[Joint House and Senate Hearing, 108 Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
HONG KONG AFTER THE ELECTIONS: THE FUTURE OF ``ONE COUNTRY, TWO
SYSTEMS''
=======================================================================
HEARING
before the
CONGRESSIONAL-EXECUTIVE COMMISSION ON CHINA
ONE HUNDRED EIGHTH CONGRESS
SECOND SESSION
__________
SEPTEMBER 23, 2004
__________
Printed for the use of the Congressional-Executive Commission on China
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CONGRESSIONAL-EXECUTIVE COMMISSION ON CHINA
LEGISLATIVE BRANCH COMMISSIONERS
House
Senate
JIM LEACH, Iowa, Chairman
DAVID DREIER, California
FRANK WOLF, Virginia
JOE PITTS, Pennsylvania
SANDER LEVIN, Michigan
MARCY KAPTUR, Ohio
SHERROD BROWN, Ohio
DAVID WU, Oregon
CHUCK HAGEL, Nebraska, Co-Chairman
CRAIG THOMAS, Wyoming
SAM BROWNBACK, Kansas
PAT ROBERTS, Kansas
GORDON SMITH, Oregon
MAX BAUCUS, Montana
CARL LEVIN, Michigan
DIANNE FEINSTEIN, California
BYRON DORGAN, North Dakota
EXECUTIVE BRANCH COMMISSIONERS
PAULA DOBRIANSKY, Department of State
GRANT ALDONAS, Department of Commerce
JAMES KELLY, Department of State
STEPHEN J. LAW, Department of Labor
John Foarde, Staff Director
David Dorman, Deputy Staff Director
(ii)
C O N T E N T S
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Page
STATEMENTS
Opening statement of Hon. James A. Leach, a U.S. Representative
from Iowa, Chairman, Congressional-Executive Commission on
China.......................................................... 1
Schriver, Hon. Randall G., Deputy Assistant Secretary, Bureau of
East Asian and Pacific Affairs, U.S. Department of State,
Washington, DC................................................. 2
Davis, Michael C., Robert and Marion Short Visiting Professor,
Notre Dame Law School, South Bend, IN.......................... 9
Overholt, William H., Asia Policy Chair, Cente for Asia and
Pacific Policy, RAND Corporation, Santa Monica, CA............. 12
Hung, Veron, associate, China Program, Carnegie Endowment for
International Peace, Washington, DC............................ 14
APPENDIX
Prepared Statements
Schriver, Randall G.............................................. 26
Davis, Michael C................................................. 28
Overholt, William H.............................................. 33
Leach, Hon. James A.............................................. 39
Hagel, Hon. Chuck................................................ 39
HONG KONG AFTER THE ELECTIONS: THE FUTURE OF ``ONE COUNTRY, TWO
SYSTEMS''
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THURSDAY, SEPTEMBER 23, 2004
Congressional-Executive
Commission on China
Washington, DC.
The hearing was convened, pursuant to notice, at 1:03 p.m.,
in room 192, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Hon. James A.
Leach, [Chairman of the Commission] presiding.
Also present: Senators Chuck Hagel [Co-chairman of the
Commission] and Max Baucus; and Representative Sander M. Levin.
OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. JAMES A. LEACH, CHAIRMAN,
CONGRESSIONAL-EXECUTIVE COMMISSION ON CHINA
Chairman Leach. We convene the CECC today to examine the
progress and prospects of constitutional development in Hong
Kong. Nothing could be more timely, given the Legislative
Council [LegCo] elections just concluded on September 12.
Whether the 21st century is peaceful and prosperous will depend
on whether China can live with itself and become open to the
world in a fair and respectful manner. Hong Kong is central to
that possibility. As such, Hong Kong's affairs and people
deserve our greatest attention, respect, and goodwill.
America and China both have an enormous vested interest in
the success of the ``One Country, Two Systems'' model in Hong
Kong. From a congressional perspective, it seems self-evident
that advancing constitutional reform, including universal
suffrage, would contribute to the city's political stability
and economic prosperity.
In that light, the September 12 elections had both good and
bad news. While a record number of Hong Kong's voters turned
out and voted heavily for candidates favoring continued reform,
the bad news is that the prospect was constrained by rules
under which the Hong Kong people could not enjoy full
democratic autonomy.
Hence, we continue to be concerned that, while recent
decisions by Beijing that set limits on constitutional
development of Hong Kong implicitly acknowledge a degree of
autonomy for Hong Kong, they do not represent a forthright
commitment to the high degree of autonomy that was promised by
the central authorities in the 1982 Joint Declaration and Basic
Law.
Few places on the planet are better prepared for democratic
governance than Hong Kong. In the LegCo elections earlier this
month in which record numbers voted, the people of Hong Kong
again made plain their aspirations for greater democratic
autonomy, aspirations fully within the framework of the ``One
Country, Two Systems'' formula. They previously had shown their
keen interest in participatory democracy when they turned out
in record numbers for the District Council elections last
November. Yet the way forward is now rather murky. No one is
certain what will happen after 2007. The central PRC Government
says that it maintains a commitment to universal suffrage and
direct election of the Chief Executive and the LegCo, as
contemplated by the Joint Declaration and Basic Law.
But without a timetable, the fullness of this commitment
lacks clarity and instills uncertainty. We must all acknowledge
that the recent election is a step forward, but democratic
frustration continues to build because there is simply no
credible reason to thwart the pace of democratic transformation
in Hong Kong.
Hong Kong is important unto itself. It is also a model for
others. What happens there is watched particularly closely by
Taiwan. In a globalized world where peoples everywhere are
seeking a sense of community to serve as a buttress against
political and economic forces beyond the control of individuals
and their families, it is next to impossible to reconcile
political systems based on unlike institutions and attitudes.
Mutual respect for differences is the key to peace and
prosperity in a world in which, history suggests, conflict has
been a generational norm.
To help us understand what has just transpired in the Hong
Kong elections and how it might affect the progress of
constitutional development, we turn to our witnesses this
morning.
Our first witness, Randy Schriver, joins us from the East
Asia Bureau at the State Department to give the U.S.
Government's perspective, and we have a distinguished panel of
private experts who will share their expertise with us a bit
later.
Before beginning, let me note that there are a series of
votes that are about to be called on the House floor, and that
will be a little discombobulating to the hearing this morning.
But we are going to try to proceed, if possible, through the
votes.
Secretary Schriver, proceed.
STATEMENT OF HON. RANDALL G. SCHRIVER, DEPUTY ASSISTANT
SECRETARY, BUREAU OF EAST ASIAN AND PACIFIC AFFAIRS, U.S.
DEPARTMENT OF STATE, WASHINGTON, DC
Mr. Schriver. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you for the
opportunity to address this topic today, the very important
topic of Hong Kong's future prospects for democracy, and also
to talk about the recently concluded election.
As you know, Mr. Chairman, we meet shortly after the LegCo
elections on September 12, and there are plenty of people who
are giving thought and producing analyses on who may have won
or lost, or what the outcomes might mean. While that unfolds,
we can certainly say that some things are indisputable and very
clear.
Mr. Chairman, you already noted that perhaps the most
significant outcome we observed is the fact that voters turned
out in record numbers. To us, this suggests a very clear
message to both the Government of Hong Kong and the central
authorities in Beijing, that the people in Hong Kong want
democracy and they value it very much, and they want it sooner
rather than later. This has been a consistent message from the
people of Hong Kong for some time. This was prominently
expressed in July 2003, and also July of this year when people
took to the streets to express their views and ask that their
voice be heard.
I think the voter turnout was as impressive as it was,
perhaps, in part to respond to the regrettable decision that
the central authorities made last April to cut short public
debate on universal suffrage and direct election of the Chief
Executive and the LegCo in future elections.
Mr. Chairman, some other notable results. The Democratic
Coalition came away with 25 seats and a very impressive 62
percent of the vote of those seats that were up for direct
election. I think sometimes the worst thing you can do in
politics is fall short of expectations, and it is important
that we be mindful of the fact that they did get a very
significant and large majority of the vote, a very impressive
62 percent.
Also, some very high-profile government critics won seats
in the LegCo, including radio personality Albert Cheng, who
believes he may have lost his job in radio through intimidation
and coercion from Beijing. So, this is significant that the
people did make the choice to send him to the legislature. The
Pro-Business Liberal Party, which we believe leans toward
Beijing, but nonetheless came out against the national security
legislation last year, won 10 seats, and for the first time
also won two seats that were directly contested in direct
elections for those seats. The Pro-Beijing Democratic Alliance
for the Betterment of Hong Kong won 12 seats, which makes them
the largest single bloc in the LegCo.
The election did highlight some shortcomings, and we are
aware of some of the allegations of technical and procedural
problems. But we are also aware that the Electoral Affairs
Commission will investigate these, and we wish them well in
that endeavor.
But more fundamentally and more troubling, there are
persistent charges of voter intimidation and that a climate of
fear existed in the run-up to the election. Here, too, the
Government of Hong Kong has promised to investigate these
issues and to defend vigorously the integrity of its elections.
This is extremely important. It is appropriate that these
matters be investigated, but it is also much more important
that their deeds at this point match their words, because the
people of Hong Kong certainly deserve no less.
Beijing issued a statement after the election stating that
this proves that the people of Hong Kong are masters of their
own house. Surely a more accurate statement would note that
Beijing will continue to wield significant influence on the
future of Hong Kong. Nonetheless, I think even Beijing realizes
at this point that to move their agenda and ensure that their
vision comes to fruition, they need to find a way to mobilize
genuine support within the LegCo and within the population of
Hong Kong to ensure their own success.
The Government of Hong Kong and the central authorities in
Beijing may not have to face a democratic coalition majority,
but they certainly have to take their views into account, and
they will not be successful in their agenda if they do not
undertake some effort to generate genuine popular support.
Let me speak very briefly, also, about our goals with
respect to Hong Kong more broadly, and then wrap up.
Our underlying goals associated with Hong Kong are the same
as they were before reversion, and they continued through
reversion and up to the present day. That is, we want to see
the people of Hong Kong succeed, we want their prosperity to
continue, and their way of life to continue. This is not only
the right thing for the people there, but also serves important
U.S. interests. We believe that Members of Congress share that
goal as well, and this is probably part of the spirit behind
some of the recent legislation we have seen that is, I believe,
designed to support the people of Hong Kong.
Hong Kong, in a way, continues to be a work in progress.
There is a foundation that has been laid with the 1984 Joint
Declaration, the promulgation of the Basic Law, the fact that
Hong Kong has maintained control of its day-to-day affairs for
just over seven years now, and has laid a foundation that
allows us to continue to treat Hong Kong as a unique and
separate entity, and it lays a foundation for Hong Kong to
continue its political and economic evolution. We have embraced
this unique status, the Congress in the Hong Kong Policy Act,
and the Administration in the implementation of that Act.
Mr. Chairman, as you noted, we do have profound interest in
Hong Kong. Some 45,000 Americans reside there, and over 1,000
U.S. firms operate from Hong Kong. It is our fourteenth largest
trading partner. We have significant foreign direct investment
there. Hong Kong, as a major trading entity, shares a lot of
our goals on trade liberalization worldwide, and they have been
an important partner in the World Trade Organization [WTO] and
the trade discussions there.
I think the trade and the commercial relations are well-
known. Perhaps less well-known is the developing security
relationship we have with Hong Kong and the ways that they are
making very valued contributions to American security
interests. As the single largest source of U.S.-bound sea
containers, Hong Kong is vital to our ability to protect
America from potentially dangerous inbound cargo, and thus Hong
Kong's participation in the Container Security Initiative is a
very significant contribution to our security.
They have also played a leadership role in the Financial
Action Task Force, to help address terrorist financing. Our law
enforcement cooperation continues to be excellent. Hong Kong
has continued to serve as a welcome port of call to many of our
U.S. Navy vessels and Air Force aircraft.
Finally, Hong Kong's effective export control system
remains in place and ensures that illicit and dangerous
commodities and equipment are not transshipped through Hong
Kong.
Then there is Hong Kong's comparative advantage. It remains
one of the freest economies and places in the world, and this
is reflected in many indexes that are well known. The Heritage
Foundation, for example, every year ranks Hong Kong as the most
free economy in the world. People in mainland China benefit
from Hong Kong's openness, not only in the direct economic
sense, but also in the fact that Hong Kong serves as an
important model for China in so many ways.
U.S. policy has been very clear. We want to see the people
of Hong Kong succeed. We believe that the key to that success
is Hong Kong continuing to move forward with democratization
and reaching the goal of universal suffrage. The political
future of Hong Kong should rightfully be in the hands of the
people of Hong Kong. We in no way seek to usurp their
decisions, nor do we in any way wish to interfere in the
relationship between the people of Hong Kong and the central
Chinese Government. Nonetheless, we will always stand for our
core principles of democracy and freedom, and we will not
shrink from making those principles known.
Again, Mr. Chairman, as you noted, the most telling point
of this election in Hong Kong is the fact that people turned
out in record numbers, and through that displayed their strong
desire for continued participation in their government. They
certainly are a proud, smart, and capable people who deserve
every chance for success in this century.
While Chinese sovereignty is a reality that will heavily
influence the success of those dedicated to democracy in Hong
Kong, our view is that we can respect Chinese sovereignty but
continue to make points in a very straightforward manner to our
interlocutors in both Hong Kong and Beijing that this is
important to us and it is important to the people of Hong Kong
and the goals that we share.
With that, Mr. Chairman, I welcome any questions you may
have. Thank you.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Schriver appears in the
appendix.]
Chairman Leach. Well, thank you very much for that
testimony. Let me just stress, I think it is well articulated
and balanced, and the stress being that both the Executive
Branch and the U.S. Congress have no desire to upset any kind
of relationship between Hong Kong and Beijing in the sense of a
``One China'' policy. But we also support two systems. In that
regard, I would only like to stress--and you pointed out--the
United States has a significant interest in Hong Kong. But our
principal concern is for the Hong Kong people. We think
democracy is stabilizing, not destabilizing. I stress this
point because there is a great concern about potential
instability in China. I can think of nothing more stabilizing
in Hong Kong than full democracy.
Also, when we think of Chinese history, I think of Sun Yat-
Sen and his approach to staged democracy. Hong Kong provides a
wonderful model for the rest of Chinese society. Maybe that is
one of the reasons why there is reluctance to give it fuller
autonomy at this time, or fuller democratic autonomy, but I
think it is something that, from our point of view, we have to
point out. In any case, I know of few subjects where the
Executive Branch and Congress are more in lock-step. I think
your testimony is a perfect reflection of that.
Senator Hagel has joined us. As I announced earlier, we are
expected to have a long series of votes on the House floor
shortly. I apologize for that. But let me recognize the
Senator.
Senator Hagel. Mr. Chairman, thank you very much. I add my
welcome and appreciation, Mr. Schriver, for your testimony. I
apologize for getting caught late. Nonetheless, we are mindful
of the effort that you are making, along with your colleagues,
and again appreciate your coming forward and offering your
testimony. Thank you.
Mr. Chairman, thank you. I have a statement that I would
ask be included in the record.
Chairman Leach. Admitted without objection, of course.
Senator Hagel. Thank you.
[The prepared statement of Senator Hagel appears in the
appendix.]
Chairman Leach. If you have no questions, we will go to our
panel of private sector witnesses.
Senator Hagel. Mr. Chairman, I would like to ask just a
couple of questions before the other panel comes up. I would be
interested in knowing, how often does the U.S. Government bring
up the issue of Hong Kong with the Chinese Government, and on
what basis do we do that? What parameters are set, or not set?
Thank you.
Mr. Schriver. Yes, sir. Thank you. I would characterize it
as quite frequent. It would be difficult to put an exact number
or percentage of time and meetings, but it is often raised at
the senior-most levels of our government. I would describe it
as one of the priority issues so that it is quite frequently
discussed.
Sometimes we have very specific issues that we raise. At
the time of the national security legislation, we made our
concerns known. Sometimes it is a more general discussion on
the future of Hong Kong. Our feeling, and I believe the
Chairman's remarks on this are consistent with our view, is
that we actually have some shared objectives related to Hong
Kong. We both want Hong Kong to succeed and we both think that
the key to that success if faithful implementation of the
agreements that are in place.
So, though we have some different views, we do try to
approach this from a perspective where we actually have some
things we share with the Chinese on this subject, and that our
belief is that the central Chinese Government should not be
threatened by the political evolution and democracy of Hong
Kong, but rather should see it as a force that will ultimately
be a stabilizing force for Hong Kong and will contribute to its
continued success. So, that is the nature of how we frame it.
Again, it is a priority for us, and I
believe the Chinese as well, so it is often addressed in our
senior dialogue.
Senator Hagel. How often does the Taiwan issue come up in
the framework of these discussions?
Mr. Schriver. Sir, the Taiwan issue is almost always raised
by our Chinese counterparts and interlocutors, again, at every
level and certainly at the senior-most levels. Usually it is
raised on its own and not linked to the Hong Kong question.
When we raise issues related to Taiwan, we generally do not
link it, either. So it tends to be a separate discussion.
Senator Hagel. So you would not say that in any way it
shapes our conversations with the government of the People's
Republic of China.
Mr. Schriver. Well, I think the Chinese themselves are
aware that they will be judged on the success or failure of
Hong Kong, and that there is a watchful audience in Taiwan,
there is a watchful audience in the United States and
elsewhere. But it is not necessarily a point of leverage or
something that we draw their attention to. I think it is
something that is always in the back of their minds.
Senator Hagel. Have we gotten good cooperation from the
Hong Kong Government regarding counter-terrorism, and other
wider issues?
Mr. Schriver. Yes, sir. Excellent cooperation. Again, they
were one of the first ports to conclude the Container Security
Initiative [CSI]. I have gone through the operation there, and
our officials cite it as a model operation for the CSI. Also,
in the Financial Action Task Force that addresses counter-
terrorism financing, Hong Kong was in the chair, I believe in
2003, of the Asia-Pacific Group and played a very valuable role
there.
Senator Hagel. You may have noted this in your testimony,
which, as you know, I came in the last part of it, and I
apologize if I am covering ground you have already covered. But
regarding your views of the September 12 elections, can you
develop your answer further with an assessment of any positive
signs or hopeful signs, and what are the holes? I would be
interested also in your overall assessment for the future.
Mr. Schriver. Yes, sir. I think I did address it. Probably
the most significant outcome we have observed is the very high
voter turnout. We take that as a very strong sign that the
people of Hong Kong want and value democracy, and want it
sooner rather than later.
It is also very significant that the Democratic Coalition,
although the rules and the framework that were in place did not
make it easy for them to have large gains or gain a majority of
the LegCo seats, but they did win 62 percent of the vote for
those seats that were directly contested. They did have a net
gain in the number of seats, so they control 25 of the 60
seats.
In addition, several prominent critics of the government
won seats in the LegCo. So, I would put all that in the
category of good news, in that it reflects a vibrant population
and people who are very interested in their future and who want
a say in that future.
In the ``not-as-good'' category, there were some issues
about procedural or technical glitches, which we have been told
the Hong Kong Government will look into. Then, I think more
troubling are the allegations--and these have been consistent
in the lead-up to the election--that there was a climate of
intimidation and fear among some. Human Rights Watch did a very
important report on this question. This is something that is
more difficult to get at, and also much more serious.
So, again, the Government of Hong Kong has said that they
will vigorously defend the integrity of their election system
and they will investigate these matters, but it is critical
that they do so in a way that their deeds match their words.
Senator Hagel. Mr. Schriver, thank you.
Mr. Chairman, thank you.
Chairman Leach. Mr. Levin.
Representative Levin. Good afternoon.
Sir, I missed your opening statement. I am glad to join my
distinguished colleagues. Let me just ask you a few questions,
because I have read part of your text and heard part of your
answers to Senator Hagel.
You say on page 3, in the top full paragraph there, that
``the government may not have to face a democratic majority,
but it certainly will need to continue to find ways to win in
LegCo and less popular support for its actions. It cannot
govern through administrative fiat.'' Is that not more or less
what it is doing now?
Mr. Schriver. Thank you, Congressman. Clearly, the
framework and the rules that are in place give the central
authorities a very strong hand, and they have used that on
issues that they have identified as being important. We saw
that last April with respect to the prospects for further
constitutional change. But we have also seen an example related
to the national security legislation, where people took to the
streets and expressed their point of view, where the government
was responsive to that. They have pulled the legislation for
consideration and were responsive to the people.
Representative Levin. They withdrew it, not necessarily
forever.
Mr. Schriver. That is correct.
Representative Levin. So when you say it cannot govern
through administrative fiat, you mean that that is what is
going on now unless 250,000 people take to the streets?
Mr. Schriver. I think the fact that people have taken to
the streets, combined with other elements like the very
impressive voter turnout we saw in the LegCo on the 12th of
September, the fact that the Democratic Coalition did so well,
winning over 60 percent of the vote, all those elements, I
believe, would make it more difficult for Beijing to govern in
a way that was not satisfying or popular to the people of Hong
Kong. It is an opinion and it is a view. Clearly, they sustain
the upper hand, and they have done that by design.
Representative Levin. So why do you not say that?
Mr. Schriver. Well, I think I did. I commented on Beijing's
assessment of the election, where they said this proves that
the people of Hong Kong are ``masters of their own house.''
But, in fact, as I stated, a more accurate assessment would
clearly note Beijing's continuing influence on all the
important things related to Hong Kong's future.
Representative Levin. You used the word ``influence.'' I
mean, essentially they determine the key decisions. Is that not
correct?
Mr. Schriver. I think, to date, they certainly have, yes.
Representative Levin. I will finish so we can go on. So why
do you say, on the second page, ``Here, too, the Hong Kong
Government has promised to investigate any lead, and to defend
vigorously the integrity of its elections. That is appropriate.
The government's deeds should match its words.'' If,
essentially, they are now not influencing, but essentially
directing the outcome on key things, do you have faith that
their deeds are going to match their words?
Mr. Schriver. Well, that remains to be seen. It is very
important that they do, and that is why we take opportunities
like this very public forum here, to say that this is something
that people watch closely. As I noted, there is a very robust
and energetic NGO community that watches these things. We had
an important report from Human Rights Watch. So, we want to
take all the opportunities that are afforded us to say that
this is important to us, and we are watching.
Representative Levin. I asked these questions thinking we
were right to increase our engagement with China. But part of
that approach was also to call them as we see them and to be
very direct and frank. I must say, I think the language here is
maybe more ``diplomatic'' than it is candid. For example, where
you say, ``But I do firmly believe that Beijing's vision of
Hong Kong can best be realized by moving more rapidly toward
the goal of a genuine representative government,'' I am not
quite sure what that really means to say.
Mr. Schriver. I think the leaders in Beijing do want Hong
Kong to succeed. I think they want it to be prosperous. I think
they would take pride in a Hong Kong that continues to succeed
economically. Our concerns are that if the pace of political
evolution, and in particular political liberalization, does not
meet the aspirations of the people of Hong Kong, Beijing will
not get the outcome that they desire and instead, I think, will
have a more unstable situation. So we try to portray this as an
area where, in fact, we might have a common view of this. We
both want Hong Kong to succeed. Our view is that
democratization is one element, and a very key element to that.
Representative Levin. All right. Quickly, how much further
toward the goal of a genuine representative government do you
think Hong Kong is today compared to five years ago?
Mr. Schriver. I think this election was a step forward, but
it is insufficient to meeting the ultimate goal, which even
Beijing has embraced and embodied in the Basic Law, that Hong
Kong will move to universal suffrage. But I think it is a step
forward after the LegCo elections.
Representative Levin. Thank you.
Chairman Leach. Thank you, Secretary Schriver.
We will now move to the second panel. It is composed of
Professor Michael C. Davis. Professor Davis is currently the
Robert and Marion Short Visiting Professor of Law at Notre Dame
Law School. The second witness is Ms. Veron Hung. Veron Hung is
an expert on Chinese law. She is admitted as a barrister in
England, Wales, and Hong Kong, and is a member of the New York
Bar and the District of Columbia Bar. Our third witness is Dr.
William H. Overholt, who is Asia Policy Chair, Center for Asia
and Pacific Policy of the RAND Corporation. Previously, Dr.
Overholt was a Senior Fellow at Harvard, and before that spent
21 years running research teams for investment banks in Asia.
He is the author of five books, including The Rise of China.
Welcome, Dr. Overholt. Unless there is a prearrangement, we
will just proceed in the order in which the introductions were
made.
Mr. Davis.
STATEMENT OF MICHAEL C. DAVIS, ROBERT AND MARION SHORT VISITING
PROFESSOR, NOTRE DAME LAW SCHOOL, SOUTH BEND, IN
Mr. Davis. Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I appreciate the opportunity to testify here at this
hearing. I think Hong Kong certainly has been a great interest
to people in the United States in general because of our
commitment to democracy.
I note in that regard, this morning I was reading some
literature telling me that during the 1990s, the number of
democracies in the world nearly doubled. So it seems to me that
we should bear in mind that democracy is becoming the norm,
rather than the exception, and is something I think we all
encourage.
Now, I should say that, in addition to being at Notre Dame
University, I have lived in Hong Kong for the last 20 years. I
am a legal resident of Hong Kong. I even vote in Hong Kong and
have been involved in public affairs there for a long time. I
have also been involved with the Article 45 Concern Group and
the Article 23 Concern Group, which were trying to promote
democracy in Hong Kong during the past year, and were
instrumental in several demonstrations that were held there.
Now, the official from the State Department has described
the consequence of the election. I personally would like to say
that there is an interpretation going around about the election
that I hear in the international media, that Hong Kong people
voted for stability, the implication being that somehow they
were choosing stability over democracy, and assuming that those
things were somehow in opposition to each other. I would like
to contest that interpretation. The State Department has
correctly pointed out that the support for democracy in Hong
Kong in this election was substantial. If Hong Kong's democrats
did not win the election with 62 percent of the vote, it is
because of serious flaws in the electoral system there.
The United States, recall, has been asked to treat Hong
Kong as a separate entity. So, beyond our spirit of support for
democracy, we have a very definite interest that Hong Kong
carry on under the Sino-British Joint Declaration.
Now from the opening statements of the Chairman, I know you
are familiar with the requirements that Hong Kong move toward
universal suffrage, but this is spelled out in the basic law
and the Sino-British Joint Declaration. So what I would
suggest, is that the Chinese Government has taken a view that
universal suffrage is dangerous in Hong Kong and it has
expressed this view in no uncertain terms during the last six
months. So we have to appreciate that this election is not just
about counting the votes or whether the ballot boxes were open
during certain events when they were over-stuffed and they were
tamped down. This is a serious problem that has to be
investigated. But I think the deficiency of an election where
62 percent of the voters vote for one camp, and that camp loses
the election, has to be fully appreciated. Another point that I
would like to draw attention to, is that the election is built
around functional constituencies, so fully half the seats in
the election are taken by a small circle of electors, in a
sense, just under 200,000 voters--and a good portion of them
corporations--get to choose half the members of the Legislative
Council.
Another thing is that even for direct elections, they use a
system of proportional representation. If we are investigating
this, we should at least draw attention to these specific kinds
of problems. The proportional representation system is one that
favors getting more pro-Beijing candidates in, so this is
something specific to draw attention to.
Beyond that, I would like to highlight the history of
intimidation before this election. The last nine months or so
before the election had a series of attacks on Hong Kong
democrats. The first one was the so-called ``patriot debate,''
where one member, a chairman of the Democratic Party, was
actually vilified for testifying here before the U.S. Senate.
He was accused of being unpatriotic, and a Chinese official
attacked his father also as being unpatriotic, though
previously no one had ever contested his father's patriotism.
So this ``patriot debate'' was one form of intimidation.
The second one was some argument about gradual and orderly
progress, where Hong Kong people were told that Deng Xiaoping
did not intend democracy to proceed very quickly, except that
Deng Xiaoping's own words contested that viewpoint.
The third one that came up in the last six months was an
argument largely from the Beijing media where they started
threatening to disband the Legislative Council after the
election if more than 30 members of the Democratic camp were
elected. They made statements that, ``if those who try to use
democracy to exclude the Communist Party of China and respect
Taiwan take the majority of seats in LegCo, Hong Kong's
executive-led government will collapse and the central
authority and national security will be severely challenged.''
A local pro-Beijing paper, the Wen Wei Bao, quoted a Beijing
official as saying, ``I have a knife. Usually it is not used,
but now you force me to use it.'' So, what I am suggesting to
you is that the level of intimidation was quite high.
After that, the next stage in this effort was to start
talking about the spirit of the Basic Law, and accusing the
Democrats in Hong Kong of promoting fake democracy. The next
phase was when the National People's Congress interpreted the
Basic Law on April 26, ruling out direct elections in 2007 and
2008, even though the Basic Law, as interpreted by them, would
have allowed that.
Finally, the intimidation continued into the election
itself, where a whole range of things were done or alleged to
have been done to intimidate voters who were registering, to
intimidate talk show hosts, to threaten enacting a national
unification law that would get around the national security
laws that they tried to enact last year.
Trying to reach out to Democrats was one good thing. There
were some carrots. The mainland government also had military
parades and an Olympic medalist parade past Hong Kong people,
trying to persuade them. And when you read the pro-Beijing
press, you would see a very strong bias, so Beijing was taking
a role in the election on the side of the pro-Beijing camp and
against the pan-Democratic camp.
So I think when Hong Kong people, in the face of all of
this, still voted 62 percent to support the pan-Democratic
candidates and had the highest turnout ever, it is hard to say
that they have chosen some form of ``stability'' over
democracy. I think this is an important thing for the
Commission to take note of.
Thank you.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Davis appears in the
appendix.]
Senator Hagel. Dr. Davis, thank you very much.
Dr. Overholt.
STATEMENT OF WILLIAM H. OVERHOLT, ASIA POLICY CHAIR, CENTER FOR
ASIA AND PACIFIC POLICY, RAND CORPORATION, SANTA MONICA, CA
Mr. Overholt. Mr. Chairman, I am honored to be invited to
testify before you. Like the other members of this panel, I am
here to try to be useful rather than to represent any specific
interest. I have submitted written testimony and I will make
brief comments to supplement that.
I think we need to start with the fact that this election
did have one more step toward democratization. Before the
Chinese demanded Hong Kong back from Britain, 100 percent of
all Hong Kong legislators were appointed by the British
Governor. With this election, for the first time, there are no
appointed legislators. They are all elected in some form.
However, the pace of movement has been slow. There is nothing
approaching real democracy in Hong Kong, because the Chief
Executive is hand-picked by Beijing, the system is so-called
executive-led, and of course half of the legislature is
functional constituencies, which are designed to be
predominantly conservative.
This system is gridlocked. People are unhappy with it. That
has led to big, peaceful demonstrations, demanding what the
Basic Law presents as an ultimate goal, namely direct elections
by universal suffrage, although it does not firmly commit to
any timetable in achieving that, or even to ever fully
accomplishing it.
China has reacted to those lawful, but large,
demonstrations with fear of instability. You have a new
administration in Beijing which has little experience of Hong
Kong and has suffered, to some extent, from what I have called
``the three confusions.'' They confuse the situation of
democracy in Hong Kong with the independence movement in
Taiwan; they confuse the implication of peaceful, lawful,
traditional-type demonstrations in Hong Kong with disruptive
demonstrations in mainland China; and they confuse the
democratic movement, which is very broad, peaceful, deep, and
basically loyal to Chinese sovereignty, with a few very anti-
Chinese leaders of the democratic movement.
I would characterize the Beijing policy as divided into two
pieces. What has been important to them is a response to these
demonstrations and to the movement regarding universal suffrage
in 2007. There, they have had a very broad, wide-ranging
strategy which Mr. Davis and Mr. Schriver have highlighted. The
core of that strategy was interpretation of the Basic Law to
make direct universal suffrage elections in 2007 and 2008
illegal, along with staging such events as military parades,
fleet visits, taking measures to reinvigorate the Hong Kong
economy, and sponsoring high-profile, positive steps like
visits from the ``Buddha's Finger bone'' and from the Chinese
Olympic athletes.
All these are directed at the 2007 election, and that is
important. The 2004 election has been a separate issue. There
has been a series of disquieting incidents of intimidation and
election problems, but as yet there has been no persuasive
evidence that these were other than local political
entrepreneurship and local business vengeance. There has been
no serious argument by even the most partisan commentators that
these incidents actually influenced the shape of the outcome of
the election in Hong Kong.
The election had very high turnout in a very calm
atmosphere, even an atmosphere of pride, despite the things
that had happened earlier and despite problems with the size of
ballot boxes.
The democrats clearly won the popular vote. Everybody
agrees on that, 62 or 63 percent of it. The skewing of the
system, however, meant that even a fair ballot led to the
conservatives getting 34 out of 60 of the seats. The fact that
the Liberal Party, a conservative group, was one of the very
big winners and won its first two general election seats ever,
has to do with the fact that they supported democratization.
Their leader resigned over the proposed tough anti-subversion
laws. So here again, even in the conservative victory, we see
the strength of the democratic feeling behind it. There was a
mandate in this election for democratization, but
democratization pursued by moderate means that reassure
Beijing.
Mr. Chairman, the body of Hong Kong's freedoms--freedom of
speech, freedom of press, religion, of assembly, and the rule
of law--is basically intact. There are some dents and scratches
this time around, and if those dents and scratches continue to
accumulate there will be real problems, but so far we have
dents and scratches on a sound body. There has been an
environment this time where people felt they could get away
with intimidations and tricks that they did not try in the
past. As Mr. Schriver said, everybody will be looking to see
exactly what the Hong Kong Government does to make sure that
that permissive environment is
reversed.
Beijing's hard-liners believe that economic recovery, plus
repressive actions, will contain the democratic movement. My
forecast is that, in the end, such a strategy will be like
sitting on the lid of a kettle of boiling water. The movement
will boil up. It is strong and getting stronger. The political
parties do not fully represent the strength of that movement.
Hong Kong's political parties are very weak. Beneath the
political party results, there is a much stronger movement.
That movement has only one chance of
success, and that is to push hard for democracy, while
reassuring Beijing of their loyalty. Most of the leaders of the
democracy movement have now coalesced around that strategy.
There is no assurance that it will work, but it is the only one
that has any chance.
What does this mean for the United States? Well, we are in
a in a frustrating situation. We have very limited positive
leverage. We have a lot of ability to do damage. Speaking out
very strongly, reasoning with Chinese leaders, can certainly
help. They do talk, they do think, they do take evidence on
board. The biggest gift we could give to the Beijing's hard-
liners would be a confrontational policy that allows them to
portray Hong Kong democratization as a struggle between China
and the United States, not as a struggle between them and some
of their own people. In that regard, proposed changes in Hong
Kong's trade status would simply harm those people of Hong Kong
whom we say we are trying to help. The first law of doctors is
``do no harm,'' and it is a good rule for all policies.
Hong Kong democratic forces have coalesced around a
strategy of demanding democratization, but reassuring Beijing.
The electorate has clearly endorsed that strategy. We should
not do anything to undermine it. We do provide assistance to
democratization in Hong Kong in a variety of different ways,
predominantly through NGOs, things like teaching fundraising.
That is very helpful. But some of our efforts appear to single
out one particular and particularly anti-Beijing figure, who is
not the leader any longer of any party. That can only divide
the democratic movement and harm its chances. So, we have to be
very careful which things we emphasize in our consensus support
for democratization in Hong Kong.
I would close with the thought that there is no basis for
despair. The recent completion of the generational transfer of
power in China could mean less politics and more careful policy
calculation in China. As these people gain more experience,
that will probably be helpful. They are engaging in more and
more dialogue with democratic forces in Hong Kong.
The other positive thing that we must never discount, is
Hong Kong people are enormously well-informed and good at
thinking these things through, and we can rely heavily on their
skills. But there are no assurances. Nobody can say for
certain, even if we do all the right things, that this is going
to work out well.
Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Overholt appears in the
appendix.]
Senator Hagel. Dr. Overholt, thank you very much.
Ms. Hung, welcome.
STATEMENT OF VERON HUNG, ASSOCIATE, CHINA PROGRAM, CARNEGIE
ENDOWMENT FOR INTERNATIONAL PEACE, WASHINGTON, DC
Ms. Hung. Thank you. Today I would like to focus on one
issue: will Hu Jintao, who finally took over China's military
chairmanship from Jiang Zemin last Sunday, soften Beijing's
stance on democratization in Hong Kong? Although Hu is
generally hailed as a moderate reformer, he is unlikely to
revoke Beijing's decision made in April that rules out
universal suffrage in Hong Kong in 2007 and 2008.
The decision stems largely from Chinese leaders' two fears:
first, that a democratic Hong Kong may liberate itself from
Beijing's control; and second, that democratization in Hong
Kong would inspire and mobilize mainland Chinese to challenge
the Communist Party's governance.
Sharing such fears, Hu Jintao, whose goal is to sustain the
party's role through reform but not to destroy it, will likely
uphold the April decision. But the need for Hu to prove his
governing ability may bode well for a dialogue with Hong Kong
Democrats. The absence of such a dialogue would suggest to
foreign nations a pessimistic future for political reform in
China, intensifying their doubts about China's claim to seek a
``peaceful rise'' to regional and international prominence.
International criticism of China will likely escalate and
overshadow Beijing's 2008 Olympics, which China sees as a
milestone marking the country's rise. All of this criticism
will not reflect well on Hu's leadership. Therefore, he should
have an interest in meeting with the Democrats.
Such interest may further increase after Hu Jintao
considers two implications of the Legislative Council election
results. First, the Democrats' failure to win the majority of
seats signals that even
direct elections would not guarantee the Democrats a landslide
victory. Feeling less worried about direct elections, Hu may be
more receptive to discussing democratization in Hong Kong with
the Democrats.
Second, the record-high turnout rate of 55.6 percent in the
election shows that the Hong Kong people's demand for full
democracy is still strong. If Hu does not respond to such a
demand by meeting with Democrats, citizens in Hong Kong may,
when their government blunders, demonstrate again on every July
1 to demand full democracy. But even if Hu Jintao welcomes a
dialogue with Democrats, a crucial question remains: can
Democrats stay united to speak in one voice? Some Democrats in
Hong Kong insist on pressuring Beijing to revoke the April
decision. Others, such as pro-democracy barristers who just won
in the election, appear to be more flexible. In my opinion, the
Democrats must adopt a strategically flexible approach. In
light of Beijing's two fears about democratization in Hong
Kong, the harder that the Democrats push for early introduction
of universal suffrage, the more threatened Beijing will feel
and the more readily it will play its trump card, the Basic
Law. This law gives Beijing the ultimate power to determine the
city's political future and forestall the Democrats' hopes. In
theory, of course, we may argue that Democrats could always
trump Beijing with the threat of massive unrest, but public
support for such a strategy is not present or foreseeable. Most
Hong Kong citizens are pragmatic, desiring to keep intact the
city's legal framework, prosperity, and stability.
The Democrats should aim at dispelling Beijing's fear
through dialogue. Knowing that Beijing cannot tolerate
universal suffrage in 2007 and 2008, the Democrats should
relinquish this demand, but require commensurate concessions
from Beijing, namely, a promise that once universal suffrage is
introduced, citizens will be allowed to exercise their right to
vote for the Chief Executive and all legislators by direct
elections instead of indirect elections. I must emphasize this
point, because all Hong Kong politicians have missed it.
Strictly speaking, ``universal suffrage'' only means that all
citizens of voting age have the right to vote. Full democracy,
which is the Democrats' goal, cannot be exemplified if
universal suffrage is implemented through ``indirect
elections,'' whereby citizens elect representatives who, in
turn, choose the ultimate office holders.
Recent surveys show that many Hong Kong politicians,
including those from the pro-Beijing camp, support introduction
of universal suffrage in 2012. Such wide support may encourage
China's leaders to consider it to be an option. Delaying
introduction of universal suffrage by four to five years in
exchange for a ``universal suffrage plus direct elections''
package sounds acceptable.
As every sailor knows, a boat cannot move when it is
directly against the wind because the sail luffs. To lead Hong
Kong toward full democracy against Beijing's resistance,
Democrats must master the art of steerage to position the boat
at the best angle possible under the circumstances.
Ending the dispute with Beijing over democratization of
Hong Kong helps build mutual trust, upon which successful
implementation of ``One Country, Two Systems'' depends. Thank
you.
Senator Hagel. Dr. Hung, thank you. Each of your statements
will be included in the record. I noted, Dr. Overholt, that you
essentially summarized your statement. But all of the
statements will be included for the record. Thank you very
much.
Let me ask a general question for the three of you. Dr.
Hung, in your statement, you talked about the internal
leadership situation in China and you drew some observations
and conclusions regarding the possibilities for Hu Jintao's
emerging and future role as president of China. How will this
role affect Hong Kong? I would like to ask your two colleagues
for their interpretations as well, not just of what you said,
but also to widen it a bit, and then come back to you and see
if you would like to add any further observations. I will begin
with Professor Davis. Thank you.
Mr. Davis. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
This question of the change of leadership is a very
important one. There is some speculation that Hong Kong policy
has been under the sway of very conservative elements in the
Chinese leadership, and some question whether Hu would change
that, and some doubts that he will, that in some ways having a
harder hand at the rudder might be viewed as a favorable policy
for him while he secures and consolidates his own position as
the Chinese leader.
This relates to the other statements of Dr. Hung, how Hong
Kong people should react to it. I would resist the view that
China is this static thing, monolithic thing, and Hong Kong
Democrats are this monolithic thing on the other side, and they
cannot push too hard or the Chinese leaders will get angry, and
so on. I think it has been a mutually constitutive process over
the years that I have been in Hong Kong, whether it is
interpreting the Basic Law, whether it is pushing for
democracy. And I am actually 1 of the 10 members of those
barristers to whom Dr. Hung referred. To use the language of
academia in this country, it is a mutually constitutive
process. On both sides, we are speaking to each other.
Sometimes we push hard. And so the Chinese leadership under
Hu--he will not want trouble in Hong Kong. So Hong Kong
Democrats could say, ``All right, fine, we go meet with him and
that is it.'' But they know that he is not going to give them
anything if they do not have a strong hand.
So, it is a bit of both. It is a bit of pushing and
tugging. So, the United States' role in this is generally, I
think, to represent, I think, the views that Bill Overholt
suggested. For example, encouraging China to talk to the
Democrats, to encourage dialogue, because it is within the
context of that discussion that Democrats, while pushing on the
street, can talk to Chinese leaders and maybe the Chinese
leaders will come to a point where they will see the Democrats
are not so fearsome after all. Quite frankly, the Democrats in
Hong Kong are the most moderate bunch of revolutionaries, if
that is what they are, that I have ever seen on earth. I have
been in the Democratic camp for nearly 20 years. I know Martin
Lee personally. He gave away my wife at our wedding. I mean, I
know these people all very personally. I never heard the word
``independence'' out of a Democrat's mouth in Hong Kong. The
only time I ever hear the word ``independence'' in Hong Kong is
from people from China. They talk about Hong Kong, and
sometimes they advocate that Hong Kong advocate independence.
But Chinese officials worry that Hong Kong people have some
idea of independence or getting away from Beijing. I never hear
it.
So I think the leaders need to be persuaded, to the extent
that diplomacy persuades, that they need to talk to the people
in Hong Kong, the people that have the majority of support in
Hong Kong. And I think these people are very moderate. Are they
going to always look perfectly moderate? No. Sometimes they
have to push. If they get nowhere, they have to be louder. They
have to ratchet up. Chinese leaders, I think, respond to that
better than always, as the more so-called conservatives in Hong
Kong, who always do whatever China's bidding is. I think you
have more influence in dealing with China when you are a bit
tough at times and conciliatory at other times. The leadership
in Beijing needs to understand this about the Democrats as
well. Sometimes they may insist on what they want, but other
times be willing to listen. Up until now, they have rarely been
willing to listen to Democrats. I have attended meetings where
our group of barristers were invited.
Listening to Democrats meant going to a meeting, having the
Chinese leaders tell you the decision they had already made,
and then flattering my colleagues in the Article 45 Concern
Group for a bit of time, telling them that we appreciate you
coming here, blah, blah, blah, but not consulting before the
decision is made. So if we are talking as a country trying to
encourage China to deal with Hong Kong in a way that is
consistent with our values and with the Basic Law, then I think
this kind of dialogue is something we can talk to them about. I
think they are starting to understand it, but there is such a
great, deep reluctance to really give away power in Beijing.
The idea of not being in control of someone that you are
dealing with is very hard in Chinese politics, and so this is a
hard thing. But, then again, bearing in mind that Beijing
itself is not monolithic. There are reform-minded leaders in
China as well. So, we have to approach them with this
understanding. But do not ask the Democrats to be passive.
Sometimes they have to be tough. That is how you get what you
want, and that is what is going on there.
Senator Hagel. Thank you.
Mr. Overholt.
Mr. Overholt. Mr. Chairman, I believe your question had to
do with the relationship between the power struggle or
generational change in Beijing and Hong Kong policy. This has
been a period when thinking about Hong Kong has been very
heavily influenced by what comes close to a war fever over
developments in Taiwan, and at a time when there was divided
leadership.
We do not know what happens between the leaders at the very
top, but we can see what is going on between their followers.
The divisions have been powerful. The issue of one side or the
other being soft on issues of national security or stability
has been, if anything, even more intense in that country than
it has in ours. So I think there is reason to hope--I choose my
words carefully--that their successful transition peacefully
from one generation to the next will remove some of the
political intensity that has surrounded the debate over Hong
Kong.
Senator Hagel. Let me ask a follow-up on that. I note in
the summary bullet points of your written statement you say
``deep
division in China over proper policy toward Hong Kong.'' Do you
want to add anything to what you just said in light of this
point? I did not get the sense, from what you just said, that
the intensity of disagreement is necessarily that deep.
Mr. Overholt. I have made many, many trips to China in
recent years and talked with dozens and dozens of people about
Hong Kong. There are many, many experts and officials who think
that the hard line has been counter-productive and hope that
there will be some liberalization in the future. I do not think
anybody can claim to have an adequate survey of Chinese experts
or officials, and particularly not of top-ranking officials.
But if you came to this country in 1993 when a new leader was
saying we should cutoff our principal trade ties with China,
removing most favored Nation status, or if you came here in
2001 when some people were saying, treat China as an adversary,
you would have gotten the same division between the official
experts and the new brooms coming in at the top. My sense is
that it is much more intense in China on this subject. That is
why I am trying to convey.
Senator Hagel. Thank you.
Dr. Hung.
Ms. Hung. Yes. Thank you. I just want to make a few points
in response to the comments made by my colleagues here.
The first point I want to make is that I am pleased to tell
you that one pro-democracy barrister who won in the election
made an announcement yesterday. He, himself, recognized that it
may not be politically realistic to pressure Beijing to revoke
the April decision, and he may consider just stepping back a
little bit to pressure Beijing to consider introducing
universal suffrage in 2012. I think that is a very good sign.
Second, I want to emphasize one point. Pressure does help
sometimes, but not always. Look at the April decision. I
understand that my colleague, Professor Davis, argues that
sometimes we cannot appear to be weak. But the proposal that I
am making here is not a weak proposal, it is a functional,
strategically sound proposal. In the past, the Democrats
pressured Beijing so hard, that they forgot about the two fears
Chinese leaders had. So that is the reason why Beijing came up
with this April decision. My worry is that, if we continue to
pressure Beijing to revoke the April decision, it might
actually resort to the Basic Law again through interpretation
or through amendment of the Basic Law to further tighten
control over the democratic development in Hong Kong.
Given the fact that even the pro-Beijing camp supports
universal suffrage in 2012, if democrats also support this and
bargain for a concession from Beijing, saying that ``We want
you to promise that universal suffrage should be done through
direct elections,'' I think this is actually a nice way to
attain the final goal, that is, full democracy. Thank you.
Senator Hagel. Thank you.
Dr. Overholt, I do not have it exactly in your written
statement, but I will paraphrase what I think I heard you say.
You noted that the United States must be careful not to damage
the overall relationship by how we handle the Hong Kong issue
with China. In the universe of that relationship, Hong Kong is
an important issue, but it is one of many.
One of the things you said, I think, if I can refer back to
my notes, is that we should be careful not to allow our
handling of the Hong Kong issue to fuel internal leadership
divisions in China in a way that ultimately harms Hong Kong.
Now, if I have got that about right, would you develop it
further for us--and I would ask the other two panelists to
comment on this as well--that is, areas you think the United
States should be doing more or less of in our current policy
toward China? Thank you.
Mr. Overholt. I think the things we do well are expressing
our views, holding hearings that put all the arguments on
display, for the Chinese as well as for ourselves. I think our
human rights groups do a wonderful job when they shine the
light on bad things that happen. We should do as much of those
things as we can. Having very firm arguments never hurts. We
talk in very firm ways with the Chinese about many issues,
including Taiwan and North Korea, and the dialogue moves
forward.
When we start threatening sanctions, then the hardliners
say, ``The democracy movement is just the Americans trying to
impose their will on China.'' That obscures the real issue,
which is, maybe Hong Kong would be stabilized by
democratization rather than destabilized, which I think all of
us here agree on. When we appear to take sides among the
democrats, focusing on Martin Lee rather than some of the
others for instance, it just divides the democrats. It gives
Beijing another excuse for putting its thumb on them. It is
very unhelpful.
When we do things that directly associate democracy with
instability, we feed the hardliners. For instance, when the
National Endowment for Democracy [NED] gave Martin Lee an award
that was the little Goddess of Democracy statue from Tiananmen
Square, if there is any way we could at low cost do more damage
to the image of what democratization would mean, I cannot
imagine it. We have to be very careful not to gratify our own
feelings at the expense of harming the democratization
movement.
I think, on the whole, American policy has been quite
balanced and reasonable. We have made small mistakes. The
hardliners have taken full advantage of the small mistakes we
have made. But I would endorse everything that Mr. Schriver has
said. I think that the core of American policy has been
absolutely sound, and I think the Congressional resolutions
have been helpful.
Senator Hagel. Thank you.
Professor Davis.
Mr. Davis. Yes. I agree with what Bill has said, generally,
that we need to exercise some degree of caution, and not to be
a bull in a China store--literally a China store in this case--
when it comes to China policy. I have not seen that much of
that from the United States, but I do find that sometimes the
Chinese can be very selective. They have recently vilified the
National Democratic Institute [NDI] and the NED, unrelated to
any awards to Martin Lee, in this recent election as improperly
interfering in Hong Kong, and it kind of becomes like America
trying to improperly influence the election. In fact, the NED
has funded the Republican Institute to do work in China, as
well as the NDI in Hong Kong. I know we have actually had to
caution the NDI. They have given as many seminars to the pro-
Beijing camp as they have the Democratic camp.
So I think if it were known that the NDI was not really
favoring one side, that it was actually trying to talk to
politicians on both sides--I know the people in Hong Kong that
do the work of the NDI, and I know that they do a good job and
they have for long tried to be balanced about it.
I think there are things the United States should just be
consistent about. One, is encouraging dialogue with Democrats
in Hong Kong, not just with Martin Lee, but all the Democrats,
and that, as a friend of China, that we would like to see the
Chinese have a good relationship with those people in Hong Kong
that won the popular vote in the last election.
So our State Department people are very good, hopefully, at
trying to find nice ways to say that and make that message
clear. One thing that I have also noted here that I think is
important: I would like to see more investment in our dialogue
with China itself on the rule of law, on issues of elections in
China. China has elections. The NED has often been the vehicle
through which we fund that kind of work. But a rule of law
initiative has been batted around Washington for years, and
sometimes it does not get too far. I would like to see more of
that, because then it does not look like we are just singling
out Hong Kong, but we care about China's long-term development,
about the rule of law in China. And the rule of law is a little
more neutral than some other terms you can come up with. I
would like to see growth in that initiative.
On the democratic development in Hong Kong, I think some
encouragement for a timetable is something that we might ask
for. If we want to ask for something definite, maybe encourage
Beijing to indicate a timetable. As Dr. Hung has suggested,
that timetable may well be 2012. But why not indicate that? So,
that is something specific.
I agree with Bill Overholt. Sanctions are something you do
after an event like Tiananmen Square. It is not something that
is normal policy. So, using some heavy dose of sanctions is
something the United States really should not include in its
China policy at the moment. It is just not the circumstances
where that is required. So, I agree with that. We just should
not be doing that.
These are some other things. One can think of other things
from time to time. I think on the Taiwan question, we really
have to be very, very sensitive there. But that gets beyond
Hong Kong. It is somewhat connected, but separate.
Senator Hagel. Thank you.
Dr. Hung.
Ms. Hung. Yes. I think that Washington should continue
expressing its concerns about the democratic development in
Hong Kong through low-profile diplomacy. Given the fact that
there is a high possibility that Beijing and the Hong Kong
Democrats may have a dialogue, I do not think that at this
stage the United States should react too strongly. The more
vocally the United States opposes Beijing's policies toward
Hong Kong, the more firmly Chinese leaders will believe the
Democrats in Hong Kong are actually in league with the United
States to try to overthrow it. I would also urge the United
States not to consider changing U.S. policies toward Hong Kong
as authorized under the U.S.-Hong Kong Policy Act. There are
three reasons. First, is that, on this issue, Hong Kong people
are in a passive position. They want universal suffrage as soon
as possible, but it is Beijing that made the April decision.
So if critics of China say that, ``Oh, because Hong Kong
can no longer enjoy a high degree of autonomy, we should
suspend these benefits for Hong Kong,'' then these critics are
in effect punishing Hong Kong people for something that they
have not done. This is not fair to the Hong Kong people.
Second, I also believe that it is not good for United
States' interests either, because any punishment on Hong Kong
would develop anti-American sentiments in Hong Kong and
mainland China.
Third, we need to think about the possible reactions from
China as well. For example, this April the United States
sponsored a human rights resolution at the United Nations Human
Rights Commission, and in response China suspended the U.S.-
China human rights dialogue. What I worry about, is if we
change the U.S. policies toward Hong Kong, China may react so
strongly that it might suspend the rule of law projects and
continue suspending the U.S.-China human rights dialogue. For
the sake of human rights developments and rule of law
developments in Hong Kong and China, I do not think that at
this stage the United States should change its policy toward
Hong Kong, as authorized under the U.S.-Hong Kong Policy Act.
Thank you.
Senator Hagel. Dr. Hung, thank you.
We have been joined by the former Chairman of this
Commission, the distinguished Senator from Montana. Senator
Baucus, welcome.
If I might just interrupt the hearing for a moment to do a
little business, I understand that you want to cast your vote
at our business meeting. So if you would register your vote,
Senator, then we can get on with whatever you have.
Senator Baucus. I vote aye.
Senator Hagel. Thank you, sir. You see the influence you
have on Senator Baucus? It is amazing. [Laughter.] Senator,
would you like to add anything, a statement, questions?
Senator Baucus. I am fine. I have already learned by
listening. Thank you.
Senator Hagel. Thank you. Dr. Overholt, you had noted in
your comments, and again I think I have written down basically
what you said, and I think this was your term, ``basic freedoms
are still intact in Hong Kong.'' You, I think, mentioned
specifically freedom of speech, freedom of the press.
In light of the concerns that this Commission has had
regarding freedom of religion in the PRC, how is religious
freedom--and I would ask the three of you the same question--
faring in Hong Kong? Is there any carry-over to Hong Kong on
this issue from the mainland?
Mr. Overholt. Hong Kong has freedom of religion. Every
religion I know of practices in Hong Kong. Many of them
proselytize across the border in ways that Beijing could object
to, but has chosen not to. Falun Gong practices openly. They
have public sessions in public places throughout Hong Kong
where they do their exercises. They have people passing out
leaflets in very prominent places. For instance, on either side
of the Star Ferry, they pass out leaflets. They have not been
inhibited in practicing their religion in Hong Kong in any way.
There are two complaints they have that have some substance. In
the early days, they were allowed to rent out city hall for
Falun Gong exercises. They have not been able to do that, at
least as much, recently. And the Hong Kong Immigration has not
allowed in Falun Gong people from outside Hong Kong to
participate in demonstrations. One can argue that either way,
but with those, in the large scheme of things, minor footnotes,
freedom of religion is alive and well in Hong Kong.
Senator Hagel. Professor Davis.
Mr. Davis. Yes. I agree with Bill Overholt. For the most
part, freedom of religion is fully respected. There have been
some issues. The Falun Gong one, I think he has mentioned. It
has become a kind of barometer on freedom of religion in Hong
Kong. When people see Falun Gong suppressed or harassed, then
people start worrying. So if you want a barometer, it is one of
them that I think comes up.
Other developments. There have been debates about the
Department of Education's effort to change control over
religious schools in Hong Kong by having committees of parents.
The bishop of Hong Kong has taken a strong stance against that.
I do not think this is an issue that should really concern U.S.
foreign policy. It is peculiar because Hong Kong has much less
separation of church and state than we do in the United States,
so a great deal of public funding goes to religion-run schools.
So those religions that are getting the public funding have
worried that if the government
requires a kind of elected committee, then the bishop or other
sponsors will lose control over the message and the way the
school wants to conduct itself.
The bishop of Hong Kong, Bishop Zen, the head of the
Catholic church, has spoken out forcefully against a change in
regulations. So this is an issue involving freedom of religion,
but peculiar for us to complain about because our degree of
separation of church and state means that the public funding
would not even go to all these schools as it does in Hong Kong.
Hong Kong has much less separation. They do provide public
funding to church-sponsored schools. The Baptist University of
Hong Kong is a publicly funded university. So, I do not think
this is something of concern to U.S. foreign policy.
On the positive side, Bishop Zen, who has been very
outspoken in the democracy movement in Hong Kong, has actually
been invited to Shanghai to meet with mainland church
officials. The mainland has the so-called kind of patriotic
religious churches. They do not allow private churches and they
do not allow the Vatican-sponsored Catholic churches in China.
But Bishop Zen, who has spent some of his earlier career doing
work in China, who is now the head of the Catholic Church in
Hong Kong, has been invited to China to meetings. So you are
talking about dialogue with Democrats. There is also dialogue
with this very prominent religious leader who is also very
prominent in the democracy movement. So, it is a bit of a mixed
bag. But I think the statement that there is religious freedom
in Hong Kong to date is an accurate one.
Senator Hagel. Thank you.
Dr. Hung.
Ms. Hung. I think that is an excellent piece of
information. I just want to make one minor point. Religious
freedom has never been a main concern in Hong Kong because we
generally enjoy that freedom. The main concern right now is
freedom of speech, press freedom. This is the case, especially
after three famous talk show hosts resigned in May, claiming
that they were pressured to do so. Those resignations created a
climate of fear, which was widely reported by the Western
media. But lately, this situation seems to have improved a
little. According to numerous polls announced before the
September 12 election, Hong Kong people's confidence in ``One
Country, Two Systems'' and the Hong Kong Government and Beijing
has increased.
That actually shows that they feel more comfortable about
the political environment there. That is a very good sign. But,
of course, we just keep our fingers crossed that things will
continue to improve.
Senator Hagel. Thank you.
Senator Baucus, any questions? I, unless Senator Baucus has
anything to contribute, am going to adjourn the hearing. But
before I do, I would ask if the three of you have any
additional comments that you would like to add.
Yes. Professor Davis.
Mr. Davis. Yes. I would just say that I have submitted a
written statement, so that is in the record, I think.
Senator Hagel. That will be included. All the written
statements will be included in the record.
Senator Baucus. Mr. Chairman?
Senator Hagel. Senator Baucus.
Senator Baucus. I am just curious whether you can sense any
change in China's relationship with Hong Kong with the recent,
if you will, resignation of Jiang Zemin, that is, relinquishing
military power, and Hu Jintao, I suppose, is basically in
charge. Does that mean anything or not?
Ms. Hung. Actually, I think I should answer that question.
I addressed that issue at length in my statement.
Senator Baucus. I am sorry I missed that.
Ms. Hung. So, it is on record. But I want to just add one
final remark.
Senator Baucus. Sure. Could you just, for one or two
sentences, summarize?
Ms. Hung. I think although Hu Jintao is generally hailed as
a moderate reformer, we should not expect that he can decide to
revoke the decision made in April, to allow Hong Kong to have
universal suffrage in 2007 and 2008. But then I believe that
because he has to prove that he has the governing ability, he
has to establish a dialogue with Democrats, otherwise that does
not reflect well on his leadership.
Mr. Davis. Just to add a brief comment. I think it has been
true of China's team on Hong Kong for some years that they have
been a very conservative element of the Chinese leadership.
Some of this creeps into the Taiwan issue as well. There is a
sense that it is kind of a ``one China'' issue, and they should
be tougher. So I do not think Hu Jintao, who is trying to
consolidate his position, is going to be inclined to release
all of that and put moderates suddenly in position. But I do
agree that even the conservatives have started to have dialogue
with the Democrats, and I think he would be well advised to
encourage that direction.
Senator Baucus. Thank you. Thank you very much.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Senator Hagel. Senator, thank you. Thanks to each of you.
We appreciate very much your contributions. It has been
important.
This Commission is adjourned.
[Whereupon, at 2:33 p.m. the hearing was concluded.]
A P P E N D I X
=======================================================================
Prepared Statements
----------
Prepared Statement of Randall G. Schriver
september 23, 2004
Mr. Chairman, thank you. I appreciate the opportunity to testify
before the Committee today on a subject that engages Americans and
America's interests directly: the prospects for democratic development
in Hong Kong.
We meet just 11 days after the Legislative Council elections in
Hong Kong. I have seen a lot of analysis about who won, who lost, and
what these scorecards portend for the future. While there may be a
variety of views on the election, we can cite some important outcomes
that are indisputable. Perhaps of greatest significance, is the fact
that the people of Hong Kong turned out to vote in record numbers, a
clear message to the governments in Hong Kong and Beijing that they
want--and value--democracy. They want it sooner rather than later. This
has been a consistent message for some time, including the most
prominent expression of this desire on July 1, 2003, when a half-
million people marched in the streets of Hong Kong protesting the
attempt by the Hong Kong government to rush through passage of national
security legislation.
The voter turnout was impressive and owes much, in my opinion, to
the desire of the people in Hong Kong to exercise their rights--and I
think perhaps to respond in a positive way to China's regrettable
decision last April to cut short the public debate about establishing
universal suffrage for the election of the Chief Executive in 2007 and
the fourth Legislative Council in 2008. Over 55 percent or 1.78 million
of those eligible to vote in the direct elections went to the polls.
Those who voted in the 30 functional constituencies--where there are
human voters as well as corporate ones for seats representing a variety
of professions, from educators and accountants to industry and
finance--similarly turned out in record numbers, though the numbers
were much smaller, just 135,000 or about 70 percent of those eligible.
Some notable results include:.
The democratic coalition came away with a total of 25
seats, though the Democratic Party itself found its number
reduced from 11 to nine. The coalition won an impressive 62
percent of the vote in the seats that were directly elected. A
couple of very high profile government critics--radio
personality Albert Cheng, who believes that he lost his job
because of intimidation by Beijing, and Leung Kwok-heung,
nicknamed ``longhair''--both won, and they will bring
perspectives that likely will give the Legislative Council a
more colorful cast.
The pro-business Liberal Party, which leans toward
Beijing, but which had opposed national security legislation in
2003, won ten seats, including, for the first time in Liberal
Party history, two that were directly contested.
The pro-Beijing Democratic Alliance for the Betterment
of Hong Kong won twelve seats, becoming the largest single bloc
in Legco, despite some predictions that it might be tainted by
backing Beijing on the decision to delay the introduction of
direct elections and universal suffrage for the 2007 Chief
Executive and the 2008 Legislative Council elections.
The election, which may move Hong Kong away from the polarization
of the past year, did highlight some shortcomings. We are well aware of
allegations that there were a number of technical and procedural
problems in some locations. We understand that the Electoral Affairs
Commission is looking into them and will review the entire operation to
correct any irregularities in time for the next election. In fact, the
Electoral Affairs Commission has ordered the examination of voting in
four functional constituencies where the number of ballot papers
counted exceeded those issued to registered voters.
But more fundamentally, there have been consistent charges of voter
intimidation in the run-up to the election. The campaign period was, at
times, marred by scandal mongering and allegations of not-too-subtle
pressure from the central authorities. Here too, the Hong Kong
government has promised to investigate any lead and to defend
vigorously the integrity of its elections. That is appropriate, and the
government's deeds should match its words. Our hope is that this
election can be the foundation for a steady reversal of some of the
negative trends in Hong Kong over the past year. The Hong Kong people
have earned no less.
The elections also showed that no group can stand pat and assume
that the people will follow their lead. The government of Hong Kong may
not have to face a democratic majority, but it certainly will need to
continue to find ways to win Legco--and thus popular--support for its
actions; it cannot govern through administrative fiat.
Although Beijing issued a statement that the elections showed that
the people of Hong Kong were masters of their house, a more accurate
assessment would make note of the significant influence that Beijing
will continue to wield on important matters related to Hong Kong's
future. Meanwhile, it is becoming increasingly clear that Beijing too
needs to find a way to mobilize genuine popular support for its vision
of a Hong Kong united with the mainland in a ``one-country, two
systems'' framework, forging a prosperous future together. After all,
more than half of the votes cast in this election were for supporters
of the democratic coalition. I am not suggesting that some members of
the Democratic Alliance for the Betterment of Hong Kong and the Liberal
Party are not also interested in promoting and supporting the expansion
of democracy in Hong Kong. But I do firmly believe that Beijing's
vision of Hong Kong can best be realized by moving more rapidly toward
the goal of a genuine representative government--one which would meet
the aspirations of the vast majority of the people of Hong Kong. One
important element of the Basic Law, Hong Kong's mini-constitution, was
realized in 2004 with the expansion of directly elected seats from 24
to 30. It is important that this trend be continued, if the intent of
the Basic Law--a Hong Kong governed by Hong Kong people--is to be
realized.
We have a great deal of important work to do with this new
Legislative Council in Hong Kong and with the Administration there, but
let me note that nothing that happened in this election changes
America's underlying policy toward Hong Kong, a policy which also
promotes important American interests. Both before and after the 1997
reversion, our goal remains--to the best of our ability--to help the
people of Hong Kong preserve their prosperity and way of life.
Elections do just that. The people's representatives will now have an
opportunity to justify their selection, doing the sorts of things that
legislatures normally do--enact laws, approve budgets, hold the
government accountable for its actions, and openly debate issues that
are in the public interest. We wish the Hong Kong government, the Hong
Kong legislature, and the Hong Kong people well in this task and are
prepared to assist to the best of our ability in helping them.
I believe that the U.S. Congress has the same view of the situation
and that this is behind the spirit of the recent Congressional
resolutions on Hong Kong, which support the people of Hong Kong in
freely determining the pace and the scope of constitutional
developments.
Let me offer some general comments about Hong Kong and about
America's view of it. The 1984 Joint Declaration of the UK and the PRC,
the subsequent promulgation of the Basic Law, and Hong Kong's
sustained, autonomous management of its day-to-day affairs laid a
foundation for Hong Kong's continued economic success, as well as its
political development. The United States embraces and supports Hong
Kong's uniqueness through passage and implementation of the Hong Kong
Policy Act of 1992 which established the legal authority to treat Hong
Kong as an entity distinct from the People's Republic of China.
America has a profound interest in--and commitment to--the success
of Hong Kong as a vibrant democracy. Some 45,000 Americans live and
work there. Hong Kong hosts more than 1,100 American firms, 600 of
which have regional operational responsibilities and employ a quarter
of a million people. Cumulative American foreign direct investment in
Hong Kong, a region with nearly seven million residents, totaled over
$44 billion at the end of 2003. We also have considerable trade
interests in Hong Kong. Total exports of goods and services to Hong
Kong amounted to $13.5 billion in 2003, while imports of the same
reached approximately $8.9 billion, making Hong Kong our 14th largest
trading partner.
With global trade in goods at $455 billion, Hong Kong has a vital
interest in liberalizing trade internationally. We have counted Hong
Kong among the most vocal and effective supporters of open market
principles, and, more generally, Hong Kong has been at the forefront of
efforts in the Doha Round to reduce barriers to trade. Hong Kong hosted
an important APEC Telecommunications conference in May and will host
the next WTO ministerial meeting next year.
Beyond the trade and investment statistics, there exists the
evolving but vital bilateral cooperation with Hong Kong authorities
which greatly enhances America's security. Hong Kong, the single
largest source of U.S.-bound sea containers, joined the Container
Security Initiative in September 2002 and made its program operational
eight months later in May 2003. In joining the CSI, the Hong Kong
Government underscored our common interest in protecting the smooth
functioning of the global trading system in the face of terrorist
threats. In addition to CSI, Hong Kong, the second largest financial
market in Asia, has worked closely with us and through the premier
global institution for attacking money laundering, the Financial Action
Task Force, which Hong Kong chaired in 2002, to find ways to cutoff
terrorist access to financial sources. Law enforcement cooperation,
across-the-board, has been excellent and targeted at protecting the
safety and well-being of the people of Hong Kong and America alike. And
Hong Kong has been a welcoming port-of-call for visits by American
ships.
I would also note that Hong Kong has an effective, autonomous, and
transparent export control regime that is strengthened through pre-
license checks and post-shipment verification of Hong Kong companies by
U.S. Department of Commerce representatives. Hong Kong government
officials are working with us to strengthen our already close
cooperation. They told Deputy Under Secretary of Commerce Mark Foulon
earlier this month that these kinds of controls are important to ensure
that our trade rests on a solid security foundation and that they would
address proactively all areas of concern as soon they arose. Our
exports of high technology commodities to Hong Kong depend on the
integrity of Hong Kong's separateness and on the effective and vigorous
enforcement of Hong Kong's export control rules and regulations.
Hong Kong's openness, its international status, its welcoming
attitude to businesspeople throughout the world, its active
participation in economic organizations, including the World Trade
Organization--these are elements of Hong Kong's comparative advantage.
The Cato Institute once again recognized just how open and free Hong
Kong's economy is by naming it--for the 8th consecutive year--the
freest economy according to the findings in its annual report on
Economic Freedom of the World.
The people of mainland China benefit from Hong Kong's openness as
well. Hong Kong has played a key role in helping alter the landscape in
China, especially in South China, where ten million workers or more in
at least 65,000 Hong Kong-run factories are gainfully employed and
learning how to do business with an international focus, and according
to free market principles. Hong Kong provides access to capital markets
and listings on the Hong Kong stock exchange for PRC companies that are
also becoming more international in their orientation everyday.
Democracy is predicated on the assumption that there will be
disagreements, and disagreements are settled in democracies by the
ballot box. Today's disagreements in Hong Kong are over how best to
govern and, for the most part, there is a legislature that is balanced
with a lot of different views, but with general agreement that Hong
Kong's future is best served by better communication between government
and the governed. An unproductive debate on whether some in Hong Kong
are being influenced by outsiders is the last thing that men and women
of goodwill should engage in, What will work best is for all parties,
across the political spectrum in Hong Kong, to forge responsible
positions that contribute to the resolution of Hong Kong's governing
structure and its prosperity.
Our role is clear. We want to see the Hong Kong people succeed.
They deserve a stable and prosperous home. The best means to that end,
in our view, is the steady evolution of Hong Kong toward its democratic
future. That future should rightfully be in their hands, for them to
decide. We don't seek to usurp their decisions, nor do we intend to
interfere with the Hong Kong people's relationship with their central
government in Beijing. But the United States will always stand for the
fundamental principles of democracy, and we will not shrink from
declaring our core principles. We certainly won't agree with those who
argue that democracy is a luxury to be offered to a people only at some
distant point in the future when they are somehow more prepared for it.
The most telling point that can be made about Hong Kong's legislative
election is this: the Hong Kong people proved again that they have the
wisdom and maturity to be trusted with universal suffrage. They are a
proud, smart, capable, and industrious people who deserve the best
possible chance to succeed in the 21st century.
With that Mr. Chairman, I will be pleased to take your questions.
______
Prepared Statement of Michael C. Davis
september 23, 2004
Mr. Chairman, let me first express my appreciation for holding this
hearing on the Hong Kong election. The development of democratic
governance in Hong Kong has long been a matter of great interest in the
United States. In the recent flurry of reports over the Hong Kong
election some international media reports highlighted that Hong Kong
people had chosen stability over democracy. I think this misreads voter
preferences in Hong Kong. An assessment of the complexity of and
obstructions built into the Hong Kong electoral system may assist your
assessment of the September 2004 Legislative Council election in Hong
Kong. At 55.6 percent of the registered voters, the September 12th
election had the highest voter turnout in Hong Kong history. As with
the previous high turnout, just after the handover in 1998, this
increased voter interest may reflect growing public concern with
governance in Hong Kong. The election has exposed a number of problems
in respect of Hong Kong's political development under the commitments
of the Sino-British Joint Declaration and the Basic Law. While there
were some concerns about the balloting process, more serious concerns
have arisen over the basic fairness of the election.
Respecting the former, the balloting, though generally successful,
was occasionally marred by acts of incompetence in the maintenance and
availability of ballots. This involved some instances where over-filled
ballot boxes lead to delays in allowing some voters to cast their vote.
Some members of the democratic camp in Hong Kong have worried that when
this became public knowledge it may have deterred some voters from
coming to the polls. As a consequence of this problem some ballot boxes
were allegedly opened in an inadequately supervised manner in order to
tamp down the ballots inside. There may have been some diminution of
these difficulties and greater confidence in the voting process if
election officials had taken greater advantage of local and
international election monitors who were on hand to observe and offer
advice. Other than these cases of seeming incompetence there appeared
to be generally an acceptable level of performance in respect of the
mechanics of the electoral process.
More serious electoral problems arose in respect of the overall
fairness of the election and its implications for Hong Kong's political
development. Two key areas are of concern: (1) the fundamentally
unequal voting system, and (2) the level of intimidation and seeming
official bias that preceded the election. Problems in these areas
undermine public confidence in the ``one country, two systems'' model
and represent a serious challenge to Hong Kong political development.
Chinese and Hong Kong officials should be encouraged to adopt a firm
timetable to move forward on Hong Kong's political reform agenda as
required by the Sino-British Joint Declaration and the Basic Law.
the unequal voting system
The stark denial of equal voting rights in this system is most
simply revealed in the numerical outcome of the election: overall,
candidates from the pan-democratic camp garnered approximately 62
percent of the vote but were allotted only about 41 percent of the
seats in the Legislative Council. This odd numerical outcome is a
consequence of a voting system designed to insure an electoral outcome
favorable to the existing government and its policies. This has been
combined historically with a deep-seated distrust of pro-democracy
politicians. Given the relative moderation of the democratic camp in
Hong Kong this distrust has long been unwarranted. Under the current
system, driven by these concerns, fully half of the 60 seats in the
Hong Kong Legislative Council are filled by legislators from functional
constituencies representing in total just under 200,000 voters. Of the
30 functional constituencies ten have purely human voters, while 20
have either corporate voters alone or a mix of corporate and human
voters. The bias of these constituencies toward the pro-government/
Beijing position is revealed in the fact that pro-democracy candidates,
in spite of winning 50 percent of the functional constituency vote,
were only able to take eight of the functional constituency seats, the
highest number they have taken in this sector to date over three
elections. Eleven functional constituency candidates even ran
unopposed, producing for the pro-government camp without contest nearly
two-thirds of the seats that pan-democratic candidates won in the hard
fought geographical constituency component of the election.
Only 30 legislators are directly elected in geographical
constituencies by the 3.2 million registered Hong Kong voters. Even for
the directly elected seats the government has devised a proportional
representation system which aims to insure that minority parties--in
Hong Kong generally meaning pro-government/Beijing parties--take
several of the seats with only a small fraction of the vote. This
system entails multi-seat districts with voters having only one vote
for their favored candidate list. The purpose is allegedly to allow
representation of minority parties and candidates. The consequence in
Hong Kong has tended to be to gain some additional seats (in addition
to those virtually guaranteed seats in the functional constituencies)
for pro-government politicians. If one appreciates that the government
itself is not directly elected then the deleterious consequence for
democracy can be appreciated. This system allows pro-Beijing politician
supported by a minority of voters to dominate the Legislative Council.
The outcome in this election is that 34 or 35 (depending on whether one
legislator is deemed an independent) seats are in the pro-government
camp, while 25 are held by pro-democracy politicians. The pro-democracy
camp effectively lost the election with 62 percent of the popular vote.
This proportional representation model used for the 30 geographical
constituency seats in Hong Kong has other flaws. Under this system the
need for parties and politicians to agree on the number and order of
candidates on a list breeds endless conflict in and among political
parties from all political camps, as parties seek to devise electoral
lists that satisfy the electoral ambitions of their core members and
allied parties. At the same time various parties in both the pan-
democratic and the pro-government camps are put to predicting the level
of support and devising the correct number of lists so as to maximize
the number of seats taken in the direct election. A miscalculation in
this regard could result in a list garnering a large number of votes
that practically do not count toward the electoral outcome. This is in
fact what happened in the present election for the Hong Kong Island
constituency, resulting in an even split of the six candidates between
the pro-democracy and pro-government camps, even though the pro-
democracy camp won the popular vote by approximately 200,000 as against
the pro-government camp's 140,000 votes. This system not only confuses
and angers voters but also undermines democracy by wasting many votes.
Even within the parameters of a proportional representation system
simply allowing voters to indicate a second choice so as not to waste
votes would contribute to greater concurrence with voter intentions.
intimidation of voters and candidates
The September 12 election was preceded by months of political
intimidation, first over political reform and then over the election
itself. This intimidation and the doubts that preceded it raise grave
concern for Hong Kong's political future. The current democracy debate
followed on the heals of the large demonstrations against national
security legislation by over a half-million demonstrators on July 1st
2003. The overbearing and dismissive way in which the government had
presented this legislation had incensed Hong Kong people and signaled
the need for political reform. The national security legislation was
eventually withdrawn in the face of such severe opposition. In spite of
popular outrage over the style of governance the local and Beijing
governments have not been significantly responsive to emerging calls
for democracy. In late 2003 and early 2004 Beijing took an increasingly
assertive position against democratic reform. Retreating to its long-
establish hostility toward the democratic camp and democratic reform,
Beijing launched a campaign against democracy and severely attacked the
democratic camp. This campaign constituted the backdrop to the current
election. Statements from Beijing officials and supporters initiated a
level of intimidation that had not been seen in Hong Kong since the
attacks on the British Hong Kong government in the mid 1990s. These
attacks progressively escalated as follows:
First, Beijing officials and their supporters launched the so-
called patriot debate. Hong Kong was told that under any democratic
reform ``patriots must be the main body of those who govern Hong
Kong.'' While Deng Xiaoping was cited for this requirement, Deng was
frequently on record as indicating that patriots do not exclude people
who criticize the communist party. Categories of democracy activist who
were labeled unpatriotic in this campaign included those who were said
to be subversive of mainland authorities, those who allegedly supported
Taiwan independence, those who raised the flag of democracy but were
accused of being running dogs for Western forces, and those who opposed
the Article 23 national security legislation. The patriot debate
reached its zenith when former Democratic Party Chair Martin Lee was
attacked for testifying before a US Senate hearing on Hong Kong. He was
vilified by a variety of leftists but the greatest attack came when Mr.
An Min, a PRC Vice Minister of Commerce attacked even Martin Lee's
father, General Li Yin-wo, who had been an officer in the KMT
resistance during World War II.
The second stage of the attack on democracy was to offer a steady
diet of Deng Xiaoping statements arguing the meaning of ``gradual and
orderly progress.'' This was cherry picked to suit the moment and again
with no Basic Law support. As it became apparent that ``Deng thought''
could be used on either side this barrage slowed down. Ultimately, one
suspects the best source of Deng thought is the Basic Law, which is
better subject to current interpretation--rather than vague and
contradictory interpretations. Such is more consistent with the rule of
law.
The third stage of this attack on democratic reform became even
more aggressive when the Beijing media started publishing threats to
dismiss the Legislative Council if democrats took more than 30 seats in
the September elections. The China Daily warned, ``If those who try to
use democracy to exclude the Communist Party of China and `respect
Taiwan self-determination' take the majority of seats in Legco, Hong
Kong's executive-led government will collapse and the central authority
and national security will be severely challenged.'' The local pro-
Beijing paper, the Wen Wei Po, quoted an unnamed Beijing official as
saying, ``I have a knife. Usually it is not used but now you force me
to use it.'' These statement were understood locally to threaten
dissolution of the Legislative Council if pro-Beijing parties lost
control in the next election. It is true that the Basic Law has
provisions specifying that the Chief Executive may dissolve the
Legislative Council, after consultations, if it refuses to pass bills
proposed by the Chief Executive. But these provisions require a new
election of a new Legislative Council and specify that if the
Legislative Council again refuses to pass such bill then the Chief
Executive must resign. It must be seriously in doubt whether the
current non-elected Chief Executive would willingly subject himself to
what amounts to a referendum. This actually points to another argument
for democratization, as the Basic Law constitutional design clearly
contemplates the use of such provisions by an elected Chief Executive
with political support. The only alternative to using these provisions
for the purpose implied in the above comments is the declaration of a
state of war or turmoil under Article 18, but such extraordinary
provision only indicates the application Mainland laws, not dismissal
of government.
The fourth phase in the crisis was to lecture Hong Kong on the
``spirit'' of the Basic Law and the demerits of ``fake democracy.''
Hong Kong was told by a mainland ``legal expert'' that the spirit, not
words, is the key to the Basic Law. The spirit in question appeared to
be a very mainland-regarding spirit and offered little regard to the
long ago assurances that Hong Kong people should put their hearts at
ease and that the rest of the world might rely on Hong Kong's autonomy.
The pro-Beijing business elite has also weighed in on this spirit,
asserting a Hong Kong by and for business interests and worrying about
a welfare state. At this stage the extreme rhetoric had caused such a
negative response in Hong Kong it seemed to be called off.
The fifth phase in the current process was launched by the
announcement that the NPC Standing Committee would interpret the above
noted reform provisions in the Basic Law. The NPC Standing Committee
made this interpretation behind closed doors with the advice of a Basic
Law Committee made up of six mainland and six local members, the latter
all being from the pro-Beijing camp. This interpretation essentially
added the requirement that the Chief Executive initiate any reform
process by issuing a report. The Chief Executive and Task Force reports
that quickly followed effectively imposed a variety of socio-political
conditions on reform. On April 26, 2004, a further NPC Standing
Committee interpretation in response to the Chief Executive's report
largely ruled out significant democratic reform. Essentially, Beijing
has seized for itself control over not only the approval but the
initiation of any future reform effort. Unless Beijing has a change of
heart it is likely that it will only allow future reforms that retain
Beijing control over critical political outcomes.
A sixth stage in the reform debate has seen Beijing, after its
April 26th interpretation, seek to gain a favorable electoral outcome
in the September 2004 Legislative Council election. This has been done
through a variety of strategies. There have been allegations of heavy-
handed tactics in registering voters and allegations of intimidation of
popular radio talk-show hosts. More clearly visible has been support
for pro-Beijing candidates (and opposition to democrats) in the Central
Government controlled media and soft inducements toward patriotic
support through military parades and visits by Olympic medalists. The
carrot of better dialog with the democrats, aimed at reducing the size
of democratic support in public demonstrations and elections has also
been tried. It is not clear whether there is any hope of reversal of
the anti-democrat stance. During the election period Beijing appeared
to articulate support for pro-Beijing politicians in various pro-
Beijing newspapers, especially the Hong Kong edition of the China
Daily. There have also been various accusations of Beijing meddling in
organizing the pro-Beijing camp, in deciding who should stay in or drop
out of the elections. During this period Mainland public security
officials also arrested on prostitution charges and detained without
trial for six months of reeducation a member of the Democratic Party
who was running for the Legislative Council. The daily diet of drawing
attention to Democratic party difficulties in pro-Beijing papers has
generally been seen as an effort to gain local support for pro-Beijing
candidates.
the future of ``one country, two systems''
The basic constitutional and electoral design in Hong Kong has long
sought to privilege the Beijing appointed local government and its
supporters. That elected Hong Kong politicians swear to uphold the
central government is, of course, a legitimate Beijing concern. The
problem for Hong Kong has been the degree of Beijing's concern over
political loyalty and the measures taken to insure full political
support. One would like to see a more generous posture that aimed to
keep the fundamental democracy and human rights commitments required by
the Sino-British Joint Declaration and international human rights law.
The Sino-British Joint Declaration provides for a high degree of
autonomy in Hong Kong and that democracy and basic civil liberties be
protected in accordance with international standards. By inviting
international support for its ``one country, two systems'' model China
has invited international concern for these commitments.
In respect of democracy, the Sino-British Joint Declaration
requires that members of the Legislative Council be chosen by
elections. The Hong Kong Basic Law, in this respect, reflects the above
noted Beijing anxieties, by providing for a very slow pace of
democratic development. Articles 45 and 68 and Annexes I and II of the
Basic Law outline the method and pace of democratic development. These
articles specify the ultimate aim as full universal suffrage both in
respect of the Chief Executive and the Legislative Council. The annexes
in question provide that the method for choosing the Chief Executive
and the Legislative Council can be changed for elections subsequent to
2007. In April of 2004 the Chinese government, in interpreting the
Basic Law, rejected any substantial changes for the upcoming 2007/2008
elections. Many pro-democracy politicians have run on a platform of
trying to change this position and encourage a more firm and prompt
timetable for democratic reform.
An additional factor making democratic reform of great urgency is
the political impotence of the Legislative Council. The Legislative
Council is currently restricted from proposing bills on public policy
and bills that require public expenditure. A split voting system
between directly elected and functional legislators further ties the
hands of legislators who would like to take the initiative on matters
of public concern in Hong Kong. The Basic Law provides a way out of
this by allowing for a change in both the method of election and the
methods for voting on bills from 2007. These provisions on reform were
the source of the recent tension over political reform. The democratic
camp pushed for democratic reform and the Beijing government refused
such reform, leaving Hong Kong largely polarized over its political
future. This debate became the basis for the extreme intimidation over
the past few months, which carried over into the just-completed
election.
In considering the future of ``one country, two systems'' in Hong
Kong, it is obvious that the time for establishing a substantial reform
agenda is fast approaching. Without reform it appears that the level of
trust in government will continue to erode. This will mean a government
with decreasing legitimacy prone to crisis management and
indecisiveness. Rather than congratulating themselves for avoiding a
train wreck in the current election local and central officials should
recognize the need for political reform before confidence is eroded
further. The costs to Hong Kong of continued dithering over political
reform can be enormous. Hong Kong is clearly positioned quite favorably
for full democratic development. The levels of civic engagement and
economic development both point to a society well positioned for a
democratic transition. Without forthright movement on reform the risk
that Hong Kong will fall back from this favorable posture and enter a
phase of continuing political crisis and lost public confidence is
high.
At this stage the only obstacle to democratic reform appears to be
Chinese government anxiety about democracy and democrats. The cure to
this I believe is greater Beijing engagement with the pro-democracy
camp. China's leaders, the Hong Kong Government and pro-Beijing
politicians should be encouraged to take a more inclusive and tolerant
attitude toward democracy and democrats. The costs of stifling Hong
Kong's political development have already been evident in uncertain
governance and a series of crises that have emerged in Hong Kong since
the handover. A government which has no popular legitimacy in a
democratic process, supported by unpopular legislators who do its
bidding, has clearly angered the Hong Kong public on several occasions.
This was especially evident in the mass demonstrations over national
security legislative proposals in 2003 and over democracy in 2004. A
more inclusive system of democratic governance offers much greater
promise for Hong Kong and China and would better address the human
rights concerns of the local and international communities. A movement
toward greater inclusiveness would appear to be the next step in Hong
Kong's democratic transition. From such posture the Beijing government
should work out a clear time-table for full democratic reform to be
achieved as soon as possible.
______
Prepared Statement of William H. Overholt\1\
september 23, 2004
summary
The recent Hong Kong election was noteworthy for:
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ The opinions and conclusions expressed in this testimony are
the author's alone and should not be interpreted as representing those
of RAND or any of the sponsors of its research. This product is part of
the RAND Corporation testimony series. RAND testimonies record
testimony presented by RAND associates to federal, state, or local
legislative committees; government-appointed commissions and panels;
and private review and oversight bodies. The RAND Corporation is a
nonprofit research organization providing objective analysis and
effective solutions that address the challenges facing the public and
private sectors around the world. RAND's publications do not
necessarily reflect the opinions of its research clients and sponsors.
Very gradual democratization;
Recent new restrictions on the pace of future
democratization that clearly frustrate a majority of Hong Kong
people;
Chinese central government fear of the democracy
movement leading to repressive tactics that are largely legal
but ultimately contrary to its own interests;
Some unsettling incidents of legal and illegal
intimidation prior to the election;
A high turnout election in a calm atmosphere with an
outcome that was not affected by the incidents;
A voting majority above 60 percent for pro-democracy
candidates;
An electoral system that nonetheless translated the
pro-democracy majority vote into a majority of seats (35/60)
for pro-government conservatives;
A clear mandate for a strategy of democratization and
moderation;
Weak, semi-competent, scandal-ridden political parties
poorly representing their social bases;
A democracy movement caught between a rising,
frustrated consensus on the necessity of more rapid
democratization and a deepening consensus against direct
confrontation with Beijing;
Deep division in China over proper policy toward Hong
Kong;
Considerable hope in Hong Kong for an understanding
that accommodates both Hong Kong's democracy aspirations and
China's security concerns;
Policy proposals in the U.S. that expressed
understandable frustration but risked undermining the democracy
movement.
gradual democratization/absence of democracy/rising frustration
Hong Kong has been experiencing very gradual democratization. Up to
the time when China demanded Hong Kong back from the British, 100
percent of legislators were appointed by the British Governor.
Effective with this election, 0 percent of legislators are appointed.
Notwithstanding this gradual improvement, the system has not
progressed to the point where even very popular views can effect
structural change or ensure policy change. China's central government
handpicks the Hong Kong Chief Executive through a carefully chosen
small committee that has no autonomy. The central government has less
control over the legislature, but the elitist functional constituencies
constituting half of the legislature (30/60) heavily weight electoral
outcomes in favor of candidates who follow the Chief Executive's
wishes; that gives the Chief Executive effective control over most
policy issues.
dirty events/clean election
A number of intimidating incidents and violations of people's
freedoms occurred prior to the election. Beijing efforts to contain the
democracy movement have been directed primarily not at this 2004
election but at staunching pressures for
universal suffrage elections in 2007-8. Chinese officials and media
announced in late 2003 and early 2004 that Hong Kong could only be
ruled by patriots and put a newly restrictive interpretation on
``patriots.'' The Politburo Standing Committee issued a quasi-
constitutional ``interpretation'' of Hong Kong's Basic Law that barred
universal suffrage elections in 2007-8. (China has the unambiguous
legal right to make that decision; the issue is not whether it is legal
but whether it is sensible policy.) A Chinese fleet sailed through Hong
Kong harbor for the first time since 1997, and the Peoples Liberation
Army held its first-ever military parade in Hong Kong. Equally
prominent were carrots designed to win favor from Hong Kong people,
most notably measures that successfully reflated the Hong Kong economy,
visits by Olympic athletes and a finger of Buddha, conciliatory albeit
uncompromising visits from Beijing dignitaries, and gradually
increasing willingness to consult quietly with pro-democracy figures.
Second, and quite separately, there was also a series of human
rights and democracy violations affecting the current election whose
origin and intent were more obscure. There were isolated reports of
attempts from people on the mainland side of the border to influence
votes, including demands for cell phone photographs of their completed
ballots. Three radio station hosts resigned after alleged intimidation.
A Democrat Party candidate was imprisoned for soliciting a prostitute.
Office fronts belonging to three prodemocracy figures were vandalized.
Some commentaries lumped such incidents together as part of a concerted
campaign by Beijing to influence the election.
The reality behind these violations was more complex. Some were
unambiguous violations of ambiguous origin. Some may or may not have
been actual violations. The head of a movement opposing further
landfills in Hong Kong's harbor was threatened, resigned his position,
and left Hong Kong. The vandalism definitely occurred. In all
probability there were some actual cases of people in China trying to
impose voting choices on Hong Kong people.
However, unlike the clear effort to repress demands for universal
suffrage in 2007-8, the origins and intents of these violations related
to the 2004 election remained unclear. It is difficult to imagine
Beijing taking a serious interest in the Save the Harbour movement,
easier to imagine action by enraged local business interests, and
successor Christine Loh seems not to have been intimidated. Radio host
Albert Cheng, who had been physically attacked in the past after for
publicly denouncing triad criminals, said he resigned because of
threats, but he then ran for election, giving his abrasive views a much
bigger megaphone, and won. Apparently he felt intimidated about one job
but not the other; he certainly did not moderate his views.Radio host
and former conservative politician Allen Lee resigned following what he
believed was an intimidating phone call that referred to his virtuous
wife and beautiful daughter; it transpired that the phone call came
from a retired Chinese official, Cheng Sousan, who had made such calls
to quite a number of people, who apparently didn't feel threatened, and
Beijing immediately identified the person in question. Was this
intimidation, or an elderly gentleman seeking news?
Democrat Party candidate Alex Ho was arrested for soliciting a
prostitute. Fearful democrats could reasonably infer malice when a
single Democrat was arrested at this particular time although numerous
other politicians, officials and executives were vulnerable to arrest
for the same offense over the years and few or no others have been
arrested. On the other hand, despite the scandal, the Hong Kong
government certified Ho as a candidate even though it might have been
able to interpret the law restrictively. If the goal was to hurt the
Democrats in the election, Alex Ho was a strange target, since nobody
gave him any chance of election. Was such an arrest part of a grand
Beijing intimidation plan or some local prosecutor trying to impress
his boss?
I do not know conclusively whether Beijing strategy or local
political entrepreneurship or business vengeance was behind any of
these cases. Anyone who claims to know must elucidate details and show
evidence. It is difficult not to notice that Beijing's repressive
posture regarding 2007-8 exhibited a very clear strategy, with sticks
and carrots clearly proportionate to the (regrettable) goal it sought
to achieve, whereas the incidents affecting the 2004 election made no
strategic sense either individually or as a group. To put it another
way, Beijing has so far taken a clear repressive stand on the issue of
structural changes in the electoral system, but there is as yet no
persuasive evidence that it is interfering with the election process
itself.
Third, there were occasions of election day incompetence. Long
lines formed at some polling booths and some ballot boxes were not big
enough to accommodate the consequences of larger turnout, larger
ballots, and crumpled ballot sheets. There is an argument that pro-
democratic voters tend to vote later and therefore may have suffered
more discouragement from late-day delays. Conversely, there are reports
of more votes than eligible voters in some of the functional
constituencies won by democratic groups.
Through the fog of conflicting evidence on such incidents, five
things stand out.
The functional constituency structure is designed to
allocate seats disproportionately to conservative forces and
did so.
No commentator of standing, including the most
partisan, has argued that any of these instances of
intimidation, rights violations or incompetence significantly
affected the basic shape of the election outcome. Exit polls
and election results tallied to the degree expected in a proper
election. The balloting process was basically clean and calm
despite the problems.
In longer perspective the main consequence of the
anti-democratic incidents has probably been to broaden and
deepen the appeal of the democracy movement.
There has been a permissive atmosphere in which
threatening incidents have become more common than in the past.
The Hong Kong government has an indisputable responsibility for
ensuring an atmosphere of rigorous observance of people's
rights, and it will at some point have to provide a thorough
account of how vigorously it protected rights, what scale of
investigative resources it devoted to identifying potential
malefactors, and most importantly whether the permissive
atmosphere disappears.
The body of Hong Kong's freedoms of speech, press,
religion, assembly, rule of law and so forth, remains intact,
but has accumulated dents and scratches at a rate that raises
concerns.
The real issue for Hong Kong democracy is not the detail of this
legislative election but whether there will be substantial, early
progress toward a system that would give Hong Kong people more direct
leverage over the officials and decisions that affect them or whether,
on the contrary, democratization will be indefinitely stalled.
the election outcome
The election itself enjoyed a record turnout of 55.6 percent and a
calm atmosphere. Clearly a majority of Hong Kong people felt that their
votes mattered and that they were comfortable voting.
Pro-democratic groups got over 60 percent of the vote but only 25
of 60 seats. Beijing takes heart from conservatives' continued
numerical control of the legislature, while democrats demonstrated, and
slightly increased, their dominance of the popular vote. Among the
conservatives, the Liberal Party gained substantially and won its first
ever popularly elected seats. Much of its popularity was due to the
fact that it has not been a conservative rubber stamp. Liberal Party
leader James Tien resigned from the government last year to oppose the
controversial anti-subversion law, and the Liberal Party platform calls
for universal suffrage elections in 2012. Hence the Liberal Party's
gains demonstrate simultaneous support for wider suffrage and for
moderate strategies.
While the results send a strong message to Beijing that Hong Kong's
majority wants wider suffrage, they also demonstrate a continued
embrace of moderation by a large center of gravity of the electorate.
There have been huge controversies over the antisubversion bill of 2003
and over suffrage for the 2007-8 elections, but and the Hong Kong
majority is standing firm about these issues but is equally firm about
avoiding gratuitous confrontation.
An important caveat to the electorate's embrace of moderation comes
from the elections of abrasive former radio commentator Albert Cheng
and disruptive Trotskyist ``Long Hair'' Leung, which constitute a
warning that segments of public opinion can take a different turn if
aspirations are frustrated too long. Cheng is the Ralph Nader of Hong
Kong and Leung is analogous to a leader of the old 1960s ``Weatherman''
faction of Students for a Democratic Society. Conservative groups
associate opposition to democracy with ``stability,'' but the election
of ``Long Hair'' indicates that rigidity and social frustration could
cause future instability.
Collectors of historical ironies should note that the single most
unsettling aspect of this election for Beijing was Hong Kong's first-
ever election of a disruptive Marxist, and the most upsetting thing for
Hong Kong's democrats was Beijing's insistence on further entrenching
rules that give special advantages to Hong Kong's leading capitalist
interest groups.
an immature party system
It would be a mistake for either Washington or Beijing to view the
election results as a clear image of the electorate's sentiments. Not
only are the rules such that democratic groups' majority of the popular
vote translates into a minority of seats, but also immature political
parties only partially translate the breadth and intensity of
democratic sentiment.
Democratic political parties are split and much weaker than the
social forces they represent. There are several distinct parties among
the democracy advocates. The Democratic Party of Hong Kong has a total
of 638 members (according to its website on September 15, which cites
July 2004 figures) and negligible ability to raise funds from Hong Kong
citizens. It is deeply divided between an elitist leadership and a
populist base, and between older leaders who are confrontational toward
China and younger supporters who are far less so. It lacks distinctive
policies on the principal social and economic issues facing Hong
Kong.\2\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\2\ See for instance its website statement of education policy, a
subject where major reform is a vital issue for Hong Kong's future:
http://www.dphk.org/e site/index e.htm.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
For some years new leadership, under Yeung Sum, has run the
Democratic Party of Hong Kong, with Martin Lee continuing to serve as a
primary spokesman toward foreigners because of his exceptional command
of the English language. In addition, other democratic groups have
arisen. Audrey Eu is now the most popular figure in the democratic
movement, running first in popularity among legislators compared to
Martin Lee's seventh, and her Article 45 Concern Group has, according
to HKU POP polls, slightly exceeded the Democratic Party in name
recognition among the electorate.\3\ Political figures like Audrey Eu,
Ronnie Tong, Alan Leong, and Margaret Ng are coalescing into what may
become a formal political party.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\3\ See the Hong Kong University Public Opinion Poll surveys of
August 9-16, 2004, and September 14, 2004. http://hkupop.hku.hk/
english/release/release241.html
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The conservative DAB, which won the most seats, is better organized
than any other party. Its links to its constituents are based on
detailed study and emulation of the major U.S. parties. DAB events are
well funded due to the contributions of the local subsidiaries of
Chinese state enterprises--a large advantage in any polity. It receives
loyal support from the trade union leadership. (Over 90 percent of the
union functional constituency vote went to conservative groups.) But it
has lost credibility from support of last year's government-proposed
anti-subversion law, from abandonment of past promises to advocate
democratization, and from some deeply ideological leadership. In the
previous election, it was severely set back by leadership scandals, and
its improved position this time is largely a bounce-back from those
scandals.
The issue of outside influence over Hong Kong campaigns continues
to have great salience. Many in China charge that the democratic
movement is manipulated by the United States and support their charges
by citing Martin Lee's long reliance on an American strategy advisor,
his vigorous solicitation of foreign support, and his pre-1997
characterization of laws restricting foreign political party donations
as a human rights abuse. Grants from American NGOs, his warm welcome in
Washington in March of this year, and the National Endowment for
Democracy's presentation to him of a democracy award modeled on the
statue of freedom in the 1989 Tiananmen Square demonstrations have been
emotionally gratifying for some Americans, but their main consequence
has been to bolster the hardliners in Beijing and to fuel controversy
inside Hong Kong's democracy movement. In recent years, Lee's foreign
support has undoubtedly hurt his party more than it has helped. Every
conversation I have about Hong Kong in China, even with the most
sympathetically liberal figures, quickly homes on this issue of U.S.
manipulation.
Having said that, anyone who has lived in Hong Kong, as I have,
knows that those long lines of middle class families demonstrating
against tough anti-subversion laws and in favor of greater
democratization come from the heart and could not imaginably be
mobilized by foreigners. U.S. favoritism toward Lee may in fact have
weakened the ascent of stronger leaders in his own party and also
slowed the competitive rise of parties more likely to be able to
consolidate the democratic movement. A lesson from the business world:
any party that depends for long periods on foreign NGO donations is
never going to learn to raise money itself. The rising stars of the
democracy movement are not those with particularly strong foreign
connections. The charge of U.S. domination of the democracy movement is
false, but our own actions make it difficult to convince a skeptical
observer.
Mainland Chinese influence on the other hand is everywhere
manifest. Mainland officials authoritatively exhort members of the
Chief Executive Selection Committee to back Tung Chee-hwa. While the
subsidiaries of mainland firms operating in Hong Kong are local
entities, the extent to which they finance the DAB by funding its
events certainly gives Beijing great leverage. DAB leaders reverse
their policy positions, including on democratization, when Beijing
demands it.
where does hong kong go from here?
Hong Kong's future path will depend on the wisdom of leaders in
Beijing and Hong Kong. Success, even if defined narrowly in classic
Hong Kong terms as stability and prosperity, will require compromise on
both sides. Instability and decline will result from rigidity or
confrontation on either side.
Hong Kong immediately after the election is quiescent.
Conservatives among the leaders in China may see this as confirming
their view that a combination of prosperity and firmness will squelch
the democratic movement. Many Chinese as well as foreign experts
recognize that as an illusion. There was a time when Hong Kong people
were apolitical and obsessed with economic growth to the exclusion of
political concerns. Two things have changed that. First, there is a
pervasive sense among political aware groups that Beijing chose an
ineffective leader for Hong Kong, then insisted on reselecting him, and
that Hong Kong's future therefore depends on Hong Kong people being
given a chance to choose their leadership. Second, the Tung
government's handling of the Article 23 controversy of 2003 created for
the first time very focused popular fears about their freedoms. A
Chinese policy of trying to push back the tide will not bring
stability, whereas a policy of gradually channeling the tide will
benefit all parties.
The center of gravity of Hong Kong opinion wants both moderation
and democratization. It recognizes that confrontation with Beijing in
the service of democratization is selfdefeating, and hence it seeks to
reassure. The most important democratic leaders in Hong Kong, including
Martin Lee, have for instance recently been emphasizing their consensus
acceptance of Chinese sovereignty over Hong Kong and also Taiwan. Some
reached out to China by re-labeling the July 1, 2004, demonstration for
democracy as a ``celebration of civic society.'' From personal
experience I can testify that most people in the democratic movement
celebrate China's successes. But a clear majority also demands
improvement of the current system and, if the policy of democratic
reassurance fails to find partners in Beijing, political pressure will
build up like steam in a covered kettle. When and how that steam will
vent I cannot predict, but eventually it will.
While the strategy of reassuring Beijing while pressing hard for
greater democracy provides the only strategy that has any chance at all
of success for Hong Kong's democracy movement, there is no assurance
whatever that it will succeed. That depends on politics in Beijing, and
I cannot predict the outcome of that process. In pure policy terms,
there is a great divide between the top leaders' current choice of a
hard line and the view of large numbers of officials and scholars with
expert knowledge of Hong Kong that the hard line is self-defeating.
Policy analysis has suffered from what I call the Three Confusions:
confusion of Hong Kong, where there is virtually no separatist
sentiment, with Taiwan; confusion of the meaning of traditional lawful
demonstrations in Hong Kong with disruptive demonstrations in the
mainland; and confusion of the anti-China tactics of a few older
democratic leaders with the moderate loyal sentiments of the
overwhelming majority of the democratic movement. There is reason to
hope that, with greater experience on the part of the new leaders, such
confusions will dissipate.
Purely political considerations, however, dim the prospects for
such intellectual clarity in the short run. Perceptions of Hong Kong
have become tied to a crisis atmosphere regarding Taiwan. Moreover, any
leaders who might wish to pursue a more generous approach to Hong Kong
are exquisitely vulnerable to the charge that they are insufficiently
attentive to the security of the nation. In China as in our own
country, there is no more serious charge.
Such overwrought charges have been magnified during a transitional
period of
divided leadership in 2003-2004, as they have been during own election.
With the retirement of all the top leaders of the pre-2003 era
transitional stresses should decline. In addition, Beijing leaders are
exhibiting more willingness to talk with leaders of the democracy
movement. In the past they have largely limited senior Chinese
consultations to Hong Kong groups that have strong business interests
to oppose democratization, but now they are broadening their contacts
and possibly their vision. That is a good start. But the prosperity and
stability they seek will eventually require substantial steps toward
the democratization that is enshrined as the ultimate goal in the Basic
Law, a document that Chinese leaders wrote themselves.
The key strategic considerations for the democracy movement are
two. First, democratization will never happen unless the central
government is comfortable with it. (The Basic Law shows that in
principle they can get comfortable with it.) Second, in an executive-
led government, the key to giving the people some influence over policy
is to give them traction over the choice of Chief Executive. Short of
direct universal suffrage election of the Chief Executive, which China
banned for 2007-8, there is an infinitely divisible range of
possibilities from the present near-zero traction up to broad popular
election of the Selection Committee, which would then function like the
U.S. Electoral College.
The key strategic consideration for China should be
straightforward. Because of recent demonstrations, the central
government fears instability in Hong Kong. But repression of popular
desires for wider suffrage will cause instability whereas satisfying
them will ensure stability and continued loyalty. The argument to the
contrary is based on what I have called the Three Confusions. The
argument that Hong Kong can be stabilized by purely economic means is
obsolete. The argument that democratization in Hong Kong will
destabilize the rest of China is wrong; ever since Deng Xiaoping
invented one country, two systems, there has been broad acknowledgment
that the Hong Kong system is different. While the argument that the
central government can't make political concessions as a result of
demonstrations in Hong Kong without encouraging demonstrations in the
mainland has some validity, any capable mainland politician of good
will should be able to overcome this by making the case that broader
suffrage was encouraged by the Basic Law and negotiated with parties
that are emphasizing a policy of reassurance.
u.s. interests and policy
The United States has large interests in Hong Kong. Tens of
thousands of Americans live there, and tens of billions of dollars of
American money are invested there. We enjoy the ability of our Navy to
visit Hong Kong. But economic and strategic interests are mostly not at
stake in the debate over Hong Kong democracy. When Americans and
American businesses leave Hong Kong, they predominantly move to
Shanghai, which is less democratic. Militarily the Hong Kong port calls
are a convenience, not a necessity, and anyway they are not at stake
unless we have a larger confrontation.
For the purpose of this hearing, therefore, the American interests
at stake are our fellow feeling for the Hong Kong people, our sympathy
for the democratic movement, and our hope that China under its new
leaders can become as comfortable with democracy in Hong Kong as they
have become with the rule of law in Hong Kong.
U.S. policy has a frustrating dilemma. Americans love democracy and
would like to support it in Hong Kong, but we have limited positive
leverage and great negative leverage. Stating our views emphatically
and reasoning with Chinese officials can help; most are in fact open to
dialogue. Ultimately, no matter what we do, there is no assurance that
China's central government will move in the direction we prefer. The
best we can do is to argue our case and to avoid actions that would
impair chances for a broader suffrage.
There have been proposals to express our concern over China's
recent hard line by removing Hong Kong's status as a separate customs
territory or removing its exemption from export controls. Changing Hong
Kong's separate trade status would cause grievous harm to precisely
those Hong Kong people they purport to help. Removing its exemption
from export controls would destroy the ability of banks, including our
own banks based there, to upgrade their computers; that would destroy
Hong Kong as Asia's and America's regional banking center and cause
grievous harm to the people we wish to help. Turning to political
strategy, confrontational policies would defeat the moderate strategy
of the democratic forces in Hong Kong and the desire of Hong Kong
people for a strategy of moderation as clearly expressed in this
month's balloting. Nothing serves China's hardliners better than an
ability to portray the Hong Kong problem as a confrontation with the
United States rather than a negotiation with some of their own people.
Times may change, but for now the American posture most supportive of
Hong Kong's democratic forces combines a clear voice with avoidance of
confrontation.
Put another way: We Americans have every right to press China to
show some respect for the clear mandate the Hong Kong people gave for a
policy of democratization and moderation. When we make that case, we
incur our own obligation to show respect for the second part of the
mandate as well as the first.
There are also clear implications of this analysis for the roles of
U.S. government-related NGOs. Teaching all political parties in Hong
Kong how to organize and raise funds from the electorate provides an
unexceptionable service. The parties advocating democratization benefit
disproportionately from such a service, because they don't have Chinese
enterprises funding their events, but the service itself does not
discriminate between the DAB and the Democratic Party, and, equally
important, it does not favor one democrat over another. On the other
hand, with anti-democratic conservatives basing their influence on an
argument that democratization in Hong Kong equates to instability, a
policy of systematic American favoritism toward one particularly anti-
Chinese figure, and awarding him a statue that associates Hong Kong's
democracy movement with Tiananmen Square 1989, seriously damages the
prospects of democratization. The ancient rule of the medical
profession is valid here: When you seek to help a patient, first do no
harm.
______
Prepared Statement of Hon. James A. Leach, a U.S. Representative in
Congress From Iowa, Chairman, Congressional-Executive Commission on
China
september 23, 2004
2255 Rayburn House Office Building We convene the CECC today to
examine the progress and prospects of constitutional development in
Hong Kong. Nothing could be more timely, given the Legislative Council
elections that just concluded on September 12. Whether the 21st Century
is peaceful and prosperous will depend on whether China can live with
itself and become open to the world in a fair and respectful manner.
Hong Kong is central to that possibility. As such, Hong Kong's affairs
and people deserve our greatest attention, respect, and good will.
America and China both have enormous vested interests in the
success of the ``one country, two systems'' model in Hong Kong. From a
Congressional perspective, it seems self-evident that advancing
constitutional reform--including universal suffrage--would contribute
to the city's political stability and economic prosperity. In that
light, the September 12 elections had both good and bad news: while a
record number of Hong Kong's voters turned out and voted heavily for
candidates favoring continued reform, the bad news is that the process
was constrained by rules under which the Hong Kong people could not
enjoy full democratic autonomy. Hence, we continue to be concerned that
while recent decisions by Beijing that set limits on constitutional
development in Hong Kong implicitly acknowledged a degree of autonomy
for Hong Kong, they do not represent a forthright commitment to the
``high'' degree of autonomy that was promised by the central
authorities in the 1982 Joint Declaration and the Basic Law.
Few places on the planet are better prepared for democratic
governance than Hong Kong. In the LegCo elections earlier this month,
in which record numbers voted, the people of Hong Kong again made plain
their aspirations for greater democratic autonomy, aspirations fully
within the framework of the ``one country, two systems'' formula. They
previously had shown their keen interest in participatory democracy
when they turned out in record numbers for District Council elections
last November. Yet the way forward is now somewhat murky; no one is
certain what will happen after 2007. The central PRC government says
that it maintains a commitment to universal suffrage and direct
election of the chief executive and LegCo, as contemplated by the Joint
Declaration and Basic Law. But without a timetable, the fullness of
this commitment lacks clarity and instills uncertainty. We must all
acknowledge that the recent election is a step forward, but democratic
frustration continues to build because there is simply no credible
reason to thwart the pace of democratic transformation in Hong Kong.
Hong Kong is important unto itself; it is also a model for others.
What happens there is watched particularly closely by Taiwan. In a
globalized world where peoples everywhere are seeking a sense of
community to serve as a buttress against political and economic forces
beyond the control of individuals and their families, it is next to
impossible to reconcile political systems based on unlike institutions
and attitudes. Mutual respect for differences is the key to peace and
prosperity in a world in which history suggests conflict has been a
generational norm.
To help us understand what has just transpired in the Hong Kong
elections, and how it might affect the progress of constitutional
development, we turn to our witnesses this morning.
Randy Schriver joins us from the East Asia bureau at the State
Department, to give the U.S. government's perspective, and we have a
distinguished panel of private experts who will share their expertise
with us a bit later.
______
Prepared Statement of Hon. Chuck Hagel, a U.S. Senator From Nebraska,
Co-Chairman, Congressional-Executive Commission on China
china september 23, 2004
A majority of the Hong Kong population supports the development of
democratic institutions and a local government that fully represents
their interests. This aspiration is within reach but has not yet been
realized despite the commitment to universal suffrage in Hong Kong's
Beijing-promulgated Basic Law. We meet today to examine the road ahead
to a popularly elected Hong Kong government.
Mr. Chairman, I congratulate you for holding today's hearing. The
United States has important interests in Hong Kong. There are over
1,000 U.S. businesses in Hong Kong and more than 50,000 American
citizens reside there. The international business community is
attracted to Hong Kong by its strategic location and international
status, its open and transparent economy, and its strong tradition of
rule of law. These are impressive achievements. Hong Kong's economic
attractiveness is further strengthened by its steady progress toward
democratic governance, a process set in place by the British in 1991
and carried forward by the Chinese government after 1997. Despite
continued steps forward in the recent Hong Kong Legislative Council
election, I am concerned that recent actions by Beijing toward Hong
Kong were driven by backward looking policies designed to dampen Hong
Kong's continued enthusiasm for democracy.
China's central government continues to state its support for
eventual universal suffrage in Hong Kong as laid out in the Basic Law.
However, the continuing process is no longer clear, and lack of clarity
breeds uncertainty. Hong Kong stands as a successful model for all
China, but uncertainty will stifle the prospects for Hong Kong's future
prosperity and development. Beijing is both challenged and charged with
developing China in a positive way. Mr. Chairman, as you have astutely
pointed out, ``Hong Kong will only become a threat if China makes it
so.''
The United States has a vested interest in Hong Kong's continued
autonomy and the success of the ``one country, two systems'' model as
laid out in the 1984 Sino-UK Joint Declaration and the Basic Law. Hong
Kong's political and economic development has much to offer by example
to China's leaders as they experiment with reforms elsewhere in the
county. The United States wants to work with China to build a more open
and participatory society. The United States and China will not always
agree, and the United States should not shy away from voicing its
concerns about human rights and the rule of law. Political change is
complex and multidimensional, and it should be up to the Chinese people
to decide where their country goes and how it gets there. But Beijing
must listen to the voices of all China's citizens and take the first
steps, and the United States must be ready to assist.
Thank you.