[Senate Hearing 108-723]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
S. Hrg. 108-723
THE ROAD MAP: DETOURS AND DISENGAGEMENTS
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HEARING
BEFORE THE
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS
UNITED STATES SENATE
ONE HUNDRED EIGHTH CONGRESS
SECOND SESSION
__________
JULY 20, 2004
__________
Printed for the use of the Committee on Foreign Relations
Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.access.gpo.gov/congress/
senate
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COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS
RICHARD G. LUGAR, Indiana, Chairman
CHUCK HAGEL, Nebraska JOSEPH R. BIDEN, Jr., Delaware
LINCOLN CHAFEE, Rhode Island PAUL S. SARBANES, Maryland
GEORGE ALLEN, Virginia CHRISTOPHER J. DODD, Connecticut
SAM BROWNBACK, Kansas JOHN F. KERRY, Massachusetts
MICHAEL B. ENZI, Wyoming RUSSELL D. FEINGOLD, Wisconsin
GEORGE V. VOINOVICH, Ohio BARBARA BOXER, California
LAMAR ALEXANDER, Tennessee BILL NELSON, Florida
NORM COLEMAN, Minnesota JOHN D. ROCKEFELLER IV, West
JOHN E. SUNUNU, New Hampshire Virginia
JON S. CORZINE, New Jersey
Kenneth A. Myers, Jr., Staff Director
Antony J. Blinken, Democratic Staff Director
(ii)
?
C O N T E N T S
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Page
Biden, Hon. Joseph R., Jr., U.S. Senator from Delaware, opening
statement...................................................... 9
Dodd, Hon. Christopher J., U.S. Senator from Connecticut,
prepared statement............................................. 23
Lugar, Hon. Richard G., U.S. Senator from Indiana, opening
statement...................................................... 1
Miller, Mr. Aaron David, president, Seeds of Peace, Washington,
DC............................................................. 47
Prepared statement........................................... 51
Ross, Hon. Dennis, director and Ziegler Distinguished Fellow, The
Washington Institute for Near East Policy, Washington, DC...... 32
Prepared statement........................................... 38
Said Aly, Dr. Abdel Monem, visiting research fellow, Saban Center
for Middle East Policy, The Brookings Institution, Washington,
DC............................................................. 40
Prepared statement........................................... 43
Satterfield, Hon. David M., Deputy Assistant Secretary of State,
Bureau of Near Eastern Affairs, U.S. Department of State,
Washington, DC................................................. 3
Prepared statement........................................... 4
(iii)
THE ROAD MAP: DETOURS AND DISENGAGEMENTS
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TUESDAY, JULY 20, 2004
U.S. Senate,
Committee on Foreign Relations,
Washington, DC.
The committee met at 9:33 a.m., in room SD-419, Dirksen
Senate Office Building, Hon. Richard G. Lugar (chairman of the
committee), presiding. Present: Senators Lugar, Hagel, Chafee,
Brownback, Biden, Dodd, Boxer, and Bill Nelson.
opening statement of senator richard g. lugar, chairman
The Chairman. This hearing of the Senate Foreign Relations
Committee is called to order.
The committee meets today to examine the new dynamics in
the Middle East and their impact on the Israeli-Palestinian
peace process.
Last February, our committee held a hearing on the Road Map
that challenged the notion that progress toward peace could not
be achieved before the United States election in November.
Advancement of the peaceful two-state solution envisioned in
the Road Map is urgently needed by the Israelis and the
Palestinians and is critical to our own success in the global
war on terrorism. Al-Qaeda and other terrorist organizations
use the Israeli-Palestinian conflict to enlist fresh recruits
to conduct terrorism across the globe. It offers enormous
complications. We should continue to pursue without delay every
opportunity to resolve this longstanding conflict.
The violent Palestinian uprising against the Israelis since
September 2000 has cost both sides dearly. Nearly 1,000
Israelis and 3,000 Palestinians have died in the cycle of
violence during the past 3 years. The economies of both Israel
and the Palestinian Authority have been decimated. In Israel,
exports have fallen from $2.7 billion in 2000 to $1.3 billion
in 2003. The Palestinians' gross domestic product dropped 40
percent during the period, and unemployment rates have soared
from 15 percent to between 20 and 30 percent in the West Bank
and Gaza.
Recent developments in the region, however, have created
the possibility for movement in the peace process. Israel's
plan for unilateral withdrawal from Gaza and some West Bank
settlements has changed calculations about what is possible.
Egypt has taken a more active role in coordinating the
disengagement plan with the Palestinians. Other nations, such
as Jordan and Turkey, also have offered to facilitate the
process. Today we want to examine in detail how the United
States and the international community can take advantage of
the Israeli disengagement plan and other openings to make real
progress on the Road Map.
The United States must determine how we can strengthen
Israelis and Palestinians who are willing to support the
disengagement plan. Surveys indicate that 65 to 70 percent of
the Israeli population supports the disengagement plan, but
others in Israel consider it ``rewarding Palestinian
terrorism.'' Internal Israeli politics have been thrown into
upheaval over this question. Prime Minister Sharon has risked
his government to keep the disengagement plan alive, and is
trying to form a new coalition with the Labor party to gain the
Israeli parliament's approval of the plan. Internal conflicts
among the various Palestinian factions also are intensifying as
they cannot agree on who takes control when the Israelis leave.
The Egyptians, fearing instability on their border,
recently have renewed their efforts to work with the
Palestinians on a cease-fire, as well as to help restructure
Palestinian security forces. The Egyptians cannot succeed in
these efforts alone. The United States and other members of the
Quartet--the European Union, Russia, and the United Nations--
must do more to buttress Egyptian efforts and ensure that the
disengagement plan can be implemented. Jordan, Saudi Arabia,
and perhaps other Arab nations also should contribute funds or
personnel to help train and equip the Palestinians to take
authority over areas from which the Israelis withdraw.
A sustainable peace settlement is likely to require
additional international resources. We should explore how
organizations such as the World Bank might develop a
comprehensive settlement package as an incentive for the
Palestinians and Israelis to move forward with the Road Map. In
addition, the United States must work with our allies to stop
the flow of weapons and financing, particularly from Syria and
Iran, to those who continue suicide bombings and terror
attacks.
Although many recent developments have the potential to
help the peace process, the International Court of Justice's
non-binding advisory opinion condemning the Israeli security
fence is not one of them. This decision does not help move the
peace process forward, because it does not consider the
realities of terrorism on the ground.
We welcome today two distinguished panels to discuss
ongoing efforts to advance peace. First, we will hear from
Ambassador David Satterfield, the Deputy Assistant Secretary of
State for the Near Eastern Affairs Bureau. He was recently
confirmed by the Senate as our new Ambassador to Jordan.
On our second panel, we will hear from Ambassador Dennis
Ross, director and Ziegler Distinguished Fellow of the
Washington Institute for Near East Policy. Ambassador Ross has
written a new book on his experience as the chief Middle East
peace negotiator for both President George H.W. Bush and
President Bill Clinton, and we look forward to his insights.
Also on our second panel, we welcome Dr. Abdel Monem Said Aly,
director of the Al-Ahram Center for Political and Strategic
Studies in Cairo and a visiting fellow at the Saban Center for
Middle East Policy at the Brookings Institution; and Mr. Aaron
Miller, president of Seeds of Peace and formerly Senior Advisor
to the Secretary of State for Arab-Israeli negotiations.
We look forward to these insights and recommendations of
our distinguished witnesses. I will call now upon the first of
these, Ambassador Satterfield. Would you please proceed.
STATEMENT OF HON. DAVID M. SATTERFIELD, DEPUTY ASSISTANT
SECRETARY OF STATE, BUREAU OF NEAR EASTERN AFFAIRS, U.S.
DEPARTMENT OF STATE
Ambassador Satterfield. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I would
like permission to have my written remarks entered into the
record, and I have a brief statement I would like to make.
The Chairman. Your comments will be published in full, and
that will be true for each of our witnesses today.
Ambassador Satterfield. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I am very glad to have this quite timely opportunity to
speak with members of the committee. I have just returned from
a trip to the region where I met with Egyptian, Jordanian,
Israeli, and Palestinian officials to discuss those issues
which you raised in your opening remarks. It is clear, as you
have noted, that we are, once again, at a potential watershed
moment in the Middle East peace process. We are indeed seeing
more positive activity than we have witnessed for almost a
year, as Israel refines its own plan to withdraw from Gaza, and
the international community strives to ensure that this
withdrawal leaves Gaza able to move forward in an orderly
fashion toward economic viability and prosperity and the
critical issues of security and political reform.
Security, of course, Mr. Chairman, is the No. 1 issue. The
increasingly chaotic security and political situation in Gaza
over the past few days only underscores, even more strongly
than before, the need for genuine, not merely rhetorical steps
for security reform and leadership transformation in the
Palestinian Authority. Cosmetic changes in leadership, cosmetic
changes in the structure of security services are not enough.
What counts, the only thing that matters, are changes on the
ground.
In order to reestablish, or to establish for the first time
in a great while, true law and order in Gaza, in order to put a
lasting stop to terror and violence, the Palestinian Authority
must consolidate the security forces under a single, empowered
and accountable leadership and propose credible clean
candidates to head those services.
Resolving the Israeli-Palestinian conflict remains one of
this administration's highest foreign policy priorities. Prime
Minister Sharon's plan to disengage from Gaza offers a real
opportunity, a genuine chance, to restart progress on the Road
Map and move the parties forward toward realization of
President Bush's vision of two states, Israel and Palestine,
living side by side in peace and security.
As plans for Gaza disengagement move forward, the issue
before the United States, the Quartet, and the broader
international and regional communities are how to prepare the
Palestinians to take the necessary steps to ensure the smooth
and orderly transition in Gaza so necessary for lasting success
not only during but the day after disengagement.
Egypt is indeed working, Mr. Chairman, very closely with
both Israelis and Palestinians and planning and preparing for
the quite difficult security aspects of Gaza withdrawal, and as
I noted at the outset, recent events make the necessity of
these preparations crystal clear. Both sides, Israelis and
Palestinians, have welcomed Egypt's helpful role, and the
United States and the Quartet have expressed our full support
for Egypt's engagement.
The international community is focusing on continuing
efforts to provide assistance and to promote Palestinian
reform. Although Palestinian progress in these areas has been
extremely slow, there have been some successes, significant
successes, in the areas of fiscal and budget accountability and
transparency, and the Palestinian Authority has announced its
intention to begin phased municipal elections before the end of
the year. We are ready to assist the Palestinian Authority in
the preparations necessary to hold these free and fair
elections.
International aid efforts to the Palestinians continue to
be crucial. The humanitarian plight of the Palestinian people,
as you noted, Mr. Chairman, is very real and has in some cases
been exacerbated by the building of the Israeli separation
barrier. Israel has the unquestioned right to defend itself.
However, we do have concerns. When the construction of this
barrier appears to prejudge final borders, it leads to
confiscation of Palestinian property or imposes humanitarian
hardships on Palestinian lives and livelihoods. The recent
Israeli High Court of Justice ruling that portions of the
barriers route around Jerusalem must be altered to ease those
hardships on Palestinians show that Israel itself recognizes
these issues. This ruling is binding on the Israeli Government
unlike the recent International Court of Justice opinion to
which you referred.
Gaza disengagement, rather than the Road Map per se, has
been the focus of attention since the beginning of this year.
That disengagement, along with practical steps to reform the
institutions of the Palestinian Authority, has the real
potential to reenergize the peace process and get the sides
back on track. Disengagement, conducted properly with
appropriate support from the regional and international
community, does offer a chance to move the parties back to a
political process closer to realization of the ultimate goal to
which the Road Map is a path and to which each side has
committed themselves, two states living in peace and security.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I will be happy to take your
questions.
[The prepared statement of Ambassador Satterfield follows:]
Prepared Statement of Amb. David M. Satterfield
Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I'm glad to have this timely opportunity
to speak with members of the Committee, as I was just in the region ten
days ago. We are--once again--at a potential watershed moment in the
Middle East peace process. We are seeing more activity and movement
than we have seen for almost a year, as Israel refines its plan to
withdraw from Gaza; and the Palestinians, along with the international
community and regional partners such as Egypt, strive to ensure that
this withdrawal leaves Gaza in a position to progress in an orderly
fashion towards economic vitality, and security and political reform.
Resolving the Israeli-Palestinian conflict remains one of this
Administration's highest foreign policy priorities. Prime Minister
Sharon's plan to disengage from Gaza offers a real opportunity to
restart the Road Map and move the parties toward realization of
President Bush's vision of two states, Israeli and Palestinian, living
side by side in peace and security. For the first time ever, Israelis
proposing to evacuate settlements from the West Bank and Gaza. It is an
historic decision for Israel, and one President Bush fully supports.
But it needs to be done in such a way that it is consistent with a
process that leads to peace and security for Israel, and to a viable,
contiguous, democratic state for the Palestinians.
According to the disengagement plan, all settlements and certain
military installations would be removed from Gaza, and four settlements
would be removed from the northern West Bank. The Israeli Cabinet has
approved this plan in principle. I don't want to underestimate the
domestic difficulties still facing Prime Minister Sharon: he is
currently engaged in discussions to secure the political base necessary
to proceed with disengagement.
As-plans for Gaza disengagement move forward, the issue before the
U.S., the Quartet, and the broader international community is how to
prepare the Palestinians to take the necessary steps to ensure a smooth
and orderly transition in Gaza. We are engaged in intensive planning
and discussion of practical matters of security, Palestinian political
reform, and economic and humanitarian assistance.
Security, of course, is the number one issue that needs to be
addressed. The Quartet envoys met with Palestinian Prime Minister Qurei
two weeks ago, and stressed to him the need to take concrete action,
particularly on security, in order to seize the opportunity presented
by an Israeli withdrawal from Gaza. In all honesty, I must tell you
that there has been very little preparation or movement on the part of
the Palestinian Authority to take these steps. But we will continue to
push them, because as Israeli withdrawal from Gaza draws closer, it
becomes increasingly vital that the PA be prepared to take over and
maintain law and order and stability in Gaza.
Egypt is working closely with both the Israelis and Palestinians in
planning and preparing for Gaza withdrawal, particularly the difficult
security aspects. Both sides have welcomed Egypt's helpful role, and
the United States and the Quartet have expressed full support as well.
The Egyptians have been very clear with the Palestinians on their
expectations for security reform, and have pushed them to take those
steps quickly. Egypt has also committed to provide training and
assistance, including on the ground in Gaza, to the restructured
Palestinian security services. In addition to this, Egypt has worked
closely with Israel on the critical questions of Gaza border security.
We are pleased at the level of cooperation the two sides have shown, at
both the political and operational levels, and the trend is definitely
going in the right direction. While recent cooperation between the two
sides has been good, there is much more that needs to be done.
The Quartet envoys also met this month with international
representatives of the Local Aid Coordination Committee and the Task
Force on Palestinian Reform to discuss their continuing efforts to
provide assistance and promote Palestinian reform; and preparations are
underway for a meeting in September of the Ad Hoc Liaison Committee of
major donors to assess Palestinian Authority progress on reforms.
Again, Palestinian progress in this area has been extremely slow,
although there have been some notable successes in the areas of fiscal
accountability and transparency, and in the implementation of a direct-
deposit payment system for all PA security service salaries. The PA has
announced its intention to begin municipal elections sometime before
the end of the year, and the U.S., along with the Quartet, is ready to
assist the PA in the preparations necessary to hold free and fair
elections. We would like to see the established independent election
commission play a role in organizing and regulating this election
process.
Given the continued desperate state of the Palestinian economy in
Gaza and the West Bank, international aid efforts are crucial. The
humanitarian plight of the Palestinian people is very real and has, in
some cases, been exacerbated by the building of the Israeli separation
barrier. Israel has the unquestioned right to defend itself, however we
do have concerns when the construction of the barrier appears to
prejudge final borders, leads to confiscating Palestinian property, or
imposes further hardship on Palestinians. Israel itself is starting to
address this issue: the Israeli High Court of Justice ruled last month
that portions of the barrier's route around Jerusalem must be altered
to ameliorate the hardship it imposes on Palestinians. This ruling is
binding on the Israeli government, unlike the recent International
Court of Justice opinion that found Israel's separation barrier to be
illegal. We have said from the beginning that this referral to the ICJ
was inappropriate and was likely only to impede efforts towards a
negotiated peace between Israelis and Palestinians. Our position on
that has certainly not changed, and we are now eager to refocus
attention where it should be--on Gaza withdrawal and practical steps to
reform the institutions of the Palestinian Authority. These are the
types of efforts that will reenergize the peace process and get the
Road Map back on track.
It is true that the Road Map has been stalled, with neither party
having fulfilled its commitments under Phase I. Most crucially, the
Palestinian Authority has not put a stop to violence and terror.
Without an end to brutal acts such as suicide bombings, there can be no
progress towards peace. Israel also has obligations under the Road Map,
and has promised to fulfill the commitments Prime Minister Sharon made
to President Bush at Aqaba last year to dismantle unauthorized outposts
and establish parameters for a freeze on new settlement construction.
The Deputy National Security Advisor met with PM Sharon last week in
Israel, and Sharon reiterated his determination to dismantle
unauthorized outposts and take steps to ease the humanitarian situation
of the Palestinian population.
Gaza disengagement, rather than the Road Map per Se, has been the
focus of attention since the beginning of the year. Disengagement
indeed offers a real opportunity to make progress in the seemingly
endless quest for peace in the Middle East. However, it is also an
opportunity to move back to a political process. Israeli disengagement
from Gaza, done properly and with appropriate support from the
international community, has the potential to move both parties to the
conflict closer to realization of the ultimate goal to which the Road
Map is a path: two states, living side by side in peace and security.
Thank you. I'll be happy to take your questions.
The Chairman. Thank you very much, Ambassador Satterfield.
We have two distinguished panels today and therefore we
will have rounds of questions with both. I would suggest with
our first panel that we limit ourselves to 8 minutes this
morning. Others may join us, and if there are additional
questions, why, members may have a second chance.
I will begin the questioning, Ambassador Satterfield, by
asking you to try to sketch out for me and for others how this
business of disengagement may leave the Palestinian territory.
When the Israelis move out of areas who will be in charge? How
can efficient, stable, secure governance occur?
One answer is that the Palestinian Authority will do that.
People will come in and assume their proper roles and provide
this security. As a result, some would say that this is not
that complex a question. The two-state situation happens. One
state on one side and the other state on the other.
But for some reason, there are a good number of witnesses--
we heard some in February--who do not believe that
disengagement is this simple. This is why the question of Egypt
or other nations is injected. For a while some other nations
that are friendly to the Palestinian Authority may have to
serve in a trusteeship function, although clearly with
recognition that they will leave, and that they are not there
as permanent trustees. They are there helping people for the
moment. This may help shore up a Palestinian group that can, in
fact, negotiate a two-state settlement, or a solution to the
crisis, as opposed to what is often suggested on the
Palestinian side, that there is no stable group that is really
able to effect decisions, to come to agreements.
Now, in your own mind's eye, how do you see this working in
an optimum way? As Israeli settlers withdraw--and as we have
both indicated, we applaud the courage of the Prime Minister in
moving in that direction--it is a very controversial issue in
Israel. At the same time, apparently that is the way things are
going to move. How do things become secure territorially and
stable and strong, so there is a negotiating partner to make an
agreement?
Ambassador Satterfield. Mr. Chairman, there are three
principle issues that need to be addressed to ensure that both
the conduct of disengagement or withdrawal from Gaza, whether
on the military or civilian settler side, is successful, and as
or more importantly, to ensure that the day after disengagement
and withdrawal, what emerges in Gaza is a stable, sustaining
entity from a security, political, and an economic standpoint.
Those three areas, security, political structures, economic
structures, are the critical areas of focus that we, the
Quartet, and the international community have been focused upon
with the Palestinians, with the Israelis, and on the security
issue, with the principal actor right now, Egypt.
To take security first, because that is the primary issue,
that challenges, the successful stable conduct of disengagement
and the day-after disengagement, it is quite clear that for
Israel's unilateral decision to withdraw from Gaza to be a
success, success in its conduct, success in its results, there
has to be a stable environment on the ground. We very obviously
do not have that stable environment today. That was true before
the events of this past weekend. It is certainly true
following.
There needs to be a comprehensive end to violence and
terror. There cannot continue to be targeting of Israelis,
whether in Gaza or the West Bank or in any other points, if
this process is to unfold to the benefit of both Israelis and
Palestinians. And we do see it to the benefit of both sides.
Egypt has been engaged as an interlocutor with the
Palestinians, as well as with the Israelis, to try to see what
is necessary, what it can do to bring about that establishment
or reestablishment of security, bringing about of a
comprehensive end to violence and terror through its work with
the Palestinian factions. And in its work with the Palestinian
Authority and its leadership, including Arafat, Egypt has
sought to pass the exact message which we and others clearly in
the Quartet have been passing.
For the Palestinians' own sake today and for their future,
for the sake of the goal of two states, which the President has
espoused, there does need to be an end to violence and terror.
For that to happen, the Palestinians have to take
responsibility at long last for the situation on the ground.
The Egyptians have endorsed and have strongly advocated the
restructuring of Palestinian services from the many disparate
branches that exist today into three primary services, a civil
police, a national security force or internal security force,
and an intelligence service, and to have clean leadership,
which then responds to an empowered civil leadership in charge.
Now, that sounds very simple, Mr. Chairman, but that has been a
major challenge which we, the international community, the
Quartet have been advocating unsuccessfully for quite a long
while now. We very much hope that Egypt's efforts bring about
the success that is so necessary on this issue.
Egypt is prepared to do more than simply talk with both
sides. Egypt is prepared to deploy forces to its side of the
Gaza border to help address the issue of smuggling more
effectively than has been done in the past. Egypt is also
prepared--and both Palestinians and Israelis have welcomed this
offer--to send trainers and advisors to Gaza itself once
disengagement is being conducted. And these are very important
steps on offer from the Egyptian Government. We wish them the
best. But Palestinians, at the end of the day, Mr. Chairman,
have to respond.
Now, on the political side, there does, indeed, need to be
a Palestinian leadership in Gaza which is capable and competent
to assume control of events there as and after withdrawal of
Israeli forces and with Israeli settlers occurs. Those
structures do not exist today or they exist only in fragmentary
and nascent form.
We and our partners in the international community have
been strongly urging on the Palestinians for years now the
institutional and structural reforms necessary to prepare
Palestinians not just for the ultimate goal of statehood, but
for assumption of responsibility over their own affairs in
areas where Israeli forces have withdrawn, as is the case now
pending in Gaza and in the West Bank. And we will continue to
do what we can to focus Palestinians and encourage and support
Palestinians in that reform and leadership transformation
process.
Now, the final but by no means least important issue here
is the question of economic stability in Gaza. The
international donor community has been quite generous in the
support that it has offered Palestinians over the years, but
that support for the past 3 years has been largely focused on
immediate humanitarian issues. We need to go back to providing
support in a structured fashion for long- and medium-term
infrastructure development, for the long-term economic
viability of Gaza and the West Bank. We will be engaging with
the donor community over the time ahead, particularly with the
World Bank and the Ad Hoc Liaison Committee, which groups
principal donors, to see that these efforts reach fruition. We
are contemplating, Mr. Chairman, a meeting of the Ad Hoc
Liaison Committee at the end of September to continue the focus
of donors on these issues. If the situation on the ground
permits from a security and a political standpoint, we would
look at a major donor effort either at the end of this year or
the beginning of next year to provide the necessary assistance
in a structured, accountable manner for the Palestinians.
The Chairman. How many people are in Gaza, and how many
will be there after the Israeli settlers leave?
Ambassador Satterfield. There are approximately 7,000
Israeli settlers in Gaza today. The Prime Minister has proposed
a complete withdrawal of all Israeli settlers and all Israeli
settlements. What the disposition is of specific physical
settlement infrastructure remains to be discussed and remains
to be determined.
The Chairman. But in the rest of Gaza, how many people? Are
there other people or have the 7,000 occupied the whole
territory?
Ambassador Satterfield. The total is really civilian
settlers present. There are a number of IDF deployments in
Gaza. That is a number that fluctuates from time to time. The
Prime Minister has said that in principle Israel would like to
withdraw all of its military forces from Gaza. Whether in fact
forces remain in a particular area adjacent to the Egyptian
border or not is largely, Mr. Chairman, a product of what
security arrangements are ultimately put in place.
The Chairman. I thank you.
I want to recognize now the distinguished ranking member of
the committee, Senator Biden, for his opening statement.
OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR JOSEPH R. BIDEN, JR.,
RANKING MEMBER
Senator Biden. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I would ask
unanimous consent that my entire statement be in the record. I
apologize. I was coming from another meeting.
The Chairman. It will be published in full.
Senator Biden. Mr. Chairman, our hearings, to state the
obvious--and I imagine the witness has already indicated it--
take place in the backdrop of new turmoil in Gaza within the
Palestinian leadership. A power struggle is underway, as
competing factors vie for control ahead of Israel's withdrawal
within the next year. And another Palestinian Prime Minister
has come close to following on the heals of Abu Mazen by
tendering his resignation because of Arafat's unwillingness to
cede control, especially in security areas. Today reports
indicated that he has reluctantly rescinded his resignation.
The one bright spot possibly in an otherwise bleak picture
is that Egypt is trying to prevent a security and political
vacuum from emerging by demanding, as our witness has
indicated, a consolidation of Palestinian security services
under a new leadership, offering to train those forces and to
station monitors in Gaza, and planning to beef up security
along the border, and promoting a cease-fire and a dialog
between the Palestinian factions.
But in order to move forward with its commitment, my
understanding is that Israel--and this is what I would like to
talk to the witness about at the appropriate moment--has three
basic demands, as I understand them: first, that there be a
complete Israeli withdrawal from Gaza and that includes the
security forces; second, that the Palestinians and Israelis
agree on how to prevent provocative acts from leading to a
cycle of escalation that would undermine Egypt's role; and
third, that there is light at the end of the tunnel by firmly
tying disengagement to implementation of the Road Map. I would
like to hear from the Secretary on how the administration views
these Egyptian ideas, assuming I have accurately portrayed
them.
Mr. Chairman, a solution in the Middle East is as obvious
as it is elusive. We all know that any viable peace agreement
will have a few key components. Israel will have to abandon
most of the settlements on the West Bank and the Palestinians
will not be able to exercise their right of return but to
Palestine. That, it seems to me, is the core of the bargain.
More than two-thirds of the people on both sides consistently
say that they favor a two-state solution, but the problem is
neither side seems to believe the other is committed to the
means to accomplish that solution.
Events in recent days demonstrate that the main obstacle to
peace, at least in my view, is the absence of a responsible
Palestinian leadership. But the unprecedented challenge to
Arafat's leadership may offer--and I would like to talk about
this as well--a possible opening to advance key political and
security reforms which are critical to getting the peace
process back on track.
Last year our country and Israel missed another
opportunity, in my view, by not supporting Prime Minister Abu
Mazen more actively. Clearly he was prepared to challenge
Arafat, but at the end of the day, he was discredited by his
inability to deliver any improvement in the lives of ordinary
Palestinians. That suited Mr. Arafat, in my view, just fine for
it seems to me that he seems to thrive on the suffering of his
own people.
Mr. Chairman, the direction the Israeli-Palestinian
conflict takes will have a direct bearing on the key strategic
issues our country faces from the war on terrorism, to the
promotion of democracy, to success in Iraq. And the stakes are
very high.
Yet, I do not see any commensurate level of urgency or
sustained and consistent involvement by the Bush
administration. My hopes were raised last year when President
Bush traveled to the Middle East and put his personal prestige
on the line. He appointed a diplomat to ``ride herd on the
process.'' He cajoled. He rallied, and yes, he even bullied.
And I supported him in all his efforts. For a few short months,
there was hope, at least in my view, of progress, but then the
interest level seemed to wane in the Middle East, which
presents a formidable challenge to even full-fledged peace
efforts that overwhelmed what soon became a half-hearted
effort.
Ever since, instead of American leadership creating new
opportunities, events on the ground have driven our policy.
Prime Minister Sharon took a bold initiative with his
disengagement plan. Egypt steps in and works on a plan to fill
the vacuum. And where is American diplomacy? It is not as if we
have the luxury of time.
Iraq's new government is struggling to establish its
authority in the face of violence that continues unabated.
Democracy promotion in the Middle East appears to be stuck as
the two key regional players, Egypt and Saudi Arabia, stayed
away from the G-8 summit, and the terrorists have found a gold
mine of recruiting in the discontent and anger that spans the
Arab and Muslim worlds.
It seems to me we have to view the Arab-Israeli conflict in
the context of this volatile strategic climate, and it explains
why making progress has never been more important. I am not
suggesting there is any easy solution to the Arab-Israeli
conflict. If there were, it would be solved by now. Nor am I
suggesting that American leadership alone can solve it. The
Arab states, the Palestinians, our European friends, and the
Israelis must step up to the plate, and they have not
sufficiently done so in my view. But only American leadership
can synchronize those efforts and begin to move this gigantic
rock up the hill again.
Promoting peace and securing Israel requires hard work day
in and day out, as our witnesses can attest. And benign
neglect, punctuated by episodic engagements, imperils America's
strategic interest in the region. We have no choice but to be
involved and the central element of my questions today to all
the witnesses will be to what degree and how should we be
involved. What should we, the United States, be doing more
proactively, if anything, that we are not doing now?
I thank the witness. I apologize for not being here at the
opening of his testimony, and I look forward to hearing his
answers to questions. I thank you.
[The opening statement of Senator Biden follows:]
Opening Statement of Senator Joseph R. Biden, Jr.
Mr. Chairman, thank you for calling this hearing. I look forward to
Secretary Satterfield's testimony.
I'm also eager to hear from the second panel. Ambassador Ross led
American diplomacy on the peace process for a decade. Aaron Miller was
his colleague in that effort and continues to promote conflict
resolution through the important work of Seeds of Peace. And Dr. Said
Aly has been a long-time voice of reason as head of one of the Arab
world's most respected institutions.
Our hearing takes place against the backdrop of new turmoil in the
Gaza Strip and within the Palestinian leadership. A power struggle is
underway as competing factions vie for control ahead of Israel's
planned withdrawal next year.
And another Palestinian Prime Minister has come close to following
on the heels of Abu Mazen by tendering his resignation because Chairman
Arafat is unwilling to cede control, especially in the area of
security. Today, reports indicate that he has reluctantly rescinded his
resignation.
The one bright spot in an otherwise bleak picture is that Egypt is
trying to prevent a security and political vacuum from emerging by
demanding a consolidation of Palestinian security services under new
leadership, offering to train these forces and to station monitors in
Gaza, planning to beef up security along the border, and promoting a
cease-fire and dialog between Palestinian factions.
But in order to move forward with its commitment, my understanding
is that Egypt has three basic demands. First, that there be a complete
Israeli withdrawal from Gaza. Second, that Palestinians and Israelis
agree on how to prevent provocative acts from leading to a cycle of
escalation that would undermine the Egyptian role. And third, that
there is light at the end of the tunnel by firmly tying disengagement
to implementation of the Road Map. I'd like to hear from Secretary
Satterfield how the administration views these Egyptian ideas.
Mr. Chairman, the solution in the Middle East is as obvious as it
is elusive. We all know that any viable peace agreement will have a few
key components--Israel will have to abandon most settlements in the
West Bank, and Palestinians will NOT be able to exercise the right of
return but to Palestine. That, it seems to me, is the core of the
bargain.
More than two-thirds of the people on both sides consistently say
that they favor a two-state solution. The problem is that neither side
believes the other one means it.
Events in recent days demonstrate that the main obstacle to peace
is the absence of responsible Palestinian leadership. But the
unprecedented challenge to Chairman Arafat's leadership may offer a
possible opening to advance key political and security reforms which
are critical to getting the peace process back on track.
Last year, our country and Israel missed another opportunity, in my
view, by not supporting Prime Minister Abu Mazen more actively.
Clearly, he was prepared to challenge Arafat, but at the end of the day
he was discredited by his inability to deliver any improvement in the
lives of ordinary Palestinians. That suited Mr. Arafat fine--for he
seems to thrive on the suffering of his own people.
Mr. Chairman, the direction the Israeli-Palestinian conflict takes
will have a direct bearing on the key strategic issues our country
faces--from the war on terrorism, to the promotion of democracy, to
success in Iraq. The stakes are very high.
Yet I don't see a commensurate level of urgency, nor sustained and
consistent involvement from the Bush administration. My hopes were
raised last year when the President traveled to the Middle East and put
his personal prestige on the line. He appointed a diplomat to ``ride
herd.'' He cajoled, he rallied, and, yes, he even bullied. And I
supported him in all his efforts.
For a few short months there was hope and progress. But then, the
interest level seemed to wane, and the Middle East--which presents a
formidable challenge to even full-fledged peace efforts--overwhelmed
what soon became a half-hearted effort.
Ever since, instead of American leadership creating new
opportunities, events on the ground have driven our policy. Prime
Minister Sharon took a bold initiative with the Disengagement Plan;
Egypt steps in and works on a plan to fill the vacuum. Where is
American diplomacy?
It is not as if we have the luxury of time. Iraq's new government
is struggling to establish its authority in the face of violence that
continues unabated. Democracy promotion in the Middle East appears to
be stuck as two regional players--Egypt and Saudi Arabia--stayed away
from the G-8 summit. And the terrorists have found a goldmine of
recruiting in the discontent and anger that spans the Arab and Muslim
worlds.
We have to view the Arab-Israeli conflict in the context of this
volatile strategic climate. And it explains why making progress has
never been more important.
I am not suggesting that there is an easy solution to the Arab-
Israeli conflict. If there were, it would be resolved by now. Nor am I
suggesting that American leadership alone can solve it. The Arab
states, the Palestinians and our European friends must step up to the
plate, and they haven't thus far, in my view. And the Israelis will
have to meet their responsibilities as well. But only American
leadership can help synchronize these efforts and begin to move this
gigantic rock up the hill again.
Promoting peace and securing Israel require hard work--day in and
day out--as our witnesses can attest. Benign neglect punctuated by
episodic engagement imperils American strategic interests in the
region. We have no choice but to be involved.
The, central question I will ask of all the witnesses is: to what
degree and how should we be involved. What should we be doing pro-
actively that we are not doing now.
The Chairman. Thank you very much, Senator Biden.
Senator Chafee.
Senator Chafee. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Welcome.
In your statement, Mr. Secretary, you said that ``Israeli
disengagement from Gaza, done properly and with appropriate
support from the international community, has the potential to
move both parties to the conflict closer to realization of the
ultimate goal to which the Road Map is a path: two states,
living side by side in peace and security.''
Now we have a ruling by the International Court--and I know
the position of the administration. It should not even have
been there. But nonetheless, we have our allies, Norway, the
UK, Holland, China, Russia, all who sit on this court, advising
us to be more involved in the construction or the route of this
barrier.
How do you reconcile your urging us to get the support from
the international community in your statement in order to move
the Road Map forward while not adhering to what they are saying
on the International Court?
Ambassador Satterfield. Senator, if I could respond first
to Senator Biden's question. You had asked in the closing part
of your question, Senator, what would we do, what should we do
to best advance this process? What we should do is continue to
articulate, as clearly, as explicitly as we can, directly to
the parties through private conversation and publicly, the
vision that lays out there for both sides of peace, lasting
peace, and of genuine, enduring security and the pathway that
takes them to that goal. We have done so. We have articulated
not only the goal, two states, but the Road Map to that goal, a
pragmatic, practical approach which requires both sides to
engage in phased and sequential obligations and
responsibilities, both to each other and to the achievement of
the ultimate objective of a lasting, sustainable peace.
Now, the parties themselves do, indeed, have the primary
responsibility for taking the steps, and they are painful
steps. They are steps that require courage and sustained
leadership in order to be meaningful, in order to work. They
have the prime responsibility, but we do have to remain
engaged. Our diplomatic engagement has not wavered over the
past months, over the past year since the President's
disengagement in Aqaba and Sharm el Sheikh. We have been in
touch not only directly with the parties on a continuing basis.
In the course of the last month, Assistant Secretary Burns,
Deputy National Security Advisor Hadley and I have all traveled
to the region and there will be further such travel in the
weeks and months ahead. But we have also remained engaged with
our international and regional partners.
Senator Biden. Was there a reason why Sharon did not see
you?
Ambassador Satterfield. The meeting was not sought. This
was an operational meeting, Senator, to meet with Palestinian
leadership both individually and with a Quartet combined
meeting and to talk about technical issues relating to
withdrawal with Israeli officials, and no other reason than
that.
We continue to be engaged with the international community,
with our Quartet partners to assure a unified voice on the need
for security steps, on the need for reform, and with Israel our
message has been very clear. Israel too has obligations and
responsibilities, humanitarian and political, including on the
settlements issue, both steps toward a settlement freeze and
the elimination of settlement outposts.
These are not easy issues, Mr. Senator, as you referred to.
They are difficult. But they need to be advanced because if
Gaza withdrawal is to be successful, it must occur in a
context, not alone. It cannot be Gaza first and Gaza last. Gaza
withdrawal, as we have emphasized and will continue to
emphasize, must be seen squarely in the context of return to
progress on the Road Map toward the two-state vision, and we
see that as possible. We see it as achievable, but it is going
to require efforts by the Palestinians on security and
leadership transformation. It is going to require efforts by
Israel in Gaza and the West Bank that address the humanitarian,
political, and economic issues that are so critical to the
goals we are trying to see achieved.
You have asked first, though, about Egyptian contributions
to this policy. We believe Egypt is indeed a key player here on
security, and we are committed to supporting Egypt's role. What
does Egypt need? Egypt needs a secure environment in Gaza. It
needs an environment in which whatever advisors or trainers it
sends can do their work free of attack, free of danger. That is
a goal we all support.
The answer on how you achieve that situation is a
meaningful cease-fire, a meaningful end to violence and terror,
an end to the kinds of actions that precipitate a continued
destruction of lives, continued destruction of property. We see
it as doable. And Egypt is working in these months, prior to
withdrawal, to see that that is achieved.
The Chairman. Let me now just sort out the situation for a
moment. I appreciate those excellent responses to my
colleague's questions. We will restore to Senator Chafee his
full time, and then just for the sake of argument, I will then
recognize Senator Boxer, Senator Dodd, and Senator Biden on
this side for additional questions, with Senator Hagel,
intervening between these folks.
Senator Chafee. They will follow me.
The Chairman. Yes. Now, Senator Chafee, you are restored to
your rightful place.
Senator Chafee. Should I repeat my question? No.
Ambassador Satterfield. Senator, we indeed need the support
of the international community. We need it in two different
ways. We need their positive engagement and support as we move
ahead, to speak with a unified voice, not many disparate
voices, about the need for the critical performance by the
Palestinians on security and leadership. We need their support
in our engagement with Israel in a way that encourages Israel
to take the necessary steps to move forward. The Quartet is the
embodiment of the international will on these issues, and we
have been remarkably successful in our engagement with the
Quartet over the course of the past 2 years in trying to close
off the different voices, the disparate voices that so often
led to confusion.
But we need the international community's support in
another way. We need an avoidance of the sorts of unprofitable,
unconstructive efforts such as the International Court of
Justice ruling that only complicate efforts to see peace
achieved. Our position on the ICJ consideration of this case
has been made very clear, and we had support from our critical
partners in the international community on this before the
court took this issue. We do not believe it is an appropriate
issue to be addressed by the ICJ. The United States will not
support any purported endorsement of that ICJ ruling and we are
working with our partners, both in the Quartet and more
generally, to mobilize a support against an unhelpful
resolution in the General Assembly or an unhelpful,
counterproductive resolution that may be brought to the
Security Council.
You had raised, Senator, the issue of the participation of
judges from those countries that we have relied upon for
support in this process. My understanding, Senator--and I will
defer to our legal experts on this--is that those judges, once
they are appointed to the ICJ, function in an independent
fashion which does not necessarily reflect the foreign policy
and the national policy of their countries of origin.
Senator Chafee. Going back to Senator Biden's statement
that a year ago, almost exactly a year ago, there was so much
optimism coming out of Aqaba--and you alluded to it yourself--
and Abu Mazen coming here, and as Senator Biden said, we did
not deliver for him so he could deliver to his people. I
remember him coming a year ago and saying please help me, and
he had three issues, the settlements, the continued expansion
of the settlements, the construction of the barrier, the route
of the barrier--it is not the construction. I want to make that
clear. It is the route--and also the holding of prisoners
without charges.
At that time there was the cease-fire, the hudna, if you
will, a 7-week period of no violence, relatively no violence.
And now the International Court which is, as you keep
mentioning, the Quartet--here they are--the United Nations, the
European Community. Here we all are, and they are 14 to 1
urging us to address the route of this barrier. It seems to be
still difficult for us to make progress without taking this
ruling into consideration. I know the Israeli court has ruled,
but if it is still going to be built beyond the Green Line, I
think that is where the controversy is.
What is our official position on that, the building of it
outside of the Green Line?
Ambassador Satterfield. Senator, we have expressed strong
concern over the routing of the fence where it impacts
humanitarian or human issues, the lives of Palestinians, the
livelihoods of Palestinians, where it produces the confiscation
of Palestinian land, and when that course impacts, prejudges
the outcome of permanent status resolutions.
The Israeli High Court judgment is a significant event. It
is being taken quite seriously by the Government of Israel, and
while I would defer to them, in terms of the ultimate choices
which they are now forced to make with respect to the routing
of the fence, our hope is that the High Court judgment produces
changes on the ground which rectify, which address these
concerns which we and others have addressed for so long. Israel
does, indeed, have the right to defend itself, including
through construction of a security barrier. But where the
course of that barrier has the impacts that I described, there
are real concerns here, which the administration will continue
to address.
We do not see that the ICJ judgment is a constructive
judgment. Indeed, we have significant problems on the substance
of the judgment and the manner in which the court took on this
issue. We believe the Israeli High Court, its decisions, and
the response of the Israeli Government to those decisions
offers the best potential for serious addressing of this
question.
Senator Chafee. That all having been said, we could argue
some of those points, but if we are going to get the
international community, as you say in your statement, on our
side, is this not a factor? If we are going to have the
Quartet, if we are going to have the international community
helping us here, whether it is the Egyptians or anybody else
that might not have been part of this ruling, do you not think
we have to be stronger on the route of this barrier?
Ambassador Satterfield. I believe, Senator, we have been
quite strong on the routing of the barrier. Our concerns have
been made very clear by all U.S. Government interlocutors to
the Government of Israel. They understand the President is
concerned over the routing of the barrier and its impact both
on permanent status negotiations and on Palestinian lives.
We see the ICJ judgment, though, as only affording an
opening for unhelpful, provocative resolutions in the General
Assembly and potentially in the Council, which have very little
to do with advancing the cause of peace. We are confident that
appropriate steps will be taken by the Government of Israel to
address the routing-related issues, but we are not prepared,
Senator, to support in any way the findings of the ICJ in this
regard.
Senator Chafee. Even if that means lack of participation on
the Road Map.
Ambassador Satterfield. Senator, I do not believe in
practice, indeed I am quite confident in practice, that
whatever positions may ultimately be chosen in General Assembly
debate or Council debate on this particular issue, the ICJ
judgment, that we will continue to have the engagement and
support of our critical partners in the region and in the
international community through the Quartet and elsewhere for
the Road Map.
Senator Chafee. I have got a few seconds left. Do you
know--and maybe I am putting you on the spot--where in specific
do you take exception to the court's ruling?
Ambassador Satterfield. Two different issues primarily. One
is procedural. For the court to take up an issue----
Senator Chafee. OK. Beyond that. I know that argument.
Anything beyond that?
Ambassador Satterfield. On the substance, we believe this
is essentially a political issue to be resolved by agreement of
the parties in negotiations, not for resolution by a judicial
council or judicial body.
Senator Chafee. Thank you.
The Chairman. Thank you very much, Senator Chafee.
Senator Boxer.
Senator Boxer. Thank you so much, Mr. Chairman and
colleagues, for holding this hearing.
Ambassador Satterfield, I want to talk to you about suicide
bombing. In March 2003, the Bush administration released the
performance-based Road Map to a permanent two-state solution to
the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, and that is the subject of
this hearing. But I think very key to this is for the
Palestinians to declare an unequivocal end to violence and
terror and undertake visible efforts on the ground to arrest,
disrupt, and restrain individuals and groups conducting and
planning violent attacks on Israel. The Palestinians were
further required to rebuild their security apparatus and begin
sustained, targeted, and effective operations to confront all
those engaged in terror.
Unfortunately, Palestinian leaders have not changed the
atmosphere--this is my view--in which suicide bombers continue
to operate, and one gets the feeling that suicide bombers
continue to be viewed as heroes in the Palestinian world. I
believe as long as suicide bombers are viewed as martyrs and
their photos are worshipped by the community, any Road Map,
regardless of all its intentions--and Lord knows we all support
this--is not going to work because that was the whole point.
There had to be an end to the violence.
I think sometimes when we talk about all these issues
dealing with negotiations and so on and the shape of the table,
we forget to put a face on what this has meant. Last September,
Dr. David Applebaum and his daughter Nava were killed when a
suicide bomber blew himself up in a Jerusalem cafe. I will
never forget that story. For whatever reason, it just touched
every bone in my body as a parent. Nava was to be married the
next day. Her father simply wanted to share a meal with his
daughter before giving her away. Instead of a wedding with
hundreds of guests, there was a funeral with thousands of
mourners. Over the past 4 years, 1,000 Israelis have been
killed in similar attacks.
Senators Allen and Brownback joined me a few years ago in a
bipartisan amendment that said there was no justification for
suicide bombings and the world should condemn them. Suicide
terrorism cannot be used as a negotiation tool. And that is why
we must insist on Palestinian leaders to reform their security
forces and dismantle the terrorist groups that support suicide
terrorism.
So my question, Ambassador Satterfield, is, can you comment
on Arafat's refusal to take on this issue of suicide bombing
head on? And do you see anyone in the Palestinian community who
will step up to the plate on this issue? After all, think of
what they are losing on the Palestinian side, young, vibrant
people, who are blowing themselves up, and that loss is
palpable. So I need to hear from you where you see this whole
issue of suicide bombing right now.
Ambassador Satterfield. Senator, I certainly agree both in
your outlining of the requirements for progress on the Road
Map, for progress toward a two-state solution, but also the
very unfortunate judgment which we fully share of the lack of
progress that has been made on the critical issues not only of
an end to violence and terror, but also an end to the
atmosphere, the culture of incitement of grievance which feeds
so much of what takes place on the ground. Far too many Israeli
and Palestinian lives have been, continue to be, and will be
lost in this process unless there is a coming to grips with
this fundamental issue.
With respect to the leadership of the Palestinians, clearly
there is a continuing need for a structure of Palestinian
leadership, both political and security, which is free of the
taint of violence and terror, which is committed to taking the
courageous, sustained steps necessary to speak out against the
phenomenon of violence, whether it is suicide bombings or any
other form of violence and terror. That leadership has not been
able to express itself. That leadership has not been able to
take effective steps on the ground. This is what we are
advocating, a reformed Palestinian leadership, a reformed
structure of Palestinian security services in Gaza and the West
Bank that are capable and willing to take steps.
Now, Senator, we have not advocated--and we say this very
often--the Palestinian Authority to take measures which are
beyond its physical scope and grasp. It is not what is being
asked for today. It is not what was being asked for when Abu
Mazen was Prime Minister or when Abu Allah took office. We are
asking for reasonable, doable, achievable steps to be taken
that send the message to the Palestinian people that this
leadership is serious, that it will not tolerate violence and
terror. It will not tolerate the further suffering of
Palestinians through these phenomena. Now, that leadership has
to emerge. If it does not, it will not be possible to advance
this process. It will not be possible to see the successful
conclusion of Gaza disengagement in the way that we all wish to
see it, as a step back toward the two-state goal and a step
forward for the Palestinians. It has to be done.
Senator Boxer. Well, I just want to make a point here and
the reason I stressed the suicide bombing aspect is if we are
ever going to get a change, it seems to me this is an example
where we can build some kind of a worldwide ethic against
suicide bombing. I guess what I would urge the administration
and future administrations of both parties is--I remember when
the first woman suicide bomber blew herself up, and at that
time I was in charge of a committee here and Senator Chafee and
I had a hearing about that phenomenon. It just seems to me
there is so much to be done, but this area of young people
blowing themselves up, men, women, youngsters and killing dads
and daughters who were having a cup of coffee to discuss
marriage, that there is something there where we could, in
fact, reach the mothers on both sides of the dispute.
I am just trying to figure out a way to break through from
all the diplomatic talk. By the way, you do it very well and
you are very good at it. But when I read it back, it is
diplomatic talk. You talked about coming to grips with the
fundamentals and so on. I just think we need to somehow break
through and put a more human face on what is happening.
While I have one-half a minute, I ask you one more
question, and that is about the Egyptians. According to
reports, Egypt proposed sending 150 to 200 police officers to
train a Palestinian force of 30,000 to provide security in the
Gaza, but the offer is contingent upon Arafat handing over
control of security forces to Mr. Qurei. Now, I know that you
met on July 8 with Egyptian Presidential advisor Al-Baz to
discuss the situation in Gaza. Where does this Egyptian offer
stand following this weekend's events in the Gaza?
Ambassador Satterfield. The Egyptian offer continues to be
there and the Egyptians and the Israelis, the Egyptians and the
Palestinians continue their direct parallel discussions on
these issues. Egypt's commitment to do what is necessary both
on its side of the border, as well as in Gaza, in the context
of withdrawal, remains very much a critical element for us, for
the international community, and for Israel.
Senator Boxer. Thank you.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
The Chairman. Thank you very much, Senator Boxer.
Senator Hagel.
Senator Hagel. Mr. Chairman, thank you. Ambassador
Satterfield welcome.
How significant do you believe the events of the past few
days in Gaza, in particular, have been in regard to
demonstrations against Arafat? It seems that there is some
connection now--and this is really the question--between the
people wanting a government that is honest, direct, can
negotiate, and further to that point, it seems that there is an
element of the Palestinian people that is starting to
understand that unless they get that, their future is and will
continue to be in doubt. Am I reading too much into what we
have seen in the last few days? If you would, sort that out for
us. Thank you.
Ambassador Satterfield. Thank you, Senator.
We agree with that latter part of your statement that there
is a significant number of Palestinians who are sickened by the
ongoing destruction, deterioration, and violence, who are
sickened by the lack of leadership capable and willing to
address their needs and to help them advance their aspirations,
supported by the United States and the international community,
toward a life very different from that that they lead today.
I wish I could tell you, Senator, that the events of the
past 3 days represent a genuine movement toward reform, toward
structural changes, toward leadership transformation. But while
those events are still, in some fashion, going on, I think our
judgment is this represents more of an internal clash between
personalities than it does a fundamental shift on the critical,
structural, and leadership issues, which we, the Quartet, and
Egypt have all insisted upon.
We would hope that the opportunity continues to present
itself, and the opportunity will be taken to make those
changes. But I think it would be overreading the situation, as
we understand it today, Senator, to see in Gaza's events that
particular positive phenomenon unfolding.
Senator Hagel. Thank you.
You mentioned in your remarks and in your response to some
questions here this morning that the Quartet is dealing with a
post-Israeli pull-out of Gaza in the way of economic reform,
economic restructuring, all the social dynamics that are going
to have to be thought through and put in place.
Specifically, do we have plans now that we are working
through for economic reform, specific areas of not just the
economic potential and framework and infrastructure, but
connect that to the humanitarian? Thank you.
Ambassador Satterfield. Yes, Senator. We have been very
successful over the course of the past several years in helping
to see put in place a very accountable and transparent
budgetary process in the Palestinian Authority. That has been
of enormous encouragement to the broader international donor
community. We are, indeed, working on a concerted plan with the
World Bank and with the international donor community on what
will be necessary, post-Gaza withdrawal, to address both
urgent, emergent humanitarian needs and longer-term
infrastructure development requirements.
The World Bank has produced an excellent study of the
priorities for the donor community and for the Palestinians
with Gaza withdrawal. On the basis of that report, we, Israel,
the Palestinians, and the core leadership of the donor
community will be moving ahead in the days and weeks ahead. We
have had several meetings on this subject. The next major
gathering will occur probably at the end of September with a
meeting of the Ad Hoc Liaison Committee. We would hope that
events would support, by the end of this year or beginning of
next, a major donor conference, a pledging conference to focus
on those needs which the bank has so correctly identified.
Senator Hagel. Thank you.
In your opinion, what are the prospects of an Israeli-
Syrian track being developed to deal with a peace process? In
that regard, has the Syrian Accountability Act helped,
hindered, neutral? What effect has it had or not had on the
Israeli-Syrian peace prospects and Syria's role in this area?
Ambassador Satterfield. Senator, we see little indication
that an activated Syrian-Israeli negotiating track is likely in
the near or predictable future. Syria's behavior on critical
areas of concern to the United States, support for,
encouragement of facilitation of the work of terrorists on its
own soil, Palestinian, Iranian, Hizballah, has not diminished.
These concerns led the administration, along with concerns over
Syria's conduct with respect to Lebanon and conduct with
respect to securing its border with Iraq, to imposition of
sanctions under the accountability act earlier this year.
I believe the act is having impact in terms of its affect
on the Syrian economy and the Syrian financial sector, but it
has not yet, Senator, produced palpable changes in any of the
critical areas of concern, Iraq, Lebanon, or the questions of
terror.
Very frankly, if Syria does not move forward in ways that
send a signal to the Israeli people and to the Israeli
Government that they are prepared, as other parties have been
prepared, to enter into peace negotiations without using the
card, as they refer to it, of terror, as a lever to be wielded,
I do not see a realistic chance of these negotiations beginning
any time soon. We would hope that for the sake of the Syrian
people, for the sake of their hope in a comprehensive peace,
which President Bashar al-Assad has recently espoused, the
Syrians recognize that the time has passed for the use of
terror and violence as a corridor or pressure point in
negotiations.
Senator Hagel. Would the Gaza disengagement plan be helped
by a new Likud labor coalition government in the Israeli
Government?
Ambassador Satterfield. Senator, I hope you will respect my
right to decline an answer to that question, which is really a
matter of internal political concern to the Government of
Israel.
Senator Hagel. There seems to be--and you have alluded to
this in some of the discussion here this morning--a significant
reduction in terrorist attacks in Israel over the last few
months. Is that attributable mainly to the barrier in your
opinion?
Ambassador Satterfield. Senator, when we address the issue
of a decline or relative decline in the number of security
attacks, there are really two issues here. Have there been
attacks successfully conducted? And there, yes, the number has
declined.
Has there been a decline in the number of planned
operations? There the issue is much murkier. The problem with
the cease-fires of the past with the periods of quiet, so-
called, in the past has been in fact there has not been a
diminution in the number of planned operations. There has just
been a more successful effort to confront them and stop them
before they succeed.
I am afraid that those operations continue to be planned.
There continue to be efforts to attack Israel. Certainly there
have been a number of factors involved in the diminution of
successful attacks. The leadership of Hamas, of Islamic Jihad
has been very severely affected by Israeli strikes.
But what is critical and how we will define a true cease-
fire, a true end of violence and terror is when we see planning
for attacks, not just successful attacks, ceased.
Senator Hagel. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
The Chairman. Thank you, Senator Hagel.
Senator Dodd.
Senator Dodd. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman, and let me
express my apologies as well to you and the committee for
arriving after the testimony was provided by our first witness.
But let me thank you again, Mr. Chairman. I think this is a
very important hearing to have today on the status of the Road
Map and it is important that we take stock of where we are in
all of this.
It has been said by others but I think deserves being
repeated. Just to go back briefly in the recent past history,
it was only a few short months ago, really when you think about
it, that the entire world I think believed that peace between
the Israelis and the Palestinians was imminent. We had the
cooperation on security and economic spheres. It was helping to
stabilize the life for the peoples of both Israel and
Palestine. Cooperation was in no small part, in my view, due to
the laser-like attention the Clinton administration paid to
this issue, particularly the efforts of Dennis Ross.
Then we saw things begin to really fall apart. The last-
ditch peace talks, of course, collapsed. You had the second
intifada erupted. Yasir Arafat provided tacit, if not very
direct, support for terrorist attacks against Israel. As
Senator Boxer has pointed out, 1,000 innocent people have lost
their lives as a result of suicide bombers. Corruption in the
Palestinian Authority paralyzed its institutions, and that is
an ongoing saga that does not seem to have any end in sight.
Suicide bombings became almost a daily occurrence, and Israel's
justified needs for self-defense required an approach that
increased difficulties in the day-to-day life of Palestinians
in my view. Tragically these two peoples who had devoted so
much energy to the peace process--nothing seemed further away
from the goal of peace, as we now close out end of this year
2004.
In 2003, of course, the Road Map was picked up on and sets
forth some principles, the Quartet and all of the like.
I was struck by a statement made by a witness we are going
to hear from shortly, Mr. Chairman, by Dennis Ross in an
interview he gave a few weeks ago, and I will ask him about it
when he appears. But he said in that interview--what should
they do was the question, and he said you need an enormous
amount of effort to resolve these issues. The U.S. cannot
expect to swing by the region every couple of months, make a
couple of phone calls, and all be well. An ongoing, intensive
effort is needed. Third, we need to engage in a peace process
again. Right now we have a dialog of violence not words. To end
this conflict, you need to get back to the latter.
Senator Biden has asked this question. You gave a rather
facile answer, Mr. Secretary. But the fact of the matter is,
for many of us, we seem to have been just occasionally showing
up on this issue, and not that I expect the United States
necessarily to assume the responsibility for all that has
occurred, but the failure for us to be as engaged as directly
as we have been in the past seems to me to have contributed at
least in small part, if not larger part, to the situation that
presently exists.
Tell me why you think I am wrong on that conclusion and why
others hold that same view?
Ambassador Satterfield. Senator, this administration has
articulated, for the first time in U.S. history, a goal, a goal
of two states, Israel and Palestine, beyond simply articulating
that vision and the further definition of how you get there,
how you get to the end of the occupation that began in 1967
through direct negotiations, and has put out a Road Map, a Road
Map which has full international and regional support and that
has been endorsed by both sides, a Road Map that takes into
account the sharp deterioration in trust and confidence, indeed
the absence of trust and confidence between the parties, which
existed when this administration took office. It has posed
realistic, pragmatic, and practical steps for both sides to
take, some in parallel, some sequential that bring the parties
back to a point, with broad international support, to the
ability to discuss the difficult permanent status issues
between them.
Senator Dodd. But we do not seem to have any broad
international support here. We find ourselves more and more
isolated. I do not disagree with your response to Senator
Chafee, though, but we are getting more and more isolated on
this issue and Israel seems to be getting more and more
isolated on the issue as well. How do we explain this? I mean,
4 years here. This thing is getting worse, not better. There
does only seem to be an occasional interest in the subject
matter, not the kind of intensive, laser-like fashion that you
need to have if you are going to play a constructive role here.
Ambassador Satterfield. Senator, I do not believe that the
United States and its position on what is necessary to get to
the two-state goal is in fact isolated. It is quite the
opposite. We have broad international consensus behind us. The
Quartet represents in its meetings, in its own engagement on
the ground an expression of that international consensus behind
our efforts.
With respect to the situation on the ground, you are quite
right, Senator. The situation is very bad. It has been a
progressive deterioration. But I would challenge very
respectfully the accusation that somehow a lack of attention on
the part of the United States has been responsible for the
continuing breakdown in this process.
Senator Dodd. I said in part. I did not say all obviously.
I accept the fact that there are others to share a lion's share
of the responsibility, but we certainly cannot avoid the
conclusion that this sort of casual participation in all of
this has in my view at least--and others may share this view--
contributed to the situation.
Ambassador Satterfield. Senator, this issue, the
Palestinian-Israeli crisis has had the attention of the
President, the National Security Advisor, the Secretary of
State throughout all of this painful period. And there have
been a constant series of exchanges here in Washington, in the
region with all of the key leadership, as well as with the
parties, private and public----
Senator Dodd. Well, let me ask you very specifically. The
President appointed a Special Envoy, John Wolf, to deal with
this issue. Now, he retired several months ago. Has anybody
been named to replace him, for instance?
Ambassador Satterfield. Mr. Senator, John Wolf was head of
our monitoring and compliance mission, but a monitoring and
compliance mission needs something to monitor and compliance to
judge. The parties themselves did not take the necessary steps
on the Road Map in order to provide the progress necessary for
that monitoring role to function.
Senator Dodd. Well, you are making my case, it seems to me,
here. So we get rid of the person. We get rid of the office. We
give up?
Ambassador Satterfield. No. We remain committed, Senator,
to trying to advance this process. It is why we have seen in
the Prime Minister's Gaza disengagement proposal an
opportunity, one of the very few opportunities the last several
years have presented, to break this cycle downward, to get back
to the process through a unilateral decision by Israel, but a
decision whose implementation will require broad support and
broad engagement, back to the Road Map, back to the two-state
goal. We do not, in any way, challenge the gravity of the
situation.
What I would challenge is whether the administration has
been responsible for this failure to move forward to the goal
of two states. In the end, the parties are responsible for
their actions or inactions, Senator.
Senator Dodd. Well, I appreciate your answer, but I must
say it is not satisfactory to this member. And I appreciate
your defense of the administration, but it seems to me we have
seen anything but the kind of attention that I think this issue
has merited over the last 3\1/2\ years.
I am anxious to hear the other witnesses, Mr. Chairman.
I am not laying this all at the doorstep of our witness
here this morning, but you are the representation of the
administration. And as far as this Senator is concerned, this
has been a failure, a failure in my view. There is a vacuum
here, and the vacuum of leadership on the part of the United
States I think has contributed to what we are seeing today.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
The Chairman. Thank you very much, Senator Dodd.
[The prepared statement of Senator Dodd follows:]
Prepared Statement of Senator Christopher J. Dodd
The Senate Foreign Relations Committee has convened this morning to
discuss a vitally important issue: the status of the Road Map to peace.
I thank the chairman for holding this hearing, which is an opportunity
to refocus attention on the Road Map--an issue that we ignore to the
detriment of both Israelis and Palestinians. I would also like to
welcome the distinguished witnesses here with us today, Ambassador
Satterfield, Ambassador Ross, Dr. Aly, and Mr. Miller. I trust that
they will provide us with valuable insights.
Only a few short years ago, the entire world believed that peace
between Israel and its Palestinian neighbors was imminent. Israeli-
Palestinian cooperation in the security and economic spheres was
helping stabilize life for both peoples. This cooperation was in no
small part the result of the Clinton administration's laser-like focus
on this conflict, including and especially the efforts of Ambassador
Ross.
But then everything seemed to fall apart. Last-ditch peace talks
were unsuccessful. The second intifada erupted. Yasir Arafat provided
tacit, and many would argue, direct support to terrorist attacks
against Israel. Corruption in the Palestinian Authority paralyzed its
institutions. Suicide bombings became an almost daily occurrence. And
Israel's justified needs for self-defense required an approach that
increased the difficulties of day-to-day life for Palestinians.
Tragically, for the two peoples that had devoted so much energy to the
peace process, nothing seemed farther away than their goal of peace.
In April 2003 the Bush administration took an important step toward
a long-overdue re-engagement in the region, when it worked along with
the EU, UN, and Russia to craft the Road Map. The Road Map sets forth
principles to ensure security for Israel's citizens. It also holds out
the promise of a sovereign Palestinian state, if the Palestinian
Authority takes certain concrete actions.
Now, more than a year later, little progress has been made toward
implementation of the Road Map. Commendably, Israeli Prime Minister
Ariel Sharon is pushing forward with his plan for Israeli disengagement
from the Gaza Strip, a move which many agree is a step toward full
implementation of the Road Map.
However, instability and corruption continue to paralyze the
Palestinian Authority [PA]. Domestic Palestinian dissatisfaction with
cronyism in the PA played a large role last year in forcing Yasir
Arafat to create the post of Prime Minister. But his refusal to give up
the reins of power was arguably the major factor contributing to the
resignation of the first Palestinian Prime Minister, Mahmoud Abbas.
There is now a new Palestinian Prime Minister, Ahmed Qureia. But
the situation has remained largely the same, and Prime Minister Qureia
submitted his resignation to Arafat just last weekend. Although he has
since rescinded his resignation, tensions remain high between the two.
Indeed, frustration with corruption at the top of the Palestinian
hierarchy seems to have reached a high-water mark--frustration on the
part of the Egyptians, the UN, and the Palestinians.
Despite significant efforts on the part of the Egyptian Government
to help prepare the Palestinians for a Gaza withdrawal, Yasir Arafat
has continued with his usual delay tactics. Only recently and following
threats by the Egyptians did he consolidate about 12 disparate security
services into three organizations. And while this consolidation was
called for under the Road Map, it appears that Arafat retains authority
over these services.
This same frustration prompted UN envoy Terje Roed-Larsen, in a
move that is unusual for UN officials, to harshly criticize Arafat for
the lack of support he has given to Egyptian efforts in Gaza. It is
quite telling that Mr. Larsen was promptly declared persona non-grata
in the Palestinian territories.
Palestinian frustration with corruption in the PA has also been
increasing and seems to have culminated over the past week, when Yasir
Arafat appointed his cousin, Moussa, to be the head of one of the
newly-formed security services. In response to this appointment, three
prominent Palestinian security officials resigned and thousands rioted
in Gaza. The appointment and resulting chaos in Gaza also led the
Palestinian Prime Minister to tender his resignation. While Moussa
Arafat's appointment has now been annulled, this frustration threatens
to boil over.
Many Israelis and Palestinians would agree that we are at a
critical juncture here. That is why it is so important for the U.S. and
the international community to remain engaged. Significant progress in
the Middle East has historically come only when the U.S. is
consistently engaged, and at the highest levels.
Therefore, the U.S. should now assist the Israeli Government in
implementing its disengagement plan, which is essentially a part of the
Road Map, and which the majority of the Israeli public supports. And we
should continue to provide Israel with all appropriate resources to
protect its people. Commensurate with reforms in the Palestinian
Authority and actions against terror, we should also help the
Palestinian people build the institutions that they will need to
realize the end-goal of the Road Map, namely a sovereign Palestinian
state.
The U.S. should also provide Egypt with the proper support for its
efforts, while at the same time insisting that it take meaningful steps
to shut down tunnels used for weapons smuggling between Sinai and Gaza.
That will contribute to Israeli and Egyptian security, and it will cut
off a vital artery to terrorist groups, and thus instability in Gaza.
Finally, the Bush administration should take heed of some trenchant
comments, written by Ambassador Ross in a recent Op-Ed. In that Op-Ed,
he wrote ``The U.S. cannot expect to swing by the region every couple
of months, make a couple of phone calls, and all will be well. An
ongoing, intensive effort is needed.'' For the sake of millions of
Israelis and Palestinians, who dream of peace and who deserve to
realize that dream, I urge the administration to make that effort.
Again, I thank the chairman for convening this hearing. I look
forward to asking some questions of our witnesses.
The Chairman. Let me explain to Senator Nelson that I
recognized earlier Senator Biden for his question period at
this stage. I will recognize him now and then you.
Senator Biden. No. That is all right.
The Chairman. You will yield to the Senator? All right.
Senator Nelson.
Senator Biden. No. I have already had a bit of a round.
Please go ahead.
Senator Nelson. Well, Mr. Chairman, before I ask my
question, I want to tell a story that is relevant to this
situation and my question. That was, prior to going to Israel
and visiting with the Israeli Government and the Palestinian
Authority, I had visited with the President of Egypt and his
head of security, General Suleiman. General Suleiman told me to
confirm with the Palestinian Prime Minister that he, General
Suleiman, had just visited with Arafat and that Arafat had
assured him--now, this is January--that within 2 weeks, that he
was going to appoint a new security chief. So I carried that
message from General Suleiman to Prime Minister Qurei, and he
kind of smiled and said, maybe 2 weeks, maybe 52 weeks. Of
course, what he was saying is what we see today, that either
Mr. Arafat is unwilling or incapable of bolstering up the
security for the Palestinians.
So in light of that, my question is in the chaos that is
enveloping, do we see the Egyptians entering in and trying to
provide some stability, and if not, what about NATO?
Ambassador Satterfield. Senator, we do indeed see the
Egyptians engaging in quite extraordinary efforts to try to
move the Palestinian leadership, working at the level of the
most senior officials, including Arafat, and also working at
the level of the security commanders, to confront and take
those steps necessary to move forward on security.
Prime Minister Abu Allah's comment to you in January, 2
weeks, 52 weeks, is indeed indicative of the problem he, we,
and the Palestinian people face. There has been a failure of
leadership and I would attribute it, frankly, Senator, to a
failure of will, not capacity to move. Those in responsible
positions in the Palestinian leadership, including Chairman
Arafat, have failed to take steps they are quite capable of
taking for the benefit of the Palestinian people, and that
failure has harmed the Palestinian people in the past and
continues to do so today.
Egypt is playing an exceptional role here and we want to
see that role continue to move the Palestinian people forward.
Senator Nelson. Well, instead of the international
terrorist groups completely taking over, do you see some
optimism with regard to the Egyptians stepping in?
Ambassador Satterfield. I think the Egyptians are perfectly
prepared and have discussed quite openly with the Palestinians
and Israelis a supportive role on security, but if your
question, Senator, refers to Egypt assuming political control
in Gaza, that is not an issue at all.
Senator Nelson. I am talking about security.
Ambassador Satterfield. On security, Egypt is not in a
position to take over except in terms of security on its own
borders in the Sinai. What it is able to do is to provide very
significant encouragement, support, and direction for
Palestinian security forces to assume their responsibilities,
and that is the role that we very much hope can be played.
Senator Nelson. Well, when Israel starts its withdrawal
from Gaza--look into your crystal ball--is there going to be
any subsiding of the violence?
Ambassador Satterfield. For withdrawal to be a success,
there will have to be preexistent an end to violence and terror
on the ground. There will have to be a significant change in
the structuring of the Palestinian security forces. That is in
order to make this all work. Do I think it is possible?
Absolutely, Senator. I think it is indeed possible. But it is
going to require leadership decisions taken by the Palestinian
Authority that have yet to be adopted.
Senator Nelson. How about the role of NATO?
Ambassador Satterfield. We do not see a role for NATO or
external forces in Gaza at this time.
Senator Nelson. I recall that the Israeli High Court on the
question of the fence said the fence is legitimate for
protecting against terrorists, but they said you have got to
take into consideration some of the demographics and how you
are splitting Palestinian neighborhoods. Give me the
administration's response to that.
Ambassador Satterfield. We very much respect the High Court
judgment which certainly upheld the security justification for
a barrier, but stated--and I paraphrase here--that there needs
to be a balance struck between those security justifications
and the political and humanitarian consequences of the fence on
the ground. The administration separately has made very clear
that we also respect the security needs of Israel in the
deepest sense possible, but we also believe and have
significant concerns over the impact of the course of the fence
on humanitarian lives, Palestinians, as well as on the
political future of the negotiating process, and we hope very
much, in response to the High Court judgment, there are changes
made in the routing of that fence which do respond to our
concerns.
Senator Nelson. Is the administration prepared to provide
assistance to Israel to compensate the settlers and cover the
cost of disengagement?
Ambassador Satterfield. That issue has not been raised with
the government.
The Chairman. Thank you, Senator Nelson.
Senator Biden.
Senator Biden. Thank you very much.
Much of what I wanted to discuss has been covered. Let me
just focus on two specific points.
One, Mr. Secretary, you indicated what you thought was
necessary for withdrawal to be a success. Is full Egyptian
engagement necessary for withdrawal to be a success? Or put
another way, if Egypt opts out, do you see any circumstances
under which withdrawal can be a success?
Ambassador Satterfield. Senator, I think the Egyptian role
is critical to success of this undertaking, critical to its
preparations now, critical to the successful conduct of
withdrawal, and certainly critical to what happens after, and
that is for two different reasons.
Egypt is the most significant Arab interlocutor with the
Palestinians today, with the Palestinian leadership, with the
security services. That is very important and it needs to keep
that role front and center.
Egypt also has an immediate role on the Rafah-Sinai border.
We all know the phenomenon of smuggling of arms through tunnels
into Gaza is a destabilizing issue today. It will be a
destabilizing issue tomorrow. Egypt has a key role to play
there, indeed a vital role to play there.
Yes, I would identify the Egyptian role as important,
vital, critical.
Senator Biden. Now, that being the case, are we prepared to
be an interlocutor between Egypt and Israel? I guess the
antecedent question is, in you view are, what I understand to
be the demands of the Egyptians in order to play the envisioned
role, those demands being consolidation of the security
services by the Palestinians, complete Israeli withdrawal--that
does not just mean, as I understand the Egyptian position,
civilian withdrawal, the roughly 7,000 Israeli citizens living
there, but the military as well. And there is the question of
that very border where the smuggling takes place. The IDF is
having to make a judgment of whether or not they are prepared
to cease and desist from controlling that area.
I understand a third request or demand of the Egyptian
Government is that there be agreements. I assume it means
Egyptian agreement bilateral with the Palestinians and with the
Israelis not to escalate the response to provocations, i.e.,
Katyusha rockets coming out of the Gaza, Israelis responding
where there are Egyptian forces or Egyptian personnel. And an
agreement that there is direct linkage to reengaging the Road
Map, to get everybody out of park and on the road driving
again.
Now, first of all, am I correct that these are the essence
of the demands that the Egyptian Government has in order to be
engaged to the degree that you believe, I believe, I believe
the Israelis believe is useful, if not necessary, for a
successful disengagement by the Israelis? Are they the demands
as you know them?
Ambassador Satterfield. Senator, you are quite correct in
characterizing the Egyptian assistance upon restructuring and
consolidation of Palestinian security forces under clean,
competent leadership responsive to an empowered civilian
leadership. You are quite correct in stating Egyptian concerns
over the security environment in Gaza for their forces should
they place trainers and advisors there, as is under discussion.
And you are also correct in describing broad Egyptian interest,
which is certainly supported by the United States in seeing
Gaza withdrawal take place within the context of broad steps
that move us back to the Road Map toward the two-state vision.
With respect to the character of the dialog between----
Senator Biden. Excuse me. Is the fourth element not total
withdrawal of Israeli forces?
Ambassador Satterfield. The Egyptians have publicly stated
that they wished to see full withdrawal of Israeli military
forces.
With respect to the character of the dialog being conducted
directly between Egypt and Israel at a political, as well as a
security expert level, we are both impressed and quite pleased
by the vigor, by the robustness of that dialog. The two sides
are, as we speak, in discussion on the very issues which you
are raising here today, and we are quite encouraged by the
revival in direct contacts on this critical issue between Egypt
and Israel. It is a process that has benefits to both sides. We
certainly want to see it continue.
Senator Biden. Are there any of the Egyptian requests that
the United States views as not reasonable?
Ambassador Satterfield. These are positions that the
Government of Egypt is representing directly to the Government
of Israel in some cases and directly to the Palestinian
leadership in others. We are quite confident this is a
productive and a constructive dialog.
Senator Biden. But are we engaged in that at all? This is I
think the frustration that Senator Dodd--it is dangerous to
characterize another colleague's concerns, but I think Senator
Dodd and I share the same concern here. You are technically in
a sense, in a legal sense being absolutely accurate and
precise. But in the past--we have been here for a long time--
Republican as well as Democratic administrations have used
their good offices behind the scenes to engage the parties. Let
me give you an example.
I am not asking you whether you are doing this. It would
seem to me it would be very useful for us to be intervening
with our Quartet members to entreat them to make clear their
views to Mr. Arafat on the notion of consolidation of the
security force. One of the continuing problems we have had that
the average person listening to this hearing might not
understand but you fully understand is that we have been at
odds with the Quartet not on the broad Road Map, but on the
degree to which we should each be engaged in promoting that
Road Map, i.e., putting pressure on Arafat to do certain things
rather than continuing to support Arafat publicly.
So I want to make it clear that I think you are very adept.
Were I in the administration, I would be very pleased with your
testimony. You are very good. Very good and very bright and
very patriotic. But you are very State Department-esque
evasive.
And we are used to that. That is part of your job. I got
that. I understand that.
But the bottom line here is that what we need to get a
sense of, if not from you--and I am not being a wise guy when I
say this. This may be above your pay grade. I am not being a
wise guy. I mean that sincerely. I really, truly understand it.
It may be beyond your ability to speak to.
Senator Dodd. Tell us anyway, though, if you would.
Senator Biden. Yes. But here is the point. I do not want
the record left without this being addressed. The fact of the
matter is there are multiple things this President, in my
characterization, when he has been more engaged, would do in
this circumstance and may be doing, but I am unaware of, and
that other Presidents and other Secretaries of State and people
in your position have been doing. If we think this is an
important ingredient for the possibility of successful
withdrawal, which is the only thing that is changing the
dynamic in the region right now, whether you like Sharon's
notion or not, I think everyone has to agree this is the only
thing on the board that changes the dynamic. Everything else
remains the status quo. And it is a chance he is taking
politically and it is a chance he is taking substantively.
Reasonable people can disagree on whether or not it is a wise
move for Israel or for peace, whether it is Gaza only or Gaza
first. All that history will decide. We will soon find out.
But in the past, this President briefly, the last two
Presidents, including the President's father, would be more
significantly engaged in, for example, facilitating the
Egyptian request, not merely saying, look, we are just good
bystanders here. It is good, in my view, a very positive step,
that the Egyptians and the Israelis are actively engaged one on
one.
But I hope you are not telling us that we are essentially a
bystander here. If they work it out, wonderful. It is good that
they are working on this. It is a fine thing they are engaged.
We think this is very constructive. And maybe the second
tranche of this agreement will work out so that we end up
having dah-de-dah. The bottom line is--I am not asking for
detail. Tell me, wink, nod, give me some reassurance that you
guys are doing something other than what you said.
Ambassador Satterfield. Well, Senator, what I said and what
I will reiterate is we are actively engaged and have been
throughout with the Governments of Israel, Egypt, and with the
Palestinians to support the necessary steps to make this
withdrawal a success, and that specifically includes not only
our own support in public and behind the scenes for the
Egyptian effort, it means mobilizing the Quartet which has
expressed, most recently in early May when the principals met,
its own strong support on behalf of the international community
for Egypt's efforts. We are engaged.
Senator Biden. Have they communicated that, do you know?
Have the individual members of the Quartet picked up the phone
and called Arafat and said, Jack, get off the dime or you lose
our support? Is that happening?
Ambassador Satterfield. Senator, I will point out remarks
made in the Security Council by the U.N. Special Coordinator
for the Middle East, Mr. Larsen, which attracted the attention
of the Palestinian Authority in which he stated in terms as
blunt, as clear as have ever been used in that forum, the
concerns that the United Nations feels, through his
representation, and which the Quartet collectively feels about
the need for the Palestinians and the chairman to act. He could
not have been blunter in his remarks. That is a product of the
diplomacy on which we have been embarked for these last years.
Senator Biden. You are good. Thanks.
The Chairman. Thank you very much, Senator Biden.
Senator Brownback, do you have questions for the witness?
Senator Brownback. Yes. If I could just briefly, Mr.
Chairman.
The Chairman. Please proceed.
Senator Brownback. My apologies for being late. I just got
off a plane from Tel Aviv and was there and talking with the
Israeli leadership and looking at the security fence. So I
apologize for coming late, and I apologize I have not heard all
the testimony and questions earlier.
It does strike me from being there that until there is
somebody to negotiate with at the PA, there is not a whole lot
that is going to be able to happen, and that the Bush
administration, at least certainly from the Israeli leadership,
is doing everything that they can. But until the Palestinians
sort out their own leadership discussions and debate, there is
just not a whole lot that really can happen. What you are doing
is appreciated, but we cannot determine the Palestinian
leadership. Palestinians have to determine their own leadership
and they should determine their own leadership. They are
involved in, it looks like to me, a very messy dispute right
now to determine who is going to lead and how, and that could
take some time to sort out.
I do not know what else you do. The Bush administration
cannot go in there and say, OK, this is the person that is
going to lead. The Quartet cannot go in there and say, OK, this
is the person that is going to lead the Palestinians. That has
to be resolved by themselves and it could be a difficult period
of time. I think we can encourage them to select leadership and
should get the Quartet to encourage them to select leadership.
But until they pick that, I do not see who is there to
negotiate with. You just cannot negotiate with yourself.
Now, on the security fence, I toured several areas of the
security fence, and I do not think there is any question but
that this has been, as a security fence, successful. It is
something I think, Mr. Chairman, we probably would do here if
we were confronted with a very similar situation of such close
proximities to a population and so many terrorist bombings
taking place, that we would probably do something really quite
similar. As a democracy, the first call is to protect its own
citizens. It is hard to see much any different than what has
taken place.
I would urge the administration and the Israeli leadership,
as I did there, to work with as many people as possible so that
the route is as least intrusive on people's normal lives, if
they can do that. And they seem to be very open to being a part
and to do that, and they are reconstructing it at a number of
points to try to make that take place.
I appreciate what you guys are doing. Mr. Chairman, not to
prolong this, but I just would encourage you to stay as engaged
as you can. But I think there have to be a couple of factors
they are going to have to put into place before a whole lot
more can happen in the region. The first of that and the
foremost is going to be the Palestinian leadership.
Thank you for being here. Mr. Chairman, thanks for holding
the hearing.
The Chairman. Well, thank you, Senator Brownback. We
appreciate the fact that you got back safely. As you can see,
Ambassador, members of our committee are engaged in the
territory, as you have been. We are deeply interested, and we
appreciate your efforts.
Senator Chafee. Can we ask any more questions or do you
want to go to the next panel?
The Chairman. Do you have another one? Please go ahead.
Senator Chafee.
Senator Chafee. I just want to followup on some of the
questions that have been asked subsequent to my question about
the engagement and the commitment and your own testimony that
the President believes in the two states living side by side.
One of the fervent opponents of any land for peace and one that
has written that the West Bank essentially should be Israeli
territory is David Wormser, who the Vice President hired as its
Middle East advisor. Have you met with him?
Ambassador Satterfield. Senator, I would respectfully
decline an answer. I know Mr. Wormser but this is a domestic
issue.
Senator Chafee. Has he expressed his opinions to the
Department of State?
Ambassador Satterfield. I really could not comment on that
issue.
Senator Chafee. I think this leads to a lot of our
uneasiness about the President's commitment to what he is
saying, leading to some of the other questions that I have
heard here this morning.
The Chairman. Thank you, Senator Chafee.
Senator Dodd.
Senator Dodd. Dennis Ross, a witness coming up, raises
something in his testimony and normally I would obviously let
him make his own testimony, but assuming he makes this comment,
I wanted to raise the question with you to see how you would
respond to this. And I am quoting from his testimony. He said:
``While sympathetic to the Israeli concerns, I favor Arafat
being released from the Muqata. He certainly hasn't earned a
release, but he is using his virtual prisoner status as a
symbol of humiliation, not of himself but of the Palestinian
people, and that resonates, building support for him and
keeping reformers on the defensive. However, I would make
Arafat's release to Gaza, not release for external travel, part
of a package of understandings in which Arafat would not be
able to go to Gaza until the security restructuring had taken
place and there was actual performance for several months.''
I just want to get your reaction to that.
Ambassador Satterfield. Senator, a number of parties,
Palestinian and external, have proposed various formulae to
address the situation of Chairman Arafat in the Muqata, most of
which seem to focus on his ability to travel outside, whether
it is just to Gaza or to select cities in the West Bank. Where
all of this falls down in a practical sense is that Arafat has
before him literally today challenges which he can respond to,
has the capacity to respond to from Ramallah in a positive
fashion for the benefit of his people. And he has time and
again chosen to take another set of decisions or to simply not
act at all while his people continue to suffer. To the extent
that any party is holding out the prospect of a different
status for Arafat, Arafat has done absolutely nothing to
justify any change as we see it in any parties' view of his
situation.
I would have to raise here one particular U.S. Government
concern. Three American officials were killed in Gaza a year
ago. There has been no satisfactory resolution of this case. We
can only conclude that there has been a political decision
taken by the Chairman to block further progress in this
investigation. I raise this only as an example of how this
individual has had challenge after challenge posed to his
leadership and has either not acted or has acted negatively in
response.
Senator Dodd. So you would flatly reject this idea.
Ambassador Satterfield. Pardon?
Senator Dodd. You would flatly reject this idea then raised
by Dennis Ross.
Ambassador Satterfield. My comment would be Arafat has done
nothing--nothing--to demonstrate a positive role on behalf of
his people.
Senator Dodd. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
The Chairman. Well, thank you, Senator Dodd. Thank you
again, Ambassador Satterfield. We appreciate your testimony. We
wish you every success in your forthcoming mission as our
Ambassador to Jordan. We appreciate your coming today.
I would like to call now upon our second panel of
distinguished witnesses, and those will include: the Honorable
Dennis Ross, director and Ziegler Distinguished Fellow of the
Washington Institute for Near East Policy; Dr. Abdel Monem Said
Aly, visiting fellow of the Saban Center for Middle East
Policy, the Brookings Institution; and Mr. Aaron David Miller,
president of Seeds of Peace in Washington, DC.
Gentlemen, we appreciate your coming to the committee this
morning. We look forward to your testimony. I will call upon
you to testify in the order that I introduced you and that will
mean, first of all, Ambassador Ross.
Let me just say that your statements will be made a part of
the record in full. I ask that you proceed in any way that you
wish. I will not be rigorous in terms of time constraints. Our
desire today is to receive the information and then hopefully
you will respond to questions in a round of questioning after
the three witnesses have concluded.
Senator Dodd. Mr. Chairman, let me say some of Ambassador
Ross' statement has already been made part of the record, and I
apologize. It is normally not something I do, but I could not
resist asking the question based on something he said.
The Chairman. This should be reassuring, Ambassador Ross,
that we read the testimony and study before we come to these
hearings.
Would you please proceed.
STATEMENT OF HON. DENNIS ROSS, DIRECTOR AND ZIEGLER
DISTINGUISHED FELLOW, THE WASHINGTON INSTITUTE FOR NEAR EAST
POLICY
Ambassador Ross. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. First, I thought
it was an excellent question. So I was not at all unhappy to
hear it.
What I am going to try to do this morning, rather than
repeating what I have submitted, is offer a set of comments
largely based on what I heard this morning because I think it
will offer a perspective on a lot of the questions that were
raised and give us a chance, I think, to try to understand
really where we are and also what the American role is right
now, which seemed to be such a critical concern.
No. 1, let us put things in perspective. Since the year
2001, there really has not been a peace process. A peace
process means that in fact you do have a dialog of words
between the parties, and we have had a dialog of violence.
There have been a few moments where there was some greater hope
and the sense of possibility.
One was the Road Map, but the Road Map, bear in mind, was
not negotiated with the parties. It was negotiated with the
members of the Quartet, and it really never has been
implemented on the ground. It remains on paper. When I am asked
the question, is it dead, I say it has to be born first, and it
really has not been.
Second was with Abu Mazen when Abu Mazen became the Prime
Minister. But here again, he was in for all of 3 months and
never really was able to act on many of the things that he said
for a variety of reasons that perhaps we can discuss later on.
So the point is we have not had a peace process. We have a
situation that has been largely frozen. The situation has been
frozen mostly in terms of hope, but not in terms of a constant
deterioration. What we have seen has been a constant
deterioration with both sides paying a very heavy price over
the last 3-plus years, Israelis as well as Palestinians.
Now, there are two decisions the Israeli Government has
made that are beginning to change that situation. One is
changing the situation from a security standpoint for the
Israelis and that, Senator Brownback, is what you were
referring to, the security barrier or fence. It affects things
because the fact of the matter is while David Satterfield was
correct, the numbers of attempts are continuing, the difficulty
of carrying out successful suicide attacks has changed, in no
small part because many of the suicide attacks begin in the
northern part of the West Bank and to travel down around where
the fence is already built or where the barrier is already
built is not so simple. You subject yourself to more people you
have to work with. That gives the Israelis additional
opportunities to find out what is going on and intercept those
who would carry out the attacks.
Now, the reason it remains difficult for the Palestinians
is the barrier is one-quarter completed and the Israelis
maintain a siege in the rest of the territories. So Israel is
becoming more secure even while there are as many attempts as
before, but life for the Palestinians remains very difficult.
Now, the second decision the Israelis have made that is
changing the situation and in this case creates the possibility
of an opening is the decision to withdraw from Gaza. It is
obviously not a simple decision. When I was in the area a
couple of weeks ago and I spoke to the Prime Minister of
Israel, one thing was unmistakably clear. He will do it. He
will absolutely do it. He may not have the government to do it
right now. He may not know what the politics are going to be to
get it done, but he is going to get it done.
And there is nobody on the Palestinian side who questions
whether Israel is going to withdraw from Gaza. And because of
that, now we are seeing the turmoil on the Palestinian side. We
are seeing the turmoil because Palestinians understand the
Israelis get out of Gaza, and when they get out of Gaza, the
Palestinians have to govern themselves. They have to bring
order out of chaos. They have to prove to the rest of the
world, as well as themselves, that they are ready for
statehood, and they cannot do it with the current situation
where there is no rule of law, where there is corruption, where
there is a dependency on the cronies of Arafat who have no
credibility with the population certainly in Gaza.
And you see a move of some of the younger members of Fatah,
not only in terms of organizing elections in Gaza over Arafat's
opposition, but also an insistence that things have to change.
The Palestinians have to put their house in order. And the
turmoil that you have seen over the last several days is a
function of recognizing that they have to change and they
cannot continue as they are.
Now, when the Palestinian Prime Minister Abu Allah
threatens to resign and today he rescinds it, it is also part
of a strategy right now designed to say to Arafat, if you do
not go along with the restructuring of the security forces, I
cannot do my job. He went there today with a committee to meet
with Arafat, and the reason he made his decision is because he
got a number of promises from Arafat on going ahead.
Now, the story you recounted, Senator Nelson, about is it 2
weeks or 52 weeks probably fits these promises as well. Abu
Allah has a pocket full of promises from Arafat. Will these be
different? Well, they could be in one respect.
Arafat has a nose for survival and what he has always cared
about more than anything else is the Palestinian street. In
Gaza right now, you are beginning to see the Palestinian street
express itself. Because they do not have a normal structure for
expressing themselves, what do they do? They kidnap one of his
cronies, Ghazi Jabali, the head of the police, and they march
him through a refugee camp. In the refugee camp, they have him
admit--and they point out that he has been stealing their
money. This is the way they express themselves. They challenge
who he is appointing. When he appoints his cousin to be the new
head of security, they are up in arms with that. There are
attacks against headquarters. Now, it may not be the way we
would like to see them expressing themselves, but they do not
have a lot of other vehicles right now.
So in answer to the question that was posed earlier, is
this the beginning of something significant, my answer is yes.
It is going to be transformed into something that creates a new
reality? I do not know yet. I do not think anybody can say yet.
And let us bear in mind that no one historically has
confronted Arafat on the Palestinian side because he is an
icon. He put the Palestinians and their cause on the
international map, on the international stage. He gave them
recognition when nobody else had. One of the most famous
Palestinian poets referred to the Palestinians as being a
people expelled from history. Arafat gave them a history, but
Arafat gives them no present and he gives them no future. And
most Palestinians know that, and while they do not want to
divide themselves, now with the Israeli withdrawal coming, they
know they have to do something.
Now, if he reads the mood of the street, insisting he has
to do something, he will accommodate it. Even while he
accommodates it, given his historical pattern, he will maneuver
and try to subvert what it is he has accommodated. But the more
the Palestinian street is in evidence, the more he will make
adjustments in light of that.
So in that context, now the question comes, where is the
diplomacy, what is going on right now? I think we have to be
clear, the only one who is truly being active right now from a
diplomatic standpoint is Egypt. We are not. Senator Biden is
not here, but Senator Biden said, are we a bystander? Well, I
would not say we are solely a bystander, but the question he
was getting at is in the middle of the Israeli-Egyptian
discussions are we there as well. And the answer is no. They
inform us, after the fact, of what they are talking about.
Let us put in perspective what the Egyptians are doing
right now. The Egyptians, in effect, are playing what has been
the traditional American role. Look at the three basic things
the Egyptians are doing.
The first, the Egyptians are trying to reassure the
Israelis on security so that the Israelis can get out of Gaza
completely. The Israeli military believes that for now it needs
to stay in what is known as the Philadelphia Route, which is on
the border of Gaza and Egypt, and the reason is because of
smuggling. The idea of concern is that you are going to have a
qualitatively different kind of weapon smuggled into Gaza after
they are out. What does it mean? Katyushas into Gaza which have
the range to hit Ashkelon. Surface-to-air missiles, even
portable into Gaza that could bring down an Israeli aircraft.
That changes the whole rules of the game. The IDF view is
satisfy us on that before we can get out. At this point the IDF
is not satisfied but the Egyptians are beginning to work on it.
So here are the Egyptians assuming the responsibility for
reassuring the Israelis on the issue of security.
The second role they are playing is putting themselves with
the Palestinians to try to carry out the structural
reorganization of the Palestinian security organization so
instead of having 12 organizations, all competing with each
other, all designed to ensure loyalty only to Arafat and not to
each other, you should have three and they should be
professional. What the Egyptians are trying to do, the essence
of their plan is to actually get the three appointed, organized
with leaders, have those leaders come to Egypt where they will
have discussions with the Egyptian security on what their role
and responsibilities will be. And the Egyptian role of putting
advisors in is not to go and train. It is to monitor, to be
there in Gaza to monitor the responsibilities that they have
worked out with the Palestinian security forces. Arafat at this
point said yes to it, but he means no.
But here again, so first the Egyptians are trying to assure
the Israelis on security. Second, they are trying to carry out
the reorganization with a structure of responsibility that they
will monitor on the issue of security and the security
organizations.
Third, when the Israelis and the Palestinians are not, in
fact, engaged in a discussion at any senior levels, they are
trying to coordinate between the two of them because the
Israeli withdrawal--and Prime Minister Sharon wants to withdraw
and he does not want to have to negotiate it. He said, look, I
have not had a partner up to now. If I have to negotiate it,
the Palestinians force me to adjust what we are going to do in
our own interests. I want to be able to do it on my own.
But the reality is you have to coordinate it in some
fashion. Who do you hand it off to? When you withdraw, is it
going to be Hamas who benefits? Is it going to be Palestinian
elements or the Palestinian Authority that is prepared to
coexist with Israel? If you are going to get out of the
settlements, which they are going to, who does it get handed
off to?
Are you going to agree that the buildings there will be
dismantled, but the infrastructure maintained? When I was just
in the area, what I heard from all the Palestinians I talked
to--and I talked to a very wide spectrum in both the West Bank
and in Gaza--they actually are now saying let the Israelis take
down the settlement houses because we are concerned if the
houses are there, it will go to the cronies of Arafat or the
thugs who have the most arms. We would rather have the houses
taken down, the infrastructure maintained, build apartment
buildings there so many more Palestinians can benefit. Well,
here again, this is not going to happen in the abstract. It is
only going to happen if in fact there is some kind of
coordination, and it is the Egyptians right now who are going
between the Israelis and the Palestinians. Now, this is the
historic American role.
Now, the Egyptians have a set of concerns. Some of those
are the ones that Senator Biden raised, but there are a few
other ones as well. For them to be able to carry out what they
want to do, they want to know certain things from us, and it is
not just on the issue of Egyptian withdrawal. They want
assurances from us that the U.S. role will be one of insisting
that this be Gaza first, not Gaza last. That is not so
difficult.
They want assurance from us that we will do what we told
the Egyptians and everybody else that we would do at the time
that Abu Mazen was Prime Minister, which is we would provide
the equipment and some training for the Palestinian security
forces. Now, that has not happened yet, but that is something
the Egyptians want.
They want an assurance from us that we will lead a
significant donor effort. So in fact you will have real
infusion of money and assistance into Gaza so that you can make
this a going concern as the Israelis withdraw. So you build a
stake of everybody there in having stability and calm. That is
not so hard.
The last one is going to be more difficult. They want
assurances from us that as they work on the Palestinian
requirements, they will also have some requirements for the
Israelis, and they want us to ensure that their requirements
for the Israelis will be met. And what are their requirements
for the Israelis?
One. This is one of the reasons I made the suggestion in
the testimony that you cited. They are going to come to the
United States, maybe not now but at some point. It is almost a
given. They are going to say, look, we cannot only pressure
Arafat, we have to give him something too. They will recognize
maybe you cannot give him anything politically but at least
give him the reality of being able to get out of the Muqata.
And they are going to come to us with that, and we need to
think about it before they come to us.
Now, they are also going to come to us on something else.
They are going to want a comprehensive cease-fire. David
Satterfield made a reference to a comprehensive cease-fire.
What does that mean in practical terms? It means if you get a
hudna, which you had before, which you cited, Senator Chafee,
on the Palestinian side when you get it, you do not use it as a
respite to rebuild and retool and plan your next set of
operations. But at the same time, if you really get it, on the
Israeli side, the Israelis stop the targeted killings and they
stop all the raids. And they will look to us to produce that.
Now, from my own standpoint, the Egyptian role is critical,
especially since no one else is playing it. I would like to see
us playing a more active role. I would like to see us defining
for ourselves what the requirements are, not having somebody
else define the requirements and we respond to them. When I
said we had no peace process, it is because it is the essence
of the peace process that produced the Israeli decision to
withdraw from Gaza. That is an Israeli decision. It was not
because of American pressure, even an American conscious
approach. That is fine. That is appropriate. But we should be
defining the requirements for how to make the Israeli
withdrawal work so it becomes a building block to transform the
situation and it does not become only an end in itself.
There is something else we can do. I heard constant
questions about the role of the Quartet. The fact is there is a
difference between us and other members of the Quartet on
Arafat, do you deal with Arafat, do you not deal with Arafat.
We say we do not deal with Arafat. I agree with that. They
continue to deal with Arafat. I think it is a mistake on their
part. But even if it was not a mistake, the one thing we could
get the Quartet to do and the one thing we could get the
Egyptians to do, if the Egyptians want us to play an active
role in support, is to get them to go public about Arafat.
Being tough with Arafat in private--let me tell you I spent
more time with Arafat than any non-Palestinian and most
Palestinians will say to me more time with him than them. Being
tough with Arafat in private means exactly nothing. Arafat
basically shrugs that off. He is used to it. It is when you go
public and it is the traditional friends of the Palestinians
who are seen as instinctively supportive of the Palestinians.
If the Europeans who are seen as instinctively supportive of
the Palestinians were publicly to say if we do not see, not
just in private, as you were suggesting--or maybe you were
suggesting, Senator, in public as well--if we do not see 12
organizations in the security side turned into 3, if we do not
see a clear chain of command, if we do not see a clear effort
made to delegitimize the violence, something that was never
done, then you lose our support. We favor Palestinian
statehood. We are prepared to put our money where our mouth is.
Europeans have done that. They have put a lot more into the
Palestinians than we have. But we will not do it if the
Chairman continues to obstruct this.
Now, when I said before he pays attention to the
Palestinian street, you have a lot of turmoil among the
Palestinians right now, as we are seeing. If he believes that
the Palestinian public says, wait a second, he is blocking us,
and our friends are saying he is blocking us, guess what. His
behavior will change.
So one of the things we need to do is establish our own
requirements and we should support the Egyptians but we should
also make it clear what we require, and what we require right
now is a readiness to go public. I do not care if that is a
threat in private to begin with, as long as Arafat knows at
some point they will all go public. Our going public in
criticism of him right now means nothing because we do not have
a whole lot of credibility with the Palestinian public. The
Europeans going public or Arab leaders going public--and I can
assure you that in private I have never heard a single Arab
leader say something good about Arafat--if there is a readiness
and he knows there is a readiness to go public, they will not
even have to. He will get out of the way. He will stop blocking
this.
Let me just conclude with one overarching set of comments,
and I will keep it brief.
Because for the last 3-plus years we have had a war and not
a peace process, the legacy on both sides has been terrible.
The psychology on each side is not a psychology of loss of
confidence. That simply trivializes it. There is a loss of
faith and belief. There are some who say, go ahead, we know
what the outcome is based on the year 2000. Even I would say
the outcome is no longer a mystery. The problem is how do you
get from where we are to the outcome. But to think that we can
do it in one step, that we can outline the settlement and say,
here it is, and it is going to be adopted is an illusion.
You look at Palestinians. You ask them what their reaction
to the Geneva Accords is, and basically they say we are against
it. Why? Because they do not believe it will be implemented.
You talk to Israelis and Israelis will tell you, even
people that I have talked to in the settler movement, that they
are ready to give up most of the settlements. They are ready to
accept something like the Clinton ideas, but they do not
believe the Palestinians will ever accept a Jewish state of
Israel and they do not believe they will ever really give up
terrorism instruments.
And until you reestablish belief on both sides, you cannot
now say, here it all is, because neither side will believe that
it will be done. So you have to create a way station. The value
of the Israeli decision of getting out of Gaza and at least
four settlements in the northern West Bank is it creates an
opening for you. Now you have to build on that opening. You
have to create a principle wherever the Israelis are going to
withdraw, the Palestinians are going to assume responsibilities
and demonstrate the assumption of responsibilities and get
others to get behind that.
By the way, getting the Europeans to support something like
that is not so hard. They are not against the Israelis getting
out of settlements. They will support that. And they understand
that the Palestinians have to assume responsibilities. We have
to get them to go public with it. We have to build on the
principle of Israeli withdrawal/Palestinian responsibility. And
when we build on that principle and make it real on the ground
and you do it now--I mean, whoever becomes President come
January, if we have not done what we have needed to do between
now and then, the task will be that much harder. But we will be
spending our time at the beginning of next year trying to make
the Israeli withdrawal work. If we make it work, it is a way
station, and the way station creates two essential freedoms,
which are the prerequisites for being able to then negotiate
the final outcome. One is the Israelis need freedom from
terror, and two is the Palestinians need freedom from Israeli
control.
I will stop there.
[The prepared statement of Ambassador Ross follows:]
Prepared Statement of Amb. Dennis Ross
TAKING ADVANTAGE OF A MIDDLE EASTERN MOMENT: THE NEED FOR AN ACTIVE
AMERICAN ROLE
While the world remains riveted on Iraq, there is a small glimmer
of hope between the Israelis and the Palestinians. Prime Minister
Sharon's intention to withdraw from the Gaza Strip has created an
opening. To be sure, the prime minister must still find the way to
overcome internal opposition to implement his decision, and given the
opposition within his party and his own lack of a majority within the
Knesset, this won't be easy. But his determination to implement his
initiative, the fact that 70% of the Israeli public supports the
disengagement plan, and the readiness of the Labor party to join a
national unity government all suggest that Prime Minister Sharon will
in time succeed in implementing his decision to withdraw from Gaza. In
any case, it is clear from discussions I had recently in Egypt, the
West Bank, and Gaza that the Palestinians and Egyptians are convinced
that Israel is going to leave Gaza.
Palestinians see both the opportunity and the danger in the Sharon
initiative. They understand that once Israel is out of Gaza they can no
longer blame failings on the Israelis and must be able to govern
themselves. They must be responsible. Here is the chance to have good
governance, and to demonstrate to the world that Palestinians are ready
for statehood.
The danger for the Palestinians is that their current fragmentation
will be exacerbated after the Israelis withdraw, with heightened
competition and even conflict, to see who can emerge dominant in Gaza.
Yasir Arafat does not make the task any easier. He will certainly try
to frustrate Palestinian efforts to forge internal understandings if he
cannot look like the liberator of Gaza. Arafat's likely opposition will
make the Egyptian task that much more difficult.
For its part, Egypt tends to see Gaza more through the prism of
danger than opportunity. The last thing Egypt wants is to have Gaza,
sitting as it does on Egypt's border, either devolve into chaos or
become dominated by Hamas. Stability in Egypt will not be served by
either possibility. To avoid any such eventuality, Egypt is now
determined to work with the Israelis and Palestinians.
Ironically, the Sharon decision to leave Gaza has led Egypt to
assume the role previously played by the United States. It is now Egypt
that is seeking to coordinate Israel's withdrawal and the parallel
assumption of responsibilities by the Palestinian Authority. It is now
Egypt that is seeking to address Israeli security concerns to ensure
that the withdrawal will be complete. And it is now Egypt that is
trying to reorganize, restructure, and train Palestinian security
forces and empower the Palestinian prime minister.
Can Egypt succeed? It will not be easy. With both the Israelis and
Palestinians, there will be difficult challenges that must be resolved.
In Israel, Ariel Sharon may have made his decision to withdraw
completely but he cannot ignore the concerns of the IDF, particularly
at a time when his own party is resisting the withdrawal. Even before
the first-ever killing of Israelis by a Qassem rocket in the Negev city
of Sderot two weeks ago, the Israeli military worried about the
smuggling of qualitatively more destructive weapons (Katyusha rockets,
shoulder-fired surface to air missiles) into Gaza after Israeli
withdrawal. From Gaza, Katyushas would be able to hit the port city of
Ashkelon or a surface to air missile could bring down an Israeli
aircraft; the IDF's concerns in this regard won't be met with slogans
but with tangible, practical approaches for preventing either
eventuality. That is why IDF has favored holding the Philadelphi route
on the Gaza-Egyptian border, notwithstanding the Prime Minister's
desire for full withdrawal. If Egypt wants the Israeli withdrawal to be
complete, it will have to demonstrate to the Israeli military that it
is acting to shut down the smuggling tunnels that run from its side of
the border into Gaza. So far, the Israeli military leaders I spoke with
remain unconvinced.
But the challenge with the Palestinians may be even more demanding.
Today the Palestinian Authority in Gaza simply does not function on
security matters. There are different security organizations, tied to
different factions of Fatah, and with different strongmen. If that were
not enough, these competing forces must also contend with Hamas and
Islamic Jihad. Egypt wants to create coherence by having Arafat permit
the consolidation of the security organizations into three services
with a professional chain of command and separated from Fatah. Egypt
wants the leaders of the new consolidated security services to come to
Egypt to reach understandings on their responsibilities, how they will
be fulfilled, and how Egypt will monitor their performance while also
providing them support. Only after reaching such understandings would
the Egyptians then send several dozen advisors to work with and monitor
the new security services in Gaza.
It is a logical plan. While it has the support of the Palestinian
Prime Minister, Ahmed Qurei, Yasir Arafat has given only grudging
support to the plan--and even this under pressure from Hosni Mubarak
and his intelligence chief Omar Suleiman. In truth, at this point
Arafat's yes is in reality a ``no.'' He has not reconciled himself to
giving up control of the security organizations or to allowing them to
fulfill their obligations. (Terje Larsen, Kofi Annan's special
representative in the Middle East, has complained about these very
points in a presentation to the Security Council.) Does this mean all
is lost? Not necessarily, but it will require constant pressure on him
from President Mubarak, including the threat of going public about
Arafat's obstructionism. Arafat may have little to fear from our
criticism, but should the traditional friends of the Palestinian people
declare that he is blocking efforts to advance the Palestinian cause,
that could have a decidedly different impact on the Chairman.
For Egypt to be willing to go public in its criticism of Arafat
would represent a bold new step. In private, President Mubarak and
other Arab leaders have never spared Arafat of criticism. But they have
never been willing to make the same statements in public, perhaps
fearing Arafat's ability to manipulate their publics about a betrayal
of the Palestinian cause. Perhaps, Egypt's stakes in what happens in
Gaza may change the traditional calculus. Perhaps, it will also
motivate the Egyptians to press the Jordanians, Saudis, Moroccans,
Tunisians and others to join it in being prepared to go public with
criticism of Arafat. Should Arab leaders act collectively, they would
feel less vulnerable to Arafat's charges; on the contrary, Arafat would
be the one feeling vulnerable. And this may not be such a far-fetched
idea as Arab leaders are evidencing increasing frustration with Arafat.
But here there should also be no illusions. The readiness to put
real pressure on Arafat to go along with the restructuring of security
organizations and the assumption of meaningful security
responsibilities will probably be tied to giving Arafat something. At a
minimum, the Egyptians and others are likely to insist that Arafat be
released from the Muqata, his virtual prison. Israel is likely to
resist this, fearing Arafat's desire to return to Gaza as a hero and
the need for him to pay a price for his continuing support for terror
against Israelis.
While sympathetic to the Israeli concerns, I favor Arafat being
released from the Muqata. He certainly hasn't earned a release, but he
is using his virtual prisoner status as a symbol of humiliation not of
himself; but of the Palestinian people--and that resonates, building
support for him and keeping reformers on the defensive. However, I
would make Arafat's release to Gaza, not release for external travel,
part of a package of understandings in which Arafat would not be able
to go to Gaza until the security restructuring had taken place and
there was actual performance for several months.
The question remains can Egypt broker this kind of a package
arrangement? Indeed, can it broker broader understandings between the
Israelis and Palestinians on the timing of the steps the Israelis will
take as they prepare withdrawal, the steps the Palestinians must take
in response, the ways the handover of territory will be coordinated,
and the specific areas where the IDF and the Palestinian security
services will work together? Can it put all this together without also
negotiating a comprehensive ceasefire that is not only an internal
Palestinian hudna but involves the Israelis as well?
All this is an extraordinarily tall order, and the Egyptians are
unlikely to succeed, much less stick with the effort, without active
American support. Already the Egyptian timetable of two months for
Yasir Arafat to concede on the consolidation of Palestinian security
forces suggests to some Palestinians and Israelis that the Egyptians
are reluctant to push too hard at a time when they believe the
Administration is otherwise occupied.
I am afraid that the Egyptians may believe that the Administration
will do very little before November, and while the Egyptians are
prepared to take the lead, they definitely are counting on the United
States for several things. First, they want an American public
assurance that the Gaza withdrawal will be the first step, not the last
of the process. Second, when they identify requirements for Israeli
behavior (and this is likely to focus on releasing Arafat and stopping
targeted killings and raids as part of a comprehensive ceasefire), they
will want the Administration to press the Israelis to accept these
steps.
Third, they will want us to provide the material help we promised
the Palestinian security organizations during Abu Mazen's time but
never delivered. And, lastly, they will want us to lead an
international donor effort that produces significant assistance for
Gaza to show life can get better.
I certainly favor American activism sooner rather than later. While
I think Egypt has a very important role to play and am pleased by its
readiness to play it, I would prefer to see the U.S. taking the lead.
American leadership with Egyptian support is ultimately more likely to
be successful than Egyptian leadership with U.S. support. Regardless,
one point is very clear: the Israeli withdrawal from Gaza can be used
to end the war between Israelis and Palestinians and make the
resumption of a peace process possible. It can be used to create a new
climate in which both Israelis and Palestinians have a chance to
restore their belief again in peaceful coexistence. But the less that
is done now to capitalize on this moment, the more that will need to be
done later and the greater the risk that the moment will be lost.
Middle East moments have a way of appearing and disappearing quickly,
and, unfortunately, when they are lost, the situation is almost always
worse than it was before.
The Chairman. Well, thank you very much, Ambassador Ross,
for a very comprehensive and important statement.
We would like to hear now from Dr. Said.
STATEMENT OF DR. ABDEL MONEM SAID ALY, VISITING RESEARCH
FELLOW, SABAN CENTER FOR MIDDLE EAST POLICY, THE BROOKINGS
INSTITUTION
Dr. Said. Thank you very much, Senator Lugar. I am really
honored to be here. I must confess I am totally overwhelmed. It
is my first time to be before such an honorable committee, and
also I am overwhelmed because I feel that the perspective here
is completely different from where I am coming from. So I will
try to do my best to relate to you my honest opinion on a very
complicated topic.
Actually I am torn between responding to many of the things
that were said, that I think were quite important, and sticking
to my brief. I have already submitted my testimony. But I want
to emphasize some, at least what I think are grand points that
need to be emphasized even when we come into some of the
details that we are discussing.
The most important thing is that the Palestinian-Israeli
conflict is a strategic conflict, and I mean by strategic
conflict to bring to the minds here, it is like the German
question that haunted European politics for about two
centuries. This conflict actually haunted the Middle East
politics for over a century, and I hope it will not stay with
us for a second century.
The second point, strategic conflicts are dealt with by
grand strategy which I am afraid that many of the details we
talk about really make us not look on the grand picture. The
Palestinian-Israeli conflict is part of a region and this
region has monopolized about 25 percent of conflicts since the
Second World War. I think in that region that is called the
Middle East, many of the conflicts that now the United States
is involved directly like in Iraq are highly integrated. It is
a totally, completely strategic, integrated region. Issues of
the Palestinian-Israeli issue, terror, weapons of mass
destruction, Iraq, civil wars, reform are all integrated.
The third point I want to emphasize is that a short-term
solution can work for a short time. Beware, however, they are
short-lived and sometimes they are dangerously addictive. The
major rule in the politics of the Middle East is that unless
concerned parties do not come after the conflict, the conflict
will come after them. Unless concerned parties launch peace,
others will make war.
The fourth point is a resolution of the conflict is
possible. I believe it is possible. There is an international
consensus on the parameters of the end road of the Palestinian-
Israeli disputes. However, the Arab side has resolved the
Palestinian question by the Arab initiative, by identifying the
solution of the Palestinian question in terms of the 1967
boundaries, more or less. We need a similar position that
resolves the Jewish Israeli question within the same
boundaries.
I think--and I may beg to differ--that it was mentioned
that there is an absence of a Palestinian partner as the
essence of the problem we are facing. That is part of the
reality, but I believe the essence of the problem is
occupation. We have a long-term vision for a two-state
solution, but we never defined really in the record where these
states will be. Even my dear friend talked about Israeli
control. In our perspective it is outright occupation, and I am
totally a bit surprised that the United States can talk about
its occupation of Iraq freely but we cannot talk about the
Israeli occupation of Palestinian and Arab territories.
I will say--and that is another point--that progress
happened in the past and it could happen in the future if we
have four conditions.
No. 1, serious American involvement at the highest level.
We never really got progress unless President Carter in the
past, President Bush in the past, President Clinton in the past
really committed time and resources.
The second one, that we have a majority of Palestinians and
Israelis really agreeing on the final solution. So far we have
public opinion polls that tell us that the mainstream Israelis
and Palestinians agree on a certain type of a final status
agreement. However, there is total mistrust now for different
reasons and also we have forces that are working against that.
I think that is where the problem lies in where we are going at
this moment and what Egypt is really trying to do with the
Palestinians. And we hope that you can do it with the Israelis.
What we are trying to make with the Palestinians is another
option. Actually we are fighting terror. We are fighting
radicalism. We are fighting fundamentalism in the time we are
trying to solve the Palestinian question or trying at least to
move it forward. And that is a way to affect Arafat. I mean,
what I heard here today about Arafat, he looks like a giant
actually. That is a guy sitting in a Muqata. Actually he cannot
have a shower without Israeli permission because they can
cutoff water from him at any time they need, and at the same
time it seems he is in control. He has no authority. He has no
power. He has only moral and political influence. That will not
be shaken without somebody else in the Palestinian ranks can
come and say, here, I am bringing you an independent state in
the 1967 borders.
That is what I think Dennis was talking about, legitimacy
of leadership. Arafat provided the legitimacy of a struggle. We
have got to give the Palestinians the ability to have
legitimacy of a recognized future. In this case, then we have a
solution.
A third condition is total Egyptian and American
cooperation, and finally a clear plan.
I will say that none of these conditions is really
available enough. We have a bit of each of it. But I am afraid
that now Egypt is using a lot of political assets, a lot of
political investments in this process. I want to say here for
this honorable committee that political assets and investments
in the Middle East are not in abundance. They are short and
sometimes they have a hell of a cost. I want to say that the
Egyptian leadership really needs to be encouraged to continue
in that path.
Finally, I want to say that at this moment like many of the
histories of regions of the world, you have defining moments.
It is not per se the Palestinian-Israeli conflict. That is one
of the conflicts--I am international relations expert and I am
familiar a little bit of history. Conflicts continue sometime
for too long. But actually the one I want to emphasize that the
Arab-Israeli conflict is really measured with much larger
conflicts. The events of September 11 here in this country have
really put us into a new phase in world history I will say.
That is very complicated. We do not see it completely, but
really I see that you find the Palestinian cause is mentioned
by people in Indonesia and people in the Philippines. There is
no justification for terror, I will say, but something is
simmering going on and this something is completely dangerous.
The place we have to face it or the beginning of the line,
it is not all the lines. It is a very complicated process. It
is there in the Palestinian-Israeli one.
I think the Arabs should have the courage to say we accept
Israel among us. We have to build a future together through
diplomacy and politics. We are threatened together by forces
who want to terrorize our future.
We need another commitment. I know it is difficult. I heard
in this committee a lot of what Arafat should do and many of
the things that were said were right. Arafat has got to have a
central security apparatus. He has to have an efficient and
reformed government. He has to build something to make the
Palestinians feel that they will have a better state than the
one they have.
But at the same time, I have not heard the ``settlements''
once. I have not heard what can we talk and tell the Israelis
what they do. I know it is difficult. I know it is difficult in
an election year situation. But I think it has to be said not
only for the sake of us in the region, which is very important,
but for the sake of Palestinians, Israelis, and Americans.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
[The prepared statement of Dr. Said follows:]
Prepared Statement of Abdel Monem Said Aly
I. INTRODUCTION: A STRATEGIC CONFLICT
The history of the Arab-Israeli conflict is full of moments of
success, and plenty of failures and lost opportunities. For the last
four years, the Palestinian-Israeli part of the conflict has defied all
plans for reconciliation the latest of which is the Road Map.
The Egyptian plan could face the same fate unless it was treated by
the United States and of the world concerned community in much more
serious ways than what is already taking place.
Plans and initiatives do not work in their own, or because of their
internal consistency and logic, or because they are just and fair, or
even because they are accepted by the parties; but rather because there
is a political commitment that understands the gravity of the situation
and has the stamina, the patience, and the resources to achieve
results.
Such a commitment will not be obtained unless the concerned
parties, particularly the. United States, have come to the conviction
that the Arab-Israeli conflict is endowed by three characteristics:
First, the conflict is a conflict of strategic magnitude. It is not
a dispute that time will ameliorate its acuteness, reduce its agonies,
heal its wounds, and ends its pains. The Arab-Israeli conflict has been
one of the most important chapters of the cold war and now it could be
the most important chapter in the war against terror. Without any
exaggeration, it will be at the center of the ``Clash of
Civilizations'' if the predictions of Samuel Huntington, and,
ironically in a completely different way, Osama bin Laden ever come
true.
Second, the conflict is part of a larger regional context. A
strategic conflict is by definition a protracted one with security,
social and political implications that go beyond the direct interests
of the conflicting parties. The Middle East regional context of the
Arab-Israeli conflict is a highly integrated strategic area in which
all the subjects of Iraq, Palestinian-Israeli problems, terror, reform,
fundamentalism, are all related and interdependent. Unless all the
concerned parties, particularly the United States, understand the
regional and the global reach of the conflict, the commitment to solve
it will not be obtained.
Third, the Arab-Israeli conflict is in a state of flux and change.
It is as many issue areas in the Middle East such as Iraq and reform
are in transition. And transition is a state of uncertainty and the
competition of opposing forces. Those are the times when the devils of
history do not wait much for presidential election cycles, nor could
they wait for plans or initiatives to be stacked for posterity. One of
the greatest achievements of the peace process in the last three
decades has been the transformation of the Arab-Israeli conflict from
being an existential conflict to be a conflict about how can the Arabs
and Israelis live with each other. Such achievement in the time of
transition is susceptible to reversals by forces that opposed peace
from the start.
II. THE EGYPTIAN INITIATIVE
If such understanding of the strategic magnitude of the conflict,
its regional context, and its transitional nature has established the
commitment for the resolution of the conflict, the Egyptian initiative
will have a chance for success. The measure of success is to jump start
the peace process and put it back into the Road Map track. So far, the
Egyptian initiative has achieved the following:
1. It has kept the interest in Sharon unilateral
disengagement plan going despite the series of setbacks in his
own Likud party who voted against his plans and the constrains
which are imposed by his cabinet on the substance and the
timetable on his initiative.
2. It has initiated a dialogue process within the Palestinian
political factions for a strategic and political program to
reach an independent Palestinian state that live in peace side
by side with Israel, the Jewish state, according to President
Bush's vision of a two state solution to the Palestinian-
Israeli conflict. Such a dialogue will include the unification
of security organs under one single leadership and will be
concluded in Cairo, hopefully, before November 2, 2004. Just on
time for the new American administration to take action if it
so will.
3. It has the support of the Palestinian public. According to
a public opinion poll conducted by the Palestinian Center for
Policy and Survey Research (PSR) in 24-27 of June, 2004, 64% of
the Palestinians support the initiative and 32% oppose it.
Support for the various aspects of the initiative varies but
all indicate a willingness to make it succeed: 81% for the
unification of the security services under the control of the
cabinet, 87% for the appointment of a strong minister of
interior, and 53% for the deployment of Egyptian military
advisers and security experts in the Gaza Strip.
4. It has initiated a process of Egyptian-Israeli dialogue,
coordination and cooperation over issues related to the
disengagement plan such as the tunnels and the use of Israeli
forces in Gaza near the Egyptian borders. And, over other
issues that are neither related to the disengagement plan nor
to the Egyptian-Israeli peace treaty such as the QIZs and the
export of Egyptian gas to Israel.
5. It has filled the diplomatic vacuum that was generated by
the American engagement in Iraq and the coming presidential
elections. The meetings of the Quartet started to give a sense
of new possibilities for the peace process. As Henry Kissinger
once said: the Arab-Israeli peace process is like riding a
bicycle uphill, you have to keep going up, or you will fall
down. The Egyptian initiative is struggling to continue upward.
All these are tactical achievements, temporary, and all reversible.
Few trends are emerging to endanger the Egyptian initiative:
1. There are several negative changes in the original Israeli
unilateral disengagement plan that is making it less and less
attractive to the Palestinians and the rest of the Arab World.
The plan which is supposed to achieve a clean Israeli
withdrawal of forces and settlements from Gaza and part of the
West Bank has been staged over a long period of time and always
subject to Israeli cabinet approvals, and maneuvers. The new
amendments have allowed for several Israeli types of control in
Gaza which makes the withdrawal more as redeployment of forces
than being a serious disengagement.
2. The Israeli side is refusing to link the disengagement
plan to the Road Map. The best that the Israeli leadership is
coming with is that its plan is not inconsistent with the Road
Map. As the Road Map is having three stages, and Israel is
planning now to withdraw, or redeploy its forces, in three
stages, the absence of a direct linkage with the Road Map is
undermining Egypt's position and its legitimacy in Egypt and
the Arab World regarding involvement in the Israeli-Palestinian
negotiations.
3. Most thoughtful observers in Israel are indicating that
the essence of the Sharon plan is to consolidate the Israeli
presence in the West Bank. Former Israeli Labor minister
Ephraim Sneh wrote to the Israeli Policy Forum in July 13,
2004: ``He (Sharon) expects that leaving the Gaza Strip will
enable him to assume greater control over the West Bank,
perhaps annexing at least half of it.'' Neither Egypt, nor the
world, has any interest in allowing Israel to have a de facto
annexation of the West Bank or parts of it. Israeli leadership
did not make any effort to alleviate such worries.
4. The process of building settlements in Gaza and the West
Bank have not abated but rather it shows signs of acceleration.
Excessive Israeli violence against the Palestinian populations
has put the Egyptian initiative in serious danger of being like
condoning Israeli behavior.
5. The American letter of assurances to Prime Minister Sharon
in April that touched upon final status issues did not achieve
its original objective of helping Sharon to win the support of
his Likud members, nor has it helped the peace process. It was
an embarrassment to Egypt and its efforts.
These negative developments have sucked some of the air out of the
Egyptian initiative. However, the Egyptian leadership continued its
efforts to make the disengagement plan possible if it ever is going to
be implemented. But, unless there is a genuine help from the United
States and the other Quartet members, Egyptian initiative will be added
to a long list of failed attempts to resolve the conflict.
III. WHAT CAN THE U.S. AND OTHERS DO?
The external support should utilize the available assets that are
available in order to chart a meaningful process that will make the
resolution of the conflict possible.
The first asset is the Egyptian and Jordanian peace agreements
which give a living proof of the long lasting rewards of peace; namely
the end of hostility and belligerence, the return of occupied
territories, and the commitment to the peaceful resolution of the
conflict. These agreements have created stakes for Cairo and Amman to
continue the search for peace in the region.
The second asset is the Palestinian and the Israeli citizens who
want to live in peace. Despite the bloodshed since September. 2000,
public opinion polls in Palestine and Israel all indicate that the
majority of the population on both sides still favors the peace
process. Israeli polls have shown increasing acknowledgement of the
impossibility of a military imposed resolution of the conflict. On the
Palestinian side also there is more acknowledgement of the futility of
suicide bombing targeting civilians, as a means to advance the national
interest.
The third asset is an emerging consensus over a historical
compromise which responds to the minimum requirements of both parties;
i.e. Israeli withdrawal from territories occupied in 1967, equal
exchange of 3% of the land, and establishing the Palestinian state with
East Jerusalem minus the Jewish quarter and the wailing wall as its
capital, whereas West Jerusalem plus the Jewish quarter and the wailing
wall becomes the capital of Israel, and a just settlement of the
refugee problem that does not deny the right of return, while
preserving the Israeli demographic balance at the same time. The Geneva
accords are a living evidence of the possibility of agreement between
the two sides. Today, we miss the tunnel, but most already see the
light at its end.
The fourth asset is the international support for a peaceful
resolution of the Middle East conflict. This support has become more
institutionalized through the Quartet; the U.S., the EU, Russia, and
the UN.
The fifth asset is the Arab initiative supported by Egypt and Saudi
Arabia who are in fact the backbone of the Arab world. Saudi Arabia has
informed the U.S. that it will be willing to implement the
normalization process with Israel upon signing a peace agreement
between Israel and the Palestinians. Israel could have normal relations
with the majority of Arab states upon accepting withdrawal from the
Arab occupied territories in 1967. Elsewhere Shai Feldman and I have
outlined the possible use of the Arab initiative in supporting the Road
Map process. (Ecopolitics: Changing the regional Context of Arab-
Israeli Peace Making, Harvard University, August 2003).
The sixth asset is that an absolute failure of the peace initiative
will mean a nightmare for the Palestinians and Israelis. After four
years of futile warfare, both societies have lost opportunities for
peace and for economic and social progress.
These assets are encountered with serious liabilities:
First, there is no trust left between the Palestinians and Israelis
as a result of four years of intensive fighting that shattered the good
will that was developed during the implementation of the Oslo
agreements.
Second, there are active and highly potent minorities in both sides
that are more determined to prevent a historical reconciliation between
the Arabs and Israelis.
Third, other problems in the Middle East and elsewhere are always
capable of distracting international attention from the peace process.
The war on terror and the war in Iraq have put the Palestinian conflict
away from the priorities of the international community particularly
the United States.
Fourth, there is some sort of a diplomatic fatigue in the Middle
East conflict. The failures of many diplomatic initiatives have created
reluctance in the United States and even in Europe to invest the
necessary political resources in the settlement of the conflict.
Fifth, American Presidential cycles always disrupts the working for
peace in the Middle East.
The balance between assets and liabilities will be decided by the
American strategic evaluation of the conflict and its centrality to
other Middle East interests. These interests include success in Iraq,
victory over terror, increasing the space for reform in the Middle East
countries, in addition to all other traditional American interests in
the region such as oil, security of Israel, and stability in the
region.
As has been mentioned above, the United States and its partners in
the Quartet should deal with the Arab-Israeli conflict as strategic
conflict, in a highly integrated strategic area, going through
uncertain transitional period with highly historical implications.
If that is the case, it has to be understood from the start that
the Egyptian initiative is limited to bridge the current situation to
the first phase of the Road Map. As Egyptian-American cooperation has
been essential in all the previous successes of the peace process
through out the 1990s, continued cooperation between Cairo and
Washington is necessary.
Attempts to pollute the air between the two capitals at this stage,
and in particular through using the Assistance program, or playing up a
non-issue such as the Gaza tunnels, will not be helpful, and will shift
the Egyptian-American dialogue away from advancing the causes of peace
and change in the region. In fact, now is the time to appreciate
Egyptian efforts on the Israeli-Egyptian borders and increase American
help and assistance to Egypt in order to build a coalition of
moderation in the region. This coalition will not be only instrumental
in working for peace in the Middle East but also it will be a
cornerstone for the rebuilding of the region.
More specifically, the United States and its partners could help
Egypt in her efforts to bring this strategic objective closer by doing
the following:
1. Make a commitment for the original Sharon Plan of clean
disengagement and make it clear that the plan is part of the
first phase of the Road Map. Subjecting Egyptian effort to the
changing winds of Israeli politics will put in doubt the
chances of Egypt's success, and even its continued engagement.
2. Support this commitment by a congressional bipartisan
resolution that will make American policy in the Middle East
less likely to be affected by domestic American politics.
3. Support an active international, and in particular
European, security role in the areas that Israel will withdraw
from, and convince Israel to accept.
4. Work out a formula for Palestinian legislative and
Presidential elections and a referendum on a two state solution
to the Palestinian-Israeli conflict. Such a process will help
to give the PA the legitimacy it badly needs and isolate the
extremists. And, do that soon enough before the support for the
Egyptian initiative erodes.
5. Give material support and assistance in the rebuilding of
Palestinian institutions particularly security ones.
6. It is important for the Palestinians to feel that a change
is taking place in their lives and the Gaza first will not be
Gaza last. Therefore, make sure to open the Gaza airport and
the corridor between Gaza and the West Bank.
7. Ask Arab countries to restore their relations with Israel
once the IDF withdrawal takes place from Gaza and to
communicate to the Israelis in different ways their commitment
to the Arab peace initiative.
8. Make preparations and consultations for the next phase of
the Road Map particularly as related to the international
conference which is responsible for starting the final status
negotiations.
9. Create support for the Geneva accords in both sides
through hearings, congressional missions, dialogues, and other
tools.
10. Work out a formula that will deal with contingencies such
as terror acts against Palestinian civilians and suicide
bombings.
IV. CONCLUSIONS
There are moments in history that are more important than others
are. They come usually after defining times that make what is after
significantly different from what was before.
These defining moments came to the world and the Middle East after
World War II, the end of the Cold War, and now after September 11th and
the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq.
Now is the time to act to change the course of history in the
Middle East, and the world. Failure to do so will be a submission to
the law of nature. And, when nature takes its course all parties loose.
The beginnings of the loss are already there. Palestinians are
deprived not only of their national goals but also from the basic needs
of life. In fact, life has become not more rewarding than death. And,
let me stray here from my line of thought to elaborate on this point. I
might have been the Arab World's most vocal and consistent critic of
the Palestinians' use of violence, and the particular tactic of suicide
bombing.
I always thought that it is morally wrong, and politically harmful
to a cause I believe is just. It is important to understand, though,
that such acts are the result of a distorted mind and a desperate soul.
Those minds and souls will not be cured by encirclement and punishment,
if anything; this will most definitely lead to even worse kinds of
behavior. The best antidote for this downward spiral and I am talking
out of first hand knowledge, and a genuine desire for an end this
spiral, is hope.
Israelis are not much better. Walls now surround the national dream
of a safe and accepted homeland. Israel is increasingly becoming the
largest ever-Jewish ghetto in history. Other regional powers are
totally entangled in a conflict that so far resisted solutions, their
national agendas are delayed and extremism is ready to attack.
It could be a dim future indeed. Now is the time to change this
future. It is time for a long-term vision not a short term management
of events. It is the time for strategy not tactics. It is the time to
deal with history by creating a better future, not by eternally
reliving the past.
The Chairman. Thank you very much, Dr. Said.
We would like to hear now from Mr. Miller.
STATEMENT OF AARON DAVID MILLER, PRESIDENT, SEEDS OF PEACE
Mr. Miller. Mr. Chairman, first, let me thank you and
Senators Biden and Chafee for the opportunity to present here
today, as well as other members of the committee. With the
possible exception of the outcome of American policy in Iraq,
there is no more important issue to American credibility and
interests than the pursuit of Arab-Israeli peace.
Over the course of the last 25 years, I had the honor to
serve as an advisor to the last six Secretaries of State on
Arab-Israeli negotiations, including until January of last year
for Secretary Powell.
During the course of these years, I developed a profound
faith in three basic propositions. I believed in them when I
started. I believed in them when there was a peace process
worthy of its name, and I believe in them now when everything
we have worked to achieve lies broken and bloodied somewhere.
First, there is an equitable and durable solution to the
Arab-Israeli conflict. There is no perfect justice but there is
one that meets the needs and requirements of all sides.
Second, the only way to achieve this solution is through a
flawed and imperfect process of negotiation, negotiation based
on a balance of interests, not on an imbalance of power.
And third, there can be no solution, even in an existential
conflict, which the Israeli-Palestinian conflict very much is,
without the engagement of the United States as a full partner.
I raise these tenets because they inform what you are about
to hear from me and they informed the policies of my government
during the course of the last 30 years. What I would like to do
is offer six quick observations about Gaza disengagement and
American reengagement with one cautionary note. Whether it is a
second Bush administration or a Kerry administration, it is
absolutely critical that the next administration begin to craft
a serious and a sustained approach to Arab-Israeli peacemaking
because Arab-Israeli peace is perhaps one of the few issues in
the international system today in which three very important
elements coincide for us: our national interests, our moral
interests, and our capacity demonstrated over four decades to
make a bad situation not perfect but to make a bad situation
better. Six brief observations.
First, the focus on unilateralism, specifically Gaza
disengagement, is a response to a structural crisis in the
pursuit of Arab-Israeli peace. For the first time in a decade,
there is no serious process of engagement between empowered
Israelis and Palestinians. For the first time in a decade,
there is no framework, no Madrid, no Oslo, no permanent status.
And frankly, at the moment, zero chances of implementing the
Road Map. For the first time in a decade, there is no trust and
no confidence between these parties, and for the first time in
a decade, there is no meaningful, serious and sustainable U.S.
role as a third party.
Without over-dramatizing, I would argue to you that this
structural crisis presents a huge challenge to the one
instrument that has delivered agreements both between Israel
and Egypt, Israel and Jordan, and a heroic attempt between
Israelis and Palestinians, which has to date failed, and that
is the notion of bilateral direct negotiations sometimes under
U.S. auspices, sometimes without.
Second, as presently articulated, the chances for
unilateral implementation of the Israeli disengagement plan are
probably unworkable. At the same time, that plan represents the
first serious, the most serious initiative undertaken by any
party, including the United States, during the course of the
last 4 years. It seems to me obvious that as a point of
departure, as a reentry point--Dennis described it as a way
station--back into a meaningful process, this disengagement
should be the focus of everyone's efforts, but it is going to
have to be modified substantially. In my written testimony, I
point out four or five critical modifications that I suspect
will have to take place if it is going to be implemented
successfully and not leave in its wake more confusion, more
trouble, more terror than currently exists at the moment.
Third, political realities and circumstances at the moment
on both sides will contribute to the non-implementation of this
particular initiative. On the Israeli side--and I am not under
the constraint that my colleague, David Satterfield, is under,
although I am under certain constraints--it seems to me a
political center will have to emerge. I am not going to define
it whether it is a national unity government, whether it is an
expanded coalition in some way, shape, or form. Oddly enough,
the people of Israel are well out ahead of their politicians in
this regard, and it may well be for the first time in a decade
that that popular will can express itself. But there is going
to have to be a political center capable of implementing
unilateral disengagement.
On the Palestinian side, there is either going to have to
be a reckoning, which I doubt is going to happen, or some form
of modus vivendi or reconciliation between Fatah, the dominant
secular movement, however divided it may be, and Fatah's
Islamists and secular opponents because what has been lost
these many years--and if you really want to talk about the true
Palestinian transgression, it is not Mr. Arafat's refusal to
accept what was offered at Camp David. It was not. It is the
willing acquiescence in the loss of the monopoly of the forces
and sources of violence within Palestinian society. Whether you
are the District of Columbia or the State of Ohio or the United
States, you must preserve control of the forces and sources of
violence within your society. Otherwise you have no credibility
with your own constituents and certainly none with your
neighbors. That monopoly on force and violence must be
reacquired.
Fourth, because nothing ever happens quickly between
Israelis and Palestinians, unilateral disengagement in my view
will remain, however serious the preparations for it, a virtual
initiative until some time in 2005. Whether it is early, mid,
late is unclear. Our Presidential elections, as they often and
usually do, will delay matters further, and I doubt frankly
whether the administration will be prepared during the next 3
or 4 or 5 months to raise its profile, nor I suspect will this
issue, that is to say, the issue of Arab-Israeli peace, become
a significant topic of debate, serious debate, within the
campaign for a variety of reasons.
In the interim, that is to say, between now and the end of
this year, there are things that we can do, but they are going
to be modest because we do not have the moment for movement
right now. Encourage the Israelis and Palestinians to discuss
day-after scenarios. Continue to support the Egyptian efforts
to forge consolidation among security services and also focus
the Israelis on their responsibilities for dismantling
settlements outposts and also to have a serious discussion with
them on settlement activity.
Fifth, the next administration, whether it is a second Bush
or a Kerry administration, as it crafts its approach to this
issue, will have to deal with three realities, which are sad
realities. I cannot change them. I wish I could.
No. 1, the Israel-Palestinian negotiation, unlike Israel-
Egypt and Israel-Jordan, is not based on a balance of
interests. Negotiations succeed when they are based on a
balance of interests whether it is a good marriage, a good
business proposition or a good friendship. When each party has
their mutual needs and requirements met, negotiations succeed;
when they do not, the negotiations do not succeed. Israel-Egypt
succeeded because it was based on a balance of interests.
Israel-Jordan succeeded because it was based on a balance of
interests. Israelis and Palestinians, no. It was based on an
asymmetry of power, hopelessly skewed. Palestinians wielded the
power of the weak, which is a terrifying power. It is the power
to acquiesce as the weakest party to a negotiation to say this
is not my fault. This is not my responsibility. I can acquiesce
in a range of behaviors, including suicide terror, because I
cannot do anything about it. And Israelis, on the other hand,
wielded the power of the strong, the capacity to act at will
not in legitimate defense of their security requirements. No
one is doubting or disputing that right. But in defense of a
variety of policies, including land confiscation, settlement
activity, housing demolitions, which do not contribute,
frankly, to the security of the state of Israel, let alone to
the facilitation of the Arab-Israeli peace process. That
asymmetry of power needs to be addressed.
Second, we are out of the age of heroic politics when it
comes to Arab-Israeli peacemaking for now. Sadat and Begin,
Rabin, Peres, King Hussein, Arafat in his first incarnation,
the leaders capable of taking the existential decisions are not
there now, and that is a reality which any American
administration is going to have to deal with.
And finally, progress is likely to be slow and incremental
but it will not come--it will not come--without a major
initiative on the part of this government.
Finally, the elements that any next administration will
have to consider:
One, make this issue a priority, make it a real priority, a
Presidential priority, not that the President has to engage,
but it has to be unmistakably clear that we care about this.
Second, empower a diplomat to work this issue creatively
and actively. Whether it is the Secretary of State or a special
envoy, empower that person.
Three, do serious diplomacy, 24/7 diplomacy. There is
nothing wrong with the Road Map, but there are no benchmarks.
There are no performance standards. There are no time lines.
There are no monitoring mechanisms. It is not a dynamic
document. We can make it a dynamic document. Difficult, but we
can do it.
Mobilize Arab support. And I think that will be easier once
we engage.
And finally, define a political horizon, not a Geneva
agreement. Do not negotiate for the parties. But begin to craft
non-threatening parameters about where we are going in this
process.
Let me close with one brief observation. The stakes here
are very high. There was a war in every single decade of the
last century in the modern incarnation of the Arab-Israeli
conflict, 1948, 1956, 1967, 1973, 1982. The 1990s came and went
without a major Arab-Israeli war, and there was a reason for
that. Under a Republican administration, you had Madrid with
engagement. Under Democrats, you had Oslo, however failed a
process it was. You had the Israeli-Jordanian peace treaty. You
had serious Israeli-Syrian negotiations.
My real concern here today is that if this idea that
negotiations cannot be used to resolve problems dies and if we,
by a sin of omission or commission, contribute to that fact,
then we risk surrendering the field to the forces of history.
And if they could speak to you here today, here is what they
would say. They would say we know how this conflict is going to
end. We do. There is going to be one winner and there is going
to be one loser. And no one who cares about American national
interests, no one who cares about the security and well-being
of the State of Israel, no one who cares about any sense of
justice for Palestinians or Arabs can afford to court that kind
of outcome.
Thank you very much.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Miller follows:]
Prepared Statement of Aaron David Miller
GAZA DISENGAGEMENT AND U.S. REENGAGEMENT IN ARAB-ISRAELI PEACEMAKING
Mr. Chairman, members of the Committee: it's an honor to have the
opportunity to testify today on the pursuit of Arab-Israeli peace and
American efforts to address the current Israeli-Palestinian crisis.
Over the past twenty-five years, I have had the privilege to serve
as an advisor on these matters to the last six secretaries of state,
including until January of 2003, to Secretary Powell.
During this period, I developed a profound faith in three
propositions. I believed in them when there was a peace process worthy
of the name, and I believe in them now when everything reasonable
Israelis, Arabs, and Americans sought to achieve lies broken and
bloodied:
1. There is an equitable and durable solution to the Arab-
Israeli conflict--no perfect justice but one that can satisfy
the needs of all sides;
2. This solution can only come about through negotiations
based on a balance of interests not on a skewed balance of
power;
3. There will be no serious negotiations, let alone solutions
without the U.S. engaged as a full partner.
These propositions shape my testimony today just as they have
shaped the policies of the U.S. government for the past thirty years.
We cannot afford to abandon them; to do so means abandoning any hope
for a solution and surrendering the field to the crueler and more
impersonal forces of history and to continued confrontation.
I would like to use my time with the committee to share my
observations of Gaza disengagement, what might need to be modified to
make it succeed, and what elements a second Bush or a Kerry
administration will need to consider if they undertake--as I hope they
will--a serious and sustainable U.S. approach to Arab-Israeli
peacemaking.
First, the focus on unilateral actions, specifically unilateral
disengagement from Gaza, is an outgrowth of the profound crisis in the
entire structure of Arab-Israeli peacemaking. For the first time in a
decade, there is:
1. No serious negotiation between empowered Israelis and
Palestinians;
2. No mutually agreed framework within which to negotiate--no
Madrid, no Oslo, no permanent status parameters, and no chance
right now for the road-map;
3. No trust and confidence between leaders who are driven by
zero sum game politics instead of common vision or for serious
progress;
4. And no third party U.S. role to facilitate, bridge gaps,
or defuse crisis.
Without over-dramatizing, what is now at stake is a threat to the
very structure that delivered two successful peace agreements between
Israel and Egypt and Israel and Jordan and a heroic attempt to produce
a third between Israelis and Palestinians: bilateral negotiations--
sometimes direct, often under U.S. auspices to reach agreements.
Indeed, unilateral solutions without reciprocity are a dangerous
precedent which will not resolve conflict, leave a thousand problems
unaddressed, and could paradoxically demonstrate weakness and court
terror.
Second, as presently constituted--and under prevailing political
conditions among Israelis and Palestinians--unilateral disengagement is
probably unworkable. At the same time, it's the most important idea
proposed by any party in four years of confrontation. With substantial
modifications, the Israeli initiative might be used as a reentry point
for re-launching a serious interim Israeli-Palestinian negotiation and
over time, reengaging in permanent status issues. Modifications would
have to include:
1. A direct empowered Israeli-Palestinian dialogue. ``Day
after'' Gaza withdrawal issues demands it;
2. A meaningful link in time and substance to the West Bank.
Gaza first cannot become Gaza only;
3. Palestinian reciprocity. In the Middle East, giving
requires getting. Even the current Egyptian effort to force
consolidation of PA security services and a ceasefire reflects
this;
4. The Arafat problem will need to be addressed;
5. Defining a political horizon. Even if it is fashioned as a
set of commonly accepted principles, there needs to be hope of
a broader political process. Here the U.S. role is critical.
Third, political realities and circumstances will need to change
among Israelis and Palestinians if there is to be a serious political
process.
1. On the Israeli side, either a National Unity Government or
new elections will be necessary to ensure a political center
capable of serious movement;
2. On the Palestinian side, either a reckoning or a
reconciliation will be required between Fatah and its Islamic
and secular opponents leading to a ceasefire and/or a monopoly
by a centralized authority over forces of violence within
Palestinian society.
Fourth, because nothing ever happens quickly between Israelis and
Palestinians, unilateral disengagement will remain virtual at least
until early in 2005. Our presidential elections will further delay
matters as all sides await the outcome. And the political realities--
Republican and Democratic alike--will ensure that the Administration
does not raise its profile on this issue; nor that it emerges as a
topic of serious debate in the campaign.
In the interim, during the remainder of the year, the best possible
approach would be to try to:
1. Encourage serious Israeli-Palestinian discussions on Gaza
withdrawal, particularly day after scenarios;
2. Continue to support Egyptian efforts to consolidate
security services, promote inter-factional dialogue, and
identify elements for a ceasefire;
3. Focus Israelis on their responsibilities for removing
settlement outposts and launch honest discussion on West Bank
settlement policies while focusing Palestinians on their
obligations for combating terror and promoting reform;
4. Intensify public diplomacy in the region highlighting U.S.
commitment to continue efforts to advance a two-state solution
and to resolution of all permanent status issues.
Fifth, the next Administration will seriously need to consider how
to engage on the Israeli-Palestinian issue. With the possible exception
of the outcome of our efforts in Iraq, no issue is more critical to
U.S. influence and credibility in the region. And there are few issues
on which American national and moral issues coincide with something
else: a demonstrated capacity to make a bad situation much better.
Whatever approach the next administration adopts, three realities need
to be faced up to squarely:
1. Oslo failed because unlike the Egyptian-Israeli and
Jordanian-Israeli negotiations, it was not based on a balance
of interests but on an imbalance of power. The skewed asymmetry
in which Palestinians wield formidable power of the weak
(abdication of security responsibilities and acquiescence of
terror) and in which Israelis wield power of the strong (the
capacity to create settlements and confiscate land) must be
addressed and corrected;
2. The age of heroic politics and leaders in Arab-Israeli
peacemaking is over for now. In the absence of leaders with
vision able to bring along their constituencies, progress will
be slow, incremental;
3. Even incremental progress will be unlikely without a much
more proactive and assertive U.S. role.
Sixth, with a leadership role consisting of the following elements,
the next Administration could transform the situation on the ground
within six months and create an environment for serious negotiations,
even over time, on permanent status issues:
1. A real priority: The President must make it unmistakably
clear that the Arab-Israeli issue is a top priority and that
the Administration is unified on the issue;
2. High level attention: Empowerment of the Secretary of
State or a high level political envoy with the President's full
confidence to assume 24/7 responsibility for this issue;
3. Serious U.S. diplomacy: The Road Map is an important
instrument but it needs a third party as a driving force to
create timelines, sequenced responsibilities, benchmarks, and
performance standards with accompanying monitoring mechanisms;
4. Behavior on the ground: The parties must be focused
initially on changing behavior on the ground: Palestinians on
combating terror and violence, the Israelis on a freeze on
settlements and related activities;
5. Arab state support: Only if we stand up will we get the
support we need from key Arab states. That support needs to be
directed at pressing Palestinians on security but supporting
them as well politically and financially blocking funds and
support for Hamas/Jihad; and reaching out to Israel with
confidence builders as the situation improves;
6. Define a political horizon: re-launching negotiations on
permanent status is not possible right now. But the U.S. in
association with others can create a non-threatening political
horizon that outlines general principles required for a
negotiated settlement. This should not be a detailed blueprint
(the parties need to negotiate that). But it should lay out
parameters for resolution of key issues.
Finally, I would be remiss if I did not briefly allude to an issue
of great importance to the United States and to this committee.
Specifically, the challenge of dealing honestly with the image of
America in the Arab and Muslim world and the need to generate more
effort and resources to eliminate the misperception, confusion, and
stereotype that now surround that image.
Seeds of Peace has been involved now for more than a decade in
trying to promote understanding between Arabs and Israelis, Indians and
Pakistanis, and Greek and Turkish Cypriots. This summer we will be
running a new program called Beyond Borders which will bring young
Arabs, including Saudis, Kuwaitis, Iraqis, Yemenis, Egyptians, and
Jordanians, together with young Americans for two weeks of intensive
dialogue. In the spring of 2005, the entire group will have a regional
follow-up experience in Jordan. In the years ahead, I hope to be able
to offer this experience to hundreds of young Arabs and Americans.
Mr. Chairman, these may well be generational conflicts, and we are
in danger of losing an entire generation of young Arabs, Palestinians,
and Israelis to forces of hopelessness and despair. We must do a better
job of taking this generational challenge more seriously and invest the
resources and legitimacy in efforts to promote better understanding
among prospective leaders and publics.
The Chairman. Thank you very much, Mr. Miller.
Let me recognize Senator Biden who has a question because
he has an immediate appointment. Senator Biden.
Senator Biden. Mr. Miller, you are as bright as your
father. I am impressed.
I have one question. I have a lot of questions actually,
but the chairman is kind enough to let me ask this one
question. The North Korean Ambassador is in town, which is
rare, and there is an agreement I made to speak to a group
upstairs here in just a moment. I apologize for leaving.
Dennis, this will not surprise you. It may hurt your
reputation. I agree with you completely, as usual here, in
terms of the first incremental thing that has to occur. Nothing
in private with Arafat matters. I have not been as deeply
involved as you, but the chairman and I have been around doing
this for over 30 years now, and I have seen nothing--nothing
ever--that happens in private unless he believes there is going
to be--and it is not just him, but we will focus on him for a
moment.
What is your sense of whether or not this administration--
and the reason I was not here for the beginning of your
testimony is I was in the back making this same exact point
privately to the previous witness. What is your sense of this
administration's view that, among other things, the Europeans
must communicate directly to Arafat their conditions, if you
will?
And two, what is your sense of where the other Quartet
members are in terms of their calculus as to whether they
should or should not directly communicate what we have talked
about to Arafat?
And third, what is your sense of the degree of leverage, if
any, we have with our European counterparts in the Quartet to
encourage them to take this, what would be uncharacteristic
action relative to Mr. Arafat? Three parts of the same question
actually.
Ambassador Ross. I got it. As you can see, Aaron and I
bring no passion to the subject.
Senator Biden. You bring a lot of light, though, both of
you.
Ambassador Ross. The administration I think is in fact
communicating with the Europeans asking them to convey this
message. I think that is a fact. Where it breaks down is a
difference in view of Arafat. I am afraid that the other
members of the Quartet, come November 3, will say, you know,
what? We tried it without Arafat. You see it is a mess.
Therefore, we have got to go back to him. So the kind of threat
that you were suggesting should be made where you pick up the
phone and you say, look, if you do not do this, you get no more
support from us. We are going to cutoff all money and we are
going to say this publicly. They are not saying that. They go
to him in private. They say you should do this. There is never
a consequence. As long as he knows there is not a consequence,
then he is not going to change course.
What I am suggesting now is public postures on this can
make a difference because you see what is happening----
Senator Biden. I agree with you completely, but why is it--
I have had these conversations with the heads of state
literally, not figuratively, of the countries in the Quartet,
this literal conversation. A year and a half ago, I had the
same discussion relative to Abu Mazen and their continued
support for Arafat financially while Abu Mazen was out there
flipping. And I get a blank stare. All I would get back,
whether it is at the Foreign Minister level, Defense Minister
level, parliamentary level, or occasionally at the head of
state level, is our skewed policy. That is all I get back.
I never get a response that says, well, that is a good idea
or a bad idea for the following reasons. I get the generic
response, doctor, that you gave and I am not disagreeing with,
that look, it is not all Arafat. He is the only one there. He
is the choice of the Palestinian people and we should not
interfere. I get non-answers.
Ambassador Ross. Look, I think among the Europeans there
has been what only can be described as a kind of political
correctness when it comes to Arafat. He is the embodiment of a
national liberation movement. The Palestinians are perceived as
the victims. By the way, they are the victims, unfortunately,
largely the victims now of what he is doing. But they have been
the victims historically. There is no doubt about this. But
there is a built-in sympathy.
If you go back to first assumptions between us and the
Europeans, basically--it is an oversimplification, but I am
doing it for effect--we tend to look at the conflict through
the lens of the absence of the real acceptance of Israel, which
therefore justifies terror against it in the eyes of the Arabs.
The absence of the moral legitimacy of Israel makes it
difficult to justify compromise and makes it easy to justify
terror and violence. So we see that and we say you have got to
address that.
The Europeans have a way of looking at this and they see it
not through that lens, but through the lens of the Palestinian
victimhood. And they say, look, the issue is the Palestinians
are victims, and when you end the occupation, everything will
be fine. They pay a kind of lip service to the issue of Israeli
security. They say, yes, Israel should have security, but that
is it. It is a slogan.
So there is a divide there and there is a kind of political
correctness that gets reflected in their approach.
The fact that Palestinians themselves are expressing, as I
said, unfortunately the only way they have right now, their
real disenchantment with the current situation gives us a
basis.
There is one other point. You asked what could give us the
means to make a difference. There is a paradox here. When I was
negotiating, the Europeans used to always come to me and they
used to say, you got to cut us in. And I would always say, I am
not keeping you out. It is the Israelis and the Palestinians
who are keeping you out because they do not see you having much
effect.
The last 3\1/2\ years, you have had an administration that
basically gave them a perfect opportunity to come and play a
fundamental role because the administration was not. Now, they
found out they could not because basically they are not able to
affect Israeli behavior, and the Palestinians know that as
well.
Now, the paradox is that the administration's readiness to
play an active role is a lever. If Europeans want us to be
involved--and they do--then I think one of the things we say is
here is what we need from you. I would like to see the
administration use that lever, and I have not seen them use it
as much as I would like to see them do it.
Senator Biden. Thank you very much. Thank you, Mr.
Chairman, for allowing me to go out of order. I thank the
witnesses.
The Chairman. Thank you, Senator Biden.
Senator Chafee, do you have a question?
Senator Chafee. No. I am good. Thank you.
The Chairman. Very well.
Let me begin just by sketching what you all know because
you are veterans of the trail in terms of American diplomacy.
Many commentators have indicated that the United States foreign
policy began anew after 9/11, 2001. There were fairly large
sections of the world in which we had Ambassadors and we had
interests, but in terms of extensive activity, this had fallen
off in large part because of disinterest among the American
people. In fact, one can trace, sometimes simplistically, back
to Somalia and the abrupt withdrawal of Americans from that
area, or even from Haiti in our own hemisphere, as times in
which public opinion by and large seemed to be saying that
people are going to have difficulties, and they have had them
historically for a long time. But the thought that the United
States should be involved in nation-building, or attempting to
adjudicate these disputes, attempting to intervene boldly, is
interesting for people interested in foreign policy like
ourselves. We hold hearings and discussions about this, but my
constituents say, we are real people. We are doing our work,
raising our families, farming, manufacturing, and that is what
we are about. Leave us alone. The taxation upon us is
substantial as it stands. If you get us into wars, and we lose
lives, and we lose our young people, and we become
disillusioned, and so forth, that is a bridge too far.
Now, bit by bit, perhaps because of our involvement in
NATO, as difficulties occurred in the Balkans, we began to edge
up to the shore again, only very reluctantly. I can recall, as
you can, taking trips on behalf of the administration in a
bipartisan way, visiting with people in the area, trying to
establish what might be doable. Europeans were unwilling to
assume the responsibilities we thought they would. The first
George Bush indicated with relief that Europeans were prepared
to take care of the situation in the former Yugoslavia, but
ultimately they were not. They said, we cannot. It comes down
to the United States. This is a point which many of you made
today in one form or another. We cannot make it. If NATO and
Europe and the rest of us are to have a better time, you are
going to have to intervene and do so with a good bit of
resources, including personnel at risk.
Now, I do not want to trace things unduly country by
country, but this has been a very difficult process for the
American people and for the Congress.
Suddenly after 9/11, within 2 weeks, Secretary Powell comes
to members of this committee, meeting up in S. 407, and says,
you have to lift immediately all the sanctions against India
and Pakistan. Members who had been busy debating this for a
long time, and levying sanctions because of the military
dictatorship, or because of nuclear weapons-building, or very
valid reasons, said, all of them, and forever? And the
Secretary said, yes, both. It is a new situation. Then he goes
through a list of other new situations.
This is a radical readjustment. No way that that could have
occurred, the repeal of all of this in one afternoon, or the
next week, or so forth, without the threat that had come to our
country, and the actuality of loss of life and institutions.
Now, I mention this because in the case of the Israeli-
Palestinian situation, there have been Americans--you are among
them--consistently all the way through, who have said this is
very important. America has to be involved. America has to be
credible. Other people may not stay the course, but we must.
And by and large, that has stuck through several
administrations, although it has not called for American troops
to invade the area, to occupy. We have not been involved in
physically bombing the territory, killing people, and
destroying institutions. The thought has always been that
diplomatically, given the authority we have, we could make a
difference in the situation. Indeed, perhaps some day we will.
You are trying to outline, at the behest of this committee
today, how we might do so fairly promptly.
As we started the hearing, we said that we did not accept
the beginning of the year. This is just a year of time out. We
had Secretary Powell, among others, testify. You, Ambassador
Ross, were there for our first go at this early in the year. It
was an important hearing, in which many people on our committee
and perhaps in the rest of our body gained insights.
I mention all this because we are now at a point in
American life in which many Americans would say, what are our
priorities? One clearly is still the war against terrorism, the
fact that people who were educated and organized somewhere else
in some other country came to the United States and attacked us
and destroyed Americans and property here. Second, we are
worried in an existential way about the intersection of these
people with weapons of mass destruction. We do not know which
form this might take, whether piecemeal with a dirty bomb, or
with a nuclear weapon, or in some unusual formulation, but
nevertheless a lot of people would be killed in one incident, a
huge number in this country, quite apart from anywhere else. So
these are high objectives.
We have had hearings in the last month in this committee in
which we have explored North Korea and Iran, to take two. In
both cases, there is clearly a will to build weapons of mass
destruction, a question of how far those situations have gone,
and a question of how far they will go. Do they complete the
task? And do we take military action in the meanwhile, or do we
not? Do we get allies on board or are they anywhere around?
This is not clear. Given the stretch of American forces in
Iraq, the re-upping of reserves who have gone home because we
are so dependent upon reserves now, quite apart from permanent
personnel, how do you handle the situation? These are basic
issues, quite apart from the many other issues of American
foreign policy. We have very great stakes in terms of security.
Now, it is on top of all this that we come back today to
Israel and Palestine. As you pointed out, Ambassador Ross, you
said there is no peace process now. There is constant
deterioration. Well, that is not very promising.
Senator Biden, in his questioning, asked, fair enough, how
active is this administration? How busy are they with this?
Well, the answer was that they are busier some days than
others, and on some occasions they are probably wondering
literally what kind of intervention would make any difference
that day.
Having said all that, our committee remains optimistic that
there is a way, that in fact American leadership is important,
that American people will support constructive efforts.
You have used, and I have, too, the word ``existential''
today. I have a nagging feeling, as I listen to these hearings,
that a great many persons--I will not say nation states--but
persons, groups, cells, whatever--in the vast Middle East have
not accepted for one day the thought that Israel should be a
state and should be there. This may be the case, and this may
be widely felt. Maybe it is not. It may be a small minority
viewpoint, overwhelmed by a vast amount of good will, which is
not observable. Is the situation one in which we are going to
climb up the hill every year, about this time, simply because
in an existential way there are a lot of people who say Israel
does not deserve to be here? They ought to be wiped out of
here, and by golly, we have the staying power, the ethic, the
morals, the religion, whatever, that says they ought to go. And
the Israelis say correspondingly we are not going. Believe us.
We will arm ourselves. We will gain the allies that are
required. We are going to be here.
Now, we can dance around forever, debating withdrawal or
not withdrawal, the conditions or so forth, but on this basic
issue, how do we come to grips with this? We work fine in terms
of a broad sense. The President is talking about
democratization of the Middle East and programs that might
help, as well as changes in the public school system so that
there will not be reliance by default on the madrassa schools,
and a lot of other things that may make a difference despite
great resistance from Arab countries that declined to come to
Sea Island, and that say, you are preaching to us.
So we try to devise ways. I have offered the thought of a
large trust fund in which people can make applications for
support for democracy and so forth. Maybe something of this
sort might be constructive. But this is tough going in terms of
a broad group of people out there who may or may not want to
have peace, who may not support for a moment the diplomacy of
any of the three of you.
Can any of you offer some sustenance to keep our hearings
going, in particular as to why there could be a change in this
predicament?
Mr. Miller.
Mr. Miller. Yes, let me try. But I think it requires
abandoning certain illusions, and I would argue that I was at
the top of the list in harboring the first.
We think in terms of administrations. That is the nature of
our political clock, and that is completely understandable. But
I think the perspective from the region is not a perspective
measured in administrations. It is a perspective measured in
generations. And in an existential conflict, literally the
stakes are physical and political survival of small tribes, and
in the words of one great Lebanese historian, great powers
meddle in the affairs of small tribes at their own risk.
This notion that we have a generational conflict which is
going to take years to resolve is something we as Americans
resist instinctively. I resisted it. I am sure Dennis did for
the 20-plus years we were engaged in this effort. But it is a
reality. The Arab-Israeli conflict evolved in phases over time.
It can be resolved in my judgment, but only in phases over
time. That does not mean time is an ally. It is an adversary.
It is an absolute adversary, but we have to be in this for
strategic reasons with a constancy, a continuity, and a
commitment that takes into account the generational nature of
change.
One additional comment. Because it is a generational
conflict, we need to start thinking much more seriously and
much more creatively about what is happening to the young
generation, the so-called next generation. We are in danger of
losing an entire generation of young Arabs, Israelis, and
Palestinians to the forces of hopelessness and despair that
have now defined their lives. Building leadership, the
organization that I am running is a premier example of this,
trying to reach out, doing transformational diplomacy, not just
transactional diplomacy, not just conventional diplomacy. But
you want a strategy? You do transactional diplomacy. The United
States gets involved, but you also do transformational
diplomacy. You invest. You legitimize these people-to-people
programs. You develop leaders and you develop public
constituencies. It will not solve the Arab-Israeli conflict
overnight, but it will create an environment in which perhaps
the chances of resolving it will increase.
The Chairman. I appreciate that answer very much, and I
want to hear each of the rest. But let me just say that I
approach it on the level of our inquiries about why the United
States is disliked so much by so many people in the area.
Whether it is the Pew Poll or others, country after country,
there is very little going for us, quite apart from the feeling
about Israel. This really demands a public diplomacy response
with something much greater than that. You were talking about
developmental change, or hope for the youth over a long period
of time. This might be a kind of bold thinking that will not be
specific to Israel and Palestine, but I would agree with you
that it is pretty fundamental to maintain perspective having a
sense over generations of existential change in light of the
fact that the countries are likely to be there.
Yes, Dr. Said.
Dr. Said. Thank you.
I once was asked in Israel--I was on a visit in Tel Aviv
University and I was asked when really you guys, the Arabs,
accept us, accept the Israelis. What we have is an arrangement.
We have peace. We have settlements, but accepting is a very
psychological, historical, emotional reality.
My answer was the following. I said when we both meet two
conditions. One, when Israel stops being an exceptional state.
When we think of Israel like we think of Libya or Qatar or
whatever, many of the Middle East states are new, and we never
thought if Libya is a state or not. That needs two efforts, one
on our part not to consider the Israelis as exceptional in
history and having a state and so forth, but also when the
Israelis themselves think they are not exceptional. They have
only a security problem. They only need nuclear or other
weapons. They have to be dealt with on completely different
standards.
I have been educated here in the United States, and I know
the legal powers of the judiciary, of the codes. The legal
thinking in this country is very big and powerful. But I found
listening to International Court of Justice with a little bit
of scorn and disdain, that is exceptional. That is very
exceptional. If any court that said what it said regarding
something in Costa Rica or in Mali or wherever, I think the
American listening to the resolution will be different. That is
the point I am making, Israel to stop being exceptional.
No. 2, I told them you will be loved in the region when the
region knows that it will be better off by your existence than
your absence. And I gave a reason. Israel is a very unique
experience. The only closest historical example to it is the
case of Singapore, which you have Chinese settlers who moved
from the Chinese mainland, established a state that was part of
Malaysia, but then became divided and created it. It is a
Chinese island in a kind of Malay, you know, like being in the
Arab world. But Singapore over the years, because of its
innovation, because of its economic vitality, actually was
leading in many ways the good things in Southeast Asia.
Those are the two conditions, and I believe they are
possible.
I cannot leave the microphone without just one note on why
they hate us. I do not think the people in the region hate the
United States. They have a major problem with the legitimacy of
what it is doing. We have an irony in the Middle East. The
irony in the Middle East is that we have new states with new
institutions. Legal traditions are not big yet. But we have a
belief in the order, in the legitimacy of the order. It is
being disappointed. I believe that is characterized. Now,
people see American movies, their first choice of emigration.
At least among the elite, who scorn many of the United States'
action, but it is the issue of the legitimacy.
And I believe basically that many of the United States'
actions are legitimate in many ways, but you have a serious
problem always if we are not sure in the Arab world, in
particular, that we are listening to the United States.
Sometimes, at least strongly probably, we are hearing the echo
of somebody else.
Thank you.
The Chairman. Thank you, doctor.
Ambassador Ross.
Ambassador Ross. I will make, I guess, three points in
response.
First, to deal with the essence of your question, which
when you go through it, you are basically asking why should it
matter to us. We have got a lot of other things that confront
us that are more immediately threatening. Why should it matter
to us?
We will take a step back. The first thing we have to bear
in mind is that the measure of diplomacy is not always what you
achieve. Sometimes it is what you prevent, and a more active
diplomacy, if it prevents a war, is keeping a problem that
could confront you later on off of the immediate perspective
that you have in mind.
Second, one of the things that is very interesting in the
polling right now among Palestinians and Israelis is the
parallelism. Both sets of polls are schizophrenic. With
Palestinians, you will see they want peace, they want an end to
the violence, and at the same time, the same percentage, 75 to
80 percent, will support a continuation of suicide attacks. How
do you explain it? On the Israeli side, you find up to 75
percent want to get out of all the settlements, not just the
unilateral, and at the same time, they will say we are not
being tough enough with the Palestinians. Both are angry and
fearful and disbelieving in the other, and yet both want the
conflict over.
The mainstream of the Palestinians would like to see this
conflict end, and I do not just say that based on the polling.
I say it on what has been a very long experience dealing with a
very wide spectrum of Palestinians.
In the rest of the Arab world, I think this issue remains a
source of grievance. It is an injustice in their minds that has
not been addressed and it should be. But the fact is if the
Palestinians were satisfied, they would be fine. They would be
fine to say it is over. We are glad it is over. They are not
looking to perpetuate it.
There is a concern about the effect of the last 3 years,
and I think Aaron is absolutely right on this point. If you
look at the youth on both sides right now, it is very
disturbing. When I talk to some of the younger Fatah activists
who were responsible for the first intifada, they tell me one
of the reasons they are motivated now to try to end this is
because they are afraid of what is happening to the next
generation, that they are losing sight of what is actually in
the Palestinian interest, which is living in peace with the
Israelis. So the longer you let this drift, the more you are
going to face that problem, and the more you face the problem
of the next generation changing, the more it will infect the
rest of the region and make that sense of grievance worse. And
this gets me really to the last point.
If tomorrow the conflict were to disappear, we would still
have a war on terror, but we should not kid ourselves. In the
Israeli-Palestinian conflict, the Palestinian sense of
grievance is an evocative issue in the Arab world. It certainly
mobilizes passions. One problem that we have today is we do not
look like we care about it. The more you look like you
disengage, the more it looks as if you just do not care. So
here is something that they care about and we do not look like
we care.
Diffusing it, because I do not believe you can solve it
right now--I think you have to diffuse it before you can solve
it--will at least take away one of the recruiting tools that is
used that plays upon the anger that exists in the region. You
have got a region with a lot of angry younger people. This is
one source of the anger but not the only one. If the conflict
disappeared tomorrow, you would still have anger. But at least
you take away one of the symbolic recruiting tools, and if you
reduce the recruiting tools for those who are engaging in
terror, we are going to be better off.
The Chairman. Well, I appreciate those responses, as well
as the other remarkable oral comments that you made, in
addition to the written testimony that will be published in
full, as I indicated early on at the outset of this hearing.
I believe that the hearing was important not just for those
of us who are privileged to be here as members of the
committee, but likewise as an indicator, much as you have just
expressed, that this is a high priority for America. We are
doing the very best we can to think through as Americans how we
can be most constructive. We are doing so in the midst of a
political campaign in which many members of the committee are
engaged. One of our members is a candidate. So this is not
merely a lofty academic subject. There are important
stakeholders, and you are clearly among them by virtue of the
commitment in your lives.
We thank you very much. The hearing is adjourned.
[Whereupon, at 12:21 p.m., the committee adjourned, to
reconvene subject to the call of the Chair.]