[House Hearing, 109 Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
CBP AND ICE: DOES THE CURRENT
ORGANIZATIONAL STRUCTURE BEST
SERVE U.S. HOMELAND SECURITY INTERESTS?
=======================================================================
HEARING
before the
SUBCOMMITTEE ON MANAGEMENT, INTEGRATION, AND OVERSIGHT
of the
COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND SECURITY
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
ONE HUNDRED NINTH CONGRESS
FIRST SESSION
__________
MARCH 9, 2005
__________
Serial No. 109-4
__________
Printed for the use of the Committee on Homeland Security
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Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.access.gpo.gov/congress/
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COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND SECURITY
Christopher Cox, California, Chairman
Don Young, Alaska Bennie G. Thompson, Mississippi
Lamar S. Smith, Texas Loretta Sanchez, California
Curt Weldon, Pennsylvania, Vice Edward J. Markey, Massachusetts
Chairman Norman D. Dicks, Washington
Christopher Shays, Connecticut Jane Harman, California
Peter T. King, New York Peter A. Defazio, Oregon
John Linder, Georgia Nita M. Lowey, New York
Mark E. Souder, Indiana Eleanor Holmes Norton, District of
Tom Davis, Virginia Columbia
Daniel E. Lungren, California Zoe Lofgren, California
Jim Gibbons, Nevada Sheila Jackson-Lee, Texas
Rob Simmons, Connecticut Bill Pascrell, Jr., New Jersey
Mike Rogers, Alabama Donna M. Christensen, U.S. Virgin
Stevan Pearce, New Mexico Islands
Katherine Harris, Florida Bob Etheridge, North Carolina
Bobby Jindal, Louisiana James R. Langevin, Rhode Island
Dave G. Reichert, Washington Kendrick B. Meek, Florida
Michael McCaul, Texas
Charlie Dent, Pennsylvania
______
Subcommittee on Management, Integration, and Oversight
Mike Rogers, Alabama, Chairman
Christopher Shays, Connecticut Kendrick B. Meek, Florida
John Linder, Georgia Edward J. Markey, Massachusetts
Tom Davis, Virginia Zoe Lofgren, California
Katherine Harris, Florida Sheila Jackson-Lee, Texas
Dave G. Reichert, Washington Donna M. Christensen, U.S. Virgin
Michael McCaul, Texas Islands
Charlie Dent, Pennsylvania Bennie G. Thompson, Mississippi Ex
Christopher Cox, California Ex Officio
Officio
(II)
C O N T E N T S
----------
Page
STATEMENTS
The Honorable Mike Rogers, a Representative in Congress From the
State of Alabama, and Chairman, Subcommittee on Management,
Integration, and Oversight
Oral Statement................................................. 1
Prepared Statement............................................. 4
The Honorable Kendrick B. Meek, a Representative in Congress From
the State of Florida, and Ranking Member, Subcommittee on
Management, Integration, and Oversight
Oral Statement................................................. 3
Prepared Statement............................................. 5
The Honorable Christopher Cox, a Representative in Congress From
the State of California, and Chairman, Committee on Homeland
Security
Oral Statement................................................. 6
Prepared Statement............................................. 8
The Honorable Bennie G. Thompson, a Representative in Congress
From the State of Mississippi, and Ranking Member, Committee on
Homeland Security.............................................. 6
The Honorable Donna Christensen, a Delegate from the U.S. Virgin
Islands........................................................ 55
The Honorable Charles W. Dent, a Representative in Congress From
the State of Pennsylvania...................................... 50
The Honorable Katherine Harris, a Representative in Congress From
the State of Florida........................................... 57
The Honorable Michael McCaul, a Representative in Congress From
the State of Texas............................................. 59
The Honorable Bill Pascrell, Jr., a Representative in Congress
From the States of New Jersey.................................. 52
The Honorable Dave G. Reichert, a Representative in Congress From
the State of Washington........................................ 61
The Honorable Christopher Shays, a Representative in Congress
From the State of Connecticut.................................. 53
WITNESSES
Mr. T.J. Bonner, President, National Border Patrol Council
Oral Statement................................................. 30
Prepared Statement............................................. 32
Mr. Randy Allen Callahan, Executive Vice president, American
Federation of Government Employees, AFL-CIO
Oral Statement................................................. 25
Prepared Statement............................................. 27
James Carafano, Ph.D., Senior Research Fellow, The Heritage
Foundation
Oral Statement................................................. 10
Prepared Statement............................................. 12
Mr. Michael Cutler, Former Senior Special Agent, U.S. Immigration
and Naturalization Service
Oral Statement................................................. 34
Prepared Statement............................................. 37
Mr. Kenneth C. Klug, Former Special Agent in Charge, U.S.
Immigration and Customs Enforcement, U.S. Department of
Homeland Security
Oral Statement................................................. 19
Prepared Statement............................................. 22
Mr. David Venturella, Former Director, Office of Detention and
Removal Operations, U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement,
U.S. Department of Homeland Security
Oral Statement................................................. 39
Prepared Statement............................................. 40
APPENDIX
Material Submitted for the Record
The Honorable Sheila Jackson-Lee, a Representative in Congress
From the State of Texas, Prepared Statement.................... 86
Questiona and Responses for the Record of T.J. Bonner............ 67
Questions and Responses for the Record of James Jay Carafano, PhD 68
Questions and Responses for the Record of Mr. Michael Cutler..... 72
Questions and Responses for the Record of Mr. Kenneth C. Klug.... 81
Questions and Responses for the Record of Mr. David J. Venturella 84
CBP AND ICE: DOES THE CURRENT
ORGANIZATIONAL STRUCTURE BEST SERVE U.S. HOMELAND SECURITY INTERESTS?
----------
Wednesday, March 9, 2005
House of Representatives,
Subcommittee on Management,
Integration, and Oversight,
Committee on Homeland Security,
Washington, D.C.
The subcommittee met, pursuant to call, at 10:05 a.m., in
Room 2212, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Mike Rogers
[chairman of the subcommittee] presiding.
Present: Representatives Rogers, Shays, Harris, Reichert,
McCaul, Dent, Cox (Ex Officio), Meek, Jackson-Lee, Pascrell,
Christensen and Thompson (Ex Officio).
Mr. Rogers. I want to welcome all of you to this the
inaugural meeting of the Homeland Security Committee's
Subcommittee on Management, Integration, and Oversight; And I
would also like to welcome our Ranking Member, Kendrick Meek of
Florida, and Mr. Thompson of Mississippi to this committee. I
know we are going to have a lot on our plates. It is going to
be an interesting committee, and I look forward to the
challenges we face.
It is going to be our responsibility to address the serious
management challenges facing the Department of Homeland
Security, and I must add that improving the management and
operation of the Department is no small challenge, but we
accept that challenge with a commitment to do what is best for
our Nation.
The purpose of today's hearing will focus on one of the
most important management challenges facing the Department and
involves one of the most important functions, protecting our
borders and enforcing our immigration and customs laws.
The Border and Transportation Security Directorate, or BTS,
of the Department of Homeland Security is divided into two now
separate bureaus, the U.S. Customs and Border Protection, or
CBP, and the U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement, or ICE.
In particular, we will explore whether the current Division of
Border Security, within CBP, and Immigration and Customs
investigations, within ICE, is the best way to structure these
important functions or if the separation has caused more
operational, administrative, and budgetary problems that
negatively impact the Homeland Security missions of these
agencies.
I believe that we are best served today by attempting to
gain an understanding of the challenges facing these agencies,
whether the current organization is the best structure to face
these challenges, and discussing possible solutions to the
problems that we identify.
Shortly before the Department of Homeland Security
officially opened its doors, the Administration used the
reorganization authority provided to the Secretary of DHS in
the Homeland Security Act to split up the Customs Service and
the Bureau of Border Security and reconfigure them into two new
bureaus within the BTS directorate: Customs and Border
Protection, CBP, and Immigration and Customs Enforcement, or
ICE. Essentially, the reorganization merged Customs and
Immigration enforcement at the border into one agency, while
separating out Customs and Immigration investigations into
another agency. It is important to note that this was not a
simple border security versus interior enforcement split, since
ICE agents often operate at or near the borders and Border
Patrol agents are not limited geographically to the borders.
As a result, CBP now consists of the Office of Border
Patrol and the Office of Field Operations, the latter of which
is staffed by INS inspectors, former Customs inspectors, and
former Department of Agriculture inspectors. These CBP
officers, as they are now called, are responsible for carrying
out the duties and functions formerly carried out by these
three separate agencies.
ICE is comprised of former INS investigators and former
U.S. Customs investigators, who are referred to as ICE agents,
and are responsible for the enforcement of both immigration and
customs laws. ICE also contains the Office of Detention and
Removal, the Office of Intelligence, the Federal Protection
Service, and the Federal Air Marshals.
The issues at hand today--as with all reorganizations there
will always be growing pains, but 2 years later the concerns
with the current structure seem to be growing and not receding.
Through the committee's oversight activities we have learned of
several anecdotal examples of poor operational coordination
between the Border Patrol and ICE's Office of Investigations
that have or could have led to security or operational
compromises.
In addition, we have heard of concerns that inspectors are
not receiving investigative support as readily as before the
reorganization and that reorganization may have created
bureaucratic walls that impede effective and efficient
communication and information sharing.
We have also learned of serious budgetary problems facing
in particular ICE and the challenges that appear to be
attributable to the inexact division of resources within INS
when INS was divided in three separate parts: CPB, ICE, and the
U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Service. ICE's budget
shortfalls have forced ICE to impose hiring freezes and to
release aliens that otherwise should be detained.
Today, we will start a dialogue on the future of CBP and
ICE by examining the effects of the Administration's
reorganization, both pros and cons, 2 years after its
implementation. As we undertake this review, we must examine
this issue in the larger context of the BTS Directorate and its
role with respect to ensuring coordination and achievement of
the missions of ICE and CBP, and we will also examine how a
proposed new DHS regional field structure would impact upon
operational efficiencies and what the effect of the
Department's new secretarial-level policy office will have upon
the operations of these two bureaus.
We hope our witnesses today can provide some insight, not
only into the challenges and concerns that exist within the
current organization of CBP and ICE, but also some potential
solutions. I thank them all for providing us with their
testimony today.
At this time I would now recognize my friend and colleague
from Florida, the Ranking Member, Mr. Meek, for any statements
that he may have.
Mr. Meek. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman; and I think
that you really framed the meaning for this meeting and also
for the ongoing dialogue.
Mr. Chairman, I want to congratulate you on our first
meeting and also the whole committee on becoming a standing
committee here in this Congress. As you know, many of us were
on the oversight committee, the Select Committee last year, and
I think this is a step in the right direction for the
protection of the homeland.
I also would like to thank those members of the Department
of Homeland Security for all the hard work that they have been
doing since the creation of the Department, and I can tell you
that it was done in a way to get us to this point so that we
can have a subcommittee like we are having now to review some
of the functions of the Department.
As you know, today's subject will pretty much focus on CBP
and ICE and seeing how we could possibly make the functions
work better, but I am definitely looking forward to many of our
witnesses that are here today and hearing their comments and
also their findings.
Mr. Chairman, I just would pretty much like to just share
some of the concerns that I have and would hopefully like to
see some of the witnesses address or hear them address.
What do they think, as it relates to the Department as it
is moving now and these two agencies and the reason why they
were integrated in the first place, on the positive, the reason
why it was done?
And, also, I think not necessarily negative, but how can we
move towards a more creative functional agency if it was merged
together? How would we deal with some of the issues of the
upper echelon of the agency, in military talk, brass? How would
that integrate itself together? And will it jeopardize the
security of the homeland and the function of this enforcement
arm of Department of Homeland Security?
We have a number of members here, Mr. Chairman, that I know
that are going to have some insightful questions for our panel.
I know our panel is quite large, so I will reserve the rest of
my comments and enter it for the record so that we can have it
on record for future meetings.
But I am honored to be here and pleased to be your ranking
member on this committee. I know that we are going to do good
work together, and I know that we are going to get out in the
field, and we are going to see what these gentlemen are going
to share with us this morning firsthand.
[The information follows:]
Prepared Opening Statement of Mike Rogers, a Representative in Congress
From the State of Alabama, and Chairman, Subcommittee on Management,
Integration and Oversight
Today's hearing marks the inaugural hearing of the Subcommittee on
Management, Integration and Oversight, which I am honored to chair. I
want to thank Chairman Cox and Ranking Member Thompson for their
leadership in establishing this Subcommittee, which will focus on
improving the management and operations of the Department of Homeland
Security--no small challenge. And I would also like to take this
opportunity to welcome the Subcommittee Ranking Member, Mr. Meeks of
Florida. I look forward to working with you and the other Members of
this Committee in a bipartisan fashion to address the serious
management challenges facing of one our Nation's most critical
agencies.
Today's hearing will focus on one of those important management
challenges--whether the two now-separate bureaus within the Border and
Transportation Security Directorate (BTS) of the Department of Homeland
Security--U.S. Customs and Border Protection or ``CBP,'' and U.S.
Immigration and Customs Enforcement or ``ICE''--should be reorganized
to enhance the homeland security mission. In particular, we will
explore whether the current division of border security, within CBP,
and immigration and customs investigations within ICE, has caused
operational, administrative, and budgetary problems negatively
impacting upon the homeland security missions of these agencies.
When Congress passed the Homeland Security Act of 2002 and created
the Department of Homeland Security, it placed the responsibility for
immigration inspections, investigations, detention, removal, and border
patrol functions into one new Bureau of Border Security, within the
Directorate of Border and Transportation Security, or BTS. Congress
also transferred the functions of the Customs Service to DHS intact, as
a stand-alone agency, into BTS. The Act also separated the immigration
and alien services functions of the former INS from immigration
enforcement, by creating a stand-alone agency within the Department
called U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS).
Shortly before the Department officially opened its doors, however,
the Administration used the reorganization authority provided to the
Secretary of DHS in the Homeland Security Act to split up the Customs
Service and the Bureau of Border Security, and reconfigure them into
two new bureaus in the BTS Directorate: CBP and ICE. Essentially, the
reorganization merged customs and immigration enforcement at the border
into one agency, while separating out customs and immigration
investigations into another agency. But it is not a simple border
security vs. interior enforcement split, since ICE agents often operate
at or near the borders, and Border Patrol agents are not limited
geographically to the borders.
As a result, CBP now consists of the Office of Border Patrol and
the Office of Field Operations--the latter of which is staffed by
former INS inspectors, former Customs inspectors, and former Department
of Agriculture inspectors. These ``CBP Officers,'' as they are now all
called, are responsible for carrying out the duties and functions
formerly carried out by these three separate agencies.
ICE is comprised of former INS investigators and former U.S.
Customs investigators, who are referred to as ICE agents, and are
responsible for the enforcement of both immigration and customs laws.
ICE also contains the Office of Detention and Removal, the Office of
Intelligence, the Federal Protective Service and the Federal Air
Marshals.
As with all reorganizations, there will always be growing pains.
But two years later, the concerns with the current structure seem to be
growing, not receding. Through this Committee's oversight activities,
we have learned of several anecdotal examples of poor operational
coordination between the Border Patrol and ICE's Office of
Investigations that have or could have compromised important
operations. We have heard concerns that inspectors are not receiving
investigative support as readily as before the reorganization, and that
the reorganization may have created bureaucratic walls that impede
effective and efficient communication and information sharing.
We also have learned of serious budgetary problems facing ICE in
particular, challenges that appear to be attributable to the inexact
division of resources when INS was divided into three parts (CBP, ICE,
and U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services). ICE's budget shortfalls
have forced ICE to impose hiring freezes and to release aliens that
otherwise should be detained.
In light of these reported problems, I was encouraged last week
when incoming Homeland Security Secretary, Michael Chertoff, indicated
that the Department will begin ``a comprehensive review'' of its
organization, operations, and policies, and that ``. . . analysis of
the threats and risks [posed to the United States by terrorists] will
drive the structure, operations, policies and missions of the
department, and not the other way around.''
Such a review is, indeed, necessary, and this Subcommittee should
not jump to any particular conclusion about the optimal structure for
CBP and ICE. Instead, we will start a dialogue today on the future of
CBP and ICE by examining the effects of the Administration's
reorganization--both the pros and cons--two years after its
implementation. As we undertake this review, we must examine this issue
in the larger context of the BTS Directorate, and its role with respect
to ensuring the coordination and achievement of ICE and CBP's missions.
And we also must examine how a proposed new DHS regional field
structure would impact upon operational efficiencies, and what the
effect of the Department's new, Secretarial-level policy office will be
upon the operations of these two bureaus.
We hope our witnesses today can provide some insight not only into
the challenges and concerns that exist with the current organization of
CBP and ICE, but also as to some potential solutions. I thank them all
for providing us with their testimony today.
At this time, I will now recognize the Ranking Member, Mr. Meeks,
for any opening statement he may wish to make.
Prepared Statement of The Honorable Kendrick Meek, a Representative in
Congress from the State of Florida, and Ranking Member, Subcommittee on
Management, Integration and Oversight
Mr. Chairman, I would like to first congratulate you on being
appointed chairman and I look forward to working with you throughout
this term. I believe that the Management, Integration, and Oversight
Subcommittee is one of the most important in that it oversees the
Department of Homeland Security. On this, the first meeting of the
subcommittee, I am eager to begin our work on ensuring that DHS is
functioning at a level to best protect the American people.
I would also like to extend a warm welcome to the panelists.
Dr. Carafano--You and your colleague at the Center for Strategic &
International Studies have written a very interesting report that
helped move the current debate on DHS internal restructuring--
specifically Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) and Customs and
Border Protection (CBP). While many frontline officers and
investigators have expressed concern about the current structure and
the operational, communication and coordination problems between ICE
and CBP, your paper has helped focus more Members of Congress on this
issue. Thank you for that.
Mr. Klug--I really look forward to your testimony especially given
your experiences in New York before and after 9/11. I would very much
like an ICE agent's view on how the Department is working--and where
and how it can be more effective.
Mr. Bonner--I welcome your testimony--I share a number of your
concerns about the lack of sufficient funding for the Border Patrol.
Mr. Venturella, Mr. Cutler, and Mr. Callahan--I look forward to
hearing your testimony. Thank you for taking the time to be with us
today.
The mission of the Department of Homeland Security is vital--the
difference between the success and failure of DHS are American lives.
The reason we need DHS to succeed is just that simple. The mission of
this particular subcommittee is to determine what problems prevent DHS
from achieving its mission.
This is why I am delighted that the first hearing before this
Management and Oversight Subcommittee is on a topic critical to our
homeland security--determining whether the current structure of CBP and
ICE--agencies charged with key border security functions--facilitates
coordination, communication and information sharing between key border
agencies.
Two years after its creation, we have an opportunity to evaluate
whether the existing structure of Border and Transportation Security
works. The DHS 2.0 report states that there may be too many layers of
bureaucracy at DHS and recommends the merger of CBP and ICE. I am not
convinced that creating an agency or moving boxes around on a chart
alone secures America or our borders. A clear mission, the ability to
coordinate operations and communicate effectively, sufficient staffing,
access to relevant information and intelligence, access to needed
technology--these will help our men and women secure our nation's
borders.
Additionally, I think that it is critical that we have some
coordination of the immigration function within the DHS. Who in DHS is
responsible for national immigration policy? We know that every
immigration benefit is connected to an enforcement action at our ports
of entry or overseas, or at one of our Citizenship and Immigration
Service offices within the United States. While the Homeland Security
Act abolished the Immigration and Nationality Service and separated it
into enforcement and services bureaus, I am very concerned about the
further separation of immigration enforcement into ICE and CBP. I hope
that our panel will address that issue in their testimony.
Additionally, as you provide testimony I hope that you'll keep four
questions in mind.
(1) What do you think was the basis for the Administration decision to
integrate functions of the U.S. Customs Service and Bureau of Border
Security and form CBP and ICE?
(2) What are the problems that were created by the current structure of
CBP and ICE?
(3) Is it possible to resolve existing problems within the current
structure or is it necessary to make structural changes?
(4) If structural change is necessary then what type of restructuring
do you recommend?
I look forward to your testimony.
Mr. Rogers. I agree. I do look forward to it, and we do
intend to be a very active subcommittee and spend some time in
the field. So we will be seeing a lot more of you folks in the
future.
Before I recognize our next member, I would ask everybody
or remind everybody that the rules of the full committee are
the rules here and that all cell phones should be turned off or
turned to the vibrate position, please.
With that, I now recognize the gentleman from Mississippi,
the ranking member of the full committee, Mr. Thompson.
Mr. Thompson. Thank you very much, Chairman Rogers and
Ranking Member Meek. I would like to welcome the witnesses
also.
I think it is fair to say that all the Members of this
committee want to hear what needs to be done to make America
safer by improving enforcement and customs and immigration
laws. That said, I am interested in finding out how we improve
coordination between CBP officers, Border Patrol agents, and
ICE special agents.
In case anyone doubts the need for better coordination, let
me offer a few examples of the problems that are occurring all
too frequently because of conflicts and miscommunication among
BTS organizations.
ICE and the Border Patrol continue to fight over controlled
deliveries. The lack of coordination has resulted in, at best,
the jeopardizing of investigations and, at worst, danger to law
enforcement personnel. At a northern point of entry, a Border
Patrol agent stopped a vehicle, ran a computer check and
discovered an active ICE investigation. The agent searched the
vehicle, found automatic weapons and silencers and referred the
case to DEA. The DEA, not the Border Patrol, subsequently
notified ICE.
I could give you some other examples of a lack of
coordination, Mr. Chairman, but I am sure the testimony will
highlight it. I think it is clear that this subcommittee
hearing is timely. It is important for the safety of this
country as well as the men and women in uniform, and I look
forward to the testimony.
Mr. Rogers. Thank you, Mr. Thompson.
The Chair now recognizes the chairman of the full
committee, our friend and colleague, Mr. Cox, from California.
Mr. Cox. I want to thank you, Mr. Chairman; and let me
begin by commending Chairman Rogers and Ranking Member Meek for
your willingness to lead this critically important
subcommittee.
Thank you also for holding today's hearing to examine the
potential merger of two operational components of the
Department of Homeland Security: Customs and Border Protection,
or CBP, and U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement, known as
ICE. They are both responsible for immigration enforcement, but
today they are doing that job separately.
I would also like to welcome and thank each of our
distinguished witnesses for appearing before the subcommittee
to discuss this important issue with us.
Our responsibility as Members of this committee requires us
to conduct vigorous oversight and to regularly assess the
direction and management of the Department of Homeland
Security. Is the Department making acceptable progress towards
integration of its operations? Is the Department optimally
structured to achieve its core missions of preventing
terrorism, protecting against terrorism, and being prepared to
respond to acts of terrorism?
This subcommittee will take the lead in examining these
issues. I look forward to working with Chairman Rogers, Ranking
Member Meek, and the other members of this subcommittee as we
explore such questions.
We created the Department of Homeland Security with the
express purpose of enhancing the Nation's ability to prevent
and to deal with terrorist acts. It was that overarching
purpose that drove our decision to consolidate existing Federal
agencies into a single new department. The main organizational
task for the Department now is to realign the missions of those
legacy agencies to more directly support our national Homeland
Security efforts.
Today, we are investigating whether the Immigration and
Naturalization Service and the U.S. Customs Service, both of
which were transferred to DHS, have been reorganized in a way
that is optimal for improving our immigration security efforts.
The good news is that these immigration control agencies are
now within the same department, and they have a clear and
critical new mission: to prevent foreign terrorists and their
weapons from entering the United States and to prevent those
terrorists from having free reign within our country.
Abolishing the INS and moving its functions into this new
department was meant to correct the fundamental problems that
existed within the INS itself. The old INS had multiple and
sometimes conflicting roles as provider of immigration services
and enforcer of immigration laws. The Homeland Security Act
abolished the INS and split immigration services from
immigration enforcement.
But the Congress did not have the last word on the
organization of Customs and Immigration enforcement functions
within DHS. Utilizing its reorganization authority under the
Homeland Security Act, the administration acted in January,
2003, to merge the Customs and Immigration border inspection
and patrol functions, along with Agriculture inspection
functions, into what is now CBP. In doing so, the
Administration also created a new entity called ICE, which
contains the Customs and Immigration enforcement agencies whose
investigative responsibilities include crimes, as opposed to,
for example, the inspection of cargo and people crossing the
border.
Two years later, questions remain about whether DHS has
organized itself and is managing its immigration enforcement
and border security resources in the most efficient, sensible,
and effective manner. Anecdotal evidence suggests that the
division of Customs and Immigration inspectors from their
related investigative colleagues may be building administrative
walls and hampering cooperation and information sharing between
ICE and CBP in critical mission areas.
Some observers also have suggested that the distinction
between the so-called interior enforcement activities of ICE
and the so-called border security functions of CBP are
artificial constructs that contribute to needless
administrative overlaps, programmatic turf battles, mission
gaps, and sometimes dangerous operational conflicts.
In addition, it appears that at least some of ICE's very
troubling budget shortfalls over the last 2 fiscal years have
been attributable to erroneous budget allocations that occurred
upon division of CBP and ICE into two distinct components of
the Border and Transportation Security Directorate.
In light of these concerns, we must ask ourselves whether
the organizational structure currently in place is contributing
to these problems and whether a merger or reallocation of
responsibility may help to resolve them.
Ultimately, our goal is to see that immigration enforcement
and border inspection activities operate within an
organizational structure that provides for strong policy
guidance and coordination, fair and efficient allocation of
funding, and clearly-defined and seamless operational roles. It
is also critical that we fully fund the authorized levels of
both Border Patrol and Immigration Enforcement agents.
As the committee moves toward the development of
comprehensive reauthorization legislation for the Department, I
anticipate that our findings in this hearing, and others to
follow, will play an important role in determining the path
ahead. I look forward to an honest exchange of ideas on this
issue as we explore the best way to protect our Nation from
those who would do us harm.
Prepared Opening Statement of The Honorable Christopher Cox, a
Representative in Congress From the State of California, and Chairman,
Committee on Homeland Security
Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Let me begin by commending Chairman Rogers
and Ranking Member Meek for their willingness to lead this critically
important Subcommittee. Thank you also for holding today's hearing to
examine the potential merger of two operational components of the
Department of Homeland Security. Customs and Border Protection, or CBP,
and U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement, known as ICE, are both
responsible for immigration enforcement. But today, they are doing that
job separately. I'd also like to welcome and thank each of our
distinguished witnesses for appearing before the Subcommittee to
discuss this important issue with us.
Our responsibility as Members of this Committee requires us to
conduct vigorous oversight, and to regularly assess the direction and
management of the Department of Homeland Security. Is the Department
making acceptable progress toward integration of its operations? Is the
Department optimally structured to achieve its core missions of
preventing terrorism, protecting against terrorism, and being prepared
to respond to acts of terrorism? This Subcommittee will take the lead
in examining these issues. I look forward to working with Chairman
Rogers, Ranking Member Meek, and the other Members of this Subcommittee
as we explore such questions.
We created the Department of Homeland Security with the express
purpose of enhancing the Nation's ability to prevent and to deal with
terrorist acts. It was that over-arching purpose that drove our
decision to consolidate existing Federal agencies that drove our
decisions to consolidate existing Federal agencies into a single new
Department. The main organizational task for the Department now is to
realign the missions of those legacy agencies to more directly support
our national homeland security efforts.
Today we're investigating whether the Immigration and
Naturalization Service and the U.S. Customs Service-both of which were
transferred to DHS-have been reorganized in a way that is optimal in
order to improve our immigration security efforts. The good news is
that these immigration control agencies are now within the same
Department. And they have a clear and critical new mission-to prevent
foreign terrorists and their weapons from entering the United States
and to prevent terrorists from having free reign within our country.
Abolishing the INS and moving its functions into this new
department was meant to correct the fundamental problems that existed
within the INS itself. The old INS had multiple and sometimes
conflicting roles--as provider of immigration services, and enforcer of
immigration laws. The Homeland Security Act abolished the INS and split
immigration services from immigration enforcement.
But the Congress did not have the last word on the organization of
customs and immigration enforcement functions within DHS. Utilizing its
re-organization authority under the Homeland Security Act, the
Administration acted in January 2003 to merge the customs and
immigration border inspection and patrol functions, along with
agricultural inspections functions, into what is now CBP. In doing so,
the Administration also created a new entity called ICE, which
contained the customs and immigration enforcement agencies-whose
investigate crimes as opposed to inspecting cargo and people crossing
the border.
Two years later, questions remain about whether DHS has organized
itself and is managing its immigration enforcement and border security
resources in the most efficient, sensible, and effective manner.
Anecdotal evidence suggests that the division of customs and
immigration inspectors from their related investigative colleagues may
be building administrative walls, and hampering cooperation and
information sharing, between ICE and CBP in critical mission areas.
Some observers also have suggested that the distinction between the
'interior enforcement' activities of ICE and the 'border security'
functions of CBP are artificial constructs that contribute to needless
administrative overlaps, programmatic turf battles, mission gaps, and
sometimes dangerous operational conflicts. In addition, it appears that
at least some of ICE's very troubling budget shortfalls over the last
two fiscal years have been attributable to erroneous budget allocations
that occurred upon the division of CBP and ICE into two discrete
components of the Border and Transportation Security Directorate.
In light of these concerns, we must ask ourselves whether the
organizational structure currently in place is contributing to these
problems, and whether a merger or reallocation of responsibility may
help to resolve them. Ultimately, our goal is to see that immigration
enforcement and border inspection activities operate within an
organizational structure that provides for strong policy guidance and
coordination, fair and efficient allocation of funding, and clearly
defined and seamless operational roles. It also is critical that we
fully fund the authorized levels of both Border Patrol and immigration
enforcement agents.
As the Committee moves toward the development of comprehensive
reauthorization legislation for the Department, I anticipate that our
findings in this hearing and others to follow, will play an important
role in determining the path ahead. I look forward to an honest
exchange of ideas on this issue, as we explore the best way to protect
this Nation from those who would do us harm.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and I yield back the balance of my time.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I yield back.
Mr. Rogers. Thank you, and thank you for you comments.
I would remind the other Members that they can provide
opening statements for the record. When we have smaller panels,
I will work with the Ranking Member to arrange for other
members to give 1--or 2-minute opening statements, but today we
have a very large panel, and we are going to be here for awhile
just getting through their testimony. So we will refrain today.
We are pleased to have with us a distinguished panel of
witnesses before us on this important topic. Let me remind the
witnesses that their entire written statements will appear in
the record. Therefore, we ask that, due to the number of
witnesses on the panel, that you strive to limit your oral
testimony to 5 minutes.
Mr. Rogers. At this time, the Chair recognizes Dr. James
Carafano of The Heritage Foundation to testify.
STATEMENT OF DR. JAMES CARAFANO, SENIOR RESEARCH FELLOW, THE
HERITAGE FOUNDATION
Mr. Carafano. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I am a New Yorker.
We talk pretty quick. So I can get through this in 5 minutes.
The Heritage Foundation and the Center for Strategic
International Studies issued a report called DHS 2.0. One of
the recommendations was merger of the Customs and Border
Protection and ICE agencies. This recommendation was made by
about 30 individuals from academia, think tanks, some people
from the Hill working together. It is a collaborative
recommendation.
The inspiration behind the overall report was simply
recognition that, in Washington, bureaucracy can be created but
never destroyed. But it can be reorganized. And when you are in
a long-term conflict, you need organizations that are built and
structured to be there for the long term.
We took an object lesson from the creation of what became
the Department of Defense in 1947, which had fundamental flaws
which everyone recognized when the Department was created. Some
of those were fixed in 1949 that actually enabled a secretariat
that could actually have the capability to run the services
underneath them. Some of them didn't get fixed until the
Goldwater-Nichols Act of 1986, a mere 3 years before the end of
the Cold War, almost 40 years.
We think we can do a lot better. We think that the war on
terrorism is going to be a long, protracted conflict; and so we
need an organization that is structured for the long term and
that fixing the things that will make it more efficient and
effective are better done now regardless of the short-term pain
because in the end it will make us all safer in the long term.
Specifically on the CBP/ICE recommendation, the genesis of
the recommendation was really two points. One is that, in doing
the literature search and in interviewing individuals who had
been involved in putting together the Homeland Security Act of
2002, we simply could find no compelling argument for splitting
the organizations to begin with.
If you look, for example, in the Hart-Rudman Commission
which made a recommendation about creating a Department of
Homeland Security before 9/11, there is absolutely no
discussion at all about a necessity to split internal
enforcement or investigation from border security.
The second thing is, in looking at the operation of the
Department and recognizing all the problems of the
reorganization and getting started and everything else, we
simply couldn't determine any substantive benefit that had been
made from splitting the Department, nor could we determine any
substantive potential benefit of having them remain separate.
But there is an argument that the Department has gone
through an enormous amount of reorganization and turmoil, and
there is a question there, is there pain in further
organization. So I think it is worthwhile to ask the question,
is the pain worth the gain and is the gain substantial enough
to overcome the short-term problems of further disruption?
So I would offer up three criteria that we should use to
measure whether this is a good idea or not, and I would just
like to run through those very briefly.
The first one is, will it improve the overall management of
the Department, which we think is the absolutely most crucially
important thing. The only notion or the only idea worth
creating this Department was that we were going to gain the
benefits of integrating the activities of 22 agencies.
One of the most compelling findings of our report is that
the way we structured the four under secretary positions
doesn't help that. What we have done is created four
stovepipes, rather than using the under secretary positions for
doing the cross-cutting integration of Department activities.
We would much prefer restructuring the Department to have the
under secretary positions be responsible for activities that
integrate across the Department, rather than trying to command
separate agencies. So, therefore, we would argue that the BTS
under secretary would be better served doing something else and
that we had a single border services agency.
The second criteria that we would use to measure whether
this is a good idea or not is will this create strong
operational agencies? We think that the right model for this
Department is to split activities between operating agencies
and support activities. The operational agencies are
responsible for going out and catching and stopping terrorists
and doing the other statutory requirements of the Department,
and then there are support activities that are responsible for
supporting the Department overall and integrating them. We
think when you separate that you have stronger core
competencies and a more focused department.
So one of the other recommendations we made in our report
was to create the deputy as a chief operating officer and have
the agencies report directly to him and just have strong
operating agencies. If we want to do that, we have got to
reduce the number of operating agencies in the Department to
something that is manageable, that the deputy can actually
handle; and right now there are too many operating agencies in
the Department. So consolidating CBP and ICE would give the
deputy, I think, a reasonable span of control.
The third and I really think the most important criteria is
what we call ``envision the future.'' One of the problems we
had in debating the CBP and ICE merger is nobody could really
articulate for us how we want to address the problem in 5 to 10
years of--from the point of origin overseas of a bad thing or a
bad person, through the border, to internal enforcement. How do
you address that end-to-end problem? How do you decide where
you get your biggest bang for the buck? Where do you want to be
5 or 10 years from now in terms of securing the United States?
And, lacking that, it was actually kind of difficult to answer
these organizational questions.
We said, if somebody can sit down and articulate to us,
describe for me a vision of how you want to do border security
in 5 or 10 years, then we could articulate for you the right
organization to do that.
I think that the only solutions are comprehensive solutions
that really provide as much as possible the integration of
activities from the point of foreign origin through internal
enforcement. So I think what you really want is an operational
agency with as broad jurisdiction as possible. So, for example,
I would argue not only for the integration of CBP and ICE, for
also for all the visa issuance and monitoring activities into
one single agency. Because in law enforcement, law enforcement
doesn't have separate jurisdictions because they like it, they
have separate jurisdictions because they don't have any other
choice. In a perfect world, they would have as broad as
jurisdictions as they possibly could to do that activity.
Then, finally, my last point is, is where do we go from
here? And we argued for really a three-step process. Actually,
we argued for something different, because we didn't have any
confidence in the Congress in creating permanent Homeland
Security committees, and then we were proved absolutely wrong.
But now that we have permanent committees and we have a good
partner with DHS to work on these problems, we would recommend
a three-step process.
Step one would be to fix management first, to key on the
most critical management activities in DHS that can make it a
more effective integrated Department. I think this primarily
relates to integration at the under secretary level. And the
Congress and DHS Secretary, fix those first, get the management
issues the best. We think that eliminating the BTS under
secretary would be part of that.
The second one is we think there is a need for something
equivalent to the QDR in DHS, a quadrennial security review in
which the Department every 4 years sits down and maps out its
resources, its requirements, its strategy, and provides a
comprehensive assessment to the Congress of where it wants to
go. Then we would see that QSR being done in the near term in
DHS, and that that would then serve as a basis for further
integration of the Department.
Then the last thing we recommended was a one-time national
security review, kind of an independent assessment to the
Congress of the work of the QSR and, quite frankly, we think
the work of the QDR as well to really say, does all this come
together into one coherent package? And to really give the
Congress something to chew on in looking at a way ahead in the
future.
With that, I look forward to your questions.
Mr. Rogers. Thank you.
[The statement of Mr. Carafano follows:]
Prepared Statement of Dr. James Jay Carafano, Senior Research Fellow,
The Heritage Foundation
Mr. Chairman, I am honored to testify before the committee
today.\1\ Thank you for the opportunity to discuss the proposal to
merge the Department of Homeland Security's (DHS) Customs and Border
Protection (CBP) and Immigration-Customs Enforcement (ICE) agencies.
This was one of the key recommendations of the task force chaired by
myself, on behalf of The Heritage Foundation, and David Heyman of The
Center for Strategic and International Studies. The task force's
report, DHS 2.0: Rethinking the Department of Homeland Security,\2\
evaluated the department's capacity to fulfill its mandate as set out
in the Homeland Security Act of 2002.
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\1\ The Heritage Foundation is a public policy, research, and
educational organization operating under Section 501(C)(3). It is
privately supported, and receives no funds from any government at any
level, nor does it perform any government or other contract work. The
Heritage Foundation is the most broadly supported think tank in the
United States. During 2003, it had more than 200,000 individual,
foundation, and corporate supporters representing every state in the
United States. Its 2003 income came from the following sources:
Individuals--52%
Foundations--19%
Corporations--8%
Investment Income--18%
Publication Sales and Other--3%
The top five corporate givers provided The Heritage Foundation with
5 percent of its 2003 income. The Heritage Foundation's books are
audited annually by the national accounting firm of Deloitte & Touche.
A list of major donors is available from The Heritage Foundation upon
request. Members of The Heritage Foundation staff testify as
individuals discussing their own independent research. The views
expressed are their own, and do not reflect an institutional position
for The Heritage Foundation or its board of trustees.
\2\ The task force co-chairmen and participants would like to
acknowledge the helpful support provided by the Center for the Study of
the Presidency and the use of its online Homeland Security Database and
Information Exchange Site, which facilitated the task force's
deliberations. The site is located at http://www.thepresidency.org/
hsdatabase.htm.
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In my testimony, I will address, 1) the report's proposal for
merging CBP and ICE and how it was developed, 2) standards that could
be used to evaluate the recommendation, and 3) possible next steps for
the department and Congress.
Before I discuss the recommendation to create a single border
services agency, I would like to share with the committee our rationale
for undertaking this study and why the task force feels it is
imperative this issue receive prompt attention from Congress and the
department's new leadership.
We have learned much since 9/11. Americans have had time to dwell
on the challenges of protecting the nation against foreign threats in
the 21st century and to think about the kinds of institutions we need
to address these dangers in the decades ahead. In particular, it is
time to reconsider the role of the newly established Department of
Homeland Security in this effort. Experience reminds us that it takes
only a few years for bureaucracies to become entrenched. After that
they are impossible to change. The creation of the Department of
Defense is a case in point. During the debates over the 1947 National
Security Act and again as president, Eisenhower lobbied for
reorganizing the Pentagon to ensure the armed forces would work closely
together. He failed to overcome the political opposition and the
service parochialisms that blocked reforms. As a result, fundamental
problems in joint operations went unaddressed until 1986 and the
passage of the Goldwater-Nichols Act.\3\ The lesson is clear. Fix them
at the beginning or live with the mistakes for a long time.
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\3\ James R. Locher III, Victory on the Potomac: The Goldwater-
Nichols Act Unifies the Pentagon (College Station: Texas A&M University
Press, 2002), pp. 25-31.
The Recommendation to Merge CBP and ICE
The proposal to consolidate CBP and ICE was developed by a task
force with members from academia, research centers, the private sector,
and Congress and chaired by homeland security experts at The Heritage
Foundation and The Center for Strategic and International Studies. The
task force examined the effectiveness of the new department in four
areas: management, roles and missions, authorities, and resources.
Based on analysis, conducted through seminars, an extensive
literature search, and interviews, the task force developed 40 major
recommendations for improving the oversight, organization, and
operation of DHS. The findings and recommendations of the task force
can be found on The Heritage Foundation's web site at http://
www.heritage.org/Research/HomelandDefense/sr02.cfm.
Specifically regarding challenges related to border security the
task force observed that before the creation of DHS, seven agencies,
among others, were involved in securing our borders, enforcing our
immigration laws, and protecting our transportation system. They were:
(1) U.S. Customs; (2) the Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS);
(3) the Executive Office of Immigration Review (EOIR); (4) the Bureau
of Consular Affairs; (5) the U.S. Coast Guard; (6) the Transportation
Security Administration (TSA); and (7) the Animal, Plant, Health
Inspection Service (APHIS). Agency missions overlapped. It was
difficult to resolve operational or policy conflict without resorting
to a cumbersome, inefficient, and ineffective interagency process.
The creation of the DHS was supposed to consolidate agencies with
overlapping missions and to better integrate the national border
security effort. And it has succeeded to some degree. The INS has been
abolished. Immigration border inspectors and Border Patrol Agents have
been merged with most of U.S. Customs and the border inspectors of
APHIS to create CBP. Customs and Immigration Investigators and
Detention and Removal Officers were combined into a new organization,
ICE, responsible for ``internal enforcement.'' The two agencies were
assigned to a Border and Transportation Security (BTS) directorate
under the Undersecretary for Border and Transportation Security.
In ``consolidating'' responsibility for border, immigration, and
transportation security, DHS actually increased the number of involved
agencies to eight and created more problems that now need solving. In
addition, it has failed to clearly delineate the agencies' missions
within DHS that also have border, immigration, or transportation
security responsibilities.
Additionally, the task force concluded that the split of
responsibilities between CBP and ICE was done without a compelling
reason. The task force was not able to find any convincing argument
that there were unsolvable problems in the legacy agencies of having
border agents and internal enforcement investigators working in the
same organization. Indeed, in various interviews, not one person was
able to coherently argue why CBP and ICE were created as separate
operational agencies. In addition, the Hart-Rudman Commission, which
recommended creating a national homeland security agency before the 9/
11 attacks, saw no need to split border and internal enforcement
authority.\4\ Some have analogized the separation to deciding to break
up the New York Police Department into two separate agencies--one
housing the uniformed ``beat cops'' (analogous to CBP's uniformed
officers), and the other housing the detectives (analogous to ICE's
plain-clothes investigators).
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\4\ The United States Commission on National Security/21st Century,
``Road Map for National Security: Imperative for Change,'' (February
15, 2001), p. 12, www.au.af.mil/au/awc/awcgate/nssg/phaseIIIfr.pdf.
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The reorganization exchanged one seam in U.S. security for another.
Before the creation of DHS, ``people'' and ``things'' entering the
country were handled under separate systems. There were no common
policies, programs, or standards. Dealing with dangers that involved
both required coordination between two different agencies. Today,
travelers and goods are handled by an integrated system, but border
operations and interior enforcement are now bifurcated into two
different organizations creating a new requirement for interagency
coordination.
Complicating the border security picture is the mission of TSA.
While most Americans associate TSA with ground screeners at airports,
the Aviation and Transportation Security Act creating TSA also charges
TSA with responsibility ``for security in all modes of
transportation,'' including ensuring the ``adequacy of security
measures for the transportation of cargo.'' This has injected TSA into
the realm of border security, and created friction with other DHS
agencies historically in charge of securing the movement of cargo into
the United States--CBP and Coast Guard. In addition, BTS has not been
particularly effective in clearly delineating the relative
responsibilities of CBP and TSA.
Another complicating factor is that under the Homeland Security
Act, responsibility for ensuring that terrorists do not obtain visas to
enter the United States is shared between DHS and the State
Department's (DOS') Bureau of Consular Affairs. Integration of their
activities and supporting intelligence services represents a
significant interagency challenge.\5\ For example, the process for
negotiating a Memorandum of Understanding between DOS and DHS
delineating their respective responsibilities took over a year.
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\5\ James Jay Carafano and Ha Nguyen, ``Better Intelligence Sharing
for Visa Issuance and Monitoring: An Imperative for Homeland
Security,'' October 27, 2003 (Backgrounder #1699), www.heritage.org/
Research/HomelandDefense/BG1699.cfm.
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DHS 2.0 proposed rationalizing border security and immigration
enforcement by merging CBP and ICE and eliminating BTS. The directorate
has neither the staff nor infrastructure to integrate the operations of
CBP and ICE on a consistent basis. Nor does it have a policy operation
with sufficient influence with the secretariat to resolve interagency
conflicts. Merging CBP and ICE into a single border services agency
will bring together all of the tools of effective border and
immigration enforcement--Inspectors, Border Patrol Agents, Special
Agents, Detention and Removal Officers, and Intelligence Analysts--and
realize the objective of creating a single border services agency.
With the merger of CBP and ICE into a single agency, there is no
need for the BTS ``middle management'' layer. All operational agencies
should have a direct reporting relationship to the Secretary via the
Deputy. This will allow for a better, DHS-wide (including the Coast
Guard) policy and operational strategic approach to border security
matters.
Additionally, splitting responsibility for visa issuance and
management between DHS and DOS was a mistake. Operations could be
managed more efficiently under one department and would place
responsibility and accountability in one place. The choice is
difficult. Arguably DOS is better positioned to consider the
diplomatic, economic, and cultural issues at stake in issuing visas. On
the other hand, if DHS were responsible it could seamlessly integrate
visa management into a merged border services agency, thus overseeing
the movement of people and goods from the foreign point of origin to
the interior of the United States. Any consideration of a CBP/ICE
merger should also rethink the management of activities for visa
issuance and monitoring.
All the Right Moves?
Perhaps the most valid criticism of the DHS 2.0 proposal to create
a single border services agency is that it would heap more turmoil on
organizations that have already seen substantial disruption. In short,
critics argue the pain of further change is not worth the gain. Three
measures could serve as a guide for determining whether further
reorganization is warranted. Any proposed changes should:
Improve overall management of the department as a
first priority;
Divide department activities between operational
responsibilities and support functions under different chains
of command.
Implement a future vision of the department.
The proposal to create a single border services agency should be
judged against these standards. I would like to address each in turn.
Focusing on Management
In a recent report the DHS Inspector General identified department-
wide management as a significant issue of concern. ``Integrating its
many separate components into a single, effective, efficient, and
economical department,'' the IG wrote, ``remains one of DHS'' biggest
challenges.'' \6\ The weaknesses in DHS management are critical because
they cut against the core rationale for passing the Homeland Security
Act: gaining the synergy of having most of the key federal agencies
with homeland security responsibilities grouped in one department.
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\6\ Office of the Inspector General, ``Major Management Challenges
Facing the Department of Homeland Security,'' Department of Homeland
Security, December 2004, p. 1.
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The creation of a single border services agency should only be
undertaken if it will help address the most significant management
challenges of DHS.
The task force concluded that merging CBP and ICE provides an
opportunity to substantially strengthen the DHS secretariat. Currently,
the undersecretary positions in DHS are used to command subordinate
agencies, rather than contributing to the cross-cutting integration of
department activities and strengthening coordination with other federal
agencies, state and local governments, the private sector, and foreign
governments. Merging CBP and ICE into a single agency would eliminate
the need for a BTS Undersecretary and allow the department to use that
position to enhance the capacity of the secretariat to provide stronger
leadership for the department overall.
DHS 2.0 proposed to have the new border services agency report
directly to the Deputy Secretary, who would act as the department's
chief operating office (COO), as well assume the responsibilities of
the Undersecretary for Management. This change would address one of the
key concerns expressed in the DHS IG report on the major management
challenges of the department--confusing and duplicative reporting
chains. Currently, DHS employs a concept called ``dual
accountability,'' where agency staff are asked to report both through
their undersecretaries and chief officers in the secretariat.\7\ This
dual reporting system has proven contentious and inefficient.
Eliminating the ``middle management'' over operating agencies will
create a single chain of command and allow the deputy to more
effectively direct financial, information management, acquisition, and
personnel initiatives that cut across the DHS.
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\7\ Office of the Inspector General, ``Major Management
Challenges,'' p. 2.
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Consolidation is also important for making the deputy's duties
manageable. If the deputy is to serve as an effective COO, his span of
control needs to be reasonable. This would require consolidation of
existing organizations within the DHS. The merger of ICE and CBP help
reduce the scope of COO responsibilities.
The need for a BTS directorate over ICE and CBP, can also be
eliminated by moving oversight functions, such as policy, planning, and
stakeholder outreach, into the secretariat where they more properly
belong. To address this, our report also called for reconfiguring two
undersecretary positions. First, DHS 2.0 proposed an Undersecretary for
Policy and Planning, which would include an Assistant Secretary for
International Affairs. Second, the report recommended eliminating the
Undersecretary for Emergency Preparedness & Response (EP&R) and
replacing this position with an Undersecretary for Protection and
Preparedness who would oversee critical infrastructure protection,
preparedness, and state and local governments/private sector
coordination efforts. This would consolidate the following agencies:
the Infrastructure Protection component of the Information Analysis and
Infrastructure Protection Directorate; Office of State and Local
Government Coordination and Preparedness (OSLGCP); the non-operational
transportation infrastructure protection mission of TSA, the
``preparedness'' piece of the EP&R Directorate; the Office of Private
Sector Liaison, and; grant making authority for DHS.
One consideration for the Congress and the department's new
leadership is the potential of using the creation of a single border
services agency as a catalyst for overall reforms in the department,
improvements that would enhance the capacity of the secretariat to
integrate and coordinate activities across DHS.
Operating Responsibilities and Support Functions
A second measure that should be used to judge the value of creating
a single agency is whether this initiative would sharpen the
operational effectiveness of the department. Dividing functional
responsibilities in the department between ``operational'' agencies and
``support'' organizations is a sound management principle because it
focuses agencies on critical missions. It also helps to develop strong
institutional cultures. The Defense Department explicitly follows this
model. Combatant commanders are charged with ``running the war.'' The
services are responsible for ``raising, training, preparing, and
sustaining'' the force. It is a model that works well because it
encourages organizations to focus on their core competencies. A DHS
analogy would be to establish robust operational agencies that
concentrate on stopping terrorists and conducting the department's
other statutory missions apart from the staffs and directorates
responsible for conducting planning, coordination, policymaking,
budgeting, and support activities for the department as a whole.
A single border services organization responsible for visa issuance
and monitoring, managing points of entry, patrolling the borders, and
interior enforcement should only be established if it will create a
stronger and more effective operating agency.
In recent hearings before the Senate Homeland Security and
Government Affairs Committee, Michael Wermuth, director of Homeland
Security at RAND, was skeptical of the proposal to merge CBP and ICE
concluding that ``a good argument can be made that the skills required
for the performance of those separate tasks require different
recruiting, retention, training performance evaluation, operational
procedures, and other related activities.''\8\ Indeed, both agencies
are currently struggling with the challenge of cross-training skills
and building a common culture among agency personnel. Wermuth argued
for a comprehensive assessment to determine whether a single
organization could appropriately manage the plethora of skills and
activities involved in overseeing the movement of goods, people, and
services across America's borders.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\8\ Michael A. Wermuth, Testimony before the Senate Homeland
Security and Government Affairs Committee, January 26, 2005, p. 5,
hsgac.senate.gov/--files/WermuthCT233.pdf.
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Concerns over the capacity of an integrated agency to train,
manage, and retain personnel are worthwhile considerations. These,
however, are not issues of organizational design, but challenges for
human capital and information technology programs. Indeed, creating a
single operating agency might enhance prospects for establishing more
robust personnel programs, offering a wider range of career progression
and professional development options, opportunities for both cross-
training and specialization, and an increased capacity to shift and
surge resources. In addition, creating a single agency may offer
advantages for integrating and consolidating information technology
programs. Any consideration to merge CBP and ICE must be made in tandem
with discussions over the scope and structure of the human capital and
information technology initiatives that will be instituted to support
consolidating the agencies.\9\
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\9\ James Jay Carafano, ``The Homeland Security Authorization Bill:
Streamlining the Budget Process'' April 15, 2004 (Executive Memorandum
#923), www.heritage.org/Research/HomelandDefense/em923.cfm. For
example, one area where consolidation may contribute to improving
operational performance is in the implementation of Chimera. The
Enhanced Border Security and Visa Entry Reform Act of 2002 requires the
integration of all data systems related to visa issuance and monitoring
into Chimera, an interoperable, interagency computer-based data
management system. The law assigns the DHS primary responsibility for
developing an overarching information architecture to share immigration
and intelligence data and calls for creating an eight-member commission
to oversee Chimera. To date, little progress has been made in
implementing the system.
Envisioning the Future
A third way to evaluate the benefit of further organizational
innovation is to measure how change will contribute to the long-term
development of the department. One hotly debated issue relates to the
division of roles and missions within the department. The creation of
DHS was supposed to consolidate agencies with overlapping and
complementary missions. Since its formation, DHS has made some positive
efforts to group the right activities under the right organization.
Moving the Office of Air and Maritime Interdiction under CBP and
shifting the Federal Marshal Service to ICE are cases in point.
However, a broader assessment needs to be made across the department.
There is reluctance to undertake such a review based on the argument
that the organizations have not yet absorbed all the change heaped upon
them. Such thinking is shortsighted. The war against terrorism will be
a protracted conflict and DHS needs to be structured and resourced for
a long campaign.
DHS needs to be organized not to accommodate the present, but to
build toward the ideal organization of the future. Therefore, the
department needs to articulate how it envisions conducting its missions
five to ten years from now and let this vision drive the organizational
design, particularly the structure of border security operations.
The department's current organization reflects an outdated vision
of how to protect America's borders. Visa issuance, border security,
and internal enforcement are divided into three separate agencies,
suggesting that threats and countermeasures can be neatly segmented in
discrete activities. There are, however, no frontiers in 21st century
national security, nor are all border security issues best handled at
the border. Protecting the United States against terrorist threats and
significantly reducing transnational crime (e.g. drug, arms, and human
trafficking) and environmental dangers (such as contagious diseases and
invasive species), as well as illegal entry and unlawful presence in
the United States requires activities that address these challenges
from the point of foreign origin through transiting the border, and
within U.S. territory. Distinguishing clear lines of responsibility
between foreign, border, and domestic security is a thing of the past.
Nor can responsibilities for security, promoting economic growth, and
protecting the liberties of American citizens (as well as visitors and
international business partners) be considered in isolation.
DHS' future vision must not only speak to how to integrate
activities, but how to establish priorities and make trade-offs,
focusing investments on where the nation can get the biggest ``bang''
for its security ``buck.'' At least three major issues should be
addressed.
First, the vision must make hard choices in deciding between
investments in monitoring legal means of trade and travel and combating
illegal entry into the United States. Improving the monitoring of legal
means to enter the country, including improving physical infrastructure
at points of entry and promoting programs like US-VISIT \10\ and the
Smart Borders Initiative,\11\ should have the highest priority. Most
goods, services, and people enter and exit the United States through
legitimate networks. These networks are the lifeline of the U.S.
economy and must be appropriately managed and protected. Likewise,
virtually all known terrorists who have entered the United States came
in through legal channels.\12\ In addition, as the United States
improves its capacity to reduce entry into the country at places other
than legal points of entry, illicit activities attempting to penetrate
legal networks of trade and travel will likely increase. Effective
border services must already be in place to meet this challenge, if the
United States hopes to improve its overall security.
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\10\ The purpose of the United States Visitor and Immigrant Status
Indicator Technology (US-VISIT) program is to establish a system that
can collect, maintain, and share biometric and biographic data on
foreign nationals for border and immigration enforcement. The goal of
the system is to screen all foreign nationals from non-visa-waiver
countries entering and exiting the United States. See James Jay
Carafano, ``The Homeland Security Budget Request for FY 2005:
Assessments and Proposals,'' Backgrounder #1731 March 5, 2004,
www.heritage.org/Research/NationalSecurity/bg1731.cfm.
\11\ The National Strategy for Homeland Security calls for the
employment of technologies to establish ``smart borders'' that promote
the efficient flow of people, goods, and conveyances while providing
greater security. Office of the President, ``The National Strategy for
Homeland,'' (July 2002), p. 22, www.whitehouse.gov/homeland/book/nat--
strat--hls.pdf. In December 2001, the ``United States and Canada agreed
on a Smart Border Declaration and a 30 point action plan to implement
smart borders. Office of the Press Secretary, ``US-Canada Smart Border/
30 Point Action Plan Update,'' (December 6, 2002), www.whitehouse.gov/
news/releases/2002/12/20021206-1.html. See also, Andre Belelieu,
``Canada Alert: The Smart Border Process at Two: Losing Momentum''
Hemisphere Focus, Center for Strategic and International Studies, XI/31
(December 10, 2003), pp. 1-8, www.csis.org/americas/pubs/hf--v11--
31.pdf.
\12\ Carafano and Nguyen, ``Better Intelligence Sharing for Visa
Issuance and Monitoring: An Imperative for Homeland Security.''
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Second, strategic choices need to be made on how to best affect the
flow of illegal entry and unlawful presence in the United States, as
well as transnational criminal activities and environmental threats.
Too often the assumption is made that the best place to reduce illegal
and illicit activity is by interdicting it at the border. In practice,
internal enforcement policies and programs, followed by working with
point of origin and transit countries, probably offer a greater return
on investment. In the long term, for example, initiatives such as
effective workplace enforcement (which discourages the employment of
individuals who are unlawfully present in the United States), domestic
counterterrorism investigations (including means to track down criminal
aliens),\13\ and the Millennium Challenge Account \14\ (which promotes
policies that advance economic growth, sound governance, and the rule
of law in foreign countries) will have a greater impact on illegal
entry and unlawful presence than hiring additional border guards.
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\13\ For example, terrorist investigations involving immigration
violations are an area in which much could be done immediately to
improve the role of state and local law enforcement. Domestic
counterterrorism comprises law enforcement efforts primarily by the
Federal Bureau of Investigation and ICE to identify, prevent, and
prosecute terrorists. One improvement would be to form cooperative
partnerships among federal, state, and local law enforcement agencies
for immigration investigations related to terrorism. While using state
and local law enforcement officers to enforce federal immigration laws
has been controversial, such programs may be appropriate for some
states and localities. In June 2002, the INS and the State of Florida
created a pilot program that could serve as a model for enhanced and
appropriate cooperation. The program trained selected state and local
law officers to assist in domestic counterterrorism immigration
investigations. The Florida officers were required to be members of the
state counterterrorism task force and could engage in these activities
only when taking part in counterterrorism operations supervised by the
federal INS officers. When the INS became part of the DHS, the
program's memorandum of understanding was renewed. The Florida pilot
program represents an ideal model for the limited and appropriate use
of state and local support in expanding the DHS' investigatory
capacity. Congress should provide sufficient resources to allow the DHS
to offer similar programs to other states and U.S. territories. See,
James Jay Carafano, Paul Rosenzweig, and Alane Kochems, ``An Agenda for
Increasing State and Local Government Efforts to Combat Terrorism,''
February 24, 2005 (Backgrounder #1826).
\14\ In March 2002, President George W. Bush proposed the creation
of the Millennium Challenge Account (MCA), a new foreign assistance
program to low-income countries that demonstrate a strong commitment to
``ruling justly,'' ``investing in people,'' and ``establishing economic
freedom.'' Ana I. Eiras, ``Make the Rule of Law a Necessary Condition
for the Millennium Challenge Account,'' March 7, 2003 (Backgrounder
#1634), www.heritage.org/Research/TradeandForeignAid/BG1634.cfm.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Third, addressing the challenge of illegal entry between the points
of entry cannot be ignored, but clear priorities have to be
established. Investments must be made in resources that create a
system-of-systems approach to security. Rather than trying to control
the entire border, the United States needs a system that direct the
right capabilities to the right place at the right time to provide an
appropriate response. Key investments include a combination of high
speed and armed airborne assets and robust airborne sensor
capabilities. These assets need to be linked to an intelligence and
early warning network that provides knowledge of activities in the
maritime domain and along the border, as well as to means to
effectively analyze and share that knowledge. Modernizing CBP's air and
marine interdiction capabilities in concert with increasing funding for
the Coast Guard's Integrated Deepwater acquisition program, for
example, ought to take precedence.\15\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\15\ Robin F. Laird, et al, ``The Challenges to Developing a
Effective Maritime Security Architecture,'' in James Jay Carafano and
Alane Kochems, eds., Making the Seas Safer, Heritage Special Report No.
3, (February 17, 2005), pp. 20-27, www.heritage.org/Research/
HomelandDefense/loader.cfm?url=/commonspot/security/
getfile.cfm&PageID=74871.
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To address these three issues, DHS must conduct a national
assessment to determine the system-of-systems it requires. Any system
will need to include all the ``layers of security'' that impact on
securing the border. Congress and the administration should use this
analysis to determine where their efforts should be directed and
whether creating a single border services agency with jurisdiction over
all activities related to the transiting of U.S. borders would improve
the department's allocation of assets and effectiveness.
Next Steps
DHS 2.0 called for the President and Congress to establish a non-
partisan commission to review the performance of the department and
assess its capacity to fulfill the missions outlined in the Homeland
Security Act and report back within six months. Without permanent
oversight committees in the Senate and House, the task force felt
Congress would be unable to effectively address the challenge of
restructuring the DHS. Things have changed. The task force applauds the
action taken in both chambers to create permanent committees. With
Congressional oversight of the department's management now consolidated
in appropriate committees, Congress could consider alternative paths
for moving forward. One would have Congress legislate key management
reforms and establish a routine authorization process. Then, Congress,
jointly with the leadership of DHS, can address reorganization issues,
such as merging CBP and ICE, in a more deliberative manner through a
combination of reviews conduct by DHS and an independent panel
answering to the Congress.\16\ This strategy might proceed as follows.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\16\ James Jay Carafano, Baker Spring, and Jack Spencer ``National
Security Requires a National Perspective--and Congressional Action,''
February 17, 2005 (Executive Memorandum #959), www.heritage.org/
Research/NationalSecurity/em959.cfm.
Step #1: Legislate Undersecretaries for Policy and Protection and
Preparedness and abolish the Undersecretaries for Emergency
Preparedness and Response and Management. Establish Chief Operating
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Officer functions under the Deputy Secretary.
Step #2: Implement an authorization process for DHS. An
authorization bill for the DHS could serve as a critical statutory
management tool providing the means to exercise stronger oversight of
important DHS activities such as key personnel programs, performance of
critical missions, major research programs, and information technology
investments.
Step# 3: Establish a requirement for periodic reviews. Congress
should establish a requirement that DHS conduct quadrennial reviews of
the department's strategies, force structure, resources, and
appreciation of the threat. The Quadrennial Homeland Security-Review
(QHSR) should be timed to coincide with the mid-point of the
presidential term. The first QHSR should be specifically tasked to
establish a future security vision. That vision will inform the
decision over whether to merge CBP and ICE.
Step #4: Create a one-time National Security Review Panel. In
parallel with the first QHSR, the Congress should establish a non-
partisan National Security Review Panel (NSRP). The NSRP should be
charged with providing an independent assessment of the QHSR as well as
assessing the efforts of the DHS in the context of larger national
security programs and strategies.
Conclusion
The creation of the DHS was supposed to consolidate agencies with
overlapping missions and to better integrate the national border
security effort. Any proposal, including merging CBP and ICE should be
evaluated against whether it will improve the overall management of
DHS, whether it will further delineate department activities between
operational and support functions with each under a separate chain of
command, and whether the action implements a future strategic vision of
the department.
Once again, thank you, Mr. Chairman and the rest of the Committee
for holding this hearing and for inviting me to participate. I look
forward to answering any questions you might have.
Mr. Rogers. The Chair now recognizes Mr. Klug, who is a
former Special Agent in Charge of ICE.
Mr. Klug. Former Associate Special Agent in Charge, but I
appreciate the promotion. Thank you.
Mr. Rogers. Thank you.
Mr. Klug. I am a New Yorker, also, so I will speak quickly.
STATEMENT OF KENNETH C. KLUG, FORMER SPECIAL AGENT IN CHARGE,
U.S. IMMIGRATION AND CUSTOMS ENFORCEMENT, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF
HOMELAND SECURITY
Mr. Klug. Good morning, Mr. Chairman and distinguished
members of the subcommittee. It is an honor and a privilege to
appear before you today to present testimony in furtherance of
reuniting the enforcement and regulatory functions of what were
the U.S. Customs Service and the Immigration and Naturalization
Service.
The majority of my 25-year career was spent with the United
States Customs Service. The final 2 years was spent with
Immigration and Customs Enforcement. The majority of my time in
the last 4 years of my tenure was spent rebuilding the Special
Agent in Charge New York office which had been destroyed during
the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001.
When the inspectors and special agents were separated into
Customs and Border Protection, CBP and ICE, their
collaboration, cooperation, and teamwork immediately began to
diminish. Since the separation of the two agencies, there has
been a sharp decline in the traditional Customs/Border-related
investigations, resulting in a drastic reduction in narcotics,
illegal merchandise, munitions, and currency seizures.
The decision to split Customs and Immigration into ICE and
CBP seriously undermined rather than strengthened the new
Department's law enforcement's critical mission. The decision
to separate the two agencies reflects an absence of
understanding in the matter of processes, relationships, and
how the border environment and Federal law enforcement
functions most optimally.
Inspectors are first to see passengers and merchandise at
the border crossings. Agents investigate violations emanating
from cross-border movements. As such, the Nation has a vested
interest in these two law enforcement forces being united in
leadership, resources, strategy, method, and communications.
Instead of streamlining the flow of information vital to
our national security, the new structure places roadblocks in
the way. The separation of inspectors and special agents caused
a gap in the flow of information, detracting from border
enforcement and port security. The creation of ICE was
tantamount to building a house without a foundation. The
administration failed to conduct a comprehensive review in the
beginning relative to the complexity or feasibility of
combining these two diverse agencies. No study, cursory or in
depth, was requested to be produced in anticipation of the
proposed separation, as far as I understand.
I am certain that if an independent group such as the
Government Accountability Office had conducting a study at that
time, it would have undoubtedly led to an understanding of the
symbiotic relationship and intermeshed roles of the agents and
inspectors. Consequently, the separation of CBP and ICE would
have never occurred.
Furthermore, I believe that an understanding of the current
flawed situation inevitably will lead to the conclusion that a
merger would correct this irrational design that has hampered
DHS's ability to progress in the arena of border enforcement.
From the onset, we were told that ICE was created to
protect the Nation's border foremost against terrorism. We in
the New York field office that had firsthand witnessed the
death and destruction on September 11 welcomed the opportunity
to contribute to this effort. We were anxious to engage in the
fight and looked forward to our role in this important mission.
We awaited direction from the agency in the form of a mission
statement. No such statement was forthcoming, and inexplicably
to date no succinct mission statement regarding our role in the
war on terrorism has been issued. Additionally, no specific
enforcement priorities have been identified.
Like many of my colleagues, I left the agency rather than
stay and watch it helplessly while it declined. My
understanding is that ICE currently has in excess of 800
vacancies which have been caused by the mass exodus of
disillusioned employees and a hiring freeze.
CBP inherited Customs' cutting edge computer technology and
administrative systems. ICE inherited the INS computer systems
that were archaic at best. When we advised ICE's new management
team that the systems were not adequate, they repeatedly told
us that we didn't understand the systems and they were in fact
superior. Of course, the contrary was true.
As Congress has repeatedly stated in the past, the
Immigration systems provided the user with no ability to track
the use of funds or live within its allotted budget. Even
today, the ICE administration systems fail to track the budget,
procurement, property and travel and fail to support the
agency. This has been repeatedly evidenced by the continuing
need to have independent auditors from the private sector
review the ICE funding levels and anticipated expenditures.
After 2 years, this agency does not have accountability over
the funds provided by this committee.
A merger of ICE and CBP would greatly reduce the
duplication of effort and costs associated with the current
separations of information technology systems.
I have yet to hear one individual within DHS articulate a
single sound reason for the continued separation of Customs and
Border Protection and the Immigration and Customs Enforcement.
One very vague explanation is that CBP will handle border
enforcement and ICE will be responsible for interior
enforcement. This reasoning is fatally flawed. Border
enforcement and interior enforcement cannot be separated. This
is the same defective logic which created the agency in the
first place; and, once again, this reasoning displays a
complete lack of understanding of the agencies' roles and
jurisdictional responsibilities.
In a similar fashion to CBP, ICE's jurisdictional
responsibilities relate to a must-have nexus to the border.
ICE's jurisdictional responsibilities directly relate to cross-
border movement of people and merchandise. Illegal aliens cross
our borders. Those involved in immigration fraud cross our
borders. Narcotics cross our borders. Trademark-restricted
merchandise crosses our borders. Illicit funds cross our
borders. Munitions and high technology cross our borders. And
terrorists cross our borders. ICE is responsible for pursuing
criminal investigations into all of these critical areas.
However, we have separated the agencies responsible for
investigating these important violations, and that undermines
our national security.
The situation is analogous to separating the uniformed
police officers from the detective force. By merging CBP and
all of the entities involved in border and immigration
enforcement, responsibilities would be brought together with a
single mission and chain of command. We will not realize the
objective of creating a single border enforcement agency until
special agents, inspectors, border patrol agents, intelligence
analysts, retention and removal officers are brought together
under one roof. Under a unified command structure, a single
border agency would be far more productive.
There are a myriad of reasons why initial separation of
these agencies never made sense and a number of additional
justifications as to why combining CBP and ICE is best for this
Nation and its war on terrorism. One thing is certain. Whatever
the decision of Congress is regarding the merging of these two
agencies, it should be done quickly. Should we continue on the
current configuration, that would mean maintaining the
duplicity of tasks, wasting tax dollars, and perpetuating the
downward slide of its employees and morale. Simply stated, a
house divided cannot stand.
Mr. Rogers. Thank you, Mr. Klug.
[The statement of Mr. Klug follows:]
Prepared Statement of Kenneth c. Klug
Good morning Mr. Chairman and distinguished members of the
subcommittee. It is an honor and a privilege to appear before you today
to present testimony in furtherance of reuniting the enforcement and
regulatory functions of what were the U.S. Customs Service and the
Immigration and Naturalization Service. The majority of my twenty-five
year law enforcement career was spent with the U.S. Customs Service. I
held positions in several field offices on both the regulatory and
enforcement sides of the Customs Service. I spent the final two years
of my career with the Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) before
retiring in July 2004. Most of my efforts during the latter years of
federal service were focused on rebuilding the Special Agent-in-Charge
New York office, which had been destroyed as a result of the terrorist
attacks on September 11th, 2001.
For over two centuries, the U.S. Customs Service has facilitated
the flow of our nation's commerce while protecting American's business
and populous from contraband and more recently terrorist threats. U.S.
Customs has always been at the forefront of protecting our nation's
borders. A notable example is when a Customs Inspector in Port Angeles,
Washington intercepted terrorist Ahmed Ressam who had driven off the
ferry from Victoria, B.C., destined for Los Angeles airport with 135
pounds of bomb making ingredients hidden in the trunk of his car. U.S.
Customs personnel apprehended him after a foot chase through the
streets of Port Angeles almost certainly averting a major disaster. The
U.S. Customs Service garnered many similar front page headlines with
numerous successful investigations and its many innovative impact
programs.
Legacy Customs was comprised of two disciplines, the regulatory
side, which included the uniformed inspectional force that the
traveling public is familiar with and the investigative function which
included the offices of Intelligence, Air and Marine units. The two
sides of the agency shared a symbiotic relationship that led to many
successful investigations in the enforcement of numerous domestic and
international laws. When the Inspectors and the Special Agents were
separated into Customs and Border Protection (CBP) and ICE, their
collaboration, cooperation and teamwork immediately began to diminish.
The current ICE administration paints a favorable picture of the
existing situation. It uses superfluous adjective and adverbs along
with rhetoric to disguise its current problems. The reality is that ICE
statistics are embarrassing compared to those numbers produced before
the merger. Since the combining of the two new agencies there has been
a sharp decline in the traditional ``Customs'' related investigations
resulting in a drastic reduction in narcotics, illegal merchandise,
munitions and currency seizures
It is the belief of many of my colleagues in the Office of
Investigations, that the concept of ICE and the subsequent division of
the Customs Service was fatally flawed from its inception. Frankly, the
creation of ICE was tantamount to building a house without a
foundation. Many in the law enforcement community found it quizzical as
to why all other agencies that were incorporated into DHS, such as
Secret Service, FEMA, Coast Guard, etc. maintained their identity in
the transition. The logic behind the concept of ICE became even more
arcane when the Federal Protective Service (F.P.S.), an agency
responsible for guarding government buildings, was taken from under the
General Services Administration and placed within ICE. To date, not a
single individual I have spoken with in the federal government can
supply any reason for incorporating F.P.S. into this border protection
agency. Furthermore, the administration did not conduct a comprehensive
review or issue a written report relative to the complexity or
feasibility of combining these diverse agencies. Apparently no study,
cursory or in depth, was requested or produced in anticipation of the
proposed separation. I am certain that if a study had been conducted by
an independent group such as the G.A.O., the separation would have
never been recommended and consequently not have occurred. Many of my
coworkers believed then and continue to feel that the proposed division
of Customs and INS was a result of the lack of specific knowledge on
the part of those individuals in the administration who proposed it.
They certainly had to be unaware of the precise missions of the two
agencies. The months following the creation of ICE proved to
substantiate that belief. All of our trepidations over the ill
conceived creation of ICE quickly began to be realized during the first
few months of the new agency's history.
From the onset we were told that ICE was created to protect the
nation's borders, foremost against terrorism. We in the New York field
office who had witnessed firsthand the death and destruction on
September 11th, welcomed the opportunity to contribute to this effort.
We were anxious to engage in the fight and looked forward to our role
in this important mission. We anticipated ICE's development and
communication of our new mission. We awaited a statement that clearly
outlined our long and short-term goals. We believed that
organizationally, the structure of ICE would be changed to reflect our
new mission. We looked forward to the publication of objectives in
furtherance of achieving our mission. We believed that the new policies
would be distributed to all employees. Two years after the creation of
ICE, none of these necessary precursors have been identified let alone
accomplished. The best ICE has been able to do thus far is produce a
nebulous statement as to what the agency purpose has become.
Inexplicably, to date no succinct mission statement has been issued and
no specific priorities have been identified.
Customs was always on the cutting edge of computer technology and
administrative systems. ICE inherited the INS computer systems that
were archaic at best. When we voiced our comments on the need to
improve or change these systems to ICE's new management team, we were
repeatedly told by ICE management that we didn't understand the new
systems. In fact ICE management informed us that they were superior to
the Customs systems. Of course the contrary was true, as Congress had
repeatedly said in the past, the Immigration systems provided the user
with no ability to track the use of funds or to live within their
allotted budget. Even today the ICE administrative systems that track
budget, procurement, property, travel and even time and attendance fail
to support the efficiencies of the service or promote accountability.
This has repeatedly been evidenced by the continuing need to have
independent auditors from the private sector review the ICE funding
levels and anticipated expenditures. After two years this agency does
not have accountability over the funds provided by this Committee. To
further exacerbate the situation the agency has failed to identify a
clear mission, establish measures of effectiveness and identify the
funding level required to pursue its mission. In effect, there is no
accountability for the proper expenditure of appropriated funds.
Instead of engaging in the war on terrorism we found ourselves
fighting with ICE management to upgrade computer systems and update its
programs. We were not requesting anything more than to bring us back to
a level of technology that had successfully supported our mission in
the past. It became apparent at this point in time that the
organization was unable or unwilling to entertain suggestions to
improve antiquated technology and flawed policies. Consequently I
decide along with many of my contemporaries to retire from the agency,
rather than stay and watch helplessly as it deteriorated. This loss of
experience and talent has further undermined the agency's ability to
succeed. Every current Customs employee I speak with today express
their desire to leave ICE, either by retiring when eligible or
transferring to another agency. ICE currently has in excess of 800
vacancies which have been caused by the mass exodus and a hiring
freeze. If CBP were successful in forming an investigative arm, all of
the former Customs Criminal Investigators I have spoken with would
readily apply for transfer.
In the interim, morale continues to fall rapidly within ICE.
Contributing to this downward trend is the discontinuance of some
positive employee initiatives. The Tuition Assistance Program which
helps subsidizes education costs, has been ceased. The small monetary
recognitions which were distributed to deserving employees in the
Customs Service during award ceremonies have disappeared under the new
regime. While other divisions within DHS enjoy adequate budgets and
recognize their employees for their efforts, ICE employees have
difficulty securing sufficient funding to pursue operational objectives
and receive no recognition for their often times exemplary performance.
The impression, whether true or not, is that the ICE hierarchy has
mismanaged the budget. When the ICE hierarchy was informed of the low
morale caused by the absence of these programs, they were either non
responsive or dismissive of our concerns. From speaking to many people
who remain with the agency, ICE continues to flounder.
A merger would reverse this disturbing situation and makes sense on
a number of different planes. The over riding reason is an improvement
in the efficiencies and effectiveness of government while eliminating
duplication of effort. Considerable cost savings of tax dollars could
also be realized. Some examples of how a merger will benefit
productivity while reducing costs are as follows:
1. It would be beneficial to have one air and marine unit under
a single command to support the Immigration/Customs enforcement
function.
2. Duplicated intelligence organizations would be melded into a
single cohesive unit producing a more efficient and
comprehensive intelligence product for the new agency.
3. The separate Internal Affairs units would join together
bolstering the efficiency and integrity of the new agency.
4. The forfeiture fund process would be more effective under a
single management and result in a more lucrative source that
would augment the new agency's budget.
5. Human Resource functions will be integrated into one unit,
unifying hiring and recruitment of core area positions.
6. Training staff and regiments would be integrated, resulting
in a cost savings and a more effective program.
7. A single Information and Technology division would upgrade
all systems databases and make them interoperable creating a
more powerful and cost efficient tool.
8. Foreign posts could be filled by one individual representing
all Homeland Security interests instead of one for CBP and one
for ICE.
9. A single border agency would provide a central point of
contact for intelligence and communication on all Immigration
and Customs matters with other federal, state and local
agencies thus eliminating the current confusion.
10. The business and trade communities would have their issues
and concerns better served by the unification of the regulatory
and investigative functions.
11. The merger would eliminate the cumbersome necessity of
complying with the Third Agency Rule for the exchange of
information that is critical to the protection of our borders.
12. The exodus of talent from the agency would stop and the
agency would be able to attract highly qualified candidates
I have yet to hear from any individual within DHS articulate a
single sound reason for the continued separation of Customs and Border
Protection from Immigration and Customs Enforcement. One very vague
explanation is that CBP will handle ``border enforcement'' and ICE will
be responsible for ``interior enforcement''. This reasoning is fatally
flawed. ``Border enforcement'' and ``interior enforcement'' cannot be
separated. This is the same defective logic which created the agency
and once again this reasoning displays a complete lack of understanding
of the agencies roles and jurisdictional responsibilities. In a similar
fashion to CBP, ICE's jurisdictional responsibilities relate to, or
must have a nexus to, the border.
ICE's jurisdictional responsibilities directly relate to the cross
border movement of people and merchandise. Illegal aliens cross our
borders, those involved in immigration fraud cross our borders,
narcotics cross our borders, trade mark restricted merchandise crosses
our borders, illicit funds cross our borders, munitions and high
technology cross our borders and terrorists cross our borders. ICE is
responsible for pursuing criminal investigations in all of these
critical areas. However, we have separated the agency responsible for
investigating these important violations that undermine our national
security from those actually standing on the border. This situation is
analogous to separating the uniformed officers from the detectives. A
recent decision by CBP to not allow ICE to have immediate access to
passenger manifests on aircraft arriving from foreign countries
illustrates the types of difficulties encountered as a result of the
current structure. Although ICE has a critical need for information on
the arrival of foreign passengers to identify criminal violators,
smugglers, fugitives and even terrorists, ICE is treated as a ``third
agency'' and must submit a formal written request for the information,
a time consuming process that could cost lives
By merging CBP and ICE all of the entities involved in border and
immigration enforcement responsibilities will be brought together with
a single mission and chain of command. We will not realize the
objective of creating a single border enforcement agency until Special
Agents, Inspectors, Border Patrol Agents, Intelligence Analyst and
Detention and Removal Officers are brought together.
There are a myriad of other reasons why the initial separation of
these agencies never made sense and a number of additional
justifications as to why combining CBP and ICE is best for this nation
and its war on terrorism. I find it hard to believe that anyone can
propose a counter argument, with as much cause, to maintain these
agencies as separate entities. One thing is certain, whatever the
decision of congress is regarding the merging of the two agencies, it
should be done quickly. Should we continue with the current
configuration it would mean maintaining the duplicity of tasks, wasting
tax dollars and perpetuating the downward slide of ICE and its
employee's morale. Simply stated, a house divided against itself cannot
stand.
Mr. Rogers. The Chair now recognizes Mr. Randy Callahan,
Executive Vice President of the American Federation of
Government Employees, AFL/CIO, and a current ICE investigator.
Mr. Callahan.
STATEMENT OF RANDY ALLEN CALLAHAN
Mr. Callahan. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I am actually an
immigration enforcement agent. It is a little bit different
than a criminal investigator, and I can go into more detail on
that if you need that.
I am here today as the Executive Vice President of Council
117 of the American Federation of Government Employees. It is
also known as the National Homeland Security Council Number
117. And my background, I started in 1996 as an immigration
inspector and a year later became a detention enforcement
officer, which was reclassified in August of 2003 as
immigration enforcement agent.
The Council that I represent represents approximately
15,000 employees of the former Immigration and Naturalization
Service, which, as we have discussed, is split into three
separate bureaus: Customs and Border Protection, ICE,
Immigration and Customs Enforcement, and U.S. Citizenship and
Immigration Services.
In our view, there are both advantages and disadvantages
with each proposed organizational structure, the current one
and the proposed merger, and I will try to go into that. Those
proposing to combine ICE and CBP argue that two-bureau
structure is overly duplicative and bureaucratic. Proponents
view ICE and CBP as mutually responsible for the enforcement of
our Nation's immigration and customs laws and their workforces
should be combined. Certainly a review of the many occupational
positions within the two bureaus assigned to enforce these laws
would suggest this.
CBP officers, formerly known as immigration customs and
agriculture inspectors, are the first line of defense at all
air, land and seaports of entry into the United States. Border
Patrol agents are assigned to CBP and are responsible for the
areas along the border between U.S. ports of entry. Deportation
officers are assigned to ICE in the Detention and Removal
Operations Division, and they are responsible for maintaining
dockets of the removal cases and immigration proceedings. They
are also responsible for fugitive operations, finding people
that have been released from custody on the condition that they
show up to their removal proceeding and failing to do so.
Immigration enforcement agents are assigned to ICE in
either the Investigations or the Office of Detention and
Removal Operations Divisions. They are a combination of two
positions that were part of the Immigration and Naturalization
Service, detention enforcement officer and immigration agent;
and they have a wide range of duties that include holding
people in custody until their removal proceedings, removing
them from the country once an order of removal has been issued.
They participate in fugitive operations, and they assist other
Immigration officers.
Why are there so many different types of positions to
enforce the same set of laws? Wouldn't it make more sense to
have an all-encompassing position that is trained to enforce
the law? In some ways, the answer is yes. Having one position
or having one organizational structure would allow for greater
flexibility in deploying the force, could provide a career
progression ladder and could provide pay parity or parity for
pay and benefits.
This last reason may well be the reason why the positions
haven't been combined as of yet. CBP officers are not provided
the law enforcement retirement benefits or law enforcement
salary rates. In fact, the Immigration enforcement agents are
the lowest paid on the GS scale. Then it goes up from there.
The Border Patrol agents are paid less than deportation
officers, et cetera.
Combining ICE and CBP could potentially eliminate several
levels of management and combine budget control offices.
Potential savings of salary and benefits by eliminating these
management level positions is fairly significant.
Combining ICE and CBP may also result in greater
cooperation among the divisions. As it is right now, we have
the problem of a serious lack of cooperation between legacy and
components. People are still holding on to that: I am a Customs
employee or I am an Immigration employee. So until that
environment is changed, you are going to continue to have those
internal struggles.
For this reason, if it is decided to combine the two
bureaus into one, we would recommend that whoever is picked to
lead that bureau has a background in both divisions. That way
they understand the importance of both ICE, Immigration and
Customs Enforcement.
Now, supporting the status quo. Why was the INS split up in
the first place? After the attacks of September 11th, the
country demanded to know how the terrorists were able to enter
the country. Investigation into the 9/11 attacks determined
that there were several missteps by the Immigration and
Naturalization Service that allowed the terrorists to plan and
execute their plot. Couple that with the approval of student
visas of the terrorists subsequent to the attacks and you can
understand why there was a call for dismantling the INS.
One of the reasons why the division was done the way it was
done was because, in the old INS, there was regular shifting of
funds between the divisions and what would happen is, as an
example, it would depend on the office.
In my office in San Diego, for example, there were a lot of
times where detention removal resources and funds were used to
support the inspections on border operations. Our western
region director had a background in the Border Patrol and would
use those resources to help Border Patrol operations. As a
result, interior enforcement or fugitive operations were
greatly diminished. We weren't going out and finding fugitives
to the scale that we needed to. For this reason, it seems that
it makes sense to separate those chains of command and have
them concentrate on specific jurisdictions.
The problem still exists. We have mentioned or it has been
mentioned before about the ICE budget problems. As I understand
it, there is approximately $300 million of ICE funds that were
used by both CBP and CIS. How that all happened, I don't know.
I haven't seen the audit report yet. But if the organizations
were combined, how much more of that money would have been used
to support border operations or the Immigration Services
Division? That, I don't know, and I really would rather not
think about it.
How do employees look at the merger? It is a mixed bag. You
have got some that are for it and some that are opposed to it.
We definitely need to look more into it to find out what the
best structure is. But the bottom line is, no matter what the
organizational structure, we need good leaders to focus on the
mission, and we need adequate staffing and resources to get the
mission accomplished.
Thank you.
Mr. Rogers. Thank you very much, Mr. Callahan.
[The statement of Mr. Callahan follows:]
Prepared Statement by Randy Callahan
Mr. Chairman, Honorable Members of the Subcommittee:
My name is Randy Callahan. I am currently an Immigration
Enforcement Agent with the Department of Homeland Security's Bureau of
Immigration and Customs Enforcement, Office of Detention and Removal
Operations. I began my career in 1996, when I was hired by the
Immigration & Naturalization Service as an Immigration Inspector. In
1997, I became an Immigration Detention Enforcement Officer. In August
of 2003, the Detention Enforcement Officer was reclassified into my
current position.
I am here today as the Executive Vice--President of Council 117 of
the American Federation of Government Employees, also known as the
National Homeland Security Council. The Council represents
approximately fifteen thousand employees of the former Immigration and
Naturalization Service, which, as you know, was split into three
separate Bureaus: Customs and Border Protection (C.B.P), Immigration
and Customs Enforcement (I.C.E) and Citizenship and Immigration
Services (C.I.S) in March of 2003. On behalf of the bargaining unit
members of these Bureaus, I thank you for inviting me to present NHSC's
views on the current organizational structure of C.B.P and I.C.E and
whether or not it best serves the homeland security interests of U.S.
citizens.
In our view, there are both advantages and disadvantages with each
proposed organizational model. I shall attempt to present the pros and
cons of each.
Arguments in Support of an I.C.E/C.B.P Merger:
Those proposing to combine I.C.E and C.B.P argue that the two
Bureau structure is overly duplicative and bureaucratic. Proponents
view I.C.E and C.B.P as mutually responsible for the enforcement of our
nation's immigration and customs laws and their work forces should
therefore be combined. Certainly, a review of the many occupational
positions within the two Bureaus assigned to enforce immigration and
customs law would suggest this.
C.B.P Officers, formerly known as Immigration or Customs
Inspectors, are the first line of defense at all air, land, and sea
ports of entry into the United States. They facilitate the legal entry
of imported goods, as well as bona fide immigrants and non-immigrants,
while identifying persons attempting to enter the country illegally
using fraudulent methods. In addition, C.B.P Officers gather
intelligence on smugglers, seize vehicles used by drug and alien
smugglers, and prepare prosecution cases for the U.S. Attorney's
office.
Border Patrol Agents are assigned to C.B.P and are responsible for
the areas along the border between U.S. ports of entry. Their job is to
prevent illegal border crossings, and to intercept drugs and people
being smuggled into the country. I.C.E Criminal Investigators work in
the Office of Investigations (OI) and are responsible for breaking up
human and drug smuggling organizations, as well as identifying,
locating, and arresting terrorists and terrorist organizations working
within the country.
Deportation Officers are assigned to I.C.E in the Detention and
Removal Operations (DRO) division. They are responsible for locating
and apprehending fugitive aliens, preparing travel documents for aliens
that have been ordered removed from the country, and maintaining file
dockets of removal proceedings.
Immigration Enforcement Agents (IEA) are assigned to I.C.E in
either the office of Investigations or the Office Detention and Removal
Operations. They are a combination of two positions that were part of
the Immigration & Naturalization Service: Detention Enforcement
Officers and Immigration Agents. They are largely responsible for
holding in custody people arrested by other Immigration Officers and
who are facing removal proceedings. Immigration Enforcement Agents
assist Deportation Officers with fugitive operations, escorting aliens
ordered removed from the country to their country, and basically serve
at the will of C.B.P.
C.B.P uses Immigration Enforcement Agents as prisoner transport
officers at both Border Patrol Sectors and ports of entry. Soon, the
office of Detention and Removal will take over the Alien Criminal
Apprehension Program (ACAP) from I.C.E's Office of Investigations. ACAP
is a program where Criminal Investigators or Immigration Enforcement
Agents assigned to the Office of Investigations identify aliens in
violation of immigration laws at state and local prisons, or jails.
Once state or local authorities have completed their review, illegal
aliens are transferred to I.C.E, where they are placed into removal
proceedings.
Why are there so many different types of positions to enforce the
same set of laws? Would it not make more sense to have one `all-
encompassing' position that is trained to enforce the law? In some
ways, the answer is yes. Having one position would allow for greater
flexibility in deploying the work force, would provide a career
progression ladder, and would provide parity for pay and benefits. This
last reason may well be why the positions have not been combined to
date. C.B.P Officers are not provided law enforcement retirement
benefits or the law enforcement salary rate. In fact, Immigration
Enforcement Agents are paid at the lowest full performance GS level;
Border Patrol Agents are paid less than Deportation Officers, who are
paid less than Criminal Investigators. It is likely more cost effective
for the government to keep the positions separate, though it is not
necessarily best for the mission of the Bureaus or the Department.
Combining I.C.E and C.B.P could potentially eliminate several
levels of management and combine budget control offices. Instead of
having two Bureau heads, two directors of operations, two budget
directors, two offices of labor relations, etc., it would be possible
to consolidate these offices into one. The potential savings in salary
and benefits by eliminating these management level positions is fairly
significant.
Combining I.C.E and C.B.P may also result in greater cooperation
between divisions. Indeed, as it stands right now, there is a serious
lack of cooperation between legacy components (INS and Customs) of the
two Bureaus. The leadership of the former INS and Customs Service are,
as we speak, locked in a heated battle for control of the purse
strings. As President Bush acknowledged when discussing the position of
Intelligence Czar, the larger the budget one controls in Washington,
the more influence one has. The combined budget of I.C.E and C.B.P will
give a great deal of additional power to the individual chosen to lead
the merged Bureau. For this reason, I recommend that this person have a
strong background in both immigration law enforcement and customs law
enforcement. Only will such an individual have the ability to ensure
that both sets of laws enforcement priorities.
Arguments in Support of Maintaining the Status Quo:
I have already given you the current organizational structure and a
few reasons why I believe that combining the two Bureaus might make
sense. Now, I will offer you some arguments in support of the status
quo, arguments that have advantages in terms of mission effectiveness.
In looking at this issue, the question must be asked: Why was the
INS split up in the first place? After the attacks of 9/11/01, the
country demanded to know how the terrorists were able to enter the
country. The investigation into the 9/11 attacks determined that there
were several missteps by the Immigration and Nationalization Service
that allowed the terrorists to plan and execute their plot. Couple that
with the approval of student visas for a few of the terrorists
subsequent to the attacks and you can understand why there was a call
for dismantling the INS.
When the Department of Homeland Security was being created, a
review of the functions of the different agencies was conducted to
determine where each one belonged in the new structure. Because of
longstanding problems with INS management, it was judged that there was
a need to divide the agency's responsibilities. It was also determined
that the INS had failed to put sufficient emphasis on the enforcement
of immigration laws in the interior parts of the U.S.
I know of countless situations in which the INS would shift funds
and resources to focus on the favored projects of certain INS managers.
For example, the former INS District Director in San Diego frequently
used funds and resources from the Detention and Removal branch and the
Investigations branch to support inspections operations at the San
Diego Ports of Entry. In addition, the former INS Western Regional
Director used the same resources to support Border Patrol operations in
Arizona. These reallocations of funds meant that there was less money
available for fugitive operations. It was In an attempt to prevent
these types of problems in the future, that the office of Detention and
Removal Operations and Investigations were separated from the Border
Patrol and Inspections in the new Department. Clearly, the designers of
the Department of Homeland Security were correct when they decided to
separate these components of I.C.E and C.B.P.
Yet the problems still exist. As things now stand, C.B.P and
Citizenship and Immigration Services (C.I.S) have expropriated over
$300M of I.C.E's funds under the current organizational structure. How
much more money would C.B.P successfully siphon out of Detention and
Removal and Investigation Operations if I.C.E and C.B.P were merged is
a question I and my colleagues at I.C.E feel compelled to raise.
One of the main reasons it appears that I.C.E is failing is because
it is being starved of necessary resources. It may be that this hearing
would not be necessary if I.C.E had all of the funds appropriated by
Congress. I already alluded to a $300 million shortfall in I.C.E's
budget, because funds were transferred to C.B.P and C.I.S. I now hear
that the Border and Transportation Security Directorate (BTS) took
funds from all BTS components in order to support certain BTS
activities. If that is the case, and Congress did not approve this
reallocation of funds, then I hope you will address the issue with BTS.
The problem may lie less with the organizational structure, and more
with the people filling key leadership positions.
How Do Employees View the Merger:
I've laid out arguments both in favor of, and against the existing
organizational structure, and I believe that a merger can work. But
what do the employees in the field want? Frankly, it's a mixed bag.
C.B.P managers strongly support a merger. They want access to the I.C.E
dollars and the power that comes with them. They believe that in a
merger of the two Bureaus, C.B.P will emerge as the lead agency. The
primary concern of C.B.P employees is that there be someone to pick up
their detainees and transport them to a detention facility or wherever
they need to go.
Criminal Investigators that were Customs employees prior to the
creation of I.C.E also generally support a merger. I have heard that
they believe they will have a larger share of the budget pie under
C.B.P than they currently have with I.C.E. I hear also that there is an
attitude among former Customs CI's that immigration enforcement is
somehow beneath them. It may be that because immigration law is so
complex and their training in it so limited, they have no desire to
conduct investigations of immigration violations. Or, it may be that
they simply want nothing to do with immigration matters. However, since
all of the terrorists on 9/11 were immigrants, this is a dangerous
situation that must be rectified.
Legacy Immigration Criminal Investigators largely want to remain in
I.C.E. While they were recently taken out of the collective bargaining
unit, and I am no longer able to represent them, I still field calls
from Criminal Investigators who are frustrated with the way they are
treated now that they can not be part of the union, but who feel they
definitely have it better in I.C.E than they would in C.B.P.
Deportation Officers and Immigration Enforcement Agents also want
to remain in I.C.E. They fear that the progress they have made in
security funding for fugitive operations will be for naught, if C.B.P
is allowed to divert DRO resources to support C.B.P initiatives. As one
of my colleagues put it, ``The border is, has been, and always will be,
the squeaky wheel. Businesses and illegal immigrant rights activists
don't cry when someone doesn't show up for their removal hearing, but
man do they ever scream when the border wait is longer than forty-five
minutes.'' The squeaky wheel will always get the grease, and the grease
will be taken from Detention and Removal if C.B.P management can
arrange it.
Conclusion:
The employees of I.C.E and C.B.P will work within whatever
organizational structure is determined by Congress and the Secretary of
Homeland Security. We strongly believe that, no matter what the
structure, the mission of DHS is doomed to fail if management continues
to cling to its respective legacy components (INS, Customs) and battles
for overall control of the Bureaus is allowed to continue. Whatever is
decided on this issue, it is essential that Congress also ensures that
I.C.E components receive the funds appropriated for them and not allow
these funds to be continually diverted for other purposes.
Mr. Chairman, on a final, unrelated note, my ability to testify at
this hearing stems from my right to be part of a union. It is an honor
for me to be here and I hope to be able to speak on behalf of I.C.E
employees for a long time to come. My colleagues in the I.C.E Office of
Investigations, the Federal Air Marshal Service, the TSA, and other
agencies that make up the Department of Homeland Security do not have
the same right. Please correct this injustice by allowing them to join
a union and by strengthening whistle blower protections. Employees
should not have to suffer silently as they watch fraud, waste and abuse
occurring in front of them. Thank you again for the opportunity to
provide this testimony.
Mr. Rogers. Our next witness is Mr. T.J. Bonner, President
of the National Border Patrol Council. Mr. Bonner.
STATEMENT OF T.J. BONNER, PRESIDENT, NATIONAL BORDER PATROL
COUNCIL
Mr. Bonner. Thank you, Chairman Rogers, Ranking Member
Meek, other distinguished members of the subcommittee.
I have been a Border Patrol agent for the past 27 years and
am proud of that. The Department of Homeland Security is very
fortunate to have inherited tens of thousands of dedicated,
talented employees. Unfortunately, many of these people are
leaving as soon as they are able to retire, and many of them
have their resumes out there looking for other jobs. They are
stifled by the current organizational structure which does not
allow them to do their jobs.
Organizations in and of themselves are incapable of
accomplishing the mission. It is always the employees who carry
out the mission. An organizational structure can either
facilitate the accomplishment of the mission or impede the
accomplishment of the mission. In this case, the dual
enforcement structure of CBP and ICE has proven to be a major
barrier to the accomplishment of the extremely vital mission of
the Department of Homeland Security, stopping terrorists from
entering our country and carrying out their dastardly deeds.
A long time ago, before Homeland Security was even
contemplated, before the Department of Homeland Security was
contemplated, there was talk about merging or rather splitting
up the enforcement and service functions of the Immigration and
Naturalization Service. The National Border Patrol Council
supported that idea. It made perfect sense. That concept was
carried over in the Homeland Security Act, and we supported it
then, also.
We did not, however, support the further administrative
bifurcation of interior and border security because it simply
made no sense. Everything is integrated. All of the crime that
our agents deal with, whether it be Border Patrol agents,
inspectors, special agents, it all emanates outside of this
country, or if it is emanating within this country, it is
importing people or goods illegally into the country.
There needs to be coordination and cooperation between all
of these agencies. Unfortunately, that does not exist today. It
has worsened since the merger of the 22 agencies into the
Department of Homeland Security, especially because of the
artificial bifurcation of the two enforcement bureaus.
We support merging Customs and ICE--I am sorry, CBP and ICE
and believe that this can be done in a manner that would
benefit the country. It has to be done, however, thoughtfully
and carefully. It has to be done in such a manner that it
encourages people to cooperate and that it is structured in
such a manner that that happens as a natural consequence, not
because of the will of some managers or employees fighting
against the current of the river, swimming upstream as it were.
It has to be something that naturally flows from that.
For example, right now there are no defined career paths
within either of the bureaus that leads to an intermingling of
the various occupations. Amazingly, the criminal investigators
in ICE are selected, by and large, from people straight out of
college or right off the street. They are not drawn from the
ranks of Border Patrol agents, CBP inspectors or Immigration
enforcement agencies. That would make perfect sense, but it
doesn't happen.
I can't think of a single major metropolitan police
department where this happens, where they don't go to the ranks
of their uniformed officers looking for their detectives. This
would yield a better product because you would have
knowledgeable, skilled employees filling these ranks. Also, it
would cut down on the attrition problems that we have within
these ranks, Border Patrol agents, CBP inspectors. Because,
right now, your reward for putting in 10, 15 years on the
border is to watch someone straight out of college get a higher
paying, more challenging job than your job. So what is the
incentive for these people to stick around?
I would also like to touch on the need for specialization.
One face at the border, while it sounds--it has a lot of facial
appeal, the concept has simply not worked. Expecting one class
of employees to be knowledgeable in immigration, customs, and
agricultural law is asking too much of a single human being. So
what we have ended up with is a generation of generalists
rather than specialists. This is going to be disastrous a few
years down the road.
Right now, we still have people who were trained very well
in these specialized disciplines, so we haven't seen the full
effects of one face at the border. But when we end up with a
bunch of generalists, we are going to see a lot of things
slipping by these inspectors at the border that should not be
slipping by them; and having specialists in the secondary areas
will not cure that defect because the people on the primary
inspection lines are the ones who have to be able to recognize
that something is wrong in order to send it over to the
secondary inspection line.
Finally, no discussion of this problem would be complete
without at least touching upon the fact that the new personnel
regulations that have been forced upon these employees will
have the effect of driving away the best and the brightest. As
I mentioned earlier, it is the employees who will make or break
this agency. To the extent that these personnel regulations
push people away from this agency and make service in the
Federal Government less attractive, the Department will not be
able to meet its mandate to protect this country.
In summary, the National Border Patrol Council fully
supports the idea of merging ICE and CBP but urges that it be
done carefully, listening very carefully to the people at all
levels of the organization, those on the front lines, those
mid-level managers and upper-level managers, figuring out what
makes sense and proceeding along those lines but ensuring that
the structure facilitates cooperation and coordination and that
it allows for specialization within the various occupations.
Because, bear in mind, we still have to enforce all of the laws
that are out there on the books: the immigration laws, the
custom laws, the agricultural laws, the maritime laws. All of
the laws of those 22 agencies that were merged into the
Department of Homeland Security still need to be enforced by
someone.
Thank you very much for your time, and I look forward to
your questions.
Mr. Rogers. Thank you, Mr. Bonner.
[The statement of Mr. Bonner follows:]
Prepared Statement of the National Border Patrol Council of the
American Federation of Government Employees AFL-CIO, Presented by T.J.
Bonner, National President
The National Border Patrol Council, which represents approximately
10,000 front-line Border Patrol employees, appreciates the opportunity
to share its views and concerns regarding the organizational structure
of the Department of Homeland Security.
The Homeland Security Act of 2002 merged 22 diverse agencies within
the Executive Branch of the Federal Government with the goal of
fostering better coordination and cooperation among them in order to
better protect the United States against the threat of terrorism. Three
years later, it is appropriate to evaluate the effectiveness of one the
more controversial after-the-fact organizational changes--the creation
of two separate enforcement bureaus within the Directorate of Border
and Transportation Security instead of a single bureau as originally
called for in Section 442 of the Act. As contemplated therein, the
Bureau of Border Security would have been responsible for coordinating
and carrying out all of the functions of the Customs Service and the
Transportation Security Administration, the law enforcement functions
of the Immigration and Naturalization Service and the General Services
Administration, and certain agricultural inspection functions of the
Department of Agriculture. For reasons that were more political than
practical, two bureaus were created in its place: the Bureau of Customs
and Border Protection (CBP) and the Bureau of Immigration and Customs
Enforcement (ICE). The legacy Customs Service management structure took
control of CBP, and the legacy Immigration and Naturalization Service
(I&NS) management structure took control of ICE. Although the stated
rationale for the bifurcation of the enforcement functions was to allow
CBP to primarily focus on enforcement at the borders and ICE to
primarily focus on enforcement in the interior, it is obvious to even
the most casual observer that this distinction is almost completely
artificial. In order to effectively carry out their statutory missions,
both of these bureaus need to be able to seamlessly operate without
regard to artificially-imposed boundaries. It is now apparent that the
dual structure was mainly created to allow the existing Customs and
I&NS bureaucracies to survive largely intact. The survival of an
existing bureaucracy in a consolidation can be either productive or
counter-productive, depending upon whether or not it is compatible with
the new mission and contributes to its accomplishment. In the current
structure, unfortunately, the new bureaucracies have impeded the
accomplishment of the Department's anti- terrorism and other law
enforcement missions. These important objectives require a high level
of coordination and cooperation among all of the Department's
employees. The current bifurcated structure places needless barriers
between these employees and provides major disincentives for them to
coordinate their efforts and cooperate with each other. In fact, the
level of coordination and cooperation has decreased significantly since
the consolidation.
Long before the Department of Homeland Security was even
contemplated, there was a great deal of concern in Congress about the
ability of the I&NS to effectively discharge its dual enforcement and
service missions under a unified structure with a single chain of
command. The National Border Patrol Council supported splitting the
service and enforcement programs in order to enable both of them to
operate at peak efficiency while at the same time facilitating
coordination and cooperation between the two branches. The Council also
supported the same goal under the Homeland Security Act, but did not
endorse the dual split of the enforcement bureaus. It maintains that
such a move was a mistake from the beginning, and should be rectified
as soon as possible. Of course, merely merging these two bureaus will
not cure the ills that plague them. A fundamental restructuring of
every key aspect of the organization must also occur if meaningful
improvements are expected.
The new consolidated structure must be fully integrated at all
levels of the organization. It must not only eliminate impediments to
coordination and cooperation, but must also facilitate the achievement
of these goals. Such critical matters should not be dependent on the
will and strength of a few high-level leaders, but must be the natural
result of a well-planned organizational structure. In order to ensure
the success of the new structure, it must be carefully constructed,
paying close attention to the input of employees at all levels and
components of the existing bureaus. To be successful, this new
structure and culture must first be embraced by the leaders at the top
of all of the integrated programs, and then be filtered down to
employees at all levels of the organization. The only way that this
will happen is if the changes make sense to all employees and truly
represent a significant improvement.
Weak links in the organizational chain should not be allowed to
frustrate the accomplishment of the overall mission. For example, the
current structure places all of the funding and responsibility for the
detention of illegal aliens into a single bureau, even though all of
the programs in both bureaus are dependent upon this resource. Allowing
mismanagement and under-funding in one program to disrupt the entire
operation is untenable. A proper organizational structure would ensure
that all aspects of the operation are carefully planned and integrated,
and that all of the resources are properly distributed to ensure that
such disparities rarely, if ever, occur. Unanticipated shortfalls in
one or more key areas would be compensated for by shifting funds and
resources from other areas.
The chains of command and lines of authority in the new
organization must be structured horizontally as well as vertically in
order to ensure that all of the components seamlessly interface with
each other as well as to facilitate cooperation. Currently, all of the
Department's criminal investigators belong to one bureau, while all of
the front-line personnel who enforce the laws pertaining to the legal
and illegal entry of people and goods entering the United States belong
to a different one. Under this system, there is absolutely no incentive
for these employees to coordinate their investigations or to cooperate
with each other. To the contrary, it actually encourages competition
and isolationism.
Another factor that discourages coordination and cooperation among
the Department's employees is the absence of defined career paths
within the various organizational components that would allow for the
easy interchange of experience and skills between them. For example, in
a properly-constructed organization, criminal investigator positions
and other higher-graded occupations should be selected from the ranks
of entry-level occupations such as Border Patrol agents, CBP
inspectors, and Immigration Enforcement agents. This would not only
provide the Bureau with experienced employees who would require minimal
training to perform well in these complex assignments, but would also
boost morale and slow attrition among the ranks of the other
occupations. Amazingly, the Department hires almost all of its criminal
investigators straight out of college. This has no parallel in any
other law enforcement agency in the country. Every single major police
department hires its detectives from the ranks of its uniformed
officers.
It would be a serious mistake to assume that the employees in the
various occupations within the consolidated bureau are interchangeable
and that some of these occupations should therefore be merged.
Occupational distinctions should be based upon operational requirements
and realistic employee expectations, not on uniformity for uniformity's
sake. In addition to its over-arching mission of anti-terrorism, the
Department continues to be responsible for enforcing immigration,
customs, maritime, and agricultural laws. All of these laws are
complicated and arcane, and it is unrealistic to expect one employee to
be an expert in more than one discipline. While it is helpful for all
employees to be familiar with those laws that they might encounter
during the normal course of their duties, it is unwise to attempt to
create a workforce of generalists rather than specialists.
The best example of this theory going awry is the ``One Face at the
Border'' initiative undertaken by CBP shortly after its creation. While
the phrase has a certain facial appeal, its underlying premise is
fundamentally flawed. The complexities of the three major types flaws
and regulations that are enforced at the border virtually guarantee
that no individual can become an expert in all of these areas. Efforts
to homogenize the inspectors at our Nation's ports of entry will
ultimately result in a workforce composed of ``jacks of all trades, but
masters of none.'' The plan to place specialists in the secondary
referral areas as an adjunct to these generalists in the primary
inspection areas will also prove ineffective. If the primary inspectors
have insufficient knowledge of the applicable laws, they will be
incapable of identifying suspicious people and cargo for referral to
the secondary areas. For similar reasons, the current attempt to force
all criminal investigators to handle cases involving all of the various
laws within the Department's jurisdiction is also doomed to failure.
Specialization must be embraced and encouraged at all levels of the
organization.
Finally, it must be recognized that organizational structures in
and of themselves are wholly incapable of carrying out an agency's
mission - they merely facilitate the accomplishment of the mission by
the agency's employees. The more skilled and dedicated the employees
are, the more effectively the mission will be accomplished.
Unfortunately, the Department of Homeland Security is in the process of
implementing a new personnel system that will make it very difficult to
recruit and retain the best and the brightest employees. Although the
new rules purport to be progressive measures that will reward and
encourage superior performance and hold all employees accountable, they
are in fact throwbacks to the corrupt, cronyism-based nineteenth
century civil service system that nearly ruined public service in this
country. All employees want to be paid and treated fairly, and to have
a say in the decisions that affect their working conditions. Because
this new personnel system does not meet those basic needs, it will
discourage highly-skilled and dedicated employees from serving their
country in this vital agency.
In summary, the National Border Patrol Council strongly supports
the merger of the Department of Homeland Security's two enforcement
bureaus, but cautions that such a consolidation must be undertaken
thoughtfully. Otherwise, it will not correct the problems that exist in
the current bifurcated structure, and could actually worsen the
situation. In order to be effective, the new structure must foster the
coordination and cooperation that are so essential to the
accomplishment of the Department's anti-terrorism and other law
enforcement missions. It must also facilitate specialization in the
various laws that the Department is charged with enforcing in order to
maximize the odds that terrorists and weapons of mass destruction will
be intercepted. Finally, it must ensure that employees are treated
fairly and that their input is heeded so that the Department is able to
continue its tradition of attracting the best and brightest to protect
America against the threat of terrorism.
Mr. Rogers. The Chair now recognizes Mr. Michael Cutler,
former Senior Special Agent, U.S. Immigration and
Naturalization Service.
STATEMENT OF MICHAEL CUTLER
Mr. Cutler. Thank you for having me. Good morning. As a New
Yorker, I will also try to speak quickly for you.
Mr. Rogers. We are going to have to get some southerners on
this panel.
Mr. Cutler. I think so. We are kind of taking over today.
Chairman Rogers, Ranking Member Meek, distinguished members
of the Congress, members of the panel, ladies and gentlemen, I
welcome this opportunity to provide testimony today on the
critical issue of determining if the current organizational
structure of ICE and CBP best serves U.S. Homeland Security
interests.
This issue is of great concern to me on two levels. First
of all, I am an American; and, second of all, I am a former INS
Senior Special Agent, having worked for the agency in New York
for some 30 years.
We all know the significance of September 11, 2001, but how
many Americans remember February 26, 1993? I believe that few
Americans would readily remember that second date perhaps
because we have a short memory as a Nation, perhaps because the
events of that date were so drastically and horrifically
eclipsed by September 11, 2001. We recently marked the 12th
anniversary of the first attack on the World Trade Center,
which in fact occurred on February 26, 1993. Six people lost
their lives on that day simply by going to work. At least a
thousand people were injured, and it has been estimated that
the damage to the World Trade Center complex was an estimated
half billion dollars. Our Nation did little to protect itself
after that attack, and the terrorists essentially of their own
volition waited more than 8 years before they attacked this
country again at that very same location. Therefore, we should
take very little comfort that there have been no attacks
committed within our country's borders since September 11,
2001. Indeed, we are continually warned about the potential for
future attacks on our Nation that might involve weapons of mass
destruction. I fear a future attack might serve to eclipse the
attacks of 9/11.
The fact that the issue of reorganizing the agencies which
bear the responsibility of securing our Nation's borders is the
focus of this hearing encourages me that this subcommittee is
intent on making the protection of our borders and the
enforcement of the immigration laws the priorities, as well
they should be. But I would implore you and your colleagues who
represent us in both Houses of Congress to act swiftly and
resolutely to secure our Nation's borders which at present are
anything but secure. The clock is ticking, and the time is on
the side of our Nation's enemies.
To quote the first two sentences of the preface of a report
entitled, ``9/11 Terrorist Travel, a staff report of the
National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United
States,'' and I quote: ```It is perhaps obvious to state that
terrorists cannot plan and carry out attacks on the United
States if they are unable to enter our country. Yet, prior to
September 11, while there were efforts to enhance border
security, no agency of the U.S. government thought of border
security as a tool in the counterterrorism arsenal.
The failure of our Nation to impose even a modicum of
control over who is able to enter our Nation even now is a
clear indication of the inability of the United States to
protect its citizens from the potential of another terrorist
attack.
And it is not only terrorists who threaten our well-being.
It is estimated that some 30 percent of the Federal inmate
population is comprised of aliens.
When I worked at the former INS, I became an advocate for
the concept of what I have come to refer to as the
``immigration law enforcement tripod.'' Under this concept, the
Border Patrol enforces the law between ports of entry, the
inspectors enforce the laws at ports of entry, and the special
agents comprising the interior enforcement component of
immigration law enforcement, along with deportation officers,
back up the other two divisions of what was the Immigration
Service. I had recommended that the service side of the INS
should be spun off as a separate entity that would rely on
special agents to conduct field investigations when
appropriate, to seek to uncover immigration benefit fraud, a
critical issue that has all been ignored and neglected.
As we know, since the formation of DHS, the immigration
benefits program has been indeed placed under a separate
bureau; and, in addition, enforcement elements of the former
INS have been merged with U.S. Customs Service to form the
Bureau of Immigration and Customs Enforcement. Additionally,
other agencies have been added to the DHS, among them the
Secret Service, the Transportation Service Safety
Administration, and the GSA Police.
To further complicate matters, the current structure
divides interior enforcement of the immigration laws from the
enforcement of the immigration laws along the border and at
ports of entry. The inspectors and Border Patrol agents are now
part of CBP, and we need to fortify our Nation's exterior
borders but not create bureaucratic borders between these two
law enforcement agencies that share responsibilities for a
common mission.
It is my opinion and the opinion of many of my former
colleagues at the former INS that this management structure is
unwieldy and ineffective. The enforcement of the immigration
laws is critical and shares little with the other agencies
which have been combined with the former INS. The mission of
each of these agencies is critical but unique.
The mission of the former U.S. Customs Service bears little
in common with the work and priorities and orientation of the
former INS. In fact, prior to the merger, Customs was a
division of the Treasury Department and the INS was a division
of the Department of Justice. Its primary responsibility was to
prevent contraband from entering the United States and to
collect tariffs and duties. Customs is responsible for the
movement of goods and currency across our Nation's borders. The
INS was concerned with the movement of people across our
Nation's borders and has been involved with issues that more
closely paralleled what the employees of State Department, the
Labor Department, and the FBI are involved with.
To reinforce this point, I would point out that, while it
was relatively rare for INS agents, at least in New York, to
work with their Customs counterparts, it was relatively common
for us to work with agents of the other agencies that I just
mentioned. The primary similarity between Customs and the INS
was the border, and once you remove the border from the
equation, the differences became obvious and profound.
Since the merger of INS into ICE, the new special agents
who are now being trained are no longer even receiving Spanish
language training. It is estimated that some 80 percent of the
illegal alien population of the United States is Spanish
speaking. This language training was an integral part of the
curriculum for all new law enforcement officers at the old INS.
Mr. Cutler. You cannot investigate people that you cannot
communicate with. It is worth noting that most of the special
agents in charge of ICE offices came from the U.S. Customs
Service, further eroding the immigration mission. I have come
to think of the current situation, quite frankly, as the
Customization of immigration and law enforcement. I have been
told that few employers of illegal aliens are found under the
auspices of the Employer Sanctions Program in the United States
last year.
Additionally, the investigation of immigration benefit
fraud has been relegated, from what I have been told, to being
pursued by very few field agents and some computer systems. We
are currently engaged in a war on terror where control of our
Nation's borders is critical to the outcome of this battle
where the stakes are so high.
In order for the borders to be secured, we need to have a
coordinated enforcement program that creates a seamless effort
from the borders to the interior. This can best be done, in my
estimation, by putting the CBP and ICE under one roof. It is
also essential that separate chains of command be established
with the Immigration and Enforcement Program with specific
training and funding and accountability. This is the era of the
specialist; one size does not fit all.
It is critical that our Nation gains control of its borders
and the entire immigration bureaucracy if we are to protect our
Nation from illegal immigration. Illegal immigration has a
profound impact on more aspects of this Nation has does any
other issue. It impacts on everything from education, the
environment, health care, and it also involves criminal justice
and national security. It is vital, in my view, that this
mission be effectively dealt with. The current structure does
not provide the framework or leadership to enable this to
happen.
Morale among the former INS personnel is at an all-time
low. Clearly this situation needs to be remedied, and a
reorganization such as I have outlined, I believe, would
represent a major step in the right direction.
Thank you for your time. I look forward to your questions.
Mr. Rogers. Thank you very much for your comments,
Mr.Cutler.
[The information follows:]
Prepared Statement of Michael W. Cutler
Chairman Rogers, Ranking Member Meek, distinguished members of
Congress, members of the panel, ladies and gentlemen. I welcome this
opportunity to provide testimony today on the critical issue of
determining if the current organizational structure of ICE and CBP best
serves U.S. homeland security interests.
This issue is of great concern to me on two levels. First of all I
am a citizen of the United States. Secondly, I am a former INS senior
special agent, having worked for that agency for some 30 years.
We all know the significance of September 11, 2001, but how many
Americans remember February 26, 1993? I believe that few Americans
would readily remember that second date. Perhaps it is because we have
a short memory as a nation. Perhaps it is because the events of that
date were so drastically and horrifically eclipsed by September 11,
2001. We recently marked the 12th anniversary of the first attack on
the World Trade Center which occurred on February 26, 1993. Six people
lost their lives on that date by simply going to work. At least a
thousand other people were injured and some estimates pegged the damage
to the World Trade Center complex at being in excess of one half of a
billion dollars. Our nation did little to defend itself after that
attack and the terrorists, essentially of their own volition, waited
for more than 8 years before attacking our nation at that location
again. Therefore we should take little comfort that there have been no
attacks committed within our country's borders since September 11,
2001. Indeed, we are continually warned about the potential for future
attacks on our nation that may make use of Weapons of Mass Destruction.
I fear a future attack might serve to eclipse the horrific attacks of
9/11.
The fact that the issue of re-organizing the agencies which bear
the responsibility of securing our nation's borders is the focus of
this hearing encourages me that this subcommittee is intent on making
the protection of our borders and the enforcement of the immigration
laws the priorities as well they should be. But I would implore you and
your colleagues who represent us in both houses of congress to act
swiftly and resolutely to secure our nation's borders which at present
are anything but secure. The clock is ticking and time is on the side
of our nation's enemies. To quote the first two sentences of the
preface of a report entitled, ``9/11 and Terrorist Travel, A Staff
Report of the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United
States,''
``It is perhaps obvious to state that terrorists cannot plan and
carry out attacks in the United States if they are unable to enter the
country. Yet prior to September 11, while there were efforts to enhance
border security, no agency of the U.S. government thought of border
security as a tool in the counterterrorism arsenal.''
The failure of our nation to impose even a modicum of control over
who is able to enter our nation, even now, is a clear indication of the
inability of the United States to protect its citizens from the
potential of another terrorist attack. And it is not only terrorists
who threaten our well-being. It has been estimated that 30% of the
federal inmate population is comprised of aliens.
When I worked at the former INS, I became an advocate for the
concept of what I have come to refer to as the ``Immigration Law
Enforcement Tripod. Under this concept the Border Patrol enforces the
laws between ports of entry, the inspectors enforce the laws at ports
of entry and the special agents, comprising the interior enforcement
component of immigration law enforcement along with the deportation
officers back up the inspectors and Border Patrol agents. I had
recommended that the service side of the INS should be spun off as a
separate entity that would rely on the special agents to conduct field
investigations, when appropriate, to seek to uncover immigration
benefit fraud, a critical issue that is all but ignored and neglected.
As we know, since the formation of the Department of Homeland
Security the immigration benefits program has, indeed, been placed in a
separate bureau and in addition, enforcement elements of the former INS
have been merged with the U.S. Customs Service to form the Bureau of
Immigration and Customs Enforcement. Additionally, other agencies have
been added to the DHS; the Secret Service, the Transportation Safety
Administration and the GSA Police. To further complicate matters, the
current structure divides interior enforcement of the immigration laws,
from the enforcement of the immigration laws along the border and at
ports of entry. The inspectors and Border Patrol agents are now part of
CBP or Customs and Border Protection. We need to fortify our nation's
exterior borders but not create bureaucratic borders between these two
law enforcement agencies that share responsibilities for a common
mission.
It is my opinion, and the opinion of many of my former colleagues
at the former INS, that this management structure is unwieldy and
ineffective. The enforcement of the immigration laws is critical and
shares little with the other agencies which have been combined with the
former INS. The mission of each of these agencies is critical, but also
unique. The mission of the former U.S. Customs Service bears little in
common with the work and priorities and orientation of the former INS.
In fact, prior to the merger, Customs was a division of the Treasury
Department and the INS was a division of the Department of Justice. Its
primary responsibility was to prevent contraband from entering the
United States and to collect tariffs and duties. Customs is responsible
for the movement of goods and currency across our nation's borders.
The INS was concerned with the movement of people across our
nation's borders and has been involved with issues that more closely
paralleled what the employees of State Department, the Labor
Department, and the FBI are involved with. To re-enforce this point, I
would point out that while it was relatively rare for INS agents to
work with their Customs counterparts it was relatively common for us to
work with agents of the other agencies I have just mentioned. The
primary similarity between Customs and the INS was the border. Once you
remove the border from the equation the differences become obvious and
profound.
Since the merger of INS into ICE the new special agents who are now
being trained are no longer even receiving Spanish language training.
It is estimated that some 80% of the illegal alien population is
Spanish speaking. This language training was an integral part of the
curriculum for all new enforcement officers at the old INS. You cannot
investigate people you cannot communicate with. It is worth noting that
most of the Special Agents-in-Charge of the ICE offices came from the
U.S. Customs Service further eroding the immigration mission. I have
come to think of the current situation as the ``Customization of
immigration law enforcement.'' I have been told that few, if any
employers of illegal aliens were fined under the auspices of the
employer sanctions program in the United States last year.
Additionally, the investigation of immigration benefit fraud has been
relegated, from what I have been told, to being pursued by very few
field agents and computer systems.
We are currently engaged in a war on terror where control of our
nation's borders is critical to the outcome of this battle where the
stakes are so high. In order for the borders to be secured we need to
have a coordinated enforcement program that creates a seamless effort
from the borders to the interior. This can best be done, in my
estimation, by putting the CBP and ICE under one roof. It is also
essential that separate chains of command be established for the
immigration enforcement program with specific training and funding and
accountability. This is the era of the specialist. One size does not
fit all. It is critical that our nation gains control of its borders
and the entire immigration bureaucracy if we are to protect our nation
from illegal immigration. Illegal immigration has a profound impact on
more other aspects of this nation than does any other issue. It impacts
on everything from education, the environment, health-care and the
economy to criminal justice and national security. It is vital, in my
view, that this mission be effectively dealt with. The current
structure does not provide the framework or leadership to enable this
to happen. Morale among the former INS personnel is at an all-time low.
Clearly this situation needs to be remedied. A reorganization such as I
outlined would represent a major step in the right direction.
I look forward to your questions.
Mr. Rogers. Our next witness is Mr. David Venturella,
former Director of the Office of Retention and Removal
Operations, and we look forward to your comments.
STATEMENT OF DAVID VENTURELLA
Mr. Venturella. Thank you. For the record, I am from
Chicago, so I may need an extra 30 seconds.
Mr. Rogers. We will work with you.
Mr. Venturella. Mr. Chairman and honorable committee
members, I would like to thank you for the opportunity to
testify today, an honor to appear before you to discuss the
matter at hand.
In an 18-year career in law enforcement, I have worked as
an entry-level deportation officer with the former Immigration
and Naturalization Service to overseeing the detention and
removal operations of criminal and illegal aliens as the Acting
Director of Detention and Removal Operations within U.S.
Immigration and Customs Enforcement.
The creation of Homeland Security was one of the greatest
and most significant realignment efforts in the Federal
Government in over 40 years. The goal of the established
Department to break through the layers of bureaucratic red tape
and turf wars that existed between various law enforcement
agencies and focus the mission of government on protecting our
Nation and its people will be achieved by asking the questions
such as the ones presented here today. The question of this
hearing should be should we possibly merge ICE and CBP, and is
there a benefit to doing so?
While I applaud this committee and others for recognizing
that ICE and CBP are not functioning at their optimum level and
looking at options to fix that situation, it is my humble
opinion that an option to merge the two organizations is not
necessary at this time and may well cause the Department to
move backwards.
The creation of DHS provided an opportunity to take a fresh
look at how the former Customs Service and Immigration and
Naturalization Service could maximize their effectiveness by
aligning all of the right pieces to carry out its important
missions. Unfortunately, that has not occurred. In particular,
the potential envisioned by the creation of an enforcement
agency has not been fully realized. Instead, I would recommend
a thorough examination of the components of each bureau and
redistributing programs to provide a logical alignment of
operations, assets, as well as the integration of appropriate
resources.
In that vein, I would suggest strongly placing customs and
agriculture and port assets under our Customs Bureau, and
immigration and enforcement assets under an immigration bureau.
The Federal Protective Service and the Federal Air Marshals
should be moved elsewhere in the Department. They don't fit. It
doesn't make sense. The experiment of forcing square pegs into
round holes and joining numerous programs under one roof has
served merely to diminish the Department's focus on
enforcement.
While the leadership at ICE had the most difficult job in
the three immigration bureaus in addressing the critical
infrastructure issues, which are hampering its ability to
execute just basic functions, the fact remains that neither ICE
nor CBP have plans to complement one another, nor are they
capable of successfully moving forward. It is vital to
recognize that the two bureaus barely interact. When they do,
they argue over budget, operation and jurisdiction.
This is not to say that there have not been successes at
integration. The Arizona Border Control Initiative, the
expansion of expedited removal between ports of entry, and the
publication of joint detention priorities are a few of the
areas where the two bureaus working with the Border and
Transportation Security Directorate have been able to work
together to increase the effectiveness and inefficiency of
operations. However, all too often BTS, which has insufficient
resources to properly integrate the agencies, has been forced
to waste their scarce resources and staff mediating disputes
between these agencies instead of developing strategy and
integrating operations to fulfill the Department's mission.
Whether the decision is ultimately made to merge ICE and
CBP or not, real issues will remain unless the underlying
vision and mission occur in a unifying manner. If ICE and other
Homeland Security agencies do not have the proper strategic
planning, mission focus and strong leadership, their goals will
remain unreachable, and our country will remain vulnerable.
Aside from the organizational issues that are being
contemplated today, this committee must look at major policy
issues. Throughout my 18 years of service in the former
Immigration and Naturalization Service and Immigration and
Customs Enforcement Bureau, this country has lacked a clear
policy in immigration matters.
Congress and the administration must send DHS a clear
signal on immigration policy. This lack of direction has made
the missions of the current agencies responsible for enforcing
these statutes more confusing and complicated. Unfortunately
for the Department, there are many dedicated individuals who
often, without the appropriate resources, clear mission and
strategy, continue to perform the impossible day in and day
out. Within that same breadth, the Department, and in
particular ICE, has lost many talented individuals who can no
longer wake up each day to face those trying circumstances.
Now it is time to reexamine not just organizational issues,
but again the larger issues, policy, strategy and mission.
Again, thank you for the opportunity to testify. I welcome
the opportunity to answer any questions you may have.
Mr. Rogers. Thank you for that statement.
[The information follows:]
Prepared Statement of David Venturella, Former acting Director of the
Office of Detention and Removal Operations
Mr. Chairman and honorable Congressional Members, I would like to
thank you for the opportunity to testify today and I am honored to
appear before you to discuss the matter at hand.
In an eighteen year career in law enforcement, I have worked as an
entry-level deportation officer with the former Immigration and
Naturalization Service, to overseeing the detention and removal efforts
of criminal and illegal aliens in the United States as the acting
Director of Detention and Removal Operations within U.S. Immigration
and Customs Enforcement, or ICE.
The creation of the Department of Homeland Security was one of the
greatest and most significant re-alignment efforts in the federal
government in over 40 years. The goal of the established Department to
break through the layers of bureaucratic red tape, end the turf wars
that existed between various law enforcement agencies and focus the
mission of government on protecting our nation and its people will be
achieved by asking questions such as the one presented here today.
The question of this hearing is. . .should we possibly merge ICE
and CBP and is there a benefit to doing so? While I applaud this
committee and others for recognizing that ICE and CBP are not
functioning at their optimum level and are looking at options to fix
that situation, it is my humble opinion that an option to merge the two
organizations is not necessary at this time and may well cause the
department to move backwards. The creation of DHS provided an
opportunity to take a fresh look at how the former Customs Service and
Immigration and Naturalization Service could maximize their
effectiveness by aligning all of the right pieces to carry out its
important missions; unfortunately that has not occurred. In particular,
the potential envisioned by the creation of an enforcement agency has
not been fully realized. Instead, I would recommend a thorough
examination of the components of each bureau and redistributing
programs to provide a logical alignment of operations, assets as well
as the integration of appropriate resources. In that vein, I would
suggest that you strongly consider placing customs and agriculture
assets under CBP and immigration enforcement assets under ICE. The
Federal Protective Service and the Federal Air Marshals Service should
be moved elsewhere in the department. The experiment of forcing square
pegs into round holes and jumbling numerous programs under one roof has
served merely to diminish ICE's focus on enforcement.
The leadership at ICE had the most difficult job of the three
immigration bureaus in addressing the critical infrastructure issues
which are hampering the ability to execute basic functions. The fact
remains that neither ICE nor CBP do not have plans that compliment one
another nor are they capable of successfully moving forward. It is
vital to recognize that the two bureaus barely interact and when they
do, they argue over budget, operations and jurisdiction.
That is not to say that there have not been successes in
integration. The Arizona Border Control Initiative, the expansion of
expedited removal between ports of entry, and the publication of joint
detention priorities are a few of the areas where the two bureaus,
working with the Border and Transportation Security (BTS) Directorate
have been able to work together to increase the effectiveness and
efficiency of operations. However, all to often, BTS, which has had
insufficient resources to properly integrate the agencies has been
forced to waste its scarce staff and resources mediating disputes
between the bureaus instead of developing strategy and integrating
operations to fulfill the Department's mission. Whether the decision is
ultimately made to merge ICE and CBP or not- the real issues will
remain unless the underlying mission, vision and planning occur in a
unified manner.
If ICE, CBP and other Homeland agencies do not have the proper
strategic planning, mission focus and strong leadership, their goals
will remain unreachable and our country will remain vulnerable.
Fortunately for the Department, there are many dedicated
individuals, who, often without the appropriate resources, clear
mission and strategy, continue to perform the impossible. Within that
same breath, the Department, and in particular, ICE has lost many
talented individuals who could no longer wake up each day to face those
same trying circumstances.
It is time to re-examine not just organizational issues, but the
larger issues of policy, strategy and mission.
Again, thank you for the opportunity to testify regarding this
important issue. I welcome the opportunity to answer any questions that
you may have.
Mr. Rogers. I thank all of you for what I think are very
thoughtful statements and helpful, very diverse.
I would like to start off the questioning and would remind
everybody that we are going to try to stick to the 5-minute
rule on the committee with our questions as well, and I will
try to set the pace for that.
In listening to the statement, I thought about an article
that I read recently by Asa Hutchinson just as he was about to
leave his post. The Under secretary was urging that we not undo
2 years of productive growth and development. He considered
this period, while painful and flawed, part of a developmental
process that we needed to stick--to adhere to.
I would like to know from you, Mr. Venturella, would you
agree with that? Are we in the right path? Is this just growing
pains that we are experiencing?
Mr. Venturella. We are certainly feeling growing pains,
sir. When I was in the Department, we were feeling growing
pains. Are we on the right path? I just don't know what that
path is, and I think that is the problem, where are we going
and how are we getting there. Spell it out to us.
Again, there are great individuals working in all of these
bureaus who, if they had the proper direction, the proper
focus, would carry out and execute perfectly. But that doesn't
exist. You know, I don't want to blame any individuals, it is
just, again, some of these--the misalignment of bureaus and
operations and functions has taken the focus away from the
Department on what is our strategy, what are we going to do the
next 3 to 5 year out, and focus on these start-up issues.
Mr. Rogers. Okay. Mr. Carafano, in your remarks, I think it
would be fair to say you disagree with former Secretary
Hutchinson. Would you tell us why he is wrong, and those just
aren't growing pains that we are living with?
Mr. Carafano. Yes. I have great respect for what Under
Secretary Hutchinson did as the Under Secretary for DHS. But he
was very much focusing on standing up the organization that he
was handed. I mean, he didn't get a vote on what it should look
like.
I think the most salient comment was made by David. I mean,
we don't--there is no vision of where we are going. Therefore,
it is kind of a circular debate as is this growing pains or not
because we really don't know where we are going.
In my statement I tried to articulate four or five pieces
of what I thought envisioning the future ought to look like and
that would serve the basis for reorganization. The top three
is--one is first you have to focus on the legal means of entry
in the United States. Those are our vital lifelines. They have
to be protected. Virtually every known terrorist that entered
the United States has come in through a legal means, so those
legal means and infrastructure that support them at the border,
I think, ought to be our number one priority.
Internal enforcement and point of origin and point of
transit, because the worst place to stop this is at the border.
It is better to keep the flow from the border to begin with,
and internal enforcement and external pressure, I think, will
provide much more bang for the buck.
The third point I try to make is on the border, I think,
where we really need to put our priority is between the points
of entry. Therefore, I think what is really required is a
systems-to-systems approach is what gets the right assets to
the right place at the right time to interdict threats. And
what I argued before, there is, I think, a lot of that going to
be airborne, whether it is the air and maritime interdiction
capabilities, which is now in CBP, or in pumping up the Coast
Guard's domain, awareness and capabilities to react.
But I think we need that kind of document on the table from
the Department, because otherwise we are really just--everybody
can make a great compelling case based on what they are
particularly concerned about, but what is most important is how
do we reduce illegal entry and unlawful presence overall, and
how do we keep terrorists and other bad things out of the
country.
Mr. Rogers. Excellent.
Finally, I would like a quick answer of Mr. Klug. You
talked about how we needed to merge in order to enhance our
border security specifically. What is our biggest
vulnerability, in your opinion, without the merger?
Mr. Klug. I believe it is the flow of intelligence that
surrounds port security that is our greatest vulnerability.
Mr. Rogers. Okay. Thank you.
I now would like to recognize my Ranking Member, my friend
Mr. Meek from Florida, for questions.
Mr. Meek. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I want to thank the
Members for speaking from their heart today about the direction
that we are going in, direction that we may take in the future.
I can tell you that I was sitting here and I was waiting for
the real what we should do. I am hearing both sides.
Mr. Chairman, I think we put together a very good panel
here, because we are going to have some insightful questions
from members of this committee that will hopefully get us to
some sort of conclusion, and that conclusion doesn't have to be
today. I think it is an ongoing discussion and action.
But I can tell you what I do fear. It is a very difficult
task that we are talking about here, the enforcement of
protecting the homeland and also at our airports and seaports.
I mean, this is a big job. This is not small. So if anyone may
hear your statements and say, why aren't they coming to hard
conclusions, I think you have said it best if we are heading in
the direction that we are heading.
I don't know quite what direction we should go into now,
but I can tell you there are two reasons why we are here today.
One is the GAO report that was produced, and also the
Department of Homeland Security 2.0, and looking at the
conclusions of both of those reports, I can tell you that it is
not something that the Department, from what I can see,
Mr. Chairman, has embraced, or even having a serious
discussion about looking at how we can deliver.
But, Doctor, I want to just ask you a quick question, and I
know that you have had a lot to say here today, and I can see
that you spent quite a bit of time on it.
Originally we started out looking at this with four
principles, four guiding principles, of putting these--in
having these two agencies separate, and the creation of the
Department of Homeland Security. One was delivery, control of
delivery; and also prevention of alien smuggling; and, three,
detention and removal; and guidance of communications. I want
to just--I want you to elaborate, and anyone else can elaborate
with the time that is left, on the end of the fourth point, not
necessarily in that order, the guidance of communications.
I think being a past creature of law enforcement myself, I
know, when we talk about those stovepipes, is very hard, they
are steel, they are galvanized, they are tribunal, almost. You
have to either be a part of that agency to receive information.
As we talk about protecting the homeland, communication and
information is important.
So, in your report, in your 2.0 report, did you have any
findings, or did you come about to any conclusions on how
communications will be improved if we were to change our
present structure right now?
Mr. Carafano. Most of the input was anecdotal, but
basically it was a lot of stories of coordination that simply
wasn't required before, because now people are in separate
buildings. People don't have TDY to go and talk to other
people. People have to talk to a boss to coordinate, when they
didn't have to before.
The other common thing that we heard a lot of was that in
the old CBP, it was often the investigators that really had the
big picture and really could work with the border people in
terms of providing them the context of how what they are doing
fit in the overall picture, and that made much more better
internal enforcement investigations.
Mr. Meek. Anyone else care to elaborate on that?
Mr. Klug. I would like to echo what the Doctor said, quite
true, that intelligence and that expertise that was inherent in
the Customs Service relative to port security, much of that
expertise was lost when the two agencies were split. And that
symbiotic relationship I spoke about in my testimony weren't
flowery words, it was the passionate truth.
We are collocated. On a formal and informal basis we
exchange intelligence information, and that led to many
successful seizures of narcotics. We could have continued to
take that expertise if we are combined or continue to be
combined and focused on the war on terrorism. We lost that when
the two agencies were split, and we are continuing to increase
that schism as the days go on.
Mr. Meek. Yes, sir.
Mr. Cutler. Well, before I became a special agent, I was an
inspector at Kennedy Airport. The nice thing was that I
maintained that special relationship with the inspectors. They
were a great resource for me as an agent, when I made the
transition to becoming a special agent.
But I speak to my colleagues today who are agents assigned
to ICE. There has been literally a barrier that has now gone
up. They will tell me of instances of law violations are being
discovered by inspectors who are calling the FBI before they
are calling ICE. They are saying, why aren't we notified if we
are supposed to be part of the same organization? There is a
sense of organization, there is a sense of we are us, and you
are you, and this didn't happen before. That is why I was
saying before that we need to build up the exterior borders of
the United States to protect ourselves from those who would
come here and harm us. But on the other hand, we need to remove
all of these barriers that we have erected within the
Immigration and Customs law enforcement community, because it
is a community, and we do have to rely on each other.
But I think the other part of the problem is, though, that
we just don't have the resources to do an effective job. I just
want to make one fast point about that. Once again, I have to
tell you that I am a New Yorker for a reason. New York has
claimed to be the safest big city in the United States. We have
8 million people confined to a small area, but we have a police
force of nearly 40,000 police officers. We have about 2,000
agents dedicated to enforcing the immigration laws for the
entire country, where we have an illegal alien population that
might be twice as great as the number of people who live in the
city of New York.
Without the resources, without the detention space, without
a clear mission, without the political will--and this has been
a problem from before the merger, we got into this mess--the
folks who are here illegally in the United States didn't come
here last Thursday. This problem was building for a very long
time, so that what we need to understand is historically no one
has wanted to deal with immigration. People called Social
Security the third rail. I think if there is a third rail, it
has been immigration. So I think we really need to come to
grips with resources as well as management and structure.
Mr. Rogers. Thank you.
Mr. Meek. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Venturella. I do have one final point.
Mr. Rogers. Go ahead.
Mr. Venturella. Those barriers have been created, but once
again it is because of the leadership that has allowed those
barriers to be created. They have forced a schism between the
bureaus. On paper, yes, these are our bureaus, but it takes
leadership to break those down. That hasn't occurred. Again, we
have lost focus on what the goal and the mission is for the
Department of Homeland Security.
Mr. Rogers. The Chair recognizes the gentleman from
Mississippi, Mr. Thompson.
Mr. Thompson. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. Let me
compliment the witnesses on their testimony and let me make
some suggestions for you, Mr. Chairman. It just appears at some
point we ought to bring some people from the administration--
Mr. Rogers. I agree.
Mr. Thompson.--in and let hear see the other side.
Mr. Rogers. Exactly. It was on purpose that we brought
folks from the outside first to get their perspective before we
had the folks from the inside. But we do intend to do just
that. I agree with you.
Mr. Thompson. Because there are some things that are very
troubling for me. What I hear from people in the field is that
they want it to work, but the mechanics for that to happen just
don't happen to exist at this point.
One of the things I would like to assure Mr. Klug is that
we need to see the audit of ICE, and we hope to get that audit
report at some point and review it, because those things help
us.
Mr. Chairman, I think we also need to get someone in here
from ICE to explain that audit to the committee, since we are
an oversight committee, and we should examine some very glaring
issues raised in this audit from an oversight and management
standpoint.
Mr. Rogers. I agree.
Mr. Thompson. I guess the last thing is what I got from
everyone at the table is that you think, given the right
direction, the merger is good. But unless you get it right, it
is suspect. Why don't we start with the good doctor and give me
a personal observation on that.
Mr. Carafano. I think that is correct. I mean, I think a
reorganization without a comprehensive vision that tackles
tough political issues like illegal entry and unlawful presence
in the United States is not helpful.
I would certainly agree with the argument that it is a
resourcing question as well as an organizational question, and
I think that is part of the study is you never are going to
have all the money you want. The question is do you have an
organization that is designed to put the resources where you
are going to get the biggest bang for the buck to address the
problem? Any time you ask that decision among multiple agencies
and the Department, it is just more complex, because you are
worried about making your agency healthy as well as getting the
mission done.
So when you create an operational agency, which has a core
competency of addressing the problems from end to end--and I
actually include visa issuance in this--from visa issuance to
internal enforcement, then hopefully you have somebody at the
top who can look at the problem strategically and not only say,
how can I best put my organizational piece to do that, but how
can I best apply the resources to do that.
I don't think ICE is ever going to, ever, ever going to
have the capacity to do internal enforcement, so I truly
believe it is the one thing we really, really have to do if the
Federal Government wants to make a substantive contribution to
this problem. It is never going to happen as an independent,
tiny little agency sitting by itself, hanging out at the end of
DHS. It is never going to have the pull, the politics, the
cover that it needs to do its job.
Mr. Klug. I am here today at my own expense. I came in from
New York. I don't represent a foundation, I don't represent a
union. I come here, I am no longer an employee, so unlike the
committee, I cannot be promoted to another position.
I am here out of concern for what I thought was a very
broken agency, or had become a broken agency. I am here for
concern of the general American public. I have no other agenda
other than to speak to the distinguished members of this
committee to say that what has occurred would have separated
these two agencies was a flawed idea, and that I am hoping that
the agency and I am hoping--and I am not so presumptuous enough
to think that I have the whole picture. I realize that I have
an opinion predicated upon a relatively short career of 25
years, but that opinion I am passionate about.
That is why I am here today, and I think that the best
thing for the American public is to merge these two agencies
back together, because that merger would be much more conducive
to what I think the intent of Congress was when it formed the
Department of Homeland Security, and that was to protect our
borders.
Mr. Rogers. Time has expired on this line of questioning. I
would like to recognize the chairman of the full committee, Mr.
Cox of California,
Mr. Cox. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and once again thank you
to each of our witnesses. Like the Ranking Member of the full
committee, the gentleman from Mississippi, I look forward to
hearing from the Department of Homeland Security and
administration witnesses on this topic.
But I want to thank each of you, because what we have found
both in this committee, and in our other work in the Congress,
is that when people leave their service and the Administration,
when they leave the government and get a chance to reflect on
their duties, they are oftentimes more candid with us, and we
are trying to solicit views both from within the government and
out of the government. We put a lot of weight on not only what
the government says in defense of its own structures, but also
what others who spend full time examining these issue think and
what they have concluded. Therefore, the views of academics, of
think tanks, of professional associations and so forth are of
very significant importance to this committee. ?
And as has been just pointed out, some of you are traveling
here at your own expense, and we very much appreciate this.
Make no mistake, we will be hearing from and having very
serious discussions with, in formal hearings and other fora,
the Administration on these topics.
What got us here, of course, is that after Congress passed
the Homeland Security Act, there was a DHS-initiated
reorganization plan. So the Homeland Security Act didn't lay it
out this way. This is not what Congress did, but there was a
subsequent decision after 2002 the Homeland Security Act
passed. 2003 was the date of the reorganization plan. There was
a subsequent decision to do something that may have very
profound long-term consequences, and that is to separate before
what had not been separated, immigration enforcement at the
border from immigration enforcement throughout the rest of the
country.
Now, we are all familiar with the problem that we have in
our Federal system of the bank robber who flees the
jurisdiction, runs across county lines, and, you know,
different county sheriffs to go after them across the State
lines, and different State jurisdictions have to go after them;
and some of those different turf rivalries in different
situations of the State, and not too dissimilar with
experiences we have had between the Federal Government and
State and local authorities. Some of those things can get in
the way of doing the job.
What we found post-9/11 in the 9/11 Commission report, and
with everything else that has been brought to the table to
analyze these questions, is that information-sharing and
accountability and responsibility at the highest levels are
vitally important if we are going to stop the terrorists from
exploiting these holes in our system.
What we are here today to find out is whether or not we
have such holes in our system; whether or not, as someone flees
across the border and gets beyond a certain distance so that
they are no longer within the purview of what we have
artificially called the border piece, they fall into another's
jurisdiction. Even though it is all the same Department, the
hand-off isn't working.
So I want to put the question to you in that very stark
way. Are we missing people who could be picked up because of
the lack of hand-off between CBP and ICE? I will put that
question to anybody who wants to leap at it.
Mr. Cutler.
Mr. Cutler. Yes, I think we are. We have to look at the
fact that there are so many competing interests, because things
are driven by interests, as we all know.
There is a Visa Waiver Program in effect right now, just to
give you an idea, where people from 27 countries plus Canada
don't even need to get visas in order to enter the United
States. It is bad for two reasons. Number one, we don't get the
right opportunity to make use of biometrics and other methods
to properly vet people applying for entry in the U.S.,
notwithstanding US-VISIT and so forth. The other thing is
Congress passed legislation a few years ago that made a crime
of visa fraud punishable, if it is involving narcotics
trafficking, by 20 years in jail; 25 years in jail for visa
fraud if someone is a terrorist. But if you have a visa waiver
program, those folks are able to come to our country--a guy
like Richard Reid, the shoe bomber, would have been eligible to
enter this country without a visa. So if you look at the way
the various agencies work in fragmented ways that are often
contradictory, and competing methods, that is one problem.
The other problem that we deal with is immigration benefits
fraud. What we saw the terrorists do--and they are very
sophisticated and very adept at this--is they want to come to
our country and hide in plain sight. The easiest way to hide in
plain sight is to get lawful status in the United States. If
you can get a green card, or especially if you can get a U.S.
passport, that gives you free access not only to our borders,
but to virtually all the borders of the countries throughout
the world.
The 9/11 Commission found that the ability to travel freely
and frequently was vital for those characters to prepare to
attack us.
Mr. Cox. Mr. Bonner, do you remember not too long ago that
in the San Diego sector there was an edict issued that the
Border Patrol officers would go so far and no further and it
was then publicly reversed? What is the situation now in
California, and is there an informal point beyond which the
Border Patrol can't go?
Mr. Bonner. Yes, there is. And that remains in effect, and
basically that point is the immediate border vicinity places--
Mr. Cox. Defined as what?
Mr. Bonner. It is not strictly defined, but probably 25 to
50 miles is about the strength of our jurisdiction.
Mr. Cox. Well, that is a big fudge factor, 25 miles. Now,
what happens, let us say we are out 25 miles, and then we have
got the next band of 25 to 50. What is going on in there? Who
is working that area? Is that ICE, is that CBP, is it both;
and, if so, are they seamlessly working together?
Mr. Bonner. No, they are not seamlessly working together.
There is very little cooperation between the two agencies. The
current detention fiasco where we have a policy when we catch
Central Americans, people from countries other than Mexico, we
do not have bed space to hold those people, so we release them
into the United States. Then CBP points the finger at ICE and
says, your end of the boat is sinking.
This is everybody's problem, yet this bifurcated structure
pretends that it is just isolated to that one area, when, in
fact, we all depend on those resources in order to accomplish
the mission of the agency.
Similarly, on the interior enforcement, we are told as
Border Patrol agents, the ICE agents will handle this. Well, we
know that there are less than 2,000 ICE agents to cover the
entire country, and we know they are not handling that problem.
We say, we have the resources, why can't we go there and work
citizen capabilities and the intelligence that we have? And we
are told that it is not your job. Well, whose job is it? There
is just no coordination, no hand-off here.
Mr. Cox. Apparently no one.
Yes, Mr. Carafano.
Mr. Carafano. Just a very quick example, because it is also
an example of efficiencies. Sea Hawk, which is the operation in
Charleston, South Carolina, single best port security operation
I have ever seen. Everybody comes to the table; Federal, State
and local share assets, share information, absolutely fabulous.
At the meeting every morning there is a CBP agent, there is
a ICE agent there. Why? Because there are two separate
agencies, because--one guy actually in terms of allocating
resources for what needs to be done and allocating and sharing
tasks and intelligence can do that very well.
So we have doubled the force requirement at this center
simply because we have two agencies there. There is a lot of
that, I think, inefficiency at many administrative levels when
you only need one representative to handle this array of tasks.
Chairman Cox. Mr. Carafano, could you help us understand
what precisely is the counterterrorism aspect of this problem?
What is the cost? What are the consequences of this cumbersome
hand-off right now between what we are artificially calling
border and interior?
Mr. Carafano. Well, I think the single greatest one is the
vast majority of bad things and bad people come in through
illegal points of entry. What you want to do--those have got to
be as robust as possible. What you want to do is you want to
take as many people who are not coming through the legal ports
and convince them--them that they need to come through the
legal--so you want to get as many people going through the
legitimate gates as possible. That is where we are really
simply failing.
We are doing a fair job, there is a lot better we can do,
about increasing the infrastructure at the ports of entry,
increasing the procedures, making things flow, but still--
surveying things; but we are doing a very, very awful job about
convincing people that they need to go that route rather than
the black route. Because we get the people--we get the majority
of people going through the legal ports of entry. The few bits
and services that are not coming through are the really bad
people we want to go after, and then we can use our targeted
assets to go after them much more efficiently.
But we have got to do a better job of not just
strengthening the legal points, but getting the illegal flow
down, diverting it through the legal mechanism. We are never
going to do that unless we increase internal enforcement. And
the lack of cooperation between the border and internal
enforcement is part of the problem, and the lack of resources
for internal enforcement is a big part of the problem.
Mr. Cox. Would any other part of the panel wish to comment
on that question on the counterterrorism aspect of this
discussion?
Mr. Venturella. We miss opportunities every day in the area
of counterterrorism, because of the lack of intelligence that
we gather from these activities, the lack of intelligence that
is passed on to the appropriate agencies. We are missing that
opportunity to gather that intelligence and determine the right
strategies and right initiatives to tackle these problems.
We miss that opportunity every day, from the Border Patrol
who arrests an individual, finds out there is no detention
space, and lets that person go. We have lost that individual.
We have lost that opportunity to gain whatever intelligence we
could on this on the way, the manner these individuals came to
the United States to help law enforcement and to secure that
border.
Mr. Cox. Thank you.
Is the green light stuck on?
Mr. Rogers. That is what I was going to tell you, the
lights aren't working out here.
Mr. Cox. I yield back, in that case, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Rogers. I will at the 5-minute point tap the gavel so
you know time is up, and if you will wrap up your point so we
can move back to the next Member.
I guess we are back in order. I recognize the gentleman
from Pennsylvania Mr. Dent.
Mr. Dent. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thanks to all of you
for your very thoughtful testimony here today. I am tempted to
ask you who is enforcing the border between ICE and CBP, but I
won't do that. My question though deals with this.
Mr. Cutler, when you were talking about these bureaucratic
borders that you have experienced, and you have cited one
example a few moments ago with the FBI and I guess it was ICE,
would you give us some more specific examples of these
bureaucratic examples that you have been experiencing as a
professional all these years?
Mr. Cutler. Well, I left the agency before the merger, so I
am relying on folks that are there. But basically the way it
stands is that a wall has truly been erected between the people
at CBP and the people at ICE. It used to be that as an
immigration agent we were part of INS, and it included the
inspectors, it included the special agents. We all worked for
the same district Director, so we were all part of the same
office.
They have separate chains of command at this point, so
everyone now has a sense of competition, this is my territory,
you are in my domain, and I control this; and people tend to be
very territorial. The result of that is it that becomes that
kind of a competition for resources, for intelligence, to take
the credit for having made the accomplishments, and we can't
afford that if we are fighting a war on terror or if we are
fighting a war on drugs.
People have to cross our borders to get to the interior. It
is a continuing flow. They don't materialize in the middle of
the United States. If they land at an airport, they are going
to see an inspector. If they run the border, then they have
managed to evade the Border Patrol, or because of a lack of
resources, the Border Patrol did what T.J. referred to, this
catch and release program where they are so overwhelmed by the
numbers of illegal aliens that they have to permit them to
travel onward with the orders that they are to appear for a
hearing. What is the rate that shows up, 10, 12 percent, if
that many? So what we wind up doing is overburdening the
interior because we can't deal with it at the border.
We need to understand that this is a whole system. You
can't address it piecemeal. It is kind of putting a watch
together. It is great if you have all of these great
components, but if you don't fit them into that watch case and
screw them together so that everything measures, that watch
isn't going to run. We have never put all of these components
together in a unified program to make certain that the program
works either.
Mr. Dent. Mr. Bonner or Mr. Callahan, do either of you have
specific examples you might like to share with us in this
committee?
Mr. Bonner. Sure. The Border Patrol used to have criminal
investigators within its ranks that reported up through its
chain of command. We would work very closely with these
criminal investigators to take down smuggling operations at the
highest levels, and there was a tremendous amount of
cooperation. The agents at the field level knew what was going
on in these investigations and very highly coordinated.
After the merger those agents were taken and put into ICE,
and the cooperation--it was as if a wall was erected from that
point forward; unless you knew people in the organization and
would go around the walls and make clandestine phone calls to
try and share information, there was simply no information
being shared. Now we are not cooperating and coordinating our
operations, and it is a shame, because a lot is still going on
at the border in the way of smuggling, but we are not being
nearly as effective as we used to be in stopping that.
Mr. Dent. Thank you, Mr. Callahan.
Mr. Callahan. While there are territorial aspects of it,
while it is not just within the bureau, you have a fight for
control within each bureau between the legacy components, the
INS components and the Customs components. They are fighting
for control of the budget, they are fighting for control of the
bureau, and, depending on which office you go to, the focus is
primarily what that person's background is. In some offices it
is Immigration, but in a majority it is Customs, and the
immigration falls to the wayside. You really need to look at
the leadership and bring in leaders that are going to focus
equally on both aspects and on the antiterrorism aspects of the
enforcement.
Mr. Dent. My final question deals with the Canadian
situation, Canadian border. Mr. Cutler, you pointed out the
2,000 Border Patrol for the whole Nation.
Mr. Bonner. Two thousand special agents.
Mr. Dent. Two thousand special agents, I am sorry, on the
border of Canada, more than 2,000 miles long. I guess the
question I have, it is probably directed more to Mr. Bonner and
Mr. Callahan, do you believe the consolidation of ICE and CBP
would enhance the resources along the northern border,
especially given the--well, specifically given known terrorist
cells up there. Do you think this merger would help us in the
northern border?
I need you to give a quick answer because time has expired.
Mr. Bonner. Sure, it certainly would help. I would point
out that the northern border is 4,000 miles long between the
continental U.S. and Canada. Currently we have currently fewer
than one--well, we have approximately 1,000 Border Patrol
agents to patrol that entire area 24 hours a day, 7 days a
week. We need more resources. I believe that a more cohesive
structure would allow the Bureau to focus its resources where
they are needed.
Mr. Dent. Thank you.
Mr. Rogers. The Chair now recognizes the gentleman from New
Jersey, Mr. Pascrell.
Mr. Pascrell. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. You know,
Mr. Chairman, what I have heard this morning is not very
comforting.
Mr. Rogers. I agree.
Mr. Pascrell. Number two, the 9/11 Commission called for an
addition of 2,000 Border Patrol agents. The President's budget
called for an addition of 200. So we keep on sliding back here
and failing to come to grips with the major issue of personnel.
I want to ask two questions, if I may, Mr. Chairman, two
areas. Number one, what is the relationship, if any, between--
and I know we are dealing with enforcement agencies--between
Citizenship and Immigration Services, and what we are talking
about today, ICE and the Customs and Border Protection? Are
there any discussions between the two groups? Because if you
are trying to get people into the legal process of becoming
citizens, you are doing a lot--not you, personally--you are
doing a lousy job, and it would seem to me that we would want
to strengthen that relationship between enforcement and those
folks who have had the responsibility all the time of trying to
get people into the legal process, which we want, which makes
jobs easier for enforcement.
What am I missing? Mr. Callahan?
Mr. Callahan. Actually CIS is a missing cog in this whole
equation. The adjudicators, asylum officers and information
officers identify criminal aliens and that quite frequently,
and they actually issue out notices to appear in removal
proceedings, and what is supposed to happen is they are
supposed to call up the enforcement branch, usually
investigations--it could be the detention removal office--to
have that person come down and actually take them into custody.
How frequently does that happen? I can't really say. I don't
think it is happening as often as it needs to. But the short
answer, we could do a better job at it.
Mr. Pascrell. Yes.
Mr. Cutler. Well, you know, there was a program called
Citizenship USA under the prior administration that wound up
where tens of thousands of criminals got to be U.S. citizens.
The reality is we need integrity to the benefits program.
The GAO did a study 3 years ago that found fraud to be rampant
and pervasive. Without resources, without people knocking on
doors to make certain that there is any kind of validity to an
application, whether it is residency based on a marriage,
residency based on a job, or application for citizenship where
the person uses multiple identities, you have people involved
making claims of political asylum who aren't entitled, who make
false statements. The only way you are able to determine the
validity of statements made or the validity of an application
is to have enough people to knock on the doors and burn shoe
leather and make field investigations.
Most people think of interior enforcement to be purely
reactive, to go out and arrest people who shouldn't be here
legally. The fraud component is huge. And to go back to what I
said originally, the ideal situation for a U.S. terrorist is to
be a U.S. citizen. Someone said that a spy is someone who
couldn't attract the attention of a waitress in a greasy spoon
diner. The same thing is true as of a terrorist. They want to
be able to hide in plain sight. The easiest way to do it is to
get U.S. citizenship or residency, and if that program lacks
integrity--and right now I understand there are 6 million
applications for benefits pending at CIS. How could you
possibly have integrity? These folks are adept at using the
system to accomplish their goals. That is why you need the
resources, and you need a coordinated effort.
One last thing about the coordination between CIS and
investigations, I have been told that when they need their help
to provide them with documents for an undercover operation or
whatever, they are not getting CIS to cooperate with ICE
either. So that is another area of vulnerability that hurts the
operational end of things and makes us again vulnerable to
terrorists.
Mr. Pascrell. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I hope we will heed
what is being said here.
I just have one other question, if I may. The Federal
Protection Services, the primary mission is one of protection,
community policing, crime prevention, as I understand it, much
like a traditional uniformed police department. ICE, on the
other hand, is charged primarily with investigations and
prosecutions and alien removal.
Now, I would like to hear your thoughts on whether there is
more efficient placement of the Federal Protection Services
within the Department that exist now, and, for example, given
that the FPS protects infrastructure and doesn't assist State
and local police with information-sharing, wouldn't placement
within--on this interesting chart--with the Information
Analysis and Infrastructure Protection Directorate seem more
logical? Would anyone care to respond to that?
Mr. Rogers. A quick answer, time has expired.
Mr. Venturella. Very quickly. In my statement, I propose
that FPS should be moved out of ICE. I think there needs to be
serious consideration whether it actually fits into the
Department. It is a very hard placement in looking at the
various functions of responsibilities in Homeland Security. So
I would raise the question, maybe it should be moved out of the
Department.
Mr. Pascrell. Altogether.
Mr. Venturella. Altogether.
Mr. Pascrell. Wow. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Rogers. Thank you.
The gentleman from Connecticut Mr. Shays is recognized.
Mr. Shays. Thank you very much.
When we passed the Department of Homeland Security, it just
seemed illogical to us on the face of it to separate Customs
and INS, just to address that issue, I mean, because then other
things happened afterwards. Was there logic in bringing them
both together? Shaking the head without speaking is not
helpful.
Mr. Cutler. No. As I said during my testimony, Congressman,
I think it was a mistake.
Mr. Shays. Okay. I want to know--I am trying to sort out
who thinks what. Do others disagree with that view?
Mr. Carafano. Yes. Yes, I disagree. You can--there are
many, many skill sets and activities within the whole border
services activity. If you parse them all out into their own
little tidy area, you would have an infinite number of
agencies.
I think, again, it goes back to envisioning the future. If
the future, again, is to have as broad jurisdiction as
possible, to have as many integrated activities as possible,
then that argues for a larger thing. I actually disagree--I
agree with one criticism at the border. I think one face at the
border is not what we are looking for in terms of one superman
who can do everything. What we want, however, I do think, is an
integrated and coordinated handling of people and things with
standards in the program.
Mr. Shays. That is what I want. That is what I want. Tell
me again why that just doesn't happen. Is it a cultural
problem?
Mr. Cutler. I think it is a cultural problem. It is also a
very different type of investigation. If you are worried about
people coming across the border, and you are worried about
processing applications and dealing with visas and that whole
complex area, that is very different from the movement of goods
and currency.
Yes, there is going to be overlap. I mean, goodness,
everything overlaps into something else eventually, but that is
why, again, going back to what I said is that Treasury used to
be the parent organization of Customs, and INS had been under
DOJ. It is a very different perspective.
Mr. Shays. I will just say to you on the surface, and we
will get into this, and hopefully will resolve it, thank God we
now have a committee that can do it, can resolve it.
Mr. Cutler. Yes.
Mr. Shays. It does seem to me this is more of a cultural
battle, and it does seem to me it is a budgetary issue. I mean,
we screwed up in who got money and who didn't get money, and
that is part of the challenge as well. I am struck by the fact
that investigations just in one group, both enforce--correct?
ICE and both enforce--not a nod of your head.
Mr. Cutler. Yes.
Mr. Shays. But we have put the investigation on one side.
Should investigation again be on both sides--nodding the heads.
Anybody disagree with that?
Mr. Klug. No. Look, again, I am a proponent of the merger
of CBP and ICE, so I am looking at one investigative unit of
the two agencies combined.
Mr. Shays. You would put them all together, wouldn't you?
Mr. Klug. Yes, I would.
Mr. Shays. How many of you would put them all together? I
mean, who wouldn't again? Who would not put--okay, you are the
lone wolf here. Is this an employee issue?
Mr. Cutler. I am no longer an employee, as is the case of
Mr. Klug. I am a former agent here on my own expense. I am here
because I want to see the mission accomplished, and I don't see
it being accomplished under the same situation. Now, perhaps
they could be under the same umbrella, but I really believe you
need separate chains of command with budget and accountability
and training that is specific to each of the two tasks.
Mr. Shays. In my world I would like people to have skills
that could do both sides of it. I would like it to not be just,
you know--yes, sir.
Mr. Cox. I am sorry, would you yield for a second?
Mr. Shays. Yes.
Mr. Cox. I want to understand the witness's answer. What
you want to keep separate with separate chains of command is
Customs on one hand--
Mr. Cutler. That is immigration.
Mr. Cox.--and Immigration Enforcement on the other hand.
But what you are not saying is you want to keep the border
interior separated.
Mr. Cutler. No, no, no. I want those integrated,
absolutely. We should not be drawing that distinction,
absolutely not.
Mr. Cox. Thank you, Chris.
Mr. Carafano. Just very quickly, I just want to point to
something that is in my prepared testimony. I think this is an
issue not of organizational design, but an issue of human
capital development. I think that we have to separate those
out, because I think a lot of the points that he has raised,
and a lot of the points that you have raised, can be addressed
through career patterns, the career progressions and the
operational assignments that you can give somebody. But that
can all take place within the rubric of one unified agency.
What I would hate to see is--which is the point the
Department tried to argue--this is too complicated to fit in.
Well, that is like saying the Army couldn't fit everything in.
It is not true.
Mr. Shays. I hear you. I am sorry, I missed your opening
statement, so I didn't hear that. Yes, sir.
Mr. Callahan. Yes, sir. The investigations and the
inspections program both, what they have done is created a
jack-of-all-trades and a master of none. You need to have some
specialization. I think breaking off or splitting up--at least
the management levels of it, I am sorry, splitting off the line
employee part of it, where you have line employees that are
working on investigations that Customs traditionally handled
and investigations that Immigration traditionally did, is a
good idea and integrating the management aspects of it. The
same with inspections.
Mr. Shays. Just very quickly, does anyone here believe that
establishing the Department of Homeland Security was a mistake?
Mr. Venturella. No.
Mr. Shays. I am going to assume that all of you think it
made sense, so now we have to make it work. I am seeing nodding
of the heads.
With that, I would yield back.
Mr. Rogers. Thank you. The gentleman's time has expired.
The gentlelady from the Virgin Islands, Mrs. Christensen is
recognized.
Mrs. Christensen. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I can see that this subcommittee is going to be very busy,
because the issue we are discussing today goes beyond CBP and
ICE. It is an issue of whether what we did in the legislation
or the Department as implemented is effective or not, and it
goes to the heart of the matter.
I am going to try to get through three questions real
quickly. I would appreciate as abbreviated answers as possible.
I hope we have more than one round.
Dr. Carafano, in reading--I am going to ask you about
someone else's testimony. Mr. Venturella said merging now, if I
understand you correctly, would set us back instead of moving
us forward; it would lose valuable time.
Recognizing the need for effective border and INS control
now, does the need to fix it quickly override the
recommendation to merge, or do you disagree that merging now
would impede improving the operations that we need today?
Mr. Carafano. Yes. I would go back to my testimony. I think
we have got to answer the three basic questions, will it help
improve the overall management of the Department, will it
create a strong operating agency, will it take us towards the
ultimate organization that we want to do this in the future. If
the answer is yes, then I would say do that as quickly as
possible.
I do think the pain is worth the gain, because this is a
long-term problem. The pain we feel--you know, took 5 years to
plan 9/11, 3 years to plan Madrid. The next problem may not
happen. If this was a 1-year problem, I would say let us live
with it, but this is a generational issue.
Mrs. Christensen. I am clear where you are in the merger. I
wanted to ask Mr. Klug and maybe Callahan and Bonner if they
could answer quickly. As I read your testimony, it causes me to
wonder whether the issue is whether there are two separate
agencies operating without coordinating, or is the main issue
the structuring within each agency, having--having this FPS and
ICE, unequal infrastructure, unequal funding, unequal pay? What
is the core of the issue for you? I will ask Klug first then.
Mr. Klug. I believe that you created two new agencies. I
believe those agencies--an actual byproduct of the agency is
parochialism. That is predicated upon two agencies now fighting
for resources and budget resources.
Mrs. Christensen. So could it be fixed by just evening out
the resources, lowering salaries? That was--
Mr. Klug. They will always be competitive, they will always
believe that the measurement of success will predicate the
amount of money and resources they will get. That is where the
parochial comes in. If we supply this information and the other
agency gets the headlines, they are going to be seen by
Congress as more prominent and more noteworthy, and they will
get the resources in budget.
Mrs. Christensen. So the problem is that it needs to be
merged, not that there is an inequality. Does anybody disagree?
Mr. Venturella.
Mr. Venturella. Again, I disagree with the notion that the
merger is the cure-all for all of this. Again, I look at
leadership of those two bureaus and within the Department. Why
is this pettiness allowed to occur? Why has it festered for 2
years, and why haven't you done something about it? We can
better organize the Department. There is no question about
that; make it more efficient, accomplish the mission.
But, again, it is going to take strong leadership to make
that happen, and I don't see that. And it is a shame, because
there are individuals here that currently work for those
bureaus who day in and day out struggle with the pettiness with
the division that has been created.
Mrs. Christensen. Well, won't the merger fix that?
Mr. Venturella. I don't think so. Again, I think you need
strong leadership, you need somebody who is visionary, and you
need to have a plan. If you ask any of these individuals what
is the mission, what is the plan, you will get different
answers. There should be one statement coming from these
individuals.
Mrs. Christensen. Let me try to get to my third question.
When we are concerned--this is to Mr. Klug. We are concerned
that ICE and CBP were created from Customs and legacy and INS
components of Customs, and ICE inspectors lost their best
source of intelligence and law enforcement information. Given
that Customs inspectors are charged with assessing the risk of
cargo containers and working with industry to secure these
supply chains, I worry that CBP programs will not achieve their
full potential because of the disconnect between ICE and their
inspectors.
So what was the relationship before, between inspectors and
investigators, and what is it now? Are there any benefits to
the current structure, and what has the impact been on the
cargo security mission of CBP?
Mr. Klug. I believe I mentioned in my testimony earlier
that the symbioism that existed between the two agencies, there
is a rift occurring, and that is basically that--and some of
the gentlemen alluded to it before--that when there is a
discovery, when there is intelligence and there is some
information, it is passed to other agencies as opposed to ICE.
For example, narcotics issues, we have heard instance of where
the Drug Enforcement Administration was called rather than ICE.
We have heard the FBI being called with information.
Mrs. Christensen. Specifically I asked about the cargo
security.
Mr. Klug. The cargo security. Again, the intelligence and
information that is guarded on both sides of the house remains
separated, rather than combined, so the intelligence that is
gathered by the ICE agents, by the ICE intelligence analysts,
is separate, in a separate component, in a separate database.
That is the intelligence gathered by CBP and their intelligence
analysts. So two separate analytical groups, both gathering
intelligence, and then exchanging it freely, or certainly as
freely as it was when it was one intelligence unit.
Mr. Rogers. All right. The gentlelady's time has expired.
The Chair recognizes the gentlelady from Florida.
Ms. Harris.
Ms. Harris. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I am going to ask Mr. Klug, with reference to your last
question, you said it has to do more with leadership or vision
problem between the two agencies. Could that be fixed if
questions of leadership and vision were clarified?
Mr. Klug. I believe that a stronger mission statement would
be helpful. In ICE currently, I believe, it is a very vague
mission statement that we had. Leadership comes and goes;
institutions remain.
Ms. Harris. Right.
Mr. Klug. So trying to find strong leaders and predicate
your hopes of the success of an agency on the next successor.
Ms. Harris. Do you think the old INS and Customs worked
more efficiently than this does today?
Mr. Klug. Yes, absolutely.
Ms. Harris. Do you basically think that it was just ill
conceived, and how it was set up that they are trying to do
their missions, but it was both ill conceived?
Mr. Klug. Which I believe it was ill conceived, yes.
Ms. Harris. Let me go to Mr. Cutler, back to some of your
questions, some of your statements. Do you think we could
better reconcile the policies and practices of these two
agencies so they were cooperating instead of competing? Or,
again, do you think it is just ill-conceived from the outset?
Mr. Cutler. Are you referring to the CBP and ICE?
Ms. Harris. Yes.
Mr. Cutler. Yeah, I think that you could put ICE and CBP
together because it is a continuum. People are trying to move
from the border to the interior. I mean, that is the goal.
Which is, by the way, why when Border Patrol is forced to do
catch and release, that is so troubling; because the goal that
the aliens had in the first place when they ran the border was
to get to the interior.
Ms. Harris. Given more time, do you think these two could
work these issues out to be able to have a continuum, or do you
think on the face of it it just isn't going to work that way?
Mr. Cutler. No. I think by compartmentalizing the way they
have, it is not working. And I don't think that the passage of
time is the issue. I think it is a matter of recognizing that
everyone has to feel that they are on the same team. The only
reason I wanted to divide the immigration chain off is to make
sure that people get the specific training, because it is a
very arcane set of laws. It is a big body of law, and it is on
both sides. But as far as the border and interior, we should
not be drawing that distinction because it is a continuous
process.
Ms. Harris. This may be a question better asked of the
administration. But in your time there right now, presently I
understand there is a 300 million shortfall in ICE, and there
is that same amount of surplus over at CBP. Is there anything
you can tell me about that, or anything anyone else can?
Mr. Cutler. All I can say is this goes back to the idea
that if they were able to have the funding available, with the
understanding that it is a continuous process from the border
to the interior, I think you would eliminate some of those
problems.
Ms. Harris. Thank you, Mr. Cutler.
Mr. Carafano. I just--there is a resource issue, and I do
think combining the organizations will help solve that. And I
will give you one very small example. The 287(g) program is a
provision of the INA code which allows for State and local
enforcement agents to work under an ICE investigator. It is a
terrific problem. Florida has one of the two pilot programs. It
has been great. It is dying on the vine because ICE simply
doesn't have money to train a new set of investigators because
they have moved on. I mean, so those things are just dying
because you have an agency which is fighting for its little
piece of the pie rather than being considered as part of this
comprehensive problem of an end-to-end thing, and then somebody
at the top saying, you know, where can we put the investment to
get the biggest bang for the buck.
Ms. Harris. Let me ask you, we have spent millions of
dollars branding, promoting, marking, just making the
delineations and the communications and the IT. Obviously, you
feel it is worth the millions to go back or to reorganize
again. And do you think that the short term and the time that
we won't be as effective is worth the long-term gains? Do you
think there are savings in management?
Mr. Carafano. I think there is definitely savings in
management. But I think the difficult real political things
will never get done in the current organization. I will give
you another example, which is Shamira, requiring the Homeland
Security Act of 2002, a single integrated IT system that would
start from visa issuance all the way through internal
enforcement. Zero progress has been made to doing this, and
zero progress will be made because it is too complex a program
coming across too many different departments and agencies to
ever get anywhere. If you had one guy or one woman who was
responsible for--if you had emergency BP in ICE, and if you had
emergency BP in ICE with visa enforcement in it, and you had
one person who had 85 percent of that responsibility for that
program, then you might actually see something happen.
Ms. Harris. One last question. Mr. Venturella, you said
that the staff had never been kind of more discouraged. And I
am really concerned about that, particularly when we read that
we are having record seizures of drugs and interception of
smugglers and money. What is it; what is not working? I mean, I
know the accomplishments are there.
Mr. Venturella. To answer very simply, again, the creation
of Homeland Security was an opportunity to do things better, to
accomplish a unified mission, protecting this homeland.
Everything that--and any one of us can stand up and say, day in
and day out this is why I get up and go to work, because I have
a mission I can stand behind. And I just don't see that coming
to fruition. Again, 2 years have been wasted for an opportunity
that we had to make things better.
Ms. Harris. Do you have FBI or State Department
interference? Do you think there is a better continuum?
Mr. Venturella. I don't look at that as interference. I
look at that as an opportunity to work with law enforcement and
to work with the diplomatic community to accomplish the
mission. And--I would leave it at that.
Ms. Harris. Thank you.
Mr. Rogers. Thank you. The gentlelady's time has expired.
The Chair recognizes the gentleman from Texas, Mr. McCaul.
Mr. McCaul. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
And thank you, distinguished panelists, for being here
today. It has been insightful. And I can't say it is the first
time I have heard these responses.
When I go back to my district, and I am in a border State,
the number one issue is border security. I believe the Federal
Government has failed us in this mission. And it is no longer
just a question of immigration; it has become a question of
national security in the post-9/11 world.
Oftentimes in my prior job I worked with Federal law
enforcement on the border, and I heard two things that I heard
from the panelists today; and that is, not enough agents, not
enough space to lock out the people that we apprehend on the
border.
It is astonishing to think there are 40,000 New York police
officers, and yet we only have 2,000 Border Patrol special
agents on the border. The catch and release program, Mr.
Cutler, that you referred to, which, as you know, when you are
at Kennedy Airport, Ramzi Yousef slipped through our system
with that catch and release program.
These are issues that I am concerned about. I know the
intel bill authorized these additional agents and bed space. I
have sent a letter to appropriations for the funding for these
issues. I see these two issues as probably the most two
important to facing border security.
But what I would like to hear, because we are here on the
topic of merger, is whether this merger would in fact expedite
the processing and deportation of illegal aliens. Would it
essentially tear down the stovepipes and the walls, or are we
just moving boxes around?
Mr. Cutler. Well, I believe it would help. And there are
two reasons why it would help. Number one, again, I don't think
that these folks should be thinking, well, I work for this
little group and he works for that group over there. We need to
understand we are under the same roof, doing the same job.
But also please understand, you can't control the border
purely at the border. Nobody would break into an amusement park
if they couldn't go on the rides. Once people get past the
Border Patrol or they get past that inspector at the airport,
they know that there is virtually no chance that anyone is
going to look to stop them from doing whatever they want to do
in the United States. There are no employer sanctions, there
are no real fraud investigations being conducted. So if you can
get into the interior, you get involved in a marriage fraud,
you get whatever you want to do, and you are here. And under
those situations, the pressure on the border is tremendous.
I know that Mr. Bonner testified last week about the lack
of Border Patrol agents, that 2,000 were authorized, 210 are
going to be hired, according to what the President wants.
Tomorrow I will be testifying before that same subcommittee,
the Immigration Subcommittee, about 143 new special agents to
be hired versus the 800. I thought the 800 was anemic; 143, I
don't want to tell you what I think that constitutes. It won't
even cover attrition.
So we need the resources, but we need to coordinate the
resources to take the pressure off the border also. This is a
closed system, Okay? If you tighten the border to the point
where nobody can get across the border, the people that want to
come here aren't going to throw their hands up and say, let us
go to New Zealand. They will land at an airport, they will sky-
dive. They are going to do whatever it takes to get them here.
And we similarly have to look at this as an overall system and
have a systemic approach to solving the problem. And we can't
do it by fractionalizing components that are responsible for
the same mission.
Mr. McCaul. Mr. Bonner, do you have any comments on that?
Mr. Bonner. I agree wholeheartedly. I think that if you are
looking for a solution to these problems, you have to look at
it globally. You can't just focus all of the resources on the
border. You have to understand why people are coming here.
Ninety-eight percent of the people coming to this country do so
because they are looking to improve their economic life. As
long as we allow employers to continue to hire people, they
will continue to come, and we are just shoveling sand against
the tide. That law has to be toughened up. Make it simple for
an employer to figure out who has a right to work in this
country. And if they choose to hire people who have no right to
work in this country, take out a big hammer and smack them real
hard with it, and then everyone else will sit up and take
notice, and a lot of the problems that we have on our borders,
people coming across illegally, will be solved.
Mr. McCaul. I agree. And I think there has been a lack of
will to enforce or support these laws. We have an estimated 10
to 15 million illegal aliens in this country in the interior,
and I see little movement in the area.
Mr. Callahan. If I can add, moving the boxes around isn't
enough. You have to ensure that the budgets or the
appropriations language that comes out specifically goes into
more detail on how much is going to be spent, and where; and
don't allow them to move funds from interior enforcement,
detention removal program, and investigations over to the
border just because, as we know, the squeaky wheel gets the
grease. And the border is the squeaky wheel. And that is what
happens more often than not. So mergingSec. and merging these
people together or these organizations together will give
whoever leads it the chance to move funds over to that squeaky
wheel.
Mr. Rogers. The gentleman's time has expired.
Mr. McCaul. And would it enhance communication as well?
Mr. Callahan. Possibly.
Mr. Rogers. Thank you. The gentleman's time has expired.
Mr. Callahan. Thank you.
Mr. Rogers. The Chair recognizes the gentleman from
Washington, Mr. Reichert.
Mr. Reichert. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I think everyone in this room and on the panel and on the
committee recognizes we have got to get this right. We
absolutely have to get this right. And I want to thank all of
you for being here today, and I especially want to thank all
the men and women who serve out there today protecting our
country.
I want to let you know that I have had the opportunity of
working with all the agencies that we have talked about today
on a professional level, along with the FBI and Secret Service
and ATF and DEA and all those others. And it seems to me that
on the street level the work usually gets done. I mean, the
people on the street get it done. They are working together
usually, and they are cooperating.
But what I hear today is that in fact what has really
happened is it has even collapsed in that arena; that the
people who are working--and correct me if I am wrong--but the
people who are working day to day even are having difficulty
communicating, sharing information, and deciding whose job is
whose. And when that happens, we have got a serious, serious
problem.
You have laid out the problem very, very clearly. And just
let me go over just some of the things that I heard today.
Number one, there is no vision. There is no mission. There
is no goals. There is no resources. There is no plan. And I
would imagineSec. I didn't hear this mentioned today, but I
would bet you there is low morale. That was a good guess on my
part.
So my question is--and really today the purpose that we are
here, and I was just looking at, does the current
organizational structure best serve the U.S. homeland security
interests? And what I am hearing today is no. And then we
also--then adding onto that a second question. We are
considering an additional reorganization.
My question to you is, shouldn't we fix the current
structure the way it exists today and then move on to a
reorganization? Because I think that eventually we have to
come--the cultural mindset from pre-9/11 has to change. We are
in a different world today, and there has to be a cultural
change in every agency that serves this country.
So the first question is, reorganization now, an additional
reorg, will it make it worse? And the second question is, I
just want to hear maybe a one--or two-word or one- or two-
sentence comment on what you think, very briefly, your solution
would be to making this system work.
Two tough questions in a very short amount of time.
Mr. Carafano. I will just address the second. I really
think that the biggest problem is you have 400 secretaries who
are responsible for kingdoms as opposed to 400 secretaries who
should be used to provide integrative functions to make all 22
agencies operate together. So, in my mind, that is the single
thing that has got to be fixed first.
Mr. Klug. I do believe that the agencies, the
reorganization should happen now. I do believe that, in its
current configuration, it cannot be fixed. I think it is on a
downward slide. I think morale is on a downward slide. And,
again, I ask Congress to act quickly in merging the two
agencies.
Mr. Callahan. Well, I think that the reorganization itself
isn't enough. You have to have leadership in place that are
going to focus on every aspect of the mission and not
concentrate just on one area or another area.
Mr. Bonner. I think that you are just rearranging the deck
chairs on the Titanic if you try and work within the current
system. You have to break down those barriers. Right now the
successes we have are in spite of the system, not because of
the system. And it has to be changed.
Mr. Cutler. I think we need to have the political will to
bring about the changes. I think that there has been a lack of
political will to enforce the laws the way they need, and I
think we have a lack of resources, and that is why you have no
goal. I think we have to address all of it, but I don't think
the current structure meets the needs. So you have to do all of
those things and understand that our survival really is at
stake.
Mr. Venturella. Again, I think there needs to be
reorganization, but not just ICE and CBP. Departmentwide, you
need to take a fresh look. In the automobile industry, you
would be in the process of a recall: You have a design flaw,
you need to fix it because people could lose their lives. You
need to fix it.
Mr. Reichert. Thank you. Just let me make one comment. It
takes a lot of courage, I know, for you to come and explain
this so clearly and honestly as you did. And we appreciate it.
That is the only way that we are going to be able to help. I
agree with the committee chair, Chairman Cox's comments, that
now you have a committee that is here to help you, and
hopefully we can get this thing fixed. So thank you all for
being here today.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Rogers. Thank you.
We had a great morning, very productive. And you all have
been very helpful, and the members clearly are interested and
have a lot more questions than they have time. Even though we
are running long, I would like, though, for the members who do
have an additional question to have a brief opportunity to ask
it, so we are going to go around one more time with members
being given 2 minutes to ask any follow-up questions. And I
would yield the first question to the Ranking Member, Mr. Meek
from Florida.
Mr. Meek. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Hearing a lot about leadership, and I can tell you right
now as it relates to this full committee--and I don't want to
speak for the Chairman or the Ranking, but definitely for this
subcommittee--we definitely have our work cut out. Leadership
starts here in the Congress. And we have to 9 times out of 10
do some very unpopular things as it relates to bureaucracies
and what people are used to. But I can tell you the latter is
another commission being pulled together like the 9/11
Commission looking at the failures of which you shared with us
today. Some of the information that you shared with us today is
very alarming and disturbing. And I am glad that all of you are
free to speak to that, and I want to commend all of you as
Americans, and especially those of you that are either in a
foundation or not in a foundation or pay for your own ticket,
appreciate you coming here. It is going to make a better
security situation for us.
Mr. Chairman, I can tell you when we do have the Department
come, I would definitely like to see attrition numbers of
frontline men and women that are out there doing the hard work,
what has actually happened prior to the transition and after. I
think that will be revealing from what I am hearing here at
this table. And I can tell you right now, in the future I can
see more officers beingSec. this Congress pushing for more
officers out there doing good work. But if we don't have the
leadership on the management level and the leadership here in
the Congress to set an environment that they want to serve
their country in that capacity, then it will be for naught.
So I just wanted to make a statement. I know some other
members are going to ask a question. I know that the time is
running out, and I want to stick to it. I know you have a
burning question, but if you could probably answer it in one of
the future questions, I would appreciate it.
Mr. Rogers. Thank you. And the Chair recognizes Chairman
Cox.
Mr. Cox. Thank you very much. I just want to take the
opportunity once again to thank our panel. And as I was going
over your testimony, in addition to the oral testimony that you
provided, the written testimony as well, I was struck by Mr.
Callahan's very clear statement of the way things stand right
now. And you are in a good position, Mr. Callahan, to comment
on this, since you are in the midst of all of it. I just want
to ask you all to comment on what he has described to us.
As it stands right now--I am reading from Mr. Callahan's
testimony--there is a serious lack of cooperation between
legacy components, INS and Customs, of the two bureaus. That,
of course, is what we have got to eliminate. We can't have turf
jealousy, competition, even the old structures, as a result of
this merger of 22 legacy agencies into the new DHS.
He goes on to say: The leadership of the former INS and
Customs Service are, as we speak, locked in a heated battle for
control of the purse strings. So at least in this description,
we are being told that the competition exists even at the top.
And, of course, the leadership of the former INS and Customs
Service is literally that: people from those two former parts
of government. So I would like to hear from each of you whether
or not you see this as a current ongoing problem for the
management of DHS.
Mr. Carafano. If I could, just for an example. There was an
enormous debate over whether to move air and marine
interdiction from ICE to CBP, a debate which made actually no
sense if you just looked at the operational needs and where the
most efficiencies were. But yet they were debating over it
because it was bodies and spaces and airplanes, and they both
wanted them, because that is what bureaucracies do. But if
somebody had looked at it holistically, you would have just
said, well, this just makes perfect sense.
Mr. Rogers. Thank you.
The Chair recognizes the gentleman from Mississippi, Mr.
Thompson.
Mr. Thompson. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. It appears that our
retreat on Monday and Tuesday is paying off. I see very little
disagreement, and I want to compliment the Chairman for
providing leadership.
A couple issues. Number one is I understand that OIG is
looking into the problems between ICE and CBP, Mr. Chairman, at
the request of Senator Collins. I need to get some agreement
with you--I am told that some employees are reluctant to come
before the committee because of potential retribution from the
administration. And I would not want any citizen of this
country to feel like they can't come before this committee and
tell the truth. And however we need to communicate that,
through the Secretary or whomever, I think we really need to do
it. I am told that some individuals who are not in the union
are reluctant to say things. And I just think we need to get to
the bottom of it.
The other thing I want to do--is, one, when the Secretary
comes, I think he needs to explain to us from a budgetary
standpoint why the administration didn't request full funding
of the 9/11 bill. There are just too many things left out here
that we all agree on, from Border Patrol agents to beds for
detainees and other things, that we absolutely ought to be
funding.
Lastly if I could get someone to brief me on this notion,
maybe after the hearing, on detainees who are released and
turned loose never to be seen again. I am told there are
several hundred thousand of these individuals walking around
the country.
Mr. Rogers. Thank you. The gentleman's time has expired.
The gentleman from Connecticut, Mr. Shays.
Mr. Shays. I would like to ask if anyone on the witness
table believes this is not a solvable problem. So all of you
concur that it is a solvable problem? That is the senseSec.
Mr. Cutler. It has to be.
Mr. Shays. It does have to be. And it is so. I mean, this
is not something--but I will take a little bit of time. You
know, there will be a--I think, Mr. Chairman, thank you for
having this hearing and thank you for the witnesses. I
appreciate each and every one of your insights. I found in my
National Security Subcommittee I learn the most, frankly, from
those who aren't directly in government, because there is a
candidness that I don't see elsewhere. I want to thank you, Mr.
Venturella, for your candidness as well. All of you have been
very helpful. Thank you.
Mr. Rogers. Thank you.
The Chair recognizes the gentlelady from the Virgin
Islands, Mrs. Christensen.
Mrs. Christensen. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I do think this
is an important hearing as well. And just like my other
colleagues, I feel that my district could be the poster child
for the insecurities that exist at our border, and we need to
fix the system.
And I would also add that, taking away from some of the
discussions I have had at home with my local and Federal law
enforcement, it is clear that they would definitely welcome and
support any fix, whether it is a merger or any other way of
fixing it. And I find--I want to thank everyone for your
testimony. It has been very, very helpful as we move forward.
I probably would ask one question. Mr. Bonner, you and
several others spoke about--to me--against the trend, when you
spoke about the need for specialization in this one face at the
border environment that they are in. Can't this be overcome?
Can't we continue the one face at the border and overcome this
need by just increased training?
Mr. Bonner. I think you are asking an awful lot for one
human being to be expert in all of these three very complex and
arcane areas. I mean, if you stack the laws and the regulations
and all of the other information up, each of them is over 6
inches tall, and we are talking a lot of on-the-job training
that is necessary to get to the level where I would feel
comfortable that those inspectors on the front line are doing
their job as it should be done, picking off those people who
should not be entering our country.
Mr. Carafano. It really depends. I mean, a small post at
the Canadian border, which has very few people that cross every
day, doesn't need the same kind of staffing and resources as
LaGuardia and New York City. So one of the arguments I would
make as well as you want a large robust agency, is you want to
have the capability in your workforce to tailor it to meet the
different needs in the different parts, both on the border and
internally.
Mrs. Christensen. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Rogers. Thank you.
Mr. Meek. Mr. Chairman, just before we adjourn.
Mr. Rogers. Certainly.
Mr. Meek. Ms. Jackson-Lee had to leave, but she wants to
enter her statements and concerns for the record, if there is
no objection.
Mr. Rogers. There will be no objection.
[The information follows:]
Mr. Rogers. I do want to thank you all for your testimony,
it has been very helpful, and thank the members for their
questions. And if any members do have any additional statements
or questions, they can submit them. And I would ask if there is
a question, if you would submit a written response within 10
days. We are going to keep our committee record open for 10
days to accept those.
And with that, I thank the panelists and committee members,
and we are adjourned.
[Whereupon, at 12:26 p.m., the subcommittee was adjourned.]
A P P E N D I X
------------
Material Submitted for the Record
Questions and Responses of T.J. Bonner Submitted by The Honorable
Bennie Thompson
Question: 1. With all of the attention that was paid within both ICE
and CBP to bringing their own INS and Customs components together as
part of DHS's genesis, is it fair to say that not enough attention has
been paid to inter-bureau coordination? No response has been received.
Question: 2. Absent issues which receive headquarters attention, namely
anything connected to terrorism, minority staff field investigations
over the last year found that the degree of local CBP and ICE
coordination was heavily dependent on whether or not the supervisors
had a good personal relationship. Given this dynamic, for a merger to
be worthwhile wouldn't it have to affect more than just the
headquarters components? No response has been received.
Question: 3. Even though the initial decision to split ICE and CBP may
not have been ideal, would we be discussing a merger if BTS management
had taken action to ensure proper coordination between the components?
No response has been received.
Question: 4. Would you agree that many of the problems and concerns
which lead you to the call for the merger of CBP and ICE arise from the
only common supervisor being at the Undersecretary or even, if CIS is
involved, the Deputy Secretary level? No response has been received.
Question: 5. With or without a merger, isn't the key issue making sure
that policies and procedures are in place to encourage Border Patrol
agents, CBP officers, and ICE agents to share information, coordinate
operations and resolve procedural disagreements at the lowest possible
level? No response has been received.
Question: 6. DHS has trumpeted the success of the Arizona Border
Control (ABC) initiative in reducing the flow of migrants through the
Arizona desert. Much of the success has been attributed to the command
structure of the ABC initiative--a task force of CBP and ICE personnel
headed by the Border Patrol sector chief. Do you believe that creating
additional task forces under the direction of a local supervisor (an
ICE agent-in-charge or a Border patrol chief) is a viable way to ensure
that ICE and CBP coordinate their law enforcement efforts? No response
has been received.
Question: 7. If task forces are a good idea for border control,
wouldn't it also make sense to extend this model to other missions such
as interior enforcement, alien and other smuggling through airports? No
response has been received.
Question: 8. Would the problems we have discussed here today be
lessened if the Administration decided to fully fund the border
security enhancements called for in the 9/11 bill? No response has been
received.
Question: 9. Who do you think is responsible for overall immigration
policy within DHS? Is it one person? Would the Department be better off
if one individual reporting in the Secretary could coordinate overall
immigration policy? No response has been received.
Question: 10. What do you believe was the basis of the decision by the
Administration to reconstitute the U.S. Customs Service and Bureau of
Border Security into CBP and ICE? No response has been received.
Question: 11. Will you please address the One Face at the Border
initiative? Do you think this program is this program working? Do you
have concerns about the ability of inspectors to learn customs and
immigration law? Can you please discuss your concerns in primary
inspections and secondary inspections? No response has been received.
12. We are concerned that when ICE and CBP were created from Customs
and legacy INS components that Customs inspectors lost their best
source of intelligence and law enforcement information. Given that
Customs inspectors are charged with assessing the risk of inbound cargo
containers, and working with industry to secure these supply chains, I
worry that CBP programs will not achieve their full potential because
of the disconnect between ICE agents and CBP inspectors.
Questions:
a. What was the relationship between customs inspectors and
investigators before the creation of DHS? No response has been
received.
b. What is the existing relationship? What kinds of walls exist and how
has CBP tried to compensate for the loss of Customs agents? No response
has been received.
c. Are there any benefits to the current structure? No response has
been received.
d. What is the impact on CBP's cargo security mission? No response has
been received.
Questions Submitted for the Record by The Honorable Kendrick B. Meek
for T.J. Bonner
Question: 1. What do you believe was the basis of the decision by
the Administration to have CBP and ICE created as separate operational
agencies? No response has been received.
Question: 2. If, for whatever reason, DDS ultimately decides not to
merge ICE and CBP, what is the next most important action that could be
taken to improve the effectiveness of CBP and ICE? No response has been
received.
Question: 3. For a merger between COP and ICE to address the concerns
you have raised, what additional steps beyond combining the
headquarters operations would have to be part of the merger? No
response has been received.
Questions and Responses by James Jay Carafano, Ph.D. Submitted by The
Honorable Bennie Thompson
Question: 1. With all of the attention that was paid within both ICE
and CBP to bringing their own INS and Customs components together as
part of DHS' genesis, is it fair to say that not enough attention has
been paid to inter-bureau coordination?
Response: 1. Absolutely. There have been some instance of good
coordination between CBP and ICE, particularly with regard to the
Arizona Border Initiative, but in general it's a problem. In part,
because there are new coordination requirements that did not exist
before the creation of the department when border inspectors and
investigators were in the same agency, and in part because ICE lacks
resources. Freezing credit cards and eliminating TDY funds, for
example, prevented agents from undertaking the travel needed to effect
coordination.
More fundamental to the coordination challenges is that the
existing artificial seam between border and internal enforcement makes
no sense. Distinguishing clear lines of responsibility between foreign,
border, and internal enforcement security is a thing of the past.
National security, economic growth, and the liberties of American
citizens (as well as visitors and international business partners) can
no longer be considered in isolation. The visa-issuing activities of
the Department of State and the Customs and Border protection (CBP) and
Immigration and Customs Enforcement agencies in the Department of
Homeland Security (DHS) should be merged into a single border services
agency under the DHS.
Question: 2. Absent issues which receive headquarters attention, namely
anything connected to terrorism, minority staff field investigations
over the last year found that the degree of local CBP and ICE
coordination was heavily dependent on whether the supervisors had a
good personal relationship. Given this dynamic, for a merger to be
worthwhile wouldn't it have to affect more than just the headquarters
components?
Response: 2. Merging CBP and ICE, even just at the headquarters' level,
sends an important message that the Secretary expects these groups to
work together and emphasizes as desired a cooperative culture. The
merger ideally should be part of a much larger reorganization of DHS
that would eliminate extraneous bureaucracy and consolidate policy and
planning into a single office.
I do, however, agree with, your point. DHS requires a sophisticated
professional development program. We made an argument for such a
program in The Heritage/CSIS report DHS Report 2.0: Rethinking the
Department of Homeland Security.
Question: 3. Even though the initial decision to split ICE and CBP may
not have been ideal, would we be discussing a merger if BTS management
had taken action to ensure proper coordination between the components?
Response: 3. BTS does lack the staff to properly integrate the
activities of the agencies, but that misses the point. If we had the
right organization to begin with we would not have to create a
bureaucracy to manage a problem that doesn't need to exist.
Question: 4. Would you agree that many of the problems and concerns
which lead you to the call for the merger of CBP and ICE arise from the
only common supervisor being at the Undersecretary or even, if CIS is
involved, the Deputy Secretary level?
Response: 4. Again, I think problems and concerns arise from an
artificial layer of coordination between inspectors and investigators
that is unnecessary.
Question: 5. With or without a merger, isn't the key issue making sure
that policies and procedures are in place to encourage Border Patrol
agents, CBP officers, and ICE agents to share information, coordinate
operations and resolve procedural disagreements at the lowest possible
level?
Response: 5. Absolutely, the key to addressing border security is to
deal with international, border, and internal enforcement as a single
integrated mission. Addressing the challenge of illegal entry between
the points of entry cannot be ignored, but Congress needs to establish
clear priorities and invest in resources that create a system-of-
systems approach to security. Rather than trying to control the entire
border, the United States requires a network of assets that direct the
right capabilities to the right places at the right times to provide
appropriate responses. This will require a combination of investments
in high-speed and armed-airborne assets and in robust airborne sensor
capabilities linked to an intelligence and early warning network. The
network would provide knowledge of activities at sea and along the
border, as well as the means to analyze and share that knowledge
effectively. Modernizing the CBP's air and marine interdiction
capabilities in concert with increasing funding for the Coast Guard's
Deepwater acquisition program ought to take precedence.
Question: 6. DHS has trumpeted the success of the Arizona Border
Control (ABC) initiative in reducing the flow of migrants through the
Arizona desert. Much of the success has been attributed to the command
structure of the ABC initiative--a task force of CBP and ICE personnel
headed by the Border Patrol sector chief. Do you believe that creating
additional task forces under the direction of a local supervisor (an
ICE agent-in-charge or a Border patrol chief) is a viable way to ensure
that ICE and CBP coordinate their law enforcement efforts? .
Response: 6. ABCI task forces would be much easier to initiate if it
were done within a single agency. Even then, while the task forces make
an important contribution, they are not the answer. They are an
effective tactic, but not an adequate strategy. We need full
integration of all ICE/CBP activities, not just cooperation in special
task forces.
Question: 7. If task forces are a good idea for border control,
wouldn't it also make sense to extend this model to other missions such
as interior enforcement, alien and other smuggling through airports?
Response: 7. Yes, but again this could be mores effectively done under
the leadership of a single agency.
Question: 8. Would the problems we have discussed here today be
lessened if the Administration decided to fully fund the border
security enhancements called for in the 9/11 bill?
Response: 8. No. Just hiring border guards is not the answer. A much
more comprehensive solution is required.
The Administration and Congress need to agree on a bipartisan
approach to border security that gives precedence to the efforts that
will make the nation significantly safer and more prosperous while
protecting individual freedoms. Five steps should top the ``to do''
list.
Step #1: The U.S. needs a single border services agency. The
government's current organization reflects an outdated vision of how to
protect America's borders. Responsibilities for visa issuance and
monitoring, border security, and internal enforcement of customs and
immigration are divided among three separate agencies in two
departments on the erroneous assumption that threats and
countermeasures can be neatly segmented in discrete activities.
However, there are no frontiers in 21st century national security, nor
are all border security issues best handled at the border.
Protecting the United States against terrorist threats and
significantly reducing transnational crime (e.g., drug, arms, and human
trafficking); environmental dangers (e.g., contagious diseases and
invasive species); and illegal entry and unlawful presence in the
United States requires addressing these threats from their points of
foreign origin through transiting the border to their U.S.
destinations. Distinguishing clear lines of responsibility between
foreign, border, and domestic security is a thing of the past. National
security, economic growth, and the liberties of American citizens (as
well as visitors and international business partners) can no longer be
considered in isolation. The visa-issuing activities of the Department
of State and the Customs and Border Protection (CBP) and Immigration
and Customs Enforcement agencies in the Department of Homeland Security
(DHS) should be merged into a single border services agency under the
DHS.
Step #2: Monitoring and servicing legal entry into the United
States should be the highest priority. Improving the infrastructure and
programs that oversee and support lawful means of trade and travel
should be funded first. This includes upgrading immigration services
and physical infrastructure at the busiest points of entry and fully
funding programs like US-VISIT (tracking the entry and exit of visa
holders); Smart Borders Initiatives (employing technology to speed the
flow of people and goods); and Secure Flight (checking airline
passengers against terrorist watch lists).
Most goods, services, and people enter and exit the United States
through legitimate means. These networks are the lifeblood of the U.S.
economy and must be appropriately managed and protected. Likewise,
virtually all known terrorists who have entered the United States came
in through legal channels. In addition, as the United States improves
its capacity to reduce illegal entry, illicit attempts to penetrate
legal networks of trade and travel will likely increase. Effective
border services must already be in place to meet this challenge if the
United States hopes to improve its overall security.
Step #3: Internal enforcement and international initiatives should
take precedence over interdiction at the border. Too often,
policymakers have assumed that the best place to reduce illegal and
illicit activity is at the border. In practice, internal enforcement
policies and programs, followed by working with point-of-origin and
transit countries, probably offer a greater return on investment. For
example, approximately 85 percent of illegal immigrants who receive
final removal orders abscond.
Focusing on deporting people already ordered removed from the
country is a good starting point. In the long term, initiatives such as
effective workplace enforcement to discourage employment of individuals
unlawfully present in the United States, domestic counterterrorism
investigations including means to track down criminal aliens, and the
Millennium Challenge Account (foreign aid that encourages countries to
adopt polices that promote economic growth, sound governance, and the
rule of law) will have a greater impact on illegal entry and unlawful
presence than will simply hiring additional border guards.
Step #4: Border security must become a system of systems.
Addressing the challenge of illegal entry between the points of entry
cannot be ignored, but Congress needs to establish clear priorities and
invest in resources that create a system-of-systems approach to
security. Rather than trying to control the entire border, the United
States requires a network of assets that direct the right capabilities
to the right places at the right times to provide appropriate
responses. This will require a combination of investments in high-speed
and armed-airborne assets and in robust airborne sensor capabilities
linked to an intelligence and early warning network. The network would
provide knowledge of activities at sea and along the border, as well as
the means to analyze and share that knowledge effectively. Modernizing
the CBP's air and marine interdiction capabilities in concert with
increasing funding for the Coast Guard's Deepwater acquisition program
ought to take precedence.
Step #5: The federal government should engage state and local
governments and the private sector while respecting the principles of
federalism and a free-market economy. Very little of this effort should
rely on throwing money at the problem through federal grants or
establishing unfunded Washington mandates. Rather, the federal
government should take measured steps to strengthen the means of state
and local law enforcement to conduct security and criminal-related
immigration investigations, to maintain strong legal authorities for
sharing law enforcement information, and to promote the development of
effective national intelligence and early warning systems. Cooperative
efforts with the private sector should focus on removing the barriers
to effective information sharing between the government and non-
government entities--information that is essential for conducting risk
assessments and implementing effective vulnerability reduction measures
that promote economic growth and protect the privacy of citizens and
proprietary information of companies.
Question: 9. Who do you think is responsible for overall immigration
policy within DHS? Is it one person? Would the Department be better off
if one individual reporting in the Secretary could coordinate overall
immigration policy?
Response 9. The answer is simple. No one is in charge. Yes, I think it
should be one person. That person should be within an Undersecretary
for Policy and Planning. We discussed the scope of this position in The
Heritage/CSIS report DHS Report 2.0: Rethinking the Department of
Homeland Security.
Question: 10. What do you believe was the basis of the decision by the
Administration to reconstitute the U.S. Customs Service and Bureau of
Border Security into CBP and ICE?
(1) The intent to abolish legacy INS. (2) The notion that internal
enforcement would be improved by integrating immigration and customs
investigators into a single agency.
Question: 11. Will you please address the One Face at the Border
Initiative? Do you think this program is working? Do you have concerns
about the ability of inspectors to learn customs and immigration law?
Can you please discuss your concerns in primary inspections and
secondary inspections?
Response: 11. I think ``one face at the border'' should not mean that
one agent is required to do everything, in all circumstances. I think
it should reflect the intent to establish common practices, policies,
and guidelines for handling people and things, simplifying charges and
taxes into a single system, and eliminating unnecessary duplication of
support assets. I think having inspectors cross-trained is good
professional developments and there are some situations (such as a
small crossing point) where a single inspector might make sense or for
some primary inspection functions, but in general I would want
secondary screening and major threat areas to be staffed by
professionals trained with expertise in particular areas.
Question: 12. We are concerned that when ICE and CBP were created from
Customs and legacy INS components that Custom inspectors lost their
best source of intelligence and law enforcement information. Given that
Customs inspectors are charged with assessing the risk of inbound cargo
containers, and working with industry to secure these supply chains, I
worry that CBP programs will not achieve their full potential because
of the disconnect between ICE agents and CBP inspectors.
a. What was the relationship between customs inspectors and
investigators before the creation of DHS?
It is my understanding that there was a great deal of
cooperation. Furthermore, there were more career development
opportunities. It was not unusual for border inspector or
border patrol agent to become a customs investigator. Now, many
of the ICE investigators are hired straight out of college and
lack useful field experience.
b. What is the existing relationship? What kinds of walls exist
and how has CBP tried to compensate for the loss of Customs
agents?
CBP and ICE try to compensate by creating task forces.
c. Are there any benefits to the current structure?
The research and interviews conducted in support of the
Heritage/CSIS report DHS Report 2.0: Rethinking the Department
of Homeland Security did not find any compelling advantages to
the current structure.
d. What is the impact on CBP's cargo security mission?
CBP's cargo security mission has led to an inability to really
maximize the information that might be available from ICE that
might help with local targeting assessments.
Questions and Responses by James Jay Carafano, Ph.D. Submitted for the
Record by The Honorable Kendrick Meek
Question: 1. What do you believe was the basis for the decision by the
Administration to have CBP and ICE created as separate operational
agencies?
Response: 1. The intent to abolish legacy INS. (2) The notion that
internal enforcement would be improved by integrating immigration and
customs investigators into a single agency.
Question: 2. If, for whatever reason, DHS ultimately decides not to
merge ICE and CBP, what is the next most important action that could be
taken to improve the effectiveness of CBP and ICE?
Response: 2. The next most important action would be to fix ICE's
financial problems and ensure that the agency has adequate staff,
resources and the authority to implement aggressive internal
enforcement operations.
Question: 3. For a merger between CBP and ICE to address the concerns
you have raised, what additional steps beyond combining the
headquarters operations would have to be part of the merger?
Response: 3. Additions steps should include:
1. A robust professional development and executive education
program.
2. A long term investment strategy to give the agency adequate
resources and capabilities to perform its mission and invests
in critical infrastructure at major border crossings and points
of entry.
3. An integrated border security strategy that addresses the
international dimension, the border, and internal enforcement.
Questions and Responses of Michael Cutler Submitted for the Record by
The Honorable Bennie Thompson
Question: 1. With all of the attention that was paid within both ICE
and CBP to bringing their own INS and Customs components together as
part of DUS's genesis, is it fair to say that not enough attention has
been paid to inter-bureau coordination?
Response: 1. It is my belief that when you look at numerous issues
concerning, the merging of the former Customs Service and the former
INS into these two agencies, it becomes readily apparent that the
result has left many employees from both former agencies frustrated and
disappointed, although I believe that the former INS employees are in a
worse position than are their counterparts from Customs. At present,
most of the ICE field offices are headed by former Customs officials
who lack a true understanding and appreciation, for the nature of the
work that the former INS was responsible for. The immigration laws,
both administrative as well as criminal, can be of great value in
prosecuting the ``War on terror'' as well as the ``War on drugs.''
Moreover, these statutes provide real leverage in combating a wide
variety of criminal activities and can also be instrumental in
cultivating informants who can act as the eyes and ears of law
enforcement agencies when used to best advantage. Because of the
problems that are currently being faced in integrating these two very
different agencies into both ICE and CBP many opportunities are being
lost to maximize the potential that could otherwise be realized to
great advantage.
Question: 2. Absent issues which receive headquarters attention, namely
anything connected to terrorism, minority staff field investigations
over the last year found that the degree of local CBP and ICE
coordination was heavily dependent on whether or not the supervisors
had a good personal relationship. Given this dynamic, for a merger to
be worthwhile wouldn't it have to affect more than just the
headquarters components?
Response: 2. I certainly believe that headquarters is essential for
providing leadership and clearly defined goals, however, a head without
a body won't go anywhere on its own. In order for any organization to
be effective, leadership is essential at all level of the hierarchy to
establish goals and to make certain that all members of the
organization are contributing to the overall mission. The vast majority
of field offices are headed by Special Agents-in-Charge who came from
the former u.S. Customs Service. Perhaps, in part because of this, the
immigration laws are being, in many instances, being neglected in the
overall mission. Part of this problem stems from a lack of resources,
both monetary as well as manpower, however, the fact foreign language
training is no longer a part of the curriculum for new agents is a very
telling omission as is the fact that to my understanding, there is no
effort being made to provide in-service document training for special
agents. These decisions were presumably made at the headquarters level.
Until the merger of INS and Customs, all INS enforcement officers were
mandated to successfully complete a Spanish language-training program
because it is estimated that some 80% of the illegal alien population
are individuals who are Spanish speaking. It is interesting to note
that the United States military is now actively attempting to recruit
both uniformed as well as civilian personnel who have foreign language
skills or to train personnel in foreign languages including so-called
strategic languages. It is hard for me to understand why special agents
of ICE, the agency that is most likely to encounter individuals who do
not speak English within our borders, are not being given appropriate
language training. Additionally, for law enforcement officers in
general and for immigration enforcement officers in particular,
document training is vital because identity documents serve as the
``lynchpin'' that holds any immigration law enforcement program
together. It is especially important for those who are charged with
enforcing the immigration laws to know precisely who they are dealing
with to determine alienage and deportability of criminals and other
individuals they come into contact with.
These issues represent only a ``tip'' of the proverbial iceberg in
illustrating how at present, the bureau of Immigration and Customs
Enforcement at the headquarters level is failing to provide absolutely
vital training to its law enforcement officers at a time when our
nation's security hangs in the balance. On the local level, as I
pointed out in response to the first question, the great majority of
the field offices are being lead by former Customs officials. I have
also been told that at some offices, there are problems in coordinating
the activities of special agents of ICE and the CBP managers within
whom they interact on a routine basis. Among these issues are the facts
that ICE agents have been told to make prior notification before going
to an airport on matters of official business and CBP inspectors have
on various instances at various locations, notified agencies other than
ICE about violations of laws that they encountered that are clearly
within the purview of ICE. It is inefficient for CBP inspectors to call
the FBI or DEA when the first call should have been to ICE. These
failures in coordination and cooperation are demoralizing and
counterproductive and are symptomatic of a breakdown in the
professional relationship that these two agencies must have if they are
to succeed in securing our nation's porous borders.
Question: 3. Even though the initial decision to split ICE and CBP may
not have been ideal, would we be discussing a merger if BTS management
had taken action to ensure proper coordination between components?
Response: 3. I believe that creating two agencies that have a common
goal was flawed from the outset. Humans, like most creatures, are
territorial and turf battles among agencies has historically plagued
various efforts in our government. Additionally, I have often stated
that immigration law enforcement needs to be thought of as an
``Enforcement Tripod.'' Under this concept, the inspectors at ports of
entry enforce the immigration laws at ports of entry, the Border Patrol
enforces these laws between ports of entry and the special agents and
deportation employees enforce the laws from within the United States
and back up the other two components and constitute the third leg of
the tripod. The interior enforcement component has always been the
least funded and the one that has been nearly ignored for the past
several decades, resulting in the collapse of the entire immigration
effort that we are all too aware of today. In order for enforcement and
administration of immigration laws to be effective, the three legs need
to be of equal length and they also need to work in a coordinated
fashion creating a virtually seamless operation. Creating a
bureaucratic barrier between the components of what should be a single,
coordinated agency hampers the essential mission of securing our
nation's borders and endangers our security.
Question: 4. Would you agree that many of the problems and concerns
which lead you to the call for the merger of CBP and ICE arise from the
only common supervisor being at the Undersecretary or even, if CIS is
involved, the Deputy Secretary level?
Response: 4. Certainly this is a problem, but I think that this problem
needs more than a change in the way that the components are supervised.
I believe that the structure of the agency is at the root of many ofthe
problems. I also believe that while I would like to see ICE and CBP
merged into one agency, I would like to see separate chains of command
and separate funding and separate accountability for the immigration
program. As I pointed out during the hearing, I believe that the merger
of Customs and Immigration into one agency has created an unwieldy
bureaucracy. The cultures and objectives of the former Customs and the
former INS are very different from on another. Once you get past the
point that they have both been traditionally involved with enforcing
laws at the border, you find that they share little else in common. I
believe that these two entities should coordinate their efforts to
secure our border, but I am greatly concerned that the way that these
efforts are currently being made, that too many gaps in the system
threaten our security just as holes in a fence would fail to establish
a secure perimeter around a parcel of land.
I would not object to having the enforcement personnel who are
primarily concerned with the enforcement of immigration laws from
working side by side with those who are charged with enforcing the
customs laws in one agency, I just want to make certain that neither
side of the operation suffers because of the experience and orientation
of the management at a particular office. Perhaps this would not be as
critical had the attacks of September 11 not taken place, but inasmuch
as we needed to be up to speed yesterday, we cannot afford a lengthy
gestation period for this offspring to come into the world. I believe
that what I am recommending would facilitate the effective enforcement
of all of these critical laws in a much quicker pace, provided that the
resources that are currently lacking are provided to accomplish these
vital missions.
Question: 5. With or without a merger, isn't the key issue making sure
that the policies and procedures are in place to encourage Border
Patrol agents, CBP officers, and ICE agents to share information,
coordinate operations and resolve procedural disagreements at the
lowest possible level?
Response: 5. I absolutely agree that this is the destination that this
process needs to take us, I just do not believe that the current
structure of separate agencies (ICE and CBP) is the vehicle that will
get us there. I believe that we need to rethink the structure of the
agency that is charged with this most vital mission, securing our
nation's borders and effectively enforcing the immigration laws that
are supposed to protect our citizens from aliens who threaten our
nation's security and our citizens' lives.
Question: 6. DHS has trumpeted the success of the Arizona Border
Control (ABC) initiative in reducing the flow of migrants through the
Arizona desert. Much of the success has been attributed to the command
structure of the ABC initiative--a task force of CBP and ICE personnel
headed by the Border Patrol sector chief. Do you believe that creating
additional task forces under the direction of a local supervisor (an
ICE agent-in-charge or a Border Patrol chief) is a viable way to insure
that ICE and CBP coordinate their law enforcement efforts?
Response: 6. I believe in the effectiveness of task forces having
worked on various task forces for a significant portion of my career.
However, I also think that a single agency will do a better job of
accomplishing a goal than by creating a task force. When I was assigned
to the Organized Crime Drug Enforcement Task Force, I was supposed to
provide my insight, expertise, law enforcement authority and access to
immigration resources to aid in the investigation of aliens who were
involved in major drug trafficking organizations with the ultimate goal
being the arrest, successful prosecution of the individuals involved in
drug trafficking and related crimes.Additionally, I was also involved
in the forfeiture of their assets, the deportation of aliens involved
in drug trafficking after they served out their sentences, if
applicable and the dismantling of drug trafficking organizations. There
were, however, instances when the goals of my agency, the INS were not
the same as the goals of the other agencies such as the DEA, the FBI
the A TF or local or state police. In these instances I was often
caught in the middle between the goals of the INS and the goals of the
other agencies. However, task forces certainly operate more effectively
than do individual agencies that are not participating in a task force
that can help to facilitate the coordination of their operations.
Question: 7. If task forces are a good idea for border control,
wouldn't it also make sense to extend this model to other missions such
as interior enforcement, alien and other smuggling through airports?
Response: 7. I certainly think that such task forces would be a
beneficial development, but I also think that where such crimes as
alien smuggling is concerned, it would be easier to create a seamless
effort ifCBP and ICE were merged to track the movement of the aliens
and the smugglers from outside the United States, to our border or port
of entry all the way to the ultimate destination within the United
States, whether it be a safe house or the destination to which the
smuggled alien was ultimately destined to enable the enforcement
program to track down and arrest and prosecute all of the defendants
involved in the case. There would be fewer problems and a greatly
reduced likelihood that the two agencies would ``trip'' over each
other. If task forces are good, a single agency would be better.
Question: 8. Would the problems we have discussed here today be
lessened if the Administration decided to fully fund the border
security enhancements called for in the 9/11 bill?
Response: 8. Certainly I was outraged that the Administration did not
fully fund the border security enhancements called for in the 9/11
bill. In fact, on March 10, the day after the hearing that I testified
before the Committee on Homeland Security, I testified before the House
Subcommittee on Immigration, Border Security and Claims about a
component of this very issue, the fact that the Administration only
requested funding to hire some 143 special agents for ICE as compared
with the 800 that was authorized by Congress. Having said this, I
nevertheless have to respond to this question by saying, ``No.'' I am
certain that this answer will surprise you but I think you will quickly
understand my reasoning.
I think that we need to be mindful of the sound of the ticking
clock. Weare well into the fourth year on this ``War on terror'' and
our borders are, to my thinking, nearly as porous as they were on
September 10, 2001. That our nation has not suffered an attack on our
soil in the time since September 11,2001 gives me little comfort
inasmuch as the terrorists who set off the bomb at the World Trade
Center on February 26. 1993 waited more than 8 years to attack that
facility again without significant interference from our government.
Vice President Cheney compared the attacks of September 11, 2001 with
the attack on Pearl Harbor committed on December 7, 1941. While the
comparison was apt, our reaction to these two attacks could not have
been more different. In short order, after December 7, our nation
created fleets of cutting edge aircraft, battleships, submarines and
aircraft carriers. We even created and successfully deployed nuclear
weapons with brand new technology and less than four years after that
day that, as President Roosevelt declared, would live in infamy, our
nation, with the backing of our allies ended that war.
Today we still have virtually no control over our borders. We still
have a visa waiver program. We are still not requiring biometric
passports from countries that participate in this program. We still
have only 2,000 special agents to enforce the immigration laws from
within the interior of the United States. Recently, I saw a video clip
in which Vice President Cheney publicly declared that our nation has
millions of illegal aliens. He went on to say that we didn't know who
they are, that we didn't know where they are and they we didn't know
what they are up to. The enforcement of the immigration laws is the
solution to that problem. Not the continuing debate about amnesty for
illegal aliens or the sanctuary policy of many cities and local
communities. I know that I am going a bit off the question, but I
believe it is essential to make the point that indeed we need to have
much better coordination among all components of the elements of the
agencies and bureaucracies that are charged with securing our nation's
borders, however all of the coordination in the world will not secure
the borders when you simply do not provide the funding or the resources
and leadership to make certain that the job get done. To think that
2,000 special agents who work in proper coordination with the Border
Patrol can get the job done is absolutely outrageous!
New York City has been found to be the safest big city in the
United States based on the crime statistics compiled by the FBI. New
York has approximately 8 million residents who all are confined to the
relatively small space that makes up the 5 boroughs of the city of New
York.The New York City Police Department (NYPD) has nearly 40,000
police officers. It has been estimated that there may well be more than
twice as many illegal aliens in the United States than there are
residents in New York City. These aliens are scattered across a third
of the North American Continent that comprises the United States. They
are policed by some 2,000 special agents. What would happen to New
York's crime rate if the number of police officers of the NYPD was
reduced to 2,000?
Three years ago the GAO issued a report on the issue of immigration
fraud. The report made it clear that fraud was a pervasive problem. In
short, our nation has given many thousands of aliens resident alien
status and even United States citizenship to which they would not have
been entitled had all of the relevant facts been known. The way to
combat such fraud is to have sufficient numbers of special agents who
can do the appropriate field investigations to determine the bona fides
of applications for immigration benefits. Such investigations are
rarely if ever done today. Simply put, there are not enough agents to
do this most basic job. Because of this, many more aliens are
emboldened to file fraudulent applications, confident that their
application will most likely not be investigated or even given the sort
of scrutiny that is critical. Additionally, even if by some quirk, it
is determined that their application is fraudulent, the lack of special
agents, coupled with the lack of jail space will mean that even if the
application is denied, there is almost no chance that an agent will be
assigned to track that alien down to either seek his prosecution or his
removal from the United States. Consequently, we have a vicious cycle
where more aliens file more applications further exacerbating the
problem.
With an estimated illegal alien population that may well exceed 15
million, with 30% of the federal inmate population in federal
penitentiaries being identified as being foreign born, with a backlog
of millions of applications for immigration benefits now pending
adjudication, how does anyone even suggest that 2,000 special agents or
even 10,000 special agents can even begin to make a dent in this
critical situation? I haven't even mentioned the involvement of aliens
in crime that is dealt with on the local level. Nor does this include
the crisis in health care and education. It also does not include the
fact that it has been estimated that last year more than 16 billion
dollars was electronically transferred from the United States to Mexico
by illegal aliens working in our country and sending money to their
home country. Finally, I have read that illegal aliens from Mexico
represents less than one third of the illegal alien population in the
United States. Consequently, even more money is being sent from the
United States to the respective nations from which these other aliens
come, further draining money from our economy.
It may be costly to hire an adequate number of special agents to
constitute a deterrent to aliens who would come to this country in
violation of our immigration laws, or who legally enter our country
with the intention of ultimately violating our laws, either by
accepting unlawful employment or by engaging in criminal activities
such as membership in violent gangs, drug trafficking or terrorism. It
is, however, far costlier for our nation to not address this problem
which has been growing exponentially, spurred on by the knowledge that
aliens who are present in our country in violation of our laws have
little, if anything to fear.
I would like to insert a quote that I referred to when I testified
before the House Subcommittee on Immigration, Border Security and
Claims on March 10,2005. This quote is from page 49 of a report
entitled, ``9/11 and Terrorist Travel, A Staff Report of the National
Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States''.
``Thus abuse of the immigration system and a lack of interior
immigration enforcement were unwittingly working together to support
terrorist activity.''
I am therefore compelled to ask what it will take to change the way
that we deal with this issue that has a direct bearing on the future of
our nation? Can we afford to not secure our nation's borders especially
as our government focuses on securing the borders of Iraq as we attempt
to secure that nation against terrorists and insurgents? Should the
American people expect a smaller effort from the government of the
United States to secure their borders than the citizens of Iraq are
currently enjoying where their borders are concerned?
I recall that when I testified at a hearing before the House
Immigration Subcommittee on Immigration and Border Security that
focused on the Administration's proposed budget for immigration
enforcement, on February 25 of last year, that Representative Lamar
Smith, the former chairman of the House Subcommittee on Immigration and
Claims and currently a member of that subcommittee, stated, ``And while
it's a step in the right direction that we're increasing the amount of
money--as I recall, it was something like from $20 million to $40
million, roughly--for worksite inspections, that's a little bit like
having two candles instead of one candle in a blackout. It's a step in
the right direction, but it's not doing near what we should.''
I would make the same point about the staffing levels authorized by
Congress for this fiscal year. I am afraid we don't need a couple of
more candles, given the seriousness of the situation; we need to break
out the floodlights!
Question: 9. Who do you think is responsible for the overall
immigration policy within DDS? Is it one person? Would the Department
be better off if one individual reporting to the Secretary could
coordinate overall immigration policy?
Response: 9. I believe that this is a difficult question to answer.
Immigration policy needs to be fair, consistent and ultimately,
effective. Immigration policy is one of the most critical issues that
the federal government needs to address. It has been said that you only
get one opportunity to make a first impression. The way our nation
enforces and administers the immigration laws serves as that critical
first impression for people throughout the world. We need to balance
fairness and compassion with justice and integrity. America is and
hopefully will always be seen as the ``Land of opportunity.'' We must,
however, not permit it to become the land of opportunity to those who
would harm us. We must deprive the criminals and the terrorists the
opportunity to victimize our citizens and attack our nation. At present
several individuals head up components of the immigration mission.
Eduardo Aguirre is the head of Citizenship and Immigration Services,
Mike Garcia headed ICE and Robert Bonner has headed CPB. I do not
believe that a triumvirate is the best way to go. The concern I do have
is that if the person who is ultimately responsible for the immigration
system is a person who favors the service side, as was clearly the case
with former INS Commissioner Meisner, that the enforcement program will
suffer. It might make sense to have two distinct chains of command, one
reporting to the person in charge of CIS and the other to what I hope
will become a combination of ICE and CBP. The person charged with
running the enforcement mission should be someone with extensive law
enforcement experience, who thoroughly understands law enforcement. I
would further suggest that they would then report to a person who would
be in the position of balancing and coordinating both missions. The
critical issue here is that we need to make certain that CIS be given
clear marching orders that while the efficient processing of
applications is important the backlog of applications should never get
more attention than the integrity of the process. National security has
to be the primary consideration for both sides of the operation. Having
stated my misgivings about the situation that existed under the former
INS, I also think that by putting a single person in charge of both
sides of the operation, that individual will feel truly accountable.
Sometimes people feel that there is safety in numbers. When a person
can hide in a committee or a bureaucracy, it may become easier to not
feel quite as accountable as a person who is ultimately the one person
who bears ultimate responsibility. I recall that President Truman had a
sign on his desk that said, ``The buck stops here.'' Perhaps that sense
of accountability should exist for the person who will take charge of
the immigration system. (Indeed immigration needs to be thought of as a
system and not as a collection of loosely assembled components if it is
to be successfully managed and lead.)
Question: 10. What do you believe was the basis of the decision by the
Administration to reconstitute the U.S. Customs Service and Bureau of
Border Security into CBP and ICE?
Response: 10. I have no idea and, in fact, I have often asked myself
that very same question.
Question: 11. Will you please address the One Face at the Border
initiative? Do you think this program is working? Do you have concerns
about the ability of inspectors to learn customs and immigration laws?
Can you please discuss your concerns in primary and secondary
inspections?
Response: 11. I do not have an extensive background in customs law,
however, I do have an extensive background in immigration law
enforcement. Immigration laws are complex and are constantly evolving.
The decisions that the inspectors at airports and other ports of entry
have to make, especially in secondary where arriving aliens may make
claims concerning political asylum and credible fear are conceivably
life and death decisions. On the other hand, we have also seen that
mistakes that err on the side of permitting aliens into the United
States who are involved with crime and terrorism. Several times these
sorts of decisions inadvertently facilitated the actions of the
terrorists of September 11. It is absolutely critical that the
inspectors who stand watch on our nation's borders have extensive and
effective training in laws, in procedures and in terms of intelligence
including developments in document fraud. I am most concerned with the
training given to inspectors who handle secondary inspections, since
the primary inspector does not need quite as much background as does
the secondary inspector.
I have also been told that the senior immigration inspectors at
many ports of entry are no longer as involved as they had been in
seeking criminal prosecutions against aliens who seek to enter the
United States in violation of law. This issue has been a development
since the implementation of ``One Face on the Border.''
As I stated during the hearing, this is the age of the specialist.
I believe that our security would be enhanced by making certain that
the inspectors, especially in secondary, have the specialized training
that they need. In view of these extremely critical and sensitive
issues our nation would be better served by having separate customs and
immigration inspectors handle secondary inspections.
Question: 12. We are concerned that when ICE and CBP were created from
Customs and legacy INS components that Customs inspectors lost their
best source of intelligence and law enforcement information. Given that
Customs inspectors are charged with assessing the risk of inbound cargo
containers, and working with industry to secure these supply chains, I
worry that CBP programs will not achieve their full potential because
of the disconnect between ICE agents and CBP inspectors.
a. What was the relationship between customs inspectors and
investigators before the creation ofDHS?
b. What is the existing relationship? What kinds of wall exist
and how has CBP tried to compensate for the loss of Customs
agents?
c. Are there any benefits to the current structure?
d. What is the impact on CBP's cargo security mission?
Response: 12. As I have stated previously, my knowledge about customs
is extremely limited. I have heard anecdotal instances where CBP
inspectors called other agencies when they encountered law violations
that were under the purview of ICE such as drug seizes and the like.
Clearly this is not helpful or in anyone's best interests. I regret I
cannot provide answers or insight on the other issues that relate to
customs enforcement issues you raise in this question.
Please note:
If I can be of further assistance to you or other members of the
Committee or members of your respective staffs, please do not hesitate
to contact me. I welcome the opportunity to contribute to efforts
intended to enhance the security of our nation.
Questions and Responses by Michael Cutler Submitted for the Record by
The Honorable Kendrick B. Meek
Question: 1. What do you believe was the basis of the decision by
the Administration to have CBP and ICE created as separate operational
agencies?
Response: 1. I can only speculate on the motivation to go in this
direction inasmuch as I was not contacted when this decision was made,
nor have I spoken with anyone who may have been involved in that
decision making process. It may be that the thought was that the border
was seen as an entity apart from the interior of the United States. If
indeed that was the reason, it was, in my estimation, flawed because
the two are truly an extension of each other. In fact, what is often is
overlooked is the fact that an airport located in the heart of the
United States is as much a part of the border as would be a land border
port. Airports provide direct access into the United States which is
why the enforcement of the immigration laws from within the interior of
the United States is as critical to the success of the immigration
enforcement mission as are enforcement efforts conducted by the Border
Patrol operating in proximity to our nation's land borders.
Question: 2. If, for whatever reason, DDS ultimately decides not to
merge ICE and CBP, what is the next most important action that could be
taken to improve the effectiveness of CBP and ICE?
Response: 2. It is my belief that we need to place as much emphasis on
the enforcement of the immigration and customs laws from within the
interior of the United States as we do on the border. (I will focus on
the issue of immigration law enforcement rather than customs law
enforcement only because of my own background as a former INS law
enforcement officer.)
Interior enforcement efforts need to be greatly ramped up because
we need to think of immigration law enforcement as a system rather than
as a collection of separate and unrelated parts. You cannot control the
flow of illegal aliens into the United States purely at the border for
a host of reasons. First of all, nearly 50% of the illegal aliens
currently in the United States did not evade the inspections process
but did, in fact, enter the United States through a port of entry and
then, in one way or another went on to violate the terms of their
admission into our country.They may have simply stayed in the United
States for a longer period oftime than they were given when they were
admitted, they may have accepted unauthorized employment, or they may
have committed felonies. In any event, these aliens fall squarely
within the scope of the interior enforcement program that has been
historically ignored, under-funded and understaffed.
It is also worth remembering the controversial ``Catch and
Release'' program of the Border Patrol where illegal aliens arrested by
Border Patrol agents are permitted to head for the interior of he
United States supposedly to turn themselves over to the immigration
authorities for removal hearings. Not surprisingly, only a very small
percentage of these illegal aliens do this. They simply head to their
intended destinations and blend into the huge alien communities
throughout our nation. They are welcomed by communities that have
implemented ``sanctuary policies'' they are even able to apply for
loans to conduct business as usual as our country ever increases
efforts to blur the distinction between resident alien and illegal
alien. Securing work is not difficult. Last year no company paid a
single fine for knowingly employing illegal aliens, although the law
clearly states that such companies are supposed to be fined under the
auspices of the Employer Sanctions Program. An effective interior
enforcement program would deter many would be illegal aliens from
coming to our country. Conversely, the lack of meaningful interior
enforcement encourages many aliens to come to this country in violation
of law and when members of the political establishment publicly
speculate about a guest worker program or other such amnesty program
for illegal aliens, still more aliens are emboldened to run our borders
and otherwise violate the immigration laws of this country.
To quote John F. Shaw, the former Assistant Commissioner for
Investigations of the Immigration and Naturalization Service when he
testified before the House Subcommittee on Immigration and Claims on
March 4, 1999:
``In its determined efforts to establish control of the border by
tightening security on the perimeter, Congress has seemingly ignored
the critical, complementary roles and responsibilities of Interior
Enforcement. . . and these fall mainly on the shoulders of
Investigations. I believe that the concept of Interior Enforcement,
supported by a well articulated strategy document, ought to be as
familiar in the nomenclature of immigration enforcement as the concept,
or term, Border Control. Although, I must admit that even in-house at
INS, the Commissioner has said that Interior Enforcement is a term of
usage invented by Investigations and devoid of meaning.''
That, according to the former head of the investigations program
for the former INS would state that his boss, Commissioner Doris
Meisner would indicate her disdain for the interior enforcement program
of the INS after the first attack on the World Trade Center on February
26, 1993 shows how great the problem is where dedicating adequate
resources to this critical mission is concerned.
If we do nothing else, I would urge that the interior enforcement
of the immigration laws be given at least as much emphasis as we are
giving the Border Patrol. When FBI Director Robert Mueller testified
before the Senate Intelligence Committee in February of this year, he
spoke of his concerns about possible terrorist sleeper cells operating
within our nation. As I stated during the testimony that I provided
when I testified before the House Subcommittee on Immigration, Border
Security and Claims on March 10, 2005:
``Sleeper agents are not like cicadas; they do not simply slip into
our country and then burrow into a hole for months or years awaiting
their instructions to emerge to carry out a deadly terrorist attack.
Sleepers are, in fact, aliens who, upon entering our country, manage to
hide in plain sight by finding a job, attending a school or doing other
such ``ordinary things'' that do not call attention to them. Someone
once said that an effective spy is someone who could not attract the
attention of a waitress at a greasy spoon diner. The same can be said
of an effective terrorist. It is vital that we regain control of our
borders and the entire immigration bureaucracy and enforcement program
if we are to protect our nation against terrorists and criminals. This
requires that we have an adequate number of law enforcement officers
who are dedicated to this critical mission.''
I believe it absolutely imperative that we do not seek a false
economy of not fully funding a robust interior enforcement program if
we are to secure our borders against terrorists, drug traffickers,
members of violent gangs and others who would threaten our nation and
our citizens. I also want you to know that my concept of fully funding
this program does not coincide with what has been authorized by
Congress. Our nation needs many for special agents, they need adequate
resources including jail space and operating funds and need effective
training including foreign language training, intelligence training,
document training and true leadership to operate effectively. Our
agents who enforce the immigration laws are in the best position to
defend our nation from terrorists and other criminals by cultivating
informants and by being the people who are most likely to spot trends
as they develop. Admittedly this is not a cheap proposition, but when
you consider the costs that accrued since 9/11, without even getting
into the massive, horrific loss of human life on that horrendous day,
our nation would be wise to find the money and protect our citizens.
When I spoke with the investigators who were involved in the
investigation conducted in the aftermath of the first attack on the
World Trade Center, some of them told me that they were actually
surprised that the bomb did not bring down the tower that was struck,
sideways. There would have been no escape from that tower had that
occurred. Other building would have undoubtedly been hit. It is
virtually impossible to know what that carnage would have been,
however, it would have been many, many times greater than the level of
loss of life that we experienced on September 11. We have been hearing
constant warning about terrorists seeking to obtain and deploy weapons
of mass destruction. The cost in terms of dollar amounts and more
importantly, human lives, has the potential to eclipse the horror this
nation experienced on 9/11.
I would also remind you that 30% of the federal inmate population
incarcerated in federal correctional facilities are identified as being
foreign born. It is therefore safe to say that many more people die in
our country each and every year because of crimes committed by alien
criminals than were killed as a result of the terror attacks of
September 11. Alien criminals are involved in everything from drug
trafficking (an activity that has, in many instances, been linked to
terrorist organizations) ethnic organized crime groups, including
violent gangs and whitecollar criminal activities which again, have
been shown, in some instances, to have links to terrorist
organizations.
I know that you have asked me a relatively short question, and that
I have responded with a rather lengthy response. I have done this
because of how certain I am as to the rightness of my response and I
want to make it abundantly clear that there are definite reasons that I
hold these beliefs.
Question: 3. For a merger between COP and ICE to address the concerns
you have raised, what additional steps beyond combining the
headquarters operations would have to be part of the merger?
Response: 3. I believe that beyond adequate funding for both the
enforcement of the border components of the program and the interior
enforcement efforts, we need to have coordination of both elements at
the field office level and also need to coordinate these efforts with
the benefits program to address the concerns of the GAO when that
agency prepared a report on a study on the issue of immigration benefit
fraud in February 2002, that stated that fraud was a pervasive problem
throughout the immigration benefit program. The 9/11 Staff Report on
Terrorist Travel made it clear that in preparing to attack our nation,
these enemies of our nation traveled frequently and extensively and
probably could not have attacked us had they been unable to travel in
that fashion. A United States passport would go a long way to
facilitate the travel of a terrorist not only to easily cross our
nation's borders, but to enter into many other countries inasmuch as
the United States passport is considered the ``gold standard'' of
passports throughout much of the world. Immigration benefit fraud can
put an alien on the road to that highly coveted United States passport.
While we are on the topic of the United States passport, we also need
to seek simple solutions to problems as well. When an alien
naturalizes, the law states that the new citizen may take any name that
he or she desires at the time of naturalization. When a naturalized
citizen applies for a United States passport, the only name that the
passport generally reflects is the name that is on the naturalization
certificate. I believe that it would make sense to make certain that
the United States passport should also contain the name that the alien
used prior to being naturalized so that if such a person was wanted in
a foreign country under his/her original name, they wouldn't be able to
circumvent a name-based watch list in another country. This would
enhance the security of that other country and may also help our nation
keep better track of those who may pose a threat. This would not cost
anything and may make us a bit safer. There are other such things that
can be done at little or no cost to improve security.
The 9/11 Staff Report on Terrorist Travel noted the many identity
documents that the terrorists used. I believe that the issuance of
driver's licenses to illegal aliens must stop immediately. I have heard
many people who favor open borders voice concerns about the use of
driver's licenses as national identity documents. Frankly, they are too
late. We have been using these documents in that fashion for quite some
time. Any significant purchase in a store will most times trigger a
request to see a driver's license whether you pay by check or credit
card. Entry into sensitive buildings in the private sector as well as
government often requires the display of a driver's license. Boarding
an airplane or train also triggers that request. The only problem is,
driver's licenses are not secure identity documents, we only pretend
that they are. I have often said that the only thing worse than no
security is false security. The demand of a driver's license at present
is the equivalent of whistling past a graveyard. It may give us
comfort, but it changes nothing. Only criminals and undercover agents
would lie about their true identities. Undercover agents who work for
our government are no threat to our well-being. Criminals and
terrorists are. The argument that illegal aliens will drive with or
without driver's licenses shows the level of contempt that currently
exists for our laws. We currently take away driving privileges from
motorists who are arrested for drunk driving to protect the rest of the
population. We often hear about a drunk driver who drives a car without
a license, gets into an accident and kills someone. I wonder if those
who argue that illegal aliens will drive whether or not they have a
license would argue against taking licenses from convicted drunk
drivers on the same grounds--``That they will drive anyway.''
It is crucial that we deter illegal immigration and not by simply
posting more Border Patrol agents along our nation's borders. We need
to create an effective immigration system that is fair, consistent, and
effective and prevents illegal aliens who get past the Border Patrol or
the inspector at the port of entry from conducting business as usual.
This would deprive an alien who has no lawful right to be in the United
States the reasons to come here in the first place. A prudent homeowner
would not allow a stranger in without looking though the peephole to
make certain that the person knocking on the door is of no danger
should he be allowed in. This country should do no less. Our nation's
military is currently attempting to secure the borders of Iraq to stop
terrorists and insurgents. It appears to be working. We should do no
less for our nation and our citizens. An effective, coordinated effort,
aimed at the enforcement and administration of the immigration laws
would go a long way to protect our homeland.
Please note:
If I can be of further assistance to you or other members of the
Subcommittee or members of your respective staffs, please do not
hesitate to contact me. I welcome the opportunity to contribute to
efforts intended to enhance the security of our nation.
Questions and Responses by Kenneth C. Klug Submitted for the Record by
The Honorable Bennie Thompson
Question: 1. With all of the attention that was paid within both ICE
and CBP to bringing their own INS and Customs components together as
part of DHS's genesis, is it fair to say that not enough attention has
been paid to inter-bureau coordination?
Response: 1. It is clear that much could be done in the area of inter-
agency coordination. First and foremost the agency heads should be held
accountable for maintaining effective working relationships. By all
accounts there is a rift between CBP and ICE at the highest levels.
Question: 2. Absent issues which receive headquarters attention, namely
anything connected to terrorism, minority staff field investigations
over the last year found that the degree of local CBP and ICE
coordination was heavily dependent on whether or not the supervisors
had a good personal relationship. Given this dynamic, for a merger to
be worthwhile wouldn't it have to affect more than just the
headquarters components?
Response: 2. Absolutely, the entire organization needs to report
through their respective chains of command to Headquarters and
Headquarters needs to hold principal field officers accountable for
maintaining effective and complimentary working relationships. This is
analogous to nothing more than establishing a detective division within
the existing CBP structure.
Question: 3. Even though the initial decision to split ICE and CBP may
not have been ideal, would we be discussing a merger if BTS management
had taken action to ensure proper coordination between the components?
Response: 3. Perhaps, but it's difficult to speculate. Clear leadership
would have offset some if not many of the difficulties encountered. BTS
could have required the components to establish clear cut mission
statements, communicate expectations, provided resources, and held
agency heads accountable for maintaining effective working
relationships. BTS has also treated ICE in a disparate fashion with
regard to resources. TSA held a widely publicized award ceremony and
the Under Secretary for BTS participated in the CBP awards ceremony.
Conversely ICE inadequate funding levels resulted in no awards for
personnel. This added to the already debilitated morale of employees.
Question: 4. Would you agree that many of the problems and concerns
which lead you to the call for the merger of CBP and ICE arise from the
only common supervisor being at the Undersecretary or even, if CIS is
involved, the Deputy Secretary level?
Response: 4. I would agree. Furthermore, due to the size of the
organization and their responsibilities the Undersecretary and/or
Deputy Secretary are too far removed from the day-to-day operations of
the respective organizations.
Question: 5. With or without a merger, isn't the key issue making sure
that policies and procedures are in place to encourage Border Patrol
agents, CBP officers, and ICE agents to share information, coordinate
operations and resolve procedural disagreements at the lowest possible
level?
Response: 5. These are important issues but the separation has also
caused duplication of effort, duplicative administrative processes and
the inefficient utilization of resources.
Question: 6. DHS has trumpeted the success of the Arizona Border
Control (ABC) initiative in reducing the flow of migrants through the
Arizona desert. Much of the success has been attributed to the command
structure of the ABC initiative--a task force of CBP and ICE personnel
headed by the Border Patrol sector chief Do you believe that creating
additional task forces under the direction of a local supervisor (an
ICE agent-in-charge or a Border Patrol chief) is a viable way to insure
that ICE and CBP coordinate their law enforcement efforts?
Response: 6. Many question the success of the ABC. Personally I feel
that the flood of migrants should have been monitored more closely from
the onset. Had enough attention been paid to the slowly rising pattern
more effected action could have been taken earlier, negating the need
for the task force and consequently the tax dollars spent on it.
Although task force initiatives may be worthwhile in some instances,
agencies should not be relying solely on the efforts of principal field
officers. Direction and leadership need to come from Washington and not
negotiated in the field.
Question: 7. If task forces are a good idea for border control,
wouldn't it also make sense to extend this model to other missions such
as interior enforcement, alien and other smuggling through airports?
Response: 7. Again this is the underpinning of the fallacy. There is no
``interior enforcement strategy'' and you cannot separate the
functions. They are both border related. If carried to the logical
conclusion under the ``interior enforcement strategy'', are the
functions at inland international airports and seaports interior
enforcement? Certainly not, their duties are border related. ICE does
not have jurisdiction unless people or merchandise cross a b-o-r-d-e-r.
Question: 8. Would the problems we have discussed here today be
lessened if the Administration decided to fully fund the border
security enhancements called for in the 9/11 bill?
Response: 8. I am not well versed enough in this arena to answer this
question but will restate that ICE has experienced significant
financial hardship and operations have been adversely impacted.
Question: 9. Who do you think is responsible for overall immigration
policy within DHS? IS it one person? Would the Department be better off
if one individual reporting in the Secretary could coordinate overall
immigration policy?
Response: 9. I would suggest along with many others, that a
comprehensive review of the nations immigration policy is in order. A
bipartisan approach similar the 9-11 Commission should be taken. To
illustrate the problem of dealing with the problem without a
comprehensive plan, many suggest that we continue to hire additional BP
officers in order to control the border. This approach has not and will
not work. This will do little good if we do not have the funding or the
facilities to house apprehended aliens. They are literally ``caught and
released''. It does little good to issue appearance notices when the
vast majority fail to appear.
Question: 10. What do you believe was the basis of the decision by the
Administration to reconstitute the U.S. Customs Service and Bureau of
Border Security into CBP and ICE?
Response: 10. As I stated in my March 9th, 2005 written testimony to
the subcommittee ``It is the belief of many of my colleagues in the
Office of Investigations, that the concept of ICE and the subsequent
division of the Customs Service was fatally flawed from its inception.
Frankly, the creation of ICE was tantamount to building a house without
a foundation.Many in the law enforcement community found it quizzical
as to why all other agencies that were incorporated into DHS, such as
Secret Service, FEMA, Coast Guard, etc. maintained their identity in
the transition. The logic behind the concept of ice became even more
arcane when the Federal Protective Service (F.P.S.), an agency
responsible for guarding government buildings, was taken from under the
General Services Administration and placed within ICE. To date, not a
single individual I have spoken with in the federal government can
supply any reason for incorporating F.P.S. into this border protection
agency. Furthermore, the administration did not conduct a comprehensive
review or issue a written report relative to the complexity or
feasibility of combining these diverse agencies. Apparently no study,
cursory or in depth, was requested or produced in anticipation of the
proposed separation. I am certain that if an independent group such as
the G.A.O. had conducted a study, the separation would have never been
recommended and consequently not have occurred. Many of my coworkers
believed then and continue to feel that the proposed division of
Customs and INS was a result of the lack of specific knowledge on the
part of those individuals in the administration who proposed it. They
certainly had to be unaware of the precise missions of the two
agencies. The months following the creation of ICE proved to
substantiate that belief.''
Question: 11. Will you please address the One Face at the Border
initiative? Do you think this program is this program working? Do you
have concerns about the ability of inspectors to learn customs and
immigration law? Can you please discuss your concerns in primary
inspections and secondary inspections?
Response: 11. Inspectional (CBP) personnel would best address this
question.
Question: 12. We are concerned that when ICE and CBP were created from
Customs and legacy INS components that Customs inspectors lost their
best source of intelligence and law enforcement information. Given that
Customs inspectors are charged with assessing the risk of inbound cargo
containers, and working with industry to secure these supply chains, I
worry that CBP programs will not achieve their full potential because
of the disconnect between ICE agents and CBP inspectors.
a. What was the relationship between customs inspectors and
investigators before the creation of DHS?
Customs Agents and Inspectors were closely aligned, roles
clearly established and programs were integrated. That does not
appear to be the case with INS Inspectors and Agents.
b. What is the existing relationship? What kinds of walls exist
and how has CBP tried to compensate for the loss of Customs
agents?
The relationships vary by location. In many instances
legacy relationships exist and are working.
Unfortunately, these will deteriorate over time due to
attrition. In other location the entities do not
interact.
Many walls have surfaced. As an example CBP has decided
that the release of a passenger baggage declaration or
a customs entry for imported merchandise is subject to
the ``third agency rule''. In some instances agents
have been escorted from Inspectional areas and CBP has
pulled back from joint intelligence operations such as
ICAT and the EXODUS command center.
CBP has compensated for the loss of the agents by
establishing their own intelligence division, foreign
offices and investigators referred to as 1895-Es.
There is much duplication of effort.
c. Are there any benefits to the current structure?
Any perceived benefit is clearly outweighed by the
negatives.
d. What is the impact on CBP's cargo security mission?
Inspectional personnel would best address this
question, however, many of the functions that were
performed by the agents are now being performed by the
inspectors.
Questions and Responses by Kenneth C. Klug Submitte for the Record by
The Honorable Kendrick B. Meek
Question: 1. What do you believe was the basis of the decision by the
Administration to have CPB and ICE created as separate operational
agencies?
Response: 1. As I stated in my March 9th, 2005 written testimony to the
subcommittee ``It is the belief of many of my colleagues in the Office
of Investigations, that the concept of ICE and the subsequent division
of the Customs Service was fatally flawed from its inception. Frankly,
the creation of ICE was tantamount to building a house without a
foundation. Many in the law enforcement community found it quizzical as
to why all other agencies that were incorporated into DHS, such as
Secret Service, FEMA, Coast Guard, etc. maintained their identity in
the transition. The logic behind the concept of ICE became even more
arcane when the Federal Protective Service (F.P.S.), an agency
responsible for guarding government buildings, was taken from under the
General Services Administration and placed within ICE. To date, not a
single individual I have spoken with in the federal government can
supply any reason for incorporating F.P .S. into this border protection
agency. Furthermore, the administration did not conduct a comprehensive
review or issue a written report relative to the complexity or
feasibility of combining these diverse agencies. Apparently no study,
cursory or in depth, was requested or produced in anticipation of the
proposed separation. I am certain that if an independent group such as
the G.A.O. had conducted a study, the separation would have never been
recommended and consequently not have occurred. Many of my coworkers
believed then and continue to feel that the proposed division of
Customs and INS was a result of the lack of specific knowledge on the
part of those individuals in the administration who proposed it. They
certainly had to be unaware of the precise missions of the two
agencies. The months following the creation of ICE proved to
substantiate that belief.''
Question: 2. If, for whatever reason, DHS ultimately decides not to
merge ICE and CBP, what is the next most important action that could be
taken to improve the effectiveness of CBP and ICE?
Response: 2. Not to merge the agencies would be a grave mistake. What
has been need and should be instituted immediately is to identify clear
mission statements, priorities and roles and responsibilities for the
respective entities. Currently the impacted elements have been required
to negotiate Memorandums of Agreement. This is no substitute for
leadership. There are redundant systems and the entities are ``mission
creeping''. The Border Patrol has reestablished it's prosecutions units
that conduct investigations and OFO is contemplating expanding their
investigative functions as well. Should the current organizational
structure continue the Department and BTS needs to clarify missions and
expectations.
Question: 3. For a merger between CBP and ICE to address the concerns
you have raised, what additional steps beyond combining the
headquarters operations would have to be part of the merger?
Response: 3. We will not realize the goals of ``one face at the
border'' until all entities with a responsibility for border
enforcement are under one roof, pursuing the same priorities and
reporting to one management structure. Although there may be separate
functions within the component parts the efficiencies of Government
will not be addressed unless they are marching in the same direction.
Questions and Responses by David J. Venturalla Submitted for the Record
by The Honorable Bennie Thompson
Question 1. With all of the attention that was paid within both ICE and
CBP to bringing their own INS and Customs components together as part
of DHS's genesis, is it fair to say that not enough attention has been
paid to inter-bureau coordination?
Response: 1. It is my opinion that very little has been done to
coordinate the strengths and capabilities of ICE and CBP in an effort
to protect our homeland. With the lone exception of the ABC initiative,
DHS, in particular has not provided the direction and leadership
necessary to capitalize on this opportunity.
Question 2. Absent issues which receive headquarters attention, namely
anything connected to terrorism, minority staff field investigations
over the last year found that the degree of local CBP and ICE
coordination was heavily dependent on whether or not the supervisors
had a good personal relationship. Given this dynamic, for a merger to
be worthwhile wouldn't it have to affect more than just the
headquarters components?
Response: 2. Coordination must start at the top. DHS and the
headquarter components of ICE and CBP must develop the culture and
structure that will facilitate coordination and communication at all
levels. ICE has done little to foster communication and coordination
within its own organization and even less with CBP. The leadership at
ICE has failed to recognize the important elements that make an
organization successful.
Question: 3. Even though the initial decision to split ICE and CBP may
not have been ideal, would we be discussing a merger if BTS management
had taken action to ensure proper coordination between the components?
Response: 3. I agree with your assessment. BTS and the Department
should have taken a more active role.
Question: 4. Would you agree that many of the problems and concerns
which lead you to the call for the merger of CBP and ICE arise from the
only common supervisor being at the Undersecretary or even, if CIS is
involved, the Deputy Secretary level?
Response: 4. I do not agree with that assessment. The problems that
exist today are the result of weak leadership, poor planning and poor
organizational decisions made early on by the Department. For example,
the ``shared service'' concept was well intended but the lack of
oversight by the Department has only served to widen the rift between
ICE, CBP and CIS.
Question: 5. With or without a merger, isn't the key issue making sure
that policies and procedures are in place to encourage Border Patrol
agents, CBP officers, and ICE agents to share information, coordinate
operations and resolve procedural disagreements at the lowest possible
level?
Response: 5.
Question: 6. DHS has trumpeted the success of the Arizona Border
Control (ABC) initiative in reducing the flow of migrants through the
Arizona desert. Much of the success has been attributed to the command
structure of the ABC initiative--a task force of CBP and ICE personnel
headed by the Border Patrol sector chief. Do you believe that creating
additional task forces under the direction of a local supervisor (an
ICE agent-in-charge or a Border Patrol chief) is a viable way to insure
that ICE and CBP coordinate their law enforcement efforts?
Question: 7. If task forces are a good idea for border control,
wouldn't it also make sense to extend this model to other missions such
as interior enforcement, alien and other smuggling through airports?
DHS and BTS operational policy and procedural guidance on many
important issues have not been forthcoming. In the two years the
Department has been in existence, only a handful of instructions have
been generated. As a result, ICE and CBP are allowed to act independent
of one another thereby creating redundant operations and processes.
This lack of direction only exacerbates the problems that exist between
ICE and CBP.
Response: 6 and 7. Task forces are one way of executing an operation;
however, the impact of task force operations is very short in duration
and does little to sustain the positive results achieved when the task
force is dissolved.
What is lacking in the Department is a long-range strategy that is
supported by initiatives which compliment on another. Without a
comprehensive border and interior enforcement strategy, initiatives
such as ABC are only marginally successful as it relates to securing
the border.
Question: 8. Would the problems we have discussed here today be
lessened if the Administration decided to fully fund the border
security enhancements called for in the 9/11 bill?
Response: 8. With or without the enhancements, the vulnerabilities we
have in border security and interior enforcement would still occur
because there is a lack of a common mission and strategic focus.
Throwing money at the problem will not solve the problem.
Question: 9. Who do you think is responsible for overall immigration
policy within DHS? IS it one person? Would the Department be better off
if one individual reporting in the Secretary could coordinate overall
immigration policy?
Response: 9. Prior to the creation of the Department of Homeland
Security, the responsibility of immigration policy was located under
one person and one organization. As we all recall, this didn't work
well either. The structure of the organization did not contribute to
this failure; rather, it was the lack of leadership and vision that
failed this country. I do support the creation of a directorate for
policy and planning that would report to the Secretary with the Deputy
Secretary having responsibility for policy implementation and
operational execution.
Question: 10. What do you believe was the basis of the decision by the
Administration to reconstitute the U.S. Customs Service and Bureau of
Border Security into CBP and ICE?
Response: 10. I believe the Administration saw a logical break--border
(CBP) versus interior (ICE) when it started to realign and distribute
functions. I also believe they envisioned a new tool to secure the
borders and improve overall enforcement that could potentially occur as
a result of the merger of custom statutory authorities and assets with
immigration authorities and assets. Because of the lack of leadership
and vision, the development of these powerful tools has not come to
fruition.
Question: 11. Will you please address the One Face at the Border
initiative? Do you think this program is this program working? Do you
have concerns about the ability of inspectors to learn customs and
immigration law? Can you please discuss your concerns in primary
inspections and secondary inspections?
Response: 11. It is my opinion that ``The One Face at the Border''
initiative only addresses operational efficiencies and morale issues.
It is not a strategy to improve security at our ports of entry and at
our borders. In fact, without the inclusion of the U.S. Coast Guard,
this initiative is incomplete.
I do not have any concerns about the ability of inspectors to learn
both customs and immigration law. When I was attending my basic
training at the Federal Law Enforcement Training Academy as a
deportation officer, I had to learn basic customs law. I believe
inspectors from the former Customs Service and Immigration and
Naturalization Service have been provided a basic foundation in both
sets of statutes and learning the nuance of the laws would not pose a
concern.
I have no specific concerns regarding inspectors performing their
duties during the primary and secondary process. I remain concerned
about the information an inspector, in particular at a land border port
of entry, has available to make their decisions.
12. We are concerned that when ICE and CBP were created from Customs
and legacy INS components that Customs inspectors lost their best
source of intelligence and law enforcement information. Given that
Customs inspectors are charged with assessing the risk of inbound cargo
containers, and working with industry to secure these supply chains, I
worry that CBP programs will not achieve their full potential because
of the disconnect between ICE agents and CBP inspectors.
Questions:
a. What was the relationship between customs inspectors and
investigators before the creation of DHS?
b. What is the existing relationship? What kinds of walls exist and how
has CBP tried to compensate for the loss of Customs agents?
c. Are there any benefits to the current structure?
d. What is the impact on CBP's cargo security mission?
Response: 12. I cannot to respond to these specific questions regarding
the relationship of Customs Inspectors and former Custom Agents.
Questions and Responses by David J. Venturella Submitted for the Record
by The Honorable Kendrick B. Meek
Question: 1. What do you believe was the basis of the decision by the
Administration to have CPB and ICE created as separate operational
agencies?
Response: 1. I believe the Administration saw a logical break--border
(CBP) versus interior (ICE) when it started to realign and distribute
functions. I also believe they envisioned a new tool to secure the
borders and improve overall enforcement that could potentially occur as
a result of the merger of custom statutory authorities and assets with
immigration authorities and assets. Because of the lack of leadership
and vision, the development of these powerful tools has not come to
fruition.
Question: 2. If, for whatever reason, DHS ultimately decides not to
merge ICE and CBP, what is the next most important action that could be
taken to improve the effectiveness of CBP and ICE?
Response: 2. As I stated in my testimony, I would recommend a thorough
examination of the components of each bureau and redistributing
programs to provide a logical alignment of operations, assets as well
as the integration of appropriate resources. In that vein, I would
recommend placing customs, immigration and agriculture port assets
under CBP and immigration enforcement assets under ICE. The Federal
Protective Service and the Federal Air Marshals Service should be moved
elsewhere in the department. The mismatch of functions and overlapping
areas of responsibilities has served merely to diminish DHS's focus on
enforcement.
Question: 3. For a merger between CBP and ICE to address the concerns
you have raised, what additional steps beyond combining the
headquarters operations would have to be part of the merger?
Response: 3. While I do not support the merger of the two bureaus, for
this organization to be successful, someone with a sense of vision
needs to lead the new bureau. This leader must be able to see down the
road, examine the threats to our country and develop a plan on how take
the current organization beyond in current capabilities to an
organization that can overcome the threats of the future.
Prepared Statement of The Honorable Sheila Jackson-Lee, a
Representative in Congress From the State of Texas
Chairman Rogers and Ranking Member Meek, I appreciate your effort
in holding this very important hearing to analyze the proposed
efficiencies of the new consolidated bureaus of the Border and
Transportation Security. The purpose of establishing the Department of
Homeland Security was to facilitate greater communication and
coordination. According to a report from the General Accounting Office
(GAO), DHS has had mixed results in this regard. While many of the
field officials with whom GAO spoke were pleased with the communication
and coordination they had with other DHS immigration programs, problems
still exist. The purpose of the hearing today is to learn about the
communication problems within DHS between the bureaus of Customs and
Boarder Patrol (CBP) and Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE).
I am particularly interested in the way the cooperation between CBP
and ICE has affected the government's efforts to deal with commercial
alien smuggling operations. CBP and ICE issued general guidelines on
each bureau's roles and responsibilities regarding how they would
transfer the assets of anti-smuggling investigators from the Border
Patrol to ICE, and how they would handle anti-smuggling investigations
after the transfer of these investigators to ICE. A memorandum jointly
issued by CBP and ICE in April 2004 for SACs and Border Patrol sector
chiefs in field locations outlined each program's basic
responsibilities. ICE would assume responsibility for administrative
support; funding of the anti-smuggling investigators; and all
investigations and complex cases such as international in nature or
related to organizations or national security. The Border Patrol would
have lead responsibility for cross-border and border related
interdiction activities, such as surveillance to interdict illegal
border crossings.
According to the GAO report, these efforts have not been fully
successful. Visits to the field and conversations with DHS employees
suggest the reason for this is that alien smuggling cases traditionally
arose from inspectors, border patrol agents or adjudicators noticing
patterns or trends. The dissolution of INS has cut the connections
between the agents who investigate alien smuggling and frontline
personnel. In the same vein, fewer Customs investigations were
generated based on leads from inspectors.
Mr. Chairman and Ranking Member, I would hope that the questions
that this body will pose to the witnesses will bring us closer to
initiating action to address the problems and areas of vulnerability
that exist in our border security program.