[House Hearing, 108 Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
ASSESSING THE SECURITY NEEDS OF THE WEST
=======================================================================
HEARING
before the
SUBCOMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE AND
COUNTERTERRORISM
of the
SELECT COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND SECURITY
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
ONE HUNDRED EIGHTH CONGRESS
FIRST SESSION
__________
AUGUST 21, 2003
__________
Serial No. 108-22
__________
Printed for the use of the Select Committee on Homeland Security
Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.access.gpo.gov/congress/
house
__________
U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE
97-777 WASHINGTON : 2004
____________________________________________________________________________
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SELECT COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND SECURITY
CHRISTOPHER COX, California, Chairman
JENNIFER DUNN, Washington JIM TURNER, Texas, Ranking Member
C.W. BILL YOUNG, Florida BENNIE G. THOMPSON, Mississippi
DON YOUNG, Alaska LORETTA SANCHEZ, California
F. JAMES SENSENBRENNER, JR., EDWARD J. MARKEY, Massachusetts
Wisconsin NORMAN D. DICKS, Washington
W.J. (BILLY) TAUZIN, Louisiana BARNEY FRANK, Massachusetts
DAVID DREIER, California JANE HARMAN, California
DUNCAN HUNTER, California BENJAMIN L. CARDIN, Maryland
HAROLD ROGERS, Kentucky LOUISE McINTOSH SLAUGHTER,
SHERWOOD BOEHLERT, New York New York
LAMAR S. SMITH, Texas PETER A. DeFAZIO, Oregon
CURT WELDON, Pennsylvania NITA M. LOWEY, New York
CHRISTOPHER SHAYS, Connecticut ROBERT E. ANDREWS, New Jersey
PORTER J. GOSS, Florida ELEANOR HOLMES NORTON,
DAVE CAMP, Michigan District of Columbia
LINCOLN DIAZ-BALART, Florida ZOE LOFGREN, California
BOB GOODLATTE, Virginia KAREN McCARTHY, Missouri
ERNEST J. ISTOOK, JR., Oklahoma SHEILA JACKSON-LEE, Texas
PETER T. KING, New York BILL PASCRELL, JR., New Jersey
JOHN LINDER, Georgia DONNA M. CHRISTENSEN,
JOHN B. SHADEGG, Arizona U.S. Virgin Islands
MARK E. SOUDER, Indiana BOB ETHERIDGE, North Carolina
MAC THORNBERRY, Texas CHARLES GONZALEZ, Texas
JIM GIBBONS, Nevada KEN LUCAS, Kentucky
KAY GRANGER, Texas JAMES R. LANGEVIN, Rhode Island
PETE SESSIONS, Texas KENDRICK B. MEEK, Florida
JOHN E. SWEENEY, New York
JOHN GANNON, Chief of Staff
UTTAM DHILLON, Chief Counsel and Deputy Staff Director
DAVID H. SCHANZER, Democrat Staff Director
MICHAEL S. TWINCHEK, Chief Clerk
______
Subcommittee on Intelligence and Counterterrorism
JIM GIBBONS, Nevada, Chairman
JOHN SWEENEY, New York, Vice KAREN McCARTHY, Missouri
Chairman EDWARD J. MARKEY, Massachusetts
JENNIFER DUNN, Washington NORMAN D. DICKS, Washington
C.W. BILL YOUNG, Florida BARNEY FRANK, Massachusetts
HAROLD ROGERS, Kentucky JANE HARMAN, California
CHRISTOPHER SHAYS, Connecticut NITA M. LOWEY, New York
LAMAR SMITH, Texas ROBERT E. ANDREWS, New Jersey
PORTER GOSS, Florida ELEANOR HOLMES NORTON,
PETER KING, New York District of Columbia
JOHN LINDER, Georgia JAMES R. LANGEVIN, Rhode Island
JOHN SHADEGG, Arizona KENDRICK B. MEEK, Florida
MAC THORNBERRY, Texas JIM TURNER, TEXAS, ex officio
CHRISTOPHER COX, California, ex
officio
(ii)
C O N T E N T S
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STATEMENTS
The Honorable Jim Gibbons, Chairman, Subcommittee on Intelligence
and Counterterrorism, and a Representative in Congress From the
State of Nevada................................................ 1
The Honorable Shelley Berkley, a Representative in Congress From
the State of Nevada............................................ 7
The Honorable John B. Shadegg, a Representative in Congress From
the State of Arizona........................................... 1
The Honorable Jon C. Porter, a Representative in Congress From
the State of Nevada............................................ 12
WITNESSES
Mr. Jerry Bussell, Special Advisor to Governor, Nevada Homeland
Security Office
Oral Statement................................................. 22
Prepared Statement............................................. 24
Dr. Dale Carrison, Emergency Department Medical Director,
University Medical Center, Trauma Center,
Oral Statement................................................. 47
Prepared Statement............................................. 50
Mr. Bill Conger, Deputy Chief, Las Vegas Metropolitan Police
Department
Oral Statement................................................. 51
Prepared Statement............................................. 53
Mr. Frank F. Navarrete, Director, Arizona Office of Homeland
Security to the House Select Committee on Homeland Security.... 2
Mr. William H. Parrish, Assistant Secretary for Information
Analysis, Information Analysis and Infrastructure Protection
Directorate
Oral Statement................................................. 14
Prepared Statement............................................. 10
Mr. David Shepherd, Head of Security, Venetian Resort
Oral Statement................................................. 36
Prepared Statement............................................. 39
Mr. Larry L. Todd, Director, Security, Safety and Law
Enforcement, Bureau of Reclamation, U.S. Department of the
Interior
Oral Statement................................................. 18
Prepared Statement............................................. 20
Mr. Randy Walker, Aviation Director, Clark County Department of
Aviation
Oral Statement................................................. 41
Prepared Statement............................................. 45
ASSESSING THE SECURITY NEEDS OF THE WEST
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THURSDAY, AUGUST 21, 2003
U.S. House of Representatives,
Subcommittee on Intelligence and Counterterrorism,
Select Committee on Homeland Security,
Washington, D.C.
The subcommittee met, pursuant to call, at 10:40 a.m.,
Clark County Commission Offices, 500 South Grand Central
Parkway, Las Vegas, Nevada. Hon. James Gibbons [chairman of the
subcommittee] presiding.
Present: Representatives Gibbons and Shadegg.
Also present: Representatives Berkley and Porter.
Mr. Gibbons. Good morning, everybody. I'm Congressman Jim
Gibbons, the Second Congressional District of Nevada, the
chairman of the Subcommittee on Intelligence and
Counterterrorism for the Committee on Homeland Security.
To my right is Representative John Shadegg from Arizona.
We're welcoming him. He's the chairman of the Subcommittee on
Emergency Preparedness and Response for Homeland Security.
We'd like to welcome all of you here today. Today is a
hearing on intelligence and homeland security needs of the
West. As a result, we directed ourselves to have it in Las
Vegas as a perfect place to have this hearing.
Before I begin my opening remarks, I would like to invite
our two other Congressmen, if they are in the room, to join at
the dais. And it should be noted that these two Congressmen
from Nevada, Jon Porter from the Third District and Shelley
Berkley from the First District here in Las Vegas will be
invited to join us on the dais, making any opening statements
they want, and but they will not be able to ask questions
simply because they're not members of the committee.
I'd like to ask unanimous consent from the committee for
that. Without objection, when they arrive, they will be invited
to sit at the dais.
Right now I'd like to turn the mike over to my colleague
from Arizona for any motions that he may have at the beginning.
Mr. Shadegg. Mr. Chairman, the only request I would make
would be an unanimous consent request that the statement of Mr.
Frank Navarrete, the Arizona director of Homeland Security be
included in the record.
As you know, Mr. Navarrete was supposed to be here today to
testify before us. Unfortunately, because of an ongoing
situation in Arizona with the gasoline shortage, it was
impacted just yesterday by some developments affecting the gas
pipeline coming to Arizona from California.
Mr. Navarrete is not able to be here, so I would request
that his testimony, his statement, be included in the record.
Mr. Gibbons. Without objection, so ordered.
[The statement of Mr. Navarrete follows:]
PREPARED STATEMENT OF MR. FRANK F. NAVARRETE, DIRECTOR, ARIZONA OFFICE
OF HOMELAND SECURITY TO THE HOUSE SELECT COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND
SECURITY,
I am Frank Navarrete, Director of Arizona's Office of Homeland Security
and Director of the Arizona Division of Emergency Management.
I would like to begin by thanking Congressman John Shadegg for the
invitation to present testimony here today, and to thank Congressman
Jim Gibbons as well for this opportunity.
Homeland Security is a high priority for the Governor of Arizona, Janet
Napolitano, and that has naturally benefited homeland security efforts
in the state. Arizona was one of the first states to develop a homeland
security strategy. I traveled to Washington, D.C. this spring to
personally deliver copies of the ``Securing Arizona'' plan to our
congressional delegation. My office provides montly updates to keep our
federal delegation appraised of activities and progress in homeland
security in Arizona.
Governor Napolitano created the Office of Homeland Security to embrace
homeland security needs and provide direction and control.
Additionally, she created the Homeland Security Coordinating Council to
provide broad representation for input in homeland security long-range
planning. Regionalization and partnerships are recognized as integral
elements to ensuring protection and safety for citizens in every reach
of the state. A couple of months ago, we became the first state in the
nation to put a statewide fire service mutual aid plan in place. In
short, the importance the Governor places on homeland security provides
high profile for strategy development and problem-resolution. Due to a
significant deficit in the state's budget however, funding for homeland
security is tight.
So we have the will and ability to assess needs and vulnerabilities in
our state, and are therefore able to develop a strategy. As the federal
government develops its long-term strategy, Arizona will work to align
the state strategy to embrace the principals and guidance provided in
the federal strategy.
Strategic planning, vulnerability and equipment assessments show us
where our shortfalls are, however we are currently in a position where
the gap between needs and funding is wide.
Some of our homeland security needs have been satisfied through funding
streams from federal government agencies including DOJ, ODP, and CDC.
For that, we would like to express our sincere appreciation.
As you know, updated vulnerability assessments are currently being
conducted for the ODP's 2004 Homeland Security Grant Program. In
Arizona, we have utilized a Domestic Preparedness Terrorism Task Force,
co-chaired by myself, as Director of the Division of Emergency
Management, and by the Director of the Department of Public Safety.
Stakeholders such as local government, first responders, tribal
representatives and private stakeholders, sit on that task force. They
make recommendations on spending strategy to an Executive Council. The
Council works with the Office of Homeland Security to determine how the
grant money will be allocated. The money is allocated to the counties,
whose local emergency planning committees determine local distribution.
I would like to note here that, in conducting these assessments we
recognize and are taking steps to identify various potential threats or
vulnerabilities that lie across our border in Mexico and include them
in the assessments.
In Arizona, we face many of the same challenges as other states:
1 We have vulnerabilities, like areas of higher population
2 We have a need for additional funding:
Prevention of a terrorism event is the number
one homeland security priority of Governor Napolitano
and in the ``Securing Arizond' strategyplan
WMD equipment for first responders
The medical community is in need of additional
equipment and training to deal with potential
bioterrorism threats. Additionally, efforts are
underway to develop a tracking and reporting mechanism
for disease surveillance
Interoperability problems are widespread and
include the additional challenge of a lack of radio
coverage in many parts of the state
The Arizona Department of Health Services
chairs a bi-national bioterrorism committee which
closely dovetails the Arizona Office of Homeland
Security
3 Information-sharing between different levels of government
and among different agencies has improved since September 11th,
however emergency managers, first responders and state agencies
with homeland security-related missions continue to share
concerns about the availability of current intelligence
information.
We appreciate and utilize information provided
by the Department of Homeland Security. We continually
combine federal intelligence and threat information
with our own state and local input, analyze the
information, identify pockets of vulnerability, and set
forth prudent awareness and security steps for those
threatened areas.
T2We have unique challenges in Arizona as well:
1 We are a border state. We share 370 miles of border with
Mexico. This includes 8 Ports of Entry.
A great deal of the border is located in rural
areas and has a high incidence of illegal immigrant
traffic.
Local governments, like counties and
tribal communities expend . time and personnel
resources coping with problems associated with
the illegal immigration traffic, such as
hospitalization and deaths, crime and
additional law enforcement costs, and littering
and property damage.
Bi-national visit programs--there is a great demand to
meet the visitation needs of workers who travel back
and forth across the border, tourists, and also provide
a timely flow of commercial traffic, especially during
harvest season, when produce must be transported
quickly from one place to another. This is a federal
policy issue with significant local impact. I
appreciate the concept of improved security and in
improved visit programs.
Interoperability and communication problems
are vitally in need of equipment so that we are able to
communicate with our federal partners and Mexican
colleagues across the border in Mexico. In November,
the Arizona Division of Emergency Management will
conduct a bi-national WMD exercise in Nogales, which
will employ the critical response elements of planning,
response, interoperability, and radio communications.
4 Tourism brings 29.5 million people to the state each year
(Arizona's population from 2000 census is 5.2 million). Arizona
ranks 18 among the 50 states for domestic tourism:
The Grand Canyon, with over 5 million
visitors annually
Glen Canyon Daml/Lake Powell
Conferences and conventions that place
large numbers of people
generally into the downtown area of Phoenix
High profile events:
Phoenix is one of a handful of
cities nationwide that entertains the
``Big Four'' in the world of sports--
football, baseball, basketball and
hockey
Other premier sporting events,
including the NASCAR and Indy Car
racing circuits and the World Series
5 Agriculture in the state, and agricultural products that
flow through Arizona from other states and from Mexico. Of
concern is the spread of disease or bioterrorism attack.
6 Areas of low population with vulnerable infrastructure like
the Mexican border, dams, utilities, bridges and underground
power, telephone and fuel lines that are located in rural
desert or mountainous terrain.
Clearly, our current experience with the
rupture of a major gasoline line in the Tucson area
illustrates the disruptions that can result from a
terrorist attack on such an easily accessible target.
The current event is in its third week, and has
resulted in gasoline shortages in Maricopa County and
gasoline price increases that have spread across our
borders into other states.
We note with interest and concern the
electrical grid events that resulted in massive
blackouts on the East Coast. Having dealt with a
similar problem with our Western United States
electrical grid in the late 90's, we appreciate the
importance of the hardening of critical infrastructure.
7 Hoover Dam and more dams downstream
8 Palo Verde Nuclear Power Plant, the largest in the country
and second largest in the world, and located 50 miles from
downtown Phoenix
To meet some of the challenges we face, we have identified ``model''
programs. As an example, we are working with our partners in the 4
corners area--New Mexico, Utah and Colorado, to resolve radio
interoperability problems. We are working on technical solutions along
the border to aid in the slowing of the illegal immigration flow and
overall security improvements. And we have entered in to discussions
with other border states, including Texas, New Mexico, and California
for inter-state interoperability solutions.
In summary, we are actively pursuing enhancements to our homeland
security program in Arizona. We developed a statewide strategy plan to
provide guidance and intend to build on the process by developing a
multi-year homeland security plan; the Governor created the Office of
Homeland Security to lead homeland security efforts and seated a
coordinating council; and state, local, federal and tribal partners and
members of private industry are working closely together. I share
Governor Napolitano's philosophy that our objective is to create an
environment where homeland security is imbedded into our day-to-day
business of governance.
We are working hard to do our part, appreciate your federal support,
and hope that, together, we will make our homeland more secure and
provide for the heath and safety of the citizens of Arizona.
I thank you for allowing me to participate in this hearing.
Mr. Gibbons. As we might advise the people in the audience
here today, this is a committee hearing. It is being recorded,
and it is not what you might otherwise be familiar with as a
townhall meeting. This is a committee hearing that is part of
the congressional process. We take recorded testimony. And as a
result, it is included in the congressional record.
At this point in time, I'll begin with our opening remarks.
And I would begin by saying that homeland security issues still
remain a top priority and a major focus for America today.
The events of September 11th, of course, raise new public
policy issues affecting every level of government service and
private business.
The United States depends on citizens to be vigilant. It
depends on State and local government and private businesses to
assess critical infrastructure vulnerabilities and work with
Federal organizations in support of national and collaborative
partnerships.
It depends on businesses to take the necessary steps to
protect their facilities and their patrons, and it depends on
thousands of trained personnel to work with communities across
the country to security our water and power supplies and their
distributions systems to secure our transportation systems and
to ensure preparedness of expert medical care when needed.
Facing this first real crisis, it's first real crisis,
since it began operations earlier this year, and the Department
of Homeland Security viewed the massive power outage in the
northeast United States this past week as a test of their
ability to respond to a crisis.
While there were no casualties, no terrorists, and we are
thankful for that, and no chemical or biological weapons, the
Department of Homeland Security was able to assist in the
response.
After receiving word of the outage last Thursday, within
hours, the Department assembled crisis action teams in
preparation to coordinate the Federal response and the
Department's communication network and was assessing its
ability to serve as an information clearinghouse, tracking the
blackouts impact for local authorities.
The State and local authorities shouldered most of the load
in responding to the outage, but the Department of Homeland
Security emergency response teams stood ready to deploy.
Again last week, the contingent of Southern Nevadans
attended a Federal Emergency Management Agency exercise in
Maryland to test Las Vegas' long-term hazardous emergency
operations plan. The City of Las Vegas received praise for its
response during the mock disaster and passed the course at the
Emergency Management Institute.
Multi-levels exercises such as this are key to discovering
an emergency response plan's shortcomings and ingrain the
importance of mutual support.
This week Nevada is currently taking part in a Department
of Homeland Security and Department of Defense co-sponsored
bio-terrorism exercise. This joint Federal, State, and local
exercise determined promise is testing our readiness and our
ability to respond to a local terrorist attack.
The exercise is being conducted by the newly created U.S.
Northern Command in conjunction with the State of Nevada's
Governor's Office and the Federal Emergency Management Agency,
the Nevada National Guard, and a number of local first
responder organizations.
The exercise is taking place at Logandale, Nevada, and
involves upwards of 5,000 local, State, and Federal
participants and exemplifies the cooperative nature of
operations in protecting our homeland.
The primary purpose of this hearing today, entitled
``Addressing the Security Needs of the West,'' is to focus on
the issues that cut across government and industry sectors and
ensure a cohesive approach to achieving continuity in
delivering critical infrastructure and information sharing
services in the Western United States and then in making sure
that is in place and effective.
It is my pleasure to introduce two members of the
distinguished panel, when we get to those, the first panel,
which will be Colonel, retired, with the United States Marine
Corps, William Parrish, Assistant Secretary for information
analysis for Department of Homeland Security; Mr. Larry Todd,
Director of Security, Safety, Law Enforcement, Bureau of
Reclamation; and Colonel, retired from the Nevada Army National
Guard, Jerry Bussell, who is the special advisor to the
Governor of the State of Nevada for homeland security.
The second panel we will have today is Mr. David Shepherd,
head of security for the Venetian Resort; Mr. Randy Walker,
Aviation Director for Clark County Department of Aviation; Dr.
Dale Carrison, Emergency Department Director, University of
Nevada Las Vegas Medical Center; and Deputy Chief Bill Conger,
Las Vegas Metropolitan Police Department.
I want to thank all of you for coming, and I will turn the
mike over now to my colleague from Arizona, the chairman, as I
said, of the Emergency Preparedness and Response Subcommittee,
Mr. John Shadegg.
Mr. Shadegg. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
And it is a privilege for me to be here. I want to express
my appreciation for your holding this important hearing. It is,
of course, as a congressman from Arizona, important to me that
we, in fact, assess the security needs of the West. And I think
this hearing will produce some important information on that
topic.
As I already mentioned, Frank Navarrete, the State of
Arizona, Director of Homeland Security, unfortunately, had to
cancel his appearance today, but his statement is in the
record. I wish he could be here; however, there are issues that
require his attention immediately in Arizona.
These issues, I think, are very, very important to all of
us in the West. Oftentimes when we see these crises, and when I
interact with my colleagues in the U.S. Congress, they think of
the homeland security threat as being something unique to the
East Coast or perhaps to the East and West Coasts, and they
forget the intermountain west. And so I'm very appreciative of
your holding the hearing today.
Col. Parrish, I want to thank you for coming to the West
and getting a chance to view our unique security issues and
give us your testimony and perhaps firsthand some of the
challenges we face.
I appreciate all the witness that are here today,
particularly the Bureau of Reclamation. I will tell you that in
extensive conversations with Chairman Chris Cox of the Homeland
Security Committee, Select Homeland Security Committee in the
House, we have looked at the issue of whether or not homeland
security funds are being properly allocated under the current
formula.
And sometimes you hear colleagues say, ``Well, it shouldn't
be done on a population basis. It shouldn't be on done on the
current formula basis. It ought to be done on a different
formula.''
I'd like to chime into those discussions and point out that
while perhaps the greatest need for the resources may be in our
huge population centers like New York or Los Angeles or other
major cities, I have some deep concerns about the Bureau of
Reclamation facilities and the fact that they are indeed, I
think, fairly vulnerable and were they to become the targets of
a terrorist attack, the devastation could be vast and far more
than I think the country appreciates. So I'm looking forward to
your testimony.
Clearly, Mr. Chairman, the success of our anti-terrorist
efforts depend a lot on intelligence and your efforts in the
intelligence arena.
They also depend upon open lines of communication. One of
the most common complaints I get when I am out here in the West
talking with local law enforcement officials or other first
responders is the issue of information flow.
And it is critically important that information flow from
the Department of Homeland Security, the FBI, the CIA, TTEC,
all the Federal offices involved to the State and local
personnel so that they have an operational knowledge of what is
going on, and that the information flow in the opposite
direction. And I know since that this is kind of the first time
in our Nation's history when we are confronting the sharing of
highly classified national security information with State and
local first responders, we're struggling through that process.
But I want to stress how important it is.
And so I hope that at least the one thing that comes out of
this hearing is improving the lines of communication and a
development of relationships.
The Chairman has already mentioned that I chair the
Subcommittee on Emergency Preparedness and Response for the
Homeland Security Select Committee in the House. I want to make
it clear that my focus, while making sure that we have the
resources to engage in response once an attack occurs, my
primary focus on that subject is on preparedness.
I believe the American people expect us to be forward
looking, to look out into the world to see where the attack is
coming from and stop it before it occurs.
It is all well and good that we be in good position to take
care of the attack once it has occurred, but I want to point
out that at least from my perspective, terrorist attacks are
different than hurricanes, perhaps different than floods and
other types of emergencies that our Nation can face.
I know of nothing we can do to stop a hurricane. I know of
nothing we can do to stop a flood. And, yet, I know of things
we can do to stop terrorist attacks, and I think the American
people expect that out of us, and I know that Chairman Cox
feels that way as well.
One point I want to make. I have been involved throughout
my congressional career in focusing on the Colorado River, the
dams on the Colorado River, and my interest in preserving them.
There are those who would like to take down for, example, Glen
Canyon Dam. I spent some time opposing those efforts.
But I would point out we have just had this energy crisis
on the East Coast, which has cost us electricity. I have just
returned from Iraq where the absence of reliable electricity is
disrupting that society rather severely.
Glen Canyon Dam has a capacity of 1.2, 1.3 kilowatts;
Hoover Dam right here just miles from us a little over one
million kilowatts. Those are the second and third largest dams
that the Bureau of Reclamation has a responsibility for. Davis
Dam and Parker Dam have 251,00 kilowatts and 120,000 kilowatts
each. Those are critical work resources to this Nation. Indeed,
during the California energy crisis of 2001, it was power from
those dams that enabled us not to have any more severe
consequences than we did.
The last issue I just want to mention in my opening
statement is a perennial issue for those of us in the
Southwest, and that is the porous nature of our Arizona-Mexico
border.
And I hope, Mr. Parrish, at some point you'll get down
there and be able to see it. It is wide open. You can fly over
it. There are vast stretches where there is not even three-
strand barbed wire fence. I think that is a clear security
issue for this Nation.
So I look forward, Mr. Chairman, to the testimony and again
thank you for holding this important hearing.
Mr. Gibbons. Thank you very much, Mr. Shadegg.
Mr. Gibbons. We'll turn now to our two colleagues who are
guests on this committee for any remarks that they may have.
I'll turn to my left to Ms. Berkley from the First District
for her remarks.
Ms. Berkley. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
I'd like to thank Ranking Members Jim Turner and Ms.
McCarthy for inviting me to this hearing on assessing the
security needs of the West. The security needs of our Nation
must be addressed in a bipartisan basis, and that's why I am
particularly delighted that Congressman Gibbons has invited me
to speak with you today.
I believe this is an important and timely hearing, and I
welcome my colleagues on the committee to my home town and my
congressional district to discuss vital concerns about
protecting western communities such as Las Vegas from the
continuing threat of terrorism.
Additionally, I would like to recognize my fellow panel
members. I have had the distinct pleasure of knowing them and
working with them for quite a while on this and other issues.
And I know that their leadership IS needed to manage and ensure
the protection of Southern Nevada.
September 11th woke our Nation to the fact that we have
enemies ready and willing to take dramatic and unconventional
action against the United States. As we meet here today, it is
very likely that terrorists are meeting somewhere in the world
planning another attack on our Nation.
In the fall of 2001, that attack was against New York City
and Washington, D.C. The next attack could very well be against
a community in the West.
Federal, State, and local emergency officials across the
West recognize this and are working to prevent and prepare for
such an occurrence.
Our Nation's first responders are on the front line of
homeland security. Local preparedness must be a top priority.
Our first responders must be involved in every step of the
process and be afforded the flexibility to meet community-
specific needs.
A major concern in Southern Nevada is the availability and
distribution of funding resources for homeland security. Local
officials and first responders know best what their community
needs are.
States and localities should not find themselves in the
position of having to implement numerous Federal mandates
without the funding resources needed to support these mandates.
However, Congress and the Executive Branch continue to
place expensive requirements on State and local agencies to
meet Federal homeland security goals without providing the
necessary funding. Among these burdens are: Transit security
measures, border protection, safeguarding air cargo, port
security, the protection of chemical facilities, and perhaps
most importantly, funding of our first responders.
This is of particular concern at a time when the states are
facing their greatest financial crisis since World War II. It
will continue to be my priority in Congress to ensure that
states and local communities are provided greater resources to
address their security needs. Homeland security must be given
more than lip service in Washington, D.C. It must be a fully
funded national priority.
An issue specific to Las Vegas and other tourism-based
areas is how tourists and visitors will be accounted for in the
homeland security funding formulas. Local officials and
emergency response personnel must devise security plans to
protect not only the 1.5 million residents, but also 36 million
visitors who travel to Southern Nevada annually.
After September 11th, I held a roundtable discussion with
Southern Nevada's first responders to assess their needs. After
this meeting, I sent a letter to the President and to Secretary
Ridge urging them to devise a funding formula that would
address the needs of tourist communities.
I was very pleased that on July 30th of this year, a
provision proposed by Senator Reid and Senator Ensign was
approved by the Senate Appropriations Committee with
jurisdiction over homeland security funding. This important
resolution changes the homeland security funding formula to
take tourism into account. I was pleased that the Senate
recognized the impact tourism has on the ability of many
communities to adequately prepare for and prevent terrorism.
As this important provision moves to conference, I hope
that the two bodies can agree that the impact tourism has on
many communities greatly affects their ability to prepare for
and respond to threats.
However, we need to do more to help these communities.
Factoring tourism into the funding formulas is important, but
we must ensure that actual funds get to the responders
protecting these communities.
On a busy weekend there may be upwards of an additional
300,000 people in Las Vegas. The population of the community
increases substantially and the responsibility of local
emergency responders increases along with it. Las Vegas
officials must be able to address the security needs of their
residents as well as the added burden of thousands of visitors.
Therefore, the resources available to these emergency
responders must take into account these added responsibilities.
Another homeland security issue that affects Nevada and the
West is protection of Hoover Dam. Hoover Dam provides water to
Arizona, California, and Nevada and supplies power to the
Western states.
A breach at the Dam would be a catastrophic event that
would affect millions of Americans. As the Federal Government
assesses the needs of the West, officials must evaluate the
possible risks related to the Dam and ensure that resources and
information are available should there be such an occurrence.
Yucca Mountain and the proposed shipment and storage of
nuclear waste to our State Poses one of the West's most serious
security threats. I have introduced legislation requiring a
comprehensive analysis of the Yucca project's safety and
vulnerability to terrorist attacks and the development of a
Federal emergency plan, including one specifically for airborne
attacks, to defend the site.
Under my legislation, the analysis and defense plan would
cover the site, transportation routes and shipping casks, waste
storage containers, and personnel working for the project,
among other items.
Instead of making the United States safer, the proposed
Yucca Mountain project and the shipment of 77,000 tons of
nuclear waste across our roads and railways provides terrorists
a target that could cause massive economic and civilian
casualties.
Before we start transporting nuclear waste across the
country and before we spend another dime on this project, we
better know what we're going on to address the possibility of
terrorism and how we're going to do it.
Since September 11th, we have continued to hear and read of
the efforts of al-Qaeda and Osama bin Laden to develop a
radioactive ``dirty bomb'' or other means of nuclear attack on
the United States.
It is naive to believe that thousands of shipments of
nuclear waste and the storage of spent fuel in a single,
massive facility without adequate safeguards would not be a
target of opportunity to these mass murderers.
I am concerned about the waste at every stage of its
transfer. Waste would be vulnerable to attack during packaging,
shipment, temporary storage, repackaging, and finally in a
single national repository. It must be realized that the
nuclear waste will be stored above-ground for a significant
period of time before it is actually placed in the repository.
There will be hundreds of shipments of waste across our
country each year. A single truck bomb, or private plane used
as a weapon, could release radioactive waste that could
endanger lives, pollute the environment, and cost millions in
economic damages.
Just last week it was revealed that the Department of
Energy secretly shipped nuclear waste from New York to Idaho
without informing officials and first responders in the
communities along the route. The Yucca Mountain project poses
far too great a risk to accept blind assurances from the
Department of Energy and the nuclear industry that every
precaution is being taken to prevent a terrorist attack and to
prepare communities that would be affected.
The Federal Government has a duty to assess the risk of
this misguided plan, not just to protect Nevada and our
neighbors in the West, but for the well-being of our Nation.
Again, I want to thank you, Mr. Chairman, for holding this
important hearing. I am looking forward to the testimonies of
my fellow panel members and further discussion on homeland
security needs of the West.
[The information follows:]
PREPARED STATEMENT OF MR. WILLIAM H. PARRISH, ASSISTANT SECRETARY FOR
INFORMATION ANALYSIS, INFORMATION ANALYSIS AND INFRASTRUCTURE
PROTECTION DIRECTORATE
Good morning Mr. Chairman and distinguished members. I am delighted to
appear before you today here in Las Vegas, Nevada to discuss The
Department of Homeland Security's role in securing the West.
I am currently the Acting Assistant Secretary for Information Analysis
in the Information Analysis and Infrastructure Protection Directorate
(IAIP). Prior to assuming this position on July 3rd of this year, I was
the Senior DHS representative to the Terrorist Threat Integration
Center (TTIC). In this capacity I served in a senior leadership
position as the Associate Director for Homeland Security. My tenure in
US Customs as the Executive Director of Anti-terrorism provided the
opportunity to gain an appreciation for the criticality of information
sharing and the necessity for recognition and understanding of
individual agencies' capabilities in the fight against terrorism.
The Department of Homeland security is focused on a clear mission: to
prevent terrorist attacks, reduce our vulnerability to an attack, and
minimize loss of life and speed recovery should one occur. Further, the
Department's mission includes reducing the opportunity for terrorists
to exploit failures of critical infrastructure caused by natural
disasters or other unplanned emergency circumstances (e.g.,
vulnerabilities arising from failures in water supply, dams, bridges,
or power grids).
In this mission, the Department of Homeland Security is not alone. We
are actively working with our Federal partners, State and Local
governments and the private sector. Our strategy for protecting the
country is a national strategy for a reason, as Secretary Ridge has
stated on numerous occasions, ``When our hometowns are secure, our
homeland will be secure.'' That is not merely rhetoric, but a
fundamental principle of the nation's hOl1)e.1and security effort.
Everyone is a partner in the effort. As you all know, 85 percent of our
nation's critical infrastructure is owned or operated by private
enterprise. This includes systems such as telecommunications, banking
and finance, energy and transportation. The private sector also is a
key source of new ideas and innovative technologies that will provide
tools in the fight against terrorism.
We must be aggressive in connecting and staying connected with our
partners to provide an extraordinary and unprecedented exchange of
information. This information must be actionable by local law
enforcement and first responders, but must also empower the average
citizen to do his part in assisting with securing our homeland.
We can never guarantee that we are free from the possibility of
terrorist attacks, but we can say this: Today, the American people are
more secure and better prepared than ever before.
I say that because we are more aware of the threat of terrorism, and
more vigilant about confronting it. We share more information with the
people who need it, including our state and local partners and the
private sector. And they share with us. Ensuring homeland security
requires a nation-wide cooperative effort.
We've moved rapidly to map and protect our critical infrastructure,
such as power plants and financial systems; seal our borders from
terrorists and suspicious cargo; and prevent and prepare for attacks
involving weapons of mass destruction.
The terrorist networks we seek to eliminate, in large measure, plot and
train overseas. They recruit new members in democratic countries. They
launder their money through international banks. They communicate
through the same networks used for global commerce, and travel the same
busy ports. That's why we're providing added layers of security that
push our borders outward, making our seaports, airports and borders the
last line of defense, not the first. Taken together, these measures
help us achieve the mission of homeland security.
The Department of Homeland Security's Information Analysis and
Infrastructure Protection directorate plays an important part in the
mission of homeland security by: (1) providing the full range of
intelligence support to senior DHS leadership; (2) Mapping, with
Infrastructure Protection (IP), terrorist threats to the homeland
against our assessed vulnerabilities in order to drive our efforts to
protect against terrorist attacks; (3) conducting independent analyses
and assessments of terrorist threats, including competitive analysis,
tailored analysis, and ``red teaming''; (4) integrating the work of all
DHS components as well as managing the collection and processing of
information into usable and actionable information from DHS'
intelligence components; and disseminating time sensitive alerts and
advisories to federal, state, local governments and private sector
infrastructure owners and operators.
IAIP has robust, comprehensive, and independent access to information
relevant to homeland security--raw and processed--collected
domestically and abroad. Accessing the information and intelligence
from this mosaic of programs and systems of federal, state and local
agencies supports our mission to analyze data and take action to
protect against terrorist attacks directed at the U.S. homeland. Our
Information Analysis (IA) office has the ability to conduct its own
analysis and to leverage the information of the FBI, the CIA, TTIC and
the remainder of the Intelligence Community and federal government,
plus state and local law enforcement and private sector entities, to
protect the homeland.
Central to the success of the DHS mission is the close working
relationship between ``IA'' and ``IP'' to ensure that threat
information is correlated with critical infrastructure vulnerabilities
and protective programs. This threat and vulnerability information can
then be used to recommend preventive and protective measures.
In addition to the unique IA-IP partnership; the Homeland Security
Operations Center (HSOC) serves as a focal point for the Nation's
efforts to protect our homeland. The HSOC is a 24 x 7 x 365 days a year
center comprising members from more than 13 federal agencies from the
Intelligence Community, Law Enforcement Agencies, emergency
preparedness organizations and other entities focused on infrastructure
protection. Given the information provided from the parent
organizations of these entities, and the all-source data provided by
other DHS partners, information and intelligence relating to threats to
the homeland are analyzed from multiple arenas. This all-source data-
fusion performed at IAIP allows products to be tailored to address a
specific threat that assist DHS constituents in prioritizing resource
allocations in the enhancement of their security posture that supports
their efforts in countering potential terrorist acts.
IAIP is the central information center ofDHS' efforts to coordinate the
protection of U.S. homeland security. As such, IA supports DHS' law
enforcement components through timely and integrated analytical
support. For example:
In coordinating with Customs and Border
Protection, which process more than 1.1 million
passengers arriving daily at our Nation's airports and
seaports, and inspects more than 57,006 trucks and
containers, 580 vessels, 2,459 aircraft, 323,622
vehicles, and arrest over 2,500 illegal alien border
crossers and smugglers daily. IA has immediate access
to valuable information regarding potential terrorist
activities that further enhances our ability to develop
threat plot lines - connecting the dots.
In coordinating with immigration and Custom
Enforcement, which investigates cases involving alien
smuggling, terrorist financial dealings and other
crimes associated with terrorist operations, IA
analyses and assessments ensure the ability to identify
potential trends of terrorist related activity.
In coordinating with the Transportation
Security Administration, which screens approximately 1.
5 million passengers every day before they board
commercial aircraft, IA assists in determining
individuals to be entered on Watch lists.
IA ensures that homeland security products derived from the fusing of
disparate types of information are shared with Federal, State, and
Local governments, as well as the private sector. Additionally, IA
coordinates with the Federal Bureau of Investigation in publishing
combined DHS-FBI Intelligence Bulletins.
IAIP is building a strong team of professionals and assigning dedicated
and knowledgeable individuals in key liaison positions within our
partnering agencies. This will further enhance the timely access to
critical information that when placed in the hands of the dedicated and
competent members of DHS serving at our borders, airports, seaports
across America, will increase our ability to detect, prevent and deny
terrorists the opportunity to plot a strike against our Homeland. With
the continued support of Congress, I am confident that IAIP and our
partners in the war against terrorism can succeed in meeting the
challenges presented before us.
The Department of Homeland Security is the second largest department in
our Government. In our first six months we have made progress in
numerous areas, but we are just at the beginning of this comprehensive
effort to protect our Nation from terrorism. While much has been
accomplished, there is much more work to be done. We must stay focused
and engaged in this effort so that we can meet the challenges of this
critical time in our Nation's history.
Mr. Chairman, this concludes my prepared statement. I would be happy to
answer any questions you may have at this time.
Mr. Gibbons. Thank you very much. We'll turn now to the
newest member of the Nevada delegation, who we are all pleased
and proud to work with, Mr. Jon Porter from the Third
Congressional District.
Mr. Porter, welcome to the committee. You have five minutes
to make your opening statement.
Mr. Porter. Thank you very much, Congressman Gibbons, for
your leadership and to my colleague from Arizona, Mr. Shadegg.
We appreciate your help and assistance. And of course to the
panel and all those first responders in the audience today--
fire, police, highway patrol, Federal agencies, we appreciate
your input. And trust me, we want to hear what you have to say.
The events of September 11th, of course, changed forever
the way that this country considers its safety. Threats we did
not think were serious or that we failed to recognize have
become far too real to ignore any longer.
Thanks to the leadership of the President and farsighted
members, such as the panel here today, we now have a Homeland
Security Department to coordinate responses to the immense
challenges of guarding against terrorist attacks and this
committee to oversee that department and point out where more
effort is needed.
Las Vegas and all the other communities here, including the
County of Clark, have a special challenge since that day of
September 11th. We depend upon the free flow of tourists into
our community, yet we cannot afford any threats to our air
transport system. We depend on critical infrastructure for our
very existence, but cannot afford to be over dependent on any
single response plan or resource for meeting threats to that
infrastructure.
Southern Nevada turns a friendly smile to the world, but
cannot forget that there are men and women who would take
advantage of us and threaten our community and our families.
Since my election to Congress, I have worked with Mr.
Gibbons and, of course, my colleagues here on the panel,
Director Randy Walker, who is here today, Rosemary, and to many
others, Jerry Bussell, friend for years, to help improve our
ability to protect ourselves and to prepare Nevada in case of a
disaster.
The Nevada delegation is working to ensure that our massive
population is taken into account when funds are distributed to
cities by population.
Having chatted with Metro, and I think Stan Olsen is here
today, Stan, we're hearing your words. Where at one time we can
have a population of 250,000 to 300,000 or more at a given
time, in reality, this is an emergency that can impact millions
of people.
We must have adequate funding to ensure that our first
responders continue to be able to ensure the safety of all
residents and the visitors of our county, aid to communities
must be proportional to the population and the threat.
We must also work towards ensuring the safety of our power
grid and energy generators. The recent blackouts in the
Northeast show, once again, how important the Hoover Dam and
the transmission lines are to Southern Nevada and to the whole
West Coast, from agriculture, irrigation, to power. We have to
ensure that Hoover Dam and other critical infrastructures are
physically safe and also that our infrastructure is safe from
the electronic attack that could take place or interfere with
water, power throughout the community.
Having met with many local government leaders, city
managers, a grave concern for our communities is the
technology. Imagine for a moment an individual sitting in a
hotel room or in a tent or in a home somewhere around the world
with a laptop computer that could break into our technology and
literally bring our communities to a halt.
Working with Mrs. Berkley, we were able to make sure that
McCarran Airport is reimbursed for funds it's put up for
security improvement. And we want to do more. We were able to
convince Transportation Security Administration to revoke some
of the draconian cuts that is proposed for McCarran. Randy and
Rosemary, we appreciate everything you're doing.
As I mentioned, we are working with Metropolitan Police
Department. Another major concern for Nevada and the rest of
county is uniform communication system. I can remember being at
ground zero in 1988 shortly after the explosion in Henderson,
the PepCon line, communication was a challenge. Of course, our
heros in the fire and rescue and police did a yeoman's job. But
I remember that day in 1988, we were talking about having a
uniform communication system so our different levels of
emergency personnel could respond accordingly. We have yet to
meet that challenge.
In the coming months, we'll be working together to make
sure that more resources are available for our communities and
to ensure that Southern Nevada is prepared for the challenges
our Nation may face.
I want to thank, of course, all the witnesses and
appreciate everyone for being here today, and I'm looking
forward to working together as we accomplish this main goal.
Thank you all very much.
Mr. Gibbons. Thank you very much, Mr. Porter.
Mr. Gibbons. Before we begin with our first panel, there's
a few housekeeping items that need to take place.
First, I need to advise the panelists here that we try to
restrict our opening remarks to five minutes or thereabout. No
one is going to stop you if you go over, but we would like to
proceed timely so that both panels will have an opportunity to
be heard and for the panel here to ask question of each of the
members there.
So with that stated, let me say that each of your written
statements in full will be submitted in its entirety for the
records. So if you want to summarize your remarks, that is fine
as well.
Also, to the audience, for those people here, the record is
going to remain open for a period of 14 days so that any
comment or comments that you want to submit for the record will
be allowed. You can send those to us at the committee in
Washington, D.C. They will be entered into the record.
That being said, let me also now turn to our first panel.
Welcome each of you. This is a very distinguished moment for
all of us here, and I am sure that it is for you, to appear
before a United States Congress committee and have an
opportunity to have your voices heard.
Mr. Gibbons. I will begin with Mr.--Colonel Parrish and his
remarks.
Mr. Parrish, welcome. We're happy to have you, and the
floor is yours.
STATEMENT OF MR. WILLIAM H. PARRISH
Mr. Parrish. Thank you very much, sir. And good morning,
Chairman, and Congressman Shadegg and Congresswoman Berkley,
and Congressman Porter. I am delighted to be here and honored
before you this morning.
Before I begin, I would like to express on behalf of the
Department, sir, we appreciate, Congressman Gibbons, your
tireless and dedicated efforts in this fight against terrorism,
your recognition of how important the efforts of the Department
is in securing a safe nature. We appreciate that.
This hearing is also very important to the Department of
Homeland Security because it affords me the opportunity to get
out of Washington and get out in America, and, unfortunately, I
just don't have enough time to spend in this great city for a
few more days, or I think literally I could walk the streets
and the lobbies of the hotels and probably talk to at least one
person in every section of this great country and hear
firsthand about their views on how the scorecard is for the
Department of Homeland Security.
But I think it's safe to say that the people I have talked
to, I think, without question, that the leadership of Congress
and the Administration, our President, in developing without
and creating the Department of Homeland Security was certainly
the right step to take for this Nation.
I am the acting assistant secretary for Information
Analysis of the Information Analysis Infrastructure Protection
Directorate. I assumed that position on the 3rd of July.
Prior to that, I was assigned as the Senior Department of
Homeland Security representative to the newly created Terrorist
Threat Integration Center, where I served in a key leadership
position known as the Associate Director for Homeland Security.
Prior to that, I stood up for the Office of Anti-terrorism
with the U.S. Customs Service right after 9-11. During my
tenure at Customs is really when I became aware of the fact of
that the importance and the critical pieces in this war against
terrorism had to be information sharing amongst agencies.
And I will submit that I like to see that the glass is half
full. And I'm not sure if it was cultural issues or a lack of
willingness to share information as much as a full
understanding and appreciation for what another agency could do
with that information if they had it.
I continue to strive for that same type of approach now
that I am at the inner-agency level, if you will, and not
operating just within the confines of a single organization.
And I'll refer to that a little bit later on.
Within the Department of Homeland Security, we have the
operational organization, as I've mentioned, such as Customs,
and now the integration with Customs and Border Protection. We
have agencies that have access to a wealth of information that
assist in connecting the dots, if you will, of terrorist
activities or potential terrorist activities in this country.
When you look at the borders, and as Congressman Shadegg
indicated, the southwest border there and the vastness of it,
certainly, I know it is a priority within the Custom-Border
Protection with the Secretary of how we address that situation.
But when on a daily basis, we have over 1 million
passengers coming across our borders, either through the air or
across the land, or by sea entering our country--over 57,000
trucks coming across our borders and containers, with 580
vessels arriving at our seaports on a daily basis, 2,500
aircraft coming into the United States and over 323,000
vehicles entering our country, stop and think for a moment,
though. The Customs inspectors and the border patrol agents
have the ability as they access potential information because
of their unlimited search authorities at those borders, the
ability to acquire information that could be a key piece, a
missing dot, if you will, in a major FBI case trying to
formulate and see if we have a potential terrorist plot.
We have the same with our Immigration and Customs
Enforcement Bureau, again, where they're working and
investigating cases on alien smuggling operations, financial
operations, and other crimes that may be associated with
terrorist operations.
The Transportation Security Administration postured at the
airports processing 1.5 million passengers daily, again,
another set of eyes and ears, if you will, out there looking at
what's moving through our country.
But to further enhance this process of correlating the
information from other agencies, we have within the information
analysis and the infrastructure protection directive, the
homeland security operations center, which we man 24 hours per
day, seven days a week, 365 days a year. And in reference,
Chairman Gibbons, to last week's blackout was a major active
player in the immediate processing of information to be able to
advise key leadership of the country what was happening with
the northeast corridor during that blackout period.
Additionally, within that center, we have approximately 15
different Federal agencies represented. In my experience, any
time you bring different agencies sitting down in a room
together next to each, a tremendous amount is learned about the
capabilities and what each agency brings to the fight.
I'm proud to say each morning between 9:00 and 9:30, the
director of the operations center huddles all those agencies,
and each one reports on the major activities of their agencies
what they're getting from the operations center, another step
in the information sharing process, which is so critical.
As these reports are received into the operations center,
they may be coming, again, from our supportive agencies. They
may be coming from State and local authorities, and even the
private sector, suspicious activity reports.
These reports are then processed with the information
analysis director, the people under my staff. We analyze this
information. We coordinate it with other agencies in order to
identify if there is any possible correlation with terrorists'
nexus to these reports that are coming in.
For example, a report of suspicious person videotaping the
entrance to a nuclear power facility at one location and
perhaps two days later at another site in another State, a
similar vehicle is also observed.
How is this correlated to see if, in fact, we have now a
presurveillance operation in place?
This is the type of information that we look to bring into
the operations center at our department so we can conduct this
in-depth assessment, independent assessment and an analysis of
what we're dealing with.
I'm confident that the process and procedures that we are
continuing to build upon, though, that I have described here,
are in full compliance with the legislature that had been
passed by you, by the Congress, in the Homeland Security Act of
2002.
Specifically, though, regarding, on the success, the most
recent successes of the FBI and CIA, who should very well be
commended on those great Americans, what they are doing, we
have succeeded in arresting some very key members of al-Qaeda
over the past 12 months. I think you have been hearing about
some of the reporting and the information that we are learning.
What we are seeing is that the organization al-Qaeda
singles out targets whose destruction may have symbolic
resonance, strike a blow to U.S. power and prestigious impacts,
causing mass casualties and generate economic shockwaves
throughout the country, and, of course, us being the center of
the world, if you will, a global economic impact.
Further, the concept of multiple and simultaneous attacks
are part of this modus operanti, as we observed here in the
U.S. on September 11th and other attacks overseas. And although
we have learned of their focus on these type of targets,
specific intelligence is not always present. It's a very
daunting and very challenging process of trying to acquire that
type of specific intelligence.
However, it's important to ensure that our State and local
partners as well as the private sector entities are aware of
the terrorist focus on such high value targets. Many such
examples are present here in the West.
As you know from previous reporting, in our major
metropolitan areas, such as Washington, New York, Los Angeles,
and Chicago, we have numerous facilities that offer this type
of high value targets. We have learned from detaining
debriefings that al-Qaeda is interested in a range of
facilities from transportation, infrastructure nodes to
apartment buildings and tall buildings.
Some domestic targets may include symbolic structures,
particularly the White House, the Capitol, and other Federal
buildings here in the West. Symbolic icons might include tall
buildings and other high profile landmarks. Headquarters for
major corporations and financial centers would achieve their
intent of disruptions of our economy.
The energy sector including the U.S. nuclear facilities,
petroleum, tank farms, and refinery facilities are also target
lists for al-Qaeda.
The railway, the mass transit systems, and things such as
bridges and tunnels also have been reported as potential for
al-Qaeda. The dams and water systems have also been addressed
in some of the debriefings. Public venues, we can no longer
conduct a large scale public event without having a detailed,
well rehearsed security plan in advance.
And, finally, aviation remains a target since September
11th operation of al-Qaeda's greatest success and one that
their masterminds consider worth repeating.
Late last month, the Department issued a threat advisory
warning of a potential hijacking end of summer plot in the U.S.
and abroad.
I would like to say here, going back to the last year, when
Congressman Shadegg had asked me to do an independent
assessment, I will tell you I was a holdout in the intelligence
community on that report. Secretary Ridge has an undaunting,
challenging task of making that announcement to the American
people.
As we understand the limited resources of the states and
private sectors to expend their resources to enhance security,
securities, it is my responsibility to ensure that I am picking
up every rock, every piece of raw material and analyzing it to
the greatest extent possible so that I can look the Secretary
in the eye and say, ``I agree that this is a credible threat
that needs to go out.''
I delayed the process probably for 24 hours because I had
to be convinced, and I will tell you I was convinced in the end
based on the intelligence report that I reviewed.
But I just want to share that with the panel that we in the
Department of Homeland Security are very sensitive to the
State, local, and private sector on how they need to prepare
for it. I think the focus of our Homeland Security advisory
bulletins and information bulletins when we put those out, we
try to put something out that says, ``Here is a threat, but yet
here are protective measures that you may consider to employ as
we address this threat.''
We want to do more to help our partners. And when I say
``our partners,'' I mean the State and local Americans that are
out there that are doing such a tremendous job. They are a
wealth of information for us as well in being able to provide
information that can help us connect the dots.
I'd like to just close here, then, and just to say that our
robust and comprehensive independent assessment, we are
continuing to refine that. It's not a push-pull system yet. We
are still pulling for information.
As I said before to the committee, ``Parrish has not been
told no yet when he's asked for a piece of key intelligence,''
and the day that Parrish is told no, you will be the first to
know, sir.
We are just at the beginning, though. We have a long ways
to go in this processing. Hearings such as yours today provides
each of us, though, an opportunity to learn and look back at
where we have come as a Nation since that dark day in our
history on September 11th.
We need to recognize that thanks to you and to your staffs
and our Federal agencies, including all law enforcement and
intelligence agencies, the dedicated State and local
authorities in the private sector, and the American people in
general have risen to the challenge of the new enemy threat,
the new enemy threatening our security.
The coordinated efforts of all of us, sharing, in a key
part sharing the challenges and responsibilities together, we
have made a difference, and our Nation has not suffered another
attack. We must not become tired or grow weary. The dedication
and commitment must continue, and above all, continuous prayers
for the safety and security of this great Nation.
Thank you, sir, for this hearing and the opportunity. I
look forward to your questions.
Mr. Gibbons. Thank you very much, Secretary Parrish. And I
do apologize. I should have said Secretary Parrish when I
introduced you earlier. That was my mistake.
Your testimony and statement is very enlightening, very
helpful to the community, and I am sure the public was
listening to it as well.
Right now we'll turn now to Mr. Larry Todd. Welcome, and
the floor is yours, Mr. Todd.
STATEMENT OF MR. LARRY TODD, DIRECTOR, SECURITY, SAFETY AND LAW
ENFORCEMENT, BUREAU OF RECLAMATION, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF THE
INTERIOR
Mr. Todd. Thank you. Mr. Chairman, members of the
committee, it is a pleasure to be here today to provide this
report on what the Bureau of Reclamation is doing to address
the security needs of its water and power facilities in the
Western United States.
My name is Larry Todd. I am the Director of Security,
Safety, and Law Enforcement for the Bureau of Reclamation.
Reclamation is responsible for over 350 major dams and
reservoirs and 58 power plants in the West. In carrying out
this responsibility, the security and safety of the public, and
our employees and the facilities is our highest priority.
Reclamation has had a long-standing and effective safety
program for public and employee safety, as well as dam safety.
However, our efforts in establishing a separate security
program only began in 1995. At the time, we hired a security
officer, complete security reviewed, established work levels,
and began hardening our facilities. Reclamation thus had
various security measures and response plans in place prior to
September 11th. Those measures were instrumental in our ability
to respond quickly and effectively to the events of that tragic
day.
Since 9-11, Reclamation has significantly improved its
security efforts by implementing long-term security programs.
Key elements of the program include establishing a security,
safety, and law enforcement office; conducting vulnerability
risk assessments at all major dams and facilities; contracting
for a top-down security programs review by outside experts;
implementing Reclamation's new law enforcement authority and
implementing various informational and personnel security
measures and polices.
Currently, we have designated 280 facilities that are being
assessed by the end of 2005. This past year we have assessed
and implemented security measures on 55 of those most critical
facilities, and 12 Reclamation Visitor Centers.
On these facilities, we have implemented well over 50
percent of the accepted recommendations. We have developed
personnel security, designating for background checks when
necessary for both employees and contractors who access
facilities.
We have instituted an information policy to more closely
control sensitive information about facilities. And we have
staffed the security and law enforcement functions with in-
house expertise as well as experts recruited from other
agencies. We have also created secure office space to
effectively deal with classified and control documents and have
established a secure communications systems.
We are progressing very well in established a secure
security program with Reclamation. For example, with Hoover
Dam, we have made several security-related enhancements since
9-11. First, we have enhanced our relationship on security
matters with the Federal, State, and local law enforcement
agencies, including Clark County, Las Vegas Metro Police and
the National Park Service. We also maintain a close working
relationship with the Arizona Department of Public Safety,
Division of Criminal Intelligence, and its Nevada counterpart
in sharing relevant intelligence information.
Second, we have increased the number of law enforcement
officers and security guards on site. We then enhanced
checkpoints on both the Nevada and Arizona side and added
lighting and electronic monitoring surveillance devices at
selected sites.
Third, we have limited traffic across the Dam to passenger
vehicles, vans that are easily inspected, and short-haul trucks
with permits. All vehicles are subject to random checks. The
long-haul trucks are being re-routed around the Dam through US
95 and Interstate 40.
Fourth, we have added physical security upgrades and
modified visitor tours.
In conclusion, I believe that Reclamation has made
considerable progress to date in ensuring our dams and other
facilities are much more secure today than they were on
September 11th.
However, we recognize that a great deal of work still needs
to be done as more risk assessments are completed and new
vulnerabilities and threats are discovered. Reclamation remains
fully committed to the safety and security of the public, our
employees, and our water and power facilities which provide
these vital resources to so much of the West.
Mr. Chairman, that concludes my prepared remarks, and I am
ready to address any questions the committee may have.
Mr. Gibbons. Thank you very much, Mr. Todd. We appreciate
your statement and your comments here as well. They have been
very helpful to us.
[The statement of Mr. Todd follows:]
PREPARED STATEMENT OF MR. LARRY L. TODD
My name is Larry L. Todd. I am Director of Security, Safety and Law
Enforcement for the Bureau of Reclamation. Mr. Chairman, it is a
pleasure to be here today to provide this report on what the Bureau of
Reclamation is doing to address the security needs of its water and
power facilities in the Western United States. Reclamation is
responsible for over 350 major dams (including 58 power plants) and
reservoirs in the West, and the security and safety of the public, our
employees, and our facilities is our highest priority.
Reclamation has a long-standing and effective safety program for public
and employee safety, as well as in dam safety. However, our efforts in
establishing a separate security program only began in 1995. At that
time, we first established the position of Security Officer, performed
initial vulnerability assessments at five of our dams, and formalized
the emergency action plans exercise program. In subsequent years, we
continued to perform more in-house vulnerability assessments at key
facilities, developed a data base on resulting recommendations for
improving security, and implemented site security improvements. These
improvements consisted of measures such as ensuring access doors and
gates were locked, improving lighting of key areas, and increasing
employee security awareness. We also developed continuity of operations
plans for all our major offices and developed threat response measures
for 4 different alert levels. Reclamation worked closely with other
Federal water and power resource agencies through the Interagency Forum
on Infrastructure Protection in developing risk assessment tools and
sharing technologies, and also participated in the FBI Joint Terrorism
Task Force to share intelligence information. The coming of the new
millennium and the concern over Y2K issues raised our awareness of
electronic security. These events resulted in Reclamation contracting
with the United States Department of Energy's Sandia National
Laboratories for an IT Security assessment.
Reclamation had various security measures and response plans in place
prior to September 11, 2001 (9-11). Those measures were instrumental in
our ability to respond quickly and effectively to the events of that
tragic day. On 9-11, we immediately implemented high alert levels and
threat response measures commensurate with those levels. This program
included closing all visitor centers and halting all tours, posting
Department of the Interior and State law enforcement officers at major
dams on a 24/7 basis, increasing security patrols at all our
facilities, and shutting down our web site to review it for sensitive
information and to protect potentially sensitive information during the
review process. Reclamation's response activities were closely
coordinated within the Department of the Interior, which provided law
enforcement assistance. This was necessary since, at that time,
Reclamation did not yet have its own law enforcement authority. We
began working with the new White House Office of Homeland Security and
other Federal infrastructure agencies to share information on potential
threats and on response measures being taken. There were no
interruptions in any of our water or power deliveries as a result of
the events of 9-11.
In the months following 9-11, Reclamation developed and provided
guidance to our regional and area offices on critical considerations
such as: addressing chemical, biological, and radiological attacks;
ensuring that necessary emergency management actions are taken;
protecting and safeguarding information and records; and providing for
tourism security, particularly as it relates to international visitors.
Reclamation's four-level threat-response measures were revised to match
the five-color- level alert system established by the Office of
Homeland Security. Under these measures, there are specific security
steps to be taken at each facility, depending on the type of facility
it is, for each of the national threat levels. There are also exact
procedures in place for ensuring that, in transitioning from one alert
level to the next, certain tasks are met, such as: timely communicating
the transition; ensuring that all necessary measures are implemented in
a timely manner; and transmitting situation reports to keep management
informed of changing conditions. These procedures have been tested and
successfully applied on several transitions to date.
In addition to these short-term responses, Reclamation recognized the
need to develop a comprehensive long-term security response plan. Key
elements of the long term response plan that were developed include:
establishing a Security, Safety and Law Enforcement Office; conducting
vulnerability and risk assessments at all dams and major facilities;
contracting for a top-down security program review by outside experts;
implementing Reclamation's new law enforcement authority in Public Law
107-69, and implementing various informational and personnel security
measures and policies.
In 2002, Reclamation Commissioner John W. Keys, III established the
Office of Security, Safety and Law Enforcement, and appointed me as the
Director reporting directly to the Commissioner. The Office is located
in Denver, Colorado and it includes the previously existing
occupational safety and health, dam safety, emergency management, and
security functions, as well as Reclamation's new law enforcement
function. We have staffed the security and law enforcement functions
with in-house expertise and with experts recruited from other agencies.
We also created secure office space to effectively deal with classified
and controlled documents, and have established secure communication
systems.
To facilitate the potential re-opening of the 12 major visitor centers
at Reclamation facilities, we contracted with Sandia National
Laboratories to conduct security risk assessments at our visitor
centers. Following implementation of the recommended security
improvements--which included posting armed guards at visitor centers
and on tours, screening visitors, and limiting tour routes--visitor
centers were re-opened to the public and tours were re-initiated.
Under Reclamation's Safety of Dams program, we have 252 ``high and
significant hazard'' dams, which are facilities where failure could
cause loss of life or significant economic damage. Reclamation
committed to conducting vulnerability and risk assessments at all those
facilities, as well as at 28 other critical facilities, such as power
plants, pumping plants, and canals. Using carefully defined key factors
to rate each facility, we prioritized all 280 facilities to be
assessed. In 2002, Reclamation contracted with security experts at the
Defense Threat Reduction Agency, Lawrence Livermore National
Laboratories, and five other private security firms, to have our 55
most critical facilities assessed for risk, vulnerability and security.
Those assessments were completed in 2002. The recommendations resulting
from those assessments were analyzed by Reclamation's security experts
with assistance from experts from the Corps of Engineers and Sandia
National Laboratories. These recommendations were then presented to
management for development of a final decision document for
implementing the accepted recommendations to enhance security
procedures and fortify the facilities. Approximately 54% of the nearly
1,400 recommendations resulting from the first 55 risk assessment
reports have been implemented to date, and many others are in the
process of being implemented. Risk assessments are being initiated in
fiscal year 2003 at an additional 101 facilities; the remaining
facilities will be assessed in fiscal year 2004.
For example, at Hoover Dam we have made several security related
enhancements since 9-11. First, we have enhanced our relationship on
security matters with the Federal, State, and local law enforcement
agencies, including Clark County, Las Vegas Metro Police and the
National Park Service. We also maintain a close working relationship
with the Arizona Department of Public Safety, Division of Criminal
Intelligence and its Nevada counterpart in sharing relevant
intelligence information. Second, we have increased the numbers of Law
Enforcement Officers and Security Guards on site, enhanced checkpoints
on both the Nevada and Arizona side with lighting and barrier gates,
and added lighting and electronic monitoring and surveillance devices
at select sites. Third, we have limited traffic across the Dam to
passenger vehicles, vans that are easily inspected, and short-haul
trucks with permits. All vehicles are subject to random checks. Long-
haul trucks are being re-routed via US 95 and Interstate 40. Fourth, we
have added physical security upgrades and modified the visitor tour.
A top-down review of Reclamation's security program was conducted by
Sandia National Laboratories in 2002 and included members of the
Interagency Forum for Infrastructure Protection. The purpose of the
review was two-fold: (1) to evaluate the current organization,
policies, and processes of Reclamation's security program by reviewing
numerous security documents and interviewing all levels of Reclamation
and Interior personnel, and (2) to make recommendations for a mature,
sustainable security program. The final report was presented to
Reclamation's senior management in June 2003 and they are currently
considering the review's findings and recommendations.
Until the enactment of Public Law 107-69 on November 12, 2001,
Reclamation had no law enforcement authority. Public Law 107-69
provided Reclamation with the authority to enforce Federal laws on
Reclamation projects and lands and to contract for law enforcement
services with other Federal, state, Tribal, or local law enforcement
agencies. Following enactment, Reclamation published regulations on
public conduct on Reclamation lands and at Reclamation facilities, and
on the use of non-Interior law enforcement officers to enforce Federal
laws on Reclamation lands. (It should be noted, however, that at Hoover
Dam, Reclamation has long had authority under different statutes and
regulations to maintain an armed police force.)
Since 9-11, in the area of personnel security, we have put in place a
policy requiring background checks of our employees and contractors.
This includes identifying additional positions needing security
clearances. We have also implemented a policy on restricting and
protecting security-sensitive information and have installed perimeter
security around our information technology systems.
In fiscal year 2002, Reclamation received $30.2 million in supplemental
appropriations for our security and counter-terrorism efforts. That
funding was used primarily for guards and surveillance, studies and
risk assessments, law enforcement and interim security equipment. In
fiscal year 2003, our $28.4 million appropriation for site security/
anti-terrorism was increased by $25 million through a supplemental
appropriation, for a total of $53.4 million. Those funds are being used
for guards and surveillance, including those needed to maintain our
continuing heightened state of alert at all our facilities; for
additional risk assessments at key facilities; for further
implementation of our law enforcement program; for law enforcement and
security equipment; and for hardening our facilities through the
implementation of recommendations in the completed vulnerability risk
assessments.
In conclusion, I believe Reclamation has made considerable progress to
date in ensuring our dams and other facilities are more secure today
than they were on September 11, 2001. However, we recognize that a
great deal of work still needs to be done as more risk assessments are
completed, more recommendations are accepted for implementation, and
new vulnerabilities and new threats are discovered. Reclamation remains
fully committed to the safety and security of the public, our
employees, and our water and power facilities which provide these vital
resources to much of the West.
Mr. Chairman, that concludes my prepared remarks and I stand ready to
address any questions the Committee may have.
Mr. Gibbons. We turn now to my good friend, Mr. Bussell,
Colonel, retired, now the head of this State's Department of
Homeland Security for Nevada.
Jerry, welcome.
STATEMENT OF COLONEL JERRY BUSSELL, SPECIAL ADVISOR TO THE
GOVERNOR, NEVADA HOMELAND SECURITY OFFICE
Colonel Bussell. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman,
distinguished members of the committee, as you can see in my
written statement, I plan to address five areas--funding,
communication interoperability, critical infrastructure,
homeland advisory system, and Nevada's need for a civil support
team.
I'd like to deviate from that just a little bit.
Congressman Berkley's statement so cleared walked right down my
funding list, I think it would be repetitive that I go over
those things again. I would just like to jump over and talk
about communication interoperability.
But before I go there, there's a couple of things that I
would add in the areas of vulnerability in the funding. Las
Vegas has 18 of the 20 largest hotels in the United States, and
they are located on our 2.1 mile Las Vegas Strip. Understanding
that the Las Vegas Strip is not actually in Las Vegas, it is in
the unincorporated greater Clark County, that 11 of those
largest hotels are right next to McCarran Airport, which is the
seventh busiest airport.
At any one time, 24/7, 365, the Las Vegas Strip has more
people than Fort Lauderdale, Florida, or Salt Lake City, Utah.
If that is not a vulnerability, Mr. Chairman, I don't know what
is.
Moving on, in the areas of communication interoperability,
should an incident occur, it's important that first responders
have the ability to talk with each other. I think that is a
pretty commonly accepted statement, one of the fireman would be
able to talk with the policeman and both to be able to talk to
the first medical responder. In a perfect world, wouldn't it be
nice if every policeman and fireman and medical responder could
talk to each other anywhere and everywhere.
However, at this time we do not live in a perfect world. We
live in a world that is at war. But we do need to build a
system where a first responder's leadership or the first
responder leader could talk. The incident commander could have
a full chain of communication abilities, not just for voice,
communications for the computer, and maybe even the future, the
video. An instant commander would need the ability to talk not
only to the firemen, the policemen, or the emergency medical
responders, but, for example, he may need to talk or she may
need to talk to Department of Transportation, the water
company, the power company, schools, or those other first
responders that we don't normally think of, some people like
our civil support team, Hazmat teams, the National Guard, maybe
the directors of the different securities or the security
directors of our different hotels, not to include the number of
Federal agencies, whether it be the FBI, ATF, DEA, ICE, and on
and on and on.
Nevada is probably no more unique in the areas of
communication interoperability than many other states. Since
there is no perfect system available, we are looking at a
number of options, but there's a clear problem. With Nevada's
current shortfall, it is going to be almost impossible to
completely fund even a partial system without help.
That completes my initial formal remarks, Mr. Chairman. I
look forward to your questions.
Mr. Gibbons. Thank you very much, Mr. Bussell.
[The statement of Colonel Bussell follows:]
PREPARED STATEMENT OF MR. JERRY BUSSELL
Mr. Chairman, it is a pleasure for me to have this opportunity to
testify. You have been provided a copy of my written testimony for the
record.
In my written testimony, I will address five areas: funding,
communications Interoperability, critical infrastructure, homeland
security advisory system, and Nevada's need for a Civil Support Team.
Due to time constraints this morning, I will only formally discuss
funding.
FUNDING
As you are aware, I have been critical of the Department of Homeland
Security's funding formula for some time. As I understand it, current
Homeland Security formulas are based on three criteria: the 2000
Census, critical infrastructure and vulnerability assessments. Before I
proceed, I must state, I was personally disappointed that Las Vegas was
not Included In the fiscal year 1903 Supplemental Budget Grant given
directly to 30 cities.
We can all agree, Las Vegas is a unique city in itself, but the Las
Vegas Valley is even more unique. The majority of people think the Las
Vegas Strip is in Las Vegas. Most of it is actually In the
unincorporated area of Clark County. The greater Las Vegas Valley
includes the cities of Las Vegas, North Las Vegas, Boulder City,
Henderson and unincorporated Clark County, where most of the Las Vegas
Strip and the cities of Jean and Primm, Nevada are located.
If you merely look at the population of Las Vegas as shown in the 2000
Census, one receives an Incorrect picture. The 1.7 million population
of the Las Vegas Valley is significantly greater than the 400,000
population of the City of Las Vegas. The figures used by the Department
of Homeland Security must not have included the 1.7 million Las Vegas
Valley residents.
To receive a clear picture of our needs, one must look at the 1.7
million Las Vegas Valley residents; then include the 40 million plus
tourists.
In the vulnerability area, Las Vegas has 18 of the 20 largest hotels in
the United States, located on a 2.1 mile strip. It includes the first
11 largest hotels. Right next to the Las Vegas strip is McCarran
International Airport, which is the 7th busiest airport in the United
States.
To put it another way. Our tourist population on the Las Vegas Strip,
on any given night, exceeds the population of Ft. Lauderdale, Florida
or Salt Lake City, Utah.
Now I want to talk about critical infrastructure. Without going into
significant detail, there are a number of critical infrastructure and
key assets located In the Las Vegas Valley. Most prominent is Hoover
Dam. Hoover Dam not only supplies water for most of the southwestern
United States, It is a major source of electric power.
Why these unique factors were not considered in the Department of
Homeland Security's funding equations seems strange.
It is my understanding there is a Senate Bill, that has passed
Committee, addressing some of these funding inequities. I am asking for
your support in changing the Department of Homeland Security's funding
formula.
Funding to protect the citizens of this great country should not be
based on their street address--but on where they are should an incident
occur.
COMMUNICATIONS INTEROPERABILITY
Should an incident occur, it is important that first responders have
the ability to talk with each other. One would want the firemen to be
able to talk with a policeman, and both to be able to talk to a first
medical responder. In a perfect world, It would be desirable for every
policeman, fireman and emergency medical responder to be able to talk
with each other. However, at this time, we do not live in a perfect
world. To build the system where every first responder could talk with
each other Is probably not practical and may be cost prohibitive.
Nonetheless, we must have a system where first responder leadership can
communicate with one another. Where an Incident Commander has a full
range of communications ability-not Just voice (radio) communications -
but computer and maybe In the future, video. An Incident Commander
needs to be able to communicate with a number of organizations. For
example, the Nevada Department of Transportation, the water company,
the power company, schools, and other special response units like the
National Guard, Civil Support Teams, HAZMAT teams, or the directors of
security at our major hotels. I have not Included federal agencies like
the FBI, ATE DEA, ICE, and on and on.
With Nevada's unique needs and no perfect system readily available, we
are looking at a number of communication options. With the state's
current funding shortfalls, it is going to be almost impossible to fund
even a partial system without federal help.
CRITICAL INFRASTRUCTURE PROTECTION
With the recent multiple power outages in the Northeastern United
States, critical infrastructure is on the forefront. Everyone knows
that water, power, banking/finance, and transportation are vitally
important to the United States.
Critical infrastructure, to me, is reliability and availabllity-based.
To assure reliability and availability, we must protect our critical
infrastructure. To protect the critical Infrastructure, a meaningful
vulnerability assessment is necessary--a vulnerability assessment based
on a national standard.
Yet there is no national plan clearly defining roles and
responsibilities of critical Infrastructure protection in either the
public or private sectors. There are no objectives, milestones, or time
frames leading to achievable performance measures.
Over 80% of our nation's critical infrastructure is in the private
sector, however, they are operating in a vacuum. There is no immediate
method of notification of threat or any way to give our critical
infrastructure specific, actionable Information on a timely basis.
We ask our private entities to perform vulnerability analysis and
correction using their own resources. There must be some way to help
private and semi-private entities with public funding. It could be in
the form of specialty tools, training, training aids, standardized
vulnerability assessments or tax incentives.
CIVIL SUPPORT TEAMS
Nevada does not have a Civil Support Team. Nevada's Adjutant
General, Major General Giles Vanderhoof, lists the need for a Civil
Support Team as his number one unit priority. I certainly agree with
the Adjutant General based on my recent observations during DP-03 where
a clear need for such a team was evident.
Mr. Chairman, I know you have personally been working on this
project for several years, but I cannot emphasize any stronger how
important this critical asset is for Nevada.
HOMELAND SECURITY ADVISORY SYSTEM
The Homeland Security Advisory System is vague, difficult to explain,
and lacks public confidence. The color-code system initiated by the
Department of Homeland Security in March of 2002 has not worked well.
It does not define what states, cities, businesses or Individuals
should do at a particular color code level. It clearly does not explain
what should happen when the color code changes--either up or down.
I would like to recommend several methods to improve the color code
system, Including Issuing specific warnings to targeted regions or
facilities. I would further recommend that certain protective measures
for specific states and cities be channeled regionally If they do not
affect the entire country.
Changes to the Homeland Security Advisory and Color Code System should
be Initiated Immediately.
Public confidence is at stake.
Thank you for allowing me the opportunity to testify today.
Mr. Gibbons. We'll turn now to questions from the
committee.
And let me begin by thanking each of you once again for
taking time out of your busy day to come here before the
committee and provide us your testimony.
My question would first go to Mr. Parrish. Just on a
generality, Mr. Parrish, and knowing the fact that I was one of
the architects of the language which created the Homeland
Security, the Department of Homeland Security, what is your
assessment after one and a half years of the Department's
capabilities? Where are we?
We have got a massive new organization, second largest
department in the United States Federal Government. We merged
more than 100 separate agencies together in a colossal effort
to address the issue of homeland security and issues that are
pertinent to that.
What is your assessment of the functionality? How is it
doing after one and a half years? Is this a toddler that is up
and walking? Is it ready to run? Is able to talk? Where are we
in that?
Mr. Parrish. Sir, it's a very timely question. Yesterday
morning I was at the John F. Kennedy School of Government at
Harvard speaking to the national--international security
manager's course, which, as you know, has a significant
audience of tremendous leadership from around the Federal
Government as well as international equal.
The point that I made in there to a similar question was
comparing us to the Department of Defense, we're the second
largest--if you look at the Department of Defense since 1947,
actually when we demonstrate our successes in the war in Iraq
in 1991, we kind of got it right, from 1947 to 1991.
The Department of the Homeland Security is coming on up its
six months anniversary. It's pulling together those agencies
and bringing each one to the table to be able to make sure that
we are having the interoperability, as Jerry indicated, remains
a process that we'll continue to work on very closely and very
diligently.
I think what we are finding is the success is that now the
Federal Government and interagency because of our change in
liaison programs, as I said earlier in opening remarks, having
people from those agencies present is really assisting in that.
I think when we look back at some of the initiatives that
our organization brought to us within the department, it
continued to build on those. I look at the Customs programs and
what they are doing on the borders to enhance the security
screening there, the outreach of the container security
initiative overseas. If you look at that, the department is
engaging heavily with those organizations to make sure that we
have this defensive depth and later strategy, if you will, of
trying to bring together the best practices, the best
capabilities of all the agencies to be able to detect and
prevent a terrorist activity, detect as far out as possible to
prevent any type of activities here in the United States.
I think the area that we need to move faster on, and I have
made notes to myself on this, is hearing from State and local
and the private sector because the wealth of information out
there is what we need to hear from them and also that we need
to make sure that we are getting to them.
I think the Homeland Security advisory bulletins and
information bulletins that we have been putting out, we've been
getting good feedback from that.
An example of that, I think, is showing now that other
agencies recognize the importance of the department and what we
are trying to do and serve the American people in the private
sector. Because immediately after the attacks of Al Kot on May
11th, at that time, I was the associate director in the
Terrorist Threat Integration Center. When I got to work that
morning at six o'clock and began looking at the very sensitive
national security type intelligence information that was coming
out from those reports, I immediately contacted then the
assistant secretary Paul Redmond back at the Department at
Homeland Security who was the information analysis secretary,
assistant secretary.
And I said, ``Paul,'' I said, ``Start working on protective
measures because we have seen some new tactics and techniques
employed by al-Qaeda in this attack. I will work the terror
line with the CIA and get this information downgraded so that
we get it out in the hands of State, local, and private
sector.'' So talking to hotels and industries and chemical
facilities and those things.
And to the credit of the interagency process, by the end of
the day, we had out on the street a document which we have
gotten remarks that it not only quickly described what happened
in Al Kot, a breakdown of the three compounds and the tactics
and techniques employed by al-Qaeda, but we had protective
measures that would help the states and locals be able to
prioritize what they were looking at and trying to support the
expenditures of limited resources.
So I think that is an example of how the Federal Government
recognized the mission of the department in conveying this type
of information. So I think we are moving the ball forward. We
have got a long ways to go, but I think right now we are making
great strides in making that happen.
Mr. Gibbons. Mr. Secretary, many people in the audience
here time and time again hear about our security warning status
and the levels of security, whether it is yellow today, orange
tomorrow, or red, and wonder how we get to each one of those.
Whether or not, we are vertically integrating the
intelligence, as you have already talked about, down to our law
enforcement first responders that allow for the average citizen
out here to feel safe, that someone knows about the
information, that someone knows about the criticality of this
intelligence, that is on our local first responder's list that
can assess that because the average public would never be able
to say, ``Well, what does the orange threat mean to me? I'm
going from my home out to Lake Mead, for example, am I at
risk?'' They will never know that.
How is that vertical integration going and what are your
responses to those people who will probably come later to say
that they don't feel they are getting enough information?
I guess my final part of that long detailed question is how
is the reverse of that information flowing? Are you getting
critical information from first responders who are by far and
away our best intelligence source? When a policeman stops an
individual that is on a suspect list, does that information go
up vertically quick enough? How is the two-way flow of that
information going.
Mr. Parrish. Sir, if I could start, kind of work backwards
a little bit, but on that last question, the flow of
information coming in, you remember Operation Liberty Shield,
as this Nation began to commence hostilities in Iraq, I was
presented the great opportunity on Friday afternoon, the 28th
of February, the day before the department stood up to develop
Operation Liberty Shield and bring it to the White House by
four o'clock Monday afternoon. It was a very long weekend, as
you might imagine, but to the credit of the government, we had
25 Federal agencies working diligently throughout that weekend
to develop the protective measures that we employed in Liberty
Shield to include the active support there of the Bureau of
Reclamation and the Department of Interior, and each agency had
their protective measures.
Once we initiated and commenced Liberty Shield, the
operations center received a report one night from a local
police department up around the oil facilities outside of
Philadelphia. As you go up the Delaware River, you see some oil
facilities. They picked up two individuals that apparently had
been surveilling those oil facilities.
At the same time the Coast Guard came in with their report.
We had a foreign flag oil tanker in the Delaware River getting
ready to bring its oil. We ran the manifest on the crew. The
captain of the vessel was an Iraqi. The senior first engineer
was an Iraqi, and 15 Pakistani crew members.
Was there a correlation here to what was going on? In the
end, no, but we didn't take any chances. We removed the captain
of the vessel. We brought on a Coast Guard crew to drive the
vessel up to offload that, and the another two individuals were
turned over to the JTTF in Philadelphia for further
questioning.
It's that type of information flow that was coming into the
operations center and exchange of information. So the eyes and
ears that are out there in the streets of America are front
line defenders are critical to get that information in.
The process of going to change the national threat level is
a tremendous effort, as you might imagine, because Secretary
Ridge takes great, great concern over this.
I have had the privilege and the opportunity to be with him
in the last three times that we have made that decision. What
we are trying to do right now in the homeland security advisory
system is to go back and take a look at that.
Is it practical to say that the entire country orange, when
yet the intelligence we are looking at may only be focusing on
a threat to the chemical facility or it may only be focusing in
an area around the northeast?
But we have to be very careful, though, that we don't
convey that, and then the rest of the country says, ``Well,
drop my pack. It's not--I don't have to worry about it.''
So we are trying to look really close at how we can go back
and take a look at the homeland security advisory system in
that regard.
I think we have to do better in working with our State and
local authorities in being able to help them understand that.
As many may think, there is this great fountain of top-secret
SCI, sensitive intelligence sitting there in Washington, and
it's not getting handed down.
I wish there was because I would be fighting everyday to
make sure it was getting downgraded.
But, you know, to our successes now and the people that we
have picked up, that's the good news. Now we may be not quite
getting as much of the information we had gleaned before. But I
think it's important to recognize getting the system explained
to the State and locals.
An initiative that I have under--the program known as risk-
net, which is a regional information sharing system. We have a
pilot program we're kicking off this month, and right now we
are going to target just nuclear power facilities. But in risk-
net now, we'll have the nuclear facilities be able to report to
us any suspicious activities, and we're initiating this in six
states.
I want to build on this as quickly as possible so that we
can use risk-net for this dialogue that will go back and forth
between our operations center, getting information out to the
State and local. Risk-net covers, I want to say, it's about 65
State and local authorities around the country. I want to be
able to have a website there so we can put up the daily
homeland security intelligence summary which will be at law
enforcement sensitive or official-use only level.
And the second piece that I want to do, and you have heard
talk about Parrish's concept of the hybrid analyst. In this war
we have, we need to create an individual who is looking at the
operational environment as well as the intelligence, who
understands the Department of Homeland Security's operational
environment. This fusion will be built around some of our
subordinate agency people that are coming in, agents,
inspectors, and that type, we'll have some analysts, and we
will create this hybrid.
We also now are working with emergency defense
preparedness. We're reviewing a program of instruction that
we're going out to State and locals on intelligence analyst
training. I want to be able to prioritize where we are going to
send that, and I want to be able to regionalize it so that we
have, for example, a course that may come out here to Nevada,
and we bring in analysts from the western region. So when they
graduate from this course, and I'm not sure exactly whether
it's going to be one week or two weeks, they will then have a
counterpart over in California or down in Arizona and say,
``Have you seen this? We just pulled this guy over, and we
found in part of his documents here a hotel receipt from
Arizona. Do you know anything about this?'' And this type of
information sharing.
The next step to that is I want to bring these analysts
into our fusion cell in Washington where they would spend two
weeks. They would see then the type of information that we are
getting in there, and I think it would be a better appreciation
of exactly how this is all processed.
So I think that we are moving forward in getting that
information out as quickly as possible. That is my number one
priority in working with the sensitive intelligence that comes
out and getting it downgraded into the hands of the State and
the locals as quickly as possible. We have to get it down to
those operators in the field because they will be the ones that
either going to prevent, detect or deny terrorists from
conducting an operation here in the United States.
Mr. Gibbons. Secretary Parrish, I have a number of other
questions for you, but I know that the other members of this
panel, Mr. Shadegg, would like to also engage you in some
questions, and I don't want to take up the whole time. So I'll
ask Mr. Shadegg for questions.
Mr. Shadegg. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Gentlemen, I have questions for each of you, so I'm going
to ask you to be as brief as you can in your responses.
Mr. Parrish, I want to thank you for your testimony before
the committee previously and for your testimony here today. I
find in very informative and helpful. I think I expressed the
last time you testified the admiration I have for the
incredible challenge we have given the department, to try to
stand up a department of this size and scope and to try to get
all these diverse and disparate agencies working together in a
common effort, I think, is a daunting task. As you pointed out,
you are barely six months into it, and, yet, I think the
statement you make in your testimony that the Nation is, in
fact, safer now was accurate. And I think it can be safer
still.
But I have great admiration for the task that Secretary
Ridge is doing with trying to pull all this together,
especially, I spent some time in law enforcement myself, the
years I was in the Attorney General's office dealing the
disparate interests of all the law enforcement agencies in
Arizona and trying to get them to pull together rather than be
at war with each other was a significant challenge. I can't
imagine trying to do it nationwide.
I want to ask you a few specific questions directly from
your earlier testimony. There is a statement in your testimony
that says, ``Our Information Analysis Office,'' which is what
had, ``has the ability to conduct its own analysis of the
security information you get.'' I'm very pleased to hear that.
As you know, the statute requires you to be able to do that.
Can you give me here today an idea of how many people are
engaged in that task at this time and whether there is yet room
to grow in that area?
Mr. Parrish. Yes, sir. We are still somewheres right around
about the 55 people. Again, that's analysts as well as the
liaison from the other agencies. We are looking to grow. As you
know, we are moving into a larger facility. The time line on
that may be slipping a little bit, but we are pushing very
quickly to do that because once we do, we'll be able to bring
in the other individuals.
When you look across the Department of Homeland Security
and at the other intelligence organizations that exist, there
are a number of analysts in there. It could be in excess of 800
across the other departments. We are going now to look at that
and making sure we don't have duplication of effort. In fact,
maybe some of those analysts may need to be migrated into the
Information Analysis Office, which will increase our
capabilities.
Mr. Shadegg. I guess the second question, and the only
other one I have for you this morning, and that is in your
prepared statement says, ``We share more information with
people who need it including our State and local partners.''
Could you briefly summarize for the committee precisely how you
share that information with State and local officials?
And I'll warn you in advance, I'm going to ask Mr. Bussell
how he sees that working.
Mr. Parrish. Right now what we're pushing out is the
information bulletins and the advisory bulletins. We coordinate
with the FBI when they put out their weekly intel summaries,
that goes out every Wednesday, and also when they put out an
advisory through the NLETS system.
The success, I think, on the advisory bulletins and
information has been being able to engage members of the
intelligence community and getting a tear line. A tear line, as
you know, is getting a sensitive or highly classified piece of
intelligence tear line that will make it unclassified or at the
secret level.
Sometimes I have been only able to get it to the secret
level. But we do have now within our states the Homeland
Security advisors having that classification and being able to
get that piece of intelligence.
And then, of course, on the official-use only, we do that.
Suicide bomber vests, again, Marines over took that one
facility in Bagdad. Photographs I saw of the suicide leather
vests, and these types of things, I went to DIA immediately.
That afternoon we had photographs made, and we put out an
advisory so that every State and local would be to see exactly
if they pulled somebody over and opened the trunk and found
these, they would know exactly what they're looking at.
I want to be able to do better than that. I want
electronically--I want a web page so that they can each day
pull up.
The other piece of that is the best practices. Let's learn
how some of the great American State and locals are out there
effecting their jobs, conducting their jobs, and paste that on
this web page. This is how it was done in Arizona, this was how
it was done in Nevada, and let other states learn from that.
Mr. Shadegg. Mr. Bussell, it's your chance to say what's
working and what could be improved.
Colonel Bussell. Mr. Chairman and Congressman Shadegg,
thank you very much.
Let me start out by saying that this individual homeland
security advisor organization, Homeland Security directors are
different in every State. Saying that, I'm a homeland security
advisor with one person. However, I have the same
responsibilities maybe a larger State would have a number of
people.
The intelligence information that is coming down is in its
very embryotic stages. There is no question about that. Mr.
Secretary, it's clearly on the right steps. I can say with
absolute confidence if we needed to know something, some
actionable, absolutely certain intelligence, there would be no
question in my mind that I have would it immediately, and I
could go straight to the Governor.
However, we do need to take some real looks at how we are
handling this. As an example, if you send something down and it
just comes through normal routine procedures, I may or may not
be able to get that. Where I get most of my intelligence is
from the folks in the back of this room every single day. They
have a spot report that comes up from Clark County, comes up
from the JTTF down here, from Washoe County, and it goes in.
I'll be very candid with the group, the committee. I look
there first now. Now, leading to that if something is really
happening, we can talk. And I have been very critical of the
current system. The Homeland Security advisory system, I have
been vocal, very vocal. And as Mr. Secretary said, we are
changing it. I have been vocal about the intelligence system. I
hope that answers your question, sir.
Mr. Shadegg. Yes, it does. It helps give us some
information on how it's flowing at this earlier stage.
Mr. Todd, let me conclude the questioning with you. I read
your written statement and was impressed at the steps that the
Bureau of Reclamation has taken to try to upgrade its security
and its analysis of its exposure in the time since 9-11.
But I did not read in there anything that suggested to me
that you have done an analysis of kind of a worst case
scenario. As a Westerner and native of Arizona, it randomly
goes through my mind exactly what would happen if you
successfully blew up Hoover Dam? Exactly what would happen if
you successfully brought down Glen Canyon Dam?
And I guess my question of you is in addition to assessing
how vulnerable your facilities are, have you yet contemplated
to perform an analysis of kind of a ``What if'' scenario if, in
fact, your security measures fail, and one of those facilities
was breached?
Mr. Todd. The answer is yes, we have, Congressman. There's
two ways that we have looked at this.
The first way is that we have a very high expert safety dam
program where we understand what the extent of these dams will
do, and that consequence analysis goes right into our
vulnerability analysis that we have completed for each of these
dams.
And so with the consequences on the one hand, the threats
that we know about on the other, and then the potential in the
middle, we look at that with the analysis of the assessment.
From that, we make decisions about how far to go with
instituting and implementing the security measures.
For instance, on Glen Canyon and on Hoover, we had Defense
Threat Reduction Agency do the assessment. We looked at that
information and then looked at our dam safety consequences
information and made sure those were talking to each other
before we made the decision.
Mr. Shadegg. And all of that information has been made
available to the private contractors who have also looked at
your security measures?
Mr. Todd. I'm--.
Mr. Shadegg. There was some reference to private
contractors that have looked at it, and, also, I think, the
National Laboratories at Sandia?
Mr. Todd. The Sandia has done a couple of different things.
The private contractors we had looked at a number of sites. The
Defense Threat Reduction Agency looked at national critical
structures. We had 50 other sites that prior contractors looked
at. All of those went through a security advisory team meeting
to really look at the consequences and how we would put in our
security measures. On that panel sat a Sandia member. As well
as Sandia also looked at top-down review for our overall
umbrella security program. So there were two top-down focuses
that were provided us.
Mr. Shadegg. Mr. Chairman, I'm well over the five minutes.
I appreciate your indulgence.
Mr. Gibbons. Well, I think simply because there's just the
two of us here that we can engage in extended question and
answer without offending anybody else.
Mr. Shadegg. Unfortunately, I have obligations, and so I'm
going to have to conclude at this point. So I'll leave it to
you.
Mr. Gibbons. Mr. Shadegg, thank you--.
Mr. Shadegg. So you can ask questions.
Mr. Gibbons. Thank you for your presence and thanks for
your time here.
Let me continue with this. And I want to go back to Mr.
Bussell and ask him a question about the State of Nevada. We
have heard criticisms sometimes in the media that the Federal
Government is not giving any Homeland Security dollars to the
State of Nevada.
What is your comment with regard to being on the receiving
end of those dollars if you are not getting any and how many
dollars or how much money has been sent to the State of Nevada
in the course of time for homeland security problems?
Colonel Bussell. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. That is a very
interesting question, and sometimes one wonders where does the
money come from. So the money I'll be talking about this
morning it is in two breaks. It's at the fiscal year 2003 phase
I--.
Mr. Gibbons. That's fiscal year 1903 for these people who
don't know what fiscal year 2003 means.
Colonel Bussell. Yes, sir. It was $6.77 million that
arrived in Nevada April of 2003. And for record, I will be
putting these notes later on, Mr. Chairman. That was $6.7
million followed in July by $17.9 million for a total for 27,
almost--I'm sorry--25, almost $25 million. Nevada received that
and in the process of passing it on down and basically the 80/
20, with 80 down to the first responders.
Mr. Frank Circusa, the director of the Department of
Emergency Management is the administrative agent and actually
handles the operational part of disbursing the money through a
homeland security committee that is in the process of being
changed. It will be based on recent State legislature Assembly
Bill 441. We're in the process of forming a homeland security
commission, and certainly that will be a top priority.
But back to your question, sir. We have received that
money. It is here, and we're in the process of getting it out
to the first responders.
Mr. Gibbons. So just this year alone, you've gotten nearly
$25 million into the State of Nevada for the homeland security
efforts.
How is that money apportioned between cities, counties, and
states? You said it was 80/20, but 80 percent going to first
responders.
Colonel Bussell. Yes, sir. 80 percent going out through an
interesting system. We use the LEPC system in the State of
Nevada. It was in place way before I came on the station. LEPC
is an local emergency planning committee. The group gets
together, and then there are 17 LEPCs because there's 17
counties in the State of Nevada. They get together and decide
what their priorities are. The LEPC arranges their horizontal
priorities into a vertical priority.
They come to the Homeland Security Committee subcommittee,
present their priorities by LEPC, by county. That is then taken
into a vertical and presented to the Homeland Security
Committee for final review, and it's passed out in that
process.
Mr. Gibbons. Mr. Todd, let me you ask when you talk about
24/7 security at a lot of our dams and other infrastructures
that you're responsible for, you indicated in your testimony
that both Department of--Bureau of Reclamation and State
security, how is that breakdown cost arrived at?
Mr. Todd. Well, many of our dams, we have our own security
guards contracted for, and, specifically, at Hoover we have a
police department. We also contract for armed guards.
We have also contracted with the local sheriff department,
and sometimes local PDs, and certainly we contracted with the
National Park Service for rangers to watch our dams. After 9-
11, we certainly did that for quite a while.
Mr. Gibbons. To summarize, if you have a responsibility and
you have contracted it out to either the State, the county, or
locality metropolitan police, you pay them to do the security
on your facilities?
Mr. Todd. That's correct if we have a contract, that's
correct.
Mr. Gibbons. And includes the State if it were the National
Guard?
Mr. Todd. We don't go with the National Guard. There's ome
authorities that prohibit Federal funding of the National Guard
in that kind of situation. But we do certainly with the State
patrols, and we have that on a number of sites.
Mr. Gibbons. Okay. There is a number of other questions.
Mr. Parrish, Secretary Parrish, there are those of us in Nevada
who are very, very concerned with the Yucca Mountain. There is
no doubt about it. To those of us here, it's not something that
we look forward at all.
And my question would be with our concerns--and I, for one,
as a scientist, have concerns just about the structures that
there are for the security of the material incitsu, let alone
any kind of an act that might jeopardize that.
My greater concern is that of the transportation of the
material from nuclear power plants across this country to Yucca
Mountain. I know of no studies that have been done to look at
either the structural--infrastructure risks that are there.
How do you assure communities, states across this country
that that material coming through there is not going to be the
subject of a terrorist attack with devastating consequences?
Mr. Parrish. Sir, the Department of Energy, and I really
can't speak for them, but I think they have a program, as you
know, in the movement of special assets, but I think maybe a
blueprint for what we need to build upon in this process as we
look as the movement of these type of hazardous materials and
waste that are moved across the United States. Energy will have
the lead in this area, but, again, working very closely with
the Department of Homeland Security, Transportation Security
Administration, the Nuclear Regulatory Commission as well as
the Department of Transportation.
Our infrastructure protection director is heavily involved
with these other agencies in assessing this. I think you raised
a good point about the study that has been looked at, and I
will go back and try to see if we have either something in
progress or, if not, an area that we probably should move to.
But each of agencies in varying degrees have a certain
responsibility. And, again, as Department of Homeland Security
is now up and running, we would certainly have a major role in
making sure that event of the coordination is being done with
most of these agencies when we start talking about moving any
significant amounts of hazardous materials, such as nuclear
waste across the country.
So I have the specifics, and perhaps when I'm back in
Washington, I can sit down with you and we can get a little bit
more detail. But at this point in time, based on my phone calls
and talking to our infrastructure protection director, they are
engaged with the Department of Energy at this time. Under
Secretary Laguti and I, in fact, we meet with the National
Regulatory commission, I believe it is, next week, and one of
these will be the topic of discussion.
Mr. Gibbons. Let me say that your department will be well
into which all of this intelligence information is poured. You
will have the responsibility to ferret it out, digest, and
analyze potential risk and threats that would be made to that.
I see that as an overwhelming problem because of the
vulnerability. We have already talked about porousness of our
borders, the porousness of infrastructures, rail systems,
highway systems, bridges, rivers for this material is--I mean
it's incalculable how large that problem could be for you. I'm
very concerned about it. I look forward to talking to you
further to get your information.
Mr. Todd, let me ask you one final question as well with
regards to water supplies, Hoover--Lake Mead provides an
enormous quantity of water, a reservoir, but it's always a
reservoir from which communities are served water, especially
the Las Vegas community and Clark County, and community
downstream from Lake Mead.
What steps have you taken or the Bureau of Reclamation
taken to assure that these critical water sources are safe for
our communities with regard to some type of chemical or
biological agent that might be used to contaminate those
waters?
Mr. Todd. Well, early on, we put out some memos and
guidance to field staff on being watchful and understanding
what the chemical biological kind of attacks may be. We have
more to do in that area, but certainly we have the guidance
there for the field people to really be aware of what may
happen.
Mr. Gibbons. Are you coordinating those investigations with
other agencies to share that information, say, for example,
with Homeland Security who might know of information that could
relate to that?
Mr. Todd. Yes, we are. We have a lot of coordination with
Homeland Security at the Washington level and then also our
local offices are coordinating with the local first responders
and so forth.
We have a program where we do environmental--not
environmental--emergency preparedness work. We do table top
function exercises and so forth. Those exercises many times
include that kind of work where we may have a truck affecting
the carrying of the chemical that is affecting the reservoir,
and so how would we deal with that on an emergency basis.
So those exercises are ongoing continually, and we work
right along with first responders on those kinds of things.
Mr. Gibbons. Knowing the size of Las Vegas, I cannot
imagine being able to just turn the tap off if there were a
problem with the water supply out here at Lake Mead. And it's
something I'm sure that the community here is very concerned
about, and I would look forward to spending time with you to
discuss the issue further to make sure that we have reached a
satisfactory answer to the question about the security of that
water system for Las Vegas.
Mr. Todd. I'd be happy to.
Mr. Gibbons. Gentlemen, we have to go to the second panel
here. We have taken a great deal of your time, and the
committee is grateful for your presence and your testimony. We
would like to excuse the panel with thanks from me personally
and from the committee.
We will take a 5-minute break, and when we come back, we
will call up our second panel for the committee.
Gentlemen, thank you very much. We'll take a 5-minute
break.
[Brief recess.]
Mr. Gibbons. The Subcommittee on Intelligence and
Counterterrorism will come back to order.
At this point in time, we would like to call our second
panel, and that will include Mr. David Shepherd, head of
security at the Venetian Resort; Mr. Randy Walker, aviation
director of Clark County Department of Aviation; Dr. Dale
Carrison--am I pronouncing your name correctly, Doctor?
Dr. Carrison. Yes.
Mr. Gibbons. Emergency Department Medical Director, UMC
Trauma Center; and Deputy Chief Bill Conger, Las Vegas
Metropolitan Police Department.
Gentlemen, we want to welcome you here. Just as you heard
from the previous witnesses, we try to limit our opening
remarks to 5 minutes, but we will include your complete and
full and written testimony for the record.
And simply because I'm the only person here doesn't mean
that it isn't important what you say because all of these
hearings are recorded. We have a process whereby the record
will reflect what you say and it will be reviewed after this
subcommittee returns to Washington, D.C.
With that in mind, I'll just proceed from left to right, my
left, my right, or your left, or your right to your left,
whichever, but I'll start with Mr. Shepherd, head of security
for the Venetian Resort, for your opening remarks.
Mr. Gibbons. Mr. Shepherd, welcome. We're happy to have you
before the committee.
STATEMENT OF MR. DAVID SHEPHERD, HEAD OF SECURITY, VENTIAN
RESORT
Mr. Shepherd. Good morning.
Mr. Gibbons. And you have to push the red button so that
you can be heard.
Mr. Shepherd. Good morning. I would like to thank
Congressman Jim Gibbons for the opportunity to speak before
this prestigious panel assembled today. It is truly an honor
and pleasure to be here.
I am a blend of both the private and public sectors. I
retired from the FBI after 24 years of service in 1999 and
began my career in the private sector immediately thereafter.
As a supervisory special agent with the FBI, I participated in
counterterrorism matters with SWAT, Team Leader, and as the
Coordinator for this program.
For nearly 16 years, I dealt with terrorism matters at the
Nevada Test Site, Tonopah Missile Range and Hoover Dam. I
trained with Delta Force, Army Rangers, Special Forces and Navy
Seals, and, of course, the security forces from each of these
special sites. I further participated in intelligence
gathering, with the Office of Threat Assessment, U.S.
Department of Energy and participated in numerous nuclear
exercises through the United States.
In the private sector, I am the Executive Director of
Security for the Venetian Resort Hotel Casino in Las Vegas. The
Venetian is the third largest hotel in the world with over 7
million square feet of space, 4,049 suites, and has an average
daily visitor rate of 80,000 guests per day, which is four
times the average American city.
I have attempted to extract from both sectors the best of
each world in the protection of the property. The tourist/
entertainment/gaming industry presents its own challenges,
because if I create an airport style of visible protection and
security precautions, the guests will go across the street to
another property. If the city receives too many threats, the
guests will stay at home.
Security in the customer service industry is a delicate
balance and froth with challenges at every turn. Most people
sitting here today have no idea what it takes to operate a
security department in today's marketplace. I would like to
shed some light on our challenges and outline some of the great
lengths security must envision to ensure the safety of our
guests and property.
As the security director, I must be concerned with civil
liability issues, criminal activities, and terrorism, plus the
threat of SARS or other diseases that our world travelers might
bring to the property.
During the height of the worldwide SARS scare, the Venetian
hosted the JCK Jewelry Show, a show where over 35,000
conventioneers participated, over 1,500 exhibit booths
displaying jewelry products throughout the property. Included
in the booths, 1,500 booths, were 110 booths from China and 40
booths from Canada.
The Venetian maintained contact with the CDC and Clark
County Health District concerning possible courses of action to
take in the event that one of our conventioneers displayed
signs of SARS. Fortunately, no cases were reported, but we
planned for the worst, just as we are required to do for each
key security issue.
The security directors of today face greater challenges
than ever before, and we must be forward-thinking each and
every day, because our greatest concern is the safety of our
guests, first and foremost.
Today's directors cannot rely on successes of the past or
the tools and equipment of the past or the training used in the
past. Technical advances coupled with a trained, alert staff
can speak volumes, when the lives of thousands rest in their
hands.
If you haven't prepared or anticipated each threat, the
fear of failure and disaster are the end results. The
repercussions of a failed security defense can have lingering
effects for years to come. We do plan and must plan for every
contingency to ensure the safety of our guests and team
members.
The security directors of today must anticipate the source
of each threat or situation and then establish policies and
procedures to meet the threat head on under the principles of
``Total Prevention'' and/or ``Damage Limitation.'' In ``Total
Prevention,'' the department must stop every conceivable plan
of attack. Not one attack or plan can be successful. Each
attempt must be crushed without the slightest bit of damage or
loss of life.
In ``Damage Limitation,'' the department must limit the
loss of life and the spread of further damage. Each minute that
we fail to act could have deadly effects on those caught in
harm's way.
Many of the thousands of survivors in the World Trade
Center and the Pentagon owe their lives to the foresight and
training of those dedicated security and safety professionals
who anticipated the threat. The casino security directors in
Las Vegas have planned and are working together to anticipate
each threat.
In Vietnam, we did what is called, ``looking at both sides
of the wire.'' We look at the property from the angle of
protection and from the angle of penetration. What holes do
they see in our defenses? How would they approach the property?
Can we turn a weak point into a strength?
A good friend of mine once said, ``Being forewarned is
being forearmed.'' If we know what they can do and have done,
then we can plan accordingly.
A security plan begins with research. Each day I review
intelligence reports from around the world, but not just from
one source. Several sources, documents and agencies are
contacted before I start my day. I want to know what happened
in the world yesterday and today. I want to know what the
latest trick or tactic they tried. I want to listen to minutest
shred of data or perceived concept, then say, ``What if they
tried the same thing here?''
Under the same concept, at the Nevada Test Site, we did
what is called, ``What ifs.'' What if the enemy did this or did
that? Are we prepared to defeat, defend, and neutralize the
aggressors? That is how we plan. Not for just one key event,
but multi-events, threats and attacks.
As an example of our foresight, the Venetian has analyzed
the threats and implemented 84 changes to the property to
ensure the safety of our guests and team members, just during
the first year following September 11th. That number has now
toppled over 100 improvements or modifications to our security
measures.
Recently in Indonesia, a taxi, dropping off a guest in the
porte chere of a hotel, exploded, killing 13 people and
wounding over 100. We modified our procedures in accepting
taxis on property. We innovate, adapt and overcome any threat
that is presented to us.
In SWAT we stated, ``We are only as strong as our weakest
link.'' How do you ensure the preventive measures and concepts
are firmly entrenched into your property on every level?
Training. Training for what? Training for everything.
In security we don't need to know the political motivation
or the reason why the person is doing such a horrific act. We
need to know the physical actions and their tactics. In
football, no team goes straight to the Super Bowl without first
practicing, creating defensive and offensive plays, and
scouting out the other team. In security we must do the same.
We establish plans, obtain intelligence, implement the
preventive measures and train.
After September 11th, I received more calls than Allied Van
Lines has movers. Every suspicious person or situation was
reported. People broke the mold. They didn't say, ``That's not
my job,'' or ``I don't want to get involved.'' They became part
of the security department. The size of my department isn't the
number of officers I have on my staff, but it should be
everyone that walks in that property.
We cannot afford to become complacent as the al-Qaeda
training manual has indicated. We continuously train our front
line staff to be vigilant and recognize suspicious persons or
situations.
Ask your staff this one question, ``Do you feel safe?'' If
they don't feel safe, then the directive of each security
director and corporate officer is to reverse this sense of
insecurity without question.
In conclusion, Mel Gibson played Benjamin Martin in the
movie, ``The Patriot.'' He said, ``This war will not be fought,
not on the frontier, not on some distant battlefield, but
amongst us, among our homes. Our children will learn of it with
their own eyes.''
Isn't that what happened on September 11th?
In the field of casino security, the casino chiefs'
association has brought together security chiefs to develop
training programs, opened lines of communication between
multiple agencies and raised the level of security in Las
Vegas. We cannot afford to become complacent as the al-Qaeda
training manual has indicated just because nothing has happened
in the United States since September 11th and the terrorist
acts have occurred in foreign lands. We are working together
daily to ensure the safety of our guests and employees, but not
on just one property. All casinos are part of the protection
equation. They will never take away our freedom or our way of
life.
Thank you.
[The statement of Mr. Shepherd follows:]
PREPARED STATEMENT OF MR. DAVID SHEPHERD
Good morning. I would like,thank Congressman Jim Gibbons for the
opportunity to speak before this prestigious panel assembled today. It
is truly an honor and privilege 'to be here today.
I am a blend of both the private and public sectors. I retired from the
FBI after twenty-four years of serve in 1999 and began my career in the
private sector immediately thereafter. As a supervisory special agent
with the Federal Bureau of Investigation I participated in counter
terrorism matters as the SWAT Team Leader and as the Coordinator for
this program. For nearly sixteen years I dealt with terrorism matters
at the Nevada Test Site, Tonopah Missile Range and Hoover Dam. I
training with Delta Force, Army Range, Special Forces and Navy Seals,
and of course the security forces from each of these special sites. I
further participated in intelligence gathering, with the Office of
Threat Assessment, US Department of Energy and participated in numerous
nuclear exercises throughout the United States.
In the private sector, I am the Executive Director of Security for the
Venetian Resort Hotel Casino, Las Vegas, Nevada. The Venetian is the
third largest hotel in the world with over 7 million square feet of
space, 4049 suites, and has an average daily visitor rate of 80,000
guests per day, which is four times the average American city.
I have attempted to extract from both sectors the best of each world in
the protection of the property. The tourist/entertainment/gaming
industry presents its own challenges, because if I create an airport
style of visible protection and security precautions, the guests will
go across the street to another property. If the city receives too many
threats, the guests will stay at home. Security in the customer service
industry is a delicate balance and froth with challenges at every turn.
Most people sitting here today have no idea what it takes to operate a
security department in today's marketplace. I would like to shed some
light on our challenges and outline some of the great lengths security
must envision to ensure the safety of our guests and property.
As the security director I must be concerned with civil liability
issues, criminal activities and terrorism, plus the threat of SARS or
other diseases that our world travelers might bring to the property.
During the height of the worldwide SARS scare, the Venetian hosed the
JCK Jewelry Show. A show in which over 35,000 conventioneers
participated. Over 1500 exhibit booths displayed jewelry products
throughout the property. Included in the exhibit booth total were 110
booths from China and 40 booths from Canada. The Venetian maintained
contact with the Center for Disease Control and the Clark County Health
District concerning the possible courses of action to take in the event
that one of our conventioneers displayed signs of the SARS virus.
Fortunately, no cases were reported, but we planned for the worst, just
as we are required to do for each key security issue.
The security directors of today face greater challenges than ever
before and we must be forward thinking each and every day, because our
greatest concern is the safety of our guests, first and foremost.
Today's directors cannot rely on the successes of the past or the tools
and equipment of the past or the training used in the past. Technical
advances coupled with a trained alert staff can speak volumes, when the
lives of thousands rest in their hands. If you haven't prepared or
anticipated each threat, the fear of failure and disaster are the end
results. The repercussions of a failed security defense can have
lingering effects for years to come. We do plan and must plan for every
contingency to ensure the safety of our guests and team members.
The security directors of today must anticipate the source of each
threat or situation and then establish policies and procedures to meet
the threat head on under the principles of ``Total Prevention'' and/or
``Damage Limitation''. In ``Total Prevention'' the department must stop
every conceivable plan of attack. Not one attack or plan can be
successful. Each attempt must be crushed without the slightest bit of
damage or loss of life. In ``Damage Limitation'' the department must
limit the loss of life and the spread of further damage. Each minute
that we fail to act could have deadly effects on those caught in harms
way. Many of the thousands of survivors in both the World Trade Center
and the Pentagon owe their lives to the foresight and training of those
dedicated security and safety professionals who anticipated the threat.
The casino security directors in Las Vegas have planned and are working
together to anticipate each threat.
In Vietnam we did what is called, ``looking at both sides of the
wire''. We look at the property from the angle of protection and from
the angles of penetration. What holes do they see in our defenses'' How
would they approach the property? Can we turn a weak point into a
strength? A good friend of mine once said, ``Being forewarned is being
forearmed''. If we know what they can do and have done, then we can
plan accordingly. A security plan begins with research. Each day I will
review intelligence reports from around the world, but not just from
one source. Several sources, documents and agencies are contacted
before I start my day. I want to know what happened in the world
yesterday and today. I want to know what the latest trick or tactic
they tried. I want to listen to the minutest shred of data or perceived
concept, then say, ``What if they tried the same thing here''. Under
the same concept, at the Nevada Test Site we did what is called, ``What
iPs''. What if the enemy did this or did that. Are we prepared to
defeat, defend and neutralize the aggressors? That is how we plan. Not
for just one key event, but multi-events, threats and attacks.
As an example of our foresight, the Venetian has analyzed the threats
and implemented eighty-four changes to the property to ensure the
safety of our guests and team members, just during the first year
following September 11th. That number has now toppled over one-hundred
improvements or modifications to our security measures. Recently in
Indonesia a taxi dropping off a guest in the porte cochere of a hotel,
exploded killing 13 people and wounding over 100. We modified our
procedures in accepting taxis on property. We will innovate, adapt and
overcome any threat that is presented to us.
In SWAT we stated, ``You are only as strong as your weakest link''. How
do you ensure the preventive measures and concepts are firmly
entrenched into your property, on every level? Training. Training for
what? Training for everything. In security we don't need to know the
political motivation or the reason why the person is doing such a
horrific act, we need to know the physical actions and their tactics.
In football no team goes straight to the Super Bowl without first
practicing, creating defensive and offensive plays, and scouting out
the other team. In security we must do the same. We establish plans,
obtain intelligence, implement the preventive measures and train.
After September 11th I received more calls than Allied Van Lines has
movers. Every suspicious person or situation was reported. People broke
the mold. They didn't say, ``That's not my job'' or ``I don't want to
get involved''. They became part of the security department. The size
of my department isn't the number of officers I have on my staff, but
it should be everyone that enters the property. We cannot afford to
become complacent as the Al Qaeda training manual has indicated. We
continuously train our front line staff to be vigilant and recognize
suspicious persons or situations. Ask your staff this one question,
``Do you feel safe?'' If they don't feel safe, then the directive of
each security director and corporate officer is to reverse this sense
of insecurity without question.
In conclusion, Mel Gibson played Benjamin Martin in the movie, ``The
Patriot'', he stated, ``This war will not be fought, not on the
frontier, not on some distant battlefield, but amongst us. Among our
homes. Our children will learn of it with their own eyes''. Isn't that
what happened on September 11th? In field of casino security the casino
chief's association has brought together the security chief's to
develop training programs, opened lines of communication between
multiple agencies and raised the level of security in Las V egas. We
cannot afford to become complacent as the Al Qaeda training manual has
indicated just because nothing has happened on United States soil since
September 11th and the terrorist acts have occurred in foreign lands.
We are working together daily to ensure the safety of our guests and
employees, but not on just one property. All casino properties are part
of the protection equation. They will never take away our freedom or
our way of life.
Mr. Gibbons. Thank you very much, Mr. Shepherd. Your
testimony was excellent as we anticipated. And it reminded me
of something that I wanted to do at the beginning of this
second panel, if I may take a moment of just personal
privilege.
I want to recognize and thank all the members out here in
the audience who belong to our first responders, whether
they're fire, police, Metro, Highway Patrol, you did a
wonderful job just 48 hours ago responding to the floods that
were here in Las Vegas. The footage that we watched on the
television were just heroic of your efforts.
So on behalf of, not just Congress, but myself and I think
a lot of Nevadans, we all want to say thank you to you
personally for the efforts that you've done.
This is part of our Homeland Security. You are a big part
of it, and we want you to know that we appreciate your efforts.
Mr. Gibbons. With that being said, let me now turn to Mr.
Randy Walker for your opening statements. Mr. Walker, welcome,
and the floor is yours.
STATEMENT OF MR. RANDY WALKER, DIRECTOR, CLARK COUNTY
DEPARTMENT OF AVIATION
Mr. Walker. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. On behalf of Clark
County and the Clark County Department of Aviation, I thank you
for this invitation to address the security needs of Las Vegas
McCarran International Airport.
On September 11th, 2001, almost two years ago, the aviation
industry suffered a devastating blow, as we all know. As
airplanes were forced down onto airfields around the Nation and
all air travel was suspended for days, the problems facing our
industry changed in an instant.
You may recall that prior to 9-11, we were faced with
unprecedented passenger traffic, which created significant
strains on the Nation's aviation infrastructure. Before 9-11,
our focus was on more runways, airspace efficiency enhancements
and a passenger's bill of rights.
Almost overnight, our concerns shifted to the survival of
the Nation's airlines and the major security enhancements
necessary to assure the traveling public it was safe to fly
again. We applaud Congress for responding in record time by
enacting Federal legislation which imposed sweeping security
obligations and requirements on all airports and airlines.
A new Federal agency, the Transportation Security
Administration (or TSA), was created, and a new Federal
security screening workforce began to assume the security
related responsibilities previously borne by the airlines.
The Aviation and Transportation Security Act required the
TSA to install Explosive Detection Systems (EDS) at 429
commercial airports to screen all checked baggage by December
31, 2002. In addition, TSA and its industry partners were given
deadlines for enhanced screening of passengers, checked
luggage, and cargo shipments.
In retrospect, we all knew it would be difficult, if not
impossible, for TSA to meet this deadline at 100 percent of the
Nation's commercial airports. According to the Department of
Transportation Inspector General, as of July 6, 2002, a little
over a year ago, six months before the screening deadline,
there were only 215 EDS machines and 273 Explosive Trace
Detection machines in use at 59 airports.
Consequently, TSA would have had to purchase and install
1,000 EDS machines and 5,600 EDT machines at airports in just
five months, approximately one machine every 37 minutes between
July and December 31st to fulfill the 100 percent explosive
detection mandate.
Even if manufacturers could produce that many machines, TSA
would have been required to hire and train enough baggage
screeners to operate the EDS and ETD machines. TSA would have
needed to recruit, hire, and train approximately 21,600
screeners to operate these machines.
Again, according to the DOT Inspector General, by July of
last year, the TSA had hired and trained only 215 baggage
screeners. Consequently, the agency was given the impossible
task to recruit, hire and properly train approximately 21,400
screeners over five months, approximately one screener every
four minutes.
With encouragement from the airports, including McCarran
International Airport, Congress responded by providing the TSA
needed flexibility to meet the statutory deadlines imposed,
particularly at unique airports like McCarran.
These requirements have posed a significant burden on
airports everywhere; however, I dare say, with the exception of
New York and Washington, D.C., no one has felt the adverse
impact more than we have Las Vegas and at McCarran.
From a high of 3.4 million passengers in the month of
August 2001, passenger traffic at McCarran fell 37 percent
almost overnight. Our hotel occupancy plummeted during the fall
of 2002 as cancellations reflected the somber and apprehensive
mood of the Nation. This, combined with the fear of flying,
kept many of our tourists away from Las Vegas. Thousands of
hotel workers lost jobs. At McCarran, most of the planned
capacity expansion projects were shelved and our focus shifted
immediately to meeting the enhanced security requirements
imposed by the Federal law.
Interesting enough, air traffic to Las Vegas was really the
first to begin to recover in the Nation. By Christmas of 2001,
we began to see a return of some of the lost passenger volume.
While our numbers during 2002 failed to match our record highs
of the previous year, they grew gradually from the post 9-11
traffic levels, while traffic at most other airports continued
to decline or at best remained flat.
However, with the return of our passengers came a host of
new challenges. Long lines and extensive delays sprung up at
the security points in the airport as a result of the required
enhanced passenger processing and security screening. This
problem was exacerbated by the layoffs of airline employees by
many of the carriers serving McCarran as they struggled to
survive financially.
I am sure I do not need to remind you, Mr. Chairman, of the
endless lines that stretched out the doors and onto McCarran's
roadways, because I know you experienced them personally, and I
know you stood in the lines as well, or the hour it took to
pass through the security checkpoints.
Immediately this highlighted another security threat that I
don't think people have thought about. Such long lines give
terrorists an alternative and attractive target, thereby
creating an unacceptable increased security risk at airports.
In addition to the security risks, we feared that tourists
whose travel is discretionary would choose to avoid screening
delays and business travelers might not choose to endure the
hassle of traveling to Las Vegas if the delay problems were not
rapidly solved.
McCarran is unique among the Nation's airports when you
consider that we handle approximately 36 million passengers who
use our airport each year; 82 percent of McCarran's passengers
are tourists or conventioneers who are vital to the continued
economic well being of Southern Nevada.
Las Vegas is the second leading airport in the Nation for
origination and destination passengers. This means that we
handle more passengers through the security screening than any
other airport in the world except for Los Angeles. Las Vegas
handles an average of 50,000 departing passengers per day.
These passengers bring with them approximately 60,000 bags per
day that need to be checked, which means we must screen more
luggage than most of the Nation's larger airports.
On our weekly peak days of Thursday or Sunday, when
tourists coming and from leaving Las Vegas, we screen over
65,000 passengers.
Like most airports, Las Vegas McCarran was not designed
with adequate space in the ticket lobby or bag makeup rooms for
the installation of large numbers of screening machines, which
are now required by the TSA. Shoehorning such equipment into
the existing space just to meet an arbitrary deadline would
have led to inefficiencies, delays, and economic burdens and
even security-related problems, with masses of people cramped
into a small area.
McCarran's analysis has shown that under one development
scenario, proposed by the TSA early in 2002, passengers
checking baggage would have waited up to four hours in line to
check their bags. Clearly unacceptable from a security and from
customer service standpoint.
Giving TSA more flexibility to work with a few selected
airports like McCarran on how to efficiently install in-line
ESD and ETD luggage screening machines helped prevent further
economic disruption to the airline industry and tourism
following 9-11 and also allowed us to meet the security goals
that Congress had established for airports.
McCarran has moved aggressively and was one of the first
airports in the Nation to be given approval to commence
construction of the In-line baggage screening system at our
main terminal. This in-line system will change the passenger
ticket counter experience to almost a pre-9-11 experience for
the customer.
Luggage checked at the ticket counter will be directed to
the TSA through a complex system of conveyor belts and
screening machines. TSA employees will screen each bag for
dangerous materials before the bag is returned to an airline
for processing. This system will cost approximately $125
million dollars to install and is scheduled to be operational
by December 31, 2004. In fact, the first two notes of this six-
note system are under construction as we speak.
Recently, we faced an additional challenge when the TSA
announced plans to reduce the number of passenger screeners
assigned to our airport. Upon our investigation of the
methodology used by TSA to make personnel and equipment
allocations among the Nation's airports, we found several major
flaws:
TSA's staffing formula was not based on the number of
passengers that require security screening, but rather upon the
number of checkpoint screening lanes that an airport may have.
TSA screeners were assigned to match the number of
screening lanes at an airport regardless of the need. If an
airport had more physical space for lanes, they would get more
staff regardless of the number of passengers using those lanes.
TSA's own formula underestimated staffing needs at
McCarran. Their initial proposal was for 528 screeners, and our
calculations showed that the average passenger wait time at the
screening checkpoint would have been 41 minutes under that
plan, well in excess of the 10-minute commitment provided by
the Federal Government initially.
Our analysis shows by adding one staff member per shift per
checkpoint lane, we could reduce the average passenger wait to
13 minutes. And this would bring the total staffing
requirements from TSA to 630.
We are moving aggressively at McCarran to add more security
checkpoint lanes. On June 6, 2002, we added three new screening
lanes to serve Concourses C and D. We are about to begin
construction on a project to extend the screening areas over
baggage claim so that we can install six more screening lanes.
However, this will require an additional TSA staffing to fully
man and operate them.
We want to thank Congress for recognizing in the recently
approved FAA Reauthorization Conference report that allocation
of TSA personnel and equipment based exclusively upon lanes or
hubbing passengers was not the right approach. We gratefully
thank our congressional delegation for their support in this
effort. We now believe that the TSA has a greater appreciation
of the security problems, especially at McCarran and is moving
to address them.
Our local Federal Security Director is an essential member
of our McCarran team and has proven to be an excellent partner
in addressing these problems.
We still have a long way to go, however. Last month, for
example, we enjoyed the fifth busiest month in the history of
the airport. In July, just this last month, we processed more
passengers than we did July 2001.
We have resumed the expansion of the ``D'' satellite
concourse. We anticipate that as soon as three years form now,
depending on traffic flow, we could begin construction of
another Unit Terminal along Russell Road in front of ``D''
gates. This will necessitate new in-line baggage screening
equipment and additional screening checkpoints for passengers
who will use that terminal.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for allowing me to review the
significant security-related challenges we faced at McCarran.
Our success is of vital importance for the continued recovery
and expansion of Las Vegas' economy, and I'm sure you know that
very well, and we appreciate your assistance. I express our
appreciation for your previous help and previous help of our
congressional delegation on these issues. I am thanking you in
advance for the help I know that you will give us in the
future.
Mr. Gibbons. Thank you very much, Mr. Walker. As a frequent
flyer into and out of Las Vegas, I can attest to everything you
have said in your comments. I can understand and appreciate
your efforts to make it better.
[The statement of Mr. Walker follows:]
PREPARED STATEMENT OF MR. RANDALL WALKER
Chairman Gibbons and Members of the Subcommittee, I want to thank
you for this invitation to address the security needs of Las Vegas
McCarran International Airport.
On September 11th, 2001 almost two years ago, the aviation industry
suffered a devastating blow. As airplanes were forced down onto
airfields around the nation and all air travel was suspended for days,
the problems facing our industry changed in an instant. You may recall
that prior to 9-11, we were faced with unprecedented passenger traffic,
which created significant strains on the nation's aviation
infrastructure. Before 9-11, our focus was on more runways, airspace
efficiency enhancements and a passenger's bill of rights.
Almost overnight, our concerns shifted to the survival of the
nation's airlines and the major security enhancements necessary to
assure the traveling public it was safe to fly again. We applaud
Congress for responding in record time by enacting federal legislation
which imposed sweeping security obligations and requirements on all
airports and airlines. A new federal agency, the Transportation
Security Administration (or TSA), was created and a new federal
security screening workforce began to assume the security related
responsibilities previously borne by the airlines. The Aviation and
Transportation Security Act required the TSA to install Explosive
Detection Systems (EDS) at 429 commercial airports to screen all
checked baggage by December 31, 2002. In addition, TSA and its industry
partners were given deadlines for enhanced screening of passengers,
checked luggage and cargo shipments.
In retrospect, we all knew it would be difficult--if not
impossible--for TSA to meet this deadline at 100 percent of the
nation's commercial airports. According to the Department of
Transportation (DOT) Inspector General as of July 6-six months before
the screening deadline--there were only 215 EDS machines and 273
Explosive Trace Detection (ETD) machines in use at 59 airports.
Consequently, TSA would have had to purchase and install approximately
1,000 EDS machines and 5,600 EDT machines at airports in just five
months--approximately one machine every 37 minutes between July and
December 31 to fulfill the 100% explosive detection mandate. Even if
manufacturers could produce that many machines, TSA would have been
required to hire and train enough baggage screeners to operate the EDS
and EID machines. TSA would have needed to recruit, hire and train
approximately 21,600 screeners to operate these machines. Again,
according to the DOT Inspector General, by July of last year the TSA
had hired and trained only 215 baggage screeners. Consequently, the
agency was given the impossible task to recruit, hire and properly
train approximately 21,400 screeners over five months--approximately
one screener every 4 minutes.
With encouragement from the airports, including McCarran, Congress
responded by providing the TSA needed flexibility to meet the statutory
deadlines imposed--particularly at unique airports like McCarran.
These requirements have posed a significant burden on airports
everywhere; however, I dare say no city with the exception of New York
and Washington D.C. felt the adverse impacts of9-11 more than Las
Vegas. From a high of 3.4 million passengers in of the month of August
2001, passenger traffic at McCarran fell 37% percent almost overnight.
Our hotel occupancy plummeted during the fall of 2002 as cancellations
reflected the somber and apprehensive mood of the nation. This,
combined with the fear of flying, kept many of our tourists away from
Las Vegas. Thousands of hotel workers lost jobs. At McCarran, most of
the planned capacity expansion projects where shelved and our focus
shifted immediately to meeting the enhanced security requirements
imposed by federal law.
Interestingly enough, air traffic to Las Vegas was really the first
to begin to recover. By Christmas of 2001, we began to see a return of
some of the lost passenger volume. While our numbers during 2002 failed
to match the record highs of the previous year, they grew gradually
from the post 9-11 traffic levels, while traffic at most other airports
continued to decline or at best remained flat.
However, with the return of our passengers came a host of new
challenges. Long lines and extensive delays sprung up at the security
points in the airport as a result of the required enhanced passenger
processing and security screening. This problem was exacerbated by the
layoffs of airline employees by many of the carriers serving McCarran
as they struggled to survive financially. I am sure I do not need to
remind you, Mr. Chairman, of the endless lines that stretched out the
doors and onto McCarran's roadways, or the hours it took to pass
through the security checkpoints. Immediately this highlighted another
threat. Such long lines give terrorists an alternative and attractive
target, thereby creating an unacceptable increased security risk. In
addition, we feared that tourists whose travel is discretionary would
choose to avoid screening delays and business travelers might not
choose to endure the hassle of traveling to Las Vegas if the delay
problems were not rapidly solved.
McCarran is unique among the nation's airports when you consider
that:
There are more than 36 million passengers who use our
airport each year.
82% of McCarran' s passengers are tourists or
conventioneers who are vital to the continued economic well
being of Southern Nevada.
Las Vegas is the second leading airport in the nation
for origination and destination passengers. This means that we
handle more passengers through security screening than any
other airport except for LAX.
Las Vegas handles an average of 50,000 departing
passengers per day. These passengers bring approximately 60,000
bags per day, which means we must screen more luggage than most
of the nation's larger airports.
On our weekly peak days of Thursday or Sunday (when
tourists come in and out for the weekend) we screen over 65,000
passengers.
Like most airports, Las Vegas McCarran was not
designed with adequate space in the ticket lobby or bag makeup
rooms for the installation of large numbers of the screening
machines, which are now required by the TSA.
Shoehorning such equipment into the existing space
just to meet an arbitrary deadline would have led to
inefficiencies, delays, and economic burdens on our air
carriers and potentially to our tourism based economy.
McCarran's analysis has shown that under one
deployment scenario, proposed by the TSA early in 2002,
passengers checking baggage could be waiting in line for four
hours.
Giving TSA more flexibility to work with a few selected airports
like McCarran on how to efficiently install inline EDS and EID luggage
screening machines helped prevent further economic disruption to the
airline industry and tourism following 9/11.
McCarran has moved aggressively and was one of the first airports
in the nation to be given approval to commence construction of the In
Line baggage screening system at our main terminal. This in-line system
will change the passenger ticket counter experience to almost a pre-9-
11 experience. Luggage checked at the ticket counter will be directed
to the TSA through a complex system of conveyor belts and screening
machines. TSA employees will screen each bag for dangerous materials
before the bag is returned to an airline. This system will cost
approximately $125 million dollars to install and is scheduled to be
operational by December 31, 2004.
Recently, we faced an additional challenge when the TSA announced
plans to reduce the number of passenger screeners assigned to our
airport. Upon our investigation of the methodology used by TSA to make
personnel and equipment allocations among the nations airports, we
found several major flaws:
TSA's staffing formula was not based upon the
number of passengers that require security screening
but rather upon the number of checkpoint screening
lanes an airport may have.
TSA screeners were assigned to match the
number of screening lanes at an airport regardless of
the need. If an airport had more physical space for
lanes, they would get more staff regardless of the
number of passengers using those lanes.
TSA's own formula underestimated staffing
needs at McCarran (the actual calculation was not
correct!)
With TSA's initial proposal for 528 screeners,
the average passeneer wait time would have been 41-
minutes at McCarran. well in excess of the 10-minute
commitment made by the federal government.
Our analysis shows by adding one staff member per shift per
checkpoint lane we could reduce the average passenger wait time to 13
minutes. By adding one more person to each lane, total TSA staffing
requirement would be 630 based on existing lanes.
We are moving aggressively at McCarran to add more screening
checkpoints lanes. On June 6, 2002 we added three (3) new screening
lanes serving Concourses C and D. We are about to begin construction on
a project to extend the screening areas over baggage claim so we can
install 6 more screening lanes. However, this will require an
additional TSA staffing to fully man and operate them.
We want to thank Congress for recognizing in the recently approved
FAA Reauthorization Conference report that allocation of TSA personnel
and equipment based exclusively upon lanes or hubbing passengers was
the not the right approach. We now believe that the TSA has a greater
appreciation of the security problems, especially at McCarran and is
moving to address them. Our local Federal Security Director is a member
of our McCarran team and has proven to be an excellent partner in
addressing these problems.
We still have a long way to go however. Last month, for example, we
enjoyed the fifth busiest month in our history. We have resumed the
expansion of the ``D'' satellite concourse and we anticipate that as
soon as 3 years from now we could begin construction of another Unit
Terminal on Russell Road in front the ``D'' gates. This will
necessitate new inline baggage screening equipment and additional
screening checkpoints for passengers who will use that terminal.
Thank you for allowing me to review the significant security
related challenges we have faced and are facing at McCarran
International Airport. Our success is of vital importance to the
continued recovery and expansion of Las Vegas' tourist dependent
economy while maintaining a high level of safety. Along with providing
the highest level of safety and security, we strive to maintain an
exceptional customer service environment. We certainly are appreciative
of the recent revision to the allocation of Homeland Security funds
that now includes tourist numbers in the formula which was accomplished
by our Nevada delegation. We recognize our vital role as the gateway to
the most exciting city in the world. We are truly the first impression
and last look of every air passenger to Las Vegas.
I want to take this opportunity to express my appreciation for
helping to ensure that every air passenger to Las Vegas enjoys a safe,
secure and hassle- free experience.
Mr. Gibbons. We turn now to Dr. Carrison. Welcome, the
floor is yours. We look forward to your testimony.
STATEMENT OF DR. DALE CARRISON, EMERGENCY DEPARTMENT MEDICAL
DIRECTOR, UNIVERSITY MEDICAL CENTER, TRAUMA CENTER
Dr. Carrison. Thank you, Congressman Gibbons, it's a
privilege to be here. I appreciate you having us here, and I
think it is extremely important.
You have my document for submission in the record. I will
address some issues in that and make some extemporaneous
comments based on what I heard here today.
I am proud to represent University Medical Center, the only
public hospital in Southern Nevada and the only level-one
trauma center in the State of Nevada. We have been fortunate
that we've had incidents with regards to weapons of mass
destruction that occurred at our hospital, and we have learned
from those.
The first two incidents were prior to September 11th. We
had an incident when an anthrax exposure came into the
hospital. At that time we had post-incident debriefing, which
involved essentially the emergency department, the agency that
brought the alleged victim of anthrax infection in. We learned
from that. It was not what I would call an ideal debriefing.
We had a second incident in the community where there was a
sarin gas threat of a person who had taken over a facility and
threatened that they had sarin gas. We were able to respond to
that with the help of Nellis Air Force Base. We were able to
obtain the medications that would have been necessary to
address this had there, in fact, been sarin gas.
We had a much better post-incident debriefing on that
incident. We were able to establish some policies and
procedures that would assist us if that occurred in the future.
But I think at that point reality had not really set in.
Reality set in as of 9-11. Since 9-11, we had an incident where
an individual in the community manufactured some lysine and
injected himself. That incident after 9-11 showed the hospital
and community really had their heart in finding out what we
could do to prevent casualties from these weapons of mass
destruction similar to this biological chemical radiological.
That incident, we had 20 agencies, 50 people. The post-
incident debriefing was outstanding. We went back to the
hospital. Since that time, that gave us new life. After 9-11,
of course, we started like everyone else to look at our systems
and see what could be prepared better. We reviewed our policies
and procedures, modified them. We have a committee, a WMD
committee. We established an incident command. We have enhanced
our security capabilities. We expanded the staff training just
so that people know what these agents are and what their
effects on. With ignorance, you can't have that because people
become terrified.
Our nursing, clerical, from the janitors to the clerks,
everyone involved in the hospital, we've attempted to educate
them on weapons of mass destruction, particularly biological
that we would see in a hospital so everybody understands and
that there is no mystery and they understand that it is a
disease.
With that, we expanded that decontamination plan. And just
so I better address the EMS system so that the committee
understands that I am EMS friendly. I'm a former deputy
sheriff, Orange County, Southern California. I'm a former
special agent of the FBI, and the current medical director for
Clark County Fire Department, Medical Director for Mercy Air
Helicopter, which provides the emergency helicopter services in
the county, Medical Director for Lake Mead National
Recreational Area, and I'm an active responder with the Las
Vegas Metropolitan Police Department as a tactical position for
the SWAT team. So I am EMS friendly and I have been a responder
and I am a responder.
Communications are extremely important. We have enhanced
our internal communications. And as you respond, it's as you
train. We have increased our training. I don't think it's
enough yet, but we're working on that. Training takes resources
as everything associated with this does.
We have done a much better job of coordinating with local
communities and working with the Clark County Health
Department, the LEPC, Clark County Public Safety Coordination
Team, the FBI, and local law enforcement terrorism. We have
good communication with that now.
Mr. Shepherd brought up a point that it's only as good as
the weakest link. I have concerns that as a director of an
emergency department and responsible for two other emergency
departments in the community that we may be the weak link.
Without allocation resources to the EMS community, first
responders to law enforcement, I think we need to remember that
the last link in that chain is the hospital. Without that link,
our best efforts of first responders will bear no fruit. We
won't save people. We won't be able to treat their injuries. It
won't happen.
And no offense to anyone, but the allocation of resources
to the State of Nevada as the public hospital in Southern
Nevada, University Medical Center for my WMD program, I
received zero. Zip. Nothing. We want to be a link in that
chain, but we want to be a strong link. We don't want to be the
weak link.
As everything, everyone wants, everyone wants more
resources so they can do a better job at being prepared. I
understand that. I understand the allocation and limitation of
resources, but I would point out once again, that what we have
are patients. Those people who are victims of a weapons of mass
destruction event are going to the hospitals. They're going to
come to us for treatment.
We have--the Clark County Fire Department Hazmat is
outstanding. They would be at an incident. What does my Hazmat
do for decontamination at the hospital? I have the ability to
decontaminate two people at a time. Past Federal rules indicate
that the decontamination area should be within the walls of the
hospital. We know now that is a great mistake. The last thing
you want in a hospital emergency department is to bring a
contaminated person within those walls because then you will
set down the only patient emergency system that you have
because the whole place would be contaminated, and that would
be the end of that link in the chain.
Extremely important to remember the hospital--extremely
important that we remember our patients and our mission to our
patients, and if we are not included in that first responder as
the emergency responder that the patients are going to come to.
The other part we don't address, you can't think of how
many people are going to get in their cars when they think
they've been exposed, and we saw this with the anthrax. We had
people bringing letters into the emergency department that had
a white powder. We have to address that from a security
standpoint. We have to address that multiple people showing up
that we can't allow into the emergency department from both a
security point and from a decontamination point, so that the
safety of those people who are providing the patient care is
ensured.
We also have to remember that because we have an incident
of this sort, the other things that occur in our community are
not going to stop. We are going to continue to have motor
vehicle crashes. We are going to continue to have people with
heart attacks. We are going to continue to have people that
have respiratory illnesses that require emergent intervention.
I can go on with that list of things.
I can tell you that the system right now is stressed to the
max. And if we had an incident, it could break that system.
That was one consideration given for having a mobile
hospital, something that we could set up immediately to provide
the care for those people who may be contaminated and provide
them a safe environment and a safe environment for those
persons who are taking care of them.
In closing, I appreciate, again. Being here. I will tell
you that we are committed to staying ever vigilant in our
efforts and to the best of our ability to respond to any
disaster in our community.
Thank you.
Mr. Gibbons. Thank you very much, Doctor. You have brought
some new information to light here with this committee and have
raised a number of questions even in my mind that I'll talk to
you about in a minute.
[The statement of Dr. Carrison follows:]
PREPARED STATEMENT OF DR. DALE CARRISON
hospital emergency preparedness assessment, enhancements and planning
As the only public hospital in Southern Nevada, University Medical
Center of Southern Nevada (UMC) has been actively involved in emergency
response planning for a number of years. After the tragic events of
September 11, UMC initiated a number of analyses to help ensure its
readiness to respond to a man-made or natural disaster. In particular,
UMC conducted a hazardous vulnerability assessment to identify the
range of hazards to which UMC could be called upon to respond. As a
result of these analyses, UMC has identified some specific areas on
which immediate efforts could be focused, given existing resources, to
help increase UMC's readiness to respond in the event of a disaster in
our community. Additional emergency response enhancement opportunities
have also been identified for possible future implementation in the
event that additional resources become available.
The following is a list of the emergency response enhancements that
have been implemented since September 11:
1) Review and revision of emergency response policies and
procedures.
2) Formation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) committee.
3) Establishment of an Incident Command System (ICS).
4) Enhancement of security capabilities.
a) Traditional personal safety and site security.
b) ``Medical'' safety, contamination prevention.
c) Coordination with local law enforcement agencies.
5) Expansion of staff training on clinical and operational
emergency response.
6) Establishment of decontamination plan.
7) Establishment of clinical resource library.
8) Enhancement of internal and external communications
equipment and systems.
9) Expansion of in-house disaster planning drills.
10) Coordination with all local emergency response agencies and
participation in emergency response drills.
a) Local Emergency Planning Committee (LEPC)
b) Clark County Public Safety Coordination Team
c) Clark County Health District Incident Response
d) FBI and Local Law Enforcement Terrorism Coordination
With the implementation of these immediate enhancements, UMC has
increased its readiness to respond in the event of a disaster in our
community. In addition, UMC has identified other enhancement
opportunities in the areas of equipment, supplies, capacity, planning
and coordination that it is working to develop with existing and/or
potential future resources. The following is a sample of the additional
enhancements that have been identified for future emergency readiness:
1) Enhance internal and external communication systems and
technology.
2) Acquire additional personal protective equipment and
supplies.
3) Increase emergency patient decontamination capacity.
4) Increase emergency patient isolation capacity.
5) Enhance security-related technology.
6) Enhance training and education.
7) Acquire additional clinical equipment.
8) Enhance ICS capabilities.
9) Acquire ``mobile hospital'' MASH-style capabilities.
10)Enhance coordination with local, state and federal agencies
to help institute a uniform leadership policy in Southern
Nevada.
11)Initiate coordination with FEMA regarding emergency
pharmaceutical distribution.
Since September 11, a great deal of effort has been devoted to
helping ensure UMC's readiness to respond to any type of disaster, man-
made or natural. As a result of our initial assessments, we have
identified a number of immediate and long-term opportunities to enhance
our ability to respond. While we have learned a great deal and
instituted some successful enhancements, we realize that we have some
future enhancements that would further increase our response
capabilities, and potentially new challenges that may arise. It is with
this in mind that we are committed to staying ever vigilant in our
efforts to do the best of our ability to be ready to respond to any
disaster in our community.
Mr. Gibbons. Now, I'll turn it over to Mr. Bill Conger for
your comment. Bill, welcome, and the floor is yours.
STATEMENT OF MR. BILL CONGER, DEPUTY CHIEF, LAS VEGAS
METROPOLITAN POLICE DEPARTMENT
Mr. Conger. Mr. Chairman, I appreciate the opportunity to
speak this morning. I'm substituting for Sheriff Young because
he is unable to be with us today.
The Las Vegas Metropolitan Police Department is the
eleventh largest police department in the country with 4,300
employees and jurisdictional responsibility of 7,800 square
miles.
We are responsible for all of unincorporated Clark County,
which includes the Strip corridor, McCarran Airport, the sixth
or seven busiest, depending on who you talk to, Nellis Air
Force Base, Hoover Dam, portions of the Nevada Test Site, and
all other outlying areas, including the population centers of
Laughlin and Primm.
Our jurisdiction also includes the City of Las Vegas. Most
of the entertainment industry in Southern Nevada and
approximately 1.2 million of the county's 1.6 million
population and most of the 35 million visitors that visit our
community each year are also our responsibility.
Our local response community has long recognized the need
for a regional approach to preparedness and response to any
eventuality that could occur.
This valley has a longstanding history of major events from
the MGM/Hilton fires in the early 1980s, the PepCon explosion,
and the yearly preparation for New Year's Eve, which is second
only to New York in size and scope. These major events have
created a viable emergency management community that has been
in full swing for many years.
The preparedness/response piece of the puzzle is a focus
that is vital to the future of our community, but it is only a
part of the total picture, especially in areas that are totally
reliant on tourism, as we are, and the economic impact that its
loss would incur. Because, without a doubt, our most important
economy and a significant portion of the state's economy is
based on discretionary spending from tourism and the
entertainment industry. Any impact on those dollars would have
a staggering effect both on the local economy and the State.
When I speak about our community, I am speaking regionally,
which includes the cities of Henderson, North Las Vegas,
Boulder City, and Mesquite, because all the local governments
recognize the impact of an event anywhere in this valley.
This brings me to the focus of the Metropolitan Police
Department in the fight against terrorism. Prevention of an act
in our community is the most important issue we deal with on a
daily basis. The fact that the economic life of our community
is dependent on the discretionary dollars makes us vulnerable
to those who would make our community unsafe for visitors. To
put it bluntly, people won't vacation where they don't feel
safe. Even the threat of an event could have a substantial
impact.
The national strategy includes the prevention of an act as
a significant portion of its effort. Prevention from our
perspective is twofold:
Number one, the open and overt aspect of the policing
function including partnerships within both the public and
private sector and educating people on what to look for and
where they can go with the information. We have created a
preparedness document for the citizens of Clark County called
``H.A.N.D.S.S.'' and partnered with the Sprint Telephone
Company to get it printed in the phone book essentially got it
out to 1.3 million copies in the local community. This gave
citizens instructions on how to prepare for any diaster.
We have created a Homeland Security Bureau and activated a
hotline for citizens to call to report suspicious activity. All
leads that come in on that hotline are investigated and either
verified and passed on to the JTFF or defunked with no further
investigation necessary. Open source information is collected
daily, analyzed, and disseminated to both law enforcement and
the public/private sector, especially if the information is a
potential challenge for that particular group or industry.
Communications operability and interoperability are
significant issues that not only affect our community, but most
other jurisdictions as well. Prevention of an act and the
coordinated response to an act are linked to the ability for
police and the rest of the first response community to
communicate with each other.
It is important to talk with other agencies and
jurisdictions, but also a major challenge facing us currently
is the inability for police officers to talk to each other
inside buildings and in certain areas of town.
The second side of prevention has to do with the covert
aspect of what we as a police agency do with our Federal
partners. After 9-11, our department moved very quickly to get
security clearances for officers involved in the JTTF. Key
administrative personnel were also given clearances in order to
make decisions based on national security for determination of
whether a mobilization may be necessary to prevent an event.
Covert operations have long been a vital aspect of the
police function. In today's environment with the potential for
individuals to destroy the safety and security of our
community, covert operations with Federal partnerships are
necessary to protect our tourist lifeblood.
I am reticent to discuss whether we are a target or
vulnerable to terrorism in an open forum, but I know the local
and Federal partnerships that have been created have gone a
long way in ensuring the creation of an inhospitable
environment for those who would cause our community harm.
I want to thank you for giving the Metropolitan Police
Department the opportunity to share our views on the vital
mission of homeland security as it relates to Clark County and
the southwest region.
Mr. Gibbons. Thank you very much, Mr. Conger.
[The statement of Mr. Conger follows:]
PREPARED STATEMENT OF MR. BILL CONGER
Mr. Gibbons, members of Congress, my name is Bill Conger. am a
Deputy Chief with the Las Vegas Metropolitan Police Department
substituting for Sheriff Young who is unable to be with us today.
The Las Vegas Metropolitan Police Department is the eleventh
largest police department in the country with 4,300 employees and
jurisdictional responsibility of approximately 7,800 square miles. We
are responsible for all of unincorporated Clark County which includes
Congressional Hearing, August 21, 2003 Testimony of Deputy Chief Bill
Conger Las Vegas Metropolitan Police Department the Strip corridor,
McCarran Airport (the sixth busiest airport in the nation), Nellis Air
Force Base, Hoover Dam, portions of the Nevada Test Site, and all other
outlying areas of the county, such as Laughlin and Primm. Our
jurisdiction also includes the city of Las Vegas. Most of the
entertainment industry in Southern Nevada and approximately 1.2 million
of the county's 1.6 million population and most of the 35 million
visitors that visit our community yearly are also our responsibility.
Our local response community has long recognized the need for a
regional approach to preparedness and response to any eventuality that
could occur.
This valley has a long-standing history of response to major events
from the MGM/Hilton fires in the early 1980's, the PepCon explosion,
and the yearly preparation for New Year's eve which is second only to
New York City in size. These major events have created a viable
emergency management community that has been in full swing for several
years.
The preparedness/response piece of this puzzle is a focus that is
vital to the future of our community, but it is only a part of the
total picture, especially in areas that are totally reliant on tourism
and the economic impact its loss would incur. Because, without doubt,
our most important economy and a significant portion of the state's
economy is based on discretionary spending from the tourism,
entertainment industry. Any impact on those dollars would have a
staggering effect on both the local economy and the state.
When I speak about our community, I am speaking regionally, which
includes the cities of Henderson, North Las Vegas, Boulder City, and
Mesquite, because all the local governments recognize the impact of an
event anywhere in this valley.
This brings me to the focus of the Metropolitan Police Department
in the fight against terrorism. Prevention of an act in our community
is the most important issue we deal with on a daily basis. The fact
that the economic life of our community is dependent on discretionary
dollars makes us vulnerable to those that would make our community
unsafe for visitors. To put it bluntly, people won't vacation where
they don't feel safe. The threat of an event could have a substantial
impact.
The national strategy includes the prevention of the act and is a
significant portion of our effort. Prevention from our perspective is
twofold:
1. The open aspect of the policing function including partnerships
within both the public and private sector and educating people on what
to look for and where they can go with the information. We have created
a preparedness document for the citizens of Clark County called
``H.A.N.D.S.S.'' and partnered with Sprint Telephone to get it printed
in the phone book. This gave citizens instructions on how to prepare
for a disaster.
We have created a Homeland Security Bureau and activated a hotline
for citizens to call to report suspicious activity. All leads that come
into our office are investigated and either verified and passed on to
the JTTF or debunked with no further investigation necessary. Open
source information is collected daily, analyzed, and disseminated to
both law enforcement and the public/private sector, especially if the
information is a potential challenge for that particular group or
industry.
Communications operability and interoperability are significant
issues that not only affect our community, but most other jurisdictions
as well. Prevention of an act and the coordinated response to an act
are linked to the ability for police and the rest of the first response
community to communicate with each other. It is important to talk to
other agencies and jurisdictions, but a major challenge facing us
currently is the inability of police officers to talk to each other
inside buildings and in certain areas of town.
2. The second side of prevention has to do with the covert aspect
of what we as a police agency do with our federal partners. After 9-11,
our department moved very quickly to get security clearances for
officers involved in the JTTF. Key administrative personnel were also
given security clearances in order to make decisions based on national
security for determination of whether a mobilization may be necessary
to prevent an event.
Covert operations have long been a vital aspect of the police
function. In today's environment with the potential for individuals to
destroy the safety and security of our community, covert operations
with federal partnerships are necessary to protect our tourist
lifeblood. I am reticent to discuss whether we are a target of
terrorism in an open forum, but I know the local and federal
partnerships that have been created have gone a long way in ensuring
the creation of an inhospitable environment for those that would cause
ourcommunity harm.
I want to thank you for giving the Metropolitan Police Department
the opportunity to share our views on the vital mission of Homeland
Security as it relates to Clark County and the southwest region.
Mr. Gibbons. And to each of you, I'm sure you can tell by
the tenor of your statements to the records that all is not
quite as rosy as you might have heard from those people on the
higher echelon in homeland security. That's one of reasons why
we are here in this hearing is to have the differences, the
gaps, the weakness of this chain, as Mr. Shepherd said, brought
to light so that we in Congress can have an idea on how better
to help you do your job.
Let me begin by asking Mr. Conger--I know that your
position, you have a great deal of day-to-day contact with the
soldier who is down there in the trenches doing the battle on
the streets fighting crime, drugs, and terrorism.
Do you feel that your officers are as prepared as they can
be to recognize needed indexes of terrorists and tactics of
terrorism to be able to report back to you, which then can be
shared vertically that information? Are they trained to look at
those issues?
Mr. Conger. I'm going to answer that this way, sir. We
still have a long way to go. We have a department of 4,300 and
we also have a large jurisdiction, and it doesn't just include
our employees being prepared. It includes the first response
community, the entire--requires the help of the citizens of
Clark County, and it is our goal to get everybody prepared and
everybody up to the level that they need to be, that if they
see something suspicious, they can give us that information
knowing that we are going to take care of it.
Are we there yet? No.
Are we as prepared as any community in the United States to
respond to any eventuality? Yes, with some caveats, and those
caveats being we have to overcome a person's innate fear of the
word ``weapon of mass destruction,'' of the word ``it's
radiologic,'' or of the word, ``it's biologic.'' And we need to
be able to create an environment that the first responders and
the citizens don't go into a panic when those issues raise
their head.
I was the incident commander on the lycine incident in
Clark County. The call that I received at two o'clock in the
morning was, ``Chief, we have a lycine exposure, we have two
emergency rooms closed, we have several officers exposed,'' et
cetera. It brought this community to the forefront on the
response aspect of this very quickly.
Did we make mistakes? Yes.
Are we going to do it better next time. And as Dr. Carrison
talked about, working as a partnership is what is most
important to this community. In that lycine incident after
about three hours, we knew that it was a horrible public
relations nightmare for this community. So we needed to get
that information out as fast as we could that this was not a
terrorist event, it was an individual act.
Did I answer your question, sir?
Mr. Gibbons. Very well.
Mr. Conger. Thank you.
Mr. Gibbons. And it's nice to know that you're making a
difference and that we are better prepared today than we were
yesterday for events that reflect terrorism. As you indicated,
prevention is the number one goal. Being a first responder says
that somehow we didn't bat 1000. We are now responding to
something. And, unfortunately, there's no luxury of batting
1000 in this world. You have to do the best you can.
Unfortunately, you are not in baseball. If you're batting even
500 in baseball, you would be paid millions and millions of
dollars. But if you're batting 500 in defending this country,
defending the citizens, you're basically at risk for being
criticized.
And what I want to say is that I hope our police forces,
our Metro and first responders, aren't handcuffed by risk
aversion considerations. In other words, there's so many
political and sociological forces that drive us today that we
are risk averse. We're afraid of being sued. Unfortunately,
sometimes that can have a dramatic effect on how we view the
overall picture.
It's something that I don't know how to address, and
perhaps you can address it as you work through these issues,
but it's something that does concern me.
Thank you for your comments. They have been great, and I
really appreciate it.
Dr. Carrison, is UMC part of the overall county picture
that goes to the State, as we heard Jerry Bussell talk about
earlier, to decide how that in the last three or four months
$25 million that have come to the State and shared 20 percent
to the State, 80 percent to counties and cities, are you part
of that decision process? Are you involved in that?
I'm concerned if you say you get zero, and we understand
the risks you just described.
Dr. Carrison. I'm concerned also because that's the first
time I've heard those figures. I'd have to defer that to acting
CEO, Mike Walsh is here. I can tell you as the director of the
emergency department and actively involved in medical staff and
medical executive committee of the hospital, no.
Mr. Gibbons. You've never heard of--.
Dr. Carrison. Never heard of the process and having been
involved.
Mr. Gibbons. That means that there's somehow a breakdown in
the communication on the county side because the counties are
involved, obviously from the county perspective, we were told
there are 17 representatives, one for each county, as to the
body that makes the decisions about how this money is to be
allocated, resources provided is going to be divided up.
Dr. Carrison. The one thing that someone might say is we
are a county-supported hospital. If that's the only county
hospital, we're court of last resort for those people who don't
have resources to go elsewhere for good medical care or for any
medical care.
Mr. Gibbons. And you are probably going to be the court of
first response when it comes to finding something biological or
other attack that comes in because you have to treat
individuals that are to be--.
Dr. Carrison. Individual--
Mr. Gibbons. Treat--.
Dr. Carrison. And the teaching hospital, we have those
resources with regard to what some of the research that is
being done, number one trauma center, we are talking about
explosive type injuries.
Mr. Gibbons. Perhaps you could do me a favor because I
realize that is a Federal level we're talking about on this
committee, but this is an issue for county officials and county
hospital, if you talk to the county and find out what the
answer is to that question and respond back to me. I would like
to know just for my own satisfaction. I'm sure there's a lot
people out there that would like to know why the county is--
major hospital, the county hospital in this community gets zero
dollars out of that first responder money.
Dr. Carrison. I understand that. I think we also have to
consider--I don't want be cavalier on this or give the wrong
impression, but I think we have to consider that we have a
hospital that was losing lots of money since 9-11 because of
the number of indigents or patients without resources increased
dramatically. We required increased subsidy from the county. We
are receiving a subsidy from the county, and the county
manager, Mr. Wiley, is--I've worked with him, I spoke with him.
He's done an excellent job. Mr. Walsh is stepping in as the
acting CEO, and his staff are doing an excellent job addressing
our shortfalls and they've reduced that. But that may be a
consideration in the funds.
But, again, that's operating costs versus costs that we are
looking at to give us the equipment necessary to be that link
in the first responder chain if we have a WMD incident.
Mr. Gibbons. Well, in any event, if you can find an answer
in that determination and share that with us, we would be very
interested. Because I'm sure it is not a unique problem to Las
Vegas. I think this has got widespread problematic concerns and
much broader applications than just what you indicated.
Dr. Carrison. Even if I were to say a comment for all
hospitals and particular emergency departments and emergency
personnel, physicians that staff those hospitals, it is a
problem throughout the United States, and, again, we're
establishing an excellent infrastructure from the Federal level
going down to the State level and then into the county levels,
but the problem is the hospital is still there. In some areas
it's only private hospitals that have that, but they are still
going to be the ones that take care of our citizens and our
patients, then they cannot be overlooked because the system
will break if that happens.
Mr. Gibbons. I think people for all good reasons anticipate
that the hospital will be there and capable of taking care of
any illness that they have because you have done a great job in
the past, and you've always been there for them, you will
always be there in future, and we may be making an assumption
that shouldn't be made.
Dr. Carrison. I believe it is an assumption that absolutely
should not be made. Because in most places of the United States
now, if you look at the emergency visits and how they have
increased and the number of hospitals that have closed, the
system is really stretched to the max right now. If something
happened, major incident in any number of places, the hospitals
are going to be completely overwhelmed, completely
overstressed. And, you know, we need part of that allocation of
resources and with particularly the training and the knowledge
that go with that to be able to be that final link in the
chain.
Mr. Gibbons. I have a number of questions that I've love to
engage with you in, including some ideas about how you create a
list of doctors and health care providers from around the State
that can respond and how do we get that coordinated and how do
we work on an emergency list that is--.
Dr. Carrison. What's actually doing a decent job on that is
association with FEMA through the fire department and the FEMA.
We have done much with local coordination with them, because,
as you know or probably know, with the event of a chemical
biological incident, we have to depend on FEMA because the
medical resources with regard to pharmaceuticals in our
community would be overwhelming without FEMA bringing those in.
So that coordination is going on. There are physicians
associated with that.
I think that part of it is much better than it was, but,
unfortunately, I still see people having meetings. I was able
to be included on the planning session for operation determined
promise, but the physician that is there today is there with
Clark County Health District. I think we have to remember,
again, I hate to be redundant, but we still have to remember
that the role the hospitals play in that first responder
situation.
Mr. Gibbons. And I think that's part of the whole process
of this determined promise exercise that is going through right
now out in Mesquite or Logandale about health care issues.
Doctor, let me go over to Mr. Walker and ask him a question
because I know that aviation is absolutely unique. It's unique
in its whole character. There is no industry that is like it
from the standpoint of how it provides the basis for an economy
such as Las Vegas.
I know that many times Congress does things in an effort to
bring about some assurances to the public that we are taking
steps to ensure their safety. Of course, the December 31st
deadline for 100 percent baggage screening, 100 percent
passenger screening that was required by us oftentimes didn't
consider the reality that those machines hadn't been built and
couldn't be built by December 31st.
My question would be to you: Knowing the strategies of a
layered defense and knowing the risk that airports have
throughout the Nation, not necessarily Las Vegas, but all
airports throughout, where should the first layer of security
be at an airport?
Should it be before they ever get to the grounds of the
airport? Should it be on the airport premises? Should it be in
the ticketing and baggage screening area? Where should that
first layer is?
Mr. Walker. Our goal is the Federal intelligence and the
local intelligence will sniff out any plots and prevent them.
Mr. Gibbons. That is my goal as well, too, and it's
something I'm working on.
Mr. Walker. But if that doesn't happen, then I've heard--
we've gone through at one time--when we talked about whole
masses of people in the terminal, somebody had the brilliant
idea that we can't let anybody come to the terminal. We better
have a processing center away from the airport that doesn't
blow up.
But the question was then you have to build holding
buildings somewhere else and have all the people standing
there, and that's the building they'll blow up. So at some
point in time, you have to understand that you can have a lot
of people come somewhere, you're going to have a lot of people.
So I think given the way the airport operates, the way that
the bags and the people are being screened, at the airport, I
think, is the right location. And then we set up a lot of
layers in there, a lot of them we don't tell everybody what
they are in order to enhance them.
There are airports--one of the things we've done, of
course, is put a lot of cameras in the security checkpoints to
record everything. If an incident happens, we have very--it's
all digital. We have very instantaneous information about what
happened at the checkpoint.
We've also put in a lot of automatic doors that are tied to
the checkpoints, so if the emergency button is pushed,
basically seal off sections of the airport so that two things
happen. One is whoever has penetrated the security
inappropriately can't get too far into the system. And,
secondly, if there becomes a situation where we have to empty
the terminal, we only have to empty part of a terminal instead
of the full terminal, which enhances our customer service. So
we are looking at all of those kind of things to help secure
it.
I think the biggest area that I would be concerned about as
the director of an aviation system that I don't think Congress
has spent enough time addressing, and that is the whole
noncommercial aviation, the whole general aviation.
You know, we have close to 500,000 operations in McCarran
annually. About 32 percent of those are not commercial
aircraft. Some of those aircraft are very large. There are
Boeing business jets which are as large as 737. And we have G-
5s and other significant sized airplanes that come in and out
of our airport that go through very little security. We don't
know where they come from when they get here. We don't know
what kind of security they have had at the other side.
And the whole security at that side of the field is much
less than it is at the passenger side, yet, those airplanes are
fairly large. And if someone were able to take command of one
of those airplanes and get full control of it, I think we could
have a serious problem. So I think that needs to be looked at
in the future.
General aviation at small airports is also a concern, but
those aircraft tend to be a little smaller. So if I were
looking at the biggest threat, I would look at larger airports
and the type of business aircraft that come in in the larger
size. But I think that is a concern from my perspective.
Mr. Gibbons. Well, I know that your concern that you just
alluded to, the private sector aircraft, has been one which the
Federal Government has looked at with regard to security of
many of the nuclear power plants because there was a
theoretical prospect that some private aircraft loaded with
some type of explosive would be used to crash into a nuclear
power plant causing an enormous disaster. So that's an issue
that they are looking into on the Federal level right now.
Mr. Walker. When we talk about general aviation, most
people think of small private planes, but general aviation
actually includes anything from a Boeing business jet, which is
very large, down to a single engine propeller airplane. So I
think maybe there has to be some categories of different sizes
of aircraft and what kind of security you might have based on
the potential threat to the size of an aircraft being posed if
it were taken over by people with some ill intent.
Mr. Gibbons. Mr. Shepherd, I'm sorry we left you to the
last. You provided your testimony first. It was enlightening to
say the least. I heard Mr. Conger talking about H.A.N.D.S.S.
program, H-A-N-D-S-S, sharing of information or creating and
establishing an informational net is provided in telephone
books.
Do hotels like the Venetian give information like that to
their tourists when they arrive?
Mr. Shepherd. Pretty much when they ask. We try to have
more of appearance of security they'll see when they come in
with the armed checkpoints as they come on the property, where
the officers will meet them when they come in. That's how we
end up doing it most of the time.
Mr. Gibbons. From your experience, I'm sure the Venetian is
much like any other infrastructure sensitive industry, whether
it's the power and gas company, whether it's the
communications, whether it's a hotel, motel, or whether it's
trucking industry.
When you do your risk assessment for vulnerabilities inside
your structure, do you work with the local police, local fire
departments when you look at that and made some coordinated
effort with them to determine what the best recourse would be
for an incident that occurred in your hotel?
Mr. Shepherd. Sir, that's correct. We use all kinds of
different sources, whether it be law enforcement, private
vendors, or threat assessment people, as well as people on our
staff that are from other countries as well. We look at it from
all sides again trying to stop any threat, whether it be a
terrorism threat.
Our emergency command center, for an example, we have set
up in three different way. We set it up for terrorism, we set
it up for life safety, and we also set it for a natural
disaster be it an earthquake.
Mr. Gibbons. Finally, Mr. Congers, my last question,
because we are out of time, we were required to vacate this
room by one o'clock, and it's little after, the program that I
just talked about that you created that you put in the phone
books for advising tourists, is that shared outside of the
Clark County? Is it shared in other counties in the State of
Nevada, other communities? Is it shared nationally or
internationally? It seems like it is a creative program that
you made and one which has a great deal of merit to it.
Mr. Conger. Actually the genesis of the project was from
the FEMA preparedness handbooks that had been around for a long
time. After 9-11, people became very cognizant of potential
danger and potential manmade disaster and started calling and
asking questions, ``What do we do? How do we do it? Who do we
notify? Where do we go? What happens if we have an event? Do we
shelter in place? Do we evacuate?'' That type of stuff.
We had a very creative person on our department that came
forward with this during Sheriff Keller's tenure last year, and
we carried it forward, partnered with Sprint Telephone,
including 1.3 million phone books.
We have disseminated this to all major cities and major
cities chiefs association. The Sheriff, when he goes to those,
he disseminates H.A.N.D.S.S. handbook, and he also disseminates
a disk.
The challenge that we had initially was not producing the
document, it was getting it disseminated. That's where the
actual costs are involved with the document. It was going to
cost the department 600 to 800 to a million dollars to get it
produced and distributed to people.
When Sprint Telephone came forward and offered that it went
in the phone book, and it was minimal, we were able to provide
for essentially everybody in the community. If we send a
document to each address in the phone book or--excuse me--each
address on the mailing list, the MGM Hotel would get one, the
Venetian Hotel would get one, et cetera. By doing it in the
phone book, each phone, each room in every hotel room in Las
Vegas has a phone book, and they have access to that.
The biggest challenge we have now is getting the
information to the tourists that that is there, ``If we have an
incident, look in the book. It's in the first part of the
January phone book.'' And we intend to carry forward with this
and get it further into the communities as we go forward.
Mr. Gibbons. Gentlemen, I know that we have run out of
time. And there's many, many questions that I have just sitting
here on my mind wishing to ask you, but we are out of time. I
want to thank you for your patience. I want to thank you for
your presence and your testimony here today.
If you wouldn't mind, just as with any other members of the
previous panel, we oftentimes will write questions and submit
them to you, if you wouldn't mind giving us an answer to some
of those questions. Maybe the questions will be generated out
of the testimony that you have presented to us today.
We would appreciate it if you would respond to our
questions so that we can add that information to the
congressional hearing today.
With that, I want to thank you again. I want to thank the
audience for being out there as patient as they have been, and
let them know that they also can submit a statement that will
be included in the record if they so choose. That has to be
submitted to us within 14 days of this hearing. So if you are
of a mind to do that and want to add your thoughts to the
congressional record on this hearing, please remember the time
lines and that it has to be sent to us at the congressional
committee which is in Washington, D.C. for Homeland Security.
With that, I'm going to close this hearing and excuse our
panels for today. Thank you very much again. And this hearing
is now closed.
[Whereupon, the subcommittee was adjourned.]