[Senate Hearing 109-98]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
S. Hrg. 109-98
THE PRESIDENT'S BUDGET FOR FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND BUSINESS MEETING TO VOTE
OUT THE NOMINATION OF ROBERT B. ZOELLICK TO BE DEPUTY SECRETARY OF
STATE
=======================================================================
HEARING
BEFORE THE
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS
UNITED STATES SENATE
ONE HUNDRED NINETH CONGRESS
FIRST SESSION
__________
FEBRUARY 16, 2005
__________
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COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS
RICHARD G. LUGAR, Indiana, Chairman
CHUCK HAGEL, Nebraska JOSEPH R. BIDEN, Jr., Delaware
LINCOLN CHAFEE, Rhode Island PAUL S. SARBANES, Maryland
GEORGE ALLEN, Virginia CHRISTOPHER J. DODD, Connecticut
NORM COLEMAN, Minnesota JOHN F. KERRY, Massachusetts
GEORGE V. VOINOVICH, Ohio RUSSELL D. FEINGOLD, Wisconsin
LAMAR ALEXANDER, Tennessee BARBARA BOXER, California
JOHN E. SUNUNU, New Hampshire BILL NELSON, Florida
LISA MURKOWSKI, Alaska BARACK OBAMA, Illinois
MEL MARTINEZ, Florida
Kenneth A. Myers, Jr., Staff Director
Antony J. Blinken, Democratic Staff Director
(ii)
?
C O N T E N T S
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Page
Biden, Hon. Joseph R., U.S. Senator from Delaware................ 4
Prepared statement........................................... 9
Lugar, Hon. Richard G., U.S. Senator from Indiana................ 1
Rice, Hon. Condoleezza, Secretary of State, U.S. Department of
State.......................................................... 11
Prepared statement........................................... 14
Additional Statement and Questions and Answers Submitted for the Record
Alexander, Hon. Lamar, U.S. Senator from Tennessee, prepared
statement...................................................... 49
Rice, Hon. Condoleezza:
Responses to questions submitted by Senator Lugar............ 50
Responses to questions submitted by Senator Sarbanes......... 57
Responses to questions submitted by Senator Biden............ 58
(iii)
THE PRESIDENT'S BUDGET FOR FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND BUSINESS MEETING TO VOTE
OUT THE NOMINATION OF ROBERT B. ZOELLICK TO BE DEPUTY SECRETARY OF
STATE
----------
WEDNESDAY, FEBRUARY 16, 2005
U.S. Senate,
Committee on Foreign Relations,
Washington, DC.
The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 10 a.m., in room
SD-419, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Hon. Richard G. Lugar,
chairman of the committee, presiding.
Present: Senators Lugar, Hagel, Chafee, Allen, Coleman,
Alexander, Martinez, Biden, Sarbanes, Feingold, Boxer, Nelson,
and Obama.
OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. RICHARD G. LUGAR, U.S. SENATOR FROM
INDIANA
The Chairman. This hearing of the Senate Foreign Relations
Committee is called to order.
Today the Committee welcomes our Secretary of State,
Condoleezza Rice. Although she appeared before us four weeks
ago, this is the first time that she has testified before the
Congress as Secretary of State, a very special occasion. We
welcome her in this new capacity. We look forward to many such
appearances in the future.
The Foreign Relations Committee, Congress, and the American
people have followed your recent travels, Ms. Secretary, to
Europe and to the Middle East, with very great interest. We are
excited to learn more about the progress you have made in
advancing relations with important friends and allies. The
United States needs partners in the world who will work with us
toward mutual goals.
The international debate on Iraq exposed the division
within the Atlantic Alliance over the best methods to combat
terrorism and weapons of mass destruction. This has strained
some of our traditional partnerships, but it has not broken
them. We applaud your efforts to improve the dialog with
friends and allies who have shared our values for generations.
During the last several years, American foreign policy has
achieved an extensive list of accomplishments, many of which
require resources and attention to nurture. The people of Iraq
have held successful elections under difficult circumstances.
Schools are operating, police and army units are being trained,
free media is being established, and women are participating in
societies in ways they have not done before. Violence continues
as the opponents of freedom and stability seek to reverse the
course of democracy. But elections have provided a basis for
moving forward with self-government in Iraq.
We also are encouraged by openings in peace negotiations
between Israel and its Palestinian neighbors. We applaud the
role that you have played in moving these talks forward, and we
are interested in your report on this subject.
In his recent Inaugural and State of the Union addresses,
President Bush placed the advancement of freedom and democracy
at the core of U.S. foreign policy. American encouragement and
assistance has contributed to important democratic successes in
Ukraine and Georgia. In the Middle East, our efforts and the
democratic advances in Iraq and Afghanistan are helping to
spark a debate over modernization and democracy. It is vital
that the United States back up our rhetoric with resources and
action. Democracy-building is hard work, but the President is
right that such efforts are the means through which our own
security and prosperity will be achieved.
The United States also has had successes in the area of
nonproliferation. In Russia, the Nunn-Lugar Cooperative Threat
Reduction Program and its associated programs continue to
safeguard and destroy the arsenal of weapons of mass
destruction built by the former Soviet Union. Through the G8
Global Partnership Against the Spread of Weapons of Mass
Destruction, we have secured $10 billion in commitments for
this endeavor from our allies. Congress passed legislation that
allows the Nunn-Lugar program to be used outside the states of
the former Soviet Union. With President Bush's strong
encouragement, chemical weapons destruction at Shchuchye in
Russia has been accelerated. We must ensure that the funding
and momentum of the Nunn-Lugar Program and other
nonproliferation efforts are not encumbered by bureaucratic
obstacles or undercut by political disagreements.
The Bush administration also has recruited more than 60
countries to join the Proliferation Security Initiative, a
program that has enhanced our ability to interdict illegal
weapons-of-mass-destruction shipments around the world.
Through the Energy Department, the administration
established the Global Threat Reduction Initiative, which aims
to secure high-risk nuclear and radiological materials
globally. In addition, it secured the passage of the United
Nations Security Council Resolution 1540 in April 2004, which,
for the first time declared that weapons-of-mass-destruction
proliferation is illegal.
Libya's decision to open its weapons-of-mass-destruction
program to international inspection is a continuing success for
United States foreign policy, resulting from close coordination
with allies, firm diplomacy, and the demonstration of our
resolve in Iraq and Afghanistan.
State Department diplomacy has provided constant
encouragement to the promising talks between nuclear weapons
states, India and Pakistan, that represent the best chance in
years to reduce tensions on that subcontinent.
The President put forward bold plans to fight the global
spread of AIDS and to establish the Millennium Challenge
Corporation, which will encourage political and economic
progress in developing nations that embrace positive reforms.
Congress worked closely with the White House and the State
Department on these initiatives and passed legislation that
would implement them.
We've also extended the African Growth and Opportunity Act,
which will expand our economic cooperation with that continent.
These and other efforts, including our response to the
tsunami disaster, demonstrate that the United States intends to
provide leadership in fighting the poverty and disorder that so
often are at the root of conflict.
This partial list of foreign policy successes and
priorities shows how expansive the global challenges are for
our country. These challenges cannot be met merely through
insightful decisionmaking. Effective diplomacy requires that
our policymakers and diplomats have at their disposal an array
of smoothly functioning foreign policy tools, including foreign
assistance, public diplomacy, secure embassies, and post-
conflict reconstruction capabilities.
I have spoken often of the diminishment of U.S. foreign
policy capabilities and resources that took place during the
1990s. The foreign affairs budget has been underfunded since
the end of the cold war. The American public generally
understands that the United States reduced military spending in
the 1990s, following the fall of the Soviet Union. Yet few are
aware that this peace dividend spending-reduction theme was
applied even more unsparingly to our foreign affairs programs.
In constant dollars, the foreign affairs budget was cut in
6 consecutive years, from 1992 to 1997. This slide occurred
even as the United States sustained the heavy added costs of
establishing new missions in the 15 emergent states of the
former Soviet Union. In constant dollars, the cumulative effect
was a 26-percent decrease in our foreign affairs programs. As a
percentage of GDP, the 6-year slide represented a 38-percent
cut in foreign affairs programs.
By the beginning of the new millennium, these cuts had
taken their toll. The General Accounting Office reported that
staffing shortfalls, lack of adequate language skills, and
security vulnerabilities plagued many of our diplomatic posts.
In 2001, the share of the U.S. budget devoted to the
international affairs account stood at a paltry 1.18 percent,
barely above its post-World War II low, and only about half of
its share in the mid 1980s.
Under President Bush and Secretary Powell, funding for the
Foreign Affairs account has increased substantially. The
President has requested increases in each of the last four
budgets. In this year's budget, the President has requested a
13-percent increase for the Foreign Affairs account, the
largest percent increase of any account in the budget. This is
a tangible demonstration of the President's commitment to
diplomatic strength, and Congress must now do its part by
providing the resources the President needs to carry out an
effective foreign policy.
Secretary Rice, we are eager to hear your views on the
health of our alliances, the Bush administration's plans for
making further progress in Iraq and Afghanistan, the status of
negotiations pertaining to Iran, North Korea, and the Arab-
Israeli peace process, and your assessment of the State
Department's budget. We thank you for joining us today. We look
forward to your discussion.
And I call now upon the distinguished ranking member for
his welcoming remarks, Senator Biden.
STATEMENT OF HON. JOSEPH R. BIDEN, U.S. SENATOR FROM DELAWARE
Senator Biden. Thank you very much.
Madam Secretary, welcome. Great job. You made us proud. You
did a wonderful job of your maiden voyage. I really mean it.
You said this was going to be the term of diplomacy, and you
did it with grace and strength, and I applaud you for it.
And while you were away--you may not have noticed--there
were an awful lot of pictures of you and me hugging after I
said, ``Don't listen to Rumsfeld.'' [Laughter.]
And several reporters called me and said--mainstream
international reporters said, ``If she doesn't listen to
Rumsfeld, what in the heck would make you think she'd listen to
you?'' I said, ``I had no thoughts that that would happen.''
But I'm sure that you've, for the record, discounted my
recommendation, as you probably should.
But I really mean it, it was a first-rate performance, and
I was really pleased. Quite frankly, I was excited about it. I
was excited about the opportunity that I think you've opened up
for the President's trip. I think you have presented him with a
glide path that is going to be a very different environment,
because of you having been there, than might have existed,
fairly or unfairly. I think you've set this up perfectly. And
now I hope our European friends, as I said in Davos, in my
private meetings with heads of state, including France, should
get over it. I know they're characterized as the bluest state.
But the truth of the matter is, they need us. And, in my view,
I think we need them.
Your trip provided, I think, a fresh start and a chance to
repair some of the damage done to our transatlantic
relationship after the diplomatic battles over Iraq and other
issues. And I think you made important progress.
But diplomacy requires not only listening--it ultimately
involves mutual agreement. It remains an open question--open to
me, only; I speak for myself, I must tell you--it remains an
open question just how prepared the President is to reach out
and swallow hard, sometimes, to reach some mutually beneficial
agreements. And I must tell you, I have my concerns about how
magnanimous our European friends are prepared to be. But this
is a time for magnanimity, not of our mutual self interest.
We agree, for example, to invite Europe to play a
meaningful role in helping chart Iraq's course. And I think the
public has come to conclude, as I have believed, and maybe you
and others, that Iraq is not a prize. It's a country trying to
recover from decades of despotic rule. And Europe has as much
at stake in the stability of Iraq as we do, and, I would argue,
in some cases, more at stake than we do.
And I was very disappointed the last year and a half, quite
frankly. I think some of the European countries--and they're
going to get angry with my saying this, but I've said it to
them personally--basically sat on their hands because they
didn't want to do anything they thought would promote the
reelection of George Bush. I may be wrong about that. But
whether I'm right or wrong, it's over. It is over. And that's
why I think they may be inclined, with your leadership and the
President's forcefulness--they may be prepared to play a much
larger role.
That's why I proposed--and I'm not married to the concept,
and sometimes I think if I propose it, if I suggest it, it's
maybe the death knell; I sometimes hesitate to agree with my
colleagues, because I think I hurt them--but I think this is an
opportune time to set up a contact group on Iraq. I think this
is an opportune time to include the major European powers. I
think it's an opportune time to go to the Secretary General of
NATO, the Presidency of the EU, our Ambassador in Iraq, to form
a group that literally meets on a monthly basis, to coordinate
the international community's policy toward and assistance for
Iraq.
I think it's time to make Iraq the world's problem. And in
my discussions--and you have had much more depth in your
discussions with the Europeans than I have had, in the last
month, on your recent trip, but I think they're ready. I think
they're ready if you can use your fertile imagination to come
up with a construct that allows them to sit at the table
without us, in fact, giving up anything, other than the right
for them to share their obligation and pain of what's going to
have to happen between now and, at least, next December or
January, when the elections are final, the constitution is
written.
And sometime--you don't have a lot of time now, but
sometime, I'd like to maybe come to your office and lay out, in
a little more detail, the notion--again, I'm sure there are
other people who have better ideas, but some way to get them at
the table on a regularized basis. Now, I haven't had any formal
discussions with any newly elected Iraqis, although some I've
met have been elected--I think it gives them a foil, as well.
It gives them an opportunity to look to those who want them to
be more xenophobic in their approach, whether they're Shia or
Kurds, to say, ``Look, the international community's here.
We're sitting here, and we're available, and the way to get the
most help is''--but that's just me. I'd be interested to have
an opportunity to talk with you a few minutes.
And the thing that concerns me the most is our policy on
Iran as it relates to United States/European unity. I'd like,
again, in that same meeting, to give you the opportunity to go
into some detail of what I was told, and some of my other
colleagues were told, by Chirac about where he was and what he
was prepared to do, and so on and so forth. And I'd like to
just give you the benefit of that, to see if what I'm hearing
is actually accurate.
For example, we had the Foreign Minister, yesterday, from
Egypt. We hosted him. And I asked a question that I had spent a
lot of time with Mubarak, in January, talking about, and that
is their offer of considerably more help to train. Considerably
more. You know how President Mubarak is; he said, ``We need
more. More. We'll help you more,'' and so on. So I asked. I
asked the Foreign Minister. Because some of my colleagues--not
my colleagues here--were kind of new to that idea, and he said,
``Yeah. We're ready to help more.'' And so, we asked the
Ambassador to check it out. I mean, because he didn't know the
answer to that.
So, I guess what I'm trying to say is that sometimes, what
I get over the transom and what I get in my visits is totally
consistent with what the real offers are. And Iran is a place
that is of considerable concern to me. I, quite frankly--and
I'm not going to ask you now--I don't understand our policy.
I'm not being facetious. And I don't understand how it
intersects with the European efforts.
To me, it seems like we're sitting on the sidelines a bit,
both in regard to Iran and North Korea, Madam Secretary. I
think the Europeans and the Asians, they have to--our allies,
our friends, our interlocutors--they have to be prepared to put
more sticks in the bag. But we have to prepare to put more
carrots in the bag, as well.
And I may be wrong, but I've not heard anybody come up with
a better idea, so far, as to how to proceed here, because one
of the things that I don't believe, as some have written, as
your number two--and he is a first-rate guy--we're going to
vote for him. I think he'll pass, you know, overwhelmingly. But
he had written an article, back in 2000, saying time was on our
side in Korea. I would strongly argue that time is not on our
side in Korea. And I'm not at all sure negotiations, no matter
how well conceived, no matter how many sticks or how many
carrots are in the bag, will change that fellow in the North. I
just don't know. I am not willing to bet my daughter's
graduate-school tuition on it. And so, I don't fully understand
our approach.
And the question I have is: Are we going to also take some
new approaches on contentious issues, that I think we're right
on in substance, but we're wrong on in our style? Kyoto. We
were right about needing to do more in Kyoto. I think we were
dead wrong walking away, just simply walking away. Like it or
not, many of our friends have committed to Kyoto, and we can't
just shrug our shoulders and endlessly debate the science. I
think, instead, we should engage our allies in constructive
dialog about a way forward, and I would argue we should do that
on the International Criminal Court, and we should do that on a
number of things. We should not sign on the way it is, but I
think we should not sign off and walk away.
Can we engage in our allies in advancing the bold agenda of
human freedoms set forth in the President's Inaugural Address?
And how is that going to coexist with our policies in the
global struggle against terrorism? Will our close allies in the
war on terrorism, Saudi Arabia, Pakistan, and Egypt--I'm
finding in my visits there a little resistance, already, to,
``What do you guys mean by `advancing freedom'? What do you
mean by it?'' And I say, ``I'll tell you what I mean by it. I
mean, you've got to change.'' But there is this real feeling
of, ``What's the deal here? What are we talking about?'' And I
say that because I got to meet with a lot of the foreign
ministers and heads of state of those countries in Davos, and
they seek, as they call them, those bilateral meetings, to ask
``What's going on?'' And I tell them, ``You've got the wrong
guy. You should talk to Hagel. He's a Republican. He'd know
better than me.''
But, all kidding aside, will they respond to this reform
agenda by reducing cooperation with us with regard to terror
and al-Qaeda? I don't think so, but it's a big issue.
And a liberal democracy, as you know, Madam Secretary, is
more than just an election. It must rest on a foundation of a
strong civil society, educational opportunity, political
pluralism, independent media, a private sector where people
invest, and the rule of law. And that takes time. And our aid
programs in places like Egypt and Pakistan, I think, have
lagged in supporting these sectors.
I think we should be more direct with our dollars in
developing the strong nongovernmental institutions in those
countries to build democratic foundations that we need. And I
think we should seek help in this venture. For example--you may
remember, because, you poor woman, you had to spend so much
time with me when Henry Hyde said, ``Joe will meet you.''
Remember that meeting? And so, we got a chance to meet a lot.
And you may remember--and I'm going to try to revive it
with my colleagues, and I think you may be sympathetic to the
idea--that when I came back from Afghanistan, right after the
Taliban fell, I had an opportunity to meet with you, and I was
told, at the time, you could build a school in Afghanistan for
$20,000, and have a teacher run it for a year. That's the total
cost. And I suggested maybe our goal should be to build a
thousand schools in Afghanistan. Because you have educated me--
as well as informed me in policy, you were the first one to
talk to me about the madrassas and how the Saudi--whether it
was the Saudi Government or not, the Saudis were building--I
believe the number in Pakistan and Afghanistan was close to
7,000. I may be mistaken about that, but I think that's right.
And I think we have to do two things. We have to hold the
Saudis in this--I'm sorry to go on so long, Mr. Chairman, I'll
finish in a moment--as we look at the aid package this year, I
think we should be insisting that the Saudis, for example--and
they are making progress, they are working at it--they should
have a law applied in their country, like ours.
There's a place called Fishtown in Philadelphia. It's the
Irish section. I remember, in the early '80s, speaking at a bar
in Fishtown, campaigning for a mayor. And because my mother's
name is Finnegan and I'm an identifiable Irish politician, I
got all this stuff about, ``Why aren't we helping in the north
more?'' It turns out, after I came back from that, the FBI
calls later and says, ``They're about to crack down in that
area, because there's a significant amount of money going to
the IRA to purchase weapons.'' Now, it's against the law for us
to do that.
The Saudis should make it against the law to help any
outfit if it turns out that the mosque that they build is one
that venom is being preached from about taking down the United
States. If we can produce, for example, books coming out of the
madrassa and present it to the Saudis, that it's about ``Kill
Americans,'' then they should act. They should be held to the
same kind of standards that we hold people here to, because our
lives are at stake. They don't quite get that yet. They're
doing a lot. They're doing a lot. But there's still a lot of
charities out there that are not held to a followup standard as
to what's happening once the madrassa is built.
I also think we should insist that that aid not go from us
without going through the host government. When I was in
Kirkuk, with my friend here, we rode by and saw these
magnificent, shiny, new mosques. I mean, they were magnificent.
And everything else was desolation. And we turned to our host,
who is now the Foreign Minister, and turned and said, ``What's
this?'' And he just nodded his head, and he went, ``Saudis.
Saudis.'' No permission sought.
And we've got to compete. These madrassas are a little bit
like the way people used to send kids to monasteries in the
14th century. You get three square meals, you get some kind of
education, you're out of the house, and you're indoctrinated.
Now, let me turn quickly to the budget. I think you did
well on securing increases when many other agencies in
government took reductions, but I think the budget is a
disappointment in a few places. Specifically, it breaks the
commitment the President made to the world, and omits billions
of dollars in costs from the discipline of the budget process
by putting them into this supplemental. And 3 years ago, in
Monterrey, Mexico, the President pledged to the world that we
would increase our core development assistance over 3 years,
resulting in $5 billion in new funds by fiscal 2006.
The President's budget seeks just $3 billion for the
Millennium Challenge Account, and falls far short of the
promised $5 billion. Now, I know the Congress has not pursued
it. The Congress has not gone forward. But I don't think it's
any excuse for the President not to push it, because if he
pushes it, we've got a shot up here.
I also would suggest that the budget doesn't include things
that should be in the budget. This is not your fault, quote,
``responsibility'' or whatever. But the idea that we're putting
the Baghdad Embassy in the supplemental emergency, what's the
game here? That's a direct budget item. We knew we were going
to have to build that. That should not be in a supplemental.
That should be in the budget, the 2006 budget.
It doesn't include funds for, for example, foreign military
financing for Afghanistan, where we've been working to help
them build a new state over 3 years.
It doesn't include costs of a new $400 million ``Solidarity
Initiative'' announced by the President last week to, quote,
``strengthen the capabilities of our partners to advance
democracy and stability around the world.''
To my mind, this is kind of an old idea wrapped in a new
package, using foreign aid funds to reward and support our
allies. But maybe there's no other choice now. I mean, $100
million to the Poles. The Poles can't afford to be there. But
the idea, up to now, we're trying to convince the American
people that we have these allies of the willing that are there.
We should tell them: they're willing as long as we help defray
the costs. I'm happy they're there. And I support the payment.
But we mislead when we include that stuff in supplementals when
we know those costs are going to be necessary.
I'd probably support many of these requests, just on their
merits. But I wonder why these costs, many of which are clearly
foreseeable, get punched into a supplemental and are not
directly in the budget.
To govern is to choose, Madam Secretary, which you know as
well as I do, and the President refuses to make some of these
hard choices between advancing his global agenda and his fealty
to a tax-cutting agenda that has converted trillions of dollars
of the surplus into massive deficits, along with other things,
including 9/11 costs.
But I would ask unanimous consent, Mr. Chairman, that the
remainder of my statement be placed in the record. Madam
Secretary, I think you're off to a great start. You're one of
those folks who I think can do the hundred in ten flat. And now
we've finally given you a lane here. I just hope they follow
it.
At any rate, I thank you for being here and thank you for
listening.
The Chairman. Thank you, Senator Biden. Your statement will
be published in the record in full.
[The prepared statement of Senator Biden follows:]
Prepared Statement of Hon. Joseph R. Biden, Jr., U.S. Senator From
Delaware
Madam Secretary, welcome back to the Committee, and welcome back
from your trip to Europe and the Middle East. You did a tremendous job.
And you opened a real opportunity for the President to have a
successful trip later this month.
Your trip provided a fresh start--a chance to repair the damage
done to the transatlantic relationship after the diplomatic battles
over Iraq and other issues. As I've said before, our European friends
need to get over their problems with this administration. They need us.
And, I believe, we need them. I think you made important progress, and
I congratulate you. But diplomacy requires not only listening--it
ultimately involves mutual agreement. And it remains an open question
just how prepared the President is to reach out and reach some mutually
beneficial agreements with our friends.
Will we agree, for example, to invite Europe to play a meaningful
role in helping Iraq chart its democratic path?
Iraq is not a prize; it is a country trying to recover from decades
of despotic rule. Europe has as much at stake in its stability as we
do, and arguably more.
That's why I've proposed a Contact Group--to include the major
European powers--to coordinate the international community's policy
toward and assistance for Iraq. It's time to make Iraq the world's
problem, not just our own. In my discussions, I think Europe is ready
to help.
What is our policy on Iran and can we agree with Europe on a common
strategy? Our European friends seek our help in their negotiating
effort, but we remain largely spectators. If the use of force is not on
the agenda at this time, then what is?
In other words, if the time for diplomacy is now, what is our plan
to undertake it with respect to Iran?
Similarly, what will the Administration do during this term with
regard to North Korea's nuclear program? In the past four years, North
Korea has increased its nuclear weapons capacity by as much as 400
percent. This is a country that will sell anything to anyone for the
right price. Time is not on our side.
In both North Korea and Iran, the best path forward would be for
our Asian and European partners to show more sticks--that is, to make
clear to North Korea and Iran the kind of sanctions and isolation they
risk if they don't do the right thing.
But we, in turn, have to show more carrots--that is, to make clear
to North Korea and Iran what they might gain if they do the right
thing.
No one knows whether a coordinated carrots and sticks approach with
our partners will succeed in either case. But no one has put forward a
better alternative to make us more secure. And treading water for
another four years is not an option.
Will we take a new approach on the contentious issue of climate
change? The Kyoto Protocol takes effect today. Like it or not, many of
our friends have committed to it; we cannot just shrug our shoulders
and endlessly debate the science.
We should instead engage our allies in a constructive dialogue
about the way forward on a challenge we all confront. That applies to
Kyoto and to other issues like the International Criminal Court. We
should not sign on the way things stand--but we cannot just sign off
and walk away.
Can we engage our allies in advancing the bold agenda of human
freedom set forth in the President's inaugural address, and how will it
co-exist with our policies in the global struggle against terrorism?
Will close allies in the war on terrorism--such as Saudi Arabia,
Pakistan, and Egypt--resist democratic reform, or will they respond to
our reform agenda by reducing cooperation against al-Qaeda and its
allies?
Liberal democracy is more than just elections. It must rest on the
foundation of a strong civil society, educational opportunity,
political pluralism, independent media, a thriving private sector and
the rule of law. Our aid programs in places like Egypt and Pakistan
have lagged in supporting these sectors. We should direct more of our
aid dollars to developing strong non-governmental institutions to help
build the democratic foundation, and we should seek allied help in this
venture.
In addition, we have to be more aggressive in ending the export of
radical ideologies. We have to be proactive, for example, in combating
the madrassas which poison children's minds but also put food in their
stomachs and clothes on their backs. When I went to Afghanistan just
after the Taliban fell in 2002, I was told that for just $20,000, we
could build a schoolhouse and staff it with a teacher for a year. I
discussed the idea with then National Security Advisor Rice. I'd like
to see us act on this idea to help countries like Afghanistan compete
with the madrassas.
Let me turn now to the budget. You did well to secure increases
when many other agencies in the government took reductions.
But the budget is also a disappointment for what it does not
include. Specifically, it breaks a commitment the President made to the
world, and it omits billions of dollars in costs from the discipline of
the budget process by putting them into the supplemental.
Three years ago, in Monterrey, Mexico, the President pledged to the
world that the United States would increase our core development
assistance over three years, resulting in $5 billion in new funds by
Fiscal 2006.
The President's budget seeks just $3 billion for the Millennium
Challenge Account next year, far short of the promised $5 billion.
True, Congress has not provided the full amounts requested by the
President, but that is hardly an excuse for abandoning his own
commitment. His leadership is critical.
The budget is notable for other things it does not include:
It does not include the costs to build a new Embassy in Baghdad,
even though we have known for two years that we will need to do so.
It does not include funds for continued Foreign Military Financing
for Afghanistan, where we have been working to help them build a new
state for over three years.
It does not include costs for the new $400 million ``Solidarity
Initiative'' announced by the President last week, which, we are told,
will ``strengthen the capabilities of our partners to advance democracy
and stability around the world.'' To my mind, this is an old idea
wrapped up in a new package: using foreign aid funds to reward and
support allies.
Where can we find all these items? In the ``emergency''
supplemental transmitted by the President on Monday. I would probably
support many or all of these requests on their merits. But I wonder why
these costs--many of which are readily foreseeable--are included in the
supplemental.
To govern is to choose. Yet the President refuses to make some of
these hard choices--between advancing his ambitious global agenda and
his fealty to a tax cutting agenda for the most fortunate among us that
has contributed, along with other problems like 9/1l, to converting
trillions of dollars in surplus into massive deficits.
Advancing American security through a strong military and active
international diplomacy is a primary function of government, and the
duty of a great power. I have not hesitated to support necessary
funding for international programs.
But it is simply wrong to impose the costs of protecting ourselves
today onto the backs of tomorrow's generations--and that is exactly
what the President's supplemental does by adding recklessly to the
deficit.
The Chairman. Let me just mention, before I call on
Secretary Rice, that in the event that 10 members of the
committee, a quorum, should appear, we will move to a
discussion, if necessary, and a vote on Robert Zoellick to be
Under Secretary of State, so that that nomination can be
considered on the floor. Our leader, Dr. Frist, has indicated
that he would be receptive to that occurring. I've mentioned
this to Dr. Rice prior to the meeting so that she would not see
this as an intrusion, and she welcomes such an intrusion, if
such would occur.
If that is not possible, I have asked the indulgence of the
ranking member that the nomination might be discharged from the
committee so that it does get to the floor, so that we do have
a number two person at the Department prior to our recess,
because life goes on in our diplomacy and in the Department.
But, in any event, we will hope for the quorum of the Senators.
Dr. Rice, thank you, again, for coming, and please proceed
with your testimony.
STATEMENT OF HON. CONDOLEEZZA RICE, SECRETARY OF STATE, U.S.
DEPARTMENT OF STATE
Secretary Rice. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. And
thank you, Senator Biden, for those comments. And I look
forward, obviously, to continuing to consult and to work with
this committee, and to discussions of ideas that you may have.
This is clearly a time of challenge, but it is also a time
of hope and opportunity. And the committee has been a stalwart
supporter of the Department and of our diplomacy, and I look
forward to continuing to work, from a strong bipartisan
consensus, to ensure that the men and women of American
diplomacy have the resources they need to conduct their vital
mission.
Mr. Chairman, I'm going to make some remarks from my
testimony and then enter the entire testimony into the record,
if that's all right.
The Chairman. It will be published in full in the record.
Secretary Rice. Thank you.
The President's fiscal year 2006 international affairs
budget for the Department of State, USAID, and other foreign
affairs agencies totals $33.6 billion. On Monday, President
Bush submitted a fiscal year 2005 supplemental request,
including about $5.6 billion for international affairs
activities and $701 million in tsunami relief for the
Department and for USAID.
In his recent State of the Union message, President Bush
spoke of the unprecedented efforts we have undertaken since
September 11 with our friends and allies around the world to
defeat terrorism. But, in the long term, as President Bush has
said, the only force powerful enough to stop the rise of
tyranny and terror and to replace hatred with hope is the force
of human freedom. The President has charged the men and women
of the Department of State with helping to create a balance of
power in the world that favors freedom, and I feel privileged
to lead them in that effort.
In order to advance our diplomatic mission of freedom, I
recently traveled, as you know, to Europe and to the Middle
East. I've spoken with European leaders about how America and
Europe can best work together to serve freedom's cause
worldwide. I emphasized with our European allies that we are in
a new phase, that it was time to turn the page on whatever had
happened before and to write a new chapter in our glorious
alliance, an alliance that had faced down tyranny before and
could do so again in the spread of democracy and freedom. And I
just want to say that I found a quite open door. I found people
who wanted to be constructive, who are looking for ways to move
forward. And will continue to pursue, with vigor, that open
door to a new path. The President travels to Europe at the end
of the week, or the beginning of next week, and he will have an
opportunity to continue to press forward on this agenda.
We talked about a number of issues. Perhaps most
importantly, we talked about the work that we have to do
together in the Middle East, the work of the broader Middle
East and North Africa initiative, but also the work of the
Middle East peace process. And, as you know, next month, in
London, Prime Minister Blair will convene an important
conference to discuss Palestinian issues. And while we know
that the path of democratic reform in the Middle East will be
difficult and uneven, the spread of freedom, the work of
generations, is urgent work that cannot be deferred. From
Morocco to Jordan to Bahrain, we are seeing elections, and new
protections for women and minorities, and the beginnings of
political pluralism.
In support of these hopeful trends, the fiscal year 2006
budget request proposes enhanced funding for diplomatic and
assistance activities in the Middle East, North Africa, and
other majority-Muslim countries. The request includes $120
million for the Middle East Partnership Initiative reform, $40
million for the National Endowment for Democracy to support the
broader Middle East, $180 million for Muslim outreach through
educational and cultural exchanges, and increases for a wide
range of other public diplomacy and broadcasting initiatives
geared toward Muslim publics, particularly toward young people.
Every leader that I met in Europe understood that our
common interest now lies in building on the recent successes
and stabilizing and advancing democratic progress in
Afghanistan and Iraq. For our part, to build on the momentum in
Afghanistan following last October's elections, President Bush
has requested nearly $1.1 billion. The money will be used to
invest in health and education and clean water and free-market
infrastructure that creates conditions for sustained growth and
stability in this country that was once a terrorist haven, but
is now an ally of the United States in the war on terror. The
$1.1 billion includes $437 million for operations to continue
the fight against drugs. And the fiscal year 2005 supplemental
seeks $2 billion for expanding police and counternarcotics
programs and accelerating reconstruction and democracy and
governance activities. The supplemental also includes $60
million for Embassy security and operational costs.
To help advance the cause of democracy in Iraq, the
President has requested $360 million for economic assistance
targeted toward basic needs, and the supplemental includes $690
million to continue United States mission operations and $658
million to construct a new Embassy compound in Iraq.
At their meeting in Sharm el-Sheik, President Mubarak, King
Abdullah, and Prime Minister Sharon, and President Abbas all
called this a time for opportunity. And I just want to say, it
was remarkable to walk into the meetings with Prime Minister
Sharon and President Abbas and have them start with the same
line, ``This is a time for opportunity, and we must seize it.''
President Bush has announced that he will seek an
additional $350 million to help the Palestinians build
infrastructure and sustain the reform process over the next 2
years. Of that $350 million, $150 is in the budget request for
2006, and $200 million is in the supplemental request. And let
me just say, I look forward to consultations with Members of
Congress about how best to use this funding as we consult also
with the members of the Palestinian Authority.
Even as we work with allies and friends to meet the great
challenges of advancing freedom and peace in this vital region,
there are other things that we must do to build on the hope for
opportunity in other areas. We seek $3 billion for the third
year of the Millennium Challenge Corporation, this bold,
growth-promoting approach to development which helps countries
that govern justly, adopt sound economic policies, and invest
in the welfare of their people. I cannot emphasize strongly
enough how important it is that we receive this funding,
because we are really now making a lot of progress in the
development of compacts with countries, and it is a challenge
to countries of the world to govern justly and to put together
programs that can demonstrate that.
We are also seeking $2.4 billion in development, child
survival, and health assistance.
We're requesting $5.8 billion in assistance to our partners
in the global war on terror. And, in the supplemental, $750
million is there to support our coalition partners, including
those who are standing with us in Afghanistan and Iraq.
I'm sure that the members of this committee will agree
that, when they engage effectively, multilateral institutions
can multiply our strength as freedom-loving nations. And so, we
are requesting $1.2 billion for our U.S. obligations to
international organizations, including to the United Nations,
and $1 billion to pay projected U.S. assessments for U.N.
peacekeeping missions. We are seeking $114 million to enhance
the peacekeeping capabilities of non-U.N. forces, with a
particular focus on Africa. In addition, the supplemental seeks
$100 million to support the North-South Peace Agreement, and
$242 million to address urgent humanitarian needs arising out
of the ongoing Darfur crisis so that we can address Sudan.
We've seen how states where chaos and corruption and
cruelty can pose a threat to their neighbors and regions, how
that can come home to our own shores as a threat. And so, we
are working to strengthen international capacities to address
conditions in failed, failing, and post-conflict states. This
committee has been particularly supportive of the President's
charge to us, at the State Department, to coordinate our
Nation's post-conflict and stabilization efforts. We are asking
for $24 million for the new Office of the Coordinator for
Reconstruction and Stabilization that is housed in the
Department. The fiscal year supplemental--2005 supplemental
seeks $17 million for startup costs and personnel costs for
that Coordinator's office. And the 2006 budget request proposes
$100 million for a conflict-response fund, because one is often
not able to see ahead in a way that is flexible enough to deal
with arising crises.
Obviously, the United States wishes to stay at the
forefront of the global fight against HIV/AIDS. We are
requesting $3.2 billion in total U.S. funding for care,
treatment, and prevention efforts that can demonstrate the
compassion of the American people.
And there are other ways that we demonstrate that
compassion. We are requesting $2.5 billion in food aid and
famine relief, and the supplemental requests $950 million for
rehabilitation and reconstruction associated with the
devastation of the tsunami. That includes the $350 million
initially pledged for tsunami efforts.
I welcome this committee's help in ensuring that the men
and women of American diplomacy are well equipped for the
challenges ahead, in terms of training and technologies and
safe workplaces. Secretary Powell made a great deal of progress
in this area, and I want very much to build on the foundation
that has been established. We are, therefore, requesting $1.5
billion for security-related construction and $690 million to
increase security for diplomatic personnel and facilities.
One of the most important things that we can do is
strengthen the recruitment of new personnel, and we are seeking
$57 million for 221 new positions to meet core staffing and
training requirements. And so that people are properly trained
and can use technology, we are asking for $249 million for
investment in information technology.
Let me say, too, that I, before this Committee, during my
confirmation hearing, said how important public diplomacy will
be for the Department. And in the fiscal year 2006 request we
have included $328 million for activities to engage, inform,
and influence foreign publics. But our public diplomacy efforts
cannot succeed if we close ourselves off from the world, so we
are asking for $931 million to improve border security at the
same time that we increase our educational and cultural
exchange programs to a total of $430 million in fiscal year
2006. In other words, we will keep America's doors open and our
borders secure.
Mr. Chairman, members of the committee, this is a time of
global transformation, and it calls for transformational
diplomacy. I've not outlined all of the elements here of the
budget, but rather to highlight some that we consider
particularly emblematic of what we must do.
I want to thank you, Mr. Chairman, for the support of this
committee, and I'm happy to answer any questions that you and
other distinguished members of the committee might have.
Thank you.
[The prepared statement of Secretary Rice follows:]
Prepared Statement of Hon. Condoleezza Rice, Secretary of State
Thank you, Mr. Chairman. This is a time of challenge, hope and
opportunity for America, and for the world. And as I mentioned during
the Committee's consideration of my nomination, I look forward to
working with you to build a strong bipartisan consensus behind
America's foreign policy and to ensure that the men and women of
American diplomacy have the resources they need to conduct their vital
mission.
The President's FY 2006 International Affairs Budget for the
Department of State, USAID and other foreign affairs agencies totals
$33.6 billion. On Monday, President Bush submitted an FY 2005
supplemental request, including $6.3 billion for international affairs
activities, of which $701 million is for tsunami relief funding for the
Department of State and USAID.
If I may, Mr. Chairman, I will begin with an overview of President
Bush's foreign policy mission, which we seek this Committee's support
to advance.
In his recent State of the Union Message, President Bush spoke of
the unprecedented efforts we have undertaken since September 11, 2001
with allies and friends around the world to defeat terrorism. The
President spoke of the significant progress we have made confronting
the enemy abroad, removing many of al-Qaeda's top commanders, cutting
off terrorist finances, and putting pressure on states that sponsor or
harbor terrorists or seek to proliferate weapons of mass destruction.
But in the long term, as President Bush said, ``The only force powerful
enough to stop the rise of tyranny and terror, and replace hatred with
hope, is the force of human freedom.''
President Bush has charged the men and women of the Department of
State with helping to create a balance of power in the world that
favors freedom, and I feel privileged to lead them in this effort.
To advance our diplomatic mission of freedom, I recently traveled,
as you know, to Europe and the Middle East. I spoke with European
leaders about how America and Europe can best work together to serve
freedom's cause worldwide. President Bush will continue that
conversation when he arrives in Europe on February 21.
Our European allies and we must put the power of our partnership to
work to meet the challenges of a changing world--particularly in the
Broader Middle East and North Africa. Efforts to encourage political
pluralism, economic openness and the growth of civil society are
critical to the future of this strategically important region.
Recognizing this, through the G-8 we have established the Forum for the
Future--a new partnership of progress between the democratic world and
the nations of a vast region extending from Morocco to Pakistan. The
first meeting of the Forum in Rabat last December was a success. We
must now follow up on that success and we are committed to assisting
the Forum to play a central role in advancing reform in the region.
Next month in London, Prime Minister Blair will convene an
important conference of major donors to help the Palestinian people
advance their political, security and economic reforms and build
infrastructure for self-government. Also in March, under the auspices
of the Broader Middle East and North Africa Initiative, Egypt will host
a meeting in Cairo of G-8 and Arab League members to broaden the base
of support for peace and reform.
The path of democratic reform in the Middle East will be difficult
and uneven. The spread of freedom is the work of generations, but it is
also urgent work that cannot be deferred.
From Morocco to Jordan to Bahrain, we are seeing elections and new
protections for women and minorities, and the beginnings of political
pluralism. In support of these hopeful trends, the FY 2006 budget
request proposes enhanced funding for diplomatic and assistance
activities in the Middle East, North Africa and other majority Muslim
countries. The request includes $120 million for the Middle East
Partnership Initiative for reform, $40 million for the National
Endowment for Democracy to support the Broader Middle East and North
Africa Initiative, $180 million for Muslim outreach through educational
and cultural exchanges, and increases for a wide range of other public
diplomacy and broadcasting initiatives geared toward Muslim publics,
particularly populations not typically reached by other programs
including women and young people. The success of freedom in Afghanistan
and Iraq will give strength to reformers throughout the region, and
accelerate the pace of reforms already underway.
Every leader in Europe I spoke to understands our common interest
in building on recent successes and stabilizing and advancing
democratic progress in Afghanistan and Iraq. For our part, to build on
the momentum in Afghanistan following last October's elections,
President Bush has requested nearly $1.1 billion. This money will be
used to invest in health, education, clean water and free market
infrastructure that create conditions for sustained growth and
stability. The $1.1 billion includes funds for operations to continue
the fight against drugs. The FY 2005 supplemental seeks $2 billion for
expanding police and counter-narcotics programs and accelerating
reconstruction and democracy and governance activities. The
supplemental also includes $60 million for Embassy security and
operational costs.
The European leaders I spoke with agree that it is time to close
the book on our past differences over Iraq, and time for all of us to
help the Iraqi people write a new book--the history of a democratic
Iraq. To help the advance of democracy in Iraq, President Bush has
requested $360 million for economic assistance to continue work already
begun under the IRRF and targeted towards helping the Iraqi government
to create a functioning democracy and a justice system governed by the
rule of law, to deliver basic services to its people, to collect
revenues, to generate jobs and to develop a free market system capable
of joining the global economy. The FY 2005 supplemental includes $690
million to continue U.S. mission operations and $658 million to
construct a new embassy compound in Baghdad.
Of course, the process of reform in the Muslim world is not
detached from the resolution of important political issues. In my
recent travels I found no difference of view, at all, between the
United States and Europe on the goal of an independent Palestinian
state living side-by-side in peace with the Jewish State of Israel. We
all support the process of reform in the Palestinian Authority. The
successful Palestinian elections of January 9, and the Israeli
withdrawal plan for Gaza and parts of the West Bank, have created a new
climate that is propitious for movement back to the Roadmap. And we
thank Senators Biden and Sununu for serving on the U.S. Delegation that
observed those key elections.
At their meeting in Sharm el-Sheikh with President Mubarak and King
Abdullah, both Prime Minister Sharon and President Abbas called this a
time of opportunity must not be lost. And President Bush has invited
both leaders to Washington in the spring. President Bush also has
announced an additional $350 million to help the Palestinians build
infrastructure and sustain the reform process over the next two years.
Of the $350 million, $150 million is included in the FY 2006 budget
request and $200 million is included in the FY 2005 supplemental.
And so I have returned from my travels to the Middle East and
Europe confident that the parties now have before them the best chance
for advancing peace that they are likely to see for some years to come.
Even as we work with allies and friends to meet the great challenge
of advancing freedom and peace in the broader Middle East and North
Africa, we will seize other important opportunities to build a world of
peace and hope.
We will work to strengthen the community of democracies, so that
all free nations are equal to the work before us. We must do all we can
to ensure that nations which make the hard choices and do the hard work
to join the free world deliver on the high hopes of their citizens for
a better life. In much of Africa and Latin America, we face the twin
challenges of helping to bolster democratic ideals and institutions,
and alleviating poverty. We will insist that leaders who are elected
democratically have an obligation to govern democratically. We will
work in partnership with developing nations to fight corruption,
instill the rule of law, and create a culture of transparency that will
attract the trade and investment crucial to poverty reduction.
We seek $3 billion for the third year of the Millennium Challenge
Corporation, our bold, growth-promoting approach to development, which
helps countries that govern justly, adopt sound economic policies and
invest in the welfare of their people. We also seek $2.4 billion in
development, child survival and health assistance. This Budget exceeds
the President's 2002 commitment for overall growth in core development
assistance by requesting a total of $19.8 billion, $8.2 billion more
than in 2002.
We will help countries enhance their capabilities to protect their
citizens from traffickers and terrorists.
Our FY 2006 request includes $734.5 million for the Andean Counter
Drug Initiative to consolidate gains made in recent years in
eradication, interdiction and alternative development.
We are requesting $5.8 billion in assistance to our partners in the
global war on terror. And the FY 2005 supplemental proposes $750
million to support our coalition partners, including those standing
steadfastly with us in Afghanistan and Iraq.
When they engage effectively, multilateral institutions can
multiply the strength of freedom-loving nations. We are requesting
nearly $1.2 billion for U.S. obligations to international
organizations, including the United Nations, and a little over $1
billion to pay projected U.S. assessments for U.N. peacekeeping
missions. We are seeking $114 million to enhance the peacekeeping
capabilities of non-U.N. forces, with a particular focus on Africa. The
FY 2005 supplemental request seeks $780 million to fund the U.N.-
assessed costs of new and planned peacekeeping missions in the Ivory
Coast, Haiti, Burundi, and Sudan/Darfur, and includes $55 million for a
possible Sudan tribunal. In addition, the supplemental seeks $100
million to support the North-South peace agreement and $242 million to
address urgent humanitarian needs arising from the ongoing Darfur
crisis.
We have seen how states where chaos, corruption and cruelty reign
can pose threats to their neighbors, to their regions, and to the
entire world. And so we are working to strengthen international
capacities to address conditions in failed, failing and post-conflict
states. We know that this is an issue of special interest to you, Mr.
Chairman, and President Bush already has charged us at the State
Department with coordinating our nation's post-conflict and
stabilization efforts. We are asking for $24 million for the new Office
of the Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization housed in the
Department. The FY 2005 supplemental seeks $17 million for start-up and
personnel costs for the Coordinator's Office. And the FY 2006 budget
proposes a $100 million Conflict Response Fund to quickly address
emerging needs and help deploy trained and experienced civilian
personnel immediately to an unstable region. We appreciate your
support, Mr. Chairman, and that of the Committee, for this funding and
look forward to working with you closely on reconstruction and
stabilization issues.
The United States must stay at the forefront of the global fight
against HIV/AIDS. We are requesting $3.2 billion in total U.S. funding
for care, treatment and prevention efforts. We will demonstrate the
compassion of the American people in other ways as well. Through our
continued support of international and non-governmental organizations,
we will ensure that America remains the world's most generous food and
non-food humanitarian assistance provider. We are requesting $2.59
billion in food aid and famine relief and non-food humanitarian
assistance. The FY 2005 supplemental seeks $950 million for relief,
rehabilitation and reconstruction of areas devastated by the Indian
Ocean tsunami and for tsunami early warning and mitigation, including
the $350 million initially pledged by President Bush. $701 million of
the supplemental is for State and USAID, including for coverage of
USAID's expenditures for relief efforts to date.
In all of these endeavors, the primary instrument of American
diplomacy will be the Department of State, and the dedicated men and
women of its Foreign and Civil Services and Foreign Service Nationals.
Together, we will apply the tools of diplomacy to protect our homeland
and advance the values for which it stands and to strengthen the
community of democracies for the work of freedom worldwide.
I welcome this Committee's help in ensuring that the men and women
of American diplomacy are well equipped for the challenges ahead in
terms of training, technologies and safe workplaces. Secretary Powell
and his team made important progress in these areas and we must build
on the foundation they established.
We are requesting $1.5 billion for security-related construction
and physical security and rehabilitation of U.S. embassies and
consulates, and $690 million to increase security for diplomatic
personnel and facilities. We have a solemn obligation to protect the
people of our diplomatic missions and their families, who serve at our
far-flung posts in the face of an ever-changing global terrorist
threat.
We must strengthen the recruitment of new personnel. We are seeking
$57 million for 221 new positions to meet core staffing and training
requirements. And as we seek out new talent, we also seek to further
diversify our workforce in the process. We send an important signal to
the rest of the world about our values and what they mean in practice
when we are represented abroad by people of all cultures, races, and
religions. Of course, we also must cultivate the people we already have
in place--by rewarding achievement, encouraging initiative, and
offering a full range of training opportunities. That includes the
training and support needed to make full use of new technologies and
tools, and we are asking for $249 million from appropriations and fee
revenues for investment in information technology.
Public diplomacy will be a top priority for me, as I know it is for
this Committee, and the FY 2006 request includes $328 million for
activities to engage, inform and influence foreign publics. America and
all free nations are facing a generational struggle against a new and
deadly ideology of hatred. We must do a better job of reaching hard to
reach populations, confronting hostile propaganda, dispelling dangerous
myths, and proactively telling a positive story about America. In some
cases, that may mean we need to do more of what we are already doing,
and in other cases, it may mean we need new ways of doing business.
If our public diplomacy efforts are to succeed, we cannot close
ourselves off from the world. We are asking for $931 million to improve
border security and for an increase of $74 million over FY 2005 for
educational and cultural exchange programs, bringing the total to $430
million in FY 2006. We will continue to work closely with the
Department of Homeland Security to identify and prevent terrorists and
other adversaries from doing harm, even as we maintain the fundamental
openness that gives our democracy its dynamism and makes our country a
beacon for international tourists, students, immigrants, and
businesspeople. We will keep America's doors open and our borders
secure.
Mr. Chairman, Members of the Committee, this time of global
transformation calls for transformational diplomacy. More than ever,
America's diplomats will need to be active in spreading democracy,
reducing poverty, fighting terror and doing our part to protect our
homeland. And more than ever, we will need your support if we are to
succeed in our vital mission for the American people.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I would be pleased to answer any questions
that you and the other distinguished Committee Members may have.
The Chairman. Thank you very much, Secretary Rice, for that
important statement.
We will now proceed with a round of questions. The Chair
would recognize that we have a number of Senators present; and
so, we'll start with an 8-minute round, and I'll commence with
the first questions.
We're putting together, in the committee now, a Foreign
Affairs authorization bill for early consideration on the
floor. We'll have a business meeting shortly after the recess.
As you may recall, in the past, the bill has met with
difficulties and entanglements that had nothing to do with its
contents. But how important is it to the Department that this
legislation be passed? That is, an authorization bill. What
would be the consequences if it were again deferred? And may I
supplement the question by asking whether you are prepared to
weigh in throughout the process of its consideration to
emphasize the importance to our country and to our diplomacy of
having this authorization.
Secretary Rice. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
We need an authorization bill, and I think it's an
opportunity to say important elements about our foreign policy.
And not only will I look forward to weighing in, but I look
forward working with the committee to try and achieve that
goal.
The Chairman. Well, I thank you for that assurance. It will
be important, because I suspect that we will have, first of
all, a problem, hopefully not insuperable, of getting time on
the floor, and, second, of working with Members so that
extraneous amendments are not offered or threatened, In the
past 2 years, at least, such amendments have jeopardized
consideration of the bill, and, on one occasion, led to it's
being taken down after 3 days of debate. So we're looking
forward to doing our work quickly so that there will be an
ample amount of time for floor activity.
Let me ask, with regard to the comments you made today on
the Reconstruction and Stabilization Office, $17 million, you
indicated, would come from supplemental requests, $24 million
in the 2006 request, and then $100 million subsequently.
Describe why you chose these sums and what kind of activity do
you anticipate, in terms of personnel or organization.
Secretary Rice. Thank you very much.
First of all, let me say that I've spent a good deal of
time on this office since I've been at the State Department,
because I think it represents, for us, a recognition that there
is a new function to be performed, and that is to have a
civilian counterpart to what can actually, very often, be done
very quickly by the military, which is the deployment of people
and a plan for civilian reconstruction. So, I think this is an
extremely important office. I might just note, too, that its
director, Carlos Pascual, our former Ambassador to Ukraine, has
just gone to do some consultations with some of our allies
about this, and there is a lot of interest in whether or not
these might be capabilities that could be around different
parts of the world.
We are asking for the $24 million to have a baseline for
the office, its requirements--its personnel requirements. But,
frankly, we need to get it started. And so, that's why in the
supplemental, so that we can get to some level of funding, a
little over 50 people we could get to some level of funding,
we've requested the $17 million in startup costs, startup
personnel costs.
The $100 million conflict-response fund is recognition of
the fact that there is the need, often, in times of crisis, to
be able to use funding for unforeseen circumstances. I can name
scores of them since we've been in office. But, for instance,
Liberia, when it came on, I think could not have been foreseen
that we were going to be able to get Charles Taylor out. When
you think about what we may be facing in Sudan, should we get
lucky enough and good enough in our diplomacy to get to the
point that we're actually in a post-conflict stabilization
point in Sudan, we would need to have some flexibility. So that
is what we envision.
The Chairman. I appreciate that explanation. As you know,
our committee has been deeply interested in this subject. At
one time it was called nation-building. But whatever the
terminology may be, the fact is that many of us felt that, as
we proceeded into Iraq, the planning for what you do after
major combat was deficient. And you have taken steps at the
Department, in conjunction with the Congress and the various
task forces, and have done so quickly and administratively. We
appreciate that. I wanted to offer the question so you would
have an opportunity to illuminate further.
Likewise, the flexibility you suggested is certainly
imperative. In your testimony before us, earlier on, you
endorsed the idea that the Nunn-Lugar Cooperative Threat
Reduction funds might be available outside the former Soviet
Union in greater abundance, because of unforeseen
circumstances; namely, that our forces may come across
chemical, biological, or even nuclear material and weapons in
places other than the former Soviet Union, and that we need to
act upon this. That's the nature of our diplomacy, as well as
our military action.
Let me ask about the Freedom Support Act assistance. That's
diminished, in this request. It's true that Georgia has become
a Millennium Challenge country, and, likewise, the
administration's requesting $60 million for Ukraine in the
supplemental. But why the cuts in the Freedom Support Act at
this particular juncture?
Secretary Rice. Well, first of all, Senator, let me--or,
Mr. Chairman--let me say that it is--by no means, reflects any
diminution in our interest in the continued democratization of
the former states of the Soviet Union. There was a graduation
schedule that was established at the time that the act was
passed, and we're working within that graduation schedule.
Fortunately, Georgia has become a Millennium Challenge
Account country. We are looking very hard at the Russia
programs, because, of course, things improve, and sometimes
there are setbacks, and we--right now, on the Russia program, a
significant part of the reduction is on the economic-reform
side, but there are some reductions on the democracy-program
side, too. And, frankly, I think we will have to take a look at
that as we go over the next 6 months to a year to see what more
we need to do. Obviously, it's been an unfortunate set of
setbacks on the democracy side, and I can assure you that we
will be looking at that. But mostly this is done in conjunction
with the graduation schedule that was established at the time
and that, I think, for the most part, has served us well.
The Chairman. Well, your recent visit with your Russian
counterpart was very important. And, of course, our President
will be meeting with President Putin in Bratislava shortly.
There is great concern in the Congress, and certainly you share
it, with regard to democracy developments in Russia.
Secretary Rice. Yes.
The Chairman. I would hope that there would be flexibility
in the event that, for some reason, better news comes along, or
other opportunities, so that we will not be flatfooted at that
point. I know you are thinking ahead on this. I raise the issue
simply so that there could be some colloquy on the fact that
there may be ways for us to work with Russian friends, and,
likewise, to move ahead on an agenda that has foundered a bit.
Secretary Rice. Yes.
The Chairman. Finally, there's been a transfer to DOD of
authority to conduct training for military and civilian police
training in Iraq and Afghanistan. Why is that authority being
shifted to DOD from the State Department?
Secretary Rice. Well, Senator, in Iraq we're in a combat
environment. It's a wartime environment. And the integration,
then, of security forces made sense in Iraq, under a single
training so that the tradeoffs can be made to fight the war--or
to fight the terrorists there.
In Afghanistan, we have, at this point, not transferred the
civilian police functions to the Defense Department. We are in
a different stage in Afghanistan, and I--we, in discussions
between Don Rumsfeld and myself, thought that this was probably
not the time to do that. Obviously, the training of the Afghan
Army was transferred to DOD--again, because the Afghan Army
fights as, really, a coalition partner in the war on terrorism.
But it seems to us, in Iraq, where it really is an
environment in which they are trying to use all of the security
assets of the country, that having those under single training
made sense. In Afghanistan, we've maintained the practice of
the civilian police training being in the State Department at
this point.
The Chairman. Thank you.
Senator Biden.
Senator Biden. Thank you very much.
There you go talking to Rumsfeld again. [Laughter.]
Madam Secretary, I have a number of questions, and some of
them are specific, and I don't expect you to have, at your
fingertips, the answer to all these questions. And so, if you
don't, just let me know and we will put them in the record.
Okay?
One very specific question I have is: The President's
budget request--this is about nuclear test-monitoring devices--
the President's 2006 budget includes only $14.35 million to the
International Monitoring System being established by the
Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty Organization Preparatory
Commission. The point of this is, that's 25 percent below the
amount requested in 2005, and 30 percent below what's needed in
2006.
Now, your budget justification calls this, quote, ``a key
element in our global effort against the proliferation of
nuclear weapons, an important supplement to U.S. monitoring
capabilities.''
So my question is: Why are we cutting it? We're not talking
about a lot of money here. If you don't know, fair enough, let
me know.
Secretary Rice. I will have to get back to you, Senator.
Senator Biden. Okay.
Secretary Rice. I assume it has to do with specific
activities that are to be funded, but let me get back to you.
Senator Biden. I would very much like to know that----
Secretary Rice. Of course.
Senator Biden [continuing]. Because I think the budget
statement attached is absolutely right. And, you know, if the
Lord Almighty could come down and say he's going to put his own
tsunami system in, as it relates to nuclear weapons, and be
able to detect any nuclear blast anywhere underground or
aboveground in the world, that would be a very good thing for
us to know and have, and it's something that we've all talked
about before, so I'd be interested in the rationale for that.
I never want to get in an argument with you, because it's
hard to win one, but I want to talk about force training for
just a second. Not going back to numbers, but last month we had
a little discussion about that. There's been a lot of
discussion since then. And no need to rehash that debate. But I
note, earlier this week, the President's supplemental asked for
$5.7 billion to train Iraqi forces, quote, ``to accelerate
efforts to provide assistance to Iraq's security forces so they
can increasingly assume responsibility for the nation's
security,'' end of quote.
Now, this comes on top of $5 billion that we allocated to
security and law enforcement in FY04. That's out of that
supplemental of $18.4 billion that we haven't spent yet.
Now, the supplemental request continues to say, quote,
``The Iraq interim and transitional government, with coalition
assistance, has fielded over 90 battalions in order to provide
security within Iraq. All but one of these battalions, however,
are lightly equipped and armed and have very limited mobility
and sustainment capability. These limitations, coupled with the
more resilient insurgency than anticipated when the Iraqi
security forces were initially designed, have led the Prime
Minister of Iraq to request forces that can participate in''--
and a quote within a quote--`` `the hard end' ''--end of
internal quote--``of the counterinsurgency, and to do so
quickly.''
Now, suffice it to say, by requesting another $5.7 billion
the administration is, I assume, with your cooperation and
others, that--listening to General Petraeus, who is
reorganizing and essentially altering the way we're going about
dealing with the training of a security force. And, as you know
from General Petraeus, there's a long way to go. I mean, we can
do it, but there's a lot of hard slogging.
Now, I want to combine that with the question that has
become--and it's literally a question; I don't know the answer
to it--a lot of Senators were in Davos last month, a lot of us
heard the same thing, a lot of us have been in and out of
Europe and the Middle East in December and January. I've made a
total of three trips. And we've been told repeatedly--not just
me, but many of my Republican colleagues--by many foreign
leaders and their governments, that they've made offers to
train. Chirac, when we met with him 2 weeks ago, he's very
regal, and he's very diplomatic, and he talked about how he
wanted to show me--I didn't demand of him to show it; I would
never demand of a President anything--the proposal he had to
train 1,500 Iraqi officers, and had been made 6 months ago,
and, mon dieu, he does not understand why, no one has
responded, et cetera. I take him at his word that he submitted
it. I don't know who he submitted it to.
So here's my question: We're going to spend, as we should--
I'm not contesting the number--over $10 billion from the FY05,
which we haven't spent out yet, the $5 billion, to the FY06
request for 5.7--the supplemental request. So we're talking
over $10 billion, which indicates we recognize there's a lot of
work to do to train.
Now, I don't expect you to have this information, but I
would like you--obviously, respond if you'd like--for the
record, could you provide us a comprehensive list of the
countries that actually have made an offer--that you're aware
of--to assist in training Iraqi security forces--police, army,
national guard, any security forces--a description of the
specific offers they have made, when the offers were made, and
what your response has been and will likely be?
I'm prepared to vote another $5.7 billion for that, but I'd
like to know the context in which I'm--not ``I am,'' but I, one
of a hundred am--appropriating the money for that purpose. So
it would be a very helpful thing if you--I mean, amazing if you
knew it now; I can't imagine how you would--let me know; if
not, would you be willing to submit that for the record?
Secretary Rice. I will try and submit that for the record.
Let me just explain why there is sometimes the question of
offer versus offer----
Senator Biden. Yes.
Secretary Rice [continuing]. Whether there was an offer. I
also was just in Europe, as you know, and I talked to--almost
to everybody about this issue. We had a NATO ministerial where
we talked about training for the Iraqi security forces, police,
and army forces as perhaps the most important thing that we
could do for the Iraqi people at this point. And, of course,
NATO is going to have, or has, a training mission, but it's
principally for leadership training.
There is a question of what training goes on inside Iraq,
what training goes on outside Iraq, and then NATO has come up
with a concept of perhaps a trust fund that could fund people
who are training inside Iraq, but perhaps fund it by those who
really don't feel that they can send forces in.
Senator Biden. Right.
Secretary Rice. And so, sometimes there is a bit of a
mismatch between what is needed in the overall plan for
security forces and the kinds of offers that you get to do
training inside or outside Iraq. And what we're trying to do--
and I have to say, a lot of this, of course, depends on how the
Iraqis see it, because it's not just been responding to General
Petraeus; it's also been responding to the interim government,
that----
Senator Biden. Right.
Secretary Rice [continuing]. Has had its own ideas about
security training--is just to, in almost matrix-like fashion,
take what has been offered, what is needed, and put it together
into a security assistance plan that makes sense. And we
started that work. NATO is a very good venue for that, at least
for the European allies.
But I can get you what has been offered. For instance, some
of it was offered directly to the Iraqi Government, that has
not always had the capacity to respond, given that they've been
a little overwhelmed doing other things. And so, we will pull
it together for you, Senator.
Senator Biden. Great.
Secretary Rice. But I just think we need to understand that
sometimes there's an ill fit between what is offered and what
is needed. But we believe that everything that is offered can
ultimately be used.
Senator Biden. Well, I close, Mr. Chairman by saying: I
would argue that's one of the reasons why a contact group, or
something like it, might be a good idea, number one. And,
number two, one of the things that I get mixed messages on, and
my colleagues have all been there, is, What is the plan?
I'll close with a quick example. I was joking with
Petraeus. I said, ``Wouldn't it help if the Germans were
offering to train out of country''? Go out and identify over
the next 4 months, or 2 months, whatever it takes, the most
competent mid-level Iraqi officers who were part of the Iraqi
military force--obviously, all Ba'athist, but we used Nazis, we
used a lot of people in the nations we defeated--and have them
fly down in a 747, put 500 of them on a plane--literally, not
figuratively--send them into Germany for 6 months of training.
He said, ``That would be a good idea.'' Said that to Allawi; he
said, ``That would be a great idea.''
So I don't know what our plan is. So the combination of the
two points would be helpful. And I would suggest that maybe
this notion of a contact group, or whatever you want to call
it, might be a facilitating mechanism.
I'll come back with other questions. Thank you, Mr.
Chairman, for letting me go over.
Thank you, Madam Secretary.
The Chairman. Well, thank you very much, Senator Biden.
Let me just supplement Senator Biden's request by the
thought that is sometimes expressed that the training needs to
occur in Iraq, that the continuity or the formation of support
with our troops, who are literally living with some of the
Iraqi recruits, are important, and that conducting this process
somewhere outside the country doesn't work so well. I don't
want to get into that argument. I've heard it. But it's an
important part of this debate, because essentially a lot of the
training is being offered outside of the country. So we need to
evaluate. Does it work the same if it is inside the country?
And, as a matter of fact, how important is it that it occur in
one place or the other?
Senator Biden. We need an official policy statement, to us,
as to whether you value it inside or out. You know, I talk to
the folks in the ground there, and my friend from Minneapolis
was there recently--you talk to them, they say, ``No, we'll
take it outside''----
Secretary Rice. Yes.
Senator Biden [continuing]. ``As well as in.'' So we'd like
to know that.
Secretary Rice. Of course. We are, by the way, encouraging
people to do it outside, if that's all they can do. It's not
necessarily, of course, one for one. If you're willing to do it
inside, it fits a little better.
The Chairman. Senator Hagel.
Senator Hagel. Mr. Chairman, thank you.
And welcome home, Madam Secretary. I would add my thanks to
your efforts, which is appearing, more and more, that they, in
fact, made a difference. We know--you know better than most--
that there's now a great deal of follow-through. I think with
the President going to Europe here over the next few days,
following on your trip, as well as Secretary Rumsfeld's trip,
that adds to the dimension here that is reflected in your
testimony this morning, as it was reflected in your initial
testimony before this committee. So thank you for your efforts.
And I also noted that Secretary Rumsfeld even reached out
to Old Europe, which we're all grateful for. So there's a--I
wouldn't necessarily term it a ``jolly'' spirit, but certainly
an improved spirit environment from where we were a year ago.
And I think we build on that to deal with these great
challenges that you have dealt with here this morning and as
you are referencing in your budget request.
I think, generally, it's a good budget, makes a lot of
sense. You're building on, as you noted, to what Secretary
Powell has been able to accomplish in the last 4 years. There's
been a remarkable reversal in the trend and momentum, and you
are going to be able to capitalize on that and build on that,
as well. So, thank you.
You noted in your testimony, when you referenced the
potential that we have in the Middle East--specifically,
Israeli-Palestinian developments--that the President has
announced an additional $350 million to help the Palestinians
build infrastructure and sustain the reform process over the
next 2 years. And I appreciate you reaching out to this
committee, when you noted that you would be interested in
having our input, as well.
Now, based on that, a couple of questions. Have you thought
through how you would use private involvement, private
investment in this? And I'm particularly interested in
thinking--all of these experiences are learning processes and
experiences. I have been very critical of the slow economic
development in Iraq. We made some big mistakes there. We were
thrust into a situation that I don't think we planned for very
well or anticipated. However, that aside, that behind us, we
should have learned something from what we didn't do in Iraq
over the last year, especially the last two, and that was: Get
that economic development down into the areas where the real
people are that can develop confidence and support for a
government--demonstration projects, hospitals, schools. And I
think it's critically important that the Israeli-Palestinian
Arab world, private sector, be engaged in that.
Could you define that a little bit and tell us what your
thoughts are that would supplement this $350 million that the
President's asked for, which I strongly support?
Secretary Rice. Well, it's a very good point, Senator. Now,
obviously, one of the problems is to get the--as you're moving
toward greater stability so that, in fact, foreign investment
can be attracted--I had conversations with the Israelis,
including with Deputy Minister Peres, who is overseeing a lot
of this, about the Gaza withdrawal and economic development.
And this is very much on his mind, too: Can we get private-
sector initiatives to come in? I think that what we should do--
right now we're focused on short-acting USAID kinds of projects
that can show immediate impact for the people of the Gaza as
the Israeli withdrawal goes forward. We're concentrating on
projects that can ease movement for the Palestinians so that
they can work. For instance, some joint work on checkpoints
that would be done, about $50 million, that we're calling
Building Bridges, which really is the Freedom of Movement
Initiative. But, ultimately, this is an area which once, in
parts of the Palestinian territories, at least, did have
private-sector activity of considerable strength.
And what I would like to do is to look at some of the
mechanisms that we use for the stimulation of private-sector
engagement--whether they're U.S. Government's--or to simply
send a message that private-sector engagement and private-
sector investment in this region is going to be extremely
important.
I think it's something that the Palestinians understand.
It's going to require, on their part, some greater--as they're
trying to do now--some greater transparency, some work on the
corruption front so that there isn't a kind of tax that is
inappropriate.
I think if they do their reform initiatives on corruption,
on transparency, on budget transparency, and on rule of law,
and if we do our work to make some quick-acting efforts on
behalf, particularly, of the Gaza, that will open up a lane for
private investment in the medium term, which we should not just
encourage, but we should see if there are ways that some of the
vehicles that we use in the United States to encourage
private--in the U.S. Government to encourage private-sector
investment can be used here.
Senator Hagel. Structurally, you're planning for that? I
noted that you were framing this thing in a way to take
advantage of those options and openings, if they develop.
Secretary Rice. That's right. I should also note that one
of the things that we did with the Egyptians and the Israelis,
of course, these qualified industrial zones, which permit
special kinds of arrangements where, in fact, there could be
private investment. We've talked about whether or not we can
look to--look at some of these other areas so that the trade
environment is one that also encourages growth and then
private-sector investment.
The near-term problem, I think, though, is to do something
about the Palestinian rule of law and transparency and
corruption initiatives, because, without that, I think you're
going to choke off private investment, even if you are
encouraging it. But, as a medium-term measure, I couldn't agree
more that we need to structure this in a way in which there is
room for private investment.
Senator Hagel. Thank you.
Let me get your sense of what happened in Beirut a few days
ago. We all agree, a very destabilizing and very, very tragic
situation. What is your sense of what happened? What are we
doing in regard to consultation with allies? How are we trying
to head off any further attacks, whatever we can find out--who
was behind it? What are we doing? Is this going to shape
relationships now in the future differently with Syria?
Obviously, the President has recalled our Ambassador. Tell us
what you can about that situation.
Secretary Rice. Of course. First, to say that the most
important call is for an investigation of what has happened
there. We don't know what the responsibility is. Nonetheless,
the--as to Resolution 1559 noted, the Syrian presence and the
Syrian involvement in Lebanese affairs has, of course, created
a destabilized environment in Lebanon. And that's why there has
been a call for the Syrians to stop that interference and to
remove their forces, because it is a destabilizing environment
in what is a developing democratic process in Lebanon.
We have said that it really ought to be--if you take Iraq,
Afghanistan, and the Palestinian territories--the fourth
democratic election in the Middle East.
We are in very close contact. We had a President's
statement yesterday at the United Nations that calls for an
investigation, calls for calm. We've been in close consultation
with our allies. I, myself, talked with my French counterpart.
The French--we and the French were the cosponsors of 1559, and
we are trying to achieve, first of all, calm in the region--
that's very important, that people react calmly, and that there
not be further violence; second, that there be an investigation
of what happened there, and a transparent investigation of what
happened there; and, third, that the Syrians accept their
responsibilities, under Resolution 1559, to stop their
destabilizing activities in the region.
Senator Hagel. Thank you.
Mr. Chairman.
The Chairman. Thank you very much, Senator Hagel.
Senator Feingold.
Senator Feingold. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
And thank you, Madam Secretary, for coming before the
committee.
I just want to follow up on your exchange with Senator
Biden and also some of the conversations we had during your
confirmation, and underscore how strongly I feel, and many of
my colleagues feel, about the need to bolster burden-sharing in
Iraq and to welcome the help that others have offered when it
comes to training Iraqi security forces. I was struck by how
this subject just kept coming up again and again yesterday in
the various meetings we were having with different officials,
both from our country and from overseas. I and many others feel
a great deal of urgency about this.
One other matter I want to mention. It seems to me that one
often-overlooked element of the long-term fight against
terrorism is more focused and energetic commitment to fighting
corruption. Whether it's the fact that radical Islamist parties
in Southeast Asia and North Africa try to attract support, in
part, because they tap into populist sentiments about wanting
more honest, though they may say virtuous, and less corrupt,
though they may say decadent, governments; or the fact that
paying off customs officials and local law enforcement officers
makes it possible for terrorists to cross borders and then plan
and execute operations, it's clear that a thriving culture of
corruption works to the advantage of those who would do us
harm.
How should the U.S. Government address this issue in our
foreign policy? And how is this important priority reflected in
this budget?
Secretary Rice. Well, the anticorruption initiatives are
extremely important. You might note that in many of the USAID
programs, there are--many of the countries with which USAID
deals, we actually have anticorruption initiatives with these
countries, because corruption is, first, in attacks on
development, as I think the World Bank has said. It is also an
important element of danger, as you have noted. The same
corrupt practices that can lead to drug-running or human
trafficking can also lead to terrorism, because it's problems
with corrupt judges or corrupt border officials or corrupt
police. And so, it has been a major element.
I would note, for instance, that it is one of the key
indicators that we look to when we're looking for Millennium
Challenge Account funding for a country, is how well they are
doing on corruption.
We've had anticorruption initiatives that are not just
bilateral U.S. anticorruption initiatives, as well. A couple of
years ago, the G8 had anticorruption initiatives. We've had
anticorruption initiatives in APEC. We want this to be a major
element of our multilateral diplomacy, as well as of our
bilateral diplomacy.
So, I would note that if you look at the MCA as a kind of
bellwether for how we view the corruption element, it is a key
element in corruption, but there are also anticorruption
activities with countries that will not qualify for the MCA.
One of the countries we've been most interested in working
with in that regard, we have a major effort with Nigeria, for
instance, where they have a new finance minister, who's trying
very hard on the anticorruption side.
I think you would find anticorruption initiatives embedded
in almost all of our bilateral diplomacy. And sometimes we have
great successes. Georgia was considered one of the most
vulnerable to corruption just 3 or so years ago, and now is an
MCA country, because of the progress that it's made on
corruption.
Senator Feingold. I appreciate that answer and the general
commitment that you've stated, and I will look to the places
you've cited. I will note, for example, that, in the
International Narcotics Control and Law Enforcement request,
INL, that there's an over--there's over a 50-percent reduction
in funds requested for anticorruption programs from last year
to this year. And when you start talking about countries like
Nigeria, it makes me wonder a little bit.
But let me ask you a different question. I share the
President's enthusiasm for supporting democratization around
the world, though sometimes I disagree with the administration
about the most effective ways to do it. Having served on the
Subcommittee on African Affairs for over 12 years now, I'm
interested in how this principle applies to Africa. How does
the administration propose to support democratization in
Zimbabwe? How about Uganda or Chad--where serving presidents
are in various stages of pursuing constitutional changes that
will enable them to serve for a third term, which many of us
believe is not a great idea? And in Rwanda, where the
government has grown increasingly intolerant of dissent, how do
the President's words, and the administration's concern, about
democratization relate to these countries and the populations
that heard those words?
Secretary Rice. Well, the most important thing that we can
do is, we make it an agenda item with each and every country in
the world, and we make clear that, no matter what elements of
cooperation we may have on other issues--for instance, we have
very good cooperation with Uganda, as you know, on HIV/AIDS,
but it is--does not mean that the political development of
Uganda toward a more open political system is unimportant to
us. In fact, it's very important to us. Similarly, in Rwanda,
even though we have very good relations with Rwandan
Government, they've served in--their forces have been willing
to serve in places where they were needed--we have been very
clear that we expect the movement toward the democratic
processes and establishment of democratic institutions to
continue.
So, in places where we have good relations on other areas,
the importance is not to let it supplant the need for continued
pressing on the democracy agenda.
In places where we don't, like Zimbabwe, I think we've been
pretty strong on Zimbabwe. I think so much so that we've caused
some outbursts from President Mugabe about both the President
and about me. But I think we should continue, and we will
continue. We need help on Zimbabwe from the Commonwealth, where
they were suspended from membership. We need help on Zimbabwe
from the South Africans, who have a good deal of influence
there. And it is--the Zimbabwe situation is, therefore, part of
our bilateral diplomacy with other countries, particularly with
South Africa, but also the members of the Commonwealth.
So, you can be assured, Senator, that this is very high on
our agenda, because we believe that in Africa, just like every
place else, the accountable government, transparent government,
democratic principles, and democratic institutions contribute
to stability and contribute to better governance. And, finally,
when we--again, when we set up a program of development
assistance, like the MCA, this is one of the criteria that we
use.
Senator Feingold. Thank you. I appreciate your fairly
strong comments on Zimbabwe. I'd submit it doesn't take much to
get Mr. Mugabe to have an outburst, so that shouldn't be the
test, as I know you know.
Secretary Rice. I agree.
Senator Feingold. So I hope that the administration will
continue to look for opportunities and seek my help and the
help of others on the committee to be very firm in that regard.
The last question I'll ask has to do with the fact that the
$82 billion supplemental appropriations request that was sent
to Congress contains a request for $4.8 million for additional
broadcasts into the broader Middle East. And I would be curious
to know how you feel we should evaluate the efficacy of our
broadcasting initiatives, because more money is being put into
it. And I'm wondering if there is a good way to monitor the
value and the effectiveness of this.
Secretary Rice. Well, one of the things that the
Broadcasting Board is going to do is to set up--they intend to
be able to do more, for lack of a better word, market research
and market segmentation research, which, I think, will help us
to know what is really happening. And that's part of this
request. They will have more effort in that way.
But the efficacy of these programs, I think, should not
just be measured in how many people you're reaching, although
that's an important part of it. But if I go back to my
experience as a Soviet specialist during the cold war, it was
probably Radio Free Europe and Voice of America that did as
much, if not more, for our efforts there than many of the other
things that we did when we couldn't reach these populations in
any other way. And if you look at Radio Sawa or Radio Farda or
the desire to have Persian-language broadcasting or the--what
is really a capital expenditure for a tower that will allow
broadcasting into places in Central Asia where democracy is not
on the march, and ought to be, I would hope that we would be
able to evaluate these programs, in terms of who they're
reaching and comments that you get, but also to recognize that
this is a long-term struggle, and that, very often, you're
reaching people who may not even be willing to say to you,
``I'm being reached,'' given the environments in which they
live.
I'm a very big supporter of our international broadcasting
efforts. I think we ought to be looking at what more we can do,
because this has been a winner for us in the past. It's not
just broadcasting. We also ought to be exploring new media,
what we can do through the Internet and the like. But I think
this is a very big winner for us.
Senator Feingold. Thank you, Madam Secretary.
The Chairman. Thank you very much, Senator Feingold.
At this moment, I will call the committee into a business
session. Now that a quorum is present, I would call members'
attention to the agenda. The hearing is now recessed, to
reconvene shortly at the conclusion of the business meeting.
For the interest of our audience, this should take just a
moment.
The sole item on the agenda today is the nomination of
Robert B. Zoellick to be Deputy Secretary of State. Senator
Biden, do you have a further comment, or----
Senator Biden. I only have one comment. I'd like the record
to show that Democrats are here and ready to vote. [Laughter.]
So, we're really here, Madam Secretary, and we're ready to
vote.
The Chairman. I thank the distinguished ranking member.
[Laughter.]
Is there further debate?
[No response.]
The Chairman. Hearing none, I ask the nomination be
approved. All in favor, say aye.
[A chorus of ayes.]
The Chairman. Opposed, no.
[No response.]
The Chairman. The clerk will record that all present voted
aye, and we will send the nomination to the floor for
consideration of our colleagues.
Senator Biden. Mr. Chairman, I would ask the record be kept
open for those who wish--not to hold up going to the floor, but
those who wish to vote, unless you--if you have the proxies,
that they be recorded, as well, that everybody has an
opportunity to vote.
The Chairman. The point is well taken. And I do have
proxies in favor of Ambassador Zoellick, from Senator Hagel,
Senator Sununu, Senator Allen, Senator Alexander. And if others
wish to vote, they'll have that opportunity, and----
Senator Biden. Thank you very much.
The Chairman [continuing]. Within the business day.
Senator Biden. Thank you.
The Chairman. I thank the ranking member. I thank the
indulgence of the Secretary. This concludes the business
meeting. I now call to order the hearing.
Senator Chafee.
Senator Chafee. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Welcome, Dr. Rice.
Secretary Rice. Thank you.
Senator Chafee. I see in the budget we're budgeting $734\1/
2\ million for the Andean Counter-Drug Initiative, and I'm
wondering how we're doing on the war on drugs, and not only in
the Andean area, but also Afghanistan and other areas.
Secretary Rice. Thank you.
In the Andean area, I think we can cite progress from the
really foresightful way that the Andean Initiative was put
together, because it was put together, yes, as an eradication
initiative, but it was also put together in a way that was
regional, so that there was an understanding that if you
succeeded in one place, you didn't want a drug infestation in
another. And so, this regional approach has been very
effective.
It is a broad-scale initiative. And, given Colombia's
circumstances, in particular, one where we're now partnering
with a government that has gotten even tougher--very, very
tough on narco-trafficking through its efforts with the FARC,
the Andean Initiative has, I think, succeeded, and we just need
to continue to succeed, because, of course, what happens is
that it's--you're never completely through with this kind of
initiative. It breaks out in other places. But, I think, you
can say that the Andean Initiative has been a great success.
And if you talk to the Peruvians or to the Colombians or to the
Bolivians, for that matter, I think you will find that.
We're just starting in Afghanistan, and it is, frankly, one
of the most difficult and challenging problems, because, while
we are making a lot of progress in Afghanistan on--since the
election of Karzai, the economy is making some progress,
they're making some progress in the--getting the warlords out
of business. A lot of progress has been made in Afghanistan. I
don't think that anyone will tell you that we're satisfied with
the state of counternarcotics in Afghanistan, where the numbers
have been going up.
We have a five-pronged strategy with the Karzai government
to deal with counternarcotics there. It is a strategy that the
British have been in the lead in, but we're taking a much more
active role now. We've talked to the Russians about their
involvement, perhaps, in counternarcotics, because this is a
scourge that is hurting very much in Europe. It appears on the
streets in Europe.
The five parts of it include, not just eradication, as
important as eradication is, and not just alternative
livelihoods, as important as alternative livelihoods are, but
also helping the Afghans with the law-enforcement side having
to deal with counternarcotics, training their police to be
counternarcotics police. Karzai has put in place a Minister who
is to oversee the entire counternarcotics effort. And it turned
out that there needed to be a significant public affairs
campaign in Afghanistan to delegitimize the growing of poppy in
this country that has been at civil war and has, therefore,
been doing this for quit a long time.
So I would say, Senator, that the lesson of the Andean
Initiative is that if you fund it properly, stay with it,
regionalize it, and get good, strong support from the
governments, you have a chance of success. Afghanistan is at
the beginning of that process, but we're going to have to have
the same kind of commitment to Afghanistan that we've had in
the Andean region.
Senator Chafee. Thank you.
One of the curious things in Bolivia, of course, is the
rise of the political party of the coca growers. And so, as we
promote democracy, that's a phenomenon that exists----
Secretary Rice. It's a----
Senator Chafee [continuing]. In Bolivia.
Secretary Rice. It's----
Senator Chafee. They have a--actual political party that's
very successful.
Secretary Rice. We're very concerned about that party,
we're very concerned about the challenges to the president
there. We're concerned about--I won't name any names of the--of
our concerns there, but--because it's a democratic process--
but, obviously, efforts to stabilize Bolivia--we had an
initiative last year on trying to do some things, in terms of
economic development to try and help the Bolivians.
Senator Chafee. Thank you.
Switching back to the Middle East and Senator Hagel's
questions on the horrific bombing in Lebanon and our decision
to recall our Ambassador, on the surface it seems--prior to any
proof, what's the symbolism of that action?
Secretary Rice. Well, we have been very clear that we don't
know the--who is responsible for the bombing, but that there
needs to be an international investigation of that. But the
Syrians, given their position in Lebanon, given their
interference in Lebanese affairs, given the fact that their
forces are there, given the terrorists that operate in southern
Lebanon, with Syrian forces in close proximity to them, does
put on the Syrians a special responsibility for the kind of
destabilization that happened there, in that this sort of thing
could happen. That's why recalling the Syrian Ambassador made
sense. It also is the culmination of a long series of problems
with the Syrians, including ineffective or incomplete efforts
to deal with the fact that Syrian territory is contributing to
the insurgency in Iraq.
And Deputy Secretary Armitage, before he left office, went
to Syria. He delivered a very strong message to the Syrians
about this problem of insurgents operating out of Syria. We,
frankly, did not get much in the way of help. And the Syrians
need to understand that the United States is very serious about
activities out of Syria that may be endangering our forces.
And so, this--the proximate cause was Lebanon, but,
unfortunately, we have an increasing list of problems with the
Syrians.
Senator Chafee. And how long do you expect this to occur,
having our Ambassador not in place?
Secretary Rice. It's indeterminate at this point, Senator,
but we will make known that there are some steps that we would
like to see taken. But I would not want to get into a situation
in which we've said, ``Do this, and then we will return the
Ambassador.'' I think we will have to see how seriously the
Syrians take this signal.
Senator Chafee. And are there actions beyond that in
regards to Embassy and its presence there, or is it just the
symbolism of our lead----
Secretary Rice. Well----
Senator Chafee [continuing]. Diplomat that--being
withdrawn?
Secretary Rice. I don't believe, at this point, that we
need to contemplate any further actions, in terms of the
Embassy. It's a very strong signal to return one's Ambassador,
as you know, Senator. As I described for the chairman, we are
also doing some other things, in terms of the United Nations,
in terms of our diplomacy with the French, out of Resolution
1559, to try and get the Syrians to live up to their
obligations.
Senator Chafee. Thank you, Dr. Rice.
Secretary Rice. Thank you.
The Chairman. Thank you very much, Senator Chafee.
Senator Sarbanes.
Senator Sarbanes. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
Madam Secretary, I want to join my colleagues in welcoming
you before the committee. I think this is your first hearing
with us since your confirmation. We look forward to many more.
I have some very specific questions I'd like to put to you.
The budget request from the administration reduces the amount
for UNICEF by $11 million from what was appropriated last year,
down from $125 million to $114 million. Now, this strikes me as
coming at an especially odd moment, as your former colleague in
government and former Cabinet member, Secretary of Agriculture
Ann Veneman, is about to assume the position of executive
director of UNICEF on May 2. So I'm curious, What's the
rationale behind the proposed cut? And it's not exactly the
best launching pad for the new executive director, who has come
out of this administration and into the UNICEF position.
Secretary Rice. I understand, Senator. There isn't intended
to be, here, any diminution of our support for UNICEF. I will
check. It may be this was, in fact, what the President
requested last year. Is that--one of the--let me get you an
answer on this one, Senator. I'll----
Senator Sarbanes. I think----
Secretary Rice [continuing]. Have to get the specific----
Senator Sarbanes [continuing]. I think this figure is even
less than the President requested last year, and it's almost 10
percent less than what the Congress provided.
Secretary Rice. Senator, we'll----
Senator Sarbanes. If you were going to be the executive
director at UNICEF, you wouldn't feel this was a very good
sendoff into your new position, would you?
Secretary Rice. Well, Senator, Ann Veneman is a terrific
choice, and she's a good friend. I will check to see on what
basis this was made.
Let me just say that we are operating in an environment, a
budget environment, in which we----
Senator Sarbanes. Now, I want to----
Secretary Rice [continuing]. Have done----
Senator Sarbanes [continuing]. Want to----
Secretary Rice [continuing]. Very well.
Senator Sarbanes [continuing]. I want to pursue that budget
environment. You've led me right on into my next question, and
I appreciate that very much. I'm concerned by the lack of
priority for the needs of children, which extends beyond UNICEF
to the entire budget for child survival. The overall account
for child survival and health is cut from $1.54 billion to
$1.25 billion, a total cut of $286 million. Even when you count
the $170 million that was transferred from child survival to
global AIDS--because we're trying to compare apples to apples,
and I'm trying to anticipate the response that says, well, we
shifted some of that money somewhere else in order to roughly
accomplish the same purposes--we still get a cut of about 8
percent in child survival and maternal health, a 30-percent cut
in other infectious diseases, and I can go on through a number
of others.
Now, is the justification for these that you have a tight
budget and you have to make these cuts?
Secretary Rice. Senator, I think, in a tight budget
environment, we've done really very well. I think that the
President's budget for the State Department accounts represents
a recognition of how important the diplomatic initiatives are,
how important our work is in support of the war on terrorism,
how important our work is in support of the compassion agenda.
My understanding of this particular case is that, in addition
to the point that you've made about the $171 million that was
transferred to the global AIDS account for focus countries,
that this is essentially what the President requested in fiscal
year 2005, and that this is what the administration believes is
needed in those accounts. I understand that there was a plus-up
in that account in 2005.
Senator Sarbanes. Well, let me pursue this a little bit.
The administration, when it put forth the Millennium Challenge
Account, argued quite strongly that it would not come at the
expense of core development and humanitarian programs. Now, I'm
being told this morning, ``Well, we have a tight budget. We
have to pull back.'' We have to constrain our commitment to
these well-established and, I think, by and large, effective
programs, yet the budget proposes an increase for the
Millennium Challenge Account from $1.5 billion to $3 billion.
That's a $1\1/2\-billion increase. The cuts I've been talking
about are in the tens of millions, or maybe in the hundreds of
millions in certain instances.
Now, I've supported the Millennium Challenge Account, but I
just want to make this observation. There's been $2.5 billion
appropriated for the Millennium Challenge Account thus far.
You're asking for $3 billion in this budget; $2.5 billion has
been appropriated over a 2-year period--$1 billion in FY04,
$1\1/2\ billion in FY05. And my understanding is that not a
single dime of that has moved out to provide assistance to
countries.
Now, if that's the case, why are we plussing-up the
Millennium Challenge Account by quite a substantial margin at
the expense of some of these core humanitarian and development
programs which deal with some of the most vulnerable
populations?
Secretary Rice. Shall I respond, Senator? Thank you.
Well, first of all, again, on the child survival and health
programs, the request is almost straight-lined from what the
President had requested before. The Millennium Challenge
Account--the Millennium Challenge Corporation is a very, very
high Presidential priority for three reasons. First of all,
because it----
Senator Sarbanes. I'm not contesting the Millennium
Challenge Account. I'm simply asking--you have $2\1/2\ billion
that has been appropriated, none of which has moved out of the
pipeline. Two and one-half billion dollars. And now you're
coming in and requesting a jump to $3 billion--from $1\1/2\
billion last year to $3 billion this year. Three billion
dollars. Another $1\1/2\ billion for an account that already
has $2\1/2\ billion unspent. You're going to add 3 to it.
You're going to go to $5.5 billion, and no money has been spent
from that account. And yet you're cutting these other core
humanitarian and development programs. What is the rationale
for that?
Secretary Rice. Well, Senator, we're not cutting the other
programs, we're requesting what we requested----
Senator Sarbanes. Well, I----
Secretary Rice [continuing]. Last year.
Senator Sarbanes [continuing]. I mean, we----
Secretary Rice. But----
Senator Sarbanes [continuing]. I mean, I can show it to
you. I mean, we'll have to differ on that, but I think we can--
--
Secretary Rice. I'm looking at it, Senator, and I think the
request is similar to what we requested in 2005.
But let me answer the question about the Millennium
Challenge, and not having yet spent the money. First of all, it
did take about a year to get the corporation authorized and up
and running. They now are making a good deal of progress in
getting these compacts put together. It is a process that
requires countries to apply with a plan that shows that they
are meeting, not just the requirements of a good program that
they would like to carry out, but that they are meeting the
requirements, in terms of transparency and good governance and
democratization and anticorruption, all of the things that the
Millennium Challenge requires of these countries.
The money has to be there in order for the corporation to
be able to make multiyear commitments to these compacts that
are being signed with these countries. And so, I think you will
see a more rapid, now, spend-out of these--or obligation of
these funds, because they now are developing the compacts. It
sometimes even requires countries to make changes in their laws
so that they can receive this funding on things like I was just
talking with Senator Feingold about, for instance, on
anticorruption. So the money needs to be there so that the
compacts can be backed up by the actual funding being in place.
Finally, I would just say, Senator, that we would like to
meet the President's commitment of increasing American
development assistance through the MCA by 50 percent. It will
not be in 3 years; it will now be in 4 years. And in order to
be on a glide path to do that, and to be able to have the
resources available to these programs that are going to be
funded, these compacts that are going to be funded, this is the
level of funding that we need.
Senator Sarbanes. Well, but, you know, you can meet that
target and take the money out of other programs. You're just
shifting it from one pocket to another. Presumably, I will
question you again about this next year when we look again to
see how much is in the Millennium Challenge Account if we don't
shift some of that money in order to cover these problems.
Let me make one final observation. The Millennium Challenge
Account does not help ordinary people struggling to survive
under fragile, undemocratic, or corrupt governments. Child
survival and health programs in the past have worked on a
humanitarian basis. The same thing is true of UNICEF, as well
as some of these other programs we're talking about. The goal
of the Millennium Challenge Account, which is in effect to get
these countries to pull themselves up by their bootstraps and
improve their processes and so forth, is a laudable goal. But
if you're going to shift resources over into that, then there's
less available to help people who are, in effect, the victims
of an inadequate or corrupt government in their country. And
that doesn't seem, to me, to be fully responsive, on the part
of the United States, to the kinds of challenges we confront
around the world.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
The Chairman. Thank you, Senator Sarbanes.
Senator Allen.
Senator Allen. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Thank you, Dr. Rice, for being here with us.
Looking at this budget, it is a tight and taut budget, but
I think that, in looking at it, that the priorities and
expenditures seem very reasonable. There'll be differences on
some on the edges, but let's not look at the negatives, let's
look at the positives.
One thing I would like to ask you, and it's not in here,
reading through it, was something that I and this committee
worked on last year and brought this up with Ambassador--soon
to be your partner--Zoellick, and that has to do with
intellectual property protection. We had added funds in there.
So much of what we produce with our innovations are
intellectual property, which are stolen in various countries--
China is one of the main thieves that don't seem to think much
of it. Other developing countries need assistance so they
understand this concept of property rights, that it's not to be
stolen or infringed upon. Could you share with us how
assistance in the protection of our intellectual property, our
innovations, are addressed in this budget?
Secretary Rice. Yes. And, in fact, there are--and, as a
part of these programs, IPR initiatives with these countries--
with a number of countries. With China, it's principally--of
course, we don't fund----
Senator Allen. Right.
Secretary Rice [continuing]. Programs with the Chinese, but
you're right that we have been very concerned about IPR in a
number of other countries. And we do have, as a part of our
general development assistance programs, IPR initiatives as a
part of that.
Senator Allen. Let me add--I didn't mean to bring it up,
but since Syria was brought up, I think, in view of the
assassination yesterday of former Prime Minister Hariri in
Beirut, I urge you to tighten sanctions on Syria. Our message
to the Syrians and any of these other undemocratic regimes are
those that--I think that we have to be clear, we have to be
direct, it has to be that terrorist activity is not going to be
tolerated. We passed the Syria and Lebanese Sovereignty Act of
2002, on which you based your May 2004 trade sanctions against
Syria. And that was passed in response to Syria's support for
terrorism, its occupation of Lebanon, and its pursuit of
dangerous weapons.
I was just in Iraq and Israel over this past weekend.
Syria, at best, you could say, is negligent, insofar as
stopping terrorist activity from coming into Iraq. And this is
from General Casey. Meeting with leaders from Prime Minister
Sharon and Minister Netanyahu, General Gilad, the reality is
that Syria continues to be a problem funding terrorist
activities--not just in Lebanon, not just in attacking in Iran,
but also Hezbollah and others. There is a worry that Syria, in
funding some of these organizations, would actually take out
Abu Mazen, or Mahmoud Abbas. And this is a terrorist state.
I urge you to not let Syria off the hook. We may not know
the specific complicity in this particular assassination, but
they have 15,000 troops in Lebanon which would like to also
control their own destiny. Here's the fact, Syria continues to
harbor leaders who plan and finance terrorist attacks. We know
this. They do it against Israeli citizens. They have operatives
in Islamic Jihad, Hamas, the popular front for the liberation
of Palestine, and the Martyrs Brigades regularly receive
training in Syrian camps. And as long as they continue--in
Syria--to occupy Lebanon and train suicide bombers, I don't
think the region is safe.
So, I urge you all, in the administration, to take strong
action against Syria. And I know there's others who may have
another view, but, speaking for myself, I hope you take tough,
strong, serious action against Syria. Do you want to comment--
--
Secretary Rice. Yes.
Senator Allen [continuing]. On that diatribe?
Secretary Rice. Well----
Senator Allen. The thing is, now, you commented on, on the
other one, that was not quite of the same angle of----
Secretary Rice. No, I'm----
Senator Allen [continuing]. Approach to Syria.
Secretary Rice [continuing]. I'm happy to comment. There is
no doubt that Syria is a big problem. And one of the reasons
that we have been strong in supporting--or in sponsoring
Resolution 1559 is that we need the international community
united against what Syria is doing, and what Syria is using
both its own territory for and what it's using the territory of
southern Lebanon to do.
I do think that the recall of the Ambassador is a strong
signal. And, as I said, while Lebanon was the proximate cause,
this has been growing for some time. You were--you gave us the
tool of the Syrian Accountability Act. We were able to use part
of that. We continue to review what else we might do.
But we do have to get international pressure on Syria to
stop doing some of the things that they were--that they're
doing. We were just with--I was just also with President Abbas
and with Prime Minister Sharon, and they are trying very hard
to push toward some kind of more positive future. And here you
have Hezbollah and other terrorist groups, many of them
supported by Syria, trying, literally, to blow up the process.
And so, we are sending very strong messages to Syria. I
think the message that we sent yesterday was an important one,
and we'll see how they respond.
Senator Allen. What can the international community do?
Clearly, the Egyptians can be helpful, but what can they do,
tangibly? Withdrawing our Ambassador is a nice--it's a strong
diplomatic signal, but what can our friends, or sometimes
friends in the Middle East, or in Europe--what can they do----
Secretary Rice. Well, I think that----
Senator Allen [continuing]. To put pressure on Syria?
Secretary Rice [continuing]. If they can send the Syrians a
message that this kind of behavior in which they're engaged is
not acceptable, then perhaps the Syrians will start to worry
more about their isolation, not just from us--their isolation,
politically and economically--not just from us, but from
others, as well. And, thus far, we've been the only ones to be
willing to look at something like the Syrian Accountability
Act. But, ultimately, if the Syrians continue down this road,
others are going to have to look at similar modes.
Senator Allen. I would hope you'll continue to get others.
Sanctions are important, but they're most effective if they're
joined by other countries. Otherwise, they circumvent them.
Secretary Rice. Right.
Senator Allen. Let me, finally, say, you talked about the
time of opportunity, that it must not be lost, right now in
Israel, vis-a-vis Palestine, with the death of that corrupt
terrorist, Yasser Arafat. There is an opportunity. I would
encourage you to make sure that the funding that we give to the
Palestinians ends up in tangible projects so that it cannot be
embezzled or moved away. I find it just absolutely deplorable
that they're paying Yasser Arafat's wife $20 to $25 million so
she'll tell them where all the money is that he purloined and
embezzled away from the people of the Palestinian areas. And
so, for the credibility of what our funds are going to, to help
the Palestinian people, if they were tangible projects rather
than money into governmental accounts, I think that will help
the credibility of that funding and also actually help the
people. Not that I'm saying Abu Mazen would divert it, but the
specter of corruption has been there, and there needs to be
greater confidence in the transparency and the integrity of
Palestinian leaders.
Secretary Rice. I appreciate that, Senator, and we will
consult with you on moving forward with the--if we get the
allocation--on how it's spent.
Senator Allen. Thank you.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
The Chairman. Thank you very much, Senator Allen.
Senator Boxer.
Senator Boxer. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
Secretary Rice, welcome.
I'm glad that the Syria Accountability Act is giving you
the tools you need. I was the author of that, with Senator
Santorum. We got that through the State Department under--
former leadership never supported it. And I was very pleased
the President eventually signed it. And I think it could be a
model.
I also want to say that Senator Allen makes a good point,
in terms of funding to the Palestinian Authority. We're still--
we've lost, it seems, $9 billion in Iraq. We can't find it. We
had some hearings that said that millions of dollars were being
stuffed into pockets in Iraq. And it's important to have some
strings on these funds.
These funds that you're asking for, for the Authority,
which I support, they are from our taxpayers, so we really need
to, as Senator Allen, said, put some strings on there, put some
transparency into that.
I want to make some comments and then ask you some
questions.
Senator Biden raised some questions about--in general; it's
not just the State Department--these supplemental requests. The
administration is clearly funding the war in Iraq through
supplemental appropriations. And the ordinary person will say,
``Well, what's the difference? They're coming out and asking
for the funding.'' Well, the difference is, the war is off-
budget. It doesn't show up in the budget deficit. And I think
this approach to budgeting is not giving the American people
the true cost of the war in Iraq. And we need to level with the
American people.
There's not a penny of this war in the--for this war in the
2006 budget now. I haven't heard anyone say we're bringing the
troops home in 2005; nothing in the 2006 budget at all.
Frankly, I believe--I served on the Budget Committee for many
years, in the House and also in the Senate--that, basically, it
hides the deficit number. The dollars go straight to the debt.
We're borrowing. It goes straight to the debt. It doesn't show
up in the deficit. If it was put into the budget, it would show
up. It would be the highest deficit in history.
An example of this, which I find really interesting, is
that when we were leading up to the war, many of us talked
about the first gulf war and burden-sharing for the cost. As I
know that you know, we paid only 20 percent of that war, and
our allies paid 80 percent. When we asked about it, we were
told by the administration, ``We have a coalition. There is
burden-sharing,'' and they were very proud of that. And we were
all welcoming whatever partners came in.
Now the American taxpayers are asked to pay between $200
and $400 million to these coalition partners. So, in essence,
we're paying them for what they did. Now, whether that's right
or wrong, begs the question. The point is, we were told there
was financial burden-sharing, and, at the end of the day, there
isn't.
Maybe it wouldn't be so bad if this budget didn't cut
education and local law enforcement, transit programs, and
other things. But I think my constituents, at any rate, are not
exactly happy with the way the cost of this war is escalating.
When you went through progress for women, it very much
interested me. And I noticed that you, rightly, left out Saudi
Arabia, did you not?
Secretary Rice. I did.
Senator Boxer. Yes. As we saw, the men go to vote. Here we
are in the 21st century. So I'd love to work with you in the
future. Maybe we can have some type of targeted effort on
women's rights in Saudi Arabia that we could work on together.
Because, clearly, if you listen to Bernard Lewis--and I'm sure
you've read many of his writings--a very esteemed historian,
who says that if he was to name one reason why the Muslim world
is backward, it's because of the treatment of women. So I hope
we can work on that.
Now, my questions revolve, again, around Iraq. The Iraqi
elections were a very important marker along a difficult and
oftentimes painful journey we are making in order to bring our
troops home. Fifty-eight percent of Iraqis voted. And that was
wonderful. The question that is so important for our troops
coming home is, out of the 42 percent who didn't vote, how many
of those are sympathetic to the insurgents? Iraqi intelligence
estimates there are as many as 200,000 sympathizers and as many
as 30,000 armed insurgents. Our own estimates have grown from
5,000 insurgents to 20,000 insurgents. So whatever we do in
Iraq, there will not be success until the insurgency becomes
weak. We all want our troops to come home, and that great time
is tied to a more secure Iraq.
To that end, Senator Lugar held a very important hearing 2
weeks ago, after the Iraqi election, that featured the
testimony of General Gregory Newbold, a retired Marine Corps
general. General Newbold is a hero who commanded the first
marines who landed in Somalia in 1992, and he served as the
director of operations of the Joint Chiefs. He was a prime
planner for the Iraqi war. He was very involved in that war.
This is what General Newbold had to say about our policy in
Iraq. And he made three points, and I'm going to tell you what
they are and ask you to respond to them.
Quote, ``We have to understand that the fundamental reason
for the insurgency, the thing that ties all of the various
groups together, is their view that we, the United States, are
an occupying power.'' That's his first point.
Second, he said, quote, ``We should implement a
regionalization strategy that empowers the more stable
provinces. To the stable areas, we should offer increased
financial assistance, less coalition presence, and greater
autonomy in disbursing aid.''
And, third, General Newbold called on the administration to
put a 2-year goal for total U.S. withdrawal. He said, and I
quote, ``Close-mindedness about discussing anything except that
our withdrawal is wholly condition-based fuels the perception
that we have no intention of withdrawing.''
So do you agree or disagree with Marine General Newbold's
three points here: One, that we are viewed as an occupying
power; two, there should be less coalition presence and more
autonomy into stable areas; and, three, we should set a 2-year
goal for total U.S. withdrawal?
Secretary Rice. Thank you, Senator.
As to--let me start with number two, if----
Senator Boxer. Okay.
Secretary Rice [continuing]. You don't mind. In fact, I
think that if you looked on the ground, that is essentially
what is happening, is that there is greater local autonomy,
both in terms of security forces, because there are places that
these security forces are capable of acting----
Senator Boxer. Can you name those areas----
Secretary Rice. Well, for----
Senator Boxer [continuing]. Those regions?
Secretary Rice [continuing]. Instance, in the south. If you
look at a place like Najaf, which, just a little while ago, was
under a threat from another kind of insurgency, the Mahdi Army
of----
Senator Boxer. Yeah.
Secretary Rice [continuing]. Muqtada al-Sadr, I think you
will see that our forces have not been in Najaf for some time.
That really is an area that is controlled by Iraqi police and
Iraqi forces. It is also an area where the governance
structures are working and where provincial leaders are
working----
Senator Boxer. So do you think--I mean, I don't--we don't
need to go----
Secretary Rice. Just as----
Senator Boxer [continuing]. Into it at great length----
Secretary Rice [continuing]. Just as a----
Senator Boxer [continuing]. So you agree with that point
he's making, that in the--that there should be less coalition
presence and more autonomy in the stable areas.
Secretary Rice. I think you're getting it, because the
coalition presence----
Senator Boxer. So you think it's done?
Secretary Rice. No, I don't think it's done, but I think
you are getting it, because the coalition presence is more
keyed to places where it's needed, and the places where it's
needed are not places----
Senator Boxer. Okay, so it's----
Secretary Rice [continuing]. Which are stable.
Senator Boxer [continuing]. So you would agree with his
comment. You don't think it's an appropriate criticism, because
you think it's being done. Is that an accurate----
Secretary Rice. I just think that that's the direction----
Senator Boxer. Okay.
Secretary Rice [continuing]. In which it's moving.
Senator Boxer. And what about his other two points? Your
views----
Secretary Rice. On those, I have to say that I think, first
of all, American forces are operating there under a
multinational U.N. mandate to help the Iraqis do what they
cannot do for themselves. And the Iraqis, themselves, will say
that without those forces they could not maintain stability in
the country. We gave over sovereignty to this country in June
2004, and they've just had an election. These are not occupying
forces, the American and other coalition forces, they are
forces that are there as a multinational force to provide
stability for this new government.
I think it would be a mistake to have a specific 2-year
goal, because the only people that I think you will empower
with such a goal will be those who hope that we will leave, and
leave the place a vacuum, so that they can start again
repressing their fellow citizens, as they did under Saddam
Hussein.
A goal that says that, as the Iraqis' forces are trained,
and as Iraqis can do these functions for themselves, we will be
more than happy to leave, I think, is the right way to talk
about this.
Senator Boxer. Well, Mr. Chairman, if I--conclude this
round and just say this.
I think that this Marine General--I think you should meet
with him--I think that he brings to the table real-life
experience in war that you and I don't have. And I think that
his comment was, at the conclusion of the hearing, when we
asked if he was hopeful as he laid out these ideas, he said,
``I have absolutely no reason to believe that this
administration will change a process that resulted in this mess
to begin with.'' So he's very critical. And this is someone who
planned the war in Iraq.
And I just think you're again laying down these condition-
based reasons, and the message the people are getting is, we
may never leave there. And that was his point. He didn't set a
timetable, but he said it should be our goal.
Anyway, thank you very much.
The Chairman. Thank you, Senator Boxer.
Let me say that I'm advised that Secretary Rice can stay
with us until about 12:20, and I appreciate that. I'm going to
try to call upon Senator Martinez and Senator Obama for their
regular rounds, and then Senator Boxer has some additional
questions, and I would like to recognize her if there is time
at that point.
Senator Martinez.
Senator Martinez. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I appreciate the
opportunity to be with you today.
And, Dr. Rice--Secretary Rice, welcome back. And I should
say that I'm extremely pleased with the great success of your
recent European trip. I know how important our bilateral--our
relations with the European friends is, and I think you've made
great progress. I commend you and congratulate you on what, I
think, was an extremely successful trip. But I think all
Americans cheered for you and were pleased to see.
I want to also associate myself with the comments of
Senator Allen with respect to Syria. And, I think, it's correct
that you would take the action that you would take today, with
the withdrawal of the Ambassador. Even though the immediate
responsibility for the horrible acts of this week has not been
known yet, I do believe that the lack of sovereignty of the
Lebanese people ought to be something we keep uppermost in our
mind, and it is, I think, a crucial element of achieving a
lasting Middle Eastern peace, is to have Lebanon be a free and
independent state where the terrorism in the southern part of
Lebanon is curtailed.
I wanted to ask you two very specific areas in the area of
Latin America, one is Plan Colombia. How do you perceive the
success of Plan Colombia, and where do you think it will be
going in this upcoming budget?
Secretary Rice. Well, we obviously have to continue support
for Plan Colombia, particularly at a time when we have a
president, in President Uribe, who has put his country on a
course to really deal with the narcotrafficking of FARC.
The Plan Colombia, of course, does not operate in a vacuum.
It does operate in the context of an Andean Initiative, which,
I think, is also very important, because, as we've said, if you
eradicate in one area and you have growth in another, this will
not work.
We're also looking to the Colombians for what I will call
more normalization of our relationships. For instance, Bob
Zoellick, when he was USTR--I guess he still is USTR, but will
shortly not be--has engaged the Colombians in discussions on an
FTA, which would give longer term economic growth to Colombia.
So we will continue the efforts of Plan Colombia in the way
that they've been continued, but, I think, as they make
progress against the FARC, you'll want to see the transitioning
of some of this to an effort to grow the economy, to do all of
the things that will ultimately make this a really stable
democracy. And, I think, we believe we have a very excellent
partner in President Uribe.
Senator Martinez. I had talked to you in the past in terms
of the importance of promoting democracy. I know the
President's Inaugural speech and, obviously, in his State of
the Union message, as well, it's a clear purpose of the current
foreign policy of this administration to pursue freedom and
democracy whenever possible. And you know of my great passion
to see that also come to the enslaved people of Cuba.
And I was very pleased with your commitment to the
promotion of democracy through a means of communication to
people that otherwise have no means of receiving information.
I know, from talking to former Soviet dissidents, as well
as other freed Europeans, and seeing the comments that they
make, that Radio Free Europe was a great constant source of
information, of encouragement. Likewise, I've had recent
experiences in TV Marti. And some of my initial remarks as a
Member of this Senate were broadcast back to Cuba by TV Marti,
and I've had very encouraging feedback of the great
encouragement that people received from my ascending to this
office.
I wonder if, in your current budget, we'll continue to have
the same commitment the President expressed in May toward the
commitment to be able to overcome the continued jamming of
Radio and TV Marti by the Cuban Government with the
technological means that we know can do it.
Secretary Rice. Yes. Well, as you know, Senator, we have
committed over $37 million to broadcasting in Cuba, looking at
platforms, as well, as a part of that. And there's a real
commitment to broadcasting in Cuba, because, as I have
mentioned about the more general issue of broadcasting, it's
one of our best tools.
This is not a matter of propaganda. This is a matter of
simply getting the truth to people who would otherwise not be
able to get the truth. And so, as a part of a broad emphasis on
broadcasting, which I think is reflected in the budget in
increases for broadcasting, the Cuban broadcasting piece of
this also received significant funding, and should continue to.
Senator Martinez. Great.
I wanted to also let you know that Chairman Lugar has given
me the responsibility of chairing the African Subcommittee, and
I will be looking forward to getting with you and other members
of your team, as you continue to shape your team, to work in
that very important area, where I also have a lot to learn, but
I also hope to make some contribution to this committee's work.
Secretary Rice. Thank you. I look forward to working with
you.
Senator Martinez. Thank you very much.
The Chairman. Thank you very much, Senator Martinez.
Senator Obama.
Senator Obama. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Secretary Rice, congratulations on your confirmation and
what appears to have been a successful trip. Welcome back.
I missed some of your opening testimony, although I have
the opportunity to read it. And so, I apologize if I end up
going over some ground that you already answered.
The first issue I want to focus on, and we talked a little
bit about this during your confirmation hearing, was the issue
of loose nuclear material. And, you know, the President's
statement, shared by nominee John Kerry, about the number one
priority being securing loose nuclear material, I wanted to
find whether the budget request here has accelerated our
ability to secure those--that nuclear material. And, if so, do
we, at this point, have some sense of a timeline? I'm working
off a previous estimate that, if we were going off----
Secretary Rice. Right.
Senator Obama [continuing]. On our current pace, it would
take about 13 years. Have we ratcheted that up? And, if so, can
you give me some sense of what this budget does to that
process?
Secretary Rice. Well, most of the funding for the kinds of
programs that will accelerate the securing of nuclear materials
actually reside in the Energy Department budget. And, in my
previous life, we worked very hard to make certain that the
Energy Department could be on a time schedule that would secure
those materials within 4 years, not 13, which would have been
the natural----
Senator Obama. Right.
Secretary Rice [continuing]. Glide path. I have not,
myself, reviewed the Energy Department's budget submission, but
that's where----
Senator Obama. Okay, so that's where----
Secretary Rice [continuing]. That would be.
Senator Obama [continuing]. The money's going to be housed.
And so----
Secretary Rice. That would----
Senator Obama [continuing]. We're going to have----
Secretary Rice. We have, in State, some Nunn-Lugar-type
programs, and, for instance, assistance for WMD scientists----
Senator Obama. Right.
Secretary Rice [continuing]. To do other things;
flexibility, for instance, that allowed us to do something
about Libyan scientists. But the great bulk of the Cooperative
Threat Reduction Program is either in Energy or in Defense.
Senator Obama. Okay. And is that coordinated----
Secretary Rice. It's coordinated----
Senator Obama [continuing]. Through your office?
Secretary Rice [continuing]. Through the National Security
Council.
Senator Obama. The National Security Council, okay. So in
your previous job, you would have----
Secretary Rice. I did----
Senator Obama [continuing]. Been involved----
Secretary Rice [continuing]. Coordinate it, yes.
Senator Obama [continuing]. In that. Okay. Why don't I
shift gears, then, and ask a little bit about some of the
public diplomacy issues and other initiatives that are
contained in this budget.
It strikes me that promoting democracy, in and of itself,
is an important function. But, as is true, I think, in this
country, democracy works best when we have an informed
citizenry. One of the repeated problems we've always heard
about, and I've experienced firsthand, when you travel in
Muslim countries, is the huge numbers of young people who lack
educational opportunity. And that void has then been filled in
many areas of the Middle East with Madrasas and other schools
that are not necessarily promoting the sort of civic virtues
that, you know, not only we might encourage, as Americans, but
that would help sustain the long-term, stable democracy. And
I'm wondering, in this budget, where some of that--if you agree
with that, that that's an important priority, and, if so, what
are we doing through the State Department, and where will that
be reflected in the budget, some expenditures, in terms of
promoting education, in these countries?
Secretary Rice. You would look, principally, to, really,
two sources. First of all, through the economic-support funds.
We often are supporting educational initiatives in various
countries. For instance, in Pakistan we've had a program of
almost $100 million in Pakistan of trying to support
educational initiatives that are Pakistani educational
initiatives.
As you might appreciate, Senator, this is a delicate
matter.
Senator Obama. Yeah.
Secretary Rice. The idea that the United States would come
in and impose, somehow, educational programs in these countries
would be not very well received. So what we've done is to work
with countries to develop their--to help fund their own
educational initiatives that we feel are strong. And some of
the best are in places like Pakistan. USAID also has a number
of educational initiatives in key countries. But the textbook
reform initiatives--there would be, for instance, in the
Palestinian territories, if you were to look, one of the major
textbook reform initiatives there is actually a USAID
initiative. So we are trying to approach this question of the
ideology of hatred that gets taught, unfortunately, at the
earliest stages.
On the public-diplomacy side, and I appreciate very much
your support for that, we are plussing-up public diplomacy in
the budget, because we need not only to be able to add to the
infrastructure of public diplomacy--that is, what we do out in
the field through our Embassies--but also in educational and
cultural affairs. And I hope we will get the support of this
committee for a significant increase that we've made to the
educational and cultural affairs accounts to increase our
educational----
Senator Obama. Right.
Secretary Rice [continuing]. Exchanges. And one of the
initiatives that we're looking at is how we can use these to
reach disaffected populations within countries. I'm sure that
if you had done some exchanges with the United States in 1950
or 1955, you might not have gotten a very diverse group.
Senator Obama. Right.
Secretary Rice. Similarly, educational exchanges with other
countries where people are not fully into the mainstream might
not give you diversity, in terms of the Muslim population. So--
--
Senator Obama. Right.
Secretary Rice [continuing]. We're looking at that.
Senator Obama. Well, I think that would be very positive. I
appreciate your statement that, on the education front, if it
was perceived that we were structuring curriculums that
extolled the virtues of the United States, then, you know,
there would be suspicion, and it probably would lose
credibility.
You know, it's not only the ideology of hatred, I guess,
that I want to reach at. I mean, I am confident that if young
people have prospects and hope in these countries, then that is
the most important ingredient in stabilizing the countries and
incorporating them into a modern, global political economy.
And so, I would be interested, maybe if your staff could
just give me some sense of how those projects are moving
forward and how they're funded, how we evaluate them, where
they've been most successful. That's something that I would be
interested in.
Let me just pick up on one last point, because I'm sure I'm
going to be running out of time fairly soon.
Progress on Iraqi oil production. You know, the State
Department now is going to be involved, as I understand it, in
the reconstruction process, in supervising some of that. And,
you know, we had, obviously, very optimistic estimates, in
terms of how quickly we would get Iraqi oil production up and
running. Recognizing that the insurgency has stalled some of
that, we have also been hearing some disturbing reports about
mismanagement of some of the aid that's gone there and how
that's been handled.
Can you give me a sense, at this point--your best
assessment of where we're at, in terms of Iraqi oil production,
how soon some of that money is then going to be plowed back
into reconstruction, and what that means for United States
taxpayers, in terms of the burdens that they are carrying?
Secretary Rice. Well, we were doing, really, rather well,
in terms of getting production back up to prewar levels for
most of the last several months--at one point, about 2.5
million barrels a day--and then being able to export. The
problem has arisen, of course, because of, literally, sabotage
of some of the oil infrastructure and efforts now to protect
that oil infrastructure through the Ministry of Oil and through
the Ministry of Interior, with forces that are dedicated to
that.
We do have significant projects that are aimed at the
rehabilitation of existing Iraqi oil infrastructure so that
they can, not only increase their production, but maintain it.
As you know, with oil infrastructure, that's one of the
problems. It's not just getting it to a certain level, but it's
actually maintaining it. And because Iraq was, in effect,
isolated from the international technology for oil, it was a--
it's a fairly--had been a fairly creaky infrastructure. But,
again, it was producing pretty effectively.
What we hope to do is that there will be investments in the
oil infrastructure. But, of course, ultimately the answer for
the Iraqis will be to get private capital investment in their
oil infrastructure. And if the security situation gets somewhat
better, I think you will see that kind of investment, because
there are a number of countries that have expressed to the
Iraqis their desire to help with investment in infrastructure.
The Iraqis, of course, are also going to have to make some
decisions about what laws they will have about foreign
investment and what that will mean.
But the--it's very high on the agenda of infrastructure to
help the Iraqis continue their oil production at least at
prewar levels. Much beyond that, you would have to do pretty
major investments in their oil infrastructure, just because
it's very creaky from having been isolated from the
international system for so long.
Senator Obama. Okay.
Mr. Chairman, thank you very much.
The Chairman. Thank you, Senator Obama.
We will commence a second round. And I will pass,
withholding my questions, and recognize the distinguished
ranking member.
Senator Biden. Mr. Chairman, I understand the Secretary has
to leave shortly, and I have an opportunity, as you do, to
speak with her frequently. What I'll do is submit my questions
in writing.
I have some questions, Dr. Rice, about Iran. I have
questions, followup, about oil. We're at prewar levels, but
there's a $30 billion investment needed, and how we're going to
go about that. And I have questions about the issue about how
we deal with our friends in the region, particularly the
Saudis, as it relates to the charitable organizations that
still are in operation.
But I'll yield to my colleague and friend from California
for her questions.
The Chairman. Senator Boxer.
Senator Boxer. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I will try to be as
brief as possible.
I have, really, one question about Iran, but it's--I'm
going to preface it.
When we look at the administration's policy in Iraq, it's
very much a hands-on policy, to put it mildly. It is now pretty
much--with your request to pay back the coalition partners,
it's almost 100-percent funded, maybe 97- or 95-percent funded,
by American taxpayers. We know, day after day, it's--we're
calling the shots there. And whether you believe, as General--
Marine General Newbold does, that we're seen as an occupier,
the fact is, our presence there is enormous. It's huge. And we
still won't set a goal for when--a goal--for when we want to
leave. And we haven't heard any statements that, you know, we
won't be there for the indefinite period.
So, if you contrast that to Iran, it's such a stark
difference in the way we're approaching it. Here we are, you
know, day in and day out, a hands-on policy in Iraq, and, in
Iran, we're outsiders looking in. And your comment that came
out of your meetings--and, by the way, I'm really glad that we
saw you with our allies, and I hope the days of ``Freedom
Fries'' and ``Old Europe''--obviously, Secretary Rumsfeld
handled that adroitly--and comments that we should forgive
Russia, ignore Germany, and punish France--that that's part of
the past. And it looked like that was the case, and it was
reassuring, I think, to the world, to see that. So, thank you
for that.
But the Europeans have said they need you as help in order
to achieve a negotiated solution. To quote the French Foreign
Minister, he said, ``We need the confidence and the support of
the United States in this very delicate phase, and that's the
message we convey to Condi Rice,'' unquote.
Your comment, coming out of last week, was, ``Negotiations
between Iran and Europe cannot go on forever.'' That was the
quote that made it here.
Now, I don't blame you for criticizing negotiations between
Europe and Iran if you believe they're not working. That's--
you've got to call it the way you see it. I don't have a
problem with that. But you're being critical from the outside
looking in. And so, if the talks need a jumpstart, why don't we
get involved? As my colleague, Senator Biden, has been quoted
as saying, Why aren't we part of the dialog? How can that hurt?
It can only help. Especially with you coming in now and us
having this fresh start.
So, rather than say, ``These negotiations can't go on
forever,'' why don't we become part of the dialog there?
Secretary Rice. Thank you, Senator.
Let me say, I--we've not been critical of these
negotiations. In fact, I heard, from our European partners,
that they believe that, without our cooperation, coordination,
consultation, that they would not be in the position that they
are now. I believe that Secretary Straw said something----
Senator Boxer. Coordination in----
Secretary Rice [continuing]. Along those lines.
Senator Boxer [continuing]. What way?
Secretary Rice [continuing]. Along----
Senator Boxer. Coordination----
Secretary Rice [continuing]. Those lines.
Senator Boxer. Coordination in what way?
Secretary Rice. We talk frequently about what is happening
in the negotiations, what is being offered to the Iranians,
what needs--the Europeans, I think, are being very
straightforward with the----
Senator Boxer. So you talk----
Secretary Rice [continuing]. Iranian----
Senator Boxer [continuing]. To the Europeans, but you don't
talk to the Iranians.
Secretary Rice. No. And I would hope that we wouldn't allow
the Iranians to create another condition for doing what it is
that they need to do. And I said, when I was in London, that
the Europeans have given the Iranians a path by which to
demonstrate to the world that they're prepared to live up to
their international obligations. And the Iranians ought to take
that offer.
Senator Boxer. Right. So you think the Europeans are
pleased with what you're doing. Then why would they say, ``We
need the confidence and the support of the United States in
this very delicate phase, and that's the message we convey to
Condi Rice''?
Secretary Rice. Well, I tried to reassure them, and--when I
talked with them--that we, in fact, do want their negotiations
to succeed, that we believe that we are getting information and
consultation with the Europeans about what they are requiring
of the Iranians. We are completely in agreement with them that
the Iranians ought to stop enriching and that the Iranians
ought to be involved, instead, in a kind of fuel-provision
arrangement, which is something, by the way, that the President
proposed at the National Defense University some time ago.
So we are hopeful that the Europeans can do what they hope
to do with the Iranians. I don't think we need to create new
conditions of the United States, as to do----
Senator Boxer. Well, no one is asking for new conditions. I
don't think so. I think--so do you agree with Senator Biden,
when he says we should be part of dialog, that you're already
part of the dialog?
Secretary Rice. I believe that we are a part of the dialog
with the Europeans about how the Iranians could come into
compliance with their international obligations.
Senator Boxer. Okay. So we are in dialog with the
Europeans, even though they're complaining and want more
support from you. You feel satisfied we're giving them that
support. But we are not in dialog----
I want to yield to you, yes.
Senator Biden. No, no, just a moment----
Senator Boxer. Yes, that's what I----
Senator Biden. I don't think we should only be in dialog
with the Europeans. I think we should be in dialog with the
Iranians----
Senator Boxer. That was the point----
Secretary Rice. That, we----
Senator Boxer [continuing]. I started----
Senator Biden [continuing]. As well.
Secretary Rice [continuing]. Are not.
Senator Biden. Yeah.
Senator Boxer. That's the point----
Secretary Rice. We are not in dialog with----
Senator Boxer [continuing]. I was----
Secretary Rice [continuing]. The Iranians.
Senator Boxer [continuing]. Trying to make here. So, I
think a dialog goes on between both sides. That's what--I
didn't want to put words in Senator Biden's mouth. But the fact
is, a dialog means you're talking to all the sides.
So, you're saying you're talking to the Europeans. It seems
to me they would like a little more. And I'm just hoping that
you're not wedded to that approach, because, as my mother
always taught me, from the time I was a child, words are okay.
It's okay to talk. It's okay to have differences. It's okay to
lay them out. And I think you're so articulate, and I think if
you set your mind to it, we could have a breakthrough over
there.
Secretary Rice. Well, I appreciate that, Senator, but let
me just say, the Iranians know what they need to do. They don't
need to talk to us about it. They know what they need to do.
They need to live up to their international obligations. They
need to stop enriching. They need to stop trying to, under
cover of a civilian nuclear power program, get a nuclear----
Senator Boxer. Well, you----
Secretary Rice [continuing]. Weapon.
Senator Boxer [continuing]. Keep saying the Iranians know
what they need to do. I think maybe they need to hear it in a
more direct fashion. I mean, my mother always said I knew what
I needed to do, but, believe me, she told me again and again
what I had to do.
So, I wouldn't downplay the fact that your being more
involved there, with both sides, is a small matter. I think
it's a big matter, and I hope you will, perhaps, follow the
advice of a couple of us, who think a little bit more dialog
with both sides might break through.
Secretary Rice. Thank you.
The Chairman. Thank you very much, Senator Boxer.
Thank you very much, Secretary Rice. We very much
appreciate your coming to the committee today, and your
forthcoming responses to our questions. We look forward to
working with you on the budget and on our authorization bill.
Secretary Rice. Thank you very much, Senator. I look
forward to working with you, too.
The Chairman. The hearing is adjourned.
[Whereupon, at 12:25 p.m., the hearing was adjourned.]
----------
Additional Statement and Questions and Answers Submitted for the Record
Prepared Statement of U.S. Senator Lamar Alexander
At her confirmation hearing before this committee last month,
Secretary Rice stressed, ``The time for diplomacy is now.'' She said
there would be a new emphasis on diplomatic activity to advance the
Administration's foreign policy objectives. Actions speak louder than
words, and the actions of both the Secretary and President Bush have
shown the truth of her statement.
Secretary Rice has just returned from a trip to Europe and the
Middle East that has helped jump-start the peace process between the
Israelis and Palestinians. The President has unveiled a budget request
that puts greater emphasis on diplomacy as a tool in the War on Terror.
The President's budget calls for a 13-percent increase in the
international affairs budget over what was appropriated last year.
That's a higher increase than in any other part of the budget, except
for Commerce--Defense and Homeland Security each rose by about 4
percent. That 13-percent increase includes more money to fight HIV/AIDS
around the world and more money for the Millennium Challenge
Corporation that helps poorer countries that have committed to
democracy, open markets, and the rule of law.
I was pleased to see an increase of 19.4 percent ($70 million
increase) for education and cultural exchange. We are living in a time
when American motives are widely questioned and often misunderstood.
Few things will do more to help other cultures understand us (and help
us understand them) than increased contact through bringing students
and leaders here and sending our students, leaders, and others there.
This is true not only in the Arab world, which is rightly the focus of
our efforts to ``win hearts and minds,'' but also in Russia, China, and
other countries where the people were taught to hate Americans in the
past.
Today our nation faces three critical challenges:
1. Defeat terrorism.
2. Succeed in an increasingly competitive global marketplace.
3. Preserve our common American culture.
Increased cultural exchange is not a silver bullet for solving any
of these problems, but it is a tool that can help, especially with the
first two.
To defeat terrorism, we need more cultural exchange with the Middle
East. As more Arabs study and visit the United States, they will
understand our character and desire to be a force for freedom--not
tyranny--in their part of the world. As more Americans visit the Arab
world, we will come to understand their culture, and respect their
religious choices.
To improve our competitiveness, we need more cultural exchange with
the burgeoning economies of the world, especially China. If the United
States is to successfully access the Chinese market, more Americans
need to understand their language, culture, and business practices.
Similarly, if China is to continue growing and attracting investment
from the West, they need more Chinese that understand our language,
culture, and legal structures for protecting business investments.
Spending money on cultural exchange, however, is not enough to
facilitate stronger connections between Americans and the world. Our
visa policy must show a similar dedication to openness, while still
preserving American security. Since September 11, 2001, we have clamped
down and our visa policy has become stricter. As a result, applications
to American graduate schools declined 28 percent last year. Those from
China fell 45 percent; from India, 28 percent. We must reverse this
trend.
Last week, the State Department took an important step in the right
direction by announcing a change in the visa mantis clearance process
that will extend the validity of that clearance to the duration of
study (up to 4 years) for students who remain enrolled in the same
program here in the United States. The average time for a mantis
clearance is also now down from 77 days to a mere 14. This is a
dramatic improvement.
Yet more can be done. Next month, I hope to hold a roundtable with
key Senators and key decisionmakers from involved agencies to see what
more steps can be taken to improve our visa policy so that we no longer
discourage foreign students and researchers from visiting the United
States. I ask Secretary Rice to help me identify the key decisionmaker
in the State Department who should attend that discussion.
______
Responses From Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice to Questions
Submitted by Senator Richard Lugar
Question. I am concerned about the funds available for the Iraqi
International Center for Science and Industry. Like its predecessors in
the former Soviet Union, the ISTC and STCU, its goal is to re-employ
former weapons scientists in peaceful pursuits. It is intended to keep
hundreds of individuals with WMD expertise from selling their expertise
to rogue states and terrorist organizations. The Committee looks
forward to working with you to ensure that this important program is
continued. Can you share your thought on the program and your plans for
its future?
Answer. The State Department's program to redirect Iraqi weapons
scientists to peaceful, civilian employment in support of Iraqi
reconstruction is a priority nonproliferation effort, and the program
office--the Iraqi International Center for Science and Industry
(IICSI)--has been operating in Baghdad for nearly a year.
Well over a hundred Iraqi scientists, technicians and engineers
with WMD or missile expertise are currently participating in IICSI
activities for which they receive monthly stipends. The Center, working
with the Embassy, is now actively involved with Iraqi government
ministries to find participating scientists permanent positions with
those ministries. At the same time, IICSI continues to expand its
outreach to other Iraqis with WMD experience who have not yet benefited
from the program.
We are determined to maintain this vital program in operation as
long as it is needed and have included it in our FY 2006 budget
request.
Question. The administration is proposing a total of $3.2 billion
in funding to fight the international HIV/AIDS epidemic. Of that
amount, $300 million is allocated to be distributed multilaterally
through the Global Fund to Fight AIDS, Tuberculosis, and Malaria with
the rest to be allocated through bilateral channels. Why are we not
putting more funding into the Global Fund? Is the administration
disappointed in its administration of funds or its accountability in
the use of resources? How would you characterize the best balance we
should aim to strike between bilateral approaches and multilateral
approaches in fighting HIV/AIDS?
Answer. The U.S. Government provided $2.4 billion under the
Emergency Plan for international HIV/AIDS, tuberculosis, and malaria
activities in fiscal year (FY) 2004, more funding than all other donor
governments combined. U.S. Government agencies operate or fund HIV/AIDS
research, prevention, care and treatment programs in more than 100
countries. The FY 2005 budget is $2.8 billion, and the administration
has requested $3.2 billion for FY 2006.
In total, the United States has pledged 35 percent ($2.12 billion)
of the $6.0 billion in pledges to the Fund through 2008, and 32.4
percent ($1.08 billion) of the $3.3 billion contributed to date.
Nevertheless, as you know, the United States Leadership Against HIV/
AIDS, Tuberculosis and Malaria Act of 2003 mandates that the U.S.
contribution to the Fund may not exceed 33 percent of total
contributions at any time during the period of FY 2004-FY 2008. On July
31 of each year from 2004 through 2008, Ambassador Randall L. Tobias,
the U.S. Global AIDS Coordinator, assesses the cumulative amount of
non-U.S. government contributions to the Fund--measured from October 1,
2003--to determine how much of our annual appropriation from the
Congress designated for the Fund we can contribute and still stay below
that 33 percent threshold.
It is important to emphasize that in FY 2004, the United States was
unable to contribute the full $547 million Congress appropriated for
the Fund because other donors' contributions were not sufficient to
allow us to provide this amount without exceeding the 33 percent cap,
mandated by the Congress. The $87.8 million the U.S. Government was
unable to contribute last year remains available for contribution
through this Fiscal Year, in addition to the appropriation of $347
million for FY 2005. This brings the total possible U.S. Government
pledge for FY 2005 to $435 million, but, as with last year, other
donors must contribute enough to the Fund to keep our share below the
Congressionally imposed 33-percent ceiling. For the United States to
maximize its possible Fiscal Year 2005 contribution to the Fund, other
donors will need to have contributed (not just pledged) approximately
an additional $836 million by July 31, 2005.
There is no set formula for balancing funding between bilateral
programming and the Global Fund. The United States is guided in its
decision-making largely by the emergency nature and other needs of the
pandemic. With two decades of expertise fighting HIV/AIDS in the United
States and worldwide; field presence and strong relationships with host
governments in over 100 countries; and well-developed partnerships with
non-governmental, faith-based and international organizations that
deliver HIV/AIDS programs, the U.S. is uniquely positioned to scale up
funding and HIV/AIDS services rapidly, efficiently, and effectively.
The balance the Emergency Plan has struck between its bilateral and
multilateral contributions ensures our tax dollars are spent in the
most effective ways possible in combating HIV/AIDS internationally.
We are deeply committed to the long-term success of the Global Fund
as an international instrument for financing health interventions; the
United States was the first donor to the Fund, and we have always been
and remain the largest. Our investment in the Fund is now our largest
commitment to combating malaria and tuberculosis around the world, and
allows us to have projects (one-third funded by the United States) in
countries where we do not have our own bilateral programs.
The Global Fund is, however, still a comparatively new institution,
and is still in the process of establishing the institutional
infrastructure and management processes and controls to ensure the
organization fulfills its specific mandate and that it uses funds
efficiently and effectively. The Global Fund is a critical part of the
Emergency Plan's overall strategy. It will be very difficult to achieve
the long-term victory we envision in the worldwide campaign against
these diseases without it, but other nations need to do more to meet
the terrible challenge of global HIV/AIDS. The United States has led
the way in helping create the Global Fund, and has set a high bar
through our own contributions for other donors to match our efforts by
increasing their financial commitments to the Global Fund.
Question. The United States Leadership Against HIV/AIDS,
Tuberculosis, and Malaria Act of 2003 (P.L. 108-25) states the Sense of
Congress that by the end of fiscal 2006, U.S. assistance programs
should be providing anti-retroviral therapy to 2 million patients. Are
we on track to meet this target? The legislation also requires that for
fiscal years 2006 through 2008, 10% of authorized funds be devoted to
helping orphans and vulnerable children. How will you meet this target
under the FY 2006 request?
Answer. The Emergency Plan has moved rapidly to support national
strategies for treatment in partnership with the public and private
sectors, committing more than $231.9 million for ART, or 40.8 percent
of the total resources available in the 15 focus countries. The results
of these joint U.S./host-country efforts are impressive. In the first
eight months of the Emergency Plan, the United States has supported ART
for 155,000 HIV-infected adults and children in the 15 focus countries,
achieving 76 percent of its target for June 2005. As a reference point
for this rapid progress, in December 2002, one month before President
Bush announced the Emergency Plan, only 50,000 people were reported as
receiving ART in all of sub-Saharan Africa. Eight months into the
Emergency Plan, three times that number were receiving treatment. The
Plan is well on track to meet the goal of supporting ART for 2 million
adults and children in five years.
The Emergency Plan is dedicated to expanding care and ART to HIV-
infected children, supporting ART for at least 4,800 children during
the first reporting period. Few sites are currently able to
disaggregate data by adults and children, so the number of children
receiving ART is likely underreported.
The Emergency Plan includes a range of activities aimed at
improving the lives of children and families affected by HIV/AIDS.
Activities include caregiver training; access to education; economic
support; targeted food and nutrition support; legal aid; medical,
psychological, or emotional care; and other social and material
support.
In FY04 President Bush's Emergency Plan moved rapidly to expand
services for orphans and vulnerable children, committing $36,322,000 of
the resources available in the focus countries. With an emphasis on
strengthening communities to meet the needs of orphans and vulnerable
children affected by HIV/AIDS, supporting community-based responses,
helping children and adolescents meet their own needs, and creating a
supportive social environment, these resources led to supportive care
for 630,200 orphans and vulnerable children in the 15 focus countries,
provided primarily through community- and faith-based organizations. In
addition to the amount dedicated to the resources for orphans and
vulnerable children previously mentioned, the Emergency Plan also
supported antiretroviral treatment for orphans and vulnerable children
living with HIV/AIDS, significantly increasing funds for this important
group to over 10% of the budget for the fiscal year.
Question. The MCC has not been funded at the level requested for
the last two years. This year, the administration is asking for $3
billion. Do you expect full funding this year? What would be the
consequences of not having the full $3 billion for FY06?
Answer. Yes, we do expect full funding of the MCC budget request
this year. Funding the MCC at the full $3 billion level requested will
be crucial to fulfilling President Bush's commitment to reduce poverty
by promoting economic growth in the developing world. With full
funding, the MCC can achieve tangible results by working in partnership
with eligible countries to break the cycle of poverty. Not only does
this reflect America's core values, but by stimulating economic growth
and encouraging good governance, it also enhances U.S. security and
promotes freedom and democracy throughout the world.
Question. Given the recent Volcker Commission revelations about
mismanagement and corruption within the United Nation's Oil-for-Food
program, how would the administration view the legislation that would
withhold all or some of our dues payments to the United Nations?
Answer. We are concerned about the issues identified in the interim
Volcker Commission report and the need to improve oversight within the
United Nation's (UN) system. In response to a U.S.-led reform
initiative, the General Assembly this past December strengthened the
regulations for the Office of Internal Oversight Services (OIOS)
reporting procedures which now requires the OIOS to make original
versions of its reports available to member states on request. This
represents a significant and positive reform that will provide greater
insight into the U.N.'s operations, and we continue to actively press
for further improvements in U.N. oversight.
We have requested $439 million for the U.N. Regular Budget for
FY06. We believe the adopted U.N. budget level advances U.S. interests
in important ways.
The constructive linkage between withholdings of U.S. dues and
advancement of U.N. reform in unclear. Withholding payment will
compound current cash flow problems which already exist as a result of
our recurring late (``deferred'') payment.
Question. The FY 2006 budget request includes $328 million within
the Diplomatic and Consular Program for public diplomacy. What new
ideas do you have for working with public affairs officers and public
diplomacy officers in the embassies to provide improved support and
guidance for their work? How can we better address the anti-American
opinion that often appears in the foreign press?
Answer. The Department has worked closely with embassies to develop
new initiatives such as American Corners, the Partnerships for Learning
compendium of exchange programs, and active exploitation of Internet
and language-versioned website material, for just three examples. The
public diplomacy bureaus and the Office of the Under Secretary meet
regularly with public diplomacy directors of the regional bureaus to
ensure close coordination with embassy programs.
The Under Secretary's Office of Policy, Planning, and Resources for
Public Diplomacy and Public Affairs, created in September 2004, was
created to strengthen strategic focus, coherence and accountability in
public diplomacy and public affairs. It has begun to address this by:
Coordinating public diplomacy components in the Mission
Program Plan and Bureau Program Plan processes, the central
processes of the Department for developing funding and other
resource support for embassy initiatives;
Expanding the PART process to cover all public diplomacy
programs. (PART has been implemented successfully in ECA for
the past several years.) PART will provide bureaus and field
posts the first set of realistic performance indicators for
public diplomacy and public affairs;
Directing public diplomacy resource managers to match their
budgets country-by-country with policy priorities.
The goal is to ensure that we provide our public diplomacy officers
overseas and in Washington with support and guidance necessary to
engage, inform and influence publics in support of our national foreign
policy objectives, and to be able to demonstrate to the Executive
Branch, Congress, and the taxpayer with confidence that public
diplomacy and public affairs resources are being used effectively.
As for addressing anti-American opinion in foreign press, there is
no easy answer. We must stay engaged with foreign media and opinion
leaders; we must be part of the discussion of critical issues. We
support our embassies in the effort in several ways:
The daily policy guidance process, which ensures that
embassies have current U.S. policy positions;
Website support, which provides policy and background
material for distribution in country, often in the vernacular,
including Arabic, Chinese, Russian, French, Spanish and
Persian, as well as English;
Frequent briefings of foreign journalists, in the Foreign
Press Centers in Washington and New York and Los Angeles;
Video News Releases directed to foreign broadcasters;
Television co-operative programming and other programs to
help foreign broadcasters and other journalists to understand
U.S. positions and policy on current issues;
An office dedicated to countering disinformation and
misinformation that shares its responses throughout the
interagency community.
Question. What criteria are used for selecting new countries to
participate in the GPOI? What percentage of those new countries do you
expect to be outside Africa in FY 2006? Will the addition of new
countries increase the overall number of troops to be trained in FY
2006 over FY 2005, or will the number of troops to be trained in Africa
be decreased to accommodate the addition of training in other
countries?
Answer. In Africa, peace support training is implemented through
the African Contingency Operations Training and Assistance (ACOTA)
program. Currently, ACOTA plans to increase the number of partner
countries, as well as expand the training provided to existing ACOTA
partners. Candidates for ACOTA partnership must be countries that have
participated in peace support operations or expressed a serious
intention to do so and have competent and professional militaries that
serve an elected civilian government. The units selected for training
must be absent reports of gross abuse of human rights. New candidates
for ACOTA partnership are determined through an interagency process in
which several offices in the Departments of State and Defense, along
with the National Security Council, are represented.
We are still finalizing with DOD how peace support capabilities
will be developed in other regions of the world. Since each region is
different, the approach to enhancing peace support capabilities may be
different. Therefore, it is premature to determine what the percentage
of new countries to be trained will be vis-a-vis African countries.
Nonetheless, GPOI envisions assisting countries that have a history of
participating in international operations.
Training under GPOI will not occur at the expense of training in
Africa. New countries trained through GPOI will be in addition to an
increased number trained through the ACOTA program. The total number of
troops trained in FY 2006 should increase over the number of troops
trained in FY 2005.
Question. MEPI has been criticized for duplicating efforts of USAID
and other State Department Assistance programs. Is it time to establish
a single account with a Coordinator to ensure that this is a high
priority program and gets the full attention and is as effective in its
implementation as possible?
Answer. The Department of State does not think that legislation is
necessary at this point to establish a single account with a
Coordinator. The Deputy Secretary of State, by virtue of his global
portfolio oversees strategy direction and implementation of our freedom
agenda. The newly appointed Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary (PDAS)
for the Bureau of Near Eastern Affairs (NEA) will specifically serve as
Coordinator for Broader Middle East Initiatives. While the Department
believes it has the right structure, it will continue to determine if
any other organizational changes are necessary.
Under the guidance of both the Deputy Secretary and NEA PDAS, MEPI
will continue to coordinate with its counterparts in the State
Department and other U.S. government agencies, including USAID, through
both formal and informal mechanisms, such as regular program and status
meetings, inter-agency pillar committee meetings, and coordinated
strategic planning and budgeting.
Question. The Supplemental includes $200 million for assistance for
the Palestinian Authority with additional $150 million in the FY 2006
budget request. Has the State Department worked with Palestinian
President Abbas to develop a plan which identifies priorities and needs
for the use of these funds?
Answer. The $200 million in supplemental assistance for the West
Bank and Gaza is intended to support reform and expand economic
opportunities for the Palestinian people. This assistance will also
help the Palestinians to address key economic and technical issues as
they coordinate with Israel to ensure successful Gaza disengagement. It
is urgently necessary because the next six months--well before FY06
resources would be available--will see opportunities for progress
unprecedented in recent years as regards the peace process: intensified
USG involvement in strengthening the PA security services, i.e. General
Ward's mission; completion of Israel's disengagement from Gaza and
parts of the West Bank (July-September); Palestinian legislative
elections (mid-July); continuing Palestinian municipal elections (April
and August); and, ideally, an accelerating process of confidence-
building and improvements on the ground that will strengthen Abu Mazen
and Palestinian moderates. Finally, this assistance will strengthen our
arguments to regional states that they need to do more in the way of
monetary assistance to the Palestinians and the PA.
The $150 million request for FY 2006 will focus on medium-term
development needs, including reconstruction of Gaza and revitalization
of the Palestinian economy in the wake of Israel's withdrawal;
establishing the necessary foundations for emerging democracy such as
reforming governing institutions and strengthening civil society; and
infrastructure development, especially water.
Question. Will the funds be used to provide direct aid to the
Palestinians or will some or all of it be provided through NGO's or
multilateral organizations?
Answer. The current assistance package will be channeled through
existing mechanisms, including U.S., Palestinian, and international
NGO's. Although we do not have any plans to provide direct budgetary
support to the PA at this time, we would like to keep the option
available, particularly in light of the PA's estimated $500 million
dollar budget gap for 2005. There have been two instances that direct
budgetary assistance has been made available to the PA. In December
2004, the U.S. provided $20 million directly to the PA to finance
utility bills in arrearages; another $20 in direct budgetary assistance
was provided in the summer of 2003 for payment of bills in arrears as
well as for badly needed infrastructure repairs. Consistent with past
decisions on direct budgetary assistance, we will coordinate with
Congress as to the best use of appropriations.
Question. Do you agree that Palestinian assistance needs to move
quickly to ensure there are concrete aid benefits to the people? How
can you speed the delivery process once the assistance is approved by
Congress?
Answer. We agree that assistance is urgently necessary because the
next six months--well before FY06 resources would be available--will
see opportunities for progress unprecedented in recent years as regards
the peace process: intensified USG involvement in strengthening the PA
security services, i.e. General Ward's mission; completion of Israel's
disengagement from Gaza and parts of the West Bank (July-September);
Palestinian legislative elections (mid-July); continuing Palestinian
municipal elections (April and August); and, ideally, an accelerating
process of confidence-building and improvements on the ground that will
strengthen Abu Mazen and Palestinian moderates. Accordingly, the USG
reprogrammed $41 million from previously allocated assistance into
quick-disbursing programs designed to make an immediate, tangible
impact on the lives of Palestinians, particularly in Gaza.
The United States needs to act quickly to ensure that this time of
opportunity is not lost to those who would continue violence. To do
this, the new Palestinian President must be supported, and the people
of the West Bank and Gaza to see that their daily lives are improving.
Question. I understand that General Ward is being named to
coordinate the security assistance to the Palestinian Authority. Who is
going to coordinate the economic and technical assistance and ensure
that bottlenecks in the process are removed?
Answer. General Ward's mandate is security. We are seriously
looking at what we need to do on other areas such as reconstruction and
development. On the political side, the Quartet will continue to meet
and encourage both the Israelis and the Palestinians as we move toward
the Roadmap. As we have consistently stated, the Palestinians must
continue to improve the security situation in order to achieve a
lasting peace.
Regarding economic assistance and potential bottlenecks, our
missions in Tel Aviv and Jerusalem will continue to work with the
Palestinians, Israelis, the World Bank, fellow donors and other
interested parties to ensure economic and technical assistance is
delivered efficiently, effectively, and tailored to USG policy
interests, most importantly the President's vision of two states,
Israel and Palestine, living side by side in peace and security.
Question. What concrete steps could our ``Quartet'' partners, the
Europeans, Russia and the United Nations take to facilitate positive
outcomes? Are we going to coordinate our assistance with other donors?
Answer. The international community, and specifically the Quartet,
has a vital role in helping Israelis and Palestinians make progress
toward the two-state solution. The Quartet continues to support the
progress made by both the Israelis and the Palestinians, condemn terror
in the strongest possible terms, and encourage other members of the
international community to help contribute to our efforts to achieve
peace. Within the Quartet framework, the Ad Hoc Liaison Comittee (AHLC)
is one mechanism by which the international donor community coordinates
its assistance to the Palestinians.
Question. Do you envision providing assistance to Israel to
facilitate its disengagement from Gaza and sites in the West Bank? What
do you see as the risks of this effort?
Answer. The administration fully supports Israel's plan to
disengage from Gaza and parts of the northern West Bank. We view
disengagement as an opportunity for a return to the roadmap and
fulfillment of the President's vision of two states living side by side
in peace and security.
To date, we have not received any request from the Government of
Israel for assistance in carrying out disengagement. Should we receive
such a request, we would give it appropriate consideration.
Question. The FY05 Supplemental includes a request for $150 million
in additional Foreign Military Financing (FMF) Funds for Pakistan. In
yesterday's hearing, Mr. Zoellick noted we had come a long way with
Pakistan in terms of our counterterrorism cooperation, but that we
still had work to do.
How do we intend to use the new FMF money for Pakistan? What
expectations do we have of Pakistan regarding counterterrorism
cooperation, nuclear nonproliferation, progress in peace talks with
India, and democratic development?
Answer. The $150 million was requested to enable the administration
to honor its commitments. In FY05 the administration requested $300
million in ESF and $300 million in FMF as the first tranche of the
President's five-year assistance package to Pakistan. Congress
appropriated $300 million in ESF, but only appropriated $150 million in
new FMF for Pakistan, directing the administration to take the
remaining $150 million from unobligated, prior-year ESF and FMF
balances. Because FMF is ``obligated upon apportionment'' and pursuant
to the transfer statute in the FY 2005 Appropriations Act, there are no
unobligated FMF funds. Reprogramming unobligated ESF funds for military
purposes runs counter to long-standing practice that funds provided for
economic purposes should not be transferred for military purposes. This
is further codified in permanent legislation in section 610 of the
Foreign Assistance Act, which prohibits the transfer of ESF into FMF.
This assistance is intended to help us build a stable, long-term
relationship with Pakistan as recommended by the 9/11 Commission. The
FMF monies will be used to provide the Pakistani military with
capabilities that contribute to counterterrorism operations, enhance
border security, and meet Pakistan's legitimate defense needs. The
Government of Pakistan has demonstrated its commitment to combating
terrorism and is very well aware of the importance the U.S. Government
attaches to preventing the spread of nuclear technologies, pursuing
regional stability, and building a stable democracy.
Question. To follow up the question of why the Department of
Defense is training civilian police forces in Iraq, could you please
provide for the record a summary of what the State Department's role is
in DOD's review of the Iraq security forces training undertaken by
General Luck? Is the Department of State, the traditional expert on
civilian police force training, engaged in the review process?
Answer. GEN (Ret.) Gary Luck led an interagency team to Iraq
January 13-20. The purpose of the team was to assess ways in which to
accelerate the development of the Iraqi security forces' capacity to
play a greater role in fighting the insurgency against the Iraqi
Government and people. The team did not focus on the technical skills
imparted in basic military and police training. Rather, the team's
strategic focus was on assisting Iraq's Transitional Government to
develop leadership and coordinate and combine security resources to
maximize effectiveness in this critical post-election period.
The Department of State contributed two officers to General Luck's
team. In addition, two senior police officers from Coalition partners
participated: Deputy Chief Constable Colin Smith of the UK and BG
Leonardo Leso of the Italian Carabinieri. Among those whom team members
interviewed were participants in both the DOD police training efforts
of the Civilian Police Advisory Training Team (CPATT) and the State
Department's Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement
(INL) representatives in the Embassy, INL-funded police trainers and
advisors, and the Iraq Reconstruction Management Organization's (IRMO)
Senior Consultant to the Ministry of Interior.
In addition, the State Department's Senior Advisor and Iraq
Coordinator Ambassador Richard Jones led an interagency team to Iraq
February 4-8 to look at nonsecurity aspects of building the capacity of
Iraq's post-election Transitional Government, including in such areas
as the Ministry of Interior, which controls the police. LTG Odierno of
the Joint Chiefs of Staff, who participated in both the Luck and Jones
missions to Baghdad, served as the link between the two.
Question. The State Department currently has authority under the
Foreign Assistance Act to ask other agencies to act on its behalf to
carry out such activities in other countries, so there is no reason to
create a new authority for DOD to undertake the civilian police
training mission in Iraq. Why not rely on current authority to allow
DOD to carry out such activities rather than seek a new authority for
the Department of Defense to carry out what has traditionally been a
foreign assistance function?
Answer. The Department of State agrees that existing foreign
assistance authorities authorize civilian police training by the
appropriate U.S. Government entity. Special circumstances that affect
U.S. foreign policy interests should continue to be addressed through
current interagency mechanisms rather than through new legislation that
would extend foreign assistance authorities to the Department of
Defense.
Question. The Administration's request for assistance to the
Philippines for FY 2006 represents a decrease in excess of 30 percent
from last year's requested level. This reduction in assistance is
perplexing when compared to the President's budget justification
stating that winning the war on terrorism is his highest foreign policy
justification.
The President has referred to the Philippines as a key partner in
the war on terror. The recent bombings in three Philippines cities
reportedly carried out by the Abu Sayyaf terrorist group demonstrate
the need for sustained assistance to the Philippines.
What is the rationale behind requesting a reduced amount of
assistance for the Philippines?
In light of the increased terrorist violence, what steps will the
United States take to expand counterterrorism cooperation with the
Philippines?
Answer. The Economic Support Fund (ESF) request level for the
Philippines for FY 2005 was higher than it is in FY 2006 due to
expectation that a final peace agreement would have been reached
between the Government of the Philippines and the Moro Islamic
Liberation Front (MILF) in 2004. Had a peace agreement come about,
additional funding would have been needed to assist its implementation.
This did not occur, for a variety of reasons. There was a hiatus in the
peace process during the Philippine election campaign and the post-
election government restructuring. The Government's failure to deliver
on commitments made to the Moro National Liberation Front in 1996 has
given rise to doubts on the part of Muslims in general about its
willingness to address legitimate grievances. Continued violence by
MILF hardliners raises doubts about MILF cohesiveness as a negotiating
partner. A key unresolved issue has to do with ancestral domain, the
Moro demand for territory to constitute a homeland. The Government of
the Philippines, with facilitation by the Government of Malaysia, plans
to resume peace negotiations with the MILF in Kuala Lumpur in April,
with ancestral domain on the agenda.
The U.S. Institute for Peace (USIP), which President Bush offered
to President Arroyo as a resource for the peace process, is still ready
to play a role whenever the parties agree. However, to date, USIP has
not been invited to the negotiations. USIP is pushing ahead with
projects including an intensive study of the issues of ancestral
domain, which could be useful in helping to reach an agreement.
According to USIP, Philippines Foreign Secretary Romulo has said that
ancestral domain provisions of any settlement will be limited to the
Autonomous Region of Muslim Mindanao (ARMM), an idea MILF officials
reject.
The other significant difference between FY 2005 and FY 2006 is the
Foreign Military Financing (FMF) request level. For FY 2005, additional
FMF funds were requested as part of an effort to jumpstart the new
Philippines defense reform initiative. In light of the Philippines
commitment of significant national funds for defense reforms, our FY
2006 $20 million FMF request remains in line with allocations in recent
fiscal years.
Prevention of and response to terrorism in the Philippines remains
a top administration priority. In that regard, we have requested a
significant increase in Anti-Terrorism Assistance from the NADR-ATA
account from $500,000 in FY 2005 to $5 million in FY 2006. Among the
programs being considered is an in-country counterterrorism training
program similar to the one that has been very successful in Indonesia.
Starting in late 2005 and continuing into 2006, we expect a dramatic
increase in law enforcement and counterterrorism cooperation with
Philippine police.
______
Responses From Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice to Questions
Submitted by Senator Paul Sarbanes
Question. This year's appropriation bill asked the Department to
recommend as part of the President's FY 2006 budget how best to fund
and manage a scholarship program at the American universities in the
Middle East. What are your plans in this respect?
Answer. The Department has reviewed the language in the
Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2005, regarding the funding of
scholarships at American educational institutions in the Middle East.
Currently, USAID through its programs in Lebanon and Egypt is funding
scholarships to American universities. The scholarships offer a cross-
section of students access to an American-style education that fosters
openness, tolerance and critical thinking. In Lebanon, USAID supports
scholarship programs at the American University of Beirut (AUB) and the
Lebanese American University (LAU). USAID has allocated $3.4 million in
FY 2005 funds to support these universities programs, as well as
$600,000 for two high school scholarship programs in Lebanon. FY 2006
funding is anticipated to be at the same level. In addition, under its
Leadership for Education and Development Program (LEAD), USAID offers
full tuition scholarships to the American University in Cairo for 162
public school graduates (54 annually, one male and one female from each
of Egypt's governorates).
The Department supports the continuation of such scholarship
programs by USAID and USAID's budget request to continue these programs
in FY 2006.
Question. In the Supplemental request, there is a completely new
fund of $200 million called the ``Global War on Terror Partners Fund.''
From all appearances, this fund will reward nations that support our
foreign policy objectives with large infusions of cash. It is my
understanding that $100 million of this will go to Poland, which is one
of our partners, and which I certainly support. But I would like to
know why this money could not be channeled through normal foreign
assistance accounts, such as ESF, which was created for exactly this
type of purpose? Which other countries do you plan to assist under this
account? And, why was it requested as an emergency supplemental, rather
than part of the regular foreign operations budget?
Answer. The President submitted to Congress a request that funds
the immediate, urgent needs to fight the Global War on Terror and to
deal with major unanticipated costs and emergencies. While many of our
coalition partners have the ability to shoulder the costs of troop
contributions and other support requirements, many other of our
partners in freedom have limited national budgets to offset these
costs. In many cases, these willing allies are faced with constrained
budget resources while at the same time facing a growing demand from
their citizens for increased social spending. Thus, this Fund reflects
the principle that an investment in a partner in freedom today will
help ensure that America will stand united with stronger partners in
the future. The criticality of these funds is to ensure that we:
Support the broader strategy against terrorism;
Prevent/diminish economic and political dislocation that
threatens security of key friends and allies;
Promote economic growth, good governance and democracy;
mitigating root cause of terrorism;
Offset budget costs associated with troop contributions that
would otherwise support increasing civil demands for social
programs.
Programs may include:
Enhanced support for border security units and improving
interdiction and enforcement infrastructure of
counternarcotics units;
Accelerate training and equipping border personnel to
prevent illegal migration, smuggling of goods, narcotics
trafficking and transiting of terrorists.
Without the immediate influx of assistance supporting these
objectives and our partners, our ability to conduct the Global War on
Terror could easily be reversed.
What follows, is the list of countries deemed partners in the GWOT
for the purposes of this Fund.
list of potential recipients
Afghanistan
Albania
Algeria
Armenia
Azerbaijan
Bulgaria
Croatia
Colombia
Czech Republic
Djibouti
Egypt
Ethiopia
El Salvador
Estonia
Georgia
Greece
Hungary
India
Indonesia
Jordan
Kazakhstan
Kenya
Kyrgyz Republic
Latvia
Lithuania
Macedonia
Malaysia
Moldova
Mongolia
Morocco
Oman
Pakistan
Philippines
Poland
Romania
Russia
Slovakia
Slovenia
Tajikistan
Tunisia
Turkey
Turkmenistan
Ukraine
Uzbekistan
Yemen
______
Responses From Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice to Questions
Submitted by Senator Joseph Biden
Question. In your discussions during your recent trip to Europe,
did you reach any understandings with regard to support we are prepared
to provide to the EU-Three effort on Iran? If so, could you please
describe the specific steps we are prepared to take?
What did the British, the French, and the Germans tell you they
thought would be needed to reach a deal with Tehran?
Has the Administration decided its posture with regard to the EU-3
effort?
Answer. We welcome the efforts of the EU-3 and have been working
very closely with them on Iran for some time. We continue to share the
goal of ensuring that Iran does not acquire nuclear weapons. While we
welcome the EU-3's efforts in this regard, we continue to remain deeply
skeptical that Iran will agree to end its nuclear weapons program
absent further international pressure. We continue to support the
ongoing investigation by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA)
and maintain that the IAEA Board of Governors must report Iran's
noncompliance with its Safeguards Agreement to the U.N. Security
Council.
Question. During your confirmation hearing, you indicated that even
if Iran were to make a verifiable agreement to end its nuclear program,
it would still not be sufficient to warrant changes in our approach
because of other Iranian activities. Have you told the Europeans that
if they make progress in other areas of concern to us, we would then be
prepared to more actively join with their efforts? If so, how have they
responded?
Answer. We have always said that we support a peaceful, diplomatic,
multilateral resolution to this matter and continue to believe such a
resolution is possible. At this point, all options are on the table. We
welcome Foreign Minister Fischer's reaffirmation that if Iran does not
keep its pledge to suspend all enrichment-related and reprocessing
activities, the EU-3 will support reporting Iran to the U.N. Security
Council.
Question. The aftermath of the Iraqi elections seems to offer
another opportunity to involve key allies in the effort to stabilize
Iraq. I have proposed that the President establish a contact group as a
way to share in decision-making and coordinate assistance. The group
could consist of the United States, the Iraqi government, major
European powers, NATO, key regional allies, and the U.N. The group
would serve as a sort of board of directors, and we would in effect be
the chairman of the board because we are the largest outside provider
of troops, resources, and advisers.
a. Are you planning any mechanism like a contact group? If not,
why?
b. What specific commitments did you gain for support for Iraq
during your trip?
Answer. The United States strongly supports the Iraqi Interim
Government's efforts to coordinate international assistance aimed at
stabilizing Iraq and contributing to its economic recovery. These
efforts have been broad-based and inclusive, as was clear during the
several donor conferences held last year as well as the Sharm al Sheikh
conference hosted by Egypt.
We will continue to look for ways to enhance the role of the
international community in Iraq's recovery. An important initial step
in that process will be to seek the views of the Iraqi Transitional
Government (ITG), once it is formed. Pending the establishment of the
new Iraqi government, I discussed mechanisms for enhancing
international assistance to Iraq with my counterparts during my recent
visit to Europe. President Bush also plans to raise this issue during
his upcoming visit to Europe. During my recent visit, I found our
European allies very engaged on the goal of improving assistance
coordination. I am optimistic that the international community
increasingly understands the importance of helping Iraq ensure
stability and make progress on its path toward full democracy.
Encouraging international efforts to contribute to Iraq's security,
political transition, and economic recovery was a central part of my
recent visit to Europe. The European Commission (EC) has been among the
major contributors to Iraqi reconstruction efforts, donating 320
million euros in 2003 and 2004. EU member states pledged almost another
1 billion euros at the Madrid Donors' Conference. EU member states were
also among the Paris Club creditors who agreed to forgive 80 percent of
Iraqi sovereign debt, totaling $32 billion in debt relief. Several EU
member states also provide bilateral assistance to Iraq.
During my visit, I discussed with my European counterparts ways to
implement the European Commission's offer of an additional 200 million
euros for Iraq's reconstruction in 2005. We also discussed mechanisms
to enhance coordination of international assistance to Iraq, pending
consultations with the Iraqi Transitional Government. President Bush
plans to continue these discussions during his upcoming visit to
Europe, and I believe we will make significant progress in the near
future.
Question. The February l7th unclassified version of State
Department's Iraq Weekly Status Report lists the ``Total trained and
equipped ISF (Iraqi security forces)'' as 136,342, but noted that these
figures do not include unauthorized absences from either Ministry of
Defense or Ministry of Interior forces. In an average week, what
proportion of each of the components of the Iraqi security forces are
on unauthorized absence?
Answer. The proportion of unauthorized absences for military and
police during an average week varies widely between components,
geographic region and levels of insurgent intimidation in the area and
the time of year. Historically, unauthorized absence rates have ranged
from over 50 percent in some cases to negligible in others.
The Department of Defense is the lead agency responsible for
reporting Iraqi security force training numbers. Ministry of Defense
totals do not include unauthorized absences; Ministry of Interior
totals do include unauthorized absences. The State Department remains
dedicated to supporting DOD's efforts to establish a responsible,
professional, and accountable Iraqi security force.
After the issuance of National Security Presidential Directive 36
in May 2004, which placed the responsibility of developing Iraqi
security under the charge of DOD, the Multi-National Security
Transition Command-Iraq (MNSTC-I) was established and tasked with
developing a new culture for security forces--one of responsibility,
professionalism, and commitment. Under the former regime, many
organizational rules, including leave policies for security officials,
were not enforced in a way resembling Western policies. Within the
military forces, unauthorized absences appear somewhat ingrained within
Iraq's military culture. MNF-I has taken steps to replenish the ranks
of units with excessive unauthorized absences, and intends to continue
attacking the problem until each Iraqi unit is filled with committed
soldiers. Specifically, MNF-I is working with Iraqi military leadership
to drop absent soldiers from the rolls and create vacancies that can be
matched against replacements (760 soldiers recently filled vacancies in
Iraq's 1st Division that were the result of casualties and unauthorized
absences). In addition, MNF-I and Iraqi military leaders are directly
recruiting former soldiers to serve as individual replacements, and
overrecruiting to account for training losses and unauthorized
absences. Further, MNF-I is working through Advisory Support Teams to
ensure Iraqi leaders at lower levels understand the negative impact of
unauthorized absences.
Lastly, MNF-I has focused efforts on toughening the basic training
of units in order to identify uncommitted soldiers during training,
rather than during combat operations. The preliminary results of these
measures are encouraging, and as Iraqi military units gain more
operational experience and confidence, the level of unauthorized
absences drops. Our experience tells us that after initial training,
every Iraqi unit loses a portion of soldiers. Those who stay, however,
have been hardened, and have fought well in Najaf, Samarra, Fallujah,
Mosul, and in support of the Iraqi elections.
By all accounts, unauthorized absences are not a problem within the
specialized police and paramilitary forces. The elite nature of their
duties and the highly discriminating nature of their force selection
make it likely that this trend will continue. MNF-I continues to
observe these forces to ensure that manning levels do not drop after
changes in leadership occur within the Iraqi government.
Though accounting for absences in military and paramilitary forces
is relatively straightforward, the nature of duty within conventional
police forces and the lack of MNF-I oversight on the ground in each of
the 1,200 police and border stations make real time duty strength
assessment more difficult. Many stations still do not operate at night,
and the lack of automated systems for reporting daily personnel
strength makes routine data collection extremely difficult. It may take
several months before MNF-I is able to determine the level of
unauthorized absences within conventional police forces with the same
fidelity as military forces.
Question. Could you provide us a comprehensive list of the
countries that actually have made an offer that you're aware of, an
offer to assist in training Iraqi security forces--police, national
guard, any security forces--a description of the specific offers they
have made; when the offers were made, and what your response has been
and likely will be?
Answer. Manning, training, and equipping the Iraqi security forces
under the auspices of the Multi-National Forces--Iraq, falls under
MNSTC-I and Lieutenant General Petraeus. He is also ``dual-hatted'' as
Commander, NATO Training Mission-Iraq (NTM-I), as the leader of that
effort. NATO is executing a series of formal courses in Iraq under NTM-
I. Iraqis also attend NATO schools outside Iraq. We understand that
MNSTC-I carefully considers all offers made to the Multi-National Force
to train the Iraqi security forces. For specific details of the
training offers made to MNSTC-I, I will defer to my colleagues at the
Department of Defense.
Regarding bilateral offers to train Iraqi security forces made
directly to the government of Iraq, we have compiled as much
information that we were able to collect, however, we often do not have
information about bilateral offers made directly to the government of
Iraq by other sovereign governments. With that in mind, the information
below is the best information we have available and is not intended to
represent a definitive list of bilateral offers made to the Iraqi
government.
Spain: Spain has proposed training Iraqi security force
personnel at its de-mining center; that offer was made through
NATO. The Spanish are considering offering training in the
region (outside Iraq) but have made no official offer yet.
France: The French have offered to train 1,500 Iraqi police/
gendarmes over an 18-month period. This offer has been made
numerous times, at various levels, including by President
Chirac to IIG President Al-Yawer in Paris in January 2005. The
French training would take place outside of Iraq, most likely
in Qatar or in France. The French have made it clear they would
be willing to offer the training in out years as well. The
Iraqis have not responded to this offer. Separately, the French
have offered (though an EU assistance program to Iraq) to
provide a 4-week training program to 160 Iraqi police in France
this summer.
Italy: Outside of their NATO contributions, the Italians
have trained approximately 69 Iraqi staff officers at Italian
War College. Italy's Chief of Police has expressed interest in
training up to 50 Iraqi police in antiterrorism and organized
crime (Mafia) investigations; however, the Iraqis have not yet
made a policy decision on this offer.
Germany & UAE: The Germans have been conducting training for
both the Iraqi Police Service and the Iraqi Army in the UAE.
Four classes in police fundamentals of crime scene
investigation (more than 400 students) were executed in 2004
and plans are to continue the program into 2005. Further, there
are currently 30 Iraqi police officers attending a course in
personal protection training designed to train Iraqi police to
protect politicians. That course will be followed by a two-
month course in hostage rescue techniques for the same group of
police officers (the UAE police will provide that follow-on
training). German training programs for the Iraqi Army consist
of truck driving and maintenance courses to support vehicles
donated to the Iraqi Army and sold to the UAE. That program is
expected to continue into 2005 and a schedule is in place.
During Chancellor Schroeder's visit to the UAE March 4-5, 2005,
the UAE, Germany, and Iraq signed an agreement for additional
Iraqi military training. Germany will supply the instructors
and construction equipment to train and equip an Iraqi
engineering unit. The UAE will continue to cover most of the
expenses and provide facilities.
Belgium: The Belgians have pledged to send 15 to 20 trainers
to the UAE to assist the German-led training effort.
Turkey: The Government of Turkey made a bilateral offer to
train Iraqi Security Forces before the January 2005 elections.
Turkey was disappointed that the Iraqis did not accept or even
respond to the offer, which still remains open. The Turks have
offered at least five other specific courses through NTM-I.
Jordan: Pilot, crew, and technician training for the UH-1
helicopter and the C-130 aircraft has been conducted in the
Kingdom; 313 Iraqis have been trained to date; 1,661 new Iraqi
military officers and NCOs (including females) have been
trained. Almost 100 Iraqi liaison officers and interpreters
have been trained. Over 150 members of Iraqi special police
forces have received training at a 12-week course in Jordan;
more are currently in training. Jordan also hosts the
International Police Training Center (JIPTC) where State/INL
international police trainers implement basic police training
and border enforcement officer training. The Jordanian Armed
Forces also have personnel conducting NCO training in Iraq.
Egypt: President Mubarak made an offer to train Iraqi
security personnel ``in any discipline'' in September 2003.
Under a bilateral agreement, the Egyptian Ministry of Interior
conducted police training for approximately 258 Iraqi police
officers in August 2004. Furthermore, in 2003, 146 Iraqi army
personnel received a three-week training course in Egypt.
Embassy Cairo informs us that President Mubarak's security
personnel training offer remains valid and the Egyptian
Government is prepared to train up to 500 army personnel in
four-week training cycles, or up to 5,000 per year; the Iraqi
government has not responded.
Morocco: In July 2004, King Mohammed VI's offer to Prime
Minister Allawi to host training courses for the Iraqi police,
army, and civil protection units was publicly announced. The
King offered training in all fields at all Moroccan training
centers and institutes. Our information is that the Iraqi
government has not responded.
Both MNF-I and our Embassy in Baghdad are ready to support any
offer by our allies to contribute to the MNF-I and MNSTC-I programs to
train the Iraqi Security Forces. We understand, based on statements
made by Iraqi government officials, that it prefers training be
conducted in Iraq and coordinated by MNSTC-I or NTM-I. We have
supported the Iraqi government's desires and have emphasized with
others that in-country training is the preferred option. However, the
Iraqi Government and its allies are free to conclude their own
bilateral agreements. We will offer the Iraqi government resources and
expertise to assist them in evaluating and facilitating bilateral
training offers where possible. But, in the end, acceptance or
rejection of bilateral offers of Iraqi Security Force training is
ultimately an Iraqi Government decision.
Question. The President's $81.9 billion supplemental request
explains the need for an additional $5.7 billion for training Iraqi
security forces by noting in part that ``all but one of these 90
battalions, however, are lightly equipped and armed, and have very
limited mobility and sustainment capabilities.''
In light of this fact, could you elaborate on the criteria used to
designate a member of the Iraqi security forces as ``trained and
equipped'' in the Iraq Weekly Status Reports?
Answer. The term ``trained'' was defined by the Department of
Defense to be quantifiable and consistent. An Iraqi Security Force
member is considered trained and equipped after he completes the
appropriate institutional training program, demonstrates the ability to
meet the minimum standards established in the program, and is provided
with the essential equipment items required for an assigned mission.
Roughly 140,000 Iraqis have achieved the established standards for the
institutional phase of their training, received their required
equipment, and graduated from their respective courses. Most forces,
however, still lack the capacity to conduct and sustain independent
counterinsurgency operations and therefore continue to develop their
skills through on-the-job training, mentoring and experience gained in
actual operations.
Iraqi police courses are offered at regional training centers and
are coordinated by the Department of State's Bureau for International
Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs. DOD's Multi-National Security
Training Command (MNSTC-I) coordinates Iraqi Army courses at the basic
training center at Kirkush Military Center. Graduation rates from these
two training facilities indicate an objective measure of evaluated
training in a controlled environment under supervised conditions.
Key elements presently being addressed for ``post-graduate'' forces
include leadership, establishing properly manned, trained and capable
headquarters, reversing absenteeism, and revitalizing a military ethos
committed to national service under civilian control. The State
Department remains committed to supporting DOD's efforts to provide
Iraqi security forces with the training and equipment necessary for
lasting effectiveness.
Question. I share the Administration's opposition to the prospect
of the European Union lifting its embargo on sales of weapons to China.
a. What specific concerns does the Administration have?
b. What is the likelihood the EU will not proceed to end the
embargo?
c. Assuming the EU does proceed to lift the embargo, are there
other steps we're urging them to take that would mitigate our concerns?
If not, what do we intend to do about it?
Answer. The embargo was imposed in response to the killings of
hundreds, perhaps thousands, of Chinese citizens by Chinese troops
during the Tiananmen Square massacre in 1989. Fifteen years later, over
200 citizens remain in prison for their political activities during the
Tiananmen demonstrations, and China has refused to undertake a
reassessment of the event. In addition, the Government has never
provided a comprehensive, credible accounting of all those missing or
detained in connection with Tiananmen. Overall, although China clearly
has made significant progress in the areas of economic and social
reforms since 1989, there has been very little political reform and
government authorities continue to suppress any religious, political or
social groups, as well as individuals, that they perceive to be a
threat to government power or stability. Citizens who seek to express
openly dissenting political or religious views face repression. Lifting
the embargo would send a signal that the EU considers the lack of
accountability for the Tiananmen massacre and the current poor human
rights situation acceptable.
From a strategic perspective, the lifting of the embargo would send
the wrong signal regarding arms sales to China and likely result in an
increase in arms sold to China. If the EU lifts the embargo, the
overall restraint inherent in an EU-wide policy would be gone. While
there may be no current intentions to sell specific weapons, even with
the arms embargo and a Code of Conduct in place, the sales of licensed
military-related goods to China by European states doubled from 2002-
2003. The pressure from China and from domestic industries to make
additional sales will only increase with the embargo lifted. Lifting
the embargo sends a clear signal that the EU is open to considering
military exports to China. The Administration is unconvinced that the
EU's proposed arms export regimes to replace the embargo, consisting of
an enhanced Code of Conduct and a ``toolbox'' for post-embargo states,
could fulfill the commitment the EU made in December 2004 that EU
member states would not increase arms exports to China in quantitative
or qualitative terms. Lifting the embargo would also send a signal to
non-EU arms exporters that sales to China are acceptable. An increase
in arms sales would be perceived as destabilizing by China's neighbors.
While the EU continues to state it is working towards lifting the
embargo, it is not clear that a consensus has been reached on lifting
the embargo under the current Luxembourg Presidency. We are hopeful
that senior EU and EU Member State officials will recognize the
validity of repeated Administration and Congressional arguments, as
well as the views expressed by many others (including Europeans), that
lifting the embargo at this time would be unwise.
We have advised the EU that we will not negotiate terms for lifting
the embargo nor will we intercede with Congress. Our position is clear:
ending the embargo is a bad idea and we will not support the European
Union doing so. Rather than rush to lift the embargo, we have
encouraged our European partners to engage with us and the Japanese on
a strategic dialogue regarding China.
Question. On February 1, the King of Nepal dismissed his country's
government, suspended civil liberties (including right of assembly and
freedom of the press), placed dozens of top political figures under
summary detention, and gave free rein to security forces whose human
rights record had already been described by the State Department as
``poor.'' In light of this setback to democracy, does the
Administration plan to alter its FY 2006 request for 168 percent
increase in foreign military financing to Nepal?
Answer. We are deeply troubled by King Gyanendra's February 1
dismissal of the government, declaration of a state of emergency,
suspension of fundamental rights, and detention of politicians,
journalists and human rights activists. This serious setback for
Nepalese democracy risks eroding even further the Nepalese Government's
ability to resist the Maoist insurgency. We have repeatedly called on
the government to restore democracy and engage in dialogue with
legitimate political forces, essential elements in pressuring the
Maoists to return to the negotiating table and reach a peaceful
resolution to the conflict.
In recent years, the Maoist presence has spread dramatically
throughout Nepal. The Maoists have made clear their intention to impose
a dictatorship, severely limit political and economic freedoms and
export their revolution to neighboring states. The humanitarian
ramifications of such a regime would be immense, reminiscent of the
nightmare brought upon Cambodia by Pol Pot.
Given this stark situation, the U.S. must balance its assistance
programs to help Nepal prevent a Maoist takeover and build a peaceful
and prosperous future without condoning the King's actions or any
future decisions that would run counter to restoration of democracy.
Nepal's security forces play a critical role in denying the Maoists a
military victory. Thus, at this time we do not intend to alter our FY
2006 request, but are carefully reviewing our military assistance
programs.
Question. Some vitally important State Department programs find
useful work for former nuclear, chemical and biological weapons
scientists in Russia and elsewhere. The budget for these programs would
increase by $2.1 million in FY 2006.
At the same time, however, these programs are being asked to take
on more responsibility in Iraq and Libya--tasks that could easily cost
$10-$15 million. So they're faced with the prospect of having to divert
money from the effort in Russia in order to redirect scientists in
Iraq. Your Department's own budget justification underscores the
problem. It states that the FY 2006 budget:
Will allow only ``minimal support'' to the Biotechnology
Engagement Program that the Department of Health and Human
Services conducts for your Department;
May allow the Department of Agriculture to ``begin a modest
engagement'' with former biological weapons institutes in
Ukraine, which no other U.S. program has ever reached; and
Will limit the Bio-Industry Initiative to engineering
assessments of how to reconfigure former Soviet biological
weapons plants, business plans, and research projects, despite
the fact that ``several expert assessments begun in past years
are now complete and larger reconfiguration projects are ready
for funding''--that will not be forthcoming under this budget.
Then there is the important project to find peaceful careers for
former weapons of mass destruction scientists in Iraq. That is a vital
effort in a country that is rightly the focus of tremendous concern.
And your own budget justification states: ``To continue operations
beyond FY 2005 . . . significant additional funding will be needed in
FY 2006.''
The President has said he is committed to keeping the world's most
dangerous weapons out of the hands of the world's most dangerous
regimes, but this budget simply does not match his rhetoric. We cannot
expect to successfully stop the proliferation of weapons expertise if
we are not willing to commit the necessary resources to the fight.
Why aren't you doing more to insulate former Soviet weapons
scientists from the lure of overseas employment or contracts?
Answer. The Department of State is making a significant, effective
effort. State's Science Centers Program manages USG participation in
the two intergovernmental organizations created to redirect former
Soviet weapons scientists away from marketing their weapons of mass
destruction (WMD) expertise to proliferant states and terrorist groups
and towards sustainable civilian employment. Since 1994 through the
International Science and Technology Center (ISTC) in Moscow and 1996
through the Science and Technology Center (STCU) in Kiev, the U.S. and
its international partners (Canada, EU, Japan, S. Korea, Norway) have
funded peaceful, multi-year research projects engaging over 60,000
former weapons scientists.
In the last few years, the U.S. emphasis in the Science Centers has
been on integrating former weapons scientists into the global
scientific and business communities. The Centers have developed
comprehensive programs to train scientists to interact with western
counterparts and business people. They run grant writing workshops to
explain how to write competitive scientific project proposals for a
western audience. They give business training and run seminars to
explain patent filing and other intellectual property rights issues. In
addition, both Centers have a ``Partners Program'' that matches ex-
Soviet WMD institutes with western companies and research organizations
and helps them formulate cooperative business arrangements.
Question. The President's supplemental request includes $200
million in economic support funds ``to help Palestinians build
democratic institutions, develop infrastructure, and support critical
sectors such as education, home construction, and basic social
services. Of these funds, $50 million will also be used on programs to
help Israelis and Palestinians work together on economic and social
matters, including movement of people and goods in and out of Israel.''
Please provide more information on how the State Department plans
to use this $200 million. How do you expect this money to be
distributed? How will accountability and transparency be assured? What
do you hope to accomplish with this funding, and in what timeframe?
Have you been able to leverage the President's offer to gain additional
pledges of assistance from others, in particular the Gulf States?
Answer. The $200 million in supplemental assistance for the West
Bank and Gaza is intended to support reform and expand economic
opportunities for the Palestinian people. This assistance will also
help the Palestinians to address key economic and technical issues as
they coordinate with Israel to ensure successful Gaza disengagement. It
is urgently necessary because the next six months--well before FY06
resources would be available--will see opportunities for progress
unprecedented in recent years as regards the peace process: Intensified
USG involvement in strengthening the PA security services, i.e.,
General Ward's mission; completion of Israel's disengagement from Gaza
and parts of the West Bank (July-September); Palestinian legislative
elections (mid-July); continuing Palestinian municipal elections (April
and August); and, ideally, an accelerating process of confidence-
building and improvements on the ground that will strengthen Abu Mazen
and Palestinian moderates. Finally, this assistance will strengthen our
arguments to regional states that they need to do more in the way of
monetary assistance to the Palestinians and the PA.
The current assistance package will be channeled through existing
mechanisms, including United States, Palestinian, and international
NGOs. Accountability and transparency are issues we take most
seriously. The U.S Government, working through USAID, maintains close
accounting of all USG funds. Working with the full range of agencies
and resources available at Embassy Tel Aviv and Consulate General
Jerusalem, USAID carries out background checks on all Palestinian NGOs
that are recipients of funds to ensure there are no links to terrorist
organizations or to organizations that advocate or practice violence.
Since 1995, the GAO has conducted four separate program reviews,
one each in 1995, 1996, 1997 and 1998. None of these reviews has
reported any irregularities in the management or controls of ESF funds
by USAID or its contractors and grantees. Since then, the USAID Mission
has developed a comprehensive risk assessment strategy. All Mission
institutional contacts and grants--of which there are approximately
100--are audited on an annual basis by local accounting firms under the
guidance and direction of USAID's Inspector General.
The IMF provides the USG with updates on contributions to the
Palestinian Authority. Major contributors since 2002 include: Saudi
Arabia, which has provided bi-monthly budgetary support in the amount
of approximately $15 million; Libya (contributed $11 million in 2004);
and Tunisia (contributed $2 million in 2004). Several other Arab states
made pledges to the Palestinian Authority in 2002, which currently
remain unmet. We are encouraging them, and others, to recognize the
opportunity that now exists and do what they can to help the PA close
its budget gap and support the new PA leadership as it moves forward
with reforms and a renewed dialogue for peace.
Question. Why is the Iraqi scientists program not funded in either
the FY 2006 budget or the Iraq supplemental recently submitted by the
President?
Answer. The State Department's program to redirect Iraqi weapons
scientists to peaceful, civilian employment in support of Iraqi
reconstruction is a priority nonproliferation effort, and the program
office--the Iraqi International Center for Science and Industry
(IICSI)--has been operating in Baghdad for nearly a year.
Well over a hundred Iraqi scientists, technicians and engineers
with WMD or missile expertise are currently participating in IICSI
activities for which they receive monthly stipends. The Center, working
with the Embassy, is now actively involved with Iraqi government
ministries to find participating scientists permanent employment with
those ministries. At the same time, IICSI continues to expand its
outreach to other Iraqis with WMD experience who have not yet benefited
from the program.
We are determined to maintain this vital program in operation as
long as it is needed and have included it in our FY 2006 budget
request.
Question. How do you plan to address the budget deficiencies in
these important nonproliferation programs?
Answer. This administration has always strongly supported
nonproliferation and threat reduction programs. State's programs are
part of the broader U.S. effort in support of the global partnership
and are complemented by nonproliferation and threat reduction programs
at the Departments of Energy and Defense. The President's budget
reflects this support by providing enough resources to meet their
programmatic needs in the context of overarching budgetary limitations.
We will continue to work closely with the Congress to ensure these
programs are adequately funded and will continue to provide substantial
funding for these programs in the outyears.
Question. The FY 2006 budget request includes $8.75 million for the
Small Arms and Light Weapons Destruction program.
a. How much of this budget will be devoted to MANPADS destruction,
and how much to destroying small arms and light weapons?
b. Can this budget fund all requests for destruction assistance
received by the State Department, or do we turn countries down due to
lack of funds?
Answer. MANPADS destruction is the office's highest priority NADR
SA/LW activity and takes precedence over other destruction efforts. We
cannot state exactly how much of the FY 2006 funds will go to MANPADS,
given the inherent uncertainty in convincing states to agree to destroy
weapons that they often view as vital to their national security and/or
a valuable commodity. As an illustrative example, MANPADS destruction
accounted for roughly 75 percent of the almost $4 million in FY 2004
funds appropriated by Congress. We expect MANPADS to remain our number
one priority for the foreseeable future.
Historically, the primary constraint on the destruction program has
not been a lack of funds, but getting countries to agree to destroy
weapons that are often viewed as vital to their national security and/
or a valuable commodity. It has been the job of the State Department to
convince countries of the need to destroy excess/at-risk stockpiles in
order to prevent proliferation. Recently, however, several countries
have requested international assistance with the destruction of large
post-Cold War stockpiles of weapons and/or munitions. These requests
were not known at the time of our FY 2006 budget submission. We will
look to assist where we can, but will also look to the donor community
for support as well.
Question. The President's budget for FY 2006 includes a U.S.
contribution of only $14.35 million to the International Monitoring
System being established by the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty
Organization Preparatory Commission. That is 25 percent below the
amount requested for FY 2005 and at least 30 percent below what is
needed for FY 2006.
The Department's budget justification calls this program ``a key
element in our global efforts against the proliferation of nuclear
weapons'' and ``an important supplement'' to U.S. monitoring
capabilities.
Why, then, is the Administration proposing this cut?
Answer. The $7.65 million cut in funding for the International
Monitoring System (IMS) does not signal a change in U.S. policy toward
the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT). The U.S. continues to
support and participate in those activities of the Preparatory
Commission for the CTBT Organization (CTBTO PrepCom) in Vienna that
pertain to the IMS, and the U.S. has no plans to press the PrepCom to
lower its budget to a level commensurate with the $14.35 million that
the Administration has allocated for it in FY06.
Unfortunately, budgets are very tight and cuts had to be made, even
among programs supported by the Administration. A number of other cuts
were made in the Department's program requests, including in the areas
of non-proliferation and counter-terrorism. The level of funding for a
program in any given year's budget does not necessarily have a bearing
on the funding level for that program in the succeeding years.
It is important to note that the U.S. continues to observe a
nuclear testing moratorium and encourages other states not to test.
While the U.S. does not support the CTBT and will not become a party to
it, the U.S. has gone to great expense to develop a Stockpile
Stewardship Program to help ensure the safety and reliability of our
nuclear weapons stockpile without testing.
Question. In his second Inaugural Address, the President spoke
eloquently about promoting human freedom. Within a day, however, the
Administration was attempting to downplay its significance, suggesting
it would not lead to new directions in American foreign policy. But the
President's words cannot be erased from history; their echoes have
already given hope to democrats and dissidents, and it would hardly
serve his goals to adhere to the status quo.
What are the ramifications of the President's address? Do you
expect any new directions in our policy?
Answer. The President's second Inaugural Address marked a
reaffirmation and strengthening of our existing policy. Promotion of
freedom has been a cornerstone of our national strategy since September
11, 2001 attacks. We believe the expansion of ordered liberty to be the
most effective long-term deterrent to the security threats posed by
religious extremism, instability, tyranny, and terrorism. Besides being
in our national interest, promoting human rights and democratic
institutions are also consistent with our national ideals. The American
transition and universal human rights standards both recognize the
intrinsic and inalienable dignity of the human person, and the rights
and freedoms that stem from that dignity. It is the responsibility of
governments to respect and secure those rights for their citizens.
These principles have characterized the Administration's foreign
policy. As the President declared on his September 20, 2001 address to
Congress, ``The advance of human freedom--the great achievement of our
time, and the great hope of every time--now depends on us.'' This was
reaffirmed in the National Security Strategy issued on September 17,
2002, which declared one pillar of our foreign policy to be ``we will
extend the peace by encouraging free and open societies on every
continent,'' because ``freedom is the non-negotiable demand of human
dignity; the birthright of every person--in every civilization.'' The
President expanded on these principles in his November 6, 2003 address
to the National Endowment for Democracy. ``The advance of freedom is
the calling of our time; it is the calling of our country . . . And we
believe that freedom--the freedom we prize--is not for us alone, it is
the right and the capacity of all mankind.''
As the President affirmed in his second Inaugural Address, the
Administration's foreign policy will continue to adhere to these
principles, as we work to implement the President's agenda of promoting
human rights, democracy, and rule of law around the world.
Question. In light of the objectives set forth in the President's
address, why is the budget for the HRDF in the Department being reduced
from $36.7 million in FY05 to $27 million in the FY06 budget?
Answer. Administration requests to fund the Human Rights and
Democracy Fund (HRDF) remained consistent from FY 2005 to FY 2006. HRDF
is designed to provide funds to innovative seed projects that support
and strengthen democratic institutions, promote human rights, and build
civil society, which can be used as models for future funding by other
departments or agencies. This level of funding, in conjunction with
other funds administered by DRL, allow for the adequate funding of
current priorities.
In addition to HRDF funds, the Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights
and Labor also administers other substantial funds to promote similar
objectives. These include Iraq Relief and Reconstruction Funds (IRRF),
and ESF for Cuba, NED grants and Burma, and some Assistance for Eastern
Europe & Baltic States (AEEB).
Question. Why is funding for the Partnership to Eliminate
Sweatshops, a modest program funded at just under $2 million per year,
proposed for elimination in the FY06 budget?
Answer. While there is no request for a separate budget line item
for this program in FY 2006, DRL will continue to seek ways to support
the program's goals through the use of funds under HRDF. The activity
and its goals have not been abandoned.
Question. The Administration is proposing to the U.N. Security
Council that an international tribunal be established to prosecute war
crimes committed in Darfur rather than support a referral to the
International Criminal Court.
a. Why are we suggesting that another tribunal be established?
b. What is the projected cost of such a tribunal, and what will be
the U.S. share?
c. Will such a tribunal be limited in duration, and if so, for how
long?
d. How long will it take to set up such a tribunal to prosecute
alleged war criminals compared to allowing the prosecutions to proceed
at the Hague?
Answer. We have proposed the establishment of a ``Sudan Tribunal''
because we seek a fundamental African role in accountability, and
because of our concerns regarding the International Criminal Court
(ICC). This proposal, and our overall ICC policy, is consistent with
the American Servicemembers' Protection Act, passed by the Congress
with strong bipartisan support, which prohibits assistance and support
for the ICC. We believe the Rome Statute establishing the ICC is
fundamentally flawed and cannot support it. It creates a prosecutorial
system that is an unchecked power and is open for exploitation and
politically motivated prosecutions. A referral by the U.N. Security
Council, as currently proposed by ICC supporters for the Darfur case,
would not address these fundamental ongoing concerns we have with the
ICC, and our concerns about the exposure of U.S. servicemembers,
officials, aid workers, and other citizens to unwarranted investigation
and prosecution by the ICC. In addition, the ICC does not have temporal
jurisdiction to prosecute the range of crimes referred to by the U.N.'s
Commission of Inquiry in that some of these crimes were committed prior
to July 1, 2002.
At the same time, we strongly support a call for accountability for
the atrocities in Darfur, and believe that a Sudan Tribunal--created
and mandated by a UNSC resolution and administered by the African Union
(AU) and the United Nations--is the best means of providing this
accountability. The Tribunal could be based in Arusha, Tanzania, at
least initially, and could share the existing infrastructure of the
International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR). This approach would
respect the AU role in building institutions and solving problems in
Africa. The AU has played a critical leadership role in Darfur; this
type of court would allow the AU to continue that leadership role as
accountability is pursued.
Start-up costs for the Tribunal's first 6-8 months of operations
are estimated at $30 million. As the Tribunal becomes fully
operational, we anticipate that the costs will rise; however we believe
the costs will be manageable. Our preferred funding option is U.N.
assessed contributions, under which the U.S. portion would be
approximately 25 percent (assuming the model for the Yugoslavia and
Rwanda tribunals is used). The Tribunal would operate initially for 3-5
years, renewable annually as needed.
Any court that takes on Sudan war crimes would require substantial
new staff and budgetary resources. The ICC, for example, has a limited
presence in Africa, and this staff is occupied with the Uganda and
Congo investigations and possible ICC action in the Central African
Republic. The ICTR, in contrast, has extensive infrastructure on the
ground. We therefore do not see a significant difference in start-up
time or cost between the ICC and an AU-U.N. Sudan Tribunal.
Question. The African Union (AU) has made an admirable attempt to
respond to the crisis in Darfur, but even with the help of the
international community, the AU has managed to put only about 1,900
troops on the ground out of a mandated 3,200 since last fall. It is
apparent that we cannot rely on the AU alone. What additional steps is
the Administration going to take to help improve the security situation
in Darfur and bring an end to the ongoing genocide?
Answer. The solution to the crisis in Darfur will require a
combination of political, peace monitoring, and humanitarian actions.
On the political side, we will continue placing great pressure on the
GOS to end the activities of the militias and to comply with their
obligations under various U.N. Security Council resolutions. Upcoming
talks in Abuja will provide an opportunity to reinvigorate the April 8,
2004 Humanitarian Ceasefire Agreement.
In terms of peacekeeping, we have confidence that the African Union
offers the best approach for immediately improving the security
situation in Darfur and bringing an end to atrocities. African Union
Mission in Sudan (AMIS) personnel have proven to be both effective and
innovative, and have approached their task with a high degree of
professionalism. They have produced tangible improvements in security
in the areas where they have deployed. There are more than 2,300 AMIS
personnel currently deployed, including the full complement of
protection forces and most of the military observers. We are working
with other donors and African countries to enable the AU to deploy the
remaining military observers and civilian police units in the coming
weeks.
AMIS has adopted an active approach to its mandate that is
achieving results on the ground. In addition to investigating
allegations of ceasefire violations, patrol teams respond to fast-
breaking situations where attacks are imminent. They have directly
prevented village destruction and displacement through their quick
response. Also, patrols are coordinating with women's groups in
Internally Displaced People (IDP) camps to provide protection while
women gather firewood outside the camp. Sector commanders routinely
mediate between tribal leaders to cut short the spiral of violence and
revenge.
The security situation in Darfur, while improved since January,
remains fragile and continues to negatively affect the humanitarian
situation. Attacks on villages continue while rape, banditry, and
roadside attacks contribute to serious insecurity throughout Darfur. A
recently concluded assessment visit by the AU and U.N., with technical
assistance from the EU and the United States, examined the AU mission's
capacity to deliver security and will make recommendations on
strengthening the mission. The Department will analyze the results of
the mission and determine how it can support any needed adjustments to
the mission and force structure.
The United States continues to lead the international response to
Darfur. We have contributed $588 million for humanitarian assistance in
Darfur and for the 213,000 refugees across the border in Chad. We have
also committed more than $95 million to the AU mission and are
providing military and civilian observers and experts to the mission,
the latter of which is vital in the effort to strengthen the AU's
command and control capabilities. With our continued pressure and
support and the support of the international community, security that
is needed to make real progress in Darfur will be attained.
Question. The budget request for the Andean Regional Initiative is
largely unchanged over last year, at $735 million. Plan Colombia was
supposed to be a five year plan, ending this year. What do you
anticipate for the future of the program?
Answer. USG support for Plan Colombia is a key part of the Andean
Counterdrug Initiative (ACI), which is how the Andean Regional
Initiative has been known since its mission has focused more directly
on counternarcotics. This answer will refer to ACI.
U.S. policy is to respond to the Andean region's social, economic,
governmental, narcotics, and terrorism challenges in a balanced and
comprehensive manner. Our programs support, but do not substitute for,
the broader efforts of the region's governments and societies. Failure
to sustain our programs until the host nation can completely take them
over could have serious consequences and lead to greater availability
of cocaine and heroin on the streets of America at a lower price. All
our programs must strive for handoff to the host nation, but not before
the host nations are ready. Each ACI country will make progress at its
own pace.
In the coming years, we expect the focus and balance of USG
assistance to the region will gradually shift both programmatically
and/or geographically. For example, we expect to see a relative decline
in police and military support programs that are operational in nature,
but an increase in institutional development and professionalization
activities for the police and military. There may also be the need to
consider increases in general economic development assistance as the
narcoterrorists' influence decreases. Host nation or other
international funding will increase over time, and USG funding likely
will decrease.
Future plans for the ACI program vary in each of the seven ACI
countries. In the source countries where we have invested significant
funding, such as Colombia, we are at the mid-term point for certain
projects. In the transshipment countries, our investment has not been
as significant and we have not moved to the mid-term stage in a
comprehensive fashion. However, for countries like Brazil, Ecuador, and
Panama, our programs serve as models for greater host nation
investment.
Question. Since 2000, when aggressive aerial eradication programs
began in Colombia, coca cultivation in the country has been cut almost
in half. At the same time, the street price of cocaine is as cheap as
ever (in 1999 it was 135.51 per gram; in 2003, 106.54 per gram).
a. How are we doing on reaching the goals of Plan Colombia, broadly
speaking?
b. Why are we not seeing an increase in the price of cocaine,
signaling lower supply of the drug on our streets? Are we reducing the
flow of drugs to the United States as a result of Plan Colombia?
Answer. The Andes produce most of the world's cocaine and
increasing amounts of heroin. We are meeting Plan Colombia eradication
and interdiction goals established for the Andean Counterdrug
Initiative (ACI), which includes Plan Colombia. We have made
significant strides against this drug supply in the past 3 years,
especially in Colombia. Our efforts are hurting narcotraffickers in all
aspects of their business. However, narcotraffickers have not relented
in replanting illicit drug crops, processing illegal drugs and
smuggling the drugs; so much work remains to be done under ACI.
ACI reduces the quantity of illicit drugs produced in this
hemisphere through ongoing eradication programs and vigorously
combating the drug trafficking of those illicit drugs through law
enforcement interdiction programs. In 2004 ACI programs in Colombia
alone eradicated over 130,000 hectares of coca and seized over 175
metric tons of cocaine. This is an unquestionable success.
It is difficult for the State Department to make predictions or
give definitive responses to questions about price and purity of street
drugs in the United States. The U.S. street price of drugs is derived
through the interaction of many factors, and the White House's Office
of National Drug Control Policy is more directly engaged in the study
of how price and purity are affected by ACI's successes.
Question. In your testimony, you state that in Latin America we
face the ``twin challenges of helping to bolster democratic ideals and
institutions, and alleviating poverty.'' The hemisphere still has many
fragile democracies. The FY 2006 foreign aid request anticipates yet
another decline in development assistance to Latin America and the
Caribbean. What justifies this decrease? Are we not undermining vital
tools that can help advance democracy and alleviate poverty by such
reductions in assistance?
Answer. The Western Hemisphere is extremely critical to the United
States. In as much, the specific reduction in the Development
Assistance account of roughly $32 million is balanced by the request
for $30 million from the newly expanded Transition Initiative Account
for Haiti.
Question. The request for the Andean Regional Initiative (ARI) has
increased this year from $731 million to $734.5 million. At the same
time, the allocations to several countries--for example, Bolivia, Peru,
and Ecuador--have been cut. I note that these are also countries that
are facing challenges to political stability, and in which there have
been indications that coca cultivation could be on the rise. What is
the justification for cutting funding to these countries, especially
when the request for the ARI account has been increased?
Answer. Every year INL programs are reviewed to ensure we devote
the resources available to the programs where they will have the
greatest impact.
Our request for FY 2006 includes a new program to upgrade the
helicopters performing critical counternarcotics missions in the
region. This new initiative, the Critical Flight Safety Program, will
fund modifications to refurbish and restore Vietnam-era aircraft. These
upgrades are necessary for the continued safe execution of aviation
operations. This $40,000,000 program necessitated reductions in the
country accounts for all ACI-supported countries except Colombia.
The reduction in funding to Bolivia, Peru, and Ecuador by no means
indicates flagging counternarcotics performance or a failure to
recognize the challenges those countries face. The Department is very
concerned about Bolivia, and in particular, the 6 percent increase in
coca cultivation in 2004. Bolivia will receive 4 upgraded helicopters
from the Critical Flight Safety Program in FY 2006. In Peru, we are
also concerned about an increase in new coca cultivation areas and the
potential for opium poppy cultivation. Ecuador, however, is making
increased use of its own resources and has made significant advances in
securing its northern border with Colombia.
Despite the challenges ACI countries face, each one is conducting
important counternarcotics efforts and making noteworthy achievements
to prevent illegal drugs from entering the U.S. Now is not the time to
reduce ACI funding because the success of our efforts in the Andes
could be lost if we do not maintain aggressive counterdrug programs and
continue to encourage growers to enter legitimate markets. The increase
in our request for ACI funding highlights the Department's recognition
of the strategic importance of the ACI and the key role each of the ACI
countries play in our counternarcotics efforts in the Western
Hemisphere.
Question. The aid request for El Salvador calls for a sharp
increase in Foreign Military Financing, making it Latin America's
second largest FMF recipient, with $13 million. Why is this substantial
increase in military assistance proposed for a country that is at peace
and that can afford few funds for military spending? What equipment or
services would be provided, and what threat is the assistance meant to
address?
Answer. El Salvador has been a staunch supporter of our efforts in
Iraq. Originally under the Spanish command along with the other Latin
American countries who initially participated in Operation Iraqi
Freedom, El Salvador was the only Latin American country to remain in
Iraq after the Government of Spain pulled its troops out. The fourth
contingent of Salvadoran troops arrived in Iraq in mid-February. This
support has been extraordinary for a small country with modest economic
resources.
The requested FY 2006 funds would focus assistance on supporting El
Salvador's interdiction efforts, including counternarcotics and border
control programs, and enhancing its capabilities to participate in
future coalition and multilateral operations, including peacekeeping.
Specifically, the assistance would include spare parts and equipment
for fixed and rotary wing aircraft, naval vessels and vehicles, as well
as helicopter upgrades; vehicles; training; and command, control, and
communications equipment for the army, air force and navy. Funds would
also be used for individual soldier equipment, GPS systems, night
vision goggles, and training.
Question. A growing issue in Central America is the problem of
youth gangs and related violence. Some governments in the region have
taken particularly hard-line approaches and appear interested in having
their militaries play a role in policing and anti-gang activities.
Gangs are a law enforcement problem, not a military one, and they're
also a problem that has social dimensions. What does the State
Department intend to do to help Central American governments avoid
militarizing their response to this problem, as well as to help them
address both the social and the law enforcement aspects of the problem?
Answer. The violent youth gangs currently operating in Central
America have developed from a variety of factors--both sociological and
historical. They are one aspect of a general rise in crime that has
followed the end of armed conflicts in El Salvador and Guatemala and
the restructuring of police forces and criminal justice systems
throughout the region. Notwithstanding the significant efforts that
many of these countries have made to reorient their police forces to
the requirements of civilian and democratic policing, the development
of these new police organizations has not kept up with the increasing
demands placed on them. Gangs are one of these demands.
The suggestion that militaries should be brought in to help control
the gang problem reflects the institutional weaknesses of the police
forces and the criminal justice systems. The antidote to this is to
help the police forces of the region focus their resources and energies
more effectively on gangs--to analyze their movements, identify their
leaders and develop the evidence needed to gain convictions for the
serious crimes that are being committed.
In prior years, in El Salvador, we supported the formation and
provided in-service training for anti-gang units in the Civilian
National Police (PNC). Current projects in Guatemala and Panama are
working with the police in specific communities to improve their
capacity to target gang leaders more effectively. The Department is in
the process of analyzing how these efforts may be extended to other
countries in the region and how the police forces of Central America
can be encouraged to take a more rigorous analytical approach to gangs
within their jurisdiction and share that information across boundaries.
This would include sharing of information to develop high priority
cases with prosecutors in both Central America and the United States.
The Department and USAID are also active on the social side of the
gang problem. Some examples include: support for prevention and
rehabilitation programs of the National Council of Public Security in
El Salvador that are carried out in schools and include tattoo removal;
support for NGO efforts in Guatemala to mitigate delinquency in three
geographic areas, establish a ``Model Youth Home,'' and lobby for
changes in national policy on crime prevention and economic
development; and support through the Inter-American Coalition for the
Prevention of Violence to develop crime prevention plans at the
municipal level in six Central American countries.
Question. Several years ago, the scope of the Enduring Friendship
initiative was described in concept as including the waters of the
Western Hemisphere and was based on a unanimous invocation of the
mutual defense clause of the Rio Treaty after the 9/11 attacks. As
recently as spring of 2004, CINCSOUTH Gen. Hill made similar statements
in Congressional testimony. Enduring Friendship is presented in the FY
2006 budget as a Caribbean regional initiative, involving only the
Dominican Republic and Panama and ``more modest support'' for the
Bahamas and Jamaica.
a. What caused the scaling down of the initiative? Were nations
unwilling to cooperate and if so, why?
b. What is the allocation of funding to each of the 4 countries
referenced in the CBJ as receiving funds under this initiative?
c. What are the anticipated phases of growth of the Enduring
Friendship program? Which, if any, nations and areas are planned for
expansion beyond the Dominican Republic and the Caribbean?
d. Does the initiative contemplate joint exercises or joint
interdiction activities with U.S. forces or is it only to provide
equipment and training? Will the current Status of Forces Agreements
for port calls in the Caribbean be adequate or will the United States
need to negotiate new Status of Forces Agreements in portions of the
Caribbean?
Answer. Recognizing the growth in worldwide requirements for
Foreign Military Financing (FMF), the Department of State, after
consulting with the Department of Defense and our partners in the
region, decided to begin implementation of Enduring Friendship with a
limited number of Caribbean basin partners where the project would have
the most impact. There is enthusiastic support in the region for
Enduring Friendship and the decision to limit the number of countries
supported in FY 2006 should not be seen as an indicator that countries
do not want to participate. Beginning with four key maritime allies--
the Dominican Republic, Panama, the Bahamas and Jamaica--the
initiative's immediate objective is to allow coalition forces to
maintain command of the Caribbean's critical choke points and to react
to shifting threats in the Caribbean basin.
Another important objective for Enduring Friendship in FY 2006 is
to affirm the concept that regional and multilateral maritime
interdiction cooperation will act as a force multiplier for the assets
currently protecting the southern approaches to the United States. As
this concept is tested, subsequent FMF requests could seek to expand
the number of countries participating in Enduring Friendship. However,
for the foreseeable future, we do not see participation in Enduring
Friendship expanding beyond the southern approaches to the United
States.
As part of Enduring Friendship in FY 2006, we anticipate providing
the Dominican Republic $2,500,000; Panama $1,750,000; the Bahamas
$400,000; and Jamaica $350,000. After FY 2006 funds are appropriated,
the Department would determine final allocation figures for the
countries involved in Enduring Friendship and notify Congress through
normal procedures. The equipment and training will better enable those
countries to participate in joint exercises and operations with the
United States and other forces in the Caribbean. Through Enduring
Friendship, we can help these countries capitalize and expand upon
existing architectures and procedures to meet the security challenges
of the 21st century.
The USG continues to pursue standing Status of Forces Agreements
(SOFAs) with Caribbean countries where there is not an existing long-
term SOFA. Of the four countries for which we have requested FY 2006
funding, we currently have a SOFA in place with the Dominican Republic
to cover U.S. personnel participating in exercises. The USG is
currently in the process of negotiating standing SOFAs with many
additional WHA region countries. If we were unable to negotiate a
standing SOFA with a country which we were going to engage as part of
Enduring Friendship, we could seek to negotiate an exercise-specific
SOFA with the country which would provide coverage to U.S. personnel
for that exercise only.
Question. You have been a strong advocate of the President's
forward strategy of freedom around the world. Yet millions of refugees
enjoy no such freedom even though the 1951 Convention Relating to the
Status of Refugees provides for their rights to work, practice
professions, run businesses, own property, and move freely. Of the 12
million refugees in the world, more than 7 million have been confined
to camps or segregated settlements or otherwise deprived of these
Convention rights for 10 years or more. In fact, the United Nations
High Commissioner for Refugees estimates that the average length of
major refugee situations increased from 9 years in 1993 to 17 years in
2003.
As Secretary, what will you do to bring the forward strategy of
freedom to ``warehoused'' refugees?
Answer. The 1951 Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees lays
out the obligations that parties, as hosting countries, have toward
refugees. The United States expects all parties to the Convention to
uphold these oblications.
The best solution for refugees is to make it possible for them to
return to their homes. Voluntary, safe return of refugees depends on
successful efforts to address the political and humanitarian dimensions
of the conflict situations that lead them to flee. We are encouraged by
a number of peace agreements and other fundamental changes in the
internal situation of nations that have led or will lead to refugee
returns. For example:
Since the fall of the Taliban in Afghanistan, more than three
million refugees have returned from Pakistan and Iran and other
countries. This continuing repatriation represents one of the largest
refugee solutions in modern times.
The Sudan Comprehensive Peace Agreement signed on January 9, 2005,
commits the parties to ending more than two decades of civil war. We
are working hard to ensure that over 500,000 refugees displaced by the
decades of conflict will be able to return home to their communities in
the South. We remain deeply concerned about the violence in Darfur,
however, and are working diligently with the African Union, United
Nations, European Union, and other allies to help end the insecurity
there so that refugees from Darfur now living in Chad can voluntarily
return home in safety.
On August 18, 2003, leaders from the Liberian Government, rebel
groups, political parties, and civil society signed an accord that laid
the framework for constructing a two-year National Transitional
Government of Liberia. An elected government will replace the
transitional government this year. An estimated 100,000 of 350,000
Liberian refugees have already returned.
In Angola, the April 2002 Luena Memorandum of Understanding (MOU)
formalized the de facto cease-fire that prevailed following the death
of Jonas Savimbi in February 2002. As a result of the cease-fire and
MOU, there have been over 300,000 returns to date, with the possibility
of another 150,000 more.
The peace process in Burundi, beginning with the signing of the
Arusha Accords in August 2000, made 90,000 facilitated repatriations
possible in 2004.
Over 270,000 refugees have returned to Sierra Leone since 2001,
thanks to the peace agreement signed in 2001, the presence of the
United Nations Mission in Sierra Leone (UNAMSIL), and presidential and
legislative elections held in Sierra Leone in May 2002.
We will continue to work to secure political and humanitarian
solutions, including safe and voluntary repatriation.
The United States will remain a leader in international efforts to
find durable solutions for the plight of refugees and will continue to
urge countries to be generous in giving aid, providing protection, and
allowing refugees to move and work freely while in exile. We will
continue to push for local integration of refugees in host countries,
including full recognition of their legal rights, whenever possible. We
will also continue to advocate for and provide refugee resettlement
through a robust U.S. refugee admissions program in appropriate cases.
In the FY06 budget request, the President has made clear his commitment
to significantly growing this program, in part, to address the plight
of warehoused refugees.
Question. Why has the Administration requested $11 million less
than was provided in last year's appropriation for the U.S.
contribution to UNICEF just as Secretary of Agriculture Veneman is
about to assume the position of Executive Director of the organization?
Answer. Our FY 2006 request ($114 million) for UNICEF from the
International Organizations and Programs (IO&P) account represents a 5
percent decrease from the FY 2005 Administration request level ($120
million) as a result of overall budget constraints that affected the
majority of voluntary contributions funded from that account. The
request for UNICEF remains the largest in that account and in no way
reflects diminished support for UNICEF or its critical mission. We
anticipate that overall U.S. contributions to UNICEF will remain
consistent with recent years.
The United States looks forward to continuing our strong
partnership with UNICEF under the leadership of Secretary Veneman. The
United States is UNICEF's largest donor, and we strongly support its
mission to promote the survival, education, health and protection of
children worldwide. In addition to funding the State Department
provides for UNICEF's core budget through the IO&P account, the United
States supports UNICEF's work by providing funds (from other accounts
and U.S. agencies) earmarked to support specific efforts or programs
such as polio eradication and emergency response.
Question. The Committee has just learned that in 2003, the
Department spent nearly $700,000 on a series of events, including a
concert, in Paris in connection with the rejoining of UNESCO. Many of
the arrangements were handled by a public relations firm which also
handled events for the President's first inaugural. The Inspector
General, Office of Audits, questioned some $140,000 of the costs
incurred by this public relations firm. I supported the re-joining of
UNESCO, but given the limited budget for cultural affairs programming,
this seems like an excessive expenditure of funds.
a. Why was such an expenditure considered necessary and
appropriate?
b. How was the public relations firm chosen? Were competitive
procedures used? If not, why not, and what was the legal basis of the
decision not to use competitive procedures?
c. What was the final cost of the event and how much of the costs
questioned by the Inspector General were recovered from the public
relations firm?
Answer. The U.S. was rejoining UNESCO as a member after nineteen
years. Several bureaus at the State Department--the Bureau of
Educational and Cultural Affairs (ECA), the office for Public Diplomacy
(R), the Bureau of International Organization Affairs (IO), and the
U.S. Observer Mission for UNESCO worked with the NSC on events
surrounding the re-entry of the U.S. Among events discussed was the
sponsoring of an appropriate cultural event in the context of U.S. re-
entry to UNESCO. Because of ECA's long-standing expertise in cultural
programming, the Department determined that ECA was the best manager
for the event. However, ECA's program funds were not used to fund the
event.
The event showcasing American culture was attended by 1,000 guests,
including delegates from the member countries, the members of the U.S.
delegation in attendance at the general conference, and senior
international staff of UNESCO.
The final decision to have a cultural event showcasing American
talent was not made until the summer of 2003, just 90 days before the
opening of the UNESCO General Conference which was scheduled for
September 29, 2003. Because of the short time period before the event
there was not time for a formal competition. R asked ECA and State's
contracts officer to review respective GSA Federal Supply Schedules,
including their rates and capabilities. ECA knew that the vast majority
of expenses would be spent for talent and talent-related reimbursable
expenses, and for the venue, therefore, these expenses would be about
the same for whatever vendor was selected. The firm chosen was on the
GSA Schedule. The Department's contracts office awarded a firm-fixed
price GSA Federal Supply Schedule Delivery Order with a fixed price
line item for labor and a reimbursable line item for travel, site
build-out and talent components.
The final cost was $692,182.08 ($641,447.60 was paid out of R's
D&CP funds, and $50,734.48 was paid out of retained USIA gift funds).
After the event, the GCJPR firm came in with an additional bill of
$95,123.96 above the contract, so the Assistant Secretary of the Bureau
of Educational and Cultural Affairs requested that State's Office of
Inspector General (OIG) conduct a review of the bills to determine
whether the costs claimed by GCJPR were reasonable and allowable under
the delivery order and under the Federal Acquisition Regulations.
The audit report noted ``findings and questioned costs'' of
$143,317.79 out of the bills. Upon receipt of the report, ECA reviewed
the questioned costs and accepted $53,676.36 as having a basis to be
questioned. The other costs, while mentioned in the report, were
acceptable to the State Department's contracts office, such as the
actual impact of the fluctuating exchange rate on the budget. The
$53,676.36 in questioned costs were recovered by subtracting them from
the additional bill which came in.
Question. I share some of the administration's reservations about
the Kyoto Protocol. However, I was very disappointed that at the recent
meetings in Buenos Aires, the position of the United States was that it
was premature to even begin discussions on the next stage of
international negotiations, beyond Kyoto. That is not an acceptable
position.
By now, the United States must have some idea about the next steps
beyond the first reporting period of Kyoto. Our country is the biggest
historical contributor to the problem of climate change. The President
acknowledges that there is a problem. We are signatories to the U.N.'s
Framework Convention on Climate Change, which commits us to share in
the effort to limit human impact on our planet's climate. If it is our
position that the current international effort is not appropriate, we
have a responsibility--as a party to the Framework Convention--to be
part of the solution.
If it is the Administration's position that the current Protocol
fails to set adequate commitments for developing nations, then what is
our strategy for fixing that? If it is the Administration's position
that the commitments on developed countries are not economically
sustainable, what do we have to offer as an alternative?
I would appreciate a response that does not simply refer to the
current array of ad hoc bilateral discussions and programs, but one
that engages with the specific problems with the current Kyoto
Protocol, our current and future obligations under the Framework
Convention, and offers a path toward future U.S. engagement in an
international solution.
Question. If it is the Administration's position that the current
Protocol fails to set adequate commitments for developing nations, then
what is our strategy for fixing that? If it is the Administration's
position that the commitments on developed countries are not
economically sustainable, what do we have to offer as an alternative?
Answer. The United States decided in 2001 not to ratify the Kyoto
Protocol because it would harm the U.S. economy and it contains no
commitments for developing countries. Having reached this decision, we
are not seeking to ``fix'' that instrument or to offer an
``alternative.'' The United States remains a party to the U.N.
Framework Convention on Climate Change, meeting its commitments and
participating actively in that forum. Through our multilateral
initiatives (on nuclear energy, carbon capture and storage, hydrogen,
methane recapture and fusion); our participation in other multilateral
initiatives on energy efficiency and renewable energy; and in our
bilateral climate change programs with developed and developing
countries, we are promoting practical, focused efforts to bring down
the cost of existing technologies and to develop new technologies that
will help all countries meet the challenge of climate change.
Question. When do you anticipate providing the Administration's
treaty priority list for the 109th Congress?
Answer. The Treaty Priority List has been prepared and is being
cleared throughout the executive branch; we plan to submit it to the
Committee shortly. The Department recognizes the importance of this
list in assisting the Comittee to organize its work and is very
appreciative of the cooperation it has received from the Committee in
the treaty law area during the 108th Congress.
Question. In rejoining the International Coffee Agreement, why did
the United States treat it as an executive agreement and not submit it
to the Senate for advice and consent?
Answer. The 2001 International Coffee Agreement (the ``2001 ICA''),
was treated as an executive agreement primarily because its limited
scope does not include economic or market-regulatory provisions, such
as export controls, quotas or the operation of a buffer stock, which
require the enactment of legislation, unlike other, generally older,
commodity agreements submitted for Senate advice and consent, including
the 1983 International Coffee Agreement (the ``1983 ICA'').
We had a similar situation with the 1984 International Sugar
Agreement. The 1977 International Sugar Agreement, which expired at the
end of 1984, was done as an advice and consent treaty. The 1977
Agreement contained both export controls and the operation of a buffer
stock. The 1984 International Sugar Agreement provided for the
continued existence of the International Sugar Organization that
administered the 1977 Agreement, but did not contain the economic or
market-regulatory provisions included in the 1977 Agreement and
expressly limited the function of the Organization to the
administration of the new 1984 Agreement. As a result, the 1984
International Sugar Agreement was treated as an executive agreement.
Similarly, we have treated as executive agreements the International
Tropical Timber Agreements of 1983 and 1987, the International Sugar
Agreement of 1987, and the International Agreement on Jute and Jute
Products of 1982 and 1989. None of these agreements have economic or
market regulatory provisions.
The 2001 ICA contained no economic or market-regulatory provisions
and the International Coffee Organization (the ``ICO''), established by
the agreement, is a commodity organization that principally facilitates
research and development and market promotion.
In sum, the limited scope and effect of the ICO's activities, the
fact that no implementing legislation was needed to enact trade
restrictions (as there had been for the 1983 ICA) and our past
practice, led us to conclude that the 2001 ICA should be treated as an
executive agreement.
Question. Section 2242 of the Foreign Relations Authorization Act,
Fiscal Years 1995 and 1999 provides that it ``shall be the policy of
the United States not to expel, extradite, or otherwise effect the
involuntary return of any person to a country in which there are
substantial grounds for believing the person would be in danger of
being subjected to torture, regardless of whether the person is
physically present in the United States.'' The provision implements
Article 3 of the Convention Against Torture. The President himself has
underscored the importance of this commitment, by stating that
``Torture is never acceptable, nor do we hand over people to countries
to do torture.''
a. What is the State Department's role in assuring compliance with
this provision in cases where other U.S. government agencies have a
person in their custody or control?
b. By what means does the United States assess, in such cases, the
``substantial grounds'' standard? Which agency of the U.S. government
has the lead role in such assessments? What is the role of the
Department of State?
c. Which agency of the U.S. government has the lead role in seeking
assurances from foreign governments that a person will not be subject
to torture, if the person is delivered to the custody or control of a
foreign government? What is the role of the Department of State?
d. Since the enactment of Section 2242, have there been any
instances in which the United States has not effected the involuntary
return of a person because the United States concluded that there were
such ``substantial grounds''? If so, how many such instances and what
country or countries were involved that resulted in such a conclusion?
Answer. Section 2242 of the Foreign Relations Authorization Act,
Fiscal Years 1995 and 1999 accurately describes the policy of the
United States, not to transfer a person to a country if it determines
that it is more likely than not that the person will be tortured. In
several different contexts, described below, the Department of State
(Department) works with other U.S. government agencies to implement
this policy.\1\
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\1\ Sec. 2242 and Article 3 of the Convention Against Torture and
Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment (CAT) refer
to the return of individuals to another state where there are
``substantial grounds for believing'' that the individual would be
subject to torture. At the time it became a State Party to the CAT, the
United States submitted a formal understanding ``[t]hat the United
States understands the phrase, `where there are substantial grounds for
believing that he would be in danger of being subjected to torture,' as
used in Article 3 of the Convention, to mean `if it is more likely than
not that he would be tortured.' U.S. statements of policy have followed
the formulation provided in the U.S. understanding to the CAT.
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immigration removal cases
The Department plays a limited role in the implementation of this
provision in the immigration removal context. In that context,
regulations contained in 8 CFR 208.16-.18 permit aliens to raise claims
under Article 3 of the (CAT) during the course of immigration removal
proceedings. Accordingly, in the immigration removal context,
immigration judges review such claims and determine whether it is more
likely than not that the applicant would be tortured. See 8 CFR 208.16.
In practice, the record demonstrates that individuals seeking
protection under Article 3 of the CAT in many cases have obtained
protection under these regulations. In the period from 1999 when the
regulations implementing Article 3 of the CAT went into effect, through
2003, the available data indicates the following statistics regarding
grants of protection by immigration judges based on the Torture
Convention:
519 grants in FY 2000;
554 grants in FY 2001;
546 grants in FY 2002;
486 grants in FY 2003; and
532 grants in 2004.\2\
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\2\ The data were compiled by the Department of Justice's Executive
Office of Immigration Review (EOIR) and represent decisions taken by
the Immigration Courts. Accordingly, the data do not include the
following: (1) decisions on cases appealed to the Board of Immigration
Appeals; (2) cases in which individuals were granted protection and
were removed to third countries where there are no substantial grounds
for believing that the alien will be subjected to torture; (3) cases in
which Article 3 protection was subsequently terminated, when
substantial grounds no longer exist for believing the alien would be
tortured if removed to a particular country; and (4) cases in which the
U.S. removed an individual subject to assurances that he or she would
not be tortured.
These statistics demonstrate that immigration judges routinely
issue decisions that prevent individuals from being involuntarily
returned to a country where the judge has determined that the
individual is more likely than not to be tortured in the country of
removal. In exceptional cases where an arriving alien is believed to be
inadmissible on terrorism-related grounds, Congress has authorized
alternate removal procedures that do not require consideration or
review by immigration judges. See INA Sec. 235(c). The implementing
regulations provide that removal pursuant to section 235(c) of the Act
shall not proceed ``under circumstances that violate . . . Article 3 of
the Convention Against Torture.'' See 8 CFR 235(b)(4). Removal pursuant
to INA Sec. 235(c) procedures is extremely rare.
In a small number of appropriate cases, pursuant to 8 CFR
Sec. 208.18(c), the U.S. may consider diplomatic assurances that the
alien will not be tortured that were received from the country of
proposed removal. In such removal cases, the Secretary of Homeland
Security (and in cases arising prior to the enactment of the Homeland
Security Act, the Attorney General), in consultation with the
Department of State, would carefully assess such assurances to
determine whether they are sufficiently reliable so as to allow the
individual's removal consistent with Article 3 of the CAT. The United
States reserves the use of diplomatic assurances for a very small
number of the most sensitive of cases where it believes it can
reasonably rely on such assurances that the individual would not be
tortured. In no case would the United States return an individual where
it determined that it was more likely than not that the person would be
tortured.
extradition cases
Department of State regulations set forth at 22 CFR Part 95
describe the process through which the Department evaluates Article 3
claims in the extradition context. Pursuant to these regulations,
whenever allegations relating to torture are raised by the fugitive or
other interested parties, appropriate policy and legal offices within
the Department review and analyze information relevant to a particular
case to determine whether it is ``more likely than not'' that an
individual will be tortured upon extradition to the requesting State.
Information provided by the relevant regional bureau, country desk, or
U.S. embassy also plays an important role in the evaluation of torture
claims. Based on the analysis of relevant information, the Secretary of
State may decide to surrender the fugitive to the requesting State,
deny surrender of the fugitive, or condition the extradition on the
requesting State's provision of assurances, deemed to be credible by
the Secretary of State.
Since promulgation of the Department of State's regulations,
torture claims have been raised in less than 1 percent of extradition
cases and surrender warrants have been issued in all cases. In some of
those cases, it was determined that the evidence submitted by the
claimants provided no basis to conclude that it would be more likely
than not that the claimants would be tortured. In several cases,
assurances, which were deemed adequate, were received from the
requesting country. As is true in the removal context, the United
States reserves the use of diplomatic assurances for a very small
number of the most sensitive of cases where it believes it can
reasonably rely on such assurances that the individual would not be
tortured.
transfers of individuals from guantanamo bay, cuba
The Department of State also plays a role in the assessment of
nonrefoulement concerns relating to individuals detained by the U.S.
Armed Forces at the U.S. Naval Base in Guantanamo Bay, Cuba. As
described recently in an affidavit by Ambassador-at-Large for War
Crimes Pierre-Richard Prosper filed in various habeas cases, notably
including Abdah, et al. v. Bush, et al., CA No. 04-254 (HHK) USDC DDC
(March 8, 2005), the Department of Defense consults with appropriate
United States Government agencies, including the Department of State,
before determining whether to transfer particular individuals. The
United States generally seeks to return the detainee to his or her
country of nationality. In some cases, however, transfers cannot easily
be arranged. For example, the United States has made clear in the
context of the war against al-Qaida and the Taliban that it does not
transfer individuals to other countries where the U.S. believes it is
more likely than not that they will be tortured. Of particular concern
to the Department of State in making recommendations on transfers is
the question of whether the foreign government will treat the detainee
humanely, in a manner consistent with its international obligations,
including the Convention Against Torture.
The Department of State generally has responsibility to communicate
on these matters as between the U.S. and foreign governments. The
Department of State receives requests from foreign governments for the
transfer of detainees and forwards such requests to the Department of
Defense for coordination with appropriate Departments and agencies of
the United States Government. Once the Department of Defense has
approved a transfer from Guantanamo Bay and requests the assistance of
the Department of State, the Department of State initiates transfer
discussions with the foreign government concerned and pursues
assurances considered necessary and appropriate for the particular
country, including in any cases in which continued detention is
foreseen, assurances of humane treatment and treatment in accordance
with the international obligations of the country concerned, including
under the Convention Against Torture.
Decisions with respect to Guantanamo detainees are made on a case-
by-case basis, taking into account the particular circumstances of the
transfer, the country, the individual concerned, and any concerns
regarding torture that may arise. If a case were to arise in which the
assurances obtained from the receiving government are not sufficient
when balanced against treatment concerns, the United States would not
transfer a detainee from Guantanamo to the control of that government
unless the concerns were satisfactorily resolved. Circumstances have
arisen in the past where the Department of Defense elected not to
transfer detainees to their country of origin because of torture
concerns.
In sum, in the aforementioned contexts the Department of State
plays a role in the evaluation of torture concerns to assure compliance
with the policy set forth in Sec. 2242(a) of the Foreign Relations
Authorization Act, Fiscal Years 1995 and 1999.