

U.N. PEACEKEEPING REFORM: SEEKING GREATER ACCOUNTABILITY AND INTEGRITY

HEARING

BEFORE THE

SUBCOMMITTEE ON AFRICA, GLOBAL HUMAN
RIGHTS AND INTERNATIONAL OPERATIONS

OF THE

COMMITTEE ON
INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

ONE HUNDRED NINTH CONGRESS

FIRST SESSION

MAY 18, 2005

Serial No. 109-42

Printed for the use of the Committee on International Relations



Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.house.gov/international_relations

U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE

21-308PDF

WASHINGTON : 2005

For sale by the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office
Internet: bookstore.gpo.gov Phone: toll free (866) 512-1800; DC area (202) 512-1800
Fax: (202) 512-2250 Mail: Stop SSOP, Washington, DC 20402-0001

COMMITTEE ON INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

HENRY J. HYDE, Illinois, *Chairman*

JAMES A. LEACH, Iowa	TOM LANTOS, California
CHRISTOPHER H. SMITH, New Jersey, <i>Vice Chairman</i>	HOWARD L. BERMAN, California
DAN BURTON, Indiana	GARY L. ACKERMAN, New York
ELTON GALLEGLY, California	ENI F.H. FALEOMAVAEGA, American Samoa
ILEANA ROS-LEHTINEN, Florida	DONALD M. PAYNE, New Jersey
DANA ROHRABACHER, California	ROBERT MENENDEZ, New Jersey
EDWARD R. ROYCE, California	SHERROD BROWN, Ohio
PETER T. KING, New York	BRAD SHERMAN, California
STEVE CHABOT, Ohio	ROBERT WEXLER, Florida
THOMAS G. TANCREDI, Colorado	ELIOT L. ENGEL, New York
RON PAUL, Texas	WILLIAM D. DELAHUNT, Massachusetts
DARRELL ISSA, California	GREGORY W. MEEKS, New York
JEFF FLAKE, Arizona	BARBARA LEE, California
JO ANN DAVIS, Virginia	JOSEPH CROWLEY, New York
MARK GREEN, Wisconsin	EARL BLUMENAUER, Oregon
JERRY WELLER, Illinois	SHELLEY BERKLEY, Nevada
MIKE PENCE, Indiana	GRACE F. NAPOLITANO, California
THADDEUS G. McCOTTER, Michigan	ADAM B. SCHIFF, California
KATHERINE HARRIS, Florida	DIANE E. WATSON, California
JOE WILSON, South Carolina	ADAM SMITH, Washington
JOHN BOOZMAN, Arkansas	BETTY MCCOLLUM, Minnesota
J. GRESHAM BARRETT, South Carolina	BEN CHANDLER, Kentucky
CONNIE MACK, Florida	DENNIS A. CARDOZA, California
JEFF FORTENBERRY, Nebraska	
MICHAEL MCCAUL, Texas	
TED POE, Texas	

THOMAS E. MOONEY, SR., *Staff Director/General Counsel*

ROBERT R. KING, *Democratic Staff Director*

SUBCOMMITTEE ON AFRICA, GLOBAL HUMAN RIGHTS AND INTERNATIONAL OPERATIONS

CHRISTOPHER H. SMITH, New Jersey, *Chairman*

THOMAS G. TANCREDI, Colorado	DONALD M. PAYNE, New Jersey
JEFF FLAKE, Arizona	BARBARA LEE, California
MARK GREEN, Wisconsin	BETTY MCCOLLUM, Minnesota
JOHN BOOZMAN, Arkansas	BRAD SHERMAN, California
JEFF FORTENBERRY, Nebraska	GREGORY W. MEEKS, New York
EDWARD R. ROYCE, California,	DIANE E. WATSON, California

Vice Chairman

MARY M. NOONAN, *Subcommittee Staff Director*

NOELLE LUSANE, *Democratic Professional Staff Member*

LINDSEY M. PLUMLEY, *Staff Associate*

CONTENTS

Page

WITNESSES

Mr. Philo L. Dibble, Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary, Bureau of International Organization Affairs, U.S. Department of State	8
Mr. Eric Schwartz, Consultant, Council on Foreign Relations	22
Ms. Victoria Holt, Senior Associate, The Henry L. Stimson Center	27

LETTERS, STATEMENTS, ETC., SUBMITTED FOR THE HEARING

The Honorable Christopher H. Smith, a Representative in Congress from the State of New Jersey, and Chairman, Subcommittee on Africa, Global Human Rights and International Operations: Prepared statement	4
Mr. Philo L. Dibble: Prepared statement	10
Mr. Eric Schwartz: Prepared statement	24
Ms. Victoria Holt: Prepared statement	31

U.N. PEACEKEEPING REFORM: SEEKING GREATER ACCOUNTABILITY AND INTEGRITY

WEDNESDAY, MAY 18, 2005

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,
SUBCOMMITTEE ON AFRICA, GLOBAL HUMAN RIGHTS
AND INTERNATIONAL OPERATIONS,
COMMITTEE ON INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS,
Washington, DC.

The Subcommittee met, pursuant to call, at 2:30 p.m., in room 2200, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Christopher H. Smith (Chairman of the Subcommittee) presiding.

Mr. SMITH. The Subcommittee will come to order.

Good afternoon, everybody. Today's hearing is the third in a series of hearings this Subcommittee is conducting on the topic of reform in the United Nations, and the second hearing we are holding on peacekeeping reform.

On March 1, just 12 weeks ago, the Committee met to examine credible evidence of gross sexual misconduct and exploitation of refugees and vulnerable people by U.N. peacekeepers and civilian personnel assigned to the U.N. peacekeeping mission in the Democratic Republic of Congo. Human rights groups and the U.N.'s own internal investigations had uncovered over 150 allegations against mission personnel, typically involving peacekeepers' sexual contact with Congolese women and girls, some as young as 11- to 14-years-of-age, in exchange for food or small sums of money.

Further, the U.N. had struggled to deal with similar sexual exploitation and abuse allegations in recent years in Sierra Leone, Liberia, and Guinea, as well as on the European continent, in Kosovo and Bosnia. Yet despite well-meaning gestures, there had not been one successful prosecution of U.N. civilian or military personnel, either in the Congo or elsewhere.

At that hearing, the United States made available Assistant Secretary-General for Peacekeeping Operations, Dr. Jane Holl Lute, to brief the Subcommittee on steps the U.N. Secretariat and Department of Peacekeeping Operations were taking to address the problem. As Members of this Subcommittee may recall, Dr. Lute declared:

"The blue helmet has become black and blue through self-inflicted wounds of some of our number, and we will not sit still until the luster of that blue helmet is restored.

"It is unacceptable. It is simply unacceptable. The United Nations peacekeepers owe a duty of care to the people we serve. We owe this duty of care to the member states who

place their trust in us when they send us on a mission. We owe this duty of care to the aspirations and hopes for the future that everyone has when they invest a peacekeeping mission in places like the Congo. It will be stamped out.”

Since that time, I am very happy and pleased to report that we are seeing signs of real change in the way the United Nations goes about peacekeeping, certainly in the area of preventing human rights abuses. Investigations into allegations of sexual exploitation and abuse involving 96 peacekeeping personnel have been completed, with 66 military personnel repatriated on disciplinary grounds. On the civilian side, three U.N. staff have been dismissed, six others are undergoing disciplinary process, and three have been cleared. Missions have put into place a broad range of measures to prevent misconduct, from establishing focal points and telephone hotlines, to requiring troops to wear uniforms at all times.

Moreover, the Fourth Committee of the U.N. General Assembly on April 18th unanimously endorsed the reform proposals of the Special Committee on Peacekeeping Operations, which include: Training on standards of conduct; development of established units for peacekeeping, rather than those assembled on an ad hoc basis; commitments by all troop-contributing countries to pursue investigations and prosecutions of peacekeeping personnel for credible instances of sexual allegations and abuse; creation of a database to track allegations and ensure that prior offenders are not rehired; organization, management and command responsibility to create and maintain an environment that prevents against sexual exploitation and abuse; establishment of a professional and independent investigative capacity; assistance to victims; and development of a model MOU for troop-contributing countries to encompass these recommendations.

The General Assembly, for its part, provides the necessary financial and political support that fully and properly implement them. While a representative of the United Nations could not be here to brief us today on these issues due to scheduling conflicts, the U.N. has committed to providing a written statement to update the Committee on these issues.

It is my desire that this hearing will stimulate the same sense of commitment and urgency at the U.N. to undertake broader reforms in peacekeeping.

Peacekeeping has changed significantly since the creation of the United Nations and the first peacekeeping missions, which were largely limited to traditional nonmilitary functions, such as monitoring cessation of hostilities agreements, deployment of observer missions, and the maintenance and patrol of borders.

With the end of the Cold War, the number of peacekeeping missions ballooned as the Security Council deployed 20 new missions between 1988 and 1994. Tasks of peacekeepers have also evolved in that individuals now have more complex assignments such as nation building, protection of vulnerable populations, and establishment and maintenance of security in post-conflict environments.

Our collective memories are still painfully sharp in recalling the peacekeeping fiascos of Bosnia, Rwanda and Somalia. And I would point out that this Committee held numerous hearing on the trou-

bles where safe havens were created; they turned out to be anything but safe havens.

Thankfully, we have some notable successes to balance the picture out, in which stability was restored and substantial contribution transactions were made toward economic and political development in U.N. missions in Kosovo, Sierra Leone, and in East Timor. What these examples illustrate is the importance of getting the mandate right, matching the mission to the mandate, ensuring adequate staffing and funding, and providing for a transition to sustained peace.

I look forward to hearing from our distinguished panel on the border issues of peacekeeping reform. As the Committee develops legislation on these issues, Members of this Committee are particularly interested in the Administration's articulation of the role and functions the U.N. should play in the area of peacekeeping in the coming years. In particular, we hope to hear which specific reforms are needed at this time, and what financial and political resources will be necessary to implement them.

U.S. officials, as we know, have endorsed Secretary-General Annan's proposal for a Peacekeeping Commission and Support Office to undertake post-conflict transition and to coordinate donor assistance and activities. Yet, has a global audit of existing peacekeeping missions ever been conducted to review mandates and right-size missions? Has there been an examination of whether peacekeeping tasks could be outsourced to professional private security companies to perform tasks more cost effectively, or deploy into difficult situations where member states have demonstrated a reluctance or inability to go?

What are we doing to widen the donors' support base for peacekeeping missions? Finally, what should the United States do if necessary reforms are not being implemented either by the U.N. or by troop-contributing nations?

In addition, to be developed on U.N. reform, I have introduced the Trafficking Victims Protection Reauthorization Act of 2005, or H.R. 972, which contains several provisions specifically targeted at preventing trafficking in persons, sexual exploitation, and abuse by military personnel and in peacekeeping operations.

H.R. 972 would require the State Department to certify to Congress, before it contributes U.S. logistical or personnel support to a peacekeeping mission, that the internal organization has taken appropriate measures to prevent the organization's employees, contractors, and peacekeeping forces from engaging in trafficking in persons or committing acts of illegal sexual exploitation. The provision is built on two prior laws I have authored to combat trafficking in persons and reduce sexual exploitation: The Trafficking Victims Protection Act of 2000, and the Trafficking Victims Protection Reauthorization Act of 2003.

Other measures in this bill to combat sexual exploitation and trafficking in persons by military personnel and peacekeepers are: Amending the U.S. Uniform Code of Military Justice to prohibit the use or facilitation of persons trafficked for sex or labor; establishing a director of antitrafficking policies in the Office of the Secretary of Defense; reporting of steps taken by the U.N., the OSCE, NATO, and other international organizations to eliminate involvement of

its personnel in trafficking; and, finally, requiring certification that safeguards are in place to prevent military and civilian personnel from trafficking or committing acts of sexual exploitation before a U.S. contribution to a peacekeeping mission is made.

In conclusion, the progress made since our last hearing is indeed encouraging, but we are only at the beginning of the necessary reform process. I hope that what comes out at the other end will be a United Nations equipped for the unique challenges of this new century, with peacekeeping leading the way for reforms in other vital areas.

I would like to yield now to my good friend and colleague, Mr. Payne.

[The prepared statement of Mr. Smith follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF THE HONORABLE CHRISTOPHER H. SMITH, A REPRESENTATIVE IN CONGRESS FROM THE STATE OF NEW JERSEY AND CHAIRMAN, SUBCOMMITTEE ON AFRICA, GLOBAL HUMAN RIGHTS AND INTERNATIONAL OPERATIONS

The Subcommittee will come to order. Today's hearing is the third in a series of hearings this subcommittee is conducting on the topic of reform at the United Nations, and the second hearing we are holding on peacekeeping reform.

On March 1st, just 12 weeks ago, the committee met to examine credible evidence of gross sexual misconduct and exploitation of refugees and vulnerable people by UN peacekeepers and civilian personnel assigned to the UN peacekeeping mission in the Democratic Republic of Congo. Human rights groups and the UN's own internal investigations had uncovered over 150 allegations against Mission personnel, typically involving peacekeepers' sexual contact with Congolese women and girls, some as young as 11–14, in exchange for food or small sums of money. Further, the UN had struggled to deal with similar sexual exploitation and abuse allegations in recent years in Sierra Leone, Liberia, and Guinea, as well as on the European continent in Kosovo and Bosnia. Yet despite many well-meaning gestures, there had not been one successful prosecution of UN civilian or military personnel, either in the Congo or elsewhere.

At that hearing, the United Nations made available Assistant Secretary General for Peacekeeping Operations, Dr. Jane Holl Lute to brief the Subcommittee on steps the UN Secretariat and Department of Peacekeeping Operations were taking to address the problem. As Members of this Subcommittee may recall, Dr. Lute declared, ". . . The Blue Helmet has become black and blue through self-inflicted wounds of some of our number and we will not sit still until the luster of that Blue Helmet is restored. . . . It is unacceptable. It is simply unacceptable. The United Nations peacekeepers owe a duty of care to the people we serve. We owe this duty of care to the member states who place their trust in us when they send us to a mission. We owe this duty of care to the aspirations and hopes for the future that everyone has when they invest a peacekeeping mission in places like the Congo. It will be stamped out."

Since that time, I am pleased to report that I am seeing signs of real change in the way the United Nations goes about peacekeeping, certainly in the area of preventing human rights abuses. Investigations into allegations of sexual exploitation and abuse involving 96 peacekeeping personnel have been completed, with 66 military personnel repatriated on disciplinary grounds. On the civilian side, three UN staff have been dismissed; six others are undergoing disciplinary process; and three have been cleared. Missions have put into place a broad range of measures to prevent misconduct, from establishing focal points and telephone hotlines to requiring troops to wear uniforms at all times.

Moreover, the Fourth Committee of the UN General Assembly on April 18th unanimously endorsed the reform proposals of the Special Committee on Peacekeeping Operations, which include:

- training on standards of conduct;
- development of established units for peacekeeping rather than those assembled on an ad hoc basis;
- commitments by all troop contributing countries to pursue investigations and prosecutions of peacekeeping personnel for credible instances of sexual allegation and abuse;

- creation of a database to track allegations and ensure that prior offenders are not rehired;
- organization, management and command responsibility to create and maintain an environment that prevents against sexual exploitation and abuse;
- establishment of a professional and independent investigative capacity;
- assistance to victims; and
- development of a model MOU for troop contributing countries to encompass these recommendations.

The General Assembly must now act on these recommendations, providing the necessary financial and political support to fully and promptly implement them. While a representative of the United Nations could not be here today to update the Committee on these issues due to scheduling conflicts, the UN has committed to providing us with a written statement.

It is my desire that this hearing will stimulate the same sense of commitment and urgency at the UN to undertake broader reforms in peacekeeping. Peacekeeping has changed significantly since the creation of the United Nations and the first peacekeeping missions, which were largely limited to “traditional” non-military functions, such as monitoring of cessation of hostilities agreements, deployment of observer missions, and the maintenance and patrol of borders. With the end of the Cold War, the number of peacekeeping missions ballooned, as the Security Council deployed 20 new missions between 1988 and 1994. Tasks of peacekeepers have also evolved and now include more complex assignments such as nation-building, protection of vulnerable populations, and establishment and maintenance of security in post-conflict environments.

Our collective memories are still painfully sharp in recalling the peacekeeping fiascos of Bosnia, Rwanda and Somalia. Thankfully we have some notable successes to balance the picture out, in which stability was restored and substantial contributions made towards economic and political development, in UN missions in Kosovo, Sierra Leone and East Timor. What these examples illustrate is the importance of getting the mandate “right,” matching the mission to the mandate, ensuring adequate staffing and funding, and providing for a transition to a sustained peace.

I look forward to hearing from our distinguished panels on the broader issues of peacekeeping reform. As the committee develops legislation on these issues, Members are particularly interested in the Administration’s articulation of the role and functions the UN should play in the area of peacekeeping in the coming years. In particular, we hope to hear which specific reforms are needed at this time and what financial and political resources will be necessary to implement them.

U.S. officials have endorsed Secretary General Annan’s proposal for a Peacebuilding Commission and Support Office to undertake post-conflict transition and coordinate donor assistance and activities. But has a global audit of existing peacekeeping missions ever been conducted to review mandates and right-size missions? Has there been an examination of whether peacekeeping tasks could be outsourced to professional private security companies to perform tasks more cost-effectively or deploy into difficult situations where Member States have demonstrated a reluctance or inability to go? What are we doing to widen the donor support base for peacekeeping missions? And finally, what should the United States do if necessary reforms are not being implemented, either by the UN or by troop contributing nations?

In addition to legislation being developed on UN reform, I have introduced the Trafficking Victims Protection Reauthorization Act of 2005, HR 972, which contains several provisions specifically targeted at preventing trafficking in persons, sexual exploitation, and abuse by military personnel and in peacekeeping operations. HR 972 would require the State Department to certify to Congress, before it contributes U.S. logistical or personnel support to a peacekeeping mission, that the international organization has taken appropriate measures to prevent the organization’s employees, contractors, and peacekeeping forces from engaging in trafficking in persons or committing acts of illegal sexual exploitation. The provision builds on two prior laws I have authored to combat trafficking in persons and reduce sexual exploitation, the Trafficking Victims Protection Act of 2000 and the Trafficking Victims Protection Reauthorization Act of 2003.

Other measures in this bill to combat sexual exploitation and trafficking in persons by military and peacekeepers are:

- Amending the U.S. Uniform Code of Military Justice to prohibit the use or facilitation of persons trafficked for sex or labor;
- Establishing a Director of Anti-Trafficking Policies in the Office of the Secretary of Defense;

- Reporting of steps taken by the UN, OSCE, NATO and other international organizations to eliminate involvement of its personnel in trafficking;

In conclusion, the progress since our last hearing is encouraging, but we are only at the beginning of the necessary reform process. What comes out at the other end I hope will be a United Nations equipped for the unique challenges of this new century, with peacekeeping leading the way for reforms in other vital areas.

Mr. PAYNE. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman, for holding this important hearing on U.N. peacekeeping reforms, reforms seeking accountability and integrity.

In recent years the United Nations has come under increased scrutiny from the international community. Some critics charge that the U.N. is a vast, bloated bureaucracy, that its staff is incompetent and riddled with fraud, and that it gets nothing done.

Though the U.N. is not perfect, we must remember that the U.N. is only as effective as the collaboration of its member states. The U.S., being one of the founders of the U.N., necessarily plays a vital role at the U.N. and in U.N. operations. We have a responsibility to work with other member states to improve the effectiveness and the usefulness of the U.N.

Many suggestions that we have made in recent years—and the Inspector General came up with ways of reducing staff and bureaucracy as suggested several years ago by the U.S., and we have seen positive results. We know that initially the U.N. was supported almost 50 percent by United States contributions at its inception, Western Europe being the camels, and the U.S. being the only superpower at that time.

We have seen a more modest reduction in our assessments, down to 33 percent peacekeeping now. We have seen suggestions that we have made for reform where we had reduced our dues down to 27 percent and 22 percent; therefore, other parts of the world are increasing their burden. And so we are reducing our contribution to the overall U.N. even though, as we know, it is still a large contribution.

We also know that the family doesn't function well if all parts of the family are not healthy and doing the right thing. And as you recall a decade ago, as a dad who is a deadbeat dad, not supporting the family as he ought to, the U.S. became the deadbeat dad of the U.N. when we refused to pay our assessment until certain reforms were made under the Jesse Helms days.

I think we have certainly been a part of the solution, but in some instances we have indeed been part of the problem, in my opinion.

Since 1948, the United Nations has launched 60 peacekeeping operations, of which 17 are currently active. Since the 1990s, peacekeeping missions have sharply increased. And more and more, Western nations have taken the funding role while developing nations have taken the responsibility for actual peacekeeping, putting troops on the ground and putting troops in harm's way, because we are aware that these troops are less trained, less disciplined, and filling in here for the fact that the West rarely puts in peacekeeping troops. We are not surprised that in many instances we are not getting the best trained and the best disciplined. But in light of the fact that the United States in particular, and many European countries, no longer will go into peacekeeping operations in Afghanistan, for example, we then had to

deal with what we can get; and, as I said, in many instances really not the best training and the best discipline.

In light of this trend, I believe that there needs to be more adequate burden sharing. I think that there are some things that we can do without putting people in harm's way, such as logistical support in some Third World countries and things of that nature.

But anyway, as it was said several years ago, "We prepare for war like precocious giants and for peace like retarded pygmies," said Lester B. Pearson. Pearson uttered this famous quote upon acceptance of his 1957 Nobel Peace Prize, and unfortunately his observation still holds water today. Pearson's words also hold long-term implications for the needed reforms in U.N. peacekeeping operations. Indeed, from Bosnia to Afghanistan, sending in the bombers and ground forces often means that prevention and crisis management attempts have failed. If diplomacy had worked, then these problems would not have occurred.

More effective U.N. peacekeeping operations could help control or even prevent bloodshed in troubled regions of the world, including the kind of atrocities and ethnic slaughter that have become common in the last decade in Africa, Asia, and the Balkans, as has been indicated by the Chairman. However, as U.N. failures—or, I should say, our failures in Rwanda and Bosnia have demonstrated, a major overhaul of the organization's approach to crisis intervention is required if we are to enable the U.N. to play an effective role in pacifying countries and keeping them out of conflict.

The more limited aim for the United Nations should be to develop well-trained, disciplined, adequately-armed forces that could be mobilized quickly to trouble spots to prevent ethnic or political conflicts from escalating into widespread violence, or to help maintain a cease-fire, or sustain a peace agreement that brings a war or ethnic conflict to an end.

There are also circumstances when a robust U.N. military force could, in the future, help protect civilian populations against atrocities such as the current genocide in Sudan or the humanitarian crisis in northern Uganda.

Don't let the U.N. sex-for-food scandal dampen resolve to address the main tragedy, for example, in the Congo. We have all been appalled by the allegations of sexual exploitation and abuse. We must do something about it, as the steps outlined by the Chairman, that I support, particularly those concerning the U.N. mission in the DRC. The U.N. cannot act too quickly to address this problem which is repulsive and unacceptable. At the same time as pushing for reform to ensure that sexual predation by U.N. personnel does not continue, we must not lose sight of the larger tragedy in the Congo, where millions have died from war-related causes, estimated at approximately 30,000 civilians every month, and where warring parties have used systematic rape as a weapon of war.

For any reforms to work, however, commitment of member states of U.N. is essential. Many of the U.N. peacekeeping department's failures stem from U.N.'s member states' lack of commitment and political will. Not too long ago, the U.S. Congress, for example, was refusing to pay our dues, and they were dues for peacekeeping, which are funds that don't go to the U.N., but actually go to those participating countries, Third World countries that have barely no

treasuries. And so we were not hurting the U.N., we were actually stifling developing countries. Those that have the least to give were those who had to take the brunt of our disdain. So unintended consequences sometimes are not what we intend, but they have devastating impact.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. SMITH. Thank you.

Mr. Flake.

Mr. FLAKE. No statement.

Mr. SMITH. Mr. Delahunt.

Mr. DELAHUNT. No statement.

Mr. SMITH. Mr. Fortenberry

Mr. FORTENBERRY. Thank you for holding this hearing, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. SMITH. With that, I would like to call the first very distinguished witness, Secretary Philo Dibble, who was appointed Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary of the Bureau of International Organization Affairs in March 2005. He previously served as Deputy Assistant Secretary in Near East Affairs from 2003 until 2005, and as Deputy Chief of Mission in Damascus, Syria from 2001 to 2003. His other overseas assignments include tours in Saudi Arabia, Lebanon, Tunisia, Italy, and Pakistan.

Secretary Dibble has also served as Director of the Office of Northern Gulf Affairs, the Deputy Director of the Office of Egyptian and North African Affairs, as Special Assistant in the Office of Under Secretary of State for Economic, Business and Agricultural Affairs, as a financial economist at the Bureau of Economic and Business Affairs, and as a Lebanon Desk Officer.

Tremendous resume. Thank you for being here, and please proceed as you would like.

STATEMENT OF MR. PHILO L. DIBBLE, PRINCIPAL DEPUTY ASSISTANT SECRETARY, BUREAU OF INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATION AFFAIRS, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Mr. DIBBLE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank you for inviting me to testify today.

With your permission, I would like to give a brief oral summary of my testimony, but ask that the full text be entered into the record.

Mr. Chairman, since September 2003, the U.S. has supported new U.N. peacekeeping missions, with total current troop levels of over 33,000 for Liberia, Burundi, Haiti, Cote d'Ivoire and Sudan. In many cases the fact that the U.N. has created a peacekeeping mission has avoided calls from the U.S. Armed Forces to become or remain militarily involved in hotspots.

We ask a great deal of U.N. peacekeepers. Today, there are often calls for them to be aggressive against struggles and irregular units. And unfortunately, U.N. peacekeepers are increasingly targets themselves of hostile fire. Over 1,900 personnel in U.N. peacekeeping operations have been killed in the course of their duties since 1948. The most recent fatality was just last week in the Democratic Republic of the Congo.

Clearly, however, serious problems have arisen as peacekeeping has expanded. In the past year, as we have increasingly trusted the

U.N. to enforce its policy of zero tolerance of sexual abuse and exploitation by U.N. peacekeepers, cases of such abuse have increasingly come to light. These contemptible acts tarnish the reputation and effectiveness of the vast majority of U.N. peacekeepers who are not guilty of misconduct.

We have insisted that military contingent commanders be held accountable, along with their subordinates, and that troop-contributing countries take action against their peacekeepers who perpetrate acts of sexual exploitation and abuse.

The U.N., as you mentioned, Mr. Chairman, has responded with commendable energy. We commend specifically the work of the Secretary-General Special Advisor, Prince Zeid Ra'ad al-Hussein, the Permanent Representative of Jordan, who crafted a comprehensive strategy with recommendations to eliminate future sexual exploitation and abuse in U.N. peacekeeping operations.

We endorse the recommendation of the U.N. General Assembly's Special Committee on Peacekeeping, based on Prince Zeid's strategy to strengthen enforcement of a uniform U.N. code of conduct for peacekeepers, improve the capacity of the U.N. to investigate allegations of sexual exploitation and abuse, broaden assistance to victims, and enhance predeployment training for U.N. peacekeepers.

We welcome the creation of personal conduct units within the U.N. missions in Burundi, Cote d'Ivoire, the Democratic Republic of Congo and Haiti to address allegations and to assist victims. We encourage the U.N. to establish similar units in each of its peacekeeping missions.

We will continue to address the issue forcefully with offending troop contributors, and to advocate at the U.N. for systemwide reforms. Since we became aware of the problems, U.S. officials, including the Secretary of State, have raised our concerns with the Secretary-General, within the Security Council and with the contributing countries. There is, I am happy to say, broad support for a strong response, which we believe should include funding for a Secretariat proposal to create an independent investigative capacity for sexual abuse cases within the Office of Internal Oversight Services.

Looking again at the broader issues of peacekeeping, the State Department takes its responsibilities with respect to U.N. peacekeeping and to the Congress and to the taxpayers very seriously. We examine the particular recommendations of the Secretary-General on peacekeeping very carefully. And final decisions by the Security Council will, as a result, often differ from those specific recommendations.

We also report to and consult with the interested congressional Committees, both formally and informally, on a regular basis and in detail on significant developments related to U.N. peacekeeping. We keep U.N. peacekeeping operations under constant review, in particular to ensure an effective exit strategy.

Circumstances sometimes require forces to be built up in order to achieve that strategy. We will soon be sending you notifications on proposals for temporary increases of the mission in Haiti and Cote d'Ivoire needed to ensure successful elections in both countries this fall.

Once mission goals are achieved, we seek to have missions reduced or closed. The mission in East Timor will be closed this week, and the one in Sierra Leone, we hope, in December. After elections now scheduled for August in Burundi, it will be time to discuss its reduction or closure as well.

We are convinced that the U.N. can conduct peacekeeping more efficiently, and we are pursuing the details of the structure, manning, and equipping of peacekeeping units in the context of the discussions of the Fifth Committee of the General Assembly, which decides on budgetary matters.

Mr. Chairman, I thank you, and I am prepared to take your questions.

[The prepared statement of Mr. Dibble follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF MR. PHILO L. DIBBLE, PRINCIPAL DEPUTY ASSISTANT SECRETARY, BUREAU OF INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATION AFFAIRS, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Mr. Chairman, United Nations peacekeeping has gone through a period of extraordinary growth over the last two years. Since September 2003, new U.N. Peacekeeping missions, with total current troop levels over 33,000, have been created for Liberia, Burundi, Haiti, Cote d'Ivoire and Sudan. After careful scrutiny and due consultation within the administration and with the Congress, the United States voted in favor of the creation of each of those missions in the United Nations Security Council, because we have been satisfied that each one of them serves the national interest of the United States, is right-sized and includes an exit strategy. We strive to ensure that U.N. missions, which are being sent to operate in dangerous places, are properly trained, have adequate mandates, and are equipped and staffed to do what we ask of them.

In many cases, the United States has been the country to propose and lobby for U.N. peacekeeping. In many cases the fact that the U.N. has created a peacekeeping mission has served to stanch calls for the U.S. Armed Forces to become or remain militarily involved in yet another world hotspot.

There are certain inherent aspects of U.N. peacekeeping that prevent peacekeeping missions from performing at the level of a national unit of a militarily strong state. The United Nations, of course, has no standing forces, and nor would we want it to. The U.N. must therefore solicit troop contributions for individual U.N. peacekeeping operations from member states. Each U.N. peacekeeping mission is a separate entity. Each UN mission operates in different circumstances. The various national units made available for U.N. missions often operate such that they have little contact with other national units in the same mission. Many peacekeepers in a mission have never been part of a U.N. peacekeeping mission before. U.N. Peacekeeping does not enjoy the continuity or esprit de corps of a national army, and so there is much reinvention of the wheel each time a new mission is begun or a new unit rotates into an existing mission. None of this is amenable to a quick or lasting solution.

We nevertheless ask a great deal of U.N. peacekeepers. The theory and practice of UN peacekeeping mission has evolved enormously since the end of the Cold War. The blue-helmeted monitoring of a static ceasefire line is now largely a thing of the past. UN peacekeepers now find themselves regularly charged with the responsibility of protecting themselves and innocent civilians in their areas of operations. There are often calls for them to be more aggressive still against ill-pacified rebels and irregular units, and unfortunately U.N. peacekeepers are increasingly the target of hostile fire. It is a constant challenge for UN peacekeeping forces to maintain their neutrality and to avoid involvement in the local politics where they are deployed, even as they stand ready to act to protect themselves and, where so mandated, to protect innocent civilians. Over 1,900 personnel in U.N. peacekeeping operations have been killed in the course of their duties since 1948—the most recent fatality was just last week in the Democratic Republic of the Congo.

Cases of sexual abuse and exploitation perpetrated by U.N. peacekeepers continue to come to light. These abhorrent, deplorable acts tarnish the reputation and effectiveness of U.N. peacekeeping, and demonstrate that both the U.N. and troop contributing countries needs to strengthen their efforts to detect and prevent abuse, and bolster enforcement of the highest standards of peacekeeper conduct.

We have insisted that military contingent commanders be held accountable and that troop contributing countries take action against their peacekeepers who perpetrate acts of sexual exploitation and abuse.

We support the U.N. Secretary-General's enforcement of the U.N. policy of zero-tolerance. We commend the work of the Secretary-General's special adviser, Prince Zeid Ra'ad al-Hussein, the Permanent Representative of Jordan, who crafted a comprehensive strategy with recommendations to eliminate future sexual exploitation and abuse in U.N. peacekeeping operations.

We endorse the recommendations of the U.N. General Assembly's Special Committee on Peacekeeping to strengthen enforcement of a uniform U.N. code of conduct for peacekeepers, improve the capacity of the U.N. to investigate allegations of sexual exploitation and abuse, broaden assistance to victims, and enhance pre-deployment training for U.N. peacekeepers.

We welcomed the creation of personal conduct units within the U.N. Missions in Burundi, Cote d'Ivoire, the Democratic Republic of Congo and Haiti to address allegations and to assist victims.

We will continue to address the issue forcefully with offending troop contributors and to advocate at the UN for system-wide reforms. Senior U.S. officials, including then-Secretary Powell, have raised our concerns at the highest levels of the U.N. Secretariat, within the Security Council, and in troop contributing countries. There is broad support for a strong response designed to end sexual exploitation and abuse by personnel in U.N. peacekeeping missions.

The August 2000 Brahimi Report on U.N. Peacekeeping, which was written as a response to failures of U.N. peacekeeping in Sierra Leone in 2000 when peacekeepers were taken hostage by a rebel group, made a series of important recommendations about the conduct of U.N. Peacekeeping. The State Department, and in particular the Bureau of International Organization Affairs, will undertake a thorough review of just where U.N. Peacekeeping stands five years after the recommendations of the Brahimi Report. Without prejudging the results of that study, I think it fair to say that the U.N. has come a long way in responding to those recommendations, but that it still has a long way to go, and some of the Brahimi recommendations themselves are in need of reexamination.

The State Department takes its responsibilities with respect to U.N. peacekeeping and to the Congress and to the taxpayers very seriously. We keep U.N. peacekeeping operations under constant review. We resist calls to saddle U.N. peacekeeping from doing more than it can reasonably do because we want U.N. peacekeeping to succeed, not to fail. Circumstances sometimes require forces to be built up, and sometimes permit them to be reduced or closed. In the U.S. interagency process, we examine and critique the reports of the SYG on peacekeeping very seriously, taking them for what they are—recommendations. The final word on matters governing UN peacekeeping rests with the Security Council, and in many cases we work with our colleagues on the Council to pass resolutions that differ from the recommendations initially made by the Secretary-General. We also report to and consult with the interested Congressional committees both formally and informally on a regular basis on significant developments related to U.N. peacekeeping.

The U.N. Department of Peacekeeping Operations has necessarily built up its headquarters staff since 2000, and now has a best practices unit that attempts to assemble and publicize lessons learned from the U.N.'s ongoing peacekeeping experience.

U.N. Peacekeeping has clearly improved since 2000, but it just as clearly has great improvements still to make.

Once begun, U.N. peacekeeping missions are difficult to close. Local populations quickly grow used to the stabilizing presence of U.N. peacekeepers. Present as they are in some of the least developed places on earth, the local spending of U.N. missions and U.N. peacekeepers is also often a factor in the local desire to see them stay. Nevertheless, we have managed, over the last two years, to close one UN peacekeeping mission, UNIKOM on the Iraq-Kuwait border, and UNMISSET, the peacekeeping mission in Timor Leste, will wind up its operations this Friday. The peacekeeping mission in Sierra Leone, UNAMSIL, is on target to end this December. We will continue to work to ensure that the U.N. has exit strategies for its peacekeeping missions and that U.N. peacekeeping operations draw down as the mission mandates are fulfilled.

We are convinced that the U.N. can conduct peacekeeping more efficiently, and we are pursuing the details of the structure, manning and equipping of peacekeeping units in the context of the discussions of the Fifth Committee of the General Assembly, which decides on budgetary matters.

I ask that the text of my statement be included in the record.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. SMITH. Thank you very much, Mr. Secretary.

Could you give us an update on recommendations for reform in the area of sexual exploitation? Are reforms likely to be adopted by the full General Assembly, and what is the timeline that all of this can realistically be implemented?

Mr. DIBBLE. The Special Committee has come out with its own commendation of Prince Zeid's report, which is what we have fully endorsed, and we expect that to go before the General Assembly next month. I can give you some highlights of the Special Committee's recommendations.

Mr. SMITH. If you would.

Mr. DIBBLE. First is to make uniform the standards of conduct and behavior that are contained in the Secretary-General's bulletin in 2003, and to extend them to military units as well as to civilian staff.

Second is training, and not just preinduction, but ongoing training during the course of peacekeeping missions.

Third is the participation of women, among other things, to facilitate the missions' task in making contact with vulnerable groups; command responsibility on the part of managers and unit commanders to create and manage an environment that prevents sexual exploitation and abuse; force-level military police units in each mission from a troop-contributing country that is different from the others; the creation of a data collection and management system at headquarters and in the field to track allegations and abuse, and responses to admissions of those allegations, as well as responses of troop contributors. This will, among other things, prevent rehiring of prior offenders.

We have talked about full-time personnel conduct officers in several U.N. missions. That should be extended to all of them, we believe.

Finally, is the establishment of a professional and independent investigative capacity—it does not specifically say where, except within the U.N. system. We think it should be in OIOS.

Mr. SMITH. Would that include prosecutors?

Mr. DIBBLE. Prosecution will still belong to the member states.

Mr. SMITH. Prince Zeid also recommended that they be singled out. Is that being accepted or rejected?

Mr. DIBBLE. I think the Special Committee decided not to challenge the jurisdiction of the member states over their own nationals.

Mr. SMITH. You talked about enhancing predeployment training, which is also included in those recommendations. Could you highlight for us what that training would look like? Sometimes—I have seen this in the past, and I hope it is not the case here—if a video is shown or an hour-long course during the predeployment, all of a sudden that becomes an X to the box on which we trained them. How extensive, how thorough do you think that training is now and will be eventually?

Mr. DIBBLE. I will have to take the question on the detail; but I can say that clearly the Secretary-General's bulletin, which establishes the policy, has commendable statements in it, but these are not statements, first of all, that have an immediate impact on a 19-year-old private in a peacekeeping mission. So those need to be

translated into terms that the average peacekeeper can understand, first.

Second, U.N. staff and troop contributors need to put the actual units that are going to be deployed through sessions, which could include a video, so that they understand what the code of conduct means in practical terms.

And third, there needs to be continuous monitoring both by commanders, who have the responsibility for their troops, and by U.N. staff on the ground.

Mr. SMITH. Now, are we sharing our best practices? The Supreme Allied Commander of South Korea appeared before us. It was actually the Committee of Operations in Europe, which I also chair, and he has done a magnificent job in his command in evaluating best practices involving best efforts. He has reduced it to a binder about 3 inches thick describing what works. Is our expertise being shared with the U.N. on this?

Mr. DIBBLE. I am confident that it is, but I will have to take the question on the details of that.

[The information referred to follows:]

WRITTEN RESPONSE RECEIVED FROM MR. PHILO L. DIBBLE TO QUESTION ASKED DURING THE HEARING BY THE HONORABLE CHRISTOPHER H. SMITH

UNDPKO has developed an instructional module, aimed at preventing sexual exploitation and abuse, for troop contributing countries to incorporate into pre-deployment training for U.N. peacekeepers. Also, with a State Department grant of \$ 200,000, DPKO has produced: (i) awareness-raising posters and brochures on sexual exploitation and abuse, which are being distributed in all missions; and (ii) a DPKO Human Trafficking Resource Package, which provides practical guidance for peacekeeping operations on how best to combat human trafficking. USUN continues to work with the UN to encourage enforcement of the zero tolerance policy for sexual exploitation and abuse.

Mr. SMITH. I appreciate it. I read the manual, and part of what is conveyed in it is that the officer core must get it. If they get it, it is like having a good team captain or a good coach. It makes all the difference in the world.

Now, let me ask about the issue of recreation. This is something that we found in South Korea in our own troops: Where we lacked alternative recreational capacity, there was a greater opportunity for other kind of mischief on the part of the peacekeepers—or in this case, our deployed servicemen and women. Is that problem being looked at as effectively as it could? That is not a frivolous concern.

Mr. DIBBLE. No, not at all. In fact, it is being actively studied. The report of the Committee of 34 specifically highlights a need for recreational services. It asked the Secretary-General to look at that, including doing a cost/benefit analysis, living conditions and welfare recreational facilities for all categories of personnel, recognizing that the troop contributors are the ones who have first-line responsibility for that, as well as further aspects of their troops, provision of welfare and recreation facilities during the predeployment assessment. So yes, it is very much a part of this package.

Mr. SMITH. Let me just ask one final question. Are there any cases of U.S. personnel serving in U.N. missions in an official or contractual capacity who have been accused or charged with conduct violations? If so, how has our Government adjudicated those cases? I will just say that back when we wrote the 2003 Trafficking

Victims Protection Reauthorization Act, we became aware of personnel that had been accused of very serious trafficking crimes in the Balkans, and that is what prompted putting a provision into our own law that we will take a contract away from a company and try to hold the individual responsible, State or DoD or other U.S. agencies at power, to really convey that we mean business here.

Mr. DIBBLE. The case you mention is the only one that I am aware of.

Mr. SMITH. It is. Okay, I appreciate that.

Mr. Payne.

Mr. PAYNE. Thank you very much.

In one of the reports on the U.N., there was a report regarding resources where it indicated that in the 2000 U.N. peacekeeping operation, only 32 military officers were in charge of planning, recruiting, equipment, deploying, support to direct some 20,000 soldiers that comprised 15 peacekeeping missions that were underway. And as you know, police are also very—an important component to peacekeeping; and at that time, there were only nine persons that the U.N. had as police officers to support 8,000 U.N. police in the field.

And I guess my question would be: To what extent is the U.N. Secretariat still understaffed and underfunded? And how is the situation affecting the need for smart planning and management-effective peacekeeping preventing some of the situations that we have heard about in the Congo? Do you have—is it as adequate? Is it still underfunded? Where is it going, in your opinion?

Mr. DIBBLE. The size of the Department of Peacekeeping Operations has increased as the number and complexity of missions has grown over the years—I will have to get back to you on exact numbers.

There is an issue with regard to CIVPOL operations where the current staffing for that specific submission is a little thin. We do need to look at how we increase that. Increase of personnel in general at the U.N. needs to come from decreases elsewhere.

Mr. PAYNE. Also, just in peacekeeping in general, we do know that the U.S. takes a substantial portion. As I indicated, initially it was 33 percent. I think it was reduced to 30 percent, and our last figures indicate that we are down to 26.69 percent and continuing to reduce our assessment of peacekeeping.

Do you know what impact this has had on the numbers, where, in some instances, they are lacking? Is the lack in the difficulty of getting nations to come up with numbers, or is it a lack of finances to pay for the peacekeepers?

Mr. DIBBLE. So far we have been lucky enough that with the cooperation of Congress and close analysis of the mandate and the needs on the ground, we have been able to field peacekeeping forces that are adequate to the jobs they are supposed to do.

The main constraint, as I understand it, is not money at this point, but spare troops. There are now a lot of missions, and not all countries have the personnel who are trained and ready to deploy. This is one of the main questions specifically, for example, that has been raised in connection with Darfur.

Mr. PAYNE. There is some information I have that we have about 450 American personnel in the 80,000 U.N. peacekeepers world-

wide, bringing us under 1 percent. Do you feel that if we had a little more participation, perhaps not action in harm's way—in fact, the last U.S. involvement in any peacekeeping lasts maybe a decade or longer than in Somalia—do you feel that there could be a system that is maybe shaping up of peacekeepers if the U.S. would kind of reconsider and possibly get a little bit more involved? I mean even, say, in the Iraqi situation, we will say if there was not that situation in Iraq—and I assume at one point in time we will be out of Iraq—do you think that the United States, by having more of interested involvement in peacekeeping, would kind of shape up, since we certainly have a military that far exceeds anyone else, and nothing comes close to us?

Mr. DIBBLE. There are a couple of ways of looking at how the U.S. should become involved, whether it is deploying peacekeeping forces on the ground or whether we can interact usefully with either the U.N. or regional peacekeeping forces to bolster their capacity indirectly. Certainly, in the latter case, that is something that we are looking at right now in NATO. We are in discussions with the EU, the African Union and the U.N., on how NATO can help with the deployment of African Union forces in Darfur. So on that side of things, certainly there is a will to look at how the U.S. can contribute more in terms of peacekeeping.

Mr. PAYNE. And just finally, with ICC and our position on that and how it impacts with U.N. peacekeeping, do you feel that this is having an impact on the ability to encourage other countries to deal with this? Or do you think that this question of ICC is outside of the problems that we find in general with large numbers of peacekeepers needed and so forth?

Mr. DIBBLE. I would have to look, because I would assume that people who are signatories to the Rome statute would not have an issue with the ICC. We are not signatories, and we do have an issue with the applicability of the ICC's jurisdiction.

Mr. PAYNE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. SMITH. Mr. Flake.

Mr. FLAKE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you, Mr. Dibble.

How competitive is the process of getting peacekeepers from around the world? I understand that many countries look for it as a way to keep their troops in shape and engaged—and employed in some cases. How competitive is it, how difficult is it to bring on new ones? Do we have an oversupply?

Mr. DIBBLE. I do not think we have an oversupply. I think that troop-contributor countries contribute their troops for a variety of reasons, including some of the ones you have listed. I do not get a sense that there are people knocking on the door to join peacekeeping missions, however, I think they are in part stretched, but the U.N. may be able to address that in more detail.

Mr. FLAKE. I spent a year in Namibia, and most of the troops seemed to come from India at that point. In the Congo, where are most of the troops; which member country is sending the most?

Mr. DIBBLE. Pakistan, South Africa and India.

Mr. FLAKE. If we were to follow recommendations there, if there was a preponderance of abuse by any one group of nationals and we were to say that that country could contribute no more troops,

would it present a problem for the U.N. in filling the slots that we need in any of these peacekeeping areas?

Mr. DIBBLE. If we reach that point, and if the——

Mr. FLAKE. I guess what I am asking is: Is there any one country that is contributing that many troops where that would be a problem?

Mr. DIBBLE. I imagine it would. I don't think we have reached a point where the number of cases of sexual exploitation and abuse or other misconduct is such as to discredit a whole unit or a whole contributing country. But if we were to take——

Mr. FLAKE. But if that is one of the recommendations, could that perhaps be followed, that the country not be allowed to send any more troops unless it is addressed and unless they have prosecuted these cases?

Mr. DIBBLE. At the limit, that is something we should certainly consider, yes.

Mr. FLAKE. With regard to the Congo, where are most of the abuse cases coming from; are they from any particular unit?

Mr. DIBBLE. From what I understand, it is fairly well distributed, if I can use that term. We have cases of the French U.N. employee, South African, Moroccan, that have pursued prosecutions, investigations, and made public what they have decided to do. Other cases we know about are from countries that have declined to publicize the actions they are taking against their troops, but have nevertheless taken those actions. And I would happy to brief you privately on who those countries are and what they have done.

Mr. FLAKE. Are we confident, and through what channels do we work with countries that we feel are not appropriately addressing this situation through prosecutions?

Mr. DIBBLE. We deal directly with them diplomatically on these questions. We have done that in general terms to all contributing countries to make clear our own views about misconduct and what actions ought to be taken.

Mr. FLAKE. Is that true of our U.N. mission, or is it State Department?

Mr. DIBBLE. State Departments and capitals.

Mr. FLAKE. Thank you.

Mr. SMITH. Mr. Fortenberry.

Mr. FORTENBERRY. Along the same lines from previous discussion on an issue—Mr. Chairman, you might have to help refresh my memory, but we talked about enforcement mechanisms against personnel who have abused indigenous people, vulnerable people. One was looking at the payments that are made to donor countries, countries who are submitting troops, and using that as leverage to ensure that appropriate—not only methods in terms of training are enacted, but also real penalties are levied against the country itself for not appropriate enforcement, prosecution of cases when there has been true abuse.

Where does that stand? Is that idea still on the table, or is that not part of the discussion any longer?

Mr. DIBBLE. It is not part of the recommendations that are going to the General Assembly at this point. I think we are still at the stage where we are—if I can put it this way—giving credit for good intentions. We know that a number of countries have prosecuted,

a number of countries have discharged, a number of countries have repatriated units from peacekeeping missions. We know that the investigative capacity right now is limited. That is one of the reasons we want to add 57 additional positions to OIOS so that a serious criminal investigation can take place and produce evidence that is usable in national courts.

So we are at the point where everybody is on board for the policy, everybody is on board for the mechanisms; we have seen prosecutions go forward, we have seen individual members of peacekeeping contingents being discharged, in several cases dishonorably. We are not at the point yet where we think we have to lower the hammer harder, if I can put it that way.

Mr. FORTENBERRY. It might be good to keep that in the—

Mr. DIBBLE. Yes.

Mr. FORTENBERRY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. SMITH. Thank you very much.

Eric Schwartz, in his testimony, suggests that the United States should upgrade substantially its participation in the U.N. Stand-by Arrangements System, a voluntary process in which governments express their willingness to make troops and other capabilities available to peace operations. It also talks about the need for more meaningful engagement. While it is true that we do provide substantial soldiers to South Korea and peacekeepers in that peninsula, that doesn't count in this U.N. equation, including what you said about Iraq and Afghanistan and all over the world. But is he right, that the developed countries should be more willing to engage and provide peacekeepers?

Mr. DIBBLE. On the question of whether we should or should not provide peacekeepers, I think I have to leave the answer to the Department of Defense.

There is a major initiative within the group of industrialized countries to enhance peacekeeping capacities of others. It is called the Global Peacekeeping Operations Initiative. And as part of that, the discussions I described that are going on now with the African Union will continue to go forward.

There are Western countries, industrialized countries who are contributing peacekeepers. However, the value that we add at this point, in addition to the ability to step into a crisis early for example, before a mandate is fully formulated to provide logistics and support capabilities, which is where many troop contributors are lacking. That is not the case for all of them by any means. Indians, for example, have a lot of experience and they know how to do all those things. But certainly the idea of developing regional capabilities and working to strengthen regional capabilities is very much on our minds as we go forward.

Mr. SMITH. Let me ask you about the status of the Secretary-General's proposed Peace Building Commission. Who would sit on that Commission? To whom would it report? Would it serve as an adviser body, and would it have the authority to implement policy directives?

Mr. DIBBLE. The status is that it remains a set of recommendations as contained in the Secretary-General's report. It is one of the recommendations that we are looking at very carefully because we

recognize, as you have, Mr. Chairman, that peacekeeping is not what it used to be, that it is becoming an extremely complex undertaking with political and developmental aspects; that it is much more of an internal project than it is a question of monitoring a cease-fire line, and that the danger often comes or recurs after an initial conflict appears to have been settled.

We feel it should be an advisory body, and we think it should report to the Security Council. We think that there are other contributions that are needed in terms of advice from the international financial institutions, from the troop-contributor countries themselves, from those who will be receiving the assistance, because it is as much a peace-building and a developmental and reconstruction exercise as it is a question of deploying troops and restoring order.

So I apologize if the answer is so vague, but our position is still not completely formulated.

Mr. SMITH. Do integrated mission task forces still exist? Reportedly they were brainstorming as drafting committees.

Mr. DIBBLE. I don't know the answer to that. I will have to—

Mr. SMITH. Would you get back to us on that?

Mr. DIBBLE. Yes.

[The information referred to follows:]

WRITTEN RESPONSE RECEIVED FROM MR. PHILO L. DIBBLE TO QUESTION ASKED
DURING THE HEARING BY THE HONORABLE CHRISTOPHER H. SMITH

"Integrated Mission Task Force" is a term that was used notably during the lengthy planning phases before the creation of the UN Mission in Sudan, when it was apparent that a wide array of UN agencies needed to be involved. It is a coordination mechanism to bring together representatives of various UN agencies in planning meetings. It is not a separate entity with a set membership or formal reporting mechanism.

Mr. SMITH. Okay. I would like to yield now to Ms. McCollum.

Ms. MCCOLLUM. Mr. Chairman, I don't have a comment at this time.

Mr. SMITH. Ms. Lee.

Ms. LEE. Well, thank you, Mr. Chairman. I am sorry I am late, but let me just ask you—I apologize if I am being redundant. But a couple of years ago, we put into the State Department Authorization Bill some language with regard to HIV and AIDS as it relates to peacekeeping forces. And I am just wondering, given the high infection rates of many of the African countries in terms of the military, what is the U.N. doing to address this and how are we helping?

Mr. DIBBLE. I mentioned the report of the Committee of 34, which we have endorsed and which we hope the General Assembly will adopt. One of the training aspects that the Committee of 34 mentioned is specifically the efforts that have been made in training military and civilian personnel, not just on standards of conduct relating to sexual exploitation, but also HIV/AIDS awareness, and to the Department of Peacekeeping to review HIV/AIDS training to make sure that the prohibitions that exist are fully implemented.

I will be happy to take the question for the record on what exactly we are doing.

Ms. LEE. Yes. I would like to know in terms of the proper training, in terms of safe sexual conduct as it relates to abstinence, the proper use of condoms, and what the participating governments are doing, as well as what we are doing in support of that.

Mr. DIBBLE. I will take that for the record.

Ms. LEE. Thank you very much.

[The information referred to follows:]

WRITTEN RESPONSE RECEIVED FROM MR. PHILO L. DIBBLE TO QUESTION ASKED
DURING THE HEARING BY THE HONORABLE BARBARA LEE

Preventing HIV transmission among UN peacekeepers and host communities is a key priority of the UN. In accordance with UN Security Council Resolution 1308 (2000), the UN strongly supports and makes available voluntary confidential HIV testing and counseling for peacekeepers, before deployment and in missions. The UN respects national HIV testing requirements of troop contributing countries. The UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO) has a standardized pre-deployment training module on HIV/AIDS for troop contributing countries to incorporate into peacekeeper instruction.

DPKO has deployed HIV/AIDS advisers in its major peacekeeping operations, including those in Burundi, Cote d'Ivoire, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Ethiopia/Eritrea, Haiti, Kosovo, Liberia, and Sierra Leone who collaborate with UNAIDS and with national authorities on HIV/AIDS prevention plans. Smaller peacekeeping missions have HIV/AIDS focal points. UN peacekeepers carry UNAIDS awareness cards, and DPKO reviews its HIV/AIDS policy in consultation with UNAIDS.

Mr. PAYNE. Mr. Chairman.

Mr. SMITH. Sure.

Mr. PAYNE. I just wanted to say this question of—and I am sorry, the gentleman, Mr. Flake, left—the overabundance of peacekeeping. I think it is almost going to the opposite direction. In Haiti, some of the Latin Americans and the Chinese are supplying the troops, and we are starting to hear Brazilians and Argentinians are sort of talking about how long will we have to be there, and almost talking about withdrawing, difficulty of getting numbers in Sudan. I think that this question of countries really being easy to get the dollars is not really what is happening in a lot of places.

Also, I think that we need to get in some strong authorizing; I am not sure that any particular country is known for the sexual exploitation. I think that we have to get good commanders. I think every country has perverts, and we are talking about Amber Alerts and Megan's Laws in the United States and all that. So I think to try to focus on a country that may be more abusive than others, I think that we may be going up the wrong stream. I think we just have to—whoever goes, we have to be sure we have the right people there.

And the point about—I think that we need to have better training. And I would hope that we could certainly get more of our Western allies.

And just to follow your question, do you think that the U.S. is increasing its interests in efforts toward training regional organizations toward peacekeeping that—for example, in the Sahel area there is a U.S. initiative, U.S. militaries involved in training peacekeeping across the Sahel of Africa; involved in getting initiative in which the U.S. is discussing with oil-producing nations in the Balkans how they can protect the oil developments by training people so that, as we saw in the principality of Tomei where there was an attempt to have a coup, we saw in Togo where the President's son

was going to move into the Presidency, but there was an election vote—and these are oil-producing countries. Do you see us getting more involved in trying to strengthen regional groups to echo laws—

Mr. DIBBLE. Yes, sir. I think that is the wave of the future as an element of peacekeeping, that we will try to strengthen regional groups' own capacity to respond to a crisis. I don't think we will ever get away from the idea that the U.N. needs to deploy soldiers, but the regional focus will increasingly be a part of that.

Mr. PAYNE. Thank you.

Mr. SMITH. Thank you all. Anybody else?

Mr. BOOZMAN. If you don't mind. I apologize for having to sneak out. And I hope I am not covering old ground, but I was encouraged to hear—Chairman Smith said that there had been some improvement. Last time we heard about the goings on in the Congo—and I was a little concerned because we heard that, and then shortly after that I was watching television and they did a story and the guy said, "Well, we have heard there is zero tolerance now; let's see what that means." So they had their night cameras and stuff, and you could see the peacekeepers sneaking out at night, going into the village; and then a guy driving around with a U.N. car, a jeep with a big old U.N. sign on it, with a prostitute. So again, hopefully it is better than that.

I know that it is very difficult to figure out how to punish these folks. I got a little aggravated because the connotation was that this was sexual abuse, and that, you know, we are in a war zone and these things happen in the military, or whatever. But we were talking then about in many cases with very young children, boys and girls. And you know, when you are dealing with a 9-, 10-, 11-year-old girl, that is not sexual abuse, that is child abuse. And then also with the boys, that is just perversion.

These people that are adjudicated that are sent back, are they put on our sexual registries? Can these people come into our country?

Mr. DIBBLE. That is something I will have to look into; I don't know the answer.

Mr. BOOZMAN. Can you all do that? Would you need our direction to do that?

Mr. DIBBLE. To actually do it? I think we can do it. But again, it is not my expertise.

Mr. BOOZMAN. I would think under current law, we don't let others, but I would—Mr. Chairman, I wish we could look into that. And that is a higher will of God, because people do want to come to our country and this and that, but I would hope that we would look into that and perhaps, you know, see about getting it done.

Mr. SMITH. I would just say to my friend, Dr. Boozman, that as part of our trafficking legislation, we have a provision that would seek to extend Megan's Law. I would also note, parenthetically, that Megan was a very young girl that lived in my hometown who had a pedophile living across the street, and no one knew that. She was lured by the invitation to look at his puppy or something, some nonsense like that, and then was absolutely cruelly exploited and killed by a man who is now, thankfully, in prison. That was the

genesis of what became the notification requirements under Megan's Law.

We are looking at and have language that would extend that so that people coming into this country, if they were sexual predators of that kind, that would have to be made known. But I would like to share that I was with you, and perhaps you can call up or something—

Mr. BOOZMAN. Hopefully we could exclude them from coming in.

And then again, you know, it does make a difference, and certainly if some of these people are being, you know, in this situation and that are currently in the country, then we need to do something about that; either boot them out, or at least make them under the same statute.

I would want to know, as what went on in your hometown, certainly if a—you know, if somebody who we knew had committed an act with a 10-year-old Congolese and traded sex for peanut butter when the kid was starving, I would want to know if that person was living in my neighborhood. So thank you very much.

Mr. SMITH. Thank you, Mr. Secretary, for your testimony. And we will have some additional written questions that we would like to—

Mr. DIBBLE. I will answer them as fast as I can.

Mr. SMITH. I would like to now welcome our second panel. Eric Schwartz, a consultant with the Council on Foreign Relations, and a Visiting Lecturer of Public and International Affairs at Princeton University. Mr. Schwartz has also held fellowships at Woodrow Wilson Center, the U.S. Institute of Peace, and the Council on Foreign Relations, completing articles and book chapters on peace operations, humanitarian issues, and refugee policy.

At the Council on Foreign Relations, he directed the Independent Task Force on Post-Conflict Iraq. In 2003 and 2004, Mr. Schwartz was at the U.N. in Geneva, Switzerland, where he served as the second-ranking official at the Office of the U.N. High Commissioner for Human Rights. From 1993 to 2001, Mr. Schwartz served at the National Security Council, ultimately as Senior Director and Special Assistant to the President for Multilateral and Humanitarian Affairs. From 1989 to 1993, Mr. Schwartz was a Staff Consultant to the U.S. House of Representatives, Foreign Affairs' Subcommittee on Asian and Pacific Affairs.

Prior to his work on the Subcommittee, he served as Washington Director of the Human Rights Organization Asia Watch, now known as Human Rights Watch-Asia.

We will then hear from Victoria Holt, who has been a Senior Associate at the Henry L. Stimson Center since 2001, where she co-directs the Future of Peace Operations program. She co-authored a study of peacekeeping reforms at the U.N., analyzing implementation of the recommendations of the Brahimi report, and offering options for further improving peace operations. As part of her work at the Stimson Center, she also looks at regional capacities in Africa for peace operations, U.S. policies, and efforts to improve peacekeeping and associated rule of law tools.

She served as Senior Policy Adviser at the State Department for Legislative Affairs, where she was responsible for interaction with

Congress on issues involving U.N. peacekeeping and international organizations.

Prior to joining the State Department in 1999, she was Executive Director of the Emergency Coalition for U.S. Financial Support of the United Nations. Ms. Holt also directed the Project on Peacekeeping at the U.N. at the Center for Arms Control and Non-proliferation in Washington, DC from 1987 to 1994. Ms. Holt worked as a senior congressional staffer, focusing on defense and foreign policy issues for Members of the House Armed Services Committee.

Mr. Schwartz, we will begin with you.

STATEMENT OF MR. ERIC SCHWARTZ, CONSULTANT, COUNCIL ON FOREIGN RELATIONS

Mr. SCHWARTZ. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. At the outset, let me say that I am very grateful for the chance to appear before a body whose Chair and Ranking Minority Member have such distinguished records on international humanitarian issues.

I will briefly summarize my written remarks, which I ask be included for the record.

It is not possible to seriously discuss peacekeeping reform without addressing sexual exploitation and abuse by peacekeepers. Ending victimization is not only a humanitarian imperative, but is also critical to ensure the future credibility of U.N. peace operations.

But before turning to a discussion of sexual exploitation and abuse, let me try briefly to explain why the United States needs credible U.N. peace operations.

In short, they enable our Government to support conflict resolution, reconciliation, and reconstruction activities that are important to U.S. interests, and allow us to do so while relying on other governments to provide the vast majority of military and civilian personnel. This burden sharing is of vital importance, especially in light of the fundamental transformation of U.N. peacekeeping over the past 15 years.

Today members of the U.N. Security Council regularly ask peacekeepers and their civilian counterparts to remake societies coming out of internal conflicts, to help negotiate peace agreements, reform security sectors, promote political reconciliation and effective and democratic governments, and rebuild systems of justice. And U.N. troops and civilian police have also been asked and expected to ensure security in post-conflict environments.

Of course, this transformation has not been an easy one. It has been accompanied by a number of tragic failures. Nonetheless, there have also been positive developments and lessons learned in Namibia, in Cambodia, in Kosovo, in Sierra Leone, in East Timor, and other operations. U.N. peacekeeping or U.N. civilian missions serving with green-helmeted coalitions of the willing have helped to provide stability and to provide economic and political development.

The key point is that the United States and other governments will continue to ask U.N. peacekeepers to take on the tough jobs that others are unprepared to tackle. In Haiti, to cite just one example close to home, peacekeepers have been asked to launch at-

tacks on police outposts being occupied by armed opposition elements, to conduct security sweeps throughout Port-au-Prince neighborhoods engulfed in violence, and to take on responsibility for security sector reform. And the Bush Administration has strongly endorsed this robust security role for peacekeepers in that country, as it has supported robust mandates elsewhere, from Liberia to Burundi to the Congo.

But if we continue to demand more and more of U.N. peace operations, then we must also do much more to enhance capacities if we want to ensure substantial success. This means that the U.N. must develop doctrine that recognizes the need for capable peacekeeping forces in the new security environments, and strategies that integrate economic and political development with the need for security. It means that U.N. members from the developed world—and if I may repeat what the Chairman quoted—must increase the availability of troops for peacekeeping operations.

I believe the United States must upgrade substantially its participation in the U.N. Stand-by Arrangements System, which is a voluntary process in which governments express their willingness to make troops and other capabilities available to peace operations. I also think the Department of Defense should develop plans for greater U.S. support of and involvement in peace operations, though I harbor no illusions that the United States will play the most significant role in U.N. operations.

The United States, of course, should also sustain and strengthen its support for regional peacekeeping capacity such as the Global Peace Operations Initiative.

And finally, we must continue to enhance U.N. capacity for post-conflict peace-building activities. Congress should support the Secretary-General's recommendations for a Peace Building Commission, for a Peace Building Support Office, and for a Peace Building Support Fund, and should also endorse increased funding for agencies that play a critical role in post-conflict peace-building, such as the High Commissioner for Human Rights and the United Nations Electoral Assistance Division.

And the United States should strengthen its own State Department of Office of Reconstruction and Stabilization. Congress should provide it with the resources necessary, and the resources it has requested—modest but necessary—to play its coordination role.

Let me now move very briefly to the issue of sexual exploitation and abuse by peacekeepers.

As the previous witness indicated, there now appears to be an evolving consensus within the U.N. system on a number of important reforms. These include uniform standards; training programs; increased deployment of women in peacekeeping operations; deployment of established, better-disciplined units rather than those that are just patched together in particular operations; accountability of senior managers; effective data collection and management; staffing increases to enhance supervision; and organized recreational activities for peacekeepers.

And as reflected in a report issued by the Secretary-General last week, the real challenge will be in funding and in implementation. I believe the Congress should support necessary increases in both

assessed and voluntary contributions for these and related initiatives.

Moreover, Members of Congress should press for implementation of those key reforms which will be particularly challenging to implement fully, including independent investigative capacity, commitments by all troop-contributing countries to pursue investigations and, as appropriate, prosecutions of members of their military when there are well-founded allegations of sexual exploitation or abuse; measures to ensure that the United Nations civilian staff and experts on mission are not effectively immune from prosecution due to a lack of a functioning judicial system in the host state; and, finally, effective programs of victims assistance.

Key U.N. officials have recognized the importance of vigorous action, but many of these reforms will be very difficult for member states to implement, and the United States must ensure that this issue remains a high priority in the months and years to come.

In conclusion, I would like to offer a word about the nature of congressional legislation on U.N. reform.

I believe that Congress has a critical role to play in encouraging improvements in U.N. peace operations, but I would most respectfully urge that reform legislation not include withholding of assessed contributions to the United Nations, for several reasons:

First, throughout the world, the Administration is asking peacekeepers to lighten our own load in substantial ways, and we are doing this in places such as Haiti and Liberia, where our interests and our historical associations could very reasonably create legitimate expectations of much greater U.S. involvement. In those circumstances, there would be something incongruous about withholding U.S. support to peacekeeping activities.

Second, by withholding assessed contributions, I believe we risk depriving the institution of the critical resources needed to advance key reforms.

And finally, by fully meeting our obligations, we will strengthen the position of those member states—and those Secretariat officials, of whom there are many—and you had one before you some time ago: Dr. Jane Holl Lute—who are deeply committed to positive change.

Finally, to the extent that the threat of withheld assessments is designed by Congress to spur the Administration onto vigorous action—and that was something that I heard when I worked in the Administration—I hope that Administration officials will demonstrate that this is unnecessary.

In short, the best approach is for the Administration to work cooperatively with the Congress to ensure effective reforms, while sustaining support for U.N. activities that are critical not only to international peace and security, but also to U.S. national interests. Thank you.

[The prepared statement of Mr. Schwartz follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF MR. ERIC SCHWARTZ, CONSULTANT, COUNCIL ON FOREIGN RELATIONS

I want to thank both the Chair of the Subcommittee, Representative Smith, and the Ranking Minority Member, Representative Payne, for the opportunity to testify on peacekeeping reform. I'm grateful for the opportunity to appear before a body whose leadership has such a distinguished record on international human rights

and humanitarian issues. Refugees, victims of torture, those suffering the evils of human trafficking, and others around the world who have been deprived of their rights know they have a tireless ally and advocate in Congressman Smith; and Representative Payne's commitment to human rights, reconciliation and peace in Africa has helped to keep African development issues on the agenda of policy makers here and abroad.

It is not possible to discuss seriously peacekeeping reform without addressing the issue of sexual exploitation and abuse by UN peacekeepers in the Congo and in other UN operations. The attention to this issue by Members of Congress and others is highly appropriate and critically important—both because ending victimization is a humanitarian imperative, and because an effective policy of zero tolerance is essential to ensuring the future credibility of UN peace operations.

Before turning to a discussion of the UN's response to sexual exploitation and abuse by peacekeepers, let me take a few minutes to explain why the United States needs credible UN peace operations. In short, these operations enable our government to support conflict resolution, political reconciliation and economic reconstruction activities that are important to U.S. national interests, and allow us to do so while relying on other governments to provide the vast majority of military and civilian personnel. For a superpower occupied in so many places around the world, this burden-sharing is of vital importance—especially as the demands for international involvement in efforts to end conflicts and build stable societies continue to increase.

These demands have largely transformed the nature of peacekeeping over the past 15 years, altering the assumptions that had governed "traditional" peacekeeping until the end of the Cold War. No longer can peacekeepers assume the consent of all parties to the conflict; no longer are they assigned only the narrow tasks of monitoring ceasefires and border disengagement agreements between states; and no longer are they limited to the use of force solely in self-defense. In fact, the United States and other members of the UN Security Council now regularly ask peacekeepers and their civilian counterparts to remake societies coming out of internal conflict—to help negotiate peace agreements, reform security sectors, promote political reconciliation and effective and democratic governance, and rebuild systems of justice. Moreover, in the absence of indigenous capacity, UN troops and international civilian police have been asked to ensure public security in post-conflict environments, deter and respond to threats of violence, and mentor and train local security forces.

As Members of Congress are well aware, this transformation in peacekeeping has not been an easy one, and has been accompanied by some tragic failures on the part of the UN and its member states. In Bosnia and Rwanda, for example, mass killings took place notwithstanding the presence of UN peacekeepers. The causes of these two disastrous chapters in the history of UN peacekeeping have been described in detail by many analysts, but in both cases, local populations had legitimate expectations of protection while key UN member states were unprepared to assist or equip peacekeepers to address threats to civilians. In other cases, such as Sierra Leone and East Timor, rebels effectively challenged peace agreements, peacekeepers and other UN officials, and local inhabitants were subjected to vicious attacks resulting in large-scale loss of life. Nonetheless, there have also been positive developments since the end of the Cold War. In Namibia, Cambodia, Kosovo and other operations, UN peacekeepers—or UN civilian missions serving with green helmeted "coalitions of the willing"—have helped to provide stability and promote economic and political development. Moreover, the UN Secretariat and UN member states have learned and implemented important lessons over the years. For example, in Sierra Leone and East Timor, UN missions were substantially strengthened and—as a result—have helped to provide stability and hope to the citizens of both countries.

The key point is that the United States and other Security Council members will continue to ask UN peacekeepers to take on tough jobs that others are unprepared to tackle. To cite just one example close to home, the UN's peace operation in Haiti is characteristic of many of the contemporary challenges. The mission is mandated "to ensure a secure and stable environment within which the constitutional and political process in Haiti can take place." This means having the authority, will and capability to launch attacks on police outposts being occupied by armed opposition elements, conduct security sweeps throughout Port-au-Prince neighborhoods engulfed in violence and criminality, and take on responsibilities for security sector reform. It is worth emphasizing that the Bush administration has strongly endorsed this robust security role for peacekeepers in Haiti, as it has supported robust mandates elsewhere, from Liberia, to Burundi to the Congo. It is no surprise that administration support for these operations has coincided with administration statements and policies in recent years indicating its general view that "failed states

matter”—that poverty, political instability and the absence of effective and accountable government abroad can create serious threats to United States interests at home. And of course, these characteristics of state failure are common to so many countries that are now hosting UN peace operations.

But if we continue to demand that UN peacekeepers engage in a broad range of robust security activities, and that UN humanitarian and development agencies undertake ambitious post-conflict reconstruction missions, then we must do much more to enhance capacities if we wish to ensure substantial success. The alternatives—to consign the United Nations to future failures, or to reduce dramatically the United Nations’ role in efforts to build stable societies—are not acceptable.

This means that the UN, with strong U.S. support, must develop 1) doctrine that recognizes the need for capable forces in the new security environments in which peacekeepers are mandated to operate; 2) strategies that integrate economic and political development requirements with the need for security; and 3) a commitment to pre-mission assessments, and strategic mission plans that precede deployments and are drafted by senior-level mission strategy groups brought together prior to missions.

It means that UN members, especially from the developed world, must increase the availability of troops for peacekeeping operations. The United States should upgrade substantially its participation in the United Nations’ Stand-by Arrangements System, a voluntary process in which governments express their willingness to make troops and other capabilities available to peace operations. The Department of Defense should be requested to prepare policy options for greater U.S. support of capacity enhancements, and for involvement in peace operations that meet U.S. national interests. Of the some 60,000 UN troops deployed around the world at the end of March, only about 30 were U.S. soldiers. While nobody expects that U.S. troops will be regularly deployed to UN peace operations in large numbers, the administration can certainly identify ways to develop more meaningful engagement. Finally, the United States should sustain and strengthen its support for regional peacekeeping capacity-building efforts, such as the Global Peace Operations Initiative (GPOI).

It is also important to emphasize the critical need to enhance UN capacity for post-conflict peace-building activities. Congress should support the Secretary General’s recommendations for a Peace-building Commission, a Peace-building Support Office, and a Peace-building Support Fund. I would also encourage increased funding for the peace operation-related activities of the Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights and the United Nations’ Electoral Assistance Division.

Finally, to enhance U.S. ability to support post-conflict reconstruction and to coordinate its efforts with the United Nations and other governments, the United States should strengthen the new State Department Office of Reconstruction and Stabilization, and Congress should provide it with resources necessary—and requested by the administration for FY ’06—to play its coordination role.

Let me now move to the issue of sexual exploitation and abuse by peacekeepers. As members are aware, the Secretary General asked Prince Zeid Ra’ad Zeid Al-Hussein, the Jordanian Ambassador to the United Nations, to advise him on this issue and prepare a public report with recommendations. Ambassador Zeid is a highly respected and knowledgeable official, whose career has included service in the Jordanian army and on the UN civilian staff in the Balkans. His report describes a range of shortcomings, including a “mosaic” of rules and regulations that create a lack of clarity; the absence of a system-wide commitment to investigation and, as appropriate, punishment of members of military contingents; the absence of local enforcement capability for investigation and prosecution of civilian members of UN missions; lack of resources, personnel and procedures for effective investigations, training, and interaction with local populations; and absence of redress or compensation for victims. Finally, without seeking to excuse sexual exploitation and abuse, the report notes that absence of organized recreational activities for troops can contribute to aberrant and unacceptable behavior.

In recent weeks, committees of the General Assembly have endorsed in principle the bulk of recommendations made by Ambassador Zeid to address these issues, including measures to ensure uniform standards for all civilian and military participants in peace operations; training programs; increased deployment of women in peacekeeping operations; deployment of established units to peacekeeping operations (which are generally better disciplined than “patched together” units); accountability of senior managers; effective data collection and management; staffing increases to enhance supervision; and organized recreational activities for peacekeepers.

As reflected in a report of the Secretary General issued last week, the real challenge will be in funding and implementation, and the Congress should support nec-

essary increases in both assessed and voluntary contributions for these and other initiatives. Moreover, Members of Congress should press for implementation of key reforms that might be particularly challenging to implement fully, including 1) independent investigative capacity; 2) commitments by all troop contributing countries to pursue investigations and, as appropriate, prosecutions of members of their militaries when there are well-founded allegations of sexual exploitation or abuse; 3) measures to ensure that United Nations civilian staff and experts on mission are not effectively immune from prosecution due to lack of a functioning judicial system in the host state; and 4) effective programs of victims' assistance even when neither the victim nor the United Nations is able to obtain redress from the perpetrator of the abuse.

UN Secretariat officials have recognized the importance of vigorous action, and many UN member governments say they are ready to endorse real reform. At the same time, there is a difference between agreement in principle by a government and a willingness, for example, to support or pursue prosecutions against one's own nationals. Thus, the administration must ensure this issue remains a high priority in the months and years to come.

In conclusion, I'd like to offer a word about the nature of congressional legislation on UN reform. My views on this issue are informed by a variety of my own prior professional experiences: at the National Security Council, where I was responsible for United Nations issues; at the United Nations itself; and at the House Foreign Affairs Subcommittee on East Asian Affairs, where I managed humanitarian issues of great concern to United Nations agencies.

I believe the Congress has a critical role to play in encouraging improvements in UN peace operations. But I would respectfully urge that reform legislation not include withholding of assessed contributions to the peacekeeping or regular budget of the United Nations, for several reasons. First, throughout the world, the administration is asking peacekeepers to lighten the load of the United States in substantial ways. And we are doing this in places where our interests and historical associations could reasonably create legitimate expectations of much greater U.S. involvement—including the deployment of U.S. troops. In Haiti and Liberia, for example, there are very large UN peacekeeping missions, but no U.S. ground troops as part of the operations. Under these sorts of circumstances, there would be something incongruous about withholding U.S. support to UN peacekeeping activities.

Second, by withholding assessed contributions, we risk depriving the institution of the critical resources needed to advance key reforms, including those related to accountability in general and the prevention of sexual exploitation and abuse in particular.

Third, by fully meeting our obligations, we will strengthen the position of those member states and those Secretariat officials—of whom there are many—who are deeply committed to positive change. Withholding assessments risks weakening their position, playing into the hands of governments and others who argue that the UN is already far too willing to accept the dictates of Washington, and undermining the prospects for genuine reform.

To be sure, some Members of Congress may still believe a withholding strategy is necessary—not to persuade the UN Secretariat or other governments of the importance of reform, but rather to send a strong signal to the Bush administration about pursuing change aggressively. I hope, however, that administration officials will make the case that they are already deeply committed to improvements related to policy, management and accountability, and do not need the threat of withheld assessments to spur them to action. The best approach is for the administration to work cooperatively with the Congress to ensure effective reforms, while sustaining support for UN activities that are critical not only to international peace and security, but also to U.S. national interests.

Mr. SMITH. Mr. Schwartz, thank you very much.
Ms. Holt.

**STATEMENT OF MS. VICTORIA HOLT, SENIOR ASSOCIATE, THE
HENRY L. STIMSON CENTER**

Ms. HOLT. Chairman Smith, Congressman Payne, Members of the Committee, it is a pleasure to be here today. I particularly want to express my appreciation for this Committee's attention to these issues. I think it is welcomed and potentially overdue.

My testimony today reviews three areas that impact on the quality and effectiveness of U.N. peace operations. First, I consider cur-

rent peace operations and their broad challenges today. Second, I would like to talk about the reforms that are under way and need to be supported. Finally, I would suggest policy options for Congress to consider.

The U.N. and its member states must fully embrace reforms and move ahead on the recommendations of the report of His Royal Highness Prince Zeid and the Special Committee on Peacekeeping Operations, among others.

Most peacekeepers serve honorably and deserve our thanks, however, as those being investigated account for less than half of 1 percent of U.N. peacekeepers. Indeed, many put their lives on the line, as evidenced by the deaths of nine Bangladeshi peacekeepers in the Ituri region of the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) just as recently as February. Indeed, peacekeeping has grown more complex; and these are the challenges that we see today, balancing these threats and problems on the ground.

I want to talk about what we have already heard about, which is the increase in U.N. peace operations. We have heard the numbers: Over 67,000 military and civilian police serving in the field. Then you add the civilian staff on top of that, 15,000. These people come from 103 different countries.

We have seen increases primarily in African missions. They are complex and enjoy chapter VII authority. They are multidimensional. Many times they start up and head toward 15,000 peacekeepers per mission.

What does this do to the U.N.? First of all, who are the contributing countries? Today, the top 15 troop-contributing countries to the U.N. provide 75 percent of the peacekeepers, and they are all developing states. If you look at the list, the top 20, you won't find the UK, France or the Western European countries in that list. The only member that is participating in the top 15 is China.

Western forces are tied down elsewhere. We have seen our own troops in Iraq and Afghanistan and the Balkans. But to the question earlier: Do we have an oversupply of peacekeepers? I would have to say no.

So what does this mean and how does the U.N. oversee this level of complexity in the forces on the ground? The Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO) staff has increased—due to reforms after the Brahimi report (the Panel on U.N. Peace Operations) have increased professional staff. But today they have 600 people. So if you think of that ratio from the U.N. headquarters to what you have in the field, it is about one per, I think, 136 personnel, approximately. So it is a huge effort to basically manage, organize, recruit, deploy and oversee these operations.

A quick example is U.N. civilian police, which I would like to highlight for you. There are about 6,000 civilian police in the field, not as large number as peacekeepers, but the U.N. professional staff in New York are about two dozen. The difference with police is they are recruited in ones, twos, and threes for U.N. missions. You do not usually get a true contingent showing up. So they are conducting interviews over the phone in languages that are often foreign to them.

We already know a lot about these challenges. The U.N. has moved ahead. I think they should get credit for many of the re-

forms after the Brahimi report, which came out in the year 2000. But that report was primarily designed to solve the problems highlighted in the 1990s. They also designed reforms to tackle one complex mission per year, not the level that we are seeing now, two, two-and-a-half new operations per year.

I would like to hit a couple of reform highlights and then make some recommendations. I will be happy to discuss in detail both the Brahimi report and the High-level Panel report.

Let me suggest three broad categories of reform. First is the area of skilled management and U.N. headquarters capacity. As I mentioned, the staff have increased. There is better leadership selection for field missions, better identification of skilled civilians, and an improved planning capacity. But they are still lacking staff.

As I mentioned, the civilian police is one area I would emphasize to you. The High-level Panel report recommended filling that large gap not just in headquarters but in deployable civilian police and rule-of-law experts. This is just a core of 50 or 100 people to assess what is going on on the ground.

To the Chairman's question earlier regarding the Integrated Mission Task Forces, let me say that they do exist and they are continuing to be used. We give them a B or B-plus. They help the U.N. plan for operations. They have brought people together. Their effectiveness is still hindered by stovepiped decision-making, however.

The second broad category is rapid and effective deployment. The United States should get credit for helping improve the U.N. logistics base in Italy and helping set up Strategic Deployment Stocks. The basic idea is to have strategic supplies on hand to deploy quickly. The problem? We are doing more than one operation a year. So the stocks are more depleted and we need to figure out a way to renew them and make them more effective and ready to go.

Finally, the third area is quality personnel and member support. Here I want to echo my colleague's comments about the U.N. Stand-by Arrangements System (UNSAS). UNSAS is a really good idea, and the U.S. helped design it to let the U.N. plan better by having advanced listing of potential capacities to deploy. If the U.N. needs a medical unit or water purification, you have a sense of who has it. The U.S. does not participate at a high level in UNSAS, but we could, and also be advocates for other countries to participate at higher levels.

Real briefly on regional organizations, I think we have seen very real political will, particularly in Africa with the African Union (AU) and Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), to coordinate peace operations and to provide troops. But the U.N. does not have a specific tool to work with them. The U.N. is designed to run its own operations. So I recommend to the Committee that we think more proactively about chapter VIII of the U.N. Charter and how to facilitate planning and logistical support, and funding, for regional groups on a case-by-case basis. Get some personnel who are dedicated thinking actively about this.

I am sure the Committee is in sticker shock over the cost of U.N. peacekeeping operations. With increasing numbers, we have seen a direct increase in the U.S. share, and the U.N. budget is heading close to \$5 billion for 1 year next year.

Obviously, you are concerned about the budget numbers before you and what that means for other Members in the House. But I want to point out one thing about the cost. If you look at the way the money breaks down, 95 percent of it is going to the field. Only about 5 percent—when we looked at numbers from 1999 to 2004, up to 5 percent stays at the U.N. headquarters to pay for the 600 people. Almost all the other money goes to reimburse troops, pay for equipment, set up the missions, and particularly in places like Africa, pay for transportation.

That was the main point I wanted to make about the costs.

But I also want to point out quickly that the U.N. is cheaper than other ways of deploying. If we were to do it ourselves or go through NATO or the EU, if you look at the numbers—and we have done rough estimates—for the U.S. to deploy it is double the cost of deploying the U.N.

So what does this mean? I will just say a couple of quick things.

I really do strongly welcome the interest in reform, and I would suggest that, basically, the United States should press forward with a robust package at the U.N., not just dealing with sexual exploitation problems but with the things that the headquarters need, that the missions need, and with improving leadership. The U.S. has frequently been concerned with cost, and that is important. But there are some small areas that could make a huge difference in New York.

You have two budgets in front of you: The Voluntary Peacekeeping Account, which funds the United States' bilateral assistance for peacekeeping, such as ECOWAS and AU missions. The request is \$196 million. That is better. It is paying for the Global Peace Operations Initiative and U.S. regional support for peacekeeping. I would look at that seriously and ask the State Department on a good day what they could actually use. That is the only pot of money that we have to move quickly if something comes up.

Second, as my colleague mentioned, is the Contributions for International Peacekeeping Activities (CIPA). I don't think there is a lot of wiggle room there. Obviously, Congress looks at money, and that is an easy way to get the attention and put conditions on. But I would suggest two things: If that money is conditioned, it will directly impact U.N. operations. We care a lot about the Congo and Sudan, and we want them to succeed. Sudan is trying to find 10,000 peacekeepers right now. If the U.S. conditioned that U.N. funding, that mission is where the U.N. is going to be hit right away.

Second, having been at the State Department in the late 1990s, I also know that the U.S. leverage and negotiation position in New York is harmed when we are in debt to the U.N. It does not mean we can't call for reforms, but it makes our allies disinterested in opinions, and our opponents have great talking points when we come up there. So I would think how we set that up so that we can be the best and most robust with our proposals.

Finally, at the end of the day, peacekeeping relies on the people on the ground. It is basically a gamble, a hopeful gamble, one that can work. We have learned a lot, and it serves both the U.S. strategic interests and humanitarian goals.

I welcome the Committee's interest and thank you very much.

Mr. SMITH. Thank you.
[The prepared statement of Ms. Holt follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF MS. VICTORIA HOLT, SENIOR ASSOCIATE, THE HENRY L. STIMSON CENTER

Chairman Smith, Congressman Payne, Members of the Committee, it is an honor to testify before you today on the subject of United Nations peacekeeping and reforms. I applaud your Committee's interest and focus on this important subject. Given the depth of experience within this Committee, many of you know firsthand how UN peace operations can help nations transition from brutal conflicts to non-violent forms of political expression. The question today is how to improve the ability of such operations to achieve their goals.

As members here know well, the United States supports UN peace operations because they strengthen and reinforce our strategic and national interests, as well as further our commitment to humanitarian goals and human rights. Operations range widely today, from monitoring border agreements (Ethiopia/Eritrea) to helping countries implement peace where brutal wars inflicted atrocities against civilians (Sudan, Democratic Republic of the Congo); from supporting new democratic governments and the rule of law (East Timor, Afghanistan) to providing security in states recovering from civil war (Sierra Leone, Liberia).

United Nations peace operations are being severely tested on many fronts. Peacekeepers provided to the UN have failed to protect civilians, instead engaging in sexual misconduct and illegal activities while deployed. Never before has the UN witnessed this magnitude of alleged sexual exploitation and abuse as in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC). The UN and its member states must fully embrace reforms, and move forward on the recommendations of the report of His Royal Highness Prince Zeid and the Special Committee on Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO), among others. The United Nations has also underestimated the test it would face from criminal and rebel groups on the ground, as evidenced by the deaths of nine Bangladeshi peacekeepers in the Ituri region of the DRC in February 2005. Indeed, peacekeeping has grown more complex, challenging UN member states and UN headquarters to keep pace with the requirements established by Security Council.

Much has improved, too. The United Nations has embraced peacekeeping reforms following the 2000 Brahimi Report, developed its Best Practices Unit within the Department of Peacekeeping Operations, and sustained on-going efforts to improve its functions. Operations are showing signs of success, including two that are now winding down, in Timor-Lest and Sierra Leone. The UN has applied lessons from past operations to new ones, improved its mission planning and logistics capacity, and tried to be candid about how to match UN mandates with field missions, even when the Security Council did not want to hear it.

My testimony today reviews three areas that impact on the quality and effectiveness of UN peace operations. First, I consider current peace operations and their broad challenges today. Second, I review specific recommendations for UN reform and efforts to make peace operations more successful. Finally I suggest US policy options for Congress to consider in developing a reform agenda at the United Nations. These comments reflect my work at the Henry L. Stimson Center, where I have co-directed a project examining the record of implementation of UN peacekeeping reforms in the Brahimi Report, and led studies on African peacekeeping and the readiness of militaries to conduct operations to protect civilians. My views are also shaped by my experience working at the US State Department on these issues, where I saw how efforts to support peacekeeping reforms were hampered by US arrears to the United Nations.

I. CURRENT PEACE OPERATIONS AND CHALLENGES

Increased Operations, New Missions.

Members of the UN Security Council, including the United States, have approved an unprecedented number and level of UN peace operations. This growth has been acute since 2003. New UN-led peacekeeping operations have been established in Liberia, Cote d'Ivoire, Burundi, Haiti, and most recently, Sudan in the last two years. In addition to these five missions, the UN operation in the vast Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) was substantially expanded in 2003 and 2004, with authorized forces growing from 5,537 personnel in 2000 to 16,700 peacekeepers today. This growth built on the large and complex missions established in 1999-2000 at the end of the Clinton Administration in the DRC, East Timor, Sierra Leone, Kosovo and Ethiopia/Eritrea.

Supported by the Bush Administration, the UN today is leading 17 peace operations with over 67,000 military and police personnel and nearly 15,000 civilian staff from 103 countries. The UN is busy recruiting another 10,000 troops for the new UN Mission in Sudan (UNMIS). In addition, the UN runs another ten political and peacebuilding missions, such as the assistance mission in Afghanistan (UNAMA) and the assistance mission in Iraq (UNAMI) which get operational support from the UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations.

Stress on UN Headquarters, Troop Contributors.

This level of UN operations is unprecedented. Demands on UN headquarters and troop contributing countries are significant. Eight of the UN's peacekeeping operations are currently in Africa, absorbing 75 percent of the UN troops in areas that frequently have substantial transportation and infrastructure challenges. Many missions are multidimensional, complex, and operating in difficult environments with Chapter VII authority, where conflicts and insecurity continue to challenge fragile peace agreements and threaten the security of civilians. Peacekeepers are also asked to help with increased support to peacebuilding, such as assistance with electoral support; with establishment of rule of law and policing; and with disarmament, demobilization and reintegration of former fighters. At the same time, they are also asked to move beyond traditional roles to be better prepared to use force and protect civilians.

Who are today's UN peacekeepers? The top 15 troop contributing countries provide 75 percent of peacekeepers today. All are developing states, including Pakistan, Bangladesh, India, Ethiopia, Ghana, Nepal, Nigeria, Jordan, Uruguay and South Africa.¹ When developing nations provide personnel for peacekeeping missions, they frequently require outside material and financial support from the UN and bilateral partners, such as transportation, logistics, equipment, and planning and organizational support. Many developed states with highly skilled armed services are stretched by their increased military commitments, such as in the Balkans, Afghanistan and Iraq.² No Western European country currently contributes more than 600 personnel to UN peacekeeping missions. The United States provides about 375 peacekeepers to UN operations, nearly all of whom are civilian police.

So who oversees UN peace operations? Responsibility for planning, organizing, managing, and supporting these missions is primarily the job of the Department of Peacekeeping Operations within the UN Secretariat in New York. The DPKO is in charge of evaluating the requirements of a potential peace operation, providing recommendations to the Security Council through the Secretary-General, and responsible for mission planning. DPKO also recruits troops and police from contributing countries, matches requirements to budgets, determines equipment and logistical needs, sets up pre-deployment training and oversees deployment of the forces. They also work within the UN to integrate mission planning with offices responsible for humanitarian, political and relief efforts, such as the Office of the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, the Department of Political Affairs and UNHCR, among others.

The DPKO has a headquarters staff of only 600 people. That may seem like a reasonable number until you realize they are overseeing over 82,000 personnel in the field. In New York, roughly two dozen people, for example, are in charge of recruiting and managing the UN's civilian police, which total about 6,000 in the field. The job is especially difficult, since most police are recruited as individuals or in small units, unlike peacekeepers.

With ratios like this, peace operations depend on smart planning and management; on skilled mission leaders; on the quality and effectiveness of military and civilian personnel; and on Council mandates being clear and matched with the resources and political support needed to meet their goals. Underlying all of this is the fundamental requirement that peacekeepers be given jobs that they can accomplish. Peacekeeping is a temporary measure to provide security, and that security is offered so that peacebuilding efforts can succeed. Peace operations are smart gambles, but their success depends on the leaders and civil society of a region to support an end to conflict. Peace relies ultimately on them, not the United Nations.

¹ The top 15 also include Morocco, Senegal, Kenya, Brazil and China. Data from the UN, April 2005.

² Major powers have recently intervened in African conflicts, primarily to help stabilize immediate crises, such as the British deployment to Sierra Leone (2000), the French intervention in Côte d'Ivoire (2002), the French-led EU mission in the DRC (2003), and the American support to the ECOWAS mission in Liberia (2003). The Stand-by High Readiness Brigade, composed of 16 nations (mostly developed and European) played a pivotal role in setting up the UN mission in Ethiopia-Eritrea (2000) and helping transition from ECOWAS to UN missions.

II. UN REFORMS AND PEACEKEEPING

Reforms should close gaps between peacekeeping goals and what is needed to meet those goals. The UN has moved to narrow gaps between Council mandates and what peacekeepers can do in the field; within headquarters planning and supporting missions; by increasing skilled mission leadership; and finally, by developing systems for more effective and rapid deployments. These and other areas deserve attention.

The Brahimi Report and Peacekeeping Reforms.

In 2000, the report of the expert *Panel on United Nations Peace Operations* recommended specific reform measures to deal with the challenges of peacekeeping, based on a review of operations during the 1990s. Named for its dynamic chair, UN Under Secretary-General Lakhdar Brahimi, the Brahimi Report recommendations have met with much support. Of more than 80 recommendations, I will highlight a few key areas here.³ On-going UN reform efforts and the December 2004 High-level Panel Report also built on the Report and the process it launched.⁴

- *Skilled management and headquarters capacity.* The Report emphasized that the UN needed a substantive capacity to manage, organize and support UN peacekeeping missions. Member states responded by supporting an improved professional staff at UN headquarters, better leadership selection for missions, identification of skilled civilians to send to field missions, and an improved planning capacity. Today, however, UN headquarters staff are stretched thin by the increase in operations. Some smart additions to UN Secretariat staff could enable them to support their workload more effectively, as well as provide support to prevent all forms of personnel misconduct. The High-level Panel report recommended filling the large gap in civilian police and rule of law experts, for example, and by creating a corps of skilled personnel (50–100 people) who could help evaluate and start-up missions. This recommendation should be fully supported.⁵ Mission leaders now meet in advance of deployments to review their mandates and talk with their colleagues, but on-call lists of key personnel and leadership personnel still need strengthening. Further, the development of Integrated Mission Task Forces (IMTFs) has helped move UN planning forward in advance of operations; their effectiveness is hindered by stovepiped decision-making, however.
- *More rapid and effective deployments.* The UN adopted clearer timelines for deployments. Their goal is to deploy a traditional peacekeeping operation within 30 days and a complex operation within 90 days of a Security Council resolution. To prevent equipment-related delays that plagued so many missions, advance planning and acquisition of stocks has been implemented. With US support, the UN now has Strategic Deployment Stocks (SDS), which include a mix of contracts and supplies ready to support deployments, coordinated through the UN Logistics Base in Brindisi, Italy. But this excellent reform was established to support one new operation per year, not the current level of two or more. As a result, the SDS has been depleted by the pace of current operations and needs resupplying. The UN also needs better analytical and information capacity; proposal for developing this area have been supported by the US but not yet adopted.
- *Quality personnel and member state support.* Skilled personnel are the backbone of peacekeeping. UN capacity depends on the quantity and quality of troops, police and civilian personnel provided by member states. For complex operations, the skills and coherence of the force are critical. National efforts to collaborate in training and equipping brigade-sized forces can assist more effective deployments. Better use of the revised UN Stand-by Arrangements System (UNSAS), a voluntary listing by member states of the resources they *could* provide to an operation, would support improved planning and more effective operations. More countries need to participate in UNSAS to make it effective. UNSAS lacks sufficient numbers of coherent brigades, logistical sup-

³This review draws from our study of the implementation of the Brahimi Report. See, William Durch, Victoria Holt, Caroline Earle, and Moira Shanahan. *The Brahimi Report and the Future of Peace Operations* (The Henry L. Stimson Center, Washington, DC), November 2003; at www.stimson.org/fopo.

⁴*A More Secure World: Our Shared Responsibility*, Report of the Secretary-General's High-Level Panel, United Nations, December 2004.

⁵Over 75 percent of the police recruits for the UN mission in Liberia, for example, failed the test for basic qualifications in the mission; similar numbers were cited for the DRC. Interview, UN DPKO, October 2003.

port and other enabling units. Supplies can plague missions, delaying deployment of military personnel for the DRC and of qualified police for Liberia.

Civilian Protection. The 1990s witnessed the failure of UN forces to defend civilians within the safe area of Srebrenica and UN member state unwillingness to send forces into the genocide in Rwanda in 1994. These crises led to the recognition that peacekeepers needed clear direction to provide protection to civilians. Since 1999, the UN has included language within Security Council mandates for Chapter VII operations that peacekeepers should provide for the “protection of civilians under imminent threat” within a mission area. This language is an important step toward clarifying mission responsibilities.

But what does protection of civilians mean to troop contributing countries? Member states and the United Nations are still sorting this out. Troop contributing countries need to be briefed in advance that their forces may face threats on the ground. Rules of engagement must allow for the use of force in specific scenarios including and going beyond self-defense, and that needs to be understood by both the political and military leadership in an operation. Forces need doctrine or UN guidance on how to operate in such missions with civilian protection mandates. Protection also relies on forces having the capacity and mobility to act. Mission leaders need to understand the concept of operations as it relates to the protection of civilians within a mission area. DPKO has had a limited ability to demand that troops first have specific skills and training before deployment into an operation. Both doctrine and training are considered state responsibilities, and member states need to develop both to support missions involving protection.

Working with Regional and Subregional Organizations. A dramatic shift in the last five years is the increased role of regional actors in peace operations. Especially in Africa, the African Union and the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) have begun to build their capacity for leading peace operations. While still small organizations (their headquarters staff for managing peace operations number around two dozen people), they have demonstrated political will and an ability to organize troops, as seen with their operations in Liberia, Cote d'Ivoire, Burundi and Sudan since 2002. The US and other G8 countries have supported these developments and helped fund their peace operations with bilateral funding.

How can the UN work more effectively with such regional groups on peace operations? The United Nations is designed to run UN-led peace operations, not support the deployment of troops by other groups. The United Nations has assisted both the AU and ECOWAS with planning missions and transitioning their operations to UN leadership. But a more formalized capacity for the UN is needed to support regional efforts with logistics or equipment, planning and management support, or funding of operations. The High-level Panel pointed to the need to make this relationship more standardized, and suggested that the UN consider funding for regional groups with assessed contributions to members states. The United States should look at the feasibility of such a proposal for case-by-case evaluation. Providing some UN professional support to regional groups could assist both their efforts and the United Nations', enhance planning and management of operations, and prevent duplication of effort.⁶ Such an effort could further leverage capacity by building on US and G8 efforts to increase African peacekeeping capacity.

Funding & the US Share of Costs. With increased operations, assessed costs for peacekeeping have risen for member states. In the last two years, the UN peacekeeping budget has increased from an expenditure of \$2.3 billion in 2002–2003 to approaching \$5 billion for next year's estimated costs of peace operations. Congress is likely to face sticker shock over these increased budget levels. The US assessed share is 27 percent of the budget, which is likely to require \$1.2 billion for fiscal year 2005 and \$1.3 billion for fiscal year 2006.

Why are costs so high? First, peacekeeping assessments are based on the expense of the missions themselves, which have increased dramatically. The costs directly reflect the funding to pay for troops, civilian personnel, equipment, transportation and the other components of the field operations. A small fraction of assessed funding for peace operations goes to pay for the UN headquarters staff and their work. Those costs came in at five percent or less of the assessments from 1999 to 2004, making UN overhead miniscule in comparison to the field operations.⁷

Further, UN peace operations are less expensive than other forms of peacekeeping missions. When UN costs per peacekeeper are compared to the costs of troops de-

⁶Developments in this way could breathe real life into Chapter VIII of the UN Charter, which recognizes regional arrangements but does not trigger any direct UN support when cited by the Security Council.

⁷Durch and Holt, *The Brahimi Report and the Future of Peace Operations*, Table D–1, page 130.

ployed by the United States, developed states or NATO, the UN is the least expensive option by far. Rough estimates by the Stimson Center show that US forces cost approximately double that of forces deployed by the United Nations. Given that the US pays for just over one-fourth of the peace operations budget, but provides virtually no personnel to support the 17 operations, the US share seems to have high return on its funding—resulting in over 67,000 peacekeepers in the field. Conversely, delays in funding to the United Nations can have a swift and substantial impact on peace operations, impeding troops contributing countries and impacting current missions.

III. RECOMMENDATIONS FOR US POLICY AND LEADERSHIP

The recent and dramatic increase in UN peace operations is a sign of cautious optimism rather than a signal that conflicts are expanding worldwide. Peacekeepers are not sent to wage war; they are provided to help shift from conflict to a negotiated peace, such as when peace agreements are hammered out and when combatants agree to put down their arms. Even with these conditions, today's peacekeepers may face dangerous neighborhoods, tenuous peace agreements, unreasonable expectations and too little back-up. Since the end of the Cold War, the United States' only major peacekeeping role in Africa has been in Somalia. In an environment where U.S. military participation in or leadership of peace operations is minimal, a natural question is what else can the U.S. do to help other actors respond effectively?

First, the US should increase its efforts to improve UN capacities for peace operations.

The United States can play a strong and effective role in pressing for UN reforms. Better support is needed for the UN's management and planning capacity, rapid and effective deployments, and personnel. The need for qualified and skilled civilian police (CivPol), and rule of law experts (judges, corrections, penal and human rights) outpaces their availability for operations. The US should strongly support the High-level Panel recommendation for a small corps of skilled personnel in this area.

Member states should be pressed to send their best and brightest for leadership positions of peacekeeping mission; to offer specialized skill sets and contingents of civilian police; to train regionally with other military contingents to offer to UN operations. The UN Secretariat also needs to use its internal planning process, making the Integrated Mission Task Forces truly function for planning of missions, and excise the stovepipes that exist today in decision-making.

The US should also press member states to support sufficient supplies in the UN Logistics Base in Brindisi, Italy to sustain deployment of more than one major peace operations each year.⁸ Better participation in the UN Stand-by Arrangements System would help match contributors' capabilities during the planning stage for more effective deployments. The US should also identify clear DPKO guidance on civilian protection. Finally, the US could advocate better UN coordination with African regional organizations and a more formal mechanism for the UN to provide support to their capacity-building for peace operations.

Second, US programs to enhance peace operations deserve support.

Within the State Department budget, two accounts need the Committee's support:

- *The Voluntary Peacekeeping Operations account*, requested at \$196 million for fiscal year 2005 (FY06), is the central source of support to regional efforts and organizations, especially in Africa for US training of African forces with the Global Peace Operations Initiative (formerly the African Contingency Operations Training and Assistance program), and to enable US bilateral assistance to African missions (e.g., support for regional peace efforts, the AU and ECOWAS.)
- *The Contributions for International Peacekeeping Activities (CIPA)*, requested at \$1.03 billion for fiscal year 2006, provides the US share (27%) of contributions for UN peace operations. This request is less than the \$1.3 billion projected as needed for the coming year. Further, this budget is without any funding to support initiatives that invest in capacity-building and longer-term reform efforts, which limits the US ability to promote such reforms at the United Nations or within specific missions. Finally, Congress should lift the "cap" on peacekeeping funding from 25 to 27 percent, bringing US payments in line with the US-negotiated assessment rate.

⁸The UN logistics base in Brindisi, Italy, is currently configured to support deployment of one new complex UN peacekeeping operation annually. Given the current pace of UN operations, this is not sufficient in 2004.

Third, the US should devise a clear strategy on achieving UN peacekeeping reform.

We have learned the importance of professionalizing peace operations from our own experiences, ranging from Somalia to Afghanistan, from the Balkans to Iraq. This is not easy work: It takes political will and resources, and unrelenting attention, which I know the members of this Committee understand.

Congress should empower the Administration and our next UN Ambassador to argue forcefully for UN reforms. I urge the Committee to strengthen the US hand in New York and also in capitols, which would demonstrate American seriousness. We must start by assisting the Permanent Representative to the United Nations with a clear mandate to press for UN effectiveness, including urging the members of the UN to adopt and follow up on ending sexual abuse and exploitation, and providing firm support for the measures developed out of the Ziad Report. These reforms include setting uniform standards and training, and creating professional personnel and units dedicated to investigating and policing misconduct.

The United States will be most effective if it keeps current with its share of assessed funding for peacekeeping operations. Some have suggested that limiting or conditioning US funding to the United Nations is a useful way to convince other member states to support our reform agenda, especially to spur accountability for corrupt peacekeepers and to leverage change in this area. This is unlikely to be the case, unfortunately, for two reasons. First, conditioning our funding for UN peacekeeping will hinder current operations, such as in Sudan, as it reduce UN resources to recruit and deploy troops. If the US cuts support to UN peacekeeping operations, those who may suffer are the very people peacekeepers are meant to protect. We will undermine missions whose goals we support. In the DRC, for example, millions have died from war-related causes, estimated at approximately 30,000 civilians every month.⁹

Second, our critics and opponents should not be given grounds to ignore our reform agenda. We saw this dynamic during the 1990s debate over UN arrears, when the United States sought to reduce its share of assessed peacekeeping costs from roughly 30 percent to today's rate of 27 percent. The substantive US case was overshadowed by the funding crisis, and US withholding money for peace operations. Those arrears gave our opponents ammunition against the US position and our friends little motivation to listen to us. Only after extraordinary work led by Ambassador Richard Holbrooke, supported by Congress, did the many years of effort result in a change in our assessment rates.

At the end of the day, US interests are served by effective peace operations. As a nation concerned with both security and humanitarianism, the United States can work within the UN to promote these goals and values, and to so fully and effectively.

Mr. SMITH. Let me just begin the questioning.

First to make an observation or to express a sense of gratitude to Mr. Schwartz. When he worked with the previous Administration and I chaired this Committee for 6 years, at least the international operations global human rights part of it, there were a number of occasions where we worked with you—and you know it so well—on refugee protection issues and a host of other issues.

Frankly, had it not been for you and the work you did inside the building and with the NSC, the efforts to rescue something on the order of 18- to 20,000 Vietnamese as part of the Grover program and everyone saying, “Send them all back, they are economic migrants.” Human rights organizations like the Lawyers for Human Rights and others had report after report clearly showing that SOS boat people were true refugees who had been screened out improperly.

You were a great friend on the inside who worked with our Committee and our efforts in Congress, and I want to publicly thank you for that. It did make a difference. There were many other times, particularly on refugee issues, where you were absolutely stalwart; and so I thank you for that publicly again.

⁹ Figures based on reporting by the International Rescue Committee.

Let me just ask you, if I could, Ms. Holt, you pointed out that there might be a sense of sticker shock—2.3 to 5 billion, that is a very significant increase. And whether it is justified, obviously I think we need to be willing to provide that money. What could be more laudable than trying to secure and maintain and sustain the peace?

I would just note that we are always looking to make sure that we are getting what we think we are getting. There is a BRAC that Don Payne and I know just began looking at express capacity within the military, very painful process of going through what might be excess capacity to try to save money. It carries weight over on the veterans side of the VA hospitals. We are always looking to audit them.

My question would be: Has there been, recently, a global audit? Do you think one is needed? Is there enough transparency at the U.N. to make sure that the money that is being provided is being well spent and not being diverted in any way that we would find to be improper?

Added to that, one thing that I worked for and so many others, going back to Dick Thornburgh's recommendations, is an IG process that is "robust," to use the word that you used a moment ago, to ensure that the money is being well spent.

Ms. HOLT. I think that is an absolutely correct question. Nobody ever wants to see any money wasted. I am not a budget expert in the sense that I can walk through every mission budget, but I will be happy to follow up with your staff.

I think that, actually, we have seen a renewal at DPKO asking themselves these tough questions. And the U.N. has now a best practices unit which writes internal reports and puts them on its Web site criticizing itself. You can go in and look at the handout of ECOWAS in Liberia, and they say this is what we did wrong. So I think we have a different attitude, though Ambassador Thornburgh was concerned with these questions and rightfully so.

More to your point about the Inspector General and OIS. I think, actually, that we would see the Secretary welcome a thorough investigation of the budget. They do not benefit if there is waste fraud and abuse, and I think actually we have seen a useful attitude change there.

I do not have anything to point out to you. I actually tried to figure out, because these numbers are so large, if there was something we could offer up. I would suggest that potentially we sit down with State and look at how the contingent's equipment worked out in the field. I am not trying to point fingers, but if you are looking for excess, frequently what happens is that the peace-keeping operation makes recommendations to the Secretary-General who goes to the Council. As we saw with the DRC, they will often get a third or half of what they ask for. So I think they start out with less resources than they need, is the concern that I have if we are trying to do more than we can do, given the scale of a few of these missions.

Mr. SCHWARTZ. I will just echo the points that Ms. Holt made. I think that you will see coming out of this discussion of reform increased movement toward greater transparency, greater circulation

of results of audits. I think that U.N. officials in New York have not been averse to that. I think you are going to see that.

But I would also say that peacekeeping missions are vital. In fact, I alluded to the Haiti mission; and I will tell you that shortly after I returned from Haiti a month or 2 ago, the U.N. sent an audit team and it performed an extensive audit of the Haiti operation.

What I would suggest is that the Committee might ask the Department of Defense, the Administration, whether the Haiti operation has the capacity to do what the mandate is demanding. I would be very surprised if a study that had the involvement of the Joint Staff came back to you and said it did, because the security tasks that that mission is being asked to perform are so far and above what that mission really has the capacity to do right now.

So while I think the transparency and audit issues are critical, we have to be very careful not to confuse these issues with the question of whether we are asking the U.N. to do more than we are prepared to give it the tools to do; and I think the answer to that question is, yes, we are asking the U.N. to do more than we are prepared to give it the tools to do.

Mr. SMITH. Let me ask you: Do you think we are finally on the verge of getting it right when it comes to political mandate? One of the reasons why many of us were so concerned about peacekeeping operations in the former Yugoslavia was that UNPERFOR had just a poor mandate.

I visited the country. I was in Vukovar when the peacekeepers finally got there. It seemed as if they were, you know—they had such a terrible mandate that it meant that people like Mladic could meet with the Dutch peacekeepers and negotiate demise of several thousand in Srebrenica. It was awful. It is one of the reasons why we were able to provide a pass-through to the UK, but at least some of the less-developed countries could have gotten some of that money. But some of the arrearage were UNPERFOR.

I just raise that—it seems to me that is a crucial question, whether or not the political climate has changed sufficiently enough so that the mandate is right.

Secondly, in terms of additional resources, are we putting enough into the intelligence-gathering capacities so that we do not find the peacekeepers walking into ambushes and do not have the ability to successfully do force protection as well as their mission?

Finally, let me just ask you, we have focused a lot on the exploitation issue in the Congo. We held a hearing on it, as you know; and we are trying to move some legislation to address that in a larger issue. What about victims compensation? Is there something we need to be doing for those little girls in the Congo, the 13-year-olds and the 14-year-olds who have been raped? You know, they were assigned a number really to protect them during the investigation process by the U.N., just so that their names could be kept off the record. But what could be done now to help them? Is that a member states obligation? Or is that something that U.N. itself needs to address?

Mr. SCHWARTZ. Let me answer your questions in order.

First, Representative Smith, I think UNPROFOR has become the poster child of what U.N. missions should not do. The worst is to

create an expectation that you are going to provide protection that you are not capable of providing. I think that the Brahimi report focused on that. And on some critical points like impartiality in defense of a mandate does not mean a strange neutrality in which troops shouldn't be equipped to defend people in extreme circumstances and also to defend the mandate of the mission.

I think that there has been a growing realization that the mandates should meet requirements and that resources should be adequate to meet the mandates. But I think that the point that Victoria and I have been making is that over the past several years demands have increased further. It is not simply a question of troops dealing with dicey security circumstances as an exception. It is now pretty much the rule, and they are being asked to perform combat-related activities.

So the U.N. should be encouraged to develop doctrine that addresses these concerns. Member states are uneasy about it.

The answer is, yes, there has been progress, but much more needs to be done on the kind of questions raised by the UNPROFOR operation.

On information, let me credit my colleague's organization, which has recommended that member states should create a single co-located team committed to tracking and identifying conflict trends and anticipating requirements for peacekeeping or peace building.

The Stimson Center recommendation basically says the headquarters does not have adequate capability for information gathering. However, some member states have been reluctant to equip the headquarters with that capability because they do not want interference in their internal affairs.

At the same time, if we are asking the U.N. to perform these missions, then it is irresponsible not to give the headquarters the capability to have the information necessary to do those missions. But more importantly than headquarters capability, we also have to be prepared to support the capabilities of the Department of Peacekeeping Operations on the ground in the field, because their information gathering becomes much more critical and human lives depend on it and their capacities there are also wanting. So these are two very different areas.

Finally, on victims compensation, I think this is going to be about money largely; and I think Members of Congress need to follow the Ambassador Zeid report, which has good recommendations on this. But I think the Members of Congress should make it clear to the Administration that victims compensation should be—when a victim makes a credible claim, a substantiated claim of abuse, whether or not he or she is able to find the perpetrator to get redress from the perpetrator, the institution has profound responsibilities to compensate. And I think that point needs to be made clearer. There is a certain ambiguity about that issue.

On this issue of sexual exploitation and abuse, if I could take 1 more minute to make a couple of other points that are worth raising.

On the issue of independent investigatory capacity, our prior witness from the State Department spoke about having investigatory capacity in OIOS. The question that Members of Congress need to ask about that, and it is addressed in the Zeid report, is if you are

going to have investigative capacity in which you are looking at members of military contingents, then inevitably the investigators are going to have to work with representatives from the contributing nations if they are going to try to build a case that could be used in the country in which the soldier comes. So the question is, whatever investigating capacity you build, it has to work with prosecutors and others from the troop-contributing country.

The question I would have is, by putting in OIOS does it have that capacity or does it need to be independent of OIOS? I won't try to prejudge that. But I know that was an issue of concern for Ambassador Zeid. I am a little bit concerned by the quick reference to that by the State Department witness. It is an issue that needs to be looked at. Investigative capacity with respect to military contingents has to be a capacity in which the investigator can work with the representative from the troop-contributing country.

Representative Boozman made some very interesting points about ways to get at predators. I haven't thought about this, but a member of the Committee staff whispered in my ear about the possibility of tying military aid, U.S. military training programs, to the willingness of the foreign government in question either to keep predators out of those U.S.-sponsored programs, or also to the willingness on the part of participating governments to have dedicated training programs to address sexual exploitation and abuse. Conditioning U.S. military aid programs in this way is an idea worth considering.

Ms. HOLT. These are very interesting points.

You are striking at the core with your question about UNPROFOR. The Council told them what was needed on the ground, not what they needed to hear; and, interestingly enough, it was Brahimi himself who was the first one to brief the Council on Afghanistan. And Afghanistan did not become a U.N. peace-keeping operation. It is a political mission, and we recognize that, and we know the history there. But we are seeing a tug on peacekeepers, and they are—basically, it is multidimensional. They are heading in two different directions. We are asking peacekeepers to do more support to rule of law and support more civilian missions. We might want to help with disarming. We want them to provide support to elections and work in an integrated fashion. So we want them to have a softer side.

But, at the same time, we do not want to see another Srebrenica. We want these troops prepared, when necessary, to use force. We have seen, since 1999, that most chapter VII missions include a phrase saying "protection of civilians in imminent threat." I did some work on this with the military, asking them, "What does that mean to you?" And what we found was that, in general, the U.N. is trying very hard to match troops from contributing countries with situations such as eastern Congo so they are prepared to use force if they are overrun or civilians are overrun. But they cannot pick and choose all the contributors.

So if peacekeepers are sent there as guard duty and trained for that and suddenly get caught in a firefight, they will do their best. But we have a mismatch on the ground. It is not just the Council member states themselves saying okay, but who can actually do

this mission and being honest about the troop-contributing countries, matching them to do what they are good at.

Quickly, we are not talking about Sudan today, but the AU mission there has sort of a footnote on civilian protection. I separate that AU mandate out from the U.N.'s mission itself, and I think the struggle that we see there is for the African Union to do everything brilliantly, but they are an observer force. They offer protection within their immediate vicinity and within the capacity they have. I do think that we have other areas of peacekeeping concern.

On intelligence, the Brahimi report—and Eric pointed out some of our Stimson report recommendations—recommends that there be an in-house analytical capacity at the U.N. They do not have this, and we found politically that was not going to move forward. But after the Iraq office for U.N. was blown up, we have seen a slight change at U.N. There is more interest for information-gathering capacity. It is something that the U.S. has championed and we could come back to championing again.

Mr. SMITH. Thank you, very much.

Mr. Payne.

Mr. PAYNE. Thank you very much.

You know we sort of fell into that back in the middle 1990s when the U.S. decided in its cutting of costs for running intelligence, CIA and intelligence-gathering capacity to actually close all of its information-gathering operations in Africa, just totally close it down. Which was absolutely insane, because today we are depending on the Government of Sudan to give us information, which I would not go to the bank on.

I heard Mr. Smith talk about 435, which was the highlight. That is when the U.N. was at its best with the Namibia situation, because there were very few situations of that nature, and had a top person, Asario, who, you know, solved the Bosnian question finally. In those days, the U.N. had less to do and was able to do it right; and, hopefully, you know, we can get back to that whole question.

The question about U.N. as observer in the situation in Sudan, which is just—they really are just supposed to be observing, which is less than protecting; and that is something that we are really trying to get a change in the mandate of the AU.

But I think that a number of points you brought out are so important, that when it was mentioned in Haiti and Liberia, places that we sort of have had a sphere of influence, not quite colonies but almost viewed that way by outsiders with our reluctance to send boots on the ground in both of these places in recent years, kind of drew some criticism when, as you know, the French went into the DRC and Cote D'Ivoire with their troops to protect innocent civilians.

In Sierra Leone, the British prevented many killings when they went in with their troops on the ground. The Australians and New Zealanders went into East Timor. That helped keep a lot of folks from harm's way, and in Fiji. The South Africans went into Burundi to keep the mandate of Mr. Maeri, and then Mr. Mandela and Mr. Hamambeki took on Burundi. Some of their troops are there. They are negotiating with the DRC. They are negotiating in Cote D'Ivoire. We have troops there. Nigeria sent their troops into Principe, went and brought the leadership of Togo in, went into Li-

beria twice when we wouldn't go in. Nigeria even went into Western Sahara.

So this whole question of responsibility—I mean, we will not send anyone into any place, a U.N. situation. And I just—and also this \$2.3 billion that may be asked for global peacekeeping next year is a lot. Our military budget is \$416 billion. We have already done an \$80 billion supplemental, and we will have another \$25 billion supplemental. We are into \$500 billion in our U.S. defending us, of course.

So then we look at \$2 billion for our participation in the whole world, probably saving virtually hundreds of thousands of lives. I think we kind of need to look at it in the overall perspective, especially since in none of these areas are we putting a single American troop into harm's way, which is good. I am glad that we are not. If we can prevent American troops from being in harm's way, that is great. However, the world kind of takes a look at us; and so there are a lot of things to think about.

I just kind of was sitting here doodling, and I thought I would throw a few points out.

Thank you. I have no questions.

Mr. SCHWARTZ. I associate myself with the remarks of Representative Payne.

Ms. HOLT. Just a real quick comment. I think that the United States could think a little bit about something that the British have done. Not that we want to start sending U.S. troops regularly to U.N. operations. We have already given 375 and all but 10—29 total are police. But if we did put in a few key people in leadership, why not have more American Special Representatives of the Secretary-General (SRSGs) in missions? Why not send in a couple of people to be involved with the mission support on the ground?

And the reason to do this is that you can learn a lot. We can offer a lot. And it makes other people, frankly, sit up straight. If they feel there is an American investment in U.N. operations, even a handful of people, it means there is political attention from Washington; and that also gives us a place at the table.

We are worried about, as the Chairman mentioned, what are the real costs on the ground? What does it look like? If we have an American in that operation, we can find out quickly. We can also figure out what is going right as well and promote it for other missions. It is something to think about. I don't know that—I understand that we have got forces strapped down all over the world, but it might be a small investment.

Mr. SCHWARTZ. Let me just add, if I can, on this question, to follow up Victoria's comment.

I made reference to a Stand-by Arrangements System. It is a system by which governments let the U.N. know on a voluntary basis that they have some capabilities, and it does not require the government to commit to doing a thing.

There are essentially four levels on which you can be on the Stand-by Arrangements System. The highest level is, basically, you have got forces at the ready; and if the U.N. turns to you, you are in a good position to respond—again, voluntarily. The United States is at the very bottom level, where we basically say, "Yes, we have some stuff; and if you need it, you can talk to us."

My recommendation is that, for all intents and purposes, that is really of very little value to the system; and I would suggest that the Department of Defense look at upgrading. That does not mean a commitment to doing anything. But where we have made modest contributions to peace operations the difference has been enormous. The obvious example is East Timor, albeit not approaching the Australian effort. Our contribution was very modest, but it made all the difference in the world to the Australians in terms of creating credibility for the operation.

So that would be my recommendation. And, if I may, I think if there were three or four questions in this general area that I would suggest respectfully that the Committee put to the Administration, one would be that, a question about a modest enhancement of our willingness to participate in the Stand-by Arrangements System.

But I also think, in terms of the issue we addressed before: Is staffing adequate at DPKO? I would put that question to the Administration but ask them to involve the Department of Defense in the response, and ask that the response take into account the capabilities that our military would demand in terms of support for their own operations. And make sure that that study you obtain has the military's chop, because I do not know a J3 anywhere in the government who would say that what the U.N. has is adequate. I don't know every J3, but, in any event, I think that that would be something worth the Committee doing.

Mr. PAYNE. Just a quick point. I think you would be surprised to know how eager the Department of Defense would be in assisting. I have met with the European Command that is responsible for Africa. They do not make those decisions. Those are made by State, by the Administration. But the DoD could really and are anxious and eager and willing to do so much more, especially in Africa. I won't name names, but all the way to the top have said if we could just get—we could help these people so much. We could train them.

Transportation and logistics. You got 10,000, they can't walk to Sudan. They can't get them there because they do not have the transports. But we said we are not going to go in there.

We have NATO convinced. They have some opinions. The Dutch have some opinions. I met with them. They are willing to do it. But still our State says no, and the Administration says no. The DoD says we could help out so much.

Haiti is a good example. We thought Aristide was bad, pushed him out; and now they are talking about elections. You will have more problems if they hold elections today, totally unfair, and will not guarantee anything but resentment for the next 10 years. So there is an example of how we are going to have a hard time holding on to the Latin Americans who have come up with the troops for Haiti. This was actually, you know, a U.S.-driven policy; and some of them—and there has been some casualties. That is what happens when you have casualties. Back at home people say, "How long do we have to stay here?"

In Nigeria, we went everywhere when they had a military general in charge of the country. But when he was deposed—and rightfully so—and when Abiola was elected, and the Nigerians were say-

ing, "Why are we in Liberia? Why are we all around Africa? We want you to change the policy a little bit. You stand for election in a couple of years, and we may vote you out."

So this thing is complicated. But I am glad we are having this discussion, because I think we could do better. I think we could do a lot more without putting a single U.S. soldier in harm's way.

Mr. SMITH. Dr. Boozman.

Mr. BOOZMAN. I just have a couple of questions about how things work. The soldiers, when the U.N. pays them, do they pay them or their country? You got this Third World country. Are we paying some general and he is distributing the funds to his troops?

Mr. SCHWARTZ. No, I believe that the payments to the military contingents go to member governments, and then the governments pay the soldiers.

Mr. BOOZMAN. Probably in some cases then we are enriching some general. I mean we pay them, and then they distribute to their troops whatever they want to pay. We pay per diem, don't we? So much a day or a month?

Mr. SCHWARTZ. The U.N. pays for the amount of troops that are deployed on an operation.

Ms. HOLT. My understanding for the military contribution is that the countries are reimbursed. So it is not the general on the ground who could do that.

Mr. BOOZMAN. I would really like—and, again, I am very much in support of the peacekeeping, and yet I really would like to see the folks that are participating—I mean, that might be why we are having some of these problems. If we are paying the country and then they are not paying their people who are there very much, then that is going to create problems, which I am sure it is.

The other thing is: Are there any countries that habitually have acted so badly or not done anything that we need to exclude before we approve any funding in this area?

Mr. SCHWARTZ. My own impression is, as I believe the prior witness suggested, that abuses take place by members of a variety of contingents.

But I would say, number one, the U.N. should be developing, based on the recommendations that were made, a Memorandum of Understanding for all troop-contributing countries. I think the Congress could play a useful role in making sure that that Memorandum of Understanding has what it needs, and that a troop-contributing country which is not prepared to endorse a MOU that addresses sexual exploitation and abuse should not participate in a peacekeeping mission.

Number two, I think the Secretary-General and member states need to figure out a way to ensure that governments which—despite the signing of a MOU—do not put in place measures to ensure against abuses should not be permitted to be troop contributors. That is self-evident to me, but it is something that the United Nations should pursue.

Mr. BOOZMAN. I agree. It seems self-evident to me that whenever people are involved there are people that act better, there are countries that act better than others. So it does seem like—I would like to have somebody look at that. Okay?

The other thing is, I am involved in NATO. This is something that goes all on all over. Is it "caveats"? Is that what we refer to in the sense that the restrictions that are placed on troops—you will have the Germans there, and they are there, but they can't do anything. They are so restricted by their governments, literally they can't do anything.

So, again, we are approving of the budget. Are we just looking at numbers? Is there—and you have alluded to it, but is there any thought process behind—you have a thousand troops there, but 400 or 500 of them, when you look closely at their caveats or whatever it is called, they can't do anything. So it looks to me they are in worse shape if you have got these peacekeepers that the populous looks to that do not do anything. You have others that, basically, if a fire breaks out, they can step in and take whatever action they need to. Is there any discrepancy—do we pay the same for the typists as we do for the people in actual combat or have the combat capability?

Mr. SCHWARTZ. Well, the typists would be employees of the U.N., would be paid by the U.N.

Mr. BOOZMAN. The equivalent of the country that has so many restrictions that they virtually can't do anything. I know that there are countries like that. Do they get paid the same as the guy that is truly risking his life?

Mr. SCHWARTZ. This has been a problem in past operations, no question. But the way the process should work, especially post Brahimi, post these reform measures, is that in canvassing troop contributors, in trying to find troop-contributing nations, U.N. officials should be canvassing with an understanding of what the mandate of the mission will be and some sense of what the rules of engagement will be. So troops that are not prepared to do what is necessary to execute those mandates should not be chosen by the system.

I can't—I am trying to think of recent examples where the problem that you described has been in evidence, and I am having trouble thinking of examples. But maybe Victoria can talk about that.

Ms. HOLT. You know, it gets back to the problem that the U.N. can't necessarily pick and choose who volunteers for missions. But Eric is right. They try to have clarity on the mission and is mandated before they accept contributors.

Given that, I think in the case of the Democratic Republic of the Congo, when it was initially deployed, the U.N. did accept troop contributors who could negotiate their own MOUs and understandings about what their rules of engagement would be.

It is sort of interesting. Rules of engagement are a concern of the human rights community, which urges that excess force not be used. But in this situation you may find the peacekeepers are going to negotiate less use of force, and I think the case of the Congo is one.

As far as cost, I would assume that the U.N. would not pay differently based on the mandate. You are getting to the point of whether there is hazardous duty pay, or something equivalent when we know that there is a hot zone and people are asked to put their lives on the line. I think that is a fair question. We can find out how the U.N. handles that situation.

Mr. SCHWARTZ. Let me try to unpack this issue of accountability and criminality. There are several issues involved.

With respect to military troops, the question is: How do you get at them? How do they end up in jail for sexual exploitation and abuse? And there are two ways that that could happen, both of which are addressed in the Zeid report. If they are in military contingents, they are not subject to the criminal jurisdiction of the host government. So you have to get at them through the contributor government. For example, if you are a Moroccan peacekeeper, Morocco has to get at you.

Ambassador Zeid made two suggestions in his report, one of which was endorsed and the other which has not been endorsed. The first involves MOUs, in which troop-contributing nations agree that if there are substantiated claims, they will pursue investigations and, as appropriate, prosecutions. So that should be the price of admission to a peace operation. That is something I would respectfully request that Congress should follow.

The second recommendation that Ambassador Zeid made was for on-site court martials. If a Moroccan or U.S. troop committed a gross violation, there could be a court martial in the host nation under the authority and jurisdiction of the contributor government. Do it there.

One of the key arguments for that is that you demonstrate to the people of the host country that there are costs, that there is accountability. That recommendation has not been picked up and is something that Members of Congress could ask about. You should also ask the Administration, because there may be some ambivalence there. But my personal view is that it is a good idea. Why not?

There are also U.N. civilians as well as U.N. military observers and U.N. civilian police. For those individuals, the U.N. can waive any immunity. And they only have immunity for official acts. In those circumstances, the host government can prosecute. But the major problem there is that in countries that host peacekeeping operations, there is not a lot of judicial capacity. So Ambassador Zeid recommended that the U.N. look into that issue and try to find a way to promote the capacity.

Those are the issues that I would—those are the long poles in the tent.

Mr. BOOZMAN. I would really like at some point some assurance that we are not enriching some corrupt tinhorn dictator or general or whatever, which I think we are probably in some cases right now. And the other thing is that I really do think we need to look at some sort of system that pays for performance. If you have got countries, if you have good units that are doing great jobs, they need to be paid better than the \$1,080 stipend that everyone else gets that are doing a lousy job.

Mr. SMITH. Mr. Payne.

Mr. PAYNE. If the gentleman would yield, one of the problems that we have—and I agree, I think that we ought to do better—we are going to run out of people that are going to go anywhere soon. We are almost at that point now. And I think that what we probably need to do is work on what we have and make them better.

If it was a great big financial tinhorn dictator making a lot of money, they would be sending people hand over fist. Most peace-keeping operations are lacking the number of people. They keep sending letters to them, and they keep rejecting. Many people think that Zaire or Zambia is rushing out to send their troops. They really are not. In Haiti, where the Latin Americans are, they are already saying, "We are leaving." And there is no one else that is going to handle Haiti when the OAS and the Caribbean countries, which have few—because the Caribbean countries do not even have military. Most of them—a lot of them do not have militaries.

So it is not that there is a great big bunch of guys ready to rush them in for the dollars; and I worry that we are going to have, as I mentioned, operations that no one is going to be there to fund.

Mr. BOOZMAN. Can I just make one comment? And I would agree. I understand that there is a problem. I do think that it is something that we need to look at.

The other thing, though, is to me you would almost be better off with 500 people that are well trained and you had to pay them \$2,000 a month versus the \$1,000, than 1,000 people that are just there. Because if you show up, regardless of what you do or really, the situation we are in now, almost how you behave, you can get by with pretty good stuff. You are going to get your thousand bucks a month regardless.

Mr. PAYNE. And we can get a whole lot of them from the countries that do not send them.

Mr. DELAHUNT. I would just pursue that same point that Mr. Payne was making. I think—would you agree that it is a huge difficulty at this point in time in terms of recruitment? That, I would suggest, is a major problem.

I have spent considerable time in Haiti, and I was there in the 1990s and just several weeks ago. It is not a question of—people are not knocking on the door to become a contributing nation. In fact, in terms of Haiti, there are many contributing nations there that took a position contrary to the Administration's position on Iraq that feel that this is an opportunity to restore a better level of their bilateral relationship. So that is a real problem.

As I am listening—and I appreciate your testimony and the comments by my colleagues—I have supported the idea of a permanent quick strike force, 5,000, 10,000. It has been opposed by both Administrations, both the Clinton and the Bush Administration, my memory is. Because the problem is—and let's use Haiti as an example—by the time the Security Council issues its mandate and then the bureaucracy goes to work to seek contributing nations, by the time there is the transport, there is a major time delay so that much has gone on in terms of bloodshed, in terms of more destabilization, if you will. But given the political realities, that is not—that does not appear to be an answer.

But I think both of you and others have hit on what ought at least be considered, and that is—because I don't think you solve—I think everybody wants to limit, to eliminate sexual abuse and exploitation. But the reality is that will require constant vigilance, and First World nations have those problems, those issues. We

have the example of Abu Ghraib right here in terms of the American military.

But I think as you, Mr. Schwartz, talked about—maybe it was Ms. Holt—talked about the need for command, if there could be a permanent command apparatus that would be there on a consistent basis, maybe contributions from the permanent countries with a rotating basis to deal with issues of training, to deal with on-the-ground in the host nation, if you will, that might create some coherence, some logic, some experience clearly.

And we are just talking military. But, over time, that permanent command, not the 5- or 10,000 that I would support, but maybe the 500 that would be necessary on a permanent basis, would have experience intersecting with the civic needs and the NGOs, in the local institutions as well as the U.N. CivPol and other U.N. agencies that would support the soft side, if you will, as opposed to the military side.

What do you think of that as an idea.

Mr. SCHWARTZ. Well, the dilemma that I think you identified, Representative Delahunt, is that those elements of the U.N. Charter that effectively spoke about the victors in World War II using force collectively to impose their will, to impose the will of the international community, that vision was never realized—the original vision of chapter VII of the U.N. Charter.

In the absence of that sort of capability, how do you nonetheless inject this organization into conflict situations that are very messy and require robust security capabilities when governments are not prepared to cede very much, if any, of their sovereignty to the collective good?

What the Department of Peacekeeping Operations in the U.N. has done in recent years is tried to enhance that sort of predeployment planning capacity to as much an extent as the system will bear. Right now, there is a proposal on the table to pull together I think it is a 20-person police management unit. The unit would be in a position, when an operation is started, to deploy very quickly, to set up security structures, at least on the police side, as quickly as possible—to have this core of people at the headquarters who are ready to deploy. That is the recommendation that was made by the High-level Panel. I believe it was endorsed by the Secretary-General. I hope that it will be implemented, to increase the capacity of the organization to move very quickly.

Similarly, in recent years, the U.N. has made strides in terms of identifying lists of officers who could be deployed very quickly and increased predeployment training. So all of these efforts are designed to create some of the capacity you are talking about.

Mr. DELAHUNT. It is trending in that direction, I would suggest. I think that the logical conclusion of that trend is, at a minimum, a permanent, coordinated command structure, obviously, you know, with the line of authority being to the Security Council. But because what we see—at least my experience has been in Haiti, initially there is such an extended period of instability and chaos that we are losing too much time. There has to be a more rapid response.

If you have the command structure in place—and, again, to follow up on what Mr. Payne was talking about, I don't know what

the Department of Defense position would be. I dare say it would be a very positive, constructive experience for American officers to go into those command positions for a period of time and rotate in and out of them. I mean, the whole issue of sexual exploitation, you know, where you have First World military training and a level of discipline that is inculcated in an officer corps. I don't know how to solve it otherwise.

Ms. Holt?

Ms. HOLT. Well, I just think you hit the nail on the head for the central problem that the U.N. faces. We all know that once the peace agreement is signed, one of the most important things to do is to move fast; and if there is not a direct link between the peace agreement and the forces coming in that may have been promised, you get the problem that you stated.

However, in addition to what Eric has pointed out, the U.N. internally has asked for two areas of improvement. One, strategic reserve is what they are calling it, mission reserve. I can come back to the details. But they are talking more about what you are describing.

Two points, one is on the CivPol. They need 50 to 100 people to be able to move out fast and evaluate the situation and set up the mission. Second, I think that it is a strategic reserve that they are talking about that could be used to move out immediately. These are people who have trained before, have a sense of what the command is. They go in and do not stay around, but they are there to help set things up.

The very frustration you are describing is also what has led to what is called the Stand-by High Readiness Brigade, comprised of primarily European countries and Canada. They have gone out of their way to create their own planning element. They deploy in advance of the U.N. to help set up an operation for 6 months, and then they hand it off to the U.N. It does not accomplish everything you are describing, but it is a step in the right direction.

The U.N. has tried on-call lists for this reason. They wanted to have countries list in advance their expertise, mission leadership, certain skill sets and groups within the Stand-by Arrangements System for training regionally or were prepared to deploy. So the U.N. has been trying to accomplish what you are describing, but they do not have the authority themselves to require this. So I agree with you.

Mr. DELAHUNT. I think if we are going to address a lot of the issues that are of concern to Members of Congress and others, sexual abuse, et cetera, we have to recognize that we have to take a step further. It would be interesting, Don, if you and the Chairman would at some point in time have a representative of DoD to come in just to see if there is any sentiment for that.

Because as you sit here listening and you are not familiar with these issues, I mean—when I hear Dr. Boozman talk, I mean, then why don't we just go into the private sector and privatize it? It would be cheaper. The discipline would probably create more accountability. It would be there. It would be ready. It would have performance measurements that it would have to attain.

I mean, I am not for it. I do not support the idea. But I mean, you can hear it coming. Five, ten, fifteen years down the line: Dyncorp International, here we come.

Well, it is an issue that has been highly debated in recent years, in fact. And the critical—there are many critical questions, but the issue of how far you can go to a private contracting has been the subject of a lot of debate. And in fact, in Sierra Leone, in the late 1990s the Government of Sierra Leone hired a firm called Executive Outcomes, and by all accounts the firm did well in defeating the rebels. But there are complicated issues here; in particular, involving accountability. To whom are these services accountable and the like? So while private military contracting has come a long way, it has not yet been accepted, and in fact it is still seen in very negative terms by some international legal instruments and the like, but it is an issue that has been hotly debated in recent years.

Thank you.

Mr. BOOZMAN [presiding]. Mr. Payne.

Mr. PAYNE. Yeah, I recall when the Executive Outcome, made up of South Africa and the British Green Berets, you know, there is even more contracting than U.S. military, and you might find a place where that is going to be the outcome.

I think, in my opinion, that a Ready Reserve force would be what—when President Clinton attempted that, you may recall when he took that first initiative and we actually went out and got them back in—whenever that trip was, I guess it was late 1990s. And we actually saw the Rapid Response—I think it was called—it was the Rapid Response Initiative, and they were ready to have African troops train—they were being trained by the United States. And this little unit was pretty good, too. However, there was somehow a—it just didn't—either the African countries did not buy it, or there was some reason that it fell apart.

It was really a strong initiative that the Clinton Administration thought should happen, just realizing that you need someone to move in quickly and take care of it quickly. You have got to send out invitations and requests for proposal, and sometimes if you get in very quickly—and as a matter of fact, Sierra Leone, you mentioned Executive Outcomes; when they sent in an initial group, sent 50 peacekeepers up to where the RUF was mining the diamonds, I mean, it was absolutely—that was a very miscalculated event, because these guys in RUF are brutal, mean, battle-savvy people who actually not only disarmed the U.N., they took their boots and sent them back to town. Once again, that was a mistake of sending unprepared people into harm's way, and the Executive guys pulled out of the country.

So I think that the things that Mr. Delahunt and perhaps even the Chairman—somebody suggested we ought to mull around again and try to come up with some best practices in the future.

But thank you, Dr. Boozman, for chairing it at this time.

Mr. BOOZMAN. Mr. Delahunt.

Mr. DELAHUNT. I don't have anything else to say. I think—again, it was Ms. Holt that was talking about, I think, we have to be honest about what the realities on the ground are. And for example, getting back to Haiti; you go down there, and these contributing nations, they just want out. They are there because their govern-

ments have sent them there for political reasons—I am not suggesting that they are nefarious political reasons—but to repair their relationship with the United States. But only recently have we become more and more aggressive.

And the tragedy of Haiti is, as Mr. Payne indicated, if they have elections and there is not a substantial commitment postelection—and I am talking not just in terms of numbers and resources, but time; and I am not talking 5 years, I am really talking 10 to 15 years—having elections is just absolutely an exercise in futility because it will turn around the day the last blue helmet leaves. And what have we done? We have done just a huge disservice to, you know, a wonderful people that have such a sad history.

Mr. SCHWARTZ. If I could make one final comment relating to your point.

The Acting Assistant Secretary for International Organizations mentioned that his Bureau was going to do a review of the Brahimi implementation of reforms that were recommended several years ago.

I would respectfully suggest that the Subcommittee ask that any review of this look at the question of doctrine: What does the U.S. Government believe peacekeepers should be capable of doing? Because as a practical matter, we, as a matter of policy and practice, ask them to do more than we ever anticipated we would be asking them to do. And it is important that we face up to that, because if you face up to that and acknowledge what it is we are asking them to do, then the next step is to go to the U.N. and say to the Department of Peacekeeping Operations, “You have got to develop doctrine that recognizes the reality.” And a lot of member states don’t like that fact, but it is true.

And then from the doctrine question, there has got to be a willingness to recognize what the requirements are to meet the objectives. If the State Department study doesn’t address those issues, then it hasn’t really addressed the critical question that Representative Delahunt has raised.

Mr. DELAHUNT. What I believe is, first of all, we are in the middle of a rather contentious debate here, the Oil-for-Food Program, and there are some that would just as well see the U.N. disappear, and there are some that want to limit contributions to the U.N. The reality is if we are going to really be honest, it is going to require more dollars and more resources to the U.N. But I would believe if we reach a certain level, if we create a—you used the term “doctrine”—and provide the support, it is going to over time result in huge savings, not just in terms of bloodshed and lives lost, but dollars and cents.

As Mr. Payne knows, because he spent considerable time in Haiti, we have spent billions of dollars in Haiti, and it is worse now than it was the day that Aristide departed. It is worse. And what can we do?

Ms. HOLT. If I could add another thing here. And as a former congressional staffer, I am very aware and supportive, I mean, I will always be pro-Congress in that sense. But there is a lesson that the State Department may have learned too well, and that is, that money is the bottomline. And what I worry about is you don’t get candid briefings. Do you get people who come in here and say,

“Okay, we are not going to talk about money for the minute, we are going to talk about what is really required? Here is what we think the concept of the operation is.” When money is a matter, you get briefed on what you get paid for. And what I worry about is that the person who briefs the Hill every single month, the first question they usually ask is: “How much does it cost?” Here. And that is our reputation in New York as well. And so some of the things that we are discussing here today we need to have a candid conversation about.

Just a second point on the Global Peace Operations Initiative. We have seen this Administration try and offer leadership to detail what you are talking about: Who is going to do peacekeeping? How can we add a proposal in 5 years, \$660 million to a global pool to train peacekeepers around the world? I think the question is: What is our concept of operation? What are the capacity baselines that are there now and how are they moving to another level, and how is this going to be integrated? The Europeans want to help out; great; let’s have that conversation.

And back to Eric’s quote on doctrine. The U.N. is not supposed to write doctrine, they are not supposed to train either. So they can write guidance. But to the extent that we can work with the countries that have developed doctrine on peacekeeping, the U.S. has been thinking about it, the United Kingdom and Canada, a number of European countries are trying to figure out what the doctrine would look like. I think that is relevant for this Committee as you look at Africa in particular, with the African missions before us. So that is my last remark.

Thank you very much, and I have appreciated being here today.

Mr. BOOZMAN. Thank you all so much for coming. I really appreciate Mr. Payne and Mr. Smith having us here. I think it was very beneficial, something I really enjoyed, got a lot of useful information. I appreciate your testimony, and the meeting is adjourned.

[Whereupon, at 4:51 p.m., the Subcommittee was adjourned.]

