Number 66, March 1996

Conclusions

Proliferation of nuclear, biological and chemical (NBC) weapons is increasingly perceived by members of the North Atlantic Alliance as a political and military threat that could undermine NATO's ability to conduct essential defense missions, both in protecting Alliance territory and populations and in out-of-area regional conflicts.

• Alliance progress in addressing the NBC challenge is impressive. Allies have agreed on an assessment of the risks, and on the security implications of, and the military requirements to meet, the growing threat. Allies have identified a set of capabilities--in such areas as intelligence, active and passive defenses, and command and control--needed to give NATO the ability to project power and conduct operations in an NBC environment.

• The success of the NATO initiative to counter the proliferation threat, however, will only be assured when allies make national and collective commitments to field the necessary military capabilities and embed the threat in the Alliance defense planning process. To succeed, Alliance leaders will also need to rethink existing positions on nuclear deterrence and on the need for wide-area missile defenses.

• NATO's ability to respond effectively to the NBC and missile threat may well be the key indicator of the Alliance's ability to adapt to the new security environment and the most important stimulus for force planning and defense analysis in the decades ahead. Acquiring the capabilities to deter and defend against the proliferation threat is essential to the future credibility of the Alliance.

During the Cold War, proliferation was associated almost exclusively with nuclear weapons--viewed by the Alliance as an important political problem, but not central to NATO security. By the time of the Brussel's Summit in January 1994, this view had changed fundamentally. Mounting evidence--from post-Desert Storm Iraq, from North Korea and from Iran and Libya--demonstrated that potential adversaries in regions of vital interest were determined to acquire NBC weapons and missiles as political and military tools to advance very aggressive, and in most cases, anti-western agendas. In the eyes of proliferant states, possession of NBC weapons would not only add to their regional stature, but would also offer an asymmetrical counter to the West's superiority in conventional forces. Longer-range delivery systems would optimize the political effect of brandishing NBC and, thereby, add to the value of these weapons in deterring outside intervention.

Previous Alliance efforts undertaken after the Gulf War were now considered insufficient to the emerging threat, especially in the field of defense measures. As a first step to remedy the perceived inadequacies, NATO leaders at the Brussels Summit directed the preparation of an "overall policy framework." A comprehensive approach across the spectrum of political and military measures was considered essential.

Prevention of proliferation would remain the primary goal, although NATO leaders had concluded that a determined proliferant could likely succeed. Traditional methods had not worked with states like Iraq and North Korea, who violated arms control commitments without detection and manipulated export controls to gain access to sensitive technologies and materials. As a result, Alliance members would need to be prepared militarily to protect their populations and forces against the proliferation threat.

To conduct an assessment of the threat and the appropriate response, NATO established two expert groups. The first, the Senior Political-Military Group on Proliferation (SGP), was tasked to develop the broad policy framework. The second, the Senior Defence Group on Proliferation (DGP), was charged with examining the implications of proliferation for defense planning, identifying allied capabilities to protect against the threat and recommending additional capabilities that might be required.

Progress to Date: Defining the Threat

While the SGP work has been essentially descriptive in its treatment of the "political dimension" of the proliferation challenges, the work of the DGP has broken new ground. The DGP completed the first phase of its work in late 1994--an assessment of the potential threats to NATO to the year 2010 stemming from the growing proliferation in the Mediterranean and Middle East, as well as from illicit transfers of material and expertise from Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union and from suppliers outside of the NATO region, such as North Korea and China.

The DGP risk assessment resulted in even greater common ground among NATO members, including an understanding of the complexity of the proliferation threat and the need to differentiate among NBC weapons, recognizing that they possess different attributes and uses. These differences include:

• Nuclear weapons appear to be the most prized by proliferant states. While the utility of nuclear weapons has been increasingly questioned in the West, proliferators appear to value highly even a small handful of crude weapons. Presumably, such a capability could be used to coerce neighboring states and deter non-regional states from responding to aggression. The trend toward acquiring longer range ballistic missiles, capable of striking NATO territory in the future, may best be understood in the context of seeking this coercive leverage.

• Biological weapons, although still often considered less threatening than nuclear weapons, have emerged as a key threat. Technical advances have undermined many of the previous assumptions about the military utility of BW agents. For example, BW can now be used in a more discriminate fashion, such as against naval task forces or on the battlefield against such critical targets as ports and airfields.

• Chemical weapons are clearly seen by proliferant states as an effective military tool, as well as an instrument of terror. Even with effective defenses, the use of CW could have a dramatic effect on troop performance and, perhaps, on the "will" to fight. Although less effective than biological agents, chemicals could also be employed against populations for psychological and political impact.

The DGP assessment also produced a set of common views on the nature of an NBC-armed adversary. In this case, the "strategic personalities" of the regional proliferators are assessed to be much different, and more dangerous, than those of former Soviet leaders. In particular, such regimes would be less likely to act according to the "rules" of deterrence and more prone to take risks. Employment concepts would also likely be much different. NBC weapons in a regional conflict--especially chemical and biological weapons--may best be understood as weapons that weaker states could use selectively, precisely because they offer significant psychological, political and military advantages. Rather than being weapons of last resort, NBC weapons could be weapons of choice, employed early in a manner that creates significant, possibly crippling, political and military effects.

Implications for NATO Defense

The DGP began the second phase of its work program--identifying the security implications of NBC and missile proliferation and the capabilities necessary to respond--by exploring several scenarios involving an NBC-armed adversary: first, threats against Alliance territory where NATO populations would be at risk; second, threats to the ability of Alliance members to intervene in regions of vital interest; and third, threats to peacekeeping and humanitarian missions in which NATO forces would be involved.

A number of observations emerged from this examination:

• The greatest threat presented by NBC and missile proliferation, at least in the foreseeable future, is to deployed forces in regional contingencies. Therefore, NATO should give first priority to the protection of its forces. As adversaries acquire longer-range systems, the focus of the Alliance effort may shift to the protection of NATO populations.

• NBC weapons could directly impact the outcome of an operation by disrupting coalition cohesion or by inhibiting the deployment of NATO forces. In particular, loss of staging areas in the theater, because of threats to, or actual use against host countries could compromise the Alliance's ability to prosecute the campaign.

• NATO forces will be most vulnerable to NBC attack while entering the region of conflict, when large numbers of forces are concentrated at relatively few airfields and ports. NBC weapons used to disrupt operations at these facilities could have a profound influence on the ability of Alliance forces to carry out their missions.

• NBC weapons could alter the military balance in the region if their use severely degrades the capability of NATO forces essential to the conflict. Such degradation could be direct or indirect. For example, if NBC use occurs or is considered likely, forces will need to operate for extended periods in protective posture, with a major decrement to combat capabilities.

• Uneven capabilities among coalition partners with regard to equipment and training for NBC operations and for defending against the missile threat could offer the enemy opportunities for exploitation.

• Reactions by the civilian population within the theater could also have a fundamental effect on the conduct of operations. Loss of key civilian labor, such as on docks, could profoundly degrade reinforcement requirements. The need to divert military resources to protect civilians could also detract significantly from the effectiveness of Alliance forces.

On the basis of these implications, the DGP identified the range of capabilities needed to support NATO's overall political-military objectives for dealing with proliferation. A summary of the group's findings, released in late 1995, emphasized the need for the Alliance to possess a "core" set of capabilities, including:

• Strategic and operational intelligence, including early warning data;
• Automated and deployable command, control, and communications;
• Continuous wide-area ground surveillance to locate and track mobile targets;
• Remote and point CW and BW detection, identification, and warning;
• Extended air defenses, including against tactical ballistic and cruise missiles for deployed forces; and
• NBC individual protective equipment for deployed forces.

In several of these core areas the Alliance already has or is developing the required capabilities. In these cases, the DGP findings give further weight to existing programs as well as demonstrate how supplementing these capabilities with other initiatives--such as layered Theater Missile Defense (TMD) and special munitions for NBC agent defeat--could assist the Alliance in meeting its objectives in discouraging, deterring and defending against proliferation. In other core areas new initiatives will be necessary.

The Road Ahead: Key Issues and Recommendations

The DGP is currently embarked on the third phase of its work program, assessing Alliance and national capabilities with the objective of recommending specific measures to meet existing deficiencies. The ability of the Alliance to take such measures will determine the ultimate success of NATO's initiative to protect against the NBC and missile threat.

To succeed in fielding the required military capabilities, NATO will need to overcome a number of obstacles. These range from the conceptual (e.g., how the Alliance thinks about the security implications of proliferation and deterrence) to the operational (e.g., the actual commitment of resources and making proliferation an integral element of NATO's defense planning process). In particular the Alliance must address five critical issues.

1. Alliance political leaders must think differently about the proliferation threat. In this context, the views of the national leadership in several key allied governments are not well defined. The argument that traditional non-proliferation approaches are sufficient to meet the challenge may prevail in some capitals, especially when decision makers are confronted with hard policy and fiscal choices.

• The attainment of the identified military capabilities would also reinforce NATO's nuclear deterrent. Here, Alliance leaders must reevaluate longstanding and fundamental assumptions of deterrence. The principal concept of the past--deterrence based on the threat of retaliation and punishment--is likely to be less relevant in a regional conflict involving NBC where the interests are asymmetrical and the conditions for stable deterrence are problematic. The threat of a nuclear response to deter NBC use simply will not be credible in all cases. NATO did not rely exclusively on nuclear deterrence in the Cold War, nor can it in the present environment.

• While the Alliance must retain the option for an effective nuclear response, it is essential to complement NATO's nuclear forces with a mix of conventional counterforce enhancements and active and passive defenses. Possessing these capabilities will strengthen deterrence and further undermine the value of NBC use in the eyes of potential proliferators. Deterrence through denial is a stronger foundation for NATO policy than the concept of massive retaliation which, under a wide range of circumstances, would be perceived as disproportionate or otherwise inappropriate by the Alliance in time of conflict. Moreover, the identified conventional capabilities will provide the best hedge against deterrence failure, allowing NATO forces to operate effectively in an NBC environment.

• The Alliance will also need to rethink its longstanding position on wide-area missile defenses. Given the spread of increasingly capable cruise and ballistic missiles, the threat to NATO territory is rapidly approaching. Thus far, the Alliance is committed to deploying effective point defenses to protect troops against theater missiles. While this capability will make a major contribution to the Alliance's deterrence and defense posture, protection against the longer-range missile threat is essential. Concerns about the effectiveness of British and French nuclear forces (measured in the context of deterring the former Soviet Union) and about the political consequences of amending or abrogating the ABM Treaty have for decades dominated the debate and ensured opposition to developing and deploying effective territorial defenses. With the end of the Soviet Union and the expansion of the regional NBC and missile proliferation threat, the rationale behind these concerns requires reevaluation.

• Finally, the Alliance will need to commit scarce defense resources in a period of declining military budgets to meet the proliferation challenges. Commitment to acquiring these capabilities will be demonstrated only when NATO members fund specific programs, such as JSTARS and a THAAD-type TMD system.

In conclusion, NATO's preparedness to deal with proliferation threats is an essential aspect of the Alliance's adaptation to the new security environment. Alliance work to date provides the necessary framework for success and a firm foundation on which to build. NATO's military and political leadership must now follow through.

Robert Joseph is the director of the NDU Center for Counterproliferation Research and a member of the National War College faculty. He was previously U.S. Commissioner to the SCC. A longer version of this article appears in the Spring 1996 issue of Survival published by the International Institute for Strategic Studies. NOTE

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The Strategic Forum provides summaries of work by members and guests of the Institute for National Strategic Studies and the National Defense University faculty. These include reports of original research, synopses of seminars and conferences,the results of unclassified war games, and digests of remarks by distinguished speakers.