[House Hearing, 109 Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
PROTECTING OUR COMMERCE: PORT AND WATERWAYS SECURITY
=======================================================================
HEARING
before the
COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND SECURITY
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
ONE HUNDRED NINTH CONGRESS
FIRST SESSION
__________
MARCH 22, 2005
__________
Serial No. 109-5
__________
Printed for the use of the Committee on Homeland Security
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] TONGRESS.#13
Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.access.gpo.gov/congress/
house
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COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND SECURITY
Christopher Cox, California, Chairman
Don Young, Alaska Bennie G. Thompson, Mississippi
Lamar S. Smith, Texas Ranking Member
Curt Weldon, Pennsylvania, Vice Loretta Sanchez, California
Chairman Edward J. Markey, Massachusetts
Christopher Shays, Connecticut Norman D. Dicks, Washington
Peter T. King, New York Jane Harman, California
John Linder, Georgia Peter A. DeFazio, Oregon
Mark E. Souder, Indiana Nita M. Lowey, New York
Tom Davis, Virginia Eleanor Holmes Norton, District of
Daniel E. Lungren, California Columbia
Jim Gibbons, Nevada Zoe Lofgren, California
Rob Simmons, Connecticut Sheila Jackson-Lee, Texas
Mike Rogers, Alabama Bill Pascrell, JR., New Jersey
Stevan Pearce, New Mexico Donna M. Christensen, U.S. Virgin
Katherine Harris, Florida Islands
Bobby Jindal, Louisiana Bob Etheridge, North Carolina
Dave G. Reichert, Washington James R. Langevin, Rhode Island
Michael McCaul, Texas Kendrick B. Meek, Florida
Charlie Dent, Pennsylvania
(II)
C O N T E N T S
----------
Page
STATEMENTS
The Honorable Christopher Cox, a Representative in Congress From
the State of California, and Chairman, Committee on Homeland
Security....................................................... 1
The Honorable Bennie G. Thompson, a Representative in Congress
From the State of Mississippi, and Ranking Member, Committee on
Homeland Security.............................................. 2
The Honorable Bob Etheridge, a Representative in Congress From
the State of North Carolina.................................... 40
The Honorable John Linder, a Representative in Congress From the
State of Georgia............................................... 40
The Honorable Kendrick B. Meek, a Representative in Congress From
the State of Florida........................................... 47
WITNESSES
Rear Admiral Robert Duncan, Commander Eighth Coast Guard
District, United States Coast Guard
Oral Statement................................................. 3
Prepared Statement............................................. 8
Mr. Jimmy Heidel, Executive Director, Warren County Port
Commission and Vice-President of the Vicksburg-Warren County
Chamber of Commerce
Oral Statement................................................. 12
Prepared Statement............................................. 15
Ms. Cynthia Swain, Director of Safety and Security, Port of New
Orleans
Oral Statement................................................. 17
Prepared Statement............................................. 20
Dr. Deirdre McGowan, Executive Director, Inland Rivers, Ports and
Terminals Association
Oral Statement................................................. 22
Prepared Statement............................................. 23
APPENDIX
Material Submitted for the Record
Question and Responses for the Record of the Coast Guard......... 49
PROTECTING OUR COMMERCE: PORT AND WATERWAYS SECURITY
----------
Tuesday, March 22, 2005
House of Representatives,
Committee on Homeland Security,
Washington, DC.
The committee met, pursuant to call, at 9:15 a.m., at the
Vicksburg Convention Center, 1600 Mulberry Street, Hon.
Christopher Cox [chairman of the committee] presiding.
Present: Representatives Cox, Linder, Thompson, Etheridge
and Meek.
Chairman Cox. The House welcomes you to the formal portion
of the first field hearing of the Committee on Homeland
Security of the United States.
Now we have the Mayor from Vicksburg, Mississippi.
Thank you for inviting U.S. here to hold this important
hearing which will examine the security of our ports.
I would like to welcome the Rear Admiral Robert Duncan,
Commander of the Eighth Coast Guard District; Mr. Jimmy Heidel,
director, Warren County Port Commission, and vice president of
the Vicksburg-Warren Chamber of Commerce; Ms. Cynthia Swain,
director of safety and security, Port of New Orleans; and
Deirdre McGowan, Ph.D. executive director, Inland Rivers, Ports
and Terminals Association.
Thank all of you in advance for coming here to discuss
these important issues and to answer the committee's questions.
We are here today to the discuss improving the security of the
United States ports, and the issue of port security has been
widely talked about in the media. And the issue of security in
our inland rivers has not received as much attention. But,
today, we sit here along the banks of the Mississippi River,
which links with major inland ports and provides access to more
than 1,800 rivers in 21 States. We can see that this is an
important river, and our inland waterways are vital for the
United States Maritime Transportation.
Since the tragedy of September 11, 2001, the departments of
Federal and private entities have worked on security for our
Nation from the terrorists. The Federal Government has been
dispersed, and other local facilities have been hardened. We
have to ask ourselves, what are the goals that we are seeking
to achieve to end terrorism and how best can we achieve them?
We must truthfully understand the previous terrorist attacks
that face our ports in the United States and then focus on our
collective efforts. If we were to try to protect against every
potential attack, we will disperse our efforts, and our
attention will be late, and we might end up helping absolutely
nobody.
The terrorist attack, it could be nuclear and harmful,
biologically. It could be as simple as smuggling a weapon or
such things like material through America borders. The extent
to which the United States ports and waters can help is to
articulate what must be understood about the threats from the
ports. And the ports themselves must be completely aware of
homeland security and take it seriously, these threats. And how
the Department of Homeland and others are responsible for
working constructively with each other and to prevent a
terrorist incident in America.
Once again, I would like to thank the most Honorable Bennie
Thompson for welcoming US and our witnesses for appearing for
US today, and we look forward to your testimony.
Mr. Thompson. We would like to thank Warren County for all
the hospitality that they have shown my colleagues over the
last 2 years. And we are thankful for the relationship and
willingness to hold the first hearing of the House Committee on
Homeland Security here in Vicksburg, Mississippi.
And I would like to thank everybody who is in attendance
today on our ports and waterways.
September 11th is referred to as a wake-up transition. As I
ride on our shores, I see how terrorists pose a threat to our
Maritime. And then with the USAA October of 2000 incident,
killing of 1,700 sailors, we, in Mississippi, understand how
real the threat is. And we witnessed some of this when the USAA
was shipped to Pascagoula to be repaired. And we also witnessed
this with the 9/11 ambush.
And some good steps have been taken to protect U.S. from
terrorist attempts by improving our regulations employed by the
Coast Guard. The Coast Guard has taken some steps in improving
our ports. And all of these regulations, however, have not
resulted in smooth sailing, but there is an attempt to complete
those that are mandated. Compliance with these regulations has
been far more difficult to receive on our part. For example,
the Coast Guard estimates we will spend $5.4 billion over the
next 10 years to maintain security. Since 9/11, the wish has
been to ask for more port security funding; by the end of this
fiscal year, would have distributed 1715 to 40 to pay for
security upgrades. However, this still falls short of what we
need.
On the Port of New Orleans, the lack has presented a
problem with leaving the facility vulnerable to terrorist
attacks and crime. In fact, it has left the port with, and I
quote, four half gates, none of which are able to do what one
gate should do completely. We should make sure that these funds
are available to New Orleans and other communities. And we
should welcome the Coast Guard for doing all that they could.
They are not getting all they need to get the job done.
Since 9/11, many homeland security departments have had
larger increases in service budgets. The Coast Guard is
operating with fleets of aircraft. Too few small boats and too
few men and woman are protecting our ports for too long. The
Coast Guard has done more with respect to safety, and our ports
are going to remain secure.
Mr. Chairman, I look forward to the testimony, and, again,
I thank you for having this hearing in Vicksburg, and I look
forward to your testimony.
Chairman Cox. Thank you, Mr. Thompson.
Chairman Cox. Does any other member wish to be recognized?
If not, I will introduce our witness, Admiral Robert Duncan,
Commander, Eighth Coast Guard District, United States Coast
Guard and director of the Maritime Defense Administration.
Admiral Duncan, thank you for being here. I appreciate your
being here, and we want to talk about what are important issues
that affect our ports and waterways.
STATEMENT OF REAR ADMIRAL ROBERT DUNCAN, COMMANDER, EIGHTH
COAST GUARD DISTRICT, UNITED STATES COAST GUARD
Admiral Duncan. Good morning.
Mr. Chairman and distinguished members of the Committee. It
is a pleasure to be here today to discuss the Coast Guard's
role in enhancing the security of America's ports and inland
waterways in order to facilitate the safe and efficient flow of
commerce.
On 9/10/01, our primary maritime focus was on the safe and
efficient use of America's waterways. Since 9/11, we have made
great progress in securing America's waterways while continuing
to facilitate the safe and efficient flow of commerce. There is
no doubt that work remains, but there is also no doubt that we
continue to improve maritime homeland security each and every
day, thanks in large part to the continued strong cooperation
with the domestic and international maritime industry as well
as many U.S., Federal, State and local agencies.
Reducing Maritime Risk: The Coast Guards's overarching
security goal is to prevent terrorist attacks within or
exploitation of the U.S. maritime domain. Doing so requires a
risk-based approach to identifying and intercepting threats
well before they reach U.S. shores. We do that by using
intelligence information and by conducting layered, multi-
agency security operations nationwide while strengthening the
security posture and reducing the vulnerability of our ports,
with particular focus on our militarily and economically
strategic ports. Using threat, vulnerability and consequences
as a general model is fundamental to managing risks associated
with terrorist attacks while retaining our quality of life.
The Eighth Coast Guard District: The Eighth Coast Guard
District, headquartered in New Orleans, covers all or part of
26 States throughout the Gulf Coast and heartland of America.
It stretches from the Appalachian Mountains and Chattahoochee
River in the east to the Rocky Mountains in the west, and from
the U.S.-Mexico border and the Gulf of Mexico to the Canadian
border in North Dakota, which included 15, 490 miles of
coastline and 10,300 miles of inland navigable waterways.
In a typical year, the men and women of the Eighth Coast
Guard District are involved in more than 6,300 search-and-
rescue cases, saving 770 lives, assisting 7,900 mariners and
saving $37.5 million in property. The district maintains 24,000
aids to navigation, responds to more than 4,200 marine
environmental pollution incidents and conducts more than 1,500
law-enforcement boardings. The ports of New Orleans and
Houston, located in the Eighth District, are two of the busiest
shipping ports in the Nation, with more than 2 million barrels
of oil and 1 million tons of cargo imported daily.
Seventeen of the top 40 busiest U.S. ports by tonnage are
located in the Eighth District. These ports are part of an
international supply and delivery system that brings an
extremely wide range of materials and goods into the country
and exports an equally wide range of commodities from the
United States. Imports include crude oil for our refineries,
liquefied natural gas, LNG, bulk minerals and finished
products. Exports include grains, refined petroleum products
and chemicals, just to name a few.
There are more than 6,500 oil and gas producing wells,
along with 130 mobile offshore drilling units in the Gulf of
Mexico that keep the district's Marine Safety program gainfully
employed. Five of the top seven fishing ports in the country
are located in the district. They account for nearly 40 percent
of the catch of U.S. commercial fishermen.
The Western Rivers consist of 41 rivers and lakes across 18
States and encompasses the heartland of the United States. The
Western Rivers centers on the Mississippi River and its major
tributaries, including the Ohio, Illinois, Missouri, Arkansas,
Tennessee and Cumberland Rivers, over 10,300 miles of navigable
waterways. The States of Pennsylvania, Ohio, West Virginia,
Kentucky, Nebraska, Tennessee, Indiana, Arkansas, Iowa, Kansas,
Missouri, Oklahoma, Louisiana, Mississippi, Alabama, Illinois,
Minnesota and Wisconsin are all part of my area of
responsibility.
The Western Rivers waterways are vital in moving bulk cargo
and manufactured goods for foreign and domestic commerce. These
rivers have provided a channel into the Nation's heartland,
connecting the Gulf Coast with the coal and steel industries of
Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania; and the grain exporters of the Twin
Cities, Minnesota.
Charged with protecting this swath of America's heartland
are approximately 3,956 Active Duty and selected Reserve
members geographically located in the district. There are also
6,000 volunteer Coast Guard auxiliaries and 254 civilian
personnel located in the district. I would specifically like to
note that Coast Guard auxiliaries are playing an increasing
role in maritime security by their assistance to local Captains
of the Ports, COTPs. While unarmed and not performing any law
enforcement missions, these citizens act as tremendous force
multipliers and have proven themselves invaluable.
Maritime Security for America's Heartland. The Coast
Guard's strategy for maritime security consists of four primary
pillars: Enhance maritime domain awareness; create and oversee
a maritime security regime; increase operational presence; and
improve response and recovery posture.
While I will not detail all the Coast Guard is doing in
support of this strategy, I would like to highlight a few
issues specific to the Eighth District.
Enhancing Awareness: Aligned closely to the ISPS code, the
Maritime Transportation Security Act of 2002, MTSA, implements
domestic regulations for U.S. vessels and U.S. port facilities
mirroring those required for foreign vessels and foreign ports.
This includes the establishment of maritime security, MARSEC,
levels that correspond to the international system and
correlate to the Homeland Security Advisory System, HSAS, used
throughout the United States.
Additionally, NTSA required the implementation of
regulations requiring the use of Automated Information Systems,
AIS, on all foreign flag and most U.S. flag commercial vessels
transiting regulated Vessel Traffic Service areas. AIS allows
the Coast Guard to electronically track the movement of vessels
as they transit U.S. waters in U.S. ports.
In the Eighth District, we have also installed additional,
AIS tracking receivers on offshore oil production platforms in
the Gulf of Mexico, GOM, in an initiative to further push out
our borders. Much like the Distant Early Warning, DEW, system
of the Cold War, this GOM ``DEW Line'' extends the Coast
Guard's vessel tracking capabilities into the reaches of
international waters, greatly improving maritime domain
awareness. Other sensors will be added to the system.
In 2002, the Eighth Coast Guard District and the State of
Louisiana co-sponsored the Louisiana River Watch Program. Based
on the tenets of the Neighborhood Watch Program, this awareness
program asks those who work, live or recreate on or near the
water to be aware of suspicious activity that might indicate
threats to our country's homeland security. Citizens are urged
to adopt a heightened sensitivity toward unusual events or
individuals they may encounter in or around the ports, docks,
marinas, riverside, beaches or communities. Anyone observing
suspicious activity is simply asked to note details and contact
law enforcement.
In 2004, the Coast Guard expanded the Louisiana River Watch
and other similar programs to the national level and is calling
it America's Waterway Watch. This collective national action is
designed to increase the awareness of all Americans to
suspicious activities on or near our coastline and river
systems.
In yet another Eighth Coast Guard District initiative, the
Inland River Vessel Movement Center, IRVMC, was created. IRVMC
was established in fiscal year 2003 to help develop greater
maritime domain awareness on the Western Rivers through the
tracking of certain dangerous cargo, as specified by
regulation, that are carried in barges. Each year, IRVMC tracks
over 36,000 transits of barges carrying these hazardous cargo
at 94 individual reporting points, over 10,300 miles of the
inland rivers including thousands of transits through high
density population areas. The location of barges carrying
specified cargo is reported to the IRVMC either electronically
or manually. IRVMC provides this information to the inland
river COTPs. The COTPs then are able to schedule security
boardings and escorts based on individual risks associated with
the movement of the cargo through specific regions of the
country. The information provided by IRVMC is essential to the
Western Rivers Maritime Security Mission and provides the only
MDA within the inland rivers system.
Create and Oversee an Effective Maritime Security Regime:
The U.S. commercial vessel, including tank barges, fleet and
U.S. maritime waterfront facilities are the heart and soul of
the maritime industry. Under the MTSA, each vessel and each
facility is now required to be operating under a Coast Guard
approved security plan. Again, like the ISPS code, these
security plans are designed to ensure the vessel is secure and
under the positive control of the assigned crew. Security plans
require each facility to implement mandatory access control
measures to ensure that only authorized persons are able to
gain access. Plan requirements establish designated restricted
areas within the facility gates and screening protocols for
ensuring that cargo-transport vehicles and persons entering the
facilities are inspected to deter the unauthorized introduction
of dangerous substances and devices. Vessel and facility owners
are fully responsible and accountable for full security of
their infrastructure and operations.
To date, the U.S. Coast Guard has reviewed and approved
over 9,600 domestic vessel security plans and 3,100 domestic
facility security plans. The Eighth Coast Guard District is
responsible for 5,447, or 57 percent, of the domestic vessels
and 1,291, or 42 percent, of the domestic facilities. Coast
Guard personnel have inspected every single facility required
to have a security plan to verify that they are operating in
compliance with their approved plan. Additionally, Coast Guard
personnel are in the process of examining every U.S. vessel
required to have a security plan to verify that they, too, are
operating in compliance with their approved plans.
Improve Response and Recovery Posture: The Western Rivers
Area Maritime Security, AMS, Committee was chartered on January
30, 2004, in accordance with 33 CFR 103.300(b). The AMS
Committee provides a forum for port stakeholders in the Western
Rivers Region to work together in facilitating the Coast
Guard's Ports, Waterways and Coastal Security, PWCS, mission to
deter, detect, prevent and respond to attacks against U.S.
territory, population and critical maritime infrastructure.
The AMS Committee functions as the regional AMS Committee
for the Western Rivers Region. As such, it incorporates the
geographic boundaries of the Captain of the Port, COTP, zones
of Pittsburgh, Huntington, Paducah, Louisville, St. Louis, and
Memphis. In addition, certain river portions of the COTP zones
of Chicago, Mobile and New Orleans are incorporated into the
committee. The AMS Committee is comprised of an Executive
Steering Committee of voting members and at-large non-voting
members. The Committee serves as an oversight body for the Area
Maritime Security Subcommittees within the region that operate
under the COTPs. The COTPs remain the Federal Maritime Security
Coordinators, FMSC, for their respective COTP zones described
in 33 CFR part three, including all ports and areas located
therein, and oversee all AMS Subcommittee activities.
The AMS Committee coordinates maritime security activities
among Western Rivers COTP zones to assure consistency in
identifying critical port infrastructure and operations;
identifying risks, threats, vulnerabilities, and consequences;
determining mitigation strategies and implementation methods;
developing and describing the process to continually evaluate
overall port security.
Additionally, the AMS Committee prepares and maintains the
Western Rivers Area Maritime Security Plan, hereinafter
referred to as the WRAMS Plan, incorporating annexes developed
by the COTPs. The WRAMS Plan addresses port security issues and
security operating procedures common to all COTP offices in the
region. The AMS Committee does provide a regional focus to the
COTPs in their efforts to complete risk-based AMS assessments
and assist the COTPs in developing, reviewing and updating
their individual annexes to the AMS Plan.
The AMS Committee provides guidance to individual AMS
Subcommittees throughout the region and fosters a system-wide
approach to maritime security within the region that emphasizes
regional strategies and resources. Finally, the AMS committee
serves as a link in communication threats and changes in
Maritime Security, MARSEC, levels and disseminating security
information to the AMS Subcommittees through the COTPs.
Membership of the Executive Steering Committee consists of
representative from the Eighth Coast Guard District Inland
Waterways Coordinator; Transportation Security Administration;
Bureau of Customs and Border Protection; Maritime
Administration; USACE Mississippi Valley Division and Great
Lakes and Ohio River Division; Transportation Command; Towing
Safety Advisory Committee; Chemical Transportation Advisory
Committee; American Waterways Operators; Passenger Vessel
Association; American Gaming Association; Inland Rivers Ports
and Terminals; Barge Fleeting Representative; River Industry
Executive Task Force.
The WRAMS plan serves as an umbrella plan for the Western
Region into which all COTPs/FMSCs, Captains of the Ports/
Federal Maritime Security Coordinators, have incorporated their
AMS, Area Maritime Security, plans as separate annexes. It
specifies COTP/FMSC security procedures for all MARSEC,
Maritime Security, levels.
The COTPs/FMSCs in the Western Rivers Region have formed 21
local AMS subcommittees to address maritime security issues
throughout their zones. Like the WRAMS Committee, these local
committees are comprised of Federal, State and local officials
as well as maritime industry representatives whose purpose is
to assist the COTP/FMSC in the development, review and update
of AMS, Area Maritime Security, plans; to assist in
communicating threats and changes in MARSEC levels; and to
assist in disseminating appropriate security information to
port stakeholders.
All COTPs/FMSCs must complete an AMS exercise for their
respective zones by December 31, 2005. The Eighth Coast Guard
District, the COTPs/FMSCs and the local AMS committees are
presently engaged in planning the exercises that will test and
evaluate their respective annexes in the WRAMS Plan.
Port of Vicksburg, Mississippi: There are eight Maritime
Transportation Security Act, MTSA, regulated facilities in and
around the Port of Vicksburg, Mississippi. All eight facilities
have been inspected for compliance with 33 CFR 105, and have
Coast Guard-approved Facility Security Plans.
Marine Safety Unit Baton Rouge has established an Area
Maritime Security committee in Vicksburg. Representatives from
the Madison Parish Sheriff's Office, Louisiana side of the
river, Warren County Sheriff's Office, Vicksburg Police
Department, Facility Security Officers for all MTSA-regulated
facilities, the U.S. Army Corp of Engineers, Warren County
Office of Emergency Preparedness, and the Vicksburg Port
Commission are all participating members of the Committee.
Critical non-MTSA regulated facilities and infrastructure
has been identified, assessed for risk, and mitigation
strategies are in place with local law enforcement. MSU Baton
Rouge Port Security planners also met with the security
supervisor for the Grand Gulf Nuclear Power Plant located south
of Vicksburg and conducted a tour of the facility to identify
any potential maritime security concerns associated with the
power plant.
Unclassified Field Intelligence Reports describing
potential suspicious activity in and around infrastructure and
facilities in Baton Rouge are shared with local law enforcement
agencies in Vicksburg. This information is intended to heighten
the awareness of the law enforcement community in Vicksburg and
help them identify potential suspicious activity in their area
worth reporting to the Coast Guard.
Two Public Access Facilities have been identified in the
port area to accommodate MTSA-regulated passenger vessels that
make routine port calls in the area. The Coast Guard has
coordinated with the appropriate local law enforcement agencies
and the passenger vessel operators to establish security
mitigation procedures.
Boat launch facilities and logistics for accommodating
Marine Safety Unit Baton Rouge's trailer-able port security
boat have been identified in the event Coast Guard port
security patrol assets are ever needed to be deployed in the
port.
Conclusion: In closing, the Coast Guard is dedicated to
leading the way for maritime security, and nowhere is that more
true than in the Eighth District. It demands a coordinated
effort and continued vigilance by all involved, and is a charge
the Coast Guard and the men and women of the Eighth District
are proudly meeting.
I know I have gone over my time, but I thank you for the
time that you have given me.
I have details on each of those, and I will be glad to
respond if you are interested in those. With this, I will
conclude my testimony, thank you.
[The statement of Admiral Duncan follows:]
PPrepared Statement of Rear Admiral Robert F. Duncan
Introduction
Good morning Mr. Chairman and distinguished Members of the
Committee. It is a pleasure to be here today to discuss the Coast
Guard's role in enhancing the security of America's ports and inland
waterways in order to facilitate the safe and efficient flow of
commerce.
On 9/10/01, our primary maritime focus was on the safe and
efficient use of America's waterways. Since 9/11, we have made great
progress in securing America's waterways, while continuing to
facilitate the safe and efficient flow of commerce. There is no doubt
that work remains, but there is also no doubt that we continue to
improve maritime homeland security each and every day -thanks in large
part to the continued strong cooperation with the domestic and
international maritime industry as well as many US federal, state, and
local agencies.
Reducing Maritime Risk
The Coast Guard's overarching security goal is to prevent terrorist
attacks within or exploitation of the U.S. maritime domain. Doing so
requires a risk-based approach to identifying and intercepting threats
well before they reach U.S. shores. We do that by using intelligence
information and by conducting layered, multi-agency security operations
nationwide; while strengthening the security posture and reducing the
vulnerability of our ports, with particular focus on our militarily and
economically strategic ports. Using threat, vulnerability and
consequences as a general model, is fundamental to managing risks
associated with terrorist attack while retaining our quality of life.
The Eighth Coast Guard District
The Eighth Coast Guard District, headquartered in New Orleans,
covers all or part of 26 states throughout the Gulf Coast and heartland
of America. It stretches from the Appalachian Mountains and
Chattahoochee River in the east to the Rocky Mountains in the west, and
from the U.S.-Mexico border and the Gulf of Mexico to the Canadian
border in North Dakota, which includes 15,490 miles of coastline and
10,300 miles of inland navigable waterways.
In a typical year, the men and women of the Eighth Coast Guard
District are involved in more than 6,300 search and rescue cases--
saving 770 lives, assisting 7,900 mariners and saving $37.5 million in
property. The district maintains 24,000 aids-to-navigation, responds to
more than 4,200 marine environmental pollution incidents and conducts
more than 1,500 law-enforcement boardings.
The ports of New Orleans and Houston, located in the Eighth
District, are two of the busiest shipping ports in the nation, with
more than two million barrels of oil and one million tons of cargo
imported daily. Seventeen of the top 40 busiest U.S. ports by tonnage
are located in the Eighth District. These ports are part of an
international supply and delivery system that brings an extremely wide
range of materials and goods into the country and exports an equally
wide range of commodities from the United States. Imports include crude
oil for our refineries, liquefied natural gas (LNG), bulk minerals and
finished products. Exports include grains, refined petroleum products
and chemicals just to name a few.
There are more than 6,500 oil and gas producing wells, along with
130 mobile offshore drilling units in the Gulf of Mexico that keep the
district's Marine Safety program gainfully employed. Five of the top
seven fishing ports in the country are located in the district. They
account for nearly 40 percent of the catch of U.S. commercial
fishermen.
The Western Rivers consists of 41 rivers and lakes across 18 states
and encompasses the heartland of the United States. The Western Rivers
centers on the Mississippi River and its major tributaries, including
the Ohio, Illinois, Missouri, Arkansas, Tennessee, and Cumberland
Rivers (over 10,300 miles of navigable waterways). The states of
Pennsylvania, Ohio, West Virginia, Kentucky, Nebraska, Tennessee,
Indiana, Arkansas, Iowa, Kansas, Missouri, Oklahoma, Louisiana,
Mississippi, Alabama, Illinois, Minnesota and Wisconsin are all part of
my area of responsibility. The Western Rivers waterways are vital in
moving bulk cargoes and manufactured goods for foreign and domestic
commerce. These rivers have provided a channel into the nation's
heartland, connecting the Gulf Coast with the coal and steel industries
of Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania; and the grain exporters of the Twin
Cities, Minnesota.
Charged with protecting this vast swath of America's heartland are
approximately 3,956 active duty and selected reserve members
geographically located in the district. There are also 6,000 volunteer
Coast Guard Auxiliarists and 254 civilian personnel located in the
district. I would specifically like to note that Coast Guard
Auxiliarists are playing an increasing role in maritime security by
their assistance to local Captains of the Ports (COTPs). While unarmed
and not performing any law enforcement missions, these citizens act as
tremendous force multipliers and have proven themselves invaluable.
Maritime Security for America's Heartland The Coast Guard's strategy
for maritime security consists of four primary pillars:
Enhance Maritime Domain Awareness;
Create & Overseee a Maritime Security Regime;
Increase Operational Presence; and
Improve Response and Recovery Posture
While I will not detail all the Coast Guard is doing in support of
this strategy, I would like to highlight a few issues specific to the
Eighth District.
Enhancing Awareness
Aligned closely to the ISPS code, the Maritime Transportation
Security Act of 2002 (MTSA) implements domestic regulations for US
vessels and US port facilities mirroring those required for foreign
vessels and foreign ports. This includes the establishment of maritime
security (MARSEC) levels that correspond to the international system
and correlate to the Homeland Security Advisory System (HSAS) used
throughout the United States. Additionally, MTSA required the
implementation of regulations requiring the use of Automated
Information Systems (AIS) on all foreign flag and most US flag
commercial vessels transiting regulated Vessel Traffic Service areas.
AIS allows the Coast Guard to electronically track. the movement of
vessels as they transit US waters in US ports. In the Eighth District,
we have also installed additional AIS tracking receivers on offshore
oil production platforms in the Gulf of Mexico (GOM) in an initiative
to further push out our borders. Much like the Distant Early Warning
(DEW) System of the Cold War, this GOM ``DEW Line'' extends the Coast
Guard's vessel tracking capabilities into the reaches of international
waters greatly improving maritime domain awareness. Other sensors will
be added to the system.
In 2002, the Eighth Coast Guard District and the State of Louisiana
co-sponsored the Louisiana River Watch Program. Based on the tenets of
the Neighborhood Watch Program, this awareness program asks those who
work, live, or recreate on or near the water to be aware of suspicious
activity that might indicate threats to our country's homeland
security. Citizens are urged to adopt a heightened sensitivity toward
unusual events or individuals they may encounter in or around ports,
docks, marinas, riversides, beaches, or communities. Anyone observing
suspicious activity is simply asked to note details and contact local
law enforcement. In 2004, the Coast Guard expanded the Louisiana River
Watch and other similar programs to the national level and is calling
it America's Waterway Watch. This collective national action is
designed to increase the awareness of all Americans to suspicious
activities on or near our coastlines and river systems.
In yet another Eighth Coast Guard District initiative, the Inland
River Vessel Movement Center (IRVMC) was created. IRVMC was established
in fiscal year 2003 to help develop greater maritime domain awareness
on the Western Rivers through the tracking of Certain Dangerous Cargoes
(as specified by regulation) that are carried in barges. Each year
IRVMC tracks over 36,000 transits of barges carrying these hazardous
cargoes, at 94 individual reporting points, over 10,300 miles of the
inland rivers, including thousands of transits through High Density
Population Areas. The location of barges carrying specified cargos is
reported to the IRVMC either electronically or manually. IRMVC provides
this information to the inland river COTPs. The COTPs then are able to
schedule security boardings and escorts based on individual risks
associated with the movement of the cargo through specific regions of
the country. The information provided by IRVMC is essential to the
Western Rivers Maritime Security mission and provides the only MDA
within the inland rivers system.
Create & Oversee an Effective Maritime Security Regime
The U.S. commercial vessel (including tank barges) fleet and U.S.
maritime waterfront facilities are the heart and soul of the maritime
industry. Under the MTSA, each vessel and each facility is now required
to be operating under a Coast Guard approved security plan. Again, like
the ISPS code, these security plans are designed to ensure the vessel
is secure and under the positive control of the assigned crew. Security
plans require each facility to implement mandatory access control
measures to ensure that only authorized persons are able to gain
access. Plan requirements establish designated restricted areas within
the facility gates and screening protocols for ensuring that cargo-
transport vehicles and persons entering the facilities are inspected to
deter the unauthorized introduction of dangerous substances and
devices. Vessel and facility owners are fully responsible and
accountable for full security of their infrastructure and operations.
To date, the US Coast Guard has reviewed and approved over 9,600
domestic vessel security plans and 3,100 domestic facility security
plans. The Eighth Coast Guard District is responsible for 5,447 or 57
percent of the domestic vessels, and 1,291, or 42 percent, of the
domestic facilities. Coast Guard personnel have inspected every single
facility required to have a security plan to verify that they are
operating in compliance with their approved plan. Additionally, Coast
Guard personnel are in the process of examining every U.S. vessel
required to have a security plan to verify that they too are operating
in compliance with their approved plans.
Improve Response and Recovery Posture
The Western Rivers Area Maritime Security (AMS) Committee was
chartered on January 30, 2004, in accordance with 33 CFR 103.300(b).
The AMS Committee provides a forum for port stakeholders in the Western
Rivers Region to work together in facilitating the Coast Guard's Ports,
Waterways, and Coastal Security (PWCS) mission to deter, detect,
prevent and respond to attacks against U.S. territory, population, and
critical maritime infrastructure.
The AMS Committee functions as the regional AMS Committee for the
Western Rivers Region. As such, it incorporates the geographic
boundaries of the Captain of the Port (COTP) zones of Pittsburgh,
Huntington, Paducah, Louisville, St. Louis, and Memphis, as described
below. In addition, certain rivers portions of the COTP zones of
Chicago, Mobile, and New Orleans are incorporated into the Committee.
The AMS Committee is comprised of an ``Executive Steering Committee''
of voting members, and ``At-Large'' non-voting members. The Committee
serves as an oversight body for the Area Maritime Security
Subcommittees within the region that operate under the COTPs. The COTPs
remain the Federal Maritime Security Coordinators (FMSC) for their
respective COTP zones described in 33 CFR Part 3, including all ports
and areas located therein, and oversee all AMS Subcommittee activities.
The AMS Committee coordinates maritime security activities among
Western Rivers COTP zones to assure consistency in:
(1) Identifying critical port infrastructure and operations.
(2) Identifying risks (threats, vulnerabilities, and
consequences).
(3) Determining mitigation strategies and implementation
methods.
(4) Developing and describing the process to continually
evaluate overall port security.
Additionally the AMS Committee prepares and maintains the Western
Rivers Area Maritime Security Plan, hereinafter referred to as the
``WRAMS Plan,'' incorporating annexes developed by the COTPs. The WRAMS
Plan addresses port security issues and security operating procedures
common to all COTP offices in the region. The AMS Committee does
provide a regional focus to the COTPs in their efforts to complete
risk-based AMS assessments and assist the COTPs in developing,
reviewing, and updating their individual annexes to the AMS Plan. The
AMS Committee provides guidance to individual AMS Subcommittees
throughout the region and fosters a system-wide approach to maritime
security within the region that emphasizes regional strategies and
resources. Finally, the AMS committee serves as a link in communicating
threats and changes in Maritime Security (MARSEC) levels, and
disseminating security information to the AMS Subcommittees through the
COTPs.
Membership of the Executive Steering Committee consists of
representatives from:
Eighth Coast Guard District Inland Waterways
Coordinator
Transportation Security Administration
Bureau of Customs and Border Protection
Maritime Administration
U.S.A.C.E. Mississippi Valley Division and Great Lakes
and Ohio River Division
Transportation Command
Towing Safety Advisory Committee
Chemical Transportation Advisory Committee
American Waterways Operators
Passenger Vessel Association
American Gaming Association
Inland Rivers Ports and Terminals
Barge Fleeting Representative
River Industry Executive Task Force
The WRAMS plan serves as an umbrella plan for the Western Rivers
Region into which all COTPs/FMSCs (Captains of the Portsl/Federal
Maritime Security Coordinators) have incorporated their AMS (Area
Maritime Security) Plans as separate annexes. It specifies COTP/FMSC
security procedures for all MARSEC (Maritime Security) levels.
The COTPs/FMSCs in the Western Rivers Region have formed twenty-one
local AMS subcommittees to address maritime security issues throughout
their zones. Like the WRAMS Committee these local committees are
comprised of federal, state and local officials, as well as maritime
industry representatives, whose purpose is to assist the COTP/FMSC in
the development, review and update of AMS (Area Maritime Security)
plans; to assist in communicating threats and changes in MARSEC levels;
and to assist in disseminating appropriate security information to port
stakeholders.
All COTPs/FMSCs must complete an AMS exercise for their respective
zones by December 31, 2005. The Eighth Coast Guard District, the COTPs/
FMSCs and the local AMS committees are presently engaged in planning
the exercises that will test and evaluate their respective annexes in
the WRAMS Plan.
Port of Vicksburg, Mississippi
There are eight Maritime Transportation Security Act (MTSA)
regulated facilities in and around the Port of Vicksburg, Mississippi.
All eight facilities have been inspected for compliance with 33 CFR
105, and have Coast Guard-approved Facility Security Plans.
Marine Safety Unit Baton Rouge has established an Area Maritime
Security Committee in Vicksburg. Representatives from the Madison
Parish Sheriff's Office (Louisiana side of the river), Warren County
Sheriffs Office, Vicksburg Police Department, Facility Security
Officers for all MTSA-regulated facilities, the U.S. Army Corp of
Engineers, Warren County Office of Emergency Preparedness, and the
Vicksburg Port Commission are all participating members of the
Committee. Critical non-MTSA regulated facilities and infrastructure
has been identified, assessed for risk, and mitigation strategies are
in place with local law enforcement. MSU Baton Rouge Port Security
planners also met with the security supervisor for the Grand Gulf
Nuclear Power Plant located south of Vicksburg and conducted a tour of
the facility to identify any potential maritime security concerns
associated with the power plant.
Unclassified Field Intelligence Reports describing potential
suspicious activity in and around infrastructure and facilities in
Baton Rouge are shared with local law enforcement agencies in
Vicksburg. This information is intended to heighten the awareness of
the law enforcement community in Vicksburg and help them identify
potential suspicious activity in their area worth reporting to the
Coast Guard.
Two Public Access Facilities have been identified in the port area
to accommodate MTSA-regulated passenger vessels that make routine port
calls in the area. The Coast Guard has coordinated with the appropriate
local law enforcement agencies and the passenger vessel operators to
establish security mitigation procedures.
Boat launch facilities and logistics for accommodating Marine
Safety Unit Baton Rouge's trailerable port security boat have been
identified in the event Coast Guard port security patrol assets are
ever needed to be deployed in the port.
Conclusion
In closing, the Coast Guard is dedicated to leading the way for
maritime security and nowhere is that more true than in the Eighth
District. It demands a coordinated effort and continued vigilance by
all involved, and is a charge the Coast Guard and the men and women of
the Eighth District are proudly meeting.
Chairman Cox. Thank you for your testimony.
Our next witness is Jimmy Heidel, director, Warren County
Port Commission, and vice president of the Vicksburg-Warren
Chamber of Commerce.
STATEMENT OF JIMMY HEIDEL, EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR, WARREN COUNTY
PORT COMMISSION, AND VICE PRESIDENT, VICKSBURG-WARREN COUNTY
CHAMBER OF COMMERCE
Mr. Heidel. Mr. Chairman, thank you for this opportunity
this morning.
Operated by the Warren County Port Commission, the Port of
Vicksburg began shipping operations in October 1968. Each year,
more than 3 million tons of cargo passes through the port,
which has its own U.S. Customs Port of Entry.
The port consists of a slack water channel 9,500 feet in
length and 300 feet wide with 12 feet minimum depth. Vicksburg
Harbor is connected to the Mississippi River by a 4,800-foot
long channel maintained at 150 feet wide and 12 feet deep.
Based on its efficiency in loading and unloading cargo, the
Port of Vicksburg was selected as one of the best inland ports
in the Nation by the Ports and Waterway Institute at Louisiana
State University. Facilities at the Port include a 15-ton
bridge crane and a T-dock equipped with a 125-ton crane. Rail-
served warehousing facilities are also available.
One of the most outstanding features of the port is the
LASH program. This program enables a barge to be sealed for
international travel in Vicksburg and transferred directly to
New Orleans where the barge is then loaded with products still
sealed. Ten barge lines service the Port of Vicksburg year-
round without seasonal limitations.
The port is accessible from U.S. Highway 61, which
interchanges with Interstate 20, 6 miles away. The site is
within a commercial trucking zone and is served by 21 truck
lines.
A feasibility study through a contract with the U.S. Army
Corps of Engineers from the Mississippi Department of
Transportation will determine the need and economic impact on a
region encompassing a 100-mile radius around Vicksburg-Warren
County, Mississippi.
Recently, another U.S. Department of Transportation study
revealed highway and rail transportation has increased to the
point that alternate modes of transportation, such as water
transportation, will have to be utilized more in the future.
Another fact that was pointed out is water transportation is
the least costly of the three modes of transportation.
Presently, there are 322 acres of industrial land at the
Port of Vicksburg and another 25 acres along the Yazoo
Diversion Channel that have access to water transportation on
the Mississippi River and its tributaries.
There are 24 companies employing 2,413 people directly and
indirectly who use water transportation at the Port of
Vicksburg. These figures do not include the U.S. Army Corps of
Engineers or two other companies that are at the Port and use
rail and truck.
The 24 companies, situated on 322 acres, employing 2,413
people, transport approximately 3,750,000 tons per year through
the Port of Vicksburg and employ 2,413 people with an annual
payroll of $113,615,320.
Utilizing existing data on employee payrolls, tons, both
direct and indirect on existing port property, the following
economic impact can be projected.
The 322 acres of land occupied by companies utilizing water
transportation average 10 employees per acre. The payroll is
$113,615,320 for direct and indirect employees or approximately
$511,780 in payroll per acre. The average tonnage generated is
3,750,000 tons or 11,646 tons per acre.
The economic impact of 80 acres of new industrial land
fully utilizing water transportation would be an additional 872
employees at an annual payroll of $40,942,400 and an increase
of 931,680 tons per year.
The U.S. Chamber of Commerce projects a payroll turnover
seven times within a community. Therefore, an annual payroll of
$40,942,400 would generate an economic impact of $286,596,800
in the 100-mile radius of Vicksburg-Warren County, of which 60
percent remain in the Vicksburg-Warren county area.
This same impact could be felt adversely if the Port of
Vicksburg's security came under attack or that of one of its
companies. The State and national economy would have an even
greater impact if the Mississippi River Bridge, the only rail
crossing between Memphis, Tennessee, and Baton Rouge,
Louisiana, were to become a target.
The administration has developed a comprehensive National
Strategy For Homeland Security focused on several key Areas:
intelligence and warning; border and transportation security;
protecting critical infrastructure; defending against
catastrophic threats; and emergency preparedness and response.
We must prepare an approach to security that incorporates
prevention and protection in a way that respects our liberty
and our privacy and fosters our prosperity. We cannot afford to
be overwhelmed by fear or paralyzed by the existence of
threats, but be prepared and aware.
Risk management is fundamental to managing the threat,
while retaining our quality of life and living in freedom. Risk
management must guide our decision-making as we examine how we
can best organize to prevent, respond and recover from an
attack.
These words were taken from a speech delivered by our
Homeland Security Secretary Michael Chertoff.
How quickly your company can get back to business after a
terrorist attack or tornado, a fire or flood often depends on
emergency planning done today. A commitment to planning today
will help support employees, customers, the community, the
local economy and even the country. It also protects your
business investment and gives your company a better chance for
survival.
Business continuity and crisis management can be complex
issues depending on your particular industry, size and scope of
your business. However, putting a plan in motion will improve
the likelihood that your company will survive and recover.
America's Waterway Watch is a national awareness program
that asks those who work, live or recreate on or near the water
to be aware of suspicious activity that might indicate threats
to our country's homeland security. Americans are urged to
adopt a heightened sensitivity toward unusual events or
individuals they may encounter in or around ports, docks,
marinas, riversides, beaches or communities.
Since the events of terrorism on September 11th and as part
of the National Homeland Security effort, our community is
fortunate to have very proactive local leaders from the city
and county working together to address and implement mandated
procedures to protect Vicksburg and Warren County.
As a port city, there are standardized incident management
processes, protocols and procedures that have been put into
place. Working together with the United States Coast Guard and
their safety unit, a Harbor Safety and Security Committee has
been established. Daily awareness intelligence and anti-
terrorism reports are received and acted upon as necessary.
Working together with the Warren County Sheriff's Department,
patrol boats are launched as needed to monitor our bridges and
harbor through the Warren County Sheriff's Department. There is
a 24-hour security presence at the Mississippi River Bridge and
the Highway 80 Bridge. Local and county law enforcement, city
and county fire department leaders, the U.S. Coast Guard, the
Mississippi State Highway Patrol office and our local Emergency
Management Agency communicate frequently on emergency
procedures needed to activate and protect out community.
Business leaders from all industry at the Port of Vicksburg
have come together to share essential information and contact
numbers necessary to respond quickly and efficiently to ensure
our industry is aware and prepared for any emergency to protect
our port and community.
In addition, our Warren County Emergency Director, Mr. L.W.
``Bump'' Callaway is actively pursuing a Buffer Zone Protection
Grant through the Mississippi Office of Homeland Security, and
the U.S. Marshals Service is conducting a survey to ensure the
protection of our Warren County Courthouse.
The people of Warren County can take great pride in knowing
our community leaders and law enforcement are committed to
assure our citizens the events of September 11th were not taken
lightly, and security is in place to help keep our environment
and economy free from threat.
[The statement of Mr. Heidel follows:]
Prepared Statement of Jimmy Heidel
Protecting Our Commerce Enhancing Port and Waterway Security
Economic development is a long-term process that requires a vision
and hard work. In order to make progress, we have to continue to work
together and plan for the future of our children and those to come.
The Vicksburg-Warren County area economy is very diversified, with
growth in manufacturing, tourism, regional retail sales, casino gaming,
U.S. Army Corps of Engineers Lower Mississippi Division Headquarters,
U.S. Waterways Experiment Station, Mississippi River Commission
Headquarters, new regional medical facilities, and all four modes of
transportation.
There are many potential projects that will provide infrastructure
and emphasis for our area to prosper and provide a great quality of
life for our citizens. One of those is the Port of Vicksburg.
Operated by the Warren County Port Commission, the Port of
Vicksburg began shipping operations in October 1968. Each year, more
than three million tons of cargo passes through the port, which has its
own U.S. Customs Port of Entry.
The port consists of a slack water channel 9,500 feet in length and
300 feet wide with 12 feet minimum depth. Vicksburg Harbor is connected
to the Mississippi River by a 4,800-foot long channel maintained at 150
feet wide and 12 feet deep.
Based on its efficiency in loading and unloading cargoes, the Port
of Vicksburg was selected as one of the best inland ports in the nation
by the Ports and Waterways Institute at Louisiana State University.
Facilities at the Port include a 15-ton bridge crane and a T-dock
equipped with a 125-ton crane. Rail-served warehousing facilities are
also available.
One of the most outstanding features of the Port is the LASH
program. This program enables a barge to be sealed for international
travel in Vicksburg and transferred directly to New Orleans, where the
barge is then loaded, with products still sealed. Ten barge lines
service the Port of Vicksburg year-round without seasonal limitations.
The Port is accessible from U.S. Highway 61, which interchanges
with Interstate 20, six miles away. The site is within a commercial
trucking zone and is served by 21 truck lines.
A feasibility study through a contract with the U.S. Army Corps of
Engineers from the Mississippi Department of Transportation will
determine the need and economic impact on a region encompassing a
100mile radius around Vicksburg-Warren County, Mississippi.
Recently, another U.S. Department of Transportation study revealed
highway and rail transportation has increased to the point that
alternate modes of transportation, such as water transportation, will
have to be utilized more in the future. Another fact that was pointed
out is water transportation is the least costly of the three modes of
transportation.
Presently, there are 322 acres of industrial land at the Port of
Vicksburg and another 25 acres along the Yazoo Diversion Channel that
have access to water transportation on the Mississippi River and its
tributaries.
There are 24 companies employing 2,413 people direct and indirectly
who use water transportation at the Port of Vicksburg. These figures do
not include the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers or two other companies
that are at the Port and use rail and truck.
The 24 companies, situated on 322 acres, employing 2,413 people,
transport approximately 3,750,000 tons per year through the Port of
Vicksburg, and employ 2,413 people with an annual payroll of
$113,615,320.
Utilizing existing data on employee payrolls, tons, both direct and
indirect on existing port property, the following economic impact can
be projected.
a. The 322 acres of land occupied by companies utilizing water
transportation average 10 employees per acre.
b. The payroll is $113,615,320 for direct and indirect
employees or approximately $511,780 in payroll per acre.
c. The average tonnage generated is 3,750,000 tons or 11,646
tons per acre.
The economic impact of 80 acres of new industrial land fully
utilizing water transportation would be:
a. An additional 872 employees at an annual payroll of
$40,942,400 and an increase of 931,680 tons per year.
The U.S. Chamber of Commerce projects a payroll turns over seven
times within a community. Therefore, an annual payroll of $40,942,400
would generate an economic impact of $286,596,800 in the 100-mile
radius of Vicksburg-Warren County, of which 60 percent remain in the
Vicksburg-Warren County area.
This same impact could be felt adversely if the Port of Vicksburg's
security came under attack or that of one of it's companies. The state
and national economy would have an even greater impact if the
Mississippi River Bridge, the only rail crossing between Memphis,
Tennessee and Baton Rouge, Louisiana, were to become a target.
The Bush Administration has developed a comprehensive National
Strategy for Homeland Security, focused on several key areas:
intelligence and warning; border and transportation security;
protecting critical infrastructure; defending against catastrophic
threats; and emergency preparedness and response.
We must prepare an approach to security that incorporates
prevention and protection in a way that respects our liberty and our
privacy, and fosters our prosperity. We cannot afford to be overwhelmed
by fear or paralyzed by the existence of threats, but be prepared and
aware.
Risk management is fundamental to managing the threat, while
retaining our quality of life and living in freedom. Risk management
must guide our decision-making as we examine how we can best organize
to prevent, respond and recover from an attack.
These words were taken from a speech delivered by our Homeland
Security Secretary, Michael Chertoff.
How quickly your company can get back to business after a terrorist
attack or tornado, a fire or flood often depends on emergency
planning--done today. A commitment to planning today will help support
employees, customers, the community, the local economy and even the
country. It also protects your business investment and gives your
company a better chance for survival.
Business continuity and crisis management can be complex issues
depending on your particular industry, size and scope of your business.
However, putting a plan in motion will improve the likelihood that your
company will survive and recover!
America's Waterway Watch IS.a national awareness program that asks
those who work, live, or recreate on or near the water to be aware of
suspicious activity that might indicate threats to our country's
homeland security. American's are urged to adopt a heightened
sensitivity toward unusual events or individuals they may encounter in
or around ports, docks, marinas, riversides, beaches, or communities.
Since the events of terrorism on September 11th, and as part of the
National Homeland Security effort, our community is fortunate to have
very pro-active local leaders, from the city and county, working
together to address and implement-mandated procedures to protect
Vicksburg and Warren County.
As a port city, there are standardized incident management
processes, protocols and procedures that have been put into place.
Working together with the United States Coast Guard and their safety
unit, a Harbor Safety and Security Committee has been established.
Daily awareness intelligence and antiterrorism reports are received and
acted upon as necessary. Working with together with the Warren County
Sheriff's Department patrol boats are launched as needed to monitor our
bridges and harbor through the Warren County Sheriff's Department.
There is a 24-hour security presence at the Mississippi River Bridge
and the Highway 80 Bridge. Local and county law enforcement, city and
county fire department leaders, the U.S. Coast Guard, the Mississippi
State Highway Patrol office, and our local Emergency Management Agency
communicate frequently on emergency procedures needed to activate and
protect our community. Business leaders from all industry at the Port
of Vicksburg have come together to share essential information and
contact numbers necessary to response quickly and efficiently to ensure
our industry are aware and prepared for any emergency to protect our
port and community.
In addition, our Warren County Emergency Director, Mr. L.W.
``Bump'' Callaway is actively pursuing a Buffer Zone Protection Grant
through the Mississippi Office of Homeland Security and the U.S.
Marshal Service is conducting a survey to ensure the protection of our
Warren County Court House.
The people of Warren County can take great pride in knowing our
community leaders and law enforcement are committed to insure our
citizens the events of September 11th were not taken lightly and
security is in place to help keep our environment and economy free from
threat.
Chairman Cox. Thank you very much.
Ms. Cynthia Swain, who is the director of safety and
security, Port of New Orleans.
STATEMENT OF CYNTHIA SWAIN, DIRECTOR OF SAFETY AND SECURITY,
PORT OF NEW ORLEANS
Ms. Swain. Good morning. I am Cynthia Swain, the director
of port safety and security for the Board of Commissioners of
the Port of New Orleans. Thank you for the invitation to
testify at this hearing. It is my hope this committee is both
resolved and empowered to initiate the necessary actions to
address the many issues that are presented here today.
Approximately one year ago, the port's president and CEO,
Gary LaGrange, gave testimony before the Senate Committee of
Commerce, Science and Transportation. At that hearing, he
reported that the port had made significant infrastructure,
operations and procedural enhancements in an effort to address
the potential for terrorist activity and comply with the
impending deadline, July 1, 2004, for Maritime Transportation
Security Act, MTSA, regulatory compliance. A couple of the then
ongoing projects referenced have since been completed,
including: TSA II Cruise Terminal Lighting & Fencing, $600,000;
TSA II Signs, barricades, barriers, $50,000; the TSA1 Upriver
Gate Access project and the DHS Upriver Perimeter Enhancement
project are both scheduled for completion by September 2005.
Both of these projects experienced delays, in part due to
the accommodation of a U.S. Customs and Border Protection
Radiation Portal Monitor project. This project was slated for
installation at the Port of New Orleans, Felicity Street exit.
After more than a year of planning, coordination, and actual
site preparation on the part of the project consultants and
port security and engineering staff, funding was discontinued,
and the project was suddenly aborted. The TSA I Gate Access
project, even when completed, will not be used at 100 percent
capacity. The project's scope of work included the use of port
identification credentials or the Transportation Worker
Identification Card, TWIC, which was projected to be in use
fully at ports across the Nation by 2004. The Port of New
Orleans was denied funding for a port credential system in the
last funding round because it was, ``in line to receive a TWIC
system.''
There are currently 34 prototype TWIC test sites throughout
the country. The Port of New Orleans, however, is apparently in
the wrong line, because it is no closer to getting a TWIC
system today than it was then. What is the message here?
The COPS Hiring Grant provides funding for three of the six
police officer positions originally requested. All three
positions have been filled. A portion of their salaries and
benefits will be paid by the grant for three years. The Harbor
Police Department currently has one captain, one corporal and
three officers permanently assigned to Homeland Security
positions.
The Port of New Orleans has received $8 million in Federal
grant awards, and like all port authorities who have been
fortunate enough to receive awards, we are grateful. However,
the Port of New Orleans, like all other U.S. port authorities,
finds that the funding amounts are not sufficient to address
the completion of remaining enhancements to be made. In most,
if not all cases, the funding award does not pay for 100
percent of the finished projects. Ports must still bear the
cost of mandatory ``matching'' amounts, internal labor and
management costs and project overruns not covered by the award.
The financial burden of these costs cannot be ignored. Last
year, the Port of New Orleans paid more than $1.5 million to
supplement and initiate security projects. This was over and
above the Port Safety and Security Division's operating budget
of $5.5 million and a capital equipment budget of $275,000.
The port applied for more than $10 million in security
funding in TSA rounds III and IV. No awards were received from
either of these last two initiatives. Of the $46 million in
grant awards from TSA-IV, more than $4.5 million was awarded to
private entities. It is extremely disconcerting and
counterproductive for the government to supplement private
industry from the same funding source the public ports depend
upon prior to ensuring that each and every U.S. port authority
has received adequate funding. This practice diminishes the
importance of port security at every level and gives the
appearance that ports have adequately addressed their
vulnerabilities. Since TSA-IV, the Port has identified more
than $300,000 of additional fencing requirements at its
terminals, again to meet with MTSA regulations. The
Vulnerability Assessment prepared in 2001 needs to be revised,
and an annual security audit, another MTSA requirement needs to
be commissioned.
These projects are currently scheduled to be paid for with
port operating and capital improvement funds. As a result,
pending projects to improve commercial operations will need to
be postponed or cancelled. This, of course, makes the security
projects and requirements even more costly.
While it is true the ports industry, specifically vessel
operations, was not the target of or the instrumentality used
in the recent terrorist attacks, the impact of terrorism on the
port industry could conceivably be greater. The new Fantasy
line cruise vessels are capable of carrying more than 3,000
passengers. The number of lives lost during an attack on a
vessel or an act of bioterrorism would be catastrophic.
According to U.S. Coast Guard estimates, a strategically sunken
cargo vessel at or near the mouth of the Mississippi River
would close the river for over a year. Such an event would have
a global cataclysmic impact on every aspect of life as we know
it today, Because the cruise industry at the Port of New
Orleans and ports worldwide reflects not only the millions of
dollars already invested, but millions of anticipated revenues
as well. Consequently, no port can afford to have its cruise
business crippled or eliminated.
The American Association of Port Authorities, therefore,
expressed grave concern about the elimination of the Department
of Homeland Security's Port Security Grant Program. Including
infrastructure security and programmatic issues of port
security among those of other transportation entities such as
trains, trucks and other means of private and public conveyance
will ensure a decrease in the funding and attention being
sought by ports. A February 2005 report by the AAPA disclosed
that the U.S. port industry is projected to double its current
2 billion tons of cargo throughout over the next 15 years. If
ports are expected to remain competitive, the time to prepare
is now. Ports should be using funds for capital improvements
and growth initiatives and not be forced to expend limited
funds on security enhancements at existing facilities.
The Port of New Orleans has long recognized the need and
importance of safety and security at its facilities. It is one
of the few U.S. ports that has its own sworn and dedicated
Harbor Police Department. To further supplement its safety
force, the Port of New Orleans commissioned the design and
purchase of an emergency response vessel, the General Roy S.
Kelly, a prototype firefighting vessel that also accommodates
port protocol tours. This vessel is now being used to perform
under wharf inspections and daily river patrols to maintain and
monitor waterside restricted area locations when vessels are
berthed at port facilities. This vessel was not designed to be
used at the level of activity described, and the added duties
are taking a toll on this 10-year-old vessel. Last year, the
Port spent more than $50,000 on unbudgeted repair costs and is
preparing to spend more than $80,000 in additional repairs this
fiscal year, all without receiving any supplementary funds.
This vessel is routinely dispatched to assist the U.S. Coast
Guard with waterside emergencies because there are simply no
other assets in the river that can respond in a timely manner.
It takes the Coast Guard over one hour to get one of its
vessels in the river and approximately 30 minutes before a
helicopter can respond.
The Port has requested patrol vessels capable of
withstanding the currents of the Mississippi River in every TSA
round of funding. Every request has been denied. The General
Kelley's crew and others like it should be recognized for the
services they provide. Ports need funding assistance to
purchase vessels, equipment and to defray heightened
maintenance and operating costs due to increased use for
security functions.
Chairman Cox. Time is almost up.
Ms. Swain. The Harbor Police Department's mission, while
one narrowly focused on the maritime industry and port
community, has always included assisting Federal, State and
local law enforcement agencies. That focus has been greatly
expanded due to the trend toward greater interoperability
between law enforcement agencies in many areas including
communications, weaponry, intelligence and weapons of mass
destruction and bio-terrorism readiness.
The technological equipment, supplies, weapons, training
and additional staffing all create funding concerns that must
be addressed. Training, drills and exercises are costly to
conduct. MTSA regulations require that one full-scale exercise
and four drills be conducted annually. The planning, equipment
and personnel overtime requirements are significant, especially
since other safety exercises related to port operations are
still needed.
The call for interoperability has alerted many responding
agencies--62nd WMD CST, ATF, NOPD SWAT, etc.--to the fact that
they know very little about the maritime community,
particularly the Mississippi River and the Industrial Canal.
Many of these agencies have no experience boarding or searching
a cargo or passenger vessel.
The Port Safety and Security Division is often called upon
to host, coordinate and participate in training for these
agencies. In only one instance has the Port been financially
supplemented for these endeavors, yet there are costs
associated with each request. An internal tabletop exercise
limited to port employees, private security, and U.S. Coast
Guard observers will cost approximately $2,000 in
administration, supplies, accommodations and participant
salaries. A full-scale exercise involving outside responding
agencies, industry and port staff could triple in cost.
I am almost finished.
Finally, domestic terrorism, such as the World Trade Center
incidents and the Oklahoma Federal Building bombing, proves
that being reactive to terrorism, from any source, comes at an
immeasurable cost--loss of lives. Government must respond to
the funding needs identified by port authorities commensurate
with that of the Nation's alert level--Elevated--Yellow--
Significant Threat of Terrorist Activity--as though it is real
and not merely an innocuous memorial of a one-time terrorist
incident in our Nation's past.
The only way to do that is to create and fund proactive
prevention and response initiatives. To do less will create
frustration among law enforcement agencies, a continued
vulnerability of critical assets and, perhaps worst of all, a
false sense of security or a renewed atmosphere of complacency
among the people, all of which would contribute to another
opportunity for history to repeat itself--countless Americans
dead and yet another date to live in infamy.
Chairman Cox. Thank you for your testimony.
[The statement of Ms. Swain follows:]
Prepared Statement of Cynthia W. Swain
Good morning. I am Cynthia Swain, the Director of Port Safety and
Security for the Board of Commissioners of the Port of New Orleans.
Thank you for the invitation to testify at this hearing, ``Protecting
Our Commerce: Enhancing the Security of America(' Ports and Inland
Waterways.'' It is my hope this committee is both resolved and
empowered to initiate the necessary actions to address the many issues
that are presented here today.
Approximately one year ago the Port's President and CEO, Gary
LaGrange, gave testimony before the Senate Committee of Commerce,
Science and Transportation. At that hearing he reported that the Port
had made significant infrastructure, operations and procedural
enhancements in an effort to address the potential for terrorist
activity and comply with the impending deadline (July 1, 2004) for
Maritime Transportation Security Act (MTSA) regulatory compliance. A
couple of the then ``ongoing'' projects referenced have since been
completed, including:
TSA II Cruise Terminal Lighting & Fencing $600,000
TSA II Signs, barricades, barriers $50,000
The TSA I Upriver Gate Access project and the DHS Upriver Perimeter
Enhancement project are both scheduled for completion by September
2005. Both of these projects experienced delays, in part due to the
accommodation a U.S. Customs and Border Protection Radiation Portal
Monitor project slated for installation at the Port of New Orleans
Felicity Street exit. After more than a year of planning, coordination,
and actual site preparation on the part of the project consultants and
port security and engineering staff, funding was discontinued and the
project was suddenly aborted. The TSA I Gate Access project, even when
completed, will not be used at 100 percent capacity. The project's
scope of work included the use of port identification credentials or
the Transportation Worker Identification Card (TWIC) which was
projected to be in use fully at ports across the nation by 2004. The
Port of New Orleans was denied funding for a port credential system in
the last funding round because it was ``in line to receive a TWIC
system.'' There are currently 34 prototype TWIC test sites throughout
the country. The Port of New Orleans, however, is apparently in the
wrong line, because it is no closer to getting a TWIC system today than
we were then. What is the message here?
The COPS Hiring Grant provides funding for three (3) of the six (6)
police officer positions originally requested. All three positions have
been filled. A portion of their salaries and benefits will be paid by
the grant for three years. The Harbor Police Department currently has
one captain, one corporal and three officers permanently assigned to
Homeland Security positions.
The Port of New Orleans has received $8 million in federal grant
awards, and like all port authorities who have been fortunate enough to
receive awards, we are grateful. However, the Port finds, like all
other U. S. Port authorities, that funding amounts are not sufficient
to address the completion of remaining enhancements to be made. In
most, if not all cases, the funding award does not pay for 100 percent
of the finished projects. Ports must still bear the cost of mandatory
``matching'' amounts, internal labor and management cost and project
overruns not covered by the award. The financial burden of these costs
cannot be ignored. Last year the Port of New Orleans paid more than
$1.5 million dollars to supplement and initiate security projects. This
was over and above the Port Safety and Security Division's operating
budget of $5.5 million and a capital equipment budget of $275,000.
The Port applied for more than $10 million in security funding in
TSA rounds III and IV. No awards were received from either of these
last two initiatives. Of the $46 million in grant awards from TSA-IV,
more than $4.5 million were awarded to private entities. It is
extremely disconcerting and counterproductive for the government to
supplement private industry from the same funding source the public
ports depend upon prior to ensuring that each and every U.S. port
authority has received adequate funding. This practice diminishes the
importance of port security at every level and gives the appearance
that ports have adequately addressed their vulnerabilities. Since TSA-
IV, the Port has identified more than $300,000 of additional fencing
requirements at its terminals, again to meet with MTSA regulations. The
Vulnerability Assessments prepared in 2001 needs to be revised, and
annual security audits, another MTSA requirement needs to be
commissioned. These projects are currently scheduled to be paid for
with port operating and capital improvement funds. As a result, pending
projects to improve commercial operations will need to be postponed or
cancelled. This, of course, makes the security projects and
requirements even more costly.
While it is true that the port industry, specifically, vessel
operations was not the target of or the instrumentality used in the
recent terrorist attacks, the impact of terrorism on the port industry
could conceivably be greater. The new ``Fantasy'' line cruise vessels
are capable of carrying more than 3,000 passengers. The number of lives
lost during one vessel incident or an act of bio-terrorism would be
catastrophic. According to U. S. Coast Guard estimates, a strategically
sunken cargo vessel, at or near the mouth of the Mississippi River
would close the river for over a year. Such an event would have a
global cataclysmic impact on every aspect of life as we know it today.
Because the cruise industry, unlike the airline industry, is driven by
leisurely discretionary travel, an atmosphere of fear created by an
actual or threatened terrorist attack would devastate that burgeoning
industry. The presence of the cruise industry at Port of New Orleans
and ports worldwide reflects not only the millions of dollars already
invested, but millions of anticipated revenues as well. Consequently,
no port can afford to have its cruise business crippled or eliminated.
The American Association of Port Authorties (AAPA), therefore,
expressed grave concern about the elimination of the Department of
Homeland Security's Port Security Grant Program. Including the port
security infrastructure and programmatic issues of port security among
those of other transportation entities such as trains, trucks, and
other means of private and public conveyance, will ensure a decrease in
the funding and attention being sought by ports. A February 2005 report
by the AAPA disclosed that the U.S. port industry is projected to
double its current ``two billion ton of cargo'' throughput over the
next 15 years. If ports are expected to remain competitive, the time to
prepare is now. Ports should be using funds for capital improvements
and growth initiatives and not be force to expend limited funds on
security enhancements at existing facilities.
The Port of New Orleans has long recognized the need and importance
of safety and security at its facilities. It is one of the few U.S.
ports that has its own sworn and dedicated Harbor Police Departments.
To further supplement its safety force, the Port of New Orleans
commissioned the design and purchase of an emergency response vessel,
the General Roy S. Kelley, a prototype firefighting vessel that also
accommodates port protocol tours. This vessel is now being used to
perform under wharf inspections and daily river patrols to maintain and
monitor waterside restricted area locations at vessels berthed at port
facilities. This vessel was not designed to be used at that level of
activity, and the added duties are taking a toll on this ten-year-old
vessel. Last year the Port spent more than $50,0000 on unbudgeted
repair costs, and is preparing to spend more than $80,000 in additional
repairs this fiscal year--all without receiving any supplementary
funds. This vessel is routinely dispatched to assist the U.S. Coast
Guard waterside emergencies because there are no other assets in the
river that can respond in a timely manner. It takes the Coast Guard
over one hour to get one of its vessels in the river and approximately
30 minutes before a helicopter can respond. The Port has requested a
patrol vessel(s) capable of withstanding the currents of the
Mississippi River in every TSA round of funding. Every request has been
denied. The General Kelley's crew and others like it should be
recognized for the services they provide. Ports need funding assistance
to purchase vessels, equipment and to defray heightened maintenance and
operating costs due to increased use for security functions.
The Harbor Police Department's mission, while once narrowly focused
on the maritime industry and port community, has always included
assisting federal, state and local law enforcement agencies. That focus
has been greatly expanded due to the trend toward greater
interoperability between law enforcement agencies in many areas
including: communications, weaponry, intelligence, and weapons of mass
destruction (WMD) and bio-terrorism readiness. The technological
equipment, supplies, weapons, training and additional staffing all
create funding concerns that must be addressed. Training, drills, and
exercises are costly to conduct. MTSA regulations require that one (1)
full scale exercise and four (4) drills be conducted annually. The
planning, equipment and personnel (overtime) requirements are
significant, especially since other safety exercises related to port
operations are still needed. The call for interoperability has alerted
many responding agencies (62nd WMD CST, ATF, NOPD/SWAT, etc.) to the
fact that they know very little about the maritime community,
particularly the Mississippi River and the Industrial Canal. Many of
these agencies have no experience boarding or searching a cargo or
passenger vessel. The Port Safety and Security Division is often called
upon to host, coordinate and participate in training for these
agencies. In no instance has the Port been financially supplemented for
these endeavors, yet there are costs associated with each request. An
internal tabletop exercise limited to port employees, private security,
and U.S. Coast Guard observers will cost approximately $2000.00 in
administration, supplies, accommodations, and participant salaries. A
full scale exercise involving outside responding agencies, industry and
port staff could triple in cost.
Finally, domestic terrorism such as the World Trade Center
incidents and the Oklahoma Federal Building bombing prove that being
reactive to terrorism, from any source, comes at an immeasurable cost -
loss of lives. Government must respond to the funding needs identified
by port authorities commensurate with that if the nation's alert
level--Elevated--Yellow ``Significant Threat of Terrorist Activity'' as
though it is real and not merely an innocuous memorial of a one-time
terrorist incident in our nation's past. The only way to do that is to
create and fund proactive prevention and response initiatives. To do
less will create frustration among law enforcement agencies, a
continued vulnerability of critical assets, and perhaps worst of all, a
false sense of security or a renewed atmosphere of complacency among
the people. All of which, would contribute to another opportunity for
history to repeat itself--countless Americans dead, and add yet another
date to live in infamy.
Chairman Cox. Our final witness is Dr. McGowan.
STATEMENT OF DEIRDRE McGOWAN, Ph.D., EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR, INLAND
RIVERS PORTS AND TERMINALS, INC.
Ms. McGowan. Thank you, and it is an honor to be here.
I would like to introduce the current Acting Regional
Director of the Central Region of the Maritime Administration,
James Murphy and Avery Rollins, without whom none of what I am
about to talk about would have been possible.
I have 5 minutes of speaking time. There are some handouts
that are available for all of you, so pleaseSec.
I would like to directly go to the Recent Inspector General
Audits of Port Security Grant Programs. There is reason to
suspect that some, repeat some, grant awards were based on
politics rather than risk. If not true, the impression is
understandable. DOT/Maritime Administration and the Coast Guard
worked in the field to identify ports of greatest concern and
concurrent corrective action.
As TSA made the grant awards, only 4 percent of the total
dollars went to the 300 plus inland ports, which handle 1.3
billion ton miles of the Nation's waterborne cargo, with 72
percent of that cargo traveling on the tributaries of the
Mississippi River. Those that scoff at the risk vulnerability
relationship of an inland port should remember that Oklahoma
City was never identified as a prime terrorist target. The
clusters of refineries and chemical plants along our inland
rivers are tempting targets indeed. We know it, and Al-Qaeda
knows it.
Container Tracking. Important, of course, and not to be
minimized, but let's remember that the USS Cole was not
attacked by a container.
A more likely scenario is a small suicide craft determined
to block, for example, the Beaumont Ship Channel--narrow,
vulnerable, potentially toxic and the fourth busiest port in
the United States. The locks are a weak link in our
transportation chain, too, and any failure could precipitate
economic chaos and critical shortages; and there are other such
vulnerable locations throughout the system. Such tempting
targets, and not one is a container.
Proof of Concept. In the beginning of the Port Security
Grant program, there was a small window opened to creative,
imaginative solutions which could be tested and, if successful,
universally replicated. That door was slammed shut. No public
reason given.
Limited funding demands that new ideas be considered and
tested. IRPT received such a grant and was able to provide
threat analyses and employee education at 59 ports and
terminals along the inland river system that handled cargoes of
concern at less than $10,000 each. What a bang for the buck.
Focus on Technology. Technology is only part of the answer
but has been extolled by some as the solution to all of our
security problems but can also be outdated even before
installation is complete. There has been a surge of so-called
experts willing to provide technical answers for a price, the
price often beyond the reach of smaller ports handling
difficult cargoes. More emphasis needs to be put on ``people
aspects,'' training eyes and ears. Our own people are our
greatest resource.
Stakeholder Involvement. Security solutions have often been
imposed from the top down, often with mandates. We need more
public/private cooperative partnerships like the WRAMS, Western
Rivers Area Marine Security Committee. It is working in
partnership that will strengthen out country from the water up.
Since 9/11, there seems to have been more cooperation and
sharing of information among the various Federal agencies and
with the private sector. Supporting that continued cooperation
should be a priority.
Recovery Efforts. There has been little public attention
paid to port recovery, whether from terrorism, accident or
nature. The Maritime Administration has a proven track record
from efforts in Honduras and Nicaragua following the
devastation from Hurricane Mitch. I say we better do it now
before we are jammed up.
I thank you for this opportunity to testify.
[The statement of Ms. McGowan follows:]
Prepared Statement of Deirdre McGowan
Security is a process--not an end. I am honored to speak on
security issues for the inland river system, an integral part of our
country's economy. I have chosen to write in the first person and to
speak from my own port security experience. We were already presenting
seminars on port security as early as January 2000 and by ``we'' I mean
a cooperative effort with participation from the U.S. Coast Guard, the
USDOT Maritime Administration with additional cooperation from the FBI
and representatives from the Justice Department (Alcohol, Tobacco and
Firearms). I have attempted to make six points in my verbal remarks.
Here I present an expansion of those observations.
(1)RECENT INSPECTOR GENERAL AUDITS OF PORT SECURITY GRANTS:
There is reason to suspect that some, repeat some, grant awards
were based on politics rather than risk. If not true, the
impression is understandable. DOT/Maritime Administration and
the Coast Guard worked in the field to identify ports of
greatest concern and concurrent corrective action. As TSA made
the grant awards, only 4 percent of the total dollars went to
the 300 + inland ports, which handle 1.3 billion ton miles of
the nation's waterborne cargo with 72 percent of that cargo
traveling on the tributaries of the Mississippi River. Those
that scoff at the risk/vulnerability relationship of an inland
port should remember that Oklahoma City was never identified as
a prime terrorist target. The clusters of refineries and
chemical plants along our inland rivers are tempting targets
indeed. We know it and Al-Quaida knows it.
The audit actually reported, ``the program has not yet achieved its
intended results in the form of actual improvements in port security.''
Ninety-five percent of all international commerce enters the United
States through the 350 ports but 80 percent moves through only 10
ports. That makes those ten particularly attractive targets--damage
could cause many deaths, injuries and seriously disrupt the flow of
goods and by extension our entire economy. The inspector general found
that the Department of Homeland Security appeared to be intentionally
distributing the money as widely as possible -hence the term ``pork
security''. An analysis will reveal a need for broad assistance to many
ports, large and small and further that a fundamental doctrine of anti-
terrorism is hardened targets invite strikes against more vulnerable
one.
For example, the audit criticized grants awarded to St. Croix (were
they aware that as many as 80,000 passengers a week ply the Virgin
Islands? Protecting people is a priority too). They criticized an award
to Everett, Mass.--home to one of the country's most important
liquefied natural gas facilities--and near a major metropolitan area
besides. Furthermore, any weapon of mass destruction smuggled in
through a small port could as easily paralyze U.S. economic activity as
one brought into a large port.
(Reference: New York Times February 20, 2005 and Port Security News
Service, March 3,2005)
(2) CONTAINER TRACKING: Important of course and not to be
minimized. But let's remember that the USS Cole was not
attacked by a container! A more likely scenario is a small
suicide craft determined to block, for example, the Beaumont
4th busiest port in Ship Channel--narrow, vulnerable,
potentially toxic, and the the United States. The locks are a
weak link in our transportation chain, too, and any failure
could precipitate economic chaos and critical shortages--and
there are other such vulnerable locations throughout the
system. Such tempting targets--and not one is in a container.
The fourth leading port in terms of tonnage in 2002, (with 85.9
million short tons of foreign and domestic shipments), is rarely
recognized Beaumont, Texas, also the home of one of our National
Defense Reserve Fleets, miles of pipelines and is one of the top
military deployment ports. The narrow channel's vulnerability is
analogous to that of a BB stuck in the sand of an hourglass--nothing
can get through until it is un-jammed. And then there are the locks
above St. Louis and along the navigable tributaries. A lock shut-down,
(whether by knowledgeable terrorists, accident or lock failure)
jeopardizes our grain exports, fuel shipments, power plant supplies and
other critical components of the economy. Attempts to direct marine
freight to other modes will fail because of congestion. Few recognize
that Huntington, West Virginia, an inland port on the Ohio, handles 80
million short tons a year--much of it in petroleum and coal. Let's
don't deny that shutting off power supplies, petroleum products and our
entire economy is as simple as a well-placed suicide boat on a mission
or even underwater infiltration and concurrent detonation. We still
don't know how to differentiate that one lethal craft from the everyday
flotilla of pleasure boats plying every river in this country. The
enormity of our responsibility for port security extends from our
coasts and up every navigable river throughout the system.
There are surely many dedicated capable professionals working to
solve the problems associated with multiple container screenings at
ports already backlogged. Supply chain safety has to be an essential
element of our homeland security plan but is beyond the scope and
experience of IRPT.
(Reference: The U.S. Waterway System--Transportation Facts,
Navigation Data Center, U.S. Army Corps of Engineers)
(3) PROOF OF CONCEPT: In the beginning of the Port Security
Grant program, there was a small window opened to creative,
imaginative solutions--which could be tested and, if
successful, universally replicated--that door was slammed shut
-no public reason given. Limited funding demands that new ideas
be considered and tested. IRPT received such a grant and was
able to provide threat analyses and employee education at
fifty-nine ports and terminals along the inland river system
that handled cargoes of concern at less than $10,000 each. What
a bang for the buck!
IRPT was able to complete threat assessments at 59 ports and
terminals within a one year time frame. They were selected by the
various USCG Captains of the Port as warranting special attention
because they handled cargoes of concern. A summary of our findings,
with appendices, is made a part of this report to the House Homeland
Security Committee. The individual findings were provided to each port/
terminal with copies forwarded to the Maritime Administration, USCG and
the Transportation Security Administration. No, not all of the 59 were
members of our association--our criteria were USCG identified ports/
terminals.
None of this public service would have been possible had it not
been for the Proof of Concept provision in Round I of the Port Security
Grant Program. When this provision was severed without public
explanation, then small, replicable and universally applicable
solutions were also severed and the grant money was seemingly tied to
hardware at specific ports--and in some cases to private for-profit
property contiguous to a river or port. Yes, IRPT applied again with
ideas that could have solved problems shared by many ports
(communications interoperability, a port recovery plan, additional
threat assessments, etc.) but was rejected since there was no longer a
proof-of-concept provision and IRPT, of course, was not a port per se.
It may have been that the need for ``hardware'' should have had
priority, but in these later stages the need for innovation seems
apparent.
(4)FOCUS ON TECHNOLOGY: Technology is only part of the answer--but
has been extolled by some as the solution to all of our security
problems--but can also be outdated even before installation is
complete. There has been a surge of so-called experts willing to
provide technical answers for a price--the price often beyond the reach
of smaller ports handling difficult cargoes. More emphasis needs to be
put on ``people aspects''--training eyes and ears. Our own people are
our greatest resource.
I've been to meetings and heard presentations on all sorts of new
technologies--surveillance, bio-identification, container tracking and
more. But while effective and necessary, these are also expensive and
beyond the reach of many of the smaller ports-even though they may
handle very hazardous cargo. There seems to be little public discussion
paid to technology to protect the ports from waterside infiltration.
Hopefully, technology is in the developmental stage for this particular
area of vulnerability.
The point is that the training of our waterside hourly employees
seems to have been somewhat overlooked. Suspicious activity is now
reported to the Coast Guard and that reportingisappreciated--but
requires many man hours to investigate. Part of the problem has to be
that some of those reporting ``suspicious activity'' have not been
trained in the identification of anomalies and are unable to
differentiate the real threat from the phantom threat. Whether training
a high school drop-out receptionist to deal with a bomb threat to the
fork-lift operator reporting a person of interest, our people are our
eyes and ears, but their observation skills may need honing. How many
times has each of us been the victim of an expensive technological
glitch? Our workers need education on terrorism awareness and are
hungry for it, (see their comments incorporated into the final ITPT
report attached).
(5) STAKEHOLDER INVOLVEMENT: Security ``solutions'' have often
been imposed from the top down, often with mandates. We need
more public/private cooperative partnerships like the WRAMS
(Western Rivers Area Marine Security). It is working in
partnership that will strengthen our country from the water up.
Since 9/11 there seems to have been more cooperation and
sharing of information among the various federal agencies and
with the private sector. Supporting that continued cooperation
should be a priority.
Yes, the WRAMS is an excellent start. It is interesting and
rewarding to participate in the fluctuating dynamics of discussion from
totally different perspectives. I am convinced the recommendations
evolving from WRAMS are stronger and more effective than any of the
participants could generate alone. Even more public / private
partnerships should be encouraged--perhaps along the lines of our
harbor-safety committees.
At the Transportation Research Board Marine Technology Committee
Conference last November there were presentations made on cutting edge
technologies--all very impressive and all out of reach. Both the
stakeholder panel and audience response, (the speaker left before
hearing the stakeholder response or answering any questions), was a
litany of low-tech requests for assistance--such as a call-in number
for guidance since templates really serve no purpose in developing
vessel and security plans. They wanted to understand the relationships
among risk, vulnerability and threat-and wanted that understanding
related to the requirements of their own security plans. Some of the
ports have seemed definitely doomed to overkill.
(6) RECOVERY EFFORTS: There has been little public attention paid
to port recovery--whether from terrorism, accident or nature. The
Maritime Administration has a proven track record from efforts in
Honduras and Nicaragua following the devastation from Hurricane Mitch--
couldn't we tap into that expertise and develop functional recovery
plans?
I have been told that the hesitancy in developing port recovery
plans is tied to a public relations concern that there would be a panic
reaction to ``preparing for the worst''. Maybe so. Nevertheless, we saw
what happens to freight movement and passenger congestion when an
accident blocked traffic at the Port of New Orleans for a few days--and
that disruption was minimal with no infrastructure damage. I think we
need to confront the possibility of port shutdown due to terrorism or
nature. Various governmental agencies have their own plans in place but
I am unaware of a comprehensive, multi-jurisdictional, multi-agency
cooperative plan.
When Hurricane Mitch devastated Honduras and Nicaragua, the
Maritime Administration, National Oceanic and Atmospheric
Administration, the US Army Corps of Engineers, FEMA and other federal
agencies worked together to re-develop the ports. They learned many
lessons that could be applied, extrapolated and enhanced into recovery
plans for our ports. Advances in technology could provide a multi-
layered set of action plans covering almost every contingency.
In summary, I believe there needs to be less rigidity in the
application of the Port Security Grant Program--and the recommendations
of the USCG/MARAD teams need to be incorporated into any such award. We
have to continue exploring technological options and at the same time
we need to better use our people on site. We can do so by listening,
respecting and educating. The encouragement of more public/private
partnerships (like WRAMS) striving to develop individual solutions as
opposed to imposed mandates could cut the expenses for the Department
of Homeland Security, the taxpayers and the ports themselves. All of us
need to face reality and develop recovery plans together.
Final Report for:
Inland Rivers, Ports and Terminals, Inc.--Preliminary Port Facility
Assessments per Requirement of DTMAl G02028
Prepared by: Deirdre McGowan, Ph.D., Executive Director, IRPT
www.irpt.net / adminrtVirpt.net
Port Security Grants, Round 1, Proof of Concept: June 17, 2002-
September 30, 2003
REPORT OVERVIEW
Introduction
Project Objectives
Process
Project Results
General Observations
Implications for Port Security
Further Actions
Appendices
INTRODUCTION
The 303 inland river ports and 1,800 shallow draft terminals are of
national economic and strategic importance, representing $1.5 trillion
in cargo and 13 million jobs that generate $500 billion in personal
income. They move numerous products and military materiel vital to U.S.
economic interests.
Inland Rivers, Ports and Terminals, Inc., has been the industry's
professional association since 1974. The Board of Directors and general
membership voted to allow IRPT to negotiate and serve as fiscal agent
for this grant. The actual security assessments and employee education
presentations were subcontracted by IRPT.
PROJECT OBJECTIVES
Proof of Concept
Security risk assessments were to be completed on selected inland
port infrastructure systems including personnel training, physical and
technical analysis and operational considerations.
Complete risk assessments at inland river
ports and terminals that handle cargoes of concern
Identify security risks unique to each port
Determine the effectiveness of the security
protection system currently in place at each port
Initiate employee training in identification
and reporting of observed anomalies
Complete modified generic port fault tree for
all ports assessed
Identify possible corrective actions for each
port assessed
Project Objectives--Success
Per the commitments made in the grant application, the assessment and
training approaches developed and applied by Inland Rivers, Ports and
Terminals, Inc., are replicable, quantified, standardized, accountable,
traceable, consistent in terminology, and defensible.
Risk assessments were completed at 59 inland
river ports and terminals that were identified and
prioritized by USCG as handling cargoes of concern.
They are listed in Appendix A with their completion
dates.
Blind evaluations by facilities managers of
the process were returned to the IRPT offices and a
collation of those ratings has been made a part of this
report as Appendix B.
A list of all of the ``positives'' uncovered
at the various facilities has been made a part of this
report as Appendix C.-A list of all of the
``negatives'' uncovered at the various facilities has
been made a part of this report as Appendix D.
Employee training was implemented with 212
employees attending, with course evaluations completed
by most of them. A summary of their evaluations is
enclosed as Appendix E.
Security recommendations for each port were
developed and prioritized.
PROCESS
Pre-Assessment
This was a new endeavor and had to meet all commitments made in the
proposal, comply with procurement requirements, incorporate the input
from the IRPT officers and provide guidance and insight to the
facilities assessed. Concurrently it had to be flexible to incorporate
any agreed upon changes requested by the granting agencies or by IRPT.
Advertised nationally for Statements of
Interest and Qualifications.
Developed Request for Proposals.
Forwarded Request for Proposals to all who had
responded to request for statement of I & Q and all
others who requested it (total 14).
Preliminary screening undertaken utilizing
responsiveness to request and qualifications of
principals as criteria.
Responses reviewed by IRPT Executive Committee
and Chairman, IRPT Security Committee.
Contract award ranking determined at IRPT
Board meeting September 4, 2003.
Contractor references verified.
Contract awarded and subsequently negotiated.
Biographical information on the consultants is included
as Appendix F.
Assessment procedures and employee curriculum
developed.
System test scheduled for October 16, 2003 at
Port Bienville, MS.
Invitations to observe/participate/critique
initial assessment issued to USCG, USACOE, MARAD.
Preliminary assessment undertaken and systems
for management feedback and training evaluations
refined.
USCG Captains of the Ports contacted through
District 8 Headquarters to request their selection of
ports to be prioritized for assessments.
Scheduling port assessments begun and
continued through June, 2003.
Initial scheduling packets forwarded to each
port director to confirm verbal scheduling
commitments--packets included an overview of the grant
specifications, biographical information on the
consultants, and a copy of the USCG Facility Security
Planning Guide for their initial use.
Individual visits made to each identified
facility to review the responses to the Facility Guide
and follow through with the assessment process.
Assessments implemented beginning December 10,
2002.
Problems Identified
During the course of the project, numerous problems surfaced. Guidance
was requested from MARAD and/or USCG. Problem statements were forwarded
to them with requests for suggestions or direction.
Scheduling the assessments was extremely
difficult and took much longer than anticipated.
The Inland River Guide and the Journal of
Waterborne Commerce Statistics were used to assist in
the identification of facilities handling cargoes of
concern. Some of that information was dated or
erroneous.
Many national companies would not participate
because of their perceived exposure to subsequent
litigation.
Some employees were not available for training
for various reasons and the training was requested on
video.
There was a nebulous definition of what
constituted a public port/terminal.
USCG requested that several Texas ports be
assessed that did not meet the criteria for ``inland''
port but are considered as part of the inland water
transportation corridor.
Access to the USCG security assessment format
identified as PISRAT 2.0 was lacking.
In some instances, terminals handling CDCs
(Certain Dangerous Cargoes) were unwilling to provide
details regarding product amounts handled or stored,
citing ``proprietary information.''
Resolutions Incorporated
A combination of email, telephone responses and personal contact
yielded constructive solutions to many of the problems identified which
impacted completion of the project.
Scheduling: Began scheduling process sixty
days out and adjusted time-spent estimates per port/
terminal accordingly.
Data: Recognized that some cargo data was
erroneous. As one response replied, ``the only
consolation has been, is, and will be, that some data
are better than none.''
Declination: Proceeded without including any
facility that declined assessment. One response to IRPT
stated, ``Those who did not choose to participate in
Round I will want to get in later.''
Video Training: Generated bids to produce a
training video but had no suitable budget category in
the grant for implementation.
Public Port: Agreed upon an operational
definition that a private terminal is closed to common
carriage and is so located that a terrorist incident
would not affect the public at large. The exception to
that definition would be if a port or terminal was such
that its disruption would have an adverse effect upon
the commerce of the United States.
IRPT assessed the additional quasi-bluewater
ports as requested by the Captains of the Ports.
PISRA T 2.0: Access was requested to enable
those undertaking the IRPT threat assessment process to
adjust the reporting format as necessary to comply with
the specifications of NVIC 11-02. After several
discussions, IRPT operated from the assumption that the
reporting format did comply with those requirements and
proceeded accordingly.
PROJECT RESULTS
At the conclusion of the project, the identified inland river ports had
assessments completed and available employees had been trained in
various aspects of terrorism recognition and intervention.
Effectiveness of the security protection system currently in place and
recommendations for improvement were presented at management de-
briefings at the conclusion of each visit. Written reports for the
facility directors followed shortly thereafter.
Summaries of vulnerabilities and strengths are
included in the appendices attached.
Printed and CD-ROM reports for each port/
terminal were forwarded to MARAD throughout the year
with copies provided for distribution to USCG and TSA.
Photographs of each port/terminal indicating
areas of concern were included in the CD-ROM
transmittals.
Printed copies of each report, with pictures,
were provided to MARAD with a copy retained by IRPT.
Employees who participated in the training
provided comments such as ``very good and timely
information'' and ``trainers very knowledgeable of the
subject.'' Additional comments are a part of Appendix
E.
A CD-ROM of the training offered to port and
terminal employees has been made a part of this report.
The assessments were of great assistance to
the facilities since they were deemed to provide what
was necessary to comply with NVIC 11-02.
The assessments often provided the basis for
subsequent security enhancement requests from either
TSA or individual port commissions.
PorT directors and terminal managers who
forwarded their evaluations of the process were
universally positive, as seen in Appendix B.
Copies of the assessment reports were
forwarded to each facility director via certified mail,
return receipt requested.
Law enforcement personnel and facility
security officers attending the training sessions
requested copies of the PowerPoint presentation
``Terrorism Awareness``for use in their own training.
GENERAL OBSERVATIONS:
In completing the threat assessments and questioning/listening to staff
and employees at the various ports, several factors appeared to be
almost universally applicable.
Generally speaking there is a lack of security
awareness even at the facilities handling cargoes of
concern.
Facility directors were aware they needed
security improvement and they were interested in making
their facilities more secure but lacked knowledge of
security issues and techniques.
Facility directors generally had no concept of
what makes a facility secure.
There was little general awareness of NVIC
requirements regarding facility operation even if the
facility was handling dangerous cargo.
There are many small ports in the inland river
system that need attention but can't afford to
implement security measures.
IMPLICATIONS FOR PORT SECURITY
The results of the IRPT Threat Assessment and Employee Education
Project suggest some of the following implications:
There needs to be a standardized plan and
approach to address inconsistencies.
There need to be standard definitions applied
universally.
There needs to be a better identification and
tracking system for cargoes of concern.
The river system needs to be viewed as a
single entity rather than a series of discrete units.
Port security should be developed on a
regional basis.
FURTHER ACTIONS
Standardize the application of U.S. Coast Guard regulations for similar
facilities which handle CDCs (Certain Dangerous Cargoes), such as those
for operating a facility that handles ammonium nitrate fertilizer.
Example: One facility had open bays of ammonium nitrate
(no locked doors); their front end loaders were parked
nearby and accessible to anyone; there was no perimeter
fence around the facility; the road leading to the
facility was essentially a public road with no
restriction to public access; there were no alarm
systems and the area was poorly lit. The facility
operator advised that the USCG inspected them on a
yearly basis. A second facility of similar size and
location that handled ammonium nitrate was directed by
the USCG to have a 24/7 presence at the facility. The
facility hired additional staff to meet USCG
requirements. The facility had closed and locked doors
at the storage area, there was a perimeter fence around
the facility and it was well lit.
Urea is a fertilizer found in many terminals serving the needs of the
agricultural industry and those storage areas should be included in
subsequent threat assessments.
Although not as easy to use as ammonium nitrate in
the construction of a bomb, urea can be used in
constructing a powerful explosive compound. The main
explosive charge at the World Trade Center bombing of
February 1993 was an improvised explosive device
utilizing a urea base. The resulting blast produced a
crater 150 feet in diameter and five floors deep.
Section 841(d) of the United States Code (U.S.c.) and
27 CFR 55.23 refer to urea as an explosive material.
Certified courses of study on port security should
be developed for facility directors and managers and
required as part of continuing education.
The balance of the smaller inland ports should be
assessed and guidance provided to the directors for
increased security enhancement.
A standard protocol should be developed for
certification of security assessments performed in the
private sector to ensure that they meet U.S. Coast
Guard specifications.
APPENDIX A--PORTS & TERMINALS ASSESSED
Port Terminals Assessment Date
Alabama
Florence--Lauderdale Tennessee Southern Apr 23-24, 2003
County Port Authority Railroad, American
James Lowe--Exec. Dir. Metal Chemical Corp.,
PP. O. Box 1169 Muscles Shoals Marine
Florence, AL 35631 Service, Inc., F&L
Sand & Gravel (Rudolph
Marine & Salvage
L.L.C.), Roberson
Scrap Works,
Lauderdale (Alabama)
Farmers Coop, Royster
Clark
Arkansas
Port of Little Rock
Paul Latture--Exec. Dir.
7500 Lindsey Road
Little Rock, AR 72206
Logistics Services, Feb 5-7, 2003
Yellow Bend Port Authority
Kenny Gober--Exec.Dir.
P. O. Drawer 725
McGehee, AR 71654
Oakley Port of Yellow Feb 2, 2003
Miller's Bluff Port
Cross Oil Terminal
Charles Clark-Manager
484 East 6th St.
Smackover, AR 71762
Cross Oil Terminal Feb 3-4, 2003
Louisiana ....................... .................
Alexandria Regional Port
John Marzullo--Exec. Dir.
P. O. Box 628
Alexandria, LA 71303
Terral River Services Jan 15-16, 2003
Port of Shreveport--
Bossier
John W. Holt--Exec. Dir.
P. O. Box 52071
Shreveport, LA 71135
Oakley Louisiana, Inc., Jan 12-15, 2003
APPENDIX A--PORTS & TERMINALS ASSESSED--Continued
Port Terminals Assessment Date
Mississippi
Port of Aberdeen
PerryLucas--Port Dir.
125 West Commerce
Aberdeen, MS 39730
Tom Soya Grain Company, Apr 21-22, 2003
Greenville Port Commission
Harold Burdine--Port Dir.
P. O. Box 446
Greenville, MS 38701
Greenville Port May 27-28, 2003
Hancock County Harbor
& Port Commission
Hal Walters--Port Dir.
P. O. Box 2267
Bay St. Louis, MS 39521
Linea Peninsular, Oct 15-16, 2002
Natchez--Adams
County Port Commission
Pat Murphy--Port Dir.
P. O. Box 925
Natchez, MS 39121
Natchez Port Terminal Jan 7-8, 2003
Warren County
Port Commission
Jimmy Heidel--Port Dir.
P. O. Box 709
Vicksburg, MS 39181
Kinder Morgan Nov 18-20, 2003
Yazoo County
Port Authority
Gerald P. Fraiser--Port Dir.
P. O. Box 172
Yazoo City, MS 39194
MissChem Nitrogen Jan 6-7, 2003
Missouri
Howard/Cooper County
Regional Port Authority
Paul Davis-Operator
609 Main Street
Boonville, MO 65233
Interstate Marine Apr 10-11, 2003
Kansas City Port Authority
(Midwest Terminal)
DavidGriffin--VicePresident
For Operations
1851Woodswether Rd
Kansas City, MO 64105
Midwest Terminal Apr 7-8, 2003
New Madrid County
Port Authority
Timmie Lynn Hunter--
Exec. Dir.
435 Main Street
New Madrid, MO 63869
St. Judel/New Madrid, June 1-2, 2003
Pemiscot County
Port Authority
David Madison--Exec. Dir.
619 Ward Avenue
Caruthersville, MO 63830
Trinity Marine Products June 3-5, 2003
APPENDIX A--PORTS & TERMINALS ASSESSED--Continued
Port Terminals Assessment Date
Missouri
Southeast Missouri
Regional
Port Authority
Dan Overby--Director
2110 Main Street
Scott City, MO 63780
Girardeau Stevedores May29--June2 2003
Oklahoma
Muskogee City--County
Port Authority
Scott Robinson--Dir.
4901 Harold Scoggins Dr.
Muskogee, OK 74403
Muskogee City Water Feb 20-22, 2003
Tulsa Port of Catoosa
Dick Voth--Director
5350 Cimarron Road
Catoosa, OK 74015
Brenntag Southwest, Feb 17-20, 2003
Pennsylvania
Pittsburgh Port Comm.
James McCarville--Ex. Dir.
425 Sixth Avenue
Suite 2990
Pittsburgh, PA 15219
Neville Chemical Dec 9-18, 2003
Tennessee
Port of Chattanooga
(J I T Terminal)
John Bennett--Manager
P. O. Box 4800
530 Manufacturers Road
Chattanooga, TN 37405
J I T Terminal May 7-8, 2003
Texas
Port of Brownsville
Raul B. Besteiro--Dir.
1000 Foust Road
Brownsville, TX 78521
Austin Star Detonator, Jan 29-31, 2003
Port Isabel--San Benito
Navigation District
Robert Cornelison--Dir.
250 Industrial Drive
Port Isabel, TX 78578
Port Isabel Mar 24-25, 2003
Victoria County
Navigation District
Howard Hawthorne--Exec. Dir
P. O. Box 2760
Victoria, TX 77902
Equalizer,Inc Jan 28-29, 2003
APPENDIX B--FACILITY MANAGEMENT EVALUATIONS
The form for the Port Management Evaluation of Threat Assessment and
Employee Training is handed to port management by the consultants to be
forwarded directly to IRPT. Thus anonymity is protected.
14 Total Returns
(1) Did the persons conducting the Threat Assessment and
Employee Training act in a professional manner while conducting
the assessment?
Yes 14
Comments:
Very professional.
Very much so.
Both men did an excellent job. We had nine people attend the training
and they were very pleased with the information provided.
On time. Required expertise. Good communication skills. Took time to
explain. Gave detailed outbriefing.
Very knowledgeable and conducted themselves in a very professional
manner.
(2) Were they friendly and courteous to port and facility
employees?
Yes 14
They put everyone at ease.
Yes and to neighboring companies visited as part of the assessment.
They put everyone at ease.
(3) Were they on time for appointments and meetings?
Yes 14
They were early due to air travel, no problem.
Yes, both days. Kept me advised.
Never a problem.
Early due to air travel, no problem.
(4) Did they answer your questions on port and facility to your
satisfaction?
Yes 14
They provided some very valuable insight to the problem at hand.
Very Good information.
They answered the questions to my satisfaction.
Questions were encouraged and answered.
Very knowledgeable.
They were informative and offered good suggestions.
All questions were answered.
(5) Other comments
This was a long trip with poor connections from Mississippi.
I greatly appreciated the help.
Excellent and professional in all aspects.
They did a wonderful job on the assessment as well as the training
session.
Both possess excellent communication skills. Our crew members were
attentive and interested throughout the training session.
They gave me all the information I requested and agreed to send
additional information.
I believe they are doing an excellent job for IRPT.
I do not understand why type and amount of product flowing through the
port are not factors included/considered as a part of vulnerability/
threat assessment.
Very informative and worthwhile.
We were very pleased with the professionalism. The training and
assessments provided by them will be of value in completing our port
security plan.
We appreciate IRPT selecting our facility to receive the benefit of
this service.
Excellent and professional in all aspects.
Very helpful in guiding us in the right direction on our security
needs.
We had already made some assessments on our own and they agreed with
our comments and expanded in some areas where we were lacking.
They also were very cooperative with our tenants and answered all
questions posed to them.
Very good information. They answered the questions to my satisfaction.
Some of the information provided is now being used as part of our
security procedures.
APPENDIX C--POSITIVE FINDINGS
Emergency Preparedness
The Port has established a Port Security Committee,
which will complete Port Security Plan security enhancements.
The Port has an excellent emergency communications
system to notify and update tenants of an emergency in the
Port.
Liaison with community groups, law enforcement and
public safety offices are excellent.
The U. S. Coast Guard required Port and Facility
Security Plans were discussed and the initial draft of the
Port's Security was reviewed with management during the
assessment.
The Port has in place Emergency Response Plans
including Threatening Communications (Bomb Threats), Workplace
Violence and Criminal Incident Response Plans.
Appendix C--Continued
Physical Security & Access Control
Terminal's good housekeeping practices demonstrate
attention to the facility and it provides a passive security
deterrent.
Vehicle access to the facility is controlled by card
access.
The facility has an excellent perimeter fence.
The truck loading rack is located within the fenced
secure area.
The truck rack is operated by the same card access
system used at Red River Terminal.
The tank farm is secured with a perimeter fence.
The facility is well lighted.
The perimeter fence line is well maintained.
Visitors sign in and are issued badges.
Port tenants have adequate perimeter fencing and
lighting.
The Port has identified and is considering several
access control security improvements.
The Port office is alarmed.
Proper signage directing visitors to the office and/or
security procedures.
The property is legally posted including land side and
waterside for possible trespassing prosecution.
The receptionist has a panic alarm.
Human Resources
Employee security awareness is at the appropriate
level.
Facility has a drug and alcohol policy.
Two-man company driver teams make truck shipments of
product. Background investigations are conducted on new
employees of the Port.
Port has its own security guard service.
Facilities within the Port have their own security
guard services.
Physical Location
Located in a developed end of the property within
sight of a Sheriff's Deputy's residence.
Facility handling explosives is remotely located in
the Port with a large buffer zone from other port tenants.
Former employee lives near entrance to Port located in
rural area.
Current employee lives on Port property.
Other
Facility has a recent history of minimal or no
security incidents.
Portable equipment and materials are secured after
hours.
The Port has a State Police Water Patrol craft moored
in the Port.
APPENDIX D--NEGATIVE FINDINGS
Emergency Preparedness
General lack of awareness of U.S. Coast Guard NVICs
(Navigation and Vessel Inspection Circulars) requirements for
certain ports and facilities.
Lack of liaison with local Emergency Response
organizations and lack of emergency response plans.
The Port has no Emergency Response Plans.
Emergency Response Plans do not include security
subjects such as: threatening communications, bomb search
plans, workplace violence or employee security awareness
training.
The Port lacks a Threatening Communications Response
Plan.
The Port has not established a Port Security
Committee.
The Port has no emergency communications system to
notify and update tenants of an emergency in the Port.
Liaison with community groups, law enforcement and
public safety offices needs improvement.
Physical Security & Access Control
The facility does not have a perimeter fence.
A portion of the facility is unfenced.
In some instances, tenant perimeter fencing is
inadequate.
There is no formal access control system.
There are multiple uncontrolled public ingress/egress
routes.
Public access to the levee road, barge channel and
turning basin is unrestricted.
The current Closed Circuit Television system (CCTV)
does not include recording outgoing traffic.
The facility does not have an intrusion detection
system.
Public road and railroad right-of-way are access
points for undetected intrusion.
Trucks waiting to load are allowed to park adjacent to
an unattended ammonium nitrate facility after hours.
The truck rack is unsecured and is accessible to the
public via the port's unsecured public road.
Truck drivers park in the immediate area at night
awaiting early morning loading.
Facility lighting is minimal in the tank farm and
employee parking lot.
There is no CCTV coverage of the unmanned truck rack
or the office where the operating computers are located.
The facility is unattended between 11:00 p.m. and 5:00
a.m.
Fencing does not segregate the employee parking lot,
truck loading/unloading areas and the tank farm.
Key control of the two secured gates is compromised
and proper gate locking procedures are not followed. The gates
have been improperly locked, negating the tenant's lock 13
times in 7 months of operation.
The facility shares a dock with other tenants and
there is no CCTV coverage of the dock.
The Port office is not alarmed.
There is a significant volume of anticipated truck
traffic, 50-70 trucks/day, with personal recognition as the
accepted access control method.
There is a lack of signage directing visitors to the
office and/or security procedures.
The property is no legal posting of the property,
either land side or waterside for possible trespassing
prosecution.
There is a high volume of seasonal truck traffic.
There is public access to the Port 24 hours a day.
There is no electronic monitoring of vehicle traffic
at the ingress/egress gate or within the Port area.
There is no after-hours surveillance of an ammonium
nitrate facility's wharf or fleeting areas.
An unfenced ammonium nitrate facility is located on a
publicly accessible road with open loading bays and loading
equipment parked nearby.
Public tours of the Port are promoted with minimal
oversight.
There is unrestricted access to the Port Offices via
the rear entrance.
The receptionist does not have a panic alarm.
There is no telephone record capability for the
primary telephone operator at the Port's office.
Appendix D--Continued
Human Resources
The Port or facility does not have an alcohol and drug
policy.
The Port or facility does not conduct background
investigations on new employees.
Port does not have a security guard service.
Critical facilities within the Port do not have their
own security guard servIces.
Physical Location
Barge fleeting operations extend to remote area of the
waterway.
The Port or facility is located in a high crime area.
Port or facility location is remote with little law
enforcement patrol presence.
Other
There is a City-County Park located within the
Port's property.
There is no regular water patrol of the
Turning Basin.
A Port Museum is included in the same building
with the Port offices. Facility has regular criminal
incidents.
Port or terminal's housekeeping practices need
improvement.
APPENDIX E--Employee Training
July 8, 2003
IRPT Threat Assessment/Employee Education Project
Seminar Evaluations
Total Responses 24
* Cumulative 151 (Includes numbers from February 21,2003 report)
5 = high 1 = low
a. The instructor organized material effectively.
5: 18 = 75% 4: 5 = 21%3: 1 = 4%
Cum. (151) 110 = 73% 38 = 25% 4 = 2%
b. The instructor was knowledgeable of subject matter.
5: 20 = 87% 4: 2 = 9% 3: 1 = 4%
Cum. (153) 128 = 84% 22 = 14% 3 = 2%
c. The instructor presented information clearly and at a proper
pace.
5: 15 = 65% 4: 8 = 33% 3: 1 = 4%
Cum. (149) 105 = 70% 40 = 27% 5 = 3%
d. The length of the course was appropriate.
5: 7 = 29% 4: 12 = 50% 3: 4 = 17% 2: 1 = 4%
Cum. (146) 93 = 64% 46 = 32% 8 = 5% 1 = .1
e. Course goals were met.
5: 11 = 46% 4: 8 = 33% 3: 4 = 17% 2: 1 = 4%
Cum. (154) 84 = 55% 57 = 37% 13 = 8% 1 = .1%
f. Overall how was this in meeting your expectations?
5: 9 = 38% 4: 11 = 46% 3: 3 = 13% 1: 1 = 4%
Cum. (154) 74 = 48% 63 = 41% 14 = 9% 2: 2 = 1.3% 1: 2 = 1.3%
Comments:
I felt that more time could have been given toward recognizing
potential terrorist activity. Security measures that can help to
prevent terrorist acts or surveillance.
Thank you for including Connors in the seminar.
Very informative.
Good program.
Appreciate being part of the presentation.
Enjoyed it.
Very informative. (2)
Job well done!
Good basic information.
Pass out material before starting.
Pass on current news information, give audience ``inside information''
or what they believe is inside information. Stirs interest and
involvement.
More info on previous terrorist attacks.
Details that tie all this into our everyday jobs/situations.
Good awakening to possibilities.
Needs to be a bit longer.
Very informative.
Very good.
Added July 8
More instruction on developing emergency plans.
Was a good class.
Hand out more reading material.
Very informative.
Have meetings on a regular basis to inform us of latest strategy and
information available.
I feel a couple more hours would be beneficial.
The instructor had too many ``uhs''.
Mr. Rollins seems to be very knowledgeable and interesting.
Everything was very good. I like the way everything went.
Good job, very informative.
Get Coast Guard more involved.
Good course.
The information was practical and presented to where we can use it at
our facilities.
Great job.
Exceeded meeting expectations.
APPENDIX F--BIOGRAPHICAL INFORMATION
CISR, L.L.C.--John D. Gwin, President
As a Security Advisor for Exxon & ExxonMobil for 25 years, Gwin has
conducted hundreds of risk/threat assessments involving inland waterway
terminals, refinery/chemical plants, marketing (fuel) terminals,
production facilities, pipeline operations and retail service stations.
During the same period, he was responsible for conducting
investigations on behalf of the corporation involving violations of
corporate policy and/or criminal law. Gwin was a Special Agent of the
FBI for five years prior to joining Exxon and a Battery Commander in
the United States Army.
Prior to retirement in 2001, Gwin's portfolio included 23
ExxonMobil U.S. manufacturing sites (refineries/chemical plants). He
conducted threat assessments at these sites using Department of Energy
Risk Assessment methodology. Gwin has attended numerous training
programs sponsored by the American Society for Industrial Security
pertaining to physical security and assessment techniques.
Gwin has participated in the development and presentation of
security programs regarding: response plans for bomb threats and
workplace violence, terrorist threats, substance abuse in the
workplace, potential labor violence and other criminal activity such as
armed robbery and kidnapping prevention.
Rollins & Associates, Inc.--E. Avery Rollins, President
In an FBI career that spanned 31 years, Rollins developed an
expertise in Middle Eastern Terrorism and bombing matters. Early in his
career, he completed a year of training in the Arabic language (Iraqi
dialect) at the US Army Defense Language Institute after which he
conducted terrorism investigations in New York City and Washington,
D.C. In 1978 he completed training in Explosive Ordnance Demolition at
the Hazardous Devices School, Redstone Arsenal. Thereafter, much of his
work revolved around bombing matters related to domestic and
international terrorism.
With the terrorist bombing of the Murrah Federal Building in
Oklahoma City in April 1995, a building security committee was formed
at the McCoy Federal Building in Jackson, MS. The committee was
composed of representatives from each federal agency in the building,
and representatives of local law enforcement. At the time Rollins was a
Supervisory Special Agent with the FBI, supervising the Terrorism and
Bombing Matters programs and was selected Building Security Committee
Chair. The committee reviewed security procedures in place at the time,
identified weaknesses in the program and made recommendations for
improvements to the General Services Administration. He provided
training in bomb threat, bomb response and building evacuation to
federal employees.
After retirement from the FBI, Rollins began providing security
consulting and investigative services to the private sector. In June
2002, Rollins completed a six-month project for the Mississippi
Department of Transportation (MDOT). Rollins was contracted to conduct
threat assessments and develop security plans for its three
administrative offices, six district offices, and a representative
number of its 113 smaller project offices around the state. Threat
assessments, including nighttime security reviews, were conducted at 29
offices in Mississippi over the six-month period. The threat
assessments included a physical site inspection, review of records and
security procedures, and interviews of MDOT employees at each office.
District office sites varied in size from 15 acres to over 60 acres.
Findings, recommendations and specific security plans were prepared for
the administrative and district offices while generic security plans
were prepared for the smaller offices.
Chairman Cox. Thank you to each of our witnesses that are
here.
We will now proceed with questions, and I will recognize
myself for 5 minutes.
Let me begin, Admiral Duncan, by asking about the portion
of your testimony concerning the Marine Safety Unit. We toured
the Grand Gulf facility and met with the people in the security
center. Are there any maritime security--were there any--.
Admiral Duncan. There are 15 nuclear power plants. We found
all to be in compliance with a high level of standard security
in that it covers the access areas and has the ability to stand
off if there is some kind of a threat.
We have identified threats by others and created a system
that tracks all the--certain dangerous substances.
Chairman Cox. But was the assessment of this group there is
a security vulnerability in the Grand Gulf?
Admiral Duncan. I think we looked at that from a
vulnerability standpoint, but the report I have on it is we are
on top of it.
Chairman Cox. That is what I wanted to know.
Ms. Swain, in your testimony you said there could be a
holdup in the Mississippi River for over a year and that that
could have a global economic impact. You also mentioned the
threat of a terrorist attempt on a cruise vessel. Would it be
possible to close the river by that, as opposed to a cargo
vessel?
Ms. Swain. Definitely. The type of vessel at the location
and, specifically, more importantly, like I said, the cruises
have 3,000 passengers or more and the crew, so you are talking
about a significant loss of life. And the Coast Guard can
probably give you more of the terms that goes with the
referring of a vessel up to that. We had, I think, there the
river was crossed for 5 days, and that put a cost of $60
million to ports with 5 days for the closure.
Chairman Cox. If the ports were to close for as long as
possible, what would be the modality of that attack? It is 5
days?
Ms. Swain. Five days as a result of a vessel accident. A
larger submarine could be more. And so that vessel that is in
the river, they come and see where the vessel was and make
arrangements.
Chairman Cox. I am concerned about the 5 days. If an
accident happened, and your testimony is that it could be over
a year if it was accomplished in a terroristic way, What
exactly effect would that have as a result of it being closed
for so long?
Ms. Swain. Location, location, location. The amount and the
size of the vessel, and maybe the Admiral can speak to that.
Chairman Cox. On the size question, is the size of a cruise
vessel sufficient compared to a cargo in order to accomplish
that as a result?
Admiral Duncan. Definitely, it is. Yes, sir.
Chairman Cox. While I got you, Ms. Swain, I want to ask you
a question about maritime transportation security in which you
alluded to in your testimony that you mentioned. I think the
point of your testimony was the expense of it. But I want to
ask you this. Can you amend it in any way?
Ms. Swain. If I have funding so that way we could pay for
the exercises, which are very expensive. The Port of New
Orleans is doing a lot of internal training with the Port
employees; And if we reserve about 50 people, that is when you
talk about salary and overtime. That is going to be $2,000 for
administration; and involving all the different people
responding, EMS and so forth, could triple in cost.
Chairman Cox. Mr. Heidel, I want to ask you about your own
inland ports and local authority and maritime. Specifically,
when something like this happens, do you have the intelligence
available to you?
Mr. Heidel. We have gone through extensive training with
the Coast Guard. They have set the levels, and the information
was sent to U.S. for review. We are available for alert. Matter
of fact, we had all of our training that has been completed
along with your police department and so forth.
We are in the process now of scheduling another meeting of
all of our industries, the ones that uses the Port and the ones
that don't use the Port. But they need to be a support role to
help assist these that do use the water system. It is training
that is important, and we have had an analysis done on the
parts of the area that are sensitive that could be easily be
entered by terrorists to make sure that those are the gaps that
we fill in before we move forward.
Chairman Cox. My time has expired, and I think we will have
a chance to hear from the Representative from Mississippi.
Mr. Thompson. Admiral Duncan, given the level of
requirements placed on you after 9/11, have you had the
necessary manpower and other resources to do your job in a
timely manner?
Admiral Duncan. Thank you for the question, sir.
My bottom line is, yes. I think, as I sit here, we are able
to handle risk. You are aware that our budget has reached about
a 50 percent increase. We have grown fast. We have grown fast,
and we have a certain quality that we want to maintain, so we
will make that a priority to maintain that quality.
Mr. Thompson. Part of the time is that it appears in
certain security situations you are more or less responding
because of the time thing, I think, of the Coast Guard's
response is slower. I guess I am speaking to Ms. Swain, member
of the committee. The comment you made, I guess, you have to
respond because it is in the Port. But the question is, is it
the Port's primary function to respond or are you the
secondary?
Ms. Swain. It depends. We have a mandate to respond to
maritime emergency as well.
But, on a higher level, if there is a situation of an
object floating in the river and it starts to become a problem,
that would be primarily a Coast Guard situation. We have been
asked to assist and to start our--investigate those kinds of
incidents, so, therefore, it is why we are asking for access to
that kind of work, to have that kind of training and put the
right people on board to conduct those types of investigation.
Mr. Thompson. If we made funds available to do those
things, the Port of New Orleans would be available to--.
Ms. Swain. We would be available. If you are going to give
it, we will take it, and we will buy vessels with it. I will
assure it. We see it as a fundamental need.
When you were talking about putting the cruise vessel on
the water--around the cruise vessel--the river is large, but
people come up in and out of it and so forth, and they are not
Maritime, and they don't understand they have breaches, in a
sense. But we don't have any vessels of speed or something to
deter them to keep them out of harm's way from the water. Our
water side, ours is particularly vulnerable. We have added a
lot of fencing. We have, so far, the harbor to handle the
regular land security, but the Port side is something new for
U.S. And it is nothing--well, I feel we are extremely
vulnerable.
Mr. Thompson. Thank you.
Chairman Cox. The gentleman from Georgia, Mr. Linder, you
are recognized.
Mr. Linder. If we were in Memphis, how many carts would it
take to move through traffic?
Mr. Heidel. If you are talking about the cargo carrying two
containers, a barge can carry up to 30 containers, if that
helps you. And, if so, you can move a lot more cargo by water.
So, of those 30, you would have to have 15 rail cars to move
that 30 trucks, if that.
Mr. Linder. How many containers can go down the river?
Admiral Duncan. If I may, sir, there are more details in
the written report. It carries those cargoes through, so that
is 36,000 barges. That is not--and some of that is the
dangerous cargo.
Mr. Linder. What percentage of the Coast Guard is
Reservist?
Admiral Duncan. We called about 3 percent of our available
active Reserve force in this district. We called up, you know,
somewhere in the order of 1,800. Of that, 300 is active duty.
We bought them up for a specific period of time.
Mr. Linder. Do you board beyond the two-mile barrier off
shore? How far can you go?
Admiral Duncan. As far as we can reach the vessels.
Mr. Linder. And in that process, have you all been able to
interact with the ports and the rivers and have you ever sat
down to try determine what important things you need to talk
about to get some kind of idea on how to go about it? You ever
do that?
Ms. McGowan. Not exactly in the realms have we done that.
But in the private sector, from the Coast Guard, we did talk
about those kind of things; and I talked with my Port people. I
got a couple of workshops going for free for members and non-
members to help them. Among those people who were there, there
are all kinds of individuals who came together; and a lot of
that is summarized in the report that I describe here, too.
Mr. Linder. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Cox. Gentleman from North Carolina.
Mr. Etheridge. Admiral Duncan, you talked about your budget
has increased about 50 percent and that you rely heavily on
resources after the 9/11 incident. Earlier, several things
popped out, and one of them is the use of Reservists. Their
training is going to vary greatly.
My question is, what are they taking to inspect, to receive
and the level and courses and the other parts of that--do you
have to take a course or is it tapes or whatever the courses
are to ensure the safety in Greenville, Mississippi?
Admiral Duncan. Yes, sir, that is a good question that I
personally want to mention. The Maritime Security folks have
taken 2 months and went through a specialized applied center. I
had experienced people who are there that had to go through 2
months of training on that, also, for specific limitations of
the regulations.
Other than those, we were using our military to go through
like how to operate the load. They have the weapon crew that
they had in addition to the boats, in general, and focus on the
time of work that they had to do. So they had to prepare for
that 24 months, and they had to maintain those areas as we send
people in and out.
Mr. Etheridge. But given your answer then, your plan is not
to have a permanent team but to continue to rotate and use
Reservists as your personnel.
Admiral Duncan. No, sir. We have a group of people in the
Coast Guard in the past to hold many of those positions and, as
we are growing, we hope to take off with that as quickly as we
are able to do that.
Mr. Etheridge. You mentioned a few things where you were
asked about ships coming in the country. My question is, what
is the time requirement for barge transporting to submit cargo
information to the inland area?
Admiral Duncan. A couple of years ago, that cargo or barge
had to let U.S. know 4 hours in advance of moving or arriving
so that we could track the movements on them. I will receive
the response or the request, and the office faxes it or let
U.S. know where the operators are, and that gives me--pinpoint
movements.
Now the special--this was put in. I keep that. That is
available any time. And we get that and see and looking at how
you are planning your day and that is for our safety. So if you
got Baton Rouge or Vicksburg or any part of the Mississippi,
you have the intelligence to look at if there are any concerns
about touring.
Mr. Etheridge. That raises another question. How clear is
this system that you are talking about? For example, I want to
know what it does to track or to prove or--how clear is this
system that I can't tap into it?
Admiral Duncan. We recognize a lot of people may want to
get into it, and we care about who has access to it. These are
internal records and materials as well, so we are very careful.
Mr. Etheridge. So the people you share it with, there is
background and clearance and they are verified.
Admiral Duncan. I would say in most cases.
Mr. Etheridge. What does, ``most cases'' mean?
Admiral Duncan. All, yes, sir. Presently, that is what is
being done.
Mr. Etheridge. I guess it is for those other barges that
are coming in as well. Is that what you are saying?
Admiral Duncan. I am not--you have got other barges that
don't have access to that system. They don't get the
information of what is moving in that river. Is that your
question?
Mr. Etheridge. Yes. If you have a hazardous material and
someone is coming down, you may or may not want them--make sure
that someone has a checkpoint in place.
Admiral Duncan. Yes, sir. They carry some AIS or they are
communicating. So we are not trying to displace the safety
alert of ships coming around the bend. So there is a safety
that seeks to prevent those kinds of things being advertised.
What is in the system is for safety if we want to contact
anyone.
Chairman Cox. Any more questions?
Gentlemen from North Carolina.
Mr. Etheridge. This is a learning process for me,
specifically, when it comes down to ports on--not only in
Mississippi but also ports that are in the region.
Director Swain, I want to ask this of you, because I know
there are two things that you spoke about. One, the Department
of Homeland Security, specifically, and also the government
accountability saying that the Coast Guard didn't have adequate
staffing or funding to be able to carry out what was needed to
be done. I was reading some of your testimony, and I understand
that many of the people in your Port, even your customers, said
they will not pay a fee. Can you elaborate about that? Because
it is not the first time I have heard of boats that say they
are not going to pay, period.
Ms. Swain. Well, I think that was because when the Gulf
Port Association got together--and the reason they got together
was because they didn't want the Port of New Orleans to have a
fee for our competitors. So that was the purpose of them doing
it. So that the fee, today, it would not be a deal breaker for
getting or losing business.
If--I am not answering your question, I think.
Mr. Etheridge. It is not only the responsibility of the
Federal Government, but it is also a responsibility of everyone
to be able to do so. And, you know, we don't want to hurt
anyone. But, at the same time, our neighbors, as it relates to
portal fees, because of the specific access, how are we going
to help the business? Because we talk about protecting the
homeland. It is also affecting the economy, and I don't want to
put one port at a disadvantage versus another one because it
will say it is cheaper to go to a port in, like, Tampa versus
here.
Ms. Swain. Exactly. That is what we were trying to avoid by
attaching the fee strictly among our competitors. And I should
say, it is still out on the port security fee. It was supposed
to go into effect April 1st. Then I hope we don't delay it for
another month or so.
We have been hearing some drum rolls, which is normal and,
again, ours more adversely because the government has not given
U.S. the backup or the go-ahead. So that is like at the airport
and paying security fees. They are in there, and we pay that
fee, and pretty soon we forget that it is there.
We find it more--and, again, to put it on cruise passengers
vessel because, of course, it means that we become less secure
and because people who travel by cruise line go to a cruise at
their leisure and not because they have to be someplace.
Mr. Etheridge. We are going to have a second round,
correct?
Chairman Cox. That is correct.
Time has expired. I left off with you have mentioned some
things I want to tie together and ask you about.
You mentioned container shipping and you have also
criticized the overemphasis of technology at the expense of
training people and it might not be a multi-agency plan for
port reservist. I want to ask you a little more in detail, all
container tracking, when it contains biological weapons, seems
to be--can you have a deal inside of one of these containers
that would pick it up?
Admiral Duncan. The technology we have right now is it can
go to the second port if it is very busy at moving things
through the first port.
Chairman Cox. Thank you.
I want to go on and ask Dr. McGowan. You tell me a little
bit more, from your experience, what you mean that some of your
ports have to be overkill.
Ms. McGowan. Every meeting that I go to, it just seems like
we talk about the containers on the inland, containers on
barges, but not ever are we asked to track containers. That is
what I am really saying. I am always saying that we taught
employees how to identify a problem. They really want to learn.
They want to do right, so to speak. And I felt like they are a
vast resource you know--and it doesn't matter how much
education the employee has. To me, doing the right thing was
all that I wanted to do was learn how. So I don't know if I
answered that part of your question or not.
Chairman Cox. Did you--and let me ask you further about
your understanding. I will ask for your common knowledge. Is
there, in fact, no comprehensive session multi-agency port
recovery plan in the United States?
Ms. McGowan. I have not been told about it. Have you,
Cynthia?
Ms. Swain. No.
Admiral Duncan. I could address a couple of points on that.
We have quite a responsibility in making sure that that is
taken care of.
We have heard Ms. Swain talk about the incident that closed
the Mississippi River just a year ago. It was concerted in a
port and all the resources we had to bring that up as quickly
as possible and re-route the traffic to Gulfport. We received a
cruise ship that was going through the South, and we put them
through to a barge.
Chairman Cox. We have some nods on what you are talking
about.
Ms. McGowan. I am looking forward to the draft on the first
of April.
Ms. Swain. We get so accustomed to working together,
sharing things and knowing what each other is doing on a day-
to-day basis, so that when something happens with a barge or a
carrier or whatever it is, we are able to come together. But it
still doesn't mean that we don't have a national response plan.
Chairman Cox. Any questions, Mr. Thompson?
Mr. Thompson. I have a basic question. I will start with
you, Admiral Duncan. If we have a major emergency in the port
along the river, do you have the ability, right now, to talk on
a radio so that everybody responding to that emergency is on
the same response?
Admiral Duncan. That is a growing concern. I can say that
in some parts we can bring the State of Louisiana in to bring a
hand.
We know the people who are operating, we know the State
agency, we know the Federal agency, and we can pull those
together. But that is a process that is going take a little bit
of time to have a very fast response. Is that what you are
alluding to, sir?
Mr. Thompson. OK, well, so presently we don't have that
capability.
Admiral Duncan. We have some locations that are less than
others.
Mr. Thompson. All right. Thank you.
Do you know if we have that capability in Vicksburg.
Admiral Duncan. I am not--I can do that, yes, sir. I can't
answer your question about Mississippi.
Mr. Thompson. OK. Mr. Heidel, to your knowledge, can we get
everybody responding on the same frequency?
Mr. Heidel. I think that we are in the process of making
that happen. We did have--from the meeting that we had and the
coordination we have had with the river along with the Coast
Guard, I would say that we can respond pretty quickly to the
situation.
Mr. Thompson. Well, you know, we have got studies that kind
of say that it is inoperable and inadequate. And that is one of
the challenges for 9/11, is that the New York Fire Department
couldn't talk to the New York Police Department; and when it
did, went out, everyone didn't hear the call.
So I am wondering--and that sort of leads me to the
question, is if, in fact, from a first response standpoint
people are responding, but it is more or less you don't know
who is there until you get there because you haven't been able
to talk with anyone. We have tried, when we campaign, to get
everybody on the same frequency, not only who is helping you
and the people, but you also know who is coming. I guess what I
hear is that is a work in progress. Is it?
Ms. Swain. It has been a work in progress for many years,
and we are beginning to work around with these gentlemen in
patchwork. The harbor has a different radio. We can, at least,
talk to one another. If you create a NIMS incident for the
different agencies, then you can pair a harbor, both together,
and see that everybody can get the word. So it is kind of
patchwork and make sure--and a lot of the problems with that is
it costs money to do it and they don't want to give U.S. their
system and put up firewall and all of this and things like
that.
Mr. Thompson. One of the things--and not to cut you off,
but one of the things we have out here and depending on is this
radio to do all of this. But the issue is, can we make the
technology so we don't have to buy radios to communicate?
Admiral Duncan. I may have sent you the wrong way when I
answered with the response of it is either side of the levy.
There is a little more to that, and it needs to take a little
more time to think about. If somebody is on the same radio,
yeah, you can't hear anybody talking. Although we had radio,
yeah, that we worked with each other, we put--that wouldn't
discover the navigation. So it is little more complicated that.
Mr. Thompson. One more question. Do we have that in place
right now?
Admiral Duncan. The NIMS?
Mr. Thompson. What you have described, do we have that in
place right now?
Admiral Duncan. To answer your question in the context,
there was a--oh, here? Yes, sir.
I think we would come together very quickly by sending in a
PFO principal to manage that Federal response so that there is
a linkage between U.S. and the Federal response.
Mr. Thompson. Maybe I am not asking it right. I guess, if
an emergency occurred today, is the NIMS operational for
Vicksburg, Warren County?
Admiral Duncan. I believe it is, sir. I think we know the
people in the area and we can come together very quickly.
Chairman Cox. Gentlemen from Georgia.
Mr. Linder. The Admiral, in talking about sharing
information between ships, you said, we have intelligence. Tell
me, where do you get your intelligence?
Admiral Duncan. We have own intelligence in different
places, and we also tie all the NIMS communications together,
and we reach those sources as well.
The other side is how we use that. How do we get that to
people? Because most of this is private and you are operating
out of a refinery and I would like that--that comes out of the
intelligence arena, and I would like you to be aware of that so
you can organize ineffective, effective ways. There are
security information methods for doing that as well.
Mr. Linder. Thank you.
You or your people with whom you work, what are the risks?
Is the risk as much as the risk might be in New York City? Have
you ever sat down and thought about that? That is what we are
challenging here this morning. Have you done that?
Ms. McGowan. Not in the way that you have just outlined.
My knowledge, just working in it, the Coast Guard and the
Maritime Administration is--if in the event they got together
and joined their resources--there was a study done, and it
studied one of our ports of Louisiana with one of the ports of
Memphis; and because the inland port and terminal is not a
port, we could not get any, even for this little test thing, to
see if we could do what we needed to be doing.
Mr. Linder. When the Coast Guard and the Maritime folks get
together from the department to tell the risk, do they
determine that the port is more vulnerable than the other port
and can they tell at a certain point?
Ms. McGowan. That would be Mr. Murphy working together in
the Central Region at that time on those port securities, if
they are able to.
Chairman Cox. Gentleman from North Carolina.
Mr. Etheridge. I am going to talk to you a little bit about
a question that was raised that I can get better educated about
it. I noticed yesterday that the river that is along--more than
any other place in America, and they wind up at the New Orleans
Port. And we have talked about the funding. When we look at
funding to all the others--this deals with cargo of that type--
are we just looking at shipping, the risk that comes in and as
it relates to the funding for the security issues for homeland
security?
Admiral Duncan. I started responding to that, sir. All the
ports are at the front end of system to make sure that,
roughly, all parts are secure and safe.
Mr. Etheridge. Then that leads to another question. I think
it gets to something Ms. Swain said, and we may have touched on
that. If we go looking only at the--if you are looking at those
high-profile cargoes, then you ignore all the other pieces. My
question is, if we don't--how do we make this really work, not
just the shipping of it?
Who wants to take on that.
Ms. Swain. Well, I don't know about--you can spend a lot of
money and we can spend an extra amount to sort them out. If I
were to say, I am looking for a creative solution, once we
figure it out, you know, and do it short term, we can do it in
many other places. And when one fails, it fails, and we move
onto the next one. To me, it is not just more fence and more
cameras. That is my solution.
Admiral Duncan. I know that the department is looking at
these issues presently and has done something. I think we
touched on some of these here today. So it is a lot to grasp
when I go around and hear about who is getting more money than
others.
From my knowledge and standpoint, the importance of
security awareness is at stake. The country--every American is
part of this. We know that if we catch a man in a suit out
fishing, they know that people shouldn't be out fishing in a
suit, and they are going to call somebody, and it makes U.S.
aware of things like that. But I really think it is most
important of getting this right.
It makes our job all the better. It is very important to
get an all-out awareness going. Because we would still have
people forget and put a weapon in their luggage and get on the
cruise liner. Nobody forgets that they are not supposed to take
a gun on a plane. And, again, it is the same, that the ports
are less vulnerable, but it is a reality thing.
Chairman Cox. We are going to let the gentleman from
Florida ask questions.
Mr. Meek. I would like to yield my time to Mr. Thompson.
Mr. Thompson. Thank you very much.
I guess the question is, Ms. Swain, you indicated that
sometimes you have to respond to emergencies in the Port of the
New Orleans. Sometimes it takes about an hour to get a Coast
Guard present. I am wondering, if a similar emergency occurred
in Vicksburg, how long would it take to get a Coast Guard
present.
Mr. Heidel. Presently, we have located--our port Coast
Guard feels they respond pretty fast to what is going on. We
also are fortunate enough, as I said earlier, to have the
Sheriff's Department there, which mobilizes the help in those
emergencies, also.
Mr. Thompson. I guess--can we have that in New Orleans?
Admiral Duncan. Sir, I would have to check on that. I
really don't think it takes an hour to get a Coast Guard. I
have to go back and see why it would take an hour. That is an
unusual number.
Mr. Thompson. I am sure you can get that information from
Ms. Swain.
Ms. Swain. Be happy, too.
Mr. Thompson. We are here to talk about that. One of my
concerns is, if we have a unit in Baton Rouge and a unit in
Memphis and a certain kind of emergency occurs, how--I am just
wondering how would we accommodate, today, that in between?
Admiral Duncan. We have a present system in every place to
quickly respond.
Mr. Thompson. I guess someone would have to come from Baton
Rouge, and we don't have any in Vicksburg.
Mr. Heidel. We have boats on the water in both of those
places. We have a presence there. It may not be a boat
response. It might be a different type of response or from
another agency. Am I being correct, by my sheriff out there,
for presence out there? He would know better than me.
Presently, the Coast Guard does not monitor the Port. The
Sheriff's Department does the monitoring.
Mr. Thompson. We have got the Sheriff here.
One other question, Admiral Duncan, since the Coast Guard
have primary response, have you received the security plan for
all the ports along the river?
Admiral Duncan. My staff does. Yes, we do receive them.
Mr. Thompson. You receive them. Have you now taken the plan
and gone to the ports to see, actually, what was on the plan is
actually there?
Admiral Duncan. Yes, sir.
Mr. Thompson. So there is nothing that has not been
verified?
Admiral Duncan. To my understanding, we verify what is in
those plans, sir.
Ms. Swain. They verify and verified it twice. That is why
they have no shortage of staff. There was a verification at our
port, approved the plan, and then there is verification that is
going on afterward with that. That is why we have to make--we
have to get better maps, because they were OK for acceptance.
When we look at that opportunity, how we read them, we see it
is a dynamic working document. We check that when they are
coming back and make changes but verify it, they do.
Admiral Duncan. That was part of those Reservists.
Chairman Cox. Does any other member of the panel have any
further questions and want to be recognized for closing
statements?
Gentlemen from North Carolina.
Mr. Etheridge. I would like to thank the folks here, and
let me thank you for inviting US to Mississippi and,
specifically, to Vicksburg, My first trip back from a number of
years ago. I appreciate your hospitality, your testimony today.
The information we gained will certainly be available, I assure
you. I have learned a great deal about inland ports. Thank you.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Cox. Gentleman from Florida.
Mr. Meek. I want to thank everyone. I have learned quite a
bit. Thanks to Vicksburg, all of the elected leaders of this
fine city, to the people and to the people who are trying to
make this community stronger. And, also, Mr. Chairman, to the
historical as it relates to the committee. This is a major part
of our planning. It is important that we educate ourselves on
these issues and the needs of the community as we learn how to
protect them. If we do our jobs better, then we can help them
to make their jobs better on the home front.
Chairman Cox. I am going to make a pronouncement at this
time, but I want to thank you very much for the education on
our ports that you provided to U.S..
Second, I want to thank the witnesses for coming out and
educating this committee. We have learned a lot today. I have
to say that when you see how hard people work, how dedicated
people are, we have a lot to be proud of. To do security, on
top of that smiling and, most importantly, sharing information.
Working has never been--I think we are going to be very, very
successful as a result of coming together to discuss this
matter for our future. That is why we spend the extra money on
training, so that we know the technology, not just because of
the money we are spending on security but rather the
productivity.
Thank all of you for your education and also to the
Vicksburg community, and I appreciate your being in Vicksburg
and the Representative.
We are very, very glad to have closing remarks at this
time.
Mr. Thompson. Let me thank the witnesses. You have been
very good, very thorough and very subjectively put issues out
front.
For the sake of the audience and these members of the
committee to my left, I want to thank them for not postponing
the hearing and making the efforts to be in attendance; and I
thank the audience for coming and just the whole Vicksburg,
Warren County area for being here. As the Admiral said, today,
to whatever extent, it really boils down all of U.S. being a
little more aware about our surroundings and what we say, not
crying wolf all of the time. You need to let someone know so it
could be checked.
The responsibility is a task. 9/11 changed the plot in the
country, that we will never be the same. I am reminded every
time I go to the airport that it is either that fingernail file
or something I should have left or I got the wrong pair of
shoes on and got to take them off. But it will never be the
same.
So I appreciate the Chairman for agreeing to have the
hearing, and I also echo the statements of the committee
members that we need to do this as often as we can so that we
get a feel for what is going on. So, again, Mr. Chairman, thank
you very much for spending time in Vicksburg, Mississippi.
Chairman Cox. I thank the gentlemen.
There is nothing further. This field hearing of the
Homeland Security Committee is now adjourned.
[Whereupon, at 11:16 a.m., the committee was adjourned.]
A P P E N D I X
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Material Submitted For the Record
Questions and Responses of the Coast Guard
VESSEL AND FACILITY SECURITY PLAN INSPECTIONS
Question: The Government Accountability Office (GAO) issued a June 2004
report about the Coast Guard's inspection of vessel and facility
security plans required by the Maritime Transportation Security Act of
2002 or MTSA. The report stated that the Coast Guard will face numerous
short and long term challenges. The first challenge is the sheer number
of security plans that must be inspected; according to GAO the Coast
Guard plans to inspect over 3,000 port facilities and 9,000 vessels to
ensure that owners and operators are compliant with their security
plans. The second challenge that faces the service is the number of
Coast Guard personnel able to conduct the inspections. I understand
that the service has leaned heavily on it reserve force since 9/11,
which is a nice resource to call on for a temporary basis, but I
believe the Coast Guard is going to have long term staffing needs to
enforce the MTSA. What steps has the Coast Guard taken to ensure that
you have enough personnel to conduct MTSA security plan verifications?
Answer: The 2005 enacted budget provided funding for 791 personnel and
associated support funds for MTSA enforcement. The fiscal year 2006
budget requests an additional $31 million to fully-annualize the
additional staff hired to ensure MTSA enforcement.
As an interim measure while those positions are filled, the Coast
Guard employed Title-l0 Coast Guard Reservists and contractor personnel
to achieve MTSA implementation and enforcement milestones. The Coast
Guard developed and implemented training programs to provide its
personnel with the requisite knowledge and skill to conduct facility
and vessel security inspections.Ongoing field level training in
accordance with established requirements continues to provide an
increasing base of qualified security inspectors necessary to maintain
the program. The Coast Guard's classroom training curricula, which
provides the basic training to new personnel entering the field, has
also been updated to reflect the new requirements and ensure new
personnel arrive at field units with appropriate preparation to perform
these functions.
The Coast Guard has completed the initial review and approval of
over 3,000 facility and 11,000 vessel security plans. With this initial
surge of activity complete, the Coast Guard is now transitioning to a
steady state of MTSA operations and enforcement. Reservists recalled in
support of MTSA implementation will be demobilized by the end of fiscal
year 2005, but will continue to augment active duty forces during
regular drills and through the Active Duty Special Work-Active
Component (ADSWAC) program as needed to support all Coast Guard
missions.
IRVMC DISSEMINATION OF INFORMATION
Question: The Coast Guard established the Inland River Vessel Movement
Center to gather and track information barges loaded with Certain
Dangerous Cargoes (CDCs) along the Western Rivers. What is the time
requirement for barge operators transporting CDCs to submit their cargo
information to the Inland River Vessel Movement Center? Where does the
information collected by the center get disseminated to?
Answer: Barge operators are required to submit information to the
Inland River Vessel Movement Center (IRVMC) four hours before the barge
carrying the CDC is added to the tow of the vessel. Barge operators
(when moving barges with CDCs) are also required to report their
position to the IRVMC at approximately 100 designated checkpoints
throughout the Inland River System. The IRVMC then posts this
information electronically, providing a Common Operational Picture
(COP) to District Eight Inland River and Coastal Captains of the Port.
Additionally, the Captain of the Port in Chicago (Ninth Coast Guard
District) receives the same COP tracks. All Captains of the Ports use
this information to continually track movement of the CDCs through
their area of responsibility and to target vessels transiting their
areas for escorts, boardings, etc.
EXERCISE AFTER-ACTION REPORTS
Question: The GAD issued a report in January in response to a request
from Ranking Member Thompson about the use of terrorism exercises to
coordinate effective seaport security procedures. The GAD stated that
the Coast Guard's after action reports from port terrorism exercises
were either late or not sent at all. The report also stated that the
content of the after-action reports submitted by the Coast Guard was
insufficient to incorporate lessons learned for future exercises. What
steps has the Coast Guard taken to ensure that local units are
submitting thorough after-action reports in a timely fashion?
Answer: The Coast Guard acknowledges the need to improve the After-
Action Reporting (AAR) system. Improving AARs will be one of the
Commandant's top priorities in the fiscal year 2006 Contingency
Planning Guidance to operational commanders. Additionally, increased
emphasis is being placed on AARs in the Coast Guard's primary
Contingency Planner/Exercise Planner training course. A core group of
individuals are also being certified as Master Exercise Practitioners
with increased expertise in the development of AARs and lessons
learned.
CG RESOURCE LEVERAGING OF SMALL BOATS
Question: The Coast Guard's Deepwater program has received a great deal
of attention since 9/11 due to the fact that the Coast Guard's fleet of
cutters and aircraft need to be replaced. Looking at the background
information provided by the Coast Guard, the six Marine Safety Offices
on the Western Rivers have a total of 19 small boats. How is the Coast
Guard leveraging resources to ensure there are enough small boats for
the Coast Guard to perform all of its missions?
Answer: Over the past three years, the Coast Guard has added over 170
new Response Boat Smalls (RB-S) and crews throughout the nation to
perform all Coast Guard missions. In the President's Fiscal Year 2006
budget Request, the Coast Guard is requesting 14 additional RB-S's and
crews. These boats are highly capable and well suited for the inland
rivers.
In fiscal year 2005, the Coast Guard plan to establish a Security
Patrol Detachment (SPD) in Huntington, WV, as a prototype program to
address the geographically and mission unique requirements on the
inland rivers. As this pilot project yields a better understanding of
inland river operations, the Coast Guard will review its resource
allocation in other strategic ports on the inland river network.
Question: The Coast Guard just established a prototype river security
team at the Marine Safety Office in Huntington, West Virginia. This
team will perform the function of the Marine Safety and Security Teams
or MSSTs deployed to large coastal ports whose primary mission is
deter, protect, and respond to maritime security incidents at large
river ports. Do you know if the Coast Guard intends to deploy teams to
other inland river ports?
Answer: Given the geography and unique local features of the inland
river system for over 10,000 nautical miles of navigable waterways, the
MSST is not the best operational solution.
In fiscal year 2005, the Coast Guard plans to establish a Security
Patrol Detachment (SPD) in Huntington, WV, as a prototype program to
address the geographically unique security requirements on the inland
rivers. As this pilot project yields a better understanding of inland
river operations, the Coast Guard will review its resource allocation
in other strategic ports on the inland river network.
The Coast Guard has deployed MSSTs on four occasions to the inland
river ports of Memphis, TN and St. Louis, MO to meet temporary
operational requirements. Future deployments of MSSTs will be based on
a combination of port activity, threat analysis, and intelligence.