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Section 1: ORE 25-48
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The
Breakup of the Colonial Empires and Its Implications for US Security,
3 September 1948
|
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Section 2: ORE 29-50
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Consequences
to the US of Communist Domination of Mainland Southeast Asia,
13 October 1950
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Section 3: Memo
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Critical Developments in French Policy
Toward Indochina, 10 January 1952
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Section 4: Memo
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Probable Communist Strategy and Tactics
at Geneva, 19 April 1954
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Section 5: NIE 63-54
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Consequences
Within Indochina of the Fall of Dien Bien Phu, 30 April 1954
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Section 6: NIE 63-3-54
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Probable Military and Political
Developments in Indochina Over the Next 30 Days, 21 May 1954
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Section 7: NIE 63-5-54
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Post-Geneva Outlook in Indochina, 3
August 1954
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Section 8: NIE 63.1-55
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Probable Developments in North Vietnam to
July 1956, 19 Jul 1955
|
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Section 9: NIE 63-56
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Probable
Developments in North and South Vietnam Through Mid-1957, 17 July 1956
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Section 10: NIE 63.2-57
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The Prospects for North Vietnam, 14 May
1957
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Section 11: NIE 63-59
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Prospects
for North and South Vietnam, 26 May 1959
|
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Section 12: SNIE
63.1-60
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Short-Term Trends in South Vietnam, 23
August 1960
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Section 13: SNIE
10-4-61
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Probable Communist Reactions to Certain US
Actions in South Vietnam, 7 November 1961
|
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Section 14: SNIE 10-62
|
Communist
Objectives, Capabilities, and Intentions in Southeast Asia,
21 February 1962
|
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Section 15: NIE 53-63
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Prospects
in South Vietnam, 17 April 1963
|
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Section 16: SNIE
50-2-64
|
Probable Consequences of Certain US
Actions with Respect to Vietnam and Laos, 25 May 1964
|
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Section 17: Memo
|
Would the Loss of South Vietnam and Laos
Precipitate a "Domino Effect" in the Far East? 9 June 1964
|
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Section 18: SNIE
53-2-64
|
The Situation in South Vietnam, 1
October 1964
|
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Section 19: SNIE
10-6-65
|
Probable Communist Reactions to Certain US
Actions, 2 June 1965
|
|
Section 20: Memo
|
Reactions to a Further US Buildup in
South Vietnam, 10 June 1965
|
|
Section 21: SNIE
10-9-65
|
Communist and Free World Reactions to a
Possible US Course of Action, 23 July 1965
|
|
Section 22: SNIE
10-11-65
|
Probable Communist Reactions to a US
Course of Action, 22 September 1965
|
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Section 23: Memo
|
Reactions to Continuation or Termination
of the Pause in Air Attacks on the DRV, 19 January 1966
|
|
Section 24: SNIE
10-1-66
|
Possible Effects of a Proposed US Course
of Action on DRV Capability to Support the Insurgency in South Vietnam, 4
February 1966
|
|
Section 25: SNIE 13-66
|
Current
Chinese Communist Intentions in the Vietnam Situation, 4 August 1966
|
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Section 26: Memo
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The Vietnamese Communists Will to
Persist - Summary and Principal Findings only, 26 August 1966
|
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Section 27: SNIE
11-11-67
|
Soviet Attitudes and Intentions Toward
the Vietnam War, 4 May 1967
|
|
Section 28: Memo
|
Implications of an Unfavorable Outcome
in Vietnam, 11 September 1967
|
|
Section 29: NIE 14.3-67
|
Capabilties of the Vietnamese Communists
for Fighting in South Vietnam, 13 November 1967
|
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Section 30: IM-0587/68
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Hanoi's
Negotiating Position and Concept of Negotiations, 6 May 1968
|
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Section 31: SNIE
14.3-69
|
Capabilties of the Vietnamese Communists
for Fighting in South Vietnam, 17 July 1969
|
|
Section 32: SNIE
14.3-70
|
The Outlook from Hanoi: Factors Affecting
North Vietnam's Policy on the War in Vietnam, 5 February 1970
|
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Section 33: SNIE 57-70
|
The
Outlook For Cambodia, 6 August 1970
|
|
Section 34: NIE 53-71
|
South
Vietnam: Problems and Prospects, 29 April 1971
|
|
Section 35: NIE 53/14.3
- 73
|
Negotiating v Short-Term Prospects for
Vietnam, 12 October 1973
|
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Section 36: NIE 53/14.3 - 1 - 74
|
The Likelihood of a Major North
Vietnamese Offensive Against South Vietnam Before June 30, 1975,
23 May 1974
|
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Section 37: NIE 53/14.3 - 2 -
74
|
Short-Term Prospects for Vietnam,
23 December 1974
|
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Section 38: SNIE 53/14.3 - 75
|
Assessment of the Situation in South
Vietnam, 27 March 1975
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