[Senate Hearing 107-1099]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
S. Hrg. 107-1099
AVIATION SECURITY UNDER THE
TRANSPORTATION SECURITY ADMINISTRATION:
AN UPDATE ON SCREENING PASSENGERS, CHECKING BAGGAGE, TICKET COUNTER
SECURITY, AND NEW TECHNOLOGY
=======================================================================
FIELD HEARING
before the
COMMITTEE ON COMMERCE,
SCIENCE, AND TRANSPORTATION
UNITED STATES SENATE
ONE HUNDRED SEVENTH CONGRESS
SECOND SESSION
__________
AUGUST 8, 2002
__________
Printed for the use of the Committee on Commerce, Science, and
Transportation
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0SENATE COMMITTEE ON COMMERCE, SCIENCE, AND TRANSPORTATION
ONE HUNDRED SEVENTH CONGRESS
SECOND SESSION
ERNEST F. HOLLINGS, South Carolina, Chairman
DANIEL K. INOUYE, Hawaii JOHN McCAIN, Arizona
JOHN D. ROCKEFELLER IV, West TED STEVENS, Alaska
Virginia CONRAD BURNS, Montana
JOHN F. KERRY, Massachusetts TRENT LOTT, Mississippi
JOHN B. BREAUX, Louisiana KAY BAILEY HUTCHISON, Texas
BYRON L. DORGAN, North Dakota OLYMPIA J. SNOWE, Maine
RON WYDEN, Oregon SAM BROWNBACK, Kansas
MAX CLELAND, Georgia GORDON SMITH, Oregon
BARBARA BOXER, California PETER G. FITZGERALD, Illinois
JOHN EDWARDS, North Carolina JOHN ENSIGN, Nevada
JEAN CARNAHAN, Missouri GEORGE ALLEN, Virginia
BILL NELSON, Florida
Kevin D. Kayes, Democratic Staff Director
Moses Boyd, Democratic Chief Counsel
Jeanne Bumpus, Republican Staff Director and General Counsel
C O N T E N T S
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Page
Hearing held on August 8, 2002................................... 1
Statement of Senator Boxer....................................... 1
Witnesses
Acree, Hardy, Director of Airports, Sacramento County Airport
System......................................................... 10
Bowens, Thella, Director, San Diego International Airport........ 7
Green, Paul, Chief Operating Officer, Los Angeles World Airports. 4
Martin, John L., Director, San Francisco International Airport... 6
Stone, Admiral David, (Retired), Federal Security Director, Lax
International Airport, Los Angeles, Transportation Security
Administration; Accompanied by Ed Gomez, Federal Security
Director, San Francisco Airport; and General Mike Aguilar,
Federal Security Director, San Diego Airport................... 12
Prepared statement........................................... 15
AVIATION SECURITY UNDER THE
TRANSPORTATION SECURITY
ADMINISTRATION: AN UPDATE ON
SCREENING PASSENGERS, CHECKING
BAGGAGE, TICKET COUNTER SECURITY,
AND NEW TECHNOLOGY
----------
THURSDAY, AUGUST 8, 2002
U.S. Senate,
Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation,
Washington, DC.
The Committee met, pursuant to notice, at 10 a.m. in the
Commission Hearing Room, Administration Building, LAX
International Airport, Los Angeles, Hon. Barbara Boxer,
presiding.
OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. BARBARA BOXER,
U.S. SENATOR FROM CALIFORNIA
Senator Boxer. Good morning. I would like to welcome
everyone to this hearing of the Senate Commerce Committee in
order to get an update on California airport security under the
Transportation Security Administration.
We are almost a month away from the 1-year anniversary of
September 11th. As we all painfully know, that day the
terrorists hijacked four commercial jets, all of which were
headed to California, including three to this very airport.
Included among the thousands killed in the attacks, 39
Californians.
Ever since September 11th, I have been working with other
Members of the Commerce Committee to make air travel more
secure. Last fall Congress passed and the President signed the
Aviation and Transportation Security Act. I wrote the provision
of that law that required air marshals to be on board all high-
risk flights with priority given to nonstop, long distance
flights. Those were the flights that were hijacked. They had a
full fuel load and a light passenger load and they were large,
and therefore they were targeted.
Because it is classified information, I cannot give you the
numbers of air marshals that we now have on planes, but I can
say that we are making good progress. But in my view, we have a
lot more to go in that area, and behind the scenes, I am
working to make sure that the TSA lives up to what our bill
said to do, which gives priority to these long distance
flights.
I have been working hard again with Members of this
Committee--we have wonderful Members of this Committee, with
Senator Hollings being the Chair and Senator McCain being the
Ranking Member, and the staff of the Committee, and we have
several of them behind me--because to me, it is our absolute
obligation to make air travel as safe as it can be.
I would say today that air travel is more secure than it
has ever been. I can say that and feel good about that. But I
have to say I still do not believe it is as secure as it could
be or it should be. So if I have a message here in this opening
statement, it is to say that now is not the time to slow down
or delay our efforts to increase and improve aviation security.
The job is not done, and we just have to keep working. We
cannot go backward.
Today, I want to examine the status of California airports
under the direction of the new Federal Transportation Security
Administration. We will hear updates on passenger and
checkpoint screening, baggage bomb detection, and ticket
counter security. I want to briefly discuss why these issues
are so important.
First, passenger and checkpoint screening: At the beginning
of July, just a month ago, I was shocked to read that
checkpoint screeners at airports in Los Angeles and Sacramento
were ranked in the bottom 5 airports for high failure rates.
Los Angeles and Sacramento airports have failure rates of 41
percent and 40 percent respectively. The examiners who were
doing these tests did not even attempt to hide weapons and the
screeners still did not find them.
Two weeks ago, Transportation Secretary Mineta said at a
Commerce Committee hearing that oh, well, those are the old
screeners, pre-September 11. Well, that cannot be an excuse.
Whether they are the old screeners or the new screeners, our
screeners must be trained yesterday, and whether they are old
or new does not make any difference. And I think that that type
of excuse is just not going to wash with the public.
When I read about the failure rates, I called those two
airports and learned that they still had acting Federal
security chiefs. And I am glad to say that since that call, Los
Angeles has a full-fledged director. I am so happy to say that,
and we're very happy with the choice. And I also learned this
week that Sacramento also now has a new head, and I hope that I
had something to do with it because on that day that I phoned
over to Los Angeles, I felt the acting head at that time, had
an understanding of what occurred and there was movement to
change things. When I called to Sacramento, the individual that
I spoke to was very unaware of the fact that the tests even had
happened. In other words, TSA had never even informed the
acting head of that airport that there was a 41 percent failure
rate. So I was very distressed about that, and this individual
just had not a clue as to what went wrong or what should be
done. So I am really glad we now have a permanent person there.
So that is the first area.
Second, bomb detection in checked baggage: I am extremely
concerned that the installation of baggage detection machines
may not be completed by the congressionally mandated deadline,
which is the end of the year. While DOT has met the deadline to
screen all checked baggage, either by bag match, hand search or
bomb sniffing dogs, we all know that bag match for example
alone will do nothing to prevent a suicide bomber.
It really amazes me. After we were attacked, we sent our
troops halfway around the world, and we used such sophisticated
weapons that they were able to go into caves and burrow into
bunkers. So no one can convince me, no one--and if you are
going to try, try, but I am being honest with you--no one can
convince me, knowing American ingenuity and our can-do attitude
as a people, that by the end of the year we will not be able to
detect a bomb in a suitcase that is standing right in front of
our feet when we have gone halfway around the world into an
area nobody even knew and had bombs that burrowed into caves
and bunkers. So think of it that way. There cannot be an
excuse.
Now, I know these machines are large and airports are
developing plans to create space for them. That is an issue. We
have to make it work. And today, I hope to hear from the
airport officials about how the administration is working with
the airports to develop and approve of these plans for these
machines. We need these machines, and the administration needs
to ensure that these baggage detection machines are in place by
the deadline, period.
Now, the House of Representatives passed a homeland
security bill that slips the deadline. I do not understand how
that could be part of a homeland security bill; turns it into
homeland insecurity bill as far as I am concerned. So speaking
for myself as one Senator, when we take up homeland security, I
am going to fight against such a move.
Third, the ticket counter security: There are still
vulnerable spots at our airports. The breach of security at a
ticket counter here in LA on July Fourth is an example. If all
our airlines did not have two security guards at the site of
the incident, the death toll would have been far more
devastating. Put another way, there could have been a massacre.
So what does that tell us? It tells us we need security at the
ticket counters. As my children would have said when they were
a lot younger, now they are grown up, ``duh.'' We need security
at the ticket counters; very important.
And I know and I compliment LAX for increasing the police
presence in those areas. And I just want to make sure that you
are reimbursed for that because you are supposed to be, and I
want to talk to you about that. And I also want to know about
what other airports are doing at their ticket counters.
I am concerned about the mixed message I am getting from
TSA about their involvement in this issue of ticket counter
security. First when this incident happened they announced they
were all over the problem. Then they backed away. And in a
private meeting I had with our new head of TSA--and I wish him
every good wish; I am going to work with him--he indicated this
was an issue he was going to resolve. So I need to know what
the status is there. We have a lot to get done if we are going
to fulfill our responsibilities to Californians and the entire
traveling public. So with that, we will get started.
I will give you what the plan is. Our panel is Mr. Paul
Green, COO of Los Angeles World Airports and Mr. John Martin
from San Francisco International Airport, we welcome you. Ms.
Thella Bowens, director of San Diego International Airport, we
welcome you. Mr. Hardy--do I say it right?--``Acree.''
Mr. Acree. Correct.
Senator Boxer.--Director of Airport, Sacramento Airport
System. And we also have Mr. David Stone of the Los Angeles
International Airport accompanied by Mr. Ed Gomez of the San
Francisco International Airport, Mr. Aguilar of the San Diego
International Airport. They are all from the Transportation
Security Administration. As I understand it, there is going to
be one statement; is that correct?
Admiral Stone. Yes.
Senator Boxer. And who is going to deliver that?
Admiral Stone. I will.
Senator Boxer. Mr. Stone. And then I will ask questions.
This is going to be a fast-moving type of a hearing because
there are so many things to cover that I hope to do so. And I
want to thank you all for being willing to be here today
because to us, we cannot make progress without your help and
your candor. So with that, let me hear from Mr. Paul Green, COO
of Los Angeles World Airports.
STATEMENT OF PAUL GREEN, CHIEF OPERATING OFFICER, LOS ANGELES
WORLD AIRPORTS
Mr. Green. Thank you. Good morning, Senator Boxer, and
welcome back to Los Angeles International Airport. I am Paul
Green, Chief Operating Officer for Los Angeles World Airports.
For the record, Los Angeles World Airports is the city of Los
Angeles department that owns and operates a system of airports
comprising LAX, Ontario International, Palmdale Regional, and
Van Nuys. LAX is the world's busiest origination and
destination airport, meaning that more travelers and more
luggage enter the worldwide aviation system at LAX than any
other airport.
Thank you very much for the opportunity to speak to you
today regarding the vital public issue of aviation security and
Los Angeles World Airports' commitment to compliance with the
Aviation and Transportation Security Act.
We have been working closely with the Transportation
Security Administration and the air carriers to ensure we are
doing our part to meet the key deadlines set forth in the new
law. Communication and cooperation among all parties has been
excellent. We are working together to achieve the goals of
effective aviation security and efficient customer service.
Working with a team of consultants, we defined existing
conditions, monitored and evaluated new security requirements,
developed recommended improvements required to implement the
newly mandated security measures, and developed a prioritized
program of implementation for both near term and long term.
I am confident that we have sound plans in place to meet
the November 19th passenger-screening deadline and the December
31 deadline to screen 100 percent of checked baggage. The
crucial caveat is that TSA's contractors take timely delivery
at LAX of the necessary equipment and the requisite number of
Federal employees are available to operate this equipment.
I would like to turn briefly to our response to the July
Fourth tragic shooting at LAX's Bradley terminal. The immediate
law enforcement response was very effective. The investigation
into the shooting is continuing. Within 1 week of the shooting,
Mayor Hahn announced plans to expedite his security enhancement
program at LAX to allow us to hire off-duty Los Angeles police
officers to increase security in the terminal areas, which
Senator Boxer alluded to. This action allows the daily
deployment of armed police officers in each terminal area near
ticket counters and waiting areas.
Currently, 60 additional officers are being processed for
training and are scheduled to graduate from the Airport Police
Academy in January 2003. The off-duty LAPD officers will be
assisting in the terminal areas for 6 months, until this
training class of LAX officers graduates.
Another recent aviation security initiative announced by
Mayor Hahn involves a $15 million upgrade to LAX's perimeter.
The perimeter security improvements will consist of
approximately 8 miles of upgraded fencing surrounding the
airport. The new fencing along large portions of the airport
perimeter will include a 2-1/2-foot tall concrete rail with 8
feet of heavy duty chain-link fence and six strands of barbed
wire, intrusion detection devices, increased lighting, and
closed-circuit television monitoring. The new security cameras
will be controlled by security personnel who will be able to
view the perimeter area through closed-circuit television
monitors and be able to automatically zero in on any intruders.
The perimeter security improvements also includes the
expansion of ``sally port'' gate systems at all airfield entry
points, which are used by tenant airlines, airport workers, and
other authorized personnel whose jobs require access to high-
security areas that are off limits to the public. The devices
consist of two-sided gates, which surround vehicles until they
are cleared for entry.
Finally, just last week, Mayor Hahn announced that more
than 1,200 video cameras will be installed throughout the
airport complex through another $15 million initiative. We will
be adding cameras to all domestic terminals and all areas of
the Tom Bradley International Terminal. The system will be
integrated with existing video resources at LAX and will be
administered by the Los Angeles Airport Police at a new,
centralized monitoring station. In addition, video will be
recorded and maintained for future use by law enforcement
officials.
We believe LAX will be the first airport in the United
States to have such a comprehensive surveillance system.
Airports in the United Kingdom and Hong Kong have had similar
systems installed with excellent results.
Thank you very much for the opportunity to provide you with
this security status report. I will be pleased to answer any
questions that you might have.
Senator Boxer. Thank you. I am going to hold those until we
hear from everyone.
I also forgot to say that when we are done with this panel,
we are all going to go look at some of the new technologies
that are available to help us meet our security needs. I
thought that might be interesting because in California we are
really the home of a lot of those inventions and we have some
of them. So we will all take a walk through after. Wonderful.
Mr. Martin, welcome. Please proceed.
STATEMENT OF JOHN L. MARTIN, DIRECTOR, SAN FRANCISCO
INTERNATIONAL AIRPORT
Mr. Martin. Good morning, Senator Boxer. I am John Martin.
I am the director of the San Francisco International Airport. I
am honored to appear before you this morning to testify on the
challenges of aviation security under the Transportation
Security Administration and provide the Committee with an
update on screening passengers, checking baggage, ticket
counter security, and new technology.
I am pleased to provide any information necessary for this
hearing or at any other point in order that we can work with
Congress, the Department of Transportation, and the Homeland
Security Administration to meet the challenge of ensuring
passenger safety, while meeting customer service demands.
SFO does strongly support those provisions passed by the
U.S. House of Representatives in the Homeland Security Bill
that allow for airport security modifications to provide a more
measured approach. This flexibility will allow the TSA the
opportunity to deploy 100 percent-automated checked baggage
screening in all terminals. It is my sincere hope that the U.S.
Senate will adopt a similar provision so that the TSA will be
allowed the time necessary to implement safe and efficient
screening equipment.
SFO was one of the first airports in the country to deploy
a fully integrated checked baggage inspection system that
screens all baggage for international departing flights in our
international terminal. We are currently in the process of
upgrading this system to become the first airport to provide
100 percent TSA-certified in-line Explosive Detection System
(EDS) for all departing passenger baggage in the International
Terminal, and this will be in place by the end of the year. We
do appreciate the leadership of the TSA and especially Ed
Gomez, who is the FFD in San Francisco, in helping to make this
happen.
As one of the 5 opt-out airports chosen to keep TSA-
certified security contractors in place for screening
responsibilities, I am confident that TSA will be able to
provide SFO with a skilled work force at adequate staffing
levels. At the ticket counters, SFO has added police staffing
that ensures that police are in place at all times in front of
the ticket counters.
As a model U.S. airport for safety and security, SFO
believes that any alternative interim solution to 100 percent
automated checked baggage screening for checked baggage
screening would be ineffective and may result in less than
optimal security and unacceptable delays to the traveling
public.
The TSA, the airports, and the airlines need the
flexibility to provide a measured and responsible approach
which will allow us the opportunity to deploy 100 percent
automated checked baggage screening at all terminals. While
security considerations are our first priority, in the view of
our security staff and consultants' views, the TSA's deployment
of trace detection equipment at ticket counters using the
suggested methodology would do little to enhance explosive
detection. Testing of the ETD equipment indicates that they
have low detection rates, much lower than the in-line EDS
equipment, and that they also have high false alarm rates.
A comprehensive analysis of various alternatives conducted
by SFO concludes that the conservative cost of the ticket
counter ETD option would be at least three times as expensive
as a permanent solution using the best technology, and this is
due to the extraordinarily high recurring labor costs for the
use of the trace detection equipment. I have submitted a
detailed comprehensive analysis for the Committee for your
review. *
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* The information referred to has been retained in Committee files.
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Mr. Martin. The lobbies at SFO and at many airports across
the country are not capable of supporting large volumes of
passengers that will result from baggage screening operations
at the ticket counter. These infrastructure constraints will
result in the implementation of a project that exposes the
traveling public to an environment that is highly congested and
in itself could expose passengers to potential increased
security threats at the front of the terminal building and
adjacent airport roadways.
Passenger processing times would also increase to levels
that may well be unacceptable to the traveling public and
result in severe economic implications for the airlines. From a
security and customer service point of view, airports need to
move passengers and their luggage with the best available
equipment, the best available technology and a full level of
staffing. Passenger processing times must decrease, not
increase, while the industry and governmental agencies continue
to identify and deploy security that meets the highest
standards. We must develop innovative ways of handling the
flying public that allows for continuous movement of passengers
from the time the passengers enter the front door of the
terminal building through the ticket counter line, through the
checking of the baggage, and through the security screening
process.
The compromise approach passed by the House in the Homeland
Security Bill will allow airports and the TSA the opportunity
to build and install an automated checked baggage screening
system that provides effective and long term security to the
traveling public, and I believe that that installation could be
completed by December 31, 2003.
Senator Boxer, I once again thank you for the opportunity
to appear before you today. This is clearly the most important
issue facing U.S. airports and the aviation industry. And if I,
or anyone on my staff, can be of any help as we look to
Congress for help to meet the challenges, please do not
hesitate to call me. This concludes my remarks, and I would be
happy to answer any questions.
Senator Boxer. Thank you, Mr. Martin. Since we have some
basic disagreements, it will be interesting. We'll have a
little chance to debate those.
Ms. Thella Bowens from San Diego, welcome.
STATEMENT OF THELLA BOWENS, DIRECTOR, SAN DIEGO INTERNATIONAL
AIRPORT
Ms. Bowens. Good morning. I Thank you, Senator Boxer, for
the opportunity to add my comments to this very important
conversation on airport security.
The tragic events of last year have caused all airports to
recommence to the absolute need for expanding and improving
aviation security programs, particularly ones that protect
travelers from the kinds of threats experienced on September
11th.
Since the passage of the Aviation Transportation Security
Act and the creation of the Transportation Security
Administration, we at San Diego International Airport have
remained committed to assisting the TSA in implementing
federally mandated security measures. Theirs is an enormous and
difficult mission, made more so by the stringent time lines
established by Congress, and TSA should be commended for those
efforts.
Our challenge at San Diego International has been how best
to handle the installation of new security equipment and
processes in a highly constrained facility while ensuring the
airport continues to deliver the highest quality level of
customer service and thereby support the good health of the
industry.
Security checkpoint lines are longer now than before 9-11,
certainly, but they are managed carefully and moving
efficiently. To date, passenger wait times have continued to
decrease--we are at less than 20 minutes average in our
facility--as travelers become familiar with new requirements
and plan accordingly. In September/October of this year, we
will experience the installation of additional checkpoint
equipment, improved personnel training, and new streamlined
procedures. We will know then if our joint efforts are truly
successful in achieving improved security checkpoint operations
and continued convenient access to air travel services.
We are in line to meet the November deadline for checkpoint
screening. The challenge for providing for travelers' safety by
screening 100 percent of checked baggage for explosive material
by December 31st is another matter altogether.
The requirement to install Explosive Detection Systems in
the magnitude necessary to meet congressional screening
requirements at an airport with the physical constraints of
SDIA is truly overwhelming. Adding significantly to the
difficulty and expense of such an enterprise is the ever-
approaching December 31st deadline.
Given the lack of availability of Explosive Detection
Systems, EDS's, and the complexity of installing the equipment
in existing baggage handling systems, which is the better
approach to this installation, we do not expect to be able to
accomplish this task in the near term.
We are moving ahead to install the less effective and
radically more disruptive Explosive Trace Detectors, ETD's,
together with the EDS's that do become available, in the public
areas of our terminals. This is the approach that has been
adopted by the TSA as an interim measure to meet the
requirements of the law as it is now written.
The process that is currently underway at SDIA, again, with
the total cooperation of TSA personnel, led by an exceptional
Federal Security Director, Mike Aguilar, is to assess the
numbers of explosive trace detection devices required and their
appropriate locations. Working together, we have come to a very
preliminary understanding of the number of ETD's required and,
if they are installed in the manner recommended, their presence
will seriously disrupt passenger circulation in already
congested lobbies and concourses.
Additionally, screening and property search processes using
ETD's will generate long passenger waiting lines that will
serve to further discourage air travel, not only at SDIA, but
throughout an already troubled industry. More importantly, this
approach will not provide the optimal level of increased safety
and security for the traveler. Instead of the ``quick fix''
approach using ETD's, we at San Diego International join with
other large hub airports in suggesting an alternative solution.
It is our firm belief that an integrated and automated
Explosive Detection System is the most optimal and only
workable approach at SDIA. Rather than forcing airports into an
interim solution to meet the statutory deadline, we recommend
incrementally expanding baggage screening capabilities as
facilities, staff, and machines become available. This will not
result in a diminished level of protection,as we will be using
the same means as today--canine detection, positive bag
matching, hand searches, and other methods that are in place.
This measured approach would provide the TSA more time to
implement an optimal solution on an airport-by-airport basis.
Such an approach avoids a large waste of investment in both
equipment and manpower that would inevitably be replaced by a
more integrated, efficient, and cost-effective system.
As a separate but equally critical issue, I would like to
touch on an area of airport security that has gone largely
unaddressed. The need to protect cargo shipments, both cargo in
the belly of passenger aircraft and cargo carried by air
freighters, is one that we as an industry and the TSA should
move forward with as a priority. Because of the nature of
integrated cargo operations conducted at remote sites on the
airport or off-airport ``through the fence,'' to use an
industry term, this is an area of vulnerability directly linked
to perimeter security, as well. I submit that improvements in
this critical area can be made a priority while we phase in 100
hundred percent bag screening.
Finally, I would like to invite the Committee's attention
to the role of local law enforcement in providing the uniformed
security presence at checkpoints and, eventually, throughout
the airport. I believe the use of local police officers who are
knowledgeable and trained in matters of aviation security,
local law enforcement, and public safety is superior to having
a Federal force at the airport. Experience shows me that there
is no substitute for locally trained and certified police
officers who know the airport and the region and are responsive
to its people and its diverse cultures. We are using local
police to increase law enforcement now, as is present at the
ticket counter.
I do urge you to support amending the current legislation
to provide additional time for a more comprehensive approach to
solving the passenger screening responsibility. As stated in
the letter forwarded to the Senator and Secretary Mineta
earlier this year, we are truly concerned that the proposed
interim response to baggage screening designed to meet the
December 31st deadline will result in a less than optimal
approach to security, will create unacceptably long wait times
to the traveling public, and will result in an unnecessary
expensive solution.
Thank you for the opportunity to speak, and I am pleased to
answer any questions.
Senator Boxer. Thank you. We will get into those in a bit.
Mr. Acree, welcome.
STATEMENT OF HARDY ACREE, DIRECTOR OF AIRPORTS, SACRAMENTO
COUNTY AIRPORT SYSTEM
Mr. Acree. Good morning, Senator Boxer. My name is Hardy
Acree, Director of Airports for the Sacramento County Airport
System.
First, I would like to take this opportunity to thank you,
Senator Boxer, for the invitation to be here today to speak on
the very important issues of airport security. I applaud the
Senator for your efforts with helping to get answers to some
very important questions.
My comments today are intended to be constructive and not
overly critical of TSA. Heaven knows they have been given a
huge task. I am here to share with you our concerns and, yes, a
sense of frustration with how the process is working and in
some cases not working.
First, at the risk of sounding trite, on the subject of
improved airport security, it is safe to say that while some
progress has been made, it would be more accurate to say that
much remains to be done. And as we approach the first
anniversary of the tragic events of September 11th, the
deadline for meeting certain security mandates looms ever
closer.
In Sacramento we have two concerns regarding security
checkpoints: First, from a customer service perspective, we
have seen our screening checkpoint queueing lines increase
dramatically over the last 2 months. During peak times, the
lines frequently stretch all the way to bag claim, causing
excessive delays, with some passengers missing their flights.
To compound the problem, our June passenger counts were the
second highest on record with over 817,000 passengers traveling
through the airport. We are one of only a handful of airports
nationwide where passenger activity is exceeding last year's
record levels. This is a trend we hope continues but which will
only add to the challenges at the screening checkpoints.
Second, from an operational perspective, as you said, it
came as a shock for us to hear that Sacramento International
ranked in the bottom 5 for airports with the worst test failure
rate at the screening checkpoints. What happened that caused
Sacramento International to go from an airport with one of the
best screening compliance records to one of the worst since TSA
took over? Or as Gordon Bethune might say, what happened that
we went from first to worst?
In an attempt to get answers, we recently met with
representatives from TSA to discuss the issue. We were told
that TSA is in the process of hiring and training the personnel
needed to staff the screening checkpoints with Federal
employees. From our perspective, the problems appear to be
attributed to an absence of adequate supervision oversight and
the lack of a customer service focus. Now that the Federal
security director for Sacramento International is onsite, we
trust these issues will get resolved in the near term.
With regards to the checked bag screening requirements, TSA
was given the monumental task of reinventing the entire U.S.
transportation security system. For airport security, many in
the industry consider the time given TSA to make the necessary
changes to be adequate for some airports but inadequate for
others.
What we are discovering as we go through this very complex
and people-intensive process is that one size does not fit all.
What works in Sacramento may not work at LAX and vice versa. As
I sit here today, I cannot tell you whether or not TSA will be
successful in Sacramento and meet the December 31st deadline
for 100 percent checked bag screening. What I can say, however,
is that Sacramento is committed to doing everything in its
power to make it happen. But until we see a definitive plan for
how TSA intends to meet the requirement, it is impossible for
me to say whether or not it can be done by December 31st.
Needless to say, I am concerned. It is August the 8th, and
I have yet to see such a plan. I am concerned because if their
plan calls for the airport to make significant facility
modifications to accommodate the installation of EDS and ETD
machines, there is no way the airport can respond with any
substantive construction contracts in 4 and 1/2 months. Both
the airport and TSA may well need the flexibility of additional
time, but I will not know until I see their plan.
If, on the other hand, TSA comes in with a plan that calls
for a similar ``plop and plug'' approach--that is technical
terms--installing X number of EDS and ETD machines in our
terminal lobby, then where are the passengers going to go? Our
terminal lobby space is in limited supply to begin with and
that concerns me.
In that regard, customer service considerations must play a
meaningful role in any implementation plan, regardless of which
technology, solution, or combination thereof is proposed. The
airport system cannot approve a plan that does not give
adequate consideration to the customer. Lest we forget, it is
the customer who is the source of all our revenues, and it is
imperative that we not lose sight of that.
I hope you can see my concerns. Time is growing short, and
TSA lacks the sheer number of personnel who are properly
trained to operate the screening checkpoints. And we have yet
to see a plan for meeting the December 31st deadline.
In closing, we all share the same goal; that of having an
airport security system that instills confidence in the
traveling public and restores credibility in a security system
that for too long has been neglected.
Again, thank you for allowing me the opportunity to speak
before you today.
Senator Boxer. Thank you, sir, for your candor.
And now it is my pleasure to call on Mr. David Stone of the
Los Angeles International Airport. And he is the head, the
Federal head, of that airport. In other words, since we have
decided that the Federal Government will be responsible for
security, we have called in his good people, and this is his
challenge. He is going to be speaking on behalf of the TSA
folks that are here.
STATEMENT OF ADMIRAL DAVID M. STONE (RETIRED),
FEDERAL SECURITY DIRECTOR, LAX INTERNATIONAL
AIRPORT, TRANSPORTATION SECURITY ADMINISTRATION;
ACCOMPANIED BY ED GOMEZ, FEDERAL SECURITY
DIRECTOR, SAN FRANCISCO AIRPORT; AND GENERAL MIKE
AGUILAR, FEDERAL SECURITY DIRECTOR,
SAN DIEGO AIRPORT
Admiral Stone. Good morning, Madam Chairwoman.
It is a pleasure to appear before you today to discuss
airport security at Los Angeles International Airport, San
Francisco International Airport, and San Diego International
Airport. I am David Stone, the Federal Security Director here
at LAX. With me this morning are Ed Gomez, the Federal Security
Director at San Francisco, and Mike Aguilar, the Federal
Security Director at San Diego.
We are all pleased to represent Admiral James Loy, the
Acting Under Secretary of Transportation for Security. I thank
you for the opportunity to speak to you today about the
challenges we face in California in ensuring the highest
standard of aviation security. I have a short opening statement
to give, and then we will be available to answer your
questions. I have submitted a statement for the record.
By way of introduction, Ed Gomez is a retired chief of the
California Highway Patrol, Mike Aguilar recently retired as a
Brigadier General in the United States Marine Corps, and I
recently retired as a Rear Admiral in the United States Navy.
Ed Gomez took up his post in San Francisco at the end of May,
Mike Aguilar arrived in San Diego on April 1st, and I arrived
here at LAX on July 15th.
I would also like to mention that TSA has selected Federal
security directors for several other airports in California. We
now have FSDs in place at 9 of the 12 California airports that
will have FSDs. The FSDs at the other three sites are in
various stages of the selection process. As Federal security
directors, we will fill a crucial role in aviation security by
providing a clear line of authority for security at our
Nation's airports.
We report to Michael Robinson, the Associate Under
Secretary for Aviation Operations. We provide day-to-day
operational leadership for the Federal security
responsibilities at our assigned airports. The FSD is the
ranking TSA authority responsible for the leadership and the
coordination of TSA security activities within the airport,
including planning, execution, and management of coordinated
security services.
The FSD has three primary responsibilities: First,
screening operations for passengers and their carry-on
property, as well as all checked baggage and cargo that will be
carried on passenger flights. Law enforcement: We serve as the
aviation security liaison to local intelligence and law
enforcement communities. We receive, assess, distribute, and
ensure that we effectively use intelligence and law enforcement
information. We also coordinate and implement security
countermeasures with appropriate departments and law
enforcement agencies, airports, and air carriers. And third,
regulatory: We are responsible for ensuring compliance with TSA
aviation security regulations.
The FSD is responsible for securing airports and air
carriers. If a particular security threat to a gate, concourse,
terminal, airport, or related facility cannot be addressed in a
way adequate to ensure the safety of passengers, crew, or other
individuals, the FSD may clear, close, or otherwise secure the
affected facilities.
Similarly, if a security threat to a flight or series of
flights cannot be addressed in a way adequate to ensure the
safety of passengers and crew, the FSD will have the authority
to cancel a flight or series of flights, delay a flight or
series of flights, or return flights to an airport after
departure, divert such flights, or otherwise appropriately
handle these critical situations. These are important
responsibilities that we take seriously.
In consultation with TSA managers, the FSD provides for
training, supervision, and equipment for the screener work
force and Federal TSA law enforcement officers. Furthermore,
the FSD will ensure that screeners meet and maintain
eligibility for employment and that law enforcement officers
are properly deployed at screening locations. `This will result
in our supervision of large numbers of new Federal employees at
Los Angeles International and San Diego Airport. The exact
numbers are now under assessment.
Ed Gomez will have the responsibilities that Mike Aguilar
and I have without direct screener oversight. As provided for
under the Aviation and Transportation Security Act, San
Francisco is one of 5 airports in the country selected for a
contract screening pilot program. San Francisco is the only
California airport that is participating in this program.
Instead of screeners who are Federal employees of TSA, at San
Francisco the screeners will operate under a contract awarded
by TSA. The contract screeners must have the same
qualifications as TSA screeners and must follow the same
training requirements. They are entitled to receive the same
pay and benefits as TSA screeners. This contracting process has
just begun. TSA expects to award a contract in early October.
We expect to have a strong law enforcement presence. TSA is
responsible for enforcing Federal laws and regulations with
respect to aviation security at security screening checkpoints,
in the secure areas of the airport, and at perimeter areas. In
some airports, we will provide TSA law enforcement officers; at
other airports, we are contracting with State or local law
enforcement agencies to assist in the passenger checkpoint
enforcement work. Additionally, our Federal air marshals will
provide on-board security on high-risk flights.
Madam Chairwoman, we are all well aware of the tragedy that
occurred at this airport on July 4th. The fact that the gunman
does not appear to have been part of an organized terrorist
plot is of little solace to the innocent victims. In the wake
of this incident, we understand the call for additional support
from TSA to provide security in the public concourse areas of
the airport terminals. TSA has a five-pronged approach to this
issue.
First, TSA's own law enforcement officers or State and
local LEOs working under contract to TSA will chiefly staff the
secure areas of airports, and our Federal air marshals will
serve on board commercial aircraft.
Second, TSA does have an important, broader responsibility:
to coordinate and approve the overall security plan for all
commercial airports. To do so, the FSD at each airport will
work closely with State, local, and airport law enforcement
officers and the airport management team and other Federal
agencies operating at commercial airports. All of us here today
are pledged to do this.
Third, law enforcement--local law enforcement will continue
to have responsibility for enforcement in the public areas of
the airport and will coordinate with TSA on the overall
security plan.
Fourth, our limited use of TSA's law enforcement officers
outside of the immediate areas associated with screening will
be primarily to assess and make recommendations for security
improvements. This is consistent with the ATSA, the authorizing
legislation that Congress passed. Of course, if there is an
incident where it is appropriate to assist local law
enforcement officers, we certainly will do so to the extent
possible.
Finally, we are already partnering successfully with State,
local and airport law enforcement authorities nationwide. These
officers are assisting TSA in meeting our statutory
responsibilities at the passenger screening checkpoints. TSA is
seeking to clarify its authority to extend these partnerships
beyond November 19th of this year.
I would like to briefly discuss the plans to Federalize our
three airports to meet the two critical statutory deadlines.
The first is to require the screening of all passengers with
Federal screeners, with the exception of the contracting
screening pilot program in San Francisco, by November 19th,
2002.
The second is to ensure that all checked baggage is
screened for explosives by December 31st, 2002. As you can
imagine, this is an extraordinary challenge to meet at 429
airports throughout the country. Our headquarters is working
closely with our major contractors that are assisting us in
this effort. Contractors are onsite, and airport assessments
have begun in order to meet the statutory deadlines. However,
as you recently heard from Secretary Mineta, the amount of
money available to TSA this year has necessitated a
reassessment of its rollout strategy. Naturally, our
headquarters in Washington, DC will keep the Committee informed
of the results of this reassessment.
In keeping with our mandate from Admiral Loy, all FSDs
pledge to have open lines of communication with airport
operators, air carriers, and other airport stakeholders,
Members of Congress, local officials, State and local law
enforcement officials and their agencies, and the many Federal,
State, and local agencies with whom we must work cooperatively.
Mike Aguilar, Ed Gomez, all of the other FSDs in California,
and I will continue to work hard on this in the coming weeks
and months. The three of us have already begun this effort, and
we appreciate the support and cooperation from our airport
partners.
Madam Chairwoman, all of us on this panel, and indeed, all
TSA employees throughout the country, are keenly aware of the
tragic link between California and the terrorist attack on our
Nation on September 11. We know that all four planes that were
hijacked by the terrorists were bound for California--three of
those flights were destined for LAX; the fourth was bound for
San Francisco. Many California residents perished on that day.
Our goal is to ensure a level of security at our airports here
in California, and everywhere in our great Nation, so that a
tragedy like September 11 never happens again.
We all welcome your support and that of all Californians.
Mike Aguilar, Ed Gomez, and I will be pleased to answer your
questions.
[The prepared statement of Admiral Stone follows:]
Prepared Statement of Admiral David M. Stone (retired), Federal
Security Director, LAX International Airport, Transportation Security
Administration; accompanied by Ed Gomez, Federal Security Director,
San Francisco Airport; and General Mike Aguilar, Federal Security
Director, San Diego Airport
Good morning Madame Chairwoman. It is a pleasure to appear before
you today to discuss airport security at Los Angeles International
Airport (LAX) San Francisco International Airport (SFO) and San Diego
International Airport (SAN). I am David Stone and I am the newly
arrived Federal Security Director here at LAX. With me this morning are
Ed Gomez the Federal Security Director at SFO and Mike Aguilar the
Federal Security Director (FSD) at SAN. Mike is the senior member of
our group having arrived at SAN at the end of March of this year. We
are all pleased to represent ADM James Loy the Acting Under Secretary
of Transportation for Security. I thank you for the opportunity to
speak to you today about the challenges we face in California in
ensuring the highest standard of aviation security.
I would like to take a few moments to briefly introduce us to you.
Ed Gomez is a retired Chief of the California Highway Patrol (CHP) with
over 13 years experience as a member of their top management executive
team. He headed a division with over 1,400 CHP employees. As part of
his 33-year long career in law enforcement Ed has coordinated law
enforcement resources during numerous special events and disasters such
as the 1992 Los Angeles riots and the devastating Northridge
Earthquake. Ed is a member of the F.B.I. National Executive Institute
and has attend the United States Secret Service Dignitary Protection
Course. Ed has a Master's degree in Public Administration.
Mike Aguilar recently retired as a Brigadier General in the United
States Marine Corps. During a distinguished 30-year career in the
Marines Mike served in a number of key assignments including the
Commanding General Fleet Marine Forces South and the Deputy Commander
U.S. Marine Forces South. Mike served in Operations DESERT SHIELD and
DESERT STORM and has flown helicopters for many years logging thousands
of hours of accident free flights. Mike holds a Master's Degree in
Strategic Studies and National Security Affairs.
I retired as a Rear Admiral in the United States Navy. My last
assignment was as Director Environmental Protection Occupational Health
and Safety in the Office of the Chief of Naval Operations. I previously
served as the Commander of the Nimitz Battle Group where I was
responsible for organizing training and deploying over 5,000 sailors. I
also commanded the United States Middle East Force in Manama Bahrain
and served as the first United States Flag Officer to command NATO's
Maritime Immediate Reaction Force ``The Standing Naval Force
Mediterranean.'' I graduated from the U.S. Naval Academy and hold a
Masters' degree in National Security Affairs from the U.S. Naval
Postgraduate School and in National Security and Strategic Studies from
the U.S. Naval War College. I also earned a Masters Degree in
Management from Salve Regina College.
I would also like to mention that TSA has selected FSDs for several
other airports in California. We now have FSDs in place at 9 of the 12
California airports that will have FSDs. The FSDs at the other three
sites are in various stages of the selection process.
I believe that we bring a wealth of experience talent and
commitment to this important position. As Federal Security Directors we
will fill a crucial role in aviation security by providing a clear line
of authority for security at our nation's airports. We report to
Michael Robinson the Associate Under Secretary for Aviation Operations.
We provide day-to-day operational leadership for the federal security
responsibilities at our assigned airports. The FSD is the ranking TSA
authority responsible for the leadership and coordination of TSA
security activities within the airport including the planning execution
and management of coordinated security services.
The FSD has three primary responsibilities: (1) screening
operations for passengers and their carry-on property all checked
baggage and cargo that will be carried on passenger flights; (2) law
enforcement: serving as the aviation security liaison to local
intelligence and law enforcement communities. The FSD receives assesses
distributes and ensures the utilization of intelligence and law
enforcement information as appropriate. We also coordinate and
implement security countermeasures with appropriate departments and law
enforcement agencies airports and air carriers; and (3) regulatory:
responsible for ensuring compliance with TSA aviation security
regulations.
The FSD is responsible for securing airports and air carriers. If a
particular security threat to a gate concourse terminal airport or
related facility cannot be addressed in a way adequate to ensure the
safety of passengers crew or other individuals the FSD may clear close
or otherwise secure the affected facilities. Similarly if a security
threat to a flight or series of flights cannot be addressed in a way
adequate to ensure the safety of passengers and crew the FSD will have
the authority to cancel a flight or series of flights delay a flight or
series of flights or return flights to an airport after departure
divert such flights or otherwise appropriately handle these critical
situations.
In consultation with appropriate TSA managers the FSD provides for
appropriate training supervision and equipment for the screener
workforce and Federal TSA Law Enforcement Officers (LEOs). Furthermore
the FSD will ensure that screeners meet and maintain eligibility for
employment and that LEO's are deployed at screening locations in
accordance with applicable statutory standards. This will result in my
supervision of approximately 1,850 passenger and baggage screeners at
LAX. Mike Aguilar will oversee over 650 screeners at SAN.
Ed Gomez will have the responsibilities that Mike Aguilar and I
have without direct screener oversight. This is because San Francisco
will operate in a different setting. As provided for under the Aviation
and Transportation Security Act San Francisco was one of five airports
in the country selected for a contract screening pilot program. San
Francisco is the only California airport that is participating in this
program. Instead of screeners who are federal employees of TSA the
estimated 1,000 contract screeners at San Francisco will operate under
a contract awarded by TSA. The contract screeners must have the same
qualifications as TSA screeners and must adhere to the same training
requirements and they will be entitled to receive the same pay and
benefits as TSA screeners. This contracting process has just begun and
TSA has issued a Synopsis of the procurement. TSA expects to award a
contract in early October. The contract may be awarded to individual
contractors or in one bundle depending on how the offers are evaluated
to determine how the best interests of the Government may be met.
We expect to have a strong law enforcement presence in place. TSA
will be responsible for enforcing Federal laws and regulations with
respect to aviation security at security screening checkpoints in the
secure areas of the airport and at perimeter areas. In some airports we
will provide TSA employees as Law Enforcement Officers; at other
airports we are contracting with state or local law enforcement
agencies to assist in the passenger checkpoint enforcement work.
Additionally our Federal Air Marshals will provide on-board security on
high-risk flights.
Madame Chairwoman we are all well aware of the tragedy that
occurred at this airport on July 4. The fact that the gunman does not
appear to have been part of an organized terrorist plot is of little
solace to the innocent victims. In the wake of this incident we
understand the call for additional support from TSA to provide
screening in the public concourse areas of the airport terminals. TSA
has a five-pronged approach to this issue.
First TSA's own Law Enforcement Officers or LEOs working
under contract to TSA will chiefly staff the secure areas of
airports and our Federal Air Marshals will serve on board
commercial aircraft.
Second TSA does have an important broader responsibility: to
coordinate and approve the overall security plan for all
commercial airports. To do so the Federal Security Director at
each airport will work closely with State local and airport law
enforcement officers and the airport management team and other
federal agencies operating at commercial airports. All of us
here today are pledged to do this.
Third local law enforcement will continue to have
responsibility for enforcement in the public areas of the
airport and will coordinate with TSA on the overall security
plan.
Fourth our limited use of TSA's law enforcement officers
outside of the immediate areas associated with screening will
be primarily to assess and make recommendations for security
improvements. This is consistent with ATSA the authorizing
legislation that Congress passed. Of course if there is an
incident where it is appropriate to assist local law
enforcement officers we certainly will do so to the extent
possible.
Finally we are already partnering successfully with State
local and airport law enforcement authorities nationwide. These
officers are assisting TSA in meeting our statutory
responsibilities at the passenger-screening checkpoints. TSA is
seeking to clarify its authority to extend these partnerships
beyond November 19 of this year.
I would like to briefly discuss the plans to federalize our three
airports to meet the two critical statutory deadlines. The first is to
require the screening of all passengers with Federal screeners (with
the exception of the contracting screening pilot program at San
Francisco and four other airports) by November 19, 2002. The second is
to ensure that all checked baggage is screened for explosives by
December 31, 2002. As you can imagine this is an extraordinary
challenge to meet at 429 airports throughout the country. Our
Headquarters is working closely with our major contractors that are
assisting us in this effort. Contractors are on site and airport
assessments have begun in order to meet the statutory deadlines.
However as you recently heard from Secretary Mineta the amount of money
available to TSA this year has necessitated a reassessment of its
rollout strategy. Naturally our Headquarters in Washington DC will keep
the Committee informed of the results of this reassessment.
In keeping with our mandate from ADM Loy all FSDs pledge to have
open lines of communication with airport operators air carriers and
other airport stakeholders Members of Congress local officials state
and local law enforcement officials and their agencies and the many
federal state and local agencies with whom we must work cooperatively.
Mike Aguilar Ed Gomez all of the other FSDs in California and I will
work hard on this in the coming weeks and months.
Madame Chairwoman all of us on this panel and indeed all TSA
employees throughout the country are keenly aware of the tragic link
between California and the terrorist attack on our Nation on September
11. We know that all four planes that were hijacked by the terrorists
were bound for California--three of those flights were destined for LAX
the fourth was bound for San Francisco. Many California residents
perished on that day. Our goal is to ensure a level of security at our
airports here in California and everywhere in our great Nation so that
a tragedy like September 11 never happens again.
We all welcome your support and that of all Californians.
Thank you for the opportunity to testify before you and share the
challenges that the Federal Security Directors in California face today
and for your continuing support of the Transportation Security
Administration. Mike Aguilar Ed Gomez and I will be pleased to answer
any questions you may have.
Senator Boxer. Thank you so much.
I am going to skip around here because there are a few
issues I want to dig a little bit deeper into. I guess, Mr.
Martin, your comments that if you put these other machines in
as an interim solution, you will have a lot of lines, you are
going to expose the public to more security problems, I have a
problem with that. I think it is an excuse. Let me say why: If
we have adequate security in the lobbies, in the ticket
counters, that is going to be a prevention, number one.
Number two--and this goes to Ms. Bowens' and Mr. Martin's
remarks, I think, more than the others--you keep stressing
``customer friendly.'' This is important, and to some degree,
Mr. Acree said that we have got to make sure people move
through and so on and so forth. I just want you to respond to
this, and maybe it is just a disagreement we have. But I fly. I
am flying more than I am standing still. And I have talked to
people, and I have talked to employees and passengers and so on
and so forth.
My concentration on this safety issue, which has been, I
have to admit, exceedingly focused and making people
uncomfortable, which I am going to do today to you, which I
apologize for, but it is just the only way I can get to the
bottom of things, is because I believe in my heart if there is
just one more incident like the one--the several we had on
September 11th, that the blow to the airline industry, the blow
to airport travel, will be so extraordinary that it will make
your comments, in retrospect, just seem completely out of touch
with reality.
Oh, my God, people are waiting an extra 15 minutes. People
aren't thrilled to do this, but aren't there other ways to deal
with it other than slipping a deadline? And it is like ``The
dog ate my homework.'' We had a year and a half knowing this
was coming. LAX is going to meet the deadline in terms of the
bomb detection. I appreciate that very much. But, you know, who
is to say in another year, ``Oh, my goodness, we can't, we
won't, we can't.'' There are other ways to address the issue of
customer satisfaction, and one might be a trusted traveler
program.
Now, I, myself, have been patted down and pulled aside at
least 15 to 20 times because I travel so much. In fact, on the
one hand, it is a great signal to everybody that no one is
getting a free ride here, but on the other hand, it is a bit of
a waste of time to have three people on a United States Senator
who is five feet tall and a grandma, and is not such a
threatening profile.
So if people are willing to give up some of their privacy,
like if I agree, OK, I will give up some of my privacy, I will
do some genetic--let some machine test my iris in my eye or my
fingerprint or whatever, and I am willing to go into such a
program, and let us just say a third of the traveling public is
willing to go into such a program and maybe even more--granted,
it is a voluntary thing. They give up their privacy. If they do
not want to do it, fine. Now you have got a third of the people
you can treat a little differently, relieving this issue that
you all talk about at the airports--which I understand your
angst when you see long lines--but wouldn't that be a better
way to go other than saying, well, we cannot put a trace
machine in the lobby because it will be crowded in the lobby? I
am just trying to get your sense of it.
Mr. Stone, I do not know where TSA comes down on the
trusted traveler program. Can you give me a little insight into
what you know about the thinking, if you know where Admiral Loy
is coming from?
Admiral Stone. Yes. It is my understanding that Admiral Loy
is open to that idea.
Senator Boxer. Good.
Admiral Stone. Recently, TSA sent a credentials program
representative to see me yesterday to talk about how we might
use these type technologies in the Department of Transportation
Identification Card. So there is a lot of creative thinking
about how we might use new technologies along those lines, and
we are also open to new ideas such as moving the gate screening
cord and combining it with the checkpoint. And so we have a
test program here that TSA is sponsoring to change, to look at
new ideas, to look at new technologies.
Senator Boxer. Well, I am very happy to hear that, Mr.
Stone, because the prior folks were fairly close, but I think
Admiral Loy--and I met with him, and I am very impressed. And
if you could take a message back to him, and of course I will
call him myself, that this is something I think would be
important.
So perhaps the airport folks could respond to how they feel
about this trusted traveler type of program, and if you would
view that as a possible way to go to relieve the kind of
congestion that you are concerned about. We will not get into
the machines right now, just go to the trusted traveler.
Mr. Acree. I would agree with the Senator's comments. I
think the airport industry is on record as supporting a trusted
traveler concept. If we are looking for a needle in a haystack,
the first thing we should be doing is decreasing the size of
the haystack, and I think the trusted traveler program does
that.
Senator Boxer. Ms. Bowens, do you have feelings on that?
Ms. Bowens. I would agree that the trusted traveler program
as well as any other innovations that we could bring on board
would help. At this point, none of that has been discussed with
us. We have not even been--long before the TSA came in, we
investigated the availability of this explosive detection
equipment just to purchase on our own. It was not available for
us in terms of the numbers of the pieces of the equipment that
we would have to have. So we are in favor of any kind of
technology that the FAA or the TSA would approve that would
help expedite these lines, but right now, that is not available
to us. We have to deal with what's handed to us today.
Senator Boxer. I understand. I understand. But that is the
purpose of this hearing, to make it better, to keep the focus
on. Because what you are basically saying is, you are being
told you need to install these machines, and you do not see any
relief at the ticket counter. And you are concerned that that
is going to make a very crowded, unpleasant experience for
folks, and you want to put off doing the interim measures. I
understand that.
Mr. Martin?
Mr. Martin. San Francisco very much favors further
exploration of trusted traveler programs. We think that they
can benefit the aviation industry greatly, both in customer
service but also in aviation safety. Great benefits potentially
are there. Only 10 percent of our passengers, who are frequent
fliers account for over 50 percent of our trips. So you can
well imagine the benefits from a trusted traveler program.
Senator Boxer. Absolutely. It is huge.
Mr. Green, would you also favor a trusted traveler type of
program?
Mr. Green. I do favor that. I think concepts like trusted
traveler and I think increased use of technology going forward
is really going to be the solution, long term, to resolving
these service issues for the industry, particularly when it
gets back into a growth mode. Projecting what you are doing
today without technology and concepts like this in the future
is a little worrisome, so I really would endorse it.
Senator Boxer. Mr. Gomez or Mr. Aguilar, do you have any
comments on this idea of pursuing this at the TSA, developing
some--perhaps one or two or three systems that you have faith
in, or perhaps one system that could be a centralized system?
So again, we understand, some of them, in fact, may want to
be in the program, they are giving up certain privacy, and that
is something an individual has to determine. But I know most of
the folks I know who are traveling constantly would really
welcome that. Do you think it is a good thing to pursue?
Mr. Gomez. Good morning, Senator. Ed Gomez from San
Francisco. I am pleased to be here and address these serious
issues.
I think one of the points that I want to make is that we
all want the same thing. We want people to be able to travel
and have a sense of security and confidence in the airports and
other modes of transportation. And I think that some of the
ideas that are being put forth today, whether we're talking
about training people and/or baggage, I think that it is still
a process of evolution.
As we speak, there are teams of consultants in all of our
airports and hundreds of airports across the country looking at
the individual uniqueness of each airport in terms of
processing people and bags. So I like your ideas about, let us
look at things in different ways to try to get people through
but not sacrifice the quality of security. And I do believe
that identification of people and trying to say that you, as
Senator, should not be searched six times versus a frequent
flier that would have a record of travel and a stability, that
TSA would be able to perhaps look at having them be processed
in a different way.
So we are open to different suggestions without, again,
trying to diminish in any way the level of security at the
airport.
Senator Boxer. Mr. Aguilar?
Mr. Aguilar. Madam Chairwoman, again, thank you for the
invitation and opportunity to speak.
I agree with you 100 percent in that there is a threat,
there is a sense of urgency, and we have to take the technology
that we have now to address that threat. I am pleased to say
that TSA is very open to looking at new technology, emerging
technology. We are familiar with the legislation which you have
introduced, and I know Admiral Loy is very receptive to that. I
would just add probably that with this emerging technology, I
believe TSA would like to have the latitude to be able to
assess that technology before making a final decision, but we
are in complete support of contributing to the customer service
without compromising our security requirements.
Senator Boxer. I think it goes to what Mr. Acree mentioned
when he said that you are looking for a needle in a haystack,
the bad one. And if you have a smaller universe, you are going
to clearly have a better chance. So I guess now I have two
messages from me to you which I will deliver to Admiral Loy
myself, one of course, is not to let these deadlines slip, and
of course, we have disagreement here.
I thought the House bill was completely a step back for us
in terms of delaying the date because, again, the same reasons
you are giving now, excuses, problems, explanations as to why
it is difficult, are not going to really change. I want to go
to the issue of the interim check for bombs, bomb detection.
Mr. Green, if you were to say one reason why you are
successful in getting these machines installed, what would it
be? Were you just ahead of it? Were you just earlier than----
Mr. Green. Well, I think probably the short answer is we
got a jump start on it. After September 11, we had the same
concerns that all airports have and have been expressed here
this morning. But absent a mandate that says we are going to do
something later than December the 31st, our view was, earlier
this year, that we really need to get focused on meeting that.
So we brought a team, actually brought four consultants in, to
look at, not only passenger processing, but perimeter cargo and
all the other issues that we talked about. And we did that
early, and we did a lot of comprehensive analysis and modeling,
analyzing the equipment.
Senator Boxer. You mean right after September 11?
Mr. Green. This was, like, spring of this year. It was not
last year but this year. But for several months, we have been
engaged in that. And I think when the TSA came in and got
serious about establishing some protocol and some procedures
for our airport, we were fortunate enough to have done a lot of
work that has sort of come together at the right time. And I
think that put us in a position of not being delayed, and that
is why I think--given the work that our consultants did, and I
think it is shared by Admiral Stone--we are optimistic that, if
we have the equipment and the people in place, then we can
comply. But I guess the short answer really was we got started
early.
Senator Boxer. Right. I think that is an important point,
and I think there is a lesson here. I mean, we cannot wait.
Anyone who wants to get us is thinking every minute, is
planning every minute, is getting ready every minute. And we
are sitting back and saying, gee, this is hard; gee, we cannot
do it. I just do not accept it, and I just want to push a
little harder on the point.
In terms of the interim solution that none of you--well,
Mr. Acree, you have a different issue. Your problem is you just
now got somebody in place from the TSA who is a permanent
person. Is that correct?
Mr. Acree. Just this week, he was onsite.
Senator Boxer. At this point, you have no plan in place
even?
Mr. Acree. Correct.
Senator Boxer. So I hope, Mr. Stone, that you can take that
back because you are here representing TSA. They've been
disadvantaged because they are so late in getting someone on
board, and they are a growing passenger airport. They need to
have some attention paid over there. That's why I have
different airports here because I think sometimes we get lost
in the shuffle when we do not have the huge international
airports. Is yours called an international airport?
Mr. Acree. We are an international airport.
Senator Boxer. Smaller international airports, they do not
get the attention. So we need immediate attention. They had a
41 percent failure rate----
Mr. Acree. Yes, ma'am.
Senator Boxer.--at the screening. I mean, that is
outrageous. The acting Federal person, the acting head, did not
know anything about it. They need attention. So that is a
message. Sacramento needs attention. They have good people. He
is a very good man, and they just need some direction of what
they are going to do.
But in terms of this interim--what do you call the machines
that would be the interim? The trace detection machines, right?
Here's a question that I have for you, Mr. Martin: You are
concerned that they are going to be put in the middle of the
lobby and be a mess. Why is it that we have to have the
passenger there with the bag----
Mr. Martin. Why is it that we have to have a passenger with
the bag?
Senator Boxer.--that's going to be checked?
Mr. Martin. Because there is a particularly high rate of
false alarms with the trace detecting equipment, and the
passenger needs to be there with the bag when the screening
agent opens the bag.
Senator Boxer. When it is done with the trace detection as
opposed to the others?
Mr. Martin. Right. The EDS equipment did not result in
nearly as high of a false alarm rate.
Senator Boxer. What is the false alarm rate?
Mr. Martin. When there is a positive read, the bag and its
contents need to be investigated further. The EDS also has----
Senator Boxer. I said, what is the rate? What is the
percentage failure? Out of the 10 that--if they find 10 traces,
how many would be wrong?
Mr. Martin. More than 30 percent of the total bags produce
false reads. Overall, the EDT equipment----
Senator Boxer. Wait. Then I am still confused. If you are
doing bomb sniffing, where is that done?
Mr. Martin. It is done throughout the terminal building.
Senator Boxer. So the passenger is not there with the bomb
sniffing, right?
Mr. Martin. Sometimes there are passengers; sometimes there
aren't.
Senator Boxer. If the problem is--and let me just take this
to Mr. Stone--if the problem is, in terms of the movement, that
there are all these passengers around, I just want to ask you
this question. If you had a false positive with a dog sniffing
situation, you would do a hand search. The passenger does not
necessarily have to be there, right?
I mean, my question is, why does the passenger have to be
there when you do the trace, even with a third of the problems?
Admiral Stone. I would like to ask Mike Aguilar to describe
that.
Senator Boxer. OK. Mike?
Mr. Aguilar. Yes, ma'am.
The passenger is not required to be there. However, I think
most airports, just out of respect for privacy for the
passenger, just does allow them to accompany their baggage. But
as far as an absolute requirement for the individual to be
there, that is really, again, in respect for their privacy, if
they wanted to accompany their bag. As far as the false alarm
rate only, you are absolutely right----
Senator Boxer. Wait a minute. When you check your bag in
and it goes through a different check, you are not there with
the bag. What's the privacy problem? I mean, in other words,
when you are packing a bag, you know it is going to be checked.
So already you are making a decision. If you do not want to
pack that special thing, do not pack that special thing,
whatever it may be. But the point is, we all know we have to
check bags.
I mean, what I hear, if that is the reason--is that the
reason is privacy concerns?
Mr. Martin. Privacy concerns and specifically I do not know
of a single U.S. airline or foreign airline that allows a bag
to be opened without the passenger being present. So in our
international terminal where we have an in-line bag system,
four or five passengers a day are called down to the bag
screening room for the bag to be opened.
Senator Boxer. So in other words, when you do the hand
searches, the passenger is always there?
Mr. Martin. Yes.
Senator Boxer. So if the dog sniffs something and there has
to be a hand search, you go find the passenger?
Mr. Martin. That's right.
Senator Boxer. How do you do that? Page them? What do you
do?
Mr. Martin. We page them or we contact the airline. We
primarily work through the airlines in contacting passengers.
Senator Boxer. And if it is an EDS?
Mr. Martin. The EDS does not produce the high false alarm
rate. They are also more than twice as effective in identifying
if there is an explosive device.
Senator Boxer. Now, what happens if the machines that we
all want, the big machines, find something that is
questionable? Do you then call the passenger before you open
that bag too?
Mr. Martin. We contact the airline, the airline brings the
passenger down to the screening room.
Senator Boxer. All right. So you bring the passenger down.
So why do not you bring the passenger down with the other, with
the trace----
Mr. Martin. We'd have to bring 30 percent of the passengers
down with the trace detection equipment given the false reads,
and there is no way that the industry could handle that.
Senator Boxer. Do you agree that there is a 30 percent
failure rate?
Admiral Stone. No, I do not. That's not the figures that I
would be----
Senator Boxer. What are your rates?
Admiral Stone. I can only brief qualitatively that the
error rate is such that it will not cause the significant
backups that were mentioned here.
Senator Boxer. So we have a disagreement on the failure
rates. How do you base your numbers, Mr. Martin? Where do you
get your figures?
Mr. Martin. My figures are from a Reason Foundation report.
Senator Boxer. A what? I am sorry.
Mr. Martin. A Reason Foundation----
Senator Boxer. ``Reason.''
Mr. Martin. ``Reason.''
Senator Boxer. Who are they?
Mr. Martin. It is a foundation based in Southern
California.
Senator Boxer. What do they do?
Mr. Martin. They are very active on a number of issues,
commenting on privatization and, commenting on a number of
issues related to aviation----
Senator Boxer. Are they scientists or are they----
Mr. Martin. I am sorry. I cannot tell you further
background.
[Committee discussion off the record.]
Senator Boxer. Well, from what I understand, it is a group
that is trying to privatize airport security. They have another
agenda. So I would just say----
Ms. Bowens, you want to support Mr. Martin there, what he's
saying?
Ms. Bowens. I have the same information that he has.
Senator Boxer. From the Reason Foundation?
Ms. Bowens. We actually had the Reason Foundation work. And
just reading in general industry information on the ETD, that
is the number that just continues to pop up, is 30 percent.
Senator Boxer. But TSA does not agree.
Ms. Bowens. They do not have a number. They did not give a
number.
Senator Boxer. Mr. Stone, would you repeat what your
information is.
Admiral Stone. I said I had qualitative assessments that
that rate that was mentioned by that study is too high and
that, in fact, will not cause the type of backlog that was
mentioned.
Senator Boxer. Mr. Gomez?
Mr. Gomez. Senator, I think we all acknowledge that EDS has
a higher reliability rate than the trace detection machines,
but I totally agree with your point that time is an issue here.
And I think that in-line systems really are certainly faster,
will inconvenience the passengers less, but more expensive. It
is going to take a lot more time. And all of us--certainly
Congress has given us a deadline to meet, by the end of the
year.
So I think that with the help of the consultants that are
on board right now, they are going to work with each airport.
And as you know, flying around the country, each airport is
very unique, very different given the circumstances of where it
is and the environment that--these machines will still allow us
to find a lot of material that could be very hazardous to the
people and the airplanes and that.
We are going to use these hybrid systems again, even though
they are not going to be on-line, and the other machines that
would be better, will be forthcoming. But we cannot delay, and
I think these machines still--we must move forward with that to
meet the mandate of Congress.
Senator Boxer. You oversee San Francisco?
Mr. Gomez. Yes, ma'am.
Senator Boxer. So you and Mr. Martin have a little
disagreement here.
Mr. Gomez. We have talked about this a lot, and let me tell
you this: San Francisco has done a marvelous job of being
proactive, much like Los Angeles is, that because of their
proactive nature they immediately started to change the
conveyer systems and that.
We are very proud to say, by the end of the year at
international terminals, all bags going out of the country will
be screened for explosives on an in-line system. But we do not
have the time, we do not have the money, we do not always have
the wherewithal to do that with domestic. But I suggest we
cannot delay, and John and I have discussed this a lot. And
like you said already, Senator, that time is an issue, and I
think the citizens trust us to get this in line and in place as
soon as possible.
Senator Boxer. Well, I would suggest that--I am going to do
a little research on this foundation. I think they have another
agenda. And I would like to have, Mr. Stone, if you could take
a message back to TSA, what I consider to be more science-based
study of the failure rate. But be that as it may, the bottom
line is if you do not do this, you are going to have some bags
that are going to get through. Because the bag match, we all
know that does not protect us against a bomb.
So I would say to TSA--and again, I have my friends whom I
love who do not agree with me here who are going to push for
change in the law. I am going to fight against changing the
law. So I would move as if the law would not be changed.
Because you'll be back here next year and you'll ask me the
same thing. Because the problems you are describing are not
going to get away that easily.
So you might as well just face it, just like we had to face
that we had to send our troops to Afghanistan. No one wanted to
go. It was a horror. It was a nightmare. We did not know what
we were going to face. We did it and we did it well and we did
it right, and we continue to have to be there and make sure we
finish the job right and make sure there is stability there.
Think about that challenge compared to your challenge of
testing a bag that is lying in front of your feet.
Now, there may be people who will give you permission. If
you asked me when I am checking in, me--here's my bag, I am
checking it in, and if the person at the counter says to me, we
want to check your bag for bombs, but we do not have an EDS
yet; as an interim we have got this trace detection machine.
Here's an option: You can go to the gate, relax, get on your
plane, or you can stand by your bag. Give people a choice.
Perhaps half of them or more will say, fine, as long as it
makes it onto my plane. Some of them will not want to leave
their bag, they will go. I think there is some innovative ways
you can deal with the public. The public is more forgiving than
you seem to think in your testimony. You are going to have a
few people who are annoyed that they are slowed up, but most
people want to get there safely. I mean, 99.9 percent, is my
feeling. And if they know there is a little bit of an
inconvenience, so be it.
Mr. Green, you did not mention in your opening the failure
rate at the screening that was discovered by the Federal
Government when they tested.
Mr. Green. The 41 percent?
Senator Boxer. Yes. The 40 or whatever, 40 or 41 percent
failure rate. Could you discuss what's been done at your
airport to improve that situation?
Mr. Green. Well, we were certainly concerned to get those
numbers. And the thing we needed quickly was to get an FSD in
here, and, of course, Admiral Stone is here. I think the
combination of supervisory attention at these checkpoints, when
they begin to get better trained people in here, raise the
standards, manage the operation a little more effectively than
perhaps it has been over the past few years. I think we are
very confident we will not have a problem here in LA, but that
was a little disconcerting. It was a small sample size, but
once was too many and it was bothersome.
Senator Boxer. Mr. Stone, having come on board with that
problem, you came right after that, what did you do? Without
giving away any secrets, did you take that as one of your first
responsibilities, to get that down to zero?
Admiral Stone. Exactly. That caused me significant concern
when I saw that, and I think the first thing as a leader is to
bring the urgency for change. We cannot live with that type of
performance. Even though we are Federalizing in an October
timeframe, between now and October is a long time in terms of
the current threat. So an urgency for change, which I conveyed
when I got to the airport to the screening managers, was the
first step.
Senator Boxer. And the screening managers are Federal
employees at LAX?
Admiral Stone. These are contractors that gathered at the
airport. When I arrived, I asked to meet with them and talk
with them.
Senator Boxer. They are contractors. Will they become
Federal employees? Will that all be changing?
Admiral Stone. That will be part of the Federalization
process as we assess through NCS Pearson. And that process is
starting at the assessment center to see which of our current
employees meet the standards, and then we are very keen to
retain all those that do.
Senator Boxer. But now, have you tested again, in your way,
some spot checks? Do you spot check?
Admiral Stone. The TSA does.
Senator Boxer. That is what I mean.
Admiral Stone. I have not since I have been here. After the
promulgation of the standard operating procedures by TSA and
provided to the contractors as the standard to which to
measure, both--the contractor does their own self-assessment,
and TSA has sent out people to test and provide feedback to the
contractors on corrective actions that need to be taken.
The contractors were then required to provide a plan of
action to correct any mid- to long-term deficiencies, but to do
on the spot corrections at the time of the test. So that
program is in place, and we will do continuous improvement up
to the day we Federalize.
Senator Boxer. Well, I think it is very important because
when Secretary Mineta said, well, those are the old folks--old
folks, new folks, some people do not care. They want them
trained. They are out there. They are working for us, and they
are working for the people to protect the people. So I hope
that--and this is a message to the TSA folks--that you will
conduct some of your own little tests just quietly, randomly,
just to see that things are improving.
Now, Mr. Acree, I am very concerned about Sacramento. I
think Sacramento has been neglected. I feel that way in my
heart, and I am upset about it. I am very delighted to hear you
have a new person. Have you met with that person?
Mr. Acree. Yes. We met this week.
Senator Boxer. What is his name?
Mr. Acree. William Wade.
Senator Boxer. William Wade. And you expressed to him your
concerns that you do not have any plan about the high failure
rate and so on. Do you feel good that he's wrapping his arms
around these issues?
Mr. Acree. I met with him, it was his second day on the
job, so I do not think he's got his arms around that issue yet.
But we are optimistic that--as SFO, LAX, and San Diego have
experienced, we expect to have a positive working relationship.
And we think now that he's on board, we'll get some results.
Senator Boxer. Good. Well, I am going to talk to him
personally because I am very worried that you have--of all the
airports here, my sense is you have the longest way to go in
terms of having the master plan, and you've been very candid
about that. So I want you to know that I am going to help get a
little special attention over there because it worries me. San
Diego and San Francisco are complaining about, you know,
decisions that have been made to put certain machinery in their
lobbies, and you do not even know what plan there is for
Sacramento to complain about or not complain about.
Mr. Acree. We like to say that we aim to please, please
give us some place to aim. That is where we are at.
Mr. Aguilar. Senator, if I could interject, not to become
defensive, but as of February when the TSA took over all the
airports, we did not neglect any of the airports. In fact, we
placed at every airport, pending the appointment of an FSD, an
interim Federal security representative. I have not been to
Sacramento. I have to believe that they have an interim
secretary.
Senator Boxer. I talked to her----
Mr. Aguilar. Yes, ma'am, and----
Senator Boxer.--and she did not even know the results of
the TSA tests on screeners. She said she was not even told, and
she was the acting person. I am just saying, look, it is a new
agency; we are finding our way. And it is not about blame. It
is just that if I talk to an acting head--I mean, if you were
sitting there--you are the head of security and at a very
important airport, as all of these airports are, and you did
not know that your own boss's agency conducted a test and you
failed it by 40 percent, you would have to read it in the
paper--she read it in the paper--I mean, this is bad.
Now, the acting head of LAX was much more informed. He
knew, he was told, he was informed, he was making changes and
improvements, and he was excited that you were coming. This was
a different story. There was no word that anyone was coming.
And I believe that I might have helped stir the pot in that
regard just to move it a little quicker because when I talked
to TSA, they said, oh, Sacramento. I am afraid that is a long
way down the list. So I do not think it is a question of being
defensive. It is a fact that the acting head did not know that
there was this failure rate. It is just a fact. I mean, we are
all human and things happen, but--I cannot say what the bumper
strip says, but things happen. But things do happen that are
not good.
Just trying to recap where we are: do we all agree that a
trusted traveler program is very worth pursuing in order to
lessen our hunt for the bad folks? I think there is an
agreement there. That is very good. And I think if TSA--and in
the beginning, TSA was not open to it, but clearly with the new
leadership, they are open to this. So that is one very
important thing that I am going to work on to try and develop
and talk to Senator Hollings and Senator McCain and really
start to move on this because we will do much better if we
lessen the problem. And as far as what Mr. Martin said, that--
if let us just say half of the people signed up who are the
frequent fliers, that would diminish the universe by how much
do you think, in your airport?
Mr. Martin. Like 25 percent.
Senator Boxer. So if half the frequent fliers did this,
you've got a 25 percent easier job. Now, that is, of course,
knowing that, as Mr. Gomez stresses, it has got to be really
good technology and cannot be counterfeited and the rest of it.
And that is, when we get to our technology show--there are a
few things there. I do not know if it will deal with that, but
certainly here in California we can figure out a way to make
that work. So that is number one.
Number two, there is a disagreement between the Federal
folks and a couple of local airports on the error rate on the
trace detection systems.
Admiral Stone. Senator, I have a comment on that.
Senator Boxer. Yes.
Admiral Stone. Since we have these trace detection systems
here at the airport now, here at LAX, we have a protocol in
effect that if one machine you get a hit on, you go to another
one. And if that does not, then you can clear, you have
supervisors come. So the point made that that will take time in
December when we have our baggage checked in that way is true.
But I am not getting 30 phone calls an hour telling me, over
here at the terminal, that we have a problem.
This is being resolved through time and testing and
quantitative assessment by people. So as I look at December, I
realize, as you stated, there is going to be some churn, some
delay, but the costs far, I think in terms of security,
outweigh the extra time that is going to be spent to resolve
the error rate on ETDs.
Senator Boxer. So the trace detection system, that is a bit
of a conflict here. And my job, I want to get some more data,
some more data on the accuracy or inaccuracy of those tests and
the ways that you can get around it, which is to have a double
check, and also the issue of passengers getting a choice to
whether they want to stay with the bag or just go right to the
plane. So we have an issue there.
There is a disagreement between me and a couple of our
local airport people in terms of slipping the date. I view that
as a terrible way to go. And as I said, you know, it is like
when you are a kid and you are doing your homework, it is
really, give me another deadline, can't I do the test next
week? You are still working up to the last minute. It does not
work. We have a problem. We have to deal with it. We have
people working overtime trying to hurt us, and we have got to
act. And it is my view that one more horrible disaster is going
to destroy what you are trying to build. That is what I want to
put in your head. One miss, one horrible miss because somebody
said, oh, well bag match will work. Well, bag match does not
take the place of these tests.
Let us see, I want to get back to these failure rates that
we experienced at Sacramento and LAX, Mr. Stone, because I am
not clear. What is the deadline for the new hires?
Admiral Stone. Our intent is in October to Federalize LAX.
So this week NCS Pearson & Company was contracted by TSA down
here in Los Angeles, and we've opened up an assessment center.
And they are currently in the position of recruiting folks that
we are going to need to Federalize our force in October.
Senator Boxer. Mr. Stone--and again, you are just so nice
to take on this job of answering for people who are not here--
why is there no plan for Sacramento? Why are we getting this
news that there is not even a plan there that they can argue
about? Ms. Bowens, Mr. Martin, they at least have a plan they
can argue about, or they think they do. You do not have a plan?
Mr. Martin. We do not have a definite plan. We were told
that it will be several weeks before we receive the plan and
then another approximately 6 weeks, I believe, for the
architectural and engineering and design work to be done, and
then a couple months remaining for any construction work to be
completed. And that's our great concern.
We want to do all we can to be ahead of the curve on
security. We recognize it is the TSA's responsibility, and I am
purely providing my assessment of the lack of effectiveness of
the trace detection machines that are not effective as compared
to explosive detection devices on an in-line operating basis.
Senator Boxer. We know. That is why they are interim and
not permanent.
Ms. Bowens, you do not have a plan either?
Ms. Bowens. We are about at the same spot as San Francisco,
maybe just a week or two ahead of them.
Senator Boxer. So could you respond to that, Mr. Gomez?
Mr. Gomez. Yes, Senator. I told you that there were several
consulting contracts out; Boeing is doing the baggage
screening, and Lockheed Martin is going to be doing the
checkpoint screening; and that the airport management met with
these people already and preliminary kind of input was
established in terms of what they would like to see. Obviously,
they want the least amount of interruption to the passenger
screening; and that they do not want a lot of modifications,
although TSA is going to pay for that.
So keeping all those things in mind, we feel that within
two to 3 weeks at the most, we are going to have some finalized
plans that will take into account all of the input, and then
based on that, then we're going to be able to do the
reconfigurations to allow us to meet the mandate by November
19th.
All three of our airports will have the new standards for
all the screeners. They're going to be applied. They're going
to be--the people are going to be operating at higher level
with their equipment, with better configurations. So I think
that we're going to be able to meet that. So the plan will
evolve from that.
Senator Boxer. Mr. Aguilar, is that----
Mr. Aguilar. Yes. In fact, TSA has contracted, as you know,
Lockheed Martin to conduct the passenger surveys at all the
airports and Boeing for the checked baggage. And it is my
understanding, in addition to LAX, San Francisco, and San
Diego, that we currently have both Boeing and Lockheed Martin
at Sacramento doing their assessments.
I would hope that those assessment teams are working with
the interim Federal security representative in Sacramento, as I
know all of us have shared with our airport managers the status
of that assessment. And from that assessment, we will develop
our plan--but we are at the beginning, merely at the beginning;
that is what the assessment does--as to the best resolution for
the introduction of the explosive detection systems and the
reconfiguration of the checkpoints.
But all the airports and my understanding, again, for
Sacramento, that is currently being done, and certainly at San
Diego. And I know I share all that information with Thella
through my process action team. So again, that information----
Senator Boxer. So no plan yet written down, but you are
discussing what the options will probably look like. And you
are responding to that by saying you are worried about the
interim solution.
Let me just ask, Mr. Martin, Ms. Bowens, Mr. Acree, and Mr.
Green, have these consultants talked to you, the Lockheed
people and so on?
Ms. Bowens. We've had meetings.
Senator Boxer. And you've expressed your concerns, the
movement and so on. And you, Mr. Acree?
Mr. Acree. The TSA's contractor, we met with them, the
first time, 1 month ago today on July 8th.
Senator Boxer. Who was that contractor?
Mr. Acree. That's Jim Harris.
Admiral Stone. Senator, I have a comment concerning LAX on
that.
Every week we are meeting with Boeing, Lockheed Martin, Los
Angeles rural airports. There is an urgency here that this is
not a measured approach. We're at war with terrorism. Folks at
the table know that. So I think that is the key here, at least
for LAX, is that sort of mind-set about moving on----
Senator Boxer. Good. Well, I think I would encourage you,
as the TSA people, to bring in your airport folks into these
conversations, these roundtables, as often as possible so that
they can make sure that their voices are being heard. Because
there may be ways to--if the problem is congestion in the
lobby, there may be answers to that. I tried to put through a
few suggestions of my own, but they might not be the right
ones. But there may be ways to handle it in a way that it
works.
I have been at foreign airports where this is done. And,
yeah, it is a little chaotic, but you sure feel good that
somebody is checking bags for bombs. That is the bottom line.
You want to make sure there is no bomb on that plane, and that
is the thing. And if it is, you hope it is in a kevlar
container, which we are going to show later. Because if it is
in a kevlar container in a cargo hold, then apparently it will
not go up. It will blow up, but it will not cause a fire. It
will be contained in a bin.
Mr. Stone, does the TSA plan to reimburse local police
departments and so on for the security that is being provided
in the lobbies?
Admiral Stone. The arrangement for that is one of the
issues that I am currently working with TSA to find out, that
financial pipeline and how that is going to work. So when Mayor
Hahn called me after the Fourth of July and told me of his
plans, we have been discussing that issue. So I do not have any
answers, but I can get back you.
Senator Boxer. That is a very big issue because I think
that we put a price, a security tag on the ticket prices, and
you know, security is security. And if you are standing at the
counter, you should be protected. It seems to me if the Federal
Government's taking over security at airports, then it needs
to--I agree with Ms. Bowens--utilize the local people to do it,
but reimburse. It is an important thing.
Mr. Green. If I might, Senator. I think any help you can
give us in that regard would be appreciated because, obviously,
the price you spoke to is going up considerably. The costs we
are incurring going forward for security are staggering.
Senator Boxer. I would like to hear from all of you on the
added costs. Are you doing more security at the check-in
counters?
Mr. Acree. Yes, ma'am. We have deployed additional
uniformed and nonuniformed law enforcement officers as well as
additional canine teams.
Senator Boxer. Good. And you as well, Ms. Bowens?
Ms. Bowens. We have increased our police presence. We are
on the list to receive additional canine teams. Our cost
overall for increased police security at the airport has gone
up about $3 million.
Senator Boxer. Well, when I spoke to Admiral Loy, I was
very pleased with his attitude on the point, and that was
different from the prior individual. And so I am hopeful that
we can resolve that. But do let me know; detail some of these
costs.
So let me sum up here. This has been very helpful to me.
You know how I know that? Because I have a headache. And if I
get a headache, it means that I have been concentrating and
trying to figure this all out. That is how I know.
We are going to work with the local people to make sure
that you are reimbursed for your expenses that deal with the
added security at the check-in. So please let me know. I think
we have a sympathetic ear at the TSA. We just have to figure
this out.
Second, I hope that you will, instead of fighting the
deadline, which is easy to do, work with us, please. You know,
I will say this: if the Senate does vote to agree with Dick
Armey and the House people and you get another year, you are
not going to get any other years. It is only going to work
once. So the bottom line is, you are going to have to do what
you have to do. No one is going to come and arrest you, you
know, if every little ``i'' is not dotted, but let us do what
we need to do.
I want to assure you, as a member of the traveling public,
that a little inconvenience is not going to worry me. I want to
get off the plane and see my grandchild at the other end or
make my meeting at the other end, call my husband when I get to
the other end, not from the airplane saying, ``I love you.''
That is not what I want to do, and I do not think I am very
different from most.
You are going to have a couple of people who are impossible
to deal with, but that is our life. And you will always have
people who are difficult, whether there is a long line or a
short line, and we will deal with that as we have to. But I am
very sympathetic to the challenge. I also think there are ways
to get around false positives. You heard some of them from Mr.
Stone, some backup tests, et cetera, that can work.
Why do not we try to meet the deadline, please, I say to my
friends out in there in the field. I compliment LA. I hope, I
say to my TSA people, that you will stay on top of those
screeners because we cannot handle a 40 percent failure rate.
It is unacceptable. That is a giant hole in the dike that is
not good. So let us work.
Let us go and see some of the innovations. One of the
things that I am working on is to try and get a better way,
when someone gives an ID to a check-in person, to know if it is
a false ID. And we have some demonstrations on that.
So I want to thank all of you for being here. I know these
are hard things to deal with, but we are all on the same team.
The bad guys are on the other team. So let us stick together,
unified, and defeat their attempts to harm us.
I thank you very much, and we stand adjourned until we meet
in the other room. Thank you.
[Whereupon, the field hearing was adjourned.]