[House Report 109-223]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
109th Congress Report
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
1st Session 109-223
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REQUESTING THE PRESIDENT AND DIRECTING THE SECRETARY OF STATE TO
TRANSMIT TO THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES NOT LATER THAN 14 DAYS AFTER
THE DATE OF THE ADOPTION OF THIS RESOLUTION ALL INFORMATION IN THE
POSSESSION OF THE PRESIDENT AND THE SECRETARY OF STATE RELATING TO
COMMUNICATION WITH OFFICIALS OF THE UNITED KINGDOM BETWEEN JANUARY 1,
2002, AND OCTOBER 16, 2002, RELATING TO THE POLICY OF THE UNITED STATES
WITH RESPECT TO IRAQ
_______
September 16, 2005.--Referred to the House Calendar and ordered to be
printed
_______
Mr. Hyde, from the Committee on International Relations, submitted the
following
ADVERSE REPORT
together with
DISSENTING VIEWS
[To accompany H. Res. 375]
The Committee on International Relations, to whom was
referred the resolution (H. Res. 375) requesting the President
and directing the Secretary of State to transmit to the House
of Representatives not later than 14 days after the date of the
adoption of this resolution all information in the possession
of the President and the Secretary of State relating to
communication with officials of the United Kingdom between
January 1, 2002, and October 16, 2002, relating to the policy
of the United States with respect to Iraq, having considered
the same, reports unfavorably thereon without amendment and
recommends that the resolution not be agreed to.
TABLE OF CONTENTS
Page
Purpose and Summary.............................................. 2
Background and Need for the Legislation.......................... 2
Hearings......................................................... 4
Committee Consideration.......................................... 4
Vote of the Committee............................................ 4
Committee Oversight Findings..................................... 5
New Budget Authority and Tax Expenditures........................ 5
Performance Goals and Objectives................................. 5
Constitutional Authority Statement............................... 5
New Advisory Committees.......................................... 5
Congressional Accountability Act................................. 5
Federal Mandates................................................. 5
Dissenting Views................................................. 7
Purpose and Summary
House Resolution 375 requests the President and directs the
Secretary of State to transmit to the House of Representatives
all information in the possession of the President and the
Secretary of State relating to communication with officials of
the United Kingdom between January 1, 2002, and October 16,
2002, relating to the policy of the United States with respect
to Iraq.
Background and Need for the Legislation
House Resolution 375 is a resolution of inquiry, which
pursuant to Rule XIII, clause 7 of the Rules of the House,
directs the Committee to act on the resolution within 14
legislative days, or a privileged motion to discharge the
Committee is in order. H. Res. 375 was introduced and referred
to the Committee on International Relations on July 21, 2005,
and was ordered reported adversely by the Committee on
September 14, 2005.
Under the rules and precedents of the House, a resolution
of inquiry is one of the methods used by the House to obtain
information from the executive branch. According to Deschler's
Procedure it is a ``simple resolution making a direct request
or demand of the President or the head of an executive
department to furnish the House of Representatives with
specific factual information in the possession of the executive
branch.''\1\
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\1\Deschler's Precedents, H. Doc. No. 94-661, 94th Cong., 2d Sess.,
vol. 7, ch. 24, section 8.
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On July 21, 2005, Rep. Barbara Lee of California introduced
H. Res. 375. The resolution requests the President and directs
the Secretary of State to turn over all documents, including
telephone and electronic mail records, logs, calendars,
minutes, and memos, in the possession of the President relating
to communications with officials of the United Kingdom from
January 1, 2002, to October 16, 2002, relating to the policy of
the United States with respect to Iraq, including any
discussions or communications between the President or other
Administration officials and officials of the United Kingdom
that occurred before the meeting on July 23, 2002, at 10
Downing Street in London, England, between Prime Minister Tony
Blair of the United Kingdom, United Kingdom intelligence
officer Richard Dearlove, and other national security officials
of the Blair Administration.
H. Res. 375 apparently was introduced in response to
publication of a British document known as the ``Downing Street
Memo.'' The Downing Street Memo, as leaked to and published by
the press, was apparently written in connection with a meeting
between Tony Blair and British officials held on Downing Street
on July 23, 2002. The Memo was leaked to a member of the
British press and published in London's The Sunday Times on May
1, 2005. The heart of the Downing Street Memo is the memo's
description of U.S. pre-war intelligence that included the view
that intelligence was being ``fixed'' around the policy.
Prior to introduction of H. Res. 375, thorough
investigations were conducted and lengthy reports were issued
by the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, the Commission
on the Intelligence Capabilities of the United States Regarding
Weapons of Mass Destruction (known as the Silberman-Robb
Commission), the House of Commons Foreign Affairs Committee,
and the British Hutton inquiry. None of these reports found any
evidence that Administration officials attempted to coerce,
influence or pressure members of the intelligence community to
``fix'' intelligence.
The Senate Select Committee on Intelligence reviewed the
record of intelligence on Iraq over the span of a decade
stretching back to the first Gulf War. The Senate's report ran
over 500 pages and was the product of over twelve months of
Committee review of over 45,000 pages of intelligence
documents, interviews of over 200 individuals including
National Security Council staff members, and four committee
hearings. Conclusion number 83 in the Senate Intelligence
Committee report entitled ``U.S. Intelligence Community's
Prewar Intelligence Assessments on Iraq'' states: ``The
Committee did not find any evidence that Administration
officials attempted to coerce, influence or pressure analysts
to change their judgments related to Iraq's weapons of mass
destruction capabilities.''\2\ This conclusion, as is true of
the entire report, was approved by a unanimous, bipartisan vote
by the Senate Committee.
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\2\United States Senate Select Committee on Intelligence,
Conclusions of U.S. Intelligence Community's Prewar Intelligence
Assessments on Iraq, Conclusion 83, p. 25 (July 7, 2004), available at
http://intelligence.senate.gov/conclusions.pdf
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The House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence
reviewed U.S. intelligence regarding the amount or existence of
weapons of mass destruction in Iraq, including the issues of
bias, dissenting views and how intelligence was disseminated,
and the linkages between Iraq and terrorist organizations. The
Chairman and Ranking Member of the House Intelligence Committee
informed the House International Relations Committee that
Members of the International Relations Committee had been
granted access to the documentation provided by the Central
Intelligence Agency that the Intelligence Committee was
studying in its review. Again, no evidence of ``fixing''
intelligence surfaced in the course of this congressional
review.
The Commission on the Intelligence Capabilities of the
United States Regarding Weapons of Mass Destruction (the
Silberman-Robb Commission) produced what is viewed as the
definitive report on pre-war intelligence. This was a blue-
ribbon, bipartisan commission headed by former Senator Charles
S. Robb and Judge Laurence H. Silberman, which included a
talented and experienced group of commissioners such as Senator
John McCain, Walter Slocombe, Judge Patricia Wald, and Lloyd
Cutler, and was supported by a bipartisan, experienced staff of
88 professionals and consultants. The following conclusions are
particularly relevant to H. Res. 375:
We conclude that the Intelligence Community was dead
wrong in almost all of its pre-war judgments about
Iraq's weapons of mass destruction. . . . Its principal
causes were the Intelligence Community's inability to
collect good information about Iraq's WMD programs,
serious errors in analyzing what information it could
gather, and a failure to make clear just how much of
its analysis was based on assumptions, rather than good
evidence.
. . .
After a thorough review, the Commission found no
indication that the Intelligence Community distorted
the evidence regarding Iraq's weapons of mass
destruction. What the intelligence professionals told
you about Saddam Hussein's programs was what they
believed. They were simply wrong.
. . .
Finally, we closely examined the possibility that
intelligence analysts were pressured by policymakers to
change their judgments about Iraq's nuclear,
biological, and chemical weapons programs. The analysts
who worked Iraqi's weapons issues universally agreed
that in no instance did political pressure cause them
to skew or alter any of their analytical judgments.\3\
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\3\Commission on the Intelligence Capabilities of the United States
Regarding Weapons of Mass Destruction (Silberman-Robb Commission),
Report to the President of the United States, 2, 11 (March 31, 2005).
In light of the number and thoroughness of these previous
inquiries made by congressional committees and special
commissions especially well-qualified in matters of
intelligence, it is unnecessary for the International Relations
Committee to repeat such inquiries. The House and Senate
Intelligence Committees, after thorough review of large volumes
of documents, found no evidence that the Administration
improperly used, coerced, manipulated, or ``fixed'' prewar
intelligence. The Silberman-Robb Commission confirmed this
conclusion. Senator Pat Roberts, the Chairman of the Senate
Select Committee on Intelligence, referring to the numerous
reports on prewar intelligence, aptly stated, ``I don't think
there should be any doubt that we have now heard it all
regarding prewar intelligence. I think that it would be a
monumental waste of time to replow this ground any further. We
should now turn our full attention to the future . . .''\4\
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\4\Press Release, Senator Roberts' Remarks on the WMD Commission
Report (March 31, 2005), available at http://intelligence.senate.gov/
050331.htm
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Given the extensive, multiple investigations of this issue,
the Committee deemed the document requests made in H. Res. 375
to be unnecessary and voted to report it adversely.
Hearings
The Committee did not hold hearings on H. Res. 375.
Committee Consideration
On September 14, 2005, the Full Committee marked up the
resolution, H. Res. 375, pursuant to notice, in open session.
The Committee agreed to a motion to report the resolution
adversely to the House by a record vote of 22 ayes to 21 nays,
with one voting ``Present.''
Vote of the Committee
Clause (3)(b) of rule XIII of the Rules of the House of
Representatives requires that the results of each record vote
on an amendment or motion to report, together with the names of
those voting for or against, be printed in the Committee
report. The following record vote occurred during consideration
of H. Res. 375:
Vote to report to the House adversely:
Voting yes: Hyde, Smith (NJ), Burton, Gallegly, Ros-
Lehtinen, Rohrabacher, Chabot, Tancredo, Issa, Flake, Davis,
Green, Weller, McCotter, Harris, Wilson, Boozman, Barrett,
Mack, Fortenberry, McCaul, and Poe.
Voting no: Leach, Lantos, Berman, Ackerman, Menendez,
Brown, Sherman, Wexler, Engel, Delahunt, Meeks, Lee, Crowley,
Blumenauer, Berkley, Schiff, Watson, Smith (WA), McCollum,
Chandler and Cardoza.
Voting ``Present'': Paul
H. Res. 375 was ordered reported adversely to the House by
a vote of 22 ayes to 21 noes, with one voting ``Present.''
Committee Oversight Findings
The Committee held no oversight activities under clause
2(b)(1) of rule X of the Rules of the House of Representatives.
New Budget Authority and Tax Expenditures
Clause 3(c)(2) of House Rule XIII is inapplicable because
H. Res. 375 does not provide new budgetary authority or
increased tax expenditures.
Performance Goals and Objectives
The rule requiring a statement of performance goals and
objectives is inapplicable.
Constitutional Authority Statement
Pursuant to clause 3(d)(1) of rule XIII of the Rules of the
House of Representatives, the Committee finds the authority for
this resolution in article I, section 1 of the Constitution.
New Advisory Committees
H. Res. 375 does not establish or authorize any new
advisory committees.
Congressional Accountability Act
H. Res. 375 does not apply to the legislative branch.
Federal Mandates
H. Res. 375 provides no Federal mandates.
Dissenting Views
There is no more solemn decision a President or nation can
make than that of putting the men and women of our armed forces
in harm's way and going to war.
Yet, Congress continues to uncritically accept the
Administration's explanation on why the United States is at war
in Iraq.
Nearly a year after the Iraq Survey Group first concluded
that Iraq had no weapons of mass destruction, As authorizers,
this Committee has yet to take any action to further
investigate the veracity of pre-war intelligence claims. And
the American people deserve to know the truth.
In rejecting H. Res. 375, a resolution of inquiry on pre-
war intelligence, the majority has shown its unwillingness to
confront the truth. The closeness of the vote (22-21)
underscores how important this issue has become.
This resolution would have requested the President and
Secretary of State to provide all documents and communications
regarding discussions they may have had with British officials
between January 1, 2002 and during the lead up to congressional
authorization for war with Iraq on October 16, 2002.
The United States is at war in Iraq under an authority
conferred to President Bush by Congress. Consequently, it is
not only Congress's prerogative; it is Congress's
responsibility to ensure that authority was not granted under
circumstances that were deliberately misleading.
We are forced to question again the Administration's
version of events leading up to war because of documents that
have come to light earlier this year.
On May 1, 2005, the Sunday London Times published the
minutes of a secret meeting on July 23, 2002 of British
officials including Prime Minister Tony Blair. This Downing
Street Memo, as it's come to be known states that:
1. L``it seemed clear that Bush had made up his mind to
take military action, even if the timing was not yet
decided. But the case is thin'';
2. L``intelligence and the facts were being fixed
around the policy''; and
3. L``there was little discussion in Washington of the
aftermath of military action''.
On May 5, 2005, our colleague Congressman John Conyers and
119 Members of Congress sent a letter to the President asking
the administration about the grave and serious questions this
memo raises. The administration has yet to answer.
The questions the letter asked included:
(1) Lduring the lead up to war, was there a coordinated
effort with the US intelligence community and/or
British officials to ``fix'' the intelligence and facts
around the policy, as the leaked documents state?
(2) LAt what point in time did President Bush and Prime
Minister Blair first agree it was necessary to invade
Iraq?
(3) LWas there an effort to create an ultimatum about
weapons inspectors in order to help with the
justification for the war, as the minutes indicate? and
(4) LDoes the President or anyone in the administration
dispute the accuracy of the leaked documents?
With nearly 1,900 American troops killed and $250 billion
spent, the cost of this unnecessary war continues to rise. The
tough questions the Downing Street Memo forces us to ask are
critical as the United States presence in Iraq drags on into
its thirty-first month.
The Downing Street Memo and other documents make it clear
that there was little thought to post-war planning. As a
result, while pre-war Iraq had no connection with the tragic
attacks on 9/11, Iraq has since become a haven for terrorists
and has made the world less safe.
The Majority argued that information regarding pre-war
intelligence has already been studied and is readily available.
But this is only half the picture. What has been studied has
simply been pre-war intelligence gathering, not intelligence
use. Both the report of the Senate's Select Committee on
Intelligence on the U.S. Intelligence Community's Prewar
Intelligence Assessments on Iraq (S. Rep. 108-301) and the
Commission on the Intelligence Capabilities of the United
States Regarding Weapons of Mass Destruction (the Silberman-
Robb Commission) examined how intelligence before the war was
collected and analyzed. The larger question of intelligence use
remains unanswered. In the absence of an answer this question,
this resolution would have examined a specific instance of
intelligence use.
The Majority argued that there is no point in asking the
President and Secretary of State to provide these documents--
that there will be too many or that they will be classified.
The volume of information we would have received had this
resolution been enacted should not be a concern for us. We
shouldn't hold up getting to the bottom of these questions
simply because there will be too much information.
Regarding classified information, the President and the
Secretary of State should provide these documents to Congress
first. We in Congress have long had processes in place to deal
with sensitive information. This should not be an obstacle to
providing this information.
The Majority argued that there's no point in looking
backwards; that we are already in Iraq and should be concerned
about getting the job done.
But the President's justification to go to war has been
proved wrong. The Administration's sole argument for going to
war collapsed and so few have questioned how this could have
happened.
Our decision-making process for authorizing force has
broken down. We have an obligation as Members of Congress to
ensure that the process by which Congress grants the authority
to use force is never manipulated. Furthermore, we have the
right to ask questions to ensure this doesn't happen in the
future.
If the Administration has nothing to hide, then the
questions this resolution raises should not have been a
problem.
This resolution of inquiry would have helped us uncover the
truth. Finding out the truth is not a partisan exercise--it's a
democratic one.
Donald M. Payne.
Sherrod Brown.
William D. Delahunt.
Gregory W. Meeks.
Barbara Lee.
Joseph Crowley.
Grace F. Napolitano.
Diane E. Watson.
Betty McCollum.