[Senate Hearing 108-646]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
S. Hrg. 108-646
THE GREATER MIDDLE EAST INITIATIVE: SEA ISLAND AND BEYOND
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HEARING
BEFORE THE
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS
UNITED STATES SENATE
ONE HUNDRED EIGHTH CONGRESS
SECOND SESSION
__________
JUNE 2, 2004
__________
Printed for the use of the Committee on Foreign Relations
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COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS
RICHARD G. LUGAR, Indiana, Chairman
CHUCK HAGEL, Nebraska JOSEPH R. BIDEN, Jr., Delaware
LINCOLN CHAFEE, Rhode Island PAUL S. SARBANES, Maryland
GEORGE ALLEN, Virginia CHRISTOPHER J. DODD, Connecticut
SAM BROWNBACK, Kansas JOHN F. KERRY, Massachusetts
MICHAEL B. ENZI, Wyoming RUSSELL D. FEINGOLD, Wisconsin
GEORGE V. VOINOVICH, Ohio BARBARA BOXER, California
LAMAR ALEXANDER, Tennessee BILL NELSON, Florida
NORM COLEMAN, Minnesota JOHN D. ROCKEFELLER IV, West
JOHN E. SUNUNU, New Hampshire Virginia
JON S. CORZINE, New Jersey
Kenneth A. Myers, Jr., Staff Director
Antony J. Blinken, Democratic Staff Director
(ii)
C O N T E N T S
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Page
Biden, Hon. Joseph R., Jr., U.S. Senator from Delaware, opening
statement...................................................... 10
Cronin, Dr. Patrick M., Senior Vice President and Director of
Studies, Center for Strategic and International Studies,
Washington, DC................................................. 48
Prepared statement........................................... 52
El Hassan Bin Talal, His Royal Highness of the Hashemite Kingdom
of Jordan, Royal Palace, Amman, Jordan......................... 28
Prepared statement........................................... 35
Hagel, Hon. Chuck, U.S. Senator from Nebraska, prepared statement
submitted for the record....................................... 12
Larson, Hon. Alan P., Under Secretary of State for Economic,
Business and Agricultural Affairs, U.S. Department of State,
Washington, DC................................................. 13
Prepared statement........................................... 15
Lugar, Hon. Richard G., U.S. Senator from Indiana, opening
statement...................................................... 1
``A New Partnership for the Greater Middle East: Combating
Terrorism, Building Peace,'' delivered at The Brookings
Institution, Washington, DC, March 29, 2004................ 4
Proposal for A Greater Middle East 21st Century Trust........ 8
Richards, Dr. Alan R., Professor of Economics and Environmental
Studies, University of California at Santa Cruz, Santa Cruz, CA 55
Prepared statement........................................... 58
(iii)
THE GREATER MIDDLE EAST INITIATIVE: SEA ISLAND AND BEYOND
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WEDNESDAY, JUNE 2, 2004
U.S. Senate,
Committee on Foreign Relations,
Washington, DC.
The committee met at 9:39 a.m., in room SH-216, Hart Senate
Office Building, Hon. Richard G. Lugar (chairman of the
committee), presiding.
Present: Senators Lugar, Hagel, Chafee, Brownback,
Alexander, Biden, and Bill Nelson.
OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR RICHARD G. LUGAR, CHAIRMAN
The Chairman. This hearing of the Senate Foreign Relations
Committee is called to order.
As the United States and our allies continue to seek
stability and security in Iraq, we must consider how to address
broader political and economic issues in the Greater Middle
East. Ultimately, a new social and political environment must
develop in the region, which is the source of most terrorist
threats confronting the international community. Too often, the
United States policy in the Greater Middle East is focused
exclusively on the immediate crisis. Constructing a secure
future in an age of terrorism requires that we not limit our
thinking to the problems of the moment. We must also work with
like-minded nations to develop solutions to underlying social,
political, and economic conditions that breed hatred and
conflict.
Although home to some of the world's oldest civilizations,
with deep reserves of talent and wealth, the Greater Middle
East region has become a land apart from the modern world. That
is the conclusion of Arab intellectuals and scholars themselves
in two reports for the United Nations on Arab human
development. They said the region suffers from widespread
illiteracy, economic stagnation, and isolation from other
cultures. These experts concluded that this backwardness
results from three important deficits: the lack of freedom, the
lack of women's empowerment, and the lack of knowledge,
particularly with regard to science, technology, computers, and
the Internet.
These deficits have created throughout the Greater Middle
East an atmosphere of hopelessness and frustration that has
helped fuel extremist organizations, terrorist ideologies, and
reflexive resentment of the West.
To help foster a new environment of hope, opportunity, and
progress in the region, I have proposed the creation of a
Greater Middle East 21st Century Trust. The Bush administration
has proposed its own Greater Middle East initiative to achieve
many of the same ends. These ideas will be on the agenda of the
G-8 summit in Sea Island, Georgia. I hope this hearing can
provoke debate and provide valuable input for the G-8 leaders.
I believe that multilateral participation is central to the
success of any initiative to encourage economic and political
reform in the Greater Middle East. The United States can and
should continue to provide unilateral aid to the region. The
Bush administration and Congress launched the Middle East
Partnership Initiative in 2002 to support economic, political,
and educational reform, as well as women's empowerment in the
region. The other G-8 countries have similar programs. But if
we want to leverage resources for greater effect and emphasize
the broader international responsibility for improving
opportunity and hope in the region, we must have a mechanism
that includes other nations. Organizing a Greater Middle East
Trust around the G-8 would maximize the participation and
provide the imprimatur of the international community.
The Greater Middle East 21st Century Trust that I have
proposed would be modeled on the principles of the Global AIDS
Fund, the G-8 Africa Action Plan, and the U.S. Millennium
Challenge Account. The concept would unite the G-8 countries
with donor countries in the Greater Middle East. The donors
would pool resources to deliver grants and would work together
with recipients to define the funding criteria.
It is important the Trust's contributors include wealthy
countries from the Middle East, such as Saudi Arabia, that are
willing to invest in the Trust's success. This would increase
resources and guarantee Middle Eastern voices on the donor side
of the equation. In addition, it would give donors in Saudi
Arabia and other countries a secure vehicle for charitable
donations to its neighbors. Saudi Arabia has completely banned
its citizens from donating to charities in foreign countries
because it feared that funds were being diverted to terrorist
causes. To be sensitive to cultural concerns, the Trust also
could be structured to respect Islamic financial principles.
What I have proposed is different from the Bush
administration's proposal in several key respects. Rather than
a set of programs to be created and funded, the Greater Middle
East 21st Century Trust would set broad goals and criteria.
Specific programs would be developed and offered by the
recipient countries themselves, and evaluated by the Trust
based on the standards it sets. In this way, we can confer
ownership of the reform process on the recipients. The Trust
would go beyond the primary development paradigm of growth,
infrastructure, and health. It would help realize what Arab
Human Development Reports called ``a restructuring of the
region from within.'' Ultimately, the Trust would seek to
promote changes in many of the structures that the Development
Reports identify as roadblocks to modernization in the Greater
Middle East.
The Trust concept could be a vehicle for achieving economic
reform goals in the Greater Middle East that have resisted
progress for years. These include reforming economic systems,
reducing state control of economies, diversifying industries,
reforming labor markets to promote productivity and avenues for
advancement, revamping weak education systems, creating new
roles for women, and improving scientific and technological
capabilities.
It would also include political reform. Arab reformers
meeting in Alexandria, Egypt in March, for example, declared
that they wanted ``without ambiguity, genuine democracy.''
After heated debate, the recent Arab summit that occurred May
22 and 23 in Tunis resulted in calls for greater democracy,
women's rights, and human rights in the region. That these
issues were raised on the agenda was a new phenomenon. A dialog
on reform and modernization is taking place in governments,
academia, media, and other organizations in the region. This
dialog is vibrant and reflects American ideals of freedom,
despite what President Mubarak of Egypt has identified as
``unprecedented hatred'' in the Arab world for Americans after
Iraq.
As the United States and the G-8 nations consider how to
boost economic development in the Greater Middle East, we must
examine how democratic reform fits into this process. Some
experts have said that if many countries in the region held
elections tomorrow, the result might be Islamic theocracies
just as undemocratic as the current governments. In other
words, the concern is that elections would produce ``one man,
one vote, one time.''
So the question arises, how can the region move to full
democracy in stages? What other democratic and civic
institutions need to be built or strengthened before a country
is ready for full democracy? Would partial measures inevitably
be used by the existing powers to put off democracy
indefinitely?
We also must examine how the international community can be
most helpful. We know that political reforms cannot be imposed
from outside, but can our efforts help generate reforms from
the inside? What is the best way to get these societies to
accept changes that in many cases would alter the established
order? As sensible as it may seem to empower women, restructure
inefficient state industries, or broaden educational horizons,
powerful institutions on the inside have vested interests in
the status quo. How can we enfranchise the forces in these
societies that want modernization?
To begin our examination of these questions, the committee
is pleased to be joined today by three insightful panels. On
the first panel, we welcome Dr. Alan Larson, the Under
Secretary for Economic, Business, and Agricultural Affairs at
the Department of State. We then will have the honor of hearing
from His Royal Highness Prince El Hassan bin Talal of Jordan.
Prince Hassan is an extraordinary international leader and a
creative thinker on the issues we will address today. We are
grateful for his willingness to travel from Jordan to be with
us. Finally, we welcome Dr. Patrick Cronin, senior vice
president and Director of Studies at the Center for Strategic
and International Studies, and Dr. Alan Richards, professor of
Economic and Environmental Studies at the University of
California, Santa Cruz.
We look forward to the assessments and recommendations of
our distinguished witnesses.
[Additional material submitted by Senator Lugar follows:]
A NEW PARTNERSHIP FOR THE GREATER MIDDLE EAST: COMBATING TERRORISM,
BUILDING PEACE
(By Richard G. Lugar)
The Brookings Institution, Washington, DC--March 29, 2004
Since the end of World War II, we have recognized that our national
security rests on four strong pillars: our own democratic values and
the example of freedom that we hold out to the world; our military
strength; our alliances with other countries and our ability to work
cooperatively with the rest of the international community; and an
enlightened use of both hard and soft power, including diplomacy, aid,
and trade, that promotes friendship while protecting us from enemies.
To meet the threat from the Soviet Union, we maintained a strong
military and created NATO. But we did more. We also launched the
Marshall Plan to rebuild Europe and helped create the United Nations
and the Bretton Woods institutions, the World Bank, the International
Monetary Fund, and the World Trade Organization. The aim was to promote
international cooperation, to spread the values of democracy and
respect for human rights, and to fight poverty. Over time, we developed
more institutions and mechanisms: bilateral defense treaties, regional
development banks, the Helsinki Process, and the Nunn-Lugar Cooperative
Threat Reduction program, just to name a few.
Today we in the West face a major challenge. It is the threat of
weapons of mass destruction, terrorism, failed states and instability
that arises in major part from extremist organizations in the Greater
Middle East. The terrorist ideology generated there has global reach.
The region is the prime source of what I believe is the greatest single
threat to modern civilization in the 21st century--that is, the nexus
between terrorism and weapons of mass destruction. We must promote
security and stability in this vast but troubled region, where
demographics, religious extremism, autocratic governments, isolation,
stagnant economic systems, and war have often overwhelmed the talents
of its peoples and the wealth of its natural resources.
COMMON INTEREST
This is a challenge for all of us in the developed world.
Instability, poverty and joblessness increase the flow of migrants to
Europe. The Palestinian-Israeli conflict causes unrest and discord
among Europe's Muslim populations. For some, this long-standing
struggle is both a reason and an excuse for anti-Americanism and anti-
western sentiments in the Arab world. Last week's response to the
killing by Israel of Hamas leader Sheik Yassin is yet another
illustration of how events there can reverberate around the region, and
a foretaste of the conflagration that could ensue if we can't end the
spiral of violence. It underscores my strong belief that we cannot take
an election-year time-out in the quest for peace.
IRAQ AND BEYOND
While we cannot ignore the repercussions of the U.S.-led military
action in Iraq, it is now time to look forward. European and Asian
countries have the same interest as the United States in seeing that
Iraq becomes a stable democratic country. By so doing, it can become a
catalyst for positive change throughout the region, where millions of
people suffer from grinding poverty and hopelessness. This has led some
young people to terrorism and to express their despair by lashing out
at others more fortunate. At the extreme, some have chosen suicidal
missions.
But if we strongly support in Afghanistan and Iraq citizens who are
striving to build successful states that embrace freedom and enjoy
broadly shared economic development, their success could generate
extraordinary encouragement to millions of people now mired in
hopelessness.
Likewise, if we help to produce a resolution of the Israeli-
Palestinian conflict, fresh political winds would sweep through the
region and new possibilities for political reform would flourish. We
should make solving the Israeli-Palestinian conflict an integral part
of our larger strategy, not an adjunct to it, and consider new
structures that bring moderate Arab countries into the process.
LONG-TERM STRATEGY
As President Bush has said, our long-term strategy is to replace
the region's pervasive repression, intolerance and stagnation with
freedom, democracy and prosperity. The war on terrorism is only a part,
although a crucial one, of this broad and ambitious agenda. The best
way to achieve this goal is to cooperate with our traditional partners
and with countries in the Greater Middle East on a new paradigm of
reform and development.
At its June Summit in Sea Island, Georgia, the G-8 (the United
States, Canada, Japan, Russia, the United Kingdom, France, Germany, and
Italy) should outline a plan for the G-8 to engage with the Greater
Middle East in a way that allows the nations of the region to set their
own priorities for the new millennium.
Many of the nations of the Greater Middle East have entered this
new era isolated from the industrialized world. As the U.N. Arab Human
Development report noted, the whole Arab world translates only 300
books annually, 65 million Arab adults, including half of the women,
are illiterate, and only 1.6 percent of the Arab population has
Internet access. This isolation contributes to the misunderstanding and
prejudice that leads to violence. Other advancements in communications,
transportation, health and educational opportunities have yet to reach
large percentages of the people of the Greater Middle East. As the 2002
Development report noted, while poverty is a serious problem, ``The
region is richer than it is developed.''
The 2003 UN Arab Human Development Report identified knowledge,
freedom and women's empowerment as the most serious challenges to
development. Fourteen million Arab adults do not make enough money to
buy even the most basic necessities. Steep population increases in many
Arab countries mean that as many as 50 million more Arab workers will
enter the job market in the next eight years. In addition, the
Development Report found that Arab countries had the lowest freedom
score out of the seven world regions. A number of these findings are
applicable to non-Arab nations of the Greater Middle East as well.
The G-8 can be a key instrument to effect long-term political and
economic change in the Greater Middle East by leveraging financial
contributions from Europe, Asia and the rich countries of the region,
and by providing the imprimatur of the broad international community.
The United States has already begun on its own. The Bush administration
launched the Middle East Partnership Initiative (MEPI) in 2002 to
support economic, political, and educational reform as well as women's
empowerment in the region. MEPI currently consists of 87 programs in 16
different countries. The other G-8 countries have similar programs.
Many of these existing efforts should continue. But the G-8,
speaking with one voice, must make a bolder statement.
PROPOSAL
I propose a grant-making Greater Middle East 21st Century Trust,
sponsored by the G-8. It would be modeled on the principles of the
Global Fund to Fight AIDS, Tuberculosis, and Malaria, the G-8 Africa
Action Plan, and the United States' Millennium Challenge Account. The
21st Century Trust would unite the G-8 countries with donor countries
in the Greater Middle East in a quest for political, economic, and
educational modernization. The donors would pool resources to deliver
grants and would work together to define the funding criteria based, in
part, on the high priority needs identified in the United Nations' Arab
Human Development Reports, which were written by Arab scholars.
Vigorous two-way interaction between donors and recipients is vital:
change cannot be imposed from the outside.
The Trust would not only increase development funding to the region
but would also provide an opportunity for the G-8 countries to work
alongside countries in the Greater Middle East toward common goals,
instead of arguing over old disputes. It is particularly important to
demonstrate to countries like Afghanistan and Pakistan that G-8
interests stretch beyond capturing terrorists and destroying their
networks.
It will be important for the Trust's contributors to include rich
countries of the region, such as Saudi Arabia, willing to invest in
their own futures and take a stake in the Trust's success. Equally
important, Saudi Arabia has completely banned its citizens from
donating to charities in foreign countries because it feared funds were
being diverted to terrorist causes. A 21st Century Trust would give
donors in Saudi Arabia, and other countries, a secure vehicle for
charitable donations.
To be sensitive to cultural concerns in the Greater Middle East,
the Trust could be structured to respect Islamic financial principles.
These principles, in part, forbid the payment or receipt of interest,
or any transaction that involves speculation, but allow grants, profit-
sharing, transaction fees and other financial structures. This would
provide a vehicle that both the religious and the non-religious could
use.
This Trust proposal reflects advances in our understanding of
international development. The programs it is based upon--the G-8
Africa plan, the global AIDS fund, and the Millennium Challenge
Account--represent a new form of social compact between governments and
donors that does not superimpose a plan from donors but, instead, works
with the recipient countries to plan and set priorities. The MCA and
the Global Fund institutionalize the inclusion of civil society in
project design and incorporate benchmarks so we can know if a project
is effective.
Under MCA, countries must demonstrate that they are ``ruling
justly, investing in their peoples, and establishing economic
freedom.'' The MCA will use independent indicators to judge a candidate
country's fitness in such realms as corruption, rule of law, political
rights and trade policy. The MCA includes at least three break-through
concepts that could be applied to the Trust proposal:
Donors and recipients negotiate compacts based on goals put
forth by the recipient countries. This gives recipients the
lead in coming up with their own priorities.
The compacts contain benchmarks that can be measured over
time to assess progress. This lays the groundwork for
performance-based evaluations.
Both the compacts and the projects are to be published on
the organization's Web site. This provides transparency and
openness.
What I am proposing today is in some ways parallel to the Bush
administration's own initiative, which it developed separately. But
mine has some key differences. For one, the Trust is not a development
bank, but a grant- and investment-making body that could conform to
Islamic financial principles. More importantly, rather than a set of
programs to be created and funded, I am proposing instead building a
vehicle for action that would set broad goals and criteria. Specific
programs would be developed and offered by the recipient countries
themselves, and accepted or rejected by the Trust based on the
standards it sets. This way, we can confer ``ownership'' of the reform
process on the countries themselves.
Similarly, the Trust would go beyond the primary development
paradigm of growth, infrastructure and health. It would help realize
what the Arab Human Development Report called ``a restructuring of the
region from within.'' Ultimately, the Trust would seek to promote
changes to many of the structures that have been identified by the Arab
scholars in the Development Reports as roadblocks to modernization in
the Greater Middle East. This involves reform of economic systems;
lessened state control of economies; diversification away from over-
reliance on oil and toward more value-added industries; reform of labor
markets to promote productivity and greater opportunities for
advancement; revamping of weak education systems; a sea-change in the
role of women in education, the economy, and society; much greater
emphasis on research, science, technology and engineering; and
political reform to give citizens more space to think and to have a
voice. As the latest Development Report notes, political instability
and struggles for power ``in the absence of . . . democracy . . .
impede the growth of knowledge on Arab soil.''
The Trust would recognize that many of the policies and practices
that have hobbled the Greater Middle East have been endorsed by the
governments of the countries in question. It will be a challenge to
convince them to join the Trust as partners in a process that will
require them to make such fundamental changes. That's why the Trust
will seek to engage all elements of societies. The Arab Human
Development Report calls on ``the state, civil society, cultural and
mass media institutions, enlightened intellectuals and the public at
large to plant those values that encourage action and innovation in the
political, social and economic sphere.''
This challenge to business-as-usual helps explain why the
administration's own ideas for a Greater Middle East initiative have so
far met with resistance from many Arab governments. Some Europeans have
also criticized the initiative for, in effect, choosing reform over
stability. I urge the President and his team to stay the course and not
be cowed by this initial reaction. Many comments about the
administration's plan have a familiar ring. Arab autocrats have
denounced it as an imposition of western values by outsiders. They've
also criticized it as being a mission impossible until western
outsiders impose a settlement on the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. Such
obstructionism simply makes the case more clearly for real reform.
I understand the desire of regional governments for ``ownership''
of this process, which is why I have emphasized the two-way nature of
the Trust's functions. But granting ownership does not mean the G-8,
through the Trust, should simply write blank checks to Greater Middle
East governments to pursue their own self-interested visions of reform.
That would deny the need for fundamental change. We must be prepared to
use our considerable leverage with allies inside and outside the region
to promote truly democratic reforms and political freedom, not simply
maintain the status quo, or our initiatives will lack credibility. At
the same time, by remaining engaged in the Israeli-Palestinian
conflict, we will strengthen the rationale for our broader initiative
in the region.
THE SECURITY DIMENSION
The social and political changes we are seeking will be even more
difficult in an atmosphere of violence. The industrialized democracies,
working with the countries of the Greater Middle East, must try to
maintain a stable environment for long-term progress. I have proposed
that NATO, with its integrated military command, interoperability of
equipment and forces, and a proven ability to make decisions and take
action, assume a larger role in the Greater Middle East and make the
region a new priority.
I have made a number of specific proposals. In particular, NATO
should beef up its presence in Afghanistan, where it is leading the
International Security Assistance Force, and assume a formal role in
Iraq. No reasonable country of the Greater Middle East, just as no
Western or Asian country, can wish for failure in the rehabilitation of
Iraq. NATO's involvement, by further internationalizing the
reconstruction effort, will make success more likely.
More broadly, NATO should launch a major effort to promote strong
military-to-military relations with Greater Middle East countries, a
program I have called ``Cooperation for Peace.'' As in NATO's hugely
successful Partnership for Peace program in Central and Eastern Europe,
NATO could help with training for peacekeeping, counter-terrorism and
border security, as well as with defense reform and civilian control of
the military. This Cooperation for Peace program would complement
efforts by the 21st Century Trust to modernize Greater Middle Eastern
societies and integrate them into the international community.
THE POLITICAL DIMENSION
Achieving the kind of regional transformation we seek will require
many steps over a long period of time. The first step, before deciding
WHAT change is necessary, must be for the leaders and the people of the
Greater Middle East to agree, through vigorous and open debate among
themselves and across the region, that change IS necessary. This reform
in attitude cannot be imposed from outside, it must be generated from
within the region, across national boundaries. And it must be seen in
the context of people taking charge of their own futures. We already
see examples under way. For instance, the Alexandria Library in Egypt
hosted a conference on ``Critical Reforms in the Arab World: From
Rhetoric to Reality'' this month to bring together members of the civil
society in the Arab region including intellectuals, businessmen and
academics. They declared they ``are fully convinced that reform is a
necessary and urgent matter.'' And contrary to the popular notion that
democracy is somehow an alien concept, they said they embraced
``without ambiguity, genuine democracy.'' We need much more of this.
Many in the region say that they cannot support an agenda for
change unless the United States addresses the Israeli-Palestinian
conflict. The Arab Human Development Report calls the conflict ``a
contributing factor to the region's democratic deficit, providing both
a cause and an excuse for distorting the development agenda.'' The
search for stability in the Greater Middle East must proceed hand in
hand with the resolution of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. But the
nations of the Greater Middle East must be brought into the process of
resolving the conflict. They cannot continue to expect the U.S. to
address these issues on their behalf, and then complain that the U.S.
is not doing it right. Therefore, I propose that as part of this drive
to bring the Greater Middle East countries into the modern world, we
bring them fully into the process of resolving the Israeli-Palestinian
conflict. This would close what has in the past often been a gap in
strategies for the larger region.
As a first step, we should expand the ``Quartet'' which is
currently directing the peace process--the U.S., Russia, the European
Union and the United Nations--into the ``Sextet'' by adding Egypt and
Saudi Arabia. This would give the Palestinians more confidence in any
proposal that comes forth, and give all countries in the region a
greater stake in both the specifics of new peace proposals and in the
efforts to follow through on their implementation. Closer Arab support
would also give the Palestinians the option to make compromises that
they might not otherwise make on their own.
Secondly, we must recognize that Prime Minister Sharon's unilateral
disengagement has created an opportunity that we should seize to
generate new attitudes and approaches to ending the violence. His
decision to evacuate unilaterally almost all settlements in Gaza and a
number in the West Bank, once unthinkable by any Israeli leader, is
being accepted by most within Israel. Many in Israel are recognizing
the demographic reality that if Israel maintains control of the West
Bank to the beginning of the next decade, Jews could be a minority in
the state of Israel. Such recognition now reinforces Israel's
acceptance of the principle of a separate Palestinian state.
The Israeli withdrawal, as a practical matter, along with Israel's
construction of a security fence, will reduce the opportunities for
Palestinians to attack Israelis, and the need for Israeli military
checkpoints and other intrusions into Palestinian daily life, which do
so much to inflame anger. The withdrawal, because it is new and was put
forward unilaterally, could energize the peace effort and provide a
useful ``detour'' in the Road Map without abandoning it.
However, it is important that we, along with the Quartet--or the
Sextet--work actively with the Israeli government to ensure that
disengagement is done in a way that enhances Israeli security, returns
a significant number of Arab neighborhoods to Palestinian Authority
jurisdiction and does not fragment Palestinian territory. It should
also be coordinated with the Palestinians and others.
There is concern that the Palestinian Authority is so weak and
fragmented that upon an Israeli departure, a radical group such as
Hamas could emerge as the de facto rulers. That's why the
administration is promoting the active involvement of Egypt and Jordan
in any security arrangement in Gaza. But we can and must go further.
With the effective collapse of the Palestinian Authority, Israel has no
reliable negotiating partner, as events of the past week have
underscored. We should consider asking moderate Arab countries to
assume significant responsibility for rehabilitating or restructuring
the Palestinian Authority so that discussions can be restarted.
Some experts have proposed turning over control of the Palestinian
territories to an international trusteeship. This trusteeship would
provide enhanced security for both Palestinians and Israelis, it could
restructure the Palestinian security services, and lead a reform of the
Palestinians' failed institutions. It would turn back sovereignty at
the appropriate time. Why shouldn't this trusteeship be managed by Arab
nations? This would give them a role in what they themselves claim is
at the core of many of their own problems.
Arab nations' establishment of a trusteeship; Israeli unilateral
disengagement: these might sound like drastic measures. But taken
together, they could revive momentum toward a solution of the Israeli-
Palestinian conflict.
CONCLUSION
The G-8 has already taken on one new role in 21st Century security,
the Global Partnership Against the Spread of Materials and Weapons of
Mass Destruction and has pledged an additional $10 billion over 10
years for Nunn-Lugar programs in the former Soviet Union. The Greater
Middle East 21st Century Trust should be a new form of social compact
between donors and recipients. By working together with a wide range of
other nations, Americans can demonstrate that we are strong and
creative advocates of a peaceful world for all, and that the future
lies in being a partner with the United States, not a counterweight to
it.
In my view, the G-8 Summit in Sea Island at the beginning of June
represents an opportunity to focus the world on modernization needs in
the Greater Middle East. This challenge should be addressed by the G-8,
and it should include the participation, contribution, and vision of
those in the Greater Middle East. By the same token, the NATO summit in
Istanbul at the end of June would be the right venue for framing a
transatlantic security structure that extends throughout the Middle
East.
As His Royal Highness Prince El Hassan bin Talal noted last October
in Amman, ``Peace is real and durable only when the root causes of
conflict have been eliminated.'' He went on to highlight the importance
of eradicating poverty to limit violence. We can achieve greater
security through careful mitigation of well-defined threats. We can
extend our idealism to create broad opportunities for millions of
people to enjoy more promising lives for themselves and their children.
Let us answer the call of those in the Middle East and work with them.
* * *
PROPOSAL FOR
A GREATER MIDDLE EAST 21st CENTURY TRUST
At the Brookings Institution on March 29, 2004, Senator Richard
Lugar proposed the creation of a Greater Middle East 21st Century Trust
(``Trust'') to combat terrorism and build peace in the region. The
Trust would unite the G-8 countries with other donors and countries of
the Greater Middle East regions to promote common interests in
political, economic and social reform and modernization, particularly
governance, sound education and health policies and programs,
entrepreneurial success, and the full participation of men and women.
STRUCTURE
Trust donors would pool resources to deliver grants and would work
together to define funding criteria based on goals and high priority
needs identified by the recipients. Clear and objective criteria would
be applied fairly to determine eligibility of recipients; levels of
support; and types of projects. Criteria and performance indicators
would be defined jointly by Trust members.
Donors and recipients would negotiate compacts based on goals put
forth by the recipient countries. This gives recipients the lead in
setting their priorities. The compacts would contain benchmarks to be
measured over time to assess progress in performance-based evaluations.
Both the compacts and projects could be published on a Trust Web site
to provide transparency and openness. This vigorous interaction between
donors and recipients is a vital component of the Trust as change
cannot be imposed from the outside.
From the recipient countries, members of civil society, non-
governmental organizations, and local, regional, and state government
agencies could submit funding proposals to the Trust. The proposals
should meet agreed criteria and goals laid out in the compact. The
Trust would review proposals on a competitive basis and provide grants
to the most promising projects.
The Trust could be administered by a new corporation designed to
support innovative strategies and to ensure accountability for
measurable results or by an existing international organization. It
could be supervised by a Board of Directors composed of Ministers from
member countries' Treasury, international development or other similar
fiscal agency. The Trust could be designed to make maximum use of
flexible authorities to optimize efficiency in contracting, program
implementation, and personnel.
UNIQUE FEATURES
The Trust would not only increase development funding to the region
but would also provide an opportunity for the G-8 countries to work
alongside countries in the Greater Middle East toward common reform
goals. Through the Trust, governments and donors would work with each
beneficiary country to plan and set their priorities. The Trust would
be modeled on the principles of the Global Fund to Fight AIDS,
Tuberculosis, and Malaria, the G-8 Africa Action Plan, and the United
States' Millennium Challenge Account (MCA).
RESPONSIVE
The Trust would seek to promote reforms such as those identified by
Arab scholars in the United Nations Arab Human Development Reports as
critical to modernization in the Greater Middle East including reform
related to economics, governance, education and the empowering women.
COOPERATIVE
The Trust's contributors ideally would include donors from the G-8,
other industrialized nations, and wealthy nations of the region, such
as Saudi Arabia and Kuwait, demonstrating their willingness to invest
in their own futures and take a stake in the Trust's success. By
considering funding proposals from governmental and non-governmental
organizations and the private sectors of the countries in the Greater
Middle East regions, the Trust would seek to engage all elements of
societies. The Arab Human Development Reports calls on ``the state,
civil society, cultural and mass media institutions, enlightened
intellectuals and the public at large to plant those values that
encourage action and innovation in the political, social and economic
sphere.''
OWNERSHIP
Rather than a set of programs to be created and funded, the Trust
builds a vehicle for action that would set broad goals and criteria.
The Trust could use independent indicators to judge if recipient
candidate countries are making strides to achieve certain goals such as
combating corruption and promoting the rule of law. Specific programs
would be developed and offered by the recipient countries themselves,
and accepted or rejected by the Trust based on the standards it sets.
As a result, ``ownership'' of the reform process is conferred on the
countries themselves.
Like the MCA, countries could enter into multi-year contracts with
the Trust with measurable performance yardsticks. Programs would be
developed and offered by those in the recipient countries, and accepted
or rejected by the Trust based on standards it sets--thus,
``ownership'' of the reform process would be held by the countries
themselves.
CULTURALLY SENSITIVE
To be sensitive to cultural concerns in the Greater Middle East,
the Trust could be structured to respect Islamic financial principles.
These principles, in part, forbid the payment or receipt of interest
but allow grants, profit-sharing, transaction fees and other financial
structures. This would provide a vehicle that both the religious and
the non-religious could use.
INNOVATIVE
The Trust proposal reflects advances in our understanding of
international development. The programs it is based upon--the G-8
Africa Action Plan, the Global Fund to Fight AIDS, Tuberculosis and
Malaria, and the Millennium Challenge Account--represent a new form of
social compact between governments and donors that does not superimpose
a plan from donors but, instead, works with the recipient countries to
plan and set priorities. The MCA and the Global Fund institutionalize
the inclusion of civil society in project design and incorporate
program effectiveness benchmarks.
The Chairman. Before calling upon Secretary Larson, I would
like to call upon the distinguished ranking member of our
committee, Senator Biden.
OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR JOSEPH R. BIDEN, JR.,
RANKING MEMBER
Senator Biden. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. As we say in this
body, I would like to associate myself with your remarks.
Welcome, Mr. Secretary.
Mr. Chairman, promoting political, economic, and
educational reform in the Muslim and Arab worlds is in my
judgment a key to winning the war on terror, but I think it
also warrants a very, very healthy dose of humility on our
part.
We should not make any mistake that there is a war underway
right now and it is not a clash between civilizations, as some
suggest in my view, but rather a clash within civilizations,
the Arab and Islamic civilizations. And it pits the forces of
reform, modernity, and tolerance against the forces of radical
fundamentalism, regression, and violence.
We may be terrorist targets today, but their ultimate aim
is not us. It is the vast majority of the moderate Muslim
world, and they will suffer most should the radicals gain
ascendancy.
The radical vision is bleak. We saw it on full display in
Taliban-controlled Afghanistan whose leaders persecuted
minorities, denied education to women and girls, banned
political activity, and institutionalized terrorism and
violence. Military law, law enforcement, and intelligence
tactics alone are not sufficient, in my view, to defeat radical
fundamentalists. We must also build an alliance of tolerance
and progress with moderate Muslim majorities.
Now, I am assuming and I believe that the vast majority of
Muslims and Arabs in particular are in fact moderate. The
radicals feed off the failures of governments, particularly in
the Arab world, to open up political systems, to modernize
education, and to build vibrant economies. In 2002, as you
mentioned, Arab scholars completed a groundbreaking study of
Arab human development. We have quoted it many times. It speaks
to the need across the Arab world to make progress in three
critical areas: empowering women, spreading knowledge, and
expanding freedom. This is an incredibly difficult challenge
for us, but it is also an extraordinary opportunity.
For example, 70 percent of the Middle East population is
below the age of 30. Unlocking their minds and unleashing their
talents can be a deep source of strength and progress. Bringing
women into the work place will boost Arab economies, not just
as women leaders past and present in Pakistan, in Bangladesh,
and in Turkey and Indonesia have demonstrated. They energized
the Muslim world of politics as well.
This committee has recognized the challenge. Last year, we
passed my proposal to establish a Middle East Foundation to
support civil societies, a free press, women's rights, the rule
of law, and education reform. And I am pleased to see it
included in the President's 2005 budget. I also look forward to
working with the State Department to identify the resources to
get this foundation off the ground.
Mr. Chairman, as you referenced, you have an excellent
proposal in my view for the Greater Middle East 21st Century
Trust. And Senator Hagel, as well, has introduced an important
bill called the Greater Middle East and Central Asia
Development Act.
Whatever the strengths of our ideas for reform in the Arab
world and Islamic world are, we cannot impose them on that part
of the world. We cannot advance them alone. As I said again, it
warrants a significant dose of humility as we undertake these
efforts.
I am pleased the administration is working with our allies
to support reform in the Arab and Muslim world. We must also
work more closely with those in the region who are committed to
reform both inside and outside the government, as your Trust
calculates to do.
Mr. Chairman, I do not have any problem with us placing
reform prominently on the agenda of the Sea Island summit, but
I am a little baffled that the twin elephants in the room are
not at the top of the agenda: Iraq and the Israeli-Palestinian
conflict. Iraq at present is serving as more of a dead weight
on regional reform than a catalyst as some had predicted.
Scheduling problems in my view did not cause the leaders of
Egypt, Saudi Arabia, Morocco, and Tunisia to decline President
Bush's invitation to Sea Island. And I do not know how we
really get very far on the notion of reform in the Arab world
when significant numbers of the countries are not engaged in
the discussion and refuse the invitation. Had President Bush
decided to focus the summit on charting a new course in Iraq, I
am of the view that the leaders of these and other Arab
countries and Muslim countries would have enthusiastically
attended.
We also cannot hold reform hostage to the Israeli-
Palestinian dispute, nor can we ignore the reality that
continuing conflict lets governments off the hook by giving
them an excuse to drag their feet. We must show sustained
leadership on this issue, and with your leadership here in this
committee and the President's focus on the issue, I am hopeful
that is exactly what we will be able to do.
I look forward to hearing from our distinguished panel, and
I would like to thank His Royal Highness for making the trip
here. It is a significant gesture and we want you to know how
much we appreciate it.
Mr. Secretary, I look forward to hearing your testimony and
working with you and the administration, along with my
colleagues as to how we can promote this notion.
I thank you, Mr. Chairman.
The Chairman. Thank you very much, Senator Biden. Senator
Biden has mentioned the legislation offered by our
distinguished colleague, Senator Hagel. I would like to include
Senator Hagel's statement in the record, as he has presented
it.
[The prepared statement of Senator Hagel follows:]
Prepared Statement of Senator Chuck Hagel
Mr. Chairman, thank you for calling this hearing on the Greater
Middle East Initiative. The G-8 Summit next week will consider ideas to
support political and economic reform in the Greater Middle East. I
support these efforts. Only through partnership with our allies and
with the governments and peoples of the region can we develop realistic
programs and policies that support sustainable change and reform.
The terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001 signaled a turning
point in United States foreign policy. The war on terrorism will not be
won through counter-terrorism and military measures alone. The roots of
terrorism are found in the hopelessness of endemic poverty and despair.
Although poverty and economic under development alone do not ``cause''
terrorism, the expansion of economic growth, free trade, and private
sector development can contribute to an environment that undercuts
radical political tendencies that give rise to terrorism.
The economic problems of the Greater Middle East and Central Asia
cannot be considered in isolation. There will be no sustainable
development in the region if the Israeli-Palestinian conflict continues
unresolved, or if Iraq becomes a failed state.
Mr. Chairman, let me acknowledge your proposal for a Greater Middle
East 21st Century Trust and Senator Biden's initiative to establish a
Middle East Foundation to encourage political participation and civil
society in the Middle East. I strongly support both initiatives.
In that spirit, our colleague Senator Joseph Lieberman and I have
introduced the Greater Middle East and Central Asia Development Act, S.
2305. The bill would stimulate private sector development, promote
strong market economies, invigorate trade relations within the region,
and empower states to rebuild and open their economies. It does so
through three new multilateral institutions: a Greater Middle East and
Central Asia Development Bank to promote private sector development; a
Greater Middle East and Central Asia Development Foundation to
implement and administer economic and political programs; and a Trust
for Democracy to provide small grants to promote development of civil
society.
In April, Senator Lieberman and I held an unprecedented meeting
with 17 ambassadors and representatives from the Greater Middle East
and Central Asia to discuss how our legislation and other initiatives
could contribute to progress toward economic and political development
in their countries. Any initiative for the Greater Middle East must
allow for the active participation of the governments of the region.
Promoting political and economic governance practices complements
our diplomatic objectives in the war on terrorism. We cannot succeed in
our war on terrorism until hope replaces despair among the next
generation in the Greater Middle East and Central Asia.
Thank you.
The Chairman. We would like to proceed now to your
testimony. I understand your time is limited, but hopefully not
too limited today. We will proceed with your testimony and then
questions from our committee and then on to our second panel.
We are delighted to have you. Please proceed.
Senator Biden. It is kind of a good thing not to limit your
time before this committee.
STATEMENT OF HON. ALAN P. LARSON, UNDER SECRETARY OF STATE FOR
ECONOMIC, BUSINESS AND AGRICULTURAL AFFAIRS, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF
STATE
Mr. Larson. I have all the time that the committee has.
Mr. Chairman and Senator Biden, Senator Hagel, Senator
Chafee, Senator Alexander, thank you very much for the
opportunity to join you to discuss efforts to encourage and
support economic, social, and political reform in the broader
Middle East and north Africa. I want to also express my
appreciation for the leadership of this committee in helping to
keep the issue of reform in the region at the forefront of
American foreign policy. If I may, Mr. Chairman, I would like
to just make a few brief comments and submit the longer
statement for the record.
The Chairman. It will be included in full in the record.
Mr. Larson. Thank you.
The broader Middle East is a region with a very important
cultural heritage and history of scientific contribution that
inspires great pride. Today, however, the region faces
significant challenges in tapping the vast potential of its
people and in offering them freedom, opportunity, and
prosperity.
The people of the region itself have clearly and
convincingly analyzed the challenges that they face. The
authors of the Arab Human Development report, the prestigious
Arab NGOs and individuals who met together at the Alexandria
Library in Egypt last March, the members of the Arab Business
Council, all of them have described the dilemma faced by the
region in very clear terms.
More recently, Arab leaders themselves answered this call
at the Arab League summit on May 22 and 23 in Tunis. There
leaders called on members of the Arab League to continue to
reform, to foster democratic practice, to broaden participation
in political and public life, to strengthen the role of civil
society, and to expand women's participation in the political,
economic, social, cultural, and educational fields, and to
enhance their rights in society.
More specifically, the region has identified several
primary challenges, including increasing commitment to free and
transparent elections, improving the functioning of
parliaments, supporting an independent judiciary, and
encouraging free media and active civil society, intensifying
efforts to develop and improve educational curricula and
teacher training systems and to combat illiteracy, generating
enough employment to accommodate the 5 million new job seekers
entering the labor market each year, increasing the region's
share in international capital flows, and expanding the
region's share of booming international trade.
So starting with these issues, the issues that our partners
in the region have identified, the United States has been
working, together with other G-8 countries, on a number of
possible initiatives that could help regional reformers achieve
their goals.
Our consultations with the region have informed and guided
our efforts to develop these reform initiatives. Some of our
partners from the region who have been involved in preparations
will attend the G-8 summit at Sea Island. King Abdullah II of
Jordan, President Bouteflika of Algeria, King Hamad of Bahrain,
President Salih of Yemen, and President Karzai of Afghanistan.
In addition to these Middle Eastern countries, Turkey will
attend the Sea Island summit. As you know, for centuries Turkey
has been a bridge between eastern and western cultures, and
Turkey has a long record of democratic institutions and of
political and economic reform and religious tolerance. So we
are pleased that Prime Minister Erdogan has accepted President
Bush's invitation to attend the Sea Island summit.
The G-8 members have not only an opportunity, but they have
a responsibility to assist in the reform effort, both through
collective actions that engage all of the G-8 countries and
also through enhanced cooperation in ongoing areas of bilateral
assistance. We are looking for ways to work together with the
countries of the region to establish a forum for discussions to
exchange ideas, to examine and share best practices in
promoting reform and to build intra-regional cooperation and
consensus.
We are working on ideas on how better to assist in the
establishment of the institutions that underlie democratic and
free societies, things like strong and independent judiciaries,
strong legislatures, free and professional press, support for
free elections.
We have been working to identify better ways to improve
access in the region to microfinance and to help local
governments improve the policy and regulatory atmosphere on
making financing available for small- and medium-sized
businesses.
More generally, we have been looking for ways to bring more
capital into the region both through the promotion of good
foreign investment policies and through collaborative
institutions that could tap private capital that in many cases
is fleeing the region now and could be brought back to the
region.
We have been pursuing trade links with the region,
including the negotiation of free trade agreements, encouraging
regional governments that are not members of the World Trade
Organization to become members, and we are considering ideas
like regional trade hubs and support for local chambers of
commerce.
Reformers in the region made it very clear at the Arab
League summit in Tunis, at the Alexandria Library conference,
and in Sana'a that they are committed to moving forward on all
fronts, including governance, not just those reforms that are
the easiest.
I am pleased to say that our initial ideas and plans for
support for a broader Middle East region have met with
considerable acceptance. As you will see at Sea Island, I think
there will be a foundation for consensus action. I believe this
is because we have taken care to reflect the views and
declarations of the people in the region and we have responded
to those views and those declarations.
Mr. Chairman, I want to emphasize that the impetus for
reform must, of course, come from the region. I also want to
emphasize that we are leaving no stone unturned in pushing
forward toward a successful political and economic
reconstruction in Iraq and a solution to the Israeli-
Palestinian conflict. Yet, as important as these tasks are,
they should not dissuade us from giving equally urgent
attention to the longer-term task, the generational task, of
supporting economic, social, and political reform in the
broader Middle East. We are encouraged by the region's recent
movements toward and calls for further reform and we do stand
ready with our G-8 partners to help the people of this region
build a future that provides more hope, more opportunity, and
more freedom.
Thank you.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Larson follows:]
Prepared Statement of Hon. Alan P. Larson
SUPPORTING REFORM AND OPPORTUNITY IN THE BROADER MIDDLE EAST AND NORTH
AFRICA
Mr. Chairman, members of the Committee: thank you for the
opportunity to speak with you today on our efforts to encourage and
support economic, social and political reform in the G8 Broader Middle
East and North Africa. Mr. Chairman, I particularly want to thank you
and Senator Hagel for keeping support for reform in this region at the
forefront of U.S. foreign policy.
The broader Middle East is a region with an important cultural
heritage and a history of scientific contributions that inspires great
pride. Today, however, the region faces significant challenges in
tapping the vast potential of its people and offering them freedom,
opportunity, and prosperity.
We recognize the importance of a lasting peaceful settlement of the
Arab-Israeli conflict, and every day we are working toward this goal--
as we are toward the goal of a peaceful, democratic, and sovereign
Iraq. At the same time, regional voices are calling for reform; we must
respond to this desire for change. Divisions, disputes, and even
violence in the region cannot be allowed to become an excuse for
deferring reform; indeed, reform can help to bring them to solutions.
President Bush has laid out a vision of partnership in support of
political, social and economic reform. From the beginning of our work
on this issue we, and our G8 partners, have recognized that reform must
be an internal process in each of the countries of the region. No one-
size-fits-all formula can meet the varied needs of this region, nor can
reform be imposed from the outside. President Bush and the
Administration are committed to working with the countries of the
region to help facilitate reforms that each nation and its people have
identified as necessary for their own advancement.
Consensus for reform, and recognition of its benefits, is growing.
In recent years, gradual reforms have led to increased political and
economic opportunities and improved living conditions for both women
and men across the region. For example, in the last three years,
citizens of Bahrain, Jordan, Morocco, and Yemen have elected new
parliaments. Last year, the people of Qatar approved a new constitution
by referendum, and just a few months ago Morocco adopted a new family
code that protects the rights of women. Recently, we concluded free
trade agreement negotiations with Morocco and Bahrain. The United
States already has free trade agreements with Jordan and Israel.
Algeria, Egypt, Kuwait, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Tunisia, the UAE, and
Yemen have signed Trade and Investment Framework Agreements with the
United States.
Reform has a positive multiplier effect in a society. Political,
educational, economic, and social reforms connect on many levels to
reinforce each other and to create hope and opportunity. Even small
steps can give people more opportunity to shape their lives, their
societies and their future. Each step leads to greater freedom, greater
experience and strengthened confidence.
We recognize, of course, that this region is one of different
societies and we know each has uniquely different circumstances. At the
same time, we believe the aspiration for freedom and opportunity is
universal. We believe that the basic pillars of democracy--such as a
representative legislature, an independent judiciary, a free press and
market economy--are suitable for all people and compatible with any
society, though they may not look exactly the same or function in
exactly the same way.
We are looking for ways to facilitate and support reform
initiatives that are identified and proposed by those who will
ultimately implement them and benefit most from them. The people of
this region want reform that will address their needs, and we stand
ready to help, for as long as it takes to achieve success.
The people of this region have clearly and convincingly analyzed
the challenges they face. The authors of the Arab Human Development
report, the prestigious Arab NGOs and individuals who met at the
Alexandria Library in Egypt last March and the members of the Arab
Business Council have described the dilemma faced by the region in
clear terms.
More recently, Arab leaders answered this call at the Arab League
Summit, May 22-23 in Tunis. Leaders called on members to continue
reform to foster democratic practice, broaden participation in
political and public life, strengthen the role of civil society, and
``expand women's participation in the political, economic, social,
cultural and educational fields, and] enhance their rights and status
in society.''
More specifically, the region itself has identified several primary
challenges, including:
Broadening participation in public and political life, in
particular, increasing the role of women in economic, social,
and political spheres.
Increasing commitment to free and transparent elections,
improving functioning of parliaments, supporting an independent
judiciary, and encouraging free media and active civil society.
Intensifying efforts to develop and improve educational to
improve curricula and teacher training systems and to combat
illiteracy.
Generating enough employment to accommodate the five million
job seekers entering the market each year.
Raising economic growth to about 6-7 percent annually over
the coming decade.
Increasing the region's share in foreign capital flows,
including direct and indirect foreign investments. The region
attracts low levels of inward FDI; suffers from capital flight;
and needs to allocate more productively the capital that stays
behind.
Expanding the region's share in booming international trade
and extending exports beyond primary products to include high-
value-added products.
Increasing intra-regional trade and investment.
Improving access to information by increasing capacity in
translation, publishing and access to the Internet.
Starting from the issues our partners in the region have
identified, we are working together with the other G8 countries on a
number of possible initiatives that will help regional reformers to
achieve their goals. These proposals will offer a broad range of
opportunities from which governments, civil society, and business can
draw. This initiative is intended to enhance and support G8 countries'
long-term engagement and dialogue with this region. We intend to
proceed in the spirit of collaboration and mutual respect.
It is for that reason that Secretary Powell, Under Secretary
Grossman, Assistant Secretary Burns and I--as well as many others
throughout our government--have consulted extensively with the region's
governments on this initiative. Secretary Powell, Assistant Secretary
Burns, and I recently attended the World Economic Forum last month in
Jordan, where we had excellent discussions with regional leaders on
this topic. Secretary Snow hosted a meeting in April for Finance
Ministers from the Broader Middle East and North Africa and G8
governments to discuss economic aspects of this initiative. These
consultations have informed and guided our efforts to develop methods
of supporting reform initiatives emerging from the region. Some of our
partners from the region who have been involved in our preparations
will attend the G8 Summit at Sea Island.
The President has invited King Abdullah II of Jordan, whose
strong economic reform program is putting Jordan on the path
toward economic growth and rapid development.
President Bouteflika of Algeria has also accepted the
President's invitation and will add valuable experience based
on his nation's experience working with the G8 in the New
Partnership for Africa's Development (NEPAD) program.
King Hamad of Bahrain will attend, bringing with him
Bahrain's experience as a leader in opening up trade in the
region.
President Salih of Yemen will attend and discuss his
country's experience in successfully running recent
parliamentary elections.
President Karzai of Afghanistan will attend and can discuss
how democracy can revitalize a society even after decades of
repression. Afghanistan is planning for national elections for
the first time in decades and has made great strides in
literacy and economic reform.
In addition to these Middle Eastern countries, Turkey will
attend the Sea Island summit. For centuries a bridge between
eastern and western cultures, Turkey has a long record of
strong democratic institutions, political and economic reform,
and religious tolerance. As Turkey advances toward full
membership in the European family, its unique history affords
potential examples of successful reform for the nations of the
Greater Middle East region. We are pleased that Prime Minister
Erdogan has accepted the President's invitation to attend the
Sea Island Summit.
There clearly are opportunities for the G8 to assist the reform
effort; both through the collective action of all G8 countries and also
through enhanced cooperation in areas of bilateral assistance already
underway. For example, countries of the broader Middle East and North
Africa would welcome opportunities through which they can exchange
ideas, examine and share best practices, and build intra-regional
cooperation and consensus on reform. We are looking at ways to work
together with the countries of the region to establish a forum for such
discussions.
Reformers in the region have also noted the need for more micro
credit programs and increased investment in small and medium-sized
enterprises (SMEs). This will help cut unemployment, improve access to
trade financing for small exporters and increase opportunities for
women to pull themselves and their families out of poverty. We are
seeking ways to improve access to microfinance and to help local
governments improve the policy and regulatory atmosphere and exchange
best practices.
Meeting basic educational needs is vital for development and
economic growth. The region has made training and development of human
resources--particularly with regard to teacher training, as well as
vocational and technical training--a priority. We will look for
opportunities to provide tools to work with the region to achieve these
important goals.
Expanding trade needs to be a focus of our efforts as well.
Regional economic integration and increased trade between the countries
of the region and the rest of the world will provide more opportunity
for business and investment. We are pursing trade links with the region
and encouraging regional governments to work toward membership in the
World Trade Organization, where they have not already done so. We could
consider regional trade hubs and support for local chambers of
commerce.
We are acutely aware of the magnitude and complexity of the reform
challenge in the broader Middle East. Reformers in the region have made
it clear in Tunis, Alexandria and Sana'a they are committed to moving
forward on all fronts, including governance, not just those reforms
that are easiest. We should not shy away from the challenge, but
support them in that great effort to transform this critical region.
I am pleased to say that our initial ideas and plans for the
initiative in the greater Middle East region met with considerable
acceptance and, as you will see at Sea Island, are the basis for
consensus action. I think this is because those plans reflect the view
and the declarations of people in the region, to which we responded.
In closing, Mr. Chairman, I want to emphasize once again that the
impetus for reform must come from the region. We have no interest in
forcing a set of proposals on the people of the broader Middle East,
nor could we do so if we wished. We are leaving no stone unturned in
pushing forward toward a successful political and economic
reconstruction in Iraq and a solution to the Israeli-Palestinian
conflict. Yet, as important as these tasks are, they should not
dissuade us from giving equally urgent attention to the longer-term
task of supporting economic, social and political reform in the broader
Middle East. We are encouraged by the region's recent movements toward,
and calls for, reform. We stand ready, with our G8 partners, to help
the people of this region build a future that provides more hope,
opportunity and freedom.
The Chairman. Thank you very much, Secretary Larson.
We have three panels today and several Senators raising
questions, so we will try for a 7-minute round at this point. I
will commence the round by asking you, Secretary Larson, what
is the best outcome you can anticipate at the G-8 meeting with
regard to a Greater Middle East initiative. By that I mean,
will there be pledges of money? Will there be some structure of
the G-8 as to how proposals are to be considered? Has the Trust
idea that I have suggested been a part of discussion at our
State Department or with anybody else in the G-8? Give us some
flavor of what we can anticipate. You say some preconsultation
has occurred. You give some optimism in your testimony of the
results, but can you sketch out more particularly what they are
likely to be?
Mr. Larson. I think the most fundamental thing we want to
see coming out of Sea Island is a recognition that the issue of
reform in all its dimensions is fully and permanently on the
agenda. Beyond that, I believe we will be able to come forward
with some new initiatives that will include the members of the
G-8 and include the countries of the region. One of those I
hope we will move forward is some type of ongoing forum where
we can further develop areas of cooperation. I think we will be
able to come forward with some specific initiatives that will
push the ball forward on issues like microfinance, small
business lending, push the ball forward on cooperation in the
promotion of democracy. But we recognize that this is just an
initial plan of support for reform, and we will have to work,
together with our partners in the region and outside of the
region, to further develop this architecture. The idea that you
have put forward for a 21st Century Fund is, I think, among
those types of very big challenging ideas.
We have had a round of discussions with the region about
ideas for new regional financing institutions. Those have not
fully gelled, to be perfectly honest. But I think that there is
a debate that has been opened up on those, and I think those
are the sorts of ideas we would hope to continue to discuss in
institutions like a forum.
The Chairman. Just for the sake of the record and our
information, lets us focus on this topic. The G-8 meets and, as
you say, is seized with various issues. It is not clear how
things move after that. In other words, the G-8 discussed--and
we have discussed before in these hearings--the so-called 10
plus 10 over 10 program in which the G-8 countries were to
match contributions by the United States in terms of the
destruction of weapons of mass destruction and nonproliferation
efforts.
From time to time the committee has probed how this is
going. What have the other seven nations stepped up to do? Who
meets with whom? And is there any sort of ongoing committee
work or structure that leads people to do things except on an
ad hoc basis, which contributes obviously to the overall
result? Can you give any idea who might meet whom after the G-8
on the issue that we have in front of us today?
Mr. Larson. Definitely. We have a team of people that work
on the preparation for the G-8 summit that includes the
President's representative at the National Security Council,
Mr. Edson, myself, Mr. Bolton at the State Department, of
course, works on issues like 10 plus 10 over 10, and others.
This year we are in the role of the chairmanship or the
presidency of the G-8, and we hold that responsibility through
the end of the calendar year. We have made a firm decision that
our presidency does not end on the 10th of June when the Sea
Island summit is over. We have determined that we are going to
need to drive a number of initiatives forward over the rest of
the calendar year, and this is one of the most important. We
would hope, for example, to host or co-host meetings that would
be designed to carry out initiatives of the broader Middle East
and north Africa later in the fall. We will be using the team
that prepared for the summit to drive this process with our
colleagues in the G-8 but also colleagues in the broader Middle
East.
The Chairman. Well, that is very encouraging. I am
encouraged by the fact that the U.S. presidency of the G-8 this
year gives us the ability to raise these issues at the G-8
summit and through the end of the year. As president of the
institution, you can call meetings and will do so. So that
really offers some promise.
Now, just for sake of our understanding, what do you
believe the Greater Middle East covers? In other words, what
countries or what areas are we talking about in terms of the
issues at the meeting we are about to have?
Mr. Larson. We have believed that it is important to have
an open architecture on a concept like this because we found in
other regional organizations when it is successful, others want
to join. So we have not wanted to draw very sharp lines
excluding some and including others. But we certainly imagine
the countries of north Africa, the Levant and the gulf and some
adjacent countries. We think that the geography will vary
somewhat depending on the topics under discussion. On economic
topics, these regional interconnections are very important and
you need to reach out to all of the necessary players. If there
are security-related conversations, we would naturally exclude
countries that are state sponsors of terrorism. So we believe
it should be open. It should be broad beyond the traditional
confines of the Middle East, and that the geography of it may
vary somewhat depending on what subjects are under discussion.
The Chairman. Carrying forward a question that Senator
Biden had in his opening statement, why have many countries
declined the invitation? This is a distinguished list who have
accepted, and that is the good news. But the Greater Middle
East covers, as you have defined it, a large number of
countries who obviously do not plan to participate. Do you have
any view as to why they are not interested?
Mr. Larson. Well, I think a number of countries that are
not attending the conference at Sea Island are very interested
in the broader Middle East and, in fact, are going to play a
leadership role in it. For example, Morocco is not going to be
in a position to attend the meeting, but the leader of Morocco
will be coming a couple weeks later. And Morocco is going to
play a leadership role on one of the initiatives designed to
promote better training and internship opportunities for young
people who want to have careers in business.
We recognized, when Sea Island was selected as the venue
for this meeting, that it would not make it possible to have
many guests outside of the G-8. We are having a separate
outreach meeting for the Africans, and we have zeroed in on six
African leaders who will be coming. And that is about the
extent of what you can accommodate.
But I can assure you that countries that are not
necessarily participating in this particular conference have,
nevertheless, had very productive conversations with us about
the content of this initiative and expect to work with us in
the implementation of it.
The Chairman. Let me just say parenthetically, given the
presence of our distinguished guest today, perhaps a better
venue would have been Amman or the Dead Sea conference area,
which has accommodated a good number of people from the Middle
East.
Mr. Larson. Well, the Dead Sea meeting that was recently
held under the auspices of the WEF, World Economic Forum, did
provide a wonderful opportunity for Secretary Powell and others
of us to consult the region, and so we took full advantage of
the hospitality of His Majesty King Abdullah II.
The Chairman. Thank you, Mr. Secretary.
Senator Biden.
Senator Biden. Thank you.
Mr. Secretary, let me move back to the centerpiece of this
initiative as I see it, the Forum for the Future, as I see it,
which is this ongoing framework for discussion, and you fleshed
it out a little bit for the chairman. Could you elaborate on
how this forum will function, how far advanced is the concept
of the forum? Is there consensus among the G-8? Did you arrive
at a consensus before you arrived at Sea Island? Is there
consensus in the region about it? And are any countries and all
countries going to be invited to participate in the forum,
including Iran and Syria?
Mr. Larson. One of the most important things that we
learned from our consultations in the region was that more
important than any single initiative that might come up was the
sense that there was an ongoing, sustained engagement on the
part of G-8 countries with the region. So you are right,
Senator, in suggesting that this idea of a forum has begun to
move to center stage because it is something that is seen in
the region as important and it is something around which the G-
8 has coalesced.
Many of the details of this will have to be worked out in
further consultations with the region, but I think the basic
framework is quite clear. We would imagine, for example, an
opportunity to have ministerial level consultations. That could
include foreign and economic and other ministers so that one
could look at the process of reform across the board, including
educational reform, economic reform, reform in areas of
governance. We would imagine a forum that would allow for a
discussion of best practices so parts of the region could learn
from the experiences, the successes of other parts of the
region----
Senator Biden. May I interrupt you?
Mr. Larson. Yes.
Senator Biden. I think that is extremely valuable and I am
sure there are other fora based on subject matter. But with
most summits, before people arrive, they agree on the major
points. Summits are not impromptu gatherings. Is there an
agreement on how often that forum will meet? Have you set dates
for these various kinds of meetings between now and the end of
the year when our presidency moves on? And have you arrived at
a consensus whether or not, for example, Syria and Iran can
participate?
Mr. Larson. We expect and believe we have an agreement on
the idea of a meeting before the end of the year. We believe we
have agreement on a structure that, in addition to the elements
I outlined, would include the opportunity for input from the
business community and civil society. We anticipate that the
forum itself would be open to all countries in the region and
interested partners from nearby the region, but that on certain
types of topics, the participation would be affected by these
countries' policies, and I gave the example of security
discussions that might take place.
Senator Biden. Over the weekend, the Jordanian Foreign
Minister expressed reservations about the inclusion of such
countries as Turkey, Afghanistan, and Pakistan in the
initiative. He said the dialog ``is best conducted between the
G-8 and the Arab group and not through a wider definition of
the Greater Middle East where we do not share sometimes the
same common interest.''
According to Robert Satloff of the Washington Institute of
Near East Policy, ``More than a quarter of all residents of
Arab countries are not Arabs, and by the Greater Middle East
Initiative's geographic definition, Arabs will be a distinct
minority in the region.'' And Mr. Satloff continues.
``Virtually all of the proposals, analyses, and recommendations
are directed toward Arabs. Where is the recognition of the
region's ethnic, cultural, religious, and linguistic mosaic?''
Could you respond to his question?
Mr. Larson. Surely. We think that it has been profoundly
important that the Arab League and Arab institutions have moved
forward to embrace this reform agenda. I think the Arab League
summit statement in Tunis was a very important initiative.
We also think, though, that the challenges that are faced
by the Arab world are not unique in every respect and that
there is a lot that can be learned from the experiences of some
of their neighbors, including neighbors like Turkey, neighbors
like Pakistan. I think it is very important that we have the
flexibility to have a dialog that brings in some of these other
countries as well.
You mentioned in the quotation that you just gave that in
many of these countries there are very important populations
from outside of the Arab world. Certainly in the gulf, the
links between the gulf and countries like Pakistan are very,
very prominent. So if you are going to have a discussion of
increased trade, increased investment, I think you need to be
able to include some of these adjacent countries, and that has
certainly been our concept.
But we have not in any way wished to diminish the
importance of the Arab identity or the importance of Arab
institutions as being key components of this push toward
reform.
Senator Biden. Thank you very much, Mr. Secretary.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
The Chairman. Thank you, Senator Biden.
Senator Hagel.
Senator Hagel. Mr. Chairman, thank you.
Secretary Larson, welcome. I think it is important that we
acknowledge the good work of Secretary Powell and Secretary
Burns, yourself, others in the administration who in fact have
put an effort into dealing with the underlying issues in the
Middle East and that is why we are here this morning. I know we
are not as far as we all would like to have come, but
nonetheless we are focused on it, and that in itself is
important and now we need to do exactly what you said in your
testimony, connect the reality and the relevancy of the
programs that will enlist the support of the people of the
Middle East.
The first question. Give me your sense of the balance, the
relationship between the Israeli-Palestinian issue, our efforts
in Iraq, the overall development challenges that we face in the
Middle East. Are they related? How are they related? And give
me your best sense of that.
Mr. Larson. We believe that it is very important to make an
all-out effort to promote Middle East peace, peace between the
Arabs and the Israelis to persevere with the task of political
and economic reconstruction in Iraq and to pursue longer-term
economic, social, and educational reforms in the broader Middle
East. We have to do all of these.
We must be clear that we are addressing the first two so
that the sense does not creep in that the discussion on the
third is somehow an alternative. But at the same time, we have
to be very firm, I believe, in suggesting to our friends in the
region that a setback tomorrow in the Middle East peace process
is not an excuse for saying we cannot address these economic
reforms that are so important for the future of our own people.
These are simply things that have to be addressed. They have to
be addressed with equal urgency and equal vigor.
Senator Hagel. Do you believe the current administration's
policy in fact is doing that, exactly that? I guess the other
part of that is how much emphasis are we putting on the fact
that all the programs that we are talking about, what may well
be laid on the table next week in the way of specific programs
in economic development are, in fact, related to the Trust that
the people in this region, the Middle East, Muslim world in
general, have in our leadership and confidence in that
leadership and trust in our purpose. What I am trying to get at
is how much is the Israeli-Palestinian issue woven into the
fabric of what we are talking about this morning, as well as
the great challenges of the Middle East, specifically now with
140,000 American troops in Iraq?
Mr. Larson. Both of those issues are fully woven into the
challenge of promoting reform in the broader Middle East.
Certainly they are huge psychological factors in the minds of
the citizens of this part of the world. I think that on Iraq,
for example, we are in a pivotal month where if we can show
that we have successfully moved forward with a Security Council
resolution, we have seen the announcement yesterday of the
interim government, we are working to get broader international
support for the task of reconstruction, I think those efforts
will help improve the climate for moving forward with the
broader Middle East Initiative.
I think that the way that we approach the prison abuse
scandal will be also very important. Obviously, it was a huge
setback for us in terms of our image in the region. But if we
address it in the way that shows a sense of democratic
accountability and that our institutions are working, I think
that will show that we are serious when we talk to the region
about democracy, about accountable institutions.
So we will need to pursue our efforts on all three of these
issues simultaneously. That is certainly what we are trying to
do, and I think we are making good progress on all fronts.
Senator Hagel. Mr. Secretary, how important do you think it
is in the minds of the people of the Middle East that they
believe that the United States is doing everything we can to
help resolve the Israeli-Palestinian issue? Can we make
progress on these other fronts we are talking about today, as
well as other more specific issues like Iraq, without that
piece?
Mr. Larson. We will always be running uphill in trying to
convince many of our friends in the Arab world that we are
doing everything we can to promote peace between the Israelis
and the Palestinians. Nevertheless, in our candid discussions
with friends in the region, I believe I have detected an
acknowledgement that they cannot hold hostage the reform and
the improvement of opportunity in their own societies for the
benefit of their own people to the day-to-day ups and downs in
the peace process. It would simply be irrational. There is a
psychological factor that we must always take into account, but
they are not pursuing reforms for our benefit. They are
pursuing reforms for their own benefit, and we are trying to
put ourselves in a position to----
Senator Hagel. But does not an awful lot have to do with
the confidence in our efforts by the people themselves? If we
lose the people, we lose the effort, the trust in our purpose,
and certainly it has to spill over into the Israeli-Palestinian
issue, as well as all of the other challenges that we have.
Mr. Larson. It comes up in every conversation. You are
right. It comes up in every conversation.
Senator Hagel. Thank you.
One last question. Any new, specific proposals going to be
introduced at the G-8 conference next week? You talked about
microfinance. You talked about a number of objectives, things
that we should be doing. We are doing now some of them, but
more need to be done. Anything new that we can expect?
Mr. Larson. I think we will have some things that will be
new twists on existing programs. We talked at some length about
the forum which we hope to launch. We hope that we will find it
possible to come up with new, more effective and expanded ways
to support small- and medium-sized businesses in the region.
A lot what we need to try to do requires mobilizing
resources from the region, from the governments of the region,
as well as from the private sector. The chairman has talked
about a 21st Century Trust. We are trying to focus on a 21st
century approach to the financing needs of the region, and that
means recognizing that the vast majority of funds potentially
available to support development will come from the private
sector. This is a region where resources have not been coming
in from abroad. In fact, their own resources have been fleeing.
So part of what we need to do is get private resources coming
back to the region.
Senator Hagel. Thank you.
Mr. Chairman, thank you.
The Chairman. Thank you very much, Senator Hagel.
Senator Chafee.
Senator Chafee. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, very much, and
welcome, Secretary Larson.
As a career public servant and having served around the
world, I believe in Zaire, Sierra Leone, Jamaica, you are
trained to understand and pick up what is happening on the
ground. How would you assess honestly our credibility and
stature at this time in the Greater Middle East?
Mr. Larson. What I find interesting from my travels in the
greater, broader Middle East is that despite some very
difficult setbacks, including some of the recent developments,
prison abuse scandal in Iraq, and the tough road that we have
been walking on the Middle East peace process, people in the
region still look to us as a country that has a model that
works, where people would like to come and live. We have found,
in particular, in our meetings with young people, outside of
government, young entrepreneurs, young rotarians, that there is
deep interest in this reform agenda. There is deep interest in
the question of what they can do to make sure they have a
bigger voice in the future of their country, bigger opportunity
to pursue their educational and economic dreams.
So I think that we are able to work with the region to
pursue an initiative like this, and it really comes from that
reservoir of confidence in the United States, notwithstanding a
lot of disagreement with what is perceived to be--what is
perceived to be--some of the policies that we are following.
Senator Chafee. Yes. That is putting a good face on it, and
I respect that.
The President's own Djerejian report said that hostility
toward America is reaching shocking levels. So we do have to be
concerned that actually--and what I am hearing from people in
the region is that by pushing this, conversely we are hurting
the effort, that we are undermining real reformers just because
our credibility and the hostility toward us is, as the
Djerejian report said, reaching shocking levels. Does that
concern you, that by pushing it, we are actually hurting the
real reformers in the region?
Mr. Larson. I think it is something to consider. Secretary
Powell went to the World Economic Forum and sat down with
leaders of the Arab Business Council and of leading Arab NGOs,
and the message that we heard there was keep it up. You have
helped to start a debate that needs to take place. Obviously,
reform must come from within the region. We all respect that.
We respect the fact that it will have to come in different ways
and at different paces, but there was very strong support from
these groups in civil society and from the business community
for the agenda that we were helping to push. I found that
encouraging because, as you pointed out, the Djerejian report
and other similar reports have suggested that there is serious
disaffection with what is perceived to be our policy in many
parts of this region.
Senator Chafee. Yes. I am sure there are some that say,
keep it up, but certainly the majority of the comments, upon
the release of the initiative, were in strong opposition and I
have a whole list of quotes here. The Jordanian Foreign
Minister said, ``our objective is for this document never to
see the light,'' and on and on it goes. So we have to be
realistic also and honest about how we want to pursue our
goals.
Mr. Larson. Let me comment a little bit about just how we
pursued consultation in the region. The document that the
Foreign Minister was commenting on was one that was an internal
G-8 working document that was leaked by someone in the G-8
process, and I must say that in my experience over a couple of
decades working on G-8 summits, it is the first time this has
ever happened. It was very, very unfortunate and we suffered a
setback because of it because it carried the perception that
there was some sort of blueprint that was being developed
without consultation from the region.
What we have done since then is to engage in an all-out
process of consultation with the region. We have shared our
ideas, including a few non-papers, with government leaders,
with business leaders, with NGO leaders. We have had meetings.
In one of my preparatory meetings with the G-8, I invited to
Washington the main author of the Arab Human Development
Report, the President of the Arab Business Council, and leaders
of the reform process, government and non-government, from the
region. We sat down and we got their advice.
So I think we have begun to recover from that period a
couple of months ago when there was a sense that we had a
secret plan that we were going to publish at Sea Island and
only then the region would find out about it. We are meeting
even this week. We are continuing our consultations with the
region so that they have a full opportunity to give us advice
on these types of initiatives, and I think through those
efforts we have helped turn around the sentiments that you are
referring to.
Senator Chafee. I might argue that our credibility being
what it is, that the cynics would say that it was purposely
leaked just to make compromise all the more palatable down the
road.
Now, of course, many of the G-8 countries have been
opponents of the war in Iraq. How do you expect the feedback at
Sea Island from these particular countries--I have many quotes
here in opposition also talking about a paternalistic attitudes
toward the region that they have been very involved in much
longer than we have.
Mr. Larson. First of all, having just gotten off a
conference call with my G-8 counterparts earlier this morning,
I think we are very, very close to agreement on the package of
ideas that we have been developing for Sea Island. So we have
been bringing this process along.
Second, I would just say that I think it is paternalistic
to say that this is a region that cannot experience democracy,
that cannot experience economic growth, and cannot experience
educational opportunity. I think it would be the worst form of
paternalism to say that we can talk about these issues in other
parts of the world, but we cannot really have it part of the
agenda in this part of the world.
Senator Chafee. I know my time is up, but I do not think
anybody is saying it cannot happen. Nobody is saying that. It
is just at its own pace as opposed to on our time table.
Mr. Larson. I think we would all agree with that, that it
will have to be at their own pace and that will differ from
country to country.
Senator Chafee. Thank you, Mr. Secretary.
The Chairman. Thank you very much, Senator Chafee.
Senator Alexander.
Senator Alexander. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Secretary, thank you for being here.
I would like to continue the line of discussion of my
colleagues about American credibility and how we seek to
improve what the world thinks of what we are doing as a way of
helping us succeed in what we are doing. I am trying to keep it
in balance.
I can remember that the American Revolution, if there had
been a poll, would not have received a majority support in the
colonies. Yet, we do not think that was a wrong revolution.
I remember being in Amsterdam and in Germany in the 1980s
and hearing preachers in the pulpits talk about Reagan and
Begin and Hitler. They objected to our presence there. Yet, we
do not think it was a wrong decision to say, Mr. Gorbachev,
tear down this wall.
And Professor Graham Allison at Harvard likes to talk about
the elephant and the mouse in the bathtub theory, that no
matter how nice the elephant is, if you are the mouse in the
bathtub with the elephant, the mouse is not going to like it
very much. That is one of the problems that the United States
has in the world.
But having said that, where we are today is not where we
would like to be in terms of what the world thinks of what we
are doing and the support we have in the Middle East for what
we are trying to accomplish. We know, as a tactical matter,
that if we want to succeed in what we are doing, we need to
isolate the radicals. We are told by the Brookings Institution,
as reported in the New York Times, that in a country of 25
million, Iraq, that there are only 5,000 insurgents whom we are
fighting and only 500 jihadists out of 25 million. That is the
size of the opposition. So we do not want to enlarge that. We
want to isolate and narrow that. How do we do it?
We have talked about several ways here today, the peace
process in Israel. You said, dealing with prison abuse in a
straightforward way is a way to do it. All the proposals that
you have suggested at Sea Island would be helpful, the various
proposals Senator Lugar and Senator Hagel and others in the
administration on the Trusts reminds us that the Marshall Plan
was a plan of the European countries. It was not our plan. they
came up with their plans for their countries, and this gives us
a chance to do that. You have emphasized that.
I wanted to ask you about one other thing, and that has to
do with what I would like to be able to call the ``first Bush
doctrine,'' although it is not for me to call it that really.
Most of us agree with what I would call the ``second Bush
doctrine,'' which came after 9/11 occurred unexpectedly, which
is if terrorists hit us, we will hit you back and you are
either with us or against us. The President was courageous in
that. I support him in that.
But he also said these words in his campaign debate October
11 in Wake Forest. In talking about foreign policy in the
future, Governor Bush then said, ``I think the United States
must be humble and must be proud and confident of our values,
but humble in how we treat nations that are figuring out how to
chart their own course.'' I would like to call that the first
Bush doctrine, and I would suspect that it is still an
operative doctrine even though we have heard more about what I
would call the second one.
So I guess my question for you would be, Mr. Secretary, are
words like these still operative words in the administration?
And as we move into a different era in Iraq, particularly after
June 30, might we hear more words like I think the United
States must be humble and must be proud and confident of our
values, but humble in how we treat nations that are figuring
out how to chart their own course?
Mr. Larson. Senator, I find it interesting that both you
and Senator Biden have touched on this theme of humility and
being humble. I think that when it comes to discussing reform,
being humble and having humility is an important part of the
message that we need to convey. We need to be able to convey
that we believe that the work of building free democratic open
societies is never done, that we do not believe that we have
achieved perfection. It is because we think that, that we have
encouraged this debate so much.
It was also interesting what you said about the elephant
and the mouse because I think that however careful we are,
sometimes by our pronouncements, because of our power and our
prosperity, things that we do not believe are meant to be
imposition sound like that sometimes to others. So we have had
to work very, very hard in the region to say that this is a
response, an initial response, to your own priorities. You set
them out in Tunis and in Alexandria and Sana'a and other
places. We have developed these proposed initial responses in
consultation with you, and we are prepared to implement them
and develop new ideas through some type of forum where we can
work together as equals. I think that message is sinking in,
but it has, frankly, taken a very serious effort, and I think
the visit of the Secretary of State to the region at the Dead
Sea conference was an important milestone in that effort.
Senator Alexander. I thought it also was important in the
President's remarks the other night and in your remarks today
what you did not say in terms of our objectives. The President
listed five. You listed several. But I did not hear anybody say
that you must have exactly our Bill of Rights. You must have
exactly our separation of church and state doctrine, which is
unique in the world really, our own version. You must have our
federalism. You must have our checks and balances. You must
have our e pluribus unum. In fact, the President's objectives
in his remarks and your objectives here today I would
characterize both as being modest and realistic and going a
long way toward the kind of words that the President himself
talked about in 2002, which are that we can be strong and
humble in recognizing that people will chart their own course,
and there is a limit to what we can realistically expect.
Mr. Larson. I would agree with that. At the same time, I
would stress that we believe that there are values that are
universal, and it is interesting to me that even though you or
I, if we were Arab leaders, might have written this summit
statement slightly differently, you nevertheless see language
about consolidating democratic practice, broadening
participation in political life, reinforcing the rights of
women in society. These are very strong statements, in their
own words, expressed in their own way.
But I think, to pick up on another phrase that you used, it
gives us reason to have confidence that the values that we
stand for and the principles that we are trying to help make
available in this region are ones that the region itself is
embracing. In other words, we are pushing on an open door. It
is just that we have to do it in a way that is tactful, that is
helpful, and that clearly reflects the priorities of the
region.
Senator Alexander. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
The Chairman. Thank you very much, Senator Alexander.
Secretary Larson, we appreciate your testimony. We are
delighted that, as you pointed out earlier, our presidency of
the G-8 will continue throughout the year. We are looking
forward to hearing from you and from your colleagues what your
impressions are after the G-8 meeting. Our hearing today was
scheduled to offer a contribution through this forum of the
U.S. Senate to that meeting. We take it very seriously, as you
do. We think it is important for the G-8 to have successful
initiatives, but also that they be implemented and that there
be some evidence of the organization that moves on, that builds
consensus and has these contacts with nations that may want to
work with us. We thank you very much for your testimony, as
always, and we look forward to hearing from you again as things
proceed.
Mr. Larson. Well, thank you very much, Mr. Chairman, and
thanks to the committee.
Senator Biden. Good luck, Mr. Secretary.
The Chairman. Now we will hear testimony from His Royal
Highness Prince Hassan, who has come to us today from Amman,
Jordan. Prince Hassan, it is a genuine privilege to have you
before the committee today. Many members of our committee have
had the privilege of being entertained by you in your country,
as well as opportunities through the Jordanian Embassy here in
Washington for events that have brought us together in the
past. Your visit is timely, and your testimony is especially
timely this morning.
We would ask you to proceed, and then to entertain
questions by the committee in much the same form as you
witnessed with Secretary Larson. Please proceed. Your full
statement will be, of course, a part of our record.
STATEMENT OF HIS ROYAL HIGHNESS PRINCE EL HASSAN BIN TALAL OF
THE HASHEMITE KINGDOM OF JORDAN, ROYAL PALACE, AMMAN, JORDAN
Prince Hassan. Senator Lugar, Mr. Chairman, Mr. Biden,
distinguished Senators of the Senator Foreign Relations
Committee, I want to say from the outset that I have been here
before. It was in the 1970s that David Rockefeller convened a
meeting, which I recall included the participation of Jacob
Javits, a bridge-builder like myself who knew both worlds. It
included Robert McNamara, former Secretary of Defense, who I
knew in his then new incarnation as President of the World
Bank. It included Senator Edward Kennedy and nationals from
other countries, including Simone Weil herself, a World War II
holocaust survivor.
We presented a concept of the Middle East 2000, and
referring to the Palestine question, we presented a regional
assessment of human, natural, and economic resources, on the
basis of a computer model, we suggested that 10 million
consumers of water could live between the Mediterranean and the
Jordan River.
The only person who has taken that study seriously as an
indicator, over the many years and over the years that I have
spoken to him, is Prime Minister Sharon. In fact, I feel that
the settlement policy has been deliberately allowed to grow by
neglect of reading the small print by Arab countries. Settlers
were less than 1,000 in the 1970s. Today they are in the
hundreds of thousands.
And today presumably this new initiative of building peace
and combating terror is based on a projection of what-if
scenarios. I would start by saying that the administration's
Greater Middle East Initiative should be understood as a
misnomer. There is no such thing as a Middle East or even a
Greater Middle East, at least in the language of the United
Nations. I am an Asian. An Egyptian is an African. An Israeli
is not a part of any region.
South Asia and west Asia--and I think here you have got it
right, with all due respect, in your Near East and South Asian
Committee. Their combined population is larger than the
population of China. And as you know, Senator Lugar, as a
guiding light in the nuclear threat initiative with Senator
Nunn, there is no weapons of mass destruction agreement or
protocol within that region which is brimming with weapons of
mass destruction. So on basic security, there is a conspicuous
absence.
On current security, as Mr. Brzezinski said the other day,
we did not fight against the Blitzkrieg. The Blitzkrieg and
terror are tools of war, however odious they may be. But we
fought against despotism. And I do not need to be told, after
30 years of lonely bridge-building, what the problems of
governance in our region are, but I would recite them for the
record: population growth, poverty and deprivation, slow
economic development, high illiteracy, high infant mortality,
poor health care and sanitation, and inadequacy of democratic
processes. Democratization is a process. Democracy is an end
result. The problem is the poor quality of the institutions of
governance. Politicians, unfortunately, have lost their bedside
manner, the ability to talk to people. Governments are
alienated from people. There is failure of political parties
and the politicization of the armed forces. And 9/11 has come
as a windfall to many countries whose security services now
regard the security priority as the main issue of policy,
flying in the face of democracy and democratic values. The
problems also are the rise of ethnic conflict, the rise in
violence, growth of urbanization, the degradation of the
environment, and corruption in public life.
And I do not think it takes too much wisdom to suggest that
the common minimum agenda for our region is to recognize the
sovereignty of the citizen, to make stakeholders out of
citizens in planning their future, obviously to control
population growth, to bring justice back to development,
economic growth with equity, not to make the rich richer. The
development reports you have quoted include the reference by
Merrill Lynch to $1.3 trillion owned by 300,000 Middle
Easterners in the United States, and yet I come from a region
where 24 percent of the population live on a dollar a day and
55 percent live on $2 to $5 a day.
Terrorist organizations do not ask for collateral on loans,
and while we sit here and talk about small- and medium-
enterprise projects, the fact is that our middle class has left
the region because there is not a merit-based system for them
to participate in.
The three baskets of Helsinki through Barcelona are
security, economy, and then culture, and humanity as an
afterthought. In 1995, I believe it was, Shimon Peres and I at
the Middle East-North Africa summit conference proposed $35
billion for a decade of infrastructure development to encourage
the will of migrants to stay in 24 countries from Morocco to
Turkey, inclusive. We were told by the European Union, first
come, first served, on the basis of what was then known as the
Copenhagen shopping list.
My hope is that the Greater Middle East Initiative is not
an initiative of sherpas and shepherds without listening to the
sheep, as I once told President Clinton before a G-8 meeting in
Denver. I hope that the people of the region can be recognized
in terms of their legitimate quandary. The Middle East region
will be discussed at the G-8 summit at Sea Island, but as
Senator Biden pointed out, it has already been sharply
criticized by those who consider that it fails to address the
Palestinian-Israeli conflict and seeks to impose reform extra
cathedra, from the outside.
Allow me to start by saying that such critics may be proven
wrong on both counts because they may have missed the point on
both counts. My part of the world needs as many initiatives for
reform as can be imagined, both from within and from outside
the region. Incidentally, I am here as an NGO, a
nongovernmental organism. Reform can also accelerate rather
than retard peace in the Middle East.
I would like to suggest that we must remember that over the
millennia, our part of the world prospered only when it had
two-way openness and interaction. The free movement of ideas
was the key to prosperity. The free movement of goods, capital,
and people followed. And yet, when we heard the statements
during the visit of Prime Minister Sharon, which included
references to the fact that the right of return and the
question of compensation were to be discussed in the context of
Israeli-Palestinian particularity alone, if they were to be
discussed at all, I would like you to know that in a
Palestinian refugee camp a week ago, with visitors from all
over the world, young men and women were saying why is it that
we are not allowed a town hall meeting where we can ask the
question, what of the long-awaited right of return and the
right to compensation. Why do we not interact with people?
The down side of the Internet revolution is that it has
created enclaves of hatred. The positive side of it is that the
other day I witnessed Bedouins in the northeast of Jordan
talking directly to Navajo Indians in Albuquerque, New Mexico
about sheep shearing. We need more citizens conferencing and
less elitism. It is all very well to talk, as Secretary Larson
mentioned, about rotarians and young entrepreneurs, but we are
not all rotarians or young entrepreneurs.
During the 1990s two ideas or initiatives were launched in
the region: the 1991 gulf war and the Madrid Middle East peace
process. They had bilateral and multilateral tracks, and of
course, there was objection to multilateralism until the
bilateral issues had been addressed. My problem with that is
that I, through the ages of the Quakers, if they will permit me
to say this, the friends for whom I have great respect, have
had the Iranians, the Israelis, Turks, Arabs, and Westerners in
one room discussing weapons of mass destruction, but the minute
they leave that room into the cruel light of day, they are
concerned about their unilateral standing with the strong
nations and in particular with Washington.
Gentlemen, there is a law of war. Treatment of prisoners is
a concession from the law of war. But there is no such thing as
a law of peace. And the new, independent humanitarian order is
on the agenda of the General Assembly of the United Nations
every year. The call for a culture of compliance for state
actors and non-state actors is on the agenda of the General
Assembly every year. Let us all in this region step up to the
template of international law. On that basis, we can begin to
convince people that this is not a new initiative emphasizing
``pipeline-istan,'' if I may on the one side, and if you will
forgive the impropriety and the lack of political correctness,
``uslikestan'' on the other.
The Israeli-Palestinian conflict and Iraq are, of course,
key issues for the people of the Middle East. Although
interrelated, it would be unwise and impractical to assume that
the Israeli-Palestinian issue, Iraq, and overarching regional
reform should be tackled in any chronological order. Resolution
of any one issue should not be conditional upon any other.
Senator Lugar, I agree with your statement and I quote.
``If we help to produce a resolution of the Israeli-Palestinian
conflict, fresh political winds would sweep through the region
and new possibilities for political reform would flourish.'' I
am deeply worried, as I think many of you are, during this
election period of the next 4 months, without presuming on
internal American domestic politics, that initiatives will
remain initiatives in name. I am afraid of the dreadful
initiatives that might be taken by extremists within the region
or beyond the region that will change the context to which we
have been alluding.
And for three decades, I have been trying to foster reform.
As a Prince, this may sound a contradiction in terms in
Republican/Democratic America, but I would like to say that the
long list of NGOs with which I am associated, both Arab and
Israeli, are civil liberty oriented, but they are
representative of the majority which is being squeezed out by
our fanatics, your fanatics, their fanatics, and without the
centrist platform, I do not see how reform can be addressed. It
is a lonely task to be the powerless lobby for the powerless,
and that is why I accepted your kind invitation solely on the
word ``partnership.''
The Achilles' heel of reform efforts is the thin and often
invisible dividing line between patronage and partnership,
between compulsion and cosmopolitanism. I want to know how do
we move from principles to instruments. Karl Popper, the
philosopher, once said any meeting that goes beyond 18, maybe
15, is not a meeting. We need a concept group of people who are
larger than the newspaper headlines, people who can exchange
ideas. There is an English expression, I believe in a meeting
of minds. If you have a mind, I would like to meet it.
Hard security, soft security have to complement each other.
Civil society stakeholding is essential in Pakistan and in
India. The first act after 9/11 was to stop importing the silk
that is being woven by the poor, who normally would be killing
each other, in the Kachi Abadi authorities in the Gramin Bank
projects.
I would like to suggest that the 21st Century Trust is a
trust that should be built on principles that can be turned
into instruments. I would like to explain that the imaginative
leaps into non-traditional combinations of policies can be a
part of a matrix for the new Middle East Initiative where we
make incremental progress, but progress all the same,
unrelenting progress, on basic security, current security, and
soft security.
The GMEI, the Greater Middle East Initiative, suggests to
me at least, if I understand it correctly, that self-reliance
is the unifying objective rather than looking to the United
States as policeman, nurse maid, and benefactor. You have said
yourself, Senator Lugar, that the United States cannot feed
every person, lift every person out of poverty, cure every
disease or stop every conflict.
I would like to suggest that the Trust should represent the
new form of social compact to institutionalize the inclusion of
civil society in project design. In doing so, it will avoid the
patronage trap. I see it as a vehicle for action. I see it as a
vehicle of hope for neglected elements of society.
As for Islamic financial principles, I have called for an
A-L-M-S. We have enough of the A-R-M-S. An A-L-M-S fund focused
on the poor for over 20 years, transparent, guaranteed by
governments, using vehicles such as the Islamic Development
Bank and other foundations in the region to focus on creating
stakeholders out of the poor.
I wonder whether a regional conference of NGOs, ministers
of development, Middle East opinion makers, can be led up to in
terms of a process. Regional reform should focus on issues of
collective security, free trade, free movement of goods,
people, and capital, but most of all, I think they should focus
on the importance of vitalizing or revitalizing something that
is really nonexistent, an ECOSOC, an economic and social
council, for the region about which we speak.
We keep hearing about summits in Tunis. Summitry is a
rarity in our part of the world. Prime Ministers do not meet on
a quarterly basis to discuss transboundary issues. Europe was
brought together on one transboundary issue, coal and steel.
Can we not work together on a transboundary issue of water and
energy?
The Alexandria Declaration, with all due respect, focused
on security, democracy, human rights, and development. But I
feel that on the security issue, with the forthcoming NATO
meeting, there should be an emphasis on a framework for
cooperation with states in the Middle East, and it is for this
reason that I worked hard and successfully to include in the
Israel-Jordan peace treaty a reference to CSCME, a Conference
on Security and Cooperation for the Middle East.
I would like to thank the Arab Development Report and the
Unified Arab Economic Report, which is less spoken of, issued
by the Arab League, the Arab Fund for Economic and Social
Development, the Arab Monetary Fund, and OAPEC. But over
association from the United States with the good works of these
committees, unfortunately, tends to kill with kindness.
I would like to suggest that the World Development Report
in its latest form states that development is not just about
money or about numerical targets, as important as those are. It
is about people, and the recommendations of these groups are
only important inasmuch as they can empower people.
As for the revival of Islamic thought, I have been working
with President Musharraf in Pakistan, with leaders in Malaysia
and Turkey and elsewhere to develop an Islamic World Forum, a
forum of the majority of the same. I hope that such an effort
can be focused on consensus, pluralism, Arabs and non-Arabs,
Muslims, Christians, Jews, and for that matter, Sunnis and
Shi'a. Whatever our differences, the challenges that face us
are far greater than those perceived differences. If we all
observed the Ten Commandments, we would not be in this mess in
the first place.
As for violent extremism, I feel that with proper
leadership and proper governance, we can effectively develop a
great resource in terms of the Muslims of the Diaspora who have
been brought up in countries like yours and who know the
institutional rules of the game of building nations.
The question is not whether the United States and the G-8
can fix the Middle East, the real question is whether we in the
Islamic world can redeploy our intellectual resources in
partnership with the United States and the G-8. And I hope that
the Greater Middle East 21st Century Trust can be such a
vehicle.
Peace is real and durable only when the root causes of
conflict have been eliminated, Mr. Chairman, and I would like
to suggest that important initiatives of leadership have been
taken over the past decades. In a bold breakthrough, President
Sadat went to Jerusalem. King Hussein concluded the peace
treaty. The Palestinians partnered in Oslo. President Nixon
called on China; Reagan on the Soviet Union. Are we inevitably
on a course of collision with the ``axis of evil''? Or would an
initiative, possibly a high level American visit to Tehran, be
justified?
The British Prime Minister visited Libya. The British
Foreign Secretary visited Tehran, presumably with prior
consultation. Can we go the extra mile particularly in the next
few months to avoid the inevitability of conflict? Can we move
from politics to statesmanship?
In terms of detail, I am going back to initiatives. Help us
to help ourselves.
I would just like to make a few specific suggestions by
referring to human resources as defined by the Commission on
Human Security, that it complement state security, furthers
human developments, and enhances human rights. It complements
state security by being people-centered. I hate to think what
is happening in all the prisons of the world, having worked
with the International Committee of the Red Cross and human
rights organizations all my adult life. We need to broaden the
human development forces beyond growth with equity.
At the core, we have to respect human rights, and in early
May, I hosted the Amman Roundtable on Human Security and we
focused on the Helsinki Citizens Assembly. We suggested MECA, a
Middle East Citizens Assembly. We worked jointly with the
Canadians and the Norwegians on the Lysoen Declaration in 1998.
The Swedish Government's Fundamental Standards of Humanity of
1992 were set on the basis of international law and human
rights, as well as cultural and ethnic norms.
I would like to suggest that producing a shopping list of
ideas, as with the shopping list we suggested in Copenhagen and
then in Brussels, will produce the answer, first come, first
served. Thirty-five billion dollars for 24 countries for a
decade of development to encourage the will to stay, to stop
migrants crossing the Mediterranean. And $35 billion was what
was spent in one day on homeland security to create Fortress
America.
Can we talk about crisis avoidance through the use of this
important vehicle of the 21st Century Trust? Can we promote
good governance in South Asia? Can we realize the hope of an
Independent Commission on International Humanitarian Issues
where we called for a new law of peace?
I spoke 3 years ago in Mainz, Germany at the First World
Congress of Middle Eastern Studies. The Congress brings
together Middle East studies associations from Europe and from
the Middle East, and from the United States. The second
Congress will be held in Jordan in 2006. I have suggested that
this is part of a process, a process where conferences have
been held, where it is found clearly that Islam and elections
are not incompatible.
We have proposed the creation of a parliament of cultures,
which will open its doors in Turkey, at the School of
Mediterranean Humanities only a few weeks away. By comparison,
the Middle East Peace Initiative, MEPI, has spent hundreds of
millions of dollars but not on interactive conversation
building.
I remember addressing the USIA board when James Michener
was a member of that board. He was talking of the American
image abroad, which concerns you gentlemen as it concerns me.
We share the same values only if we interact, and I would like
to see that citizens conferencing, that Partnership in
Humanity, as we call the organization that we founded shortly
after 9/11, be given serious consideration in building a new
citizens accord, a new citizens compact based on human values
for developing a shared consciousness.
You may be amused to know that I am also involved with a
University of Wisdom Studies. It does not mean that students
will graduate with a degree in wisdom. I wish it did. But the
cornerstone is the new Alexandrian Library of the Philosophical
Research Society comprised of over 25,000 volumes of texts and
manuscripts of ancient Greek philosophers, ancient Hindu and
Chinese masters, the traditions of Judeo-Christianity, the
mysticism of Islam, all the traditions comprising what Huxley
called the ``perennial philosophy.'' It is time to say to those
who have privatized religion that religion did not start with
you.
To emphasize the continuum, we need to encourage script
writers, interactive script writing for the media, which is so
voracious. Embedded scholars rather than or as well as embedded
journalists.
The Arab League summit in Tunis reminds me of the Arab
Economic Summit in 1980 in Amman. We proposed a decade of
development, a strategy for Arab development. My colleague, the
former President of Lebanon, Mr. Saleem Al-Huss, presented the
call for Arab League reform of the 16 Arab League institutions.
Nothing happened. Unilateralism is the order of the day.
And I would like to conclude my remarks by emphasizing that
the Kuwait Symposium, the call for Arab civil society, the
meaning of the concept of belonging and development are all
steps in the right direction. But let us start with considering
in a concept group a matrix and a strategy where incremental
progress can be achieved.
I would like to commend to you the initiative of 18
countries entitled TREC, Trans-Mediterranean Renewable Energy
Corporation. Water and energy.
Oil prices ended last week at just below $40 a barrel in
New York and around $2 a barrel lower than a week earlier amid
optimism that OPEC would act to bring prices back down to the
cartel's $22 to $28 range. Let us not leave the future of the
happiness of the most populous region in the world, South Asia
and West Asia, to the huge gap, the huge divide between the
poorest and the cartel.
I would like to suggest that the crescent of crisis, which
goes from west Africa all the way down to the south of the Red
Sea, the Persian Gulf, and right up to the top of the Caspian,
is a ``crescent of crisis'' because we have not adopted the
universal declaration on the basic principles of democracy, the
universality or relativity of democracy, democracy as a process
or a condition, democracy as methods and modalities or as
substance and substantive outcomes. Let us take these bold
steps together. Let us develop a process of implementation and
compliance of international humanitarian and human rights law.
The Club of Rome, of which I am the first Asian President,
presented limits to growth in the 1970s. Today I would suggest
that there are limits to ignorance, and I would like to commend
to you the socioeconomic plan of members of the Club of Rome
and friends, such as Mary Robinson, as an indicator of one way
to spend fruitfully the investment that we all seek from the
21st century fund in human dignity, in anthropolitics, in
politics where people matter.
Thank you for your kind attention.
[The prepared statement of His Royal Highness Prince Hassan
follows:]
Prepared Statement of His Royal Highness Prince El Hassan Bin Talal of
the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan
Thank you Mr. Chairman, Senator Biden, and members of this
distinguished Committee. Thank you for your kind invitation.
The Administration's Greater Middle East Initiative to be discussed
at the G8 Summit in Sea Island has already been harshly criticised by
those who consider that it fails to address the Palestinian-Israeli
conflict and seeks to impose reform from the outside.
Allow me to start by saying that such critics miss the point on
both counts. My part of the world needs as many initiatives for reform
as can be imagined both from within and from the outside. Reform can
also accelerate rather than retard peace making in the Middle East.
Let us remember that over the millennia, our part of the world
prospered only when it had two-way openness and interaction. The free
movement of ideas was the key to prosperity: the free movement of
goods, capital and people followed.
During the nineties, two ideas or initiatives were launched in our
region. After the 1991 Gulf War, the Madrid Middle East Peace Process
was sponsored by the United States and the Russian Federation. It had
bilateral and multilateral tracks with working groups on refugees,
water, environment, economic cooperation and regional security and arms
control. In 1994, the European Union launched the Barcelona Process for
Euro-Mediterranean Partnership. The Madrid Process is now at a
standstill. But Barcelona is still ongoing and has been conceptually
expanded by the new neighbourhood initiative.
The Palestinian-Israeli conflict and Iraq are of course key issues
for the people of the Middle East. Although interrelated, it would be
unwise and impractical to assume that the Palestinian-Israeli issue,
Iraq, and overarching regional reform should be tackled in any
chronological order. Resolution of any one issue should not be
conditional upon any other. These issues can and must be addressed
simultaneously. Progress on any one of these fronts will facilitate
resolution of the others. The inverse is also true. Failure to address
any one of these issues diminishes the prospects for resolving all of
them. Senator Lugar is correct to assert in his proposal that ``if we
help to produce a resolution of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, fresh
political winds would sweep through the region and new possibilities
for political reform would flourish.'' A stable, secure and democratic
sovereign Iraq would have a similar effect. Each issue is an integral
part of any credible initiative to promote permanent reform in the
Middle East.
Today I speak before you as a person who for more than three
decades has worked to foster reform through civil society. As a
``Prince'' this may sound contradictory. But this life-long journey
started in 1970 when I founded the Scientific Society to promote
technology transfer and education. The long list of other NGOs that I
sponsored includes the Arab Thought Forum, the Institute for InterFaith
Studies, the Hashemite Educational Society, El Hassan Youth Award.
Currently, I am promoting the concept of an Islamic World Forum.
I am referring to all this not for immodest self-acclaim, but to
say what a lonely task it has been. During these years, I often
referred to ``toothless declarations'' and the ``powerless lobby for
the powerless.'' That is why I welcome any conversation on reform in
the Middle East whether from within or from without.
Let me now move from the general to the specific.
The Achilles' heel of reform efforts and attempts to nurture civil
society is the thin, and often invisible, dividing line between
patronage and partnership. Society itself, the ultimate beneficiary of
reform, can easily be tempted by the ``patronage trap.'' Short-term
material gains can be more attractive than long-term institution
building.
The key question is how to change attitudes and move from
principles to instruments and mechanisms--to move from concepts to
defining objectives and processes for implementation. The basic dilemma
or contradiction is that society itself is both a target and an
instrument of policy.
In the hard security field, governmental institutions in our part
of the world are well developed. Perhaps too well developed in the
military and intelligence field. Cooperation in the soft security field
means building new partnerships with civil society and businesses. But,
as we know, civil society institutions are only embryonic in our
region. And the process should not end up unwittingly nurturing
``sham'' civil society institutions, like the oxymorons created by
communist governments during the Cold War.
That is why I consider that the proposal for the Greater Middle
East 21st Century Trust is a key component for the success of
initiatives to promote reform in the Middle East. Let me explain why.
As we struggle to keep up with complex phenomena, the world has
slipped during the last decade into a static approach in the face of
mobile cultural, social, political and economic realities. The world
requires imaginative leaps into non-traditional combinations of
policies.
The concept of a ``Greater Middle East 21st Century Trust'' is one
such imaginative leap. It is both timely and essential to achieve a
better future in our region. It should promote the list of ideas of
GMEI and at the same time promote other complementary initiatives from
within the region. Self reliance is the ultimate objective, rather than
looking to the United States as policeman, nurse maid and benefactor,
to be blamed selectively when problems arise.
I totally agree with what Senator Lugar has recently said, and I
quote:
The United States cannot feed every person, lift every person
out of poverty, cure every disease, or stop every conflict. But
our power and status have conferred upon us a tremendous
responsibility to humanity. In an era afflicted with terrorism,
the world will not be secure and just and prosperous unless the
United States and talented individuals devote themselves to
international leadership.
To win the war against terrorism, the United States must
assign U.S. economic and diplomatic capabilities the same
strategic priority that we assign to military capabilities.
There are no shortcuts to victory. We must commit ourselves to
the slow, painstaking work of foreign policy day by day and
year by year.
The Trust should represent a new form of social compact to
institutionalise the inclusion of civil society in project design. In
doing so, it will avoid the ``patronage trap.'' In addition, it should
have benchmarks to assess progress, and performance-based evaluations.
A third key element is transparency and openness. Senator Lugar's
vision includes all these concepts in the Trust.
In the words of Senator Lugar, it is a vehicle for action rather
than a set of programmes. I would add that it should stimulate the
evolution of genuine civil society in our region because it goes beyond
the primary development paradigm of growth, infrastructure and health.
This is the area or rather the vacuum that many of the extremist
organisations have exploited to engage the neglected elements of
societies. The Trust should aim to deal with those neglected elements
as partners. As a grant- and investment-making body that could conform
to Islamic financial principles, the Trust can be a culturally
sensitive vehicle.
The Lugar Trust could begin with a regional conference of NGOs,
Ministers of Development, Middle East opinion-makers and academics to
map out a mechanism for funding meaningful development projects with
broad impact. Working groups on education, infrastructure, free speech,
human rights, entrepreneurship, government and fiscal reforms,
technology, and poverty eradication should convene to weigh and
recommend specific projects.
Meanwhile, regional reform should focus on issues of collective
security, free trade, and free movement of goods, people and capital.
Others should be brought into the mix. The European Union and the
OSCE could provide high-level capacity-building support to Middle East
regional forums, in particular to explore regional declarations, such
as the Alexandria Declaration, on security, democracy, human rights and
development. NATO should develop its framework of cooperation with
states in the Middle East, especially to prepare the ground for a
system of regional security cooperation based on transparency,
verification, and arms control. I have called for many years for a
regional code of conduct. In fact the Treaty of Peace between Jordan
and Israel calls for a CSCME (a Conference on Security and Cooperation
in the Middle East).
It has become fashionable to talk about the lack of progress in the
Middle East and the Islamic world. But, the Arab Development Report,
and the Unified Arab Economic Report, known as the quadpartite report
(issued by the Arab League, The Arab Fund for Economic and Social
Development, the Arab Monetary Fund and OAPEC), contain many positive
indicators. The challenge is to build on the progress realised so far
and achieve a transformation in the economies of the region.
In the latest World Development Report (WDR), The World Bank
considers that for the first time in human history it is possible to
eradicate global poverty in our lifetime. It states that development is
not just about money or even about numerical targets, as important as
those are. It is about people. The WDR focuses on basic services,
particularly health, education, water and sanitation, seeking ways of
making them work for poor people. The objective should be to invest in
and to empower people, and improve the climate for investment.
The revival of Muslim intellectual thought should be a priority in
the Greater Middle East. A momentum has to be built for a Muslim
movement for peace and a new humanitarian order. This is the aim of the
Islamic World Forum (IWF) which I hope to launch. A wakeup call is
urgently needed to lead to a number of programmes aimed at Muslim
intellectual proactivism.
This effort will provide a platform for a centrist movement to
bridge the gaps between non-Arab and Arab Muslims, as well as between
different Islamic groups including Sunnis and Shiites.
With proper leadership this effort can reveal that violent
extremists in our region are only Islamic in name. They are in fact as
Islamic as the GDR (German Democratic Republic) was democratic.
For the last fifty years the centre of gravity of the Western
Alliance has been Europe, but its future is moving to the East and
South. The Alliance has to redeploy conceptually and materially to
Central and South Asia, the Middle East and Africa.
The question is not whether the United States and the G8 can
``fix'' the Middle East. The real question is whether we in the Islamic
world can redeploy our intellectual resources in partnership with the
United States and the G8 so that the front lines are transformed into a
meeting ground for security, cooperation and prosperity. The GME 21st
Century Trust is a vehicle that can help us achieve that
transformation.
Peace is real and durable only when the root causes of conflict
have been eliminated. It is important to eradicate poverty to limit
violence. The Trust answers the call of those working for reform in the
region and will make their task less lonely and more productive.
There is a need for partners that can network. For four decades I
have worked for concepts. I have come here to put those concepts into
instruments. Yes, I believe in the power of ideas, and I have come here
to work with you in this partnership to try to put this concept into a
strategy. Ideas from within and beyond the region should be tabulated
within a matrix that develops a strategy based on a vision. When one
faces a closed door--one must open another.
Whereas the G8 is presenting a list of ideas, I would hope that the
partnership concept of Senator Lugar would hone these ideas, strategise
them and evolve the instruments for implementation. To succeed we must
be positive on how to contribute to the partnership. We need a coherent
and dynamic civil society; a network of think tanks. Hence the
importance of ideas such as the Council on Foreign Relations' suggested
Tri-Consortium. This is what I bring with me to the table. Sea Island
is about governmental cooperation at the highest level. People to
people cooperation, citizens' conferencing can turn it to partnership.
I stand before you as an Arab who believes in the power of ideas.
Arab intellectuals need to talk to governments about government deals.
In my former position, I worked for 34 years in pioneering a Jordanian
centrist policy alongside my late brother, King Hussein.
What we seek is cosmopolitanism and a broader based
interdisciplinary strategy--not a policy of compulsion. I regard
partnership as complementary to official responses. Complementary of
the broader partnership--economic, social, cultural. Common humanity is
the basis for promoting soft security.
I regard Europe as a possible role model given historic geographic
proximity with the Arab world and in terms of pluralism.
We have to gently step up to the template of compliance with
international norms because we are a region without a name--a noname
region. West Asia and South Asia combined have a greater population
than China.
Robert McNamara, who I knew as Secretary of Defence as well as
President of the World Bank, contributed to the architecture for peace.
My concern is for how wars end. In that context, I am grateful to
members of the panel of the Middle East Commission of the 1970s--David
Rockefeller, Jacob Javits as well as Robert McNamara.
Help us to help ourselves. Help us to come to terms with ourselves
and to help promote the views that we share and end the stereotyping of
each other. I call for a rule of law, not of power.
The time has come to ask for a bold breakthrough. Sadat went to
Jerusalem; King Hussein concluded the Peace Treaty. The Palestinians
partnered in Oslo. Nixon called on China, Reagan on the Soviet Union.
The British Prime Minister visited Libya. Can we go the extra mile to
avoid the inevitability of conflict? Can we move from politics to
statesmanship?
What would you think of convening a meeting with the sherpas of the
G8 for which I have been calling for years?
A number of concepts come to mind in considering what mechanisms
exist or should be established to help develop new partnerships with
governments, businesses and civil society to promote political,
economic and social reform in our region. First come first served will
not work (e.g. Casablanca). A matrix of regional and global initiatives
is an important tool for deciding priorities. ``The Greater Middle East
21st Century Trust'' can partner and network extensively with a number
of on-going efforts, that include the following examples:
(A) HUMAN RESOURCES
Human security has been defined by the Commission on Human Security
that it complements state security, furthers human development and
enhances human rights. It complements state security by being people-
centred. It broadens the human development forces beyond ``growth with
equity.'' At the core is respecting human rights and promoting
democratic principles. Early May, I hosted the Amman Roundtable on
Human Security in the Middle East which considered organising a MECA
(Middle East Citizens' Assembly) in Amman. We worked jointly with the
Canadians and Norwegians on the Lysoen Declaration in 1998. The Swedish
Government's ``Fundamental Standards of Humanity'' of 1992 were set on
the basis of international law and human rights as well as cultural and
ethical norms testifying to the growing awareness of the need for
global action against flagrant violations.
Copenhagen produced a shopping list of ideas for the economic
basket of the Middle East multilateral peace track. When we met in
Casablanca for the MENA economic summit, Shimon Peres and I had a
vision for a new Middle East, a vision based on earlier studies which
included a zone of human, economic and natural resources.
``Governance in South Asia'' is an ongoing study of the roots of
misgovernance in that region and how to move towards a common minimum
agenda for good governance that includes recognising the sovereignty of
the citizen, social development and common culture.
Through co-chairing the Independent Commission on International
Humanitarian Issues in the early 1980s, we looked at the challenge, the
victims and the hope. We advised the UN on the need for a New
International Humanitarian Order. We called for a new law of peace--the
powerless lobby for the powerless.
WOCMES. I spoke three years ago in Mainz, Germany at the First
World Congress for Middle Eastern Studies. This Congress brought
together Middle East Studies associations from Europe and from the
Middle East (all countries). The second of these Congresses will be
held in Jordan in 2006.
At the end of June, together with colleagues from Turkey, a
Parliament of Cultures will be inaugurated to promote understanding
among different cultures in the world and to enhance dialogue between
their thinkers and intellectuals. The first project out of the
Parliament of Cultures, will, we hope be a School of Mediterranean
Humanities to bridge the intellectual and cultural gap between Western
and Eastern Europe and the Mediterranean, through a new curriculum of
terra media studies.
Partners in Humanity is an idea preceding 9/11. This calls for a
humanitarian outreach programme that would serve to improve
understanding, build positive relationships and promote dialogue
between the Muslim world and the U.S. We met in Boston and New York and
last year we held our first roundtable in Amman.
A Middle East Citizens' Assembly. Similar to the Helsinki Citizens
Assembly that arose out of the links of the 1980s between the Western
peace movement and East European opposition groups. The aim was
``detente from below.'' The Helsinki Assembly has been effective in
transmitting ideas and proposals to governments and to institutions.
Human Values for Developing a Shared Consciousness. Extending a
hand over the boundary. It is not the pipelines that matter but the
people living next to the pipelines. e.g. Iraq post-war psychological
reconstruction and development--to empower Iraqis to decide their own
future. A Truth and Reconciliation Commission is one instrument.
University of Wisdom Studies. This is being established in the
belief that humanity will only successfully deal with the challenges of
the future if it is firmly rooted in the wisdom of the past. The
cornerstone is the ``new Alexandrian Library'' of the Philosophical
Research Society, comprised of over 25,000 volumes of texts and
manuscripts of ancient Greek philosophers, ancient Hindu and Chinese
masters, the esoteric traditions of Judo-Christianity, and the
mysticism of Islam--all the traditions comprising what Huxley called
the ``perennial philosophy.''
Script Writers. Interactive script writing for the media. Embedded
scholars rather than (or as well as) embedded journalists.
(B) THE ARAB LEAGUE
The Arab League Summit in Tunis. The attitude is that you cannot
address structural reform for the Middle East unless you address
parallel political crises. These principles were conveyed to the United
States and other partners. Tunis pointed out certain fears. The
Alexandria Declaration certain opportunities. This is what I see being
brought to the table.
The economic documents that were presented at the 1980 Arab
Economic Summit, included some very important approaches, which are
still valid such as the call to remove barriers to facilitate the free
movement of goods, capital and labour.
However Arab divisions, especially the estrangement between Arab
countries and Egypt after its signing the Camp David Accords, had led
to a state of disarray in Arab structures, to moving the Arab League
headquarters from Cairo to Tunisia, and to the disruption of several
technical initiatives at the level of Arab institutions. Accordingly,
Lebanese Prime Minister, Mr. Saleem Al-Huss, was commissioned, at the
end of the 1980s, to head a working team to examine the condition of
the Arab League. These concepts can be revisited.
Unfortunately, though, the existing Arab order has fallen short of
appropriately employing these resources to interconnect the
infrastructures of Arab countries or to come up with a shared vision.
Perhaps ``what-if scenarios'' would help us envision the future, away
from ``short-termism'' that has bridled us.
Are we addressing unilateralism or are we addressing
multilateralism. If we want to talk of region, then it is a
multilateral concept. Soft security, or what Professor Joseph Nye calls
soft power, is the key.
If we talk of region, we must talk of South Asia and West Asia. Not
only to talk about difficulties but about solutions. In terms of
regional groupings in the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, you have
got it right as our part of the world is covered by the Subcommittee on
Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs.
(C) ARAB CIVIL SOCIETY
The Arab Thought Forum. Founded twenty-three years ago to promote
exchange of ideas in the Arab world that include: reform of the Arab
League; establishment of an Arab court of justice; an Arab parliament
and an Arab security council. Its activities include:
a. Sana'a Symposium on ``Arab Conflict Resolution through
Peaceful Means'' was held in 1999.
b. The Kuwait Symposium ``Prospects for Arab Cooperation
between Regionalism and Internationalism''--proceedings
published in 2002.
c. Next symposium will be on ``Centrism'' (or ``enlightened
moderation,'' as President Musharraf calls it).
The meaning of the concept of ``Belonging and Development'' which
has been upheld by the Arab Thought Forum since its foundation. The
1980 Economic Summit held in Amman was the first Arab summit to be
totally devoted to Arab development. In-depth studies were prepared and
discussed, such as ``The Arab Development Strategy'' and ``The Decade
of Arab Development.'' Accordingly, that summit constituted a bridge
between thought and policies, and between intellectuals and decision-
makers. Now action is needed for the phoenix to rise from the ashes.
The Al Ahram Centre for Strategic Studies was established a few
years ago and boasts a number of fine researchers.
(D) ENERGY
TREC: Trans-Mediterranean Renewable Energy Corporation, for
development, climate stabilisation and good neighbourhood. The
objective is to help transform the Mediterranean from a region of
various divides and conflicts into a region of harmonised socio-
economic development, cooperation and good neighbourhood.
From Larry Elliott's article, The Guardian Monday 31 May, 2004--
``The attack [Saudi Arabia] has some shock value for oil prices, but
things may calm down again,'' said Peter Gignoux, senior oil adviser at
the New York-based GDP Associates. ``This was a terrible act of
terrorism, but it hasn't had any impact on Saudi oil production or
exports.'' The effects of dearer crude are already being felt in the
west, with inflation in the 12-nation eurozone rising from 2% to 2.5%
in May, prices of unleaded oil in the UK moving above 90p a litre and
US motorists paying a record $2 a gallon for their fuel.
Oil prices ended last week at just below $40 a barrel in New York,
around $2 a barrel lower than a week earlier amid optimism that OPEC
would act to bring prices back down to the cartel's $22-$28 range.
I wonder how can such thought be implemented in a wise, prudent and
enlightened way? How can it spur people's conscience? Perhaps the first
step consists in defining the nature of issues and problems that form a
common basis for Arab countries in every geographic region of the
greater Arab Nation: the Arabian Peninsula, the Arab Mashreq and
Maghreb, and the Nile Valley. Undoubtedly, the cluster consisting of
the triad: (water--energy--human environment) furnishes the common
ground, both subregionally and inter-regionally.
(E) GOVERNANCE
Towards a Universal Declaration on the Basic Principles of
Democracy: From Principles to Realisation: Professor Cherif Bassiouni
is working on the three paradigms of (i) the universality or relativity
of democracy; (ii) democracy as a process or a condition; and (iii)
democracy as methods and modalities or as substance and substantive
outcomes.
Project Proposal relating to Problems of Implementation and
Compliance in the field of International Humanitarian and Human Rights
Law. This was presented to the UN in June 2000 by the UN Office for
Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs and the Independent Bureau for
Humanitarian Issues.
(F) ECONOMY
A Global Marshall Plan for a world-wide Eco-Social Market Economy:
This Plan represents--
First, a solid foundation for a new, sustainable, global
increase in economic prosperity.
Second, an especially intelligent and efficient way towards
global sustainable development.
The Chairman. Well, thank you very much, Prince Hassan, for
a very comprehensive statement drawn from your extraordinary
experience over the years. As a humanitarian, you have been
involved in all the issues you have discussed today, and many
more.
Let me just say as preface for my question--and we will
have another 7-minute round for questions--that prior to 9/11,
many observers of American foreign policy, both here and
abroad, have noted, if not quite a total lack of interest in
the area we are discussing today, certainly less diplomacy and
activity. After 9/11, things stepped up very substantially. We
dropped sanctions on many countries that had inhibited our
trade and likewise, we focused much more on our diplomacy. We
became involved because we were at war. We were threatened.
Now, essentially in fairness to the administration and the
proposal we have heard today from Secretary Larson, this is an
attempt, at least by American statesmen, to try to say that we
ought to be much more interested, a great deal more interested.
As a matter of fact, American taxpayer funds, organizational
elements of the State Department and our NGOs ought to get busy
and ought to be involved in trying to address the root causes
and fundamental problems, as you have talked about.
The dilemma of all this, of course, as you mentioned, is
the patronage trap. In other words, the enthusiasm--and it is
genuine and it is idealistic--strikes many in the area in a
very different way. So our dilemma or our challenge today in
this dialog is, how do we eliminate or get out of the trap, and
back on to a plane of genuine idealism and commitment? You have
illustrated a good number of attempts that have been made by
international humanitarian individuals and groups over the
years. Some of these reports and their implementation are still
on-going. Others have been, unfortunately, forgotten, and ought
to be revived. You have offered sort of a check-off list of
causes and ideas that ought to be thought of by people who are
serious about this.
The immediate political problem that I think that we have
and that I ask your attention to turn to is, there are a good
number of people in our country who are not extremely
enthusiastic about foreign assistance at all. Each year this
committee attempts to support budget requests by our State
Department and by others. That was the case this year. Just to
take a topical situation, the State Department requests by
Secretary Powell were 8 percent up, not just for the Department
but for what could be called broadly foreign assistance,
international involvement. And that was as many of us would
have requested.
Now, almost immediately, the Budget Committee of the Senate
chopped $1 billion just arbitrarily out of this, really without
great discussion of the merits of any of this. Fortunately,
Senators on the floor of the Senate worked and restored the
billion dollars, but not for long. Our colleagues in the House
of Representatives, as I understand their Budget Committee
deliberations, promptly chopped $4.5 billion out of the same
request.
Whether we ever come to a budget in the Senate or the House
or the Congress or not--and that is a problem for us just in a
parliamentary way now--is illustrative of the dilemma, even as
we discuss what the State Department might do, or what Mr.
Larson might do as he goes to see the G-8. We face a practical
political problem of simply implementing our own idealism.
Worse still, if there is a sense of a patronage trap about
all this, that is even worse, because many Americans would say,
well, this is just simply impossible. Not only are we being
asked to contribute, but those to whom we are contributing are
unhappy, ungrateful, and may even indicate their dislike for
us.
Now, some of us would argue there are reasons historically,
long before we had this debate today, why this might be the
case. Even if it is the case, even if the Pew polls and others
show huge numbers of people in these countries saying they
dislike America or they dislike the American Government, even
if they like only some Americans or what have you, this is a
situation that is difficult.
Now, I preface all this by saying you come here today as a
person of good will, a friend not only of our country but of
many countries and of all the people whom you are talking
about. How do you propose, just as a mechanism, not just a
public diplomacy for Americans, quite apart from public
diplomacy; for those in the Middle East to supply. How should
we go about this? How might we illustrate why the security of
the world, peace, and some mitigation of terrorism are needed?
It all depends upon getting it right, trying to implement
things that people will know about, and in which people will
have confidence that there is some degree of good will in the
world, not just in this country, but also in the G-8, and in
other countries that might come together.
Quite frankly, the reason that I offered this idea of this
Trust fund was to try to escape the patronage trap, to say that
essentially countries or people within countries who had ideas
might come forward and present them as their ideas, and then we
might applaud those ideas. I still think that probably is a
better course than attempting to do it the old-fashioned way as
we are inclined to do.
What appeal can you make, say, to Americans, leaving aside
people in the Middle East, as to why we ought to be doing this?
And in what manner can we be most successful even if we have a
generous spirit?
Prince Hassan. May I suggest, Senator, that 15 million
people inhabiting Israel, Palestine, and Jordan living next
door to 25 million Iraqis, 40 million people, could provide the
nucleus for human and natural resources needed for a renewed
democratic and prosperous Middle East?
I would like to suggest implicitly and explicitly that
attending to the two political crises is essential at this
time. In terms of Iraq, for example, it is obviously very
important that neighboring countries to Iraq should not
interfere in Iraqi affairs or, for that matter, in Lebanese or
Syrian affairs. I think that the problem, with all due respect,
is that a super power should not be playing Byzantine politics.
We should be all stepping up to the same template of a
regional concept for the future of the region on the basis of
an international conference for the region. Where and how this
can be convened has yet to be decided or thought of, but
unfortunately, the international conferences that are being
held are either NATO conferences with a view to sending more
troops into the region or, as you rightly said to Secretary
Larson, if the G-8 is to be part of a process, what is the
mechanism that is going to ensure that? So where is the
partnership element?
I would like to emphasize that democracy is not the only
issue here. Pluralism is as well. So the reference to the Arabs
being a minority in the concept of the Greater Middle East does
not worry me at all if the Greater Middle East is also south
Asia and west Asia. What worries me is that APEC, the Asia
Pacific Economic Corporation, goes all the way to the borders
of Turkey, and we, bristling with nuclear weapons and the
possibility of dirty bombs, are not being pacified, let alone
stabilized. And in that context, I think that sooner rather
than later the sense of drift has to stop. There has to be a
focus. Now, I do not know where that discussion group can be
formed. Maybe the meeting of the shepherds of the G-8 is one
way to do it.
But I do hope that the goal for exit strategies can be
given more serious consideration. Obviously, the term is used
by Prime Minister Blair with reference to Iraq by 2005. Today I
do not know in terms of the exit strategy from the occupied
territories how or what base it is going to move from, if at
all.
I think there is a huge responsibility on the host and
donor countries like my own to address the issue of
integration, not necessarily the issue of assimilation. The
late Prime Minister Rabin would say no to the right of return,
and I would say yes to the right of return. You look good with
your people and we look good with ours, but let us think of
something creative in the future on the realistic assumption
that those who would want to return may not be as large as the
figures that we have spoken about in the past.
But today none of these crucial issues are being discussed.
That is why I feel that a conference that does not address the
key political issues is the reason for the absence of many key
leaders from the region.
The Chairman. Without oversimplifying, then you, would put
just for sake of argument, a line around Iraq, around Palestine
and Israel. That would include Jordan in that group. In other
words, you would concentrate your effort on about 40 million
people, out of all the mass that we are talking about, because
of the two large political questions that arise there, as well
as humanitarian questions. You would suggest a conference of
people of that area or of others who maybe want to be helpful.
Perhaps you would define the issue more narrowly than the
Greater Middle East, or whatever we are looking at.
Prince Hassan. Exactly.
The Chairman. You made the point that probably there has to
be some degree of peace, as well as a solution to these two
major problems, for things to work satisfactorily, in terms of
the public relations aspects and the other areas.
Prince Hassan. Our region is bereft, Senator, of any crisis
avoidance center or crisis avoidance capability. So crisis
avoidance, crisis management, which is almost an oxymoron, a
contradiction in terms, is basically through unilateral
policies. But we have to involve everyone, and this is why I
suggested that a high level American contact with Iran, for
example, if properly finessed, might serve notice not only on
Iran but on the region as a whole as to our seriousness in
building peace on the basis of mutual respect.
The Chairman. A very important suggestion, which I think
our members noted.
Senator Biden.
Senator Biden. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
Your Royal Highness, I found your testimony fascinating and
enlightening. I would like to ask a couple really just very,
very basic questions.
You are very much accustomed to leading and attending
meetings at the highest level with, as you would say, the
elites of the world and the region, as well as your efforts
with the numerous NGOs you have been involved with reaching out
to, what we might say in this country, average people in the
region.
The conundrum that many Americans look at is how to get the
kind of help--and that is a broad, generalized term from
economic assistance to education reform, access to intellectual
creativity and activity--to ``average'' people--``town
meeting'' I think you referred to and why could you not in the
Palestinian region have a town meeting. There is in most places
in the Middle East from your country to Saudi Arabia to the
Gulf States to Egypt, a requirement to essentially have to go
through the governing body, and the governing body is presumed,
even in your country, which is the most open, not to be
welcoming to this kind of fora. Just the ability to engage in
an open discussion with leading Arab intellectuals in open is
not something that would be very welcome in Riyadh, might even
have some difficulty in Cairo. Other parts of the Arab world
may have some difficulty.
So the question I have, as just a plain, old politician
doing this job for 32 years, is how do we embolden and
enlighten or provide the accommodation for enlightenment for
the populace of the Arab world--I am going to focus on the Arab
world, not the whole Islamic world for a moment--without
greater cooperation or initiative coming from the governments
in the region?
Or put another way, if I can speak to Iraq, I am operating
on the premise that a significant majority of Iraqis want a
representative government, that they want something other than
an Islamic state modeled on Iran and a strongman modeled on
Saddam. They want something other than that that is more
representative. If I am wrong about that, I might add, I think
all of this is useless.
How do we get the--I realize ``moderate'' is not the
appropriate adjective, but how do we get the--I do not even
know the term--``average''? How do we get those people who are
making a dollar a day in your country and $3 a day in a
position where they are able to sort of raise their head, where
they are able to express their interests, their desires? What
forum is there for that?
Prince Hassan. I have had the privilege of knowing Vaclav
Havel, Bonislav Geramek, Adam Michnik, all people from eastern
European countries that had strong policing methods, and yet
the chapters of the Helsinki Citizens Assembly, to address your
first question, proliferate in eastern Europe. You have
chapters in Turkey, Armenia, and Azerbaijan. And I say to
people in our region, however the intensity of hatred, it is
not unique. Turks and Armenians and Azeris are talking to each
other.
So I do feel that in terms of this paralysis of the ability
to talk--I have been to Indonesia as moderator of the World
Conference for Religions and Peace, and to the Balkans. We say
to the religious community leaders--and in the case of Iraq,
they have met in Amman in May of last year, in Baghdad in
August, in March again in Amman, and last week actually in the
United Kingdom--you are the servants of the community, and we
are servants of the servants. How can we help you talk? And you
almost get the answer: talk? What is that?
Senator Biden. Let me interrupt you there, if I may, Your
Highness. Helsinki was a product of a negotiation, a long,
drawn-out negotiation, which we were a part of, as you
observed, that had heads of state and governments signing on.
That is a very different circumstance than what we are talking
about in the Middle East. That would require the heads of state
of those various governments--you had Azerbaijan, you had
everyone from Poland to Czechoslovakia, all signing on through
a negotiation involving two super powers. And it produced, I
think, some stunningly positive benefits. I would argue it
hastened the demise of the Wall.
What is the forum though? How do you do that in your part
of the world?
Prince Hassan. I come to heads of state, and of course, I
served alongside King Hussein for 34 years, and I think Jordan
has been a pioneering country in terms of reform. Of course, my
nephew, King Abdullah has been referred to on more than one
occasion as a genuine reformer, and I would second this
concept.
But I think that the spectrum of reform has to be enlarged
because heads of state today and governments are on the
defensive. The bin Ladens of this world sadly are on the
offensive. I think that we can only resolve this problem by a
double compact, the first between the people themselves and the
second between the people and their rulers. I mean turning the
power pyramid upside down, beginning to devolve power so that
legitimate village democracy can be discussed at the village
and rural level.
Senator Biden. I agree with that, but I become conflicted
as to what our role is, the role of the United States in that
effort. In other words, I have often stated that, with possible
exception of your nephew, every world leader with whom I meet
importunes me and the committee, because we have that
opportunity. It is our function. We are viewed as the totality
of their problem and the sole source of their solutions. I
realize at least it is beyond my capacity and I think beyond my
country's capacity, not that we are not the problem of many and
not that we are not the solution for some.
But what you have just described, it seems to me, I am not
sure how the United States or the G-8, for that matter,
promotes exactly what you just said, turning that pyramid
upside down so that you actually have village meetings where
people can actually have an impact on what happens in their
country.
What we seem to be debating here in this country among the
intellectuals, left, right and center, in America ranges from
we can go in and ``impose'' democracy which will in fact be
welcomed by the people--we are seeing an example of that right
now in Iraq in part--all the way to others concluding that we
cannot do much of anything other than be responsive only when
there is an indigenous movement.
For example, the comments made at the Arab League's summit
in Tunisia. There were several no-shows and a dramatic Qaddafi
early exit which is not surprising. The League did issue this
Declaration of Reform, but the Arab press did not seem
particularly impressed with the document, using terms like
``ridiculous,'' ``a failure,'' ``empty rhetoric,'' ``instantly
forgettable.'' The Lebanon Daily Star stated in an editorial,
``the only good news is that the word `reform' is now a matter
of general concern across the Middle East.'' The Economist
retorted that ``this expression of freedom to savage the kinds
of Presidents for life who run the region was itself a better
omen for reform than the verbiage of the communiques.''
I will end with this. My dilemma is your point about
partnership and paternalism. Almost anything we do--and I do
not mean to imply that somehow we have the answers, nor that we
have the capacity. But it seems to me that our greatest
difficulty here, assuming that the better angels prevail here
in the Congress in terms of moneys for foreign assistance and
the like and assuming, as I hope will occur, that Senator
Lugar's initiative becomes the law, is passed here--I have such
difficulty trying to determine at what part we can be a
positive impact other than refraining from doing things that
are negative, which would be a big help. But how we are going
to be able to be in a position that we can generate some of the
kind of change you suggested.
I was very impressed with your point--I happen to agree
with it. Maybe that is why I was impressed with it--that there
is no chronological order to tackling the problems that you
list. To use a slang expression in this country, we ought to be
able to walk and chew gum at the same time. We ought to be able
to do more than one thing or work on more than one thing.
But I am in a quandary as to how to work out this
distinction between paternalism and partnership and what
prospect is there for there to be more spontaneous, internal
calls for change within the Arab world and short of your
country, how welcoming are those ideas and what is the forum
for them internally.
Assume the United States were lifted up and taken to Mars
and dropped on Mars. There is no United States. The whole North
American Continent is gone. It is sitting up on Mars. The ocean
extends from Japan to England. What do you all do?
Prince Hassan. Well, first, I would like to say that the
values of the United States, not least of all ``We, the
people,'' are very much my values and the values of many, many
people who have come over here to make a better life, millions
of them from our part of the world.
The quandary for us is that if you hold elections, then the
Islamists will win. So the theocons will win. My point of view
is that you hold elections and you live with the results until
that process is repeated and they possibly leave office. But to
wait until economic conditions are ideal or the political winds
are favorable and not hold those elections belies the sincerity
of the democratic initiative that we are talking about.
Senator Biden. I agree with you completely.
Well, I thank you. I see our colleague, Senator Brownback,
is here and I will yield to him.
The Chairman. Thank you very much, Senator Biden.
Senator Brownback, do you have a question for Prince
Hassan?
Senator Brownback. If I could, Mr. Chairman. Thank you for
holding the hearing.
I apologize for not getting here for your direct testimony.
But I wanted to catch on a particular issue. I was actually
encouraged by the recent meetings of the Arab League and the
discussions that are taking place. These are difficult things
to talk about and difficult topics to address.
I am curious. In your country, if elections were held
within the next year or so, what would be the results of those
elections, would you speculate?
Prince Hassan. Elections were held only last year and we
have a new parliament in session at the present time. But I
think again, if we are going to talk about issues, there was a
phenomenon--and I do not want to sound critical of the
mechanisms of Israel, which is always held up in democratic
terms as being the only democracy in the region, but for a
Prime Minister to come here, to commit himself to withdrawal
and then to poll his own party rather than polling the Israeli
people came as quite a shock to people in our part of the
world.
So today, unfortunately, national elections are not going
to be held on domestic issues alone. Today, as His Majesty King
Abdullah said I think before this committee, we are caught
between a rock and a hard place. I think that people have
legitimate concerns about Finlandized Jordan. We have always
looked at the Helsinki process because Finland had troublesome
neighbors. I once said to Shimon Peres--he said, we have
difficulty with our neighbors. I said, you think you have a
problem. We have difficulty with our friends.
So I would just like to point out that we can hold
elections and parliamentary participation in public life is
strong and vibrant. But the issue of regional questions that we
are asking around this table has to be addressed by leadership,
convincing leadership, and this is why I would hope that in the
coming period, we can move from politics to policies. This is
why I am setting up a Center for Policy Dialog in Jordan
because I have no ax to grind, and I think that objectivity of
rediscovering the public realm is so important for all of us.
Senator Brownback. Do you anticipate within the next 5 to
10 years that elections for all positions throughout most
Middle Eastern countries will begin to take place? I would
sincerely hope so. The alternative would be the fragmentation
of the region into untenable ethnic and sectarian groupings,
balkanization if you will, and in that event, you will be
talking about autonomous realities which are really
unmanageable. I think this is the last opportunity, this
Greater Middle East Initiative, or whatever we call it at the
end of the day. I hope that something comes from the region
that is convincing, of course, but this is the last opportunity
to stabilize a region which is fraught with dangers, weapons of
mass destruction in Pakistan and India. I am interested to see
that Mr. El Baradi of the IAEA is now visiting Israel, which at
least is a step in the right direction. But the sooner these
issues are put on the table and discussed in terms of securing
the region, the less likely it will be that we will face some
major catastrophe.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
The Chairman. Thank you very much, Senator Brownback.
Thank you again, Your Highness. We appreciate your
testimony and your coming here and the wisdom of your
presentation.
Prince Hassan. Thank you very much, indeed.
The Chairman. The chair would like to call now Dr. Patrick
Cronin and Dr. Alan Richards to the witness table.
Gentlemen, we thank you for coming before the committee
today. I will ask that you testify in the order that I have
introduced you. That would be, first of all, Dr. Cronin, and
then Dr. Richards. I would state that your full statements will
be made a part of the record in full, and you may proceed as
you wish. Dr. Cronin.
STATEMENT OF DR. PATRICK M. CRONIN, SENIOR VICE PRESIDENT AND
DIRECTOR OF STUDIES, CENTER FOR STRATEGIC AND INTERNATIONAL
STUDIES
Dr. Cronin. Well, thank you very much, Mr. Chairman, for
this opportunity and for your leadership. Our country is well
served by having you here as the chairman of this committee.
The Chairman. Thank you.
Dr. Cronin. I think next week's G-8 summit at Sea Island
provides a timely opportunity to review where we and other
countries stand with respect to reform and freedom in the
Middle East and beyond.
For me, it is impressive to note how the issue of promoting
internal reform in the Middle East has risen over the past few
years on a lot of agendas, not just our own. European leaders
have been talking about promoting reform in the Mediterranean
Basin for almost a decade as part of the Barcelona Process, and
I was in the administration and we were talking about these
issues every day after 9/11 and we continue to talk about them
now 3 years later.
Some of the most impressive and impassioned debates have
come from the Arab world itself. The first Arab Human
Development Report, issued in September 2002, represented an
unprecedented Arab critique of their own societies, citing
major deficits of freedom and justice and opportunity. It was a
blunt assessment. It was clear in its urgency, and the second
report, that was issued the following spring, was very much
along the same lines of reasoning.
We have seen an impressive summit in Alexandria last March,
which brought together nongovernmental activists from around
the Arab world to lay out urgent and practical steps to lead
the region forward, and then last month the Arab League also
embraced reform.
What I want to highlight here in my preface is simply that
we are seeing not a U.S. phenomenon, not a European phenomenon,
not an Arab phenomenon. We are seeing a growing consensus not
only about the need to address this issue, but also about what
our goals should be. The consensus is much less clear on how we
can reach those goals, and that is where the sort of
coordination the United States is seeking at Sea Island--and
will surely seek elsewhere as well--is so vitally important.
I am not an expert on the Middle East, but I have thought a
great deal about aid programs, including as the No. 3 official
at USAID and as someone who helped to set up the Millennium
Challenge Corporation in recent months. I want to really focus
my testimony around three points with respect to structuring
aid programs.
I first want to be clear that we have to be realistic about
what we are hoping to achieve with development assistance or
foreign aid in general. Foreign aid is a very limited, if still
useful, element of foreign policy. In fact, what matters the
very most is the recipient country's policies. It is the
environment in which you are putting that aid. I think you know
that, Mr. Chairman. It produces the best results when it is
focused on achievable objectives that do not contradict other
goals like security goals that we are trying to achieve. It
works best when you have adequate resources not spread out
everywhere but focused, concentrated. And they are being
implemented through partners on the ground who have both
capacity and most importantly the political will to see through
successful implementation.
I think the purposes associated with the Greater Middle
East Initiative have generally vacillated really between two
overlapping, yet different objectives. So we really are talking
about one conversation with two purposes. Some of us are
talking about democratization, and some of us are talking about
development. There is a middle way here. We can bridge these
gaps, but there are still, at the end of the day, two
discussions going on at the same time. One goal is about
political reform. The other one concentrates on basic
socioeconomic shortcomings in a lot of these countries. Either
goal, though, will take leadership and support from within the
region, within the countries. It will take decades of sustained
commitment from a variety of actors, and we cannot hope to go
from Sea Island to sea change overnight.
The most realistic goals will be those that are locally
grown and enjoy a strong degree of ownership on the ground. In
these cases, we can use funds opportunistically to foster
reform and change. Although more difficult, we will still have
opportunities to use firm diplomacy to push for opening
political space. We must remember at the outset that the
diplomatic discipline necessary to open political space in the
Middle East in particular can quickly get lost amidst the
myriad competing security and political objectives we must
simultaneously pursue.
When it comes to funding specific programs or projects,
Members of Congress and the public will want to know that the
initiatives represent a serious plan to achieve tangible
results, with clear benchmarks to help measure progress. Such
oversight is justified and indeed desirable. Third-party
independent auditing would help avoid corruption and provide a
level of accountability we do not see, Mr. Chairman, for
instance, in the multilateral development bank projects today.
They do not have independent third-party auditing. And we
should do that with respect to whatever grants we eventually
support.
A second point I want to make is that we need to think
carefully about the role and utility of money and resources
with respect here to our countries in the Middle East. Money is
a limited lever, especially in this region, I would argue, even
if we were to contemplate a very vast Marshall Plan-like
opportunity for the Greater Middle East.
We already spend more than $1 billion of nondefense foreign
aid in this region, although the bulk of it has tended to go to
Egypt and Israel in support of very real, important strategic
goals and peace and stability, such as supporting the Camp
David Accords of 1979. This has perhaps, though, created over
time a sense of entitlement, a set of expectations of what the
United States will be giving to the region. And it is
politically difficult and costly to alter. When we launched the
Middle East Partnership Initiative in December 2002, it was
criticized by many in the region as a mere token, representing
such a small percentage of aid to the region, especially
relative to the increased numbers we were talking about, say,
with respect to the Millennium Challenge Account of $5 billion,
and here we are talking about $25 million or $100 million for
the Middle East Partnership Initiative. So even a well-
intentioned U.S. program can be portrayed as a snub, and in
these situations, international coordination again can be very
helpful for U.S. diplomacy to be more effective.
We have to tailor our approaches to individual countries.
They are all different. The gulf countries bear little
resemblance to some of the least developed countries we see in
sub-Saharan Africa where the prospect of a $200 million, 3-year
grant can really have an impact on reform, but in countries
that have such vastly larger GDPs, it is, again, much more
difficult to think about the impact of that grant on reform and
government change.
The Middle East is also home to some of the wealthiest
governments in the world. We have little ability to use money
as an incentive since there are so many opportunities for
profit through business ventures, personal subsidies, and
government grants. The dependence of populations upon their
governments, instead of the government's dependence on their
populations, makes nurturing democracy there difficult. For
many in government, business, and the military, no reasonable
amount of money is enough to induce them to embark on changes
that could bring down the whole system from which they profit.
So money in the Middle East may be better understood,
frankly, as an analgesic not an incentive. By itself, it is
insufficient to induce change, but if combined with other
tools, it can make change more acceptable. The pain-killing
effect may make it easier for governments and other local
leaders to create the political space for reform for those
interested in pursuing different types of reform and
activities: political reform by strengthening political and
judicial institutions, civil society and independent media;
knowledge acquisition and the exchange of ideas by investing in
primary and higher education, vocational training, educational
changes, and the leveraging of information technology; and
economic reform and socioeconomic opportunity by seeking
economic growth, trade capacity building, and employment, as
well as supporting basic infrastructure or a healthy work
force. In this sort of indirect manner, such investments, if
appropriate to a particular country in the Middle East, might
further pave the way toward larger national reforms over time.
But we have lost the strategic point the moment we think
this is primarily about resources. It is not. Our economic
carrots are unlikely to have as much leverage in the Middle
East as they may have in Africa, and in this region we run the
moral hazard of poisoning our friends with our carrots because
they may be seen as tainted with U.S. policy.
Now, my third and final point, Mr. Chairman, is that as we
think about specific structures for providing assistance, I
believe very strongly we should borrow heavily from our lessons
of recent experience, both with respect to the Global Fund for
AIDS, Tuberculosis and Malaria and certainly the Millennium
Challenge Corporation. I think these models provide the
attributes that we are seeking here, a transparent, locally
owned partnership arrangement where there is competition, there
is inclusivity, there is a results-based approach around which
we could build a very broad consensus.
Calls for attacking illiteracy in the region where half the
women and a large plurality of men are illiterate can only be
welcome. Supporting microfinance is a way to provide greater
equity and hope to those lacking even modest sums to invest in
a business. A regional development bank could help to make wise
investments in larger infrastructure projects on which economic
growth may hinge. And a democracy foundation could help to
foster greater dialog for good governance and political reform.
I assume Under Secretary Larson talked about all of these
useful initiatives this morning.
But of all the proposals, the one that really strikes me as
the most important and promising is the one, sir, that you have
put forward, the Greater Middle East Trust for the 21st
Century. I think it is a sound idea because, as with the Global
Fund, it could be international in scope. So it removes the
U.S. footprint from being the dominant issue. It instantly
internationalizes it. It could provide a basis of making grant
decisions that is beyond reproach because as with the Global
Fund, they use technical reviews that are not politicized. They
are literally out there trying to provide on the technical
merits of the proposals recommendations as to whether these
grants should be approved or not.
I think like the Millennium Challenge Account, it could
introduce a very healthy domestic competition because the
proposals would be coming from within countries to this Trust
and it could be still done in an inclusive process as the
Millennium Challenge Account assumes as well where you ensure
that civil society, business, and the government are all part
of that mix competing for these grants. It could lead,
therefore, to creative homegrown solutions with clear
benchmarks and a focus on closely monitored results, which is
again a hallmark of the Millennium Challenge Account approach,
making sure that we understand how this money is being spent.
And finally, the Trust could pool resources and provide a
common mechanism for providing grant assistance to these
countries rather than adding to the confusion created elsewhere
by multiple donors imposing so many competing approaches to
assistance.
I do think there is one difference between this Trust
concept and the Millennium Challenge Account, however. It may
be tempting to want to run a regional Millennium Challenge
Account competition, so judging the Greater Middle East
countries by the three categories of ruling justly, investing
in people, and economic opportunity. That competition already
exists on a global basis, and a country like Morocco may well
be successful in the second round of a Millennium Challenge
Account. So you take away the incentive for some of that.
Meanwhile, the intended reform effect of the Millennium
Challenge Account in this Greater Middle East might be lost on
the countries of the region for the reasons I have already laid
out. The reforms really have to start in the region, supported
by realistic and firm diplomacy, and then supported by
effective targeted assistance, financial assistance,
development assistance. That is really the best recipe for
ensuring that we are actually going to yield some sustainable
and helpful results here. If we expect foreign aid to be the
catalyst for change in Egypt that it may be in Mozambique, for
instance, I think we are destined to be frustrated.
Last month's Arab League summit in Tunisia suggests that
there is both interest in reform, and as seen by the inability
to agree on establishing an oversight body, there are limits to
the likely depths of such reform in the region. Analogous
efforts in other regions have fared little better. We have to
be blunt here. This is not just the Middle East lagging behind.
The New Economic Partnership for African Development, NEPAD,
and even the Association for Southeast Asian Nations have been
disappointing to those of us who expected such regional
groupings to tackle corrupt governance head on, whether in
Zimbabwe or in Burma, for instance.
Grants from a trust, however, could provide a vehicle for
engaging the region on the basis of partnership and merit, but
not so directly as to confuse suspicions about donors with
national interests and their own development. The details of
the Trust proposed by the chairman can be best worked out in
multilateral consultations with a variety of partners, perhaps
also in the form of international conferences that we have just
heard about by our previous speaker today.
I think through such relatively modest investments, as part
of a larger comprehensive set of policies and diplomacy, the
United States may sow the seeds of a new generation of progress
and peace in the Middle East. If we are to do so, we will have
to rely on our own example, as you have said, Mr. Chairman, as
well as our adroit use of both hard and soft power, tough love
diplomacy and generous and smart assistance. Through all these
means, with sufficient time, we can buttress good governance in
these countries. We can strengthen political and economic
institutions that allow for transformation of the lives of
young men and women who are educated but unemployed. And we can
reinforce the reality that the United States stands in
partnership to help these people rather than as part of the
problem.
I will stop there, Mr. Chairman. Thank you very much.
[The prepared statement of Dr. Cronin follows:]
Prepared Statement of Dr. Patrick M. Cronin
Thank you, Mr. Chairman and Senator Biden, for this opportunity to
testify. Our nation is well served by your leadership, and it is a
privilege to be here today before you and other distinguished members
of the Committee.
Next week's G-8 summit at Sea Island, Georgia provides a timely
opportunity to review what the United States and other major powers are
doing to support stability, prosperity and freedom in the Middle East
and beyond.
It is impressive to note how the issue of promoting internal reform
in the Middle East has risen on agendas all over the world. The
President and many senior members of his administration have spoken out
clearly since September 11 on the need to promote reform in the Middle
East not only for the sake of people there, but also for the sake of
our national security. Individuals from across the U.S. government have
been working for more than two years to turn this idea into a reality.
European leaders have been talking about promoting reform in the
Mediterranean Basin for most of a decade, seeking to use the European
Union's so-called ``Barcelona Process'' to promote economic growth and
political openness.
Some of the most impressive and impassioned debates have come from
the Arab world itself. The first Arab Human Development Report, issued
in September 2002, represented an unprecedented Arab critique of their
own societies. It was blunt in its assessment and clear in its urgency.
The second report, issued last spring, strongly followed the precedents
of the first.
We have also seen an impressive summit in Alexandria last March,
which brought together nongovernmental activists from around the Arab
world to lay out urgent and practical steps to lead the countries in
the region forward. The Arab League, in its meeting last month, also
embraced reform in the region.
What I want to highlight here is that what we are seeing is not a
U.S. phenomenon, a European phenomenon, or an Arab one. We are seeing a
growing consensus not only about the need to address this issue, but
also about what our goals should be. The consensus is much less clear
on how we can reach those goals, and that is where the sort of
coordination the United States government is doing in Sea Island--and
will surely do elsewhere as well--is so vitally important.
I am not an expert on the Middle East. I have thought a great deal
about how to structure aid programs, however, and it is to that topic
that I would like to devote the rest of my brief testimony.
First, we have to be clear and realistic about our goals. Foreign
aid is a limited if useful element of foreign policy. It produces the
best results when it is focused on achievable objectives that do not
contradict other, usually security, goals we are trying to obtain at
the same time. Aid works best when adequate resources are provided to
implementing partners with sufficient political will and capacity.
The purposes associated with a Greater Middle East Initiative have
generally vacillated between two overlapping yet different objectives:
democratization and development. The former goal focuses on political
reform; the latter concentrates on basic socio-economic shortcomings.
Either goal will take leadership and support from within the region,
and decades of sustained commitment from a variety of actors. Either
way, we cannot hope to go from Sea Island to sea-change overnight.
The most realistic goals will be those that are homegrown and enjoy
a strong degree of local ownership. In these cases, we can use funds
opportunistically to foster reform and change. Although more difficult,
we will have some opportunities to use firm diplomacy to push for
opening ``political space.'' We must remember at the outset, however,
that the diplomatic discipline necessary to open political space can
quickly get lost amidst the myriad competing security and political
objectives we must simultaneously pursue in the greater Middle East.
When it comes to funding specific programs or projects, members of
Congress and the public will want to know that the initiative
represents a serious plan to achieve tangible results, with clear
intermediate benchmarks to help measure progress. Such oversight is
justified, and indeed desirable. Third-party, independent auditing
would help avoid corruption and provide a level of accountability of
U.S. tax money not present in most aid programs. Over time, independent
evaluations could offer serious analysis of whether investments are
starting to achieve the desired outcomes.
Second, we need to think carefully about the utility of money and
resources in the Middle East. Money is a limited lever in this region,
even if we were to contemplate a ``Marshall Plan'' for the great Middle
East.
The United States already spends more than $1 billion in non-
defense foreign aid to the region, but the bulk of it has tended to go
to Egypt and Israel in support of the 1979 Camp David Peace Accords and
regional stability. One could argue that that money has been well spent
if it has indeed helped to provide regional peace and security. This
has perhaps created a sense of entitlement and a set of expectations
that are politically costly to alter. When the Middle East Partnership
Initiative was launched in December 2002, many in the Middle East
criticized the program because it was a ``mere'' $100 million/year,
thereby representing such a small percentage of aid to the region and
an even smaller percentage of increased aid to other regions. Thus,
even a well-intentioned U.S. program was portrayed as a snub. In these
situations, in particular, international coordination can be helpful.
We must tailor our approaches to individual countries. The Gulf
countries in particular bear little resemblance to some of the least
developed countries we see in sub-Saharan Africa, where the prospect of
a $200 million, three-year Millennium Challenge Account grant can
provide a real incentive for undertaking additional reforms. In this
region, however, a potential grant, even a relatively large one, might
as easily be seen as an insult, a threat, or an invasion of
sovereignty.
In addition, the Middle East is also home to some of the wealthiest
governments in the world. We have little ability to use money as an
incentive, since there are so many opportunities for profit through
business ventures, personal subsidies and government grants. The
dependence of populations upon their governments, instead of the
governments' dependence on their populations, makes nurturing democracy
there difficult. For many in government, business and the military, no
reasonable amount of money is enough to induce them to embark on
changes that could bring down the whole system from which they profit.
Money in the Middle East may be better understood as an analgesic,
not an incentive. By itself, it is insufficient to induce change, but
if combined with other tools it can make change more acceptable. The
painkilling effect may make it easier for governments to create the
political space for local reformers interested in pursuing different
types of activities: (1) political reform by strengthening political
and judicial institutions, civil society and an independent media; (2)
knowledge acquisition and the exchange of ideas by investing in primary
and higher education, vocational training, educational changes, and the
leveraging of information technology; and (3) economic reform and
socioeconomic opportunity by seeking economic growth, trade capacity
building, and employment, as well as supporting basic infrastructure
and a healthy workforce. In this indirect manner, such investments, if
appropriate to a particular country in the Middle East, might further
pave the way toward larger, national reforms.
But we have lost the strategic point the moment we think this is
primarily about resources. It is not. Our economic carrots are unlikely
to have as much leverage in the Middle East as they may have in Africa,
and in this region we run the moral hazard of poisoning our friends
with our carrots because they are tainted by a U.S. policy agenda.
Thirdly and finally, as we think about specific structures for
providing assistance, we should borrow heavily from recent experience
in establishing new entities such as the Global Fund for AIDS,
Tuberculosis and Malaria and the Millennium Challenge Corporation.
These models provide attributes for a transparent, locally-owned,
competitive, results-oriented assistance program around which we could
build a broad consensus.
Calls for attacking illiteracy in a region where half the women and
a large plurality of men are illiterate, can only be welcome.
Supporting microfinance is a way to provide greater equity and hope to
those lacking even modest sums to invest in a business. A regional
development bank could help to make wise investments in larger
infrastructure projects on which economic growth may hinge. And a
democracy foundation could help to foster greater dialogue for good
governance and political reform.
But of all of the proposals, the one that resonates with me is the
Trust for the 21st Century proposed by Senator Lugar. The idea is sound
because, as with the Global Fund for AIDS, Tuberculosis and Malaria, it
could be international in scope and base grant decisions on the expert
technical review of proposals emanating from each country. Like the
Millennium Challenge Account, it could introduce a healthy domestic
competition that leads to creative, homegrown solutions with clear
benchmarks and a focus on closely monitoring results. Finally, the
Trust could pool resources and provide a common mechanism for providing
grant assistance to these countries, rather than adding to confusion
created by multiple donors imposing so many competing approaches to
assistance.
At the same time, there is at least one fundamental difference in
my mind between a Trust and the MCA. It may be temping to run a
regional MCA contest in which countries of the region would be measured
by objective criteria of ruling justly, investing in people, and
economic freedom. However, that competition already exists on a global
basis, and a country like Morocco is a good bet to qualify in the
second round on its own merits. Meanwhile, the intended reform effect
of the MCA would be mostly lost on the countries of the region. As
mentioned before, reforms will have to start in the region, be
supported by realistic diplomacy, and then backstopped where helpful
with assistance. If we expect foreign aid to be the catalyst for change
in Egypt that it may be in Mozambique, for instance, I think we are
destined for frustration.
Last month's Arab League summit in Tunisia suggests that there is
both interest in reform and--as seen by the inability to agree on
establishing an oversight body--limits to the likely depths of such
reform. Analogous efforts in other regions have fared little better.
The New Economic Partnership for African Development (NEPAD) and even
the Association for Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) have been
disappointing to those who expected such regional groupings to tackle
poor or corrupt governance head on--whether in Zimbabwe or Burma, for
instance.
Grants from a trust, however, could provide a vehicle for engaging
the region on the basis of partnership and merit, but not so directly
as to confuse suspicions about donors with national interests and
development. The details of the Trust proposed by the Chairman can be
best worked out in multilateral consultations with a variety of
partners.
Through such relatively modest investments, as part of a larger
comprehensive set of policies and diplomacy, the United States may sow
the seeds of a new generation of progress and peace in the Middle East.
If we are do to so, we will have to rely on our example, as well as an
adroit use of both hard and soft power, tough love diplomacy and
generous and smart assistance. Through all these means, with sufficient
time, we can buttress good governance in these countries; we can
strengthen political and economic institutions that allow for
transformation of the lives of young men and women who otherwise may
join the tens of millions of educated but unemployed; and we can
reinforce the reality that the United States stands in partnership to
help these people rather than as part of the problem.
Senator Lugar has said eloquently that our long-term strategy is to
replace the region's pervasive repression, intolerance and stagnation
with freedom, democracy and prosperity: but in the absence of any easy
nostrum for effecting that transformation, we would be wise to listen
to our friends in the region, Europe and elsewhere, even while we
signal a willingness to make our commitment to the region both tangible
and enduring.
The Chairman. Thank you very much, Dr. Cronin, for that
very helpful testimony.
Dr. Richards, would you please proceed.
STATEMENT OF DR. ALAN R. RICHARDS, PROFESSOR OF ECONOMICS AND
ENVIRONMENTAL STUDIES, UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA, SANTA CRUZ
Dr. Richards. Thank you very much for the invitation to
comment here on the concept of the Greater Middle East 21st
Century Trust proposed by Senator Lugar.
As someone who has been studying the development problems
of the Middle East for the past 35 years, it seems to me that
Senator Lugar's proposal has at least seven quite positive
elements.
First, the proposal's overall perspective seems entirely
correct. We simply cannot successfully combat the violence
emanating from the region through military force alone. We
must, therefore, formulate a long-term strategy to help
regional political actors manage the profound social, economic,
and political challenges which they face.
Second, the proposal recognizes the complexity of the
problems facing the region. These societies are now enmeshed in
an absolutely huge crisis, with social, economic, political,
and cultural dimensions. No single country, least of all the
United States, can control these tumultuous changes. The
proposal appears to recognize this complexity.
Third, there is a very healthy stress on the absolute
necessity of international cooperation, for the involvement of
the G-8 countries, and for serious ownership of the process of
change in the region.
Fourth, the proposal seeks to engage with broad elements of
the societies in the region. It does not pretend that a better
approach can come from existing governments alone.
Fifth, it explicitly recognizes that change cannot be
imposed from the outside. This is a crucial fundamental point,
which we Americans, with our impatience and inattention to
history, regrettably forget far too often.
Sixth, the proposal forthrightly and correctly, in my
judgment, recognizes how the ongoing violence and lack of a
political settlement between the Israelis and the Palestinians
poisons any attempt by the United States or of the G-8 to help
manage the broader problems facing the region. The concept of
extending the Quartet to include Egypt and Saudi Arabia seems
to me to be a particularly interesting idea.
Seventh, the three specifics of the proposal of the Trust
that I have seen seem quite sound. The stress on a partnership
between the G-8 and the regional donors, the focus on broad,
mutually negotiated goals rather than on specific projects, and
the plan's openness to conforming with the norms of Islamic
finance--all three of these features are consistent with the
proposal's broader aim, as I take it, of a truly cooperative
approach.
These are all highly positive features. Let me now sound a
few cautionary notes.
Senator Lugar's proposal, at least in the Brookings speech
that I have read, cites the Arab Human Development Reports some
nine times, and we have heard that report cited repeatedly
today this morning. Three weeks ago, I was invited to join a
readers' group held at UNDP headquarters in New York to discuss
a draft of the 2004 report, which will be devoted exclusively
to the questions of democracy and freedom. These reports are,
of course, written by the friends of political liberty and of
democracy in the region. The authors share our values and they
hope for fundamental political change in their homelands. I
regret to tell you, however, that at this time they are also
absolutely furious at the Government of the United States, for
our policies toward the Palestinian issue and for our invasion
and occupation of Iraq. If such people who share our values are
this viscerally angry, it takes little imagination to realize
what a daunting task any proposal for American leadership for
change in the region will face.
The sad reality today is that the United States is almost
universally perceived as a neo-colonial power throughout the
Arab world and in many other circles of the Greater Middle
East. Our reputation has sunk to an all-time low throughout the
region. For example, my good friend and co-author, John
Waterbury, now President of the American University of Beirut,
wrote to me a few days ago: ``In the 44 years I have been
dealing with this part of the world, I have never seen
relations between the U.S. and the Arab world remotely as bad.
The most worrisome shift is that the old distinction of
opposing U.S. policies is now sinking into dislike for
Americans as individuals and as a people.'' So long as such
perceptions persist, any proposal for international cooperation
to effect positive changes for governance in the region will
face the greatest difficulties.
This is one reason why I think that the proposal's concept
of linking the Trust with moving vigorously toward trying to
resolve the Israeli-Palestinian conflict is such an excellent
idea. However, it seems to me it is equally true that very
sensitive proposals, such as Senator Lugar's Trust, will be
hobbled so long as the United States is so widely perceived as
an illegitimate occupying power in Iraq. Our behavior in Iraq
over the past month seriously compromises the laudable goals of
the Trust proposal. After all, with more than 130,000 troops in
Iraq, few people in the region believe us when we say that we
know we cannot impose change on the region. An early exit of
American military force from Iraq is a necessary condition for
the success of helpful proposals such as that of Senator Lugar.
We Americans say that we want to promote democracy in the
region. We may actually believe this. But given the history of
the region, it is hardly surprising that we are widely
disbelieved. The proposal correctly and forthrightly states
that the governments in the region continue to block the
transition to democracy. Many long-term students of the region,
including me, also think that our own government's actions too
often create additional obstacles to democratic change. We
continue to support authoritarian states throughout the region,
particularly if they help us hunt for the fanatics and
militants of al-Qaeda. Part of the problem remains the clash
between our perceived strategic goals and the fact that
democracy is inherently unruly and unpredictable.
Let me elaborate this last point very briefly. For more
detail, you can see my written comments.
It seems to me that a necessary condition for a democratic
transition is for both government and opposition politicians to
play by new rules and for each to control their more radical
elements whether outside the government in opposition or inside
the government. In many countries, indeed probably in most
countries, of the Greater Middle East, the best organized
opposition forces today and for the foreseeable future are
those of political Islam. The Islamist movement is huge and
diffuse, with many national and local variations. Increasingly,
what we used to call secular nationalists in opposition have
either joined Islamist movements or are cooperating with them
politically.
If we are really serious about promoting democracy in the
region--and we certainly should be--then we simply must learn
to distinguish among the different types of political Islam.
There will be no democracy and no stability without their
participation in the polities of the region. If we are serious,
we must recognize that future democracies of the Greater Middle
East will often have lukewarm, sometimes testy, and
occasionally frigid relations with the United States.
A half century ago, some Americans believed that we could
play a central role in shaping the modes of governance in
China. We discovered that this was impossible. A generation
ago, many Americans hoped that we could bring democracy to the
countries of Indo-China. We found, much to our cost, that we
were incapable of doing this. A decade ago, some Americans
thought we could transform Russia into a market economy all at
once. Again, history intruded and the results of our efforts
were far more complicated than we had initially imagined.
In China, in Southeast Asia, in Russia, and in the Greater
Middle East, the United States can, at best, facilitate
indigenous change. To believe that we can do anything else is,
in my view, dangerous, a-historical hubris. Since Senator
Lugar's Trust proposal appears to avoid this delusion, it could
make a real contribution to a safer and more prosperous world.
It is vital that we not pretend that we can do more than is
possible, and it is essential that our actions conform to our
stated intentions and to our most deeply held values.
Thank you.
[The prepared statement of Dr. Richards follows:]
Prepared Statement of Dr. Alan Richards
Thank you very much for the invitation to comment here today on the
concept of the Greater Middle East 21st Century Trust proposed by
Senator Lugar.\1\ I am happy to do this.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ Senator Richard Lugar, ``A New Partnership for the Greater
Middle East: Combatting Terrorism, Building Peace'', speech at
Brookings Institution, Washington, D.C., March 29, 2004.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
As someone who has been studying the development problems of the
region for 35 years, it seems to me that this proposal has at least
seven quite positive elements.
First, the proposal's overall perspective seems entirely correct.
We simply cannot successfully combat the violence emanating from the
region through military force alone. We must, therefore, formulate a
long-term strategy to help regional political actors manage better the
profound social, economic, and political challenges which they face.
Second, the proposal recognizes the complexity of the problems
facing the region. These societies are now enmeshed in a huge crisis,
with social, economic, political, and cultural dimensions.\2\ No single
country--least of all the United States--can control these tumultuous
changes. The proposal appears to recognize this complexity.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\2\ For a sketch of some key dimensions of the crisis, see Appendix
1.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Third, there is a very healthy stress on the absolute necessity for
international cooperation, for the involvement of the G-8 countries,
and for serious ownership of the process of change by countries of the
region.
Fourth, the proposal seeks to engage with broad elements of the
societies in the region--it does not pretend that a better approach can
come from existing governments alone.
Fifth, it explicitly recognizes that change cannot be imposed from
outside. This is a crucial, fundamental point, which we Americans, with
our impatience and inattention to history, regrettably forget far too
often.
Sixth, the proposal forthrightly and correctly recognizes how the
on-going violence and lack of a political settlement between the
Israelis and Palestinians poisons any attempt of the US or the G-8 to
help manage the broader problems facing the region. The concept of
expanding the ``Quartet'' to include Egypt and Saudi Arabia seems to me
a particularly interesting idea.
Seventh, the three specifics of the proposal for the Trust seem
sound. The stress on a partnership between the G-8 and regional donors,
the focus on broad, mutually negotiated goals rather than on specific
projects, and the plan's openness to conforming to the norms of Islamic
finance--all three of these features are consistent with the proposal's
broader aim of a truly cooperative approach.
These are all highly positive features. Let me now sound a few
cautionary notes. Senator Lugar's proposal cites the Arab Human
Development Reports some nine times, by my count. Three weeks ago I was
invited to join a ``Readers' Group'' at UNDP headquarters in New York
to discuss a draft of the 2004 report, which will be devoted
exclusively to the questions of democracy and freedom. These reports
are, of course, written by the friends of political liberty and
democracy in the region. The authors share our values, and they hope
for fundamental political change in their homelands. I regret to tell
you, however, that they are also absolutely furious at the United
States government--for our policies toward the Palestinian issue and
for our invasion and occupation of Iraq. If such people--who share our
values--are this viscerally angry, it takes little imagination to
realize what a daunting task any proposal for American leadership for
change in the region will face.
The sad reality today is that the United States is almost
universally perceived as a neo-colonial power throughout the Arab world
and in many other circles in the Greater Middle East. Our reputation
has sunk to an all-time low throughout the region.\3\ So long as such
perceptions persist, any proposal for international cooperation to
effect positive changes in governance in the region will face the
gravest difficulties.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\3\ My friend and co-author, John Waterbury, President of the
American University of Beirut, wrote on May 27: ``In the 44 years I
have been dealing with this part of the world I have never seen
relations between the US and the Arab world remotely as bad. The most
worrisome shift is that the old distinction of opposing US policies is
now slipping into dislike for Americans as individuals and as a
people.'' (Personal communication)
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
This is one reason why I think that the proposal's concept of
linking the Trust with moving vigorously toward resolving the Israeli-
Palestinian conflict is such an excellent idea. However, in my
judgment, it is equally true that sensible proposals such as the Trust
will be hobbled so long as the U.S. is so widely perceived as an
illegitimate, occupying power in Iraq. Our behavior in Iraq over the
past months seriously compromises the laudable goals of the Trust
proposal.\4\ With more than 130,000 troops in Iraq, few people in the
region believe us when we say that we know that we cannot impose change
on the region. An early exit of American military force from Iraq is a
necessary condition for the success of helpful proposals such as that
of Senator Lugar.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\4\ The lead author of the Arab Human Development Reports writes:
``To those Arabs who dream at freedom at the hands of the Americans, I
have this to say: Look at what is happening with the Iraqis''. Nader
Fergany, ``Ghosts of Abu Gbraib'' Al Ahram Weekly On Line, No. 691, 20-
26 May, 2004, http://weekly.ahram.org.eg/2004/691/op65.htm
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
We Americans say that we want to promote democracy in the region.
We may actually mean this, but given the history of the region, it is
hardly surprising that we are widely disbelieved. The proposal
correctly and forthrightly states that governments in the region
continue to block the transition to democracy there. Many long-time
students of the region, including this one, think that our own
government's actions too often create additional obstacles to
democratic change. We continue to support authoritarian states
throughout the region, particularly if they help us hunt for al-Qaeda
militants. Part of the problem remains the clash between our perceived
strategic goals, and the fact that democracy is inherently unruly and
unpredictable.
Let me elaborate this last point very briefly.\5\ A necessary
condition for a democratic transition is for both government and
opposition politicians to ``play by the new rules'' and to control
their more radical elements. In many countries of the Greater Middle
East, the best organized opposition forces today and for the
foreseeable future are those of ``political Islam''. The Islamist
movement is huge and diffuse, with many national and local variations.
Increasingly, what were formerly called ``secular nationalists'' in
opposition have either joined Islamist movements or are co-operating
with them politically.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\5\ For greater detail, see Appendix 2.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The logic of transition to democracy implies that moderates within
the Islamist (and nationalist) camp must be willing to play by
democratic rules, convince reform elements within the state of their
sincerity, and maintain control over their radical allies. Likewise,
reformers in government must be willing to allow the full participation
of Islamist forces in the political process.
If we are really serious about promoting democracy in the region--
and we certainly should be--then we simply must learn to distinguish
among the different types of political Islam. There will be no
democracy, and no stability, without their participation in the
polities of the region. If we are serious, we must recognize that
future democracies of the Greater Middle East will often have lukewarm,
sometimes testy, and occasionally frigid relations with the United
States.
A half-century ago some Americans believed that we could play a
central role in shaping the modes of governance in China. We discovered
that this was impossible. A generation ago, many Americans hoped that
we could bring democracy to the countries of Indo-China. We found, much
to our cost, that we were incapable of doing this. A decade ago some
Americans thought that we could transform the Russian economy, all at
once. Again, history intruded, and the results of our efforts were far
more complicated than we had initially imagined.
In China, in Southeast Asia, in Russia, and in the Greater Middle
East, the United States can, at best, facilitate indigenous change. To
believe that we can do anything else is, in my view, dangerous, a-
historical hubris. Since the Trust proposal appears to avoid this
delusion, it could make a real contribution to a safer, more prosperous
world. It is vital that we not pretend that we can do more than is
possible, and it is essential that our actions conform to our stated
intentions and to our most deeply held values.
Thank you.
Appendix 1
A PRIMER ON MIDDLE EASTERN POLITICAL ECONOMY
Overview:
The countries of the Greater Middle East face a daunting
complex of challenges. These challenges are demographic,
social, economic, and political.
There is no ``easy fix'' for any of the problems outlined
here. Confidence in the efficacy of the ``Washington
Consensus'' has eroded both intellectually and politically
(although this may be least obvious inside the Beltway).
Many of the relatively easy changes have already been made.
The same political forces that blocked change altogether in
the 1980s slowed change in the 1990s. There were, and are, good
political reasons for such gradualism, but the difficulties
continue to mount.
One element of the Washington Consensus remains: better
governance will be essential for coping better with these
challenges.
Contrary to currently popular political rhetoric and
actions, outsiders, particularly including the U.S., are
singularly poorly placed to foster more legitimate, accountable
governance structures.
It is delusional to think that outside intervention--
especially, military intervention--can improve the quality of
governance. Change must come from within. Outsiders can help,
but only if they are credible. Today, the US lacks such
credibility.
TEN KEY CHALLENGES:
An Overview
1. Restoring Economic Growth
2. Restraining population expansion
3. Providing jobs
4. Alleviating poverty
5. Educating the young, especially, young women
6. Coping with urbanization
7. Saving water
8. Obtaining food
9. Slowing environmental destruction
10. Attracting money for investment, both from foreigners and (more
importantly) from domestic savers
1. RESTORING ECONOMIC GROWTH
For the past two decades, the economies of the region have
essentially been ``running faster to stand still''.
During the 1980s, output per person (GDP per capita)
essentially stagnated.
The performance during the 1990s was only marginally better:
output growth rose from 2.4% per year (1981-1990), to 3.1% per
yer (1991-2000), and has remained at roughly the 1990s level
during the last few years. Since population growth rates have
fallen to about 2%, output per person has grown at slightly
more than 1% per year since the first Gulf War.
GDP per capita is no greater today than it was in 1980.
Only sub-Saharan Africa has done worse.
Such numbers are, of course, based on conventional national
income accounting. Such data fail to include two very important
phenomena:
1) The informal or underground economy, which would make the
above picture look better; and
2) The costs of resource depletion and environmental
degradation, whose inclusion would make the situation look
considerably worse--the growth rates would almost certainly
become negative.
There are considerable differences among countries' growth
performances.
Reducing unemployment and raising real wages even modestly
would require growth rates of GDP of between 6% and 7% per
year. No country in the region has achieved anything like this
performance.
2. RESTRAINING POPULATION EXPANSION
The population of the region was slightly greater than 300
million in 2000; it is expected to increase to about 400
million by 2015 (US Census Bureau)
The population of the region is now growing at about 2% per
year (according the to World Bank), or at 2.3% (UN Population
Division).
Only sub-Saharan Africa has a faster rate of population
growth.
Population growth rates have fallen quite sharply in many
countries during the past 10 years (from some 3.2% in the mid-
1980s to 2.7% in the early 1990s, to 2-2.3% today).
Sharp fertility declines caused this change; there are
reasons to expect further falls.
However, fertility (TFR 4.2) remains well above
replacement levels and past rapid growth means that an
unprecedentedly large generation of young women will soon enter
their child-bearing years.
This overall picture masks significant national differences.
Fertility has fallen sharply in Egypt, Iran, and Tunisia, for
example, but have remained stubbornly high in Gaza, the West
Bank, Yemen, and Saudi Arabia, whose rates (over six children
per woman) are among the highest in the world.
Thanks to these demographic phenomena, most people in the
region are young: half of all Arabs, Iranians, and Pakistanis
are younger than 20 years of age. Two thirds of all Middle
Easterners are younger than 30.
A large literature in political sociology confirms that the
experiences people have while they are young have long-lasting
consequences for their political views. (Consider, for example,
the impact of their disparate experiences during the Vietnam
War on the Baby Boom generation of Americans).
This implies that American actions in the region, now, will
have deep and longlasting consequences for the future.
3. PROVIDING JOBS
Current levels of unemployment are high. Methodologies for
estimating unemployment vary widely, but a consensus figure is
that unemployment stands at some 15-20% of the labor force.
Real wages have stagnated for two decades.
Three forces explain this dismal--and politically highly
destabilizing--phenomena:
1) The demand of labor has grown slowly, due to sluggish
growth.
2) The supply of labor has grown very rapidly thanks to
population expansion.
3) Government policies have created relatively inflexible
labor market institutions in the urban, formal sector.
Labor force growth in the region is the most rapid in the
world: 3-4% per year, twice as high as in the rest of the
Global South. The region needs to provide an additional 4
million jobs every year, just to keep up with additions to the
labor force.
The problem would become still more difficult should large
numbers of young women enter the labor force.
Unemployment is particularly high among the young and
relatively educated.
Arguably, this is the most politically volatile problem
produced by faltering political economies.
4. ALLEVIATING POVERTY
The conventional wisdom holds that poverty in the region is
lower (head count measure) than elsewhere in the Global South.
However, poverty rates are quite sensitive to the choice of
a poverty line. Large numbers of people live on incomes close
to the line: in Egypt, for example, although some 23% of the
population live on less than $2 per day, another 37% live on
less than $2.60 (only 30% more than the poverty line). They
are, therefore, highly vulnerable to falling into poverty.
There is consensus that aggregate poverty rates in the
Middle East fell during the years of the oil boom (from the mid
1970s to the early to mid 1980s), but started to rise after
that. Poverty has been increasing during the past decade, in
some cases, dramatically (e.g., Yemen: from l5% in 1990 to 45%
in 1998).
Three factors are plausibly the key drivers of the rise in
poverty.
1) Unemployment is high and rising;
2) Most job creation has occurred in the low wage informal
sector, not in higher paying formal sector employment.
3) Real wages in formal sector urban employment are falling.
(One might add that in some countries, including Egypt, real
wages in agriculture have also fallen).
On the other hand, , FAO data suggest that the share of
undernourished people in the total population declined over
time (from 8.8% in 1979/81, to 7.2% in 1990/92 and 6.9% in
1997/99). (Because of population growth, the absolute numbers
grew by about 25% to some 26 million).
Government policies of consumer subsidies and public sector
employment have prevented poverty from rising further. The
latter policy also contributes to slow growth and other
difficulties.
Persistent poverty undermines the legitimacy of regimes,
particularly among the young.
5. COPING WITH URBANIZATION
Urbanization has increased rapidly during the past
generation: the number of urban Middle Easterners has increased
by about 100 million in the past 35 years.
Over half (56%) of all Arabs now live in cities. In only 4
countries (Egypt, Somalia, Sudan, and Yemen) do most people
live in rural areas.
The number of urban dwellers is expected to rise from its
current level of over 140 million to over 350 million by 2025.
Public services and utilities are already overwhelmed: in
Jordan and Morocco, for example, one-third of the urban
population lacks adequate sewerage services. Urban water
supplies are often erratic at best.
Governments attempt to provide urban services through heavy
subsidies, subsidies which are largely captured by the
relatively better off urban residents. Such policies strain
government budgets, and thwart the necessary investments to
extend and to improve services.
Housing problems are severe: for example, more than a half
million Cairenes live on rooftops, and well over one million
live in and around the tombs of the City of the Dead. New
construction has lagged slightly behind new households so that
the gap remains vast.
Such problems are both cause and effect of governance
deficiencies. Few cities have much independent tax authority,
thanks to the typical pattern of fiscal centralization in most
countries in the region. At the same time, macroeconomic
austerity has deprived many municipalities of the funds needed
to cope with urban problems.
Rapid urbanization and its attendant problems strains
budgets, legitimacy, and governance, while swelling the ranks
of regime opponents.
6. EDUCATING THE YOUNG
Literacy rates remain relatively low in many Arab countries.
In only two countries (Jordan and Lebanon) can more than four
out of five adults read and write (which, in practice, means
``read and write at the fourth grade level''). More than \3/4\
of adults are literate in Kuwait, while adult literacy stands
at between \1/2\ to \2/3\ in Algeria, Iraq, Libya, Tunisia,
Saudi Arabia, and Syria. Only about half, or fewer, of adults
are literate in Egypt, Morocco, Sudan, and Syria.
Literacy rates in Iran, Israel, and Turkey are considerably
higher. The rapid increase in literacy in Iran since the
Revolution is especially notable.
By comparison, the average literacy rate for lower middle
income countries (similar to most countries of the Greater
Middle East) is nearly 90%.
The comparatively low levels of literacy contributes to high
fertility rates, low foreign direct investment, and low
international competitiveness.
Adult illiteracy is concentrated among women. In only seven
counties of the region can a majority of adult women read and
write.
The past generation has seen a dramatic increase in school
enrollments of both boys and girls. Nearly all boys are
enrolled in primary school in most countries.
Nearly all girls, are enrolled in primary school in Algeria,
Egypt, Jordan, Lebanon, Libya, Syria, and Tunisia.
The picture is less rosy in countries like Saudi Arabia,
Sudan, Oman, Morocco, and Yemen.
The waste of human resources continues to be appallingly
vast.
Despite these weaknesses, the region's social structures
continueto be transformed: increasingly, most residents of the
region are urban, with some education, and with increasing
access to information about the wider world.
7. SLOWING ENVIRONMENTAL DESTRUCTION
The costs of environmental neglect may be about 3% of
regional GDP.
Deforestation and soil erosion are particularly serious in
parts of Algeria, Morocco, Tunisia, and Yemen. According to the
FAO, for example, over 60% of the cultivated land in Morocco is
``severely degraded''.
Air pollution adversely affects the health of 60 million
urbanites, about 40% of all city dwellers. These numbers could
rise to 160 million in ten years, if ``business as usual''
prevails.
Some countries, notably Egypt, could be severely, impacted
by global warming; the country could lose 60% of its cultivated
area as sea levels rise by 2050.
Water pollution is a serious problem. For example, Damietta,
Egypt, a city of nearly one million people, has no sewerage
system. The city depends entirely on the Nile, which is heavily
polluted. Up to 40% of the population in the governorates of
Dametta and neighboring Daqahuiyya may be suffering from liver
and kidney ailments as a result of such pollution.
As educational levels rise, people elsewhere in the world
have become increasingly sensitive to environmental questions,
and have become much more demanding of environmental quality.
It seems highly unlikely that NESA residents will be any
different.
Suppression of NGOs (the usual advocates for such demands)
and restrictions on press freedom simply guarantee still worse
environmental problems. As with famine, so with environmental
disaster: freedom of the press, and of association, are good
for you, as the Nobel Award in economics, Amartya Sen, has
amply documented. The parallels of the region with the former
Soviet Union are obvious: Unaccountable, corrupt governance is
helping to destroy the region's natural resource base and
ambient environmental quality.
8. SAVING WATER
Water scarcity continues to rise in the region. Annual
renewable water resources per capita today (about 1,250 m\3\)
are less than \1/2\ of what they were in 1960. By 2025, the
number will probably fall to less than 650 m\3\ (compared to a
global average of 4,780 m\3\ per person per year).
Water use in ten countries--and Gaza--already exceed 100% of
renewable supplies.
Water quantity problems are exacerbated by water quality
problems. The latter become increasingly serious as nations
seek to solve the ``water quantity'' problem through the reuse
of water. Technologies exist to do this safely, but they
require extensive funds and careful management. Neither are
abundant in the region.
As everywhere in the world, groundwater over-pumping is a
serious problem. In Yemen, for example, water pumping stands at
over 130% of renewable supplies. The region is ``mining''
fossil groundwater.
Powerful interest groups block reallocation and
restructuring of the rules of allocation of increasingly scarce
water supplies.
Government water management systems suffer not only from
lack of money, but also from managerial cultures which were
geared to a situation of relatively abundant water.
Most water resources in the region are rivers and aquifers
which cross international frontiers. There is a sharp clash
between economic/engineering logic, which would favor managing
a river basin as a unit, and political considerations, marked
by fear and distrust of neighboring countries.
9. OBTAINING FOOD
The Middle East and North African region is the least food
self-sufficient region in the world.
Regional agricultures used more land, water, fertilizer,
machines, and labor--all just to keep up with population growth
during the past two decades.
Concerns--often obsessions--with food security have driven
policy in this sector for over a generation.
Food security has often been conflated with food self-
sufficiency.
Policies to achieve the latter have often had disastrous
environmental consequences.
Water constraints doom dreams of self-sufficiency, a fact
which is becoming increasingly apparent.
There is, consequently, no alternative to increased reliance
of ``virtual water'', or food imports to meet future increased
demand for food.
Managing such a strategy requires robust non-food exports,
which, in turn, requires significant policy changes.
Although the burden of food imports fell in most countries
during the past decade, serious further challenges lie ahead.
10. ATTRACTING MONEY FOR INVESTMENT
Huge sums of money are required to cope with these problems.
To create enough jobs to keep up with the growing labor
force over the next fifteen years will require about:
Algeria: $25 billion
Egypt: $14 billion
Iran: $31 billion
Morocco: $30 billion
Tunisia: $12 billion
To meet the increasing demand for education in the region as
a whole for the next fifteen years may require some $26 billion
per year. Spending on education needs to increase by about 20%.
Very large sums of money are held ``off-shore'' by regional
residents. Estimates are notoriously unreliable, but reasonable
guesses range from a minimum of $100 billion to over $800
billion.
The region has captured only a very small fraction of global
FDI (foreign direct investment).
The efficiency of investment has fallen during the past 25
years (1975-2000).
All three phenomena--the very large off-shore holdings, the
reluctance of foreign firms to invest in the region, and the
declining efficiency of investment, are plausibly explained by
poor governance, particularly the absence of accountability of
governments, and the weakeness--or non-existence--of the rule
of law.
WHAT IS TO BE DONE?
The conventional remedy to all of these problems has been,
for at least 15 years, the policies of the ``Washington
Consensus''.
As a generalization, macroeconomic ``policy reform'' has
been the most successful, as measured by variables such as
government deficits as a % of GDP, inflation rates, and (in
some cases), real exchange rate over-valuation.
Sectoral and microeconomic policy change has proceeded more
slowly.
The governance structures created after independence and
during the oil boom of the 1970s--state controlled industries,
extensive, arbitrary controls, and relative inward-looking
trade pictures--remain in place today.
It is unclear whether changes in such governance structures
would, in fact, actually be able to cope with the challenges
enumerated earlier. Such changes seem to provide the best
management strategy, but there is no guarantee of success.*
The institutional changes which would be necessary can only
come from within societies, because the changes require a
strong domestic constituency, and solid domestic legitimacy.
It is delusional to think that outside intervention--
especially, military intervention--can enhance the quality of
governance. Our historical record in promoting more accountable
governance in this way has been poor, and there are strong
regional reasons to doubt that the political economy of Middle
Eastern countries provides a favorable environment for such
externally-driven reform. (See Appendix 2).
------------
* For a detailed argument along these lines, see my ``Economic
Reform in the Middle East: The Challenge to Governance'', in Nora
Behsahel and Daniel L. Byman, eds, The Future Security Environment in
the Middle East. Santa Monica: RAND, 2004, pp. 57-128.
Appendix 2
DEMOCRACY IN THE ARAB REGION: GETTING THERE FROM HERE \1\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ Alan Richards, Professor of Economics and Environmental
Studies, University of California, Santa Cruz, USA. An earlier draft of
this appendix was prepared as a background paper for the UNDP's Arab
Human Development Rerort, 2004, at the request of UNDP.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Introduction
Successive Arab Human Development Reports have extensively
documented the ``freedom and good governance deficit'' in the Arab
region. There is likewise consensus that a ``democracy deficit'' both
exists and contributes to the other deficits which have been the focus
of previous reports. Although democracy is no panacea for the problems
of the Arab region (or of any other region), there are excellent
reasons to suppose that more accountable governance would certainly
help, and there are firm grounds to support transitions to more
democratic governance simply for their own sake.
A ``democracy deficit'' contributes very strongly to the ``freedom
deficit'', although, as we all know, democracies can also repress
dissent and behave intolerantly. After all, freedom, however conceived,
may be threatened not only by the actions of a repressive state
apparatus, but also by strong demands for conformity from civil
society. A transition to democracy would very likely reduce the first
threat to freedom, which would be a huge contribution to the peoples of
the region and, indeed, to everyone in the world.
It also seems clear that a democratic transition would make a
significant contribution to ``development as freedom'', as Nobel
Laureate Amartya Sen \2\ has called it. By enhancing accountability,
democracy would also very plausibly improve economic governance and
stimulate investment. It could, for the same reason, likewise improve
environmental protection, and the sustainable growth of the ``wealth of
nations''. It would almost certainly be an improvement over the current
scene, in which corrupt elites enrich themselves while plundering
natural capital, neglecting human capital formation by the poor, and
impeding physical capital formation by less privileged economic agents.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\2\ Amartya Sen, Development as Freedom, NY: Anchor Books, 1999.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Students of democracy employ various perspectives on
democratization. Some focus on the meaning of fundamental principles
such as freedom, equality, participation, and legitimacy. Others
concentrate on the institutional structures which are needed, such as
an independent judiciary, a functioning parliament, and human rights
laws. Still others examine the role and functioning of ``civil
society'' in stimulating the demand for democracy and freedom. Those
electing to study ``civil society'' typically try to explain what the
concept means, why it matters, how it is now faring, and what can be
done to strengthen it now and in the immediate future. All such studies
are very valuable for helping us better to understand democratic
institutions. They tell us much about the question, ``What is
democracy?'' They also tell us something about ``Who wants democracy?''
They tell us rather less, however, about two other, critical
questions: ``Who will effect a transition to more democratic
governance?'' and ``How will this transition happen?'' They tell us
little, in short, about how and by whom democracy is supplied. Now, in
an important sense, such questions cannot, indeed should not, be
answered a priori, least of all by outsiders. They cannot be answered
in general, for the region as a whole, simply because of the
specificity of national experiences, and because of the vast complexity
of events such as democratic transitions. Large scale historical
changes of any kind are the product of ``conjunctures''--the
simultaneous occurrence of many disparate forces. The complexity and
indeterminacy of such changes is well-reflected in the fact that
historians and political analysts continue to debate, for example, the
causes of the French, Russian, Mexican, and Iranian revolutions. They
likewise dispute, and will continue to contest, why and how democracy
came to Eastern Europe, Korea, Chile, and so on. Such questions also
should not be answered in advance, because, after all, the self-
selection of ``who'' undertakes democratic transitions, and how they do
this, is itself part of the democratic process itself. Such a process,
by its very nature, can only unfold with the freely given participation
of the relevant social actors.
Nevertheless, there remains a place for analyzing both the
questions of ``Who?'' and ``How?'' One can sketch some broad answers to
these questions without presuming to provide definitive answers, or to
pre-empt the actual political process. One may simply point to a few
important forces and issues which, in the analyst's judgment, require
the attention of the relevant social actors who, alone, can effect the
transition to democracy in any country. This brief paper tries to do
this.
The Concept of ``Pacted Transitions''
Several insights from the literature on democratic transitions may
help us to understand both what forces have impeded democratization in
the region, and how more accountable governance may be enhanced. One
prominent analysis \3\ distinguishes between two phases of the
transition, ``extrication from authoritarian rule'', and ``constitution
of a democratic one''. When the repressive powers of the state are
intact during the transition (e.g., Chile, South Korea), the first
process dominates. When these institutions have shattered, typically
thanks either to military defeat (e.g., Argentina, Greece) or to strong
civilian-party control of the repressive apparatus (Eastern Europe),
the second process is ``unencumbered by extrication'', which removes
(in theory) at least one barrier to success. From a regional
perspective, however, one should note that in both the Greek and
Argentine cases, the military defeat shattered the legitimacy of the
dictatorship, and was not followed by any occupation by foreign forces.
The salutary benefits of defeat in war for democracy are easily lost if
these two features are absent, as the current Iraqi situation suggests.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\3\ Adam Przeworski, Democracy and the Market: Political and
Economic Reforms in Eastern Europe and Latin America. Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 1991.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Especially for a transition which requires a simultaneous
extrication from authoritarianism and a transition to democracy, three
features are necessary: 1) a sufficiently large number of reformers
within the existing regime must reach an agreement with moderate
opponents of the regime; 2) these reformers must persuade military/
security ``hardliners'' within the regime to cooperate with
institutional change; and 3) moderates in opposition must contain their
allies, more radical opponents of the regime. Only if all three
conditions are met will it be possible for a large enough set of social
actors to believe that a ``credible commitment'' has been made by both
current power-wielders and their opponents to follow a set of ``rules
of the game'' in which ``defeat at the polls'' does not mean
annihilation. The literature describes (infelicitously, alas) such
coalitions and their fruits as ``pacted transitions'', so called
because a tacit agreement or ``pact'' between moderates inside the
government and in opposition is necessary for a transition toward
democratic rule.
On the Political Economy of Autocracy in the Arab Region
Several historical forces have conspired to impede such transitions
in the Arab region. One major historical force is the dominant position
of the military and security apparatuses in Arab polities--many of
whose members are ``hardliners''. The social formation often known as
the ``Mukhabarat State'' is itself very much the product of the
struggle against European colonialism and the intersection of that
struggle with the Cold War between the US and the USSR. For at least
the first two-thirds of the twentieth century, Arabs governments
unsurprisingly believed that they needed to be militarily strong to
protect their often hard-won independence. (The Anglo-American invasion
and occupation of Iraq has revived these fears.) The continued conflict
with Israel was and is understandably perceived as an extension of this
struggle. And, during the Cold War, an authoritarian military regime
could always count on support from one superpower, provided that such
an Arab regime made suitable political moves against the other
superpower. In short, the fact that the often violent struggle for
independence was followed by a half-century of conflict with Israel, in
a context of global Cold War, greatly strengthened authoritarianism.
A second critical barrier to transition has been the ``low
dependence of states on citizens'' \4\. This is a variant, of course,
of the ``rentier state'' argument \5\. Although it was first formulated
in the context of oil rents, it has and should be extended to include
what we might call ``strategic rents'', as the preceding paragraph
suggests. So long as authoritarian governments have sufficient
resources, whatever their other failings, they may have little
incentive to reform. Oil and strategic location from a Superpower
perspective have provided--and continue to provide--important barriers
to ``pacted transitions'' away from authoritarian rule in the region.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\4\ E.g., Mick Moore, ``Political Underdevelopment''. Paper
presented at the 10th Anniversary Conference of the Development Studies
Institute, London School of Economics, New Institutional Theory,
Institutional Reform and Poverty Reduction, London, 7-8 September,
2000. http://www.ids.ac.uk/idS/govern/pdfs/PolUnderdevel(refs).pdf
\5\ E.g., Kirin Aziz Chaudhry, The Price of Wealth: Economies and
Institutions in the Arab World. Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of
California Press, 1999.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The decline in oil prices in the 1980s and 1990s led to much
discussion of the weakening of the ``authoritarian social contract'' (a
presumed tacit agreement, in which the state supposedly supplied social
services to the citizens, while citizens reciprocated with loyalty and
obedience). Some Arab democrats hoped that softer oil prices would
weaken autocrats sufficiently that they would expand the social space
for political participation and foster greater accountability in
governance. Unfortunately, however, such a change did not occur on any
wide scale; further, the current up-tick in oil prices--which many
economists think will persist for some time--does not bode well for any
further weakening of the ``rentier state''.
The Prospects for ``Pacted Transitions'' to Democracy in the Arab
Region
A necessary condition for a ``pacted transition'' is the
willingness of reformers within the state to trust that key regime
opponents will both ``play by new rules'' and control their more
radical allies. The problem is fully symmetric: moderate reformers need
to know that reformist elements within the state apparatus can and will
restrain hardliners. Understanding the conditions under which such a
situation can come about seems essential for understanding how and by
whose agency democracy might come to the Arab region.
In many Arab countries, the best organized opposition forces are
those of ``political Islam''. The Islamist movement is huge and
diffuse, with many national and local variations. Increasingly, what
were formerly called ``secular nationalists'' in opposition have either
joined Islamist movements or are co-operating with them politically.
The logic of transition to democracy implies that moderates within the
Islamist (and nationalist) camp must be willing to play by democratic
rules, convince reform elements within the state of their sincerity,
and maintain control over their radical allies. It seems highly
probable that such a process will be a protracted and complex one, with
advances as well as reversals along the way.
Islamists now participate in elections in Bahrain, Jordan, Lebanon,
Kuwait, Morocco, Palestine, and Yemen. They have tried to do in Egypt
(under the banner of the Hizb al-Wasat), where the Muslim Brotherhood
has made many statements confirming its support of fundamental
democratic changes, such as fair and free elections, the amendment of
the laws on political parties and on professional syndicates, and the
lifting of the Emergency Law. Such changes are called for by all
Egyptian democrats, regardless of other ideological differences.
Further afield, Islamists have participated in elections in Bangladesh,
Malaysia, Pakistan, and Indonesia. Most pertinently here, the current
governing party of the Turkish Republic is Islamist. Many outside
observers (e.g., Olivier Roy and Graham Fuller) have noted that there
exist strong democratic trends within the (still broader) movements of
``political Islam''. One of them (Fuller) has gone so far as to remark,
``The charge, `One man, one vote, one time' is no more than a slogan
wielded by authoritarians and Westerners who fear Islamist power at the
ballot box''.\6\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\6\ Graham E. Fuller, The Future of Political Islam. NY: Palgrave
Macmillan, 2003, p. 138.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Nowhere in the world has the transition from authoritarianism
toward democracy been simple; the Arab region is likely to be no
exception. Vibrant debates over the relation between cultural
authenticity and democracy have been going on for some time in the Arab
region. Yet precisely because Arab authoritarians have remained
stronger than their counterparts in some other Muslim majority
countries, an even livelier debate has emerged in Indonesia, Iran,
Malaysia, Pakistan, and Turkey. Friends of Arab democracy have much to
learn from these discussions.
These debates are particularly revealing concerning questions of
the relationship between interpretations of Islam and various forms of
democracy. There is no doubt that for Islam, as for other religions,
(e.g., Roman Catholicism), religious texts may be interpreted to
prohibit democracy. The fact that some prominent Islamic opposition
movements (e.g., some Salafis) oppose democracy as an alien importation
is unsurprising--and hardly decisive. After all, the Roman Catholic
Church vociferously opposed democracy throughout the late 19th and
early 20th centuries, yet Catholic Europe is today entirely democratic,
as is most of largely Catholic Latin America. As noted earlier,
Islamist thinkers are now finding ways to ensure that democracy in
Muslim majority countries is culturally authentic. In short, despite
the deplorably belligerent rhetoric now fashionable in some American
circles, there is little reason to suppose that the ``culture'' of the
Arab region constitutes a barrier to the transition toward democracy.
The political economy model sketched above seems far more parsimonious,
and therefore, to many analysts, far more persuasive an explanation of
the absence of democracy in the region than ponderous (and often ill-
informed) theological pontifications.
Nor is it reasonable to argue that Arab countries are somehow ``not
ready'' for democracy thanks to their current ``level of development''.
The correlation between democracy and economic development was always
rendered suspect by the fact that the world's largest democracy, India,
was also desperately poor. Current levels of literacy, education, and
urbanization in the Arab region are certainly high enough to guarantee
a vibrant democracy--if the critical political barriers can be
overcome.
Although much attention has--rightly--been paid to the question of
whether many opposition forces are willing to play by the rules of the
democratic game, rather less focus has been directed to the other side
of the equation: why and how moderate reformers within the regime can
restrain the hard-liners of the mukhabarat and armed forces. There are
two broad reasons why those in power resist democratization: simple
material self-interest, and deeply held ideology. After all, wielding
the levers of power in an autocratic state permits one to garner
substantial rents; bluntly stated, tyrants become rich rentiers. The
hard-liners ask, ``Why should we give up our special privileges, our
wealth, and our incomes?'' One possible response by would-be
democratizers could be to show a significant portion of these rentiers
that democracy threatens their material comfort rather less than they
imagine. After all, the knowledge and connections which such people
enjoy will continue to be valuable in a democracy. Such a conclusion,
after all, seems to have been that drawn by many of the former Soviet
nomenklatura.
Economic and status benefits do not fully explain autocrats'
reluctance to forge a pacted transition, however. Ideology also
matters. The ideological opposition to sharing power which emanates
from government circles is usually framed in nationalist terms. Here
too, however, Arab democrats have opportunities. After all, autocrats
have done rather poorly in defending Arab rights in the international
order. The argument that democracy holds out considerably greater hope
for whatever genuine national autonomy remains possible in today's
globalized, interdependent world may find a friendly hearing among
forward-looking military officers. After all, for nearly all of these
men, patriotism runs very deep. It is at least possible that an
Islamist-nationalist opposition could forge a ``pact'' with patriotic
reformers within government. The devil, as always, will be in the
details of the pact, the levels of trust of the respective parties, and
the conjuncture within which the pact is negotiated. But such a pact
seems to offer the best prospects for a transition to an authentically
Arab democracy.
The Difficult Conjuncture of the First Years of the 21st Century
The key point is that the barriers to a transition away from
authoritarianism toward democracy in the Arab region are fundamentally
political. Unfortunately, current developments are far from encouraging
here. The continued, increasingly brutal Israeli occupation of the West
Bank and Gaza has not only destroyed whatever nascent democracy may
have been emerging in Palestine, but has also greatly increased the
nervousness of Arab security services and militaries everywhere. The
fact that the world's sole superpower simply refuses to restrain the
Israeli government helps to ensure that the conflict will get worse,
not better. Such a situation, in addition to being a grave and on-going
human rights disaster, impedes ``pacted transitions'' toward democracy
by encouraging both hardline authoritarians within governments and
extremists in opposition. The American invasion and occupation of Iraq
has further increased the already high level of nervousness among Arab
military and security elites, while greatly strengthening the popular
appeal of the arguments of anti-democratic radicals such as those of
al-Qaeda.
The American reaction to the events of September 11, 2001 has also
provided a poor environment for ``pacted transitions''. From a
political economy perspective, the main result of the post 9/11 policy
shifts in the US has been to ensure that any authoritarian who
resolutely pursued violent enemies of the US could depend upon US
support. Such a policy stance, of course, further bolsters hardliners
within authoritarian regimes, giving them fewer reasons than before to
seek accommodation with opposition elements.
The final barrier, then, to a transition to democracy in the Arab
region is that the world's sole superpower does not really want it to
happen, pious neo-conservative rhetoric notwithstanding. As Talleyrand
famously remarked, ``Nations do not have friends, they have
interests''. So long as ``American interests'' in the Arab region are
defined as they are currently, namely, 1) support for Israel,
regardless of her occupation policies in the West Bank and Gaza, 2)
opposition to any single state having even short-run market power over
oil prices, and 3) opposition to any regime which might harbor
terrorists, US policy actions (as opposed to rhetoric and marginal
activities, such as some support for some NGOs) are likely to undermine
``pacted transitions''.
This is fundamentally the case because the opposition in nearly all
Arab countries is dominated by the forces of political Islam. Would the
US really welcome a ``pacted transition'' in which, say, moderate
Muslim Brothers and reformist, patriotic generals in Egypt agreed to
share power? Even assuming that the thorny internal problems of
``credible commitment to the democratic rules of the game'' had been
surmounted, wouldn't the US oppose such a government--a government
which would certainly vociferously oppose current American policy in
Palestine and Iraq, for example? Given the current balance of forces in
the world today, wouldn't that opposition endanger the transition?
The situation in the Arab region today resembles that of Latin
America during the Cold War, when American paranoia about Marxism
undermined existing democracies and blocked nascent ``pacted
transitions''. As in today's Arab region, the internal and external
obstacles to a democratic transition helped to create and reinforce one
another:, the US strengthened hardliners (and, therefore, also radicals
in opposition), partly because it feared that Marxists would not play
by the democratic rules of the game if they won elections. Moderates in
opposition were weakened, because radicals could plausibly argue that
winning an election would be meaningless, since the hardliners, with US
help, would engineer a coup to overthrow an elected opposition
government. Substitute ``Islamist'' for ``Marxist'', and you have a
reasonable picture of the key dynamics currently thwarting a transition
to democracy in the Arab region.
Friends of such transitions, in the Arab region and in the US, will
have much work to do in the months and years ahead. Some of us hope
that the recent Turkish election may set a standard of an elected,
truly democratic, Islamist government. If hardliners in the Turkish
military, radicals in the Turkish opposition, and the US government can
all refrain from undermining the current government, the Turkish case
could set an important precedent for the Arab region. If so, progress
toward closing the ``democracy deficit'' may accelerate.
It would also greatly help, of course, if the world's only
superpower reversed its current declared policy of unilateral military
intervention, as well as modified its opposition to the accession to
power--democratically--of the forces of political Islam. Unfortunately,
current political and cultural trends in the United States are not
encouraging in this regard. Until these trends are reversed,
democratization in the Arab region will continue to face difficult
obstacles. In these grim times, however, it may be helpful to remember
how quickly historical tides may shift. We can only hope that such a
shift may be forthcoming, and soon.
The Chairman. Thank you very much, Dr. Richards.
Let me state at the outset that I appreciate the work that
Dr. Cronin has done on the Millennium Challenge idea. Clearly I
referenced that as a model of how our own efforts are
proceeding. I think you have offered, Dr. Richards, some very,
very important thoughts about the Millennium Challenge if we
are anticipating intrusion or attempting to wring out results
from many of the countries in the Middle East that we are
talking about today. Indeed, we were attempting to avoid the
patronage trap that Prince Hassan mentioned earlier on simply
because, as a practical matter, it really will not work.
Unfortunately, as you point out from your recent conference,
the Pew Foundation and others have found very, very deep
resentment of our country, well beyond that perhaps, in the
expressions of a few.
As you say, it is a daunting task to be talking about how
some changes in which we are involved might occur. I tried to
point out in my dialog with Prince Hassan that Americans are
interested in change, both from a humanitarian standpoint and
from a political one. I suppose, with some optimism, that the
American people, hope to foster the expression of democratic
sentiments, freedom of the press and speech and so forth. These
are likely to make the world safer in due course, although
maybe not initially. Both of you point out that democratic
governments in the area that we are talking about might be very
hostile to us also. There may be expressions of people in that
democracy who are not finding what we are doing to be any more
compatible than those that are not so.
Let us say that we, just for sake of argument, had a Trust
fund and the United States has made a generous contribution to
the fund. Likewise, some of the members of the G-8 decide to
make contributions. Maybe, as I suggested, Saudi Arabia might,
too, although this is simply a hypothetical case. But there
could be other countries in the area who have some wealth that
would find this to be a useful vehicle. If so, that would make
the dialog among those that were setting up either criteria for
objectives, or who gets the money, more meaningful, I suppose,
the more cosmopolitan and wider the group.
What sort of proposals are likely to come from any nation
at this point? In other words, for the thing to work, the Trust
fund is set up and the money is there. The assumption is that
often with trust funds people are brimming with ideas of
candidates for change. They are eager to compete for the
resources.
But is this so? Is it likely that there would be a line of
potential recipients who would want to make use of this? There
are some skeptics who would say that there is not going to be
much of a line as a matter of fact. You are waiting for
countries to come to the Trust fund and suggest ways that they
might do things. We heard earlier today about microbanking and
loans of this sort, certain literacy projects, maybe even
humanitarian health objectives. But that is not exactly why we
are headed into this fund. There are other funds that handle
these sorts of things, although this one might be well advised
to head down that path to buildup some trust.
Do either of you have any idea of who the potential
recipients might be? Why would anybody would be interested in
the concept, and would anybody come to the party?
Dr. Cronin. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I think there would be
people interested in receiving these grants from a Trust fund.
Obviously, the context does cloud the issue, but I assume this
context can improve and change with time. This is not a fixed
state.
We looked at this issue, in fact, post September 11 at the
more than 100 activities we are already conducting at USAID on
the ground throughout these countries, and we had relatively
few missions in the Middle East. We had Jordan and Egypt, of
course, but we only reopened Yemen subsequent to that. We were
actually drawing down in Morocco. And a lot of these countries
were wealthier countries where we did not have missions on the
ground, although clearly we had embassies. So you have a
variety of different levels of interaction. Along the lines of
the three areas I mentioned, political reform, education
essentially, and economic opportunity, there was a range of
activities and a range of abilities for civil society, whether
in Alexandria, Egypt, for instance, to create an open space of
civil society there, or in Cairo, whether to help train
journalists, again create space that way, or whether it was
much more focused on microenterprise, small, medium enterprise
loans and grants to set up a business to really supplement
education.
A couple of cautionary note, just in terms of the
discrepancy. Outside of the Middle East proper, I think of
Pakistan in the late 1990s, the World Bank focused all of the
donor money on a so-called social action plan to really help
health and education, which are lagging behind. At the end of
spending $8 billion, the exact same amount was being spent per
capita in Pakistan on health and education as before the $8
billion from outside went in the country. So there is this
black hole where you could pour in a lot of outside money and
not change the situation at all, which is why getting to
specific goals in an agreement is useful and then coming up
with specific plans that, based on their own merits, are
essential and they have to be audited and look at the results.
I think you can find, again, a whole array of different
activities that could be very helpful.
Governments may want to opt more for the social action plan
kind of approach of essentially budget support. Civil society,
individual organizations may also opt for a much smaller level.
Does it add up to national change is a good question.
And maybe related to my colleague's very poignant
testimony, one of the challenges we face as a government is
whether or not we can engage Islam. In Indonesia, again to take
a non-Middle East example, look at what we have failed to do on
the ground with very successful aid programs. We have not
engaged the two largest Islamic organizations that are actually
responsible for promoting democracy in Indonesia and a moderate
form of Islam as well.
The Chairman. We heard from the multinational bank hearing
that we conducted, that there is a desire on the part of many
countries for so-called budgetary support. That should not be
ruled out. In fact, the multinational banks have made a lot of
such loans. But I think as you pointed out, Dr. Cronin, it is
very important that there be some third-party auditing that is
pretty good because speaking of black holes, if you were going
on the budgetary support of the United States, you could lose a
lot of money very rapidly and not have much to show for it.
Unhappily that has been the case sometimes elsewhere.
On the other hand, one of the problems of all the third-
party auditing are the charges of intrusion that somehow or
other you are reaching in and examining how the government
works, which indeed you are doing. One of the dilemmas in a
government that has a fair degree of corruption--and many
governments do--is that there may be some whistleblowing and
some political embarrassment from the whole process.
Now, how all of this is to be separated while doing good
defys a lot of very wise people, but needs to be thought of in
advance as we initiate some new situation, particularly given
the antagonism toward the United States. This would perhaps be
mitigated by the international quality of the Trust fund, by
the board of directors, by those doing the job, and so forth.
So at least the blame would be spread more widely. But even
here, it could be placed on the wealthy countries. If you have
just the G-8, perhaps the antagonism would be not just toward
the United States but toward others, the haves as opposed to
others that have not.
I think these are questions that we are wrestling with in
this dialog. The purpose of the hearing is to try to flesh out
for our own government some issues that I think they must
address.
Yes, Dr. Richards.
Dr. Richards. My response to your question would be to
stress the importance of the context. The context is all
important. If there is progress, perceived-to-be progress in
the region on what Senator Biden described as the two elephants
in the room of Iraq and the Israeli-Palestinian conflict,
first, and second, if there is genuine change coming internally
in the region in the form of what I view as--after all,
democracy is a political process, as Prince Hassan has said.
This process is domestic and it is fundamentally political. And
if there is this ongoing kind of a pact, a tendency toward a
deal between the moderates in opposition and the moderates in
government, then all kinds of things are possible. We might see
proposals covering the whole range of the things that Dr.
Cronin outlined: civil society, economic restructuring,
education. You might see a lot of them.
But if those things are not taking place, either the two
elephants or the internal political deal necessary to get a
kind of democracy of whatever sort functioning, then I think
there are two dangers. One danger is that anything that we do
will really not matter very much because without that internal
deal, we are really just putting Band-Aids here and there. And
second, it could even be worse. As you know well, we could be
perceived to be the Judas kiss, the kiss of death, that the
United States is embracing these people and they want nothing
to do with us.
So I would just stress the answer to your question will
depend almost entirely on the context.
The Chairman. On that context issue, we just heard Prince
Hassan suggesting perhaps temporarily that this be confined to
what he described as 40 million people, Iraq and Palestine and
Israel and maybe Jordan, because that is a context in which
these two basic political issues have to be addressed, and some
progress presumably has to be made. Others might not agree with
the narrowness of that idea, but it certainly does address the
situation that you have just discussed.
I will yield to my colleague, Senator Brownback, for his
questions.
Senator Brownback. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you,
gentlemen, for being here.
I appreciate your thoughts that you are putting forward.
Particularly Professor Richards, I was looking at your
conclusions about a half century ago we thought we could shape
what was taking place in China; we failed. We thought we could
shape things in Southeast Asia; we failed. We thought we could
shape things in Russia; we failed. I would look at all that and
wonder, well, then maybe we should not be trying here at all.
But I would also suggest to you maybe you are reading it a
little harsher in the history. A number of those countries are
moving much in the direction of open societies and democracy,
and while our efforts perhaps were not as successful as we
would like and not moving as fast as we would like certainly in
places like China and in others in that region, there has been
a movement overall clearly toward an open society and democracy
in those regions even though our attempts may not have been as
successful as we would like. So reasonable efforts with
reasonable goals should be our design, but most of all, I think
we have to stand on principles and do the best we can ourselves
of being a good democracy, of being a solid country, of trying
to walk wisely.
The other thing I would really question--and this is
something that I have been troubled about since being on this
committee. When I first became a committee member, I chaired
the Middle East Subcommittee and held a number of hearings and
met with a number of Arab leaders, traveled the region. Every
one of them blamed the Israeli-Palestinian conflict for
anything that happened in the region. That was their summation
of basically any problem that took place. Well, if you could
resolve the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, everything goes away.
If you could resolve that, we would have better education, we
would have open societies, we would have virtually everything.
And I listened and for a period of time I thought, OK, I can
see how that is an irritant and a difficult thing in the region
and we should be paying attention to it.
We, by that point in time, had invested a good 20 years in
kind of a land for peace or some different type of design of a
little land for a little peace type of arrangement. We were on
Oslo at the time. We had preceded that with other types of
discussions, of trying to get some resolution within the
region. All the while, it seemed to be a very useful excuse for
a number of the Arab leaders not to engage democratizing or
opening their societies up or providing for real economic
opportunity or involving women in the society. So the more I
looked at it and studied it, I thought, while this is a key
issue--there is no question about it--for too long it has been
used as an excuse not to engage and to open up a society and to
educate greater their own people, to open up for more democracy
and human rights and religious throughout the region.
So while I think we clearly need to be engaged in the
Israeli-Palestinian conflict--and right now we have difficulty
with that of having an interlocutor on the Palestinian side
that we can work well with--I just do not think we should allow
that sort of blame game to be played on us by the Arab
leadership in the region and saying the rest of this does not
move forward effectively without this moving forward
effectively. I would hope that we would push both, but push
them separately and independently, and not have the linkages be
made nor allow the linkages to be made.
Now, people are going to draw their own conclusions and
believe what they want to believe themselves. We certainly
cannot change that. We can try to be as wise and as humble in
our own policies as possible and not do things that exacerbate
it maybe more than we need to. But these need to be pushed on
separate tracks and independent of each other and pushed
regardless of each other.
Having open societies in the Arab world and human rights,
religious freedoms, gender equality, is good in that region. It
is good for the people there, and it is a fundamental principle
on which we stand. And we push these principles everywhere and
people can accuse us of heavy-handedness or whatever they would
like to. But these are things that we have stood for and they
have stood the test of time. We are at our best when we stand
on principles and at our worst I think when we forget them and
try to say, well, OK, we cannot really do that here because we
are hunting for al-Qaeda now and we need to work with this
dictator in this particular country or this monarch in that
country because he is helping us with al-Qaeda. That is useful.
But we did that model in the 1970s in Central and South
America where a number of countries were headed by dictators,
military dictators, but they were not Communist and we were
against the Communists. So we worked with these dictators, but
the people resented it and it hurt us on a longer-term basis
because we did not stand on our own principles.
So I would hope we would not just play into the blame game
in the region but we would just stand on our principles that we
have stood for, that we have stood for around the world, that
we have been hesitant about standing on in the Middle East and
the Islamic world for various reasons, but we have been
hesitant about standing on principle there. I think we would be
far wiser to do that and to do modest measures that, while they
may not be as successful as we would like, continue to point
the way toward open societies, free societies, and that people
that are vested themselves in their own societies are the most
motivated and produce the greatest abilities and the greatest
opportunities for people of a country.
That is long to say that I can see some possibilities here
in what Senator Lugar has, that you have as well, but my
rationale at coming at it would be somewhat different from the
support that you look at it.
I do hope, Mr. Chairman, we can work on these sorts of
issues in a modest framework where we are after big goals but
realize the limitations of what we can get done. Thank you, Mr.
Chairman.
The Chairman. Thank you very much, Senator Brownback.
Let me just followup the Senator's question and statement
by asking, in the Greater Middle East situation, what
difference does the presence of madrassas schools, and the
large number of young people who come from that type of
training, make in relation to the matters that we are talking
about today? Pessimists would say that there are some countries
in which a large number of students have very little prospect
of an education, aside from these religious-oriented schools.
The extremism that comes into their lives, and their
motivation, does not make them candidates for the hopeful
policies that we are discussing today. It may be that they have
a theological view that people who are outside of their way of
thinking are enemies. As a result, they engage in conflict.
Clearly, as we have all been discussing, on the security
side, leaving aside the humanitarian side, this is a serious
problem. These people seem to form the cores of terrorist
groups or of those who sympathize with them and who sort of
cheer them on. That is really daunting, leaving aside general
antipathy toward the United States or the West or so forth.
What if in those societies there are people, in fair numbers,
with this kind of extreme commitment? How do we meet this
problem? Do you have a thought about that, Dr. Richards?
Dr. Richards. If we had about 5 days, we could talk about
that. It is such a huge topic.
Maybe the most useful thing I could say is I was asked to
write a short monograph for the Army War College, which is in
their monograph series, that is called ``Socioeconomic Roots of
Islamic Radicalism.'' It talks about these different things and
makes some suggestions about the way we might best deal with
this kind of phenomenon.
Your specific question about the madrassas schools depends
very much on what country you are talking about. In Pakistan,
yes, it is an important thing. In Egypt, it is really quite
minor, and so forth. It all depends on where exactly you are.
In Yemen, they exist but some of them then join the Islah Party
which is an Islamist party, but which nevertheless interacts in
the government and is not necessarily that they do not like a
lot of American policies, but they are not a violent threat to
us necessarily. So it all depends on the specifics.
More generally, I would say part of perhaps the key of the
daunting task that we face is that today from Morocco to Iran,
there are something like 300 million people. Nearly two-thirds
of those people are under 30 and half of them are under 20.
Another 100 million will be added by 2015. We are facing the
largest generation of young Arabs and Muslims in the history of
the planet. We all know from our own experiences in life that
what happens to us politically when we are young shapes the way
we think for a long time. After all, look at my own baby boom
generation with the disparate experiences of Vietnam. It shaped
people's politics.
What is going on right now is absolutely poisonous in the
region because, it seems to me, to be quite blunt, Osama bin
Laden is winning. He is doing very well not in the military
sense. It is not a military conflict except in part. It is a
political conflict. And the thing that disturbs me the most is
that his poisonous message is finding many more recipients,
much more friendly reception in all kinds of different circles,
not just in the madrassas. But these kinds of things that my
friend, John Waterbury, mentions, all of this sort of thing is
what disturbs me the most.
I think your proposal can help this, but it all depends on
the context. It all depends on what else is going on and what
else our own government is doing and other things that are
happening over which we have no control. One of the things I
very much liked about your proposal was precisely the humility
borne, no doubt, of your great experience in understanding that
the United States can really only do certain things. We can
only do so much. As Dr. Cronin has said, there are all kinds of
examples from elsewhere in the world where we are simply not
capable of doing things. As I said in my remarks, we Americans
are a very impatient people. We like results right away. This
is not going to happen in this particular area.
The Chairman. Well, thank you for your comment about my
proposal. It is modest because I suspect that probably the
overall thoughts you have just expressed are the more difficult
challenge that we have. I have gone forward with this idea in
large part because our government officially has come forward
with a proposal, which it was planning to go to the G-8 with,
is visiting with other countries about, and which was running
into some difficulty which you and other witnesses have
described. So as opposed to simply being an arm chair critic
and saying you folks you are not doing very well, why, you try
to step up to the plate and offer a suggestion.
But the context, the background for this is really so
important. The idea of daunting, which keeps coming up, is
clearly there.
Just out of curiosity--and you are probably right this is
sort of a five-chapter, five-session situation--when you make
the comment that Osama bin Laden's message is getting greater
resonance with young people--and you suggest half of the 300
million are under 20 and so forth--why? What are some of the
reasons why that would be a winning message?
Dr. Richards. These reasons would include, but not be
limited to, first, the kinds of socioeconomic problems that
have been alluded to at various times in testimony today. The
simple way to say it is this generation is, first, very large.
Second, there is widespread unemployment, particularly
typically concentrated among those with some education. So they
have some education, no jobs, living in cities for the first
time, cities that are crumbling where the only place that is
calm and quiet and cool when outside is dusty and noisy and hot
and chaotic, is the mosque. Further, their governments are
perceived, with some reason too often, to be illegitimate,
autocratic, unresponsive. So they are very angry at their
governments. Their societies are not producing what they need.
Yet, they have some education and there is this huge ferment
going on about, well, how do we cope with these kinds of
problems. So far, the kinds of arguments that appear to be in
the region the most culturally authentic are those of political
Islam of one sort or another.
As I stress, Osama bin Laden is only an extreme loony in
that huge political movement. There are many kinds of political
Islamism that we can easily work with. That is the critical
task. We need to be able to make those kinds of distinctions,
and to some extent, we already are doing this, but doing this
better, more often, and more thoroughly would be absolutely
crucial.
Finally, of course, when these young people see on
television all the time--they are just like everyone else. They
may not have the same Internet access because their governments
block it, but they have access to television and they can watch
it, as you know well, in their own language. They watch al
Jazeera. They watch al Manara from Beirut. They watch all these
things and they can see the kind of violence, of course, spun
in that one way as our news is spun in another way, and this
has an impact on people.
So these are just some of the features.
The Chairman. Dr. Cronin, do you have a comment about any
of this?
Dr. Cronin. Well, the one thing I would add, Mr. Chairman,
is that we also have weak state institutions in many cases on
the educational side. So there is very little of a
counterweight to madrassas, if they happen to be radical. Dr.
Richards is right. This is a much bigger problem in Pakistan,
for instance, which has some 10,000 madrassas but maybe only 1
percent may be radical, but still, maybe that is a bigger
number now than a year ago. Who knows?
In any event, the fixing of state educational institutions
in large countries like Pakistan and Egypt are a huge
challenge. Just as I mentioned the social action plan failed in
Pakistan, Egypt's education bureaucracy may be one of the
worst. So it is a very, very daunting challenge even for well-
intentioned and logical trusts to try to fix quickly. This is
going to take a generation. We hopefully have to deal with this
huge Arab youth bulge, but look out a generation from now and
hopefully have done a better job at promoting reform and
partnership than we have done maybe in the past 20 years.
The Chairman. Well, can ideas such as the ones we are
talking about today, whether they be a trust or grants or what
have you, make an impact upon educational systems in countries?
We have problems reforming education in our country because
people do have status and they do things the same way.
Obviously, there has to be some substitute for the madrassas,
or for whatever else fosters extremists. But how we intrude
into those societies and effect some marked change, even in a
generation, is not really clear to me. I ask the two of you. I
think it is probably an important objective, but it may be a
bridge too far in these initial efforts. I am not certain.
Would anybody step up and apply for educational grants if we
had a trust and that type of opportunity?
Dr. Cronin. Well, I think, first of all, you would see the
governments interested in trying to provide greater budget
support. The question is could you structure that budget
support and audit it in a way that it would be helpful. We ran
into this problem with Pakistan right after the Afghan war in
trying to structure assistance to Pakistan. I am not sure we
did the best job. You could maybe insist upon a bit more
intrusive accountability if you have the government requesting
this assistance obviously.
I think the answer is yes, Senator, there are ways: UNESCO
from the United Nations education organization, to working with
NGOs, to providing direct government assistance, to indigenous
groups in these countries. There are a number of ways to
provide educational support.
In Egypt, for instance, they wanted to focus mostly on the
top level of education that leads to jobs. So that might mix in
something like, ironically, information technology, the
Internet, which is being repressed, as Dr. Richards said. But
if you could imagine Cairo University, this Internet
university, opening up political space, in tandem with taking
technical assistance so that the Egyptians could take a leading
role in the Internet and an information-based economy that
would lead to real jobs for some of these people, I think that
could be one small way of making some tangible progress. But it
does rely upon the right political space in Egypt. It relies
upon the right regulatory environment so you can make this more
equitable.
So from basic education, you can support these programs.
They are well established through a number of international
organizations. The secondary and higher education is something
that is less well funded. There is our own exchange question
about our own ability to bring our knowledge and to transfer it
to build our own capacity, our Arab-speaking abilities up to
speed. These programs have atrophied internationally, not just
toward the region. Those could be supported somehow. English
language is something that is attractive regardless of the
views of the United States policy I believe.
I think the question of finding other ways for increasing
information through a free press, just as the Arab media have
essentially multiplied, I think there are ways, even within the
constraints on a free press, to try to encourage
professionalism and the flow of information in a way that could
be very constructive for longer-term reform and even economic
growth.
That is a very long answer, Senator. There is no easy way,
but I think there are proposals out there that could be
effective in addressing this on a country-by-country or a
regional basis within a country.
The Chairman. Dr. Richards.
Dr. Richards. I agree with most of what Dr. Cronin said.
Let me just add two additional small points.
First of all, it seems to me that the function of proposals
such as yours, should it come to be enacted, is not really even
so much the specific grants that are made. I know some friends
of mine who work for the World Bank tell me that it is not so
much our World Bank loans that cause change. The existence of
those loans really undergirds our policy dialog between the
bank and the government about what kind of policies we should
have.
So I think an analogy here may be appropriate with your
Trust proposal. It could be, under the right conditions, given
a favorable context with those two dimensions of the context
that I mentioned before, that in such a context it might
promote the kind of policy dialog, for example, on the
education front. Suppose, for example, that there were an Arab
government that was undergoing some kind of transition to a
genuine democracy where people at fairly high levels in the
government were energized and fully believed the findings of
the Arab Human Development Report of last year, of 2003, which
is all about, as you know, education. And suppose then through
that, they came up with some specific proposals and then came
to the Trust. Well, under those circumstances, many things
could be possible. Obviously, you would have to look at the
specific proposal and so forth, but it could easily do things
and we could promote a kind of a dialog and help.
But that is really all we can do. We have to let them make
proposals and work together with them, we, other members of the
G-8, and countries of the region, formulating these kinds of
proposals.
The Chairman. That is an important comment, that the Arab
report of 2003 does go into education. So if you were
attempting to find some chapter and verse upon which people in
some countries might want to act, it is an Arab proposal and
indigenous in that respect.
Dr. Cronin.
Dr. Cronin. Mr. Chairman, could I just add one other
thought that occurred to me? And that is that it would also
help with your Trust proposal if the Saudis, for instance, were
contributing to this, then that vehicle would be seen as a
positive way of working where those funds could go, as opposed
to sending charitable funds to radical madrassas which could be
exacerbating the problem rather than solving the issue.
The Chairman. I appreciate that comment. I would mention
that these endorsements I suppose are conditional and
superficial, but after the Brookings speech, Prince Bandar went
out of his way to indicate that he found a lot of merit in this
proposal. Since Saudis were named as a potential donor, why,
that was more significant perhaps, but interesting. Likewise,
Prince Hassan, whom we heard today, has been interested not
necessarily in my proposal but in this general area of trying
to think through how our government might be constructive. He
realizes, as we do, that it is very important that we do the
right thing if we are hoping to be successful. We certainly do
hope so, given all the challenges that you both have mentioned
and other witnesses.
Well, I thank you again for coming and for your patience in
an extensive hearing, one which I think has been helpful.
Dr. Richards. Thank you.
Dr. Cronin. Thank you very much.
The Chairman. Thank you very much, and the hearing is
adjourned.
[Whereupon, at 12:46 p.m., the committee adjourned, to
reconvene subject to the call of the Chair.]