Senate Report 109-101 - APPROVING THE RENEWAL OF IMPORT RESTRICTIONS CONTAINED IN THE BURMESE FREEDOM AND DEMOCRACY ACT OF 2003

[Senate Report 109-101]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]

Calendar No. 158
109th Congress Report
SENATE
1st Session 109-101

======================================================================

APPROVING THE RENEWAL OF IMPORT RESTRICTIONS CONTAINED IN THE BURMESE
FREEDOM AND DEMOCRACY ACT OF 2003

_______

July 12, 2005.--Ordered to be printed

_______

Mr. Grassley, from the Committee on Finance, submitted the following

R E P O R T

[To accompany S.J. Res. 18]

[Including cost estimate of the Congressional Budget Office]

The Committee on Finance, to which was referred the joint
resolution (S.J. Res. 18) approving the renewal of import
restrictions contained in the Burmese Freedom and Democracy Act
of 2003, having considered the same, reports favorably thereon
without amendment and recommends that the joint resolution do
pass.

CONTENTS

Page
I. Report and Other Matters of the Committee.........................2
A. Report of the Committee on Finance.............................2
B. Background.....................................................2
1. The Government of Burma............................... 2
2. The Burmese Freedom and Democracy Act of 2003 (the
Act)................................................. 2
3. Procedures for Renewing the Import Restrictions
Contained in the Burmese Freedom and Democracy Act of
2003................................................. 3
4. Committee Consideration of S.J. Res. 18............... 3
5. Report of the U.S. Department of State on the Trade
Sanctions Against Burma.............................. 4
II. Budgetary Impact of the Joint Resolution.........................10
III.Regulatory Impact of the Joint Resolution and Other Matters......12

IV. Changes in Existing Law..........................................13

I. REPORT AND OTHER MATTERS OF THE COMMITTEE

A. Report of the Committee on Finance

B. Background

1. THE GOVERNMENT OF BURMA

Burma is governed by a military junta that took power in
September 1988. The junta, the State Peace and Development
Council (SPDC), violently suppressed pro-democracy
demonstrators in September 1988. The junta allowed elections to
a National Assembly in 1990, but it nullified the results when
the opposition National League for Democracy (NLD) won most of
the seats. Since 1990, reports from human rights organizations
and the U.S. State Department have described a pattern of SPDC
policies featuring the suppression of political liberties,
jailing of thousands of political prisoners (more than 1,000
estimated imprisoned in July 2005), widespread physical abuses
against civilians, the impressment of civilians into military
service, and the conscription of thousands of civilians for
work on economic projects.
On May 30, 2003, a pro-government group of several hundred
people assaulted the opposition NLD leader Daw Aung San Suu Kyi
and her supporters near Mandalay, Burma's second-largest city.
The attackers were members of the United Solidarity Development
Association, a pro-government mass organization. Some NLD
supporters were killed, and Daw Aung San Suu Kyi and other NLD
leaders were taken into custody. The government closed NLD
offices in the country.

2. THE BURMESE FREEDOM AND DEMOCRACY ACT OF 2003 (THE ACT)

In response to the May 30th attack, the Burmese Freedom and
Democracy Act of 2003 was introduced in the U.S. House of
Representatives (H.R. 2330) and the U.S. Senate (S. 1182) on
June 4, 2003. A revised version of the legislation was
introduced in the Senate (S. 1215) on June 9, 2003. That latter
version, S. 1215, passed the Senate with an amendment on June
11, 2003, by a recorded vote of 97-1. In the House, H.R. 2330
passed with an amendment on July 15, 2003, by a recorded vote
of 418-2, 1 Present. The Senate then passed the House-passed
version of H.R. 2330 without amendment on July 16, 2003, by a
recorded vote of 94-1. The legislation was presented to the
President on July 22, 2003, and signed into law by the
President on July 28, 2003 (Pub. L. 108-61).
As enacted, the Act generally bans imports from Burma,
affecting mainly imports of Burmese textiles and garments. U.S.
imports of these products from Burma rose from nearly $60
million in 1994 to $408 million in 2001 before falling to $297
million in 2002, according to Department of Commerce
statistics. Total imports from Burma in 2002 were $356 million.
The ban on imports will remain until the President certifies to
Congress that the SPDC has made major progress to end human
rights violations, including rapes, forced and child labor, and
conscription of child-soldiers, released political prisoners,
allowed political, religious, and civil liberties, and reached
agreement with the NLD for a civilian government chosen through
democratic elections. The Act also freezes Burmese assets in
the United States and requires the United States to oppose aid
to Burma by international financial institutions.
Pursuant to section 9(b) of the Act, the import ban will
expire one year from the date of enactment unless a joint
resolution (``renewal resolution'') approving a one-year
renewal of the import ban is enacted into law prior to the
anniversary of the date of enactment. The Act also provides
that the import ban may be renewed for a maximum of three years
from the date of enactment, i.e. until July 28, 2006. Last
year, on June 14, 2004, the House passed H.J. Res. 97, by a
recorded vote of 372-2, approving the renewal of the import ban
until July 28, 2005. On June 24, 2004, the Senate passed the
House-passed version by a recorded vote of 96-1. The
legislation was signed into law by the President on July 7,
2004 (Pub. L. 108-272).
The purpose of S.J. Res. 18 is to comply with the Act's
requirement in order to renew the import ban for another year,
i.e. until July 28, 2006. An identical resolution (H.J. Res.
52) was passed by the House on June 21, 2005 by a recorded vote
of 432-2. H.J. Res. 52 was placed on the Senate Calendar on
June 22, 2005.

3. PROCEDURES FOR RENEWING THE IMPORT RESTRICTIONS CONTAINED IN THE
BURMESE FREEDOM AND DEMOCRACY ACT OF 2003

Section 9(c)(2)(B) of the Act incorporates the procedures
set forth in section 152(b), (c), (d), (e), and (f) of the
Trade Act of 1974 (19 U.S.C. 2192(b), (c), (d), (e), and (f)),
for consideration of a renewal resolution to renew the import
ban for another year.
Pursuant to those procedures, a renewal resolution
introduced in the Senate shall be referred to the Finance
Committee, which is afforded 30 days in which the Senate is in
session to consider and report the resolution. A renewal
resolution is not amendable. If the Committee does not report
the resolution within that period, it is in order for any
Member favoring the resolution to move to discharge the
Committee from further consideration of the resolution.
If, as in this case, a renewal resolution is introduced in
the Senate before receipt of an identical resolution from the
House, and the House passes its resolution before the Committee
reports the Senate measure, then upon receipt of the House-
passed measure the House resolution shall be placed on the
Senate calendar and the Committee shall continue to report the
Senate measure or be discharged from further consideration of
the Senate measure, as noted. After the Committee reports the
Senate measure, the vote on passage in the Senate shall then be
on the identical House-passed measure.

4. COMMITTEE CONSIDERATION OF S.J. RES. 18

The Committee considered S.J. Res. 18 in open executive
session on June 28, 2005. The Chairman recessed that meeting
until 9:00 a.m. on June 29, 2005. At that time, the Chairman
reconvened the meeting and the Committee voted unanimously, by
voice vote and without amendment, to favorably report S.J. Res.
18, Approving the Renewal of Import Restrictions Contained in
the Burmese Freedom and Democracy Act of 2003.

5. REPORT OF THE U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE ON THE TRADE SANCTIONS
AGAINST BURMA

On May 23, 2005, the State Department submitted to Congress
a report regarding the trade sanctions against Burma, as
required by section 8(b)(3) of the Burmese Freedom and
Democracy Act of 2003. At the request of the Chairman, that
report was made a part of the record of the Committee's
consideration of S.J. Res. 18. The State Department report is
reprinted below:

INFORMATION ON U.S. TRADE SANCTIONS AGAINST BURMA

I. Introduction and Summary

Pursuant to section 8(b)(3) of P.L. 108-61 (the Burmese
Freedom and Democracy Act of 2003), this report reviews
bilateral and multilateral measures to promote human rights and
democracy in Burma and assesses the effectiveness of the Act's
trade provisions relative to the improvement of conditions in
Burma and the furtherance or United States policy objectives.
Continued pressure by the U.S. Government sends a clear
signal that the United States expects Burma's junta to take
meaningful steps toward genuine national reconciliation and the
establishment of democracy. Such pressure also serves as a
strong symbol of support for the members of the democratic
opposition, as they continue their struggle inside the country.
Many of those who have fled from the oppression inside Burma
have supported the U.S. position and have called for other
countries to follow the U.S. lead.
The Administration continues diplomatic efforts, at all
levels, to encourage other nations to sustain pressure on the
Burmese junta. Some governments are able to offer little more
than public support for a democratic transition, but it is
through such sustained public messages that an atmosphere of
change can come to Burma. U.S. punitive measures and calls for
others to follow suit have not damaged U.S. relations with
countries other than Burma. To date no other country has
implemented U.S.-style economic sanctions. Cooperation on Burma
issues with other members of the international community
continues at the UN and in other multilateral fora, such as the
International Labor Organization (ILO), and the Financial
Action Task Force.

II. Bilateral and Multilateral Measures

usg efforts

The United States has a broad range of sanctions in place
including those enacted in 2003 and renewed in 2004: a ban on
all imports from Burma; a ban on the export of financial
services from the United States or by U.S. persons to Burma;
and, an asset freeze on certain named Burmese institutions. The
United States also expanded existing visa restrictions to
include the managers of state-owned enterprises and their
immediate family members. The Treasury Department reports that
it blocked over $900,000 worth of transactions between October
2004 and March 2005. Over the same period, the Treasury
Department issued 42 licenses authorizing the release of
blocked funds or otherwise prohibited transactions. By July 30,
2003, U.S. banks maintaining correspondent accounts with
Burmese banks had blocked the balances in those accounts, an
amount that exceeds $320,000. Other measures put in place
against the Burmese junta before 2003 include a ban on new
investment in Burma, a ban on arms sales to Burma, limits on
humanitarian assistance to Burma, and a provision directing
relevant U.S. officials to vote ``no'' on loans or assistance
to Burma by international financial institutions.
Inside Burma, U.S. Embassy officials maintain frequent and
active contacts with representatives of the democratic
opposition and major ethnic groups to learn their views of the
situation. Meetings with members of multilateral organizations
and other diplomatic missions likewise help focus the
international community's efforts in support of national
reconciliation. Although Embassy officials have limited contact
with Burmese Government officials due to the poor state of
bilateral relations, even limited contact is important to
urging reform and facilitating communication by all parties.
The continued detention of senior officials of the NLD as well
as over 1,300 political prisoners by the military junta blocks
progress toward national reconciliation. The United States
continues to call for the immediate and unconditional release
of all political prisoners.
The United States coordinates with other members of the
international community in support of democratic change in
Burma. The United States has consistently co-sponsored
resolutions at the UN General Assembly and the UN Commission on
Human Rights that condemn the human rights situation in Burma
and call for national reconciliation. Such resolutions support
the efforts of UN Secretary General Special Envoy Razali Ismail
and UN Special Rapporteur for Human Rights Paulo Sergio
Pinheiro. U.S. representatives participate in other UN
discussions on Burma. Then-Ambassador Danforth sent a letter to
UN Secretary General Annan in November 2004 urging action on
Burma. Similarly, U.S. participants in meetings of the ILO have
been supportive of ILO efforts to eliminate the use of forced
labor in Burma and to respect fundamental workers' rights.

efforts by other governments

No other nation has imposed economic sanctions as severe as
those imposed by the United States. Nonetheless, during 2003
and 2004, many states indicated concern for the situation in
Burma and instituted new or expanded measures to promote
democracy and human rights. In 2003, the European Union (EU)
expanded its existing visa and travel restrictions and its
asset freeze list to include a broader set of Burmese who
benefit from the oppressive policies of the junta. The EU also
has in place a ban on arms sales and limits on assistance to
the government. In April, the EU renewed measures announced in
2004, including a ban on extending credit to a list of Burmese-
state run enterprises, and an even more restrictive visa ban.
The EU also calls on its members to vote against assistance to
Burma by international financial institutions, though they are
not required to do so. The EU has traditionally drafted the
annual General Assembly and Commission on Human Rights
resolutions on Burma.
The United Kingdom has called on its companies to review
their investments in Burma. Canada has also expressed concern
for the lack of progress in Burma and imposed visa and travel
restrictions on Burmese officials following the May 30, 2003
attack on Aung San Suu Kyi and her supporters.
Norway has sanctions similar to the EU, banning arms sales
and enforcing a broad visa ban and asset freeze. In addition,
Norway has been a supporter of the Burmese exile movement and
hosts a radio service dedicated to providing uncensored
information to those inside Burma.
Japan has frozen all new development assistance to the
government in response to the May 30 attacks. However, Japan
does continue funding, on a case-by-case basis, certain
humanitarian programs, democracy capacity-building projects,
and those projects supporting economic structural reform.
Senior Japanese officials, including Prime Minister Koizumi,
have called for the release of Aung San Suu Kyi and progress
toward democratization.
Since May 30, 2003 Australia has deferred its recurring
human rights training program and put certain agricultural
assistance programs on hold. Australian officials have also
called publicly for Aung San Suu Kyi's release.
The majority of ASEAN members continue to consider events
in Burma to be an internal matter, although there are
indications some ASEAN governments are pressing Burmese leaders
on democracy behind the scenes. The United States continues its
dialogue with countries in the region and has made clear the
important role that ASEAN has to play in encouraging reform.
Administration officials have noted to ASEAN counterparts that
the United States will not send senior representatives to ASEAN
meetings hosted by Burma absent significant political reform.
While we share with Thailand the goal of advancing
democracy in Burma, our approaches differ. Thailand is unlikely
to change its national policy of engagement or adopt sanctions
against Rangoon. Thailand, however, has played a critical role
for many years as a refuge to Burmese fleeing their country,
and we have stressed to the Thai the importance of continuing
to fulfill this role and supporting UNHCR in its work with
Burmese refugees. The ``Bangkok Process,'' organized by
Thailand in 2003, was a planned series of meetings of
interested governments discussing the political situation in
Burma with the Burmese Government. It is now moribund due to
Burma's refusal to attend the meeting scheduled for April 2004.
China continues to be Burma's primary financial, and one of
its primary military, supporters. Chinese officials
participated in the Bangkok Process, though they did not make
any public statements critical of the government's
presentation. China has, however, expressed support for
national reconciliation. We have raised our concerns about
Burma in discussions with China.
India has neither provided strong public support for the
democratic opposition nor called for an improvement in the
human rights situation. Since the 1990s, India has vied with
China for influence in Burma, sending high-level delegations,
including a July 2003 visit by the Commerce Minister and a
November 2003 visit by the Vice President, and offering
significant financial and diplomatic support. Senior General
Than Shwe paid a state visit to India in October 2004, during
which several economic agreements and a Memorandum of
Understanding on Non-Traditional Security were signed. Burma
has also cooperated with India on the question of Indian
insurgent groups operating out of Burmese territory.

united nations efforts

The United States supports the work UN Special Envoy Razali
Ismail and UN Special Rapporteur Paulo Sergio Pinheiro.
However, neither has been allowed to visit Burma in well over a
year. Secretary General Kofi Annan hosted a meeting with
interested governments in September 2004 to discuss the
situation on the ground in Burma, The Secretary General has
also issued a number of statements calling upon the Burmese
authorities to include the democratic opposition in the
National Convention and to release all political prisoners.
The UN country team inside Burma has focused its efforts on
a range of humanitarian issues. The United States backs UN
initiatives to address the HIV/AIDS epidemic, support returned
refugees, and fight narcotics. The UN High Commissioner for
Refugees (UNHCR) provides protection and humanitarian
assistance for the communities of Muslim Burmese in Northern
Rakhine State [Rohingya] who have returned to Burma after
fleeing to Bangladesh in 1991. UNHCR representatives continued
efforts in eastern Burma to assess conditions for the large-
scale return of refugees from Thailand. U.S. officials in
Rangoon maintain close communication with UN counterparts.

III. Effects of Trade-Related Measures

political and economic situation

The junta continues to follow its seven-point ``roadmap to
democracy,'' which it announced allowing international
pressure, including new U.S. trade and financial sanctions, in
2003. A key component of the roadmap is the National Convention
to draft a new constitution. The junta handpicked pro-regime
delegates to attend the Convention, refused to include the NLD
or pro-democracy groups, and prohibited free and open debate.
The Convention's most recent session adjourned on March 31,
2005. Absent the participation of the democratic opposition and
ethnic minority political groups, the National Convention does
not reflect the true political aspirations of the Burmese
people, nor does it serve as a real forum for the meaningful
dialogue that is needed to achieve genuine national
reconciliation. Given these deep flaws, any constitution that
emerges from the National Convention, and any subsequent
referendum or general election would by extension lack
legitimacy, and would not constitute meaningful steps toward
the establishment of democracy in Burma. The junta has not
announced a timetable for a transition to democracy.
In December 2004, the junta extended the detention of Aung
San Suu Kyi for an additional year, and restricted her access
to medical care and contacts with the outside world, leaving
her virtually incommunicado. In February 2005, authorities also
extended the detention of National League for Democracy Vice
Chairman U Tin Oo, and arrested Hkun Htun Oo, head of the Shan
Nationalities League for Democracy--Burma's second largest
political party.
In recent months, there have been limited contacts between
the military junta and Burma's largest remaining ethnic
insurgent group, the Karen National Union (KNU). If a final
agreement between the parties is reached, it could end over
five decades of conflict, and could open up Karen and Mon
states for badly needed international economic and humanitarian
assistance and the eventual voluntary repatriation of thousands
of refugees from Thailand with UNHCR involvement and the return
home of thousands of internally displaced persons. Over twenty
groups have concluded cease-fire agreements with the junta.
The Burmese junta's dismal economic policies have led to
widespread poverty and the flight of most foreign investors
from the country. Likewise, Burma's dreadful employment
situation reflects decades of economic mismanagement by the
Burmese Government. However, the 2003 U.S. ban on Burmese
imports had an impact on at least one sector of the economy:
the garment industry. The result was the closure of more than
100 garment factories, which had already been in dire economic
straits before losing the U.S. market. There was an initial
estimated loss of around 50,000 to 60,000 jobs. However, new
orders from importers in EU member countries, Canada and Latin
America helped remaining factories continue production and
factories that had previously closed to re-hire some workers.

human rights

Despite the Burmese Government's purported desire to make
progress toward democracy, its extremely poor human rights
record has worsened over the past year, and it has continued to
commit serious abuses. The State Department produces an annual
report on the human rights situation in Burma. In 2004, the
report noted that the Burmese Government's extremely poor human
rights record continued to deteriorate. The junta extended for
at least another year the unjustified detentions of Nobel Peace
Prize Laureate and leader of the National League for Democracy
(NLD) Aung San Suu Kyi and NLD Vice Chair U Tin Oo. The report
also noted that citizens of Burma still do not have the right
to change their government, and that security forces have
continued to commit extrajudicial killings and rape, forcibly
relocate persons, use forced labor, and reestablish forced
conscription of the civilian population into militia units. The
military junta continues to be hostile to all forms of
political opposition. With the exception of its Rangoon
headquarters, all of the NLD's offices remain closed. Arrests
and disappearances of political activists continue, and members
of the security forces torture, beat, and otherwise abuse
prisoners and detainees. The government has allowed two visits
by Amnesty International (the latest in 2003) and maintained
cooperation with the International Committee of the Red Cross.
Our expanded sanctions represent a clear and powerful
expression of American opposition to the developments in Burma
over the past two years and signal strong support for the pro-
democracy movement. Sanctions are a key component of our policy
in bringing democracy to Burma and have been a key source of
support for the morale of many democracy activists.

IV. Effects of Sanctions Policy on Broader Policy Interests and
Relations

U.S. steadfastness sends a clear signal to the junta of
U.S. support for change. The measures in place have the broad
backing of Burmese democracy activists.
Although the EU and others have taken some steps, no other
country has taken measures as strong as those of the United
States. We continue diplomatic efforts at all levels to urge
other countries to adopt broad sanctions similar to ours or
other targeted approaches to dealing with Burma. We have found
that many in the international community have a different view
on how best to achieve our shared goals in Burma.
The trade-related sanctions implemented pursuant to the
Burmese Freedom and Democracy Act of 2003 have had a limited
impact on U.S. relations with other nations. Although some
foreign businesses and their representative embassies have
complained about the impact on their operations, all who have
invested in Burma have done so recognizing the difficult
operating environment and overall poor economic climate
fostered by the junta. Furthermore, many U.S. and other
companies had already pulled out of Burma prior to the passage
of the Burmese Freedom and Democracy Act of 2003.
The NLD remains very supportive of U.S. sanctions and urges
additional steps to pressure the government. However, some
other opposition politicians have questioned whether the
sanctions have any chance of success without the participation
of ASEAN and other regional countries and, if not, whether they
are worth the pain caused to Burmese workers.

Conclusion

International pressure and support for the Burmese
democracy movement continues to be essential for promoting
change in Burma. However, the import ban implemented in 2003
would be far more effective if countries importing Burma's
high-value exports (such as natural gas and timber), which also
tend to have closer economic links with the SPDC, would join us
in our actions. Other U.S. measures, such as the ban on new
investment in Burma and the ban on the export of financial
services to Burma, would also be more effective were the EU and
others to take similar steps. The Administration remains
unwavering in its support for the establishment of democracy
and a greatly improved human rights situation in Burma.

II. BUDGETARY IMPACT OF THE JOINT RESOLUTION

Congressional Budget Office Cost Estimate

U.S. Congress,
Congressional Budget Office,
Washington, DC, July 12, 2005.
Hon. Charles E. Grassley,
Chairman, Committee on Finance,
U.S. Senate, Washington, DC.
Dear Mr. Chairman: The Congressional Budget Office has
prepared the enclosed cost estimate for S.J. Res. 18, approving
the renewal of import restrictions contained in the Burmese
Freedom and Democracy Act of 2003.
If you wish further details on this estimate, we will be
pleased to provide them. The CBO staff contact is Emily
Schlect.
Sincerely,
Douglas Holtz-Eakin,
Director.
Enclosure.

S.J. Res. 18--Approving the renewal of import restrictions contained in
the Burmese Freedom and Democracy Act of 2003

Summary: S.J. Res. 18 would renew for one year the ban of
all imports from Burma. The ban was originally enacted as the
Burmese Freedom and Democracy Act of 2003 (P.L. 108-61) and was
set to expire on July 28, 2004. Public Law 108-272 renewed the
ban for one year through its current expiration on July 28,
2005. The import restrictions may be lifted if the State Peace
and Development Council (SPDC), the military regime of Burma,
has made substantial and measurable progress to end violations
of human rights, implemented a democratic government, and met
its obligations under international counter-narcotics
agreements. The President also would have the authority to
terminate the restrictions upon the request of a democratically
elected government in Burma or waive them in the national
interest. CBO estimates that extending the ban on U.S. imports
from Burma would reduce federal revenues by less than $500,000
in 2005 and by $1 million in 2006, with no effect thereafter.
CBO estimates enacting S.J. Res. 18 would not affect federal
spending.
By renewing the ban on all imports from Burma, S.J. Res. 18
would impose private-sector mandates as defined in the Unfunded
Mandates Reform Act (UMRA). CBO cannot estimate the cost of
those mandates for two reasons. First, information on the value
of lost profits to importers resulting from the ban are not
available. Second, UMRA does not specify whether CBO should
measure the cost of extending a mandate relative to the
mandate's current costs or assume that the mandate will expire
and measure the costs of the mandate's extension as if the
requirement were new. For those reasons, CBO cannot determine
whether the aggregate direct cost of the mandates would exceed
the annual threshold for private-sector mandates established in
UMRA ($123 million in 2005, adjusted annually for inflation).
S.J. Res. 18 contains no intergovernmental mandates as
defined in UMRA and would impose no costs on state, local, or
tribal governments.
Estimated cost to the Federal Government: The estimated
budgetary impact of S.J. Res. 18 is shown in the following
table.

----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
By fiscal year, in millions of dollars--
-----------------------------------------------------
2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
CHANGES IN REVENUES

Estimated Revenues........................................ (\1\) -1 0 0 0 0
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ Loss of less than $500,000.

Basis of estimate: Under S.J. Res. 18, the President would
have the authority to lift or waive the ban that would be
imposed by the resolution. For this estimate, CBO assumes that
the President would not exercise this authority before the
termination of the one-year ban.
Based on data from the U.S. International Trade Commission
on recent U.S. imports from Burma, information from several
government agencies, and CBO's most recent forecast of total
U.S. imports, CBO estimates that enacting S.J. Res. 18 would
reduce federal revenues by less than $500,000 in 2005 and by $1
million in 2006, net of income and payroll tax offsets.
In recent years, over half of all U.S. imports from Burma
have been knitted or crocheted clothing and apparel goods. The
remaining imports include apparel items not knitted or
crocheted, certain types of fish and crustaceans, goods made of
wood, certain precious and semiprecious stones and metals, and
woven fabrics and tapestries. In 2001 and 2002, roughly 80
percent of duties collected on these imports came from knitted
and crocheted articles. CBO assumes that most of the banned
imports would be replaced with imports from other countries.
The President could remove the ban on imports upon the
request of a democratically elected government in Burma or if
he were to determine and notify Congress that to do so is in
the national interest. Should the ban be lifted, U.S. companies
would be allowed to resume importation of goods produced,
manufactured, grown, or assembled in Burma. It is unclear
whether or when the President would exercise the authority to
lift or waive the ban on imports from Burma. If such an action
were taken during the 2005-2006 period, the impact on federal
revenues would be reduced accordingly.
Estimated impact on the private sector: By renewing the ban
on all imports from Burma, S.J. Res. 18 would impose private-
sector mandates as defined in UMRA. CBO cannot estimate the
cost of those mandates for two reasons. First, information on
the value of lost profits to importers resulting from the ban
are not available. Second, UMRA does not specify whether CBO
should measure the cost of extending a mandate relative to the
mandate's current costs or assume that the mandate will expire
and measure the costs of the mandate's extension as if the
requirement were new. For those reasons, CBO cannot determine
whether the aggregate direct cost of the mandates would exceed
the annual threshold for private-sector mandates established in
UMRA ($123 million in 2005, adjusted annually for inflation).
Estimated impact on State, local, and tribal governments:
S.J. Res. 18 contains no intergovernmental mandates as defined
in UMRA and would impose no costs on state, local, or tribal
governments.
Estimate prepared by: Federal Revenues: Emily Schlect.
Impact on State, Local, and Tribal Governments: Melissa
Merrell. Impact on the Private Sector: Paige Piper/Bach.
Estimate approved by: G. Thomas Woodward, Assistant
Director for Tax Analysis.

III. REGULATORY IMPACT OF THE JOINT RESOLUTION AND OTHER MATTERS

Pursuant to the requirements of paragraph 11(b) of rule
XXVI of the Standing Rules of the Senate, the Committee states
that the resolution will not significantly regulate any
individuals or businesses, will not affect the personal privacy
of individuals, and will result in no significant additional
paperwork.
The following information is provided in accordance with
section 423 of the Unfunded Mandates Reform Act of 1995 (UMRA)
(Pub. L. No. 104-04). The Committee has reviewed the provisions
of S.J. Res. 18 as approved by the Committee on June 29, 2005.
In accordance with the requirement of Pub. L. No. 104-04, the
Committee has determined that the bill contains no
intergovernmental mandates, as defined in the UMRA, and would
not affect the budgets of State, local, or tribal governments.

IV. CHANGES IN EXISTING LAW

Pursuant to paragraph 12 of rule XXVI of the Standing Rules
of the Senate, the Committee finds no changes in existing law
made by S.J. Res. 18, as ordered reported.