[House Hearing, 109 Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
THE HOMELAND SECURITY MISSIONS
OF THE POST-9/11 COAST GUARD
=======================================================================
HEARING
before the
SUBCOMMITTEE ON ECONOMIC
SECURITY, INFRASTRUCTURE
PROTECTION, AND CYBERSECURITY
of the
COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND SECURITY
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
ONE HUNDRED NINTH CONGRESS
FIRST SESSION
__________
JUNE 8, 2005
__________
Serial No. 109-18
__________
Printed for the use of the Committee on Homeland Security
Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.gpoaccess.gov/congress/
index.html
__________
U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE
23-744 WASHINGTON : 2005
_____________________________________________________________________________
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Committee on Homeland Security
Christopher Cox, California, Chairman
Don Young, Alaska Bennie G. Thompson, Mississippi
Lamar S. Smith, Texas Loretta Sanchez, California
Curt Weldon, Pennsylvania, Vice Edward J. Markey, Massachusetts
Chairman Norman D. Dicks, Washington
Christopher Shays, Connecticut Jane Harman, California
Peter T. King, New York Peter A. DeFazio, Oregon
John Linder, Georgia Nita M. Lowey, New York
Mark E. Souder, Indiana Eleanor Holmes Norton, District of
Tom Davis, Virginia Columbia
Daniel E. Lungren, California Zoe Lofgren, California
Jim Gibbons, Nevada Sheila Jackson-Lee, Texas
Rob Simmons, Connecticut Bill Pascrell, Jr., New Jersey
Mike Rogers, Alabama Donna M. Christensen, U.S. Virgin
Stevan Pearce, New Mexico Islands
Katherine Harris, Florida Bob Etheridge, North Carolina
Bobby Jindal, Louisiana James R. Langevin, Rhode Island
Dave G. Reichert, Washington Kendrick B. Meek, Florida
Michael McCaul, Texas
Charlie Dent, Pennsylvania
Subcommittee on Economic Security, Infrastructure Protection, and
Cybersecurity
Daniel E. Lungren, California, Chairman
Don Young, Alaska Loretta Sanchez, California
Lamar S. Smith, Texas Edward J. Markey, Massachusetts
John Linder, Georgia Norman D. Dicks, Washington
Mark E. Souder, Indiana Peter A. DeFazio, Oregon
Tom Davis, Virginia Zoe Lofgren, California
Mike Rogers, Alabama Sheila Jackson-Lee, Texas
Stevan Pearce, New Mexico Bill Pascrell, Jr., New Jersey
Katherine Harris, Florida James R. Langevin, Rhode Island
Bobby Jindal, Louisiana Bennie G. Thompson, Mississippi
Christopher Cox, California (Ex (Ex Officio)
Officio)
(II)
C O N T E N T S
----------
Page
STATEMENTS
The Honorable Daniel E. Lungren, a Representative in Congress
From the State of California, and Chairman, Subcommittee on
Economic Security, Infrastructure Protection and Cybersecurity:
Oral Statement................................................. 1
Prepared Statement............................................. 2
The Honorable Loretta Sanchez, a Representative in Congress From
the State of California, and Ranking Member, Subcommittee on
Economic Security, Infrastructure Protection and Cybersecurity. 3
The Honorable Christopher Cox, a Representative in Congress From
the State of California, and Chairman, Committee on Homeland
Security:
Oral Statement................................................. 6
Prepared Statement............................................. 7
The Honorable Bennie G. Thompson, a Representative in Congress
From the State of Mississippi, and Ranking Member, Committee on
Homeland Security.............................................. 5
The Honorable Donna Christensen, a Representative in Congress
From the U.S. Virgin Islands................................... 33
The Honorable Peter A. DeFazio, a Representative in Congress From
the State of Oregon............................................ 28
The Honorable Norman D. Dicks, a Representative in Congress From
the State of Washington........................................ 25
The Honorable James R. Langevin, a Representative in Congress
From the State of Rhode Island................................. 31
The Honorable John Linder, a Representative in Congress From the
State of Georgia............................................... 26
The Honorable Bill Pascrell, Jr., a Representative in Congress
From the State of Texas........................................ 29
The Honorable Don Young, a Representative in Congress From the
State of Alaska
Oral Statement................................................. 4
Prepared Statement............................................. 4
WITNESS
Admiral Thomas Collins, Commandant, United States Coast Guard,
Department of Homeland Security
Oral Statement................................................. 8
Prepared Statement............................................. 10
APPENDIX
Questions Submitted for the Record............................... 45
Rear Adm. Patrick M. Stillman, USCG, Oversight ad Management of
the U.S. Coast Guard's, Integrated Deepwater System............ 46
THE HOMELAND SECURITY MISSIONS OF THE POST-9/11 COAST GUARD
----------
Wednesday, June 8, 2005
House of Representatives,
Subcommittee on Economic Security,
Infrastructure Protection, and Cybersecurity,
Committee on Homeland Security,
Washington, DC.
The subcommittee met, pursuant to call, at 2:07 p.m., in
Room 2212, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Dan Lungren
[chairman of the subcommittee] presiding.
Present: Representatives Lungren, Linder, Rogers, Pearce,
Cox (Ex Officio), Sanchez, Dicks, DeFazio, Pascrell, Langevin,
and Thompson (Ex Officio).
Also Present: Representative Christensen.
Mr. Lungren. The Committee on Homeland Security
Subcommittee on Economic Security, Infrastructure Protection,
and Cybersecurity will come to order.
The subcommittee today is meeting to hear testimony on the
post-9/11 security missions of the United States Coast Guard.
Today we have the pleasure for hearing from Admiral Collins,
the Commandant of the United States Coast Guard, as we explore
the Homeland Security missions of the post-9/11 Coast Guard. I
want to start by thanking the commandant for his testimony and
appearance before us today, which I understand is the first
before the Homeland Security Committee.
I expect that we will be working together on many issues in
the years ahead as the committee vigorously exercised
jurisdiction over border and port security activities in which
the Coast Guard plays a fundamental and critical role.
Our hearing today will review how the implementation of the
Coast Guard's integrated Deepwater system is considered to
enhance our Nation's port judge minority capabilities. We will
also exam how this long-term complex and costly project, which
was begun before the terrorist attacks on the USS Cole and as
of 9/11, has been revised by the Coast Guard to appropriately
account for such events and expanded Homeland Security missions
in this unique agency.
As the lead Federal agency for maritime security, the Coast
Guard has the awesome task of protecting our waterways and
securing our Nation's ports. For over 200 years the Coast Guard
has patrolled and protected our coastlines, which total over
the 95,000 miles. The Coast Guard also plays a key role in
pushing our borders out to prevent terrorists and terrorist
weapons from arriving at our shores. The committee will be
particularly interested in the details as to how the Coast
Guard manages both these blue and brown-water missions.
The Coast Guard implements its acquisition strategy--or as
the Coast Guard implements its acquisition strategy for the
Deepwater program, this committee will pay close attention to
how well these acquisitions enhance the maritime and port
security capabilities of the Coast Guard and support the
overall mission of the Department of Homeland Security.
It is equally important that the Coast Guard's acquisition
strategy take into account the availability and capabilities of
the other DHS, Federal, State and local air and marine assets
operating in the port and coastal security environment, as well
as the need for greater interoperability and coordination
between those assets and those of the Coast Guard. I am also
interested in the flow of information.
How does the Coast Guard receive, analyze and act on
intelligence? How does the Coast Guard work with State and
local law enforcement in the maritime sector who are both users
and major collectors of valuable information?
I look forward to the insights that Admiral Collins will
provide on these topics today.
Prepared Opening Statement of the Honorable Daniel E. Lungren
Today, the Subcommittee will hear from Admiral Collins, the
Commandant of the United States Coast Guard, as we explore the homeland
security missions of the post-9/11 Coast Guard. I want to start by
thanking the Commandant for his testimony and appearance before us
today, which I understand is your first before the Homeland Security
Committee. I expect that we will be working together on many issues in
the years ahead, as the Committee vigorously exercises its jurisdiction
over border and port security--activities in which the Coast Guard
plays a fundamental and critical role.
Our hearing today will review how the implementation of the Coast
Guard's Integrated Deepwater System can serve to enhance our Nation's
port and maritime security capabilities. We also will examine how this
long-term, complex, and costly project--which was begun before the
terrorist attacks on the USS Cole and of 9/11--has been revised by the
Coast Guard to appropriately account for such events, and the new and
expanded homeland security missions of this unique agency.
As the lead Federal agency for maritime security, the Coast Guard
has the awesome task of protecting our waterways and securing our
Nation's ports. For over 200 years, the Coast Guard has patrolled and
protected our coastlines, which total over 95,000 miles. The Coast
Guard also plays a key role in pushing our borders out to prevent
terrorists and terrorist weapons from arriving at U.S. shores. The
Committee will be particularly interested in the details as to how the
Coast Guard manages both these blue--and brown-water missions.
As the Coast Guard implements its acquisition strategy for the
Deepwater program, this Committee will pay close attention to how well
these acquisitions enhance the maritime and port security capabilities
of the Coast Guard, and support the overall mission of the Department
of Homeland Security.
It also is critically important that the Coast Guard's acquisition
strategy take into account the availability and capabilities of other
DHS, Federal, state, and local air and marine assets operating in the
port and coastal security environment, as well as the need for greater
interoperability and coordination between these assets and those of the
Coast Guard.
I am also very interested in the flow of information. How does the
Coast Guard receive, analyze, and act on intelligence? How does the
Coast Guard work with state and local law enforcement in the maritime
sector, who are both users and major collectors of valuable
information?
I look forward to the insight that Admiral Collins will provide on
these topics today.
I will now recognize the Ranking Member for any opening statement
she may wish to make at this time.
I would now recognize the ranking member from California
for any opening statement she may wish to make at this time.
Ms. Sanchez. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank you,
Admiral, for being before us. I have to tell you that after
having been on this committee and the Select Committee--really,
since we set this up--I have been very critical of the
Department of Homeland Security and many of the measures that
haven't been taken, that haven't been done and implemented with
respect to the security of America and Americans. But I have to
say that one of the areas where I am pretty happy is all the
work that the Coast Guard has done.
Admiral Collins. Thank you.
Ms. Sanchez. So I want to commend you really for much of
the work. There is a lot more to be done. I want to let you
know what pieces I would like to hear from you today. But every
time that I go to the Port of L.A. or the Port of Long Beach or
the San Francisco ports, I am just amazed at how thoughtful the
Coast Guard is with respect to what has to be done and what it
has been able to do.
I think its incredibly important that we protect the ports.
As you know, 95 percent of everything of the trade that moves
from nonNorth America comes through our port system. I think
more than anything, the Coast Guard understands what an attack
would look like and the result of loss of life, and, more
importantly, as we saw on the shutdown we had a couple of years
ago in the Long Beach, Los Angeles area, the economic loss that
this country would suffer. So I commend you for many of the
things that you have done.
There are some items that I think are critical items that
still need to be completed, and I hope that you will discuss
them with us today. A national maritime security strategy, the
long--and short-range vessel tracking system, a comprehensive
maritime intelligence plan and the response plan for a maritime
security incident.
I understand that the Homeland Security Presidential
Directive 13 is supposed to address some of these requirements.
So I would like to hear from you when these items will be
completed, especially with respect to the vessel tracking
requirement.
I am also concerned about the Deepwater program. Many of us
have advocated acceleration of Deepwater. We are concerned with
the two GAO reports issued within the last year that state the
management challenges--because this really is a big job--
associated with that program.
Most of all, we want the men and women of the Coast Guard
to have the best equipment available to do their jobs, but we
also have to insure that Deepwater is being properly managed so
that those resources can reach the field in a timely and cost
efficient manner. I would love to get some assurances to you as
to how that all is moving along.
Again, I welcome you and thank you for being before us
today.
Mr. Lungren. I thank the gentlelady. Before I recognize the
chairman of the full committee and the ranking member of the
full committee, I would like to ask unanimous consent to permit
the chairman of Transportation and Infrastructure Committee,
who is also a member of this panel, to make a brief opening
statement.
Mr. Young. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. It will be brief. I
will, for the record, submit my written statement and again
welcome you, Commandant. I have worked with the Coast Guard, I
know longer than anybody on this committee. It has been my
prime objective, ever since the Merchant Marine Committee was
existing and then we lost control of that and we went to the
Transportation Committee.
I want to thank you. One of the reasons I am now chairman
of that committee is because of the Coast Guard. You have
played a very vital role. I have watched all the missions we
have charged the Coast Guard with, prior to 9/11, the oil
pollution, drug interdiction, immigration problems, all new
charges that we didn't fund. Happily, the President is
beginning to fund the program and this Congress will do also.
My main interest from you, Commandant, is, of course, the
Deepwater program. Again, you know my interest in that. I have
read your testimony already, and I see that you are addressing
that.
The second interest is one that means a great deal to me,
and I think you recognize, as I mention all along, there was a
mass hysteria to try to have security within our ports, and I
argued all along you cannot secure a port. You have to secure
the port of origin of what comes into our ports to make sure it
is safe. That is the way we make our ports safe, and I see you
have addressed that internationally.
We have some fine agreements. I hope you pursue that with
the international maritime group so we can affect our commerce.
We have to keep our commerce flowing and yes, have security,
but the way you gain that is to make sure that those countries
that import to us, as we accept those imports, everything that
comes into the ports is secured.
Mr. Chairman, I look forward to the Commandant's testimony
and I yield back the balance of my time.
[The information follows:]
The Prepared Statement of the Honorable Don Young, a Representative in
Congress From the State of Alaska
I am pleased to see the Commandant again this morning.
As the other members of the committee know, I have worked with the
Coast Guard to improve the safety and security of Maritime Commerce and
the boating public as the chairman of the Transportation and
Infrastructure Committee, which continues to have jurisdiction over the
service.
As you know, I am a strong supporter of the Coast Guard.
The service is a multi-mission agency that is responsible for many
important missions including search and rescue, marine safety, the
licensing and documentation of mariners, maritime law enforcement, and
oil pollution prevention and response.
In addition to these many traditional missions, the Coast Guard has
been designated as the lead federal agency for protecting Maritime
Homeland Security.
I look forward to hearing the Commandant explain how the homeland
security mission is being carried out in concert with the service's
other important historic missions.
Over the years that I have been in Congress several Coast Guard
missions have generated widespread public interest. Oil pollution
response, migrant interdiction, and drug interdiction have all at one
time or the other captured the public's attention.
Fortunately, those of us who work frequently with the Coast Guard
have continued to support all of the service's many missions.
It is the breadth of coast guardsmen's training, and the multi-
mission capabilities of the service's personnel, ship and planes that
give the United States a remarkably safe and economically productive
maritime domain.
I commend the chairman for holding this hearing today, and I look
forward to the Commandant's testimony.
Mr. Lungren. I thank the gentleman. The Chair will now
recognize the ranking member of the full committee, the
gentleman from Mississippi, Mr. Thompson, for any statement
that he may have.
Mr. Thompson. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman, Admiral
Collins, welcome to the committee.
Admiral Collins. Thank you.
Mr. Thompson. I am sure you will be very positive while you
are here. I would like to thank Ms. Sanchez also and join her
in supporting the men and women of the U.S. Coast Guard. As a
ranking member of the House Homeland Security Committee, I
believe this committee must provide the Coast Guard with the
support it needs to keep America's port and coast lines safe
and secure.
Our homeland security strategy depends on the security of
our ports and waterways as our ports are dependent on securing
a Coast Guard that is robust, dynamic and fully capable of
performing a diverse set of missions.
Since the tragic events of September 11th, the men and
women of the U.S. Coast Guard have been on the front lines of
the war against terror. As the Department of Homeland
Security's principal agency for maritime security, the Coast
Guard continues to play a lead role in securing the Nation's
95,000 miles of coastline and 361 ports. This includes boarding
high-interest vessels and assessing security at our ports.
One of my primary concerns is whether the Coast Guard has
the resources it needs to perform its many, many missions. I
asked the same question at a field hearing we held recently in
Vicksburg, Mississippi about these Coast Guard resources.
At that time, I was told by Admiral Duncan that resources
were sufficient. But I have had a hard time completely
believing, when I see the activities put on the Coast Guard
since 9/11, and would love to hear your position from that,
Admiral. I have had concerns about the Deepwater program. Make
no mistake, I am a strong supporter of the program. I supported
the authorization of the $1.1 billion for Deepwater last year
as a conferee on the 2004 Coast Guard authorization bill.
But the management challenges raised by GAO are
considerable, and I hope that your testimony will address some
of these problems. We simply cannot allow poor management to
result in squandered resources and delays in the implementation
of important Homeland Security projects such as Deepwater.
Finally, I would like to hear the steps taken by the Coast
Guard to protect our inland waterways. As you know, the
Mississippi River borders the entire western half of my
district, and obviously it is absolutely a priority for a lot
of us. While the inland ports do not receive attention the
coastal ports do, they are just as vulnerable and a terrorist
attack will cause significant loss of life and economic damage.
As you know, the Coast Guard is considered a very valuable
piece of the Homeland Security proposal. In fact, some might
even call the Coast Guard their king. Given the important work
you folks do, we certainly understand why. Admiral Collins,
welcome. I look forward to your testimony.
Admiral Collins. Thank you, sir.
Mr. Lungren. The Chair now recognizes the chairman of the
full committee, the gentleman from California, Mr. Cox for any
statement he may have.
Mr. Cox. Thank you very much, Chairman Lungren, Ranking
Member Sanchez, for putting this hearing together today, and
especially, Admiral Collins, thank you very much for appearing
here today. As you know this committee is strongly supportive
of the Coast Guard and its mission. It has been our observation
over the last several years, both as the Permanent Committee
and as the Select Committee, that the Coast Guard, among the
elements that were contributed to this new cabinet department
at the Department of Homeland Security, is really the crown
jewel, and your mission, even before September 11th, even
before the creation of the Department of Homeland Security,
lined up very nicely with what became the mission, the national
security mission, of what is now the third largest cabinet
department.
To put today's hearing in proper context to understand the
daunting challenges of Homeland Security when it comes to such
issues as container shipping, it is important to note at the
outset that America is connected to the rest of the world, to
the global economy, primarily through the maritime sector.
More than 95 percent of our overseas trade arrives in the
United States by ship. That is about 8,000 ships carrying
multinational crews and cargo from around the globe, making
more than 51,000 U.S. port calls every year. More than 7
million containers are coming into this country every year.
This maritime environment is amazingly complex, and the
government regulatory structure that has gone grown up to deal
with it is likewise amazingly complex, even excluding State and
local regulations. The number of Federal regulatory agencies
responsible for dealing with various aspects of our maritime
security is daunting.
There are separate regulatory systems to monitor discrete
aspects of maritime activity from tracking and targeting high-
risk vessels and crews, to screening the cargo on board those
vessels and to vetting passengers aboard the vessel. There is
often reasonable justification for this kind of division of
responsibilities.
But these divisions can also provide opportunities for our
enemies. We know from experience that terrorists seeking to
harm America study our systems and seek to exploit gaps in
those systems. It is for this reason that the creation of the
Department of Homeland Security brought under one roof for the
first time, the major elements of our maritime security system.
The Coast Guard has been given lead responsibility to insure
the seamless execution of this critical mission.
What is required is a level of coordination and information
sharing that simply didn't exist prior to September 11, 2001.
We now know that our national ability to detect potential
threats from the maritime arena request be significantly
improved through effective sharing of information. With such
advance information on inbound ships, and on cargo, crews and
passengers, border control agencies will be better able to
identify those that require more thorough security screening,
exploiting available information to discern threats and
concentrating resources to stop them, is at the heart of the
maritime domain awareness concept, and it is the key to
effective risk management.
In May of last year, the Select Committee on Homeland
Security held a hearing examining the coordination of maritime
security responsibilities and operations among DHS agencies.
This included a look at the various air and maritime
acquisition plans within the Department.
One year later, this hearing today will provide a status
update on the level of improved coordination. In particular, we
will exam how various initiatives, such as the C4ISR program,
joint harbor operation centers and other similar activities are
working to bridge the interoperability gap between the various
maritime and port security agencies within DHS and between
these agencies and State and local law enforcement and port
authorities across the country. We will also examine the
cornerstone of the Coast Guard's long-term strategy for
carrying out both its Homeland Security and nonHomeland
Security security missions, the integrated Deepwater system.
This quarter-century long acquisition project with costs
estimated to range from $19 billion to $24 billion will provide
a complete modernization of Coast Guard assets. Deepwater,
which was developed in the late 1990s, had to be revised to
accommodate the Coast Guard's new and enhanced Homeland
Security responsibilities post-9/11. The revised plan was
delivered to Congress at the end of last month. This hearing
will kick off the committee's oversight of whether these
revisions to Deepwater adequately account and provide for the
Coast Guard's Homeland Security requirements.
In 2003, the Journal of Homeland Security published an
interview with Admiral Collins in which he stressed that the
Coast Guard accomplishes its various missions through capacity,
capability and partnerships. Today's hearing will provide us
with an opportunity to explore each of these areas as part of
our broader examination of the Coast Guard's authorization
needs in its Homeland Security mission areas.
Again, thank you, Mr. Chairman for holding this hearing. I
look forward to the Commandant's testimony and an opportunity
to further explore these issues.
[The information follows:]
prepared Opening Statement of the Honorable Christopher Cox
Thank you, Chairman Lungren, and welcome, Admiral Collins. To put
today's hearing in the proper context, it is important to note, at the
outset, that America is connected to the global economy primarily
through the maritime sector. More than 95 percent of overseas foreign
trade (and 100 percent of certain commodities, such as foreign oil)
arrives in the U.S. by ship. Approximately 8,000 ships carrying
multinational crews and cargo from around the globe make more than
51,000 U.S. port calls each year. More than 7 million containers enter
the country annually.
This complex maritime environment has had similarly complex
governmental regulation. Even excluding state and local government
involvement, there are several different Federal agencies utilizing
separate systems to monitor discrete aspects of maritime activity--from
tracking and targeting high-risk vessels and crews, to screening the
cargo on board those vessels, to vetting passengers aboard such
vessels.
While there is often reasonable justification for division of
responsibility, such divisions can also provide opportunities for our
enemies--whom we know from experience study our systems and seek to
exploit the gaps in such systems. The creation of the Department of
Homeland Security brought under one roof, for the first time, the major
elements of our maritime security system, and the Coast Guard has been
given lead responsibility to ensure the seamless execution of this
critical mission.
Such execution requires a level of coordination and information
sharing that simply did not exist prior to September 11, 2001. We now
know that our national ability to detect potential threats from the
maritime arena can be significantly improved through effective sharing
and use of information. With sufficient advance information on inbound
ships, cargo, crews, and passengers, border control agencies will be
better able to identify those that require more thorough security
screening. Exploiting available information to discern threats and
concentrate resources to stop them is at the heart of the maritime
domain awareness concept, and the key to effective risk management.
In May of last year, the Select Committee held a hearing examining
the coordination of maritime security responsibilities and operations
among DHS agencies, including the various air and marine acquisition
plans within the Department. One year later, this hearing will provide
a status update on the level of improved coordination. In particular,
we will examine how various initiatives such as the C4ISR program
(which stands for Command, Control, Communication, Computer,
Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance), joint harbor
operations centers, and other similar activities are working to bridge
the interoperability gap between the various maritime and port security
agencies within DHS, and between such agencies and state and local law
enforcement and port authorities across the country.
We also will examine the cornerstone of the Coast Guard's long-term
strategy for carrying out both its homeland and non-homeland security
missions--the Integrated Deepwater System. This 20-25 year acquisition
project with costs ranging from $19 billion to $24 billion will provide
a complete modernization of Coast Guard assets. Deepwater, which was
developed in the late 1990s, had to be revised to accommodate the Coast
Guard's new and enhanced homeland security responsibilities post-9/11.
The revised plan was delivered to Congress at the end of last month,
and this hearing will kick off the Committee's oversight of whether
these revisions to Deepwater adequately account and provide for the
Coast Guard's homeland security requirements.
In 2003, the Journal of Homeland Security published an interview
with Admiral Collins in which he stressed that the Coast Guard
``accomplishes its various missions through capacity, capability and
partnerships.'' Today's hearing will provide us with an opportunity to
explore each of these areas, as part of our broader examination of the
Coast Guard's authorization needs in its homeland security mission
areas.
Again, thank you Mr. Chairman for holding this hearing. I look
forward to the Commandant's testimony and an opportunity to further
explore these issues.
Mr. Lungren. I thank the gentleman for his statement. Other
members of the committee are reminded that opening statements
may be submitted for the record. We are pleased to have a
distinguished witness as our only witness before us today on
this important topic. It is my pleasure as the Chair to
recognize Admiral Thomas Collins, the Commandant of the United
States Coast Guard to testify.
Welcome.
STATEMENT OF ADMIRAL THOMAS COLLINS, COMMANDANT, UNITED STATES
COAST GUARD, DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY
Admiral Collins. Well, thank you very much, Mr. Chairman,
good afternoon to you and to distinguished members of this
committee. It is an honor and a pleasure to be here with you to
discuss how the Coast Guard is contributing to maritime
security of the United States.
Quite simply, Mr. Chairman, the bottom line is America, the
maritime sector is safer today than it was in 2001. We still
have a ways to go. But we have made incredible progress, from
my perspective, to enhance the maritime security posture
implementing programs and practices that are already paying
substantial dividends in the way of risk mitigation, risk
mitigation.
Our approach has been to draw upon and enhance Coast Guard
strength first as an armed force; second as a law enforcement
agency, as a first responder and a regulator. When you add up
those things, that makes us a unique agency in this government.
The other important ingredient is we pursue risk
mitigation, to partner aggressively, both domestically and
internationally so it mitigates security risk on this global
system, as Congressman Young alluded to.
It is a heavy dose of preemption that characterizes our
approach, being preemptive and not static in our approach the
maritime. We developed a strategy that has four parts. One, as
you have already referred to, to enhance the concept we call
maritime domain awareness, a very, very important part of this
strategy. The second to create and oversee a maritime security
regime, one that did not exist prior to 9/11.
Third, to increase our operation presence, to be persistent
for deterrence and response and then overall, improve our
response posture in the event an incident does occur. There are
a number of very comprehensive initiatives that we have taken
in each one of these four buckets, four categories. Many are
detailed in my written statement. If you will permit me, I will
highlight just a select few to give you a flavor for our areas
of emphasis.
Since 9/11, the central element of our strategy requires
increasing knowledge of our vulnerabilities, our threats and
targets of interest. It depends on timely information sharing,
partnering with others, both at home and abroad, building on
current international cooperative security events and preparing
to respond quickly to future events.
For example, since 9/11 we have made changes to improve our
operational intelligence by building out our intelligence
program, by increasing our advance notice of arrival from 24
hours to a minimum of 96 hours for all foreign vessels and
expanded the type and the amount of information required. This
information and the vetting of this information is critical to
assess inbound risk.
We have built a robust maritime security regime predicated
on the maritime Transportation Security Act of 2002 and the
International Ship and Port Security Code or ISPSC code that
was pushed through the International Maritime Organization. We
have reviewed and approved thousands of vessel facility
security plans an, insured compliance through literally
thousands of boarding and inspections of foreign vessels. We
have set up 13 new deployable maritime security teams, and we
are full partners in the foreign intelligence community and
have operationalized this in 30 field intelligence port units
around the country.
We are realigning and integrating our field structure--that
is where security gets delivered--into single multimission
commands called sectors across the country and are moving ahead
on critical command and control technologies like Rescue 21 and
Command 2010 to improve our operational effectiveness.
Overall, we have made, I think, considerable progress in
implementing our maritime Homeland Security strategy in the
four main areas that I talked about. We will continue efforts
to close perceived security gaps by increasing our capabilities
and our capacity to deal with those gaps.
In a response to HSPD 13, the Homeland Security
Presidential Directive 13 and a counterpart, National Security
Directive 41 are the same document, cosponsored by those two
White House bodies. We are very enthused as a maritime
organization, very enthused about our current efforts,
interagency efforts to develop a comprehensive, national
interagency strategy covering a broad range of maritime
security issues and functions. Hopefully you will see the
results of those labors this summer.
I should note that the Coast Guard's inventory of
capabilities and capacities to address the full range of our
missions is critical to mitigating security risks now and into
the future.
As already mentioned by committee members, Deepwater is the
enduring solution to that capacity and capability issue to
mitigate risk. It is the key for us to develop the proper level
of readiness and to meet our missions across the board. They
are essential to providing the necessary capabilities to secure
our borders, to fight the war on terror and meet the full range
of the missions of search and rescue and beyond.
The President's fiscal year 2006 budget presses forward
each element of our maritime security strategy. It does move
the ball along in maritime domain awareness, it furthers our
efforts to tighten security, develop and to tighten the
security regime. It increases our operational presence and
improves our response posture.
So I think with this budget, in support of this budget, we
will continue to push ahead aggressively across this
challenging area.
I thank you very much for the opportunity to testify before
you today. I will be happy to take any questions that you may
have, Mr. Chairman, and your committee members.
[The statement of Admiral Collins follows:]
Prepared Statement of the Admiral Thomas H. Collins
Good afternoon Mr. Chairman and distinguished members of the
Committee. It is a pleasure to appear before you today to discuss the
Coast Guard's role in homeland security, and specifically maritime
homeland security.
The Coast Guard is a military, multi-mission, maritime service. It
is those core elements of the service's character coupled with its
broad statutory authorities, membership in the Intelligence Community,
command and control structure, and extensive experience conducting
maritime operations that uniquely equip the Coast Guard to conduct
maritime homeland security missions. For homeland security, the Coast
Guard serves as (1) the lead Federal agency for Maritime Homeland
Security; (2) the Federal Maritime Security Coordinator in U.S. ports
as designated by the Maritime Transportation Security Act (MTSA) of
2002; and (3) as a supporting or supported commander for military
operations conducted under Title 10. These and other critical roles
have imparted a tremendous challenge on Coast Guard men and women and I
would be remiss without remarking on their many accomplishments since
September 11, 2001. For example:
Before 9/11 we had no mandatory ship-tracking
requirement; now we have forged an international agreement to
accelerate the requirement for Automatic Identification System
(AIS) capability. It went into effect in December 2004.
Simultaneously, we have initiated a major acquisition project
for AIS. It has allowed us to deploy immediate capability
including AIS shore stations in VTS ports, outfitting NOAA
buoys offshore, and testing AIS receiving capability from a
low-flying satellite.
Before 9/11 we had no formal international or domestic
maritime security regime for ports, port facilities, and
ships--with the exception of cruise ships. Partnering with
domestic and international stakeholders, we now have both a
comprehensive domestic security regime and an international
security convention in place. Both have been in force since
July 1, 2004.
Before 9/11 we were shorthanded and could not have met
mission requirements without our Reserves and Auxiliary. While
our Reserve and Auxiliary forces continue to make vital
contributions, since 9/11 we have:
o Established 13 new Maritime Safety and Security
Teams,
o Deployed over 80 new small boats (RB-S) and boat
crews,
o Provided radiation detection capabilities to our
boarding teams,
o Deployed field intelligence support teams to better
collect and disseminate maritime threat information,
o Acquired fifteen 87-foot Coastal Patrol boats four
179-foot coastal patrol craft to increase operational
presence in our ports.
Before 9/11 our prevention, protection, and response
activities were coordinated by multiple commands in a single
geographic location. Since 9/11, we have begun establishing
Sector commands to streamline our command-and-control
structure, provide unity of command, and offer one-stop
shopping for port stakeholders. It is an organization re-
alignment that will have long term positive impacts on our
response and recovery posture.
Looking at their accomplishments, it is clear that Coast Guard men
and women continue rising to the challenge and delivering tangible and
important results across all Coast Guard mission-programs. No amount of
new technology or capability enhances security more than the daily
dedication of our personnel. They are the indispensable link in any
strategy and I am continually impressed by their ingenuity, courage,
and dedication.
The Coast Guard has responded to a broad and substantial level of
maritime risk with a comprehensive maritime security strategy that
guides our operational and resource planning. We have made tremendous
progress in a short period of time. Much of our success to date is a
direct result of the strong support we have enjoyed from Congress.
Through the passage of MTSA and subsequent laws providing for the
resources to implement this new law, Congress enabled the Coast Guard
to successfully institute a maritime security regime that now serves as
a global model for maritime security. But there is clearly more to do
and I echo the consensus of most on this topic; we are safer but not
yet safe. In the years ahead, Coast Guard readiness will continue to be
the key challenge to our ability to deliver results to the American
people.
Maritime Security Risks
The maritime domain is of unparalleled strategic importance. In
terms of threat, vulnerability, and consequence, there are few more
valuable and vulnerable targets than the global maritime transportation
system. I stress the words global and system here because it is
critical to understand the broad and diverse nature of the maritime
domain in order to adequately confront the threats. Increasingly, the
maritime security of the United States depends as much on international
cooperation and partnerships as it does on our ability to effect
security enhancements within areas of exclusive U.S. jurisdiction;
areas which by comparison make up only a small fraction of this global
system.
Threat: While the 9/11 Commission notes the continuing
threat against our aviation system, it also states that
?opportunities to do harm are as great, or greater, in maritime
or surface transportation.? From smuggling to piracy, suicide
attacks to the threat of weapons of mass destruction, the
threats are many and varied.
Vulnerability: The maritime transportation system
annually accommodates 6.5 million cruise ship passengers,
51,000 port calls by over 7,500 foreign ships, at more than 360
commercial ports spread out over 95,000 miles of coastline. The
vastness of this system and its widespread and diverse critical
infrastructure leave the nation vulnerable to terrorist acts
within our ports, waterways, and coastal zones, as well as
exploitation of maritime commerce as a means of transporting
terrorists and their weapons.
Consequence: Contributing nearly $750 billion to the
U.S. gross domestic product annually and handling 95% of all
overseas trade each year--the value of the U.S. maritime domain
and the consequence of any significant attack cannot be
overstated. Independent analysis has estimated the economic
impact of a forced closure of U.S. ports for a period of only
eight days to have been in excess of $58 billion to the U.S.
economy.
The only way to effectively address and mitigate these risks is
through a layered approach to security. The targets are too many and
infrastructure too diverse to rely solely on efforts within the
geographic confines of U.S. ports. It requires a layered defense
comprising the full range of maritime security operations and measures,
starting overseas and extending to U.S. shores, ports, and internal
waterways. This defense-in-depth will enable the Coast Guard to address
both external and internal threats across the full geographic spectrum
and at multiple points in an attack event chain. Simply put, U.S. port
security cannot start nor end within our own ports.
Maritime Security Objectives and Strategy
The Coast Guard's overarching maritime security objectives are to
prevent attacks in the U.S. maritime domain, protect maritime related
critical infrastructure and key assets, and ensure we're prepared to
respond to, and can expedite recovery from, an attack. These primary
objectives--Prevent, Protect, and Response/Recovery--guide our
operational and resource planning. Underlying each is the need for
Maritime Domain Awareness (MDA), enabled by our ability to collect,
fuse, analyze and disseminate large amounts of maritime data,
information and intelligence in a way that facilitates effective
decision making at every level of command. Preventing terrorist attacks
increasingly depends on ensuring we get the right information, to the
right people, at the right time, and in the right form so that optimal
decisions can be made.
The Coast Guard's Maritime Strategy for Homeland Security is in
direct alignment with the Department of Homeland Security's strategic
goals of Awareness, Prevention, Protection, Response and Recovery, and
is encapsulated in the below four pillars:
(1) Enhance MDA. We seek to increase our awareness and knowledge of
what is happening in the maritime arena, not just here in American
waters, but globally. We need to know which vessels are in operation,
the names of the crews and passengers, and the ship's cargo, especially
those inbound for U.S. ports. MDA is critical to separate the law-
abiding sailor from the anomalous threat. The core of our MDA efforts
revolve around the development and employment of accurate information,
intelligence, and targeting of vessels, cargo, crews and passengers--
and extending this well beyond our traditional maritime boundaries. All
DHS components are working to provide a layered defense through
collaborative efforts with our international partners to counter and
manage security risks long before they reach a U.S. port.
(2) Create and oversee an effective maritime security regime. To
help prevent terrorist attacks we have developed and continue to
improve an effective maritime security regime--both domestically and
internationally. This element of our strategy focuses on both domestic
and international efforts and includes initiatives related to MTSA
implementation, International Maritime Organization regulations such as
the International Ship & Port Facility Security (ISPS) Code, as well as
improving supply chain security and identity security processes.
(3) Increase Operational Presence. We seek to better protect
critical maritime infrastructure and improve our ability to respond to
suspect activities by increasing our operational presence in ports,
coastal zones and beyond . . . to implement a layered security posture,
a ``defense-in-depth''. Our collective efforts to increase operational
presence in ports and coastal zones focus not only on adding more
people, boats and ships to force structures but making the employment
of those resources more effective through the application of
technology, information sharing and intelligence support.
(4) Improve Response and Recovery posture. Finally, we are
improving our ability to respond and aid in recovery if there were an
actual terrorist attack. Understanding the challenge of defending
26,000 miles of navigable waterways and 361 ports against every
conceivable threat at every possible time, we are also aggressively
working to improve our response capabilities and preparedness.
The Coast Guard continues to guide its efforts by implementing
policies, seeking resources, and deploying capabilities through the
lens of the above maritime security strategy. However, continued risk
reduction is contingent upon Coast Guard readiness and capacity.
Without these basic building blocks, the implementation of maritime
security strategies will not be sustainable. It is no surprise then
that readiness and capacity are the focus of my most pressing concerns
in fulfilling maritime security missions.
Maritime Security Challenges
Coast Guard readiness is a product of its authorities,
capabilities, competencies and partnerships. Each provides a tool for
action and no where has this been more important than in the Coast
Guard's response to the current security environment. While each is
critical to success, I will focus today on the authorities and
capabilities the Coast Guard seeks to equip itself with to ensure it is
ready to meet the mission demands of today and tomorrow.
Authorities
The Coast Guard greatly appreciates the tradition of the
Administration supporting and Congress passing a Coast Guard
Authorization Act each year, as has been the case for three consecutive
years. These annual Acts help us keep critical authorities at the
cutting edge, enabling us to respond quickly and effectively to the new
challenges our service faces daily.
On April 12th, we transmitted to the Congress the Administration's
proposed Coast Guard Authorization Act for 2005. The bill contains
sixteen provisions that provide the Coast Guard with important new
authorities, as well as expansions and clarifications of existing
authorities. I ask that you adopt these provisions and would like to
highlight a few of them here today.
Merchant Mariner Credentials
The awful events of September 11th 2001 made clear that our country
must take more care in controlling who is able to secure and use
government-issued forms of identification. The 9/11 Commission report,
noted that the September 11th hijackers obtained and used government-
issued identification cards such as driver's licenses. The Commission
recommended that forms of identification be made more secure. Congress
mandated the development of a biometric transportation security card in
MTSA. The Coast Guard is assisting the Transportation Security
Administration (TSA) with the implementation of this requirement. The
card is known as the Transportation Worker Identification Credential
(TWIC).
Concurrently, the Coast Guard has proposed revisions to the
existing merchant marine document (MMD) requirements. These documents
are, by statute, identification documents, yet they contain virtually
no security features. This, among other reasons, is why, with the
support of the President and Secretary, I have submitted a complete
update of the merchant mariner credentialing statutes. We cannot, and
must not, continue with business as usual in the area of mariner
credentialing. Not when, as this committee is well aware, our ports and
harbors are still vulnerable to terrorist attack. The specter of a
terrorist obtaining and using a merchant mariner credential to access
and attack vital areas of a strategic port is one that is very real.
The changes we have proposed will enable the Department to heighten the
security of all merchant mariner credentials in partnership with the
mariners themselves and the maritime industry. Additionally, the Coast
Guard will work with TSA to ensure the regulations for obtaining the
MMDs are consistent with TWIC to minimize future impacts on mariners
and to ensure mariners undergo appropriate security threat assessments
in accordance with MTSA.
Our proposal enhances the Coast Guard's ability to be flexible and
agile in establishing appropriate criteria and processes for obtaining
merchant mariner credentials and in recovering them from unqualified
holders. Our proposal also updates the mariner credentialing statutes.
The existing merchant mariner credentialing statutes have developed
piecemeal over the last 50 years and have not been comprehensively
updated since 1983, over twenty years ago in a very different world. As
a result, they are unclear, self contradictory and in some cases
obsolete. This proposal would update, clarify, and simplify the
statutes allowing the Coast Guard to better administer the mariner
credentialing program as well as addressing the many changes in the
domestic and international maritime communities, and especially, as I
mentioned above, security concerns post September 11th.
Critical issues the Administration's proposal addresses include:
Authority to conduct background checks to evaluate
mariners for both maritime security and maritime safety
purposes,
Authority to issue a single merchant mariner
credential, including allowing for the merger with the TWIC,
Authority to issue cadet credentials (including to
foreign cadets) for training and educational purposes,
Authority to refuse to issue a merchant mariner
credential to a mariner who is a maritime safety or security
risk, and
Authority to refuse to issue a merchant mariner
credential for one year to a mariner who lies on application.
The suspension and revocation chapter allows for immediate
temporary suspension of a merchant mariner credential where the mariner
is involved in an accident involving death or serious injury or where a
mariner is determined to be a threat to security or safety. Because we
are very concerned with fairness and the rights of merchant mariners,
it also requires a hearing on any temporary suspension within 30 days
of the suspension. The proposal also enhances compliance with the law
by adding significant new civil and criminal penalties for making,
using, or presenting fraudulent credentials.
Other Authorization Priorities
Our proposed bill also includes some seemingly small but critically
important provisions that would enhance our authorities in maritime
homeland security and drug interdiction. These are Extension of Coast
Guard Vessel Anchorage and Movement Authority, which would extend to 12
miles the Coast Guard's authority to enact maritime protection zones
around naval vessels; Enhanced Civil Penalties for Violations of the
Maritime Transportation Security Act (MTSA), which would make each day
of a continuing violation of MTSA maritime security regulations a
separate offense; and Certification of Vessel Nationality in Drug
Smuggling Cases, which would allow the certification of the
nationality, or lack thereof, of interdicted drug smuggling vessels
without the presence in a U.S. court of foreign officials.
The Administration's bill includes other important provisions that
would improve our management of the officer corps, streamline and lower
costs of small procurements and clarify and update the tonnage laws
administered by the Coast Guard. In addition, it includes several
provisions to improve the Coast Guard's ability to carry out non-
homeland security missions as well. Most notably, the Administration's
proposal would authorize the Secretary to establish a pilot program to
conduct mandatory dockside crew survivability examinations on
uninspected U.S. commercial fishing vessels in two geographic areas
over the next five (5) years. The purpose of the pilot program would be
to examine fishing vessels and their crews to ensure the required
safety equipment is on board and that the crew is trained and exercised
in its proper use. Currently, the Secretary does not have the authority
to conduct mandatory dockside exams. We estimate that only 6 percent of
the owners or operators of the approximately 90,000 uninspected
commercial fishing vessels operating in the U.S. today make their
vessels and crew available to the Coast Guard for a voluntary dockside
examination. Since 1991, when the Coast Guard first began offering
voluntary examinations, history has demonstrated that the crews of
fishing vessels examined under such a program have a much higher
survivability rate during an accident or loss of the vessel. I ask for
your support in enacting the President's proposed bill.
Capabilities
The President's 2006 Budget requests funding to continue the
urgently needed recapitalization of our cutters, boats, aircraft and
support infrastructure to reverse declining readiness trends and
enhance operational capabilities to meet today's maritime safety and
security threats. As detailed in the National Strategy for Homeland
Security, this restoration of Coast Guard capability is a critical need
in protecting the homeland.
Many of the Coast Guard's operational assets will reach the end of
their anticipated service lives by 2008, resulting in rising operating
and maintenance costs, reduced mission effectiveness, unnecessary
risks, and excessive wear and tear on our people. Listed below are some
specific examples highlighting alarming system failure rates, increased
maintenance requirements, and the subsequent impact on mission
effectiveness:
HH-65 helicopter in-flight engine power losses
occurred at a rate of 329 mishaps per 100,000 flight hours in
FY 2004. This is up from a FY 2003 rate of 63 mishaps per
100,000 flight hours. The comparable Federal Aviation
Administration acceptable standard for a mishap of this
severity is approximately 1 per 100,000 flight hours. The
engine loss rate has resulted in flight and operational
restrictions and high levels of risk to our aircrews. Re-
engining the HH-65 will remain the Coast Guard's highest legacy
asset priority until every HH-65 aircrew is flying safely with
a fully capable aircraft. (The 2006 Budget addresses this
issue.)
The 110-foot Patrol Boat fleet has experienced 23 hull
breaches requiring emergency dry docks. The resultant loss in
operational days is unsustainable, and risks to our personnel
are unacceptable. (The Deepwater fast response cutter
initiative helps eliminate this issue.)
Our high and medium endurance cutters are experiencing
sub-system failures due to old and unserviceable systems. The
378-foot WHEC fleet averages one main space casualty, with
potential to escalate to main space fire, on every patrol.
Three out of a total class of twelve ships have recently missed
operations due to unscheduled maintenance required to repair
failing sub-systems. The total number of unscheduled
maintenance days for the major cutter and the 110' Patrol Boat
fleet has risen from 267 days in FY 1999 to 742 days in FY 2004
(175 percent increase over FY 1999). This loss of operational
cutter days in 2004 equates to losing four cutters, or 10% of
our major fleet for an entire year. (The FY 2006 budget
addresses this issue through increased investment in out legacy
systems.)
The contributions of Deepwater legacy assets to maritime safety and
security are not theoretical, evidenced by the below accomplishments in
2004 alone:
Operation ABLE SENTRY blanketed the coastline of Haiti
with Coast Guard Deepwater assets, which interdicted over 1,000
illegal migrants during this operation and deterred many
thousand more from taking to sea in unsafe boats.
The 378-foot Coast Guard Cutter GALLATIN, and its
Airborne Use of Force (AUF) capable helicopter seized more than
24,000 pounds of cocaine worth an estimated $768 million and
detained 27 suspected smugglers in the span of seven weeks.
The Coast Guard's Deepwater cutters and aircraft
patrolled over 28,000 hours in direct support of maritime
homeland security missions. 110-foot patrol boats alone
patrolled 13,000 hours supporting port and coastal security
missions including, cruise ship escorts, critical
infrastructure protection, and countless security boardings.
Working in conjunction with the U.S. Secret Service
during the national political conventions, 270-foot Medium
Endurance cutters and 110-foot patrol boats provided maritime
security, enforced security zones, and served as command and
control platforms coordinating maritime traffic. Deepwater
aircraft, equipped with the AUF package, provided air security
and conducted maritime security patrols.
Despite spending increasing amounts maintaining operational assets,
the Coast Guard is experiencing a continuing decline in fleet
readiness. Legacy cutters are now operating free of major equipment
casualties (equipment failures that significantly impact mission
performance) less than 50 percent of the time, despite the investment
per operational day increasing by over 50 percent over the last six
years. The resulting ``readiness gap'' negatively impacts both the
quantity and quality of Coast Guard ``presence''--opening an
unacceptable hole in our layered defense. If declining readiness trends
continue, Coast Guard capability and capacity will continue to be
reduced exactly when the nation needs it most.
The Integrated Deepwater System is the enduring solution to both
the Coast Guard's declining legacy asset readiness concerns and the
need to implement enhanced maritime security capabilities to reduce
maritime risk in the post-9/11 world. Aggressive implementation of the
Deepwater program will recapitalize the Coast Guard fleet and introduce
much needed surveillance, detection/clarification, intercept,
interdiction and command and control capabilities.
The original Deepwater contract baseline sought to replace Coast
Guard assets operating at their 1998 performance levels. The post-9/11
national strategic security environment demanded that the original
Deepwater solution be revised to defeat terrorist threats, address
contemporary mission demands, and satisfy current and emergent
operational priorities. In early July 2003, I directed an internal
Coast Guard study to analyze operational capability and capacity gaps
and the impact these gaps have on mission performance. This process,
known as the Integrated Deepwater System Performance Gap Analysis
(PGA), identified significant capability and capacity gaps in the
existing Deepwater system implementation plan designed to meet the 1998
performance baseline.
Based on the results of the PGA, the Coast Guard, working with the
Department, updated Deepwater capability and capacity requirements
through development of a revised Mission Needs Statement (MNS). The
revised MNS, approved by the Department of Homeland Security on January
24, 2005, calls for additional system-wide capabilities to extend the
borders of our ports and reduce maritime homeland security risk. Based
on the revised MNS, the Coast Guard developed a revised Deepwater
Implementation Plan to reflect new post-9/11 system requirements.
The revised plan addresses the Coast Guard's dual challenges of
legacy-asset deterioration and performance gaps by (1) enhancing the
performance of selected Deepwater assets through added capabilities and
conversions, including C4ISR systems; (2) adjusting the implementation
schedule and mix of individual assets over the life of the program; (3)
providing necessary balance over the life of the program based on the
Department of Homeland Security's strategic goals, current and emerging
mission requirements, and the need to provide for a high-quality
workplace for Coast Guard men and women.
In addition to delivering more capable operating assets for the
Coast Guard's post-9/11 transformation to support DHS strategic goals
and to reduce maritime security risk, the revised plan will enable the
Deepwater Program to make more significant contributions to improved
information sharing, collaboration, and interoperability in the
maritime domain--essential capabilities to implement the Maritime
Strategy for Homeland Security, and in particular enhance MDA.
The Revised Implementation Plan ensures Deepwater cutters and
aircraft will be equipped with the right systems and capabilities
(summarized below) to operate successfully in the post-9/11 threat
environment. These changes are critical to ensuring the maritime
security of America and its $750 billion maritime transportation
system, including:
An innovative, integrated network-centric C4ISR system
to harness the power of an interoperable network to enhance
performance in all mission areas, improve MDA, and provide a
common operational picture--key to Coast Guard leading the
inter-agency effort to know and respond to maritime conditions,
anomalies, vulnerabilities, and threats. Improvements to C4ISR
enable earlier awareness of events through the more effective
gathering and fusing of terrorism-related information,
analysis, coordination, response--all critical to detecting,
deterring, and defeating terrorist attacks. Upgrades to
Deepwater surface assets, for example, contribute directly to
improved intelligence collection and fusion through a
sophisticated Shipboard Sensitive Compartmentalized Information
Facility (S/SCIF), sensors, and increased data-exchange
bandwidth;
Improved maritime-security capabilities such as
increased speed and integrated weapons systems on selected
Deepwater cutters essential to higher levels of maritime
homeland security during a terrorist attack, opposed boardings,
and other high-risk operations;
Airborne use of force and vertical insertion and
delivery capabilities to allow helicopters to provide warning
and/or disabling fire, and to deploy, deliver, and recover
boarding teams safely and more effectively;
Improved fixed-wing long-range surveillance aircraft
to increase MDA and reduce maritime patrol aircraft shortfalls
in operating hours; organic Coast Guard air transport
capability will enable deployment of Maritime Safety and
Security Teams and National Strike Force teams for faster, more
effective response.
Improved capabilities for anti-terrorist/force
protection on select Deepwater assets with all-weather self-
defense and the ability to protect high-value assets; assets
will have the capability to engage terrorists with higher
assurance of survivability and continued mission capability;
and
Improved asset capabilities for detection and defense
for chemical-biological-radiological (CBR) threats--essential
to survival and continued operations during a CBR attack
involving a weapon of mass destruction.
The Deepwater system's performance-based acquisition strategy will
allow the Coast Guard to respond to changing conditions and threats,
and provides a vehicle for capability and schedule adjustments over the
life of the program--maximizing value and performance through
technology refreshment and innovation. The flexibility inherent in
Deepwater's acquisition will enable the Coast Guard to adjust the final
mix of selected platforms as overall system-of-systems capability
improvements are generated by, for example, significant improvements to
the program's system for C4ISR or Unmanned Aerial Vehicle (UAV)
technology.
Our plan to incorporate improved post-9/11 operational capabilities
on all major surface and aviation platforms will reap significant
system-wide performance improvements that will have a bearing on
capacity requirements. In the world of C4ISR, for example, we have
already seen how command-and-control upgrades to our legacy cutters
serve as a force multiplier to generate impressive dividends in
operational effectiveness and efficiency. Armed with earlier, more
accurate, and continuously streamed intelligence and operational data
to maintain a common operating picture, commanders can employ their
assets far more effectively than in the past. Our modeling and
simulation studies predict a robust return on investment by revising
the Deepwater plan to meet post-9/11 requirements.
With the continued strong support of the Department of Homeland
Security (DHS), the Administration, and Congress we are positioned to
play an even greater role in reducing the future risk of a terrorist
event against the homeland. During the past two years, we have
modernized select legacy assets to operate more effectively until
replaced by Deepwater assets. Now we have established requirements for
improved capabilities on converted or newer Deepwater platforms that
are necessary for the Coast Guard to perform its full range of post-9/
11 missions.
Conclusion
On 9/10/01, our primary maritime focus was on the safe and
efficient use of America's waterways. Since 9/11, we have made great
progress in securing America's waterways, while continuing to
facilitate the safe and efficient flow of commerce. There is no doubt
that work remains, but there is also no doubt that we continue to
improve maritime homeland security each and every day--thanks in large
part to the continued strong support of the Administration and
Congress.
The Coast Guard's 2006 Budget continues that support, proposing
budget authority of $8.15 billion, an eleven percent increase over 2005
comparable discretionary funding. The budget provides the resources
necessary to continue recapitalizing the Coast Guard's aging cutters,
boats, aircraft, and supporting infrastructure, while building out
maritime safety and security capabilities essential to meeting present
and future mission demands. In addition, the Administration's proposed
Coast Guard Authorization Act for 2005 contains provisions that provide
the Coast Guard with important new authorities, as well as expansions
and clarifications of existing authorities.
Our country faces many challenges in today's dangerous world. In
the maritime arena the Coast Guard strives every day to be the Shield
of Freedom, to protect our homeland and to continue to perform our
traditional missions in the outstanding manner that the men and women
of the Coast Guard have performed all of their many missions for over
200 years.
By supporting enactment of President's proposed budget levels and
legislative changes, the Committee will better equip today's Coast
Guard to meet our current and future maritime safety and security
challenges. Thank you for the opportunity to testify before you today.
I will be happy to answer any questions you may have.
Mr. Lungren. Thank you very much, Admiral. We will be
recognizing members for 5 minutes each for questions, and I
will start that off by, first, reflecting on the fact that the
Coast Guard personnel numbers were down prior to 9/11, you
folks suffered as much of a cutback as anybody in the Federal
establishment. They are back up now, almost the numbers, to
where they were prior to that cutback.
Your budget has been significantly increased since the mid
1990s to the present time, I guess 3.05 billion in 1995 to 6.52
billion in 2005. I would assume that much of that reflects the
increased commitment or the new compliment to Homeland
Security. Can you tell me what percentage or what portion of
those budget increases have been divided between Homeland
Security and nonHomeland Security missions of the Coast Guard?
Admiral Collins. If you look at our budget presentation, I
think that breaks out about 45 to 46 percent of our total
budget base is officially described as Homeland Security
missions, as defined in the Homeland Security Act. Of course,
most of the growth that you refer to, Mr. Chairman, has been
allocated to capability and capacity issues within those
Homeland Security missions.
Several examples, we built up, as I mentioned, 13 maritime
safety and security teams that are placed around the country,
75-person team is augmented with reservists up to 100. They are
sort of our special ops team that can provide enhanced security
in and around a port environment. That is a considerable--ate
up a considerable portion of that increase.
We have added 15 coastal patrol boats to our fleet, is
another example in the direct Homeland Security and maritime
security assets. Just two examples of where that money has been
allocated.
I should note that we have also not neglected our other
traditional missions as well. We have invested in those
multimission systems, both in people and in systems that will
enhance our systems across the board. Case in point. If you
look from 2000, 2001 to the present, we have added almost 1,000
people to our search and rescue structure in our Coast Guard
between our command centers and our stations to deal with
increased operational tempo.
And the Rescue 21, which is a VH/FM command and control
distress and calling system, digital-based that we are building
around a country is largely focused on our search and rescue
mission but is multimission mission. It is a blue force
tracker. It is a command and control system that is under the
distress calling system. This will service our missions across
the board.
Mr. Lungren. Last week I had a chance to go out and visit
the Pacific Command in the 11th District in California and had
the opportunity to look at some of the intelligence operations
you have out there.
My question is this: We have looked at, in other
committees, the difficulty, for instance, the FBI is having in
transforming itself and both attracting proper intelligence but
more importantly analyzing proper intelligence. Your people
presented to me the argument, you presented the argument that
you do a far better job on intelligence than you did before,
that there is more coordination.
How do we judge that other than the fact that we are
spending more money at it? At least in my observation, the FBI
has been--they are certainly not doing a very good job in terms
of analyzing things. They have got sort of a disrespect for
analysts, because they are not agents, and so forth.
What kind of significance do you put to the intelligence
operations you have? What benchmarks would you suggest we would
look at to see that you are actually doing a better job, not
just have more money, and now tell us that you are talking to
the other elements within DHS and DOD and local law
enforcement, for instance?
Admiral Collins. Mr. Chairman, that is a wonderful
question. It is a very difficult question. The metrics are
hard, it is like asking what the deterrence impact is of a
patrolling police officer on the street and trying to quantify
those benefits. So it is absolutely the right question. The
answer to it is exceedingly difficult.
You are right. We have added, almost doubled our intel
establishment. We have changed it organizationally. It is a
direct report to me. It is not buried down in our operational
directorate. We have added a three-tier structure. We have
added these field intelligence support teams, area fusion
centers east and west, Pacific and Atlantic, and then co-
located with the Navy at Suitland, we have a Navy intelligence
center located with ONI, which is a terrific partnership for
us.
We are in the process of building out structured competency
in this area. I can give you a classified briefing on a couple
of real high connect-the-dots payoff, connect-the-dot things
that our analysts have done that no one else saw. I would be
glad to give you a classified briefing on that. Really some
terrific, terrific, analytical work. We did it right because we
have a systems view of the maritime. We know the safety part,
maritime, environmental part, domestic part, and we are able to
tie the dots together. That is one measure, analytical success.
The second is, not only have information developed, flowing
from the bottom up and feeding into the total intel picture,
but just as important from my perspective, it is giving
tactical information to our operational commanders every day.
That is the real payoff, the real payoffs of the FITs, the
field intelligence teams.
Every day, they are assimilating information, the vessel
arrival of information that comes in, vetting that information,
up through ONI and Suitland and back, and taking that
information, fusing it and giving the operational commander
information on which he can say, well, where do I put my
boarding team today. What vessels do I escort today, where do I
put my inspection resources. It is all based on risk.
But it has to be done on the fusion of information, the
best information you have to allow you to make those kinds of
decisions. That is the real payoff, I think, that is the real
payoff. One of the elements of success is that they are joint
multiagency entities, as these field intelligence support
teams, other agencies that are coming, State and local,
willingly and eagerly to participate in this, because they see
a value proposition in the information that is brought together
within those structures.
Mr. Lungren. Thank you, Admiral. My time is up. The
gentlelady from California.
Ms. Sanchez. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, again, thank you,
Admiral. The GAO issued a report in 2004 on the automatic
identification system, which, as you know, is the short-range
tracking system, and stated that currently the Coast Guard
could only monitor vessels in 10 ports with the existing Vessel
Traffic Services, or the VTS.
It would appear to me that if you are going to be doing
this, you would have to have more ability to monitor ships than
just in 10 ports. I understand that expanding the AIS coverage
is not an easy task, and the GAO estimated that it would--a
national ATS system would be around $150 million.
Have you thought of how you are going to enlarge that
capacity? And in particular, because, in having gone to the
Port of Los Angeles-Long Beach, they have the automatic secure
Vessel Tracking System. It would seem to me like maybe you
could work with them and get some more coverage than if it
wasn't an AIS type of coverage, but something close to it.
Admiral Collins. Sure.
Ms. Sanchez. So my question is, how do you plan to expand
the AIS coverage to all the other ports and major ports and
would you consider something like that system in partnership?
Admiral Collins. Great. Terrific question. If I could just
start from a broad perspective, you are talking about maritime
domain awareness. How do you get visibility, transparency of
people, cargo and vessels and activity in the maritime, so you
can intervene and prevent. You need many systems and subsystems
to do that. AIS is a great system and it has great potential.
It is one system.
There is, if you add them all, and you get a fused, fused
multiple systems that will give you this kind of picture, it
sensors its reporting requirements, its procedures. It is all
intelligence and bringing all that together to give you that
kind of transparency. So, low light level TV in a port is a
great maritime domain awareness sensor.
AIS is a very important sensor. I would submit our
Deepwater system that we are building is really an MDA sensor
system. So it is how do you bring all of these systems
together, fuse it and have a good common picture that you can
share.
AIS is an important part of that. We have it started off in
phases, the first phase was to implement all our vessel
tracking systems with AIS. We have done that. We have done the
nine systems.
Now we are building out. We have a multiyear plan to build
out nationally to have coverage around entire coastal areas. We
are looking at efficient ways to do it. Partnering as
mentioned, as suggested, is one of those, to give you an
example of the partnering. Instead of building additional
structures to hang the AIS transponders off, for instance,
along our coast, we have partnered with NOAA in putting them
on--in installing them on NOAA weather buoys as a source. In
the Gulf, we are partnering with the petroleum industries to
hang them off oil platforms that cover our entire gulf. There
are 3400 oil platforms in the Gulf of Mexico.
So we are looking--and we don't want to build separate
dedicated towers and things like that to AIS, so we are hanging
some of these off our Rescue 21 tower infrastructure that is
going on. We are looking at satellite-based AIS systems.
So many, many different ways to track and sensor, putting
those all together, and that will be included in our plan to
hit the streets this summer, knock on wood, on a national plan
to achieve maritime domain awareness. That is an interagency
effort, a national effort that we have locked the whole team up
for 6 months, shoved pizzas under the door, and they have been
working real hard, 7 days a week to develop this plan. It is
interagency in scope, and they will lay out how all these
things intersect to give us the kind of transparency of the
maritime we need.
Ms. Sanchez. The MTSA requires a long-range Vessel Tracking
System. How long do you think before really how that plan is in
place?
Admiral Collins. That is one of the things, we have been
activists, I would describe ourselves, in the International
Maritime Organization, driving security standards through the
word, literally, through that body, I think, with a great deal
of success. Our next step, and we got short-range AIS
requirement is the function of the Solis amendments and ISBS
code that we moved through IMO several years ago.
The next step is long-range identification and tracking. We
have an effort underway right now at IMO to develop
international standards for carriage requirements for long-
range tracking out to 2,000 miles, both to the flag State, the
coastal State and the port State that would monitor this
system. It is working through that body as we speak. We have
been successful at getting two special intercessional work
groups sponsored by the Secretary General of IMO. I have his
personal commitment for the long-range identification tracking.
They are paying for and sponsoring special intercessional
working groups to move this along. We hopefully will get those
standards codified, documented, and agreed to by the key
countries so that there will be a stamp of approval next
spring. That is the next--the Marine Safety Committee is the
committee in IMO that is dealing with this. So we are working
very hard to deliver the bacon when it comes to long-range
innovation and tracking, and I think we have made progress.
Ms. Sanchez. Thank you very much.
Mr. Lungren. The gentlelady's time has expired.
The gentleman from California, Mr. Cox, is recognized for 5
minutes.
Mr. Cox. Mr. Chairman, I ask unanimous consent to exchange
my place in the order of questioning, with the gentleman from
Alaska.
Mr. Lungren. Without objection, so ordered.
Mr. Young. I thank the chairman--both the chairmen for that
courtesy. My question will be very short. You mentioned about
the original mission. That is my dear dream about the Coast
Guard. Do you have another subcommander or commandant that
handles that mission, oil spill pollution, navigational
purposes, search and rescue, or--I am worried, Commandant, more
than anything else? I listen to your testimony, you are doing
very well, but it seems to be focused only on security. I have
another role, that original mission.
Who decides the personnel count, the ships, everything that
is needed, and I am being very parochial, I have more coastline
in all the United States together and half the world and great
involvement. I don't want to see the mission diminished. Who is
handling that for you?
Admiral Collins. Sir, we have, of course, our operation, we
have an operation directorate and a marine safety directorate.
Two separate flag officers in our headquarters. The marine
safety directorate deals with port security port and coastal
security issues, carrier security, large-capacity cruise ship
security and the like, and oversees the compliance associated
with the Maritime Transportation Security Act.
The Office of Operations, the admiral in charge of that
office oversees, all our ships, and patrol boats and the
utilization of them, the allocation of them and the policy
associated with them, the counterdrug operation and the like.
Mr. Young. Do you have any plans in the future that you
know of that would drop personnel or ships in Alaska?
Admiral Collins. Of stopping?
Mr. Young. No, dropping or diminishing.
Admiral Collins. Absolutely not, sir.
Mr. Young. I wanted that on the record. Thank you, Mr.
Chairman.
Secondly, I have one interest, and I am going to make, I
hope, a constructive suggestion, again parochial. I am a
mariner, I am a licensed mariner, although you say I am now
honorary, but I am still licensed. And one of your
recommendations is the proposed revision of Merchant Marine
documentation.
I would suggest respectfully that whoever is helping you
write that communicate with me very closely. Because what
concerns me the most is that in the last paragraph it says the
proposals, the preparedness, it says that there shall be an
ability to appeal any type of decision made by the Coast Guard.
Who would you appeal to? The Coast Guard?
Admiral Collins. We have hearing offices.
Mr. Young. With the Coast Guard?
Admiral Collins. That judges--.
Mr. Young. My point is I want to suggest, and hopefully I
will do with this my other committee, because I am protecting
the existing Mariners that are documented, that are making
their living out of the Coast Guard, I say blessing, on
Merchant Marine ships that are Jones Act in our Nation. Now to
have them come under scrutiny other than security. This is
about security, and have you not allow them and the ability to
appeal to me is unfair. So I want to make sure that you
understand that.
Admiral Collins. Yes, we will work closely with you, sir,
to make sure that that is addressed.
Mr. Young. I want to make sure I get my license back. Go
ahead.
Admiral Collins. That whole issue of credentialing and
documentation does need an overhaul. That is the point. We need
to make it more effective, more efficient, more customer-
oriented for the mariner. That whole realignment of that is to
that end. We will make sure that the appeals process and the
hearing process is fair and addresses your concerns.
Mr. Young. Thank you, Admiral. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for
your time.
Mr. Lungren. The Chair recognizes the gentleman from
Mississippi, Mr. Thompson.
Mr. Thompson. Thank you very much, Mr. Chair and Mr.
Admiral. I appreciate your testimony.
We are about 4,000 men short, based upon reports that I
read from a manpower standpoint. Do you agree with that? Are
those numbers just--.
Admiral Collins. I haven't heard that. I haven't seen that
report. I don't know which report you are referring to, sir. We
have grown by 12.5 percent since 2001. That is pretty
significant in the history of our service, in terms of growth
over that similar period of time. I think it has been measured
growth. I think it would be difficult to grow faster during
that timeframe. I mean, you can grow good or you can grow not
so good. That is not being able to absorb and acculturate that
workforce and bring them up to speed and so forth.
So I think at the right pace we are on that has been
reflected in the budget since 2001. I am pleased with the
support that we have gotten through the administration and
Congress on building up that 12.5 percent.
Mr. Thompson. Well, just for the record, GAO more or less
indicated that you were 4,000 short. Obviously they had
produced the numbers based on their analysis of, I guess, Coast
Guard material. So maybe we need to go back to them and suggest
that their numbers might be a little off.
But nonetheless, is it your testimony today that we are at
a number that you are comfortable with that we don't need to
increase our numbers with the Guard or anything like that?
Admiral Collins. I think there is, you know, I probably
deal with that budget 1 year at a time. You look at the merits
of the initiatives in the budget, and every budget gets
configured based upon the, you know, the puts and the takes and
the priorities in a given budget year, as you know very well,
sir. I think the--.
Mr. Thompson. Well, let me put it another way. If you had
your druthers, would you like to have some more people?
Admiral Collins. Well, let me maybe answer it this way. The
first year--we had the opportunity this year to submit an
unfunded priorities list as directed by Congress in the 2005
Act. We submitted that list. What that list is, both dollars
and people. It said if I had the next person or the next
dollar, this is where I would put them.
So that document is on the record, on the Hill. It shows
you where we think the next dollar or the next person would be
placed if I had it at my disposal, and I think they are very
significant item, let me leave it that way. I think they are
important items that have to do with inland rivers. That deal
with security.
Mr. Thompson. Well, that is my next question.
Admiral Collins. That item is on the unfunded priority
list. It has to do with the inland river vessel movement
center. It tracks dangerous cargos that move in our inland
rivers. They are very hazardous, very dangerous. If a terrorist
did something bad to those in a high-density area, and we have
defined about 20 high-density areas along the river we have to
worry about, we need to track those. Right now, we are doing it
by hook or by crook with a reserve force that we cobbled
together.
We need to make that more permanent, and we are a little
more sophisticated in terms of technology. That is why that
line item is there. So I think that is the best way to answer
your question, sir, that we do have a list of unfunded
priorities that are meaningful, or substantial, could add
value.
Mr. Thompson. I think, for the sake of the committee, if
you could just provide each member of that committee, of the
committee, that information. It would be helpful to us again.
You talked about the inland waterway security in the
center. So you are also saying that if we chose to give you the
money, it would be an additional asset that you think the Coast
Guard could do a better job in monitoring the inland waterways?
Admiral Collins. Absolutely. That particular item, as I
said, is made up of reservists that we brought on. Their
service ends the end of this fiscal year. We are going to have
to hunt down other reservists if they want to keep that going.
Our game plan would be to put active duty permit people there
along with some contracted people, and given the proper
information technology systems to track those barges and river
traffic efficiently.
Mr. Thompson. Thank you.
Mr. Lungren. The time of the gentleman has expired. The
time of the gentleman from California who, I guess, wants to
reclaim his time now.
Mr. Cox. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Lungren. Recognized for 5 minutes.
Mr. Cox. Admiral, on May 31st, the Coast Guard submitted
your revised Deepwater implementation plan to the Congress. I
want to read from it. Because if I didn't identify the source,
this would sound like a pretty trenchant criticism of the Coast
Guard. Today's Coast Guard outfitted with assets defined for
the threat environment of 30 to 40 years ago lacks the maritime
security and network centric capabilities essential for
operational effectiveness.
That is really an indictment of where we stand. I would
like to know how the new capabilities that you are seeking to
achieve address the need for interoperability, because that is
one of the things that is referenced in our opening statement.
It is also one of the things as I mentioned in my opening
statement. Last year we held a hearing to examine the maritime
operations of the Department, and we were focused on whether
Coast Guard, aircraft and vessels are yet capable to engage in
secure communication with other DHS assets, such as border
patrol boats. Does this plan address that? And what is the
answer to that question? Can we do that today?
Admiral Collins. The current preDeepwater systems are
really independent systems, they are not network based. What I
mean by that tied together with real data; real-time data
capability, exchanged between the component parts.
To steal a term out of the Department of Defense, what we
are building is a network centric system with Deepwater with
advanced communication systems, advanced census systems,
advanced command and control systems that tie the network
together. What it does is leverages your capability to have
maritime domain awareness to understand your environment and
act on it and have real-time information through what is--the
buzz word is common operating picture.
Everyone has the fused operational picture that is moved
instantaneously that leverages each asset and increasing the
productivity of the asset. That is what we are building with
Deepwater. It is a system of ships, fixed wing, helicopters and
boats tied together in a robust way that has transparency of
its operating area. It allows you to push the borders out and
transparency along the threat axis and act on it. It will not
only help Homeland Security issues in the courts in the like,
but migrant interdiction, counterdrug interdiction, search and
rescue mission reinforcement. So it is all mission system that
will enhance our ability to act in the maritime.
[Insert for the Record. See page 46.]
Mr. Cox. I love the term ``network centric,'' and I
completely agree that it is an object much to be desired that
we have a common operational picture. My question remains, do
we have it yet at least to the extent that we can communicate
with a border patrol boat.
Admiral Collins. Yes, we do. We have it.
Mr. Cox. By communicate, can we communicate securely,
because intelligence sharing is a big piece of this. Do we have
interoperable secure communications now between those Coast
Guard aircraft and border patrol boats?
Admiral Collins. We have partial capability in that regard.
Part of the Deepwater program was building replacement assets
for the current assets over a period of time and enhancing
existing legacy systems while we transition.
So, for instance, if you look at our medium endurance
cutters, our high endurance cutters, part of the investment of
Deepwater has been to secure communications on those platforms,
they all have secure communications now. Even the legacy
system. So we have enhanced the current system and all that
will be in the new system. We are working very, very hard to
insure--and that is part of the rebase lining of Deepwater--is
to insure that they are all post-9/11 interoperable systems,
that our Rescue 21 systems are interoperable with our Deepwater
system, that is interoperable with the AIS system that can talk
to the border patrol that can talk to the local police. That is
all embedded in the requirements definition that we have
baselined.
Mr. Cox. Thank you, Admiral. Obviously, the sooner the
better on that. I am delighted we are heading in that
direction. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Lungren. Thank you. The gentleman from Washington, Mr.
Dicks, is recognized for 5 minutes.
Mr. Dicks. Thank you. Thank you, Commandant. We are glad to
have you here. Another maritime State, Washington State, where
the Coast Guard plays a great role out there. We appreciate it.
The Maritime Transportation Security Act requires that security
plans be developed for the Nation's port facilities in U.S.
flag vessels.
According to the Coast Guard, 3,000 facilities and 9,000
vessels subject to the regulations have approved plans in
place. What does the approval process entail?
Admiral Collins. They have submitted, of course. This
played out over the last year, 2 years, they submitted their
plan to us. We evaluated the plan that it had certain
prescribed things that it had to address. Access control,
perimeter security and the like, so there are some basic
ingredients as we bake the cake, so to speak.
Mr. Dicks. So it includes physical verification and review
of the security plan by the captain of the port?
Admiral Collins. Yes.
Mr. Dicks. Good. Now that the plans have been approved, how
is the Coast Guard going to insure that facilities and vessels
are in compliance with their plans and maintain their
compliance?
Admiral Collins. That we will inspect those facilities
annually and--also, as part of MTSA, as you know, sir, that as
is required is an exercise regime, it is also required not to
exceed 18 months. So there is exercise of regimes that have to
take place to exercise the plan. That is a wonderful way to
have visibility into how prepared they are.
In addition, we are starting with this 40-tabletop-
exercises plan starting this summer, across the key ports and
areas that exercise these plans.
Mr. Dicks. Now, isn't it true that there still is a
question about the financing of port security? That the ports
themselves have said that the Federal Government should be
financing this and the Federal Government has been saying well,
no, it should be the shippers and the ports doing it privately.
But isn't that still a problem?
Admiral Collins. It is still an issue, I think it may be
debated forever, but it is a key issue. There are costs to
building out the security plans. Now, the important part is
that you have a standard set of regulations that are applicable
to everyone, so there is not an unlevel playing field. It would
be really bad if we had one State that had one set of standards
and another place with another set of standards and so forth,
and that would be an unequal playing field. One of the national
standards is a level playing field of standards.
Mr. Dicks. Wasn't it true that the Coast Guard said to
fully implement the plan to do all the port security this would
cost billions of dollars, which we have not appropriated, and
the money hasn't been raised at the local level. There has got
to be a huge gap in the effectiveness of these plans that have
been put down on a piece of paper. That doesn't mean they have
been implemented and the work done to secure these ports; isn't
that correct?
Admiral Collins. There has been, of course, I think five
rounds of grants to date; $560 million have been distributed
around the country. There is another round this year. I think
it closes out, the applications close out the end of this month
or early July for another 150 million, that pushes it close to
$700 million through 2005.
Mr. Dicks. You had some numbers that you presented to the
Congress, as I recall, that were in the billions of dollars
that were needed to implement port security, and we are nowhere
near that. In many of these cases, Congress had to add the
money to the budget. It wasn't even in the President's budget;
isn't that correct?
Admiral Collins. Yes, sir. There was in the cost/benefit
analysis that is required as part of the regulatory effort,
there was an estimate of several billions of dollars.
Mr. Dicks. As I understand, 5.4 billion over 10 years for
port facilities?
Admiral Collins. Yes, sir.
Mr. Dicks. We are at $700 million. And most of that has
been put in by the Congress. So I still worry about this. I
mean I am a big supporter of the Coast Guard, but I worry
whether we have done enough on port security. And it seems to
me that with a gap of--in this case, would be $4.7 billion that
hasn't--work that hasn't been done. We still have a lot to do
here in this area, don't you agree with that?
Admiral Collins. Yes, sir. I think it is going to be built
out over time. And there are alternative security techniques
and provisions that can be included into the plan to have
equivalent levels of security while the final solution is built
up. That is built into the plan review and the system as we go
forward. It boils down to, sir, how do you distribute between
what public expense--a private expense and the public expense,
whether it is State, local, and Federal, and how that gets
distributed. There is no magic formula that has been
adjudicated that sets those boundary conditions.
Mr. Dicks. Thank you. My time has expired.
Mr. Lungren. Thank the gentleman. Mr. Linder is recognized.
Mr. Linder. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Admiral, welcome. How
many personnel do you have?
Admiral Collins. If you count the civilian personnel, which
you should, they are a great part of our work force, around
47,000 individuals.
Mr. Linder. How many reservists are on duty?
Admiral Collins. We have a selective Reserve of 8,100. We
currently have about between--voluntarily recalled and
involuntarily recalled--around 1,500 as we sit here today on
duty.
Mr. Linder. How many reservists do you have entirely,
including those that are not on full-time duty?
Admiral Collins. Eighty-one hundred selective Reserve.
Mr. Linder. All of your personnel trained in all of your
various missions?
Admiral Collins. Not everyone knows every mission. We have
multi-mission ships and multi-mission planes. A ship could be
doing a search and rescue mission in the morning and could be
interdicting drugs in the afternoon, which is frequently the
case, by the way. The competencies necessary to do a variety of
missions that are built into that platform in the amount of
people--.
Mr. Linder. Platform-related essentially, yes?
Where do you fit in the intelligence loop? Quite a bit of
discussion about intelligence and the substantial ability to
change it. Where do you fit in that loop?
Admiral Collins. We are, of course, we are a member of the
foreign intel community. That was an act of Congress right
after 9/11 that saw that need and made us a part of that
community. We are--we have intel analysts. We are a form of
collectors in the foreign intel community. Throughout our
department, we obviously have a relationship with the IAIP,
Intelligence Analysis and Infrastructure Protection under the
Secretariat.
We are co-located--and obviously responsible to the
Secretary through them. We are co-located with the Office of
Naval Intelligence in Suitland, a national intelligence entity.
And as the current--the HSPD 13 work that I referenced earlier
is a family of plans. There is an over--umbrella, national
maritime security plan and then eight subordinate plans, one of
which is integrated maritime intelligence.
In that plan that is evolving, it defines the role and the
organizational positioning particularly with the new entity.
And how we see it is we have become the maritime plug-in up the
chain in terms of focus integrated maritime intelligence.
Mr. Linder. How much of that intelligence comes from
civilian both commercial and pleasure boats? I suspect there
are a million of them.
Admiral Collins. Every one is sensor is our approach. We
have HUMINT teams. We have these 30 field intelligence support
teams that I mentioned earlier. We have started a program
called America's Waterway Watch, which is drawing upon marinas
and boatmen around the country, orchestrated and promoted by
our Coast Guard Auxillary, which is our volunteer arm of 45,000
people that help us in this neighborhood watch of the waterway
basically, and it is very, very effective. It is another
maritime domain awareness sensor, if you will, to give us
information so we can put this all together. So--.
Mr. Linder. Is it your sense that people are paying more
attention since 9/11?
Admiral Collins. Absolutely. We get the call, the report
that there is a perceived increased--someone surveilling or
taking a picture of this ferry, and looks strange, and we are
worried about him or her. So you get that kind of input all the
time. You run those things through the ground and collect the
information and do the field intelligence report and all those
things. There is a consciousness around our ports and waterways
that these are precious things, these ports and waterways, and
people want to protect them. The best way is to have people,
local folks that know what is supposed to happen in a waterway
and what is not--what is an aberration and what is not, and
they can see that aberration and report in. Some things like
America's Waterway Watch is an important initiative in that
regard.
Mr. Lungren. The gentleman from Oregon is recognized for 5
minutes.
Mr. DeFazio. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Foreign port security
assessments, I am disturbed to see--and I am certain this is a
personnel or funding issue--but only 26 of your planned 135
assessments have been done at this point in time?
Admiral Collins. Yes, sir. I think it is pretty good, sir,
from my perspective. We have, of course, had to stand up that
whole program. We had to staff that whole program and get an
inspection protocol accomplished. We got adopted by, approved
by, and embraced by IMO. So that same standard approach will be
used by others around the world. And we have done 26 already
and we are on tap to do a whole bunch this summer. So I think
as I recall the mandate, sir, if I got it right, it was 3 years
to have it all done. And I think we are going to meet that.
Mr. DeFazio. Of those 26 that have been completed, have you
identified problems?
Admiral Collins. There were two countries, small African
countries that were determined to be noncompliant. There were
five countries--and don't ask me to name them because I don't
remember them off the top of my head--I will get you the
information. There are five countries that have not reported
compliance. Under the ISPS code, flag states have to report
compliance and that they have met the port standards. There are
five countries that have not reported compliant. And two we
found on inspection.
Inserted for the Record
Currently five countries have not reported compliance as required
by the ISPS Code. (Democratic Republic of the Congo, Guinea-Bissau,
Liberia, Mauritania, and Nauru). Conditions of Entry have been imposed
on vessels arriving from those countries. These Conditions of Entry
require vessels to take additional security precautions while in ports
in the foreign countries and when in the U.S. In addition these vessels
receive intense scrutiny when they arrive in the U.S. The Coast Guard
consulted with our interagency partners to insure all other agency and
foreign policy considerations are taken into account.
What we do with that, we can deny entry for those vessels.
And what we have chosen to do with the five that have not
reported compliant is impose additional restrictions on any
vessel coming from those ports to our country. They have had to
maintain a higher security posture while they were in that
country and other documentation in order--and there are
mandatory offshore inspections before they come into our
country. We have ratcheted the security net up based upon the
status of the security in that foreign port.
Mr. DeFazio. So for ports that are noncompliant, and any
ships that have transited those ports, before coming to the
U.S., you are doing mandatory inspections?
Admiral Collins. Yes, sir.
Mr. DeFazio. The issue of vessel ownership, I know we have
talked about this before, I am just curious where we are in
terms of transparency, penetrating the veil of ownership. Osama
bin Laden may well personally own vessels that are transiting
the United States. Where are we at on that?
Admiral Collins. Part of the ISPS code in the Solis
amendments that went through IMO was a requirement for a
synopsis record on the bridge that required a full history of
that vessel, ownership.
Mr. DeFazio. Only down to the agent level or the law firm
or whatever. It does not get to actual ownership; is that
correct? We don't have anything that requires that we know what
individuals or corporations or entities own it?
Admiral Collins. I can give you a classified brief on this.
There are a number of intelligence avenues to get that
information. And in many regards we do have that information.
There was a motor vessel voyager that we tracked I think very
successfully over the last--about a month ago--that had
ownership issues, flag state issues, and a whole bunch of other
risk factors that we vetted with ONI at Suitland and with our
foreign partners and identified it, located it, tracked it with
national assets, boarded it 800 miles off shore.
So we are active from all sources to get the information we
need to assess risk. And we err on the side of being
conservative. And if there is an element of risk we are going
to be all over that vessel.
I think there are some good examples. And that was an
interagency coordinated effort, by the way. And this committee
is interested in interagency coordination. I think it is
getting better and better and better in the sharing of
information. Customs has a tracking targeting center. We have
Coast Guard people with permanent liaisons there. They have
folks in our National Maritime Intelligence Center and Vessel
Tracking Center that we have at Suitland, and we are sharing
all the information back and forth all the time.
So I am pretty pleased--not there yet, we have a way to
go--but I am pretty pleased where we are.
Mr. DeFazio. Then on the questions raised by the Ranking
Member and I believe by the Chairman, if I could quickly, Mr.
Chairman, on the long-range tracking, aren't there a number of
maritime cargo companies that actually have installed on their
vessels commercial systems so they know where that ship is
real-time all the time?
Admiral Collins. Yes, sir. And we have a couple of pilot
programs going. One in Alaska. With ORBCOMM, we have a
satellite project going. We are looking at various techniques
and lining them up to see what we could use and how we can
derive that as a solid long-range identification tracking
system. That is part of our project is to look at the options
and do demonstration projects, kick the tires, see them in
action, and then pick the best solution.
Mr. DeFazio. Thank you, Admiral.
Mr. Lungren. You mentioned Alaska and the gentleman from
Alaska was not even here. I am sure he will hear about that.
Mr. Pascrell.
Mr. Pascrell. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Admiral a few questions that go into general policy and
strategy, I am really shocked by the record of the HH-65
helicopter. You brought that to our attention in your testimony
in terms of the amount of incidents and the amount of mishaps;
500,000 flight hours, 329 mishaps. That is up from 63 mishaps.
And as you know, the FAA says what is acceptable. The standard
is 1 in 100,000. Now that is not close; that is bordering on
tragic.
Could you respond to that, please?
Admiral Collins. I couldn't agree with you more, sir. That
is why we have such a priority and such an urgency with our
reengineering effort. In the meantime, we are managing the risk
through operational restrictions on the aircraft commensurate
with the current condition and reliability; and we are building
out, replacing that engine absolutely as fast as we possibly
can do it. We have got 12 already installed, another batch in
the making. And we are putting them in as fast as the
manufacturer can build them and spending over 350 million doing
it. So this is a huge priority. It is a mainstream asset for
us. And we have--it is not only the engine, it is the engine we
are replacing, the fuel control system and the gear box, all
three in that aircraft.
If you go to the air stations where that aircraft has now
been reengined, there are a lot of aviators walking around with
their smiley faces on, because it is a much more capable
aircraft.
Mr. Pascrell. Some of those things we are addressing in the
2006 budget. But this is something that needs immediate
attention by all of us. This is totally unacceptable. I think
you would agree with that.
Admiral Collins. Absolutely.
Mr. Pascrell. My second question is this: New York Harbor.
We were up there just the other day, Homeland Security
Committee. And I want you to give me a brief assessment of the
New York Harbor in terms of security and protection of this
huge, huge harbor.
Admiral Collins. It is a very complex harbor and a very
valuable harbor. It has significant traffic in and out and, of
course, a lot of it is bulk liquid traffic. It comes in to
Bayonne and Arthur Kill area. There are vulnerable assets there
in terms of bridges and structures of national significance.
Mr. Pascrell. How many people are assigned there?
Admiral Collins. I have to get you that for the record. We
have the biggest Coast Guard station and our service is located
there, the most boats and the most people.
Inserted for the Record
There are 58 members assigned to Coast Guard Station New York.
Mr. Pascrell. That is functioning totally? That facility is
functioning?
Admiral Collins. It is on Staten Island and has the most
boats and most people of any station in the Coast Guard. We
have a major capital port function there, office in charge of
reinspection there, sector--sector New York, and we have the
capacity to augment. For example, obviously, New York is the
center of every orange condition. If you have an orange alert
or a national convention that is there, Republican in this
case, if you have the national convention there, then the
security goes up and we roll assets in and augment that. And we
did that at the national convention. We did that for the other
security conditions. So it is a dynamic process. We allocate
resources. We have the basic core level of resources there and
we increase based on risk. We have a maritime safety and
security team there.
Mr. Pascrell. I want to make one other point, Mr. Chairman
and that is when we started our first hearings a few years ago
and we looked at the Coast Guard, we were very concerned that
the process of interdiction of drugs would take a back seat. I
know that you are dealing with priorities. When everything is a
priority, nothing is a priority. But I believe the members on
both sides of the aisle feel very strongly about the
interdiction process continuing and being successful.
We have a homeland security problem with the infiltration
of drugs in our country. And let us not kid ourselves. The
terror on our streets is something that is not written about
too much lately. The Coast Guard--we have to rely on the Coast
Guard primarily to continue. This is homeland security and it
may not be somebody bringing in a bomb. To me, there is no
difference in that bomb and the drugs that are killing adults
as well as kids. And I am glad and I know you are trying to
make that effort more substantial. And I appreciate it and I
salute your entire Coast Guard.
But I want you to know, we feel very, very serious about
that issue. And I hope, Mr. Chairman, that we can look into
that specifically down the road.
Mr. Lungren. I thank the gentleman. I might say when I was
out there for my briefing with Pacific Command, I got no
suggestion that there has been any slacking on the interdiction
efforts with respect to drugs.
Admiral Collins. Sir, in fact, I agree there is nothing
more homeland ``security-ish'' than counterdrugs, and we have
continued to put great effort into that. Last year, we had an
all-time record interdiction year. We seized 241,000 pounds of
cocaine at sea. Broke the previous record by 100,000 pounds.
And this year we are ahead of that record-breaking pace. We are
putting attention to it and I think we are getting great
results.
Mr. Lungren. And I would suspect that your increased
emphasis on intelligence helps in that regard.
The gentleman from Rhode Island, Mr. Langevin, is
recognized for 5 minutes.
Mr. Langevin. Thank you Mr. Chairman. Admiral, thank you
for being here today and for your testimony. As you know, Rhode
Island has a long and proud maritime history and we have always
enjoyed strong ties with the Coast Guard and we appreciate your
service and everything that the Coast Guard does to keep our
waterways safe. I am glad to hear today in your testimony you
were talking about maritime awareness and your focus and your
concern about that, and I share that concern.
I have had several opportunities to receive a demonstration
of a very impressive maritime security system known as Project
Athena that is located at Raytheon in Portsmouth, Rhode Island.
Project Athena architecture is the same as that used by NORAD
for the national air picture; Raytheon solipsys data fusion
software, which fuses data from multiple sensors over vast
areas to monitor airborne and surface platforms and has the
potential to integrate undersea targets of interest as well. I
have been a strong supporter of Athena's work and its
capabilities continue to grow and improve each time I have had
the opportunity to visit the site.
In addition to the obvious regional interest in protecting
Narragansett Bay and Port of Providence, I really now see its a
great potential for national homeland defense application as
well. I believe that two gentlemen from the Coast Guard, Mr.
Jeff High and Rear Admiral Joe Nimick recently had a chance to
see Athena's potential firsthand. I am curious whether you were
briefed about their visit and what their assessment was and
whether the Coast Guard has any plans to integrate Project
Athena's technology and plans to integrate the technology into
any current or future operation. I know Raytheon is eager to
contribute to maritime security in any way that is possible,
and I believe that Athena could be a critical tool for our
country.
Admiral Collins. I asked them to visit based on the
correspondence that you sent me. I have yet to get a downbrief
from them on their experience and am looking forward to that
soon and we will crank it into the equation. We are in the
formative stages of our maritime domain awareness effort and
our national plan to achieve maritime domain awareness and
looking at various procedures, systems, and doctrine to attain
it. And this will be part of the mosaic and some of the options
we can look at.
Mr. Langevin. It is an impressive capability. And I hope
you have the opportunity to go see it for yourself. I know Dr.
McQueary has been out there and Secretary McHale from homeland
defense has had the opportunity to personally visit the site
and it would be an eye opener.
Another area I want to turn to is basically the ability to
do the job right now with current resources. One of my primary
concerns is whether the Coast Guard has the resources to
adequately perform its new homeland security responsibilities.
And I know we have been talking about that here today, and one
area of particular interest to me is the movement of LNG
tankers through New England ports and waterways and the
possibility of a proposed expansion of an LNG facility in
Providence. The Coast Guard officials in my region that I have
had the opportunity to meet with have indicated to me that
their staff and vessels are already stretched very thin,
particularly for LNG traffic, and it would be a great challenge
to ensure security of additional LNG traffic in the area. I
know that LNG tankers are only a small part of the Coast
Guard's homeland security responsibilities, but this anecdote
really does seem to point to a larger concern about the ability
of the Coast Guard to perform its security functions with
existing resources.
So my question, Admiral, would be whether you feel the
Coast Guard has sufficient resources to reliably perform the
requirements that you have been charged with; and, if not,
whether the authorization levels in H.R. 889 will provide the
necessary boost or whether more still has to be done to
adequately enhance the Coast Guard's capability.
Admiral Collins. The short answer is no. I have talked to
the commanding officer stationed at Castle Hill on this issue,
who incidentally just received the National Award for
Leadership, and one of our very best, and to look at what the
proper configuration is. In the 2006 budget, there is a line
item for more people and dollars for boat crews specifically
for LNG. And so that is the next increment and I hope that will
get supported with Congress. With that, we will have additional
boat crews and additional staff to oversee the security
associated with LNG. That is step number one and that is a good
step. If that can get supported, we are able to beef up places
like Narragansett Bay.
Mr. Lungren. The gentleman's time has expired. The Chair
would ask unanimous consent that the gentlelady from the Virgin
Islands, Ms. Christensen, who is a member of the committee but
not the subcommittee, be allowed to ask questions for 5
minutes. Without objection, so ordered.
Mrs. Christensen. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I would like to
welcome you, Admiral and thank you for the team that you have
in Puerto Rico that assists us and the U.S. Virgin Islands. Of
course they are very stretched. And I noticed that the Coast
Guard released a report on its current interagency operational
centers and its plans to create 40 additional centers. And I
was wondering what plans might we anticipate to have either
Puerto Rico expanded to be able to reach over to the U.S.
Virgin Islands where we have almost 200 miles of open borders,
while they are now mostly in the Mona Passage, or have our own
center.
Admiral Collins. Just one point in clarification. These are
not new centers. We are taking existing centers and converting
them. So in reshaping them and enhancing them, those are
existing centers that were part of our creation of sectors
around the Coast Guard. We are integrating our field structure,
and along with that, enhancing the existing command and control
operation centers within those entities. And we are doing that
around the country. It is called our 2010 project. Sector
Puerto Rico will be included in that. And exactly what its
reach will be in terms of sensors and so forth, I don't have at
my disposal. But there is a project in the Miami area called
Project Hawkeye that ties together Fort Lauderdale, Miami, and
Key West with AIS and radar sensors into this new command and
control center.
Mrs. Christensen. I hope that in the plans we could get a
permanent cutter in the Virgin Islands. We don't have one as
yet.
In your statement, you talk about a layered defense in
starting overseas to extend, you know, the defense layer. And I
was wondering about the operations in the Caribbean in general
and what your operations are there and how much are the island
nations in the Caribbean able to support your efforts, because
we hear from them all of the time that they are really strapped
and unable--.
Admiral Collins. Take the Caribbean Basin as a whole, I get
an operations brief every morning. I look at the force
structure every morning. If you look at that, you will see an
international force structure. We have French, British, Dutch,
the United States, United States Navy, and Coast Guard working
together in a team in a coordinated way through Joint
Interagency Task Force south out of Key West. I think it is a
terrific team and gets wonderful results and it is
international in scope. And we have Coast Guard law enforcement
detachments on British ships.
Mrs. Christensen. I have been on one of the Dutch ships as
they come into the Virgin Islands. What about the readiness of
their ports? Have they met the criteria to be approved? Because
we have a lot of small cargo in between the islands and we have
had a lot of difficulty either getting those boats in or out.
Admiral Collins. I will get back to you on the record and
the detail, but my recollection is that they all have reported
compliant. And with the 26--and I don't know if Caribbean
countries are a number among the 26 visits. We have already
made international visits. But if they have, none have been
identified as deficient, as not meeting the basic intent of
those standards.
Inserted for the Record
Twelve Caribbean Island nations trade with the U.S. and are on the
IPS Program country list: Antigua, Bahamas, Barbados, Cuba, Dominica,
Dominican Republic, Grenada, Haiti, Jamaica, Saint Lucia, Saint
Vincent, and Trinidad. All twelve countries reported their compliance
with the ISPS Code. This report is made to the International Maritime
Organization (IMO) for SOLAS signatory countries and U.S. Coast Guard
for non-SOLAS signatory countries. The Coast Guard has visited the
Bahamas, Dominican Republic, Jamaica and Trinidad as part of our IPS
Program. Based upon our visits, all four countries have substantially
implemented the ISPS Code. The remaining countries will be visited
within the next two years.
Mrs. Christensen. I see my time is almost up. I want to
associate myself with the remarks of my colleague from New
Jersey about the drug interdiction. I notice that you say you
have done better on search and rescue, which is another area
that I was very concerned about, because I lost a young man
from my district with whom I had been very close, who had been
in the water for 36 hours before he was lost, and his companion
made it. And I am hoping you will continue your efforts in that
regard.
Admiral Collins. That is our bread-and-butter mission for
us. Anything that is associated with saving a life, whether a
security issue or safety issue, that is our number one
priority. We are maintaining our standards and our readiness
posture for search and rescue. And we will not back off of that
one inch.
Mr. Lungren. Admiral, I have a few more questions and I
want to start another round for those who are here remaining. I
would like to ask you about the maritime safety and security
teams. I know you are very proud of them. I know recently you
have established an enhanced maritime safety and security team
with the express purpose of providing greater prevention and
response capabilities for WMD events. It is my understanding
the Coast Guard has asked the Congress for some clarification
in legislation to ensure that they can be deployed
internationally if needed, since current legislation appears to
restrict MMSTs to domestic operations.
What is the essential difference between the enhanced
maritime safety and security teams from the original ones? How
do they strengthen the maritime security mission? Is there
additional legislative authority you believe you need in order
to do your job? And why would you need it with respect to
international activities as opposed to domestic activity?
Admiral Collins. Let me start with the difference. The
enhanced MMST is an MMST on steroids.
Mr. Lungren. I am from California, so I understand what you
are talking about.
Admiral Collins. It is night vision goggles, automatic
weapons, vertical insertion, carrying detection devices. In the
Department of Defense parlance, special operations framework,
national structure for special operations. It is Tier 2
capability. Tier 1 is that capability that can go and detect
and render safe a weapon of mass destruction. Tier 2 doesn't
have the render-safe capability, but has about everything else.
These are folks that can jump out of the sky in the middle of
the night and see things with infrared. It is training. It is
high, high-end offensive capability.
The MMST is more defensive capability and not the high end.
The MMST has canine explosive teams and underwater capability
and the like. We are outfitting three of the MMSTs with nuke-
type detection devices. We will have one on each coast.
Enhanced--we just have one. The enhanced MMST in Chesapeake
will have it. New Orleans will have it and San Diego will have
it. So we will cover gulf, west and east coasts with that. The
enhanced MMST is a schedule deployer only. It is not 7 by 24
capable. It is capable--and this has to do with resourcing. It
can do a schedule of events. It was mobilized for the national
conventions. Mobilized for the G-8 summit, et cetera. It has
dedicated helicopters.
Mr. Lungren. Why international rather than just domestic?
Admiral Collins. My lawyers say I have all the authority I
need to deploy currently. It would be nice to have additional
clarification. That is what my lawyers are thinking.
Mr. Lungren. What training do you give your analysts?
Because I am concerned about the quality of analysts. You
talked about anecdotally and you have given me a classified
briefing on several instances.
Admiral Collins. We leverage like crazy at the Department
of Defense on a lot of things. We train our pilots at
Pensacola, the Naval Training Station. Wherever we can leverage
off the United States Navy, the Marine Corps, the Department of
Defense for this training, that is what we do. A lot of our
folks get trained through Department of Defense intel structure
and it pays huge dividends for us.
Mr. Lungren. Last question, and this is a general question
but I think it is important for informing the public. Some
would suggest if they look at your deepwater proposals and look
about the whole idea of advancing our borders or putting our
borders further out for national security and homeland defense
purposes that that should be the job of the Navy and not the
Coast Guard, and are we creating a second Navy. What would you
say to the public so they would understand why you believe
deepwater is not only important for your original mission, but,
more importantly, for this homeland security mission? And how
do you make sure you are not duplicating the Navy or getting in
the Navy's way and they are not getting in your way?
Admiral Collins. Deepwater is a little bit of a misnomer.
If you look at the entire system, it is out from port and out
in. It is all of our helicopters. It is a prime asset for our
port and coastal surveillance and protection and the like. And
it is delivering, as I testified before, it is delivering
network-centric surveillance information to the entire system.
So it is indispensable to our homeland security work.
There are also--every deepwater asset is a multi-mission
asset, so it is doing everything from fisheries enforcement to
search and rescue to drug interdiction to migrant interdiction
and the like. And the difference between the Navy and the Coast
Guard, they are higher end, high-threat platforms with high-end
weapons systems. You could plot the spectrum of threat and
higher end, the Navy owns. The lower end, we are predominant.
And in the middle, there is a slight overlap, which is good for
international interest.
We have carefully discussed that relationship and that
division of labor with the Navy collaboratively for the past 4,
5, years. We have developed the document that both Vern Clark
and I have signed, have called the National Fleet Policy
Statement. And it is a document that pledges our respective
organizations to plan together our respective fleet so they are
complementary, nonredundant systems. And that is exactly what
we have done in planning out our two fleets. They are
synergistic and complementary and not redundant. We have joint
teams that determine the requirements and the performance
dimensions of each system so they are in sync with that
relationship. It is a powerful relationship.
Mr. Lungren. Thank you, Admiral. Gentlelady from
California.
Ms. Sanchez. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I really only have one question that I want to ask you and
it comes back from this GAO report that was done in June of
2004. And it said that the Coast Guard was relying on
reservists to conduct vessel and facility inspections. And as
you can imagine, many of the reservists are reaching their
Active day service limit. And I think that means you need to
find other replacements to do those inspections.
So my questions are how are you going to do that? Does the
current budget you are proposing reflect that? Are you going to
hire more full duty inspectors? Is the $114 million that you
have in the budget sufficient to carry out that responsibility?
Admiral Collins. The use of reservists through 2004 and
into 2005 was--the best way to describe it was a bridging
strategy. Through the budget, we got over 500 additional
billets last year, positions, so that we could ensure
compliance and oversee and implement the regulation. But it
takes a while to attract, train, promote or whatever you have
to do to fill those positions. So use of Reserves was a great
way to bridge, because the work couldn't be put off, and it was
a ``now'' type of a thing. We mobilized our Reserve. That is
what they are there for, to provide for surge capability, and
they performed incredibly well. They have helped us bridge, and
well on the way of getting all those things filled out.
So now we are in the tail end of transitioning from that
Reserve-dominated force to a total Active Duty force and we are
doing well. And the money is sufficient to do that. The
annualization of that 500-plus billet--in other words, we had
partial funding in 2004 until we brought them all on. The
annualization of that is in the 2006 budget. I am pleased where
we are, and I am very appreciative of the support and I think
we are in good shape.
Ms. Sanchez. I have one last question and several of the
gentlemen alluded to it in one way or the other. This is the
Homeland Security Committee and we care about homeland security
and we understand that our ports are much of the front line.
You are the first responders in the sense here, but we are
cognizant of the fact that many of us who live near ports in
the State of Washington or California, that you have other
responsibilities: water safety, drug interdiction, search and
rescue, et cetera. Do you have resources? Are you really
cannibalizing--.
Admiral Collins. It is nice to have another dollar and
another person. Someone would always say that would be nice to
have. I think that given the budget is a relative thing, you
submit it as part of the Department. Competing requirements and
competing needs, and the President has to put together a
complicated Federal budget and he has to balance.
Ms. Sanchez. We understand that, and we balance it here in
the Congress. I guess the question is, do you feel comfortable
that the original pieces of what the Coast Guard does and did
and is supposed to do for us are getting done and not falling
between the cracks because of this whole new layer of security
that we are requiring of you?
Admiral Collins. The answer is yes. I am comfortable. And
the performance of our Coast Guard men and women has been
extraordinary, number one. You could look at it several ways.
You could look at what are the number of boat hours or aircraft
hours that you apply to these different missions and how do
they compare to point X in time: What is the performance you
have achieved in each of these areas? And I would submit if you
look at mission area by mission area by mission area, our
mission performance has been extraordinary and it hasn't taken
a back seat anywhere.
If you look at our counterdrugs, we shattered previous
performance records for drug interdiction. Last year, we
interdicted the highest amount of migrants we interdicted in
the last 10 years. Our SAR, we have exceeded our performance
standards for search and rescue. If you look at every
performance dimension, I think we are answering the mail, and
men and women doing some extraordinary things.
Ms. Sanchez. Thank you.
Mr. Lungren. The gentleman from Washington.
Mr. Dicks. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Let us go back to deepwater. I serve on the Appropriations
Committee and I was concerned when the subcommittee, Mr.
Rogers' subcommittee, cut 466 million out of the budget for
deepwater. Now, as I understood it, and the Chairman told us in
our full committee markup, was that there had been certain
reports that had not been submitted and that that is why they
were taking this large cut.
What comments--are we going to get the reports? I assume
the Chairman is going to get the reports that he wants over the
time frame that he wants.
Admiral Collins. This is probably the most frustrating 3 or
4 months since I have been in Washington, and I have been in
and out of Washington 15 years. The issue was the
Appropriations Committee wanted the full new rebaseline
implementation plan for 2006 and outyears. And that was in the
2005 appropriations bill; that was the stated requirements
submitted along with the 2006 request when it came up this
February. We weren't able to deliver on that direction. We
couldn't get the consensus within the administration to get the
information up here. And so we were late on the initial
submittal. The initial submittal came up. It wasn't seen as
responsive by the chairman and his staff. And thankfully, at
the end of last month, I think we have answered the mail. We
have got the full package of information through the
administration and into the committee. And my feedback is they
are basically pleased with the package we have given them and
we will have meetings with them to follow up. So the
information is there.
Mr. Dicks. Now GAO has also stated that deepwater has
serious management challenges that have to be addressed;
contractual deadlines are going to be met if costs are to
remain within the budget. What do you have to say about that?
Admiral Collins. I say this is the ongoing partnership with
GAO. They have been our--we have been thrilled--they have been
part of the deepwater program for the last 7 years. In the
formation of the strategy, they are always poking a critical
finger at it, which we have welcomed and we have taken every
bit of advice from them and we have tweaked and we have molded
and improved the structure. There are 11 areas that they
pointed out that have to be attended to. We are well on our way
of attending to them. A good number of them have been checked
off.
Mr. Dicks. Let me give you a couple of these for the
record. The GAO reported last year that the primary contract
management teams are understaffed, insufficiently trained and
lack decision-making authority. Has that been reversed?
Admiral Collins. In large measure, it has. And we have
worked with the project staff, brought both contracted and
ours; enhanced the training, enhanced the partnering construct,
increased the training. I would be glad to give you a blow-by-
blow point/counterpoint with here are the 11 GAO issues and
this is where we are in meeting all of those. I would be glad
to provide that to you and for the record.
Mr. Dicks. Mr. Chairman, I think this would be a good
subject for another hearing, because this is a big part of
our--.
Mr. Lungren. Could we request it in writing and take a look
at it?
Admiral Collins. I would be glad to provide this for the
record and take a look at it.
[The information follows:]
Inserted for the Record
UPDATE AS OF: 10 May 2005, GAO RECOMMENDATIONS COAST GUARD (CG) INTEGRATED DEEPWATER SYSTEM (IDS) ACQUISITION
SCHEDULE AND CONTRACT MANAGEMENT AUDITS
Note: Items in BOLD reflect brief description of Coast Guard's comment to GAO's response to action taken. Coast
Guard IDS Program has also provided five briefings, four update letters and responded to frequent requests for
conference calls and deliverables in the past year. The IDS Program embraces GAO's recommendations and will
continue to communication with them and provide periodic updates to the status of recommendations.
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
RECOMMENDATION ACTION TAKEN CG COMMENT
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
ACQUISITION SCHEDULE AUDIT: The Deepwater program updated its CG will continue to update its
Update the original 2002 Integrated Master Schedule (IMS) in Integrated Master Schedule (IMS)
Deepwater acquisition schedule time to support the 2006 budget every 6 months and provide GAO
in time to support the fiscal submission and will continue to do so additional clarity regarding its use
year 2006 Deepwater budget every 6 months. and capability as needed.
submission to DHS and Congress
and at least once a year
thereafter to support each
budget submission.
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
CONTRACT MANAGEMENT AUDIT: Training programs and processes All IPTs are now chartered and an
Increase Integrated Product Team improved and fully automated. Metrics improvement to 80% of members have
(IPT) effectiveness by training updated on monthly basis. IPT received IPPD entry level training;
IPTs in a timely manner, Measures of Success (MOS) have CG will continue to manage these
chartering sub-IPTs, and making improved and charters for IPTs processes in a timely manner, define
improvements in electronic updated. Domain Management Teams IPT team roles and responsibilities
information-sharing system. (DMT) were established to manage and improve IPT effectiveness and
product IPTs, as a result of information systems.
continued emphasis on improvement.
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Require notification to the Coast Integrated Coast Guard Systems (ICGS) Coast Guard will ensure compliance.
Guard, including ``buy'' will notify the Coast Guard one week
alternatives considered, for prior to implementation of a decision
``make'' decisions on if the amount is greater than $10M,
subcontracts valued at over $5M. which comports with the respective
Federal Acquisition Regulation (FAR).
Policy was adopted in July 2004.
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Human Capital Plan (HCP) policy The HCP provides the overarching Coast Guard is taking steps as
implementation to ensure guidance and the implementation of a indicated and will strive to achieve
adequate staffing and Deepwater Human Capital Solutions HCP and GAO objectives, while
proactively address personnel Database provides for the execution. improving results.
turnover. Workforce planning and coordination
is addressed in the HCP. The program
is adhering to requirements to ensure
that the workforce is aligned with
the program needs at every phase of
the acquisition. These defined
processes focus on key components of
workforce effectiveness including
training, leadership, knowledge
management, recruiting, retention and
culture development. Turnover risk
mitigation steps taken, additional
billets assigned and certified
program management support contracted
to bridge gaps.
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Timely communication of asset Transition team pursuing aggressive Coast Guard will continue to take
transition information to field outreach plan that continues to steps as indicated to achieve
units. expand with program execution. Over objectives and improve results,
100 field visits have been completed while closely monitoring transition
since July 2004. Maintenance and requirements for critical internal
support systems, databases and communications.
documentation have improved based on
actual application and user feedback.
Additional training sessions, hot
washes and conferences conducted to
ensure continued support and that
operational commanders remain
knowledgeable. Field personnel also
serve on IPTs and as liaison for
related training and maintenance
activities. ICGS has placed site
representatives at key field
locations in anticipation of asset
deployment. Internal outreach plan
implemented by Deepwater
Communications Management Team. Input
and feedback obtained, Survey
Implementation Plan developed, and
Survey System executed.
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Development and adherence to Coast Guard has incorporated CG will continue to use measurable
measurable award fee criteria. measurable award fee criteria and award fee criteria.
will use this criteria in the future.
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Consideration of award fee Coast Guard has standardized the CG will continue to consider COTR
assessment input from the method to compile Performance Monitor input through a standardized
Contracting Officer Technical input and subsequent revisions. methodology and ensure performance
Representative (COTR). monitors' input is included as part
of the award fee determination.
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
ICGS accountability for improved Award fee criteria have been revised CG will continue to evaluate ICGS
IPT effectiveness included in to incorporate specific IPT metrics accountability for improved IPT
future award fee determinations. during the current award fee effectiveness.
evaluation, including Integrated
Product and Process Development
(IPPD) administration, management
commitment, collaboration, and IPPD
training.
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Develop a comprehensive plan to The Coast Guard and ICGS agree with CG will continue to incorporate an
evaluate ICGS accountability for the emphasis on competition as a assessment of the steps the system
ensuring out-year competition method of achieving cost control. integrator is taking to foster
among second-tier suppliers. Prices originally contained in competition at the major
Section B of the contract represent subcontractor level.
fair and reasonable pricing obtained
as a result of competition. In Award
Term evaluations, the Coast Guard
will specifically examine ICGS'
ability to control cost throughout
the evaluation period by assessing
the degree to which ICGS fosters
competition at the major subcontract
level; ICGS' project management
structure and processes to control
costs, market surveys, or similar
assets and major subsystems.
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Establish a time frame, based on The program has a comprehensive CG will continue to execute and
the current asset delivery framework and methodologies for improve its comprehensive framework
schedule, for measuring the measuring performance. The program and methodologies for measuring
contractor's performance toward uses the Balanced Scorecard (BSC) performance as assets are delivered.
improving Operational framework and developed a ``Strategy The Integrated Master Schedule (IMS)
Effectiveness with the Map'', an industry best-practice, in has been updated starting with the
appropriate degree of fidelity. order to develop program objective FY06 budget request and will be
and measures that not only support updated every 6 months based on
the BSC perspectives but also GAO's recommendation to update the
identify linkages to the Department schedule annually in its audit
of Homeland Security Goals, USCG report, ``Acquisition Schedule
Programs and Deepwater goals. The Update Needed''.
Earned Value Management System (EVMS)
compares actual cost and schedule
results with planned cost and
schedule using an enterprise-wide
EVMS. The Deepwater Performance
Measurement System (DPMS) was
implemented as a web-based tool for
every member of the program to view
overall program status and current
metrics at any given time. The
Deepwater program, with its defined
performance standards and performance-
measurement plan determines
operational effectiveness, total
ownership cost, and customer
satisfaction.
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Refine Total Ownership Cost (TOC) The program established a TOC baseline CG provided explanation to GAO. GAO
baseline that compares the IDS for the entire program at $78.0B in was given a copy of the MNS by DHS
acquisition approach to the cost FY02 dollars, which is lower than the and has a copy of the Implementation
of a traditional acquisition. traditional business as usual Plan. CG will continue to work with
acquisition approach, projected at GAO to provide further clarity as
$83.76B in FY02 dollars, by the the program progresses.
Logistics Management Institute (LMI).
The TOC baseline has been refined to
enable comparison of the IDS
acquisition approach to the cost of
traditional acquisitions.
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Establish criteria for adjusting The Program adjusts the contract CG provided explanation to GAO and
the TOC baseline and ensure that baseline based on approved Program took action to establish criteria
the reasons for such changes are Decision Memorandums from the Agency for adjusting the TOC baseline. CG
documented. Acquisition Executive (AAE). The will continue to work with GAO to
Performance Measurement Team provide further clarity as the
established a database system that program progresses.
tracks the impact of contract changes
to the TOC of the program and changes
approved by the AAE.
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Mr. Dicks. In addition, the GAO stated that the Coast Guard
did not hold the system integrator accountable for its
performance and the Coast Guard has not developed the
comprehensive schedule to measure progress. According to GAO
testimony in April 2005, the Coast Guard has had mixed results
in addressing the management challenges associated with
deepwater, specifically about holding the system integrator
accountable. Is that being done?
Admiral Collins. Yes, sir. And we have answered the mail on
the master schedule and it has already been delivered to GAO
and it meets their requirements. A lot of this stuff we have
already marched through and answered. And we would be glad to
give you a blow-by-blow.
Mr. Dicks. I assume that a $466 million cut in your
deepwater program would be devastating. It would require
complete restructuring?
Admiral Collins. That is obviously separate from the GAO
report, related but separate. Absolutely, sir. If we are not
able to reverse this 466, it would absolutely destroy the
current acquisition strategy. We would have to totally
restructure the program and it would stretch it out forever. We
would go back to a replacement in kind, one-for-one replacement
approach, which is absolutely the wrong approach.
This systems approach we have is truly, I think, ground-
breaking in terms of acquisition strategy. It is the right
approach. It allows the necessary tradeoffs between the
component parts and the two basic metrics for this whole system
of systems, gives us the total performance of the overall
system at the lowest total cost of ownership. That is good
stewardship and a good acquisition strategy. I would hate for
that perspective alone to reverse this. And if we don't turn
this around, it will implode.
Mr. Dicks. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Lungren. I thank the gentleman. And thank you, Admiral
Collins, for your valuable testimony. The members of the
committee may have some additional questions for you, sir, and
we will ask you to respond to those in writing in addition to
what we just talked about with the gentleman from Washington.
The hearing record will be open for 10 days and the
committee stands adjourned.
[Whereupon, at 3:50 p.m., the subcommittee was adjourned.]
A P P E N D I X
---------- --
--------
Questions Submitted For the Record
Responses to the following questions have not been received.
1. As required by the Coast Guard and Maritime Transportation Act
of 2004 (P.L. 108-293), the Coast Guard recently released a report on
its current interagency operational centers and its plans to create up
to 40 additional centers in the future. The report did not address
whether future centers will be solely Coast Guard centers or if they
will be run and staffed by multiple agencies and serve multiple
purposes. An April 2005 GAO report has shown that centers constructed
on the interagency model have improved the effectiveness of
coordinating operations and information sharing.
When will you provide the Homeland Security Committee
with a copy of this report?
What plans, if any does the Coast Guard have to create
additional operational centers that are interagency in nature,
as opposed to centers constructed on the single-agency, single-
purpose model?
When will these centers be operational?
Where will the Coast Guard centers be located?
2. I understand that the MTSA was an important first step in
improving our port security.
Admiral Collins--Could you tell me what further
actions are needed beyond meeting MTSA requirements to improve
security at our nation's ports?
3. Clearly, Deepwater is a crucial program since the Coast Guard
needs to replace its outdated cutters, aircraft used to patrol our
ports and the communications systems used on these assets. Many of us
have supported accelerating the program to ensure that the men and
women of the Coast Guard have the equipment they need to protect our
ports. The GAO issued a report last year that stated that the Deepwater
program is plagued with management problems. For example, the report
stated that the Coast Guard has not held the contractor accountable,
that the Deepwater program is understaffed, and that there is no
acquisition schedule in order to measure progress. The GAO testified in
April 2005, that the Coast Guard has taken some but NOT all of the GAO
recommended steps.
Admiral, when will the Coast Guard fully implement the
GAO recommendations for this critical program?
4. Currently helicopters and small airplanes are performing touch
and go's and aerobatics on the bridge to Terminal Island at the Port of
Los Angeles--not only do these ``tricks'' contribute to noise issues,
but more importantly, there appears to be a strong margin for error
where these touch and go's are concerned. It is my understanding that
the FAA currently controls the air space over the Port and that the
USCG has no jurisdiction over this air space.
As we are moving towards collaboration and cooperation
in this post 9-11 environment, and working to secure our ports
and borders, what types of protocol are in place and has there
been communication with the FAA on this issue?
If not, is there a way that Congress may help?
5. The Coast Guard and TSA are responsible for developing the
Transportation Worker Identification Card or TWIC. The MTSA required
the development of the TWIC card. The program is way behind schedule.
The delay is a problem for transportation security, but it is an
especially big security challenge at our ports.
When will DHS begin issuing TWIC cards and what is the
revised schedule for completion of the initial issuance?
Inserted for the Record
Oversight and Management of the U.S. Coast Guard's
Integrated Deepwater System
Rear Adm. Patrick M. Stillman, USCG, Program Executive Officer,
Integrated Deepwater System, U.S. Coast Guard Headquearters,
Washington, D.C.,
24 April 2005
Introduction
During congressional testimony in March and April 2005, Margaret
Wrightson, Director of Homeland Security and Justice for the Government
Accountability Office (GAO), discussed the constructive nature of GAO's
relationship with the Integrated Deepwater System (IDS) Program. This
testimony incorporated GAO's ongoing analysis of the Coast Guard, and
actions taken on GAO recommendations from reports issued in 2004 on the
Integrated Deepwater System (IDS).
GAO's 2004 recommendations focused on four main areas of
improvement, the Deepwater acquisition schedule, program management,
contractor accountability, and cost controls. In conjunction with these
GAO recommendations, the Program has made significant advancements to
strengthen business operations and managerial practices--leading to
noteworthy improvements in the acquisition.
As Ms. Wrightson stated, ``I compliment the Coast Guard on their
very nimble approach to responding to GAO's findings and
recommendations even while we're conducting our work. . . . When GAO
goes out and finds a problem, before I can get the report written, the
Coast Guard is actively engaging with us in a way to fix it.''
Deepwater Acquisition Schedule
Deepwater's acquisition schedule, or Integrated Management System
(IMS), is intended to enable the Coast Guard and its industry partner,
Integrated Coast Guard Systems (ICGS), to track the cost, schedule, and
performance of every contract in the Deepwater Program. GAO cited
concerns in 2004 about the IMS's reliability, and further stated a need
to update the schedule annually.
At that time, ICGS had initiated a third-party independent review
of the IMS that during the ensuing months overhauled the entire system.
Additionally, the Coast Guard will have ICGS update the implementation
plan twice each year, which exceeds the GAO recommendation for annual
updates.
This work resulted in a greatly enhanced acquisition schedule that
allows monitoring of contractual successes and areas in need of
attention. As Ms. Wrightson testified, this IMS now provides the Coast
Guard and ICGS with ``a much better visibility into where they are with
each particular part of the acquisition.''
Program Management
Deepwater Program Management improvements began with the
restructuring of IDS Integrated Product Teams (IPTs). Recognizing the
notable success of IPTs in improving cost, schedule, and performance in
industry and certain government product--development programs, the
Coast Guard and ICGS instituted IPTs at the program's inception. GAO
offered guidance that proved very helpful in enabling the IDS-ICGS team
to resource, train, and empower Deepwater IPTs to meet their
responsibilities more effectively.
IPT Measures of Success, which track training, member empowerment,
application of project management processes, and communication and
collaboration both within the IPT and with the IPT customer, have
improved 69 percent since ICGS introduced them in August 2003.
Deepwater also upgraded a computer-based information-sharing system to
facilitate better document management, program oversight, and timely
exchanges of information.
GAO also identified aspects of Deepwater human capital management
as a risk to the program. In response, Deepwater helped stabilize
turnover rates by converting certain military positions (subject to
normal rotations) to civilian billets. Additionally, the Coast Guard
sought to retain institutional knowledge and insulate the program
against inevitable personnel changes by hiring experienced program
managers as support contractors and better preparing military officers
with advanced training before they report to the program. Human capital
management remains a long term challenge.
GAO faulted the Coast Guard and ICGS a year ago for not
communicating more effectively to the field about the status of the
program and the assets that fleet operators would be receiving. Team
Deepwater consequently conducted more than 100 outreach visits to key
``Operations and Support'' units since March 2004, invited Coast Guard
field personnel to serve on Integrated Product Teams and as local
contacts for training and maintenance issues, and assigned ICGS site
representatives at key field locations.
The Deepwater team also increased the quality and quantity of
communication products targeting the Coast Guard's internal audience.
Improved documentation now allows field operators to better understand
the equipment they have or will receive, and enhanced maintenance
system databases facilitate faster repairs when necessary. In the
Program Executive Office, the Deepwater Communications Team surveyed
the Coast Guard internal audience and established benchmarking data to
track information-sharing effectiveness to guide its efforts to ensure
that Coast Guard information needs outside of Headquarters are met
appropriately.
Contractor Accountability
The Program's main source of contractor performance is an
increasingly comprehensive ``Strategy Map'' (also an industry best
practice) that identifies program objectives, measures, and
accomplishments. The Strategy Map links the Department of Homeland
Security goals to specific I DS goals. This strategy map relies upon
several assessments of contractor accountability:
Earned Value Management compares actual contractor cost
and schedule to projected amounts.
Integrated Product Team (IPT) Performance evaluates the
effectiveness of joint Coast Guard/contractor development efforts.
Risk Mitigation identifies factors threatening cost,
schedule, and performance.
Contract Deliverables provide insight into timely delivery
of key contractor outputs.
Technical Performance Measures indicate whether actual
technical specifics of assets/system meet the projected technical
specifications.
Customer Satisfaction assesses the Coast Guard's
impression of contractor performance in delivering the system.
Operational Test & Evaluation demonstrates how the
delivered system performs under actual operating conditions.
Operational Performance Measures reveal actual year-end
performance results and modeled performance projections using the Coast
Guard's model.
Readiness Measures link to the Coast Guard Readiness
Measurement System to capture information deepwater asset availability,
casualties, mission capabilities, and human capital status.
The Coast Guard also conducts formal, periodic assessments of ICGS
intended to both incentivize ICGS to improve program execution with
potential award fees and discourage low performance by establishing a
body of records in preparation for the Coast Guard's decision whether
or not ICGS has earned a subsequent award term. In accordance with GAO
recommendations, the Coast Guard has refined the process through which
program managers provide assessments, and increased the objectivity of
the criteria used to assess ICGS performance.
GAO also focused on Deepwater Total Ownership Cost measurement as a
means of ensuring contractor accountability. The Coast Guard
understands that Total Ownership Costs (TOC) is a key performance
factor. We have developed criteria for managing the TOC baseline to
ensure that reasons for changes are well justified and documented. Any
changes to Deepwater's baseline are accompanied by a TOC analysis. In
addition, the Coast Guard continually examines innovative ways to
reduce Deepwater TOC.
Cost Control through Competition
The Deepwater contract was competed over several years, and the
Coast Guard analyzed multiple industry solutions before selecting ICGS.
GAO, among other independent parties, previously endorsed the results
of that competition. Additionally, Lockheed Martin and Northrop
Grumman's respective procurement systems are validated by Department of
Defense audit agencies on a periodic basis.
However, the Deepwater Program spans more than two decades and
represents an extraordinarily wide scope composed of a multitude of
subsystems. GAD seeks to ensure that competition within the IDS did not
end with the selection of ICGS, and the Coast Guard has bolstered its
assessment of ICGS subcontractor competition. More specifically, the
Coast Guard examines ICGS ability to control cost during periodic
award-term evaluations. It will base future IDS award terms, in part,
on the degree to which ICGS makes competitive lower-tier awards. A
third party independent assessment of competition employment by ICGS
and it's prime subcontractors is ongoing.
ICGS has agreed to notify the Coast Guard prior to deviating from
the accepted contract proposal if it decides to execute work in-house
above $10 million that was proposed to be subcontracted by a company
other than the ICGS prime contractor.
Conclusion
As evidenced by these significant improvements in the last year,
the Coast Guard and ICGS have embraced the GAD's observations and
continue to reinforce the Deepwater Program's foundation and execution
as it matures. Throughout that time, the Deepwater Team has maintained
a working dialogue with the GAD, first by proactively issuing periodic
update letters throughout the year, and recently hosting a series of
meetings and providing written responses to significant data requests
as the GAD prepares for testimony in 2005. As Ms. Wrightson testified
to Congress in April, GAD is ``working with the Coast Guard to put the
internal controls and other management that we asked for into place.
And once that's done, one will still need to monitor that program
because of its complexities.''
The Deepwater Program, a performance-based acquisition that unites
air, surface, logistics, and C4ISR domains, is an unprecedented
endeavor. Deepwater's mission, to properly equip the Coast Guard
charged with preserving our maritime security and safety at an
affordable cost to the American taxpayer, mandates continuous
introspective improvements as well as external oversight.