[Senate Hearing 107-1121]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
S. Hrg. 107-1121
AIRPORT SECURITY
=======================================================================
HEARING
before the
COMMITTEE ON COMMERCE,
SCIENCE, AND TRANSPORTATION
UNITED STATES SENATE
ONE HUNDRED SEVENTH CONGRESS
FIRST SESSION
__________
SEPTEMBER 20, 2001
__________
Printed for the use of the Committee on Commerce, Science, and
Transportation
89-745 PDF U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE
WASHINGTON : 2005
_____________________________________________________________________________
For Sale by the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office
Internet: bookstore.gpo.gov Phone: toll free (866) 512-1800; (202) 512�091800
Fax: (202) 512�092250 Mail: Stop SSOP, Washington, DC 20402�090001
SENATE COMMITTEE ON COMMERCE, SCIENCE, AND TRANSPORTATION
ONE HUNDRED SEVENTH CONGRESS
FIRST SESSION
ERNEST F. HOLLINGS, South Carolina, Chairman
DANIEL K. INOUYE, Hawaii JOHN McCAIN, Arizona
JOHN D. ROCKEFELLER IV, West TED STEVENS, Alaska
Virginia CONRAD BURNS, Montana
JOHN F. KERRY, Massachusetts TRENT LOTT, Mississippi
JOHN B. BREAUX, Louisiana KAY BAILEY HUTCHISON, Texas
BYRON L. DORGAN, North Dakota OLYMPIA J. SNOWE, Maine
RON WYDEN, Oregon SAM BROWNBACK, Kansas
MAX CLELAND, Georgia GORDON SMITH, Oregon
BARBARA BOXER, California PETER G. FITZGERALD, Illinois
JOHN EDWARDS, North Carolina JOHN ENSIGN, Nevada
JEAN CARNAHAN, Missouri GEORGE ALLEN, Virginia
BILL NELSON, Florida
Kevin D. Kayes, Democratic Staff Director
Moses Boyd, Democratic Chief Counsel
Mark Buse, Republican Staff Director
Jeanne Bumpus, Republican General Counsel
C O N T E N T S
----------
Page
Hearing held on September 20, 2001............................... 1
Statement of Senator Allen....................................... 4
Statement of Senator Boxer....................................... 7
Statement of Senator Breaux...................................... 5
Statement of Senator Brownback................................... 47
Statement of Senator Burns....................................... 2
Statement of Senator Carnahan.................................... 44
Statement of Senator Cleland..................................... 45
Statement of Senator Edwards..................................... 42
Statement of Senator Hollings.................................... 1
Statement of Senator Hutchison................................... 3
Statement of Senator Inouye...................................... 5
Statement of Senator Kerry....................................... 8
Statement of Senator McCain...................................... 2
Statement of Senator Nelson...................................... 6
Statement of Senator Rockefeller................................. 9
Statement of Senator Stevens..................................... 40
Statement of Senator Wyden....................................... 2
Witnesses
Barclay, Charles M., President, American Association of Airport
Executives on Behalf of the American Association of Airport
Executives and Airports Council International-North American,
prepared statement............................................. 63
Dillingham Gerald L., Director, Physical Infrastructure Issues,
General Accounting Office, prepared statement.................. 52
Garvey, Hon. Jane F., Administrator, Federal Aviation
Administration................................................. 16
Hudson, Paul, Executive Director of the Aviation Consumer Action
Project, prepared statement.................................... 67
Meenan, John, Senior Vice President, Air Transport Association... 73
Mineta Hon. Norman Y., Secretary, Department of Transportation,
accompanied by Michael P. Jackson, Deputy Secretary............ 10
Prepared statement........................................... 13
Woerth, Captain Duane, President, Air Line Pilots Association,
International, prepared statement.............................. 57
AIRPORT SECURITY
----------
THURSDAY, SEPTEMBER 20, 2001
U.S. Senate
Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation,
Washington, DC.
The Committee met, pursuant to notice, at 9:32 a.m. in room
SR-253, Russell Senate Office Building, Hon. Ernest Hollings,
Chairman of the Committee, presiding.
OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. ERNEST F. HOLLINGS,
U.S. SENATOR FROM SOUTH CAROLINA
The Chairman. I welcome our witnesses from the Department
of Transportation. We want to get immediately to the questions,
so we will ask all to try to limit their opening statements,
but mine is a suggestion, or question, Mr. Secretary. Rather
than Reagan National being a safety problem, why not make it a
safety demonstration airport, an opportunity, in the sense that
we know about the security of the cockpit, the need for air
marshals and the federalization of security personnel at the
airports, so why not immediately tell the--you do not have to
do it all at once--tell those in the shuttle business out there
that it is important to air transportation and the airlines
themselves to say, all right, secure the doors on those craft,
we have got the money to do it, and order it done, and along
with that order say, never shall a door be opened in flight
ever again, so that no longer can a domestic flight be used as
a weapon of mass destruction.
Once the doors on those shuttle planes are fixed, in the
next couple of weeks, by that time we ought to get enough
security personnel to check them in and out for those shuttle
flights and put air marshals on all of them coming and going,
so that is my question. We have got to move, and we are going
to wait on meetings upon meetings upon meetings and
consultations.
I think it was Jack Kennedy years ago that quoted the Navy
captain who said, if he waits for his ship to be fit, he never
puts to sea. If you get those doors secured where there is no
chance of hitting a Government building on takeoff or on
landing, you cannot get inside, and that is the main thing.
There is no difference. After all, we remember that the Dulles
flight was the one that hit the Pentagon. I have flown in and
out of Dulles since that time, so we have allowed flights at
Dulles. For goodness sake, do not cancel it. You cannot be
absolutely sure, but we can be mostly sure.
Let me yield to our distinguished Ranking Member.
STATEMENT OF HON. JOHN McCAIN,
U.S. SENATOR FROM ARIZONA
Senator McCain. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I am going to be
very brief, because we need to hear from our witnesses very
badly. This is a very serious situation, to say the least. I am
working with you and Senator Kerry, Senator Hutchison and
others, so that we can develop a piece of legislation in order
to ensure aviation safety and security.
This probably entails federalization of airport security
personnel. It requires cockpit security. It requires better
technology. It requires a broad range of activities, and
actions, in order to do our best to see that airport security
is at a level that the American people can feel some safety and
confidence in.
I am looking forward to hearing from our Administrator of
the FAA and our Secretary of Transportation. What we need from
you is a list of recommendations and priorities. We need that
very badly, and we need it quickly. Many of these issues have
been discussed in this hearing room in the past, and so many of
them are not new issues. What we need is your priorities and
your recommendations as the actions that need to be taken both
short-term and long-term, so we can put it into a legislative
package and get it to the Congress as quickly as possible.
Mr. Chairman, I look forward to working with you and other
Members on shaping that legislation as quickly as possible. I
thank you, Mr. Chairman.
The Chairman. Very good.
Senator Burns.
STATEMENT OF HON. CONRAD BURNS,
U.S. SENATOR FROM MONTANA
Senator Burns. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I will associate
myself with the words of the Ranking Member, and also the words
you said. I think this is not a time for long statements. We
all realize the agenda of this country has changed as of 9/11/
01, and I look forward in working with everybody with regard to
security, because I think that is going to go a long way in
building the confidence back and get the people back in the air
again.
Thank you.
The Chairman. Senator Wyden.
STATEMENT OF HON. RON WYDEN,
U.S. SENATOR FROM OREGON
Senator Wyden. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I, too, will be
very brief. As a member of the Aviation Subcommittee, I have
been studying this issue in some depth, and I think it is
important to note that there has been a 15-year pattern on this
aviation security issue, and that pattern is as follows.
There is a horrible aviation tragedy. Second, there is
tremendous outrage in the Congress and in the country. Third,
there are various recommendations issued by commissions and
blueprint studies, and then fourth, there is slow motion
implementation of those recommendations, and I think what I
have heard from you, Mr. Chairman, and I am so pleased to see
it, is that this time it is going to be different in the United
States Congress.
This time, we want to make the changes so that in 6 months
or a year we do not have Members of Congress back on the floor
in a somber procession talking about how there was another
tragedy.
I would wrap up, Mr. Chairman, by way of saying--and I
outlined this in a floor speech yesterday--that we ought to
have a to-do list made of the recommendations that the General
Accounting Office and the Inspector General have issued.
Senator McCain is absolutely right in talking about a priority
list, and I just suggest in closing, we have got it. The
General Accounting Office and the Inspector General have issued
these recommendations again and again. You, Mr. Chairman, were
warning years ago that they were not being implemented.
There are a few additional areas we can look at, such as
technology, and of course this general aviation question that
is not really regulated, but I think you were right, Mr.
Chairman, years ago when you said we ought to implement the
recommendations of the General Accounting Office and the
Inspector General. That is, I would submit, our to-do list, and
like our colleagues I look forward to getting it done this time
and getting the job actually accomplished.
The Chairman. Thank you. Senator Hutchison.
STATEMENT OF HON. KAY BAILEY HUTCHISON,
U.S. SENATOR FROM TEXAS
Senator Hutchison. I want to thank you, Mr. Chairman and
Senator McCain, as the Chairman and Ranking Member of the
Committee. Working with Senator Rockefeller and myself as the
Chairman and Ranking Member of the Aviation Subcommittee, we
are already a way down the road on a security package. All of
us have talked to Secretary Mineta and FAA Administrator Garvey
about the high priorities. I look forward, Mr. Chairman, to our
passing a bill by next week and sending it to the President for
airport security.
I think we have a short-term issue and a long-term issue. I
want to commend all of the executive branch Secretaries, who
are contributing to what I see as an immediate response. I am
seeing a supervision of the screeners in airports throughout
our country. I am seeing air marshals already on airlines that
are detailed from other law enforcement agencies.
I think we are going to build the confidence of the flying
public on a short-term basis because of these actions, but in
the long-term, I think we need a division of security in the
FAA that would have control of the screeners and the air
marshals. I think there should be a career track so that we
attract people that want to stay in this business, and with
that experience it will upgrade the quality of the product. I
think we will be able to act together.
I just want to say that I think, short term we are in the
process, and I commend you for that, but long term it is our
responsibility, and I think we can act quickly because of the
Chairman and the Ranking Member's early efforts to get us
together and make a team.
Thank you.
The Chairman. Thank you. Senator Allen.
STATEMENT OF HON. GEORGE ALLEN,
U.S. SENATOR FROM VIRGINIA
Senator Allen. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for holding this
Committee hearing. Senator McCain, I also want to commend your
leadership, and that of Senator Hutchison over the years. I am
a rookie up here, but I have watched over the years and have
been researching what has gone on in previous years, similar to
what Senator Wyden has talked about.
This is a very important hearing, and I want to thank our
witnesses for being here. I would like Secretary Mineta and
Administrator Garvey to express our thanks to each and every
person in the Federal Aviation Administration, who have been
unsung heroes, working long hours diligently, effectively, and
patriotically to get the flights down and to try to resume as
best we can safe air travel in this country.
People pay attention to those rescue workers and
firefighters and police, and they are heroes. But so are all
the men and women who we do not see, but are working very
diligently for us.
Mr. Chairman, we have a duty to make sure that no plane
ever again in this country is taken over and used as a weapon
of destruction. I associate myself with all your remarks on the
things we will need to do, whether that is sky marshals or
using new technology.
The cockpit has to be as secure as a vault, never able to
be opened. The only people to determine whether it is opened or
closed should be the pilots. We have a new paradigm, obviously,
for our pilots.
We also need to understand, as the Chairman stated, the
economic impact of all of this, and the devastating effect of
all of this on our very important airline industry, whether
that is general aviation or commercial aviation. That is a part
of our economy. It is part of our freedom of travel, and our
way of life in this country.
We have seen the layoffs of tens of thousands of people.
Small businesses, tourism and general aviation, especially in
small markets, have been adversely affected. I would like to
hear testimony in that regard.
Insofar as Ronald Reagan National Airport is concerned, you
are right, Mr. Chairman, we ought to use the Nation's capital
airport as a model of security. We should put into effect
whatever you think the best practices are for security, not
just in the cockpits, but on the ground, and in all the
security aspects. I would say to Secretary Mineta, first and
foremost, I empathize with the tough decisions and confluence
of concerns you have.
We all care about security, and I know the President is
going to address the Nation tonight. First, I am sure he will
try, to the extent he can, to talk about the actions we will
take militarily against those culpable for these vicious
terrorist attacks. I know he also has a concern about our
economy, and making sure that we return as best we can to
normalcy, and make sure America is open for business again.
The Nation's airport, Ronald Reagan National Airport, is
the Nation's capital airport. It would give everyone a good
boost if you could somehow give us a relatively certain date
when Ronald Reagan can be open for business again so Americans
can join us here in the capital more easily, whether as
tourists or for business matters.
The Nation knows that the only airport still closed is the
Nation's airport, Reagan National. Setting a date for the
reopening of Reagan National suggests confidence in the future.
I think that would be appropriate for tonight's address, but
you all make those decisions yourselves. I look forward to
working with you all and hearing your recommendations, and
working with my colleagues in this very important aspect of our
economy and our American way of life.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
The Chairman. Thank you. Senator Inouye.
STATEMENT OF HON. DANIEL K. INOUYE,
U.S. SENATOR FROM HAWAII
Senator Inouye. Mr. Chairman, I thank you for scheduling
these hearings. The outcome of these hearings will have a
direct impact upon our economy. I believe it should be noted,
Mr. Chairman, that 92 percent of the cargo that goes to and
from Hawaii is by air transport, and 95 percent of the people's
travel are also done by air transport. Therefore, it is very
important to us.
I wish to commend Secretary Mineta and Administrator Garvey
for their leadership during these trying moments. Thank you
very much.
Mr. Chairman, thank you.
The Chairman. Thank you. For the record, we have now a
quorum, so I want to confirm the appointment, without
objection, of Marion Blakey of the National Transportation
Safety Board, Joseph Clapp, Administrator of the Federal Motor
Carrier Safety Administration, Read Van de Water to be
Assistant Secretary for Aviation and International Affairs at
the Department of Transportation.
Senator Breaux.
STATEMENT OF HON. JOHN B. BREAUX,
U.S. SENATOR FROM LOUISIANA
Senator Breaux. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank you,
Senator McCain, for so promptly responding to an obvious
security crisis in the aviation industry by having these
hearings. They are obviously very timely, and extremely
important.
I think we all can agree that transportation is the real
key to economic security in this country, and that is all forms
of transportation, whether by rail or by ship, and of course,
particularly important is the transportation economic benefits
of the aviation industry. If we do not have an aviation
industry in this country, we do not have a strong and secure
country. It is just very obvious.
I think what is also very obvious is that Americans
obviously feel very vulnerable right now. They are scared to
fly. They are scared to use aviation as a means of
transportation both for business as well as for pleasure, and
that has a huge economic impact in a very negative fashion on
this country. It is our job, and particularly in this
Committee, to do everything we can to reestablish that
confidence that Americans used to have in the aviation system
that serves us all, and that is not an impossible task. We can
do it, and we will do it.
But you know, talk is cheap, and obviously now is the time
for action. As Senator Wyden has said, we have been studying
this for years, and we have always talked about the problems,
but obviously now is the time to take all of those studies and
take them off the shelf and out of the library and start
implementing them, and doing it as quickly as we possibly can.
I think this Committee will do that.
Thank you.
The Chairman. Senator Nelson.
STATEMENT OF HON. BILL NELSON,
U.S. SENATOR FROM FLORIDA
Senator Nelson. Mr. Chairman, I went to two of Florida's
major airports yesterday, and I am convinced that it is safe to
fly, that the security operations are working, and I saw a
number of the things that were confiscated yesterday. However,
that was not the case last Friday.
The sheriff of Broward County at the Fort Lauderdale
Airport, in order to test the security, had law enforcement
officers go through the security checkpoints to see if they
were working. They were not, and I want to show you what the
sheriff has sent me to show this Committee, what law
enforcement officers of the sheriff's department were able to
get through security last Friday.
I might point out that since then they have continued to
test the system, and it has worked. They have been able to
detect the items, but it just underscores the point that the
security checks of passengers need to be put in the hands of
highly trained, highly skilled people in order to give the
public the assurance.
Now, I believe that the public should have that assurance.
I flew Monday night. I flew again last night, and I believe it
is safe, but let me show you how the system broke down last
Friday at the Fort Lauderdale International Airport. This was
able to get through undetected by the magnetometers. It is an
all-purpose tool. It folds up, the knife-blades fold up, the
pliers fold up, and it fits into that little case, which is
held together by velcro, but you can see in addition the
officers were able to get through the box-cutters, the very
same tool that we have been told has been utilized by the
terrorists in last week's terrible tragedy.
The Chairman. Senator, that is why we had this hearing. It
was tested on September 11, and the Committee will take
judicial notice that we have not had sufficient security. That
is why we are having the hearing.
Senator Nelson. That is why I thank you so much, but I will
tell you, I was impressed, Mr. Chairman, yesterday with the
security I saw at two of the major airports, and I thank you
for having this hearing, and the legislation we are going to
do, because it is absolutely essential to the economy of this
country that the airlines, indeed, are functioning, and the
American public is flying.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
The Chairman. Senator Boxer.
STATEMENT OF HON. BARBARA BOXER,
U.S. SENATOR FROM CALIFORNIA
Senator Boxer. Mr. Chairman, thank you very much, both you
and Senator McCain. I will be quite brief.
First, I want to thank Secretary Mineta. I want to thank
Jane Garvey for shutting down when you did on September 11. We
have every reason to believe we could have been facing more
death and destruction had you not acted, and I want to thank
you for that.
I also want to note that every single plane that was
hijacked was headed for California. I note that only to say we
are grieving for our Californians and for every single person
who died, and I have been phoning the relatives of the victims,
and it is indeed something you just cannot--it is hard to
bounce back from it, but I am honored that I am on this
Committee so that I can do something to help you, Mr. Chairman
and our Ranking Member, to be bipartisan, and get something
done here.
I want to make some very quick points. I agree with Senator
Wyden, when he talked about how many studies have been done.
Mr. Chairman, this is just a few of them. They are all filled
with recommendations that we never followed, and we need to do
that, and I am convinced we will.
The other point I would make is that there is a role for
the FAA, there is a role for the airlines in safety, safety in
the skies, safety in the way the planes are put together, et
cetera, et cetera, but Mr. Chairman, protection from criminals,
it seems to me, is a different question. I may be the only one
that feels this way, but I just think we are missing the boat
here. I think the security, we need to look at giving that back
to our law enforcement people.
The President has shown extraordinary leadership here,
saying, in essence, we are at war. There is no declaration of
war, but we are at war, figuratively speaking, with terrorism,
and if we are, we ought to look at the laws and see if on a
temporary basis we could fill in sky marshals with people who
are trained in the military at this time, until we have been
able to train them.
I frankly feel, and again I may be the only one--I think I
may be, because I have tested it out. I think there ought to be
air marshals on every plane, not just random, on every single
plane. We have been warned, and I think that is the way to get
back the confidence of the people.
A last point, and California's number 1 economic asset is
tourism. We are like Hawaii, in many ways we are like other
States. We are not going to get back on our feet unless people
get back in the planes. That is as simple as it is, so I think
we need to do everything that we can. I was hoping some of the
funding we voted for would go to make our airports safe, our
airlines safe. I trust that the money is there, but I just
feel, frankly, if we do not do every single thing that we know
needs to be done, not random air marshals, but air marshals on
every plane, and something else happens, we will never get
people back in the air. This is our moment. We are being
tested, and I hope we rise to the test.
Thank you very much.
The Chairman. Thank you very much.
Senator Kerry.
STATEMENT OF HON. JOHN F. KERRY,
U.S. SENATOR FROM MASSACHUSETTS
Senator Kerry. Mr. Chairman, thank you very much. Thank you
for having this hearing.
Mr. Chairman, you have been there before on this issue. You
started talking about some of the needs to do this several
years ago. Senator Wyden just said to me, he has just been back
for 15 years over the proposals. There is no mystery here. The
fact is that every single one of us knows, and the airline
industry knows, people within the Commerce Department and the
FAA and others know there are a whole series of steps that are
available, that have been available for a long period of time,
which we could take, and there has been an absence of
willpower, and absence of the sense of urgency, and that is why
we have not done it.
There has also been a cost consideration. The airlines have
been responsible for the cost, and the airlines, as we all
know, because we are talking about a major bail-out, are in
financial trouble. If your financial bottom line is affected by
your security cost, then your security is affected, and it has
been. Every one of us knows that.
The folks at the security line, good people, well-intended,
are earning less than the folks in the fast-food restaurants in
those airports, and the training is less. We have got more than
100 percent turnover in airline security personnel in some of
our airports, more than 100 percent, and the supervisors are
there, many of them, for only a matter of months, so we have an
extraordinary responsibility to make clear to the American
people we are prepared to make flying foolproof, essentially.
I can guarantee you there is a simple answer to how you
prevent ever again having an airplane used as a weapon. You may
be able to have somebody go in and blow it up, I do not know, I
would hope not, but you can certainly prevent anybody from ever
getting into a cockpit.
There is an aerospace company that developed a cockpit door
impervious to bullets, knives, axes. The company has yet to
sell a single door, but last week that company got a lot of
inquiries from some of the airlines. The fact is, you can have
a policy where a hijacker and everybody in the world knows that
under no circumstances will there ever be access to a cockpit
unless the pilot wants there to be. There are ways to do this,
and if a terrorist decides they want to blow up 100 people,
they can walk into a restaurant or any other place, as well
know, very easily today and make that choice.
Mr. Chairman, the other part of the problem is, there is a
law enforcement component here. I remember when I became an
assistant district attorney, the practices were considerably
backward. State police did not talk that much to the locals,
and certainly not to the Feds, and the exchange of warrant
information county to county, let alone State to State, was
nonexistent.
If you enter the United States today, your passport goes
through a scanner, and customs can tell whether you are on the
watch list, how many countries you have traveled to, the money
spent, and so forth. The same kind of capacity of exchange of
information must exist in airlines, and there is no way for a
private company to manage that kind of effort.
You cannot know whether someone has warrants outstanding,
you cannot know where they have traveled previously, you cannot
know whether they have been on a watch list, and all of these
things in a virtual world, with the computer capacity we have
today, is discernible. Look how fast the FBI has discerned it
in the aftermath of this event.
Much of the kind of clearances and much of the process
could be done ahead of time, Mr. Chairman, if we have a Federal
capacity for airline security, and we have to be prepared on
this Committee and in this country to guarantee to our citizens
that we are going to make flying safe.
Everyone knows, if you have flown on El Al, you go through
a 45-minute interview, and there is a separation of different
folks based on the various ways in which they do their
screening. Needless to say, it is inconvenient to business, and
that is one of the reasons why it has not happened, facility,
but I think Americans want to know they can get on a plane and
be safe, and I know there are adequate numbers of proposals
already made to empower us to be able to make that guarantee to
them, and we need to just embrace it, and make it happen here
soon.
One final thing I want to say, Mr. Chairman, I am for
helping to bail out the airlines. I think all of us are. They
were in trouble before this event took place, and we all know
that, but I am not going to do that without a resolution of the
problem of rail. We have been fighting for several years now to
help resolve this issue, and we have had some $321 billion
invested in the last years into airports.
We have had about $15 billion or so, excuse me, into roads,
about $15 billion into airports. Less than $1 billion, about
$1/2 billion has been put into railroad stock, and what we
learned in the last days that if terror takes place, and if
there is terror in the skies, Americans need an alternative
transport system and they turn to rail, and it was there for
them, and we need to resolve that issue as we do this bail-out,
and I am going to insist that we do that.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
The Chairman. Senator Rockefeller.
STATEMENT OF HON. JOHN D. ROCKEFELLER IV,
U.S. SENATOR FROM WEST VIRGINIA
Senator Rockefeller. I would hope the Senator from
Massachusetts would not vote no on airline safety and airline
financial viability unless he gets what he wants. I have a long
list myself. This is a different time in our country. I think
we have to face the fact that we have faced failures, but we
have not faced fault. Fault lies with the terrorists. Failures
lie with us, and if there is any silver lining out of Tuesday,
and I cannot think of any, it is that all of the talk that
others proceed to talk about over the last number of years on
aviation issues generally, much less security and financial
viability, we have been talking about this for a long time. We
have been doing nothing about it. That is because the political
will has not been there, and the public demand has not been
there.
It is now there. This is an absolutely golden opportunity
to take enormous numbers of steps to federalize certain
security aspects, and to do other things that will put our
whole aviation system on a basis that people can come to trust
it and get back onto airplanes.
Like Senator Nelson, I flew commercial aviation twice this
weekend. I wanted to make the point that it was safe.
Unfortunately, I was virtually the only person on the airplane,
so my message did not get very far, but we have to do these
things to create the normalcy which is the American instinct,
to get back to normalcy, so if we act wisely and prudently and
quickly, I am convinced that we can do these things to provide
for safety, to return the sense of trust and normalcy, which is
so vital for one of the largest economic sectors in our entire
country.
I thank the chair.
The Chairman. Senator Stevens.
Senator Stevens. Mr. Chairman, I apologize for being late.
I have no opening statement.
The Chairman. Thank you very much.
It should be noted that El Al, the best on airline security
in Israel and around the world, of course, the safety director
was invited to attend, but because of Rosh Hashanah he begged
off, but will be with us at the first of the week. Otherwise,
if some are watching, wondering why we are not asking questions
at this particular hearing about finances, we have a hearing at
2 o'clock.
With that said, we welcome Secretary Mineta, the Secretary
of Transportation, Ms. Jane Garvey, the Administrator of the
Federal Aviation Administration, and Mr. Michael Jackson, the
Deputy Secretary of Transportation.
Secretary Mineta.
STATEMENT OF HON. NORMAN Y. MINETA, SECRETARY,
DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION, ACCOMPANIED BY
MICHAEL P. JACKSON, DEPUTY SECRETARY
Secretary Mineta. Mr. Chairman, thank you very much, and
other Members of the Committee. It is with both sadness and
resolve that Deputy Secretary Jackson, Administrator Garvey and
I appear before you today. Let me also, before I start my
testimony, thank you for the expeditious handling of our
nominees for positions within the Department.
Mr. Chairman, I join all Americans in my sadness and anger
about the lives that were lost during the heinous, cowardly
terrorist attack of September 11, and I also follow President
Bush with a firm, unfaltering commitment to help our Nation,
and specifically our transportation system, to respond,
rebuild, and recover. Though we will never overcome the sorrow
we feel for the families and friends who lost loved ones, we
will ensure public safety, and protect economic vitality, and
while it may take time to recreate comfortable confidence in
air travel, let me assure this Committee that we can and we
will enjoy a transportation system that is safe, secure, and
stable.
I also want to express my gratitude publicly about the
pride I have in the work of the Department of Transportation
and all of the employees throughout this crisis, and I would
like to call particular attention to the professionalism that
was displayed by the Federal Aviation Administration from
Administrator Jane Garvey, Deputy Administrator Monty Belger,
on down. The FAA performed magnificently, as have other crucial
players in our Department, including the Coast Guard and those
who worked with the well-prepared Department of Transportation
Crisis Management Center.
On the morning of Tuesday, September 11, I was in my office
with Isabel Durant, the Deputy Prime Minister of Belgium, who
is also the Minister of Transport, talking about United States-
European noise issues. I was then interrupted, by the chief of
staff, who came in and said, ``Mr. Secretary, may I see you?'',
and so I stepped from the conference room into my office, and
on the television was the scene that everybody is familiar
with, the smoke billowing from the World Trade Center. He said,
``I am not sure, the reports are about an explosion.'' So I
said, ``Well, keep me posted.'' I went back into the meeting,
and within 3 or 4 minutes, my chief of staff returned and said,
``Mr. Secretary, may I see you?'' So I came back out, and was
watching the smoke billowing out, and he said, ``It has been
confirmed, it is an airplane that went into the World Trade
Center.''
And as I am sitting there watching the television, I see
this gray object coming in from the right, and then all of a
sudden this billowing orange cloud that comes out of the side
of the building, so I went in and told Mrs. Durant I would have
to be excused, and by that time I had gotten a call from the
White House to get over to the White House immediately, so I
went to the White House, went into the situation room, and was
briefed by Mr. Richard Clarke from the National Security
Council, and he said, you have got to be over at the operations
center with the Vice President, and so I went over there.
By this time, of course, we knew that there were two
airplanes that had gone into two separate towers of the World
Trade Center, and we shortly after that heard about an
explosion at the Pentagon. The Vice President and I were not
sure what that was. There was some talk about it being a
helicopter, then it became apparent it was a commercial
airliner.
Like anything else, when one of something occurs, it is an
accident, when two of the same thing occurs, it is a pattern,
and when three of the same thing occurs, it is a program, so I
immediately called the FAA and told them to bring all the
airplanes down ``right now.''
All that we have learned since that fateful morning leaves
me convinced that this unusual order was the right thing to do,
and thanks to thorough preparation, the Department of
Transportation's Crisis Management Center took only minutes to
kick into action. The various modal administrations within the
Department secured thousands of transportation facilities, and
the United States Coast Guard secured our harbors and
waterways, while also readying its rescue capabilities.
As we look to the future, the administration is already
moving to restore public confidence in our transportation
system and infrastructure. On September 13, I announced the
gradual restoration of mobility within the national air space
system. We took immediate steps to develop heightened security
measures to ensure the security and the safety of airline
passengers as well as people on the ground.
As all of you know, all the country's major airports, with
the exception of the Ronald Reagan Washington National Airport,
have resumed air service operations. Now, because safety is of
paramount importance, I required that heightened security
measures, including a thorough search and security check of all
airports and airplanes be in place before any air service
resumed last week.
In addition, we discontinued curbside check-in at every
airport, and passengers are now required to go the ticket
counter to check baggage. We also discontinued off-airport
check-in. Only ticketed passengers are allowed to proceed past
airport screeners. Well-wishers must stay out of the secured
areas, and there will be no exception.
Now, consistent with the strict security measures that have
been imposed upon startup last week, I announced on Sunday the
creation of two rapid response teams consisting of FAA
employees to offer specific recommendations for the further
improvement of security within the national air space system.
One team is focusing on ways to increase security at our
Nation's airports. The other is focusing on aircraft integrity
and security, with specific attention to cockpit access and an
expanded Federal Air Marshal program. Both teams are meeting
regularly and with urgency, and their reports are due on
October 1 at the latest.
These internal teams will have input from a distinguished
group of Americans with a wide range of expertise. Please note
the need for a broad perspective as we address both security
and commerce. The events of September 11 have focused media and
public attention almost exclusively on aviation, which is
understandable.
However, our responsibility is to be equally concerned
about other modes of transportation. Under authority from the
Ports and Waterway Safety Act, we have taken action to control
the movement of all vessels in the navigable waters of the
United States. All ports and waterways have remained open and
secure since September 12, and we put pipeline operators on
alert. As we restore America's confidence in our ability to
maintain the mobility and general freedoms that we hold dear,
Congress, the executive branch, and the American people must
not loose sight of the sobering need for heightened vigilance.
We cannot allow this enemy to destabilize our political system,
our economy, and our way of life, and we will not.
As I am sure this Committee understands, the economic
viability of the United States airlines is now also an urgent
and critical matter, as all of you have stated. Given the
crucial role of air carriers, and the role of the terrorist
attacks in this economic drama, immediate action is mandated.
As soon as we get all of the approvals, we hope to submit a
proposal that will include $3 billion for airlines to offset
new costs because of heightened and tightened security, $5
billion in economic relief, authorization for use of the war
risk insurance program at the President's discretion in the
domestic as well as the international arena, and limited
modification to certain aspects of collateral liability in
order to avert a near-term threat to continued availability of
insurance.
Now, these modifications will provide a brief time in which
to resolve that threat for the longer term. Additional
recommendations that we made include credits and loan
guarantees. Those are details that still have to be looked at,
and to be worked out.
As all of you have already noted, time is of the essence
for these proposals. Therefore, I hope the measures that I have
outlined will move forward as soon as possible. We would then
have the time necessary to consider and consult with all of you
about additional measures that may prove to be necessary.
I would like to close by noting my own firm commitment to
working with the legislative leaders here today. You already
deserve our thanks for the swift bipartisan action that you
took last week to provide supplemental appropriations that
helped get action underway across the Federal Government in
these traumatic times.
I look forward to the honor of working closely with all of
you as we face the complex and crucial challenges that lie
ahead.
Mr. Chairman, I ask unanimous consent that my written
statement be made a part of the record, and my colleagues and I
would be happy to answer your questions.
The Chairman. It will be included.
[The prepared statement of Secretary Mineta follows:]
Prepared Statement of Hon. Norman Y. Mineta, Secretary,
Department of Transportation
Mr. Chairman, Members of the Committee, it is with both sadness and
resolve that I appear before you today. Obviously, our lives, and the
life of our nation, changed dramatically as a result of the terrible
attack of September 11.
Though we will never overcome the sorrow we feel for the families
and friends who lost loved ones, we will be able to ensure public
safety.
And, while it may take time to recreate comfortable confidence in
air travel, I assure this Committee that we can--and will--enjoy a
transportation system that is safe, secure, and stable. The effort
being expended by the government, the carriers, airport authorities,
local police forces, and others on behalf of aviation will continue,
and the traveling public can count on this.
That is the President's commitment, and I will marshal all
resources of the Department of Transportation to accomplish that
fundamental goal.
I should begin by taking this public opportunity to express my
profound gratitude and pride in the performance of the employees
throughout the Department of Transportation. I want to emphasize
particularly my appreciation for the professionalism displayed by the
FAA from top-to-bottom since the attack. From Administrator Garvey on
down, the FAA has performed magnificently, as have other crucial
players in our Department, including the Coast Guard and all those who
worked with the well-prepared DOT Crisis Management Center.
I hope here briefly to outline some of the key activities of our
Department on September 11 and then to move to essential plans for our
future.
On the morning of September 11th, on first word of the attack, I
moved directly to the Presidential Emergency Operations Center in the
White House. As soon as I was aware of the nature and scale of the
attack, I called from the White House to order the air traffic system
to land all aircraft, immediately and without exception. That was an
unprecedented step. But with the risk of additional flights that might
be used as terrorist weapons, I believe that it was the right and
necessary step to take.
In the moments that followed my call, countless brave, tough, and
smart Federal air traffic controllers worked with courageous and calm
pilots and flight crews to land over 4,500 aircraft. Though all these
emergency landings were entirely unplanned, they were safely and
successfully accomplished. That was an historic feat in crisis
management, and it illustrated the magnificent skill of key players in
our transportation systems.
This Committee should also be aware of the extraordinarily rapid
response achieved with respect to all modes of transportation
throughout our country on September 11th.
Thanks to elaborate simulation and preparation, the Department of
Transportation's Crisis Management Center took only minutes to kick
into action. The first crash occurred at 8:46 am, and the Crisis
Management Center was fully operational--with secure lines of
communication, initiation of security procedures, and key contacts on
line--by 9 am. Then, in a pre-planned fashion, the Department rapidly
secured thousands of transportation hubs and corridors across the
United States--including bridges and rail lines, roads and harbors.
Of course, as we move forward, we must dramatically alter our
approach. As President Bush has said: the world has changed. I add: so
too has the very nature of our national transportation system.
The events of the past several days require us to take new steps to
move people and commerce safely and efficiently, despite the fact that
the nature of the threat has clearly changed. It is a mission we cannot
afford to leave for a later time.
This Administration is already moving to restore and enhance our
air transportation system. On September 13th, I announced the gradual
restoration of flights within the national airspace system. We took
immediate steps to develop heightened security measures to ensure the
safety of airline passengers as well as people on the ground.
All of the country's major airports have resumed scheduled domestic
commercial and cargo service operations, with the exception of Reagan
National Airport, which remains temporarily closed. Scheduled passenger
airline service is operating at about 78 percent of normal levels.
General aviation operations have also resumed except for visual flight
rules operations in the immediate vicinity of our nation's 30 largest
airports. We are currently increasing access to international
commercial and general aviation flights.
Because safety is of paramount importance, I required that
heightened security measures be in place before any air service
resumed. A thorough search and security check of all airplanes and
airports took place before passengers are allowed to enter and board
aircraft.
We discontinued curbside check-in at every airport. We discontinued
off-airport check-in. We no longer allow passengers to check in for
their flights at hotels or other locations. All passengers are now
required to go to the ticket counters to check baggage. Only ticketed
passengers and authorized personnel are allowed to proceed past airport
screeners--well-wishers must stay out of the secured areas.
Let there be no doubt: we will soon be taking additional steps to
increase security beyond those already taken.
Now we must deal more broadly with the aftermath of September 11th.
We have already turned toward development of long-term, sustainable
security improvements within our airports and on our aircraft to ensure
American passengers are provided with the highest possible levels of
safety.
Consistent with the strict security measures imposed upon startup
last week, I announced on Sunday the creation of two Rapid Response
teams to make specific recommendations for the further improvement of
security within the national aviation system. Their conclusions are due
October 1, at the latest. One team is focusing on ways to increase
security at our nation's airports. The other is focusing on aircraft
integrity and security. Among those areas that will be addressed will
be making airport screening a more credible deterrent, expanding the
Federal Air Marshal program, and enhancing cockpit security. Both teams
are now undertaking their tasks with a sense of urgency.
As they work on these teams, our own experts at the Federal
Aviation Administration and Department of Transportation will have
input from a distinguished group of Americans with a wide range of
expertise in many different aspects of air transportation and law
enforcement.
I understand the complexity of these issues, and I know there have
been numerous studies on many of these issues. Yet the larger context
has changed dramatically. We now face a different security threat not
only in transportation, but in all aspects of American life. We have to
be willing to meet that changed threat with additional counter-
measures, and still find ways to keep our transportation systems the
efficient and vital circulation system of our economy. We must
therefore judge our security options in a different light than we might
have judged them in the past.
What I expect now are good, unambiguous answers to the new
questions and heightened risks. The Department of Transportation has
acted promptly in response to the changed circumstances, and we will
take further actions promptly.
Broader Security Concerns
We also need to keep a broad perspective as we address both
security and commerce. The events of September 11th have focused media
and public attention almost exclusively on aviation , which is
understandable. Yet, as Vice President Cheney has noted, the odds are
good that terrorists may use entirely new lines of attack. The
Department I am honored to direct is focusing on all modes of
transportation, including but not limited to airplanes and airports.
Thus, under authority from the Ports and Waterways Safety Act, we
have taken action to control the movement of all vessels in the
navigable waters of the United States.
All ports and waterways have remained open and secure since Sept.
12 with very limited exceptions. We put pipeline operators on alert.
And with the resources provided to the U.S. Coast Guard, it has
performed with monumental efficiency.
In the New York City area, our employees have worked selflessly for
days to bring services back, provide alternative means of access to the
City, and, at the same time, guard against possible further acts of
terrorism.
I want to emphasize the over-arching threat we now face. The new
security measures we have already implemented--and those we will
implement both publicly and discreetly--are not designed simply to deal
with threats of further attacks like those of September 11th.
For example, the President has asked our Department to help protect
the integrity of our nation's entire transportation infrastructure. And
that is what we are doing. But we also have to recognize that we have
to meet the challenge of new and different security threats not only in
transportation, but throughout our society.
We will have to take precautions in transportation that we have
never taken before, and we will have to do the same in virtually every
aspect of American life. We will find ways to preserve the best of our
transportation systems--the freedom of movement, the safe and efficient
movement of goods and people that is so necessary to our economy. We
will find ways to accomplish both heightened security and the benefits
of efficient transportation system.
Economic Response
I turn now to another critical topic--maintaining the air
transportation system in the face of severe financial problems. The
current situation in the airline industry is that access to credit
markets is greatly restricted and revenues dramatically diminished.
I would emphasize that the task at hand is not to prop up one or
another of the carriers. It is not to ``make whole'' the industry as if
September 11th had never occurred. Rather it is to recognize that this
key part of the economy of this country requires new foundations in
security and confidence as solid as they were once before. I believe
the Federal Government has a responsibility for the safety of the
public, airline passengers and crews in particular, and to ensure the
foundation of security, insurance, and other necessities that will help
this key part of the U.S. economy function. This nation needs a vital,
viable, and competitive airline industry.
Accordingly, we are proposing on an expedited basis an initial
package to provide strength, security, and confidence in air
transportation.
Our proposal includes:
$3 billion to airlines to help offset the substantial new
costs they are incurring because of tightened security
requirements.
$5 billion in direct and immediate payments to airlines,
roughly in proportion to their size.
Authorization for the War Risk Insurance Program to be
invoked, at the President's discretion, in the domestic arena
as well as the international.
Limited modifications to certain aspects of collateral
liability, in order to avert a near-term threat to the
continued availability of insurance coverage. The main purpose
is to give us a brief period of time in which to try to resolve
that threat.
We have additional steps under consideration, some of would take
additional time to fully sort out. We believe that on the measures we
are now proposing, time is of the essence. We believe these proposals
should move forward immediately, and we would then have additional days
to consider and to consult with you on additional measures that may be
needed.
I would like to close by taking this occasion to thank this
Congress for its swift, bipartisan action last week in providing needed
supplemental appropriations to get action underway across the
Government. I look forward to of working closely with each of you as we
face and meet the challenges ahead.
This completes my prepared statement. I would be pleased to respond
to the Committee's questions.
The Chairman. Ms. Garvey, do you have a statement?
STATEMENT OF HON. JANE F. GARVEY, ADMINISTRATOR, FEDERAL
AVIATION ADMINISTRATION
Ms. Garvey. Mr. Chairman, I will be very brief.
Mr. Chairman, Senator McCain, Members of the Committee, let
me first of all join the Secretary in offering our heartfelt
condolences and prayers, and those of everyone at the FAA, to
the families and friends of all of those victims of last
Tuesday's terrible tragedy, and also if I could take a public
moment to express my profound gratitude to the FAA staff as the
Secretary has done, and particularly to the air traffic
controllers.
One editorial writer who was on a plane that landed safely
wrote in an editorial that in a life and death situation that
might have been even more catastrophic, the controllers, the
system people and management supporting them did their jobs and
brought tens of thousands of Americans back to earth safely.
It is for me a singular honor to be associated with them in
this time that has been extraordinarily difficult. As the
Secretary has noted, in the aftermath of last Tuesday, the
President called on America to begin to return to normal as
quickly as possible. For those of us at the FAA, that has meant
we have needed to focus on two principal areas. First of all,
to work with the airports and to work with the airlines to put
in place very stringent security measures, and we have done
that. We have worked very, very closely with all aspects of the
aviation community. The Secretary has mentioned those in some
detail.
I will only add that I think when you look at all of those
security measures, as some of you have mentioned, you really
have to think of them as a series of redundancies within the
system. Some of those initiatives, as many of you know, are
very similar to those that were in place during the gulf war,
others are a further step. I do want to add a note about the
Federal air marshals, and again to join the Secretary in his
comments.
We are extraordinarily grateful to Congress. You allowed us
in the last several days to move very quickly on this air
marshall program to enhance those numbers, to beef up those
numbers, and we have done that really because we know the money
that is in place to do exactly that. We are also
extraordinarily grateful to the Attorney General, who has added
forces from Treasury and Justice so we can proceed quickly and
expeditiously in a program that we believe is very, very
important.
The second focus for us at the FAA obviously has been to
restore the system. We have done that, again, in very close
collaboration with the airports and with the airlines. We have
done it, we believe, methodically and deliberatively. The
system still is not fully up and operational, but we have done
that in a way that I think allows the airlines and commercial
aviation to transition in a thoughtful way.
Airlines are moving throughout the system. They are
operating at about 60 percent capacity, in some cases slightly
more than that. The load factors are still very light, as some
of you have suggested from your own travels, but in talking
with the CEO's yesterday we are beginning to see some increase
in passenger numbers, and that is very good news.
Let me just close by also mentioning, as the Secretary has
mentioned, that the incidents of last Tuesday have caused all
of us, airlines, airport operation, and public policymakers, to
rethink the balance of responsibility for civil aviation
security. We must simply think differently about this issue.
Civil aviation has been forever changed, which really leads me
to my last point.
The Secretary spoke about the rapid response teams. We are
very actively engaged in producing those recommendations. My
direction to the staff has been based on my conversations with
the Secretary. The actions must be implementable. They must be
implementable in the short term, in the long term. This is no
time for study. This is no time for review. This is really a
time, as the Secretary has told all of us, it is a time for
action.
One final last personal note, I will tell you in the last
week there have been many moments at the FAA when despair has
set in, but I will tell you that in every one of those moments,
overriding despair has been an absolute resolve, and an
absolute determination to work around the clock, if that is
what it takes, to do everything that we can to restore public
confidence in aviation.
I am really proud to be associated with the people who have
done that, and I am proud to be here today in front of you and
thank you all for your help and your confidence and your
support.
The Chairman. Mr. Michael Jackson has been heading up for
the Secretary the Task Force on Security, and I invited him to
also join us at the table. Do you have a prepared statement?
Mr. Jackson. I do not, Mr. Chairman. I am happy to be here.
The Chairman. Well, we welcome you.
Mr. Secretary, again, I am trying to get safety ahead of
money, but it looks like this crowd can work quicker on money
than they can on safety. What is the matter with Reagan
National? When it comes to air operations, there is no
difference in proximity than Baltimore or Dulles, and the plane
that hit the Pentagon, everyone knows, of course, came from
Dulles.
In fact, I do not know that the Afghans have got an air
operation, but an Afghan plane landing at Baltimore could turn
and come and hit the Committee room here or going to Dulles
could turn, and so you have got that threat and everything
else, but not from the commuters, the shuttle flights, and
while I am dillying I am putting them out of business.
Now, we have had 10 days, and I suggested last week, when I
told you of this hearing, let us go with Reagan right now. Tell
me why not.
Secretary Mineta. Mr. Chairman, Ronald Reagan Washington
National Airport is closed because that decision really is not
in our hands.
The Chairman. If it is in the Secret Service's hands, it
will never get open.
Secretary Mineta. It is in the hands right now of the
National Security Council, and specifically the U.S. Secret
Service.
The Chairman. That is what I was afraid of. Can you explain
the facts of life and the reality that we can make it secure,
and tell those commuters those shuttle planes to order one of
these Kevlar doors and get them in there in the next 2 weeks?
We can move, and once we secure the cockpit, you have got the
marshals, you have got the personnel to federalize it, so what
are they going to wait on? Just keep it closed and make sure
the airlines go broke.
Secretary Mineta. We have made all those points, Mr.
Chairman, and I recognize that one of the airlines is in a very
precarious state, and I even made the statement that if we do
not open DCA within 10 days one of the major airlines will be
going under, but their concern is the security issue.
The Chairman. Well, I have got the record of the hearings
with respect to the federalization of personnel at the
airports, the security personnel, that is from Secretary Pena
back 5 years ago, but rather my hope is to help and not to nag
and to prove my point or everything else of that kind. I still
cannot understand why the National Security Council is dillying
around. Tell them, let us move and order the doors, and get the
personnel out there, and get the marshals on those particular
planes, and let us get this country moving.
If you are at war--and I will never forget, when we had
World War II come on there was a little lieutenant colonel from
the Army Corps of Engineers that broke ground for the most
massive manufacturing facility in the world, Building Number 1
outside Marietta, Georgia, covering 73 acres. By the end of the
war, they were spitting out five B-29's a day. Ground was
broken on February 1, 1942, and by March 1, 1943 it was
producing planes at that time.
This country, if we are really going to war, has got to get
moving up here. We seem to be the problem, studying and
continue to study, but that point has been made.
Secretary Mineta. Mr. Chairman, I can only speak to my
activity since the 25th of January, when I was sworn in to be
the Secretary of Transportation.
The Chairman. Well, Mr. Jackson, you have been moving over
there, and you used to work with Andy Card. Can you not get
Andy moving?
[Laughter.]
The Chairman. Tell him, let's go, come on.
Mr. Jackson. I think there is a strong commitment to work
through this issue, Senator. We have two elements we are
pursuing aggressively, as the Secretary has instructed us.
First, a series of issues, related to air traffic control
patterns and how best to insulate the security risk there, and
in addition, as you yourself have suggested, a series of----
The Chairman. It can be done in steps.
Mr. Jackson. We are actively involved in that conversation.
This is not an issue the Department or the FAA is at all
insensitive to, or sitting back on our heels on, so we are
absolutely working this with the security agencies, at the
Secretary's strong urging.
The Chairman. Senator McCain.
Senator McCain. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Secretary Mineta,
I want to say, with regards to Reagan National Airport, I would
like to see it open, all of us would for convenience, but I
will not only respect but support whatever decision is made by
the experts who are responsible for this Nation's security, and
safety is obviously paramount, and if that means that Reagan
National Airport stays closed forever, I will not only respect
it but support it.
Mr. Secretary, in your list of financial recommendations,
you leave out loan guarantees. Have you considered that option?
Is that part of your package, or what?
Secretary Mineta. That was part of our recommendations as
we talked out these issues. At the present time that has not
been included in the package at the White House--I think it is
still an open question, but let me turn to Mr. Jackson on the
latest since he was in a meeting as late as 9:10 this morning
on this.
Mr. Jackson. Senator, as the Secretary has said, the
industry came to us and asked for a variety of actions. We are
trying to get a first tranche of support into the system this
week, and we are hoping to work with the Congress to move that.
We know that there are a series of second tranche issues to
look at.
Senator McCain. The airlines view this as a first tranche
issue, as far as their financial viability is concerned. I
think we need to visit that issue very carefully, and not 100
percent, maybe only 80 percent, but I have talked to no one in
the industry that does not believe that loan guarantee is a
critical item first tranche, so I hope we can work on that.
Secretary Mineta, do you believe we need to federalize the
airport security forces?
Secretary Mineta. We have looked at that, and I suppose if
it would be a question of whether or not--when you say
federalize, I assume this is referring to the screening
operation at the airports.
Senator McCain. Airport security personnel.
Secretary Mineta. If we are to federalize that, we feel it
would probably take in the range of about 28,000 FTE's, full-
time equivalents. When you take salary, equipment, retirement,
all of the cost involved, we are looking at somewhere around
$1.8 billion, so there is an alternative that we are pressing.
Senator McCain. Well, if we do not do that, what are the
other options?
Secretary Mineta. The alternative is something advocated in
the past such as Senator Kay Bailey Hutchison's bill relating
to security, giving to the FAA the authority to increase the
standards and to increase the training requirements, do things
on background investigation, and that has already been passed.
We have the regulations prepared on that. The problem is that
there was a hold put on the regulations going forward by OMB
until our task forces come back with their specific
recommendations on airport security.
Senator McCain. Ms. Garvey, do you have a view on the
federalization of airport security?
Ms. Garvey. The first point is, it has to be fundamentally
changed. Federalization is one option, as the Secretary said,
the cost to it is about $1.8 billion, but that is certainly one
option. Another option that has been proposed, that the rapid
response team is looking at, is a not-for-profit corporation
with a board of directors, with a dedicated part of the ticket
tax, or a dedicated part of the PFC. I think the principle is
that aviation security must be fundamentally changed, and
whether it is federalized or not-for-profit corporation, those
are two alternatives.
Senator McCain. Mr. Secretary, the rapid response task
force is going to report to you on October 1. How quick are you
going to have a legislative package up for us after that?
Secretary Mineta. Even though, Senator McCain, the task
force report will come to me then, every day we are staying in
touch with those task forces in terms of their recommendations,
so it is not that I am waiting until October 1, but as soon as
that report comes in, we will have specific legislative
recommendations where they are necessary. Some of it may
already be possible, given present law and given the
appropriations that was passed last week.
Senator McCain. Ms. Garvey, do you believe there is
anything within reason that the FAA could have done to prevent
the tragedy that happened last Tuesday?
Ms. Garvey. I have asked myself that every single day,
Senator. I think we always, whenever there is a tragedy like
this, you have to ask yourself that question, are there things
that you could have done differently. I do think in the face of
an individual who was willing to commit suicide, in the face of
an individual who was willing to use a plane as a weapon, it
was a very difficult situation. It has changed the way we think
of our own security, all of our security directives, and I
spoke with Ken Mead about this at length yesterday.
All of our security recommendations in the past have been
geared toward explosive. If you look at many of the
recommendations that the IG has put forward, and the GAO, and
our own, it has had to do with combatting explosives. This was
a whole new world for us.
Senator McCain. Let me point out in September 1996 the Gore
commission asked that security screening companies develop
uniform training procedures for all security screening
personnel. In its 2000 report, the Inspector General for the
Department of Transportation discussed the test that he
conducted in which the Inspector General sent an armed
individual through secure areas in airports, in some cases
illegally boarded an aircraft. We have had study after study,
commission after commission come before this Committee and
issue reports and recommendations that called for significant
changes.
Ms. Garvey. To the screeners in particular, Senator.
Senator McCain. On a broad variety of areas, and in all
candor, many of those recommendations were either not taken
seriously enough, or not implemented.
Ms. Garvey. Senator, just one note on the screeners. As the
Secretary mentioned the training requirements are ready to go.
Quite honestly, we have pulled all those back and said, given
what we have seen now, are those really the right requirements
we want to put in place.
Senator McCain. Do you have aviation security equipment now
sitting in warehouses because of a lack of funds for
installation?
Ms. Garvey. We have had some difficulties with the
equipment, yes.
Senator McCain. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
The Chairman. Senator Burns.
Senator Burns. I think the Administrator has struck upon
something, because whenever you get a person that is willing to
die, and use themselves, no matter what kind of screening we
have, you are almost faced with an impossible situation. How
close does the Department of Transportation work with our
intelligence people about the traveling public?
Secretary Mineta. Senator, every morning I get a briefing
from the CIA about threats, about things that are going on in
the intelligence world, and again, if I were to look back at
all the reports since I have been there on January 25, and I
get briefed every day, every morning, and I ask the CIA,
including our own security people, Admiral Underwood, if you
took all those things that we know now, is there a matrix, with
that information that we had, that would have pointed to
anything close to what happened on September 11, everyone says
no. You just cannot do it.
So the first time we had a commercial airliner turned in to
a lethal weapon, people boarded with plastic knives, that can
be as sharp as metal knives. They had box openers with a blade
this long, razor-sharp, and under the then-existing threshold,
those passed security. That is why we have the heightened
security requirements and screening requirements.
But I do get intelligence briefings every day.
Senator Burns. Well, I want to submit to you that there is
probably something on each one of us here this morning in this
room that could be used as a lethal weapon. I sit right next to
a man right here that was using one, and that is a regular pen.
This is a lethal weapon. It can be used as a lethal weapon. It
does not have to be a knife, or anything like that. I guess us
old farmers, we have always carried a pocket knife. Now I am
going to have to keep a pocket knife in Montana and one here,
because I ain't gonna get one in between.
But around this table, this broken glass could be used as a
lethal weapon, and that is hard to guard against.
I guess where I am going with this is that here was an
operation that was in the planning process for, I would say, as
much as 2 years, and no one had a clue, not one leak, or had a
clue that this thing was in process, and I find that really
disturbing, that somewhere along the line involved was 50 to
100 people, but there was no indication anywhere that this
operation was being planned, so what I am saying is that I
think we should, number 1, look at our intelligence, and how we
fund it, and the information we collect, and also in the area
of civil defense.
World War II taught us a mentality on how to think about
how we defend our country, and it gave us the mind set that we
survived the cold war. This incident now gives us a mentality
on what we are going to need as far as civil defense, and a
mind set to defend ourselves against these kinds of actions,
and so I have got to think we have to start changing our mind,
our process a little bit on what we fund, how we fund it in the
security, because if a person wants to be a human bomb, there
is nothing we can do about that.
A person can walk into a restaurant, I mean, it goes on
around the world, and there is very few things we can do about
it in a free society, so our equipment, I think we are going to
have to have a visible, visible uniformed security screeners in
airports to put the confidence back in the American people that
it is safe to fly. They want to see some visibility where there
is security, and with that we have to show some signs, kind of
like it is a duck on top of the water that looks pretty
comfortable, and not doing much, but underwater we have got to
be paddling like the dickens with our intelligence and our
security and the way we do business now, and the way we watch
the movements of people, and I have no recommendations. It is
going to take somebody smarter than I am, but I think we can
throw good money after bad if we operate in the same mind set
that we thought about security prior to 9/11/01, so that is why
I say, are you in touch with the CIA, and do they brief you on
the movements of people, and of course I think we are in a
different kind of a situation.
I thank the Chairman. I look forward to other questions
that might be asked by this Committee.
The Chairman. Senator Wyden.
Secretary Mineta. Mr. Chairman, if I might just respond.
The Chairman. Surely.
Secretary Mineta. There is no question that what happened
on September 11 has changed the world for all of us. Normalcy
is trying to restore economic vitality and part of this whole
process, I think, is that all of us, all American people are
going to have to show patience, and that patience is a form of
patriotism that they are going to have to exercise, because
life is not going to be as it was on September 10.
So the mind set for all of us is vastly different in terms
of how we approach issues, the urgency with which we deal with
issues. I know this, since I have been there trying to get
rules and regulations out of the Department, pushing to try to
reduce that time line, and to deal with issues in terms of what
we do as a Department differently than we have in the past. You
are absolutely right, it requires a mind set that is totally
different from where we have been in the past, and I believe in
our agency, in the Department of Transportation and in the
Federal Aviation Administration, as well as all our other
modes, we are in a different mind set today.
Senator Burns. Well, hindsight is always 20/20, and we have
got to turn it around.
The Chairman. Senator Wyden.
Senator Wyden. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Secretary, in recent days I have outlined a 15-year
pattern of inaction on this issue, even on the certification
question. In 1987, the General Accounting Office issued those
recommendations to tighten up the screening procedures, and
here we are today, and it still has not been done, and I will
tell you, today I am not interested in the blame game. There is
plenty to go around, but what I would really like to hear, Mr.
Secretary, from you is that this time the Government's response
is going to be different.
I do not think, for example, that we can wait till October
1. I mean, we are hearing once again the pattern of
recommendations and various efforts to study this. I think what
the public wants to hear is that this time, not just our mind
set, but the Government's response is going to be different,
and you are going to break the spiral of more tragedies,
outrageous recommendations, and then slow-motion
implementation, and I would like to give you the opportunity to
tell the public this morning that this time you are going to
break that 15-year pattern and things are going to be
different.
Secretary Mineta. I think it was broken at about 9:15 a.m.
on Tuesday, September 11 when I subsequently ordered down over
4,500 aircraft, and the skill of the air traffic controllers
and the pilots and the flight deck crews across the country
brought those airplanes down safely in less than 2 hours. From
that moment on, we have been trying to rebuild the system,
including with different rules, new rules. We did that because
the President wanted to restore the aviation system, and I said
on that Tuesday that I hoped to have it back in the air by
12:00 noon on Wednesday.
There were a lot of practicalities that prevented us from
moving to be able to open up the system by 12:00 noon, because
there were going to be new procedures that were going to be
required right then and there, and we could not put those
procedures in place to ensure the security and the safety of
the system by 12:00 noon. To recap, the first plane went into
the World Trade Center at 8:48. By 9:15, 9:20 we were looking
at a different world. I apologize if that was too slow, but we
are making differences in the system in rules and procedures,
we are not laggards, and I will put my record on the line at
this time.
Senator Wyden. Mr. Secretary, again, I am (a) not
interested in any blame game, and (b) I think what you did in
the specific instance you described was very welcome. What I am
interested in, though, is knowing whether the Government is now
going to be persistent and relentless in making the changes for
the long term. For example----
Secretary Mineta. The answer is yes.
Senator Wyden. That is what I wanted to hear. That is what
we are interested in working with you on.
The second question I wanted to explore with you, Mr.
Secretary, is the matter of general aviation. It is very clear
that there are significant vulnerabilities there. They are
described in the news media. Apparently in many respects you
can just put your money down and walk on out, and nobody really
knows much of anything with respect to security risk there. In
your view, how serious are the problems there, and what is it
that again you want to do with a new approach to change it?
Secretary Mineta. Well, as you know, general aviation is
not just someone getting in a Piper Cub and deciding to fly
around. It also includes corporate aircraft and others. It
includes, say, a wide range of different aircraft. They were
not allowed to fly until, I believe it was on September 14th
that we allowed general aviation IFR flying--instrument flight
rules, which requires a filing of a flight plan. It also
requires an airplane to have a transponder. We allowed IFR
flying, I believe, to proceed on Friday.
General aviation VFR flying was kept on the ground until
early today, and yesterday we forwarded our recommendations on
general aviation with VFR flying to the National Security
Council. The recommendations we made were modified by the
National Security Council. There are some 30 airports around
the country, major airports in which they will not be able to
fly. There are a number of general aviation types that will not
be able to operate, and so there have been a number of
restrictions that have been placed on the general aviation
community by the National Security Council in their condition
to approve what we recommended to them.
Senator Wyden. Let me ask you just one last question, if I
might, because I do think on general aviation and cargo, I
mean, Federal Express pilots, for example, are asking for
changes in rules with respect to cockpit doors, and I hope that
again this is something that you will stay with.
I want to wrap up by asking you a question about
technology. We have heard, for example, that there are new
technologies out there that could create a sort of auto pilot
function that would make it essentially impossible to fly into
a building. I would like to know whether you think that that is
credible, whether those technologies are credible, and that we
should be working with you to promote them.
Secretary Mineta. Well, this is an area I think in which I
would be very reluctant to see us legislating certain
solutions. There have been a lot of suggestions as to how the
security of the airplane might be accomplished. One of the
things that happened in this instance, the first thing they
were ordered to do, or if the hijackers, the terrorists took
over the airplane, the first thing they did was turn off the
transponder. The transponder gives us speed, altitude, and the
identity of the aircraft.
The question was, should we make it impossible for the
pilots to turn off the transponder, or maybe when it rotates
off the runway it becomes an auto switch that cannot be turned
off. The problem is that as I understand it, if there is an
electrical malfunction, they want to be able to turn off the
transponder if that is the source of where the malfunction
might be so that it does not affect the rest of the aircraft.
You could also do that by pulling the circuit breaker.
But in any event, these are technological items that are
being looked at. There is just a whole array of items,
technologically. Kevlar doors. There are doors in which, when
you close it, pins go into the bulkhead. A lot of pilots say
one of the reasons that they want to bust out the door is to
deal with fires. In the case of doors, there is a ventilation
panel not so that they can breathe in there--so that if there
is sudden decompression there is an ability of the cockpit to
maintain structural integrity.
Now, there are maybe ways to provide decompression panels
in the bulkhead between the cockpit and the cabin of the
aircraft, but that can have drawbacks. I suppose somebody could
go in with gas and put it up against the vent, but I cannot
understand why anyone would do that, knock out the pilots,
because the plane would go down.
In any event, we are looking at all of the requirements
that might be imposed, and that is why our team is an internal
team, with input from the chief engineer on the 777, also a
person who was an active pilot in the airlines, so we have got
people who are advising our FAA people who are trying to
identify new rules and regulations, and they are trying to
figure out those rules and regulations as they go along, not
waiting till October 1, so that I can say, okay, go. I am
seeing those every day in terms of recommendations as to what
direction they are going, and they are getting practical, real
world, real life opinions from people who have to deal with
these situations.
So sure, ``too little, too late,'' maybe, but we are
working at this, the people in the Department and people in the
private sector, trying to figure this out as quickly as
possible.
The Chairman. Senator Hutchison.
Senator Hutchison. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Mr. Secretary,
I am pleased that you said we are going to address aviation
security, but we are not going to just fight the last war. You
are also looking at securing our waterways, our mass transit
systems, our buses, our Amtrak trains, which are now serving so
many of the traveling public, but today we are talking about
aviation security.
Ms. Garvey, the Secretary mentioned my legislation that was
passed by Congress last year, that would require better
training and education for screeners. You just said that those
rules probably will not come out because of other things you
would like to add. However, the traveling public is still
working within the system that we have. What are you doing to
assure that there is better supervision and better screening at
the airports of our country?
Ms. Garvey. Let me clarify the first point. The rules may
still come out. We want to look at them very carefully. I got a
very helpful call yesterday from OMB, from the fellow who heads
the Rules Office, and he said, look, I want you to know we have
got a team ready. We ought to all take a look at those rules,
but we will make changes, and as the task forces or other
recommendations are coming forward, we have got a team ready to
spring right into action so we can get whatever needs to be
done, done quickly.
In the short term, you are absolutely right, even if we put
the increased training in place, that is going to take a little
hit of time just to train people and get them up to speed. In
the short term, right now, just about all the major airports
and most of the midsize airports as well I think really, nearly
all of the airports are using local law enforcement officials,
state police in some cases, county officials, National Guard.
We have supplemented, in any case, where the airport has asked,
with some Federal forces at those local screening points and
checkpoints.
The Secretary had talked with us the other day about even
expanding the use of AIP money, and I think this gets a little
bit to Senator Wyden's question as well, that in the short
term, you can use those AIP moneys perhaps to reinforce and to
reimburse some of those local officials, so in the short term
you can beef up those security checkpoints.
In addition, in a conference call on Monday, we asked all
of the major airports to pull together at each one of the
airports the station managers and the security companies. Again
the security companies are hired by the airlines, but at the
local level bring together the security companies, the station
managers, go through the guidance, make sure that if there are
questions still remaining, get those answered, so we are trying
to work at not just the national level, but from the local
level as well.
Senator Hutchison. Will the FAA monitor those State and
local efforts at the major airports of our country to assure
that there is more being done at the screening than has been
done before?
Ms. Garvey. We have directed our security officials to do
exactly that. I have to also, though, be realistic and say that
right now there are a number of other security issues, so they
are doing a lot of things. I spoke with the Inspector General
the other day about using some of his forces as well, and so we
will do that, and we will draw on other Federal offices to help
us in that.
Senator Hutchison. Okay. Let me ask you this. When we are
talking about aviation security, we are talking about airport,
and we are talking about aircraft. We are talking about
federalizing the screening process and the air marshall system,
but there is also the patrolling function at airports,
especially outside the screening area. What is your
recommendation about a Federal role to take over all airport
security, or leave that to the local law enforcement officials
with better coordination?
Ms. Garvey. That is exactly the issue. That is exactly one
of the points that the rapid response teams are discussing
today, and very early this morning I met with some of them, and
one of the points was something you had raised earlier. Might
it make more sense, for example, to combine these screeners
with the air marshals, with the other forces at the airport,
and combine that into one security unit so that you have a
sense of career progression, for one thing, and you have a much
more robust force. I think that is something we have to look at
very, very carefully, and I know that is going to be one of the
considerations that will probably be forwarded to the
Secretary. I think that is something that is well worth looking
at, because it may not be enough.
We are focused on screeners. We started the discussion
around screeners, but it may be important to go a little
further. I am anxious to hear from some of the experts, airport
officials as well on that.
Senator Hutchison. Well, of course, we want to put that in
a bill that would be going through Congress this week and next
week, and I think a career track could really enhance the
quality and the experience level of the screeners and also, of
course, the air marshals.
Also, Ms. Garvey, we have been talking about the aviation
system in our country. Are you considering it to be a
requirement of any foreign carrier that would have access to
our airports to require an air marshal, to provide this space,
and to allow an armed police officer, if we request it, to be
given a seat on their aircraft?
Ms. Garvey. Yes, we are. Yes, we are, Senator.
Senator Hutchison. Let me just ask----
Ms. Garvey. Let me just add one other note to that. In the
past, our whole focus with the air marshals has been much more
international, because that has been a concern, so there have
been discussions and similar arrangements with foreign carriers
in the past.
Senator Hutchison. Before giving them the ability to land,
we ought to set certain requirements. My time is about up, but
I just want to say one other thing. I have talked to all the
airline CEO's with Senator Rockefeller, all of you have as
well, but I do not want to forget the airports, and their role
in this, their concerns, their loss of revenue, as we are
talking about shoring up the aviation system, because it is so
important to our economy. We must also include the role of the
airports in that security and in the financial health of the
industry.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
The Chairman. Thank you. Senator Allen.
Senator Allen. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Administrator
Garvey, I want to thank you for last Thursday afternoon's
meeting with so many people in this entire region concerned
about Reagan National Airport. I think you are well aware that
this is a concern to our area.
Every Member of this Committee understands and shares
security concerns. I think you recognize that there are over
10,000 people who now can apply for unemployment benefits just
from Reagan National Airport, and the multiplier effect is five
to seven times greater, as far as jobs lost, or the economic
implications in this region.
I would also add that while everybody looks at it as Reagan
National Airport, it is really managed with Dulles Airport, and
to the extent that Reagan National Airport is closed, that has
a direct impact on Dulles. It is part of Dulles Airport in the
way the Metropolitan Washington Airports Authority handles not
just paying off the billions of dollars in bonds for the
renovations a few years ago, but also for the even more
significant improvements being made at Dulles Airport.
That needs to be considered, and we know that millions of
dollars are being lost every single day. As Secretary Mineta
mentioned, there is a particular airline that may go under. We
all know the trouble they were in, based upon your statements,
and obviously the Chairman's as well.
I would ask you, Secretary Mineta, whether you have an
update for us as to when a decision will be made by the FAA and
the Department of Defense and the Department of Transportation
and the Secret Service regarding this airport, Reagan National
Airport? Do you have any idea when you will all make a
decision?
Secretary Mineta. I cannot give you a date.
Senator Allen. Do you have a range?
Secretary Mineta. We are working every day with the
National Security Council on this issue, to come up with
alternatives. Remember, one of the conditions for reopening
Reagan National Airport is that there would only be approaches
from the south and departures to the south, which is fine to
say, but there are laws of airlift physics. You cannot fly as
safely if the wind is not coming into you, so something in the
range of 35 percent of the flights that had previously been
operational at DCA would be able to continue on to the future.
So there are requirements there that from a practical
airport, airline operational perspective, that we are working
every day with the National Security Council about, what about
this, what about this, but I cannot give you a date as to when
an approval might be coming.
Let me turn to Administrator Garvey and see if she has got
a crystal ball.
Ms. Garvey. I wish I did have a crystal ball. I can tell
you that yesterday the air traffic staff was with the NSC all
day long working on what the options are, and I really do
believe that they want to see a resolution on this as quickly
as possible, but as Senator McCain said, we want to make sure
we are addressing all of the security issues as well.
I do understand they brought in some additional outside
threat experts and I think that is welcome. We can use all the
help, of course, that we can get.
Secretary Mineta. One of the suggestions I had made is we
put an air marshal on every departure out of DCA, and every
arrival coming into DCA. Now, that alone involves something
like 830 flights. That is a lot of air marshals just to tie up
for one airport.
Senator Allen. That is with the reduced demand for air
travel, and some of the flights that have been canceled.
Secretary Mineta. But every day we have something like
5,000 air carrier operations. That is not including general
aviation. That is a lot of air marshals.
Senator Allen. If some of those ideas are what it will
take, I think there are many of us who are saying that that is
alright.
Actually, what I would like to see, along with the general
public, is some technical or operational case made of why you
would distinguish Reagan National Airport compared to other
urban center airports, such as Logan or La Guardia. You need
some factual basis why there is a security threat.
Secretary Mineta. Let me turn to Deputy Secretary Jackson.
Mr. Jackson. Senator, I would just volunteer that we
understand the importance of this issue, and particularly your
ability to bring together the community in the Northern
Virginia area to focus on these issues is most welcome, and we
would volunteer to meet with you on an ongoing basis as these
plans evolve, and discuss options with you. We have tried to
stay in touch with the head of the airport authority as well in
this regard, but I would personally be happy to make certain
that we stay very closely in touch with you as we explore these
options.
Senator Allen. When you talk to the Secret Service folks,
do you talk about the concept in light of what you just said--
the concept of a phased-in approach that was advanced at that
meeting Tuesday afternoon?
Secretary Mineta. Yes, sir, that has been an integral part
of the discussion.
Senator Allen. That would be a good first step, if you can
get them to agree to it.
Secretary Mineta. The question about flights within 500
miles, or 300 miles, and all of those options have been talked
about in terms of expanding operations incrementally so that
the shuttle might be the first to be reinstituted. But we
recognize that this is not just a Reagan National Airport
issue, because if you do not operate out of here, you do not
operate out of Martinsburg, West Virginia, you do not operate
in Charlotte, and you do not operate in a lot of places, so it
is not just about National. It is national in scope; it is more
than just Reagan National Airport.
Senator Allen. My time is up. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I
will have further questions later----
The Chairman. Senator Inouye.
Senator Inouye. Mr. Secretary, I would like to ask a few
parochial type of questions. The State of Hawaii is a rather
unique State. It is separated from the mainland by an ocean.
The State itself is made up of seven inhabited islands. When
your order was issued to ground all aircraft, several things
happened that would not happen elsewhere. For example, we were
not able to carry two donated kidneys for kidney transplants
from one island to another. There were other, similar type
emergencies that we were not able to cope with. Would your
agency favor any sort of special waiver for the State of
Hawaii?
Secretary Mineta. Well, I think in all instances now, like
that, would be able to proceed today, even after we had the
order to have no aircraft operations, we must have granted, I
would guess a couple of hundred exceptions on Wednesday,
Thursday, Friday, until September 14th when we opened up
general aviation IFR.
We had requests for exceptions, and we looked at those on a
one-by-one basis, and we did grant them.
Today, I think that most operations are allowed, except for
specific general aviation operations as they relate to flight
schools, VFR flight training operations, towing operations,
site-seeing flight operations, traffic watch flight operations,
airship and blimp operations, news reporting operations. In the
30 major airport areas, those aircraft are excluded, and I
think now most are now able to operate.
Let me turn to Administrator Garvey, because I think those
are the only exclusions as relates to class B air space.
Ms. Garvey. Senator, the Secretary is right, most of the
general aviation restrictions have been limited, or lifted,
many have been lifted, but I would underscore that in the case
of a medical emergency, even last week, waivers were given, so
I apologize if you made a request and it was not honored. It
absolutely should be. Medical emergencies should be absolutely
honored. There were some specific issues in the State of
Alaska, that is also dependent on aviation, too, that we had to
deal with in those early hours and first few days.
Senator Inouye. On the VFR operators, there is some
uncertainty as to certain types of activities. We have been
told, for example, that the scenic tour helicopters are still
grounded. Why?
Ms. Garvey. Senator, we are working very closely with the
NSC as we sort of phase in the elements, and that was one that
there was still a level of discomfort about it. There have been
some difficulties, I think, from their perspective.
But again, we are working this every day. That list of
restrictions was put in place last night, so many of the other
operations that people have been clamoring for will be able to
resume, or did resume as of last night. We will continue to
work those issues with the Security Council, continue to work
those issues among the aviation communities and just will keep
in very close touch with your office to make sure that you know
as those restrictions are lifted.
Senator Inouye. I realize that these matters are not of
great concern when you look at the problems of this Nation, but
I hope you will also look at hang gliders. I cannot see that
national security has concerns for hang gliders, but that is
restricted, is it not?
Ms. Garvey. That one I am going to have to go back and
check. I actually thought that category was allowed.
Secretary Mineta. I think that would be permitted outside
of what we call the enhanced class B air space, so if someone
is over in Kona, wanting to do ultralights and hang gliding----
Senator Inouye. The only place you can do hang gliding as
of this moment I believe is Nehi, Lanai, and Molokai.
Secretary Mineta. I would say that under what we have
authorized and given the fact that it is not class B air space,
it would be allowed.
Senator Inouye. I am grateful if you will look at all these
little problems for us.
Secretary Mineta. I will look at that specifically and get
back to you, sir.
Senator Inouye. Thank you, sir.
The Chairman. Thank you. Senator Breaux.
Senator Breaux. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I thank the panel
for being with us.
Senator Kerry and I were talking early on, when the hearing
first started, that while today we concentrate on aviation
problems, you know, if we were in a terrorist group it would
probably be the last area that we would go to for a second hit
on this country, and we have been looking at other ways to
create havoc on the American public, and I think that other
areas of transportation obviously also has to be considered,
railroads, for instance, which the security of getting on a
train is almost nonexistent, as an example, or passenger ships
that have thousands of passengers that leave every day from
ports in Miami and New Orleans, and on the West Coast as well.
These are all areas that I think under the umbrella of the
Department of Transportation we are going to have to take a
look at, and with the Chairman's permission, the Surface
Transportation Subcommittee is going to have a hearing on
security at railroads in particular, and also on ships, which
carry thousands of people.
I will tell you what I am for. I am for the Government
doing the inspections at the airports, inspection of the
passengers when they come on, doing the security on the tarmac
and around the airport. We should not be concentrating on how
cheap we can do it, but how good we can do it, and not only do
I think it gives us a better result, it goes a long way to
bringing about the confidence that the American people need to
regain in order to start flying again, so I think the
Government should do it.
I think we should consider arming the pilots, not
necessarily with pistols, but certainly at least with stun guns
that are capable of incapacitating a potential hijacker.
I think we ought to have sky marshals on planes that are
going from vulnerable airports, potentially vulnerable, that
also are at least armed with stun guns to disable hijackers if
one should happen to try and take over a plane.
And finally, I think we ought to secure the cockpit. I
mean, whether it is with metal or steel or titanium--I mean, we
make tennis rackets and golf clubs out of titanium. Certainly
we can make a cockpit door out of something that cannot be
pried open with a fork or something even less strong as a fork.
We talked about what could have been done. Had we had a
secure cockpit door, the chances are those hijackers could
never have gotten into the cockpit, and I think the science
today is certainly capable of providing us a secure cockpit
door that can be opened from the inside by the pilots when they
have to get out, but it cannot be opened by passengers.
Does that put the passengers at risk? Maybe so, but at
least the pilot could get the plane down, and they would not
have the ability to crash it into the World Trade Center.
So I think those are things that I am for, and you know,
talking about the security, I have always been sort of
mystified, and maybe you can give me just a rationale, and I am
not asking this question to be a Monday morning quarterback,
but when we have passengers going through all of the security
to make sure you do not have a penknife or a pocket knife or a
gun, or the tool that Senator Nelson pointed out, it is
interesting that after you get on the airplane, certainly if
you are sitting up front in first class, when they serve you
the meal, they give you the napkin, and wrapped in the napkin
is a metal fork, a metal spoon, and a metal knife. We actually
give passengers knives on airplanes. What is the rationale?
Why do I have a knife? You just told me I could not bring
one on the plane, and then when I get on the plane, they give
me one.
Secretary Mineta. Senator Breaux, have you been on a plane
since?
Senator Breaux. Not since Monday, but I mean, up until that
time.
Secretary Mineta. You will not get one.
Senator Breaux. I understand, but for years we allowed
that. What was the rationale for that? It is our fault. It is
your fault. It is all of our fault. We gave knives to
passengers.
Secretary Mineta. You will not get a knife. I do not know
how I am going to eat that steak, or whatever, but there ain't
going to be a knife there.
Senator Breaux. The other point is, in looking at all of
these options, there is an article, Mr. Jackson, and maybe you
could answer this, too, on the front page of USA Today on one
of the sections, I guess the money section, that says an
official at the General Services Administration says that the
very task force you all have set up is illegal, because it does
not comply with the Federal Advisory Committee Act of being
diverse in the makeup of the Committee. It says that the
Federal Advisory Committee Act requires that membership of an
advisory committee be fairly balanced in terms of the points of
views represented. Is that a problem?
Secretary Mineta. I do not know. I'm not sure why GSA would
even get into that, for one thing.
Senator Breaux. The guy that says this is Jim Dean of the
General Services Administration. His job is to ensure that
Government advisory groups comply with Federal laws.
I am glad you have got it. I support what you are doing,
but I am concerned.
Secretary Mineta. We checked with our general counsel. This
does not come under FACA, the Federal Advisory Committee Act.
That is why this is an internal employee rapid response team,
with our ability to talk to experts from the private sector,
and we cleared this to make sure that we did not have a FACA
problem.
Senator Breaux. GSA says you do.
Secretary Mineta. I hope I made that clear.
Senator Breaux. I support you on this. I think you ought to
have the advisory committee that can give you the advice that
is helpful to you, but General Services is challenging you on
that, and I hope that we take steps.
Secretary Mineta. They had better stick to renting
buildings.
Senator Breaux. Mr. Jackson, do you have a comment on that?
Mr. Jackson. The Secretary is right. We have worked with
our counsel, and we are certain we are operating effectively,
and we will double back with the individual you mentioned.
Senator Breaux. If you need help from Congress, I am sure
there will be people willing to try and make sure that DOT is
all right on that particular issue.
Mr. Jackson. Thank you. We will obey the law and get the
job done fast.
Senator Breaux. Thank you all. Thank you very much.
The Chairman. In deference to the remaining Members of the
Committee, Secretary Mineta has to leave at 12:00, so let us
try and shorten the questions.
Senator Nelson.
Senator Nelson. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Secretary, Madam Administrator, I certainly embrace the
recommendations that have been made here, and on the basis of
what I learned yesterday, I want to give you a couple more
recommendations.
At both Orlando and Tampa, with the aviation directors,
they both made the case to me that we should reopen curbside
check-in, because they felt that it was as safe as the at-the-
counter check-in, because those employees, the sky caps at the
curbside, go through all of the security checks and the
training with regard to the bags as much as do the counter
personnel of the airlines. That was what was stated to me
yesterday, and that was at two major airports. I wish you would
consider that.
Second, the question of airports being put into different
categories, category X, which Orlando is, Tampa is a category
1, Fort Lauderdale, that I mentioned about the weapons coming
through, is a category 1.
If, by virtue of an administrative decision about a
different categorization of the airport, that there is a
lessened security, which the implication to me yesterday was
that there was--and I will give you an example. Anybody going
to the ramp in Orlando had a badge that had a computer chip,
that in order to get access from the terminal out to the ramp,
for example, the baggage handlers, that badge was swiped, and
up came the employee's image, their picture on the computer
screen. That was not the case in the Tampa airport, which was
the category 1.
So if there is a difference on the security, particularly
with regard to, for example, catering personnel--Monday night
on the flight to Florida, the flight attendant said to me,
look, I have been here 25 years with this airline. They have
done checks on me completely. What about the catering employee
that has been hired for 2 weeks that has access to the
airplane.
And so the question of the security there, and then
furthermore, I would respectfully ask that the Committee and
you all consider that as we federalize the security people that
allowed that knife to come through that I showed you last
Friday, and I can give you the details--and by the way, it did
not happen just in one terminal. It happened in several
terminals. They were ticketed. The law enforcement people of
the Sheriff's Office were ticketed passengers. They did not
board the plane. They did it at several checkpoints.
All of the security failed Friday, after the Tuesday
disaster. Since then, however, things have gotten tighter, but
the question is, who ought to perform that function? What we
have heard here today is that it should not be the airlines
contracting for that function, that in order to get to a
greater security degree--everybody here has talked about
federalizing it. Well, what about the aviation authorities
themselves, who has a security force in place with high
standards that they monitor from a central control room? What
about possibly them doing it, instead of federalizing it?
The idea is to get a greater degree of security to catch
those kind of lethal items I showed you a few minutes ago.
Secretary Mineta. There is no question about that. I cited
an example to Administrator Garvey of an airport where the
crews did not go through security on Sunday. I said, tell your
FSM's, your Federal security managers to be thorough. You see,
one of the concerns I had as we were implementing this is, just
as when I was chairing the aviation Subcommittee in the House,
we had airplane mechanics who were ``pencil-whipping'' as to
whether or not they checked something on an aircraft. They go
right down the line, checking yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah.
I said to Administrator Garvey, make sure, because your
FSM's are good friends of airport directors, that they do not
just sit there and pencil-whip, that those airports were doing
certain things, that they were adhering to the new security
measures. This is because I have this example of the person who
phoned me and said, ``Norm, I never went through airport
security, yet it is a requirement that everybody goes through
airport security.'' So yes, there are those things where we
have got to ``plug the hole'' to make sure that our own people
are adhering to these standards, and you know, we are trying to
monitor those and stay on top of them as much as possible.
On the earlier example, this is what Tampa does. Does Tampa
also have a finger print machine, or a retina examination
procedure? No, because each airport determines what they are
going to use as a screening device, following standards that we
establish. The question of how those standards are fulfilled at
each airport is the responsibility of each airport, and then it
is the responsibility of our Federal security manager to make
sure that the airport is adhering to those standards.
Security standards are uniform across the board, except for
maybe general aviation airports, and even that has become a
concern to me. If I go somewhere and get on a charter, am I
going through security? Are my bags checked? We are looking at
that now. Maybe I could have Administrator Garvey expand on
that whole issue about security by categories of airport.
Again, catering personnel as you mentioned. Absolutely,
there are a lot of people on the ramp under the new stringent
measures, that have got to be properly badged, and if they are
not badged, they ain't on the ramp anymore. Again, those are
the rules and regs we set out there. Is anyone observing them?
Well, we want to make sure that our Federal security managers
are on top of those kinds of things so that you do not come to
me and say, well, guess what happened, here is a leatherman
that got through, as you did here.
I carry a leatherman. I do not any more, but I used to, in
my briefcase. I had one all the time.
Ms. Garvey. Three very quick points. One is, the Secretary
is right. We have basic standards, and airports can add to them
if they like. We have always felt that category X airports were
higher risk airports, Therefore, we have a security manager at
those airports, but you are right, I heard from Fort Lauderdale
yesterday who asked whether we can consider putting a security
manager there. We are looking at that, because we do believe
that is important.
The issue of the caterers--anyone who is in the secure area
must have an approved badge. We are asking--more than asking,
we are requiring airports and airlines to validate those
badges. I will not get into a lot of detail because of the
security implications, but let me simply say they are
validating those badges. If you have access to the secure area,
you must have a badge that has been validated by the airline or
the airport.
The Chairman. Very good. Senator Boxer.
Senator Boxer. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Secretary, Madam Administrator, I know you both really
well. I guess I had one strong request that I wanted you to
keep in your mind. You do not have to write it down, because it
is not a specific improvement, because I agree with so many of
them that have come out, and I have talked to you about that.
It is an attitude and a mind set that I think Senator Wyden is
trying to get at.
I want to know when you are sitting across from the
President, when you are sitting across from the Vice President,
that there is only one thing in your head, what happened on the
11th, and how to make sure it does not--I do not want you to
think about, well, what will it cost, and Norm, I know you well
enough that when you talk to Senator Allen and said well, one
idea is to put a marshal on every flight going in and out of
Reagan National, you kind of rolled your eyes, because I know
you, and you sort of said, gee, that is 800 flight marshals,
and please, we voted--I never saw a vote as strong, $40 billion
as the first vote, putting all other concerns aside.
How much of that money is going to go to make our airports
safe? I was voting for it believing that a lot of it would do
that. It will cost $2 billion to put an air marshal on every
plane. That is what we have calculated. Maybe it is three,
maybe it is four, and I believe we are going to see fewer
flights. I think Senator Allen is right on that. Once this
thing all gets around, we are going to see fewer flights, and I
think that is okay as long as our airlines can be healthy and
run fewer flights, and run them full, but all I want to know
from you--and I am not even asking the question.
I am asking you to think about this, that those people will
have died in vain if some bureaucratic mentality takes over, or
some budgetary consideration lets someone from OMB yell about
it, but I want you both to be there saying, I have calculated
this, I know it is a lot, but I cannot look the American people
in the eye unless I know that it is going to take me X billion
a year, and I am going to spend it right, and here is how I am
going to do it. I need to know that you will do that.
I want to get into something--I want to talk about Reagan
for just a second, because I hear the frustration of my
Chairman because his people are left in the lurch, and that is
an economic nightmare, and I understand it, and I am wondering
whether you have looked at ways to put some of those shorter
hops out of other airfields around this area. I will tell you
the reason.
I do not think you need to be a genius to know what these
terrorists did to us. They hit an economic symbol in the World
Trade Center, and Jay, you and I, you remember, and John, where
we were when we watched it happen. They hit a military symbol
at the Pentagon, and I believe they wanted to hit a political
symbol. I could be wrong, I do not know. I am thinking that may
be it, so I understand why there is a great concern around the
NSC for air traffic right over our heads. I understand that.
Frankly, I am glad they have control.
But I differ a little bit with my esteemed Chairman on the
point, because I think you are under a lot of pressures that
they are not under, frankly, but I would love to see us do
something pretty soon to save the people who are relying on
Reagan National, and I am wondering if you have looked at how
to get some more gates up and running for those people who rely
on Reagan National. Have you looked at that issue?
Secretary Mineta. Well, first of all, US Airways has, I
believe, transferred seven shuttle flights from National to
Dulles. Part of the problem is, we do not have enough gates
right now at Dulles, but airlines are looking at what
alternatives they have.
Senator Boxer. Are we helping them? Are we helping them
look? In trying to figure out how to do that?
Secretary Mineta. Absolutely, in terms of air space
allocation, in terms of gate space allocation. We're not in the
command and control system where we can say, Delta, move over
here.
Senator Boxer. I am glad you are helping.
Secretary Mineta. But whatever their needs are, we are
helping. This is what the President said to me.
Senator Boxer. I only have time for just one more. I want
to get to one other area, then I will stop. I just feel so bad
for those people who rely on--it is not my people, but it is a
lot of people, and so I hope we can help.
Last question. I want to deal with the cockpit issue,
because I feel the frustration, because--but I will not get
into the past. Right now, today, while we wait, figuring out if
we can use a type of door, et cetera, we could put a heavy
bolt. It will not cost that much, and yet I read, Mr.
Secretary, that you did not want to put out any rule, because
you are waiting to hear, and so on, and I would encourage you,
we need to take action today to secure that cockpit, so I hope
you will think about a cheap and simple way, a heavy bolt door,
and whether the bolt will cost $1,000 or $5,000 or $500 is
something I do not know. That ought to be coming down from you,
and I would like you to comment on that.
And last, do we have video cameras in the cockpit that give
the pilot a chance to look at what is happening in the cabin,
and if not, maybe this is an inexpensive way to do something
tomorrow to buy an inexpensive type of machine that if somebody
in the--if there was a disturbance, or somebody took out that
camera, the pilots would have a sense that something was wrong.
Can you comment on those rather inexpensive ways to act now,
rather than wait for your commission and your committee?
Secretary Mineta. It is not a commission. It is not a
committee. These are FAA employees. I do not know what I have
to do to explain this better.
Senator Boxer. It is not funny, because I think we can----
Secretary Mineta. Of course it is not funny. I am the one
who ordered these planes down.
Senator Boxer. I was not talking about you. I am talking
about the people out there.
Secretary Mineta. In terms of the cockpit and the video
camera, again, we are looking at every plausible alternative,
and we are not the only ones involved. Airlines are involved in
this process, airline pilots.
Senator Boxer. Have you looked at a video camera and a
bolt, that you could order?
Secretary Mineta. A video camera used to be in the American
Airlines cockpit.
Senator Boxer. Looking at the passengers.
Secretary Mineta. They had their eye on the runway.
Senator Boxer. I am talking about--let me just repeat, and
maybe I should ask Mr. Jackson, have you looked at--or Jane
Garvey, doing this right away, a heavy bolt to go on the door,
and a camera in the cockpit that looks out at the passengers
and at what is happening in the cabins?
Ms. Garvey. The bolt is one of the issues the pilot and
flight attendants have suggested, and that is under
consideration. Frankly, FAA is looking at what the logistics
are, how to do it and so forth.
Secretary Mineta. How long would it take to get a type
certificate changed to do that, and to retrofit?
Ms. Garvey. That is what we have to do, determine just that
thing.
Secretary Mineta. One of the things we are doing is saying
that, whatever the airlines do out of that money that you
appropriated last week, those are eligible expenses for
reimbursement.
Senator Boxer. Well, that is exactly what we wanted.
Secretary Mineta. Well, you got it. We are just waiting
right now for someone, whether it be an airline, or for the
Rapid Response Team--as I said, I am not waiting for October 1
to come with these actions. I am waiting for----
Senator Boxer. And the answer, have you considered a camera
that looks out at the passengers?
Secretary Mineta. Yes.
Senator Boxer. Thank you. I am sorry I took so much time.
The Chairman. That is all right. Senator Kerry.
Senator Kerry. Thank you very much.
Mr. Secretary and Madam Administrator, let me begin by
complimenting you, and I think the decision you made was an
extraordinary decision. It was the right decision. You executed
it effectively, and there is some evidence that there may well
have been other mischief that was diverted because of it, and
you deserve our thanks for that, and I wish you would convey,
Madam Administrator, to all of the controllers and those in the
system how proud we are of the job that they did. It really
showed a discipline and a capacity, I think, that was
exceptional.
I think for better or worse, this kind of situation
obviously has a lot of people afraid. There is even a little
panic in the air, and there should not be. There is no question
in my mind it is safer today to fly in the United States of
America than it has been in months, if not years, and clearly
the events of the 11th and the steps you have taken since have
heightened security levels. I do not think any American should
fear in the current construct getting into an airplane. I just
do not believe that.
Terrorists always seek out the next weakness, and they
will, and the greater concern for the United States is going to
be thinking about the things we have not thought about. It is a
terrible way, fighting the last war, fighting the last
campaigns, it is always the next one that comes to bite you. To
that end, I think you have no choice but to federalize, and
there are ways we can clearly make it safer even as I say, I
believe it is safe to fly today, and I absolutely believe that.
But we can make it foolproof. We can make it safer. We
certainly can guarantee that never again will an aircraft be
used as a weapon, directable into a building, and the doors are
obviously one component of that, and I understand and
appreciate the certification issues and the need to do that
correctly, it can be done, I think, relatively fast, and with
respect to Reagan Airport, you know, one of the strongest
responses to terrorism is defiance, and I think we need as an
act of defiance not to consider shutting Reagan Airport.
I also think, as a matter of safety, I agree with what
Senator McCain said. If there is an issue of safety, I am with
Senator McCain, as we all would be, but most of the pilots
flying those aircraft, the aircraft in the United States are
ex-military pilots, United States Air Force, U.S. Navy, and the
concept that you have a pilot risk is inconceivable. There is
not a pilot in America who has not said they would have to kill
me, tie me up, as they did, in order to take control of the
plane.
If you do not have access to the cockpit, you cannot make
it a weapon, and if the pilots controlled that, it may be tough
as a matter of policy, but we have to be tough. If a terrorist
knows there is no access, no terror in the cabin is going to
open that door, then they will start thinking about different
things. Does that mean the plane could go down? Yes, it does,
but so could the restaurant explode, and so could this Capitol
under certain circumstances, and we all know that.
The next thing we would say about Reagan is that the
screening, if you combine the lack of access to cockpit with a
significantly augmented capacity and screening, and even
marshals, whether it be on every flight or not, to be
determined, then the North River route fears that we all
understand really disappear, and there is no reason to panic
and not recognize our capacity to provide security. You could
even have a preferred pilot system. You could have all the
pilots who are eligible to fly into Washington precleared.
I mean, there are all kinds of ways to approach this. Even
on charters, fixed-base operators become part of the system.
Fixed-base operators might even be considered to be licensed,
certainly clearance checks. They become part of the process. I
do not know many charters in America where the people who get
on the charter do not know each other, and where in many cases
they are not U.S. companies that are preclearable and so forth
and so on. All of this is manageable, if we kind of stay with
common sense and thoughtfulness.
Now, with respect to the real issue here, airport security
and the clearance issue, it is true, is it not, that the
companies that currently are utilized bid, do they not, and the
bid process encourages low bid, does it not?
Secretary Mineta. It does, that is correct.
Senator Kerry. So if you have a low bid, bid process, which
is hiring minimum wage employees with minimal training, we are
not providing the kind of screening, are we, that we have
potentially?
Secretary Mineta. We recognize that as well.
Senator Kerry. Having recognized that, and recognizing that
it is also a law enforcement issue, I mean, this is not just a
matter of screening somebody. If an airport has information
about potential people on a watch list, or certain kinds of
people or screening, that is an FBI-shared information. It is a
CIA-shared information. It is a process of intelligence, which
is perhaps the single biggest gap in the United States today
with respect to any war on terrorism, and I do not know how one
can contemplate an adequate screening process that allows us to
get on with the business of moving the country forward
economically by making the airways safe without having a
standardized system with accountability, with capacity to share
information between law enforcement agencies, with procedures
that apply at every single airport, and with accountability at
their chain of command that gives the American people
confidence. Now, is that not a fair statement of the benefits
of federalizing?
Secretary Mineta. It is, sir, and those are, in terms of
standardization, levels of training, all of these issues are
paramount with us in terms of standards to be met as a
screener.
Senator Kerry. And a final question. Is it not fair to say
that if you have that level of screening, and you have a
cockpit impregnability, a plane cannot become a weapon again?
Secretary Mineta. I would like to think so.
The Chairman. Senator Rockefeller.
Senator Rockefeller. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I thank all
three of you very much.
I agree that flying is safer than it has ever been. I also
agree that, in a post-last Tuesday psychology, this country and
its people and all of us to some extent focus exactly on what
happened at the World Trade Center and tend not to think about
all the other things that might happen in the way of terrorist
attacks.
I mean, I happen to believe that one of the, again, silver
linings, if there were any of last Tuesday, were the two great
unknowns, one hidden and one simply ignored. That is, aviation
security, aviation as an important factor in our national
economy, financial viability on the one hand and intelligence,
particularly human intelligence. You know, that attack did not
go through a series of human discussions, not conducted on the
Internet between people. Had we had people penetrating in
there, then we could have known this, so that all of us on
these two issues, one taken for granted, the other simply not
understood, rose to the top of the national agenda, along with
national security as a whole.
Now, having said that, and having said that I think
aviation is safer than it ever has been, we are talking about
improvements. In the conversation that Senator Hutchison and I
had with a number of the CEO's and a number of other people,
there was this feeling that, for example, on the doors, on
modifications within the cockpit, do you put a lavatory, for
instance, within a cockpit so the pilot does not have to come
out, or that there is a warmer inside so that the lunch or
dinner does not have to go in, and people do not see that, that
there are some 7,000 commercial airliners in the air, or
potentially in the air, and that this cannot be done at all
quickly.
I would like to get your sense of how quickly do you think
we could begin to move, once you have made the decision between
Kevlar, whatever else it might be, adequate cockpit aspect
security, that we could proceed to make those changes, pay for
those changes, see them happen, because that will directly
affect, because it will be reported on extensively, public
confidence, which in turn will put people into airplanes, which
in turn will satisfy some of the problems we are going to be
discussing this afternoon, financial viability. Seeing the
improvements happen, as opposed to saying, 7,000, that is too
much, we can only do that on new airplanes that we build later,
we cannot reconfigure now.
I welcome your thoughts.
Secretary Mineta. First of all, on securing the cockpit,
there is in this legislation that will be coming up to the Hill
a certain amount of money that will be able to go to the
airlines for the retrofiting of their aircraft for the
heightened security requirements, including things like a
hardened door, including maybe modification of the electronics
to deal with the transponder, or to deal with the
communications systems so someone doesn't come in and say, turn
off your radio and your transponder. It is going to be out of
their control.
Those modifications are going to have to be done--and I
would have to defer to Administrator Garvey as to what the time
schedule will be. I think we can compress that schedule as
quickly as is practicable, but you know, everyone sort of cites
El Al as an example of an airplane that may be the least
vulnerable, but I believe their door does not meet FAA
standards, or it is not certified by the FAA, so even if we
were to say, hey, man, that El Al door is really good, and say,
put it in every U.S. aircraft, I do not believe it is certified
by the FAA as an acceptable approach right now.
Now, I believe, and I will have to defer to Administrator
Garvey, but she would have to talk to the time line on whether,
how quickly we could do this, but our direction from the
President on down is, whatever has to be done, get it done as
quickly as possible as it relates to, again, safety, security,
and the stability of the aviation industry.
Senator Rockefeller. Not waiting for the convenience of new
airliners to be built. Okay, a second question, last question,
so that everybody gets a chance to talk with you both, and that
is on technology.
I know that there is a lot--you have your explosion
detection system, there are a lot of other types of
technologies which could be enormously rapid in terms of
airport safety and passenger safety, check-in, and getting on
biometrics, for one, eye or facial recognition, finger prints,
things of this sort. What I wanted to get was that when we look
at what we are going to do in terms of inspecting people, as
well as baggage, that it is not simply going to be the best of
what we currently have, but that there is an ongoing sense of
research and development now, much-enhanced, to make sure that
we have more rapid ways of data collection, data comparison,
face, eye, all the rest of it, so that you could match things
together much more quickly and resolve matters more quickly.
Secretary Mineta. We are exploring all of these
possibilities. Whether it be a person putting in their hand for
finger-print imaging, that then gets run through FBI in a very
short period of time, whether it be retinal examination, what
kind of technology might be there, all of those are being
explored, and some of them are already available off-the-shelf
for utilization, and for the airlines it may mean cost so that
they get--they may take a look at it, take a second look at it,
but again, under the legislation that we are looking at, those
kinds of heightened security measures I am quite sure would fit
for reimbursement from the moneys that you folks are
appropriating.
Senator Rockefeller. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
The Chairman. Senator Stevens.
STATEMENT OF HON. TED STEVENS,
U.S. SENATOR FROM ALASKA
Senator Stevens. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
Each of you, Mr. Secretary and Ms. Garvey, have brought us
experience from the past administration, and we are proud of
you. As a matter of fact, we would not be sitting here--based
on information I have received we would not be sitting here
today, Norm, if you had not said, pull them all down, so I
think any implication here from anyone that might think that
you have not already thought about all of the things we have
discussed so far I think is wrong. We know you and we trust
you, and I want you to know that I personally am grateful to
you for what you did to try and recognize the situation in
Alaska and Hawaii as quickly as you did.
I do have a couple of questions, though, about that, so I
would like to get right to it.
First, there is no relief that has been suggested for the
part 135 operators. Their losses are small compared to the
others, but enormous compared to their size, and I would hope
that we would somehow or another catch up with them before this
is over.
For the benefit of some of my colleagues, the President
does not have $40 billion, he has $10 billion. The next $10
billion comes 15 days after we have received the plan. The next
$20 billion comes as each individual bill is passed to make it
available, so we have got a lot of time ahead of us to review
some of the things that you can do, and I do hope you get
access to as much as possible of that $10 billion. That was our
intention.
As a matter of fact, we wanted to make the full $20 billion
available, but there were some people that wanted to review
plans and take time, and it will take time, but I certainly do
not think you ought to be criticized for taking the time you
have taken so far.
I do have a little problem about one reg, and that is, you
have now really totally prohibited our Combi operations in
Alaska, combination cargo and passenger. Aircraft such as the
737-200's serve our regional hubs. That means that they can go
from Seattle and go out to Bethel or out to Nome; without them,
we can have intra-Alaska hubs, but we cannot have the large
hubs. I think it is going to increase the cost to our rural
areas. I would urge you to take a look at that. I do not need
your comments about that now, but I would urge you to take a
look at it.
Secondly, the FAA now requires, Ms. Garvey, background
checks for pilots but not for students. I would urge you to
take a look at that.
Ms. Garvey. We are, sir.
Senator Stevens. I knew you would, but it does seem to me
we ought to be doing more about it. I am going to get to that
also. You have got another order, I do not know how extensive
it is now, about pilot training. In my State, as you know, more
than 75 percent of all travel is by air. Our average age for
pilots is in excess of 50 years now, and as a matter of fact we
believe that of those that are flying twin-engined planes, more
than 60 percent of them are over 55.
Unless we have a pipeline of trained pilots coming at us,
we are going to be in real trouble. I would urge you to look at
that restriction on pilot training. It makes no sense, in view
of the increased demand now from the Air Force to call up the
reservists. They are going to disappear from our commuters and
our intra-State flights within days. I would urge you to take a
look at that.
Lastly, and I am not going to take all of my time. I am
going to see you again this afternoon, as a matter of fact, at
the joint House and Senate hearing. I would urge you to
consider one thing. I have had to bother you, too, and some of
your assistants so many times the last few days here, since the
11th. Can you not give some of the regional people a little bit
more discretion to deal with the exemptions such as Senator
Inouye mentioned?
We had organs for transplant in the air that were put down.
We had medevacs that were grounded. We had problems getting the
school teachers out to the schools. We had to get exemptions
for so many things from headquarters, eventhough the regional
people know us best. We are dealing with flights from Seattle
north, only.
I guess Hawaii has a similar problem with intra-State
aviation, too, but I would urge you to give those people more
discretion to make the common sense exemptions on the spot for
emergencies, for traditional uses of aircraft such as medevacs.
They are our ambulances.
My last comment would be, I do not know that there have
been any restrictions on taxis in New York. There have not been
any restrictions on buses in New York. There have not been any
restrictions on planes going in and out of New York, but guess
what, we do not have any of those. We are totally dependent, in
a State one-fifth the size of the United States, on aviation,
and we just need a little bit more understanding of that as we
move forward, particularly in terms of some of the costs that
people seem to think can be easily absorbed by airlines. We
have people still flying World War II planes on a daily basis.
They cannot be modernized that fast, and I do think that when
we are dealing with intra-State aviation, and we are dealing
with planes that obviously cannot become a bomb, that we ought
to have some greater flexibility without coming to your desk.
I thank you, each one of you, for what you have done to
help us, and again I congratulate you, Norm. I think that
decision you made saved more lives than most people will ever,
ever know. When you called and said, bring them down, you made
the decision that saved a lot of us, and I thank you again.
The Chairman. Mr. Secretary, let me associate myself with
the praise and the thanks of Senator Stevens, but can you give
us time for Senators Edwards, Carnahan, Cleland, and Brownback?
Secretary Mineta. Yes, sir. Could we take a little break
here before we proceed?
The Chairman. Yes, we can take a little break. The
Committee will be at ease here just for a minute.
[Recess.]
The Chairman. Senator Edwards.
STATEMENT OF HON. JOHN EDWARDS,
U.S. SENATOR FROM NORTH CAROLINA
Senator Edwards. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Secretary, I want to thank you, too. I want to thank
you for the important service you have provided for us over the
course of the last 10 days. The truth of the matter is that we
have collectively, all of us, let our guard down, and I think
it is important that we not just address this attack, but that
we prepare for the next attack, and it seems to me we ought to
have some basic principles, broad, comprehensive, basic
principles in preparing for that.
One is to have the right people in place, two is to have
the right technology, the right and best technology in place,
and three is to be forward-looking.
One of the concerns I have is, we have had lots of
discussion about some very important measures, some of which
you have already taken, some of which are already being
discussed, including the security of the cockpit being one,
putting marshals on planes being another, but the reality is,
we have to prepare for the next creative attack that these
terrorists are working on right now, and whether, in terms of
getting the right people in place, whether we federalize it or
not, which a lot of my colleagues seem to support and I think
makes some sense, it is critical that those people have proper
education and training, no doubt about that.
Second, it seems to me we ought to take advantage of the
best cutting-edge technology that is out there in this process,
but third, and the thing that I think concerns me the most, is
that we be forward-looking. I think many of us have been
concerned not about this specific kind of attack, but about
attacks of this kind for some kind, and for example, chemical
and biological weapons is one example, a mode of attack that I
think we need to be prepared for.
I would like to first get your comment on those principles,
on making sure that we take a broad look at this issue, and not
be overly focused on the specifics of what happened last
Tuesday, although obviously we need to prepare for that, too,
but that we also be creative and forward-thinking about what
may happen in the future, which I think is a critical component
of whatever policy we develop as a response. I would like your
response to those issues first, and then I want to ask you a
couple of specific questions about potential attacks that have
not yet occurred.
Secretary Mineta. Well, first of all, as it relates to your
three basic principles about the right people in place and the
right technology in place, there is no question that that is
what we are trying to do.
When you are talking about, in terms of forward-looking,
again I think that would have to really be done in the context
of a closed, secured hearing in terms of what and where,
because again, as I said earlier, with all the information we
have got, could we have built a matrix to give a hint about
what happened last Tuesday, everyone says no.
Everyone has got bits and pieces of information, but to try
to focus all those elements and have it pointing in one
direction in terms of mode of what would happen and how it
would happen, very little, and so the very question you are
asking is something that, because we have pipelines and rail
and all these other modes, we are thinking about what the
future threat is. In terms of getting someone to patrol
pipelines with helicopters, whatever, those things are getting
done right now. Those things started a week ago last Tuesday,
the Coast Guard, in terms of checking on passenger cruise
vessels, checking on bulk ships, whatever.
But this whole issue about forward-looking is the part that
is probably the most difficult, and it is something that
Admiral Underwood in our shop, working with the CIA and all the
intelligence agencies, FBI, we keep probing and thinking about.
I am looking at these reports day-in and day-out. Jane Garvey
is, as well as her security person, and so in terms of forward-
looking we are trying to make sure that all the modes are
thinking about these things in terms of what is the best way to
deal with it, dealing with the railroads, dealing with the oil
companies, dealing with the pipeline companies, dealing with
the ports, whomever.
Senator Edwards. You agree, though, with the notion that
these basic principles make sense, making sure we have got the
right people, making sure we have got the right technology, and
making sure that we are engaging in forward-looking thinking?
Secretary Mineta. Absolutely, and as you say, federalizing
may be part of that.
Senator Edwards. Ms. Garvey.
Ms. Garvey. I would absolutely agree with both your
statements and the Secretary, and I believe that we are doing
exactly that, focusing on those principles.
The Chairman. Very good. Senator Carnahan.
STATEMENT OF HON. JEAN CARNAHAN,
U.S. SENATOR FROM MISSOURI
Senator Carnahan. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I think clearly the goal of the terrorists last week was to
instill a crippling fear in America. They wanted, literally, to
bring us to our knees economically and politically. We have had
others who have tried to do the same. They did not succeed, and
nor will these. I think our response needs to be twofold. We
must act quickly to see that these attacks never happen again,
and we must act quickly to restore public confidence.
Mr. Secretary, obviously the new security measures are
important to protect the safety of the flying public, but these
measures are also important so that Americans regain confidence
and continue to buy airline tickets.
I understand that after the gulf war, that Barbara Bush
took a ceremonial commercial airline flight to instill this
kind of reassurance. Are there things you think that we can do
today, such as to have, perhaps, a much-publicized celebrity
flight, or to have a professional sports team take a flight to
demonstrate their confidence? In fact, perhaps you could take a
highly publicized flight and perhaps come to Missouri. We would
enjoy that.
Secretary Mineta. In fact, this is something that
Administrator Garvey and I had talked about, taking what I
called a whistle-stop, barnstorming commercial flight just
coming in somewhere, having a press conference, talking to the
local air traffic controllers, to the local press, getting on
another plane, going on to somewhere else, and doing the same
thing, just barn-storming.
Senator Carnahan. Let me know when you do that. I would
like to join you.
Secretary Mineta. We were thinking about having Members of
the House and Senate accompany us, as well as press. We have
not finalized those plans, but somewhere in my stack is the
series of airports we would visit and things we might consider
doing.
Senator Carnahan. There is one other question, Mr.
Secretary, I want you to address, if you would, as sort of an
auxiliary question, because you will not be here this
afternoon.
Secretary Mineta. I will be before the Appropriations
Committees, a Joint House and Senate Appropriations Committee
meeting.
Senator Carnahan. But you will not be here for our Commerce
Committee meeting. As you know, we are currently considering
providing financial relief to assist the Nation's airlines with
their efforts to overcome their financial troubles associated
with last week's terrorist attack.
I am convinced we must pass a comprehensive financial
stabilization measure for the airline industry that would
address the liability question in a meaningful way, but I also
believe that any relief package for the airlines must include
an additional component to provide assistance to displaced
workers.
This Congress must demonstrate that while we stand ready to
bolster the airline industry, we are also committed to
supporting the men and women who are the heart and soul of the
industry. I am working with a number of my colleagues to craft
a proposal that would provide trade adjustment assistance
benefits to these displaced workers from the airline industry.
News reports this morning indicate that the administration
has come out with a proposal for an airline relief package, but
I have not heard mention of aid for any of the displaced
workers. What are your thoughts, or the thoughts of the
administration on including such a provision in an overall
stabilization package.
Secretary Mineta. As a result of what happened on September
11, a DCPC was set up, a Domestic Consequences Policy
Committee, because there are a lot of consequences that impact
on a domestic basis, rather than the foreign policy or military
policy issues. The President has very clearly talked about
making sure that present programs relating to unemployment
compensation, trade adjustment assistance, or retraining
programs be part of the whole consideration of what we are
doing, and that is not in the jurisdiction of the Department of
Transportation, but those are on the President's menu of things
that the Domestic Consequences Policy Committee is doing.
Senator Carnahan. Thank you very much. I appreciate hearing
that.
The Chairman. Senator Cleland.
STATEMENT OF HON. MAX CLELAND,
U.S. SENATOR FROM GEORGIA
Senator Cleland. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman and
Members of the Committee, distinguished panelists. I have been
listening to what our colleagues have been saying here, and
trying to think how I could add to the discussion. I will say
that I took my own whistle-stop tour. It was on a train, on
Friday, going back to Atlanta, but I came back on Delta Tuesday
afternoon. I spent a good deal of time at Hartsfield talking to
the management there, the security people there, passengers
there.
This is my conclusion. I think we have to dramatically
upgrade our technology and our people to do the screening at
our airports or else we will basically fail in our main mission
here, and that is to increase the confidence of the flying
public in our commercial aviation system. The clock is ticking
on our airlines, as we well know.
The phrase that FDR had a number of years ago, in 1933,
comes to mind. The only thing we have to fear is fear itself,
blind, unreasonable fear, and there is blind, unreasonable fear
out there in American hearts today about flying on American
commercial airliners. We have to address that fear. We have to
do some confidence-building measures, and I think there are two
that we ought to zero-in on, two that have to do with what the
GAO has really called our weakest link. The GAO called our x-
ray process at the screening points our weakest link, but I
think we have another weak link, and before I get beyond the
question of technology, I would just like to point out that
Senator Edwards is correct, Senator Kerry is correct, and
Senator John Breaux is correct. We need to think maybe about
the next attack.
In that regard, we can think about biological chemical
warfare. Georgia Tech has invented a sensor just that can
detect chemical and biological residue. This is the kind of
technology that I think we are going to have to instill in our
screening process.
Secondly, I think we are going to have to dramatically
upgrade our people. Sadly enough, according to the National
Academy of Sciences, there are about 18,000 screeners that work
in the United States that cover some 700 security checkpoints,
but the DOTIG has reported high turnover rates, anywhere from
100 percent to 400 percent, and that 400 percent is at the
busiest airport in the world, Hartsfield, I am sad to report.
What do they make? Anywhere from $5.25 to $6.75 an hour,
without benefits.
The sad news, as I have discovered here, Mr. Secretary, is
that our screeners look at going to work for Cinnabon as a
promotion. We cannot have that kind of culture now as our first
line of defense. I favor, as would Senator Kerry, Senator
Breaux, and some others, the federalization of our screening
process. I think that is the only way we are really going to
get at this problem of instilling some confidence of the
American people and providing the technology, providing the
capability to really get the job done. I asked our security
people at Hartsfield exactly what they recommended, and that
seemed to be the unanimous opinion.
What do we have now? Unfortunately, we have a security
company that covers 17 of the 20 largest airports in the
country where two of the four hijacked planes originated. That
company pled guilty to allowing untrained employees, including
some with criminal backgrounds, to operate checkpoints in
Philadelphia. The parent company was fined over $1 million.
It is also pled guilty to falsifying test scores for two
dozen applicants, hiring at least 14 security screeners with
criminal backgrounds ranging from aggravated assault and
burglary to drug and firearm possession, and the highest
advertised job paid $8 an hour.
Now, we can do better than that. We are going to have to do
better than that. Congress, the presidential commissions, the
GAO, the Inspector General, the DOT, all over the last number
of years have indicated that we have to do better on that
screening process. The GAO looked at five other countries that
do screening at airports, and they found all of those five had
more extensive qualifications and training for screeners and
higher pay and benefits for screeners, assigned responsibility
for screeners to the airport, or to the National Government,
and had in place more stringent screener checkpoint operations.
As a matter of fact, the British in the wake of the
Lockerbie, Scotland airline disaster, where the plane was blown
up in flight, have installed very highly sophisticated x-ray
machines, and I think this kind of upgrade in technology,
upgrade in people is a tangible way to begin reinforcing the
view that it is safe to fly on American commercial air.
Mr. Secretary, do you favor--are you prepared to share with
us today your view that you favor this kind of federalization
of the screening process?
Secretary Mineta. I have not come to a real determination
as to federalization, because there are various meanings for
that term--whether these are Civil Service employees, or does
federalization mean making sure that our private operators are
going to be required to meet new standards?
Senator Cleland. I am thinking like a domestic customs
service. We have the customs service to look at people coming
into the country.
Secretary Mineta. As I said earlier, yes, we have looked at
that. It is one part of the things we are looking at. It would
be the equivalent, as I said earlier, of 28,000 plus full-time
equivalents at a cost of close to $1.8 billion. If the Congress
is willing for us to do that, of course we would do that, but
again there are a number of items on that menu about how to
deal with the screening and the ultimate answer may be Civil
Service of that screening operation, but I have not come to the
conclusion yet that that is the best way to go.
The Chairman. Senator Brownback.
STATEMENT OF HON. SAM BROWNBACK,
U.S. SENATOR FROM KANSAS
Senator Brownback. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I want to thank
the panel for the work you have done here recently under a
very, very difficult atmosphere and thank you for taking
aggressive action and taking it quickly. Administrator Garvey,
if I could, I'd like to direct questions to you, if I might, on
general aviation. You've been to my state. You've been to
Wichita I think twice.
Ms. Garvey. Three times, actually.
Senator Brownback. That's even better. To the
manufacturers, you know the concentration of general aviation
manufacturing that is taking place there. Boeing is also there
and has announced 30 percent layoffs, so it has a major impact.
I understand your concern on visual flight--limiting those
flights right now. I can see the tension that you've got about,
``should we allow some of these or shouldn't we given the
potential problems.'' I'm wondering in particular what your
thinking process is that you're going through on flight
schools. Those are the largest users of general aircraft,
general aviation aircraft and as I understand, generally they
operate under visual flight rules and they have not been
released, as I understand it. You've got a timetable that
you're thinking of in viewing this because obviously at some
point and time these need to get going again so that we can
train pilots.
Ms. Garvey. Senator, as you know, last night, yesterday
actually, we worked through a number of these issues with the
NSA and with the Secretary's approval and go-ahead last night,
we lifted many of the restrictions that we had in place for
general aviation. But you're absolutely right. Flight schools
were still an issue where the regulations or the restrictions
had not yet been lifted. I heard an excellent suggestion today
that perhaps if we looked at some of the, or did a background
check on some of the students, I think given some of the
history of the hijackers, there has been some concern but I
took note of that recommendation and that suggestion and would
like to bring that back. Perhaps if we could do something like
that, we might be able to lift that restriction. And, again,
this is in consultation with the NSC who are, of course,
looking at some of the security issues involved. But I know of
the concern, not only in your state but in a number of other
states as well, that flight schools are very important and a
number of them are very small businesses and this has an
enormous impact. So, it was a good suggestion. We'll look at it
and see what we can do.
Senator Brownback. Well, if we can put those students
through some kind of a test or screening so that we can see,
then that might give us clues or leads on potential problems. I
think this is one we need to try to work out together because
clearly there's a tension here. I don't want to get people in
training that could be potential terrorists or use a general
aviation aircraft for some sort of a bomb delivery device as
well. So, we need to look at that very carefully and I agree
with doing that. It is just we're also going to have to find a
way that we can train pilots and we're going to need to get
some of these general aviation aircraft back up in the air. Do
you anticipate, then, that you will be doing this within the
next week or two?
Ms. Garvey. We are continuing to look at these issues every
day with the NSC. There are a whole series of issues that we
are working through every day, and I'm going to go back and
talk to staff. This suggestion that was made here at this
Committee today may be something that would sort of break that
one loose. So, we'll aggressively pursue it. I do understand
it's a real concern.
Senator Brownback. And I thought, I mean Senator Stevens
thought about giving some discretion on other general aviation
work to more regional administrators and some of these calls
might be worth taking a look at. We cannot breach security
issues. I think those have to be at the top and paramount for
us but, situations do differ in differing areas and general
aviation is a very important thing in my state and many regions
of the country. Secretary Mineta, if you've had particular
thoughts about this as well?
Secretary Mineta. Sir, many of the things that we do have
to be cleared through the National Security Council. So, even
if we delegated to a regional office, it would still have to be
cleared through the National Security Council and that's why
we've held it here, but these things that we're doing right now
are not engraved in marble. We go back every day and say, okay
now, what about this? You know, yesterday we banned this but
can we lift it today? So, it's an ongoing process.
Senator Brownback. If I could, before my time is up, are
you going back through the list of pilots or people that have
taken flight training? I presume everybody's going through
those now to see about potential other problems.
Secretary Mineta. The FBI is doing that primarily.
Senator Brownback. Do we have good records on individuals
that have gone through flight training or do those records need
to be upgraded?
Secretary Mineta. We could give you a classified briefing
on that issue if you need it.
Senator Brownback. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
The Chairman. Very good. Mr. Secretary in thanking you on
behalf of the Committee and Administrator Garvey and Deputy
Secretary Jackson, normally, one, with respect to affording the
federalization of security personnel, I can take a bill out
here this afternoon and whip it through both houses with almost
a majority vote. Why? Because in Europe, they afford the
federalization. Those security personnel at all the airports
are government employees. If they can afford it, we can. In
fact, after 9/11 we must. Point two with respect to Reagan, I
wouldn't allow any plane to fly off of Reagan unless that
cockpit was secured. But what you're saying in having opened up
the experts Dulles and Baltimore, it's safe enough to hit the
White House from Baltimore and Dulles. Or, specifically, with
respect to New York, we're really concerned abut the safety of
the government down here in Washington but not for the people
of the government because you can fly off LaGuardia and hit the
Empire State this afternoon. So, let's get it with and tell
them to make some decisions and quit dallying around. And
finally, since you're Secretary of Transportation, nine out of
ten containers we've added. We've been trying to get the bill
passed. Now out of ten containers coming into the ports of the
United States of America. Come in at New York, Bale, New
Jersey, and taken right down to Times Square, with up to 40
tons of anthrax and boom. And you don't have to send them to
driver school to get that done. So, we've got a lot of work to
do and we've got to get serious about it but we can't, while
we're dallying around with the Secret Service, the President
would still be down there in Louisiana. You know what I mean?
So, let's get realistic about it and make sure you secure that
cockpit but once that cockpit with a marshal and the security
personnel but particularly when the cockpit is secured, then
you can open up Reagan.
Senator Nelson. Mr. Chairman, may I just add that we have
been hit with the issue of the flight schools in Florida so
much and I would just add to that the simulators because they
were people that just didn't go out and learn to fly two engine
airplanes. They were people that had pinpoint accuracy at high
rates of speed, accounting for wind direction and a lot of
that's got to come from either the aircraft itself or a
simulator. And that's where we need the background checks as
well.
The Chairman. Senator Rockefeller and then Senator Wyden
and then we've go to go.
Senator Rockefeller. Mine is real fast. Everybody at the
hearing this morning and virtually all who considered this
matter have made it an article of faith assumption that
screeners will be federalized. It was unanimous. When the
Senator from Georgia asked you what your view was, Mr.
Secretary, you said you hadn't made up your mind and I was
stunned by that. I'm asking for a response.
Secretary Mineta. Again, we have got all these items on the
menu and even though I may be the Secretary of Transportation,
I'm also still the assistant to the President or staff to the
President, and there's OMB, and NSC, offices, that we have to
clear it with. So, to that extent I'm talking about these at
the DCPCS we had and I will continue to do that.
Senator Rockefeller. I hope you will mention to them your
discomfort at not being able to ask or answer on nation
television something that the American people I think feel very
strongly about and surely we do because of the usual processes
of clearance.
The Chairman. Senator Wyden.
Senator Wyden. I'll be very quick. Mr. Secretary, the point
that the Chairman and Senator Rockefeller have made is
absolutely key and the point is that the Congress wants to work
with you so that quickly we can federalize this function and we
don't have a situation that 15 years from now we're having more
GAO reports. We want to work in partnership with you so that
quickly a bill that comes actually gets done and I think that
has been sort of the theme of this hearing--to work with you in
partnership so we don't have 15 years of these reports once
again. And I thank you, Mr. Chairman.
The Chairman. Senator Allen.
Senator Allen. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Our next panel will
be good for asking questions on remote guidance of aircraft and
so forth. I would say that Senator Wyden, hopefully, our
Subcommittee can have a hearing on the use of automatic ground
control systems. But let me follow up on the issue of general
aviation. I'm glad that in all but 30 areas, VFR is now open,
at least as of last evening. That means a great deal to under-
populated or smaller areas. How do you envision this industry
changing in the future? When it gets back to where you might
consider relatively normal, how do you see general aviation
changing in the future, after this tragedy?
Ms. Garvey. Well, I think we're already starting to hear
from officials of the associations in general aviation and from
members of general aviation as well that they want to look at
their own security, look at the issue of security with us. I
give a great deal of credit to the fixed based operators who in
a number of occasions over the last several days have stepped
forward with some very specific ideas on security and I think
that's good. I think we're going to see the industry and that
part of the community as engaged with us on security measures
as they have been on safety measures in the last several years.
So, they're thoughtful; they're deliberative; they're smart.
They care a lot about aviation and I expect we'll be working
closely with them on ways that we can make general aviation
which has a lot more challenges even more secure.
The Chairman. Senator Boxer.
Senator Boxer. Thank you. Let me just very quickly pick up
on Senator Rockefeller's point and it gets back to what I said
about your being at the table, looking at OMB and telling them
this is what you want. I am sad that today you can't say, in my
view, after all these studies and the stuff that Max Cleland
told you I'm sure you know about, people checking out bags who
are criminals, who look at it as a step up to working in the
donut shop, that you could say to us you are intent upon making
sure that as in other countries in the world that these
screeners have steady jobs, get the respect and the training,
and your answer is basically at this day, well, you know, I'm
the President's, I work for the President and I have got to sit
around with OMB and everybody else. What I want you to tell me,
and you haven't and you won't, and that's just the way it is
and I would sacrifice my whole future if I felt we weren't
doing every single thing we could do. And this screening issue
is absolutely crucial here. So, I just hope after this hearing
to take away anything is that colleagues here are really ready
to go. We want to work with you. We want to make sure that the
flying public is safe because I could tell you, if they aren't
then we'll try to re-roll this tape and we'll all say at that
moment, did we really rise to the occasion. Mr. Chairman, I
feel so strongly about this because I think it is the turning
point today, right now, what we all do together. And I just
want you to be strong in those meetings, Norm,. And I say the
same to Administrator Garvey, if you're not, if this isn't your
only concern, the safety, then we haven't done much today and
that's what I'm worried about.
The Chairman. Norm will be strong.
Secretary Mineta. I don't want you to have the feeling that
I'm for the status quo. It is going to be enhanced. It is going
to be a hell of a lot better than it is right now but I can't
guarantee you sitting here that these are going to be civil
servant employees doing the job. If that's the definition of
federalization, if it is the definition of federalization, I
don't think Jane is ready or Michael is ready to say let's make
it a civil service program.
Senator Boxer. But aren't there federal standards now?
Secretary Mineta. No, there are not. That was Senator
Hutchison's bill that gave to the FAA the ability to come up
with new training requirements, new screening requirements. As
Senator Cleland said, so that we know the company.
Senator Boxer. And you would call that federalization?
Secretary Mineta. What is that?
Senator Boxer. Having better standards in place.
Secretary Mineta. It is a form of federalization.
Senator Boxer. And then leaving it up to the airlines and
leaving it up to the airlines to decide who those people are?
Secretary Mineta. Based on our standards, we could still do
the screening, making sure that----
Senator Boxer. That sounds to me more like the status quo.
I've taken up too much time. I am sorry.
Secretary Mineta. It is absolutely not. I'm sorry. To think
about the screeners as we know them today, absolutely not. This
is going to be substantially different but if you're asking me
is it going to be a federal civil servant doing this work, I
can't give you that answer right now but it will be enhanced.
It will be a hell of a lot better than it is right now.
The Chairman. Making them civil service is really the only
way to get competent personnel and to get the pay up and
everything else. But that having been said, thank you all,
three of you, very, very much and we ask Panel Number II to
please come forward as quickly as they can.
Mr. Gerald Dillingham, the Director for Physical
Infrastructure Issues at the GAO; Mr. John Meenan, the Senior
Vice President of the Air Transport Association; Captain Duane
Woerth, President of the Airline Pilots Association; Mr.
Charles Barclay, President of the American Association of
Airport Executives; and Mr. Paul Hudson. We want to know him as
Executive Director of the Aviation Consumer Action Project.
Now, gentlemen, the committee apologizes, but you can
understand the interest and that's what we have every time when
we organize a committee. We tell the leadership, wait a minute.
We used to have 8 and 7 and 15 on the committee and that's the
only way to get thoroughly into the questioning and finding out
from the panel where the witnesses, and they've give us 23. And
we've got plenty of other questions I wanted to ask and others
and, of course, the record is open. That being the case, we're
going to ask you to file your statements here in full with the
committee and let me yield for the questioning of the members
here and then any add-ons you gentlemen would wish because
you're under pressure too.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Dillingham follows:]
Prepared Statement of Gerald L. Dillingham, Director, Physical
Infrastructure Issues, General Accounting Office
Mr. Chairman and Members of the Committee:
A safe and secure civil aviation system is a critical component of
the nation's overall security, physical infrastructure, and economic
foundation. Billions of dollars and a myriad of programs and policies
have been devoted to achieving such a system. Although it is not fully
known at this time what actually occurred or what all the weaknesses in
the nation's aviation security apparatus are that contributed to the
horrendous events of last week, it is clear that serious weaknesses
exist in our aviation security system and that their impact can be far
more devastating than previously imagined.
We are here today to discuss the vulnerabilities that we have
identified throughout the nation's aviation system. Our testimony is
based on our prior work and includes assessments of security concerns
with (1) aviation-related computer systems, (2) airport access
controls, and (3) passenger and carry-on baggage screening, including
how the United States and selected other countries differ in their
screening practices. Our testimony will also offer some observations
about improving aviation security in these various areas.
In summary:
As we reported last year, our reviews of the Federal
Aviation Administration's (FAA) oversight of air traffic
control (ATC) computer systems showed that FAA had not followed
some critical aspects of its own security requirements.
Specifically, FAA had not ensured that ATC buildings and
facilities were secure, that the systems themselves were
protected, and that the contractors who access these systems
had undergone background checks. As a result, the ATC system
was susceptible to intrusion and malicious attacks. FAA is
making some progress in addressing the 22 recommendations we
made to improve computer security, but most have yet to be
completed.
Controls for limiting access to secure areas, including
aircraft, have not always worked as intended. As we reported in
May 2000, our special agents used fictitious law enforcement
badges and credentials to gain access to secure areas, bypass
security checkpoints at two airports, and walk unescorted to
aircraft departure gates. The agents, who had been issued
tickets and boarding passes, could have carried weapons,
explosives, or other dangerous objects onto aircraft. FAA is
acting on the weaknesses we identified and is implementing
improvements to more closely check the credentials of law
enforcement officers. The Department of Transportation's
Inspector General has also documented numerous problems with
airport access controls, and in one series of tests, the
Inspector General's staff successfully gained access to secure
areas 68 percent of the time.
As we reported in June 2000, tests of screeners revealed
significant weaknesses as measured in their ability to detect
threat objects located on passengers or contained in their
carry-on luggage. In 1987, screeners missed 20 percent of the
potentially dangerous objects used by FAA in its tests. At that
time, FAA characterized this level of performance as
unsatisfactory. More recent results have shown that as testing
gets more realistic--that is, as tests more closely approximate
how a terrorist might attempt to penetrate a checkpoint--
screeners' performance declines significantly. A principal
cause of screeners' performance problems is the rapid turnover
among screeners. Turnover exceeded over 100 percent a year at
most large airports, leaving few skilled and experienced
screeners, primarily because of the low wages, limited
benefits, and repetitive, monotonous nature of their work.
Additionally, too little attention has been given to factors
such as the sufficiency of the training given to screeners.
FAA's efforts to address these problems have been slow. We
recommended that FAA develop an integrated plan to focus its
efforts, set priorities, and measure progress in improving
screening. FAA is addressing these recommendations, but
progress on one key effort--the certification of screening
companies--is still not complete because the implementing
regulation has not been issued. It is now nearly 2 \1/2\ years
since FAA originally planned to implement the regulation.
Screening operations in Belgium, Canada, France, the
Netherlands, and the United Kingdom--countries whose systems we
have examined--differ from this country's in some significant
ways. Their screening operations require more extensive
qualifications and training for screeners, include higher pay
and better benefits, and often include different screening
techniques, such as ``pat-downs'' of some passengers. Another
significant difference is that most of these countries place
responsibility for screening with airport authorities or the
government instead of air carriers. The countries we visited
had significantly lower screener turnover, and there is some
evidence they may have better screener performance; for
example, one country's screeners detected over twice as many
test objects as did U.S. screeners in a 1998 joint screener
testing program conducted with FAA.
The events of September 11, 2001, have changed the way this country
looks at aviation security. Last week, FAA and the air carriers
implemented new controls that promise a greater sense of security. We
support these actions. Yet, to further minimize the vulnerabilities in
our aviation security system, more needs to be done. Additional
considerations for the immediate future could include prioritizing
outstanding recommendations that address security, developing a
strategic plan to address the recommendations, assigning specific
executive responsibility for carrying out this plan, and identifying
the sources and amounts of funding needed. In establishing priorities,
a key action needed is to complete the promulgation of the screening
company certification regulation, which also implements the
requirements of the Airport Security Improvement Act of 2000, enacted
by the Congress last November. The Congress also needs to reconsider
whether airlines should continue to bear primary responsibility for
screening operations at the nation's airports. Aviation security has
truly become a national security issue, and responsibility for
screening may no longer appropriately rest with air carriers.
Consideration of the role of air carriers in conducting passenger
screening could be examined as part of the ongoing effort to identify
and structure mechanisms to provide financial and other assistance to
help the aviation industry emerge from the current crisis.
Mr. Chairman, it has been observed that previous tragedies have
resulted in congressional hearings, studies, recommendations, and
debates, but little long-term resolve to correct flaws in the system as
the memory of the crisis recedes. The future of aviation security
hinges in large part on overcoming this cycle of limited action that
has too often characterized the response to aviation security concerns.
Background
Some context for my remarks is appropriate. The threat of terrorism
was significant throughout the 1990s; a plot to destroy 12 U.S.
airliners was discovered and thwarted in 1995, for instance. Yet the
task of providing security to the nation's aviation system is
unquestionably daunting, and we must reluctantly acknowledge that any
form of travel can never be made totally secure. The enormous size of
U.S. airspace alone defies easy protection. Furthermore, given this
country's hundreds of airports, thousands of planes, tens of thousands
of daily flights, and the seemingly limitless ways terrorists or
criminals can devise to attack the system, aviation security must be
enforced on several fronts. Safeguarding airplanes and passengers
requires, at the least, ensuring that perpetrators are kept from
breaching security checkpoints and gaining access to secure airport
areas or to aircraft. Additionally, vigilance is required to prevent
attacks against the extensive computer networks that FAA uses to guide
thousands of flights safely through U.S. airspace. FAA has developed
several mechanisms to prevent criminal acts against aircraft, such as
adopting technology to detect explosives and establishing procedures to
ensure that passengers are positively identified before boarding a
flight. Still, in recent years, we and others have often demonstrated
that significant weaknesses continue to plague the nation's aviation
security.
Potential for Unauthorized Access to Aviation Computer Systems
Our work has identified numerous problems with aspects of aviation
security in recent years. One such problems is FAA's computer-based air
traffic control system. The ATC system is an enormous, complex
collection of interrelated systems, including navigation, surveillance,
weather, and automated information processing and display systems that
link hundreds of ATC facilities and provide information to air traffic
controllers and pilots. Failure to adequately protect these systems
could increase the risk of regional or nationwide disruption of air
traffic--or even collisions.
In five reports issued from 1998 through 2000, we pointed out
numerous weaknesses in FAA's computer security. \1\ FAA had not (1)
completed background checks on thousands of contractor employees, (2)
assessed and accredited as secure many of its ATC facilities, (3)
performed appropriate risk assessments to determine the vulnerability
of the majority of its ATC systems, (4) established a comprehensive
security program, (5) developed service continuity controls to ensure
that critical operations continue without undue interruption when
unexpected events occur, and (6) fully implemented an intrusion
detection capability to detect and respond to malicious intrusions.
Some of these weaknesses could have led to serious problems. For
example, as part of its Year 2000 readiness efforts, FAA allowed 36
mainland Chinese nationals who had not undergone required background
checks to review the computer source code for eight mission-critical
systems.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ Aviation Security: Weak Computer Security Practices Jeopardize
Flight Safety (GAO/AIMD-98-155, May 18, 1998), Computer Security: FAA
Needs to Improve Controls Over Use of Foreign Nationals to Remediate
and Review Software (GAO/AIMD-00-55, Dec. 23, 1999), Computer Security:
FAA is Addressing Personnel Weaknesses, But Further Action Is Required
(GAO/AIMD-00-169, May 31, 2000), FAA Computer Security: Concerns Remain
Due to Personnel and Other Continuing Weaknesses (GAO/AIMD-00-252, Aug.
16, 2000), and FAA Computer Security: Recommendations to Address
Continuing Weaknesses (GAO-01-171, Dec. 6, 2000).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
To date, we have made nearly 22 recommendations to improve FAA's
computer security. FAA has worked to address these recommendations, but
most of them have yet to be completed. For example, it is making
progress in obtaining background checks on contractors and accrediting
facilities and systems as secure. However, it will take time to
complete these efforts.
Weaknesses in Airport Access Controls
Control of access to aircraft, airfields, and certain airport
facilities is another component of aviation security. Among the access
controls in place are requirements intended to prevent unauthorized
individuals from using forged, stolen, or outdated identification or
their familiarity with airport procedures to gain access to secured
areas. In May 2000, we reported that our special agents, in an
undercover capacity, obtained access to secure areas of two airports by
using counterfeit law enforcement credentials and badges. \2\ At these
airports, our agents declared themselves as armed law enforcement
officers, displayed simulated badges and credentials created from
commercially available software packages or downloaded from the
Internet, and were issued ``law enforcement'' boarding passes. They
were then waved around the screening checkpoints without being
screened. Our agents could thus have carried weapons, explosives,
chemical/biological agents, or other dangerous objects onto aircraft.
In response to our findings, FAA now requires that each airport's law
enforcement officers examine the badges and credentials of any
individual seeking to bypass passenger screening. FAA is also working
on a ``smart card'' computer system that would verify law enforcement
officers' identity and authorization for bypassing passenger screening.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\2\ Security: Breaches at Federal Agencies and Airports (GAO/T-OSI-
00-10, May 25, 2000).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The Department of Transportation's Inspector General has also
uncovered problems with access controls at airports. The Inspector
General's staff conducted testing in 1998 and 1999 of the access
controls at eight major airports and succeeded in gaining access to
secure areas in 68 percent of the tests; they were able to board
aircraft 117 times. After the release of its report describing its
successes in breaching security, \3\ the Inspector General conducted
additional testing between December 1999 and March 2000 and found that,
although improvements had been made, access to secure areas was still
gained more than 30 percent of the time.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\3\ Airport Access Control (AV-2000-017, Nov. 18, 1999).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Inadequate Detection of Dangerous Objects by Screeners
Screening checkpoints and the screeners who operate them are a key
line of defense against the introduction of dangerous objects into the
aviation system. Over 2 million passengers and their baggage must be
checked each day for articles that could pose threats to the safety of
an aircraft and those aboard it. The air carriers are responsible for
screening passengers and their baggage before they are permitted into
the secure areas of an airport or onto an aircraft. Air carriers can
use their own employees to conduct screening activities, but mostly air
carriers hire security companies to do the screening. Currently,
multiple carriers and screening companies are responsible for screening
at some of the nation's larger airports.
Concerns have long existed over screeners' ability to detect and
prevent dangerous objects from entering secure areas. Each year,
weapons were discovered to have passed through one checkpoint and have
later been found during screening for a subsequent flight. FAA monitors
the performance of screeners by periodically testing their ability to
detect potentially dangerous objects carried by FAA special agents
posing as passengers. In 1978, screeners failed to detect 13 percent of
the objects during FAA tests. In 1987, screeners missed 20 percent of
the objects during the same type of test. Test data for the 1991 to
1999 period show that the declining trend in detection rates continues.
\4\ Furthermore, the recent tests show that as tests become more
realistic and more closely approximate how a terrorist might attempt to
penetrate a checkpoint, screeners' ability to detect dangerous objects
declines even further.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\4\ Information on FAA tests results is now designated as sensitive
security information and cannot be publicly released. Consequently, we
cannot discuss the actual detection rates for the 1991-99 period.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
As we reported last year, there is no single reason why screeners
fail to identify dangerous objects. \5\ Two conditions--rapid screener
turnover and inadequate attention to human factors--are believed to be
important causes. Rapid turnover among screeners has been a long-
standing problem, having been identified as a concern by FAA and by us
in reports dating back to at least 1979. We reported in 1987 that
turnover among screeners was about 100 percent a year at some airports,
and according to our more recent work, the turnover is considerably
higher. \6\ From May 1998 through April 1999, screener turnover
averaged 126 percent at the nation's 19 largest airports; 5 of these
airports reported turnover of 200 percent or more, and one reported
turnover of 416 percent. At one airport we visited, of the 993
screeners trained at that airport over about a 1-year period, only 142,
or 14 percent, were still employed at the end of that year. Such rapid
turnover can seriously limit the level of experience among screeners
operating a checkpoint.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\5\ Aviation Security: Long-Standing Problems Impair Airport
Screeners' Performance (GAO/RCED-00-75, June 28, 2000).
\6\ Aviation Security: FAA Needs Preboard Passenger Screening
Performance Standards (GAO/RCED-87-182, July 24, 1987).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Both FAA and the aviation industry attribute the rapid turnover to
the low wages and minimal benefits screeners receive, along with the
daily stress of the job. Generally, screeners are paid at or near the
minimum wage. We reported last year that some of the screening
companies at 14 of the nation's 19 largest airports paid screeners a
starting salary of $6.00 an hour or less and, at 5 of these airports,
the starting salary was the then minimum wage--$5.15 an hour. It is
common for the starting wages at airport fast-food restaurants to be
higher than the wages screeners receive. For instance, at one airport
we visited, screeners' wages started as low as $6.25 an hour, whereas
the starting wage at one of the airport's fastfood restaurants was $7
an hour.
The demands of the job also affect performance. Screening duties
require repetitive tasks as well as intense monitoring for the very
rare event when a dangerous object might be observed. Too little
attention has been given to factors such as (1) improving individuals'
aptitudes for effectively performing screener duties, (2) the
sufficiency of the training provided to screeners and how well they
comprehend it, and (3) the monotony of the job and the distractions
that reduce screeners' vigilance. As a result, screeners are being
placed on the job who do not have the necessary aptitudes, nor the
adequate knowledge to effectively perform the work, and who then find
the duties tedious and dull.
We reported in June 2000 that FAA was implementing a number of
actions to improve screeners' performance. However, FAA did not have an
integrated management plan for these efforts that would identify and
prioritize checkpoint and human factors problems that needed to be
resolved, and identify measures--and related milestone and funding
information--for addressing the performance problems. Additionally, FAA
did not have adequate goals by which to measure and report its progress
in improving screeners' performance.
FAA is implementing our recommendations. However, two key actions
to improving screeners' performance are still not complete. These
actions are the deployment of threat image projection systems--which
place images of dangerous objects on the monitors of X-ray machines to
keep screeners alert and monitor their performance--and a certification
program to make screening companies accountable for the training and
performance of the screeners they employ. Threat image projection
systems are expected to keep screeners alert by periodically imposing
the image of a dangerous object on the X-ray screen. They also are used
to measure how well screeners perform in detecting these objects.
Additionally, the systems serve as a device to train screeners to
become more adept at identifying harder-to-spot objects. FAA is
currently deploying the threat image projections systems and expects to
have them deployed at all airports by 2003.
The screening company certification program, required by the
Federal Aviation Reauthorization Act of 1996, will establish
performance, training, and equipment standards that screening companies
will have to meet to earn and retain certification. However, FAA has
still not issued its final regulation establishing the certification
program. This regulation is particularly significant because it is to
include requirements mandated by the Airport Security Improvement Act
of 2000 to increase screener training--from 12 hours to 40 hours--as
well as expand background check requirements. FAA had been expecting to
issue the final regulation this month, 2 \1/2\ years later than it
originally planned.
Differences in the Screening Practices of Five Other Countries and the
United States
We visited five countries--Belgium, Canada, France, the
Netherlands, and the United Kingdom--viewed by FAA and the civil
aviation industry as having effective screening operations to identify
screening practices that differ from those in the United States. We
found that some significant differences exist in four areas: screening
operations, screener qualifications, screener pay and benefits, and
institutional responsibility for screening.
First, screening operations in some of the countries we visited are
more stringent. For example, Belgium, the Netherlands, and the United
Kingdom routinely touch or ``pat down'' passengers in response to metal
detector alarms. Additionally, all five countries allow only ticketed
passengers through the screening checkpoints, thereby allowing the
screeners to more thoroughly check fewer people. Some countries also
have a greater police or military presence near checkpoints. In the
United Kingdom, for example, security forces--often armed with
automatic weapons--patrol at or near checkpoints. At Belgium's main
airport in Brussels, a constant police presence is maintained at one of
two glass-enclosed rooms directly behind the checkpoints.
Second, screeners' qualifications are usually more extensive. In
contrast to the United States, Belgium requires screeners to be
citizens; France requires screeners to be citizens of a European Union
country. In the Netherlands, screeners do not have to be citizens, but
they must have been residents of the country for 5 years. Training
requirements for screeners were also greater in four of the countries
we visited than in the United States. While FAA requires that screeners
in this country have 12 hours of classroom training before they can
begin work, Belgium, Canada, France, and the Netherlands require more.
For example, France requires 60 hours of training and Belgium requires
at least 40 hours of training with an additional 16 to 24 hours for
each activity, such as X-ray machine operations, that the screener will
conduct.
Third, screeners receive relatively better pay and benefits in most
of these countries. Whereas screeners in the United States receive
wages that are at or slightly above minimum wage, screeners in some
countries receive wages that are viewed as being at the ``middle
income'' level in those countries. In the Netherlands, for example,
screeners received at least the equivalent of about $7.50 per hour.
This wage was about 30 percent higher than the wages at fast-food
restaurants in that country. In Belgium, screeners received the
equivalent of about $14 per hour. Not only is pay higher, but the
screeners in some countries receive benefits, such as health care or
vacations--in large part because these benefits are required under the
laws of these countries. These countries also have significantly lower
screener turnover than the United States: turnover rates were about 50
percent or lower in these countries.
Finally, the responsibility for screening in most of these
countries is placed with the airport authority or with the government,
not with the air carriers as it is in the United States. In Belgium,
France, and the United Kingdom, the responsibility for screening has
been placed with the airports, which either hire screening companies to
conduct the screening operations or, as at some airports in the United
Kingdom, hire screeners and manage the checkpoints themselves. In the
Netherlands, the government is responsible for passenger screening and
hires a screening company to conduct checkpoint operations, which are
overseen by a Dutch police force. We note that, worldwide, of 102 other
countries with international airports, 100 have placed screening
responsibility with the airports or the government; only 2 other
countries--Canada and Bermuda--place screening responsibility with air
carriers.
Because each country follows its own unique set of screening
practices, and because data on screeners' performance in each country
were not available to us, it is difficult to measure the impact of
these different practices on improving screeners' performance.
Nevertheless, there are indications that for least one country,
practices may help to improve screeners' performance. This country
conducted a screener testing program jointly with FAA that showed that
its screeners detected over twice as many test objects as did screeners
in the United States.
Mr. Chairman, this concludes my prepared statement. I will be
pleased to answer any questions that you or Members of the Committee
may have.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Woerth follows:]
Prepared Statement of Captain Duane Woerth, President, Air Line Pilots
Association, International
Good morning, Mr. Chairman and Members of the Committee. My name is
Duane Woerth and I am the President of the Air Line Pilots Association,
International. ALPA represents 67,000 airline pilots who fly for 47
airlines in the U.S. and Canada. In addition, I am also here today
representing the Transportation Trades Department of the AFL-CIO, of
which I am a Executive Vice President.
It is an honor to be able to speak to you today, but I sincerely
wish that I could do so under more pleasant circumstances. Before last
Tuesday, most of us could not have imagined the possibility of the
horror that occurred on that day.
Our hearts, thoughts and prayers are with the families and friends
of those killed as a result of the four separate aircraft hijackings.
We have lost pilots and flight attendants from our ranks who, though
gone, will never be forgotten. The survivors of the Attack on America,
as it has been called, must now work diligently to ensure that our
beloved country, and its airline industry, are protected from further
acts of terrorism.
One of the lessons of this tragedy has been that the nation truly
does rely upon the aviation industry as the ``wings'' of our economy.
Without a strong airline industry, our economy is in serious peril.
With that thought in mind, I want to inform you that we are striving to
do all that we can to help the industry get back into the air and we
urge the Administration and Congress to do likewise. I am certainly
proud to inform you that union pilots and flight attendants
demonstrated a ``can do'' spirit and a willingness to return to work
shortly after the events of the 11th in order to get the aviation
system running again.
General Comments
Prior to the events of last Tuesday, the aviation security
community was generally opposed to the concept of adopting a
``fortress'' mentality to protect our airlines and airports. The use of
tall security fences, highly visible armed police officers roaming the
airport terminal, hand searches of bags, interviewers asking probing
questions of passengers, and other such measures were thought to be
incompatible with commercial aviation in a free society.
It is probably safe to say that the entire aviation industry,
including most in the government, traveling public, airlines, airports,
and perhaps, even crewmembers, enjoyed a false sense of security before
September 11th. I suspect that many of us believed that, although
flawed, our security system was generally doing the job that it was
intended to do. Unfortunately, that mind set may well have been at the
root of what enabled the 19 terrorists to perform their acts of
unspeakable devastation on an unsuspecting and innocent public.
If, in fact, there has ever been a false sense of security, it most
certainly no longer exists. We must replace that false sense of
security with a genuine sense of security, by instituting the most
advanced civil aviation security system in the world.
The security improvements that I am here to recommend to you today
range from the simple, inexpensive and quickly achieved to the
difficult, expensive and longer term. We believe that if the
government, working with us and the rest of the aviation industry, will
act on them forthrightly, we will some day be able to tell our children
and grandchildren that we turned tragedy into triumph.
Several years ago, ALPA embarked on a campaign entitled One Level
of Safety. That effort, as you probably know, was highly successful in
bringing to the attention of the traveling public, elected officials
and the aviation industry the need for significant safety improvements
to small airline aircraft operations. As a result of those efforts,
smaller airline aircraft now meet the same, or equivalent, standards of
the largest aircraft in the fleet.
This week, we must embark upon a new mission to achieve one level
of security throughout the airline industry. The security in place last
week was, by design, of differing levels. The rationale behind those
disparate levels of security was that the threat posed to small
aircraft was thought to be less than that posed to large aircraft. The
dangers associated with operating at small airports were thought to be
less than the risks germane to large airports. The hazards posed by
service personnel carrying items around the screening checkpoint were,
curiously, thought to be of less concern than those associated with
uniformed crewmembers going to their aircraft. And for the most part,
we even felt that the threat to domestic flights was less than the
threat to international flights. These assumptions have been proved
wrong.
We now know that those assumptions must be discarded so that we can
get about the work of preventing any further acts of aircraft piracy
and other acts of malice. It is now clear that any size aircraft flying
from any size airport, international or domestic, can be used as a
human-guided weapon. Accordingly, we believe that in order to create a
truly secure aviation system, we must start with the principle that the
traveling public and aircraft crewmembers need one level of security,
no matter where they fly to or from and regardless of the size of
aircraft in which they travel. The remainder of our comments should be
understood in that light.
Last week's horrific acts of violence were perpetrated, as we now
know, against a nation despised by certain Islamic terrorists. The
weapon of choice, namely, an airline aircraft loaded with fuel and
passengers, was viewed as a handy resource aimed at destroying our
nation's economic viability and wracking the American people with fear.
I am sure that you will agree with me that the terrorists will
accomplish neither objective. But, it should be recognized by all that
airline security must be viewed as a component of national security
from this day forward. It is no longer feasible to expect that the
airlines alone can protect the industry that gives wings to the rest of
the national economy. While we are not suggesting that airlines be
excused from all costs associated with securing their aircraft or the
facilities that they occupy, we are saying that the federal budget must
share in the costs of defending this national resource.
We call upon the Administration and Congress to ensure that the
funding necessary for fortifying our airlines and airports be made
available so that we can boost the public's confidence in returning to
the skies. Our economy needs a healthy airline industry and enhancing
security immediately will be essential to achieving that goal.
A New Aviation Security Blueprint
In the early 1970's, pilots took a strong, solitary stand against
hijackings by demanding that the government mandate security screening
of passengers. We were not successful in persuading the government to
provide that protection, despite literally dozens of hijackings in
prior years, until late 1972, when two separate incidents resulted in
two woundings and one death.
Thirty years later, we find that we must take another strong stand.
The aviation security system, as constructed today, must be completely
overhauled in order to (1) address the new risks that could harm us and
(2) bolster the confidence of the traveling public that it is safe to
fly again. We are promoting a new security ``blueprint'' which we
believe will accomplish both of these goals.
Near-Term Actions
Aviation security must be dramatically improved, and it must begin
not next month or next year, but today. It must happen now to limit the
amount of damage being done each day to the health of the airlines and
our national economy. As mentioned previously, the federal government
should provide the funding for these ``defense-related'' expenditures
to avoid further harm to an already weakened industry.
Following are the near-term actions that we are pursuing, for which
we request your support and assistance. As used herein, we define
``near-term'' actions as those that are under development now, or could
be very shortly, and can be implemented in a relatively short period.
1. Current cockpit doors are weak and flimsy, and can be easily
compromised by a determined adult. There is a clear need for the
increased security that a stronger door would provide. A dead bolt lock
should be installed on the inside of cockpit doors that cannot be
overridden with a key from outside; the door must be capable of being
opened quickly in the event of a safety problem. This will offer a
relatively small, but needed, additional margin of security over
today's cockpit doors.
A second, lightweight mesh net door should be installed behind
the cockpit door on the flight deck side. This net door could be used
as an additional protection device in the event of a security breach in
the cabin.
2. The development of standards for an advanced cockpit door
technology, and research on this technology, is already under way. Such
a door, when installed, will be capable of securing the flight crew
against attacks by would-be cockpit intruders, armed or otherwise. The
door system, which must be fail-safe in the event of an accident
requiring rapid egress, should be retro fitted on current aircraft and
installed by the manufacturers on new airplanes. This item cannot be
accomplished immediately, but ongoing work on it needs to be expedited.
3. Before last Tuesday, we could scarcely have envisioned calling
for cockpit protection in the form of weapons carried in the cockpit.
However, the world has changed and we must change with it. We recommend
the installation of at least two stun guns as standard equipment in the
cockpits of airline aircraft, three if there are three flight
crewmembers.
There are sophisticated stun guns on the market today that are
capable of immediately incapacitating a person of any size or strength,
without posing any health risks to the individual. The devices have
laser sights for accuracy and are capable of being used on a person up
to 15 feet away. Use of these guns would be done in only the most
extreme circumstances, to protect the lives and safety of the
passengers and crew.
4. We are most pleased to learn that the FBI is in the process of
creating a cadre of federal law enforcement officers to fly armed on
airline aircraft. The FAA is also making plans to increase the number
of Federal Air Marshals (FAMs) assigned to its contingent. ALPA has
long been a proponent of the FAM program, because we are confident in
its training standards and professionalism. We are also confident that
the FBI will successfully create a professional air marshal group
capable of defending against the types of hijackings that we saw last
week. We recommend that the Congress provide such assistance as may be
needed to facilitate the creation of the FBI's marshals and an
enlargement of the FAA's FAMs.
5. One of the most basic functions of a good security system is
positively identifying those individuals who are authorized entrance to
an area and keeping out all others. The absence of access controls was
a primary factor in the downing of PSA flight 1771 in December 1987.
Since that time, we have called for the institution of electronic means
of positively identifying each and every employee who has authorization
to enter secured airport areas.
Today, the failure to require airlines and airports to verify
employee identities is the cause of serious concerns about the security
of flight. The reported possibility that terrorism are, or may have,
posed as airline employees has caused us to focus our limited security
resources on honest, trustworthy employees instead of unknown possible-
threat passengers.
Last spring, it became public knowledge that GAO inspectors were
able to gain entrance to 19 federal office buildings and carry weapons
around two airport security checkpoints using phony credentials. The
FAA is in the process of developing a highly secure Memory Chip Card
(MCC) system to identify armed law enforcement officers (LEO's). Plans
have been announced to install a special MCC reader at each security
screening checkpoint in the U.S. in order to positively identify armed
LEO's. This technology could also be used to positively screen airline
and airport employees traversing the screening checkpoint.
Until there is a means in place to electronically verify the
identity of all employees and armed law enforcement officers, they
should produce a company ID and a photo driver's license for this
purpose. These items should be examined and validated by the airport
police at the security-screening checkpoint. An alternative measure
that would work for those airports having a computerized access control
system would be the placement of a card reader at the screening
checkpoint for use by employees.
6. In today's aircraft, there is only one way for the flight
attendants to talk with the flight crew when the cockpit door is
closed, namely, by calling on the interphone. This method of
communication is very observable when a flight attendant makes a call
under duress. We recommend the installation of a discreet switch(es) in
the cabin for use by flight attendants which enables them to discreetly
notify the flight crew that there is a security breach occurring in the
back of the airplane.
7. All personnel seeking employment in the aviation industry who
need access to airline aircraft in the performance of their duties
should, effective immediately, be required to undergo a criminal
background check. The airline industry must create and maintain the
highest personnel hiring standards in order to protect against
``insider'' threats. The technology for processing criminal background
checks has advanced to the point where they can be made via electronic
means.
8. Related to item #5, airports and airlines should immediately
revalidate all of their employee's identification cards using hologram
stickers, or through card reissuance. Some airports may be able to
electronically revalidate their cards, if they have a computerized
access control system. The industry is going to experience significant
layoffs and reductions in force over the next several months; this
could lead to many unaccounted-for ID cards that could be used in an
illegal manner.
9. The Computer-Assisted Passenger Prescreening System (CAPPS) is
designed to use the passenger information in airline data bases to
determine whether the individual poses a security risk. We have
recently learned that CAPPS is assisting the FBI in its ongoing
criminal investigation by providing information on the travel history
of known and suspected terrorists. If properly configured, CAPPS can
help identify potential security risks prior to boarding. We recommend
that CAPPS be used on all domestic and international arrivals and
departures in the U.S., Canada, and Mexico, even after the current
threat is diminished.
10. It has been the experience of U.S. pilots and flight attendants
that, depending on the carrier, airline-provided security train g is
poor and outdated. Current training includes showing crewmembers videos
that focus on hijacking situations faced in the 1970' s. Airline
security training must not only be more current, it must also address
the threats that a crew is likely to encounter. We recommend that the
airlines enhance their crewmember training through the use of cabin
mockups, problem solving, role-playing scenarios and other quality
instructional methods.
11. The FAA is in the process of updating its documentation on the
``Common Strategy,'' which is used by FAA, law enforcement, airlines,
and pilots during hijackings. The Common Strategy was written in the
Cuban hijacking era, and so involves procedures for handling extortion-
types of hijackings (e.g., demands for money). It does not address
suicidal hijackers or other such extreme hazards. ALPA recommends that
the Common Strategy be amended to include procedures and training on
the newest type of threats.
12. We have a long-standing opposition to the INS's practice of
deporting illegal aliens via airline aircraft. The agency's current
guidance allows groups of up to 10 deportees to board airline aircraft
without any type of escort. There have been serious incidents of unruly
behavior and, most disturbing, the possibility exists that a large
group of deportees may attempt to commandeer an aircraft to avoid
deportation. Clearly, INS should find another method of deporting
illegal aliens that does not place the traveling public at avoidable
risk. We urge the INS to only board deportees when they are accompanied
by two or more armed INS agent escorts.
13. The FAA issues its pilot licenses as traditional paper and ink
documents that could be easily duplicated or forged. Given that pilots
use these licenses to help identify an individual who desires to ride
the jumpseat, it is essential that they be produced in a highly secure
format (i.e., electronically verifiable).
The FAA decided approximately one year ago to put the names and
addresses of pilots in public view on the World Wide Web. This
information could be used in any number of malicious ways. We recommend
that FAA remove the data from the Web and any other publicly accessible
locations.
14. We are all familiar with the long-running public information
campaign of Smoky the Bear, a cartoon figure who reminds us that ``only
you can help prevent forest fires.'' We believe that a similar campaign
should be created by the government and industry aimed at educating the
traveling public about aviation security. A better-informed public
could serve as additional ``eyes and ears'' of security, assist
crewmembers as appropriate, and cause fewer problems onboard aircraft.
We recommend the slogan ``Security is Everybody's Business,'' and some
type of cartoon figure to carry that message via advertisements,
posters, etc.
15. Consistent with #14 above, the industry should implement the
recommendations of the FAA's Aviation Security Advisory Committee's
Employee Utilization Working Group. The essence of those
recommendations is that all airport, airline and service employees can,
and should, receive an appropriate level of training and ongoing
information about how to make aviation more secure. One noteworthy
recommendation is the creation of a security reporting ``hotline'' at
all airports for tips, suspicious behavior, abandoned bags, and the
like.
16. The threat information that pilots get, if any, is poor and
usually outdated. The government intelligence community, working in
concert with the airlines, should develop a greatly enhanced
methodology for relaying timely threat information to the carriers,
which can be shared with airline pilots.
17. We must prepare today for the possibility of a chemical/
biological agent attack in our aircraft. Airlines should install full-
vision oxygen masks in all commercial aircraft to enable the crews to
safely land during a chemical/biological agent attack. Aircraft should
be equipped with air quality monitors that can provide an alarm in the
cockpit if the presence of chem/bio agents is detected.
18. The FAA should immediately develop and implement an ATC
communication code for advising all pilots within radio contact that an
aircraft is under duress or has experienced a significant security-
related event. The major purpose of this action is to alert crews to
take appropriate precautionary measures to prevent a similar occurrence
on their aircraft.
19. The ban on all remote check-ins must include disallowing
electronic ticketing check-in kiosks that currently let passengers
check-in and receive a boarding pass without ever being identified by
the carders. All passengers must check in and show identification at
staffed check-in counters.
20. Regarding baggage security, we recommend that the FAA impose
standard limits on carry-on baggage in order to let security screeners
spend more time examining each item brought on the aircraft. We
strongly support increasing the percentage of bags subjected to search.
21. Security deficiencies can, and currently are, impacting safety.
One example virtually every cockpit crewmember has traditionally
carried a small tool kit or ``combination'' tool in their flight case
for dealing with small mechanical issues inflight. Based on the most
recent FAA Security Directives of which we are aware, pilots may not
carry them through the security-screening checkpoint.
We are urging the FAA to (1) allow pilots to carry such tools
through the screening checkpoint after their identification has been
verified, and (2) require that the airlines place these tools in the
cockpit as additional aircraft equipment.
Longer-Term Actions
Following are our recommendations concerning action items that
could be initiated fairly soon, but will take longer to implement than
those above.
1. In view of the unprecedented terrorist threat that may continue
for some time, we believe that the Administration and Congress should
consider the creation of a new aviation law enforcement agency.
Currently, civil aviation security is but one of many responsibilities
of the FAA. The FAA assumed the task of providing aviation security in
the 1970's, approximately 20 years after its creation as a civilian
agency. Although there are many hard-working, talented people at the
FAA, it is not a law enforcement agency nor is it staffed to provide
law enforcement support.
Additionally, this branch of the FAA has to compete internally
for resources and priorities within the agency's overall budget. To
avoid this conflict and provide the law enforcement expertise which is
now necessary, we believe that a law enforcement agency should be
established whose sole responsibility would be to prevent and combat
aviation-related crime. The removal of the security responsibility from
the FAA would allow the new agency to be much more proactive. Whereas
the FAA's focus is on the development, promulgation and enforcement of
regulations, the law enforcement agency should be focused on countering
existing and evolving threats. This agency would also be responsible
for coordinating threat and other security information with other law
enforcement agencies. ALPA is committed to work with you to create such
an agency.
2. The government's own inspectors, from the General Accounting
Office and DOT Inspector General's Office, not to mention the FAA's
security auditors, have found time and again that the U.S. security
screening system is ineffective. The status quo, whereby airlines
contract with the lowest bidder to perform security screening, has been
a complete validation of the concept ``you get what you pay for.'' It
is past tune to fix this problem using highly trained and motivated,
wellpaid, screening professionals and the best possible equipment. A
well-run, security-screening corporation, selected not on the basis of
lowest bid but highest competency, should perform the screening
function under the aegis of the aforementioned aviation law enforcement
agency. The U.S. should borrow from successful European security
screening systems, which employ interviewers, maintain separate ramp
crew access and other measures in the development of the new security
screening system.
3. Government and industry have, as partners, made great progress
in the development of explosive detection systems capable of spotting
the most ingeniously disguised bombs and most minute particles of
explosive material. However, there is much work still to be done.
FAA is in the initial phases of researching ``Free Flow,'' a
high-tech security screening system. We strongly support this concept
and urge the Administration and Congress to fully fund it, ultimately
as a means of rapidly and accurately detecting explosive devices,
weapons, and chemical/biological agents on persons and in their bags.
4. We have known for some tune that individuals, almost certainly
terrorists, are stealing pilot uniforms and credentials. The imposter
threat cannot be effectively dealt with unless there is positive,
electronic verification of the identities of each employee authorized
to enter the secure areas. It is past tune that we created a system
that will prevent an airline employee imposter from fraudulently
gaining access to our aircraft and threatening the lives of all onboard
and others on the ground. We have long supported the development and
implementation of the Universal Access System (UAS), an effort aimed at
closing the gaping hole in airline employee identification. FAA has
completed UAS standards; we urge that implementation of it begin
immediately.
5. Similar to the problem of employee identity verification, the
airlines are not currently capable of positively determining who is
getting on their aircraft. This is demonstrated when aircraft leave the
gate with art inaccurate manifest; we know of one airline that
routinely allows flights to leave the gate with a two-person error.
As another example, after one accident last year, an airline CEO
made a public request for assistance in identifying the passengers on
his own aircraft! The security ramifications are substantial--unless we
know that the person boarding the aircraft is the same one who bought
the ticket, we cannot positively ascertain that the individual has been
through the security checkpoint and is not carrying a weapon.
6. We are aware of a technology, available today, which is capable
of taking a photo of each person and their checked bags. The photo is
encrypted on the airline ticket in the form of a striated bar code,
known as two-dimensional bar coding. The ticket is machine read at the
gate and a monitor shows the gate agent the photo of the ticket bearer.
If the two faces do not match, the passenger is denied boarding. The
photo of a checked bag can be used to identify it easily, if it needs
to be taken off the aircraft subsequent to boarding, but prior to
flight. The system also avails the ability to positively match the
passenger with his/her bags.
We recommend that the government investigate the various
technologies available for positive passenger and checked baggage
identification and begin moving toward the eventual goal of requiting
the airlines to use it for security purposes. This identification
system can be integrated with CAPPS for even greater synergy.
7. In connection with the item above, the airlines should create,
and have readily available, basic information about each passenger's
special capabilities, if any. In the event of an emergency, the captain
could, by contacting dispatch, immediately determine if there were any
doctors, police, bomb specialists, etc., on the flight who could be
requested to provide assistance. This capability would be extremely
helpful in the event of a security breach, because the captain could
determine whether there are onboard resources that could help resolve
the problem.
8. There is much discussion ongoing today about the feasibility of
arming pilots. The events of last week demonstrated that lethal force
could be used to advantage. We have given this matter serious
discussion and we believe that there could be potential for making this
possibility a reality. However, as noted above, we have a seriously
deficient employee identification system that must first be addressed.
We want to ensure that anyone who is armed and going through the
security checkpoint is positively identified.
After meeting that goal, a thorough study should be given to a
program where airline pilots who meet strict qualifications could
voluntarily be trained as sworn federal law enforcement officers with
arrest authority and allowed to carry weapons in the cockpit to protect
themselves and their passengers.
9. The FAA should begin a program to certify flight attendants as
safety professionals. This would enhance flight attendant training and
formalize and reenforce their role as safety professionals. This would
also ensure proper training for all types of emergencies. It is
essential that flight attendant training be improved in this area.
Thank you, again, for the opportunity to appear before you today. I
would be pleased to respond to any questions that you may have.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Barclay follows:]
Prepared Statement of Charles M. Barclay, President, American
Association of Airport Executives on Behalf of the American Association
of Airport Executives and Airports Council International-North American
Chairman Hollings, Ranking Member McCain and Members of the Senate
Commerce Committee, thank you for inviting me to participate in today's
hearing on aviation security. I am testifying today on behalf of the
American Association of Airport Executives (AAAE) and Airports Council
International-North America (ACI-NA). ACI-NA represents local, regional
and state governing bodies that own and operate commercial airports in
the United States and Canada. AAAE represents the men and women who
manage the primary, commercial service, reliever and general aviation
airports. I appreciate this opportunity to discuss ways that we can
work together to improve aviation security.
I know I speak on behalf of all AAAE and ACI-NA members throughout
the United States and Canada when I say our thoughts and prayers go out
to those who suffered as result of the terrorist attacks that occurred
last week. The fact that terrorists hijacked four commercial airlines
to carry out their attacks against the World Trade Center and the
Pentagon is particularly troubling to our members because they consider
passenger safety and security to be their most important
responsibilities.
Our hearts also go out to our friends and colleagues who work for
the Port Authority of New York and New Jersey. The Port Authority, of
course, operates John F. Kennedy International, LaGuardia, Newark
International and Teterboro airports. Until last week the Port
Authority's aviation department was located on the 65th floor of One
World Trade Center--the first tower struck by American Airlines Flight
11 from Boston to Los Angeles. From reports that we have received, it
appears that most of those who served in the aviation department were
able to escape the north tower before it collapsed. Unfortunately,
approximately seventy of their colleagues from the Port Authority are
still missing. Many of those are law enforcement officers from the Port
Authority who were trying to help people evacuate the World Trade
Center. We will never forget that they and so many police officers,
firefighters, and office workers risked their lives in an effort to
save others.
In a speech that he gave at Harvard University on June 5, 1947,
Secretary of State George C. Marshall proposed that the United States
help to rebuild Europe after World War II. More than 40 years later,
the United States must repair the destruction that occurred in our own
country after terrorists struck the World Trade Center and the
Pentagon. There is no question that we will rebuild the financial
district in New York City and repair damage done to the Pentagon. But I
would suggest that all of us with an interest in aviation need to work
together on a Marshall Plan for improving airport and airline security.
We simply cannot allow the hijackings and terrorist attacks that
occurred last week to happen ever again.
On Monday, Secretary of Transportation Norman Mineta formed two
rapid-response teams to make recommendations on improving aviation
security. One will focus on ways to improve aircraft security, and the
other improving airport security. I am honored that the Secretary asked
me to work on the airport team. I look forward to working with him,
Deputy Secretary of Transportation Michael Jackson, Federal Aviation
Administrator Jane Garvey and the other members of the rapid response
teams to propose new security requirements to protect the safety of the
flying public.
But as you have been asked to do so many times before, Members of
the Senate Commerce Committee and others in Congress will need to play
a key role in developing solutions to the security shortfalls that we
experienced last week. This Committee, under the guidance of Chairman
Hollings, Ranking Member McCain, Aviation Subcommittee Chairman
Rockefeller and Ranking Member Hutchison, has a long track record on
improving aviation security, and all of you should be commended for
your leadership on this issue. I am also pleased that members of this
Committee and others in Congress are continuing to propose constructive
ways to improve aviation security in the aftermath of last weeks
terrorist attacks. I look forward to working with you to explore those
and other opportunities to enhance airport and airline security.
After the terrorist attacks that occurred last week, the Federal
Aviation Administration (FAA) promptly closed our nation's commercial
airspace system and issued two emergency amendments that included
several security initiatives. I think the Administration, Secretary
Mineta, and Administrator Garvey deserve a great deal of credit for
their quick response during this national crisis. I also applaud the
leadership and staffs of the nation's airports that have been working
with Department of Transportation (DOT) and FAA officials at an
extraordinary pace to heighten security and resume air travel.
As all of you know, airports and airlines were required to
implement these new security measures before being allowed to resume
their operations. Airports, for instance, were immediately required to
deploy more law enforcement officials and K-9 units, increase security
inspections throughout their facilities, strengthen access control
measures and remove all vehicles parked near their terminal buildings.
In addition to the new security measures that were implemented in
recent days, I think there are many other options that Congress and the
Administration should explore in an effort enhance security at our
nation's airports. I would like to take a moment to outline some
proposals for your consideration.
Use Well-Trained Security Professionals to Screen Passengers and
Baggage: As all of you know, airlines are responsible for screening
passengers and their carry-on baggage for weapons and explosives, and
carriers usually contract security companies to hire and train
screeners. The numerous shortcomings of the current system have been
well documented. Last year, the General Accounting Office reported that
screeners who operate checkpoints have ``had difficulty in detecting
dangerous objects, missing as many as 20 percent during tests.'' The
agency cited rapid turnover of screener personnel and low wages as
major causes of poor performance.
In light of the hijackings that occurred last week, it is now more
important than ever that steps be taken to improve the way we screen
passengers and their carry-on baggage. The key issue, in our view, is
to improve the training, testing, and thereby the proficiency of those
individuals conducting the screening of passengers and baggage. I know
many in Congress and the aviation industry have called for federalizing
screeners. But ultimately the more immediate need is to professionalize
aviation security personnel. It is important to note that
federalization does not necessarily mean hiring federal law enforcement
officers.
At most federal facilities today, checkpoints are operated by
contract employees. If this option were to be exercised at airport
screening checkpoints, there may be no significant difference between a
screener contracted by the Federal Government and a screener working
for a security company contracted by the airlines. One proposal is to
have federal law enforcement conducting the screening. In any event,
the issue is performance standards, not just responsibility for
oversight. For that reason, we hope that any solution--whether it
include hiring federal law enforcement officials or federalizing those
who screen passengers and their carry-on baggage--result in adequately
compensated screeners who are trained and tested to a level of
proficiency much higher than currently required of commercial
screeners.
Deploy Explosive Detection Systems at More Airports: We also need
to provide screeners with better equipment. There are a number of
innovative technologies that have made detection of explosives and
other deadly or dangerous weapons easier to identify. While these
systems are commonly viewed as only as effective as the trained
personnel who operate them, they are an increasingly essential facet of
the aviation security equation. The integration of a new generation of
Explosive Detection Systems (EDS), as called for by the 1996
Presidential Commission on Aviation Security and Terrorism, has been an
important addition to our efforts to improve the security of our
aviation system. These and other new technologies must be integrated
into the nation's airports at a much quicker pace and with increased
attention to the resources, training and infrastructure requirements
necessary for their effective use.
As with any technology, planning and training are critical to
realizing the potential of explosive and other weapons detection
systems. A significant number of the new generation explosive detection
systems are being used at 46 airports around the country. We need to
deploy more explosive detection systems at airports of all sizes
through a much more swift and coordinated process.
The FAA, through its Security Equipment Integrated Product Team,
has been responsible for the purchase and deployment of these systems
throughout major airports around the country. They are commonly used
for baggage screening of the traveling public, but a higher priority
needs to be placed on better coordination with industry on where they
are deployed both throughout the system and within individual airports.
EDS baggage screening machines and other resource intensive
security technologies come with significant infrastructure, maintenance
and training requirements. Terminal and baggage handling areas must be
redesigned to accommodate these systems. Airport and airline personnel
must be trained on their proper operation and maintenance. In many
instances, structural and electrical capabilities may need to be
upgraded to accommodate them. All of these elements must be provided
for in advance of their deployment, which has unfortunately not always
been the case. If it is agreed that the best technologies must be
deployed to combat terrorist threats, then it must be done with proper
planning, coordination and resources.
Use New Technology to Tighten Access to Secure Areas in and around
Airport Terminals: In addition to improving the screening process for
passengers and baggage, we need to do a better job of controlling
access to secure areas in and around airport terminals. Last year, the
DOT Inspector General highlighted the shortcomings in access control
technology and procedures at some airports around the country. This is
an issue that airport operators take seriously, and we need to continue
to improve procedures and deploy new technology to tighten the
perimeter of secure areas. Controlling these critical access points is
key to improving aviation security and will require capital
improvements as well as an increase in research and development
efforts.
Enhanced technology should not only be applied to access control
measures but to the process of screening personnel entering the secure
areas as well. Understanding that the secure area of most airports is
an operational area, this will be a daunting task. While there are
policy measures that can be taken such as restricting the type and
amount of personal possessions that may be carried into the secure area
as a matter of course this may not prove to be sufficient. Ideally,
each access point from the public to the secure area would be equipped
with security screening equipment and trained personnel.
Conduct Background Checks on Those Who Have Access to Secure Areas:
Better technology is only part of the equation. Just as we need to have
better trained screeners, we must also focus on eliminating undesirable
behavior that can nullify even the best technology used to control
secure areas. Toward that goal, it is essential that we concentrate our
efforts on ensuring that only those persons who have undergone thorough
background checks are granted access to secure areas.
Last year, Senator Hutchison introduced S. 2440, the Airport
Security Improvement Act of 2000. Like many on this Committee, we
strongly supported that legislation because it called on the FAA to
work with air carriers and airport operators to strengthen procedures
to prevent unauthorized access to secure areas and commercial aircraft.
The bill, which was enacted into law on November 22, 2000, requires
criminal background checks for security screeners and others who have
access to secure areas in the top twenty most at risk airports. The
legislation requires background checks for those at other airports to
be phased-in over three years. It also requires the FAA to expand and
accelerate the Electronic Fingerprint Transmission Pilot program.
In light of recent events, we think the FAA should accelerate the
phase-in period for criminal history record checks and allow all
airports to utilize the electronic fingerprint assessment technology
immediately. It is imperative that the Federal Bureau of Investigation
(FBI) give these background checks priority consideration and that the
agency be given the necessary resources to process them in a timely
manner.
Since the aviation system has been targeted as means of carrying
out terrorist activity, we believe that the current criteria applied in
assessing who is allowed access to secure areas are inadequate. Airport
operators are currently restricted by law to assessing records of
convictions for very specific crimes, and we think that the range of
activities subject to that assessment should be broadened. We are also
aware that various federal agencies keep records of persons with the
propensity to commit acts of violence and or terrorism. Airports should
be able to submit queries to a single federal entity to have applicants
for positions requiring unescorted access vetted against such lists. We
believe that this federal entity should take the lead to query all
other federal agencies with an interest in terrorist issues to ensure
that personnel to whom we grant unescorted access are not suspected of
or directly involved in terrorist activity.
Increase the Number of Law Enforcement Officials and K-9 Units at
Airports: As I mentioned earlier in my statement, the new security
measures that the DOT issued last week required airports to increase
the number of uniformed security patrols or law enforcement officials
at their facilities. Visible security patrols and uniformed law
enforcement officials have proven to be an extremely effective
deterrent to acts of violence in airports. The mere presence of
uniformed officers at and around screening checkpoints has reduced the
number of passengers attempting to circumvent the checkpoint.
Due in part because these programs have been so successful, many
have argued for an increase in the number of trained law enforcement
officers present in the public and the secure area of airports.
Currently the number of officers is small, and our forces are stretched
thin across the airport system. We believe that more law enforcement
officials should be a permanent addition to airport security and that
it is incumbent upon Congress and the Administration to make sure
airports have the resources they will need to pay for the additional
security.
FAA certified K-9 teams are an important component of an airport's
ability to screen passengers and their baggage. The FAA is recognized
as having a premier K-9 program. The problem is there are simply not
enough FAA certified K-9 units to go around. It is our understanding
that K-9 teams from other federal agencies are trained to a different
standard than the FAA teams and are therefore not authorized for use to
comply with FAA security directives. We strongly believe that the FAA
should expand its K-9 program to improve security at more airports. In
the meantime, we hope the FAA will consider allowing airports to use K-
9 teams trained by other agencies.
Disseminate Intelligence to a Designated Airport Security
Coordinator: The FBI, Central Intelligence Agency and other
intelligence agencies each play their own part in monitoring,
identifying and assessing threats to national security. Some of the
information processed by this intelligence community identifies
potential threats to the safety of civil aviation, and some of this
information is shared with offices in the DOT and FAA. However, very
little of this critical data is shared with the front line airport and
airline personnel responsible for implementing security procedures.
Aviation security needs to be among the top priorities of the
intelligence agencies responsible for identifying terrorist threats.
Coordination of intelligence dissemination with the Secretary's Office
of Intelligence and Security, appropriate FAA staff and finally airport
security coordinators will dramatically increase the likelihood that
real threats to the system are met with real local response and
preparedness.
As a direct result of the recommendations from the 1996
Presidential Commission on Aviation Safety and Security, aviation
security consortia were formed and vested with the authority to work
cooperatively with federal regulators to meet the goals of increased
aviation security. This increase in the level of effective
communication and cooperation has steadily improved the baseline of
aviation security. With the events that occurred last week, this type
of government and industry cooperation is particularly important.
Airport security professionals play a key role in developing,
implementing and maintaining effective security measures, and their
input should be used as we develop new ways to increase aviation
security.
Deploy Federal Security Managers at More Airports: The FAA is
responsible for providing threat information to airports and
establishing aviation security policies and regulations. The agency's
Civil Aviation Security Operations Office has deployed Federal Security
Managers to the nation's highest risk airports to assist in
coordinating security efforts. This program was originally intended to
give these airports direct access to the Associate Administrator for
Civil Aviation Security in times of heightened concern. But the scope
must be expanded to provide similar coordinated efforts at more
airports.
Again, these are just some options that I think Congress and the
Administration should explore in an effort to enhance security at our
nation's airports. Many of the proposals, such as providing a better
screening process, would increase security at airports and on
commercial airlines. I know many in Congress have proposed expanding
the FAA's Federal Air Marshal program as a way to deter to air piracy.
While airports don't play a role in the Air Marshal program, I think
this week's announcement by the Attorney General regarding the
expansion of the program is an extremely positive and important step.
Mr. Chairman, I would like to make two final points. First, a
number of the mandated security measures that I described earlier in my
testimony have resulted in significant cost increases for the nation's
airports. There is no question that these are important to our efforts
to enhance aviation security and absolutely necessary given the
horrific events that occurred last week. It is our hope that as
Congress considers legislation to help the airline industry funds will
also be made available to airports for compliance with the new mandated
security initiative imposed by the FAA.
I would also like take a moment to discuss Ronald Reagan Washington
National Airport. Given the airport's proximity to the White House, the
Capitol and other federal buildings and monuments in the Washington
metropolitan area, I understand the concerns that some have raised
about the possibility that the airport could be used for future
terrorist attacks. Those are legitimate concerns that need to be
adequately addressed, and additional security measures that should be
taken by the airport and the airlines that fly in and out of
Washington, D.C. But in the end, I hope the debate will be about how we
reopen National Airport--not if we reopen it. As US Airways Chairman
Stephen M. Wolf recently said, ``Closing Reagan National Airport is an
unacceptable visible win for terrorism.''
In what has become known as the Marshall Plan Speech, Secretary
Marshall said: . . . I need not tell you gentlemen, that the world
situation is very serious. That must be apparent to all intelligent
people. I think one difficulty is that the problem is one of such
enormous complexity that the very mass of facts presented to the public
by press and radio make it exceedingly difficult for the man in the
street to reach a clear appraisement of the situation.
Those comments could easily describe the confusion that all of us
felt after the terrorist attacks that occurred last week. But just as
the United States successfully helped to rebuild Europe, so too can we
can strengthen the security of our aviation system. All of us will need
to work together, and all of us will need to make some sacrifices. But
I'm confident that we can overcome the challenges ahead.
Chairman Hollings, Ranking Member McCain, and Members of the Senate
Commerce Committee, thank you again for inviting me to participate in
today's hearing on aviation security. All of us at ACI-NA and AAAE look
forward to working with you and others in the aviation industry during
the days and weeks ahead on ways to enhance airport and airline
security.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Hudson follows:]
Prepared Statement of Paul Hudson, Executive Director of the Aviation
Consumer Action Project
Good morning Chairman Hollings, Subcommittee Chairman Rockefeller
and Members of the Committee.
My name is Paul Hudson. I am executive director of the Aviation
Consumer Action Project (ACAP), an nonprofit organization founded in
1971 with thousands of air traveler supporters that acts as a voice and
ear for air travelers and the general public on national aviation
issues. ACAP has been a member of the FAA's Aviation Security Advisory
Committee since 1991 and has advocated for stronger aviation security
for more than 15 years. From 1989 to 1993 I was president of the
Families of Pan Am 103/Lockerbie, and a grieving terrorist victim
family member. I testified before Congressional committees many times
and lobbied for strengthening aviation security, particularly enactment
of the Aviation Security Improvement Act of 1990, which forms the basis
of the present aviation security system. From 1977 to 1987, I was
counsel to the New York State Crime Victims Board, and a consultant to
the American Bar Association's Victims Committee and the National
Institute of Justice on crime and terrorist victim rights.
Thank you for holding this hearing ten days after the worst
terrorist attack in history . The September 11th attacks proved that
airliners can be used as weapons of mass destruction, something never
anticipated or even imagined in my many discussions with aviation
security officials and experts.
September 11th, 2001 was certainly a day of infamy for the America
and the world. That day also changes forever how we look at aviation
security and terrorism. With over 5,000 dead on the ground plus about
200 air travelers, the total destruction of the World Trade Center and
surrounding buildings, the partial destruction of the Pentagon, the
apparent targeting of the White House and U.S. Capitol, plus enormous
damage to the American economy, aviation security is clearly a top
national security priority. It must be upgraded, at least, to the
highest standards of federal law enforcement and national security in
the coming months. In the meantime, aviation security must under no
circumstances allow a repeat of the September 11th attacks.
Accordingly, we must now focus on emergency measures that can be
done in days or weeks and not even consider things that undercut
security, while we are still under imminent threat of this new form of
terrorism.
Needed emergency measures
ACAP is recommending the following emergency measures to the FAA:
1) Quickly secure airliner cockpits. Initially this will require
deploying armed guards or law enforcement agents or armed flight
crews. Later stronger cockpit doors and security barriers or
screens must be installed.
2) Restrict or ban carry-on baggage. Since carry-on baggage can contain
weapons that can be used in hijacking and the current screening
systems are known to be inadequate, carry-ons should be restricted
to one small bag with hand searching or else eliminated entirely.
We are also calling on airline passengers to voluntarily reduce or
eliminate their carry-on baggage. This will both improve security and
reduce delays.
Backward Steps
Last weekend, the FAA lifted the ban on general aviation (private
aircraft) except within 25 miles of New York City and Washington, D.C.
With about a million private airplanes in the United States and little
or no security systems in place, the risk of terrorists using such
planes with explosives to attack tall or landmark buildings requires
temporary restrictions. ACAP recommends that general aviation be banned
to within 100 miles of major cities or likely terrorist targets,
without special FAA security officers clearance.
On September 17th the FAA lifted the ban on passenger airliners
carrying unscreened mail and cargo. This ban was only instituted last
week. The ban was in place during the Gulf War and its aftermath. It
should be immediately re-instituted.
Pressure is now building to re-open Reagan National Airport. This
step should not even be considered until a much higher level aviation
security is in place and such systems have been independently tested
and found to be effective with the highest level confidence to ensure
against a repeat attack on Washington, D.C. Since airplanes taking off
or landing at Reagan National Airport are literally seconds away from
the White House, the U.S. Capitol building, the Pentagon and other key
U.S. Government buildings and other national landmarks, we doubt that
such a system is possible.
Medium term measures
The following measures should be done in the next several months,
but may take a year or more to complete:
1) Federalization of aviation security by establishing a separate
Aviation Security Agency not within the Transportation Department
is essential to break the cycle of incompetence and lack of
accountability that is endemic in the current system of private
security contractors and airline/airport security under FAA
oversight.
While I do not wish to dwell on the past, aviation security since
1989 has been the subject of two presidential commissions (after the
Pan Am 103 bombing and the TWA 800 disaster), at least one major law,
scores of rulemaking and minor legislation. As anyone who saw the ``60
Minutes'' CBS television program last Sunday now knows, and as those
involved with this issue have known for years, the system is broken and
has been incapable for over a decade to bring its performance up to the
level required by existing security regulations based on past terrorist
attacks, much less to anticipate and effectively deal with future ones.
Who could rationally argue we should again entrust our national
security to private security contractors or airline and airport
employees with FAA/DOT oversight? After in the past week losing the
World Trade Center, four jumbo jets, part of the Pentagon and over
5,000 lives? The airlines, aviation unions and aviation consumer
organizations are united on this point.
2) Cockpit doors must be secured with strong doors and locks that have
keys that are not easily compromised. Presently such doors are
intentionally made of light weight materials so that they can be
kicked out, in case the door is jammed or locked and the crew needs
to make an emergency evacution.
Beyond this, security screens or barriers need to be installed
between the cockpit door and the passenger cabin so that hijackers
cannot even approach the cockpit door during flight.
3) Passengers, pilots, aviation security and airport and airline
employees and contractors must be screened to ensure that suspected
or wanted terrrorists are not infiltrating the U.S. aviation
system. Presently persons on the FBI or INS or Customs terrorist
watch lists or even wanted terrorists are not flagged to be
apprehended by airline security, denied boarding, or even subjected
to extra security. It has been reported that the Computer Assisted
Passenger Profiling System ( or CAPPS system) operated by the
airlines and of which they are so proud, uttering failed to
identify any of the 19 suicide hijackers involved in the September
11th attacks, even though at least two were on the U.S.
Government's terrorist watch lists and they used their own names to
purchase airline tickets on four hijacked U.S. airliners operated
by American and United Airlines. Existing employees with access to
secure airport areas are not screened for criminal histories and
not required to pass national security checks. Likewise there is
nothing to prevent terrorists in the U.S. from obtaining pilot
training on airliners or jumbo jet simulators or from renting
private airplanes in the United States.
Face recognition, optical fingerprint, retina, voice print or
other personal identification technology, all currently available
technologies, must be used to secure U.S. aviation against would be
terrorists.
4) Flight crews must be retrained to resist rather than cooperate with
hijackers.
Current training assumes that hijackers are not determined
suicidal fanantics and. emphasizes cooperation with hijackers so as not
to unduly upset them. Clearly this training is largely misguided in
light of last week and flight crews must be retrained.
5) Civil defense training and public education is needed to deal with
21st Century terrorist threats.
Public education directed to airline passengers should be altered
to deal with the present threat of suicide hijackers bent on using
airliners as instruments of mass detruction.
Likewise, occupants and operators of skyscapers or landmark
buildings or other large public facilities should be trained in rapid
emergency evacuation procedures, in order to minimize casualties in
cases of terrorist attack.
Finally, public education campaigns should inform and encourage
the public to report to law enforcement suspicious behavior that could
indicate terrorist activity.
Conclusion
I do not wish to dwell on the past (pre-September 11th, 2001) nor
to play the blame game nor the I-told-you-so game, nor the Casandra
prophesy game, but neither should we have historical amnesia. I have
included as an addendum to this testimony, a snapshot of the public
record showing how the same proposals to improve aviation security,
since at least 1990, have been made over and over to the U.S.
Government, only to be largely or completely ignored. These same
security measures still remain to be done to secure American aviation
and national security against terrorist attack.
I would like to close with some important questions for this
Committee, the U.S. Government and the American people:
--Will American democracy rise to the terrorist challenge this time?
--Or will we revert to the feckless pattern of the past, minimizing or
ignoring terrorism for the sake of short term commercial
convenience?
As you hear the siren call of ``normalization'' please remember,
even after Pearl Harbor and the German conquest of most of Europe, some
powerful American and British industrialists and leaders sought trade,
compromise and nearly business as usual with the enemy. Many others
resisted common sense wartime security measures such as turning out the
lights in coastal cities causing the loss of many merchant marine ships
to submarine attacks. Americans have in the past often learned the hard
way that enemies who declare war on the United States really mean it.
If our form of government and way of life is to survive, you must
get deadly serious about. aviation security and terrorism. I fear that
a second attack could destroy the U.S. Capitol, the White House and
other landmarks and would show our present security and government
officials as too weak and incompetent to defend America's national
security. And make no mistake, no new form of terrorism has ever not
been repeated many times over.
There is an old saying that says, ``God looks after babies, drunks
and the United States of America.'' The luck of the USA ran out on
September 11th, 2001. Now we must make our own luck, or face the
consequences. Again thank you for the opportunity of testifying before
you today. I would be welcome any questions.
______
Addendum to Testimony of Paul Hudson
The following aviation security measures were recommended by
Presidential Commissions or enacted since 1990 but never really
implemented due primarily to aviation industry opposition:
1) criminal history background checks for all persons with access
to secure areas of airports.
2) use of bomb detectors for checked luggage.
3) passenger--checked luggage bag matching.
4) upgrade security screener training (was 0-5 hours now about
12, recommended to be 40 to 350).
5) mail and cargo on passenger airliners to be screened for
explosives.
6) appointment of assistant secretary for Intelligence and
Security (position has been left vacant).
7) hardening of airframe and luggage containers to resist
explosives.
8) Policies and procedures to ensure that international terrorism
reporting on air transportation are shared with DOT/FAA.
9) Federal monetary benefits to victims and families of terrorist
victims.
10) Improve human intelligence gathering on terrorism.
11) FAA certification of screeners and aviation security
companies.
Also the Federal Sky Marshall Program was essentially disbanded in
the 1990's.
The President's Commission on Aviation Security and Terrorism
concluded in May 1990 (p. i) that ``the U.S. civil aviation security
system is seriously flawed and has failed to provide the proper level
of protection for the public.'' The Commission found the FAA ``to be a
reactive agency--preoccupied with responses to events to the exclusion
of adequate security planning in anticipation of future threats.'' The
Commission also found that Pan Am had a history of security lapses
before and after the bombing of Pan Am 103 in December 1988.
For more detail see my and aviation security advocates testimony
before congressional committees in 1989 and 1990, before the
President's Commission on Aviation Security and Terrorism (1989-90),
the White House Commission on Aviation Safety and Security (1996-98)
and before the Congress in 1996-98, including the following:
1) Testimony of Paul S. Hudson on behalf of the Families of Pan Am
103/Lockerbie before the Subcommittee on Aviation of the Senate
Commerce, Science and Transportation Committee, August 7, 1990, listing
29 amendments to strengthen the then pending Aviation Security
Improvement Act of which 4 or 5 were adopted. Measures not adopted
included establishment of an outside review board for aviation security
to ensure FAA/airline/airport compliance, closing the loophole
authorizing undefined exemptions from security employment restrictions,
requiring independent or public review of air carrier security
standards and plans, minimum funding for aviation security R & D of
$250 million per year, establishment of an Aviation Security
Administration reporting to the Secretary of Transportation, mandating
installation and use of explosive detection equipment when certain
technical criteria were met, and requiring fair compensation to
terrorist victims for economic and non-economic loss.
2) Testimony of Paul S. Hudson on behalf of Families of Pan Am
103/Lockerbie before the Senate Commerce, Energy and Transportation
Committee, September 25, 1996.
The key legislation is the Aviation Security Improvement Act of
1990 and various amendments to that law. The key committees are the
Senate and House Aviation Subcommittees, the Senate Commerce and House
Transportation Committees, the Transportation Appropriation
Subcommittees, House Foreign Affairs, Senate SC on Terrorism (Foreign
Affairs), Judiciary Committees.
The Chairman. Senator Rockefeller.
Senator Rockefeller. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Gentlemen, I
also appreciate your patience. Duane, let me start with you.
We've been talking about federal air marshals and we want them.
Federal air marshals can sit in two places, in fact, on an
airplane. They can sit at or they can sit in the cockpit. We've
divided those two very distinct parts of the airplane trying to
secure one, in absolute terms, to make sure this cannot happen
again in the form that it has. I saw you on national television
say that nothing is not on the table. I forget what the
question was in terms of the stun gun or of the firearm but in
any event, there was nothing off the table and I was pleased
about that and happy for that. The Federal Marshal AFT, with
only 32 available in the country right now and with lots of
money, there could be a lot of training but if the person isn't
yet up to speed in experience, if in training he might be, or
she, the shooting of a gun in the wrong place is catastrophic.
So, knowledge of the plane and its systems is crucial. I cannot
help but think that the, from a tactical point of view, from a
visual point of view, from a psychological point of view that
there is no, obviously, greater symbol of control than the
pilot. There's also the visional advantage that the pilot has
his back, or her back, to whoever it is hopefully cannot enter
into the reconfigured cockpit as soon as that can be
effectuated. My question to you is what do you see as the
pluses and minuses of pilots with their back to the intruder,
should that ever happen, and remember with all of the rural
places we're talking about and the turbo props you're talking
about folding often, folding doors as opposed to much more
secure ones that you have on the larger airplanes. Your sense
as to pilots' willingness, in view of other responsibilities
they have and pilots' effectiveness in terms of having either a
stun gun or other form of protection to dis-enable somebody who
might get in.
Mr. Woerth. Well, Senator, if I can make a simple
statement, we can't be Sky King and Wyatt Earp at the same
time. I mean, our principal duty is to fly the airplane but
we're left with a situation right now until all of the adequate
additional security measures of keeping bad guys off the
airplane. We're already to the point where theirs a bad guy on
the airplane, we've failed most of the system to that point.
So, we are advocating in our testimony submitted to you here
that we would at least like those non-lethal tasers or stun
guns installed in the aircraft. We believe we could use those.
But obviously the federal marshal program is going to be much
more effective. We want law enforcement taking care of
security. Pilots are trained to fly airplanes, not be law
enforcement agents and we're looking, as our first priority, at
other people in security and law enforcement to take care of
firearms and take care of that form of security.
Senator Rockefeller. In that there are two sections to the
airplane and again, this is a matter of money and as yet
untrained, completely untrained, unavailable personnel. Would
that include having a marshal in the cockpit itself in the
event of the failure of a door system and understanding that,
that is going to take some time to put that into 7,000
airplanes.
Mr. Woerth. Sir, our anticipation is the federal marshal
should be incognito, passenger inside, the passenger cabin.
Senator Rockefeller. But not the cockpit.
Mr. Woerth. But not the cockpit. A lot of it is a practical
question. We know that even with a rapidly increasing number,
hopefully, of these federal marshals, that the incognito aspect
of it, the uncertainty on how many of them there are and where
they are would be better use of them for a deterrent if
perpetrators or hijackers are never quite sure which flight, or
where this agent is. So, it is for that reason if he walks in
the cockpit and sits down, they know where he is. I'm not sure
how effective he will be. He will help us defend the cockpit
but it can cost an awful lot of havoc.
The Chairman. If the distinguished Senator would yield,
that is what Glick and Bingham proved on that plane that was
down in Pennsylvania because if they had been up in the cockpit
or recognizable as marshals, they would have been done away
with with the cord cutter long since but that Glick was a judo
expert and old Bingham was just as big and they decided and
they said so on the telephone, we're going to take them. And
that's why you and I were saved or the White House was saved,
one or the other. But definitely have them incognito.
Senator Rockefeller. I will conclude with that. Captain
Woerth, I just--The control center, absolute all psychological
senses of the cockpit and short of the installation of the
installation of the best possible door or the failsafe door to
protect the pilot and therefore the cockpit and therefore the
passenger and therefore the sense of confidence of the
traveling public. I think the cockpit has to be a very, very
secure place.
Mr. Woerth. I agree with you, Senator Rockefeller and I
think the pilots have to believe it is a very, very secure
place.
The Chairman. Very good. Senator Allen.
Senator Allen. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. My question is
going to be focused on technologies. I was reading very quickly
through Captain Woerth's near term and long term
recommendations here. All of us, along with the pilots clearly
understand that we need to make sure that never again can an
aircraft be used as a weapon. There are quite a few ideas, many
of which you have in your recommendations here to make sure
that the cockpit is like a vault that is only opened from the
inside. Long haul flights may need lavatory services somehow in
it or a double door that closes the lavatory if a pilot needs
to use it. There are all these ideas about air marshals and I
think that the air marshals are going to be part of our lives
on commercial flights in the future. In fact, one of the
Members of this Committee, Senator Hutchison, has a bill to
look into that. Now, it seems to me in the area of technology
that we do have the technological capacity on modern day
aircraft to permit a pilot to turn over control of the aircraft
to some remote site under a matter of duress. I was looking at
your recommendation 17 where you're talking about biological
chemical matters. That means you need to know what's going on.
There needs to be sensors or maybe there also needs to be ways
that you can immobilize people in the back. You also say in
recommendation 18 that the FAA should immediately develop and
implement air traffic control communication code for advising
all pilots as far as radio contact. Now, I've heard of some
research that would effectively limit where a flight may
travel. There's a topographic computer model for the route that
any flight could be built in and designate areas that are off
limits. The limits could be at all altitude floor or ceiling.
It could be a virtual fence around a city whether that's
Washington, D.C. or Manhattan or the loop in Chicago. There
could even be a virtual dome put into place over a building if
that were the concern. It's my understanding that such a system
of this kind would be very possible especially on our newer fly
by wire aircraft. I would ask you, Captain Woerth, although I
would be interested in Mr. Meenan's views as well, if you feel
that such a concept, since you represent pilots, of the control
authority transfer or automatic ground control avoidance
technologies are feasible and practical?
Mr. Woerth. They may be feasible but I do not believe
they're practical. Certainly, not in the near term answers that
the nation is looking for. They would most likely be used in
the most sophisticated new fly by wire aircraft, whether that
be Boeing or Airbus. That still leaves 5,000 other airplanes
that would have to be retrofitted and may not be capable of
employing that technology. So, I would think the amount of
money that we would spend on the project, sir, I think into the
security element up front, avoiding the problem after a direct
airplane would be better spent. I do believe it is possible but
I think as the Congress and the Administration prioritizes its
resources and where they're going to put the money first, that
is probably why it was farther down on our list of
recommendations.
Senator Allen. Since September 11th, costs are obviously
still a concern but safety is the primary concern. I would like
to see this technology as a way of helping pilots so that they
can somehow push a button, and make communication with a
location on the ground. The rest of that flight would be taken
over remotely so hijackers, even if they do somehow get in,
could not use the airplane as a weapon. We will have to explore
this in our Subcommittee with Senator Wyden. Mr. Meenan, are
your views similar to those of the Captain's?
Mr. Meenan. I would concur fully with Captain Woerth. Many
of these avionics and control solutions is something that need
to be looked at but I think we need to focus much more
immediately on the things we know we can do in the very near
term.
Senator Allen. Which is securing the cockpit.
Mr. Meenan. Well, securing the cockpit is one of them. Sky
marshals as we've all discussed is another and generally
upgrading the security at airports through a federal program to
take control of that.
Senator Allen. Thank you.
The Chairman. Very good. Senator Wyden.
Senator Wyden. Just a couple of questions. If the
government was responsible for security, wouldn't it be
possible to move more quickly when it came to dealing with
these issues? I mean, right now, as I understand it, you've got
a regulated entity. You've got regulated companies and that is
a big part of the problem with respect to the process of
getting these matters out more quickly. Do any of you an
opinion?
Mr. Meenan. Very much so. Our view is very strongly that
dealing with terrorism, there are seven tools at your
disposal--diplomacy, economic sanctions, military action, court
action, intelligence gathering, law enforcement, and the last
line of defense, not the first, is counter measures security
systems--things that we're talking about here. The government
controls all of the first six. We have been asked in the past
to control the seventh. We think the evidence is clear that
that is not the way to go. This has to be under a unified,
single point of control for the kind of speed you're talking
about, Senator Wyden.
Senator Wyden. My time is short. Do any of you disagree
with what that answer entailed?
Mr. Woerth. No.
Mr. Barclay. Among our members, at the moment we're still
trying to come up with a position on the screening issue and
the only difference we agreed that it should come from the
airlines. Some airports out there, Orlando and Tampa are two of
them, that Senator Nelson visited, think it would be best if
they used their local law enforcement people under a federal
set of standards but still you would have law enforcement
there. Most of our members agree that it is a federalization of
the process would be best.
Senator Wyden. Mr. Dillingham. Mr. Hudson. I want to ask
about one other matter.
Mr. Dillingham. Yes, Senator Wyden, we believe too that the
less levels that you have in between control and action, the
more rapidly you can get things accomplished.
Senator Wyden. Mr. Hudson, any disagreement?
Mr. Hudson. I would agree. The fact that we have private
contractors, we have air lines and we have the government and
we have airports. There's a communication problem. There's a
confidence problem. We don't think the system is going to
improve significantly. We have proposed a federal aviation
security agency be created so that it can be brought up to the
same standard as we have for other specialized federal law
enforcement in national security agencies.
Senator Wyden. Mr. Dillingham, I have a question for you. I
have been reading on the floor of the United States Senate and
in this Committee this morning essentially from 15 years of
reports that you all have issued literally going back to that
1987 report on certification of screeners and again and again,
you have documented the delays and inaction and as I've said as
well, now is not a time for a blame game and there's plenty to
go around for various presidents and various congresses and
various interest groups. What's your counsel to this Committee
today so that now on this set of key questions, not just the
screeners, but the other issues that we're looking at? What's
your counsel for this Committee so that 15 years from now we're
not going through essentially the same drill? For example, do
you think it ought to be the role of this Committee to cut
through some of the political turf battles which clearly held
up some of the actions that were warranted? Should we step in
at some point with respect to resolving some of the cost
questions? What's your counsel so that 15 years from now we're
not just going through this once again?
Mr. Dillingham. Senator Wyden, I think that I would like to
think that we have a sea change from what happened a week or so
ago and that we won't be here six years from now or 15 years
from now in the same situation but clearly we must understand
that no security system is 100 percent safe and there's no
guarantee that something like this or from another dimension
won't happen again but it seems to me that everybody is on
board now and the issues are at the margins but it is clear
that everyone says we have to move now and not later.
Senator Wyden. I guess I would tell you I'm still concerned
because I went back and looked at all those reports and people
were on board before when those recommendations were issued.
They were almost always unanimous recommendations and I think
my feeling is, and I want to talk to my colleagues,
particularly the Chairman of the full Committee and the
Chairman of the Subcommittee is that if the administration
doesn't come back on this question of federalizing security
functions with specifics pretty quickly, I hope that Senator
Hollings and Senator McCain and Senator Rockefeller and Senator
Hutchison, the bipartisan leadership of this Committee will
work with all of you and the interested parties so that it is
resolved. I don't see any other kind of path. We made it clear
today. We're anxious to work with the administration and I
would say my only non-negotiable point at this point only one
non-negotiable point is to let this thing drag on as it has in
the past. We've had plenty of well meaning people but the
vulnerability slipped between the cracks and in order to do it,
we're going to have to work closely with all of you. And I
thank you, Mr. Chairman.
The Chairman. Senator Boxer.
Senator Boxer. Yes, I apologize for having to go out and
meet some constituents. I have two questions. One of them is
specifically to talk about pilot training many of you want to
address them and then the second, I'm going to ask each of you
if you were us, and forgetting any money concerns, is if that
wasn't a question, what would the top one, two and three things
be? If you've only gone one, that's fine, but just give me
about those ideas. But before, I was thinking, Mr. Chairman,
that I have supported with many of my colleagues, a check when
people go to get a gun and it used to be a three day check. We
check on them before they can get the gun. Now, we've got it
down to a 24 hour check. We're using computers. Before they get
a gun. Now, we have a situation where American planes have been
used as missiles, weapons and I'm just thinking, pilots come,
you know, potential pilots come from other countries and they
go in and it doesn't seem to me there's much of a check. So,
I'd like to know how you feel, and again depending on if you
have the expertise on this, what's an idea? I would think we
ought to have a check on each and every person who comes. I
mean, I wouldn't profile anyone. I would just say, this is now
a whole other ballgame and could you support something like
that where we have a pretty good check and then if there's any
reason to believe a problem, we would hold it off indefinitely
until we cleared the individual to go to pilot school. Any of
you want to talk about that? Captain, do you have a feeling on
that?
Mr. Woerth. Well, I think this will probably demonstrate my
lack of knowledge in security and law enforcement which is why
I want law enforcement agencies or a new agency we recommended
be created to deal with law enforcement and security. I don't
think the FAA is competent to do it and I don't think the
airlines are competent to do it and I know I'm not competent to
do it but I want the intelligence community and all those
involved with law enforcement to be able to find these type of
individuals so they do not get to the airport and if they do
get to the airport, they don't get into my aircraft and if they
get to the aircraft they never get into the cockpit. So, that's
how I approach it.
Senator Boxer. Well, I couldn't agree with you more. I
think this is something for law enforcement and I think when
the airlines are going to come before us later, one of the
things I want to do is take that whole part of it away from
them. And frankly, my own view, away from the FAA. It is a law
enforcement issue we're dealing with and I personally think the
FAA has not done well. Witness all these reports and I hope,
Mr. Chairman, when you're looking at this whole issue of
airport security, when we think about whose these screeners
would work for, let's think about what their function is. Their
function isn't keeping the skies clear and doing air traffic
control. It's keeping criminals away from innocent people. So,
I hope you'll think about that. It may be a difficult thing
because it's a new way of thinking but, Captain, I agree.
Anybody else have thoughts on this pilot question? Yes.
Mr. Hudson. Senator, we recommend that steps need to be
taken to secure the entire U.S. aviation system again
infiltration by terrorists. There's over 40 trained pilots on
the FBI's wanted list now out of the last terrorist incident.
We know that half the hijackers of the 19 had at least some
pilot training. In addition to the people that work in the
airports and the airplanes, we think that passengers, pilots,
aviation security, airport, airline employees and contractors
must all be screened to ensure that suspected or wanted
terrorists are not infiltrating our aviation system. Part of
what happened last week is, I think, a lack of communication.
Supposedly at least two of the hijackers were on a U.S.
government terrorist watch list. I don't know if that's true
but that's been in the news reports but none of them were
flagged as far as we know of the 19.
Senator Boxer. I'm just getting at a different point. I'm
getting at a point in keeping them out of the flight schools.
For example, when someone comes in and says, I don't want to
learn to land and I don't want to learn how to take off, I just
want to know how to steer, we ought to now know that that's
something that we need to think about but, frankly, some of
these people, we know that would never have gotten into these
flight schools if they had to go through some kind of law
enforcement check. Could I ask that last question. Could each
of you give me don't pass the buck here please. What do you
think and this is just a personal opinion. I'm not asking you
to speak for anybody else. What could we do in this bill
because frankly, Mr. Chairman, you're going to have to lead us.
I'm sad to say that's what I think is going to have to happen.
Now, why do I say I'm sad. Because what I heard before is, and
I love them, a lot of holding back. I don't think we can hold
back. I talked to too many people who were directly affected.
I'm worried about them dealing with this, coping with this and
I'm worried about our economic future when you need to get
people. So, you're going to have to do this. So, I wonder if
each of you can give me your top issues that you think we could
do to make things safer, to restore confidence in the public.
Top one, top two, top three or just top one. Let's start with
Mr. Meenan.
Mr. Meenan. Senator, I think first of all, as we've said,
we think that federalizing the system is the place to start.
Senator Boxer. Federalizing the safety.
Mr. Meenan. The safety and security system. That probably
needs some further exploration because rather than creating a
traditional new federal organization, maybe there's a way to do
it through some kind of government cooperation. Other kinds of
mechanisms that might make more sense, but we've got to deal
effectively with that safety issue in order to assure the
public that it is safe to fly. I think the second two things
are, somewhat off the subject and more pertinent to this
afternoon, we've got to assure the stability, the financial
stability of the airline industry because if they start
falling, we're going to have even more problems on our hands
and therefore, there is a dying, crying need for major cash
infusion and loan guarantees as well as steps to be taken to
deal with the liability concerns and the insurance issues that
have arisen out of the incident of last week.
Senator Boxer. Okay, very good. Captain?
Mr. Woerth. I think the most important thing we can do to
install public confidence and have a secure system now is to
have the public believe and have it be true that the cockpit is
a fortress, that that cockpit door is going to be so secure and
designed so well that it cannot be penetrated and with the
additional federal marshals on the airplane, that there is
somebody who can take care of the cabin. When the public knows
that, believes that, and it's true, we're going to have our
airline system back. We're going to have our economy back.
Senator Boxer. Thank you. Mr. Barclay.
Mr. Barclay. I think I've got to give you four. We need to
put more security on the airplane and I'll leave that to Duane
to figure out. We need to professionalize the screeners in some
federal sense or local law enforcement. We need to harden the
perimeter of airports, both the perimeter of the entire airport
and the perimeter around aircraft and I think finally, there's
a fourth one that hasn't been talked about too much. The
failure of our system was that we set up a system to catch
criminals and rational people and one individual crazy. We
didn't set up a security system in aviation to catch a special
ops team of suicide pilots trained to do this and trained to
try to get around anything we were doing. So, that's why it's a
new day. We are now in almost a semi-military operation of
defense and we have to account for that. Part of that will be
we were, in any system we were out there on Monday that out of
670 million passengers, we were looking for 18 suicide pilots
who were trying to hid from us and they got on as regular
passengers with the crudest of weapons and they wanted to use
the airplane as a bomb. It was an almost unimaginable scenario.
We now know it is imaginable. Knowledge is one of the most
powerful weapons they carried on that airplane with them. What
they were going to do the fourth airplane showed that once
everybody knew what they were going to do, it wasn't going to
work. So, we need to narrow that pool of 670 million. Of the
670 million, about 90 million people who travel in the system
are foreign nationals. We need to in a military operation we
need to if we're going to fish for some of these folks, we need
to make the ocean smaller and I think there are a number of
things where we can use technology. We can use screening one
time for people who want to volunteer for it because they
travel a lot and then biometrics to make sure they are who they
say they are when they're going through so we can focus our
resources on the people we don't know traveling in the system
and the people who are more dangerous potentially.
Senator Boxer. Good. Mr. Dillingham.
Mr. Dillingham. Senator Boxer, I think the initiatives that
have been put in place since September 11th are sort of the
immediate, and we should maintain those as we move towards a
different paradigm for aviation security, in aviation security
beyond just screening. Our work has shown that there are many
gaps in the aviation security system from the outside to the
ATC system just across the board. I think from that point, the
point was made earlier on that once the bad guys are on the
plane, you've almost lost the battle. There is a system in
place, computer assisted passenger, CAPS is what it's called.
And what it does is it, based on certain characteristics, it
triggers extra scrutiny for the passenger. There are a number
of criteria but can't be spoken about but to my knowledge, that
database is not linked to law enforcement databases. It is not
linked to those lists that other law enforcement agencies have
so that a bad guy can get an airplane ticket and no one knows
who that person is. It doesn't have to be that way. That needs
to be done right away. And last.
Senator Boxer. That's an excellent idea. I'd not heard that
before.
Mr. Dillingham. It's clearly something that can be done
quickly. There are some issues that have to be worked but like
I say, we're in a sea change now and again, we support a new
paradigm for aviation screening and security all the way
around.
Senator Boxer. Mr. Hudson.
Mr. Hudson. Senator, I have a number of things in my
testimony but I'll boil it down to just one thing. Secure the
cockpits. Do that in a matter of days, not weeks or months and
if you do that, other things will start to fall into place and
the system will recover . If you don't do that, Lord knows what
is going to happen. We need, in our estimation, 30,000
temporary air marshals. We have approximately one million law
enforcement and police officers in this country, 2 million in
the military. I'm told by the FAA it would give them one to
three days of training to do this. We need to do it now. Not
talk about well, maybe in the future, maybe on some random
basis, etc., etc., The passengers will start to come back. If
you don't do that, I fear that we're in a very bad spiral.
Senator Boxer. Mr. Hudson, I could not agree with you more.
Matter of fact, God bless you for saying that. I just think
this panel has given us a roadmap and I hope that we'll be able
to convince our colleagues to take it, follow it, because I
think if we follow them, we're going to be okay.
The Chairman. I agree 100 percent and I thank also Mr.
Hudson and each of the panelists. When I invited the Secretary
of Transportation last week I said, now, don't wait for
hearings. I said I'm not trying to get hearings. I'm trying to
get results. Some of the things are obvious. For one, the
federalization, I want the panel to know I've been fighting a
rear guard action to keep them from privatizing the
controllers. You're not going to hear anybody put in a bill to
privatize the controllers any more and I've been fighting. We
had Secretary Pena with all these other secretaries, Secretary
Card, all of them came up and said, federalize it and I've been
fighting it for years. And Mr. Barclay, yes, they have thought
of it. Tom Clancy, the famous mystery writer. He wrote a book
five years ago, I think, A Rising Sun, or something that went
right straight into the Capitol during a joint session and the
President, the Vice President, the entire Congress was gone and
a certain fellow took over the government and that kind of
thing. I don't speak fancifully. The truth of the matter is
this is the greatest intelligence failure we've ever had in
history, in the history of our government. Terrorists took and
blew up the World Trade Center eight years ago, killed six or
eight people. I know they injured thousands. Thereafter, we had
the Mogadishu and the same fellow tells us about it in Somalia.
We had the proposition of the barracks there in Saudi Arabia
and bin Laden bragged about it. Then we have the embassies in
Kenya and in Tanzania and he said, whoopee then. Then he blew
up the USS Cole just last October and said all year long, here
in the year 2001, he had been saying, let's wait, we've got
coming events. It's going to be a greater thing happening and I
don't know how you ever get the attention of that crowd. And
don't get me started on it. They want analysts now. I want cold
intelligence. You've got to infiltrate. This war has got to be
fought not in uniform but in raggedy clothes and without
publicity. How you route them out and everything else like
that. It is not a military action but in any event, you folks
have been very patient. You favored the committee and I wanted
to give you a chance going down the list just somewhat like
Senator Boxer. If you've got anything you want to comment about
that you've heard here this morning or that we ought to know
about, we've got your statements. But, Mr. Meenan, did you want
to make any comment? I don't want you to go over here and say,
we waited all morning long and the fellow wouldn't even allow
me to say what I wanted to say.
Mr. Meenan. Senator, I think we have covered the issues
pretty thoroughly this morning. As I said to Senator Boxer, I
think the important things to do now are to deal with these
security issues. The whole panoply of issues we've heard about
and the best place to start that is with the federal government
inserting itself because we need the majesty of the United
States to deal with this issue. Secondarily, we need to save
the airline industry because if we don't, it is not going to be
around to have any of this make any difference.
The Chairman. There isn't any question. That's why we've
got a hearing here in less than an hour and its very important
and you've got to make a judgment up front if we're going to
save the airlines and we're going to cap it off for the
airlines at a certain level. Otherwise, we're going to get into
a limbo of everything that is coming up. Well, you've got to
save this. We've got to save them in the first original
instance. It is not just trial lawyers. It's corporate lawyers
subrogated. Two big towers full of business executive, Mr.
Barclay and with those lawyers, I know. I can give you a
personal story about it but in any event, they're not going to
think they're worth their pee unless they stop bringing claims
and everything else. So, we've got to cap it off but Captain
Woerth, do you have a comment?
Mr. Woerth. I would like to emphasize, if it wasn't obvious
in our testimony, the questions here we talked a lot about
passenger aircraft and you made a point that it's not just
passenger aircraft. I want to emphasize that that was on a
United Flight and an American Flight. It could just as easily
been Federal Express or UPS or DHL and our cargo pilots and our
cargo system and everything to do with cargo needs the same
level of scrutiny if this threat is going to be stopped with
aviaition. So cargo is every bit as important as the passenger
aircraft.
The Chairman. Very good. Mr. Barclay.
Mr. Barclay. Well, thank you and the security and safety
has got to come first. Second, you just asked the Committee
that since you're moving right into the other hearing, please
keep in mind that airports, airlines have symbiotic
relationship and the same thing that's happening to the
airlines is happening out there at the airports. The costs have
shot up to meet emergency regulations. The revenues are down
and those local governments are struggling with trying to
provide the new security. So, if you keep that in mind in the
bills you put together, we would appreciate it.
The Chairman. You're right. We have taken the poor sky cap
at the curbside check in and put him on the bread line. Mr.
Dillingham.
Mr. Dillingham. Mr. Chairman, again, security is more than
screeners and we also would like to suggest that now that we're
going to be considering in your next panel finance related to
airlines that this is an opportune time to think about the
financing of the security aspect of it as well. And, again, as
so many people have mentioned, if we can break the cycle and
not come back again, it would be a good thing.
The Chairman. Thank you very much. Mr. Hudson.
Mr. Hudson. Mr. Chairman, I would just ask you to remember
when you hear as we did a little bit this morning the calls to
return to normalcy, the calls to relax security over what we
had in the last week. Normalcy in the past has always meant
return to complacency and vulnerability. We cannot let that
happen again. Secondly, I'd ask you to keep in mind that
normalcy in wartime is very different than normalcy in
peacetime. We are essentially in a wartime situation and we
have to change our mindset to reorient to that. Thank you
The Chairman. Well, let me thank the panel very, very much
on behalf of the Committee and the Committee will be in recess
subject to the two o'clock call hearing this afternoon.
[The hearing was adjourned at 1:20 p.m]