be done.
With regard to some observations I would make and coming at
it from the perspective of the intelligence aspect, which is,
as you noted in your opening remarks, Mr. Chairman, a small
part of the Homeland Security but, in my view, a necessary
part. I believe intelligence is the nerve center. I believe it
is the trigger. I believe it is the thing without which the
rest becomes basically a huge burden on the people that Mr.
Weldon has just spoken to, the responders.
I would like to put the responders out of business. I want
them all to become Maytag people. I love them. I just don't
want to use them. I would like to have good information so we
stop the bomb before it goes off. We stop the incident before
it goes off. And that is where intelligence comes into Homeland
Security, goes into some type of a process, gets turned around
and goes out to action, agents who are properly authorized to
go out and forestall, preempt, prevent any kind of mischief
happening. That, to me, would be a successful Department of
Homeland Security.
I do believe that the present committee, the acting
committee that we have is too large a committee. I say that
because there are many interests that need to be considered and
it is entirely appropriate to have a large committee at this
point. I would hope that it could be more focused when the
organizational aspects are refined down.
With regard to jurisdiction and overlapping areas, I know
there has been a lot of discussion about that, and everybody
wants to guard their turf. And it will come as no surprise to
you that I believe that intelligence, the way we have it set up
in our oversight, both in the Senate and the House, under the
present conditions has gone through an evolutionary process
that has finally brought us a result that is actually working
quite well.
There are some who suggest that, perhaps, we should combine
the Senate and the House, and there are some other sort of
proposals on the table. But I can assure you that we now have a
system that is working and providing both the advocacy and the
oversight of our intelligence communities.
We act as the 1-800-number for keeping the intelligence
community in all its aspects in, bounds and we act also as the
advocacy by doing the authorization for all activities by
statute. We may not indulge in intelligence activities in this
country, even with appropriated funds, unless they are
authorized by the oversight committee. That is a special and
unique role for the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence
and for a good cause.
I believe that nevertheless HPSI takes on--Intelligence
Committee takes on the understood responsibility we do have to
reach out to the other chairmen where there are combined
interests. And we have 15 agencies that are in other Cabinet
areas and secretary areas that fall under other oversight
areas. And we do reach out to Chairman Sensenbrenner, Chairman
Hyde, Chairman Duncan Hunter of the Armed Services, the
appropriate committee.
We also try and have membership on our committees through
the leadership appointment process where we bridge to some of
those committees so that we are efficient. So these things are
resolvable, I believe, without having open turf wars. And I
would suggest that there is plenty of history on the books of
how we can proceed on that.
I do believe that the relationship we have with the
intelligence community is built on a clear understanding of how
we handle classified information for the intelligence community
and our portfolio. And I would not like to change that because
I do believe it does work well and serve our objectives
extremely well.
I would also point out, we work with different
appropriations people and will have no trouble working with the
different appropriations committees as authorizers whether it
is the defense appropriations committee or some other one in
the various manifestations that might come through Homeland
Security that nevertheless have an intelligence component,
which we would expect to be in our portfolio.
And finally, the last thing I was going to say, goes back
to Pearl Harbor. Interestingly enough, as horrible as Pearl
Harbor was, that 6 years after Pearl Harbor when we set up a
national intelligence program in our country--it was a national
foreign intelligence program. We do not have a domestic
intelligence agency. Americans do not spy on Americans.
That gets us to the question of how do we integrate or fuse
information that comes from our local law enforcement people in
a way that does not confound that objective of free and fair
democratic open society, all the hallmarks of being an American
in a way that we do not impose a domestic intelligence agency
on the people of the United States of America.
And I suggest that the way we are doing it now is working
quite well, using the foreign intelligence program manifest
through TTIC. Happy to answer any questions on TTIC.
PREPARED STATEMENT OF THE HONORABLE PORTER J. GOSS
In the year since the establishment of the Department of Homeland
Security and the three and half years since September 11th, the Federal
Government has moved substantial resources to break down stovepipes and
better protect the nation. The House has undertaken, in this Committee,
an exercise in reviewing our own capabilities to conduct oversight of
the Department of Homeland Security and related areas.
As Chairman of the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence
(HPSCI), I have a unique perspective because the Committee is a unique
Committee. HPSCI has been the only standing select Committee in
Congress for many years now, and I would like to provide my insights
into the authorization and oversight process we undertake to fulfill
Congress' responsibility to provide vigorous oversight of the
Intelligence Community in the most responsible manner possible. HPSCI's
creation was intended to provide Congress with the ability to oversee
disparate departments and organizations throughout the Federal
Government.
As you are aware, HPSCI has sole jurisdiction over US intelligence
and intelligence related activities. This means that we oversee the
national intelligence agencies and the military intelligence entities--
yet we also oversee the intelligence components of many other agencies,
such as the State Department, Treasury, and the FBI. We are very
focused on intelligence and we are able to do our oversight in a
thorough and constructive manner without redundancy or the interference
of other House oversight committees.
HPSCI's exclusive jurisdiction over the intelligence and
intelligence-related activities is a critical element of our ability to
conduct complete, across-the-board, non-partisan oversight. The unique
nature of HPSCI protects sensitive intelligence sources and methods
associated with intelligence collection and analysis. Congress, as a
whole, can review and benefit from finished analytic product, but the
discussion of where and how that information was acquired is reserved
for the closed-door sessions with HPSCI. This is the balance that was
struck with the Executive Branch when the committee was created, and I
believe it continues to serve us well today.
HPSCI has conducted vigorous oversight of the Intelligence
Community including the intelligence elements of counterterrorism and
homeland security. In fact, prior to the events of September 11th, the
HPSCI in January 2001 created a working group to examine the terrorist
threat and the US homeland. After September 11th, 2001 this working
group was elevated to a subcommittee. Today, that subcommittee
continues to examine many of the issues that the newly established
Select Homeland Security Committee has sought to clarify with respect
to intelligence.
HPSCI will continue to advocate for its proper jurisdiction to
oversee and authorize intelligence community elements including the
Terrorist Threat Integration Center (TTIC) and the Department of
Homeland Security's Information Analysis (IA) Division in the same way
it oversees and authorizes other Intelligence Community elements such
as the FBI's Office of Intelligence and the Counterintelligence
Division, the Department of State's Bureau of Intelligence and Research
(INR), the Department of Treasury's Office of Intelligence, and the
Department of Energy's Counterintelligence Office and Office of
Intelligence.
I believe the best defense is a good offense and that the role
intelligence plays in protecting the nation is vital, but there is more
to homeland security than intelligence. I would note that the Homeland
Security Committee has spent considerable time examining the
intelligence portion of homeland security and in questioning the
intelligence community's ability to function and communicate with other
governmental departments, specifically the Terrorist Threat Integration
Center and the CIA. I welcome the questioning of the Intelligence
Community and the dialogue between our Committees, and believe that
collectively we can better protect and prepare the nation to defend
itself from the terrorist threat.
The greatest capability that the Select Committee on Homeland
Security can and should provide to Congress is its focus on a single--
albeit enormous--Department within the Government and the integration
of that Department's many, many functions. It can pass its findings on
to the relevant Committee, or Committees that will be charged with the
long-term task of DHS.
The Select Committee also has the opportunity to define, for House
purposes, the term ``homeland security,'' and I hope we will make the
most of this opportunity. While there appears to be an ever-increasing
number of ``intelligence experts'' these days, the definition of
intelligence is generally understood. I think, however, Congress and
the country as a whole, are still working on an answer to ``What is
homeland security?''
To conclude my remarks, I would highlight the important role
intelligence plays in the protection of our nation and the strong
relationship that must develop between the Intelligence Community and
the Department of Homeland Security. We must work to bolster the
resources of both, this is not an ``either or'' proposition.
Mr. Diaz-Balart. Thank you. And we will have questions.
Thank you so much for your testimony.
Mr. Diaz-Balart. Mrs. Harman?
STATEMENT OF THE HONORABLE JANE HARMAN, RANKING MEMBER,
PERMANENT SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE
Ms. Harman. Thank you Mr. Chairman.
It is good to see you and to see several members of the
select--Permanent Select Committee on Homeland Security here as
well. And I do agree with my colleague, Congressman Weldon,
that it has been enormously frustrating trying to get one
interoperable communications system adopted for our country,
which is a critical building block to an effective Homeland
Security system. And a problem is the way Congress is
organized. Let me submit my comments for the record, too, and
just hit a few high points.
Mr. Diaz-Balart. Without objection.
Ms. Harman. I do agree with much that chairman Goss has
said. I would only add that the intelligence committees in
Congress, our jurisdiction and our focus could use A little
tune up, too. We should be more mission-based.
The mission is, at this point, counter-terrorism and more
effective efforts to stop the proliferation of weapons of mass
destruction. Those are the big threats, and I hope that our
committee will tackle them on a mission-based program, rather
than the kind of analog way we have dealt with them in the
past. But that is something he and I have discussed.
Turning to this subject, in 2000, I was a member of the
National Commission on Terrorism, chaired by Ambassador L. Paul
Bremer, also known as Jerry Bremer, now the civil administrator
in Iraq. Our charter was international terrorism, not
specifically homeland security. But we did recommend that
Congress develop mechanisms for coordinated review of the
President's terrorism policies and budgets.
Similarly, I supported the establishment. In fact, I called
myself one of its godmothers, of the Department of Homeland
Security, to bring greater focus to the Government's efforts to
protect the homeland. As I have often said, this effort was not
to rearrange the deck chairs, but to build one deck.
If we were serious about the Department of Homeland
Security and if we are serious about Congress developing better
mechanisms for coordinated review of terrorism, then we need to
establish an effective committee of homeland security. I think
it should be permanent. I don't know what its size should be.
But it should be certainly a streamlined version of what we
presently have. And it should have some clear jurisdiction to
act.
I can see at least three reasons why doing this makes
sense. First, having at least two sets of eyes can strengthen
congressional oversight. I agree with Chairman Goss that there
are areas where the intelligence committees should have primary
and possibly exclusive jurisdiction. Nonetheless, the eyes that
this committee can put on things, like the integration of watch
lists and the intelligence function, inside the Department of
Homeland Security, help augment the role of the House and
Senate intelligence committees.
Second of all, this committee can ease the burden on the
Department of Homeland Security, which already is having some
organizational--early organizational struggles in terms of
testifying before Congress and dealing with Congress. It is
unreasonable to expect Secretary Ridge and his top folks to
testify before 88 committees and subcommittees. It makes a lot
more sense to have the focal point be here.
Third, this committee, as reorganized and streamlined, can,
I think, best deliver some important messages to the Department
of Homeland Security. One of them that Chairman Cox and I
strongly agree on is that we urgently need one nationally-
integrated threat and vulnerability assessment to drive our
resources. We have to harden the right targets, put the
resources against those targets and stop the squeaky wheel
theory of homeland security funding. And if we have one
effective streamlined committee, we can deliver that message
better.
In conclusion, Mr. Chairman, since I have 48 seconds left,
I would just like to say that many people in Congress have
worked very hard on this problem and care very much about it.
That is the message we want to send to Curt Weldon's first
responders. We care very much. We do hear them. We want to do
better.
But that chart, that congressional organization chart is a
nightmare. And in order to do better for the people we
represent, we have to overcome our own internal turf battles,
organize ourselves more efficiently and then really add value
to dealing with the toughest targets in the world, terrorism
and proliferation of weapons of mass destruction.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
PREPARED STATEMENT OF THE HONORABLE JANE HARMAN
Thank you, Mr. Chairman, Ranking Member Slaughter, and my
colleagues on the Select Committee on Homeland Security, for the
invitation to appear before you today.
I am a Member of the full Committee on Homeland Security, so am
speaking both from the Intelligence Committee perspective, but also as
someone who has paid close attention to the way this committee has
worked. I understand that Chairman Goss is not only a member of this
full committee as well, but is even a Member of the Subcommittee that
he is now testifying before. I'm not sure if that constitutes a
conflict of interest, but we can be sure that at least one member of
this Subcommittee will agree with his testimony.
We have been asked to speak about how the House should conduct
oversight over the Department of Homeland Security and handle
legislation concerning homeland security in future Congresses. My
recommendation is that the House create a permanent committee with
primary oversight and legislative authorities over the homeland
security activities of the Department of Homeland Security.
The intelligence reports that I receive tell me the same thing that
your witnesses in past hearings have told you: the threat of terrorism
will be with us for the foreseeable future, and Congress needs to make
permanent structural changes to account for it. Homeland security is
not only a hot button issue in the aftermath of September 11, 2001, and
something on the nation's mind following terrorist attacks overseas,
like the recent tragic bombings in Spain. Homeland security is a new
way for our government, our private sector, and our citizenry to live.
I believe, and the past year's experience has shown, that a dozen
House committees cannot effectively oversee or legislate on homeland
security. Like every other witness that will appear before you today, I
believe that my committee, the House Intelligence Committee, has done
excellent work this Congress and in the last, to address homeland
security challenges.
The Intelligence Committee Members and staff have held hearings and
authorized activities of the Department of Homeland Security's
Directorate for Information Analysis and Infrastructure Protection,
which is a statutory member of the National Intelligence Community. We
have worked closely with DCI Tenet, Secretary Ridge, Director Mueller,
Attorney General Ashcroft, and others on the Terrorist Threat
Integration Center and the Terrorist Screening Center.
Moreover, the Intelligence Committee will continue to include part
of DHS' budget in our annual intelligence authorization bill, and will
oversee the intelligence products and processes of IAIP.
However, the excellent work of the Intelligence Committee, even if
matched by every other committee, does not translate to effective,
comprehensive Congressional action over homeland security. For example,
a Homeland Security Committee has an important role to play to
determine how intelligence from IAIP is used by the rest of DHS. That,
while potentially within the purview of the Intelligence Committee,
could not be adequately studied in the absence of a dedicated
committee.
The work of the Select Committee on overseeing the functions of the
Department also demonstrate the Committee's value. Reports produced by
the Democratic Members and staff on smallpox preparedness, terrorist
watch lists, and the anniversary report of the Department, all of which
I have been proud to sign, are valuable contributions.
Mr. Chairman, your subcommittee is clearly facing the ugliest four
letter word--turf. I'd like to speak briefly about the interactions
that we, at least on the Democratic side, have had between Intelligence
and Homeland Security.
As mentioned before, the Intelligence Committee has jurisdiction
over all intelligence programs in the federal government, including
those within DHS. We have been able to work with the Homeland Security
Committee to claim single jurisdiction over certain issues, for
example, the inner workings of the Terrorist Threat Integration Center
within the Intelligence Committee. We have collaborated closely in
other areas, such as information sharing, the quality and access of
intelligence sent to the IAIP Directorate, and the integration and use
of terrorist watch lists.
This interaction among committees is standard practice for Intel
Committee members. By House Rules, we have formal ties and shared
membership with the Committees on Appropriations, Armed Services,
International Relations and Judiciary. This practice is longstanding
and effective, and I would hope to have a similar relationship in
future Congresses with the Homeland Security Committee.
Finally, I know this Subcommittee has heard views on whether a
permanent Homeland Security Committee should be a Standing or a Select
Committee. As Chairman Goss and I have some distinct experience with
this issue, I have a few comments on this.
I thank the Subcommittee and will be happy to answer any questions
you have.
Mr. Diaz-Balart. Thank you Ms. Harman.
Thank you both.
Chairman Goss, in your written testimony, you pointed out,
in your opinion, the greatest capability that the select
committee, that this committee can and should provide to
Congress is its focus on a single Department and the
integration of the Department's many functions. Why is that so
important in your opinion?
Mr. Goss. Well, I think we have had testimony on that
already. I think Ms. Harman just said it, and Mr. Weldon hit it
with his chart very brilliantly. The issue of keeping the
coordination of the various agencies properly working is
clearly one of the main threads of our 9/11 review--the
coordination, the horizontal coordination of the various
Federal agencies--and we only do the intelligence community.
The Kean Commission is now doing the rest of them. And
clearly there was a problem. And the President of the United
States has spoken to that problem between the working
relationship between the FBI as a law enforcement people in our
country versus the overseas intelligence people. There is
actually an interpretation of the statutes that there was a
wall that forbid them from talking to each other, which we have
done our best to make sure is a broken-down wall.
So I believe that we have learned by the mistakes of the
past. We are able to--using our focus on the intelligence of
over 15 agencies and reaching out to chairmen of other areas
where we have jurisdictions to share, where we have similar
matters, classified and unclassified, we have found good
working arrangements that have prospered, I think, because we
do have a focus on the national security of what we are trying
to protect and what we are trying to do.
I think also the saving of time and so forth is very
critical. The one area that I perhaps would also say with
regard to Ms. Harman's point, I certainly agree there are some
targets we should harden. And there are some very obvious
vulnerabilities that we need to focus on.
But I think the President has also made it abundantly clear
that defense alone does not work. You have to have the offense.
You have to have a progressive, forward-leaning, how do we get
the information to prevent, to preempt. That means getting
information. And I want to make darn sure there are a bunch of
overseers who are totally focused on that balance between
getting necessary information and not intruding on Americans.
And it seems to me a lot of that is going to land in the
Department of Homeland Security and the overseers, which I
would assume would be some carry-on of this committee.
Mr. Diaz-Balart. In your testimony, which we so much
appreciate, we appreciate so very much, you support permanence
for this.
Mr. Goss. Yes, I do.
Mr. Diaz-Balart. As you pointed out, the intelligence
committee is a permanent select committee which is a little bit
different--
Mr. Goss. Yes.
Mr. Diaz-Balart. Than, obviously, the standing committees,
which are more numerous.
The select committee, the permanent select committee,
obviously, has U.S. Government-wide jurisdiction over
intelligence and intelligence-related activities. In your
experience, can you point to any pros and cons of a permanent
select in dealing with such broad subject matters, such a broad
subject matter?
Mr. Goss. Yes. I certainly can Mr. Chairman. I would say it
is broad, but it is not so far as to bridge the separation of
powers between the branches of government. There in no case has
been, that I am aware of in our intelligence committee, a
situation where the national security advisor would come and
testify under oath before Congress or in fact even bring
written documents.
But there has been a behind-the-scenes, comfortable working
relationship with every Administration of being able to work
things out that are of critical national security. And that is
part of the beauty of the permanent select committee, which
leads me to what the distinction between a Rule 10 committee, a
standing committee and a select committee.
The advantage of the select committee is that the
leadership of the minority and majority leadership select the
people to be on a select committee. That, therefore, means that
there is a closer wiring to the leadership, and the leadership
put the people on those committees that are ready to go to do
that work, to make the obligation, to make the commitments, to
do the hard and very focused work of the select committee.
It is different than getting on the committee through the
seniority and voting process of the regular standing
committees. And I believe that that extra element of
selectness, as it were, by leadership appointment very much
aids and abets that close working relationship that you have to
have to reach into the Executive Branch of Government to deal
with the business that is necessary for our national security,
even though we don't put it on the record, and we don't go
under oath with each other. I think that is absolutely
critically essential.
Ms. Harman. If I could just add to that Mr. Chairman?
Mr. Diaz-Balart. Yes, Ms. Harman.
Ms. Harman. I agree, with respect to the Intelligence
Committee. I think that element of selectness and the small
size of the committee and the fact that most of our hearings
and meetings are in closed session because we are dealing with
classified information makes it different.
But I would not carry that over to the new version, the
sleek, slimmed-down, more permanent version of that committee.
I think this should be a regular standing committee of the
House. I am not sure whether Mr. Goss was saying that or not.
Mr. Goss. I was only answering the Chairman's question. Not
making a preference.
Mr. Diaz-Balart. Right. Ms. Harman certainly made a
preference.
And Ms. Harman, obviously, are you supportive of
permanency? And we have had the opportunity to read, and we
will certainly hear later on today testimony from other
committee leaders who have a different point-of-view.
Why do you think that your viewpoint is so different than
the committee leaders who are going to basically support the
status quo today in their testimony? Is it--do you think it is
your intelligence experience or, perhaps, your exposure to the
select committee?
Ms. Harman. I think it is my exposure to the issues that
are involved here. Homeland Security is our number one priority
as far as I am concerned. It is our number one vulnerability as
well.
And if we don't think anew in this Congress, we are not
going to protect the people we represent. You know, the
dirtiest four-letter word in government is spelled T-U-R-F.
And I worry, and I am guilty of this as well, that if all
we do up here is resist, build barricades and insist on doing
business the old way, we keep America vulnerable.
So just as we insisted that the Executive Branch, by
forming the Department of Homeland Security and breaking a lot
of china to get there, I think we have to insist that Congress
change to match the threats and help add value to defeating the
threats of the 21st century.
Mr. Diaz-Balart. Well, I want to welcome, at this point,
Mrs. Slaughter, our distinguished ranking member who was tied
up. Do you have any comments at this point?
Ms. Slaughter. Yes. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
First, I want to apologize. The Rules Committee, as the
Members here know, is now working on the budget. And my staff
told me that I was urgently needed there. So the word urgent
drew me right to the committee. Only I realized that my urgency
is needed here.
I am sorry I did not hear your testimony. Both of you are
people I highly respect and highly regard on all issues and
certainly including this one.
I have been told that you have both supported a permanent
committee. And I think I would agree with you. If that agency
is going to be out there working, I think it is going to
require a great deal of oversight. The committee, I think, has
worked well together, and I appreciate what we are doing.
It is very difficult, again, without the threat assessment.
I know I met just last week with a group of my first
responders, and I keep trying to explain to them that they are
not going to get the money until everything gets straightened
out and we know where we need to go. But that is wearing really
thin on them. Their overtime and the money they have spent is
really extraordinary.
Ms. Slaughter. But tell me, if they do decide to do a
permanent committee, how do you think it ought to be done?
Would it remain a select committee--and can't be if its
permanent--but would we keep the same members? What are your
recommendations?
Mr. Goss. I suggested that there are pluses and minuses to
either using Rule 10 and going with the standing committee.
My concern on the standing committee, obviously, is that
you have people going on the committee more on the basis of
seniority rather than on the basis--or the voting system of the
way we put people on standing committees that may not get
exactly the people who are exactly the right, most qualified
people to go to the committee.
I worry a little bit about the size of the committee, and I
certainly worry about the turf wars that would go on between
standing committees. I think those are all problems.
On the other hand, the cache of having a standing committee
does help. If it becomes just another authorizing committee and
doesn't have the proper linkage with the Appropriations
Committee, however, then it runs the risk of becoming somewhat
irrelevant, as the authorizing committees sometimes do, it
seems, on the strong appropriations process we have here now.
Those are considerations. They don't lead to you one
conclusion or the other. On the select committee, I tend to
believe the smallness, the focus of the select committee,
allowing the leadership to appoint the members is a very
critical factor. It gives the flexibility and a certain
responsiveness to the top leadership and keeps the top
leadership of the House, minority and majority, involved in the
process. I think that is a very important benefit.
So I am not prepared to say which is the best. But I do
believe it ought to be one or the other.
Ms. Slaughter. One or the other.
Ms. Harman?
Ms. Harman. Well, I think it should be smaller. Looking at
all of these Floridians, I would recommend the South Beach Diet
for this committee. And I think it should be designed in a way
that it becomes a desirable place to serve, a destination for
many of the ambitious and smart Members of the House.
And so I think, as we do this, we might reconsider some of
the--I know how hard this is--but some of the jurisdiction of
some of the older committees. And we should make our House look
like the landscape of the 21st century.
And when we think about this, the large--second largest
department in the Government is the Department of Homeland
Security. The largest is the Department of Defense. And the
largest set of threats against our country are ones that this
Department has major jurisdiction to deal with.
So I think this should be a major committee, a major focus
of a redesigned committee structure in the Congress.
Ms. Slaughter. Well, I know that, in putting this together,
they put most of the committee chairs on so that we could try
to control any unruliness there. But given the fact that many
of them have jurisdiction already over parts of this, are you
both recommending that that be taken away from them and put
into Homeland Security?
Mr. Goss. Well, speaking for the Rules Committee, I don't
think there is much jurisdictional quarrel.
Ms. Slaughter. No. We don't have much of a dog in that
fight, do we?
Mr. Goss. And I don't think we need to worry about that.
Speaking for the Intelligence Committee I did testify that
I felt we have a very unique working arrangement worked out
with the intelligence community about how we manage classified
information which has evolved over a great number of decades
since we put the National Security Act together in 1947.
I think it is working extremely well, and I would not want
to change that. You may call that guarding turf. I think it is
just common sense. If you have something that is, working why
break it?
Ms. Slaughter. You wouldn't care to comment on the
Committees of Appropriations and Transportation, Ways and
Means, any of the rest of them?
Mr. Goss. On the turf?
Ms. Slaughter. Yes.
Mr. Goss. Actually, I did comment, in my opening comments
and in my aside remarks as well. We have reached out. I mean,
we do business with 15 separate agencies that are in various
cabinet secretary agencies around. So I am dealing with
secretaries of this or that, the Secretary of Defense,
Secretary of State, Treasury, Attorney General, so forth, all
these people on a regular basis.
We don't have any problem reaching out either into the
Executive Branch on our business. We don't get into other
people's business. We just do the classified intelligence piece
of that.
And we also don't have any trouble reaching out to the
various chairmen and ranking members of those authorizing
committees, and we do work very closely with the appropriators.
We have to.
Ms. Slaughter. And that is fine. But do you see that this
could be translated over to a select committee on homeland
security?
Mr. Goss. To a select committee on homeland Security?
Ms. Slaughter. Or a permanent committee. One or the other.
How do you think it will work?
Mr. Goss. I think it will work. I think it will work better
with a select committee because we have been able to make it
work that way, and I notice it hasn't worked quite that way
with some of the standing committees.
But it also has worked with some standing committees, so
you can take that either way. It depends a little bit on the
relationships and leadership of the various committees and
where the chemistry is.
But my view is, it is easier with a permanent select
committee specifically. That is not a preference, it is just a
view that that aspect is easier with the select committee.
Ms. Harman. I would just add that the goal is to make
Congress more effective in overseeing the Department of
Homeland Security and to make our homeland security effort more
effective. And that is what we should focus on, not how do I
keep as much turf as I already had, wherever it is that I may
be.
I do agree with Chairman Goss that there are some unique
aspects to the House Intelligence Committee that couldn't
easily be transferred, but I don't want to be heard to say
every ounce of turf as is has to be protected. I really think
as we have organized, reorganized the Executive Branch, we have
to be prepared to consider seriously reorganizing Congress.
Ms. Slaughter. Thank you.
Mr. Diaz-Balart. Chairman Cox?
Mr. Cox. Thank you. And I want to thank you as much for
your response to the questions as for your formal prepared
testimony and your opening because it is really helpful, to us
and the intersection between your responsibilities as Members
of the Homeland Security Committee and your permanent jobs on
the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence couldn't be
closer and more important.
I just want to begin by recognizing the complete agreement
that I have with Chairman Goss, and his testimony concerning
the importance of defining homeland security. It is a work in
progress, as you know. It is still under definition. And I
think that if we are to succeed in protecting the country, we
have to get away from that notion that Homeland Security is in
the eye of the beholder, that it is meaning is as meaning does
and that we can morph it into anything convenient particularly
for the purposes of funding programs.
That is one of the reasons I think there needs to be
rigorous congressional focus, not just from an oversight
standpoint, but from a legislative standpoint and authorization
standpoint on what this Department does. And particularly, I
say that because, while the Department can be and we intended
it to be when we just wrote the Homeland Security Act a short
while ago, a bulwark against a parade of horrible things that
might happen to us, it also has a dystopian future if we let it
become what it might in our worst imaginings, a Department of
Homeland Security that is bound to grow.
Long after we are gone, the Department will still be there.
Several decades from now it will still be growing. It will be
much bigger, and it is going to grow into something. The
importance of our job right now is that we are going to orient
it and maybe a few degrees this way, a few degrees that way,
and it will have profound consequences 10, 20 years down the
road.
So this definition is just absolutely essential. But here
is part of the dystopian vision of what Homeland Security
Department run amuck would look like. First, it would be a
threat on all of our civil liberties. Second, it would be a
regulator of every corner of American life and every aspect of
American commerce. Third, it would be the excuse for
federalizing virtually every State function and every private
sector function. And fourth, it would be the ruin of the
Federal budget.
It can be all of these things if we let it stray from its
mission as stated clearly, which is threefold: First, to
protect; second, to prevent; and, third, to respond. Those
three must, it seems to me, define the Department and thus the
jurisdiction of any committee that oversees it to the exclusion
of all else.
If you let other things--it is just as important to keep
things out, not only of congressional jurisdiction but also the
Department's own jurisdiction, as it is to put all these 22
agencies together and to make them work together.
So I think we have to recognize the importance of the job
we are doing here in Congress, because it isn't just about our
turf. It isn't just about how we organized ourselves. How we
make these choices will have immediate and long-lasting
consequences for real life over the Department of Homeland
Security and us there for the rest of the country.
The first mission, which is the most important of the
three, preventing terrorism relies heavily on an intelligence
component. Rather clearly in the charter that we wrote for the
Homeland Security Department there isn't a foreign intelligence
collection responsibility at all.
So for starters, one of the things that is squarely within
your jurisdiction should be not only squarely outside the
jurisdiction of any future homeland security committee, but
also outside the jurisdiction of, now or in the future, the
Department of Homeland Security. We don't want them in that
business.
Second, the Department of Homeland Security really doesn't
collect much in the way of domestic intelligence. I suppose if
we have an asterisk or a footnote, we should acknowledge that
the Coast Guard probably collects some foreign intelligence,
and certainly, the Secret Service receives foreign
intelligence.
But, you know, in the collection area, the responsibilities
of the Department are very slim and for the most part, we have
chartered it to focus on the fusion of intelligence from all
sources and the analysis of that intelligence. And just as
importantly, although it is not expressed in precisely these
terms in the act, the Department has the authority and the
responsibility to place requirements on the intelligence
community.
So the intersection, from a jurisdiction standpoint, occurs
at this fusion place. And the reason that we have the
Department of Homeland Security with an IA directorate is that
we thought, as a Congress, the House and the Senate, the
Democrats and Republicans, about leaving this in the
intelligence community as presently comprised.
And it frightened us, as we looked over that precipice, to
think about what would happen to the walls that we have built
so carefully about the collection of, particularly, foreign
intelligence as we define in the intelligence community and
what we expect Homeland Security to be all about, back to this
definition, which is our own back yard.
And we are talking about getting in touch with our mayors,
with our law enforcement. We are talking about, you know,
placing requirements to collection, not just overseas, but with
the FBI, all of the FISA concerns that you have already with
the Judiciary Committee, all of those things are going to go on
at the same time that foreign intelligence is being analyzed
and in the same place.
Better to put that in a Department of Homeland Security
with a strong civil liberties protection component than to
expand the notion of intelligence collection based on the old
model, given all of that history and the fact that the Homeland
Security Act, which I have in front of me, amends the National
Security Act, by definition, including within the intelligence
community, the foreign intelligence analysis component of DHS,
not the domestic analysis and not any collection.
I just want to place before you both the question about
where you think the Department belongs in this picture, first,
and whether you agree with my assumption that, at a maximum,
the jurisdiction of this committee should not extend beyond the
Department itself.
You know, obviously, there are major aspects of Homeland
Security that fall outside the Department, and I don't know
whether anybody has in mind suggesting that the Department's
jurisdiction be only the minimum and not the maximum of what
the committee would look at. So I would ask you both to opine
on both of those questions.
Mr. Goss. I think it is the hardest question. The debate is
going on in our country about--most Americans, on a given day,
count on the United States Government as a certain amount of
protection depending on what the threat is of the day, whether
there is a sniper loose or something else. Mood swings on that.
And equally, most Americans are in distress over the thought
that somebody might be checking their library records.
So you have this balance problem which is why the oversight
is so important. Now, I believe the essence of Homeland
Security and national security is preemptive. It is
preventative. I think that if we are very good at cleaning up
after the bomb goes off, that's terrific. And Thank God we have
the men and women who do that and have done it so well.
But honestly, the mission should be to stop the bomb from
going off. That means having the information. Okay. The foreign
intelligence pattern is pretty clear. It works. We have the
template. It is set up.
The problem is, where do you plug it in to Homeland
Security, since we don't have a domestic intelligence agency?
That has always been the point where we have not found a plug
that fits the receptacle.
Some of us thought when we put together the Department of
Homeland Security, we would do it all in Homeland Security. We
would create a fire hose that came in from domestic
intelligence and foreign intelligence. It would go into a room
where there were analysts, and they would be able to task
either local or foreign assets, and they would be able to
preempt doing that.
For whatever reasons, we didn't set it up that way. We set
it up differently. The bill that came out, the bill that was
signed by the President came out and the--what I call the nerve
center is now dependent on outside forces, TTIC, which are
basically now the foreign intelligence program led by a CIA
person.
Now that is very helpful to preserve the myth that
Americans don't spy on Americans. But it is also--the camel's
nose is well into the tent on the subject. So let's forget that
and stop kidding ourselves and just get to the point and say,
how are we going to get domestic information so that we can
provide American security and, at the same time, provide them
the safeguards that that is not being abused, that their
liberties and freedoms are not being preempted by the Federal
Government under the guise of giving them protection?
I don't think that is as much an organizational question as
a question of efficiency, is, how can you get that job done? I
think, down the road, we may change our mind on that, on how we
are doing it right now.
I was skeptical that the way the TTIC was set up would work
very well. Actually, it seems to be pulling itself together
fairly well because we have such a huge difference between the
size of fire hoses coming in to the fusion center. I believe
that will change in time, after we get a better definition of
what Homeland Security is and what we are allowed to do under
the PATRIOT Act and other type things.
Because if we are going to have preemptive law enforcement,
I am not quite sure, just from a practical point of view,
forget the legal problems, how I explain this in my town
meeting when I go home.
What is preemptive law enforcement? How do I know you are
about to break the law until you have broken the law? And if it
is setting off a bomb, it is a big breaking of the law.
Those are the issues. I don't think they solve
organizationally. I don't think your answer lies in the
organization. But there has to be resolve.
And I will go on to answer your question specifically and
say, yes, I think it is the Department of Homeland Security's
responsibility to respond to the issue of how you handle
domestic information that is preemptive to a bad action, how
you task to get more of that information and how you have an
action element all in Homeland Security that can actually go
arrest those people before they pull the trigger.
I think that is what I see is the future of Homeland
Security. But I still see the major component of the
intelligence processing component being in the foreign
intelligence program because it is the dominant, hugely
dominant, partner of the information and probably always will
be, given our sensitivity to our civil liberties.
Mr. Cox. Mr. Chairman I don't want to ask any additional
questions. But if you would permit, I would just ask for
further clarification on that one point.
TTIC, right now, is essentially funded out of the foreign
intelligence budget, all be it getting funded.
Mr. Goss. Yes.
Mr. Cox. But are you suggesting that TTIC actually belongs
within the foreign intelligence construct even though it is
supposed to be--
Mr. Goss. I think that we have actually come up--
Mr. Cox. Domestic and foreign.
Mr. Goss. I think it is meant to bridge the gap. I think
that is the purpose of TTIC. The Terrorist Threat Intelligence
Center, the Terrorist Threat Information Center, when does
information become intelligence, and is that where the line
gets crossed and it is a no go?
I mean, we have been very cute about how we have handled
this. I think, actually, we have stumbled into something that
is working fairly well and can work for a while. I think it is
the least of our problems right now. I am not prepared to
answer your question for all times. For where it is now, I
think it is working right, and I think we have it set up about
right.
Ms. Harman. If I could just add for 30 seconds to that
comment?
I think TTIC is one of the success stories of the moment.
We didn't intend that it exist. The President took the
initiative in his State of the Union message in 2003, and I
give him great credit for coming up with something that would
work in this moment.
So I think that TTIC actually can inform our efforts to
reform the intelligence community. Fusion and integration are
the way we have to go in the intelligence community. That is
not the subject for today.
All I wanted to say to Chairman Cox was that your notion of
simplifying the jurisdiction, limiting the jurisdiction here
and, perhaps, limiting the focus of the Department of Homeland
Security over time so that they are congruent is, I think, an
excellent idea.
If this committee has a more limited jurisdiction it will
fit better in the organization of Congress, and I think it then
will have a better shot at becoming a destination committee for
Congress, which we want. We want the most talented people in
Congress to want to serve on this committee.
But I also think that limiting the jurisdiction of this
behemoth Department of Homeland Security that we are trying to
cobble together will help it succeed and perform its critical
missions and you have defined them very well.
Mr. Diaz-Balart. I have been informed about your meeting at
2:00. I would like to recognize Mr. Weldon, who has been here
patiently, and I know he will be brief.
Mr. Weldon. Two questions. First of all, on the
jurisdictional areas. I have spent the past 5 years with a very
frustrating challenge that resulted from a 1999 trip that 11
Members of Congress took to Vienna with me, five Democrats and
five Republicans, to try to work out with the Russians a
compromise that would end Milosevic's reign. The Russians
brought with them a Serbian who they claimed could assist them.
I called George Tenet up and asked for a profile of this family
and this man, and he called me back and said, well,
Congressman, we don't have much on him. We can give you a
couple of lines. And they did.
I later got a memo, which I still have, from a CIA employee
who told me he checked the internal files of the agency, and
they didn't have anything at all except for this one person in
the family, which wasn't the person we were meeting with.
I was then the chairman of the Research and Development
Committee for the military and supporting the Army's
Information Dominance Center known as LIWA down at Fort
Belvoir, and asked them to unofficially run a profile for me of
this person, and they gave me five pages of information. Now,
granted the process wasn't very sophisticated, it wasn't a full
vetting process, which was a problem. But here, they gave me
five pages of information about this family because they had
data mining and data fusion capability. I came back, and the
CIA and the FBI both called me and asked me to brief them on
the family I had met with, and I told them everything they
asked to know, four agents in 2 hours. And when I finished, I
said, you know where I got my data from? Well, yeah, you got it
from the Russians. No. You got it from the family. No. I said,
before I left I went to the Army's Information Dominance Center
where they have a prototype with Raytheon and other companies,
and they gave me five pages of information. And the CIA and FBI
people said, what is the Army's Information Dominance Center?
From that point, working with intelligence people we put
together what was then called the NOAH, National Operations
Analysis Hub, a nine-page brief to create what is now called
the TTIC. But this was back in 1999. We put language in two
successive defense bills that called for DOD to support with
money the creation of this entity, the 2000, 2001 defense
bills.
John Hamre, then Deputy Secretary of Defense, told me,
Congressman, I will pay for it, but you have got to get the
other agencies to agree. He suggested I have a meeting in my
office with his counterparts, the CIA and the FBI, which I did
1 year before 9/11. I have the date and I have the people who
attended. And for 1 hour, four of us, John Hamre, Deputy
Director of CIA, Deputy Director of FBI, talked about creating
a NOAH. And the response by the agencies--other agencies were,
we don't need it.
So my question is, from the standpoint of data fusion and
data--I am glad we have the TTIC and I was glad the President
mentioned it in the State of the Union speech last year. We
should have had that back in 1999 and 2000 when people from the
Intelligence Community knew full well that there was a need to
have this data fusion and data mining capability. And so the
process then was to link together 33 classified systems that
our various agencies have.
I want to ask you both for the record or now, are you
satisfied that TTIC in fact has done that? And are you
satisfied that in your committee as it currently stands you
have enough jurisdiction over those 33 systems?
Mr. Goss. The answer is I am not satisfied with the system
at all. It has a long way to go for secure coms and other
matters. There is still some residual, what I will call
cultural problems. It is much improved. I think there is
clearly a mission objective now that is understood, there is a
vision about it.
Do I feel we have the jurisdiction to deal with it? I do. I
have the same frustration that you do, because we have been
banging on this particular thing for as long as you have. And
we appreciate your assistance on it. I know the work you have
done.
Part of the problem, incidentally, with the Dominance
Center was it scared the heck out of some people about the
civil liberties question, which is still part of the debate and
still going on. So, and that debate is going to go on. So that
does create an extra obstacle?
But, no, it is not as good as it needs to be. It is clear,
we understand what we need to do. Now all we have to do is get
it done. But we haven't got it done yet, and that is one of the
things I believe DHS can do.
Mr. Weldon. Perhaps I could ask my second question to Ms.
Harman, if she would take it. And that is, are you satisfied
that the Intel Committee is going to be able to deal with the
integration of--vertical and horizontal integration of
intelligence for the first responder, which is a big challenge?
Are you satisfied that that is a role that you all can play?
Ms. Harman. It is certainly a priority for us. Info sharing
was one of the big problems leading up to 9/11. And I only wish
your meeting had resulted in TTIC, standing up TTIC in the year
1999 or 2000. It would have made a huge difference. But we do
focus on it. I have paid certainly visits to TTIC; I recommend
that to others. I know Chairman Cox has been there. Its focus
is not just to fuse the data, but then to get it out vertically
down to our hometowns, and not only to get it down but to get
data from our hometowns up. And the methods of communication
are impressive because they can strip out sources and methods,
which means that the local cop on the beat without the security
clearance can get the information he or she needs to know what
to do.
And I think we are a lot farther along in that effort now
than we were a year ago. And I do think that the new
streamlined, smaller, more effective, permanent in some form
committee focusing on homeland security should keep a focus on
information sharing, should make sure that first responders
have tools in the event that we can't prevent the attack in the
first place. In fact, let me amend that. They may be the ones
who prevent the attack if they have the right information.
Mr. Weldon. Thank you.
Mr. Goss. May I add just to that, we have actually seen a
successful example of that. It turned out we were wrong, but we
had a person overheard a conversation in a restaurant in
Georgia, phoned ahead to some police people in Florida; they
got down to the local sheriff in my county down in Collier
County, and they shut down I-75. They actually arrested a car
full of people. Now, as it turned out, they were on a benign
mission, but they had been saying some things to try and create
a little story, more like a prank, and the system worked.
Everybody played by the rules and the system worked. As I say,
it turned out to be wrong. But if they had been real
terrorists, it would have been a very easy takedown. As it
turned out, they weren't, and it caused us the inconvenience of
shutting down I-75.
Mr. Weldon. Well, but you have also prototyped the JRIES
system, which does that both in New York and California, and
that is working extremely well from the standpoint of local
responders.
Mr. Goss. We have the solution. It is just a question of
doing it.
Mr. Diaz-Balart. Thank you, Chairman and Ranking Member.
Thank you so much. You have been very helpful and you have been
very kind.
We are honored with the presence of the chairman and the
ranking member of the Committee on Agriculture. We welcome both
of our distinguished colleagues. Again, welcome to both of you.
And, Chairman Goodlatte.
STATEMENT OF THE HONORABLE BOB GOODLATTE, A REPRESENTATIVE IN
CONGRESS FROM THE STATE OF VIRGINIA, AND CHAIRMAN
Mr. Goodlatte. Thank you very much Mr. Chairman. It is a
pleasure to be with you and the other members of the
subcommittee and Chairman Cox of the full committee.
We appreciate the invitation to provide testimony on how
existing House rules and procedures may affect appropriate
consideration of homeland security matters. I often hear cited
the difficulty that will be faced by the newly created
Department of Homeland Security by having to be responsive to
upwards of 88 committees and subcommittees of the Congress and
the exercise of their legislative oversight and appropriations
responsibilities.
Some have said that this would be too daunting a task and
have subsequently recommended that the new Department be
relieved of the burden of so many prying eyes. I disagree. This
is not an exercise in marking one's territory. Jurisdiction of
the various committees and the subcommittees of the House of
Representatives is divided not because of the cynic's view that
Members of Congress seek to establish and hold onto bases of
power. The jurisdiction of the various congressional committees
and subcommittees have been established over time to mirror the
complexity of the various issues with which the Congress has to
deal. The fundamental responsibility of the committees and
subcommittees of the House of Representatives is to ensure that
the expertise exists to properly oversee the functioning of our
Government. The process of dividing jurisdiction is dynamic, as
it rightly should be. Changes, when they are made, are made to
take into account the complexities of Federal programs we
create and oversee. In most cases, this means that additional
committees or subcommittees are created to provide additional
perspective on issues. Seldom does this process engage to
minimize the accountability of the Federal bureaucracy as would
be the outcome if a new permanent standing Committee on
Homeland Security were to be created.
When the Congress authorized the creation of the Department
of Homeland Security, we vested in this new Department numerous
diverse and complex programmatic responsibilities. We provided
for the transfer of up to 3,200 employees from the Department
of Agriculture, whose job it is to conduct inspections of
people and commercial goods coming into our country that may
intentionally or unintentionally be carrying pests or diseases
that could be detrimental to U.S. agriculture.
Over the years, this function has involved the investment
of billions of taxpayer dollars and had countless staff hours,
education, and experience devoted to it.
While some may believe that the first and only
responsibility of the Department of Homeland Security is
protection of our Nation against acts of terrorism, I would
underscore the fact that in the Agriculture Committee we are,
and rightly should be, at least as concerned about the
unintentional incidents since they are a constant threat. At
risk is a food production system which is truly priceless.
Those with experience in this field understand the old adage:
An ounce of prevention is worth a pound of cure. If an
accidental introduction of foot and mouth disease were to
occur, it would cost our economy tens of billions of dollars.
In our zeal to focus attention on the intentional threat to
America, we simply cannot neglect to protect ourselves from the
historical threats that continue.
Let me be clear. In the Agriculture Committee we are
concerned about both intentional and unintentional threats. My
fear is that a standing Committee on Homeland Security, whose
purpose it is to focus on the mitigation of terrorist threats,
might not pay attention to or recognize the damage that is
caused by unintentional introductions of plant or animal pests
or disease.
In a hearing held to evaluate the proposed one-face-at-the-
border proposal I used these examples to illustrate the
importance of having sufficient expertise not only at our
border inspection points but also in our oversight function.
And before I show you these examples, I want to introduce a
couple of people who are on the Agriculture Committee staff.
Now, when new Members of Congress become chairmen of
committees, they have the discretion to change the entire
committee staff or keep the committee staff. I must tell you
that my approach, because of the nature of the Agriculture
Committee, was to keep the, in some cases, decades of
experience in very fine points on agriculture. Two of those
folks are with me today. Elizabeth Parker, who is a
veterinarian, and John Goldberg, who has a Ph.D. in animal and
food science and is a microbiologist. These folks are involved
on a day-to-day basis with the Department of Agriculture, with
the agricultural community, and America's farmers and ranchers
and food processors, to make absolutely certain that the fine-
tuning of how our Government responds to threats to American
agriculture of a wide variety of kinds are understood by the
Department. The committee oftentimes is pointing out things to
the Department that they haven't taken into consideration
themselves. We are talking about the Department of Agriculture,
not even the Department of Homeland Security.
So this is a very grave concern to us, that this kind of
expertise will be lost if this jurisdiction is changed over to
someplace else. I have a few examples of the kinds of things
that come up.
These seeds that appear to be a matchbook, this is an item
that is prohibited in passenger luggage without a phytosanitary
certificate. The product is designed to look like a matchbook
and could easily be overlooked. The risk is to plant pests and
diseases.
This is a bonsai tree with silk flowers. The tree was
declared as artificial, but is actually a live bonsai with the
leaves removed and replaced with silk flowers. The risk is the
live plants in the soil, and such importation can harbor
diseases, insects, and nematodes.
This is a phytosanitary certificate dealing with prohibited
nursery stock. It prohibited plum tree cuttings imported with a
valid phytosanitary certificate. A phytosanitary certificate
only attests to the origin and apparent freedom from pests and
diseases. It cannot be used to determine enter-ability.
Detailed regulatory knowledge is essential when conducting even
seemingly routine inspections.
This is a prohibited melon seed from the Middle East
misrepresented as pistachios, and the risk is a beetle that
comes in these seeds.
This is a decorative bird's nest made from rice straw, and
this is one of many types of handcrafts made from prohibited
rice and wheat straw. These are typically declared as
souvenirs, and a number of fungal and bacterial diseases may be
contained in the rice.
This is a handicraft containing raw cotton, cotton litter,
and cotton seed. Souvenirs such as stuffed toys and handicrafts
contain prohibited agriculture materials. The risk is to pink
bollworm, golden nematode, and flag smut.
This is canned soup from England that could pass as a U.S.
product. It is Heinz Big Soup. The item is a product of
England. It is prohibited because the ingredients include lamb,
a ruminant, which is at risk for transmitting mad cow disease,
and the risk of BSE, as we all know for the last several
months, is a serious problem. It is heat resistant and survives
the canning process, and is listed as a select agent under the
Agricultural Bioterrorism Protection Act.
I don't want to bore you with too many of these, but let me
show you one that is boneless duck from Taiwan, deceptively
labeled as jerry fish. Packaging can sometimes be misleading.
At a glance, this appears to be labeled as fish. Actually, this
is boneless duck from Taiwan. Animal products must be carefully
examined to ensure that they are what they appear to be. The
risk here is exotic Newcastle's disease. It was a serious
problem in southern California last year. END is listed as a
selected agent under the Agricultural Bioterrorism Protection
Act.
Mr. Chairman, with nearly 170,000 employees and countless
missions and responsibilities, the function of the Department
of Homeland Security lends itself to a functionally diverse
oversight mechanism. I cannot see how a single standing
committee with a normal staff can ever amass the expertise
necessary to completely properly oversee this new Department.
The Congress has a constitutional responsibility to ensure that
sufficient resources are provided to review and analyze each of
our Federal programs. A single standing committee on Homeland
Security would have great difficulty in fulfilling this
responsibility, and as such I would be skeptical of any effort
to establish such a permanent standing committee.
I urge the subcommittee to be very cautious in considering
changes to be made to the underlying jurisdictional structure
of the House of Representatives. I would be pleased to answer
any questions after you hear from my distinguished colleague.
PREPARED STATEMENT OF THE HONORABLE BOB GOODLATTE
Mr. Chairman, and Members of the Subcommittee, thank you for the
invitation to provide testimony on how existing House rules and
procedures may affect appropriate consideration of homeland security
matters.
I often hear cited the difficulty that will be faced by the newly
created Department of Homeland Security by having to be responsive to
upwards of 88 Committees and Subcommittees of the Congress in the
exercise of their legislative, oversight and appropriations
responsibilities. Some have said that this would be too daunting a task
and have subsequently recommended that the new Department be relieved
of the burden of so many prying eyes. I disagree!
This is not an exercise in marking one's territory. Jurisdiction of
the various Committees and Subcommittees of the House of
Representatives is divided, not because of the cynic's view that
Members of Congress seek to establish and hold onto bases of power. The
jurisdiction of the various Congressional Committees and Subcommittees
has been established over time to mirror the complexity of the various
issues with which the Congress has to deal. The fundamental
responsibility of the Committees and Subcommittees of the House of
Representatives is to ensure that the expertise exists to properly
oversee the functioning of our government.
The process of dividing jurisdiction is dynamic, as it rightly
should be. Changes, when they are made, are made to take into account
the complexities of Federal programs we create and oversee. In most
cases, this means that additional Committees or Subcommittees are
created to provide additional perspective on issues. Seldom is this
process engaged to minimize the accountability of the Federal
Bureaucracy as would be the outcome if a new permanent standing
Committee on Homeland Security were to be created.
When the Congress authorized the creation of the Department of
Homeland Security, we vested in this new department numerous diverse
and complex programmatic responsibilities. From the Department of
Agriculture, we provided for the transfer of up to 3,200 employees
whose job it is to conduct inspections of people and commercial goods
coming into our country that may intentionally or unintentionally be
carrying pests or diseases that could be detrimental to US agriculture.
Over the years, this function has involved the investment of billions
of taxpayer dollars and had countless staff hours, education, and
experience devoted to it.
While some may believe that the first and only responsibility of
the Department of Homeland Security is protection of our nation against
acts of terrorism, I would underscore the fact that in the Agriculture
Committee, we are, and rightly should be, at least as concerned about
the unintentional incidents since they are a constant threat.
At risk is a food production system which is truly priceless. Those
with experience in this field understand the old adage: ``An ounce of
prevention is worth a pound of cure.'' If an accidental introduction of
Foot and Mouth Disease were to occur, it would cost our economy tens of
billions of dollars. In our zeal to focus attention on the intentional
threat to America, we simply cannot neglect to protect ourselves from
the historical threats that continue.
Let me be clear, in the Agriculture Committee we are concerned
about both intentional and unintentional threats. My fear is that a
standing Committee on Homeland Security, whose purpose it is to focus
on the mitigation of terrorist threats, might not pay attention to or
recognize the damage that is caused by unintentional introductions of
plant or animal pests or disease.
In a hearing held to evaluate the proposed ``One Face at the
Border'' proposal, I used these examples to illustrate the importance
of having sufficient expertise not only at our border inspection
points, but also in our oversight function.
PREPARED SLIDES: COPIES ARE MAINTAINED IN COMMITTEE FILES
Nursery Stock
Example 1--Seeds that Appear to be a Matchbook
Seed for propagation--The item is prohibited in passenger luggage
without a phytosanitary certificate. The product is designed to look
like a matchbook and could easily be overlooked.
RISK: Plant pests and diseases.
Example 2--Bonsai tree with Silk Flowers
The tree was declared as artificial, but is actually a live bonsai
with the leaves removed and replaced with silk flowers.
RISK: Live plant in soil. Such importations can harbor diseases,
insects, and nematodes.
Example 3--Nursery Stock and CITES
This nut can be mistaken for a small coconut and released.
Actually, this is a palm nut that is an endangered species (CITES II).
The correct action is to authorize movement to a plant inspection
station.
RISK: Plant diseases and violation of CITES regulations.
Example 4--Prohibited Nursery Stock Accompanied by a Phytosanitary
Certificate
Prohibited plum tree cuttings imported with a valid phytosanitary
certificate. A phytosanitary certificate only attests to the origin and
apparent freedom from pests and diseases. It can not be used to
determine enterability. Detailed regulatory knowledge is essential when
conducting even seemingly routine inspections.
RISK: Plum pox virus (listed as a select agent under the
Agricultural Bioterrorism Protection Act)
Nonpropagative Plant Imports
Example 1--Misrepresented Melon Seed.
Prohibited melon seed from the Middle East misrepresented as
pistachios.
RISK: Khapra beetle.
Example 2--Decorative Bird's Nest Made from Rice Straw
This is one of many types of handicrafts made from prohibited rice
and wheat straw. These are typically declared as souvenirs.
RISK: A number of fungal and bacterial diseases of rice.
Example 3--Handicrafts Containing Raw Cotton, Cotton Litter, and
Cotton Seed
Souvenirs such as stuffed toys and handicrafts can contain
prohibited agricultural materials.
RISK: Pink Bollworm, Golden Nematode, Flag Smut
Animal Products
Example 1--Canned Soup from England That Could Pass for a U.S.
Product
Heinz Big Soup. The item is a Product of England and is prohibited.
Ingredients include lamb (a ruminant) which is a risk for transmitting
BSE.
RISK: Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy (BSE). BSE is heat resistant
and survives the canning process. BSE is listed as a select agent under
the Agricultural Bioterrorism Protection Act.
Example 2--Boneless Duck from Taiwan Deceptively Labeled as ``Jerry
Fish''
Packaging can sometimes be misleading. At a glance, this appears to
be labeled as fish. Actually, this is boneless duck from Taiwan. Animal
products must be carefully examined to ensure that they are what they
appear to be.
RISK: Exotic Newcastle's Disease (END). END is listed as a select
agent under the Agricultural Bioterrorism Protection Act.
Example 3--Cheese with Meat.
Cheese with embedded salami originating in Europe is prohibited
without a proper certificate of processing. Hard cheeses, which are
normally enterable, may contain meat which changes the entry status.
Knowledge of animal products and the associated risks is key to making
correct regulatory decisions and preventing the entry of a foreign
animal disease.
RISK: Foot and Mouth Disease(FMD). FMD is listed as a select agent
under the Agricultural Bioterrorism Protection Act.
CLOSING COMMENTS:
With nearly 170,000 employees and countless missions and
responsibilities, the creation of the Department of Homeland Security
lends itself to a functionally diverse oversight mechanism. I cannot
see how a single standing Committee with a nominal staff can ever amass
the expertise necessary to properly oversee this new Department. The
Congress has a Constitutional responsibility to ensure that sufficient
resources are provided to review and analyze each of our Federal
programs. A single standing Committee on Homeland Security would have
great difficulty in fulfilling this responsibility and as such, I would
be skeptical of any effort to establish such a permanent Standing
Committee. I urge this Subcommittee to be very cautious in considering
changes be made to the underlying jurisdictional structure of the House
of Representatives.
I would be pleased to answer any questions you may have.
Mr. Diaz-Balart. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and we will hear
from the distinguished ranking member and then open to
questions.
Mr. Stenholm.
STATEMENT OF THE HONORABLE CHARLES W. STENHOLM, A
REPRESENTATIVE IN CONGRESS FROM THE STATE OF TEXAS, AND RANKING
MEMBER
Mr. Stenholm. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you, Ranking
Member Slaughter, members of the committee, thank you for
allowing me to testify today. And let me first say I associate
myself completely with the chairman's remarks.
The Agriculture Committee has a longstanding tradition of
bipartisanship, and today is no exception. So I associate
myself with his remarks, and would add a couple of others.
Mr. Chairman, last year testifying in favor of a Permanent
Committee on Homeland Security, one of your outside witnesses
justified his position by asking the question: Is the issue of
homeland security important enough to warrant a separate
committee focused exclusively on the policies, programs, and
problems of homeland security?
In point of fact, I believe the correct question should
have been: Is the issue of homeland security important enough
to warrant getting our policies right? The answer there is
clearly yes.
Mr. Chairman, creating the Department of Homeland Security
was a major change in the organization of our government. The
Department's success in every area is crucial to the security
of our people. The Agriculture Committee has an interest in the
transfer of functions of the Animal and Plant Health Inspection
Service to the Department of Homeland Security. We understand
the reason for the transfer. APHIS personnel have long
performed a key border security role. The agency work is done
under statutes developed over the years by the Agriculture
Committee to address the many pests and diseases, as the
chairman has shown you, that threaten our food and fiber
production system. APHIS has done that job well. We feel that
the Agriculture Committee oversight of the agency provides the
stability needed to ensure the ongoing success of this mission.
Mr. Chairman, you are more familiar than I with the various
problems that have confronted the Department of Homeland
Security in its infancy. However, I will provide an instance
relating to the agriculture functions and how congressional
oversight came into play.
Agriculture inspectors are stationed at ports and airports
throughout the U.S. These 3,000-plus inspectors formerly with
APHIS are responsible for screening arriving passengers and
cargo for materials that might produce plant or animal diseases
or pests. This work has been going on for more than a century
and is a complex task. While the agency work is not focused
solely on terrorism, as some have noted, a catastrophic animal
disease doesn't care if it is introduced by a malicious
terrorist or by a careless tourist. The effect is pretty much
the same. However, the Department of Homeland Security proposed
to eliminate the agriculture inspectors altogether and to
disburse their duties among the uniformed Customs and Border
Patrol officers.
This was a well-intended attempt at gaining efficiency for
taxpayers. However, had that plan been implemented the impact
on American agriculture and the subsequent cost to the
taxpayers could have been astronomical. Our agricultural
inspectors are highly trained professionals with years of
science training. Many hold advanced degrees in disciplines
like entomology or plant pathology. They undergo extensive
training in disease identification, technical lab analysis, and
interview methods. Under the DHS plan, the replacements would
have had only 72 hours of training in agriculture disease and
pest identification.
When members of the House Ag Committee learned of this
plan, we immediately began the process of educating the DHS
about the implications of their proposal. They came to
understand the unworkable nature, even the danger of their
plan, and ultimately scrapped it altogether, opting instead to
keep the agriculture inspectors. In fact, DHS now plans to
increase their total numbers.
This is a clear example of the critical need to keep the
expertise of the committees of jurisdiction actively involved.
Had the attention and oversight of our committee not been
present in the case just mentioned, we might have left exposed
to billions of dollars of damage the U.S. agricultural economy.
One example would be if an illness such as foot and mouth
disease had unintentionally slipped into the country under the
proposed DHS inspection plan.
Mr. Chairman, while I don't recommend the creation of a
Permanent Homeland Security Committee, I do want to make clear
that we need to increase our efforts to make sure the job of
homeland security is done right. One thing history shows is
this: While every proposal to realign jurisdiction sets out to
solve the problem of jurisdictional overlaps, no plan can
really get this job done.
In the early 1990s, the Joint Committee on the Organization
of Congress provided the idea of using ad hoc committees to
deal with crucial cost-cutting matters. I supported this. As
you consider proposed changes to House rules, I urge you to
consider giving more life to the Speaker's little used rule 12
authority to refer matters to ad hoc committees.
Finally, Mr. Chairman, it was a good idea when House rules
were amended to limit each Member to two committee assignments.
Unfortunately, this rule has been thoroughly ignored. Today 125
Members of the House serve on three or more committees. We
should strive to achieve the goal of the two-committee limit.
Establishing another permanent committee will only make
reaching that goal more difficult.
Mr. Chairman, thank you once again for this opportunity to
testify.
PREPARED STATEMENT OF THE HONORABLE CHARLES W. STENHOLM
Mr. Chairman, Ranking Member Slaughter, and members of the
Subcommittee, thank you for holding this hearing and giving us the
opportunity to testify. The Select Committee has been directed to
conduct a study of the operation and implementation of the rules of the
House with respect to homeland security, and I commend you for seeking
the testimony of interested committees.
Mr. Chairman, let me say that I am in complete agreement with the
testimony of Chairman Goodlatte. The Agriculture Committee has a long-
standing tradition of bipartisanship and takes very seriously its
responsibility to work together to improve our nation's food and fiber
production policies. Our colleagues believe this work is one of the
most important jobs they have in this House.
Clearly, the task of the Select Committee on Homeland Security is
equally important. I am encouraged by the bipartisan manner in which
you've undertaken your effort to explore possible needed changes to
House Rules, and I know that you will give every consideration to the
many issues that will be raised as you proceed.
Mr. Chairman, testifying in favor of a permanent Committee on
Homeland Security last year, one of your outside witnesses justified
his position by asking the question: ``Is the issue of homeland
security important enough to warrant a separate committee focused
exclusively on the policies, programs, and problems of homeland
security'' In point of fact, I believe the correct question to be: ``Is
the issue of homeland security important enough to warrant getting our
policies right?'' The answer there is clearly ``Yes.''
Mr. Chairman, creating the Department of Homeland Security (DHS)
was a major change in the organization of our government. The
Department's success in every area is crucial to the security of our
people. The Agriculture Committee has an interest in the transfer of
functions of the Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service (APHIS) to
the DHS. We understand the reason for the transfer; APHIS personnel
have long performed a key border security role. The agency's work is
done under statutes developed over the years by the Agriculture
Committee to address the many pests and diseases that threaten our food
and fiber production system; APHIS has done that job well. We feel that
Agriculture Committee oversight of the agency provides the stability
needed to ensure the ongoing success of this mission.
Mr. Chairman, you are more familiar than I with the various
problems that have confronted DHS in its infancy. However, I will
provide an instance relating to its agriculture functions and how
Congressional oversight came into play:
Agricultural inspectors are stationed at ports and airports
throughout the US. These 3000+ inspectors--formerly with APHIS--are
responsible for screening arriving passengers and cargo for materials
that might introduce plant or animal diseases or pests.Sec. his work
has been going on for more than a century and is a complex task. While
the agency's work is not focused solely on terrorism, as some have
noted, a catastrophic animal disease doesn't care if it is introduced
by a malicious terrorist or by a careless tourist; the effect is pretty
much the same.
However, DHS proposed to eliminate the agricultural inspectors
altogether and to disperse their duties among the uniformed Customs
Border Patrol officers. This was a well-intended attempt at gaining
efficiency for the taxpayers. However, had that plan been implemented
the impact on American agriculture, and the subsequent cost to the
taxpayers, could have been astronomical. Our agricultural inspectors
are highly trained professionals with years of science training. Many
hold advanced degrees in disciplines like entomology or plant
pathology. They undergo extensive training in disease identification,
technical lab analysis and interview methods. Under the DHS plan, the
replacements would have had only 72 hours of training in agricultural
disease and pest identification.
When members of the House Agriculture Committee learned of this
plan, we immediately began the process of educating the DHS about the
implications of their proposal.Sec. hey came to understand the
unworkable nature, even the danger, of their plan and ultimately
scrapped it altogether, opting instead to keep the agricultural
inspectors. In fact, DHS now plans to increase their total numbers.
This is a clear example of the critical need to keep the expertise
of the committees of jurisdiction actively involved.Sec. ad the
attention and oversight of our Committee not been present in the case
just mentioned, we might have been left exposed to billions of dollars
of damage to the US agricultural economy. One example would be if an
illness such as foot and mouth disease had unintentionally slipped into
the country under the proposed DHS inspection plan.
Mr. Chairman, while I don't recommend the creation of a permanent
Homeland Security Committee, I do want to make clear that we need to
increase our efforts to make sure the job of homeland security is done
right. One thing history shows is this: while every proposal to realign
jurisdiction sets out to solve the problem of jurisdictional overlaps,
no plan can really get this job done. In the early 1990's, the Joint
Committee on the Organization of Congress revived the idea of using ad
hoc committees to deal with crucial, cross-cutting matters; I supported
this. As you consider proposed changes to House Rules, I urge you to
consider giving more life to the Speaker's little-used Rule 12
authority to refer matters to ad hoc committees.
Finally, Mr. Chairman, it was a good idea when House Rules were
amended to limit each Member to two committee assignments.
Unfortunately, this rule has been thoroughly ignored. Today, 125
Members of the House serve on three or more committees. We should
strive to achieve the goal of the two-committee limit. Establishing
another permanent committee will only make reaching that goal more
difficult.
Mr. Chairman, thank you once again for the opportunity to testify.
I look forward to working with the Select Committee as it continues its
process of reviewing House Rules.
Mr. Diaz-Balart. Thank you, Mr. Stenholm, and thank you,
Chairman Goodlatte.
Following up on one of the points that you brought out,
Chairman Goodlatte, let me say first for the record that I do
not believe that any of this subcommittee's previous witnesses
in prior hearings nor anyone on the dais today have supported
creating a Permanent Committee on Homeland Security without the
necessary member and staff expertise necessary to get the job
done right.
In Chairman Bill Young's submitted written statement, for
example, he explains that when his committee reorganized they
also shifted key members and staff to the new Subcommittee on
Homeland Security Appropriations. Certainly, a shift of
jurisdiction among standing committees would necessitate a
similar shift in members and staff. I certainly would not
support a proposal that does not account for the need to
harness the expertise, some of which you have referred to with
very brilliant members of your staff, of each of the current
standing committees.
If we remove that argument, thus, Mr. Chairman, are you
still testifying today that a permanent committee with a
primary focus on homeland security issues, including
integration and coordination, would not be of benefit to the
fledgling Department of Homeland Security and the American
people?
Mr. Goodlatte. Mr. Chairman, first of all, I don't think
you can remove that argument because these folks--and there are
many, many more on the committeess staff who have expertise in
various areas for this one small segment from the Department of
Homeland Security's perspective some 3,000 employees out of
170,000. These commmittee staff are used not just for this
area, but they are used for all of the different issues that
the Department of Agriculture and the Agriculture Committee
have to deal with related to animal and plant health science.
There would be an enormous duplication of that, and, quite
frankly, a waste of resources if these folks were duplicated on
the Department of Homeland Security for the purpose of
fulfilling that purpose.
I believe that the Agriculture Committee, which spends
every minute of every day living and breathing these issues,
and looking at it from a comprehensive standpoint from the
chairman of the committee and the ranking member right through
the committee's staff to deal with these things could not be
replicated in a new committee that has so many other
responsibilities unrelated to this major concern for
agriculture, but I believe not major concern for the Department
of Homeland Security. I think the evidence of that is in the
approach they took before we spoke out, as Congressman Stenholm
said, toward designing the one-face-at-the-border program. They
have made a number of improvements to it, and I applaud that.
But that was not their perspective on how to proceed. The
oversight capability of poking holes in that comes about
through the expertise of the Agriculture Committee and is not
likely to be duplicated in a segment of a new Homeland Security
Committee.
Mr. Diaz-Balart. Mr. Chairman, according to most homeland
security experts, one of the most critical issues facing the
Nation is the threat of agro-terrorism. Do you believe that it
is important for Congress to focus on that threat?
Mr. Goodlatte. Absolutely. And we focus on that, and as a
member of the Homeland Security Committee I work to make sure
that the committee focuses on that. We are certainly very much
dedicated to the Department of Agriculture focusing on it, and
they do focus on it. Frankly, agro-terrorism is not simply an
issue that is going to be detected and stopped at our borders.
It is something that can take place in the interior of our
country, and we have to have every member of the Department of
Agriculture's staff and America's farmers and ranchers all
working in coordination to fight agro-terrorism, because it can
happen on anybody's farm anywhere and then spread rapidly
around the country.
So, again, I think the focus needs to be where the large
numbers of experts are that, again, can't be replicated by the
Department of Homeland Security to contribute to that effort on
agro-terrorism, which certainly the Department of Homeland
Security has an interest in as well, and we support. But we
think that the oversight of that effort with these agricultural
agents at the border ought to be overseen by the Agriculture
Committee.
Mr. Diaz-Balart. Mr. Chairman, has the Agriculture
Committee held any hearings in the area of agro-terrorism?
Mr. Goodlatte. We meet on a daily basis met with the folks
with the Department of Agriculture. But holding hearings on an
issue where the public knowledge about what can and could
happen here is not always desirable. We have had private
briefings on this issue, but we have not had public hearings on
it that I am aware of, at least not in the 1 year that I have
been chairman. If we saw the necessity of holding public
hearings on the issue in such a way that we did not feel that
we were educating terrorists on how to carry out their attacks,
we would certainly do so. But we think that most of this needs
to be done in a different fashion.
Mr. Diaz-Balart. I am glad you do see the importance of the
issue to the safety of the Nation.
Mr. Goodlatte. Absolutely.
Mr. Diaz-Balart. And I would like to ask, I am thinking
about, Ranking Member Stenholm, the thrust of your testimony,
for which I thank you both for your kindness and your time.
I guess what I was hearing through your testimony, Mr.
Stenholm, is your concern that a new committee focused on
homeland security would, or certainly might, lead to the
ignoring of traditional missions of some of the agencies now
within the Department of Homeland Security, and you were
concerned. Certainly I think I heard that in your testimony.
Mr. Stenholm. Yes, sir, Mr. Chairman. That was the concern.
And as I pointed out, we have--animal and plant diseases can be
introduced under agro-terrorism, or they can be introduced
naturally, or they can be brought in innocently by humans. And,
therefore, the overall function of our inspectors is, yes, to
be helpful in providing, as Chairman Cox mentioned a moment
ago, finding the bad guys before they do the bad deed. That is
one function. But also it is also internal, as the chairman has
pointed out, that it is an ongoing, everyday occurrence, an
everyday responsibility that we have for purposes of protecting
our Nation's food supply. And, therefore, the division of
responsibilities in that area could be very detrimental.
Mr. Diaz-Balart. I certainly sensed, as I say, the thrust
of your argument. I guess the flip side is continuing the
status quo perhaps could result in the opposite problem. In
other words, you focused in on the danger that there might be
some traditional missions ignored. The flip side is that the
opposite could result.
I guess, what do you think is the greater risk, Mr.
Stenholm? That we focus too heavily on homeland security, or
not enough on homeland security?
Mr. Stenholm. The greatest risk would be not enough. That
is something the House Agriculture Committee--we held a hearing
on individual animal identification as part of our food safety
concerns devoted on BSE, for example, just a couple of weeks
ago. A lot of concern in this country in the beef industry
about that, and making sure that we do everything humanly
possible to continue to assure the American public consumer
that our food supply is safe. That takes many different
directions, as we do. But the danger to all of us is not doing
enough and making sure that the resources we have are used
efficiently.
Mr. Diaz-Balart. Ms. Slaughter.
Ms. Slaughter. Thank you very much.
There was a meeting here sometime this week that one of
my--a fellow in my office attended about BSE. And one of the
questions she brought up, since they have come up with this
freon technology, was could they be adapted as a terrorist tool
to infect the agriculture in the United States? And the
response from the expert was, yes, they could. I wonder if your
committee has given any thought to anything like that?
Mr. Goodlatte. Well, we have had hearings on BSE in
addition to the hearing that Congressman Stenholm referred to.
I wouldn't want to offer my personal expertise on whether it
could be transmissible, but I think it could be a terrorist
issue because the introduction of animals with BSE into the
country could be deliberately done. The economic impact of
doing so could be devastating, far worse than the one incident
that we have had which brought about a 20 percent reduction in
beef prices upon learning that the one cow had come here from
Canada.
Ms. Slaughter. This was not necessarily a cow. This was the
agent that is associated with BSE which could be adapted itself
to infect many kinds of animals. But anyway, I just wanted to
bring that to your attention, is something that I would
appreciate if you could kind of give a look at.
Have you provided any oversight to the Animal and Plant
Health Inspection Service?
Mr. Goodlatte. We have indeed, and we have done that at the
full committee level and at the subcommittee level. And I stand
corrected by my staff. We did hold a hearing on this subject,
my predecessor did, following September 11, and it was very
much related to this issue of what is the best way to conduct
oversight and to utilize the expertise both of the Department
of Agriculture and the committee's expertise in overseeing what
is being done to combat bioterrorism.
Ms. Slaughter. How do they feel their integration is going
into DHS?
Mr. Goodlatte. Well, a hearing was held in this committee,
at which I expressed very grave concerns about to the director
of the one-face-at-the-border program about the initial plans.
This was following several other discussions that had taken
place at the member level and the staff level in order to
impress upon them our grave concern that they were overlooking
a number of things in the establishment of that program. And,
as Congressman Stenholm notes, substantial changes were made to
preserve the animal inspection system as an independent system,
merged in with the one-face-at-the-border, but nonetheless have
that distinct agricultural expertise preserved. But as has been
noted, and you have noted, Congresswoman Slaughter, this is not
just a problem at the border, it is a problem everywhere in the
country. We have 100,000 Department of Agriculture employees
who all play a role on a regular basis in educating farmers and
making sure that they are aware of necessary precautions that
need to be taken not only for the deliberate introduction of
biological agents that could cause serious harm, but for the
much more likely introduction inadvertently of these things.
Because that happens on a regular basis, and finding it and
rooting it out, destroying it and dealing with it is one of the
principal jobs of many sectors of the Department of
Agriculture.
Ms. Slaughter. Absolutely. But one of the things I
mentioned then is the border security inspections functions of
APHIS from this initial thing. Do you think that there is a
disadvantage to--as you pointed out, you have asked that that
be kept separate? How does--they separate--this party is
separated from the actual Department of Agriculture, is that
correct?
Mr. Goodlatte. Yes. APHIS was effectively split. I voted
for the creation of that after the assurances were made that
the policy regarding agricultural issues would remain with the
Department of Agriculture and the policy setting jurisdiction
would remain with the Agriculture Committee in the Congress.
And I think that is a good arrangement.
I can see that there are certain advantages to having a
coordinated effort at the border, and we recognize that, as
long as the expertise that is needed for agriculture is not
lost in that coordination. We were concerned, but I think the
process worked in that the Agriculture Committee, both the
staff and the members, stepped up to the plate and complained
about that, and that brought about a change that has improved
that one-face-at-the-border program.
Ms. Slaughter. You don't think that portends any problem
with other committees if we were to make this a permanent
select, select or permanent committee? Not being able to give
up the jurisdiction?
Mr. Goodlatte. I can't speak for the individual problems of
other committees. I am aware of the specific concerns that we
have. I can envision that there would be other concerns
expressed by other committees, but as to whether those can be
worked through or not, I wouldn't want to offer my testimony.
Ms. Slaughter. Mr. Stenholm? Any comment?
Mr. Stenholm. Yes. I have 25 years of experience dealing
with the frustrations of the bureaucracy as it influences my
decisions in what I recommend to you today. It has been
extremely difficult getting the various agencies of the United
States Department of Agriculture to cooperate together. There
is this stovepiping, this constant turf battles that go on that
is extremely frustrating.
But in this case, for this committee, I too join and
support it, as the chairman did, the movement, because it made
sense to have the authority placed in Homeland Security, but
provided you didn't lose the oversight and the expertise of the
specific functions that did not necessarily deal with human
terrorists but with the agro-terrorism. That made sense and
still makes sense, provided you continue that type of an
arrangement, and that is what we are here testifying today for.
But you--this create--when we created the biggest
bureaucracy in the history of our country, that bothered me a
little bit, because the idea of how do you control that? How
does any one committee maintain the knowledge base, both staff-
wise as well as member-wise, over that? And that is why I am a
little bit reluctant. In fact, I join the chairman in saying,
please think twice and sleep on this before you do it, because
I think a dividing of the responsibilities with the proper
focused committee is the best way to go, rather than the idea
you can create a super committee that can in fact take care of
all of the responsibilities. In the case of agriculture, I
think it would be a colossal mistake.
Ms. Slaughter. Thank you both.
Mr. Diaz-Balart. Chairman Cox.
Mr. Cox. Thank you.
I want to take the opportunity to thank you for not only
your prepared testimony but for your opening statements and
your very helpful responses to questions. And I want to ask you
right off the bat if there is any way that you would--since
that is the jurisdiction currently of the select committee, if
there is any way that you would rewrite the Homeland Security
Act with respect to either topics that are within the
jurisdiction of your committee or topics that are of concern to
your committee.
Mr. Goodlatte. Well, I don't know if I would have the
opportunity, but I would want to go back and review the
sections as they pertain to agriculture to see how much
authority we would have to alter, for example, legislatively
the kind of action that was originally proposed by the
Department of Homeland Security with regard to agriculture
inspection at borders. My understanding was, and still is, that
we would be able to undertake that in the jurisdiction of our
committee. If I found we could not, then I would want to change
that to even further strengthen that committee authority.
Mr. Cox. Mr. Stenholm?
Mr. Stenholm. I would take my own advice on that one and
sleep on it before I would give you an answer.
Mr. Cox. But I think it would be helpful as a follow-up
perhaps to your testimony here today if you could or have your
staff think about that question. I say that in response to
something that you both said in the last half hour that I
strongly agree with, and that is that there is more than turf
here. This is about policy. And, you know, to the extent that
people are making arguments about how Congress should or
shouldn't organize itself based on sound policy, it seems to me
that the same would hold true for the Department itself. If it
is not wise for the Congress to organize itself in a certain
way because of loss of focus or expertise, then perhaps it is
no more wise for the Department to be organized that way. We
are making an argument in behalf of the Homeland Security
Committee within the House on the basis that we have already
created this Department and therefore we need something to
track it. But if we have found flaws in that when we look at it
from a policy standpoint and the Congress, maybe the same
problem exists at the Department and we should revisit what we
put in there. It is certainly very much what I think our
committee responsibility here on the select committee is all
about, looking at that statute, revisiting it constantly, and
making sure that the decisions that we made in practice turn
out to be sound.
Mr. Stenholm. Mr. Cox, if I might, I would say I think you
have asked a very pertinent question that all of us need to
think of, both sides, whether the Department itself needs to be
reconfigured before we permanentize it any more than it is, and
the same way is the jurisdiction and the oversight of the
Congress. I think that is a very good question.
Mr. Cox. Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Diaz-Balart. I have one final question I would like to
ask Mr. Stenholm based on something that he referred to.
Mr. Stenholm, you suggested in your testimony that the
Speaker should utilize his authority to have the House create
an ad hoc panel to deal with homeland security, I assume. What
should be that panel's jurisdiction, in your opinion? Both
legislative and oversight, or just oversight?
Mr. Stenholm. I think it would be both. And therein, if
this oversight committee should have a concern in the area of
agriculture, that it would--they would then call on the
agriculture appropriate people, staff, members, et cetera, to
respond. If it is an ad hoc committee, it is at the Speaker's
direction, and it is for a purpose similar to what Mr. Cox was
asking just a moment ago. That is the way I would view that.
Now, I think that could be what could be very helpful and
something that we ask you to seriously consider.
Mr. Diaz-Balart. I want to thank both of you for being here
today, for your thoughtful testimony, and we are grateful. Mr.
Goodlatte, Mr. Stenholm, thank you very much.
I believe the next witnesses are Mr. Barton and Mr.
Dingell. And we are informed that they are on their way.
Hopefully, they will be here shortly.
At this point we want to ask of the distinguished ranking
member, since she was detained for a few minutes at the Rules
Committee at the beginning of our hearing, if she would be so
kind as to give her opening statement.
Ms. Slaughter. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I would be happy
to.
I thank the many members who are taking the time out of
their full schedules to speak with us today. There are many
demands on everyone's time, not the least of which this week is
the Federal budget for fiscal year 2005. Your time and your
insights are greatly appreciated.
The creation of the Department of Homeland Security has
raised many issues. Congress has the responsibility over the
new Department itself, and Congress has the heightened
responsibility to respond to the threat of terrorism. The
question that this subcommittee continues to consider today is
what structure is best for the House and best for the nascent
Department.
Some structural changes have already been made. The
Appropriations Committee created a Homeland Security
Appropriations Subcommittee. The Senate has incorporated its
homeland security duties into its Government Affairs Committee,
instead of creating a separate Homeland Security Committee.
Last year, this subcommittee heard from a series of
distinguished scholars, former Members, former Speakers, and
others. A consistence seemed to emerge from those hearings that
the House should have a Committee on Homeland Security. These
recommendation are helpful but not conclusive. Parliamentary
and practical, issues such as committee jurisdiction, referral,
oversight, legislative authority, and subject matter expertise
are important parts of the equation in determining the utility,
necessity, and desirability of a Homeland Security Committee.
This is where your experience and expertise is invaluable
to the subcommittee's deliberations. The big questions continue
to be debated: Should the House have a Homeland Security
Committee? Should it be permanent? Select? Or permanent select?
Should it have oversight jurisdiction over the Department of
Homeland Security? Should it have legislative authority for the
Department? Should the committee have jurisdiction over
homeland security programs, or jurisdiction over all of the
entities that have been moved into the Department?
I look forward to hearing from the distinguished panelists
today. The chairmen and ranking members of the committees with
jurisdictions over programs and entities within the Department
of Homeland Security will be able to provide special insight
into the daily workings of the House and our collective
response to terrorism and the creation of the Department of
Homeland Security.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Diaz-Balart. Thank you, Mrs. Slaughter.
I will at this point, since we do expect them to be here
shortly, let us recess the committee for just a few minutes,
subject to my calling the committee back into order.
[Recess.]
Mr. Diaz-Balart. The hearing will reconvene. At this point
I would ask the chairman and the ranking member, the Honorable
Joe Barton and the Honorable John Dingell, of the Committee on
Energy and Commerce to come up to the table, if you will be so
kind, and testify.
We are honored by your presence, Mr. Chairman and Mr.
Ranking Member. This is the fourth hearing of this Subcommittee
on Rules of the Select Committee on Homeland Security, and we
are completing, as you know, a very important study required by
law, and we will report to the Rules Committee our
recommendation with regard to our study of rule 10 as it
relates to the issue of homeland security.
Welcome, both of you. Chairman Barton.
STATEMENT OF THE HONORABLE JOE BARTON, A REPRESENTATIVE IN
CONGRESS FROM THE STATE OF TEXAS, AND CHAIRMAN, COMMITTEE ON
ENERGY AND COMMERCE
Mr. Barton. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank you,
Chairman Cox. Thank you, Congresswoman McCarthy. I am delighted
to testify before this committee that I am actually a member
of, also, although not this subcommittee.
Thank you for the opportunity to testify today. I would ask
that my formal statement be in the record.
Mr. Diaz-Balart. Without objection.
Mr. Barton. And I am going to briefly elaborate on it.
I think you all know that I am a new chairman of the Energy
and Commerce Committee. I have been on the job about a month.
So I am an overnight success after 20 years in the Congress,
and I am looking forward to being a chairman and taking the
wisdom of Chairman Dingell to my right, who has served this
same committee as chairman. I believe he served it for 14
years.
I believe that the work of this select committee has been
good. You have got good staff, you have helped the focus of
Congress on some of the most important issues facing America
and the American democracy.
With all respect, and I mean that respectfully, my opinion
is that this select committee's work is either done or will be
done by the end of this Congress.
Because of the work of this subcommittee, I think the House
has our house in order. I have attached to my testimony the
work that the Energy and Commerce Committee has done both
immediately before and immediately after and after 9/11 to
protect our homeland security. The Energy and Commerce
Committee has conducted over two dozen homeland security-
related hearings in the recent years, worked our will on over a
half a dozen pieces of major legislation directly related to
homeland security. We--and I mean we, being the Energy and
Commerce Committee--on a bipartisan basis have demonstrated
that the homeland matters in our jurisdiction will get the
time, the attention, and the resources that they need. The
select committee has brought the broader perspective together.
It has done an excellent job. But it is my opinion that to make
this a permanent committee would not further progress.
And why do I say that? The problem, in my opinion, is that
there is no way over time to discuss the jurisdiction of the
Energy and Commerce Committee as on homeland security and the
jurisdiction that this select committee, if it were to become a
permanent committee, would have on homeland security issues.
Let me give you a few examples. The Energy and Commerce
Committee has jurisdiction for security at commercial nuclear
power plants. Everybody, regardless of where your committee is,
agrees that securing these facilities from a terrorist attack
or any kind of attack is a very good idea. The conference
report on H.R. 6, the comprehensive energy bill, contains very
strong new requirements in that respect. These requirements
were developed in our committee on a bipartisan basis.
Congressman Markey of Massachusetts was a leading proponent of
increased security for nuclear power plants.
How do you distinguish the need to keep our nuclear plants
secure from terrorism versus the need to secure them against
sabotage or something done by a former disgruntled employee?
And the answer is you really can't. The Energy and Commerce
Committee's bill that is in the Senate right now legislates for
both these contingencies.
Let me give you another example. The Energy and Commerce
Committee has jurisdiction over the public health, and we have
the same issue there. When we look at how to deal with
outbreaks of dangerous and contagious diseases, we certainly
take terrorists using the ability through the airways, through
the waterways, to spread some contagion that would create a
contagious disease very seriously.
But are those potential terrorist attacks any more
different or any more dangerous that the spread of an
infectious disease that is spread by normal means, such as the
SARS virus last year? When it comes right down to it, Mr.
Chairman, there is really no way to distinguish between the
consequences. And if you have two committees doing the same
thing, it may muddy the water, so to speak.
I want to address one last issue. One of the primary
reasons that has been raised as to why the Department of
Homeland Security should have its own committee before the
Congress is that the Department of Homeland Security shouldn't
have to answer to numerous congressional committees and
subcommittees, that its work will be compromised by having too
many bosses in the Congress. Well, the answer to that concern
is not to the formation of another committee. The answer is
just the opposite: To get somebody to coordinate jurisdiction
between the existing committees and consolidate, not to expand.
A brand new committee, no matter how well formed and with
the right people, with new members and new staff is not going
to do a better job than the existing committees if we do our
job. And I will submit for the record the hearings and the
legislation that we have done in the Energy and Commerce
Committee over the last several years.
So with all due respect, I would hope that at the end of
this Congress, the Speaker and the minority leader wish to make
this a select committee for another Congress, that would be one
thing. But to make this a permanent committee would be
something that I would have to oppose.
And I would now yield to back to the Chair.
PREPARED STATEMENT OF THE HONORABLE JOE BARTON
Mr. Chairman, Ranking Member Slaughter, and Members of the
Subcommittee, thank you for this opportunity to testify before you on
the future of the Select Committee.
I'm new to this game, as you know. I've been a Committee Chairman,
oh, about a month now. It's good. I recommend it to anyone who gets re-
elected ten times.
I very strongly believe that the work of the Select Committee has
been good. You've had some good staff. You've helped to focus the
Congress on some of the most critical issues facing America and
American Democracy.
But, with all due respect, the Select Committee's work here is
done. The fact of the matter is that the House has its house in order.
I have attached to my testimony the incredible work that my Committee
has done--pre 9/11 and after--to protect the homeland. We have
conducted over two dozen Homeland-related hearings in recent years, and
worked our will on half a dozen major pieces of Homeland-related
legislation. We have demonstrated that the Homeland matters in our
jurisdiction will get the time, attention, and resources they need.
And, frankly, the Select Committee has become an impediment to further
progress.
The biggest part of the problem is that there really is no way to
distinguish the jurisdiction that my Committee has - and others too,
I'm sure - between homeland security-related issues and issues that we
would otherwise act on. Let me give you a couple of examples. Take
security at commercial nuclear plants. We all agree that securing these
facilities from attack is a good idea - in fact, the conference report
on H.R. 6, the comprehensive energy bill, contains very strong new
requirements in that respect. But how do you distinguish the need to
keep plants secure from terrorism versus the need to secure them
against sabotage by a disgruntled former employee? Well, you really
can't. We legislate for both those contingencies.
My Committee's jurisdiction over public health is very much the
same way. When we look at how to deal with outbreaks of dangerous and
contagious diseases, we certainly take terrorist attacks seriously. But
are those potential attacks any more different than the spread of the
SARS virus last year? When it comes down to it, not really--both
require the Congress's full attention.
Mr. Chairman, I'd like to address one last issue. Many have said
that the Department of Homeland Security shouldn't have to answer to
dozens and dozens of Congressional Committees - that its work will be
compromised by having too many bosses in Congress. Well, the answer to
that concern is not the formation of a whole new committee. The answer,
very simply, is to ensure that someone coordinates the needs of
Congress with the Department. A new committee with 50 Members won't do
any better job than a liaison staffer in the Speaker's office - and it
would be a whole lot less expensive.
We don't need a new Committee. We really need fewer Committees.
What we need is to consolidate the wisdom, and competition, and
experience, and excellence of the Members in the existing standing
Committees that have the dedication to get the homeland security job
done.
Mr. Chairman, I hope that my views are clear. And I hope that view
prevails in your deliberations.
I am, of course, happy to answer any questions the Subcommittee may
have.
March 24, 2004
HOUSE COMMITTEE ON ENERGY AND COMMERCE HOMELAND SECURITY
ACCOMPLISHMENTS
LEGISLATION
107TH Congress
USA PATRIOT Act (H.R. 3162/Pub. Law No. 107-56). Included
an amendment to the Communications Act of 1934 clarifying the scope of
permissible governmental access to the communications of certain cable
subscribers.
Public Health Security and Bioterrorism Preparedness and
Response Act (H.R. 3448/Pub. Law No. 107-188). Ensures that a
sufficient number of drugs and vaccines are available to the public in
the event of a terrorist attack. Also provides framework for greater
protection of food and drinking water supplies. Includes provisions
expediting the approval of life-saving drugs for all Americans.
Homeland Security Act (H.R. 5005/Pub. Law No. 107-188).
Committee drafted provisions relating to Information Analysis and
Infrastructure Protection (cybersecurity), Research Development and
Technology Systems, and Emergency Preparedness and Response. Committee
continues to exercise jurisdiction over critical homeland security
aspects of the Department of Energy, the Department of Health and Human
Services, and associated departments and agencies.
Price-Anderson Act Reauthorization Act (H.R. 2983/Became
part of H.R. 4, the Securing America's Future Energy Act, which died in
conference). Included rigorous new anti-terrorism requirements on
commercial nuclear energy plants and nuclear material transporters.
108th Congress
Project BioShield Act (H.R. 2122/Stalled in Senate).
Provides HHS with broad new powers to prepare for and react to
bioterrorist threats.
E-911 Implementation Act (H.R. 2898/Stalled in Senate).
Grant program to ensure that wireless phones have the technology to
provide location information to emergency call centers.
H.R. 6, the Energy Policy Act of 2003. Included rigorous
new anti-terrorism requirements on commercial nuclear energy plants and
nuclear material transporters. Pending in the Senate.
HEARINGS
106th Congress
Internet Posting of Chemical ``Worst Case'' Scenarios: A
Roadmap for Terrorists. (Joint hearing between the Subcommittee on
Health and Environment and the Subcommittee on Oversight and
Investigations) February 10, 1999
The Threat of Bioterrorism in America: Assessing the
Adequacy of the Federal Law Relating to Dangerous Biological Agents.
(Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations) May 20, 1999
The Chemical Safety Information and Site Security Act of
1999. H.R. 1790. (Subcommittee on Health and Environment) May 19, 1999
and May 26, 1999
The Security and Freedom through Encryption (SAFE) Act.
H.R. 850. (Subcommittee on Telecommunications, Trade, and Consumer
Protection) May 25, 1999
The Rudman Report: Science at its Best, Security at its
Worst. (Full Committee) June 22, 1999
Results of Security Inspections at the Department of
Energy's Lawrence Livermore laboratory. (Subcommittee on Oversight and
Investigations) July 20, 1999
The State of Security at the Department of energy's
Nuclear Weapon Laboratories. (Subcommittee on Oversight and
Investigations) October 26, 1999
Safety and Security Oversight of the New Nuclear Security
Administration (Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations) March 14,
2000
Legislation to Improve Safety and Security in the
Department of Energy. H.R. 3383, H.R. 3906, and H.R. 3907.
(Subcommittee on Energy and Power) March 22, 2000
Computer Insecurities at DOE Headquarters: DOE's Failure
to Get Its Own Cyber house in Order. (Subcommittee on Oversight and
Investigations) June 13, 2000
Weaknesses in Classified Information Security Controls at
DOE's Nuclear Weapon Laboratories. (Subcommittee on Oversight and
Investigations) July 11, 2000
107th Congress
Protecting America's Critical Infrastructure: How Secure
Are Government Computer Systems? (Subcommittee on Oversight and
Investigations) April 5, 2001
Ensuring Compatibility with Enhanced Calling Systems: A
Progress Report. (Subcommittee on Telecommunications and the Internet)
June 14, 2001
How Secure is Sensitive Commerce Dept. Data and
Operations? A Review of the Dept's Computer Security Policies and
Practices. (Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations) August 3,
2001
Reauthorizing of the Price-Anderson Act. (Subcommittee on
Energy and Air Quality) September 6, 2001
A Review of Federal Bioterrorism Preparedness Programs
From a Public Health Perspective. (Subcommittee on Oversight and
Investigations) October 10, 2001
A Review of Federal Bioterrorism Preparedness Programs:
Building an Early Warning Public Health Surveillance System.
(Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations) November 1, 2001
Bioterrorism and Proposals to Combat Bioterrorism. (Full
Committee) November 15, 2001
Cyber Security: Private-Sector Efforts Addressing Cyber
Threats. (Subcommittee on Commerce, Trade, and Consumer Protection)
November 15, 2001
Electronic Communication Networks in the Wake of September
11. (Subcommittee on Commerce, Trade, and Consumer Protection) December
19, 2001
Creating the Department of Homeland Security.
(Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations) June 25, 2002 and July
9, 2002
Securing America: The Federal Government's Response to
Nuclear Terrorism at Our Nation's Ports and Borders. (Subcommittee on
Oversight and Investigations) October 17, 2002
108th Congress
A Review of NRC's Proposed Security Requirements for
Nuclear Power Plants (Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations)
March 18, 2003
Furthering Public Health Security: Project BioShield
(Subcommittee on Health joint hearing with the Subcommittee on
Emergency Preparedness and Response of the Select Committee on Homeland
Security) March 27, 2003
Nuclear Terrorism Prevention: A Review of the Federal
Government's Progress toward Installing Radiation Detection Monitors at
U.S. Ports and Borders (Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations)
September 30, 2003
Port Security: A Review of the Bureau of Customs and
Border Protection's Targeting and Inspection Program for Sea Cargo
(Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations Field Hearing in Camden,
New Jersey) December 16, 2003
Nuclear Security: A Review of the Security at DOE Nuclear
Facilities and the Implementation of the Revised Design Basis Threat
(Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations) March 4, 2004
Mr. Diaz-Balart. Well, thank you, Mr. Chairman. You have
been very frank. We appreciate your frankness.
Mr. Dingell.
STATEMENT OF THE HONORABLE JOHN D. DINGELL, A REPRESENTATIVE IN
CONGRESS FROM THE STATE OF MICHIGAN, AND RANKING MEMBER
COMMITTEE ON ENERGY AND COMMERCE
Mr. Dingell. Mr. Chairman, thank you. It is a privilege to
appear before you today. I would like to thank you and my
colleagues and members of the committee for this opportunity.
I would like to begin by asking unanimous consent to revise
and extend my remarks in the record.
Mr. Diaz-Balart. Without objection.
Mr. Dingell. Second of all, I would like to endorse
everything that our chairman has said to you. He has talked
good sense. And I would point out this committee has done
useful work during this session of Congress, and I commend you
for it. It was necessary that we have an overview of the
entirety of the business of the national security. I think you
have accomplished that with the cooperation and the assistance
of the standing committees which have their responsibilities.
I would note that the standing committees have taken their
responsibilities as seriously as have you ladies and gentlemen
here, and we have moved cooperatively with you and with the
others who are concerned with these matters and with each other
to see to it that we have accomplished the legislative purposes
that were needed. I do not believe that the Congress is well
served by constantly multiplying the number of standing
committees. It tends to increase the budget, it tends to
increase the confusion, it tends to create additional workload
for the Members, and it doesn't seem to result in any
significant benefits in terms of either higher quality or
greater and more important legislative production.
I would note that our committee has dealt with all of the
concerns which we have in this question of national security. I
would point out that we have done the oversight which is
needed, and that this is not a new thing that began to happen
when Mr. Bliley or Mr. Tauzin or my good friend our current
chairman took office as chair. I would note that these things
were going on before, that we had very extensive hearings on
safety at nuclear power plants, safety at other power plants,
questions related to public health, matters that were
associated with possible spread of disease or epidemics or
problems of that sort, and addressing also the question of the
safety at the nuclear facilities. And we have forced a number
of clean-ups, including at the national laboratories and at the
colleges and universities which address these questions, and
have a long history going back to the days of my predecessors,
Mr. Chairman, of this committee.
Now, I would be happy to submit for the record additional
information over and above that which our able chairman has
submitted to you.
We have addressed the problem of SARS, and anthrax and
chicken flu. We have also talked about how these have come to
be and how they should be addressed and whether they are dealt
with by foreign terrorists, common criminals, or just normal
natural events. We have a long history of having worked with
the agencies under our jurisdiction, whether they are the
Department of Homeland Security with the work that they are
doing, or the Public Health Service or the Centers For Disease
Control or whomever or whatever they might happen to be, as
well as the former Atomic Energy Commission and now the Nuclear
Regulatory Commission.
And our work has been not only of high quality, but it has
been done on the basis of much experience, long association
with those agencies, and with a generally friendly
relationship.
I would say that, as our chairman indicated to you, that
the idea of having a single committee to which the agencies
would report on homeland security doesn't make very good sense
to me. I went through the energy crisis, in the 1970s, and I
have gone through a number of other problems of similar
character, and I never found that there was anything other than
benefit to be achieved by having a large number of committees
viewing these questions from the standpoint of their own
experience and expertise. And I would say that this happened
very much during the time of the 1970s when the Energy
Administrator or the chairmen of the regulatory bodies or later
the head of the Department of Energy would come up to report to
different committees about how they were conducting their
business. When there was need to get together on a large single
energy bill, it was always possible to work out the agreements
amongst the different committees that had responsibilities, and
it was always possible to work with the leadership of the
Congress, the Speaker, the minority leader, the majority
leaders, and the others so as to achieve a unified legislative
consequence to this. And I see no reason why we should be
apprehensive that that will not work again. And I would say
this having written a number of large energy bills, clean air
bills, and things of that kind that involve the jurisdiction of
many committees having to work together under somewhat
difficult, time-consuming but nevertheless successful problems
they confronted.
In any event, I think that the Committee on Homeland
Security has served the Congress well. I think that they can,
quite frankly, terminate their affairs with the thanks and the
appreciation of the Congress, and the understanding that the
standing committees that now having jurisdiction over these
matters will continue to do their work well as they always have
and that there is no great reason for setting up a single
committee which would, quite frankly, achieve I think perhaps
an excessively cozy relationship with the Department of
Homeland Security, which very frankly seems to need some rather
hard and questioning supervision. And I will be happy to talk
about them and the dissatisfaction that people at the border
region happen to feel, and I think my good friend the chairman
is nodding affirmatively that he has had similar problems with
them not doing the job they should, not having the budget that
they should, and needing, quite frankly, a long period of
patient, tolerant supervision from more than just one
committee.
And so I would suggest that you have my thanks for the good
work which you have done, you have my good wishes for the
future, you have my hope that you will succeed in your other
undertakings within this body. But I am going to observe that
we have capacity within the standing committees to address the
problems that exist, and I would hope that we would thank you,
I bid you farewell, and look forward to your continuing
success, but understand that your presence has been helpful but
is no longer required.
PREPATED STATEMENT OF THE HONORABLE JOHN D. DINGELL
Thank you, Mr. Chairman and members of the subcommittee, for this
opportunity to testify before you on the subject of possible changes to
the House Rules relating to jurisdiction over homeland security.
I made no secret of my sense that a new Department of Homeland
Security would create as many problems as it was intended to solve.
Without going into all of my reasoning, I was particularly concerned
that public health entities, such as the Centers for Disease Control
and Prevention, could be damaged by moving all or part of their
activities to the Department.
Let's look at our recent health outbreaks--SARS, anthrax, chicken
flu--you name it. Whether produced by foreign terrorists, common
criminals, or more often, natural events, all can have devastating
effects. Yet the role of public health officials is the same
throughout. And they must be prepared to respond without first
determining whether the initial cause was terrorist activity or natural
occurrences.
As a result, working on a bipartisan basis, the Committee on Energy
and Commerce attempted to limit any harm that could be caused in the
legislation establishing the Department of Homeland Security, and I
think we did so. We must now be sure that we do no harm to our
Committee's jurisdiction over ``health and health facilities'' and
``public health and quarantine,'' which enables us to address threats
to the public health regardless of the source.
I would add that our Committee has always taken its
responsibilities in this field very seriously. For example, we held
hearings on the threat of bioterrorism in America in May 1999. This was
followed by three more hearings in 2001, and we took the lead role in
crafting the Public Health Security and Bioterrorism Preparedness and
Response Act. We took the lead in this Congress on the Project
Bioshield Act.
The potential for overlap between our Committee and a Homeland
Security Committee abounds in a variety of other areas, such as nuclear
facilities, oil pipelines, chemical security, electricity transmission,
and telecommunications security. In each of these areas, our Committee
and its staff have developed expertise that predate the events of 9/11.
This should come as no surprise. For example, the regulation of
nuclear powerplants must take into account security issues, whether the
threat is a disgruntled employee or a terrorist attack. And the
regulation of electric transmission lines must take into account the
effects of overhanging trees as well as a terrorist attack.
Our Committee has been thorough and relentless in holding hearings,
seeking GAO reports, and enacting legislation to make all of these
facilities more secure. The actions we take in ensuring security at
critical facilities must be broad-based, taking into account a variety
of scenarios from acts of God, human error, or human malfeasance. We
cannot and should not try to split these important security issues
based upon their root cause.
I would also like to briefly anticipate two arguments in support of
revising Committee jurisdictions to recognize the new Department of
Homeland Security. First I am sure that the Administration would prefer
that it answer to just one Committee. My experience over many years
suggests that such a cozy relationship rarely advances accountability.
For example, many have cited intelligence lapses for September 11, but
I note that the intelligence agencies report just to the Intelligence
Committee and the FBI reports to the Judiciary Committee. It is hard to
see how that scheme improved accountability.
Second, some might suggest that a Homeland Security Committee would
somehow place a greater emphasis on homeland security issues than other
standing committees. Again, I would refer you to the record of this
Committee and our lead role in investigating matters of bioterrorism,
nuclear weapons security, and other matters to suggest that is not the
case. On the other hand, while I commend all the efforts your Committee
has made in this area, I strongly believe that the accumulated
expertise of our Members and staff in these areas would be wasted if
jurisdiction were changed to place these issues in a new committee.
In summary, we are providing you with just a recent glimpse of our
activities on homeland security issues. They show that we have looked
at these matters for many years, and when we recognized the need for
increased activity, we have been the first to act. I strongly urge you
not to recommend either limiting our Rule X jurisdiction in any
fashion, or establishing any new jurisdiction that will duplicate or
overlap our actions.
Mr. Diaz-Balart. Thank you Mr. Dingell. We also thank you
for your frankness
Mr. Barton. Mr. Chairman, we have Mr. Waxman, Mr. Hall and
Mr. Upton, I think. If you would like for them, I don't know
what the protocol is but they are willing to testify if you
wish them to or be available for questions.
Mr. Diaz-Balart. They are certainly welcome, certainly
welcome. The objective here is to listen and to get input, so
you are not foreclosed from bringing up your ideas. So if you
would like to speak now, I mean, you are more than welcome.
Mr. Upton. I am just sitting behind them for support.
Mr. Diaz-Balart. Well, your support is noted and is most
important.
Mr. Chairman, Mr. Barton, you make a valid point about how
critical infrastructure protection efforts cannot be focused
solely on the terrorist threat. But your analysis does not seem
to account for the interdependencies among critical
infrastructure and key assets and the integrated threat and
vulnerability assessment that the Department of Homeland
Security is charged with performing. These cut across many
committee jurisdictions, financial services, agriculture,
energy and commerce, transportation and infrastructure,
resources, et cetera. Do you not see that Congress seems to
need some committee focusing on such interdependencies and the
overall strategy? Who will do it otherwise?
Mr. Barton. Well, Mr.Chairman, I think that is an excellent
question. My answer is I think to the extent that the Energy
and Commerce Committee has jurisdiction in these interagencies,
in these interdependencies, we are doing that. I will not deny
that a special committee that focuses just on one department
can also do it. I mean, I don't think it is a question whether
a select committee if it were to become a permanent committee
couldn't do it. But I do think and I will put into the record
all of the hearings and the laws and the testimony that we have
done on the Energy and Commerce Committee in the last three
Congresses, and it is fairly extensive. As Mr. Dingell pointed
out in his prepared remarks, over time, if you have one
committee that oversees one agency, it is human nature to
develop, as he put it, a cozy relationship. By having several
committees that each independently oversee that, the Homeland
Security Department, you are much more likely to get all these
interdependencies covered. I mean, just by--you are getting
multiple views and multiple hearings and quite honestly
multiple personalities.
Mr. Diaz-Balart. Do you have a comment, Mr. Ranking Member,
Mr. Dingell, on that question?
Mr. Dingell. Mr. Chairman, I agree with our chairman here.
In a nutshell, if there is a large problem which needs to be
addressed, the committees now of jurisdiction have the capacity
to do that, to address that problem, especially if they have
the support and the assistance of the Speaker and the
leadership. We have done this over the years, going back into
the 1970s and the 1980s where the leadership would work with
the different committee chairmen and the different ranking
members to see to it that we all work together, and the end
result was that sometimes as many as 27 different committees
would be working together on legislation, working together very
well. The end result was that we passed legislation, which had
the unique advantage of having the special expertise and
experience of each and every one of these committees working
together with the Speaker occasionally facilitating and
assisting them in seeing to it that a unifiable and
satisfactory conclusion was achieved.
Mr. Diaz-Balart. Thank you. Miss McCarthy.
Ms. McCarthy. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thanks to my
chairman and ranking member for being here to share their
thoughts today, and I have read both of your testimonies and I
can't take issue with anything that you share because at least
70 Percent of all of the matters in the House come through the
very committee you are chairman and ranking member of, and I am
honored to serve there, so it has held me in good stead in this
new role. But I want to toss out a--expand upon your idea, Mr.
Chairman, Chairman Barton, and ask you, Mr. Dingell, to weigh
in on it.
In Mr. Barton's written testimony he spoke about the need
not so much for this committee as a liaison that would work
with all the committees, as you mentioned, that are--you know
have some jurisdiction already on this matter. The committee
that has the most jurisdiction, as you point out, Mr.Dingell,
is the Commerce Committee, both from our work on weapons
depositories and health. I think about all the joint
jurisdiction we already have with Judiciary, with Ways and
Means, but perhaps an expanded role on the Commerce Committee
with the liaison, Mr. Barton, that you mentioned someone, from
the Speaker's office that interfaces with the other committees
could see to it that there be joint referrals to the Commerce
Committee and expand the role of the Commerce Committee to
tackle additional matters beyond what we already do. I just
would love your thoughts on that kind of concept. I do think
there--well, while there may not need to be a Homeland Security
Committee, there needs to be one place that coordinates it all
from the other committees that have jurisdiction, whether that
be the Speaker's office, in conversation with the minority
leader's office, so there is input, or whether a committee as
vast already as Commerce whose jurisdiction covers almost all
of these matters anyway. I would just love your thoughts on
that as a possible solution to the matter.
Mr. Barton. Well, Congresswoman, I think that is a very
valid point. I am glad that you read the testimony. It is to
your tribute. You always do that.
Ms. McCarthy. I try.
Mr. Barton. I would like to point out I think the obvious.
The chairman of the committee, Mr. Cox, is also a member of
this committee, the Energy and Commerce Committee. He was my
vice chairman when I chaired the Oversight and Investigation
Subcommittee, and the young man that is briefing him was one of
the Oversight and Investigation Subcommittee staffers. So they
were trained well on Energy and Commerce to be the chairman and
the staffer on this committee, and if the Speaker wanted to, in
addition to appointing a senior staff member of his personal
staff and the Speaker's office to serve as the liaison with all
the committees and wanted to appoint Mr. Cox and Mr.DiLenge to
assist on that, Mr. Cox as the congressman and Mr. DiLenge as
the staff assisting the Speaker's staff, I think that would be
a great compromise, or Mr. Diaz-Balart, who is a distinguished
member of the Rules Committee. I mean I am not going to sit
here and tell you folks that you don't need to have some
coordination. But to have a full blown committee, with all the
staff and all of the jurisdictional issues that would arise
from that, to my mind is self defeating.
Mr. Dingell. I would like to echo what the chairman said,
but I would like to go further. This issue of the committee
having jurisdictional borders which cause difficulty is not a
new thing around here. Our committee has jurisdictional borders
with Ways and Means; Public Works has similar situation. We
have it on Superfund and Medicare and Medicaid. They have it on
highways and other things of that sort. We have a
jurisdictional border with Agriculture, where we have to
address together the questions of food safety. And these things
are done regularly and although they are sometimes a little bit
of difficult, they always are worked out and I think
satisfactorily over time. And if you look you will find we have
had a long and interesting relationship with our colleagues at
the Science Committee, where questions there have been dealt
with, I think, without too much difficulty simply because the
chairmen understand how these things are done by working
together. And if questions arise that require greater effort
and a major piece of legislation, which I don't think is needed
at this time, then the leadership of the House can pull this
all together. The chairmen can get together and the committees
can get together and the business that needs to be addressed
can be done, and I think expeditiously as well.
And I would point out that all of these committees have two
things. One is a familiarity with the issues. And I would point
out that in a major terrorist attempt involving health matters,
such as some kind of bacterial agent or something of that kind,
are not matters that could not be addressed in just about the
same way whether it involves terrorism or just as a naturally
unfortunate event. Similar situations with regards to a major
problem such as a huge spill of hazardous substance or an
emission, a massive emission of some kind of air pollutant or
water pollutant or something of that type. And with all respect
to this committee, you have done great work. But sitting
committees have the capacity to address these things and have
never been found wanting in their addressing of the problems.
Mr. Barton. I might just--if I may, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Diaz-Balart. Yes, you may.
Mr. Barton. And based on what Chairman Dingell said, just
give you some examples. Health and Human services, whose
Cabinet Secretary has already testified before my committee on
budget priorities and policy issues, also is subject to the
Budget Committee, the Ways and Means Committee, obviously the
Appropriations Committee, the Government Reform Committee. So
they are going to multiple committees. The Environmental
Protection Agency, which is one of the major agencies that we
have jurisdiction over, they also have to report to the
Transportation Committee, again the Appropriations Committee,
Ag Committee, the Government Reform Committee, and the Science
Committee. Department of energy, in addition to being
responsible to the Energy and Commerce Committee has issues
for, Armed Services, Government Reform, Science Approps,
Resources. So most of the Cabinet agencies do report to
multiple congressional committees, and I don't see why Homeland
Security should be any different, especially if we are doing
our job. Now if we are not doing our job, that is a whole
different ball game.
Mr. Dingell. They can fire you then.
Mr. Barton. Yeah. But I don't see, I don't sense on these
issues, nobody has said the Energy and Commerce Committee has
not done its job and again we are blessed because the chairman
of this committee is also a member of our committee, as is the
distinguished lady asking the questions.
Mr. Diaz-Balart. Ms.Dunn.
Ms. Dunn. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. Thank you
gentlemen for coming to testify before us today. I think it is
very useful to have you as a member of the committee and to get
your honest appraisal of the direction in which we should be
going, and that is why we wanted to have this hearing today. I
have a concern with the number of committees that the Homeland
Security Department has to report too. I think it might be
useful to have a resolution outlining exactly whom they should
report to. Maybe we could cut that 88 committees and
subcommittees down to a point where they would have more time
to do the job that they were put--that administration has put
to them. That could be useful and it could be done in a
separate motion.
My support for making the responsibilities of the
Department of Homeland Security Select Committee permanent has
a lot to do with focus on the problem. Things are different
since 9/11. And in every area of the administration there are
pockets of responsibilities that really need focus. ``Focus''
is the word that always makes me realize how important it is to
put together a committee that has a laser like approach to the
responsibilities that this select committee has taken, and that
is to oversee the department and to prevent terrorism, to
reduce the vulnerability of the United States and then to
respond to acts of terrorism if they were to occur. That is
what I fear we lose when we spread these responsibilities out
over 20 or so committees and additional subcommittees. I think
it is very easy to say, and I remember being part of a
wonderful bicameral group called the Organization of Congress
when I first came here as a freshman. This committee looked at
all the responsibilities of the different committees, and in
fact in 1995 we did reduce the number of committees by two or
three, and that was appropriate. But on the other side of that,
if we are not able as a Congress to respond to the new issues
as they come into being, the problems, as we did when we formed
the Energy Committee a few decades ago, then I think that we
are getting behind the ``8'' ball, behind the private sector,
behind the sort of movement that we want in this country to
preserve the safety of our citizens, which I believe is the
first and primary responsibility of all of us who represent
constituents. I think it is easy to say keep the jurisdiction
as we have it now, and so we have to push ourselves to see if
there is a way that we could bring focus to this new and
disastrous responsibility of the Congress without ransacking
all the other committees that have done a very fine job,
certainly exemplary job on most of these responsibilities up to
9/11.
My problem is with the additional responsibilities. I don't
know how much time percentage-wise can you spend on the
prevention and the response of terrorism and the assessment of
the vulnerabilities. Maybe you can do that by setting up an
antiterrorism oversight subcommittee on each committee. Maybe
that is possible.
I just would really like to go into your thinking, both of
you, and I would like to ask you if you see any responsibility
within your jurisdiction that you think could be set aside. I
think that is an important question for you to look at and
answer.
I am on Ways and Means. There may be some things we could
do with Customs to bifurcate its responsibilities, maybe not.
The Commissioner of the Customs doesn't want to separate the
revenue raising, trade-related responsibilities of Customs away
from the responsibilities they have. But on this committee, we
have subcommittees that are looking every single day at the
safety of ports and borders and cyber security and
infrastructure, and that is our specific focus, and I think
this committee does it very well with very responsible people
in charge of the subcommittees, and so I would like to ask you,
is there a responsibility that you currently have that you
think could be set aside in a committee that would focus in a
laser like way on the security of the people we represent?
Would you see a subcommittee being the answer to that problem?
Or do you think things are fine the way they are now and the
percentage of your time you have that you could allocate to
this new responsibility is adequate?
Mr. Barton. Let me see if I can address that,
Congresswoman. I would like to point out that the task force
that you served on when the Republicans became the majority in
1994 recommended, and it was enacted in the rules, the
elimination of the District of Columbia Committee. We do that
now at the--one of the subcommittees on appropriations. We
eliminated the Merchant Marine and Fisheries Committee, put
those jurisdictional issues I believe in the Resources
Committee. Maybe some of them are in Transportation. There was
some debate at the time about eliminating the Small Business
Committee. We thought those issues were broad enough that we
kept that committee. We also discussed briefly consolidation of
the Veterans' Committee in the Armed Services Committee, and so
we decided to keep Veterans' as a separate committee.
So when the Republicans became the majority and initially
in 1994, and became into power in 1995, we went both ways. We
kept two committees to focus on specifics, Veterans' and Small
Business, but in the District of Columbia and Merchant Marine
and Fisheries we consolidated. So you can argue that issue on
focus either way.
In terms of jurisdictional issues, that we wanted to create
a permanent Homeland Security, are there some jurisdictional--
is there some jurisdiction in the Energy and Commerce Committee
that should automatically go to Homeland Security? My answer to
that would be not unless it is proven that it would--that we,
i.e. the Energy and Commerce Committee, have failed. Now if
there is some issue that we have failed to act on, failed to
give the focus that you alluded to, I have only been chairman
for a month but you tell me what it is and, by golly, there
will be some focus. In terms of general oversight, I still have
to get things approved and cleared by the membership and the
leadership, but I have outlined to my subcommittee chairmen
that in the next Congress if the Republicans are still in the
majority, I am thinking of asking every subcommittee chairman
to be a member of the Oversight Subcommittee and I am going to
do oversight not only at the Oversight Subcommittee, but also
have every subcommittee chairman do oversight on their
authorization subcommittees.
So if your question is if we do not create a permanent
Homeland Security Committee, should the Energy and Commerce
Committee create a Homeland Security Subcommittee? I am very
willing to do that, if we change the rules to allow more
subcommittees than are currently allowed in the current House
rules. It is my understanding that the current House rules only
allow for five subcommittees at each standing committee. I
would not want to give up one of the existing subcommittees and
I certainly am not going to give up the Oversight Subcommittee,
but if we would expand the House rules so that you could have
six subcommittees, I would be very willing to create a Homeland
Security Subcommittee on Energy and Commerce, if that is your
question.
Mr. Dingell. I think you have to ask yourself, and I say
this with great respect, what would have been done differently
in Congress than was done if there had been a different
committee structure. First of all, when the committees, the
standing committees were asked to work on legislation, they did
so with all vigor and it was done. It came then to the
Committee on Homeland Security, and I found very small changes
made, if any, in the work that was done by the Commerce
Committee. And I think you would find a similar situation
obtained with regard to every other committee which submitted
its process to the oversight of the Homeland Security
Committee. The matter then went to the Rules Committee and the
work product of all the committees was put together and
accepted.
Now, my question is, how do you sort out--let's say that
you have got a question that relates to public health, SARS or
anthrax or chicken flu or whatever it is or some kind of
biological agent that is released. The Commerce Committee deals
with these questions every day. We know all about it, and we
know what has to be done and we know the agencies that do it.
We know what existing law is and we have that expertise. And
the question is, how much different would the approach that
would be taken, for example, by the Homeland Security Committee
be from that which the Commerce Committee would suggest because
we deal with these things in a holistic way. We don't just deal
with homeland security, but we deal with all the impacts to
this. We would have the advice of the Federal agency that has
responsibility over this, the Department of Homeland Security.
And I don't see us departing significantly from their
suggestions, but I do see us having a keen awareness of how an
attempt to address a particular problem that might relate to
homeland security or terrorist activity would impact on the
broad overall policies we have with regard to health or
dangerous biological agents that might be naturally introduced
into the society or might be introduced by terrorists. I see a
similar situation with regard to poisons or hazardous
substances or toxic substances. I see things that would relate
to other matters of jurisdiction of the Commerce Committee, and
I don't see any of the sitting committees or standing
committees that address these matters that would behave any
differently working with the Department of Homeland Security
and I don't see any difference between what they did or would
do because of the presence of the Homeland Security Committee.
Mr. Diaz-Balart. Chairman Cox.
Mr. Cox. I want to thank you formally. I have already had a
chance to thank you informally for appearing and for providing
both formal testimony and your opening statements and
illuminating answers to questions. And as you know, I am a very
proud member of the Energy and Commerce Committee myself, as
the chairman mentioned, that he and I used to be the chairman
and vice chairman respectively of the Oversight and
Investigation Subcommittee, and because of that long service on
the Energy and Commerce Committee I am very familiar with the
broad jurisdiction of the committee and also the intersection
between the focus of the Energy and Commerce Committee and the
mission of Homeland Security. At Energy and Commerce we are
responsible for energy and air quality, one of the
subcommittees on which I serve and which you used to chair, Mr.
Chairman, EPA, which is, you know, virtually a Cabinet
department, the Department of Energy, FERC, NRC. We have a
separate Subcommittee on the Environment where we focus on
things like Superfund and drinking water and RCRA, and we have
a Subcommittee on Telecommunications and the Internet, which is
very active and focused on the activities of the FCC and NTIA.
We have a Subcommittee on Commerce, Trade, and Consumer
Protection, which, among other things, includes jurisdiction
over the Department of Commerce. We have a Subcommittee on
Health, which is responsible for Medicare and Medicaid and HHS
and FDA and CDC and NIH, and we have a Subcommittee on
Oversight and Investigations, which as I mentioned I was vice
chairman of under your chairmanship, which doubles down from an
oversight perspective in all those areas.
Having spent a year and a half, actually longer than that,
because of the time we spent in Energy and Commerce with our
referral on the Homeland Security Act, going through that act
and understanding it fully and now watching the Department grow
according to that blueprint, I am pleased to say that the
Energy and Commerce Committee has almost the least amount of
conflict of any major committee from a jurisdictional
standpoint, and to the extent we do have overlap we have worked
very closely together, most notably on the BioShield
legislation. But even there, the statute makes it very clear
that the Department of Homeland Security acquired no
jurisdiction over the human health aspects countermeasure, and
so the reason for the collaboration was essentially because the
legislation itself was collaborative between the Department of
Homeland Security and HHS. That is a dual function. There was
no government agency within the jurisdiction of Energy and
Commerce transferred to the Department of Homeland Security.
There were some very small programs and a small number of them,
but no government agency, you know, unlike other committees.
The whole Coast Guard got transferred, the whole INS got
transferred, and so on. That didn't happen with Energy and
Commerce.
And so we have, I think, two premises from which to work.
First, there is already a very broad and important jurisdiction
at Energy and Commerce which we want to maintain continued
focus on. And second, there is a discrete and severable
function of this new Department that at least heretofore has
been largely without the jurisdiction of the Committee on
Energy and Commerce. I appreciate the notional offer that was
made to acquire the jurisdiction and as a proud member of the
Energy and Commerce Committee, that is my committee, I
recognize that and I am here to say that I am proud of--
Mr. Barton. I can make it more than notional if there is
any interest. We can have a proposal to this committee or the
Speaker's office within 48 hours if there is interest in that.
Mr. Cox. I recognize that Texas deal maker there. We are
happy to do this acquisition. But I think what is really
important, and I just mention in a side bar before we begin, is
that the Congress, the House and the Senate, keep a focus on
the Department of Homeland Security's mission, its purpose for
being, because in the same way that we have jurisdictional
concerns because of all the overlap here in the House, there is
a potential at least for the Department of Homeland Security to
grow into areas where it doesn't belong.
The Department of Homeland Security has a very important
mission, and I think it is vitally important that it keep
focused on that mission. Number one in its mission statement is
preventing terrorism. Number two is protecting us against
potential terrorist acts so that if they occur we minimize
their damage. And number three is, and last, it is the only
missions they have, those three, is to respond, to be prepared
to respond in the event terrorism does occur, which inevitably
some time in our future history it will, and then help the
country recover thereafter.
If the Department of Homeland Security, however, morphs
into the regulator of every aspect of American life in every
corner of American enterprise, then it is going to encroach not
only into missions which were not assigned it by the Homeland
Security Act, but also into the jurisdiction of the Energy and
Commerce Committee, where it doesn't belong. If it grows to
federalize every State and local and private sector function
because homeland security touches everything, then inevitably
it will also encroach directly into the traditional
jurisdiction of the Energy and Commerce Committee, and if it
grows in that fashion it probably will be the ruin of the
Federal budget and also encroach in the jurisdiction of the
Budget Committee in a big way, where we hope that it does not.
So I would just ask you, if not at this moment as a follow-
up, ask the professional staff of the Energy and Commerce
Committee to focus on this question. Given that the Congress
and at least for this Congress, this select committee has
jurisdiction over the Homeland Security Act itself, what
recommendations would you make, given the experience that we
now have with a real department, based on the blueprint we
wrote not that long ago, to change the Homeland Security Act
with respect to things that went in that perhaps should come
out or, if you are so inclined, things that didn't go in that
ought to have in the first place, perhaps instead of some
things that did? And if you want to respond off the cuff to
that, I would accept anything you have to offer by way of
wisdom right now. But you know, recognizing that that is the
sort of thing that would also require some study and some
professional staff work, I would welcome it as a follow-up.
Mr. Barton. I think you make a valid point, Chairman Cox. I
would reserve the right to staff it appropriately and respond
officially instead of commenting off the cuff. But the ability
of any department to grow is limited only by its ability to get
resources from the Congress in which to do that growth. And I
think on an issue like homeland security, since it covers
everything in a technical sense, there is a tremendous impetus
to become larger and larger, so I don't--if I understand your
theory correctly. I don't dispute the theory. But I would like
to allow--be given the time to respond in writing to the
specifics of the question.
Mr. Cox. I make the kind of question because I am so
convinced that if the Department does grow like Topsy that it
will lose its focus and we will be less safe. So we have got to
keep it focused on this mission.
Mr. Barton. I agree with that.
Mr. Cox. I also make the comment because in your prepared
remarks you mentioned that it might be difficult to distinguish
between what is homeland security and what is everything else,
and I think we have got to get past that. We have got to come
up with a definition.
Chairman Goss was here earlier and made the point in his
formal testimony, you know, one of the things that Congress
needs to do and the Department needs to do increasingly a
better job of is defining what is homeland security. It can't
be in the eye of the beholder. It can't be whatever we say it
is and change our mind constantly. It has to be focused.
Mr. Barton. I can tell you in my congressional district,
everybody--almost every municipality and their subdivisions
thereof now have a grant asking me to support for some effort
that they classify as homeland security. And I don't think my
district is unique. You know, I am besieged. I won't say
overwhelmed, but I am--I have probably hundreds of requests for
specific grants that are categorized as homeland security
because we have funded that and it has been a high priority, as
it should be, to focus on it.
Mr. Dingell. I would like to make a couple of observations.
One, if that is a deep concern and you feel the committee must
be kept, there is nothing to say that this committee could not
continue to be a select committee and that it could serve in
that fashion. But if there is a need to have that be focused on
by the standing committees, that could be inserted into the
rules and the Speaker can see to it then that the rules are
carried forward by the committees which have the jurisdiction.
I don't see anything which has transpired during this
session of Congress or the prior one which was any different
really because of the presence of this committee. It was a
response by the Congress, and I of course have some concern
about the fact that the Congress keeps getting bigger and
bigger. We keep getting castigated more and more for the
multiplication of efforts and the amount of work and friction
in bureaucracy and wasted time, money and energy that goes into
this body. And a major part of that is by the fact that the
committees keep getting larger and larger and we keep getting
more and more of them.
And I want just to give you some history, and I apologize
for this, but when I came here, the Committee on Energy and
Commerce was smaller than most of its subcommittees. A
subcommittee had three to five members. Five members was a big
subcommittee. When we got done with the hearings, which went
expeditiously because we didn't have, what is it 44 or 46
members--
Mr. Barton. We have 57 members of the Energy and Commerce
Committee.
Mr. Dingell. Making opening statements at 5Sec. nutes a
head. We could dispose of the hearings on a piece of
legislation in a day and have time for proper inquiry of the
witnesses. And the end result was that we would then close the
doors, take off our coats, roll up our sleeves and have a huge
Donnybrook, and sharp words were used and everything else. But
the result was that we came forward with legislation upon which
we were in agreement. And that legislation then went through
the Congress without any real difficulty because it wasn't so
complicated and we hadn't made ourselves so muscle bound that
we really had problems in legislating.
And you can keep on increasing the number of committees.
The Peter principle says every time you have a problem you set
up a committee or you set up a study group or you do something
else like that. But that doesn't address or focus upon the
problem that you confront.
So my statement to you, and my prayer to you would be let
us not increase the complexity of the Congress. Let us not
increase the number of committees. Let us not increase the
amount, the number of units of work that must be done to a unit
of accomplishment because that is simply to invite more delay
and more disaster and more problems for the Congress. And with
all due respect, and I say this sincerely, the members of this
committee have tried hard and I believe you have served well
and you have served honorably. But we are going to get so big
around here in terms of the number of committees and number of
responsibilities the Members have that we are going to have to
have one of these searing, tearing reorganizations that takes
place, causes no end of trouble, and leaves a lot of Members
adrift without things to do, that distorts the function of the
Congress for years.
That happens every time we have a reorganization, and it
also happens every time you reorganize the executive, because I
find no real benefit that has been accomplished by setting up a
Department of Homeland Security. They simply moved a lot of
agencies over there. They don't get along with each other. We
had a similar situation when we set up the Department of
Energy. Everybody hated each other inside the Department of
Energy. It was 20 years before we got them to work together. A
similar situation with regard to the Department of Education.
And I would just say that the simpler we can make this business
of ours the more successful we will be, and more committees are
not going to contribute to that.
Mr. Diaz-Balart. You have both been very patient and
helpful--
Mr. Cox. Mr. Chairman, if I might just--
Mr. Diaz-Balart. Yes.
Mr. Cox. Just as a member of both committees, I observe
that first with respect to your comment, Mr. Dingell, that you
are not sure what difference has followed from the Select
Committee's work. As a result of over 35 hearings of the Select
Committee, we put forward a dramatic restructuring of first
responder grants already, and the Department has changed very
much the way that it is focusing its first responder grant
money. We are putting in a very strong emphasis on intelligence
threat and vulnerability. We have focused a great deal of
attention on the threat advisory system and that has become
much more refined as a result. We have, after the Senate
committee of jurisdiction, without question gone forward with
BioShield as an entitlement program. We drew to the attention
of the Energy and Commerce Committee the importance of stopping
that as an entitlement program, and as you know, we have now
passed in the House collaboratively between Energy and Commerce
and our committee not as an entitlement program because we so
strongly believe, and Energy and Commerce was in agreement on
this point, that this not be unsustainable. And I think very
importantly, we put a very strong focus on the Infrastructure
Protection and Information Analysis Directorate. There is a
different person running that now following the hearings that
we have had, over 35, as I mentioned, on these subjects alone.
In contrast with that, the list that the committee provided
the Energy and Commerce Committee to this hearing of all of the
entirety of the work that has been done during the 108th
Congress lists not a single full committee hearing, and one of
the five hearings that was conducted was a joint hearing with
our committee. There is just not time nor the jurisdiction with
Energy and Commerce to reach all the things that the Department
of Homeland Security is doing, and I would just tell you that I
have made it my priority to attend all of my subcommittee
meetings and hearings not to mention markups and full committee
hearings and markups in Energy and Commerce, and I see very
little overlap with the work that--the very important and
substantial work we do in Energy and Commerce as what we are
doing in the select committee. I just think they are as
different as night and day. But that is my observation.
I would also, with respect to the growth of Congress point,
just add that historically whenever we have created a
significant new department we have also assigned authorization
and oversight responsibility to a committee in the Congress. It
is true for the Department of Defense, true for the Department
of Education, true for the Department of Energy, and it is not
clear why with a national security mission as important as
protecting the country it should be different for the third
largest Cabinet department, the Department of Homeland
Security.
Mr. Diaz-Balart. You both have been very patient, but I
would like to ask one last question, based on something that
you both stressed. You both testified that the jurisdictional
overlap is inherent in the committee system and that a new
committee would not reduce the overlap, but would rather create
many new and untested overlaps. Also, you have both testified
that in your opinion a new committee is not needed.
Former Speakers Gingrich and Foley testified before us that
there should be a standing permanent committee with
authorization jurisdiction to provide simple, focused,
centralized and efficient oversight of the Department of
Homeland Security. Both Speakers, as I am sure you recognize,
have an intimate understanding of the House committees and
jurisdiction. They both rejected the notion that a new standing
committee would increase overlap if it were done right. They
both also said that while overlapping jurisdiction may be
acceptable or even desirable on some issues, as you both, I
believe, pointed out, it is not for such a critical mission as
homeland security.
Why do you believe Speakers Foley and Gingrich are wrong?
They both suggested that opposition is based on turf issues.
How do you respond?
Mr. Barton. Well, I would respond, Mr. Chairman, that if
you had asked them whether there should be reorganization of
the entire House or a consolidation, they would have also
responded in the affirmative to that, because they are both
former Speakers and they know that over time things grow and,
as they grow, they develop some of the discontinuities that
Chairman Cox alluded to. My recollection, and I didn't read
their testimony, but I did watch snippets of it that was
presented through the media, at least with regard to the Energy
and Commerce Committee, I don't remember any specific failures
that they alluded to in our mission statement. So I think, you
know, I wouldn't say they were wrong. I think they were just
responding kind of in a natural fashion that here is a specific
issue that is a hot issue right now. We ought to focus on it. I
think we are focusing on it through the select committee, but I
think it is an open question whether it should be made a
permanent committee.
I also, before I yield to Mr. Dingell, want to respond to
something that Congresswoman Dunn said because I misresponded.
I thought the rules of the House allowed five subcommittees on
each committee. The rules of the House allow five subcommittees
plus an oversight subcommittee if you choose to have it, which
is what the Energy and Commerce Committee has chosen. So her
suggestion that we create a Homeland Security Subcommittee I
would support either for my committee or for all committees
that have jurisdiction over homeland security if we could go to
six authorization subcommittees plus an oversight subcommittee.
I think that would be a good idea.
Ms. Dunn. May I comment, please? That was not my
suggestion. That was my question to you if you felt that that
would adequately--I am a supporter of a standing committee.
Mr. Barton. Yeah. But I mean I would certainly, you know,
one way to focus, in my committee on the homeland security
issues, and Mr. Cox alluded to it, would be to have a specific
Subcommittee on Homeland Security and I am fine with that if I
can maintain the ones that I already have. I wouldn't want to
give one up to get that one.
Mr. Cox. Will the gentleman yield?
Mr. Diaz-Balart. Yes, and I am trying wrap up this panel.
Mr. Cox. I would just note doing the arithmetic that if
there is a concern about Congress growing, then if we were to
add a Homeland Security Subcommittee to each of the standing
committees that have jurisdiction we would quickly move from 88
committees and subcommittees to over a hundred.
Mr. Barton. Well, but if want to focus, you know, that is
the way to do it and you are going to get--I guarantee you if
y'all put that before the conference, the Republican
Conference, I will let Mr. Dingell speak for the Democratic
Caucus, but if you put it before the Republican Conference the
creation of an additional subcommittee on each committee is
going to pass overwhelmingly because that means there is an
additional subcommittee chairman or chairwoman.
Mr. Cox. But if you have over a hundred committees and
subcommittees with jurisdiction over something then I think the
analog to socialism is perfect. If something is owned by
everyone, it is the responsibility of no one.
Mr. Barton. You give us that and I guarantee you we will
take ownership.
Mr. Diaz-Balart. We are going to--you have been very
patient. We are going to wrap this up. Ms. McCarthy had a final
point she wanted to make briefly.
Ms. McCarthy. It was just on this point that is being
discussed now, that the Commerce Committee, having vast
jurisdiction already over the homeland security issues expand
the Oversight Subcommittee, Mr. Chairman, to include homeland
security. Because so much of it goes, comes to our committee
anyway it would make a lot of sense.
Mr. Barton. I agree with that.
Mr. Diaz-Balart. Thank you both very much. You have been
very patient. Appreciate your testimony.
Mr. Dingell. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Diaz-Balart. Mr. Davis and Mr. Waxman. We welcome the
chairman and the ranking member of the Committee on Government
Reform, Mr. Davis, Mr. Waxman, and you are free to proceed with
your testimony. Mr.Davis.
STATEMENT OF THE HONORABLE TOM DAVIS, A REPRESENTATIVE IN
CONGRESS FROM THE STATE OF VIRGINIA, AND CHAIRMAN, COMMITTEE ON
GOVERNMENT REFORM
Mr. Davis. Thank you, Mr. Chairman and Ranking Member
Slaughter, and on behalf of the Government Reform Committee I
want to thank you for holding these important hearings on
whether the House is appropriately organized to consider
homeland security matters or do we need to add another
appendage, which in my opinion is kind of a backsliding from
where we were with the Contract with America, where we came in
and we abolished committees, we didn't add committees to the
House, trying to streamline the procedures.
My friend and the ranking member, Mr. Waxman, and I are
here to testify that with positive changes the House will be
organized to ensure that Homeland Security receives the
resources and scrutiny it deserves. Because the success of the
Department is vital to the continuing economic recovery and
winning the war on terrorism, we all want it to succeed.
Congress must provide the Department with the proper resources
while at the same time maintaining aggressive oversight to
ensure that this massive reorganization and commitment of
resources succeeds.
We must ask if the House, as currently organized, has and
will continue to aggressively oversee this new Department. More
importantly, I believe a major congressional reorganization
will only hinder oversight and legislative priorities. In the
past others have testified that without a permanent committee
exclusively devoted to DHS Congress would drop the ball. The
past year and a half has shown that this is I think wrong.
There has been no lack of oversight or legislative activity to
make sure that we get homeland security right.
Our committee maintains an aggressive posture when it comes
to overseeing DHS. Whether through legislation or oversight
hearings the Government Reform Committee is fulfilling its role
as the primary oversight and investigation committee of the
House. With the cooperation of all of our members, our
subcommittees and the full committee, we have held numerous
oversight hearings, field visits and markup actions pertaining
to the Department.
For example, the committee held oversight hearings on
topics related to FEMA, TSA, first responders, critical
infrastructure, visa policy, preparedness standards, DHS
financial accountability, border management, port security and
product litigation management, to name just a few. We held
markups on Project BioShield, the Presidential Vacancy Act and
the DHS Financial Accountability Ability Act. We are fulfilling
our role and no one should question whether DHS would escape
scrutiny if there weren't a committee in Congress under the
same name.
The existing committee structure has been criticized for
the number of committees with jurisdiction over agencies and
programs that contribute to homeland security, but the creation
of a permanent homeland security panel would only exacerbate
the program of jurisdictional overlap. Jurisdictional overlap
is inherent in the committee system. The new committee won't
reduce the overlap. It only creates many new and untested
overlaps. It will not reduce jurisdiction overlap if we
increase the number of committees responsible for
transportation, emergency management, law enforcement, public
health, immigration and the many other matters involved in
ensuring homeland security.
As I know too well, jurisdictional conflicts happen. It is
the responsibility of committee chairman to manage these
conflicts. When the overlap is well understood and tested
through precedent, committees can focus on solutions, not turf.
New and undefined overlaps too often result in turf battles
that delay and even prevent positive outcomes.
A new full Committee on Homeland Security would generate
many new jurisdictional overlaps and conflicts. Each of the
conflicts would be untested and unsettled. It is my experience
that these gray areas are the source of unproductive
jurisdictional squabbles among committees, not overlap which
exists under any committee's structure.
Ensuring that DHS remains strong and that Congress is
appropriately organized to oversee this Department requires
only minor adjustments. With a few tweaks the current committee
structure would be well prepared to support and oversee DHS in
its critical mission. I suggest that the House agree upon an
organizational map. You could do it similar to the Senate
model. As in the Senate, current committees would continue to
oversee their legacy agencies, while Government Reform, like
Governmental Affairs in the Senate, would oversee the
administration of the Department's headquarters and
departmentwide policies as well as White House efforts to
coordinate homeland security policy.
The Government Reform Committee already has jurisdiction
over these matters through its authority over agency
organization, human capital, IT security, Federal-State
relations, procurement and the management and efficiency of
government organizations. Reenforcement of this authority along
with any clarifications between the other committees where the
combination of agencies or functions may have muddied the
existing jurisdictions would preserve our present strength and
let the House focus on DHS and its mission, not turf battles.
The committee I chair was at the center of the last major
reorganization in the House when Government Reform absorbed the
D.C. Committee and the Post Office and Civil Service Committee.
These moves had their doubters who most of the time thought
they would result in the neglect of those issues. I am pleased
to report that neither has been forgotten. In fact, since the
reorganization the Government Reform Committee has passed
landmark legislation affecting the District of Columbia, more
so than when it existed as a committee by itself. The Federal
Civil Service legislation we passed, the major civil service
reform this last year for the Department of Defense, which is
over half of civil service, and hopefully with the help of many
here today we are going to pass major postal reform this year
even though we don't have a dedicated committee just for that.
Our committee is living proof you don't need a marquis
committee name to make sure your agency is highlighted in the
halls of Congress. I know this existing structure works because
this is how the House oversees and coordinates our Nation's
drug policy, which is also--our committee has jurisdiction. The
Office of National Drug Policy, ONDCP, created by Congress in
1988 partly through leadership of then Government Reform
Subcommittee Ranking Member Danny Hastert, established
policies, priorities and objectives for the Nation's Drug
Control Program. The Committee on Government Reform holds
jurisdiction over ONDCP, but the Committees on Judiciary and
Energy and Commerce oversee the major components of national
drug policy, including law enforcement and public health.
As I have worked this Congress on reauthorizing ONDCP, we
have been pleased with the working relationship among the
committees involved. This model can work for homeland security
as well. This proposal would maintain existing areas of
expertise and relationships with executive branch agencies. The
proposal strengthens the parallel structures of House-Senate
relations.
And, finally, by designating Government Reform as the lead
committee on cross-agency proposals when no other committee
could naturally receive the primary referral ensures that
homeland security efforts will be coordinated. I believe that
framework will work and that the issue of whether homeland
security is adequately addressed will be protected.
In closing, I want to stress how important the issue of
homeland security is to me in my congressional district across
the river from here and to members of my committee. I am
confident that if organized correctly no one will question our
ability to oversee and contribute to the security of our great
Nation.
PREPARED STATEMENT OF THE HONORABLE TOM DAVIS, A REPRESENTATIVE IN
CONGRESS, FROM THE STATE OF VIRGINIA
Mr. Chairman, and Ranking Member Slaughter, on behalf of the
Government Reform Committee, I would like to thank you for holding
these important hearings on whether the House is appropriately
organized to consider homeland security matters.
My friend and Government Reform's ranking member, Mr. Waxman, and I
are here to testify that with positive changes the House will be
organized to ensure that homeland security receives the resources and
scrutiny it deserves. Because the success of the Department is vital to
the continuing economic recovery and winning the war on terrorism, we
all want to see it succeed.
Congress must provide the department with the proper resources
while at the same time maintaining aggressive oversight to ensure that
this massive reorganization and commitment of resources succeeds.
We must ask if the House, as currently organized, has and will
continue to aggressively and effectively oversee this new department.
More importantly, I believe a major congressional reorganization will
only hinder oversight and legislative priorities.
In the past others have testified that without a permanent
committee, exclusively devoted to DHS, Congress would drop the ball.
The past year and a half has shown that this is, quite simply, wrong.
There has been no lack of oversight or legislative activity to make
sure that we get homeland security right.
My committee maintains an aggressive posture when it comes to
overseeing DHS. Whether through legislation or oversight hearings, the
Government Reform Committee is fulfilling its role as the primary
oversight and investigation committee of the House. With the
cooperation of all our Members, our subcommittees and the full
committee have held numerous oversight hearings, field visits and
markup actions pertaining to the Department.
For example the committee held oversight hearings on topics
relating to FEMA, TSA, first responders, critical infrastructure, visa
policy, preparedness standards, DHS financial accountability, border
management, port security and product litigation management to name
just a few. We held markups on Project Bioshield, the Presidential
Vacancy Act, and the DHS Financial Accountability Act. We are
fulfilling our role and no one should question whether DHS would escape
scrutiny if there weren't a Committee in Congress under the same name.
The existing committee structure has been criticized for the number
of committees with jurisdiction over agencies and programs that
contribute to homeland security. The creation of a permanent Homeland
Security panel, however, would only exacerbate the problem of
jurisdictional overlap.
Jurisdictional overlap is inherent in the committee system. A new
committee wouldn't reduce that overlap--it would only create many new
and untested overlaps. We will not reduce jurisdictional overlap if we
increase the number of committees responsible for transportation,
emergency management, law enforcement, public health, immigration, and
the many other matters involved in ensuring homeland security.
As I know only too well, jurisdictional conflicts happen. It is the
responsibility of committee chairmen to manage these conflicts. When
the overlap is well understood and tested through precedent, committees
can focus on solutions--not turf. New and undefined overlaps too often
result in turf battles that delay and even prevent positive outcomes. A
new full committee on homeland security would generate many new
jurisdictional overlaps and conflicts. Each of the conflicts would be
untested and unsettled. It is my experience that these gray areas are
the source of unproductive jurisdictional squabbles among committees--
not overlap, which exists under any committee structure.
Ensuring that DHS remains strong and that Congress is appropriately
organized to oversee this department requires only minor adjustments.
With a few tweaks, the current committee structure would be well
prepared to support and oversee DHS and its critical mission. I suggest
that the House agree upon a organizational map that resembles the
Senate model. As in the Senate, current committees should continue to
oversee their legacy agencies--while Government Reform, like Government
Affairs, would oversee the administration of the department's
headquarters and department wide policies as well as White House
efforts to coordinate homeland security policy.
The Government Reform Committee already has jurisdiction over these
matters through its authority over agency organization, human capital,
IT security, Federal-state relations, procurement and the management
and efficiency of government operations. Reinforcement of this
authority along with any clarifications between the other committees,
where the combination of agencies or functions may have muddied the
existing jurisdictions, will preserve our present strengths and let the
House focus on DHS and its mission, not turf battles.
The Committee I chair was at the center of the last major
reorganization in the House when Government Reform absorbed the DC
Committee and the Post Office and Civil Service Committee. These moves
had their doubters and most at the time thought they would result in
the neglect of those issues. I am pleased to report that neither has
been forgotten. In fact, since the reorganization, the Government
Reform Committee has passed landmark legislation affecting the District
of Columbia, the Federal civil service and hopefully with the help of
many here today, major postal reform. My committee is living proof that
you don't need a marquee committee name to make sure your agency is
highlighted in the halls of Congress.
I know this existing structure works because this is how the House
oversees and coordinates our nation's drug policy.
The Office of the National Drug Control Policy (ONDCP), created by
Congress in 1988 partly through leadership of then Government Reform
subcommittee ranking member Denny Hastert, establishes policies,
priorities, and objectives for the Nation's drug control program. The
Committee on Government Reform holds jurisdiction over ONDCP; however,
the Committees on the Judiciary and Energy and Commerce oversee the
major components of national drug policy including law enforcement and
public health. As I have worked this Congress on reauthorizing ONDCP, I
have been very pleased with the working relationship among the
committees. This model will work for homeland security as well.
This proposal would maintain existing areas of expertise and
relationships with executive branch agencies. The proposal strengthens
the parallel structure of House-Senate relations. Finally, by
designating Government Reform as the lead committee on cross-agency
proposals when no other committee would naturally receive the primary
referral, ensures that homeland security efforts will be coordinated. I
believe this framework will work and that the issue of whether homeland
security is adequately addressed will be protected.
In closing, I want to stress how important the issue of homeland
security is to me and to the members of my committee. I am confident
that if organized correctly no one will question our ability to oversee
and contribute to the security of our great nation.
Mr. Diaz-Balart. Thank you, Mr. Davis.
Mr. Waxman.
STATEMENT OF THE HONORABLE HENRY A. WAXMAN, A REPRESENTATIVE IN
CONGRESS FROM THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA, AND RANKING MEMBER,
COMMITTEE ON GOVERNMENT REFORM
Mr. Waxman. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I am pleased to have
this opportunity to come before this Subcommittee on Rules and
give you my thoughts about whether we ought to have a
continuation of a Select Committee of Homeland Security or a
new standing Committee on Homeland Security. All of us share
the goal of ensuring that the Department of Homeland Security
operates as effectively as possible on security matters. The
question is how can the Congress promote that end in the most
efficient way possible?
One of the key contributions Congress can make is
conducting oversight, and there is no question that good
congressional oversight helps agencies do the job, the best job
they can. The problem we face now is that there are too many
committees reviewing homeland security matters. The
Transportation and Infrastructure Committee, the Ways and Means
Committee, the Energy and Commerce Committee, the Agriculture
Committee, Judiciary Committee, the Government Reform
Committee, and others all conduct oversight of homeland
security activities. Sometimes from different perspectives, but
nevertheless all these committees are potentially involved in
one way or another.
The continuation of a select or standing Committee on
Homeland Security compounds the problem. It adds another
committee and another layer of oversight. We literally have a
situation where three committees have authorities regarding
every program in the Department. One is the traditional
authorizing committee, one is Government Reform, which has
governmentwide oversight responsibilities, and one is the
present select committee, and that is simply too many.
Now there is a better model. The better model is what the
Senate is doing with this very same issue. There the existing
committees with relevant jurisdiction conduct oversight over
the agencies in their jurisdiction and the Governmental Affairs
Committee oversees issues such as coordination of homeland
security activities. They were wise enough to figure out how to
do the job of oversight in the Senate without creating another
layer of bureaucracy, setting up more committees is another
layer of bureaucracy.
I was amused to hear Chairman Barton say that the
Republican Conference, that members there would like to create
more subcommittees so there could be more subcommittee chairmen
and women. Well, to me that doesn't sound like what I thought
the Republicans were all about. I thought we were supposed to
be shrinking government, not expanding the number of committees
and subcommittee just so members could be chairmen of
committees. That is not what our job is all about. Our job is
to make sure the government functions appropriately.
Now we had a special committee create the Homeland Security
agency, and that was done in the past when legislation brought
together all the different committees of jurisdiction to
develop the energy policy in the 1970s. But I don't recall ever
a committee being created solely for the purpose of responding
to a new Cabinet level. The Department of Energy was created in
the late 1970s. There are five standing committees in the House
that have some aspect of jurisdiction over Energy.
Mr. Waxman. There wasn't an energy committee created. There
was already the Energy and Commerce Committee that had its
primary jurisdiction on energy issues. The other cabinet level
agency that was created was the Department of Education. Well,
we didn't create a new Committee on Education in the House, we
already had a Committee on Education in the House, and that
committee does it job. We have a Department of Health and Human
Services. Well, we have ways and means with jurisdiction over
Health and Human Services, we have the Energy and Commerce
Committee with jurisdiction over some of those issues, we have
the Infrastructure Subcommittee, which has jurisdiction, and
the committee we used to call Education and Labor, whatever it
is called now, they have some jurisdiction over these matters.
Should we create a new Committee on Health and Human Services
to do the job that is already being done by these other
committees? It seems to me the question answers itself.
My remarks should not be interpreted as questioning the
commitment and effort of current members of the select
committee on Homeland Security. Rather, my point is that it is
not in the long-term interests of the Department of Homeland
Security and the taxpayers to have duplicative congressional
oversight. The continuation of a select committee or a standing
committee on Homeland Security would result in spending more
money, devoting more resources to activities that other
committees, other standing committees already are doing, and
they are certainly competent to continue to do that work.
I urge my colleagues to consider terminating the committee
on Homeland Security and to let the committees of jurisdiction
that are the standing committees do the job of oversight to
help make sure this agency performs appropriately.
Mr. Diaz-Balart. Thank you both.
I would point out, Mr. Waxman, we were informed by some of
the experts that testified earlier before us that, after the
creation of the Department of Defense, the Armed Services
Committee was created. I think you pointed out, never has it
been done.
Mr. Waxman. I don't know that any of us were here, but I am
certain there was maybe a committee on the war policy. So they
changed the name to the Committee on Armed Services in the
House. But I am not sure, and none of us were here at the time.
Mr. Diaz-Balart. We weren't here, but we received testimony
on that.
Mr. Waxman. But that is certainly an important area of
expertise. And I think the history of where the committees have
conducted that responsibility is clear. But to point out the
other examples that we have had with energy and education,
which are the two most recent cabinet level positions.
Mr. Diaz-Balart. Those are more recent. But I didn't want
the record not to reflect the creation of the Armed Services
Committee after the--
Mr. Davis. Could we supplement our testimony on that point?
Because I think when you go back, you are going to find there
was a committee that dealt with this, as Mr. Waxman said. I
didn't bring any documentation, but--
Mr. Diaz-Balart. No, but we went through World War II
without one.
Mr. Davis. That is our whole point.
Mr. Diaz-Balart. What Mr. Waxman said was it had never been
done.
Mr. Waxman. I would like to research and put an addendum in
the record, which may be an apology, because you may be right
and we are wrong.
Mr. Diaz-Balart. You are more than welcome to submit any
supplementary.
Mr. Cox. Would the chairman yield?
Mr. Diaz-Balart. Yes.
Mr. Cox. I would just point out, I think we are confusing
two different concepts. One is whether or not there was a
responsibility in the Congress antedating the of a cabinet
department. And the other is whether or not our House rules
have ever been changed to give a committee of Congress primary
jurisdiction over a cabinet department.
And that has happened not only repeatedly, but it has
happened each of the last three times we have created a new
cabinet department, so that the House rules specifically
recognize the cabinet department in Rule 10 with respect to the
Department of Energy where primary jurisdiction is within the
Energy and Commerce Committee; with respect to the Department
of Education where primary jurisdiction is within the Committee
on Education and the Workforce; and with the Department of
Defense where primary jurisdiction is within the Committee on
Armed Services.
Mr. Waxman. So I think in those cases, they designated a
committee that was already in existence to be the primary
committee. And what we are suggesting is we don't need another
one.
Mr. Cox. It is not my time, but that would be a useful
point.
Mr. Diaz-Balart. We certainly heard what you are
suggesting, and we appreciate your testimony.
Given the Government Reform Committee's responsibilities
for all of the various elements of its existing Rule 10
jurisdiction, I guess the key question or the most important
question would be, how can we best ensure that sufficient
attention is being devoted to oversight of the Department of
Homeland Security and the critical task of overseeing and
authorizing the functions of the third largest department of
the Federal Government charged with the security of our
population from the domestic terrorism? That is the key, and
that is what we try to focus on in this and other hearings.
Mr. Davis. We have held over 35 hearings on matters
pertaining to this department this year in our committee, just
for the record. We have been active in legislative markups that
affected it, on bioshield and other areas that also affect the
committee. I don't think there is any problem that they are
doing it. The Senate committee has stepped up to the same
thing, I might add, without additional staff.
Our concern is simply this: Some of the biggest issues that
face a new department that is put together with different
cultures from different agencies and the like go to human
capital functions, procurement functions, bringing those
together. That is what our committee deals with. That is at the
core of what the government committee does. To write us out of
this thing and move it over to another committee I think would
be a huge error at this point. And that is basically where the
committee needs most of its oversight, immigration.
I think the Judiciary Committee has the expertise in this.
They have been guarding law in that area for a long time.
Bioterrorism, the CDC, NIH are under the jurisdiction of
Commerce. We don't have to lose those jurisdictions by moving
for a new committee where I think we are going to have
jurisdictional fights up and down.
And, also just to go to the tendency sometimes where the
committees get very cozy with the departments. Mr. Waxman and I
simply went through this with mad cow disease where dealing
with one of the local committees with oversight, very cozy with
the leadership and not wanting to hold a hearing. And it turns
out the cow--I mean, we got some concessions that some of the
investigation we had done turned out to be correct.
So that is my observation, if you really want us to be
proactive in terms of the oversight on that. I don't think you
lose a thing by using the Senate model in this case.
Mr. Diaz-Balart. Ms. Slaughter.
Ms. Slaughter. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Given your wide jurisdiction over other parts of the
government, how would you handle the authorization process for
DHS?
Mr. Davis. Well, you have different authorization process.
I don't know that you would have a DHS authorization bill. We
don't have authorization bills for a lot of departments. You
potentially could do that. I would think immigration would
probably stay over where it is at this point.
But in terms of focusing on the core mission, which is what
Mr. Cox addressed, that is the thing our committee does through
GPRA, the Government Performance and Results Act, an Act passed
by this Congress where we had agencies define their mission and
what were they doing to carry out that versus what were they
doing extra to that. Those are the kinds of things our
committee would do. But I wouldn't expect to take CDC away from
the Commerce Committee, who has had it a long experience in
oversight on that.
Ms. Slaughter. We heard that before today on Agriculture,
that AFIS and other things have been retained in the
Agriculture Department, which I believe sort of flies in the
face of the idea of putting a humongous agency together in the
first place. Do you believe that creating the agency was a bad
move?
Mr. Davis. I will give you my view. I think, I wish that we
had permanent reorganization authority, which is a bill that we
are going to be taking up later this year. That allows the
executive branch to come in with how they think an agency ought
to be run, reorganize it, and send it to Congress with an up or
down vote without amendment. Presidents from 1932 to 1984 had
that authority. We didn't have it in this case. So instead of a
thoroughbred agency, since it has to go through Congress and
all the jurisdictional fights, we ended up with a camel.
And I think the way it is organized right now is going to
be a continuing work in progress for many years. But I don't
think the creation of a new committee helps that. I think we
are probably better off dealing with the jurisdictions that
have the expertise in these areas and letting the government
committee take the lead in some of the aspects of bringing
these areas together.
Ms. Slaughter. Mr. Waxman.
Mr. Waxman. Well, I voted against creating a new Department
of Homeland Security. I didn't see that it made a lot of sense
to take all these different functions, some of which had
nothing to do with national security, and put them in one
department, but not have intelligence in that. You have the FBI
separate, you have the CIA in a separate agency. But I lost. I
voted on the losing side of that fight. Now we have a
department.
Your question was an interesting one. Who would do the
authorization bill? There is not going to be an authorization
bill as such now that it is created. We don't have an
authorization bill for the Department of Health and Human
Services, we don't have an authorization for other cabinet
departments. But there are different issues that come up. So we
would, let us say, defer to the intelligence committee on some
of the intelligence issues affecting Homeland Security. Our
committee would defer to the Energy and Commerce Committee when
it comes to those issues that are before that committee.
But we have jurisdiction over, as Chairman Davis pointed
out, all these different governmental functions and structure
and civil service issues. And we would continue to look at that
as well as our general oversight jurisdiction which covers
everything and even duplicates at the present time the
oversight that the standing committees have.
So as I pointed out, we don't have oversight; the standing
committees have oversight. And now we are going to create
another committee that will have oversight jurisdiction.
Ms. Slaughter. Well, I think what we want to do is take
theirs away. Isn't it? From the other standing committees.
Mr. Waxman. I think that would be a serious mistake.
Ms. Slaughter. Well, I agree. We would probably be hand to
hand combat, I would think.
Mr. Davis. Well, on procurement and civil service issues,
that would be precedential in this House, to give one agency
exclusive jurisdiction over those areas for their agency, and I
think it would ruin the civil service.
Mr. Waxman. And we haven't done that for the military.
There is an Armed Service Committee that shares jurisdiction
with us on the civil service questions that affect the
military. We had a bill last year that we all went to combat
over and had disagreements. But it is important to have
different committees that develop different expertise. When you
have only one committee--I think that the point has been made
over and over again. When you have only one committee, that
committee tends to get to be quite comfortable with the
bureaucracy, and you don't get that kind of oversight that you
need when you have multiple committees looking at it from
different perspectives. At least that is my point of view. We
may have a disagreement. But I am here just to share with you
my views.
Ms. Slaughter. And it is what we want. And I agree with you
that--it never occurred to me at the beginning of this that the
intelligence agencies wouldn't be a part of it. It would seem
to me that they would be the backbone of it.
Mr. Waxman. You would have thought.
Ms. Slaughter. And I was really quite struck with the fact
that they did not care to join. And I do think that that
weakens the whole Department. Nonetheless, we have it, and we
do need to know what to do with it. Thank you both very much.
Mr. Diaz-Balart. Ms. Dunn.
Ms. Dunn. Thanks for being here. We are interested in
getting your perception on how this should move. Who would you
say, which committee would you say that should be the primary,
the committee of primary jurisdiction over Homeland Security?
Mr. Davis. I think, I mean, as in the Senate model, the
Senate Government Affairs Committee has the primary
jurisdiction. Now, when I say primary jurisdiction, we are
talking about agency reorganization issues, issues that occur
when you are taking 27 different agencies and 170,000 people,
putting them together, keeping them to their mission, something
that Chairman Cox mentioned earlier. That is what we do. Those
are the kinds of governance issues that we do.
When it comes to individual jurisdictional issues like the
Center for Disease Control, Immigration, some of those issues,
we would obviously defer to the committees on expertise.
Mr. Waxman. Could you tell me who has primary jurisdiction
over the Department of Health and Human Services under the
House rules? I know that the Ways and Means Committee has a lot
of say over the various aspects of that committee's
jurisdiction, as does the Energy and Commerce Committee, and
the Ag Committee. I don't know what would be--what benefit
there would be in saying any which one of those committees
should be the primary committee. They should be the--they
should have jurisdiction over those issues where they had
written into the rules as their overview on those policy issues
and as it affects the Department of Health and Human Services,
and that is how they interact.
So I am not convinced that we need a single primary
committee to be designated with primary jurisdiction.
Ms. Dunn. There are some people who have told our committee
in testimony, former speakers, for example, but also others
including the Chairman and the Ranking Member of the House
intel community, that this responsibility is of the primary
importance, like the top responsibility now of the United
States Congress. Do you believe that we can carry out this
responsibility adequately with the committee system that we
have now, and bring to it adequate focus to make sure that we
are taking on the responsibilities that our constituents expect
us to carry on their behalf, considering this is something that
is really quite new in our lexicon since 9/11?
Mr. Davis. Ms. Dunn, I would start in saying I think you
would do a better job under the older system than the existing
for this reason: You keep--the Intelligence Committee isn't
woven into the new Homeland, Security Committee. That is a
central function of the agency, to kind of correlate some of
those areas. They have all the different intelligence agencies,
but they have got to collate it and put it together.
On issues pertaining to bioterrorism, those kind of issues,
those are issues that you need to bring the CDC in some of
those areas.
Congress pays a lot of attention, they have held more
hearings this year on those issues than they ordinarily would
because of the bioterrorism effect and the homeland. It is good
to have a lot of people engaged in this, not a select group.
And I think there is a tendency when you assign a cabinet
department to a committee to get a certain coziness up there on
these issues that you don't get when you have a lot of other
committees that can participate in the process.
You are going to continue to have jurisdictional fights
even as this is envisioned, but we have precedent for a lot of
these fights at this point. This brings whole new areas of
precedents. One of the biggest controversies for this committee
right now is on its civil service aspects and its human capital
issues. Are you going to give it to that committee, or does it
stay with Government Reform who deals with this across
government? Those are the kind of issues that I think still
aren't addressed by setting up a new committee. And, in fact, I
think you set up some needless clashes. I mean, that is just my
reaction to it.
Mr. Waxman. I certainly agree with that point of view. And
I think we can do the job effectively with using the Senate
model, which is, as we pointed out, to use the existing
committees of jurisdiction, not to create a new one. If every
time we have a new problem in this country we create a new
committee and overlapping jurisdictions, it seems to me that
there is no end to it. And I think we ought to decide what is
the rational way to handle this thing without spending
taxpayers' money.
We have got to use that money--we have got to spend less
money here so we can give more tax breaks to billionaires. And,
therefore, I don't want us to waste that money on another
standing committee called Homeland Security if it is not going
to give us any more benefit in dealing with the oversight that
Congress should be exercising. Of course, I say that tongue in
cheek.
Mr. Davis. I wanted to clarify that. I am not for
protecting billionaires. Well, they all live in your district.
Mr. Waxman. I also don't want the deficits that we are
going to see with this attitude of let us just keep spending
and keep borrowing.
Ms. Dunn. You are staying right on message, Ranking Member.
I think the comment that is obvious on your comment that why
start a new committee for every problem that comes along. This
is a unique problem and it is a serious problem, and it could
very well be the most serious problem we have ever faced in the
history of our Nation, and I think it is very important to have
a strong response. And I would simply ask you, as a follow-up,
which committee would be the coordinating committee of all the
responsibilities? For example, as we try to establish inner
communication among agencies, the sort of thing that is
necessary that we felt we had a lack of under 9/11?
Mr. Davis. That is under the purview of Government Reform.
All government organizational issues come under the Government
Reform Committee. That is traditionally what has happened. So
on those kind of issues where you don't need specific expertise
but really the expertise in governance, those are the issues we
deal with every day because we have jurisdiction and oversight
over every agency of government in calling attention to those
kind of things.
You don't necessarily make the problem better by throwing a
committee at it. In some ways, you can make it worse. And that
is--I mean, I guess if I say anything to you, we need to think
very carefully about by adding another committee on here on top
of everything else, are you discouraging other committees from
having oversight, from taking an interest in this, taking an
outside perspective, by putting it within a committee? I think
this could work very well under the Senate model. And I usually
don't say that, but I think in this particular case it works.
Ms. Dunn. And I would say, Mr. Chairman, on the other hand
I think it works far better when you have a committee of
jurisdiction with focus on the problem being the committee in
charge working with committees of other jurisdictions in
combined efforts on authorization bills, for example. Thank
you.
Mr. Diaz-Balart. Thank you both very much.
I believe we have on behalf of the Committee on
Transportation and Infrastructure, Mr. Mica. Welcome. The
ranking member Mr. Oberstar will be coming?
Mr. Mica. I think he is on his way. But if you wanted, I
could proceed.
Mr. Diaz-Balart. Thank you for being here, and we welcome
and look forward to your testimony.
Mr. Mica. Well, thank you, Mr. Chairman and Ranking Member
Slaughter and members of the committee.
Mr. Diaz-Balart. Mr. Oberstar, please, welcome.
STATEMENT OF THE HONORABLE JOHN MICA, A REPRESENTATIVE IN
CONGRESS FROM THE STATE OF FLORIDA, AND MEMBER, COMMITTEE ON
TRANSPORTATION AND INFRASTRUCTURE
Mr. Mica. Mr. Oberstar and I are pleased to be here to
share our views about the future of the Homeland Security
Committee with you today.
Last year, I did not believe a Homeland Security Committee
was necessary for the House to use to specifically address
terrorism. Not much has happened since that time to change my
mind. Any time you combine 170,000 Federal employees and some
22 agencies, it raises my concern and eyebrows.
Some have argued that a separate committee focused solely
on Homeland Security is necessary to address terrorism. This
assumes that the standing committees are incapable or
uninterested in oversight and producing effective legislation.
It also presumes that a new committee with little subject
matter, expertise, or institutional knowledge can produce
better Homeland Security legislation. I am afraid this argument
is flawed, and the evidence points to exact opposite
conclusion.
The standing committees have the--first of all, the
standing committees do have the expertise to address terrorism.
We had been focused on the terrorist threat long before the
country woke up to terrorism on September 11th, and the
standing committees have drafted almost all of the Homeland
Security legislation. Several chairmen and ranking members have
testified the House needs the standing committee's expertise to
address terrorism. Their advice should not be taken lightly for
they know their issues better than anyone.
This isn't about turf, it is, in fact, about which
committees and what organization can best prepare our country
for terrorism.
Members can't be experts on everything. We all know that.
And that is why we have in Congress committees. And that type
of expertise takes years and years and decades to develop. The
Senate recognizes this fact, and it has not changed its
existing committee structure.
To use aviation as an example, I can safely say that nobody
in the House knows more about aviation or aviation security
than our subcommittee and its members. Just between the members
that we have on the committee now, I will bet we have close to
50 years experience with aviation issues, not to mention the
expertise of a staff that has dealt with these issues and
actually drafting most of the legislation that deals with
terrorist threat in aviation and transportation.
It should be no surprise that a thorough understanding of
the aviation system is required to produce effective aviation
security legislation. The aviation system is based on a careful
balance of highly complex regulations, procedures,
infrastructure, engineering. And this system in fact has
produced the world's safest aviation industry. Preserving that
balance is impossible without the expertise that comes from
working on these issues for years.
And I tell you, I have been on that subcommittee for 12
years, I have had the honor to serve for 4 years as the Chair.
I served under Mr. Oberstar when he chaired that subcommittee.
And we may or not always agree, Mr. Oberstar and myself, but I
am telling you that we know these subjects unlike anyone else
in the House, and you lose that expertise if you move this
jurisdiction away.
The problem has never been a lack of focus or interest by
the standing committees. Rather, the missing ingredient was a
national consensus that terrorism should be a top priority.
Congress as a whole reflected the national will and has been
unable to make the tough choices terrorism required. And that,
we know, is a part of our history, unfortunately, today.
9/11 changed that, and within days or a few weeks the
standing committees had legislation ready. Back in 1990, we
mandated background checks for aviation personnel, began
deploying bomb detection devices at our airport; we built FEMA,
which helped New York and Washington respond to 9/11 and much
of the rest of the country. We created TSA, fortified cockpit
doors, armed pilots, put marshals back in the sky, developed a
whole host of comprehensive approaches not only to aviation,
but also to transportation security.
We stabilized the aviation industry, passed the Maritime
Security Act, and created port security grants.
In a few days, we will introduce legislation that will
protect airliners from another threat, and that is one of
shoulder-launched fired missiles.
The standing committees have always led the way on
terrorism and will continue to do so. Legislative jurisdiction
should not under any circumstances be wholly transferred from
the standing committees to a permanent Homeland Security
Committee. This would severely limit the House's ability to
produce effective terrorism legislation.
In closing, there is no substitute for expertise,
institutional knowledge, and experience. You need all of that
to get results. And the standing committees and their staffs
with years and years of expertise again looking at systems
rather than--and the whole problem that we face and challenges
that we face rather than little parts of it is the type of and
depth of knowledge and experience that we should have.
I would like to turn now to Mr. Oberstar, and I am sure he
has comments.
PREPARED STATEMENT OF THE HONORABLE DON YOUNG, A REPRESENTATIVE IN
CONGRESS, FROM THE STATE OF ALASKA, AND CHAIRMAN, COMMITTE ON
TRANSPORTATION AND INFRASTRUCTURE
Mr. Chairman and Members of the Committee, thank you for the
opportunity to share my views about the future of the Select Homeland
Security Committee with you.
Some have argued that a separate standing committee, focused solely
on homeland security, is necessary for the House to perform its
oversight role on the new Department of Homeland Security. This assumes
that the standing committees aren't up to this important task; that
somehow the standing committees are either incapable or uninterested in
oversight and producing effective homeland security legislation.Sec. t
also presumes that a new committee, with little subject matter
expertise or institutional knowledge can produce better legislation
than the standing committees.
This argument is flawed, and the evidence points to the exact
opposite conclusion. An fact, only the standing committees have the
expertise and institutional knowledge necessary to address terrorism.
Other than the Homeland Security Act and its technical corrections
bill, the standing committees have drafted every single piece of
homeland security legislation. And we were focused on the terrorist
threat long before the country woke up to terrorism on 9/11.
The standing committees have always led the way on terrorism, and
they still do. The Senate recognizes this fact, and has not changed its
existing committee structure.
As most of you know, I did not believe a Homeland Security
Committee was necessary for the House to address the terrorist threat
last year, and not much has happened since then to change my mind.
Homeland security is an important issue and terrorism is a serious
threat, but the standing committees are best prepared to address these
threats. The standing committees have the Member expertise,
institutional knowledge, and a proven track record of homeland security
legislation.
Member expertise and institutional knowledge are absolutely
essential to producing effective legislation. Members can't be experts
on everything. That's why we have committees. And that type of
expertise takes years and even decades to develop.
The homeland security role of the agencies that make up the
department is not a separate and distinct function from their
traditional missions; rather, it can only be effectively accomplished
within the context of those missions.
It should be no surprise that a thorough understanding of the
aviation system is required to produce effective aviation security
legislation, or that one needs to understand the pharmaceutical
industry and our health care system to draft an effective bioterrorism
bill. Only members with a thorough understanding of these traditional
missions will be able to craft effective legislation that addresses the
homeland security aspect of these agencies.
To use aviation as an example, I can safely say that nobody in the
House knows more about aviation. . .. or aviation security, than
Subcommittee Chairman Mica and Ranking Member Oberstar. Collectively
those two Members have close to fifty years experience with aviation.
The U.S. aviation system is based on a careful balance of highly
complex rules, regulations, procedures, infrastructure, and
engineering. This system has produced the world's safest aviation
industry. Preserving that balance is impossible without the expertise
that comes from having dealt with these issues for many years, as the
members of the Transportation Committee have.
Aviation safety and security are closely linked, especially in such
areas as air traffic control, aircraft maintenance, missile threats,
passenger control, and aircraft operating procedures. Even minor policy
changes can have wide-ranging negative impacts on other aspects of
aviation.
The point I'm making with aviation is true in other areas as well.
The agencies' traditional and homeland security missions are
intertwined, and you need to understand one to effectively address the
other.
While you may be able to draw a distinction between these missions
in the House Rules, it doesn't exist on a Coast Guard cutter patrolling
our coasts or on the street with first responders. In the real world,
those missions are linked, and our policy in Washington should reflect
that reality.
In addition to having the expertise to address terrorism, the
standing committees have focused on this threat for years.
At this point, I would like to read part of a statement that was
given by a colleague of mine on the House floor. The issue at hand was
preparing our first responders for a terrorist attack.
``The pictures of that awful day are a sobering reminder of the new
threats of evil that Americans face, but they also remind us of how
grossly unprepared our Nation was and still is to respond to such a
disaster.
``This bill will not prevent a terrorist attack. However, it will
help us prepare for the inevitable and ensure that our emergency
personnel have the right training and equipment to save lives.''
Chairwoman Tillie Fowler of our Emergency Management Subcommittee
made those remarks on July 25th, 2000. The House passed the
Preparedness Against Terrorism Act that day, by unanimous voice vote,
but it never made it out of the Senate.
The standing committees have a long history of focusing on
terrorism and crafting legislation to address it. The problem has never
been a lack of focus or interest by the standing committees; rather,
the missing ingredient was a national consensus that terrorism should
be a top priority. And Congress, as a whole, reflected the national
will and was unable to commit sufficient resources or make the tough
policy choices terrorism required.
9/11 changed that, and within days or a few weeks the standing
committees had legislation ready. This was possible because the
standing committees had worked on these issues for years. They knew
what the major problems were and how to solve them.
The Transportation Committee has a long and proven record of
protecting the nation from terrorism. For your review, I have included
a list of bills produced by our committee with my testimony. They range
from the Aviation Security Act of 1989 to the Coast Guard and Maritime
Transportation Authorization Act of 2004.
Similarly, the other standing committees have produced a long list
of bills protecting the country from terrorism.
In short, the standing committees have the expertise and
institutional knowledge, they're focused on the threat, and they have
moved virtually all of the homeland security legislation.
If the Rules Committee, the Leadership, and the House ultimately
decide to have a permanent Homeland Security Committee, then so be it.
It won't be the first time they've ignored my advice, but please don't
ignore the expertise of the standing committees. The House and the
nation need them to meet the challenge of terrorism.
If the House must have a permanent committee, then a select
committee with oversight jurisdiction could focus the House's oversight
over the Department without diminishing its ability to produce
effective legislation.
If the House creates a permanent committee with legislative
jurisdiction, then it must preserve the standing committees'
jurisdiction to ensure their expertise is utilized in drafting homeland
security legislation.
While not ideal, shared jurisdiction is quite common and manageable
in the House. The Parliamentarian has already testified that the
Speaker has all the authority he needs to manage overlapping
jurisdiction. In this case, the negative procedural aspects of shared
jurisdiction are far outweighed by the substantive requirement to
produce effective legislation.
Likewise, the perceived burden of having DHS report to multiple
committees is far outweighed by the need for congressional expertise
and effective legislation. Most departments report to multiple
committees without impact on their ability to fulfill their missions.
Exclusive legislative jurisdiction should not be transferred from
the standing committees to a permanent homeland security committee.
This could severely limit the House's ability to effectively address
terrorism through legislation.
In closing, let me say that addressing terrorism is first and
foremost a question of substance, not process. We must have the right
Members and committees working on the problem, and then make sure the
process enables them to get the job done.
There is no substitute for expertise, institutional knowledge, and
experience. You need them to get results, and the standing committees
are the only place where that depth of knowledge and experience exists.
The stakes are too high to cast them aside.
Thank you.
The following is a list of major terrorism legislation produced by
the Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure:
The Aviation Security Act of 1989
The Aviation Security Act of 1990
The Railroad and Transit Sabotage Prevention Act of 1995
The Federal Protective Service Reform Act of 1999
The Preparedness Against Terrorism Act of 2000
The Airport Security Improvement Act of 2000
The Air Transportation Safety and System Stabilization Act of 2001
The Aviation and Transportation Security Act of 2001
The Arming Pilots Against Terrorism Act of 2002
The Extended Unemployment Assistance Act of 2002
The Federal Property Protection Act of 2002
Title 14 of the Homeland Security Act of 2002
The Maritime Transportation Security Act of 2002
The Dam Safety and Security Act of 2002
The Wastewater Treatment Works Security Act of 2003
Over-the-Road Bus Security and Safety Act of 2003
Title 6 of the Century of Aviation Reauthorization Act of 2003
The Coast Guard and Maritime Transportation Authorization Act of
2004
Mr. Diaz-Balart. Mr. Oberstar.
STATEMENT OF THE HONORABLE JAMES OBERSTAR, A REPRESENTATIVE IN
CONGRESS FROM THE STATE OF MINNESOTA, AND RANKING MEMBER,
COMMITTEE ON TRANSPORTATION AND INFRASTRUCUTE
Mr. Oberstar. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And I thank the
Chair of the Aviation Subcommittee, Mr. Mica, for a splendid
presentation. Chairman Young and I have concurred in the views
just expressed and the views that I will express.
As Chairman Mica said, I spent a great deal of time on
aviation issues, and in my role as chair of the Investigations
and Oversight Subcommittee held first hearings in the House in
closed session, I would say, on aviation security in 1987 and
1988, and in the aftermath of Pan Am 103, at the request of the
Bush administration, introduced legislation, created a
commission, a Presidential Commission on Aviation Security and
Terrorism, on which I served and the ranking member of the full
committee at the time, Congressman John Paul Hammersmith of
Arkansas and Senators D'Amato and Lautenberg, as well as three
public members appointed by the President.
We followed the route of Pan Am 103, we talked to all the
international security experts in the European Community and in
the UK, and all the way through Scotland Yard to a constable at
Lockerbie, and crafted legislation--also from our own national
security interests. We crafted legislation that is the basic
bill on aviation security that formed this Nation's view of
matters, until the major transformation and the aftermath of
September 11th.
Regrettably, not all of the recommendations of the
Commission were fully enforced and carried through by the
various agencies of the Department of Transportation.
The point is, it began with our committee, Aviation
Security. And when September 11th struck, as Chairman Mica
said, we took this whole issue to a much higher level where
most of us members of the Pan Am 103 Commission wanted to go
but couldn't because of various institutional resistance.
The point is, you bring to bear the experience, the
history, the knowledge, the understanding of multiplicity of
security issues to bear on the issue before you as a member of
the standing committee.
In the aftermath of the aviation security bill, we worked
together on our committee to craft the maritime security, which
was called the port security bill. And we took many of the
experiences from aviation and applied them to ports. Again,
what was missing from the port security bill was a mechanism
for funding the port security initiatives that were necessary,
unlike aviation where we do have an aviation security fee that
provides a steady stream of funding. Again, had our committee's
experience and recommendations been followed, there would have
been a port security fee applied and a revenue stream for ports
to carry through.
So, now your select committee is in the process of deciding
where to go in the future; and with Chairman Mica, I urge you
to consider this wealth of expertise and continuity of service
and understanding of substantive issues in security and the
interrelationship between safety matters and security. We drew
considerably on aviation safety in crafting aviation security,
layering redundancy, backup systems in order to develop a sound
safety and security system.
Our committee also has jurisdiction over the Coast Guard.
The Coast Guard has been absorbed into the Department of
Homeland Security despite the objections of Chairman Young and
myself. We met with the President, appealed to him to keep the
Coast Guard out of the Department of Homeland Security. Why?
Because Coast Guard has responsibilities not directly related
to security: Commercial safety inspections, licensing of
mariners, registering vessels, maintaining buoys, navigation
aids, recreation boating recalls, and search and rescue
functions. We pointed out, who is going to delineate for the
Coast Guard when a search and rescue mission morphs into or
becomes diverted to a security mission? That is a matter that
our committee needs to understand, needs to deal with, because
we under the interrelationships. We have the staff, we have the
institutional memory, we have the understanding to deal with
those.
FEMA is another one. FEMA deals with disasters of all
kinds, both natural disasters and manmade such as September
11th. We felt that FEMA should be kept separate, but if not, at
least our committee's jurisdiction should prevail both with
Coast Guard and with FEMA. We believe that we understand the
interrelationship of various functions of the agencies of which
we have jurisdiction and how best to coordinate security and
safety and other mainline missions of the various agencies that
have been subsumed into Homeland Security.
Some security measures in aviation will have an adverse
impact on travel times. Secretary Mineta has said he wants
world class security with world class service. How to get
there? I think our committee understands how to do that. We
have contributed a great deal of time to the deliberation on
these issues. And while we might start out with differing
viewpoints, we generally come to a consensus position on the
underlying legislation and then work to ensure that it is well
carried out.
So I urge this committee to keep in mind this body of
expertise, that not only ours but other authorizing committees,
standing committees have in matters such as the one you are
considering and, more importantly, the interrelationship with
other functions of these departments and agencies that are not
security but may have relationship to security, and let us
continue to attend to the needs and craft the legislation and
shape the future missions of these agencies in a way that will
be supportive of security but also respectful of the historic
functions of say, Coast Guard, aviation, FEMA, and our maritime
system. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Diaz-Balart. Thank you both.
Mr. Oberstar. And Ranking Member Slaughter.
PREPARED STATEMENT OF THE HONORABLE JAMES L. OBERSTAR
Mr. Chairman, Ranking Member Slaughter, and Members of the
Committee, I'm pleased to have this opportunity to discuss with you how
we should organize our Committee structure to deal with the new
Department of Homeland Security (the Department).
During my 29 years in Congress I have given high priority to
security, particularly the security of our transportation system.
In 1988, after the terrorist attack on Pam Am Flight 103, I
authored legislation creating the President's Commission on Aviation
Security and Terrorism. I was privileged to serve as a Member of that
Commission. When the Commission completed its work, I introduced
legislation embodying its recommendations, and these recommendations
were the basis for the landmark Aviation Security Improvement Act of
1990.
Following the tragic events of Sept. 11, 2001, I was actively
involved in developing the Aviation & Transportation Security Act of
2001, which transferred security responsibilities from the airlines and
private contractors to the Federal Government. I was actively involved
in developing the Maritime Transportation Security Act of 2002, which
established a new security system for vessels and facilities along the
navigatable waters of the United States.
Today's hearing focuses on the future role of the Select Committee
on Homeland Security. Your Committee provided badly needed oversight as
the new Department of Homeland Security began the difficult task of
moving and integrating scores of government departments, with more than
180,000 employees. The Select Committee did a commendable job of
overseeing the process of organizing the new Department, but the
decisions on policy should remain--as it currently does--with the
Committees that have the history and expertise in these areas.
Recently, there have been proposals to expand the jurisdiction of
the Select Committee, to give it primary jurisdiction over all
legislation affecting the Homeland Security Department and all of the
agencies incorporated in the Department. I strongly oppose this change
because I believe it would undermine our effectiveness in overseeing
the Departments and its agencies.
A first difficulty is that the agencies making up the Department
have many responsibilities that are not related to security. I will
focus on agencies within the Transportation and Infrastructure
Committee's jurisdiction; I expect that the other Committees with
jurisdiction over Homeland Security issues will do the same for their
agencies.
The Transportation and Infrastructure Committee (T&I Committee) has
legislative responsibility over several agencies with both security and
non-security functions that have been transferred to the Department of
Homeland Security. For example, the Coast Guard has numerous
responsibilities that are not directly related to security. The Coast
Guard conducts commercial safety inspections; it licenses mariners; it
has a system for registering vessels; it establishes and maintains
buoys and other navigation aids, and it has responsibility for
recreation boating recalls. The issues involving these responsibilities
are complex, having evolved over many years. The T&I Committee has the
Member expertise, the staff and the institutional memory to deal with
these issues. I believe that the quality of Congressional oversight and
legislation on these issues would be diminished if a new Committee was
simply given responsibilities for all these issues. It could take years
for the new Committee to develop the institutional background and
expertise that currently resides in our Committee.
The T&I Committee also has legislative responsibility over the
Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA), which was transferred to
the Department of Homeland Security and split in two. FEMA has the
responsibility to prepare for and respond to disasters of all kinds--
both natural, such as hurricanes and floods, and manmade. Since FEMA's
creation in 1979, the Transportation Committee has prepared and
reported numerous pieces of legislation designed to further FEMA's all-
hazards mission. I am concerned that this history and experience would
be lost if oversight of FEMA is permanently transferred to the Select
Committee, and that, in a Committee focused on terrorism and security
issues, FEMA's traditional, and critically important, mission of
preparing for and responding to natural disasters may not receive the
attention and oversight that they deserve.
Our Committee is also the best equipped to deal with security
issues affecting transportation. As I have already mentioned, our
Committee developed the landmark Aviation Security Improvement Act of
1990 (P.L. 101-604), which mandated background checks for airline and
airport employees and the deployment of bomb detection equipment for
baggage at our nation's airports. During the 1990's, our Committee
continued to respond to the changing security needs through oversight
and legislation. In the aftermath of the September 11, 2001, the T&I
Committee drafted and marked-up the Aviation and Transportation
Security Act of 2001 (ATSA). ATSA established a new Transportation
Security Administration (TSA), Federalized the screening workforce, and
required the screening of all checked baggage to protect against
terrorist threats.
While TSA was transferred to the newly created Department of
Homeland Security, our Committee retained its jurisdiction over TSA's
transportation security activities. Since September 11th, our Aviation
Subcommittee has held 16 hearings focusing on all aspects of security,
including the deployment and use of security technology, general
aviation, checked baggage screening systems, the computer assisted
passenger pre-screening system, flight deck officer program, defense
systems against missiles, and the financial impact of security on the
aviation industry. Clearly our Committee has the expertise and the
commitment to deal with aviation and other transportation related
security. It would take a new Committee years to develop the background
and expertise necessary to effectively deal with these issues.
Moreover, it is important to have a single Committee balance the
needs of security with those of safety, and the efficiency of our
transportation system. The safety and efficiency of our transportation
system are the responsibility of the Department of Transportation and
the Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure oversees these
programs.
To illustrate these interrelationships, some aviation security
decisions have safety implications, and there is a need to balance
possible security benefits against possible safety risks. For example,
there may be safety risks if pilots are armed and fire shots which
damage the aircraft. Similarly, if equipment is added to the body of
aircraft to counteract missiles fired from the ground there may be an
effect on aerodynamics and safety.
There is also a need to balance security needs with the continued
viability of our transportation system. Some security measures will add
greatly to the time required for passengers to travel, or limit the
ability of our transportation system to provide for the efficient
movement of cargo. These needs must be balanced with security benefits
and weighed against the costs of benefits and alternative measures.
Aviation is an $800 billion sector of the U.S. national economy and the
cornerstone upon which all other sectors rely to make economic
progress. The opportunity, both in the U.S. and abroad, to travel for
business has fostered a tremendous growth in electronics and aircraft
manufacturing, communications, and tourism, which supports a $1.6
billion sector worldwide.
Much of our economy depends on a ``just in time'' delivery system
using all modes of transportation. If security measures undermine the
effectiveness of this system, factory lines may shut down and retail
stores may find it difficult to obtain the goods that Americans need in
their daily lives. The Transportation and Infrastructure Committee has
a long history of dealing with the tradeoffs between safety, security
and economics. Again, I am concerned that a new Committee would lack
the background and expertise to most effectively deal with these
issues, and that we could lose the expertise that has developed over
the years, or in may case, the nearly three decades of working with
these issues. It is not enough to say that Members with particular
areas of expertise will have an opportunity to be heard on these
issues. The most effective way to influence policy is to be part of the
debate and discussion in the early stages of policy formation; simply
voting yes or no when legislation makes it to the House floor is
generally not sufficient participation to craft policy.
Supporters of consolidating all jurisdiction over the Department in
one congressional committee argue that it is inefficient and
distracting for the Department to have to deal with several committees.
These arguments ignore the fact that the system of Committees we have
established in the House is not based on an exclusive one to one
relationship between each Committee and a cabinet agency; rather our
Committee system is based on subject matter such as, science, small
business, government reform, international relations, or
infrastructure. These issues are spread over a number of different
cabinet agencies.
In short, we have developed a system in which each cabinet agency
is within the jurisdiction of several congressional committees. I have
attached a chart to my testimony that lists which House Committees
oversee the different cabinet agencies. It indicates that most
departments are responsible for reporting to at least 10 congressional
committees. A number of departments have different committees
overseeing major portions of their responsibilities. Keeping the status
quo for the Department of Homeland Security would not place the
Department in a different position than other cabinet agencies.
In conclusion, Mr. Chairman, Ms. Slaughter and Members of the
Subcommittee, I strongly believe that congressional role in security
will be most effective if we continue the Committee jurisdiction which
is now in place.
AGENCY:
HOUSE COMMITTEES HAVING JURISDICTION:
DEPARTMENT OF AGRICULTURE
- Agriculture Committee
- Resources Committee
- Government Reform Committee
- Financial Services Committee
- International Relations Committee
- Small Business Committee
- Select Com. On Homeland Security
- Budget Committee
- Appropriations Committee
DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE
- Energy & Commerce Committee
- Financial Services Committee
- Ways & Means Committee
- Science Committee
- Resources Committee
- International Relations Committee
- Government Reform Committee
- Judiciary Committee
- Transportation & Infrastructure Com.
- Budget Committee
- Appropriations Committee
DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
- Armed Services Committee
- Veterans Affairs Committee
- Judiciary Committee
- Education & the Workforce Committee
- Financial Services Committee
- Government Reform Committee
- Intelligence Committee
- International Relations Committee
- Transportation & Infrastructure Com.
- Budget Committee
- Appropriations Committee
DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION
- Education & the Workforce Committee
- Financial Services Committee
- Ways & Means Committee
- Government Reform Committee
- Agriculture Committee
- Resources Committee
- Science Committee
- House Administration Committee
- Budget Committee
- Appropriations Committee
DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY
- Energy & Commerce Committee
- Science Committee
- Resources Committee
- Government Reform Committee
- Small Business Committee
- Ways & Means Committee
- Financial Services Committee
- International Relations Committee
- Transportation & Infrastructure Com.
- Budget Committee
- Appropriations Committee
DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVICES
- Energy & Commerce Committee
- Ways & Means Committee
- Government Reform Committee
- Financial Services Committee
- Energy & Commerce Committee
- Science Committee
- Resources Committee
- Judiciary Committee
- Select Com. on Homeland Security
- Budget Committee
- Appropriations Committee
DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY
- Select Com. On Homeland Security
- Judiciary Committee
- Transportation & Infrastructure Com.
- Energy & Commerce Committee
- Armed Services Committee
- International Relations Committee
- Science Committee
- Financial Services Committee
- Government Reform Committee
- Education & the Workforce Committee
- Intelligence Committee
- Budget Committee
- Appropriations Committee
DEPARTMENT OF HOUSE AND URBAN DEVELOPMENT
- Financial Services Committee
- Small Business Committee
- Government Reform Committee
- Transportation & Infrastructure Com.
- Agriculture Committee
- Judiciary Committee
- Budget Committee
- Appropriations Committee
DEPARTMENT OF INTERIOR
- Resources Committee
- Science Committee
- Agriculture Committee
- Energy & Commerce Committee
- Resources Committee
- Transportation & Infrastructure Com.
- Government Reform Committee
- Justice Committee
- Budget Committee
- Appropriations Committee
DEPARTMENT OF LABOR
- Education & the Workforce Committee
- Ways & Means Committee
- Small Business Committee
- Financial Services Committee
- International Relations Committee
- Veterans Committee
- Judiciary Committee
- Government Reform Committee
- Resources Committee
- Transportation & Infrastructure Com.
- Budget Committee
-
Appropriations Committee
DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
- Judiciary Committee
- Select Com. On Homeland Security
- Energy & Commerce Committee
- Financial Services Committee
- Small Business Committee
- Ways & Means Committee
- Education & the Workforce Committee
- Resources Committee
- Government Reform Committee
- Science Committee
- Transportation & Infrastructure Com.
- Agriculture Committee
- Intelligence Committee
- International Relations Committee
- Budget Committee
- Appropriations Committee
DEPARTMENT OF STATE
- International Relations
- Financial Services Committee
- Intelligence Committee
- Armed Services Committee
- Resources Committee
- Science Committee
- Judiciary Committee
- Transportation & Infrastructure Com.
- Energy & Commerce Committee
- Small Business Committee
- Ways & Means Committee
- Government Reform Committee
- Select Com. on Homeland Security
- Budget Committee
- Appropriations Committee
DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION
- Transportation & Infrastructure Com.
- Select Com. on Homeland Security
- Science Committee
- Small Business Committee
- Government Reform Committee
- International Relations Committee
- Education & Labor Committee
- Ways & Means Committee
- Judiciary Committee
- Resources Committee
- Armed Services Committee
- Budget Committee
- Appropriations Committee
DEPARTMENT OF TREASURY
- Financial Services Committee
- Ways & Means Committee
- Government Reform Committee
- Agriculture Committee
- Education & the Workforce Committee
- Intelligence Committee
- Small Business Committee
- Transportation & Infrastructure Com.
- Veteran's Affairs Committee
- International Relations Committee
- Judiciary Committee
- Select Com. on Homeland Security
- Budget Committee
- Appropriations Committee
DEPARTMENT OF VETERAN's ADMINISTRATION
- Veteran's Affairs Committee
- Armed Services Committee
- Financial Services Committee
- Government Reform Committee
- Budget Committee
- Appropriations Committee
* Resources used: Congressional Quarterly's Washington Information
Directory, Agencies' Congressional Testimony and phone calls to
Agencies' Congressional Affairs offices.
Mr. Diaz-Balart. Mr. Mica, you made emphasis on aviation,
of which you both have tremendous expertise in that area. The
attacks of September 11th, 2001 revealed, among other things, a
lack of integration between Federal agencies involved with
aviation security and those involved with border and
immigration issues. Could you educate us on what your committee
has done to address the integration of aviation security with
other relevant Homeland Security missions?
Mr. Mica. Well, that is a good example, Mr. Chairman.
The Homeland Security agency that--our department we
created really doesn't do much to protect us. In fact, I think
it has bogged the process down for the most part. It is at best
an ineffective cumbersome additional layer of bureaucracy.
Let me give you a good example. What say do you have over
the State Department? None. Who issued the visas for the
terrorists? The State Department. Who got the information--who
should have had the information about bad guys and gotten it to
the State Department employees who were issuing the visas? That
would be the CIA. You don't have any say over the CIA, the
State Department; you dragged in Secret Service, but you don't
have the FBI included.
What is the purpose of this Homeland Security committee?
Shouldn't--and the Department? Shouldn't it be, first of all,
prevention? And then, secondly, it should be coordination of
all of the Homeland Security things that protect us. And I
submit it doesn't do it.
Just in the aviation area, it has created another layer of
bureaucracy. I haven't been able to get a damned answer out of
anybody in Homeland Security since they took over. In fact, now
you have this game of Under Secretary or assistants to Tom
Ridge, and then you have Ridge up here. Try to get something
done with TSA, and it is almost impossible to get anyone to
move because of the new layers of bureaucracy that we go
through.
So I am telling you that rather than improve the situation,
I think it has complicated the situation and we are less safe
as a result of the new bureaucracy and impediments that have
been in place.
If the committee is looking for something to do, look at
coordinating some of these government activities.
Mr. Oberstar. Let me supplement, if I may, the Chairman's
response in two points. In the report of the Presidential
Commission on Aviation Security and Terrorism, the Pan Am 103
Commission, we recommended the establishment within the
Executive Branch of a central entity whose job would be to
coordinate intelligence gathered at home and abroad, and to
disseminate that intelligence on aviation security matters to
all relevant agencies. We also proposed the establishment
within the Department of Transportation of an Assistant
Secretariat for Aviation Security. That latter was objected to
by the administration, so Mr. Hammersmith and I agreed on an
advisor to the Secretary, an assistant to the Secretary For
Aviation Security.
Second, and we were way ahead. Had that recommendation been
implemented, there would have been coordination of information
from all of the relevant security and intelligence agencies in
advance of September 11th, and the ability to evaluate and
disseminate information properly.
Secondly, in the transportation security bill that we wrote
in our committee, we required at the--because that was our
jurisdiction, Department of Transportation, coordination among
all the modes of transportation for security purposes. It would
be up to the--we anticipated it would be up to the, if there
were a Department of Security, to coordinate with the
intelligence agencies. But we foresaw that need, and we crafted
the language to require coordination within the Department of
all the modes on all aspects of transportation security so that
there would be cross-fertilizing, if you will, one another.
Mr. Mica. Might I just add something here. We crafted in
the original TSA bill, we worked on this together, exactly what
Mr. Oberstar said. We saw that you needed a coordination of
information about bad guys and intelligence. That is one thing
that was lacking. That was in the TSA bill. When you created
the Homeland Security bill, it was transferred over there. So
what we started was transferred over there. They have since
created, I guess, an agency to do something on that. We had
them in last week. They still don't have a watchlist, they
still do not have a coordinated list that we asked for when we
created the original TSA entity. And who is in charge of that?
Are you in charge? Is Homeland Security in charge of that?
You see, what we have created hasn't gotten us to where we
should have been a year ago. It actually delayed the process,
and now it is sort que pasa as far as who is responsible.
Mr. Diaz-Balart. Mrs. Slaughter.
Ms. Slaughter. I just have one question I would like to ask
of both of you. If the legislative authority for DHS is given
to a committee, standing committee, how would you deal with the
authorization of, let us say, Coast Guard and FEMA which has
both the DHS responsibilities as well as domestic
responsibilities of other types?
Mr. Mica. Again, I think you need to go back and look at
the core of how we created Homeland Security. It should be for
prevention, it should be for coordination. Coordination across
the board. And then for oversight. I think those are the
important missions. Leave the standing jurisdiction with the
committees and their expertise, and your folks are--your folk's
mission or the folks on this committee, if we have a committee,
a select committee or whatever it is, standing committee, is a
coordinating effort to see that things are moving forward, or
at least some better oversight of what has been created and
pushed into Homeland Security.
Mr. Oberstar. I would supplement that comment and in
support of it by saying that not all cabinet departments have a
single authorizing committee over all the jurisdiction within
that department. For example, within DOT in the National
Highway Traffic Safety Administration where we do the roadway
rules for road physical safety matters, the Energy and Commerce
Committee has jurisdiction over the vehicle that goes on that
roadway. And not all cabinet agencies have a single
authorization bill for the entire department. We do a separate
authorization within our Committee for FAA, a separate one for
the Federal Motor Carrier Safety Administration, we are doing a
separate authorization for the Federal Highway and Transit
Administration. We do a separate authorization bill for
pipeline safety and so on. I need not cite all of them.
So in some cases there, as in the case of highway safety on
vehicle side, we share that with the Energy and Commerce
Committee with whom we work, we share some aspects of pipeline
safety with the Energy and Commerce Committee with whom we work
those matters out. So I think leaving the authorization process
in the hands of the standing committees has worked very well.
It also provides multiplicity of oversight.
Ms. Slaughter. Thank you both.
Mr. Diaz-Balart. Chairman Cox.
Mr. Cox. Thank you.
I want to congratulate both of you for giving very cogent
testimony, and thank you for being here and for the work that
went into preparing the testimony for the rules subcommittee.
As you know, the Chairman of the subcommittee has done a lot of
work over a period of a year and a half really examining this
question from a big picture standpoint. And the contribution
that you have made today I think is very, very helpful. And I
agree with much of it.
In particular, Chairman Mica, I agree with your dichotomy
between the functional responsibility of the standing
committees that have long existed in the House to deal with all
the pre-9/11 real world, and the industries that are allocated
committee by committee within their respective jurisdictions.
We will hear from the chairman of the Ways and Means Committee
shortly that he supports the creation of a permanent committee,
provided that the jurisdiction of Ways and Means with respect
to Customs, specifically the Customs missions as they relate to
trade and revenue is preserved. And that makes sense if you
have got a focus on Homeland Security, because Homeland
Security is not about trade, except with a really expansive and
I think dangerous definition.
It is not about revenue. And that is what Ways and Means is
all about. We may have a more difficult nut to crack with
aviation simply because the mode of attack on 9/11 was
airplanes, and as a result Congress rather rapidly passed what
we thought was remedial legislation. But it may not provide the
model for what we want to do everywhere. I mean, we may have
learned some things about our response that we wish we could
improve upon. And I would hope that it would be the
responsibility, the continuing responsibility of the
Transportation Infrastructure Committee to be responsible for
those things.
Specifically, I would hope that even though we deregulated
aviation in 1978, as you know, it is heavily regulated, and I
would hope it would be the continuing responsibility of the
Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure to be
responsible for regulation of that industry. I would hope that
it would be the continuing responsibility of the Committee on
Energy and Commerce to look after regulation of the nuclear
industry and the chemical industry, and so on, all the way
through the Congress, because that expertise has been developed
over a long period of time and because it involves so much more
than Homeland Security.
So your formula is one that at least insofar as I
understand your presentation of it agrees with mine, and that
is, that you have got a Department of Homeland Security that is
focused on prevention, protection, and response, and is not
going to become the regulator of every aspect of American life;
it is not going to become the regulator of every aspect of
American commerce. But, as I have said, before other panels
have testified today, I think there is a risk the Department
could morph into those things.
And that is one of the reasons that we want very, very
strenuous oversight from the Congress that created it so
recently, because if the Department, which surely is going to
exist indefinitely, if the new cabinet department history
suggests they don't go away, is going to grow. And if it is
going to grow and last indefinitely, then it needs to stay
focused, and it needs to stay focused on protecting Americans
and our security and not get into all these other areas. And we
will lose our competitiveness in all these industries if we
regulate them not with a view to the big picture, which
includes competition of global commerce, job creation,
investment, in the case of transportation safety and all these
other things.
If we have on the blinders of security and that is all, and
then we become--we, the Department of Homeland Security in this
case, become the regulators of all these industries, then the
regulation will suffer, the industries will suffer, the country
will suffer, and it won't work. So I think that dichotomy makes
a great deal of sense. And it is just as important that we
circumscribe the mission of the Department of Homeland Security
as it is that we respect the traditional jurisdictions of the
committees. And I think they go hand in hand.
But I would appreciate any further comment you want to make
on that. I am just trying to, I guess, express my gratitude for
and agreement with much of what you said.
Mr. Oberstar. If the Chairman permit. Chairman Young was
particularly insistent on addressing vigorously the Coast Guard
matter, and it falls in line with what you have said, Chairman
Cox. I would call your attention to the authorizing language
for the U.S. Coast Guard. It is what I call an itinerant
agency. It started out as the revenue cutter service in 1789,
the oldest agency of the Federal Government. But the
authorizing language says or refers to the agent in conferring
power: The Secretary of the Department in which the Coast Guard
resides. Every other authorization refers to the Secretary.
FAA, we mean by that, the Secretary of Transportation. But
the Coast Guard has moved around so many times. But when it has
moved from an independent entity to the Naval Department, and
then to the War Department and then to the Commerce Department,
and to the Treasury Department, and then back to Commerce and
then to the Department of Transportation, it has moved intact.
Jurisdiction over its functions was not shared among committees
of either the House or the Senate. And that is what Chairman
Young wants to see, is this jurisdiction remains intact and as
you suggested. So we can address all these other
responsibilities of the Coast Guard in the context of security
and weave security into the total role of the Coast Guard.
Mr. Mica. If I may. There are some functional
responsibilities that Homeland Security, the Department has
inherited that they are responsible for, and that is important
and I think your committee should look at some of those things.
Let me say that I have great concern about the Homeland
Security Committee and also the Department we created. It has
huge gaps in it. For example, let me give you just two
practical examples that I have worked on this week. Biometric
standards. And Ms. Slaughter talked--we were talking about, you
know, what happened before September 11th. We still do not have
an acceptable biometrics standard that is acceptable by all
agencies. I have 328 agencies that have various fire--carrying
firearms on airplanes. I have no biometric identification
standard. What is interesting, this week I found out State
Department through their Visit U.S.A., is developing a
biometric standard to be put in passports and visas.
Who the hell is coordinating this stuff? We are 2 years
out. We don't have an ID card for people who work at an airport
because nobody will make or coordinate a decision. And I have
got one agency hung out here making those kinds of decision.
And I am thinking, well, if they adopt that and it doesn't go
with this, somebody needs to be in charge of this stuff, folks.
This morning I had a briefing with the CIA--I can't go into
all the details, but we are concerned with the terrorist
threat. They blow some more planes out of the sky. You ain't
seen nothing compared to what happened at the economy on 9/11.
And this is the kind of threat that we deal with. I don't deal
as much with it as much with Mr. Oberstar as I do with the
Ranking Member of the Aviation Subcommittee, but we talk about
this all the time.
As of this morning, when I talked to CIA, FBI still is out
of the loop on a lot of the terrorist threat. I can't go into
specifics here. Who the hell is coordinating this stuff? And I
am just chairman of aviation, so I am looking at a little bit,
and this one doesn't know what the other one is still doing.
So you have this committee, if we have a select committee
on a permanent committee, it has some important
responsibilities of coordinating Federal agencies, some that
were left out here, that we pieced this together. So you have
an important responsibility. And then coordinating some of
these things among--and there is turf among the committees and
the jurisdictions that they have--in seeing that this all comes
together. Without being expertise, putting together expertise
that each committee, standing committee has and all of that.
So coordination is important. It is lacking. And your
jurisdiction, I am here to tell you, you are not looking at
enough of the picture and Homeland Security I don't think is.
Sorry. Frustrating.
Mr. Diaz-Balart. Further questions?
Mr. Cox. I appreciate that, and my red light is on. Thank
you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Diaz-Balart. Well, Mr. Mica has made a series of
extraordinarily important points that are very helpful to us.
Ms. Lofgren Thank you both for--
Ms. Slaughter. Just one other question before you go.
Mr. Diaz-Balart. Yes.
Ms. Slaughter. Because I agree with you that the Agency is
not working well. We don't have a threat assessment after all
this time, and they are waiting for each State to make them own
and go over them to make sure they are accurate. So it could be
a year or more.
But the one thing that is most troubling, I just got a
notice that the governor of my State has managed to get some
money from somewhere, 500,000 to give one of my small counties
on the border that protects one of the--the only power system
in the United States. And yet I think in your committee we
can't get the grant money out for first responders. So can we
make a complaint about that as well, and tell me where in the
world that money is and what we plan to do about that?
Mr. Oberstar. That goes back to my comments about FEMA,
that I didn't think it was an appropriate step to take FEMA
into the Department of Homeland Security because it would be
buried in with a whole group of other agencies and its response
to natural disasters confused without any clear delineation
lines a responsibility for counterterrorism actions. And the
funding has indeed gotten merged with the other programs. And I
think if you look at the total funding for first responders,
particularly firefighters, you will find that funding level is
less than when we started because of the fundability of dollars
within that department, and it has been moved around.
Ms. Slaughter. Well, FEMA responds to national emergency
and they pay money out, but for some reason, the money to these
first responders, which has been paid out by them and that they
longingly wait for reimbursement just doesn't come. And we were
wondering if you could, and your committee seems to be where it
is bottled up, what you can do about it.
Mr. Oberstar. We can certainly work together with the
majority to inquire into that matter.
Ms. Slaughter. I can promise you that I don't think any of
us go home to find anything more disconcerting than the fact
that budgets are broken or the money that they have spent is
more than they can afford and have no way to cover it. And we
just really have to deal with that. That is as frustrating to
me as the fact that we have no threat assessment, which makes
no sense to me.
Ms. Lofgren. Would the gentlelady yield for just--I don't
have a question. I do think the question you have asked is an
important one, and obviously no one committee has all the
responsibility as collectively the government has fallen short
and we need to fix it. I just wanted to note, if I could
indulge the committee, that I have another committee meeting at
5:00 over in the Capitol that I cannot avoid. And I see the
Chairman of my other committee is here, and I want to assure
the Chairman that I have read every word of his testimony and
beg his forgiveness for having to leave.
Thank you.
Mr. Diaz-Balart. Thank you. Thank you both very much.
It is our privilege to welcome the chairman of the
Committee on the Judiciary, Mr. Sensenbrenner.
Mr. Chairman, welcome. We look forward to your testimony.
Of course your entire testimony will be part of the record, and
we look forward to studying it. If you could perhaps, as we
have been asking witnesses, to summarize your testimony in 5
minutes.
STATEMENT OF THE HONORABLE JAMES SENSENBRENNER, A
REPRESENTATIVE IN CONGRESS FROM THE STATE OF WISCONSIN, AND
CHAIRMAN, COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY
Mr. Sensenbrenner. I am very happy to summarize my
testimony. But first let me explain the props that are in front
of me.
This is the work product of the Judiciary Committee since
September 11th relative to Homeland Security Activities and
other matters within the jurisdiction of the committee. We have
this stack of hearings, this stack of legislative reports on
bills that have become law, and this stack of oversight reports
that were either done directly by the committee, by the General
Accounting Office, or by the inspector generals of various
agencies.
The Judiciary Committee, I think, has an unprecedented work
product in dealing with these issues that are within our
jurisdiction.
I am pleased to appear before the Subcommittee on Rules to
testify on the topic you have under discussion. I believe that,
given our track record--and you see the paper there, and a lot
of hours were put into developing that paper--that the
Judiciary Committee should retain its jurisdiction over all the
matters it currently it has. While I am not opposed to a
Committee on Homeland Security as such, I believe that the
proponents of such a committee have the burden of proving that
a distinct Homeland Security Committee is an overall benefit to
Congress and to our country. To date, I do not believe that
burden has been met.
The Committee on the Judiciary has actively participated in
the response to the 9/11 attacks. This is entirely appropriate
because our jurisdiction includes ``the judiciary and judicial
proceedings, civil and criminal,'' ``espionage and
counterfeiting,'' ``civil liberties,'' ``immigration and
naturalization,'' and ``subversive activities affecting the
internal security of the United States.''
I believe that the Judiciary Committee's record
demonstrates that we are best able to meet that challenge in
those areas that have been traditionally within our
jurisdiction. We have the expertise, we have the staff, we have
been active, and we have produced results.
The creation of the Department of Homeland Security touches
on the jurisdiction of the committee on the judiciary in three
principal areas: Law enforcement agencies at DHS, Federal and
State law enforcement training, and immigration. The committee
has unique expertise in each of these areas, and it should
continue to exercise jurisdiction over them.
Mr. Sensenbrenner. The first aspect of the Homeland
Security Act that implicates the jurisdiction of the Committee
on the Judiciary is the transfer of law enforcement agencies
and their training activities. The HSA transferred several
criminal and law enforcement agencies to DHS--the Secret
Service, the Immigration and Naturalization Service, the
Customs Service, the Transportation Security Administration,
the Federal Protective Service and the Coast Guard.
The Committee on the Judiciary has general jurisdiction
over the Secret Service and the successors to the INS. It has
jurisdiction over the successors to the Customs Service, TSA,
FPS, and the Coast Guard to the extent that these agencies
enforce criminal law and exercise criminal law enforcement
powers. The committee has jurisdiction over the functions of
the former National Infrastructure Protection Center, the
Domestic Energy Response Team and the law enforcement training
activities of the Federal Law Enforcement Training Center and
the Office of Domestic Preparedness.
The Committee on the Judiciary has had jurisdiction over
criminal law enforcement since 1880. This tradition largely
derives from the jurisdiction over ``the judiciary and judicial
proceedings, civil and criminal,'' and ``subversive activities
affecting the internal security of the United States.'' The
committee has played the lead role in the House in criminal law
enforcement policy. We have an extensive record of legislative
and oversight activity that is set forth at in full in my
written statement. Our committee has the expertise and
experience in those areas, and it simply cannot be matched by a
new committee, with a short history and a new staff.
There is more to law enforcement and training than just
security. There is an important balancing to be done between
security and civil liberties. It is dangerous to put that
balancing task in a committee, the primary focus of which is
security. I fear that civil liberties interest will be
sacrificed.
Finally, I believe that the Committee on the Judiciary
should retain jurisdiction over the Department of Justice, its
prosecutorial activities, and its primary law enforcement
agencies, including the FBI. Jurisdiction over the law
enforcement agencies in DHS should remain in the same committee
as the DOJ law enforcement agencies. There should be one
unified approach that takes into account the complex balancing
act that must occur.
Having some agencies under the jurisdiction of a committee
that has traditionally carefully balanced civil liberties
concerns with law enforcement concerns and having others under
a committee that is focused solely on security is a
prescription for disaster.
The Committee on the Judiciary has had jurisdiction over
immigration and naturalization since 1946. Since that time, the
committee has played an integral role over immigration policy.
It has essentially created modern immigration law. It has an
extensive record of oversight and legislative activity that is
set forth in great length in my written statement.
As the record in my written statement shows, the Committee
on the Judiciary has unparalleled experience and expertise in
the immigration area and has demonstrated its ability to
identify and remedy the vulnerabilities in our immigration
system that expose our nation to risk. For decades it has done
this work. Since 9/11, it has responded to the call to further
strengthen our immigration policy.
There is another reason why immigration jurisdiction should
remain with the Committee on the Judiciary. Although countering
the terrorist threat is of significant importance in
implementing our immigration laws, it is certainly not the only
issue. Rather, immigration involves much more than homeland
security, reuniting families, providing needed workers for
American businesses, offering havens to refugees, and deporting
those aliens who have broken our laws.
Security and legal immigration must be balanced. We must
use our immigration enforcement powers to both protect our
people from those who break our laws as well as to facilitate
the admission of lawful entrants.
Another complexity in immigration policy is that authority
over immigration is spread across four departments--Homeland
Security, Justice, State, and Labor. The Judiciary Committee
currently has jurisdiction over each of those components as
well as over other agencies of limited jurisdiction that are
charged with carrying out our immigration laws.
The variety of concerns involved here cries out for the
experience and expertise of the committee that I chair. This
committee has long had the responsibility of balancing
immigration, law enforcement, terrorism, and civil rights
issues involved. A committee narrowly focused on security with
a much shorter history is not the best place to try to balance
the many complex interests involved. Rather, the Judiciary
Committee's experience in dealing with the various immigration
components counsels in favor of its continued jurisdiction.
I also want to address the argument that the DHS cannot
function effectively if it must report to multiple committees.
First, DHS reports to several committees now; and while
there is always room for improvement, the committee operation
is effectively functioning now.
Secondly, every agency reports to at least four
committees--a House authorizing committee, the House
Appropriations Committee, a Senate authorizing committee and
the Senate Appropriations Committee. Moreover, many existing
agencies report to more than one authorizing committee in the
House. All of these agencies are able to function effectively
within these arrangements.
Third, the Committee on the Judiciary and the Select
Committee on Homeland Security have already shown an ability to
work together effectively on projects of mutual interest. We
have already had one joint hearing, and another one will be
held tomorrow. We are currently working on first responder
legislation. Regardless of how this matter is resolved, if
there is a Committee on Homeland Security, either select or
permanent, I expect this working relationship to continue.
In short, the DHS is functioning effectively under the
current committee system, and it can continue to do so in the
future.
However the question regarding the future of the House
Homeland Security Committee is resolved, I emphatically believe
that the Committee on the Judiciary should retain jurisdiction
over all the matters it now has. This is what we have done. It
ain't broke, and it doesn't need fixing. We have the experience
and the expertise. Over the years, we have shown the ability to
apply the unified, balanced approach that these issues require;
and this successful formula should not be altered.
Thank you.
Mr. Diaz-Balart. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
PREPARED STATEMENT OF THE HONORABLE JAMES SENSENBRENNER
Mr. Chairman, I am pleased to appear before the Subcommittee on
Rules to testify concerning ``Homeland Security Jurisdiction: The
Perspective of Committee Leaders.'' To state my position briefly, I
believe that the Committee on the Judiciary should retain jurisdiction
over all matters that it currently has. In addition, while I am not
opposed to a Committee on Homeland Security as such, I believe that the
proponents of such a committee have the burden of proof, and that
burden has not yet been satisfied.
Now let me explain that in more detail. As you know, Rule X sets
forth the jurisdictional parameters of the various committees of the
House. In general, I believe that Rule X is working well. However, the
challenges brought on by the murderous terrorist attacks of September
11, 2001 require us to reexamine all that we are doing, including the
operation of Rule X, to ensure that we are doing all that we can to
protect our national security.
The Committee on the Judiciary has actively participated in the
response to the 9/11 attacks and the new world that we face. That is
entirely appropriate because our jurisdiction includes: ``the judiciary
and judicial proceedings, civil and criminal;'' ``. . . espionage and
counterfeiting;'' ``civil liberties;'' ``immigration and
naturalization;'' and ``subversive activities affecting the internal
security of the United States.'' See generally Clause 1(k) of Rule X.
Among other things, the Committee was heavily involved in the passage
of the USA PATRIOT Act and the Homeland Security Act. I believe that
our record demonstrates that we are best able to continue to meet the
challenge in those areas that have traditionally been within our
jurisdiction. Let me now discuss that in more detail.
I. The Department of Homeland Security
On November 25, 2002, President Bush signed the Homeland Security
Act (``HSA'') creating the new Department of Homeland Security
(``DHS'') by combining numerous existing agencies that deal with
various aspects of homeland security. Pub. L. No. 107-296. Section 1503
of the HSA provided that it is the sense of Congress that the House and
the Senate should review their respective committee structures in light
of the creation of the Department. In addition, Sec. 4(b)(3) of House
Resolution 5 requires the Select Committee to conduct a study of the
operation and implementation of the House Rules with regard to homeland
security.
The creation of DHS touches on the jurisdiction of the Committee on
the Judiciary in three principal areas: immigration, law enforcement
agencies at DHS, and federal and state law enforcement training both at
the Federal Law Enforcement Training Center (``FLETC'') and through
grants to state and local law enforcement administered by the Office
for Domestic Preparedness (``ODP''). The Committee has unique expertise
in each of these areas, and it should continue to exercise jurisdiction
over them.
II. Immigration
The Committee on the Judiciary has jurisdiction over ``immigration
and naturalization'' under clause (1)(k)(8) of Rule X. The HSA
transferred the functions of what had been the Immigration and
Naturalization Service (``INS'') to DHS and divided those functions
between what are now known as the Bureau of Customs and Border
Protection (``CBP''), the Bureau of Immigration and Citizenship
Enforcement (``ICE''), and the Bureau of Citizenship and Immigration
Services (``CIS''). See HSA Sec. Sec. 401 et seq.
A. History
Beginning in 1893, the House had a standing Committee on
Immigration and Naturalization. That committee had general jurisdiction
over immigration and naturalization matters, but between 1893 and 1906,
it also shared some matters in this area with the Committee on the
Judiciary. In the Legislative Reorganization Act of 1946, the Committee
on Immigration and Naturalization was abolished, and its jurisdiction
was transferred to the Committee on the Judiciary.
Since that time, the Committee on the Judiciary has had exclusive
jurisdiction over immigration and naturalization matters, and it has
played an integral role in immigration policy. Specifically, the
Committee has played a major role in a number of major immigration
bills that have created and recreated modern immigration law: the
Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952, the Immigration and
Nationality Act Amendments of 1965, the Refugee Act of 1980, the
Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1986, the Immigration Act of
1990, and the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility
Act of 1996.
In addition, since 1946, it has held hundreds of legislative and
oversight hearings on these matters. Indeed, the Committee's
Subcommittee on Immigration, Border Security, and Claims recognized the
threat posed by alien terrorists well before 9/11. Two particularly
notable hearings that foreshadowed the attacks were entitled
``Terrorist Threats to the United States'' on January 26, 2000, and
``Law Enforcement Problems at the Border Between the United States and
Canada, Focusing on the Issues of Drug Smuggling, Illegal Immigration,
and Terrorism'' on April 14, 1999.
B. The Record Since 9/11
Currently, the Committee deals with most immigration matters in its
Subcommittee on Immigration, Border Security, and Claims. The
Subcommittee's initial investigation of the September 11 attacks
established that alien terrorists have studied our immigration system
and they have identified and exploited weaknesses in that system in
planning and carrying out their attacks. For that reason, the
Subcommittee has focused special attention on the legislative,
procedural, and technological vulnerabilities in our nation's
immigration system, so that those vulnerabilities can be identified and
remedied. The Subcommittee has also worked to ensure that our
immigration enforcement officers have the resources and authority to
protect the United States from those aliens who would come to our
country to harm the American people.
Since 9/11, the Subcommittee has conducted 35 hearings on
immigration matters. Among the most important of these are hearings
entitled: ``US VISIT: A Down Payment on Homeland Security'' on March
18, 2004; ``Funding for Immigration in the President's 2005 Budget'' on
March 11, 2004 and February 25, 2004; ``War on Terrorism: Immigration
Enforcement Since September 11, 2001'' on May 8, 2003; ``Department of
Homeland Security Transition: Bureau of Immigration and Customs
Enforcement'' on April 10, 2003; ``The Immigration and Naturalization
Service's Interactions with Hesham Mohamed Ali Hedayet'' on October 9,
2002; ``The Role of Immigration in the Department of Homeland
Security'' on June 27, 2002; ``The Risk to Homeland Security From
Identity Fraud and Identity Theft'' on June 25, 2002; ``The INS's March
2002 Notification of Approval of Change of Status for Pilot Training
for Terrorist Hijackers Mohammed Atta and Marwan Al-Shehhi'' on March
19, 2002; ``The Implications of Transnational Terrorism for the Visa
Waiver Program'' on February 28, 2002; and ``Using Information
Technology to Secure America's Borders'' on October 11, 2001.
The Committee has also conducted effective oversight through other
means. For example, a Committee oversight letter to the former INS
requesting the immigration file of Hesham Hedayet, who killed two and
wounded several others at Los Angeles International Airport on July 4,
2002, revealed that the INS had failed to investigate the possible
terrorist connections of this asylum applicant who claimed that he was
suspected of terrorism in his home country. Committee requests brought
this issue to the attention of the Attorney General, who ordered INS to
review all existing asylum files ``to ascertain whether other
individuals may be present in the United States who have admitted that
they have been accused of terrorist activity or terrorist
associations.'' Such a review had not been previously undertaken
despite other aliens having been able to use the asylum system to plan
and carry out terrorist attacks in the United States, including Ramzi
Yousef, mastermind of the first World Trade Center bombing, and Mir
Aimal Kansi, who killed two CIA employees outside CIA headquarters in
Langley, Virginia.
A Committee request for information about the INS's erroneous
waiver into the United States of four Pakistani nationals, who were
crewmen on a vessel that docked in Chesapeake, Virginia and who later
absconded, led to the issuance of an order that all INS employees
follow agency directives. The Committee's subsequent request for those
directives helped spur the consolidation of those directives for the
use of INS employees. Prior to this incident, those directives filled
``roughly one-half dozen boxes . . . and several volumes of electronic
materials.'' Today, most of this information has been consolidated and
updated electronically and is available to employees of INS's
successors at headquarters via CD-ROM and the intranet, and we
understand that in the near future all internal directives will be
accessible to all employees including those in the field.
The Committee's investigation and requests for information into the
activities of John Allen Muhammad and Lee Boyd Malvo, convicted in
connection with sniper shootings in the Washington, D.C. area in
October 2002, has revealed loopholes in the policies and procedures for
readmitting U.S. citizens to the United States when they return from
countries in the Western hemisphere--loopholes that could be exploited
by alien terrorists and criminals. The Committee is evaluating possible
legislative fixes to these problems.
Committee oversight of the detention and release of alien criminals
brought the problem of alien criminal recidivism to the attention of
the INS. In working for the passage of Illegal Immigration Reform and
Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996, the Committee dramatically
increased the number of criminal aliens detained and deported by the
INS. The Committee's continued attention to the threat posed by alien
criminals has contributed to a restructuring of staffing of the
Institutional Removal Program, and a reassessment of the entire manner
in which ICE identifies criminal aliens in the United States. When this
restructuring is completed in 2005, ICE should be able to identify
many, if not most, aliens in criminal detention in the United States.
Nor has our oversight work been limited to simple letters to the
agencies. We have also requested a wide variety of General Accounting
Office and Inspector General investigations to support oversight on
Homeland Security and Immigration topics.
Committee hearings and oversight investigations in 2001 determined
that one of the root causes of weak internal enforcement against
immigration absconders was the breakdown of voluntary alien
registration record updates at the INS. Voluntary status updates by
registered aliens have been required by law since the Alien
Registration Act of 1940 introduced the first national requirement that
all aliens in the United States be registered with the government. It
required registration, fingerprinting, and reports of changes of
address, but fell into disuse in the 1990s.
To confirm and document our findings, on April 10, 2002, we
requested and received the following report from GAO: ``Homeland
Security: INS Cannot Locate Many Aliens Because It Lacks Reliable
Address Information'' dated November 2002. The report detailed INS's
negligence with regard to address and status updates. With the report
in hand, we scheduled a series of high level meetings with immigration
officials in December, 2002 and in January, 2003. As a result, INS's
successors at DHS agreed to reinvigorate their enforcement of the
registration law, and told us that the GAO study provided valuable
guidance that would be used both to address policy and to improve
management of information technology to update and maintain alien
registration address and status records.
In 2001, I became deeply concerned after Committee hearings
revealed indifferent oversight by the Department of Justice of INS's
systems planning, procurement, and project management that led to
failures in INS enforcement systems. I requested GAO to investigate
DOJ's oversight of INS with regard to four specific systems used to
track non-immigrant entry and exit information (Automated I-94 system),
alien criminal records (ENFORCE), criminal alien fingerprints and
photos (IDENT), and alien identity cards and Border Crossing Cards
(ICPS).
The resulting report, ``Information Technology: Justice Plans to
Improve Oversight of Agency (INS) Projects'' dated November 2002, has
been extremely helpful not only to continuing oversight by this
Committee, but also to the appropriators as they evaluate costs and
benefits and agency performance at DHS, where these immigration
functions are now located.
In 2002, Judiciary subcommittee hearings regarding identity theft
and the ease with which the 9/11 terrorists were able to obtain
drivers' licenses using fraudulent information led to our recognition
that a key factor in confirming identity is whether the states employ
information available from the Social Security Administration
(``SSA''). After staff investigations determined weaknesses with the
SSA process, I requested that the GAO investigate, resulting in the
study ``Social Security Numbers: Improved SSN Verification and Exchange
of States' Driver Records Would Enhance Identity Verification'' dated
September 2003. The study led to three important recommendations that,
if implemented by SSA, would lead to a reduction in driver's license
fraud.
The Committee's oversight of both law enforcement information
sharing and compliance with the Privacy Act led me to request that the
GAO investigate whether complaints by the federal and state law
enforcement agencies regarding the SSA's lack of cooperation are valid.
Because SSA did not have a clear or consistent policy, I asked GAO to
describe SSA's disclosure policy for law enforcement and how it
compares with the Privacy Act and the policies of other federal
agencies and to evaluate SSA's actual sharing of information with law
enforcement. The resulting study ``Disclosure Policy for Law
Enforcement Allows Information Sharing, but SSA Needs to Ensure
Consistent Application,'' dated September, 2003, included convincing
evidence that SSA has not done enough to educate law enforcement
agencies and its own employees about disclosure policies. More
importantly, the SSA Commissioner, as a result of this study, agreed to
update its policy manuals to clarify the rules for SSA law enforcement
disclosures.
We plan to continue to pursue oversight of the SSA's responsiveness
to the conclusions of both of these reports because of the critical
importance of SSA records with regard to prevention of immigration
fraud and identity theft. The SSA's policies and practices are
particularly important with regard to enforcement of employer laws
barring employment of illegal immigrants. As part of our ongoing
oversight into federal agencies' failure to enforce employer related
immigration laws, on June 26, 2003 together with Representative Shaw of
the House Subcommittee on Social Security, I requested a GAO report
addressing SSA's management and policy practices for employers who
employ large numbers of illegal aliens. The study is looking at SSA's
records of erroneous or fraudulent W-2 and W-4 earnings statements
submitted by employers, as reflected in the Suspense Files for Earnings
associated with invalid Social Security Numbers.
I also asked GAO to look at whether SSA has effective procedures to
prevent aliens and identity thieves from fraudulently obtaining SSA
cards. Ongoing meetings with the GAO investigative team indicate that
there are numerous problems with SSA's policies that the Committee
plans to examine in 2004 in the context of taking concrete steps to
reduce illegal immigration and identity fraud--two issues that are
intrinsically linked.
Within the context of the Committee's oversight of problems with
SSA benefits fraud, in 2003, I became concerned about the SSA's
announced intention of concluding an Agreement with Mexico regarding
``totalization,'' and requested the GAO to evaluate whether the SSA was
accurately estimating the cost of the anticipated agreement. The GAO
report, ``Social Security: Proposed Totalization Agreement with Mexico
Presents Unique Challenges'' dated September, 2003, concluded that the
SSA's estimates did not take into account the millions of Mexicans who
have earned social security ``quarters'' working illegally in the
United States. This Committee continues to conduct active oversight on
the potential downstream effects of this Agreement, with regard to the
potential it may have for increasing illegal immigration from Mexico
once the totalization agreement provides assurance that illegal workers
will receive Social Security benefits they are now denied. The
Committee plans to continue to work with the House Subcommittee on
Social Security to conduct active oversight of the Totalization
Agreement practices of the SSA to prevent such agreements to become
incentives for illegal immigration.
Our plans for the remainder of the 108th Congress regarding
immigration enforcement include following up on anticipated results
from a variety of other pending requests to GAO. One such project
addresses overall statistical information on the number of illegal
aliens in the United States, from a request dated April 16, 2002. This
request has already produced testimony addressing the significant
number of illegal immigrants who enter this country legally, but then
overstay their visas to remain here indefinitely. The GAO research team
anticipates delivery of a report in the next several months addressing
the visa overstay problem more completely.
A request by Ranking Member Conyers and me to the GAO for an
investigation regarding INS procedures for passenger transit and
security at airports on July 12, 2002, led to a report which we used to
meet with airport security officials regarding the need to improve the
design of airports regarding the control of arriving international
passengers. The report was not produced for public access because the
security weakness disclosures might afford terrorists vital
information.
Members of the Committee became concerned about news accounts of
the issuance of consular identification cards by several nations to
their citizens residing illegally in the United States and the policy
position of the U.S. Department of State that it was powerless to
prevent the issuance of these cards. The House passed a provision that
would require the Department of State to actually regulate the issuance
of such cards by foreign countries.
I requested that GAO gather information on the use of consular
identification cards on April 29, 2003. The Committee plans to use this
information to assist in legislative deliberations and in oversight of
the Department of State. In particular, the Committee plans to examine
whether the issuance of consular identity cards contributes to
additional illegal immigration and whether reported loose practices by
foreign nations may actually result in criminals who are not actually
citizens of the issuing countries assuming false identities. Many
States have revised their laws regarding the use of consular identity
cards to bar the cards as valid identification for obtaining drivers'
licenses, citing testimony by FBI and DHS officials at hearings
conducted by Judiciary Subcommittees in 2003.
Concerned about reports of state budgets being overburdened by the
cost of illegal immigration, in December, 2002, I requested a GAO study
of the state costs of educating illegal alien school children. That
study's release is due within the next several months, and it will
figure into this Committee's plans to examine the previously
undisclosed costs of the federal government's failure to enforce
immigration laws.
The Committee has also requested the assistance of a number of the
Offices of Inspector General (``OIG'') of federal agencies to address
homeland security issues. For example, beginning in 2001, the Committee
requested a series of briefings from the Inspector General of the SSA
regarding: (1) how terrorists associated with the 9/11 attacks were
able to obtain valid social security numbers that they then used to
create fraudulent identities; (2) how the SSA could improve controls
over Social Security numbers to guard against criminal and terrorist
use of SSNs; (3) how the SSA could improve information sharing and
prosecutorial cooperation with federal law enforcement, especially with
regard to the increasing number of criminal organizations that obtain
valid SSNs through fraud for resale to illegal aliens.
Since the establishment of the DHS OIG in 2003, the Committee has
requested a series of investigations of alleged mishandling of detained
illegal aliens that led to the release of criminal aliens who went on
to commit aggravated felonies, such as murder, rape and kidnapping.
These DHS OIG investigations are now ongoing, some of which will lead
to public reports. The Committee has also asked the DHS OIG to look
into alleged mishandling of equipment pertaining to improved border
security and into DHS's internal investigative units charged with
identifying and prosecuting corruption by DHS employees.
The Committee has generally had a particularly active relationship
with the DOJ OIG, leading to investigations highly relevant to
immigration, border security, and information sharing among federal
agencies pertaining to terrorist watch lists. Among the more prominent
of public reports that were generated as a result of Committee requests
are:
-- A series of reports addressing the lack of integration between
the INS (now ICE) and FBI fingerprint systems, among which the most
notable are: IDENT/IAFIS: The Batres Case and the Status of the
Integration Project (March 2004) and The Rafael Resendez-Ramirez Case:
A Review of the INS's Actions and the Operation of Its IDENT Automated
Fingerprint Identification System (March 2000).
-- A May 2002 report entitled, ``The Immigration and Naturalization
Service's Contacts With Two September 11 Terrorists: A Review of the
INS's Admissions of Mohamed Atta and Marwan Alshehhi, its Processing of
their Change of Status Applications, and its Efforts to Track Foreign
Students in the United States.''
-- Follow up March, 2003, ``Followup Review on The Immigration And
Naturalization Service's Efforts to Track Foreign Students in The
United States Through The Student And Exchange Visitor Information
System, (March 2003).
-- ``INS's Use of Re-employed Annuitants'' (2002).
-- A follow-up review on the visa waiver program--and a series of
other INS programs that affect national security--addressing weaknesses
in programs previously identified that could facilitate illegal entry
of criminals and terrorists into the United States (December 2001).
-- An Investigation of the Immigration and Naturalization Service's
Citizenship USA Initiative (July 2000).
In addition, since becoming Chairman of the Committee, I have made
eight trips to border areas within the United States and our consular
offices and embassies overseas to learn personally how our immigration
laws are being implemented. These trips include: California, Michigan,
Florida, Texas, the United Kingdom, France, Thailand, Mexico, Germany,
Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, and Belgium.
While the Committee has worked closely with the agencies over which
it has oversight to craft responses to the vulnerabilities in our
immigration laws and their implementation, there are limits to
administrative action. For this reason, where necessary, the
Subcommittee has drafted and worked to enact legislation to address the
most serious immigration issues facing our country.
For example, the USA PATRIOT Act was the initial response to the 9/
11 terrorist attacks, and it included a number of important tools to
the federal government to combat alien terrorists. Before passage of
the PATRIOT Act, there was no general prohibition against an alien
contributing funds or other material support to a terrorist
organization. The PATRIOT Act provides that an alien is inadmissible
and deportable for contributing funds or other material support to an
organization that has been designated as a terrorist organization by
the Secretary of State, or for contributing to any non-designated
terrorist organization, unless the alien can demonstrate that he did
not know and should not reasonably have known that the funds or other
material support or solicitation would further terrorist activity.
The PATRIOT Act also provides a mechanism whereby the Attorney
General can certify an alien as a suspected terrorist and detain him
for up to seven days before placing him in removal proceedings or
charging him with a crime. If no charges are filed by the end of this
period, the alien must be released. Otherwise, the Attorney General
shall maintain custody of the alien until the alien is removed from the
U.S. or is found not to be inadmissible or deportable.
The HSA included a version of the Committee's INS restructuring
legislation. This legislation created a framework for handling the
enormous task of keeping terrorists and criminals out while also
treating legal aliens with the courtesy and respect they deserve.
The INS restructuring legislation was no small effort. Rather, it
was the culmination of years of work by the Committee. The Immigration
and Naturalization Service had been a beleaguered bureaucracy for
decades. Appropriators continually increased the INS's budget, hoping
that additional resources were what was needed to solve the agency's
shortcomings. Just in recent times, the INS's budget increased from
$1.4 billion in fiscal year 1992 to $5.5 billion in fiscal year 2002.
Notwithstanding this budgetary expansion, the INS's performance did not
improve.
The magnitude of the INS's problems was extraordinary--it had a
backlog of millions of applications to be adjudicated, forcing aliens
trying to play by the rules to wait in limbo for years. Millions of
illegal aliens resided in the United States. Hundreds of thousands of
criminal and deportable aliens ordered removed by immigration judges
had absconded. Much of the INS's failure stemmed from the conflict
between its enforcement and service missions.
The Immigration Act of 1990 established the U.S. Commission on
Immigration Reform to review and evaluate our immigration system. The
Commission, chaired by the late Barbara Jordan, concluded that the INS
suffered from mission overload. The Commission explained that the INS
was required to give equal weight to more priorities than any one
agency can handle: ``[i]mmigration law enforcement requires staffing,
training, resources, and a work culture that differs from what is
required for effective adjudication of benefits or labor standards
regulation of U.S. businesses.'' The agency moved from one crisis to
the next, with no coherent strategy of how to accomplish both missions
successfully. Time and time again it attempted to cure itself with
internal reorganizations that cured little and often made the patient
worse.
In 1995, the Judiciary Committee began to examine management
problems in the INS and ``radical'' proposals to break apart and remake
the agency. In February, 1995, the Immigration Subcommittee held a
hearing on management practices at the INS. In May, 1998, the
Subcommittee held a hearing examining alternative proposals to
restructure the INS. In July, 1998, the Subcommittee for the first time
approved legislation to break apart the enforcement and service
functions of the INS.
Representative Hal Rogers, then chairman of the Commerce, Justice,
State Subcommittee of the Appropriations Committee, introduced this
legislation. Mr. Rogers worked closely with Immigration Subcommittee
Chairman Lamar Smith to fundamentally reform INS. The Committee's goal
was finally achieved last Congress.
I was scheduled to introduce the Barbara Jordan Immigration Reform
and Accountability Act when September 11 intervened. However, after a
delayed introduction, the House approved my legislation in April, 2002
by an overwhelming margin. This bill would have broken the INS apart
into a Bureau of Citizenship and Immigration Services and a Bureau of
Immigration Enforcement, both within the Department of Justice. Then
President Bush decided to seek creation of a Department of Homeland
Security. When the HSA was sent to the President for signature in
November, 2002, it included the bifurcation of immigration functions
that the Committee had been seeking for so long--only now within the
newly created department. The Committee is proud of this accomplishment
and wants to assist the new immigration agencies in fulfilling their
promise.
The Committee was also instrumental in passing the Enhanced Border
Security and Visa Entry Reform Act of 2002 which took several steps to
tighten our border and visa policies including: requiring biometric
identifiers (i.e., fingerprints, retinal scans, etc.) for visas;
requiring biometric scanners at all U.S. points of entry; requiring DHS
to implement an entry-exit tracking system; strengthening the reporting
requirements for the foreign student tracking system; providing DHS and
consular officials access to the databases of U.S. law enforcement and
the intelligence community; authorizing an additional 200 immigration
investigative personnel and 200 immigration inspectors for each of the
next 5 years; and providing a pay raise and additional training for
immigration personnel, including Border Patrol agents.
Finally, the Committee reported H.R. 1954, to provide various
immigration benefits to members of the Armed Forces fighting in Iraq
and their families. A version of this legislation was incorporated in
the Department of Defense authorization bill for FY 2004.
Going forward, the Judiciary Committee's immigration oversight will
continue to focus on making America safer. The terrorist threat against
us is composed almost entirely of persons who came to the United States
from abroad. We cannot ignore the link between our immigration system
and our vulnerability to terrorism. It is not just a matter of fixing
the student visa program or the tourist visa program. Every aspect of
our immigration system has been used by foreign terrorists to gain
access to, and a safe haven in, the United States. Let me cite a report
issued by the Center for Immigration Studies that tracked how 48
foreign-born militant Islamic terrorists, including the 9/11 hijackers,
entered the U.S. over the last decade. The Center found that:
[The terrorists] used almost every conceivable means of entering
the country. They have come as students, tourists, and business
visitors. They have also been [legal permanent residents] and
naturalized U.S. citizens. They have snuck across the border illegally,
arrived as stowaways on ships, used false passports, and have been
granted amnesty. Terrorists have even used America's humanitarian
tradition of welcoming those seeking asylum.
The Committee will work continuously to ensure that no aspect of
our immigration system can be used by terrorists to strike at America.
The Committee will also strive to ensure that the great promise of
a restructured immigration service is fulfilled. The Committee is
concerned about the continuing poor manner in which legal immigrants
are treated by CIS. The backlog of applications waiting to be
adjudicated has exceeded the six million mark. This disrupts the lives
and dreams of aliens who are playing by the rules and deserve to be
treated better. Committee oversight will focus on righting this wrong.
The Committee also will continue to apply stringent oversight to
DHS's efforts to enforce our immigration laws. The Committee will
continue its ongoing supervision of DHS initiatives to curtail
immigration fraud, to ensure that all deportable criminal aliens are
identified, detained, and removed, to secure our northern and southern
borders from illegal aliens and alien terrorists, to prevent illegal
aliens from finding employment in the U.S., and to ensure that aliens
ordered removed are actually removed.
More specifically, for the balance of the 108th Congress, a major
activity will be oversight of DHS's compliance with the Border Security
Act and the USA PATRIOT ACT. We plan hearings that address the complex
and intertwined requirements to establish clear requirements for
security upgrades to U.S. passports and visas, as well as to nations
whose citizens may enter the country without visas under the Visa
Waiver Program (``VWP'').
The first of these hearings will examine the capability of VWP
countries to meet two deadlines that become effective on October 26,
2004: (1) the countries must issue tamper resistant machine readable
passports after that date; and (2) their passports must contain a
biometric identifier in a form that can read by U.S. inspectors. The
Committee will also make an assessment of DHS's preparations for
reading the new passports and for reading the new biometric, tamper
resistant visas that the State Department is scheduled to begin issuing
in advance of the deadlines.
The Committee plans an additional hearing that will examine whether
the Secretary of State and the Secretary of Homeland Security have met
the requirements of the Border Security Act with regard to establishing
a clear set of standards for machine readable travel documents based on
the National Institute of Standards and Technology's research and
recommendations. Further, the hearing will address what kind of notice
should be provided to foreign countries who have publically state that
they will try to comply with the U.S. deadlines.
Another hearing planned for late in the 108th Congress will address
DHS's deployment of identity card scanners at more than one hundred
ports of entry to validate the identities of foreign travelers who
present the border crossing cards, by testing the biometric photo and
fingerprints stored on the card against the bearer. This important
milestone, first set by the 1996 Act, was further specified in the
Border Security Act. The DHS Executive Director of Border Security and
Facilitation testified before the Subcommittee last week that CBP will
deploy these scanners beginning in June, 2004, and will have inspectors
trained in using them well before the October 26th deadline. The
Committee will assess DHS's compliance with this deadline, and its
effect on identifying imposters and protecting our country from
criminals and terrorists attempting to use fraudulent information to
enter the United States.
Major oversight objectives planned by the Committee for the
remainder of the 108th Congress and the 109th Congress are to examine
the nexus between money laundering and the financing of large scale
alien smuggling into the United States, as well as how money laundering
here continues to fund terrorism throughout the world. Within that
context, the Committee plans to address the organization of DHS's
Office of Inspector General to ensure that the process of assembly of
auditors and inspectors to compose this new office has not led to gaps
in performance audits. Importantly, the components of the Treasury OIG
which have traditionally audited the Secret Service with regard to
money laundering and counterfeiting investigations were transferred to
the DHS OIG. The Committee plans to assess whether the DHS OIG is
performing its required role of assessing the performance of DHS money
laundering investigators. This plan aligns with the GAO study request I
made in December, 2003 to study the Department of Treasury's remaining
money laundering enforcement team and its coordination with DHS's ICE.
The GAO is tasked to identify faster and more effective means to bring
Treasury's capabilities to bear in money laundering. This study will
also address whether the Treasury is directing the Internal Revenue
Service and other Treasury agencies to use the PATRIOT Act provisions
to share information to pursue terrorist and alien smuggling
organizations.
In the 109th Congress, the Committee also plans to use information
derived from a GAO study request I made in November, 2003, to look at
Treasury's enforcement of money laundering prevention provisions of the
PATRIOT Act. Although Treasury's role is often overlooked by others, it
contributes both to DOJ and to DHS efforts to prevent terrorist acts
here in the United States. It is the Treasury which has the predominant
authority with regard to gathering and assessing Suspicious Activity
Reports (SARs) provided by banks. We intend to examine whether Treasury
is effective in telling banks what to look for with regard to potential
terrorist or alien smuggling money laundering. We will also examine
whether Treasury is providing useful sorting and filtering of the
thousands of reports so that DOJ and DHS enforcement officers can take
timely action to prosecute criminals and prevent terrorist acts.
In the remainder of the 108th Congress and the 109th Congress, we
intend to look intensively at whether the Internal Revenue Service is
performing its mission to enforce immigration laws, including
specifically INA provisions that apply to the IRS. To assess what the
IRS is doing as a basis for this oversight, Rep. Hostettler, Chairman
of the Immigration Subcommittee, requested that the GAO evaluate the
IRS pilot penalty program for employers who are problem filers of wage
reports. We want to know whether the IRS has the resources and the will
to enforce employer penalties, or whether that function should be
transferred through legislation to a more aggressive agency.
In the remainder of the 108th Congress and the 109t h Congress, we
will conduct active oversight into the cost of incarcerating alien
criminals and the potential role of local law enforcement in assisting
federal agencies with the prosecution of criminal aliens. To that end,
I requested the GAO to prepare a detailed study of the number of
criminal aliens incarcerated in federal and state correctional
facilities, the types of crimes they committed and the costs of
incarceration. This oversight is consistent with the Committee's
concerns about unrecognized costs of illegal immigration and the need
to bring more resources into coordination with DHS's mission of
internal immigration law enforcement. We intend to use information from
this study to hold one or more hearings on the scale of the criminal
alien problem and what needs to be done about it through targeted
legislation.
C. Jurisdiction over Immigration Should Remain In the Committee on the
Judiciary
As the foregoing record shows, the Committee on the Judiciary has
unparalleled experience and expertise in the immigration area, and it
has demonstrated its ability to identify and remedy the vulnerabilities
in our immigration system that expose our nation to risk. For decades,
it has done this work. Since 9/11, it has responded to the call to
further strengthen our immigration policy.
But there is another reason that immigration jurisdiction should
remain with the Committee on the Judiciary. Although countering the
terrorist threat is of significant importance in implementing our
immigration laws, it is not the only issue. In fact, only a small
fraction of aliens in the United States have any connection to
terrorism. Rather, immigration involves much more than homeland
security--reuniting families, providing needed workers for American
businesses, offering haven to refugees, and deporting those aliens who
have broken our laws. Lawful immigrants to the United States should not
be viewed by the American people as a threat to be contained, and our
country cannot afford to be viewed as an unwelcoming host to those who
would come here lawfully to make a contribution to our way of life.
Immigration is America's past, present, and future.
Two projects in which the Committee has played a leading role
illustrate this need for balance. In the mid-1990s, Committee members
became concerned about the admission and presence of alien students in
the United States. In 1996, the Committee worked to secure passage of a
provision for a tracking system for such students during their stay in
the United States. Administrative delays and competing interests slowed
the development of that system.
The Committee's foresight on this issue became all too clear
following 9/11 when it was revealed that the pilot who flew American
Airlines Flight 11 into the Pentagon was an alien student who failed to
show up at school, and that two of the other pilots received visas to
take their flight training in the United States. The Committee again
pushed, through the PATRIOT Act, for full implementation of that
system.
Recognizing the possible delays that such a system could pose and
the economic and academic value of foreign students to the United
States, the Committee worked closely with INS, and then with DHS, as it
implemented that program to ensure that the concerns of students and
schools, as well as national security concerns, were considered during
the design and deployment of the system. Committee staff met with
school administrators and associations for feedback during the
development of the system, now known as SEVIS. The Committee held two
separate oversight hearings during the development and implementation
of that system, to allow school officials and the Justice Department's
Inspector General to confront government officials with their concerns
and complaints about the system.
Finally, the Committee pressed DHS to start collecting the fee
required for funding of that system; the Department issued a proposed
rule for collection of that fee in October 2003, and final regulation
is pending. Once DHS starts collecting that fee, it will save the
American people an estimated $50 million in enforcement costs that they
currently pay. All in all, notwithstanding some bumps in the road, I
believe that SEVIS has been a success and that this system has made the
United States safer without imposing an onerous burden on either
foreign students or American schools. The Judiciary Committee's
balancing of the needs of both security and the needs of the students
and the schools has played no small role in that success.
Likewise, the Committee was concerned about tracking of non-
immigrant aliens in the United States. Section 110 of IIRIRA required
the development of an entry-exit system that would track non-immigrants
who overstayed their visas. Active oversight by the Committee following
IIRIRA determined that virtually no progress was made to plan for
needed improvements in legacy systems to improve entry inspections, and
no progress at all was made to establish exit controls for travelers.
This led to the Committee's initiative to establish the Data Management
Improvement Act of 2000 (``DMIA''), which further amended section 110
to require the basic system to collect electronic data on the arrival
of aliens with the capability of matching that data with an alien's
departure data. The DMIA did much more than establish the requirement--
it also required INS to establish a DMIA task force to include other
federal government agencies, state and local government
representatives, and private industry groups representing businesses.
DMIA charged the Task Force with intensively studying the problems and
issues related to establishing a comprehensive entry exit system and
publishing the results. The Committee pursued aggressive oversight with
the INS to get the Task Force established and operating, participating
in meetings and site visits as the required DMIA work was undertaken.
In late 2001, recognizing the continued delays by the Department of
Justice, including INS, and the Department of State in sharing
information and the failures to coordinate data between entry systems
and visa systems, I drafted the Enhanced Border Security and Visa Entry
Reform Act of 2002 to mandate improvements in data sharing, entry
controls, and international travel documents. Working with other
Members of the House and with the Senate, hard deadlines were
established by which real change had to be completed.
Since the Act became law, the Judiciary Committee has aggressively
worked to ensure that all elements of the federal government were
working together to meet the Act's requirements. The Committee's work
entailed hundreds of hours of meetings pursuing the detailed plans,
pilot programs, technology tests, and procurement actions necessary to
get the job done. It included meetings with the National Institute of
Standards and Technology team, coordinating with industry and
government to establish practical standards for biometric identifiers
in documents, and meeting with federal government delegates to the
International Civil Aeronautics Machine Readable Travel Document groups
to insure that there was parallel progress at the international level.
Both in 2003 and 2004, the Committee hosted briefings for Congress by
the DMIA task force, the most recent of which was a March 15, 2004
presentation to which staff of the Select Committee on Homeland
Security was invited.
These two examples show the need for balance between security and
facilitating legal immigration. It was to balance out immigration
enforcement and services that the Committee proposed splitting those
functions which had long been joined in the former INS. We must use our
immigration enforcement powers to protect our people from those who
break our laws. We must also, however, continually exert our best
efforts to facilitate the admission of lawful entrants.
Another complexity of immigration policy is that authority over
immigration is spread across four departments--Homeland Security,
Justice, State, and Labor. From the issuance of a visa to removal from
the United States, an alien could interact with no fewer than nine
components in those four departments. The Judiciary Committee currently
has jurisdiction over each of those components, as well as over other
agencies of limited jurisdiction that are charged with carrying out our
immigration laws. Even with the formation of the Department of Homeland
Security, the Attorney General's opinion with respect to all questions
of law involving the Immigration and Nationality Act is controlling,
and he has final authority over the decisions in our nation's
immigration judiciary system.
The variety of concerns involved in these many conflicting and
overlapping interests cries out for the experience and expertise of the
Committee on the Judiciary. This Committee has long had the
responsibility for balancing the immigration, law enforcement,
terrorism, and civil rights issues involved. A committee narrowly
focused on security and with a much shorter history is not the best
place to try to balance the many complex interests involved. Rather,
the Judiciary Committee's experience in dealing with the various
immigration components should tip the scales in favor of its continued
jurisdiction.
III. Law Enforcement Agencies at DHS
Another aspect of the HSA that implicates the jurisdiction of the
Committee on the Judiciary is the transfer of law enforcement agencies.
The HSA transferred several criminal law enforcement agencies to DHS:
the Secret Service, the Immigration and Naturalization Service
(``INS''), the Customs Service, the Transportation Security
Administration (``TSA''), the Federal Protective Service (``FPS''), and
the Coast Guard. The Committee on the Judiciary has general
jurisdiction over the Secret Service and the successors to the INS. It
has jurisdiction over the successors to the Customs Service, TSA, FPS,
and the Coast Guard to the extent that these agencies enforce criminal
law and exercise criminal law enforcement powers. The Committee also
has jurisdiction over the functions of the former National
Infrastructure Protection Center, which was formerly part of the FBI,
and the Domestic Emergency Response Team, which formerly advised the
FBI when there was an emergency.
A. History
The Committee on the Judiciary has long had jurisdiction over
criminal law enforcement. This tradition largely derives from the
Committee's jurisdiction over ``the judiciary and judicial proceedings,
civil and criminal'' under clause (1)(k)(1) of Rule X and ``subversive
activities affecting the internal security of the United States'' under
clause (1)(k)(18) of Rule X. The Committee has had jurisdiction over
criminal law under the House Rules since 1880. It acquired jurisdiction
over subversive activities when the Committee on Internal Security was
abolished in 1975.
In that period, the Committee has played the lead role in the House
in criminal law enforcement policy. For example, the Committee was
instrumental in passing the most important terrorism bill to become law
before 9/11, the ``Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of
1996,'' which was Congress's response to the murderous terrorist attack
on the federal building in Oklahoma City.
Over the more than 100 years of its jurisdiction in this area, the
Committee has held hundreds of legislative and oversight hearings on
these matters. Indeed, the Committee's Subcommittee on Crime,
Terrorism, and Homeland Security had begun considering the terrorist
threat even before 9/11 holding hearings entitled: ``The Threat Posed
by the Convergence of Organized Crime, Drug Trafficking, and
Terrorism'' on December 13, 2000, ``Breaches of Security at Federal
Agencies and Airports'' on May 25, 2000, ``Prohibition on Financial
Transactions With Countries Supporting Terrorism Act of 1997'' on June
10, 1997, and ``The FBI Investigation into the Khobar Towers Bombing in
Dhahran, Saudi Arabia and the Foreign Investigative Activities of the
FBI in General'' on February 12, 1997.
B. The Record Since 9/11
Since 9/11, the Subcommittee on Crime, Terrorism, and Homeland
Security has held 29 hearings on law enforcement matters. Among the
most important of these are hearings entitled: ``Law Enforcement
Efforts Within the Department of Homeland Security'' on February 3,
2004, ``Homeland Security-the Balance Between Crisis and Consequence
Management through Training and Assistance (Review of Legislative
Proposals)'' on November 20, 2003, ``Terrorism and War-Time Hoaxes'' on
July 10, 2003, ``The Proposal to Create a Department of Homeland
Security,'' on July 9, 2002, ``The Risk to Homeland Security From
Identity Fraud and Identity Theft'' on June 25, 2002, the
``Antiterrorism Explosives Act of 2002'' on June 11, 2002, and the
``Homeland Security Information Sharing Act'' on June 4, 2002, the
``Cyber Security Enhancement Act'' on February 12, 2002, the
``Implementation Legislation for the International Convention for the
Suppression of Terrorist Bombings and the International Convention for
the Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism'' on November 14, 2001,
and the ``Anti-Hoax Terrorism Act of 2001'' on November 7, 2001.
In addition to these hearings, the Judiciary Committee, in the
spirit of cooperation, has held a joint hearing with the Select
Committee on Homeland Security on the Terrorism Threat Integration
Center (``TTIC'') on July 22, 2003, and jointly sent letters with post-
hearing questions to the relevant agencies on the implementation of
TTIC. Tomorrow, on March 25, 2004, the Judiciary Committee and Homeland
Security Committee will hold another joint hearing. This one will focus
on the integration of terrorism watchlists at the Terrorism Screening
Center.
The Committee on the Judiciary has also conducted oversight through
other means. It has sent two major oversight letters to the Attorney
General on the implementation of the USA PATRIOT Act. These letters
were aimed at ensuring that the Department of Justice maintains a
proper balance between security and civil liberties in implementing the
Act.
The Committee has also closely monitored the activities of DHS
recently sending letters to Directors of ICE and FPS regarding their
law enforcement missions at the Department of Homeland Security. The
Committee will soon send a letter to FLETC on its law enforcement
mission. Additionally, it has sent a letter to the Federal
Communications Commission and will soon send a letter to DHS regarding
the Administration's efforts to ensure the ability of first responders
to communicate with one another with interoperable equipment. I have
also traveled to New York personally to observe the operations of the
Secret Service there.
In addition, the Committee has requested several GAO reports in
this area including: ``Combating Terrorism: Funding Data Reported to
Congress Should be Improved'' dated November 2002; ``Social Security
Administration: Disclosure Policy for Law Enforcement Allows
Information Sharing, But SSA Needs to Ensure Consistent Application''
dated September 2003; and ``Firearms Control: Federal Agencies Have
Firearms Controls, But Could Strengthen Controls in Key Areas'' dated
June 2003.
The Subcommittee has played a central role in passing legislation
in response to the 9/11 attacks. The Committee reported out the
legislation that became the USA PATRIOT Act in a 36-0 bipartisan vote.
That Act was Congress's initial response to the 9/11 attacks. It
provides new tools for law enforcement and for improved information
sharing among Federal agencies to address terrorist threats. It also
authorizes the sharing of information between the intelligence and law
enforcement communities and makes it easier to begin investigations of
foreign intelligence subjects.
The Subcommittee has also moved a variety of other legislative
responses to the attacks. It reported implementation legislation for
the International Convention for the Suppression of Terrorist Bombings
and the International Convention for the Suppression of the Financing
of Terrorism that became law on June 25, 2002. This legislation helped
to implement treaties the U.S. and dozens of others countries have
signed to suppress terrorist bombings and the financing of terrorism.
Several other pieces of legislation developed by the Subcommittee
were incorporated into the HSA. They include: the Cybersecurity
Enhancement Act of 2002 that enhanced protections against cyber attacks
by terrorists; the Homeland Security Information Sharing Act that
enhanced intelligence and law enforcement information sharing among
federal, state, and local governments to help protect against terrorist
attacks; and the Anti-Terrorism Explosives Act of 2002 that places
common sense requirements on those purchasing, transporting, or using
explosive materials. The Committee is continuing this work with the
Anti-Hoax Terrorism Act and legislation to adequately fund first
responders.
Some additional oversight efforts in the law enforcement area that
the Judiciary Committee plans to pursue in the near future include
border corruption, financing of terrorism activities, transportation
security, and background checks for security personnel and others that
affect the national security or public safety.
First, the Committee will be looking at corruption of government
officials on the border. The Committee is concerned by reports of
bribes of officials who allow contraband and persons to be smuggled
into the United States. The Committee has already sent oversight
requests in this area and plans to a review this problem further.
Second, the Committee will be holding hearings on how terrorists are
financing their activities, what law enforcement is doing to stop that
financing, and whether law enforcement needs further legislative
support. Third, the Committee is reviewing transportation security and
container security issues, e.g., H.R. 4008, the ``Anti-Terrorism
Protection of Mass Transportation and Railroad Carriers Act of 2004,''
was referred solely to the Judiciary Committee. This legislation would
increase penalties for terrorism against mass transportation and
railroads and enhance law enforcement tools to combat and prevent such
attacks. Fourth, the Judiciary is examining the various laws
authorizing criminal history background checks and new legislation to
provide such background checks for private security guards.
C. Criminal Law Enforcement at DHS
The Committee on the Judiciary has long been the authorizing
committee for the Secret Service. Indeed, the Committee reported the
first modern authorization of the Secret Service in 1951. Pub. L. No.
82-79. It has remained the authorizing committee for the Secret Service
since that time.
The HSA provided for the Secret Service to become a separate agency
within DHS--i.e., it is not within any of the directorates of DHS.
See--1703 of the HSA. It has two missions: law enforcement,
particularly with respect to counterfeiting, a matter within the
Committee on the Judiciary's jurisdiction, and the protection of the
President, the Vice President, their immediate family members, and
others.
The HSA also established the Border and Transportation Security
Directorate (``BTS''), and it is responsible for maintaining the
security of our nation's borders and transportation systems. BTS is
comprised of law enforcement and other employees from the former INS,
the former Customs Service, TSA, FPS, and the Coast Guard.
CBP consists of elements of the former INS and the former Customs
Service. In addition to its immigration responsibilities, CBP plays a
critical role in confronting the law enforcement challenges facing our
nation. CBP's Interdiction and Security (Outbound) enforces criminal
export laws and regulations that prevent weapons of mass destruction
from falling into the hands of terrorists. As part of this
responsibility, the agency interdicts illicit proceeds from narcotics
and other criminal activities in the form of unreported and smuggled
currency.
Another new agency within BTS is ICE, which is the largest
investigative arm of DHS. It also includes elements of the former INS
and the former Customs Service. Assistant Secretary Michael J. Garcia,
then Acting Assistant Secretary for ICE stated that ``[t]hrough this
reorganization, ICE is building a foundation to become one of the
world's preeminent law enforcement agencies--one that provides
unparalleled investigation, interdiction, and security services to the
public and to our partners at DHS.'' Department of Homeland Security
announcement entitled ICE Announces Agency Reorganization Plan dated
May 16, 2003. Outside of its immigration role, the responsibilities of
ICE range from law enforcement intelligence work to investigating child
pornography.
TSA is also part of BTS. TSA's primary mission is to provide for
the security of the civil aviation system, including all domestic cargo
and passenger air transportation, as well as the civil aviation
infrastructure. TSA has authority to receive, assess, and distribute
intelligence information and assess threats to transportation
facilities. 49 U.S.C. Sec. 114(f).
TSA's budget request described part of its mission as ensuring that
it builds a strong enforcement presence on-site at the nation's
commercial airports. TSA negotiates long-term agreements with state and
local enforcement agencies to provide uniformed officers at passenger
security checkpoints.
TSA includes the National Explosives Detection Canine Team Program
to provide local law enforcement officers with the right equipment,
technical assistance, and partial reimbursement costs for security. It
also supports Federal Flight Deck Officer training for pilots at FLETC
to train pilots on the use of firearms.
FPS is responsible for law enforcement protection of federal
employees and property. According to its web page, the mission of FPS
is ``to provide law enforcement and security services to over one
million tenants and daily visitors to all federally owned and leased
facilities nationwide. FPS's protection services focus directly on the
interior security of the nation and the reduction of crimes and
potential threats in federal facilities throughout the nation.''
The Coast Guard is also a law enforcement agency with a mission
divided into four major roles--maritime law enforcement, maritime
safety, marine environmental protection, and national defense. The
Coast Guard's law enforcement functions include maritime narcotics
enforcement. See 46 U.S.C. App. Sec. 1903, 14 U.S.C. Sec. 89, 16 U.S.C.
Sec. 2409.
At a February 3, 2004 hearing before the Judiciary Committee's
Subcommittee on Crime, Terrorism, and Homeland Security, Admiral Thomas
Collins testified that the Coast Guard has extensive regulatory and law
enforcement authorities. He further stated that Maritime Safety and
Security Teams of the Coast Guard have provided critical port security,
deterrence, and response capability. These efforts include the use of
canines and divers to detect narcotics and explosives hidden on board
vessels. Interdiction of narcotics is a primary law enforcement mission
of the Coast Guard both directly and through law enforcement
partnerships.
The National Infrastructure Protection Center (``NIPC'') was
created in May of 1998 through Presidential Decision Directive 63 as an
interagency center housed at the FBI Headquarters. At the FBI, NIPC
served as the focal point for the governments efforts to warn of, and
respond to, cyber threats. NIPC was also part of the FBI's
Counterterrorism Program the mission of which was to detect, deter,
prevent, and swiftly respond to terrorist actions that threatened U.S.
national interests at home or abroad. Briefing Book of General
Information on the FBI, (2000) at 84. The FBI used NIPC to assist in
the coordination of ongoing computer crime investigations and
identification of threats against the nation's critical infrastructure.
The HSA transferred NIPC to the Department of Homeland Security and it
was placed into the Information Analysis and Infrastructure Protection
Division (``IAIP''). The functions of NIPC have been assumed into
various components of IAIP.
The HSA transferred the Domestic Emergency Support Team (``DEST'')
from the Department of Justice to the Department of Homeland Security
where it is now referred to as the Domestic Emergency Response Team.
DEST was an interagency team responsible for providing the FBI, the
lead Federal agency for crisis management, with expert advice and
support concerning the U.S. Government's capabilities in resolving the
terrorist threat or incident. When such a threat or incident occurred,
this rapidly deployable interagency team was activated to provide
crisis and consequence management assistance, technical or scientific
advice, and contingency planning guidance tailored to situations
involving chemical, biological, or nuclear weapons. The DEST was
managed by the FBI's Critical Incident Response Group. Its mission was
to provide expert advice and assistance to the FBI On-Scene Commander
related to the capabilities of various federal agencies depending on
the type of terrorist attack. This task force was not an office and did
not have assets or resources. Its sole responsibility was to advise the
FBI during the response to an attack.
In short, the Committee on the Judiciary has general jurisdiction
over the Secret Service and the successors to INS (ICE, CBP, and CIS).
It has jurisdiction over the successors to the Customs Service, TSA,
FPS, and the Coast Guard to the extent that they enforce criminal laws
and exercise criminal law enforcement authorities. It also has
jurisdiction over the functions of the former NIPC and the former DEST.
D. Jurisdiction over the Law Enforcement Agencies at DHS Should Remain
in the Committee on the Judiciary
The Committee on the Judiciary has a long and vast history of
jurisdiction over law enforcement agencies. It has the expertise and
the experience in these areas. That expertise and experience simply
cannot be matched by a new committee with a short history.
As with immigration, there is more to law enforcement than just
security. There is important balancing to be done between security
interests and civil liberties interests. Indeed, during consideration
of the HSA itself, the Committee reported several civil liberties
provisions, including heightened whistleblower protections, a more
independent Inspector General at DHS, and the creation of a privacy
officer to ensure against the unauthorized disclosure or dissemination
of personally-identifiable information. The Committee on the Judiciary
has been at this balancing task for years. It is dangerous to put that
balancing task in a committee the primary focus of which is security. I
fear that civil liberties interests would be sacrificed.
Finally, I believe that under any scenario, the Committee on the
Judiciary will retain jurisdiction over the Department of Justice and
its primary law enforcement agencies, the Federal Bureau of
Investigation, the Drug Enforcement Administration, and the Bureau of
Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms, and Explosives. In addition, the Committee
on the Judiciary will retain jurisdiction over the various
prosecutorial activities of the Department of Justice. Jurisdiction
over the law enforcement agencies in DHS should remain in the same
committee as the DOJ law enforcement agencies. There should be one
unified approach that takes into account the complex balancing that
must occur. Having some agencies under the jurisdiction of a committee
that has traditionally carefully balanced civil liberties concerns with
law enforcement concerns and having others under a committee that is
focused solely on security is a prescription for disaster. Jurisdiction
should be based on function--not agency carrying out the function.
IV. Law Enforcement Training at DHS
The HSA transferred two major law enforcement training programs to
DHS: FLETC and ODP.
A. History
The Committee on the Judiciarys history of jurisdiction over law
enforcement training derives from the same sources and has the same
history as its jurisdiction over law enforcement agencies. See III.A,
above. Before 9/11, the Subcommittee on Crime, Terrorism and Homeland
Security had considered the predecessors to ODP within broader
oversight hearings on May 15, 2001 and July 22, 1999.
B. The Record Since 9/11
As noted above, since 9/11, the Subcommittee on Crime, Terrorism,
and Homeland Security has held 29 hearings on law enforcement matters.
Several of these have included discussion of law enforcement training.
A three-part hearing on the effectiveness of the Office of Justice
Programs, which then included ODP, occurred on March 5, 7, and 14,
2002. More recently, the Subcommittee has conducted hearings on ``Law
Enforcement Efforts Within the Department of Homeland Security'' on
February 3, 2004, and ``Homeland Security-the Balance Between Crisis
and Consequence Management through Training and Assistance (Review of
Legislative Proposals)'' on November 20, 2003, both of which dealt with
law enforcement training. I have traveled personally to Vermont to
observe the training of law enforcement agents there.
Due to press reports of mismanagement of first responder grants, on
January 21, 2004, the Committee on Judiciary sent letters to the
Secretary of the Department of Homeland Security and the Inspector
General of the Department of Homeland Security requesting a review. It
appears that this letter has been effective. According to a FCW.com
March 9, 2004 article, ``Officials from the Homeland Security
Department's Office of Domestic Preparedness are putting in place
several policies to oversee and enforce how state and local agencies
are spending their federal funding, according to an ODP official.''
Right now, the Committee on the Judiciary is working with this
Committee on Chairman Cox's first responder funding bill, H.R. 3266. We
are not in total agreement on all of the issues, but we have reached
agreement on many of our differences and we will continue to work
cooperatively to produce a good bill in this critical area.
Additionally, the Committee is reviewing all law enforcement
training, including homeland security training, provided by all Federal
law enforcement agencies. The Committee is also examining the training
and authority of public and private uniform security officers
protecting Federal buildings and critical infrastructure. As part of
this review, the Committee has written oversight letters to FLETC and
FPS.
C. The Federal Law Enforcement Training Center
According to the FLETC web page, the stated mission of FLETC is
``to serve as the Federal government's leader for and provider of
world-class law enforcement training. We prepare new and experienced
law enforcement professionals to fulfill their responsibilities in a
safe manner and at the highest level of proficiency. We also ensure
that training is provided in the most cost-effective manner by taking
advantage of economies of scale available only from a consolidated law
enforcement training organization.''
D. The Office for Domestic Preparedness
Until passage of the HSA, the Office for Domestic Preparedness was
an office within the Department of Justice responsible for establishing
domestic preparedness programs and activities to assist state and local
governments to prepare for, and respond to, terrorist incidents,
including attacks involving weapons of mass destruction. The Judiciary
Committee, through the enactment of the USA PATRIOT Act, authorized the
Office (formerly the Office for State and Local Domestic Preparedness
Support of the Office of Justice Programs) in the Department of
Justice. The Committee on Judiciary changed the name of this office to
the Office for Domestic Preparedness, in the ``21st Century Department
of Justice Appropriations Authorization Act'' and further authorized
the ODP to assist states and localities.
E. Jurisdiction over Law Enforcement Training at DHS Should Remain in
the Committee on the Judiciary
The Committee on the Judiciary should retain jurisdiction over law
enforcement training for much the same reasons that it should retain
jurisdiction over law enforcement agencies. It has the experience and
expertise in this area. Training, like other law enforcement
activities, requires a careful balancing of interests that a committee
focused solely on security is not likely to handle well. Other law
enforcement agencies will remain with the Committee on the Judiciary
under any scenario, and the training of those agencies, as well as the
DHS agencies, should remain under one committee that can provide a
unified, balanced approach.
With respect to ODP, under any scenario, the vast majority of
grants to state and local law enforcement agencies will be made through
the Office of Justice Programs and that Office will remain with the
Committee on the Judiciary. It makes no sense to split off one
grantmaking office, ODP, and give it to another committee. Again, we
need a balanced, unified approach in this area.
V. DHS Can Function Effectively While Reporting to More Than One
Committee of Jurisdiction
Some argue that DHS cannot function effectively if it must report
to multiple committees. I disagree for a variety of reasons. First, DHS
reports to several committees now, and while there is always room for
improvement, it is functioning effectively now.
Second, every agency reports to at least four committees: a House
authorizing committee, a House appropriations committee, a Senate
authorizing committee, and a Senate appropriations committee. Despite
this, most of our agencies function effectively. Moreover, many
existing agencies report to more than one authorizing committee now.
For example, the Secret Service and the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco,
Firearms, and Explosives always reported to the Committee on the
Judiciary when they were at the Department of Treasury while the rest
of the Department generally reported to the Committee on Ways and
Means. The Federal Trade Commission reports to the Committee on Energy
and Commerce for its consumer protection mission, but to the Committee
on the Judiciary for its antitrust mission. The Commerce Department
reports to the Committees on Energy and Commerce, Science, Resources,
and the Judiciary. The Energy Department reports to the Committees on
Energy and Commerce, Science, and Armed Services. All of these agencies
are able to function effectively within these arrangements.
Third, as outlined above, the Committee on the Judiciary and the
Select Committee on Homeland Security have already shown an ability to
work together effectively on projects of mutual interest. We have
already had one joint hearing, and another one will be held tomorrow.
We are currently working together on first responder legislation.
Regardless of how this matter is resolved, if there is a Committee on
Homeland Security, either select or permanent, I expect this working
relationship to continue. In short, DHS is functioning effectively
under the current committee system, and it can continue to do so in the
future.
VI. CONCLUSION
I believe that the proponents of a Committee on Homeland Security,
select or permanent, in future Congresses have the burden of proof, and
to date, they have not carried it. However that question is resolved, I
emphatically believe that with the Committee on the Judiciary should
retain jurisdiction over all the matters that it now has. We have the
experience and the expertise. Over the years, we have shown the ability
to apply the unified, balanced approach that these issues require. For
those reasons, I believe we should retain our jurisdiction over these
matters.
Mr. Diaz-Balart. Mr. Chairman, in your testimony you talk
about what you consider to be Federal law enforcement agencies,
the Legacy agencies of Customs and INS now, and the Customs and
Border Protection and the immigration and enforcement--the
citizenship and the immigration services, the Legacy agencies
and the TSA and the FPS, which is the Federal Protective
Service and the Coast Guard.
However, the Department of Homeland Security and its
agencies are not just solely law enforcement agencies. Rather,
as the act itself describes, these agencies must work to
prevent terrorist attacks and reduce the Nation's vulnerability
to terrorism. These agencies have a much broader mission than
just law enforcement.
Are you arguing that, for example, on the Customs, Border
Protection and the ICE are actually law enforcement agencies
and therefore you should have sole jurisdiction over those
agencies because you have jurisdiction over the Federal law
enforcement?
Mr. Sensenbrenner. Certain functions of the Customs Service
have always been under the jurisdiction of the Judiciary
Committee, and certain functions have not. My testimony argues
in favor of keeping the existing arrangement as it is. We on
the Judiciary Committee don't want to deal with the enforcement
of the tax laws or the tariff laws. The Ways and Means
Committee has had jurisdiction over that. But in terms of the
actual arrest of people who are smuggling, Judiciary has had
jurisdiction and done oversight over that, and I think it
should remain that way.
Similarly, we have had general jurisdiction over the INS
and its successor agencies.
I don't think you can separate some enforcement functions
from some service functions. The people who check passports at
the ports of entry don't actually enforce a law until they
think that somebody is trying to break the immigration laws. On
the other hand, what types of visas there are that are stamped
in those passports and presented to immigration inspectors at
the ports of entry, is a part of the immigration jurisdiction
that has nothing to do with law enforcement. It has something
to do with terrorism.
But to put whether or not applicants for visas ought to be
interviewed and put that in one committee while putting the
underlying law on who qualifies for a visa in another committee
would make no sense. In terms of doing the oversight, too many
cooks will spoil the broth.
Mr. Diaz-Balart. Ms. Slaughter.
Ms. Slaughter. Mr. Sensenbrenner, I don't have any
questions. Thank you. I appreciate your testimony. It was most
enlightening. Thank you.
Mr. Diaz-Balart. Chairman Cox.
Mr. Cox. Thank you. I wanted to be sure to be here so I
could on the public record thank the chairman of the Judiciary
Committee for the extraordinary working relationship that the
Judiciary Committee has established with the Select Committee
during the 108th Congress. I agree with the representation that
you have laid before this subcommittee about the volume and
quality of work that the Judiciary Committee has done and about
the importance of maintaining the Judiciary Committee's central
roles in each of these areas of expertise, because so much of
it is irreplaceable and simply couldn't be replicated from
scratch or otherwise we would attempt to do so.
Prior to your arriving, I had the opportunity to make a
point with other chairmen about my concern, first for the
importance of the mission of the Department of Homeland
Security, which is protecting us all from annihilation at the
hands of terrorists, but, derivative of that, the importance of
keeping the Department of Homeland Security focused on its
mission. I believe there is an opportunity for the Department
of Homeland Security to be distracted from that mission by
either expanding its current role beyond what it already is
with respect to many parts of our social life in America, or by
essentially taking on other functions that follow from Congress
having put more in the Department, perhaps, than was necessary
strictly for purposes of fighting terrorism.
So I think that defining the mission of the Department and
specifically defining homeland security, something Chairman
Goss mentioned in his testimony, is just as important as our
allocation of responsibility within the Congress.
To the extent that we lose sight of the essential mission
of homeland security in the Department, we are going to create
even more overlap and conflicts among standing committees of
jurisdiction here in the Congress.
Conversely, if we have a good, clear, sharp focus in the
Department of Homeland Security, what we are trying to
accomplish there, the basis for creating that new Department,
then we will have fewer conflicts as we try to oversee that
Department here in the Congress.
I also want to congratulate the Judiciary Committee and
your leadership of it, Mr. Sensenbrenner, for your emphasis on
the importance of and authorization process for the Department
of Justice. It is one of the major responsibilities of
Judiciary, and it is one of the reasons I think that a homeland
security committee could meet the burden that you place before
it of helping make the country safer and of keeping the
Department of Homeland Security focused on its mission.
I think there needs to be a committee whose primary
responsibility it is to look after what is the biggest
reorganization of our Federal Government since the creation of
the Department of Defense, but I take very, very seriously and
understand very clearly the caveats that you have laid out
about duplication of jurisdiction. You are absolutely right
that every committee has--pardon me--every Cabinet department
has at least four committees that it has to report to. The
problem that we have with Homeland Security is that number is
up to 88, and it needs some simplification.
I think that what we could best benefit from at this point,
in addition to your testimony, which has been very clear and
helpful, is perhaps the help of the professional staff, unless
you care to answer it off the cuff, on a question of the
Homeland Security Act itself. Because at least in this Congress
that lies within the oversight of jurisdiction of this Select
Committee. I would ask specifically which things that have been
tentatively placed by the Congress within the jurisdiction of
the Department of Homeland Security do you think should be
excised, if any, and if you are so inclined, are there things
that were left out of the Homeland Security Department thank
you ought to have gone in?
Mr. Sensenbrenner. Well, let me say, first of all, Mr.
Chairman, that I appreciate your comments about the work the
Judiciary Committee has done. And it is not just the chairman.
It is all the members of the committee and the staff.
To answer your question specifically about whether we need
to make changes in the Homeland Security Department creation
act, I think it is too early to say. It has been a major
reorganization of government agencies. I think the Department
has been slower in getting up and running than all of us had
hoped when it was created.
The best example, I think, is the fiasco of the first
responder grants. There is over $5 billion in the pipeline and
our first responders are waiting to get that money to do what
that money is supposed to do in terms of training and equipment
and making us better able to respond to a terrorist strike.
I don't think that there is a problem in the law on this. I
think there is a problem in the implementation of the law, and
this is perhaps where the Homeland Security Committee can do a
good job in doing oversight and getting on the back of those
who have caused this backlog and to get the money flowing as
the Congress intended it to do.
As you know, I do believe that authorization bills ought to
be passed. The DOJ authorization bill that the President signed
in November of 2002 after being passed by a voice vote in both
Houses was the first DOJ reauthorization in 23 years. We have
another one out of the committee, and I hope to have that on
the floor relatively soon. We have still got some rough edges
to negotiate out, but I intend to continue doing this.
Finally, I was present for the tail end of the testimony of
the representatives from the Transportation and Infrastructure
Committee where they talked about biometrics in travel
documents, specifically U.S. passports and visas. That was a
part of the Visa and Border Security Act which the Judiciary
Committee wrote, which was unanimously passed in both Houses
and signed by the President May of 2002. The State Department
was given some deadlines on this. They don't like them, and we
will be hearing from the Secretary of State and I believe
Secretary Ridge after the Easter break on why they need more
time to get this done.
I can tell you that with the U.S. VISIT program, with the
pictures and the fingerprint scans, within the first month when
visa holders were required to do that, there were 30 people
against whom criminal warrants were pending that tried to get
into the United States using forged travel documents that were
apprehended, and 6 of those 30 were wanted for murder. So the
Visa and Border Security Act I think is not only making our
borders more secure, but finding some people that law
enforcement has been looking for for a while.
Mr. Cox. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Diaz-Balart. Thank you.
Chairman Sensenbrenner, as always, your testimony has been
very impressive.
Mr. Sensenbrenner. Thank you.
Mr. Diaz-Balart. I want to add my commendation to the work
of your committee, because it is not only evident but it is
well known and it is important, and so I simply wanted to add
my commendation.
Mr. Sensenbrenner. Thank you.
Ms. Slaughter. No comment. I am going to ask Zoe Lofgren,
Mr. Sensenbrenner, if she has bet all the props.
Mr. Sensenbrenner. Well, I will put on the record that I
have. But even though I presided over most of that or made the
request, these reports in particular, Representative Slaughter,
have really given the bureaucracy their marching orders on
where things are wrong and how to correct them. No executive
branch agency likes oversight being done, regardless of who is
the President, who is the Secretary, and who is in Congress,
but I think the framers made our oversight functions as
important as giving us the power of the purse, because if the
agencies don't spend the money we give them, wisely and
appropriately, then egg is on our face as well as theirs.
Mr. Diaz-Balart. Thank you very much. We are waiting for
the chairman of the Ways and Means committee.
Mr. Diaz-Balart. Welcome the chairman of the Ways and Means
committee, Mr. omas, my good friend. Thank you for being here
this afternoon, and we look forward to your testimony.
Mr. Thomas. Thank you, Mr.Chairman. I would ask unanimous
consent that my written testimony be made a part of the record.
Mr. Diaz-Balart. Without objection, so ordered.
STATEMENT OF THE HONORABLE WILLIAM M. THOMAS, A REPRESENTATIVE
IN CONGRESS FROM THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA, AND CHAIRMAN,
COMMITTEE ON WAYS AND MEANS
Mr. Thomas. Just briefly to comment on the question in
front of us. Many of us are on committees. I have the privilege
of chairing the Ways and Means committee, which is the oldest
committee. One of the first functions established by the
government, as you might guess, was the Customs Service to be
able to raise revenue to run the country.
As the economy of the world has gotten more complex, the
job of Customs has become more complex. I find it rather
interesting at this point in the country's history that we have
gone through--oh, just pick it up from the Civil War period--
the Civil War, Spanish American war, World War I, World War II,
the Korean War, the Vietnamese war, and no one ever thought of
the restructuring as we are talking about doing today.
I agree that the threat to national security is somewhat
unique versus those earlier historical periods, but these sorts
of threats--not to diminish the threat--tend to be cyclical or
periodic, and I am a little concerned that we are talking about
a fundamental restructuring not only of the committees of
jurisdiction perhaps, because all we do is monitor what the
executive branch does to a very great extent, but the way in
which duties that have been developed over two centuries would
be mixed and handled.
I will say that we were as cooperative as I think we could
have been in trying to merge the commercial concerns that run
through the executive department of the Treasury with the
genuine concern that our border security was threatened because
you had a number of different individuals performing distinct
and different duties at the border without overall
coordination.
What has occurred in terms of the coordination of
activities at the border I think was overdue, and it probably
took a crisis such as this to require the rethinking and the
integration of those border duties.
I just have to tell you that the period in which we have
negotiated with the homeland security structure has been one
that I fully anticipated. That is, when your primary title is
security, you make decisions differently than beings who are in
the process of attempting to facilitate commercial intercourse
and have been doing it for several hundred years. The question
of whether or not a potential threat to, say, a port or an
airport would require it to be shut down oftentimes is on the
teeter-totter between public security and freedom. Those people
who have security in their title hastily move to make sure that
the place is secure.
You will recall around the Capitol that if we had no
movement whatsoever, our security would be much higher. In
discussing with the Sergeant At Arms and others, I said, well,
gee, if we were never here, we would be even more secure, so
that if we weren't here and we did nothing, we would have
maximum security. The problem is we wouldn't get much done.
So this relationship is one that will always be in need of
observation, oversight and adjustment.
We had a period where seniors in this country had a number
of needs that weren't being met. We had some Federal programs
for them, but many of their real needs weren't being met. The
House in its wisdom created a committee called the Committee on
Aging. It had no legislative jurisdiction, but it had the
ability to focus concerns about a distinct group, seniors, so
that the committees of jurisdiction could carry out changes in
the law in a more coordinated way through the general
observations of the Committee on Aging; and I think the
Committee on Homeland Security would be a similar structure if
it were to work most successfully.
The idea of focusing on security and having that as your
primary concern, not even necessarily having the ability to
legislate in the area but the ability to coordinate those
efforts with those committees of jurisdiction, I think would
make some sense.
You are always going to have a bit of edge and conflict
where security wants to trump the legitimate other functions,
but having an understanding and a need to continue to
coordinate is I think a very useful and necessary role that the
Committee on Homeland Security could perform. I don't know that
you necessarily have to have a jurisdictional structure. I
don't know that you necessarily have to have the legislative
capability. What you need is the focus on a problem by virtue
of the committee's name ``Homeland Security'' and the need to
maintain coordination among those other committees of
jurisdiction.
So I come down on the side of I think it was overdue. I
think what we have done was a useful and needed step. I would
be very concerned if we created a Committee of Homeland
Security and gave them control from a security point of view of
all of the key points of commerce, not just on our borders but
internally, because I know the decision that would be made more
often than not, the answer would be to stop, slow down, shut
down commerce that is necessary.
So the function could be one of coordination, of concern,
of observation, of assistance, but I would be strongly opposed
to a committee that was created with jurisdiction in ways that
would interfere with a structure that has been successful
through a number of other threats to our security and has
worked marvelously in coordinating those activities over the
last 200 years of the Customs office and duty and service.
Mr. Diaz-Balart. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
PREPARED STATEMENT OF THE HONORABLE WILLIAM M. THOMAS TESTIMONY OF BILL
THOMAS
Chairman Diaz-Balart, Ranking Member Slaughter, and Subcommittee
members, thank you for inviting me to testify on the role of the Select
Committee.
The Committee on Ways & Means has oversight responsibilities over
all functions relating to customs and customs administration, including
tariffs and import fees, classification, valuation, special rules for
imports, and special tariff provisions and procedures. These functions
cover most of the Bureau of Customs and Border Protection (CBP) and a
substantial part of the Bureau of Immigration and Customs Enforcement
(ICE) of the Department of Homeland Security (DHS).
The oversight of the Committee on Ways & Means has a long history.
The Customs Service was the first agency of the federal government to
be created over 220 years ago to collect revenue and to ensure that
imports flow smoothly across the border. Today, Customs collects more
than $20 billion in revenue each year.
Over the years, Customs has taken on many other functions because
of its unique border presence. Fighting against illegal drugs,
transshipped t-shirts, and Rolex knockoffs are just a few of these
other functions. In the wake of the terrorist attacks on the United
States, the role of Customs in guarding our borders against chemical,
biological, and conventional weapons has become more prominent.
While I supported the creation of the new Department, I was
concerned that this move could damage the critical trade function of
Customs. To address those concerns, I worked with many of you, Mr.
Rangel, the Administration, and the Senate to transfer customs
functions to the new department but, at the same time, to maintain
statutory revenue authority within Treasury and to prohibit
consolidation, discontinuation, or diminishing of customs functions,
resources, or staffing.
It is my understanding that this arrangement has functioned fairly
smoothly, but I believe that continued oversight by the Committee on
Ways & Means is necessary to constantly reinforce the importance of
trade functions. Consider this example: At a recent briefing, the
Bureau of Customs and Border Protection presented us with its mission
statement. The first three bullet points were entirely devoted to
security. Trade concerns were not mentioned until the fourth point, and
even there, the focus was on enforcing laws rather than facilitating
trade, stating ``We steadfastly enforce the laws of the United States
while fostering our nation's economic security through lawful
international trade and travel.''
I know it is only natural that when a Department's central mission
is homeland security, the agencies of that Department will be judged on
their ability to support that central mission and will shift their
focus accordingly. However, with international trade comprising nearly
25% of our gross domestic product, CBP's mission to move goods across
the border in a smooth, efficient, and predictable manner cannot be
accorded a mere minor role--instead, it is a vital part of our economic
strength and viability. For that reason, continued active oversight by
Ways & Means is essential.
Oversight by Ways & Means is also important for reasons of
competency. The tremendous range of functions that the border agency
performs requires enormous technical expertise not only of the customs
officials themselves, but also within Ways & Means. Relying on our
expertise, we have exercised considerable oversight on customs matters
since the Customs Service was incorporated into DHS, such as:
Coordination with the Administration to draft an Executive
Order giving the Homeland Security Department general authority over
Customs revenue functions but allowing the Treasury Department to
retain final authority over regulations concerning Customs revenue
functions, and the authority to review, modify, or revoke specified
determinations or rulings.
Markup and passage of the Miscellaneous Trade and
Technical Corrections Act, legislation which makes significant changes
to certain Customs rules.
Passage of legislation to temporarily extend customs user
fees, and examination of whether the level of such fees is commensurate
with the level of services provided. Tracking the user fees in the new
Department to ensure that they are used for commercial functions is
required by our World Trade Organization obligations.
Passage of legislation addressing textile transshipment,
including allocation of funding for 70 new positions, travel, training,
and outreach, and a GAO audit of textile transshipment monitoring.
Oversight of highly technical customs classification
decisions, based on the over 800-page Harmonized Tariff Schedule.
Oversight of the development of the Automated Commercial
Environment, which is designed to fully automate the process of moving
goods across the border, a massive undertaking that will not be
completed until 2007. The General Accounting Office has issued over a
dozen reports on various aspects of this system.
Finally, the Committee plans to hold a hearing on Customs-
related issues in the spring in preparation for our legislation to
reauthorize Customs functions.
The Select Committee on Homeland Security has been a useful
coordinator of the efforts and oversight of the many committees that
have some role in the Department of Homeland Security and can continue
to play an important coordinating role with respect to the work of
these committees. However, oversight over the customs functions
performed by the Bureau of Customs and Border Protection and the Bureau
of Immigration and Customs Enforcement should remain with Ways and
Means as the Committee with jurisdiction over the underlying laws.
Accordingly, I support making the Select Committee permanent only if we
are assured that the ability of Ways & Means to carry out its customs
oversight functions would not be jeopardized. The focus of the Select
Committee on Homeland Security has, quite appropriately, been on
security issues and not the perhaps more mundane, but still critical,
trade and revenue functions. We provide that expertise and oversight.
Mr. Diaz-Balart. You say in your written testimony that you
also appreciate--you state that you would support a permanent
Committee on Homeland Security as long as the Ways and Means
Committee could retain the facility to carry out its Customs
functions.
I guess what I would seek from you is a clarification on
what you consider Customs oversight functions and what--if you
could give us some specificity, some specific roles that you
would envision for a permanent homeland security committee in
those areas.
Mr. Thomas. Well, obviously, if I envision a permanent
homeland security committee but not with the jurisdiction of
Ways and Means, and every other committee that had jurisdiction
asserted the same thing, what you would create would be a
committee that had the theme, much like the Committee on Aging,
of homeland security. That would be their focus, and they would
be working on coordinating to make sure that things worked.
I would be very concerned if you created a committee of
homeland security with jurisdiction and you provided the
Customs duties to that committee, moving them out from under
Treasury, in which the committee makes a decision and has the
total capability of making a decision of shutting down a port
because there was a telephone call and the port was shut down
for 4 days and the argument was that it was for national
security. It would have a devastating effect on the economy of
this country if that were the way in which decisions were to be
made.
So I am very concerned about losing the knowledge and the
ability in a continually growing, complicated area of
intercourse. It is not bright-lighted. It is not a big area,
but, boy, is it necessary to function smoothly as the world's
largest importer and the world's largest exporter. The point at
which those activities occur have to be allowed to go forward
in a very smooth and efficient manner, with the full
understanding of the concerns of security today different than
previously, that we are more than willing to take into
consideration on a negotiated basis with Treasury retaining the
structure that it has, with the ability to consult and make
adjustments. That is where we are today. That arrangement seems
reasonable to me.
But if the option of a permanent committee on homeland
security is to take jurisdiction from other committees and put
it together under the rubric of security and expect, for
example, the Customs fees and duty collection function to
continue would be rather naive. They would be submitted to
security restrictions which I think would make it virtually
impossible for them to do their historic job.
Mr. Diaz-Balart. Ms. Slaughter.
Ms. Slaughter. Mr. Thomas, I have no questions, but thank
you very much for very interesting testimony. I appreciate both
hearing it and reading it. Thank you very much.
Mr. Thomas. Thank you.
Mr. Diaz-Balart. Thank you, Chairman Thomas. Thank you very
much.
The hearing record will remain open for 10 days to allow
for additional testimony and questions. I thank all of the
members who sat through the questions, of course all those who
testified, and at this point we hereby are ending--I hereby end
this hearing.
[Whereupon, at 5:35 p.m., the subcommittee was adjourned.]
ADDITIONAL PREPARED STATEMENTS
THE HONORABLE SHERWOOD BOEHLERT, CHAIRMAN, OF THE COMMITTEE ON SCIENCE
Mr. Chairman and Members of the Subcommittee:
I appreciate the opportunity to testify before you today. The
Science Committee played a central role in the creation of the
Department of Homeland Security (DHS), and we have vigorously exercised
our oversight since its creation.
The Science Committee contributed to every title of the Homeland
Act, but we are especially proud of having created the Science and
Technology Directorate--an entity that was missing from the President's
original proposal--and most of the language in Title III came directly
from the legislation reported by our Committee. We also wrote the
language in Title III creating the Homeland Security Advanced Research
Projects Agency, which was added after the House passed its initial
version of the bill.
We have actively overseen the new Department, paying special
attention to the Science and Technology Directorate, cybersecurity,
programs for firefighters and visas for scientists. Some of our
Committee staff are dedicated almost exclusively to overseeing the
Department, and we have had numerous hearings on, and including, the
Department. For example, at our annual full Committee hearing that
looks at proposed R&D spending across the Federal Government, Under
Secretary Chuck McQueary is one of our witnesses.
We have worked closely with Chairman Thornberry's subcommittee on
your Select Committee, and our staffs have frequently met jointly with
Homeland officials. We have discussed holding joint hearings.
So it is without any animosity and with the utmost respect for the
Select Committee that I turn to the primary questions you have posed to
me. And I hope no one will take any offense at the directness of my
answers.
I do not believe the House needs a committee devoted exclusively to
Homeland Security. In fact, I believe that such a committee is likely
to prove counter-productive. Let me explain why.
First, I think that Republicans are rightly proud that we reduced
the size of House staffs and the number of Committees when we became
the majority. Since 1995, we've recognized the need for some increases,
but creating a new Committee would be a wholesale reversal. At a time
of budget deficits and spending freezes, this seems unwise.
It seems especially unwise because there is no demonstrated need
for a permanent committee. There are two opposing sets of arguments for
such a committee--the first is that the existing committees won't give
homeland security the attention it deserves, and the second is that the
existing committees will pay too much attention, thereby tying down the
new Department, like Gulliver, with 88 Lilliputian subcommittees.
Both of these seem plausible in theory--even though they're
contradictory--but neither has proven to be the case in fact. Standing
Committees, like ours, have exercised rigorous oversight without having
tied down the Department with conflicting demands. Moreover, there are
ways to deal with ``turf issues'' without creating a new Committee,
which I'll get to in a moment or so.
But the main reason not to create a permanent Homeland Committee is
that it will impede, not assist, proper Congressional oversight. How
could that be? Well, in at least two ways.
First, homeland security is not a single task, but a collection of
tasks--and each task needs to be looked at in the context of how the
Federal Government as a whole is carrying out that job. For example, we
can't evaluate what the Homeland Department is doing in science and
technology without a full understanding of what the Federal Government
as a whole is doing in that area. The same is true for transportation,
emergency response, cybersecurity, indeed for each and every
responsibility of the Department--and even more so for DHS
responsibilities unrelated to its homeland mandate. The only way to
properly oversee DHS is through the standing Committees that have the
government-wide purview and expertise to assess the Department's work
in context.
Second, it's an unfortunate fact of institutional life that
Committees can tend to become captives of the agencies they oversee.
This would be especially unfortunate in the case of DHS, which we gave
unusual latitude in the Homeland Act. A Committee whose entire
existence depends on a single Department is more likely to become a
captive of that Department. Congress is much more likely to rigorously
exercise its oversight of DHS if we do so through a variety of
Committees, none of whose existence depends solely on DHS.
But then how to prevent a hopeless proliferation of Committees
pestering DHS? There are many options, but I would suggest giving
primary legislative jurisdiction over each directorate of DHS to the
appropriate standing Committee and having the Committee on Government
Reform exercise its traditional jurisdiction across the agency.
Such a system would be clear and would save DHS from Congressional
chaos--while still subjecting the Department to strong oversight by
Committees with broad expertise in the department's functions. There
may be other ways to achieve that goal, but a permanent Homeland
committee is not one of them.
Let me close by saying that I know that any testimony by any
chairman against a new Committee can be dismissed as petty turf
fighting. I hope the arguments I've made today make clear that
protecting turf is not my motivation.
And I would point out that with term limits, testifying on the
basis of turf is especially pointless. Chairs only have their turf for
a relatively short period of time; we're talking here about changing
Congress for years to come.
Finally, I would say that in the writing of the Homeland Act and in
overseeing the DHS, the House has been remarkably, even
uncharacteristically, free of turf battles. That's a tribute to the
Committees and especially to the Leadership. I think a sensible system
of DHS oversight can continue that peaceable and collegial situation. A
new permanent Committee is more likely to create turf battles than
prevent them.
I urge this Subcommittee to take these arguments seriously. I would
be happy to answer any questions.
THE HONORABLE BART GORDON, RANKING MEMBER, OF THE COMMITTEE ON SCIENCE
Thank you for inviting me to testify regarding changes to Rule X
and the future of the Select Committee. The growing pains of the
Department have been echoed to a lesser degree by some of the
experiences of the Select Committee. That is understandable. Growing a
Committee from scratch is an appreciably difficult task. I think that
Chairman Cox and Ranking Member Turner have done an excellent job at
their core task of keeping track of the progress the new Department has
made in establishing itself and carrying out the terms of the law
creating the Department. All of the Members and staff of the Select
Committee are to be congratulated.
Now we begin to wrestle with the tough question of how we go
forward as an institution. It seems to me that the core rationale for
the creation of the Select Committee--oversight of the messy and
tumultuous process of bringing a new department into being--is eroding
by the day. Beyond that core rationale, there seems to be one central
argument for keeping the Select Committee: it will enhance the
efficiency of the workings of the House. I believe that claim is based
on a faulty understanding of the House, its Committee structure and
operations. In fact, I think the effect of maintaining the Select
Committee would have a generally deleterious effect on the House for
reasons that I will elaborate upon.
My testimony is informed by having been a Member of Congress for
twenty years, and from sitting on two Committees that share
jurisdiction with the Homeland Security Committee. I can say from
experience that the Homeland Security-related jurisdiction of both the
Commerce Committee and the Science Committee, where I have the honor of
being the Ranking Minority Member, can be more than adequately covered
by those Standing Committees.
In fact, both Committees have been active in tending to their
oversight responsibilities related to Homeland Security. I believe they
would be even more active in the future were the Select Committee not
in place.
The jurisdiction of the Science Committee involves the work of the
Under Secretary for Research and Development. The creation of that
office, and the entire R&D title of the organic act, was the product of
the Committee on Science. Those provisions were not in the original
proposal that came from the White House, but were added by my Committee
under the leadership of Chairman Boehlert. Mr. Armey and Ms. Pelosi
both endorsed retaining those elements in the final bill. It is hard to
imagine a more fundamental argument for jurisdiction, or competence to
cover it, than the fact that we created the organic language based on
our own Committee's expertise in the area.
The core logic for creating the Select Committee was the need for
specific, on-going attention to the Executive as the new Department was
brought together. That process is well underway now so the logic for
the Select Committee begins to slip away. The standing Committees are
more than capable of handling, as they have continued to oversee, the
activities of this newest established Department.
But one also hears that even with the Department becoming
established, the need for the Select Committee continues. The core
claim is that the Select Committee will enhance the efficiency of the
House. This is a curious claim. There is only one condition under which
maintaining the Select Committee might enhance our efficiency--that
being that all other standing Committees be stripped of their
legislative and oversight jurisdiction over Homeland Security. I will
return to why such a step would be a folly, but will first address what
inefficiencies attach to keeping the Select Committee without stripping
all other Committees of their jurisdiction.
The first flavor of an efficiency argument is that having the
Select Committee will enhance the House's ability to handle authorizing
legislation. This is an ill-considered argument. Simply designating a
lead Committee from among the standing Committees is a perfectly
reasonable solution. That is the solution the Senate settled upon. The
Senate's reaction to the creation of the Department was to designate
the Government Affairs Committee as the lead for handling legislation
related to the Department, but standing Committees retained their
discrete expertise and responsibilities. Any legislation coming out of
the House that hopes to survive the Senate process will have to take
that into account.
Further, the underlying premise of those who worry about the need
for a lead Committee is that we will move reauthorizations for the
entire Department all in one move. The huge, multi-function, multi-
Committee bill that created the agency is unlikely to be repeated in
future authorizations for a variety of reasons, not least of which will
be the need to give somewhat more frequent legal guidance to this
emerging agency and the difficulty of negotiating such a huge package
either through the House Committee process or, just as importantly, the
Senate Committees of jurisdiction.
My own suspicion is that the authorizations we move will be more
along functional or sub-agency lines. The current standing Committee's
with their legislative jurisdictions will be more than adequate for
handling such legislation. I can imagine an R&D authorization that
could move as a stand-alone bill; or a customs piece or an immigration
service piece; or a coast guard authorization. Such targeted
authorizations seem a far more reasonable expectation for future
legislation than an Omnibus authorization.
If we do need to do a more sweeping authorization, the Speaker has
plenty of tools to deal with the current overlapping jurisdictions. In
such an event, it would be easy enough to adopt the Senate model and
designate one Committee as the lead and let other Committees get
referrals as their jurisdiction is engaged. This is how we handle all
major pieces of authorization. Frankly, unless Rule X is amended to
strip all the Standing Committees of their legislative responsibilities
for the functions that have been rolled into the new Department, this
is what would happen if the Select Committee was made permanent and
given legislative authority. Such a step would add one more Committee
to the mix for referrals--the very opposite of the stated goal of
achieving efficiencies.
Another argument for the need to have a Select Committee rests on
the claim that such a Committee will streamline the oversight process
on the Hill. This is usually attached to some claim that the Department
has to answer to dozens upon dozens of Committees and Subcommittees of
the House and Senate. It always baffles me, absent stripping the
Standing Committees of their jurisdictions, how adding a Committee and
its requisite Subcommittees would do anything but inflate the number of
Committees with jurisdiction; a counterintuitive outcome to the claim
that the Select Committee represents an efficiency enhancement.
Further, the notion that an agency answers to multiple Committees
as an unnecessary burden on both the Executive and Congress always
confuses me. The Science Committee in the House shares jurisdiction
with at least 8 other House Committees on Energy Department issues.
Other Committees, such as International Relations or the Permanent
Select Committee on Intelligence may also have reason to take testimony
from the Department of Energy. There is a similar array of Committees
in the Senate with some claim on the Department. Yet in his over 3
years in office, Secretary Abraham has only come to the Hill 27 times
since his confirmation hearing. I can only recall the Secretary
appearing before the Science Committee on one occasion, and on that
occasion he was testifying in support of the President's energy
initiative. It doesn't seem to me as if these multiple, overlapping
jurisdictions are creating an unnecessary burden on the leadership of
the Department of Energy, nor do I expect it would for the Department
of Homeland Security.
Let me return to the one method by which retaining the Select
Committee could lead to a streamlining of work for the House, that is:
through a complete re-writing of Rule X to center all legislative and
oversight responsibility in the hands of this one Committee. I don't
believe anyone is advocating this, and the problems with such a step
are probably manifest to all. However, I seriously believe that is the
only way to gain any ``efficiency''.
If we strip the standing Committees of their legislative and
oversight responsibilities efficiency will be purchased at the price of
sacrificing our existing expertise. That expertise resides in the
Standing Committees. The Department was not made of whole cloth. It is
instead largely a bundle of pre-existing agencies and programs brought
together because they broadly share in the mission of protecting our
borders. The Committees of the House have generally overseen those
programs from Administration to Administration stretching back over
long years. Expertise on the programs at the Department of Homeland
Security resides today in the same Committees that helped in the
creation of that Department, and it would be foolhardy to diminish
their role in the future work of the Department.
The whole philosophy of organizing the House into Committees of
jurisdiction rests upon a belief that the activities of the Executive,
and the challenges to our nation, are so diverse that we must develop
very specific expertise to be an effective partner and watchdog of the
Executive. Members serve on just a few Committees in their tenure in
the House, no matter how long, and the professional staffs of those
Committees largely stay on with each change in Chairman or Ranking
Member because the institutional knowledge that resides in the staff is
indispensable to the House in carrying out our Constitutional
functions. To strip standing Committees of their jurisdiction in
pursuit of some chimera of efficiency would undercut the source of
strength that resides in the Committee structure.
There is another, more philosophical objection to the pursuit of
efficiency by the House. In the debate surrounding the proposed
Constitution, the Federalists clearly viewed efficiency, energy, action
as an attribute to be attached to the Executive. However, the
legislature was to be a deliberative body designed to examine,
challenge, consider.
In Federalist #70, Alexander Hamilton directly addresses these
differing natures. As to the legislature, he wrote, ``(P)romptitude of
decision is oftener an evil than a benefit. The differences of opinion,
and the jarring of parties in that department of the government, though
they may sometimes obstruct salutary plans, yet often promote
deliberation and circumspection, and serve to check excesses in the
majority (The Federalist Papers, edited by Clinton Rossiter, p. 427).''
It is against the nature of the House, against the intent for how
we should conduct business, that we pursue ``efficiency'' as an over-
riding goal in how we organize our business. I would argue that clear
lines of legislative jurisdiction for the Standing Committees, and
clear guidance from the Speaker, will be more than adequate efficiency
when it comes to moving legislation. When it comes to oversight, I
think a little obscurity is a good thing to create a sense of
competition among the Committees in examining the workings of the
Department, challenging the claims that come up to us and in asking
hard questions. More oversight is better than less oversight, and you
purchase that through the ``inefficiency'' of multiple Committees
having a stake in the Department's operation.
This last observation opens the door to the possibility that a
Select Committee for Homeland Security limited to oversight alone might
be an enhancement of the powers of the House. After all, it would add
one more Committee into the mix that could watch the Executive in this
very important area. I truly believe that the current array of Standing
Committees is more than adequate to create an environment for
aggressive oversight if Congress is of a mind to engage in that duty.
If Congress is not interested in carrying out that function, no number
of Committees, no matter how large, will be sufficient to spur the work
forward.
I thank the Subcommittee for considering my testimony and your
time.
THE HONORABLE HENRY J. HYDE, CHAIRMAN, AND THE HONORABLE TOM LANTOS,
RANKING MEMBER, OF THE COMMITTEE ON INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS
Thank you Mr. Chairman. We appreciate your accepting this statement
for consideration by the Subcommittee on Rules.
Mr. Chairman, as you know, the legislation creating the Department
of Homeland Security has created a major reorganization of the U.S.
Government. When that legislation came before the Committee on
International Relations, however, the Committee had only a relatively
small aspect of that reorganization: the relationship between the
Department of State and the Secretary of Homeland Security.
Mr. Chairman, the immigration function, prior to the creation of
the Department of Homeland Security, was shared between the Department
of State's consular service and the Department of Justice's Immigration
and Naturalization Service. The Committee on International Relations
was regularly involved in overseeing the activities of the Consular
Affairs Bureau at the Department of State and providing authorities and
authorization of its activities, such as the application of visa policy
implementation of programs related to international abductions of U.S.
children and the implementation of the Hague Convention on Inter-
Country Adoption.
The International Relations Committee was also involved in
decisions regarding the designation by the Secretary of State of
Foreign Terrorist Organizations (FTO5), a provision contained in the
Immigration and Nationality Act (INA), and the impact of such
designations on other areas of international affairs legislation, such
as prohibitions on dual-use exports to FTOs and on U.S. assistance. In
addition, there are a number of other immigration-related authorities
committed to the Secretary of State by the 1NA. The Committee conducted
oversight over virtually all these areas. In this context we worked
closely with the Judiciary Committee on these matters, particularly
where there was joint jurisdiction.
The ``Homeland Security Act of 2002'' continues to provide for
substantial authority within the Department of State. Under that Act,
the Secretary of Homeland Security has authority over visa policy, has
the authority to refuse visas, and can develop training programs for
consular officers. In addition, the ``Homeland Security Act of 2002''
maintained certain immigration authorities exclusively under the
Secretary of State and kept the Bureau of Consular Affairs and all
overseas consular officers in the Department of State.
In this context, the Committee on International Relations maintains
a significant interest in the continued oversight of these activities.
In addition to any number of briefings and hearings in these areas
since the enactment of that statute, the Committee has exercised
legislative jurisdiction over a number of consular issues, particularly
through the ``Foreign Relations Authorization Act for Fiscal Years 2004
and 2005.'' We continue to have an abiding interest and expertise in
all the issues that we described above relating to the Department of
State.
We would oppose any effort to transfer jurisdiction over the Bureau
of Consular Affairs or the Committee's role in the Secretary's
authority over immigration activities to any other committee, whether
it to be a new standing committee on homeland security or to any other
standing committee.Assuming that such a transfer does not happen, when
it comes to the question of amending Rule X of the House to create such
a standing committee, the Committee on International Relations could
undoubtedly adapt to such a new situation. If such a committee is
created and includes jurisdiction over the immigration function, we are
sure that the Committee could work with a new standing committee in a
way similar to how it works with the Judiciary Committee. If such a
committee was created through an amendment to Rule X, we would also
strongly recommend that, in order to clarify the relationship between
the two committees, the jurisdiction of the Committee on International
Relations should be clarified by specifically adding ``the Department
of State'' to the matters for which the Committee on International
Relations is responsible.
We are cognizant of the many competing concerns which must be
weighed in the course of this study of the future of the Select
Committee on Homeland Security. The primary consideration should be to
establish the most efficient oversight, investigative, and legislative
processes. However, we would be remiss if we did not raise some
concerns regarding the creation of a new standing committee on the
basis of efficiency. There is, of course, logic in centralizing all
oversight of the new Department in one committee, an effort which would
have obvious benefits. We need to recognize, however, that currently
the several committees that have jurisdiction over the Department of
Homeland Security have a wide range of highly-skilled and experienced
members and staff who have developed real expertise in the particular
areas under their jurisdiction, including immigration, customs, safety
of life at sea and other functions which now reside in Department.
The creation of a standing committee with new members and staff
risks losing this valuable expertise. Indeed, over the short or medium
term, the creation of a single standing committee may actually reduce
the ability of the House to properly oversee this new Department just
as it continues to face the normal challenges from the reorganization.
One option that the Committee may want to consider is postponing the
decision to create a new standing committee on homeland security until
the beginning of the 0th Congress, giving the current structure two
more years to help oversee the Department as it works through these
challenges. In any case, careful consideration must be given to finding
ways to preserve the current expertise if the creation of a new
standing committee is to be given serious consideration.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
THE HONORABLE MICHAEL G. OXLEY, CHAIRMAN, AND THE HONORABLE BARNEY
FRANK, RANKING MEMBER, OF THE COMMITTEE ON FINANCIAL SERVICES
U.S. House of Representatives
Committee on Financial Services
Washington, DC 20515
March 22, 2004
The Honorable Lincoln Diaz-Balart, Chairman
The Honorable Louise Slaughter, Ranking Member
Subcommittee on Rules
Committee on Homeland Security
2244 Rayburn House Office Building
Washington, D.C. 20515
Dear Chairman Diaz-Balart and Ranking Member Slaughter:
Thank you for your recent invitation to appear before the
Subcommittee on Rules on the effect of the Rules of the House on
consideration of homeland security matters. While we will not be
appearing before the Subcommittee, we have enclosed our joint written
statement on the subject, and would appreciate it being made a part of
the hearing record.
Again, we appreciate the invitation to testify, and look forward to
working with you as the Subcommittee continues its work. Should you or
your staff have any questions, please contact either of us, or Mr. Hugh
Halpern of the Majority staff at extension 5-7502, or Mr. Jaime
Lizarraga of the Minority staff at extension 5-4247.
Yours truly,
MICHAEL G. OXLEY
Chairman
BARNEY FRANK
Ranking Member
JOINT STATEMENT OF CHAIRMAN MICHAEL G. OXLEY AND RANKING MEMBER BARNEY
FRANK BEFORE THE SUBCOMMITTEE ON RULES SELECT COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND
SECURITY
March 24, 2004
Chairman Diaz-Balart, Ranking Member Slaughter, and Members of the
Subcommittee, we appreciate this opportunity to offer our views on the
future of the Select Committee on Homeland Security. Our comments for
the Subcommittee will not address the issue of whether the Select
Committee should be added to the list of permanent standing committees
of the House in the 109th Congress or beyond; rather, they will lay out
the important work done by the Committee on Financial Services in the
post-9/11 era, and express our view that any changes to Rule X should
permit our committee to continue our work on those issues.
THE COMMITTEE ON FINANCIAL SERVICES
Established in the 107th Congress, the Committee on Financial
Services represents the latest effort on the part of the House to
rationalize Rule X with the evolution of the modern economy. With the
passage of Gramm-Leach-Bliley and the ongoing modernization of the
financial services industry, the House recognized the need to merge the
jurisdiction of the old Committee on Banking and Financial Services
with jurisdiction over securities and exchanges and insurance
previously exercised by the Committee on Commerce. This combination was
intended to better reflect the realities of the marketplace, and we
believe that our track record demonstrates the wisdom of that decision.
In the 3 short years since the Committee came into existence, we
have been forced to respond to a series of crises which threatened the
economic well-being of the Nation. The Committee was only 9 months old
when Manhattan was attacked on September 11, 2001. Yet the Committee's
oversight and coordination played an important role in ensuring that
banks never closed, the money supply was safe, and the capital markets
reopened within days of the attacks, despite many of those markets
being based within blocks of Ground Zero.
In the weeks following the attacks, the Committee authored
legislation to assist the Department of the Treasury and law
enforcement to track and shut off the sources of terrorist financing
and to provide a temporary Federal backstop to ensure that businesses
could continue to get insurance coverage for acts of terrorism. The
most recent piece of financial services legislation responding to the
September 11 attacks was enacted last year, ensuring that payments can
continue unimpeded, even if the transportation system is crippled.
At the same time, the Committee was forced to respond to a crisis
in confidence created by a series of corporate scandals, further
undermining the resilience of our capital markets. The Committee
responded on several fronts, culminating in enactment of the Sarbanes
Oxley Act, and recent work to address abuses found in the mutual fund
industry.
All of these activities occurred outside of the Homeland Security
Act and the Department of Homeland Security (DHS), yet no one would
argue that they were any less important to the long-term security of
the Nation, or that they should have occurred in any other venue.
CREATION OF THE DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY
During the consideration of the legislation to create DHS, Chairman
Armey of the first Select Committee solicited the views of the
committees of jurisdiction. Chairman Oxley and then-Ranking Member
LaFalce submitted their views on HR. 5005, the Homeland Security Act of
2002 (see attachment). In that letter, they identified several agencies
either within the jurisdiction of the Committee on Financial services
or which have important roles with regard to matters within the
Committee's jurisdiction. While the attached letter discusses the
programs in more detail, they are briefly described below.
Federal Emergency Management Agency
The Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) administers 3
programs which fall under the jurisdiction of the Committee on
Financial Services: (1) the National Flood Insurance Program, (2) the
Emergency Food and Shelter Program, and (3) the Defense Production Act
(DPA). The first 2 programs fall within the Committee's jurisdiction
over public and private housing (ci. 1(g)(8), Rule X), and the
Committee is explicitly given jurisdiction over defense production (cl.
1(g)(2), Rule X).
While each of these programs is related to FEMA's core mission of
preparation, response, and prevention of disasters, they are relatively
small elements of the agency's portfolio. For instance, the Emergency
Food and Shelter Program places FEMA in a coordination role with
charitable third-parties to ensure that food and shelter resources can
be dispatched where they are needed most. Similarly, FEMA's role under
the Defense Production Act is to coordinate Federal agencies' decisions
regarding transportation services and the availability of civil defense
resources in times of national emergency, while other agencies such as
the Department of Commerce and the Department of Defense implement
other aspects of the DPA. The National Flood Insurance Program (NFIP),
while wholly administered by FEMA, is a program which permits
homeowners to purchase flood insurance, a product private insurers
refuse to provide due to problems with the traditional economics of
insurance underwriting when applied to flooding. Unlike much of the
post disaster aid provided by FEMA, NFIP is a premium-supported system,
with the full faith and credit of the United States providing the
ultimate backstop. The program's primary purpose is to ensure that home
buyers can obtain the insurance demanded by lenders when the property
is located within a flood plain.
United States Secret Service
While the Secret Service and its activities do not fall directly
within the jurisdiction of the Committee on Financial Services, it's
origins in the Department of the Treasury and mission have led to its
historic close working relationship with this Committee, its
predecessors, and other financial regulatory agencies. Since the Secret
Service's founding in 1865, it has been the primary protector of the
Nation's currency, and has developed extensive expertise in the
protection of the Nation's payments system. This mission was expanded
with the passage of the Omnibus Crime Control Act (Public Law 98-473)
which gave the Service jurisdiction over crimes involving credit cards,
identity theft, and computer crime. This jurisdiction was expanded
again in 1994 when the Service was given additional jurisdiction to
investigate fraud against financial institutions.
RECENT ACTIVITY IN THE COMMITTEE ON FINANCIAL SERVICES INVOLVING DHS
FEMA
FEMA Programs
The transfer of FEMA to DHS has not affected the legislative or
oversight activities of the Committee on Financial Services. During the
last session of the 108th Congress, the Committee reauthorized the
Defense Production Act. On March 19, 2003, a witness from DHS appeared
alongside witnesses from the Department of Commerce and the Department
of Defense at a hearing on reauthorization of the DPA. The Committee
reported legislation reauthorizing the DPA on April 2, 2003 (H.R. 1280;
H. Rept. 108-56). The DPA was reauthorized through September 30, 2008
with enactment of the companion legislation from the Senate (S. 1608;
Public Law 108-195).
Similarly, the Committee reported legislation reforming and
reauthorizing the National Flood Insurance Program. The Flood Insurance
Reform Act of 2003 (H.R. 253; H. Rept. 108-266) passed the House on
November 20, 2003 by a record vote of 352 yeas and 62 nays, and is
currently pending in the Senate. The Committee has also had to shepherd
a number of short-term extensions of the program in the 108th Congress
(See H.R. 11, H.J. Res. 2, H.R. 2555, 5. 1768).
Secret Service
While the Committee has not reported legislation giving new
responsibilities to the United States Secret Service since its transfer
to the Department of Homeland Security, the Committee continues to
enjoy a close working relationship with the Secret Service as it
oversees the safety and security of the Nation's currency. The Secret
Service worked closely with the Treasury Department's Bureau of
Engraving and Printing (BEP) in the design of the new $20 bill released
last year, and is continuing its work with the redesign of the $50 and
$100 bills, scheduled for release in 2004 and early 2005. With the
Secret Service on the front lines of the battle against currency
counterfeiting, their expertise is essential in the BEP's efforts to
design currency which thwarts counterfeiters using increasingly
sophisticated and readily-available technology.
OTHER HOMELAND SECURITY-RELATED ACTIVITIES IN THE 107TH AND 108TH
CONGRESSES
One of the primary lessons of the post-9/11 era is that ``homeland
security'' is not a monolithic concept. DHS was designed to be multi-
disciplinary, incorporating elements to address border and
transportation security, emergency preparedness and response, and
critical infrastructure protection. Yet, while DHS is one of the lead
agencies in the Nation's fight against terrorism, it does not carry out
that fight alone.
One of the key elements in stopping terrorist attacks before they
begin and catching the perpetrators in their aftermath is tracking
terrorist financing. The Committee has engaged in vigorous oversight of
the Department of the Treasury, the lead agency in this effort, as well
as all of the other financial regulators to ensure that terrorist
financing activities cannot escape detection, and that our financial
system is not abused by terrorists.
Similarly, while DHS is the coordinating agency in the protection
of the Nation's critical infrastructure, the Department of the Treasury
and the other financial regulators, including the Federal Reserve, the
Securities and Exchange Commission, the FDIC, and others, have the day-
to-day responsibility for securing the payments system and capital
markets against all manner of attack. The rapid recovery of the capital
markets and limited disruption of the banking and payments system was
one of the great success stories from the events of September 11.
The Committee on Financial Services has pursued a legislative and
oversight agenda intended to reinforce those elements in the tracking
of terrorist financing and protection of our critical financial
infrastructure, while seeking improvement in those areas where
weaknesses have been found. What follows is a brief description of the
Committee's activities in this regard.
Money Laundering and Tracking Terrorist Financing
What began as an effort to track the activities of drug traffickers
and organized crime has evolved into one of the most essential tools in
the war on terrorism. The Committee and its predecessors have held a
long-standing interest in the matter, and it has been the subject of
legislative and oversight activities since the early-1980's.
Jurisdictionally, money laundering and terrorist financing
enforcement efforts fall into two categories: (1) criminal enforcement
provisions, which fall within the jurisdiction of the Committee on the
Judiciary, and (2) coordination and regulation of activities at
financial institutions, securities firms, and other financial
intermediaries to track and reduce money laundering, which fall within
the jurisdiction of the Committee on Financial Services.
The Department of the Treasury has long been the central
coordinating authority in the effort to track and disrupt the money
flows to terrorists and criminals. Since the establishment of the
Committee on Financial Services in the 107th Congress, it has held a
number of hearings on the subject, including:
Internet gambling and its use as a money laundering
conduit (7/11/2001);
The design and security of the Nation's currency (7/24/
2001);
Dismantling the financial infrastructure of global
terrorism (10/3/2001);
Preventing identity theft by terrorists and criminals (11/
8/200 1);
Oversight of the USA PATRIOT Act and investigating
patterns of terrorist financing (2/12/2002; 9/19/2002);
Recovering monetary assets stolen by dictators (5/9/2002);
Progress since 9/11 in tracking terrorist financing (3/11/
2003);
Freezing, seizing, and repatriating funds stolen by Saddam
to Iraq (5/14/2003; 3/18/2004); and,
The Hamas asset freeze and other efforts to curtain
terrorist financing (9/24/2003);
Additionally, the subject of terrorist financing and efforts to
curtain money laundering are often the subject of questions during
Chairman Greenspan's twice-yearly appearances on the state of monetary
policy and the economy, as well as during routine oversight hearings on
the other financial regulators.
Legislatively, the Committee has also been active in efforts to
curtain money laundering. The most substantial effort in this regard
was the Financial Anti-Terrorism Act of 2001 (H.R. 3004, 107th
Congress), enacted as title III of the USA PATRIOT Act (Public law 107-
56). This measure contained a wide-variety of provisions addressing
activities commonly associated with money laundering. It gave the
Treasury Department important new authorities to reduce the traditional
avenues of terrorist financing, such as hawala and other informal
money-transfer systems which operate outside of the traditional banking
system.
Additionally, the Act strengthened already existing elements with
the Treasury Department to ensure that they were suited to the job of
tracking terrorist financing. Most notably, the Financial Crimes
Enforcement Network (FinCEN) was elevated from an office to a bureau
within the Treasury, and it was given significant new standing and
resources. FinCEN draws on the expertise of a number of different
agencies to serve as an ``early warning'' system for terrorist
financing, attempting to discover efforts by criminals and terrorists
to move money through the system before it can be used to finance
criminal acts. The Committee continues to closely monitor FinCEN's
progress, and is actively engaged in making its efforts successful.
Similarly, the Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) is an entity
within the Treasury Department which receives regular scrutiny from the
Committee. OFAC's mission is to freeze, seize and assist in the
repatriation of foreign assets found in the U.S. banking system. OFAC
and FinCEN, when taken together, are the frontline organizations in the
Nation's battle against money laundering, representing the
consolidation of expertise on the matter.Critical Infrastructure of the
Nation's Financial System
One of the lessons arising from the events of September 11 was the
importance of protecting the critical infrastructure of the Nation's
financial system. The planes which hit the World Trade Center were a
direct attack on the Nation's capital markets. The New York and
American stock exchanges were temporarily shut down after the attacks,
and a number of large market-makers, clearing operations, and other
financial intermediaries were actually located within the towers
themselves. However, the New York Stock Exchange was only closed for 4
business days, and the market infrastructure demonstrated an astounding
degree of resilience given the magnitude of the destruction.
Much of the credit goes to preparations made by the financial
services sector in their effort to avoid problems associated with the
Y2K bug. During those efforts, many of the exchanges, firms, and
financial institutions took the opportunity to build redundancy and
backup systems, and perfect their disaster recovery procedures. Those
efforts were invaluable in ensuring that the quick recovery of the
markets.
However, those same events revealed other weaknesses in the system
which the Committee continues to pursue. While critical infrastructure
protection has many common elements across industries, such as the need
to protect important telecommunications or transportation arteries, the
financial services sector has demonstrated that if other assets
peculiar to that industry aren't protected, the results can be
disastrous. By way of example, after the completion of a sales
transaction for equities, the transaction goes through a ``clearing''
process which can take up to 5 days. If the records of those
transactions are lost during the clearing process, literally billions
of dollars could disappear from the economy in the blink of an eye. In
the event of an emergency, the markets and their associated sales and
clearing systems must be shut down in an orderly process so as to
minimize the potential economic effects of a catastrophic failure.
Through a pattern of cooperation with the financial regulators and
their regulated firms, the Committee has had a record of successful
identification of problem areas, and efforts are under way to address
those flaws. For instance, on February 12, 2003, the Subcommittee on
Capital Markets, Insurance, and Government Sponsored Enterprises held a
hearing entitled ``Recovery and Renewal: Protecting the Capital Markets
Against Terrorism Post 9/11.'' This hearing featured the testimony from
the General Accounting Office (GAO) highlighting their work on the
financial services critical infrastructure issue, entitled ``Potential
Terrorist Attacks: More Actions Needed to Better Prepare Critical
Financial Markets'' (GAO as well as other testimony from the Securities
and Exchange Commission, the New York Stock Exchange, NASDAQ, and the
Bond Market Association. The Committee's efforts to address problem
areas is ongoing both in public and non-public oversight efforts.
Through the work of this study and the Committee's other work on the
subject, it is apparent that a high level of expertise in the operation
of the markets is necessary to protect its unique infrastructure.
RECOMMENDATIONS FOR THE SUBCOMMITTEE
Most of the preceding material described the Committee's
interaction with DHS on those programs within its jurisdiction and the
Committee's other activities which might be characterized as
``related'' to homeland security. However, as you can see from those
descriptions, our work has focused on the aspects of homeland security
which are financial in nature, and essential to the proper functioning
of the financial services sector.
In general, should the House decide to add the Homeland Security
Committee to the roster of standing committees of the House, we believe
that those matters that currently fall within the Financial Services
Committee's Rule X jurisdiction are distinct enough so as to avoid any
interference with the current or future work of the Homeland Security
Committee. The Committee on Financial Services and its predecessors
have a demonstrated expertise in the increasingly complex financial
services sector which we should be permitted to continue to exercise.
Specifically, should the House decide to reorganize Rule X to
better define the Homeland Security jurisdiction in the House, we
recommend:
1. Programs administered by FEMA which currently fall within the
jurisdiction of the Committee on Financial Services should remain
within its jurisdiction. Those programs include the Defense Production
Act (which FEMA shares with the Departments of Defense and Commerce),
the Emergency Food and Shelter Program, and the National Flood
Insurance Program. All of these programs are directly related to the
core jurisdiction of the Committee on Financial Services, in either the
areas of housing or defense production, price controls, or industrial
policy. The Committee's legislative efforts on these matters have not
been impeded by the transfer of FEMA to DHS. Similarly, other
committees have always been FEMA's authorizing committees, and their
efforts have similarly been unimpeded.
2. Jurisdiction over money laundering and terrorist financing
should remain with the Committee on Financial Services. Despite the
importance of money laundering and terrorist financing regulation to
the efforts to protect the homeland, those programs are closely related
to the regular operations of financial institutions and similar firms.
The Department of the Treasury continues to be the lead agency in
tracking, freezing, seizing, and repatriating illegal financial assets,
and the Committee on Financial Services should maintain its traditional
role in overseeing those operations.
3. Any grant of critical infrastructure protection to a Committee
on Homeland Security should only be ``general'' While there is a role
for a committee to play in formulating overall critical infrastructure
protection policy, the oversight of specific sectors should remain with
the committees of jurisdiction. This is similar to the grant of
jurisdiction over insurance to the Committee on Financial Services,
where the Financial Services Committee is granted jurisdiction over
``insurance, generally'', while other committees have jurisdiction over
health insurance, crop insurance, and other similar matters. In the
case of the Committee on Financial Services, oversight of the critical
infrastructure efforts specific to the financial services sector should
remain with the Committee on Financial Services.
We hope that you have found these explanations and recommendations
helpful in your deliberations. We stand ready to assist the
Subcommittee and the Select Committee further should you require our
assistance.
ATTACHMENT
U.S. House of Representatives
Committee on Financial Services
Washington, DC 20515
July 11, 2002
The Honorable Richard K. Armey, Chairman
Select Committee on Homeland Security
U.S. House of Representatives
Washington, DC 20515
Dear Chairman Armey:
The terrorist attacks of September 11 demonstrated the need for
improved security and prevention measures to combat acts of violence
against U.S. citizens. The Financial Services Committee has contributed
to the fight against terrorism by cutting off funding for organizations
that finance terrorist activities and strengthening existing money
laundering laws through the USA PATRIOT Act (P.L. 107-56).
Additionally, the Committee has sought to prevent catastrophic economic
losses from such attacks through the passage of the Terrorist Risk
Protection Act (H.R. 3210).
The Financial Services Committee has done an extensive review of
its jurisdiction as it relates to the President's proposal to create a
Department of Homeland Security (H.R. 5005). The Committee strongly
supports the efforts of the President and the Select Committee on
Homeland Security to create a new executive department that will
coordinate resources in an effort to prevent attacks on the United
States.
While the Committee will not mark up H.R. 5005, it would like to
identify its jurisdiction over this legislation and reserve its right
to consider the issues within our jurisdiction in the future. The
Committee believes that it is in the best position to continue
oversight of these programs, regardless of what executive department
they are located.
The following represents our views about how the programs within
our jurisdiction will integrate into the new Department of Homeland
Security:
FEDERAL EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT AGENCY
The Committee has jurisdiction over three programs within the
Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) that would become the
responsibility of the new department created through H.R. 5005. These
programs are: the National Flood Insurance Programs, the Defense
Production Act and the Emergency Food and Shelter Program. FEMA's
mission is to prevent, prepare for, respond to, and recover from
disasters of all types. The, Committee believes that the expertise of
FEMA in consequence management is critical to the function of the
proposed Office of Homeland Security
National Flood Insurance Program--The National Flood Insurance Act
of 1968 (42 USC 4001 et seq.) created the National Flood Insurance
Program (NFIP) and authorized the Director of FEMA to administer the
Federal Insurance Administration (FIA). The FLA provided insurance
protection for properties which are vulnerable to floods, but not
insured by the private sector. Prior to passage of this act, insurance
companies generally did not offer coverage for flood disasters because
of the high risks involved. The legislation as amended in 1973 and 1994
authorized the FIA and Mitigation Directorate to administer the NFIP.
In 2001, the FJA and the Mitigation Directorate were brought together
into a single organization, the Federal Insurance and Mitigation
Administration (FIMA).
FIMA has expertise in risk assessment, mitigation or loss
prevention and insurance. Efforts such as resident education and flood
mapping enable FEMA to reach out to residents in flood prone regions
and protect against preventable losses. These services work in
conjunction with the NFIP and have proven successful in building
relationships in regions where floods are a threat to property and
lives. The Committee understands that FIMA's risk assessment programs
are now being designed to assist local communities to identify and
address their vulnerabilities from natural and man-made disasters.The
Committee views FEMA's efforts to prevent and mitigate damage from
floods as critical to the protection of lives and property. The
Committee further believes that it is important that the NFIP and the
FIMA to work together efficiently in the prevention of losses from
floods and from other disasters and for that reason should for the time
being remain within FEMA as it is transferred to the Department of
Homeland Security. FEMA's programs may be reviewed by the Committee in
the future in an effort to improve their operation and to ensure that
users are properly served.
The Defense Production Act--The goal of the Defense Production Act
of 1950 (50 USC App. 2062) (DPA) is to ensure that the United States
has the ability to mobilize industrial and other civilian resources in
support of national defense an civil emergency preparedness maintain
military readiness when there is a threat to national security. The DPA
is essential to the protection of the United States in so far as it
uses economic tools to provide uninterrupted supplies of industrial
resources in times of military crisis and civil emergency.
The DPA authorizes FEMA to coordinate Federal agencies' decisions
concerning the provision of transportation services, the priority
availability of civil defense resources, materials, services and
facilities to ensure the dispersal of such resources in the interest of
national defense. The DPA was reauthorized by the Financial Services
Committee in 2001 for two years (F.L. 107-47).
The Committee believes the DPA is an important mechanism for the
protection of the United States and should be located in the new
Department of Homeland Security. Through the President's proposal, the
DPA will be very important to mobilize national defense and civil
emergency preparedness resources in the event of a terrorist attack or
in an effort to ensure that there is adequate preparation to prevent
such an attack.
T2The Emergency Food and Shelter Program--The Emergency Food and
Shelter Program (EFSP) (P.L. 100-77) is governed by a national board
consisting of several charitable organizations and is chaired by FEMA.
The goal of this program is to allocate Federal funds for the provision
of food and shelter. The national board awards funds to jurisdictions
based upon a formula. Further, a small portion of the overall award is
allocated by formula to state set-aside committees which then allocate
funds to jurisdictions based upon the criteria they feel is most
appropriate. The EFSP seeks to ensure that allocations are quickly made
to neediest areas of the country, that the public and private sectors
cooperate, and that decisions are made at the local level. In 2001,
$140 million in aid was distributed through this program.
It can be argued that the operation of food and shelter programs
has little to do with the protection of the United States from
terrorist activities. However, the EFSP is a critical program which
supplies food and shelter to needy people in emergency situations, and
to ensure that the program remains effective and functional, the
Committee recommends that it remain within FEMA at this time. The
President's 2003 budget proposal calls for the EFSP to be moved from
FEMA to the Department of Housing and Urban Development. This could be
an effective allocation of Federal resources to aid those in need, and
the Committee may examine the viability of such a move in the future.
UNITED STATES SECRET SERVICE
The Committee commends the President for his proposal to move the
United States Secret Service (USSS) to the new Department and maintain
it as a ``distinct entity'' outside the four major jurisdictional
cylinders established under the new Secretary. The Committee believes
that the long dual-role history of the Service--investigative and
protective--combined with its more recently developed expertise in
preventing and investigating cyber crimes and its core mission of
protecting the financial system of the United States, make the USSS
uniquely suited to draw from and augment the work of the other
component agencies of the new Department.
Since its founding in 1865 as the first investigative arm of the
United States government and the protector of the integrity of U.S.
currency, the Service has been the primary guardian of the country's
financial services--banks, currency and payment systems. The added
mission of personal protection, dating to 1901 following the
assassination of President William McKinley, built on the Service's
expertise at preventing crimes. That mission statement was expanded
again in 1984 with passage of the Omnibus Crime Control Act (P.L. 98-
473), adding jurisdiction over new crimes involving identity theft,
access devices such as credit cards, and computer crimes. In 1994,
further jurisdiction was added, recognizing USSS expertise
investigating fraud against financial institutions. Today, the Secret
Service has over 6,000 employees, an annual budget of just over $1
billion and 125 field offices across the United States and around the
world.
Infrastructure Protection-- Springing from the Service's personal-
protection role is the unique and important duty to protect critical
infrastructures of the United States. The Committee believes this role
should become an enhanced portion of the Service's duties at the new
Department.
The events of September 11 reinforce lessons the Committee learned
in efforts to protect against financial-system and infrastructure
failures due to the Year 2000 problem: that in an increasingly
computerized and inter-connected world, the failure of a seemingly
innocuous system can cause panic, deaths or economic calamity. Recent
news stories indicating that Al Qaeda operatives have been probing the
cyber security of U.S. power systems and dams as well as banks and
defense systems show that the lesson has not been lost on terrorists,
either. A serious compromise of these electronic networks could wreak
havoc on our economy, law enforcement, military, health care,
transportation and emergency services.
Cyber Crime--Cyber criminals have devised sophisticated programs
and techniques to defraud both consumers and private industry through
electronic means. In response, the Secret Service has developed new
tools to combat the growing areas of cyber terrorism, financial crime
and computer fraud. These techniques include the widely respected
Electronic Crimes Special Agent Program and the series of task forces
modeled on the New York Electronic Crimes Task Force that are now under
development. The former program provides specialized training to select
agents in all areas of electronic crimes, qualifying those personnel as
experts in the forensic examination of electronic evidence. The USA
PATRIOT Act, to which the Committee contributed a major title,
authorized the Secret Service to establish a nationwide network of
cyber crime task forces, based on the New York model that uses an
innovative approach allowing local, state and national law enforcement
agencies to combine their resources and experience with those of
prosecutors, the private sector and academic institutions to deter
electronic crimes of all sorts. In recent months, the Service has
launched similar task forces across the country. The Committee strongly
supports these efforts and believes they can be instrumental in
preventing crimes that could disrupt the financial systems of the
United States.
Anti-Counterfeiting--The Service's original mission in 1865 was to
block the counterfeiting of the newly issued national currency, and
while the mission does not today have the profile of protecting the
President, it remains a core function. Indeed, the USSS anti-
counterfeiting efforts may be even more important today than they were
a century ago, as the U.S. dollar is the reserve currency of the world,
is the official currency of a number of countries, and is the default
currency of many more. The public's faith in the integrity of the
dollar is at the heart of the stability of the U.S. economy.
Thus, the Committee believes that the Service's efforts to combat
counterfeiting deserve continued and enhanced emphasis. Recent
discoveries in Colombia of credible counterfeits of the new U.S. one-
dollar coin and in both Colombia and in areas of Eastern Europe of
counterfeit plants producing or ready to produce both U.S. banknotes
and the new Euro banknotes indicate the magnitude of the problem. The
Committee believes that the continued growth of counterfeiting by
personal computer in the U.S. eventually will be mirrored overseas,
where counterfeiting still mostly is done on presses and is thus
somewhat easier to interdict. Also, the Committee believes that the
establishment of more overseas field offices so that agents can gather
and act on information first-hand--rather than relying on other Federal
law agencies or other countries' law-enforcement--will increase the
ability to stop counterfeiting.
Given the demonstrated nexus between counterfeiting, drug-running,
arms-smuggling and terrorism, the Committee strongly believes that
trying to staff anti-counterfeiting and other anti-crime and threat-
assessment efforts for all of Central and South America and the
Caribbean (except Colombia) from a single office in Miami is simply not
practical anymore.
The Committee further believes that the Service's recent agreement
with Europol to jointly police against counterfeiting is an important
move and a model for other law enforcement that should be encouraged.
The Committee stands ready to enhance other anti-counterfeiting law, as
appropriate.
Financial Crimes--The Service's pedigree as the only Federal
investigative unit until some of its agents were detailed to help form
the Federal Bureau of Investigation in 1907, and its position within
the Department of the Treasury, naturally led to a good relationship
with the financial services industry and successes in stopping
financial crimes. In the 1 980's, with the advent of relatively new
technologies such as computers and credit cards came a wave of an
entirely new sort of bank and financial fraud, and the 1984 Act created
three new criminal statutes--Title 18, Sections 1028, 1029 and 1030--to
deal with fraud in conjunction with identity documents, access device
fraud arid computer crimes, giving the Service major new authorities
and clear jurisdiction. The USA PATRIOT Act cemented the Service's
jurisdiction over Sections 1030 and 1344. The Committee believes that
the Service's role in these areas, as well as the assessment of threats
against financial services companies and the protection of that
infrastructure--communications, power, etc.--vital to those companies,
is invaluable and should be emphasized.
Monetary Security--While the President's legislative proposal for
the new Department does not suggest consolidating the Treasury
Department's monetary security forces into the new Department, the
Committee believes that this could be an important step that should be
closely examined. Currently the United States Mint and the Bureau of
Engraving and Printing (BEP) maintain separate security forces that
over the years have had varying degrees of success. The Committee feels
that transferring this mission to the Secret Service in the new
Department would have important benefits both to the security of the
facilities that produce the country's currency and coins, and also to
the security of U.S. gold reserves held at Fort Knox, currently under
the supervision of the Mint. Noting that the BEP currently relies on
the USSS heavily for consultations on its security arrangements, the
Committee further believes that moving this mission to the Service may
allow the currency- production arms of the Treasury to concentrate on
what they do best and allow the Service to train its newest agents in a
different form of protection detail, ultimately enhancing their
abilities.
The Financial Services Committee strongly supports the efforts of
the President and the Select Committee on Homeland Security to protect
our citizens from terrorist attacks. While the Committee waives its
referral of H.R. 5005, its Members stand ready to assist in the
structuring of the envisioned Department of Homeland Security if such
assistance is requested.
Yours truly,
MICHAEL G. OXLEY
Chairman
BARNEY FRANK
Ranking Member
THE HONORABLE CHARLES B. RANGEL, AND RANKING MEMBER OF THE COMMITTEE ON
WAYS AND MEANS
Chairman Diaz-Balart and Ranking Member Slaughter, I appreciate the
invitation to present my formal views to Members of the Subcommittee on
Rules regarding the Select Committee on Homeland Security (``the Select
Committee''). Establishment of the Select Committee for the 1 08
Congress was necessary to insure effective oversight and coordination
in the creation of the Department of Homeland Security (DHS). Without
question, the Committee played a valuable role in implementing the
Homeland Security Act of 2002, monitoring the activities of the DHS,
and providing a meaningful Congressional forum for discussion of our
homeland security activities, problems, and concerns.
On the issue that is the subject of this hearing, the future of the
Select Committee, I believe that there could be a continued role for
the Select Committee to play, particularly with regard to coordinating
the oversight and authorization activities of the various House
committees that retain primary jurisdiction over elements of the
Department of Homeland Security. That said, I do believe that the
Committee on Ways and Means continues to have an important role in
directly overseeing the customs activities of DHS, and in particular,
the Customs and Border Protection (CBP) division. Much of the customs
work done at CBP directly relates to revenue measures (e.g., collection
of duties and implementation of U.S. trade laws, including laws related
to U.S. trade agreements).
My current view is consistent with the position I took during
passage of the Homeland Security Act of 2002. There I expressed strong
reservations about the movement of the former U.S. Customs Service
(USCS), which dealt with the movement of people, goods and cargo across
our borders, from the Department of the Treasury to the new Department
of Homeland Security.
My reservations stemmed, in large part, from the simple fact that
the USCS played a unique role among all of the border agencies. USCS
had a two-fold mandate--it was an enforcement agency and trade
facilitation agency. On the enforcement side, USCS policed the borders
to prevent the entry of contraband (drugs, hazardous materials,
terrorist implements, etc). On the trade facilitation side, USCS
processed imports, collected duties, produced trade statistics,
determined classification of products, and monitored and prevented the
illegal transshipment of goods.
During the debate over the creation of the Department of Homeland
Security, I wanted to make clear, if the USCS were moved from Treasury,
that whatever reconstituted agency emerged would not be dominated by a
focus on enforcement activities to the detriment of trade facilitation.
The compromise eventually adopted in the Committee on Ways and Means,
which preserved certain core trade positions from USCS at Treasury,
attempted to address part of that concern, albeit imperfectly. I say
imperfectly because many elements of the USCS were still moved to DHS,
even though they are involved in what I view as essentially trade
facilitation activities.
As you know, the Committee on Ways and Means' jurisdiction on
trade- related issues includes ``customs and customs administration . .
.procedures which relate to customs operations affecting exports and
imports. . .budget authorizations for the U.S. Customs Service. . . .''
Given the continued trade focus of aspects of the CBP, the Committee on
Ways and Means should continue to have primary jurisdiction over the
trade facilitation aspects of the agency. Committee on Ways and Means
oversight is necessary to ensure that trade facilitation does not
become a secondary function of the CBP but rather continues as a tier-
one priority along with border security and enforcement, as it was
under the former USCS.
The trade-related nature of many of CBP's activities is evident
from many of the primary projects CBP is pursuing as part of its core
operations.
First, take the Customs-Trade Partnership Against Terrorism (C-
TPAT) which is a partnership between the Federal Government and
industry. Under the program, participating companies agree to adopt
``best practices'' to improve the security of their shipments from the
factory floor to the foreign loading docks to the U.S. border points of
entry. Those companies meeting security standards are then given a fast
lane through border crossings and sea ports.
C-TPAT obviously serves two purposes. First, it helps CBP ensure
that incoming cargo to the United States contains legitimate trade and
has not been compromised by terrorists or smugglers of contraband.
Second, and equally important, C-TPAT faciliates trade. It allows
companies importing goods into the United States to get those goods
processed in a timely, efficient manner. In this era of just-in-time
delivery, this is crucial to the survival of any company.
Second, take the Automated Commercial Environment (ACE) which is
the new trade processing system that will enable CBP to track, control,
and process all commercial goods imported into and exported out of the
United States. ACE was developed to replace the former USCS's existing,
outdated automation system, which could not handle the massive increase
in the volume of United States trade. A recent U.S. General Accounting
Office study reported that the benefits of ACE include ``speeding the
flow of legitimate commerce into and out of the United States . . . and
providing a single interface between the trade community and the
Federal Government for trade data.''
Third, consider how the CBP's core mission is described in the
President's fiscal year 2005 budget justification materials: ``CBP . .
. implements and enforces the international trade agreements, such as
the North American Free Trade Agreement . . ., the African Growth and
Opportunity Act . . ., the Andean Trade Act, and the Caribbean Basin
Initiative. In some instances, CBP officials are involved in trade
negotiations on trade agreements. Other issues that CBP is involved in
are the enforcement of the Trade Act of 1930 This can include taking
enforcement action for any forced child labor or anti-dumping
countervailing violations Also in support of domestic industry, CBP
enforces . . . laws pertaining to intellectual property rights . . . .
CBP administers and enforces any quotas on specific products such as
textiles.''
Finally, consider that in fiscal year 2003, CBP processed 26.1
million import entries, valued at over $1.2 trillion, and collected
$24.7 billion in duties and fees.
I understand that CBP has other responsibilities. After all, the
agency is not just comprised of the former USCS. It has immigration
inspectors from the former Immigration and Naturalization Service,
agricultural border inspectors from the Agriculture Department, and the
entire Border Patrol. The total number of employees in CBP is 40,000.
The Ways and Means Committee, of course, does not have jurisdiction,
nor would I argue we should have, over these other elements of CBP.
Other standing Committees have the requisite expertise to handle such
matters.
As I indicated from the outset, I do believe that the Select
Committee could have a role to play in coordinating the activities of
the standing committees of jurisdiction and in providing technical
support on a bipartisan basis. Further, continued oversight of DHS
priorities and decisions will undoubtedly create balanced, ``good
government'' analyses that will benefit all Members of the Congress.
In conclusion, I want to again support the efforts of the Select
Committee on Homeland Security. It is only with our commitment and
cooperation that, together, we can fight international terrorism and
protect our borders at home.
THE HONORABLE C.W. BILL YOUNG, CHAIRMAN OF THE SUBCOMMITTEE ON RULES
Ladies and Gentlemen of the Subcommittee on Rules, I am pleased to
share with you today my observations and reflections of the House
Committee on Appropriations' oversight structure for homeland security
programs and activities. These observations are based upon my
experience of reorganizing the House Committee on Appropriations last
year. I believe that the House Committee on Appropriations is the only
committee of the House that has permanently reorganized in the wake of
the tragic events of September 11, 2001, and the establishment of the
Department of Homeland Security. Doing so was no small task. In fact,
the last reorganization of the Committee on Appropriations was some 3
decades ago and is indicative of the difficulty in proposing and
implementing change in this institution.
The Committee was guided by several principles in developing and
implementing its reorganization plan: firstly, the committee needed to
provide a structure of oversight to the Department of Homeland
Security. The department itself lacked an institutional structure; it
was a conglomeration of several disparate agencies. Secondly, we had to
create a subcommittee that was comprised of members and staff that had
the credibility and tenacity to provide effective oversight over a
nascent department with arguably some of our government's most
important programs. We had to move quickly, without regard to political
turf, and we had to move unilaterally. I would like to expound on each
of these points briefly.
The imperative for the Committee (and the department presumably)
from the outset was to provide a structure for the legacy agencies to
coalesce into a single department with a coordinated, unified mission.
The vast number of agencies, accounts and programs that were
transferred to the new Department of Homeland Security cut across the
majority of our thirteen subcommittees. Clearly, it would not be
physically possible for the Secretary of the Department of Homeland
Security to testify before each of seven appropriations subcommittees,
an equal number of authorizing committees, and to organize a new
department, and most importantly, to improve our nation's security. And
just as the Secretary could not focus on his new job at hand and
testify and report to several different subcommittees, the Committee
would find it equally difficult to provide consistent oversight and
appropriate funding levels if the myriad of the department's programs
and activities were scattered across seven subcommittees. It was
obvious to me early that we needed to reorganize--to provide a
structure to ourselves and for the new agency that we were to oversee
and fund.
Like national defense, homeland security should be above political
infighting. To that end, we decided that the new subcommittee should be
an ``exclusive'' subcommittee, comprised of members with previous
oversight experience of the programs of the new department and had who
proven themselves to be thoughtful, deliberative and above the
political fray. We felt that these traits were important for the
members to serve on this subcommittee since, in the absence of a single
permanent committee with exclusive jurisdiction of homeland security
programs, this subcommittee would be the sole committee providing
continuing oversight without regard to inter-authorizing committee
jurisdictional concerns. Just as it was important to ensure that the
members of the subcommittee had oversight experience, we drew from the
senior committee personnel to staff the new subcommittee. The staff has
extensive program management, administrative and legislative
experience. Members and senior staff were moved from our old
transportation, energy and water, and treasury/postal subcommittees.
Doing so ensured effective oversight and a structure to produce a
bipartisan bill in a timely manner.
Lastly, the decision was made to act decisively and unilaterally. I
briefed the chairmen of the affected subcommittees and my leadership of
the planned reorganization. I selected the new chairman. And I acted.
Broad discussion with stakeholders would have proven fatal to a
reorganization that had to be in place quickly to ensure our
government's newest department was up and running quickly with proper
and effective management controls in place and robust and continuing
oversight conducted by the Appropriations Committee. Within a few short
weeks, the Senate replicated the House Committee on Appropriations'
reorganization.
I hope that my experience in reorganizing the Committee on
Appropriations proves useful to you as you consider the appropriate
authorizing structure of the programs of the Department of Homeland
Security.