[Senate Report 109-209]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
109th Congress Report
SENATE
1st Session 109-209
_______________________________________________________________________
Calendar No. 224
HOMELAND SECURITY FOOD AND
AGRICULTURE ACT OF 2005
__________
R E P O R T
of the
COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND SECURITY AND
GOVERNMENTAL AFFAIRS
UNITED STATES SENATE
to accompany
S. 572
TO AMEND THE HOMELAND SECURITY ACT OF 2002 TO GIVE ADDITIONAL
BIOSECURITY RESPONSIBILITIES TO THE DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY
December 15, 2005.--Ordered to be printed
COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND SECURITY AND GOVERNMENTAL AFFAIRS
SUSAN M. COLLINS, Maine, Chairman
TED STEVENS, Alaska JOSEPH I. LIEBERMAN, Connecticut
GEORGE V. VOINOVICH, Ohio CARL LEVIN, Michigan
NORM COLEMAN, Minnesota DANIEL K. AKAKA, Hawaii
TOM COBURN, Oklahoma THOMAS R. CARPER, Delaware
LINCOLN D. CHAFEE, Rhode Island MARK DAYTON, Minnesota
ROBERT F. BENNETT, Utah FRANK LAUTENBERG, New Jersey
PETE V. DOMENICI, New Mexico MARK PRYOR, Arkansas
JOHN W. WARNER, Virginia
Michael D. Bopp, Staff Director and Chief Counsel
James R. McKay, Counsel
Joyce A. Rechtschaffen, Minority Staff Director and Counsel
Jason M. Yanussi, Minority Professional Staff Member
Trina D. Tyrer, Chief Clerk
Calendar No. 224
109th Congress Report
SENATE
1st Session 109-209
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HOMELAND SECURITY FOOD AND AGRICULTURE ACT OF 2005
_______
December 15, 2005.--Ordered to be printed
_______
Ms. Collins, from the Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental
Affairs, submitted the following
R E P O R T
[To accompany S. 572]
The Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental
Affairs, to which was referred the bill (S. 572) to amend the
homeland security act of 2002 to give additional biosecurity
responsibilities to the Department of Homeland Security, having
considered the same reports favorably thereon with an amendment
and recommends that the bill do pass.
CONTENTS
Page
I. Purpose & Summary................................................1
II. Background.......................................................2
III. Legislative History..............................................4
IV. Section-by-Section Analysis......................................4
V. Estimated Cost of Legislation....................................6
VI. Evaluation of Regulatory Impact..................................7
VII. Changes in Existing Law..........................................7
I. PURPOSE & SUMMARY
The Senate Governmental Affairs Committee (the
``Committee'') approved S. 572, the Homeland Security Food and
Agriculture Act, on September 22, 2005. This legislation would
establish a program at the Department of Homeland Security (the
``Department'' or ``DHS'') to protect agriculture and the food
supply by increasing the coordination and communication between
federal, state, and local governments on agricultural security.
II. BACKGROUND
United States agriculture generates over $1 trillion
annually, including $50 billion in exports.\1\ ``The
agriculture industry represents about 13 percent of Gross
Domestic Product and nearly 17 percent of domestic
employment.\2\ One in eight Americans work in an area directly
supported by food production.\3\
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\1\ Much is Being Done to Protect Agriculture from a Terrorist
Attack, but Important Challenges Remain,'' Government Accountability
Office, GAO-05-214, March 8, 2005.
\2\ Bio-security and Agro-Terrorism: Hearing before the Committee
on Agriculture, Nutrition, and Forestry, 109th Congress (2005)
(statement of the Honorable Charles F. Conner, Deputy Secretary, United
States Department of Agriculture).
\3\ Agroterrorism: The Threat to America's Breadbasket: Hearing
before the Committee on Governmental Affairs, S. Hrg. 108-491, (2003)
(statement of Dr. Peter Chalk, RAND Corporation) at 14.
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An event that causes a loss of confidence in any portion of
the U.S. agriculture sector could result in severe economic
losses for the U.S. economy. As a result of the detection of
only one case of bovine spongiform encephalopathy (BSE or mad
cow disease) in the United States in December 2003, most
countries banned U.S. beef exports which caused the U.S. beef
industry to lose between $3.2 and $4.7 billion in 2004. Two
years later, Japan and South Korea, which together account for
over 50 percent of U.S. beef exports, have not lifted the ban.
According to a study conducted by the California Department of
Food and Agriculture, each day that an outbreak of foot-and-
mouth disease is not contained could cost the United States $1
billion in trade sanctions alone.\4\
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\4\ Id. at 80.
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Experts warn that the American food supply system could be
a target of terrorist attack. While testifying before the
Committee on Agriculture, Nutrition, and Forestry on July 20,
2005, Mr. John Lewis, Deputy Assistant Director,
Counterterrorism Division, Federal Bureau of Investigation
(FBI), stated, ``Most people do not equate terrorist attacks
with agroterrorism. But the threat is real, and the impact
could be devastating.'' \5\ Another witness, Dr. Robert
Brackett, Director, Center for Food Safety and Applied
Nutrition, Food and Drug Administration (FDA), added, ``A
terrorist attack on the food supply could have both severe
public health and economic consequences, while damaging the
public's confidence in the food we eat.'' \6\
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\5\ Hearing supra note 2, (statement of Mr. John E. Lewis, Deputy
Assistant Director, Counterterrorism Division Federal Bureau of
Investigation).
\6\ Id. (statement of Dr. Robert Brackett, Director, Center for
Food Safety and Applied Nutrition, Food and Drug Administration).
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A 1999 report to Congress by the Advisory Panel to Assess
Domestic Response Capabilities for Terrorism Involving Weapons
of Mass Destruction (also known as the Gilmore Commission)
stated:
. . . a biological attack against an agricultural
target offers terrorists a virtually risk-free form of
assault, which has a high probability of success and
which also has the prospect of obtaining political
objectives, such as undermining confidence in the
ability of government or giving the terrorists an
improved bargaining position.\7\
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\7\ ``First Annual Report to the President and Congress: Assessing
the Threat,'' Advisory Panel to Assess Domestic Response Capabilities
for Terrorism Involving Weapons of Mass Destruction (the Gilmore
Commission), December 15, 1999, at 12-15.
In 2003, while testifying before the Senate Governmental
Affairs Committee, Dr. Peter Chalk, RAND Corporation, further
noted that unlike other types of terrorist attack, an
agroterrorist attack could be executed with little technical
expertise or financial cost and would not put the attacker in
harm's way because most foreign animal and plant diseases are
not transmittable to humans.\8\
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\8\ Hearing supra note 3 at 79.
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Since September 11, 2001, the Bush Administration has taken
steps to improve U.S. agriculture security, but holes in
prevention, preparedness, and response remain.
On December 17, 2003, the Administration issued Homeland
Security Presidential Directive 7 (HSPD-7) which established a
national policy for federal departments and agencies to
identify and prioritize United States critical infrastructure
and key resources and to protect them from terrorist attacks.
HSPD-7 tasks the Secretary of Homeland Security with
coordinating the overall national effort to enhance the
protection of the critical infrastructure and designates the
Department of Agriculture with the sector-specific
responsibility for food and agriculture protection.\9\
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\9\ Homeland Security Presidential Directive 7, ``Critical
Infrastructure Identification, Prioritization, and Protection,''
December 17, 2003.
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On January 30, 2004, the Administration issued Homeland
Security Presidential Directive 9 (HSPD-9) to establish a
national policy to defend the agriculture and food system
against terrorist attacks, major disasters, and other
emergencies. HSPD-9 generally instructs the Secretaries of
Homeland Security, Agriculture (USDA), and Health and Human
Services, the Administrator of the Environmental Protection
Agency, the Attorney General, and the Director of Central
Intelligence to coordinate their efforts to prepare for,
protect against, respond to, and recover from an agroterrorist
attack. HSPD-9 specifically tasks DHS with developing a
coordinated agriculture and food-specific standardized response
plan, ensuring that adequate response capabilities exist at the
federal, state, and local levels for an attack on the
agriculture sector, establishing information sharing and
analysis mechanisms for agriculture and food, and coordinating
the federal research efforts into countermeasures against
catastrophic animal, plant, and zoonotic diseases.
According to a March 2005 Government Accountability Office
(GAO) report entitled, ``Much is Being Done to Protect
Agriculture from a Terrorist Attack, but Important Challenges
Remain,'' DHS's communication with state and local officials
and coordination of federal activities is lacking. GAO reported
a lack of communication between DHS and states regarding the
development of emergency response plans, grant guidance, and
best practices. State and industry officials reported that
there is no mechanism to share lessons learned from exercises
or real-life animal disease outbreaks. The GAO report also
stated that shortcomings exist in DHS's federal coordination of
national efforts to protect against agroterrorism. Federal
officials claim that there is confusion in interagency working
groups as to which responsibility falls with whom. According to
GAO, DHS has been unable to coordinate agriculture security
research efforts throughout the government as it was tasked to
do in HSPD-9. While some program staff from DHS, USDA, and
Health and Human Services have engaged in preliminary
discussions, there is no overall departmental coordination of
policy and budget issues between the various federal
agencies.\10\
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\10\ Report supra note 2.
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The lack of DHS leadership on agriculture security can be
seen in the June 2004 incident in Washington State where 18
cattle developed chromium contamination. Agroterrorism was
suspected, yet neither USDA nor DHS were notified for over a
week. In May 2004, representatives from the FBI, FDA, and USDA
gave a presentation at an agroterrorism conference in Kansas
City, Missouri on lessons learned from the Washington outbreak
which included a slide stating that the following agencies
should be contacted if agroterrorism is suspected: a state's
Department of Agriculture, FDA, USDA, FBI, local law
enforcement, and state and county public health officials.
However, despite presidential directives, the Department of
Homeland Security was not on the list. It is apparent that
federal coordination remains inadequate if notification of DHS
is considered unnecessary by other responding agencies.
Since September 11, 2001, the Senate has held three
hearings on agriculture security. The Subcommittee on Emerging
Threats of the Senate Committee on Armed Services held a
hearing titled, ``Agricultural Biological Weapons Threat to the
United States,'' on October 27, 1999. Four years later the
Governmental Affairs Committee held a hearing focusing on the
federal government's preparedness and response capabilities
titled, ``Agroterrorism: The Threat to America's Breadbasket,''
on November 18, 2003. The Committee on Agriculture, Nutrition,
and Forestry held a hearing on the subject, ``Biosecurity and
Agroterrorism,'' on July 20, 2005.
However, no comprehensive agriculture security legislation
exists and the Department of Homeland Security's role in
agriculture security remains largely undefined in statute. S.
572 would define and codify the important role DHS should play
in agriculture security preparedness and response.
III. LEGISLATIVE HISTORY
S. 572 was introduced on March 9, 2005, by Senators Akaka
and Durbin and was referred to the Committee on Homeland
Security and Governmental Affairs. On September 22, 2005, the
Committee considered S. 572 and ordered the bill, as amended by
an Akaka substitute amendment, favorably reported by voice
vote. Members present were Senators Collins, Lieberman,
Voinovich, Coleman, Chafee, Lieberman, Levin, Akaka,
Lautenberg, and Pryor.
Senator Akaka introduced similar bills in the 107th and
108th Congresses. S. 2767, the Agriculture Security
Preparedness Act, was introduced on July 22, 2002, and referred
to the Committee on Agriulture, Nutrition, Forestry, and S.
427, the Agriculture Security Assistance Act, and S. 430, the
Agriculture Security Preparedness Act, were introduced on
February 24, 2003, and referred to the Committee on
Agriculture, Nutrition, Forestry.
IV. SECTION-BY-SECTION ANALYSIS
Section 1. Short title
This Act may be cited as the ``Homeland Security Food and
Agriculture Act of 2005.''
Section 2. Agricultural biosecurity
(a) This subsection amends the Homeland Security Act of
2002 (P.L. 107-296) to create Subtitle J, Agricultural
Biosecurity, after Subtitle I under Title VII.
Section 899(a)--Definitions
Section 899(a) of the new Subtitle J defines the terms
agriculture disease, agriculture, agroterrorist act, and
biosecurity for the purposes of this Subtitle.
Section 899(b)--Agriculture security responsibilities of
the Department of Homeland Security
Subsection (a) authorizes an agriculture security program
within the Department to include advising and coordinating with
federal, state, local, regional, and tribal homeland security
officials regarding preparedness, detection, prevention, and
mitigation of an agroterrorist act and executing the
agriculture security responsibilities of the Secretary
described in Homeland Security Presidential Directive 7
(December 17, 2003) and Homeland Security Presidential
Directive 9 (February 3, 2004).
Subsection (b) tasks the Secretary of Homeland Security
with the following responsibilities under the agriculture
security program: organizing communication among federal, state
and local emergency response providers for agricultural
emergencies; ensuring that emergency response providers execute
their roles in the event of an agroterrorist attack; ensuring
that emergency response providers have the necessary
information and resources regarding an agroterrorism;
developing information sharing procedures among emergency
response providers; working with the Department of
Transportation to developing guidelines for the transportation
of agricultural products in response to an agricultural
disease; coordinating with the Environmental Protection Agency
about the potential environmental impact of an agricultural
disease; coordinating with the Department of Agriculture
regarding recognizing agricultural products from suspected
locations; coordinating with Department of State to establish
mutual assistance agreements with other countries; ensuring
state, local, and regional response plans include an
agriculture security component; and establishing a taskforce of
state and local homeland security officials to identify best
agriculture security practices and disseminate the best
practices to all states.
Subsection (c) creates a grant program in the Office of
State and Local Government Coordination and Preparedness to
facilitate the participation of agriculture specialists in
agricultural security emergency preparedness. This grant
program is intended to be used for events such as conferences
and exercises that will bring emergency management and animal
and plant healthcare officials together for planning and
preparedness purposes.
(b) This subsection makes technical and conforming
amendments.
V. ESTIMATED COST OF LEGISLATION
S. 572--Homeland Security Food and Agriculture Act of 2005
S. 527 would amend the Homeland Security Act to require the
Department of Homeland Security (DHS) to establish a program to
protect the agriculture industry and the nation's food supply
from terrorist acts. In addition, the legislation would
authorize the appropriation of $5 million in fiscal year 2006
for grants to state and local animal health care officials.
CBO estimates that implementing S. 572 would cost $8
million in 2006 and $53 million over the 2006-2010 period,
assuming appropriation of the necessary amounts. Enacting the
legislation would not affect direct spending or revenues.
S. 572 contains no intergovernmental or private-sector
mandates as defined in the Unfunded Mandates Reform Act (UMRA)
and would impose no costs on state, local, or tribal
governments. Any costs incurred by these governments to
participate in the activities authorized by this bill would be
incurred voluntarily.
Estimated cost to the Federal Government: The estimated
budgetary impact of S. 572 is shown in the following table. The
cost of this legislation falls within budget function 800
(general government).
------------------------------------------------------------------------
By fiscal year, in millions of
dollars--
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2006 2007 2008 2009 2010
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CHANGES IN SPENDING SUBJECT TO APPROPRIATION
Establish Food Supply Protection
Program:
Estimated Authorization 6 9 12 12 12
Level......................
Estimated Outlays........... 5 8 11 12 12
Local Community Emergency
Planning:
Authorization Level......... 5 0 0 0 0
Estimated Outlays........... 3 2 0 0 0
Total Changes:
Estimated Authorization 11 9 12 12 12
Level..................
Estimated Outlays....... 8 10 11 12 12
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Basis of estimate: For this estimate, CBO assumes that the
bill will be enacted early in fiscal year 2006 and that
spending will follow historical patterns for similar programs.
DHS currently has a Directorate for Preparedness that
identifies and assesses current and future threats to the
United States. According to that office, it is working to
coordinate the protection of the agriculture industry and food
supply throughout the United States.
S. 572 would codify and expand the current duties of the
Directorate for Preparedness. The directorate would be
responsible for communicating and coordinating among federal,
state, and local emergency response providers regarding threats
to the agriculture industry and food supply, for ensuring that
state and local officials have access to information on
agricultural terrorism, and for planning to prevent and respond
to food and agriculture emergencies. Based on information from
DHS, CBO estimates that the office would need about $12 million
a year for additional staff to carry out its additional
responsibilities under S. 572. CBO expects that the office
would steadily expand its budget and staff over the next three
years before it reached that level of effort. We estimate that
the added duties for the directorate would cost $48 million
over the 2006-2010 period, assuming appropriation of the
necessary funds.
The legislation also would authorize the appropriation of
$5 million for grants to state and local animal care officials
to participate in community emergency planning efforts. CBO
estimates that implementing the grant program would cost $5
million over the 2006-2007 period.
Intergovernmental and private-sector impact: S. 572
contains no intergovernmental or private-sector mandates as
defined in UMRA and would impose no costs on state, local, or
tribal governments. Any costs incurred by these governments to
participate in the activities authorized by this bill would be
incurred voluntarily.
Estimate prepared by: Federal Costs: Matthew Pickford;
Impact on State, Local, and Tribal Governments: Marjorie
Miller; Impact on the Private Sector: Paige Piper/Bach.
Estimate approved by: Peter H. Fontaine, Deputy Assistant
Director for Budget Analysis.
VI. EVALUATION OF REGULATORY IMPACT
Pursuant to the requirements of paragraph 11(b) of rule
XXVI of the Standing Rules of the Senate, the Committee has
considered the regulatory impact of this bill. CBO states that
there are no intergovernmental or private-sector mandates as
defined in the Unfunded Mandates Reform Act and no costs on
state, local, or tribal governments. The legislation contains
no other regulatory impact.
VII. CHANGES IN EXISTING LAW
In compliance with paragraph 12 of rule XXVI of the
Standing Rules of the Senate, S. 572 adds entirely new language
and, therefore does not change existing law.