[House Report 109-392]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
109th Congress Rept. 109-392
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
2d Session Part 1
======================================================================
DARFUR PEACE AND ACCOUNTABILITY ACT OF 2006
_______
March 14, 2006.--Ordered to be printed
_______
Mr. Hyde, from the Committee on International Relations, submitted the
following
R E P O R T
[To accompany H.R. 3127]
The Committee on International Relations, to whom was
referred the bill (H.R. 3127) to impose sanctions against
individuals responsible for genocide, war crimes, and crimes
against humanity, to support measures for the protection of
civilians and humanitarian operations, and to support peace
efforts in the Darfur region of Sudan, and for other purposes,
having considered the same, reports favorably thereon with an
amendment and recommends that the bill as amended do pass.
TABLE OF CONTENTS
Page
The Amendment.................................................... 2
Purpose and Summary.............................................. 8
Background and Need for the Legislation.......................... 9
Hearings......................................................... 13
Committee Consideration.......................................... 14
Votes of the Committee........................................... 14
Committee Oversight Findings..................................... 14
New Budget Authority and Tax Expenditures........................ 14
Committee Cost Estimate.......................................... 14
Performance Goals and Objectives................................. 14
Constitutional Authority Statement............................... 15
Section-by-Section Analysis...................................... 15
New Advisory Committees.......................................... 19
Congressional Accountability Act................................. 19
Federal Mandates................................................. 19
Changes in Existing Law Made by the Bill, as Reported............ 19
The Amendment
The amendment is as follows:
Strike all after the enacting clause and insert the
following:
SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE; TABLE OF CONTENTS.
(a) Short Title.--This Act may be cited as the ``Darfur Peace and
Accountability Act of 2006'' .
(b) Table of Contents.--The table of contents of this Act is as
follows:
Sec. 1. Short title; table of contents.
Sec. 2. Definitions.
Sec. 3. Findings.
Sec. 4. Sense of Congress.
Sec. 5. Sanctions in support of peace in Darfur.
Sec. 6. Additional authorities to deter and suppress genocide in
Darfur.
Sec. 7. Multilateral efforts.
Sec. 8. Continuation of restrictions.
Sec. 9. Assistance efforts in Sudan.
Sec. 10. Reports.
Sec. 11. Rule of construction.
SEC. 2. DEFINITIONS.
In this Act:
(1) Appropriate congressional committees.--The term
``appropriate congressional committees'' means the Committee on
International Relations of the House of Representatives and the
Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate.
(2) Government of sudan.--
(A) In general.--The term ``Government of Sudan''
means the National Congress Party, formerly known as
the National Islamic Front, led-government in Khartoum,
Sudan, or any successor government formed on or after
the date of the enactment of this Act (including the
coalition National Unity Government agreed upon in the
Comprehensive Peace Agreement for Sudan), except that
such term does not include the regional Government of
Southern Sudan.
(B) Officials of the government of sudan.--The term
``Government of Sudan'', when used with respect to an
official of the Government of Sudan, does not include
an individual--
(i) who was not a member of such government
prior to July 1, 2005; or
(ii) who is a member of the regional
Government of Southern Sudan.
(3) Comprehensive peace agreement for sudan.--The term
``Comprehensive Peace Agreement for Sudan'' means the peace
agreement signed by the Government of Sudan and the Sudan
People's Liberation Movement/Army (SPLM/A) in Nairobi, Kenya,
on January 9, 2005.
SEC. 3. FINDINGS.
Congress makes the following findings:
(1) On July 22, 2004, the House of Representatives and the
Senate declared that the atrocities occurring in the Darfur
region of Sudan are genocide.
(2) On September 9, 2004, Secretary of State Colin L. Powell
stated before the Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate,
``genocide has been committed in Darfur,'' and ``the Government
of Sudan and the [Janjaweed] bear responsibility--and genocide
may still be occurring''.
(3) On September 21, 2004, in an address before the United
Nations General Assembly, President George W. Bush affirmed the
Secretary of State's finding and stated,``[a]t this hour, the
world is witnessing terrible suffering and horrible crimes in
the Darfur region of Sudan, crimes my government has concluded
are genocide''.
(4) On July 30, 2004, the United Nations Security Council
passed Security Council Resolution 1556, calling upon the
Government of Sudan to disarm the Janjaweed militias and to
apprehend and bring to justice Janjaweed leaders and their
associates who have incited and carried out violations of human
rights and international humanitarian law, and establishing a
ban on the sale or supply of arms and related materiel of all
types, including the provision of related technical training or
assistance, to all nongovernmental entities and individuals,
including the Janjaweed.
(5) On September 18, 2004, the United Nations Security
Council passed Security Council Resolution 1564, determining
that the Government of Sudan had failed to meet its obligations
under Security Council Resolution 1556, calling for a military
flight ban in and over the Darfur region, demanding the names
of Janjaweed militiamen disarmed and arrested for verification,
establishing an International Commission of Inquiry on Darfur
to investigate violations of international humanitarian and
human rights laws, and threatening sanctions should the
Government of Sudan fail to fully comply with Security Council
Resolutions 1556 and 1564, including such actions as to affect
Sudan's petroleum sector or individual members of the
Government of Sudan.
(6) The Report of the International Commission of Inquiry on
Darfur, submitted to the United Nations Secretary-General on
January 25, 2005, established that the ``Government of the
Sudan and the Janjaweed are responsible for serious violations
of international human rights and humanitarian law amounting to
crimes under international law,'' that ``these acts were
conducted on a widespread and systematic basis, and therefore
may amount to crimes against humanity,'' and that Sudanese
officials and other individuals may have acted with ``genocidal
intent''.
(7) The Report of the International Commission of Inquiry on
Darfur further notes that, pursuant to its mandate and in the
course of its work, the Commission had collected information
relating to individual perpetrators of acts constituting
``violations of international human rights law and
international humanitarian law, including crimes against
humanity and war crimes'' and that a sealed file containing the
names of those individual perpetrators had been delivered to
the United Nations Secretary-General.
(8) On March 24, 2005, the United Nations Security Council
passed Security Council Resolution 1590, establishing the
United Nations Mission in Sudan (UNMIS), consisting of up to
10,000 military personnel and 715 civilian police tasked with
supporting implementation of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement
for Sudan and ``closely and continuously liais[ing] and
coordinat[ing] at all levels with the African Union Mission in
Sudan (AMIS) with a view towards expeditiously reinforcing the
effort to foster peace in Darfur''.
(9) On March 29, 2005, the United Nations Security Council
passed Security Council Resolution 1591, extending the military
embargo established by Security Council Resolution 1556 to all
the parties to the N'djamena Ceasefire Agreement of April 8,
2004, and any other belligerents in the states of North Darfur,
South Darfur, and West Darfur, calling for an asset freeze and
travel ban against those individuals who impede the peace
process, constitute a threat to stability in Darfur and the
region, commit violations of international humanitarian or
human rights law or other atrocities, are responsible for
offensive military overflights, or violate the military
embargo, and establishing a Committee of the Security Council
and a Panel of Experts to assist in monitoring compliance with
Security Council Resolutions 1556 and 1591.
(10) On March 31, 2005, the United Nations Security Council
passed Security Council Resolution 1593, referring the
situation in Darfur since July 1, 2002, to the prosecutor of
the International Criminal Court and calling on the Government
of Sudan and all parties to the conflict to cooperate fully
with the Court.
(11) In remarks before the G-8 Summit on June 30, 2005,
President Bush reconfirmed that ``the violence in Darfur is
clearly genocide'' and ``the human cost is beyond
calculation''.
(12) On July 30, 2005, Dr. John Garang de Mabior, the newly
appointed Vice President of Sudan and the leader of the Sudan
People's Liberation Movement/Army (SPLM/A) for the past 21
years, was killed in a tragic helicopter crash in southern
Sudan, sparking riots in Khartoum and challenging the
commitment of all Sudanese to the Comprehensive Peace Agreement
for Sudan.
(13) Since 1993, the Secretary of State has determined that
the Republic of Sudan is a country which has repeatedly
provided support for acts of international terrorism and,
pursuant to section 6(j) of the Export Administration Act of
1979, section 40 of the Arms Export Control Act, and section
620A of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, designated Sudan as
a State Sponsor of Terrorism, thereby restricting United States
assistance, defense exports and sales, and financial and other
transactions with the Government of Sudan.
SEC. 4. SENSE OF CONGRESS.
It is the sense of Congress that--
(1) the genocide unfolding in the Darfur region of Sudan is
characterized by acts of terrorism and atrocities directed
against civilians, including mass murder, rape, and sexual
violence committed by the Janjaweed and associated militias
with the complicity and support of the National Congress Party-
led faction of the Government of Sudan;
(2) the Secretary of State should designate the Janjaweed
militia as a foreign terrorist organization pursuant to section
219 of the Immigration and Nationality Act;
(3) all parties to the conflict in the Darfur region have
continued to violate the N'djamena Ceasefire Agreement of April
8, 2004, and the Abuja Protocols of November 9, 2004, and
violence against civilians, humanitarian aid workers, and
personnel of the African Union Mission in Sudan (AMIS) is
increasing;
(4) the African Union should rapidly expand the size and
amend the mandate of the African Union Mission in Sudan to
authorize such action as may be necessary to protect civilians
and humanitarian operations, and deter violence in the Darfur
region without delay;
(5) the international community, including the United
Nations, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), the
European Union, and the United States, should immediately act
to mobilize sufficient political, military, and financial
resources to support the expansion of the African Union Mission
in Sudan so that it achieves the size, strength, and capacity
necessary for protecting civilians and humanitarian operations,
and ending the continued violence in the Darfur region;
(6) if an expanded and reinforced African Union Mission in
Sudan fails to stop genocide in the Darfur region, the
international community should take additional, dispositive
measures to prevent and suppress acts of genocide in the Darfur
region;
(7) acting under Article 5 of the Charter of the United
Nations, the United Nations Security Council should call for
suspension of the Government of Sudan's rights and privileges
of membership by the General Assembly until such time as the
Government of Sudan has honored pledges to cease attacks upon
civilians, demobilize and demilitarize the Janjaweed and
associated militias, and grant free and unfettered access for
deliveries of humanitarian assistance in the Darfur region;
(8) the President should use all necessary and appropriate
diplomatic means to ensure the full discharge of the
responsibilities of the Committee of the United Nations
Security Council and the Panel of Experts established pursuant
to section 3(a) of Security Council Resolution 1591 (March 29,
2005);
(9) the United States should not provide assistance to the
Government of Sudan, other than assistance necessary for the
implementation of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement for Sudan,
the support of the regional Government of Southern Sudan and
marginalized areas in northern Sudan (including the Nuba
Mountains, Southern Blue Nile, Abyei, Eastern Sudan (Beja),
Darfur, and Nubia), as well as marginalized peoples in and
around Khartoum, or for humanitarian purposes in Sudan, until
such time as the Government of Sudan has honored pledges to
cease attacks upon civilians, demobilize and demilitarize the
Janjaweed and associated militias, grant free and unfettered
access for deliveries of humanitarian assistance in the Darfur
region, and allow for the safe and voluntary return of refugees
and internally displaced persons;
(10) the President should seek to assist members of the
Sudanese diaspora in the United States by establishing a
student loan forgiveness program for those individuals who
commit to return to southern Sudan for a period of not less
than five years for the purpose of contributing professional
skills needed for the reconstruction of southern Sudan;
(11) the President should appoint a Presidential Envoy for
Sudan with appropriate resources and a clear mandate to provide
stewardship of efforts to implement the Comprehensive Peace
Agreement for Sudan, seek ways to bring stability and peace to
the Darfur region, address instability elsewhere in Sudan and
northern Uganda, and pursue a truly comprehensive peace
throughout the region;
(12) to achieve the goals specified in paragraph (10) and to
further promote human rights and civil liberties, build
democracy, and strengthen civil society, the Presidential Envoy
for Sudan should be empowered to promote and encourage the
exchange of individuals pursuant to educational and cultural
programs, including programs funded by the Government of the
United States;
(13) the international community should strongly condemn
attacks against humanitarian workers and demand that all armed
groups in the Darfur region, including the forces of the
Government of Sudan, the Janjaweed, associated militias, the
Sudan Liberation Movement/Army (SLM/A), the Justice and
Equality Movement (JEM), and all other armed groups refrain
from such attacks;
(14) the United States should fully support the Comprehensive
Peace Agreement for Sudan and urge rapid implementation of its
terms; and
(15) the new leadership of the Sudan People's Liberation
Movement (SPLM) should--
(A) seek to transform the SPLM into an inclusive,
transparent, and democratic body;
(B) reaffirm the commitment of the SPLM to bringing
peace not only to southern Sudan, but also to the
Darfur region, eastern Sudan, and northern Uganda; and
(C) remain united in the face of efforts to undermine
the SPLM.
SEC. 5. SANCTIONS IN SUPPORT OF PEACE IN DARFUR.
(a) Blocking of Assets and Restriction on Visas.--Section 6 of the
Comprehensive Peace in Sudan Act of 2004 (Public Law 108-497; 50 U.S.C.
1701 note) is amended--
(1) in the heading of subsection (b), by inserting ``of
Appropriate Senior Officials of the Sudanese Government'' after
``Assets'';
(2) by redesignating subsections (c) through (e) as
subsections (d) through (f), respectively; and
(3) by inserting after subsection (b) the following new
subsection:
``(c) Blocking of Assets and Restriction on Visas of Certain
Individuals Identified by the President.--
``(1) Blocking of assets.--Beginning on the date that is 30
days after the date of the enactment of the Darfur Peace and
Accountability Act of 2006, and in the interest of contributing
to peace in Sudan, the President shall, consistent with the
authorities granted in the International Emergency Economic
Powers Act (50 U.S.C. 1701 et seq.), block the assets of any
individual who the President determines is complicit in, or
responsible for, acts of genocide, war crimes, or crimes
against humanity in Darfur, including the family members or any
associates of such individual to whom assets or property of
such individual was transferred on or after July 1, 2002.
``(2) Restriction on visas.--Beginning on the date that is 30
days after the date of the enactment of the Darfur Peace and
Accountability Act of 2006, and in the interest of contributing
to peace in Sudan, the President shall deny visas and entry to
any individual who the President determines is complicit in, or
responsible for, acts of genocide, war crimes, or crimes
against humanity in Darfur, including the family members or any
associates of such individual to whom assets or property of
such individual was transferred on or after July 1, 2002.''.
(b) Waiver.--Section 6(d) of the Comprehensive Peace in Sudan Act of
2004 (as redesignated by subsection (a)) is amended by adding at the
end the following new sentence: ``The President may waive the
application of paragraph (1) or (2) of subsection (c) with respect to
an individual if the President determines that such a waiver is in the
national interests of the United States and, prior to exercising the
waiver, transmits to the appropriate congressional committees a
notification which includes the name of the individual and the reasons
for the waiver.''.
(c) Sanctions Against Certain Janjaweed Commanders and
Coordinators.--The President should immediately consider imposing the
sanctions described in section 6(c) of the Comprehensive Peace in Sudan
Act of 2004 (as added by subsection (a)) against the Janjaweed
commanders and coordinators identified by the former United States
Ambassador-at-Large for War Crimes before the Subcommittee on Africa of
the House International Relations Committee on June 24, 2004.
SEC. 6. ADDITIONAL AUTHORITIES TO DETER AND SUPPRESS GENOCIDE IN
DARFUR.
(a) United States Assistance to Support AMIS.--Section 7 of the
Comprehensive Peace in Sudan Act of 2004 (Public Law 108-497; 50 U.S.C.
1701 note) is amended--
(1) by striking ``Notwithstanding'' and inserting ``(a)
General Assistance.--Notwithstanding''; and
(2) by adding at the end the following new subsection:
``(b) Assistance to Support AMIS.--Notwithstanding any other
provision of law, the President is authorized to provide assistance, on
such terms and conditions as the President may determine and in
consultation with the appropriate congressional committees, to
reinforce the deployment and operations of an expanded African Union
Mission in Sudan (AMIS) with the mandate, size, strength, and capacity
to protect civilians and humanitarian operations, stabilize the Darfur
region of Sudan and dissuade and deter air attacks directed against
civilians and humanitarian workers, including but not limited to
providing assistance in the areas of logistics, transport,
communications, materiel support, technical assistance, training,
command and control, aerial surveillance, and intelligence.''.
(b) NATO Assistance to Support AMIS.--The President should instruct
the United States Permanent Representative to the North Atlantic Treaty
Organization (NATO) to use the voice, vote, and influence of the United
States at NATO to advocate NATO reinforcement of the African Union
Mission in Sudan (AMIS), upon the request of the African Union,
including but not limited to the provision of assets to dissuade and
deter offensive air strikes directed against civilians and humanitarian
workers in the Darfur region of Sudan and other logistical,
transportation, communications, training, technical assistance, command
and control, aerial surveillance, and intelligence support.
(c) Denial of Entry at United States Ports to Certain Cargo Ships or
Oil Tankers.--
(1) In general.--The President should take all necessary and
appropriate steps to deny the Government of Sudan access to oil
revenues, including by prohibiting entry at United States ports
to cargo ships or oil tankers engaged in business or trade
activities in the oil sector of Sudan or involved in the
shipment of goods for use by the armed forces of Sudan until
such time as the Government of Sudan has honored its
commitments to cease attacks on civilians, demobilize and
demilitarize the Janjaweed and associated militias, grant free
and unfettered access for deliveries of humanitarian
assistance, and allow for the safe and voluntary return of
refugees and internally displaced persons.
(2) Exception.--Paragraph (1) shall not apply with respect to
cargo ships or oil tankers involved in an internationally-
recognized demobilization program or the shipment of non-lethal
assistance necessary to carry out elements of the Comprehensive
Peace Agreement for Sudan.
(d) Prohibition on Assistance to Countries in Violation of United
Nations Security Council Resolutions 1556 and 1591.--
(1) Prohibition.--Amounts made available to carry out the
Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 (22 U.S.C. 2151 et seq.) may not
be used to provide assistance (other than humanitarian
assistance) to the government of a country that is in violation
of the embargo on military assistance with respect to Sudan
imposed pursuant to United Nations Security Council Resolutions
1556 (July 30, 2004) and 1591 (March 29, 2005).
(2) Waiver.--The President may waive the application of
paragraph (1) if the President determines and certifies to the
appropriate congressional committees that it is in the national
interests of the United States to do so.
SEC. 7. MULTILATERAL EFFORTS.
The President shall direct the United States Permanent
Representative to the United Nations to use the voice and vote of the
United States to urge the adoption of a resolution by the United
Nations Security Council that--
(1) supports the expansion of the African Union Mission in
Sudan (AMIS) so that it achieves the mandate, size, strength,
and capacity needed to protect civilians and humanitarian
operations, and dissuade and deter fighting and violence in the
Darfur region of Sudan, and urges Member States of the United
Nations to accelerate political, material, financial, and other
assistance to the African Union toward this end;
(2) reinforces efforts of the African Union to negotiate
peace talks between the Government of Sudan, the Sudan
Liberation Movement/Army (SLM/A), the Justice and Equality
Movement (JEM), and associated armed groups in the Darfur
region, calls on the Government of Sudan, the SLM/A, and the
JEM to abide by their obligations under the N'Djamena Ceasefire
Agreement of April 8, 2004 and subsequent agreements, urges all
parties to engage in peace talks without preconditions and seek
to resolve the conflict, and strongly condemns all attacks
against humanitarian workers and African Union personnel in the
Darfur region;
(3) imposes sanctions against the Government of Sudan,
including sanctions against individual members of the
Government of Sudan, and entities controlled or owned by
officials of the Government of Sudan or the National Congress
Party in Sudan until such time as the Government of Sudan has
honored its commitments to cease attacks on civilians,
demobilize and demilitarize the Janjaweed and associated
militias, grant free and unfettered access for deliveries of
humanitarian assistance, and allow for the safe and voluntary
return of refugees and internally displaced persons;
(4) extends the military embargo established by United
Nations Security Council Resolutions 1556 (July 30, 2004) and
1591 (March 29, 2005) to include a total prohibition on the
sale or supply of offensive military equipment to the
Government of Sudan, except for use in an internationally-
recognized demobilization program or for non-lethal assistance
necessary to carry out elements of the Comprehensive Peace
Agreement for Sudan; and
(5) calls upon those Member States of the United Nations that
continue to undermine efforts to foster peace in Sudan by
providing military assistance and equipment to the Government
of Sudan, the SLM/A, the JEM, and associated armed groups in
the Darfur region in violation of the embargo on such
assistance and equipment, as called for in United Nations
Security Council Resolutions 1556 and 1591, to immediately
cease and desist.
SEC. 8. CONTINUATION OF RESTRICTIONS.
(a) Continuation of Restrictions.--Restrictions against the
Government of Sudan that were imposed pursuant to Executive Order 13067
of November 3, 1997 (62 Federal Register 59989), title III and sections
508, 512, 527, and 569 of the Foreign Operations, Export Financing, and
Related Programs Appropriations Act, 2006, or any other similar
provision of law, shall remain in effect and shall not be lifted
pursuant to such provisions of law until the President transmits to the
appropriate congressional committees a certification that the
Government of Sudan is acting in good faith to--
(1) peacefully resolve the crisis in the Darfur region of
Sudan;
(2) disarm, demobilize, and demilitarize the Janjaweed and
all government-allied militias;
(3) adhere to United Nations Security Council Resolutions
1556 (2004), 1564 (2004), 1591 (2005), and 1593 (2005);
(4) negotiate a peaceful resolution to the crisis in eastern
Sudan;
(5) fully cooperate with efforts to disarm, demobilize, and
deny safe haven to members of the Lords Resistance Army; and
(6) fully implement the Comprehensive Peace Agreement for
Sudan without manipulation or delay, including by--
(A) implementing the recommendations of the Abyei
Commission Report;
(B) establishing other appropriate commissions and
implementing and adhering to the recommendations of
such commissions consistent with the terms of the
Comprehensive Peace Agreement for Sudan;
(C) adhering to the terms of the Wealth Sharing
Agreement; and
(D) withdrawing government forces from southern Sudan
consistent with the terms of the Comprehensive Peace
Agreement for Sudan.
(b) Waiver.--The President may waive the application of subsection
(a) if the President determines and certifies to the appropriate
congressional committees that it is in the national interests of the
United States to do so.
SEC. 9. ASSISTANCE EFFORTS IN SUDAN.
(a) Additional Authorities.--Section 501(a) of the Assistance for
International Malaria Control Act (50 U.S.C. 1701 note) is amended--
(1) by striking ``Notwithstanding any other provision of
law'' and inserting the following:
``(1) In general.--Notwithstanding any other provision of
law'';
(2) by inserting ``civil administrations,'' after
``indigenous groups,'';
(3) by striking ``areas outside of control of the Government
of Sudan'' and inserting ``southern Sudan, southern Kordofan/
Nuba Mountains State, Blue Nile State, and Abyei'';
(4) by inserting at the end before the period the following:
``, including the Comprehensive Peace Agreement for Sudan'';
and
(5) by adding at the end the following new paragraph:
``(2) Congressional notification.--
``(A) In general.--Assistance may not be obligated
under this subsection until 15 days after the date on
which the President has provided notice thereof to the
congressional committees specified in section 634A of
the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 (22 U.S.C. 2394-1)
in accordance with the procedures applicable to
reprogramming notifications under such section.
``(B) Rule of construction.--The notification
requirement of subparagraph (A) shall not apply in the
case of assistance subject to notification in
accordance with section 634A of the Foreign Assistance
Act of 1961 pursuant to any provision of an Act making
appropriations for foreign operations, export
financing, and related programs.''.
(b) Exception to Prohibitions in Executive Order No. 13067.--Section
501(b) of the Assistance for International Malaria Control Act (50
U.S.C. 1701 note) is amended--
(1) in the heading, by striking ``Export Prohibitions'' and
inserting ``Prohibitions in Executive Order No. 13067'';
(2) by striking ``any export from an area in Sudan outside of
control of the Government of Sudan, or to any necessary
transaction directly related to that export'' and inserting
``activities or related transactions with respect to southern
Sudan, southern Kordofan/Nuba Mountains State, Blue Nile State,
or Abyei''; and
(3) by striking ``the export or related transaction'' and all
that follows and inserting ``such activities or related
transactions would directly benefit the economic recovery and
development of those areas and people.''.
SEC. 10. REPORTS.
(a) Report on African Union Mission in Sudan (AMIS).--Section 8 of
the Sudan Peace Act (Public Law 107-245; 50 U.S.C. 1701 note) is
amended--
(1) by redesignating subsection (c) as subsection (d); and
(2) by inserting after subsection (b) the following new
subsection:
``(c) Report on African Union Mission in Sudan (AMIS).--In
conjunction with reports required under subsections (a) and (b) of this
section, the Secretary of State shall submit to the appropriate
congressional committees a report, to be prepared in conjunction with
the Secretary of Defense, on--
``(1) efforts to fully deploy the African Union Mission in
Sudan (AMIS) with the size, strength, and capacity necessary to
stabilize the Darfur region of Sudan and protect civilians and
humanitarian operations;
``(2) the needs of AMIS to ensure success, including in the
areas of housing, transport, communications, equipment,
technical assistance, training, command and control,
intelligence, and such assistance as is necessary to dissuade
and deter attacks, including by air, directed against civilians
and humanitarian operations;
``(3) the current level of United States assistance and other
assistance provided to AMIS, and a request for additional
United States assistance, if necessary;
``(4) the status of North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO)
plans and assistance to support AMIS; and
``(5) the performance of AMIS in carrying out its mission in
the Darfur region.''.
(b) Report on Sanctions in Support of Peace in Darfur.--Section 8 of
the Sudan Peace Act (Public Law 107-245; 50 U.S.C. 1701 note), as
amended by subsection (a), is further amended--
(1) by redesignating subsection (d) as subsection (e); and
(2) by inserting after subsection (c) the following new
subsection:
``(d) Report on Sanctions in Support of Peace in Darfur.--In
conjunction with reports required under subsections (a), (b), and (c)
of this section, the Secretary of State shall submit to the appropriate
congressional committees a report regarding sanctions imposed under
subsections (a) through (d) of section 6 of the Comprehensive Peace in
Sudan Act of 2004, including--
``(1) a description of each sanction imposed under such
provisions of law; and
``(2) the name of the individual or entity subject to the
sanction, if applicable.''.
SEC. 11. RULE OF CONSTRUCTION.
Nothing in this Act (or any amendment made by this Act) or any other
provision of law shall be construed to preempt any State law that
prohibits investment of State funds, including State pension funds, in
or relating to the Republic of the Sudan.
Purpose and Summary
The Darfur Peace and Accountability Act of 2006 (H.R.
3127), as ordered favorably reported out of the House Committee
on International Relations with an amendment in the nature of a
substitute, expresses the Sense of Congress with respect to the
situation in the Darfur region of western Sudan and amends the
Comprehensive Peace in Sudan Act of 2004 to promote peace and
accountability in Darfur. Inter alia, the bill:
LAmends the Comprehensive Peace in Sudan Act
of 2004 to confer upon the President, notwithstanding
any other provision of law, the authority to provide
assistance to reinforce the deployment and operations
of an expanded African Union Mission in Sudan (AMIS),
with the mandate, size, strength and capacity to
protect civilians and humanitarian operations,
stabilize Darfur, and, as necessary, dissuade and deter
air attacks directed against civilians and humanitarian
operations;
LCalls on the international community,
including the UN, the European Union (EU), and the
North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), to
immediately mobilize political, military and financial
resources to support the expansion of AMIS;
LImposes targeted sanctions against
individuals determined by the President to be
responsible for acts of genocide, war crimes, or crimes
against humanity in Darfur;
LProhibits the provision of non-humanitarian
U.S. assistance to nations violating the military and
arms embargo imposed pursuant to UN Security Council
resolutions 1556 and 1591;
LCalls for the suspension of Sudan's
membership in the United Nations;
LEncourages the President to deny entry at
U.S. ports to certain Sudanese cargo ships or oil
tankers if the Government of Sudan fails to take
specified measures in Darfur;
LAmends the International Malaria Control Act
to authorize the President to provide assistance to
Southern Sudan, Southern Kordofan/Nuba Mountains State,
Blue Nile State, and Abyei, provided that Congress is
notified pursuant to Section 634A of the Foreign
Assistance Act of 1961, and to expand existing
exceptions to prohibitions on imports to and exports
from Southern Sudan and other marginalized areas;
LAmends the reporting requirements in the
Sudan Peace Act of 2002 to include sections on U.S. and
NATO efforts to support the deployment of an expanded
AU mission in Darfur, the performance of AMIS in
Darfur, and the status of the imposition of sanctions
pursuant to the Darfur Peace and Accountability Act;
and
LProvides that nothing in this Act shall be
construed to preempt State laws which prohibit
investment of State pension funds in Sudan.
Background and Need for the Legislation
The Darfur region of western Sudan is home to at least 36
tribes identified within two major groups: Arabs and non-Arabs
(the latter known as ``Zurga'' or indigenous Africans).\1\ Both
groups are predominantly Sunni Muslim, and years of
intermarriage have made racial distinction difficult. Over the
years, desertification and competition over scarce resources
has triggered sporadic armed conflict between the largely
nomadic Arab herders and sedentary African pastoralists.
Successive governments in Khartoum exacerbated these tensions
by manipulating ethnic divisions and arming tribes of Arab
descent to act as proxy forces in the region. This strategy is
markedly similar to that which has been pursued by the
Government of Sudan (GoS) in Southern Sudan, where over 21
years of war left two million dead and nearly four million
displaced.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ International Crisis Group (ICG), ``Darfur Rising: Sudan's New
Crisis,'' 25 March 2004.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Citing ethnic, political, and economic marginalization of
non-Arabs in Darfur, two rebel groups emerged in February 2003:
The Sudan Liberation Army (SLA) and the Justice and Equality
Movement (JEM). The SLA is composed mainly by the non-Arab Fur,
Zaghawa, and Masaalit tribes. It is speculated that the SLA has
received support from fellow Zaghawa in Chad and Libya,
Darfurian businessmen in the Persian Gulf, and from the
Government of Eritrea. The SLA also received early support from
the Sudan People's Liberation Army (SPLA) in Southern Sudan.\2\
The JEM is dominated by the Zaghawa and is alleged to have
links to Dr. Hassan al Turabi, founder of the National Islamic
Front (NIF), former Speaker of Sudan's National Assembly, and
potential threat to President Omar Bashir.\3\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\2\ Ibid, page 20.
\3\ Ibid.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The GoS has dismissed the SLA and JEM as terrorists and
claims the conflict is tribal in nature. However, observers
consistently assert that the conflict has far more to do with
political and economic marginalization--and a war between the
center of power and the periphery--than it does with
traditional tribal rivalries. Khartoum's concerns over threats
emanating from the West reportedly were exacerbated in March
2003, when the SLA joined the National Democratic Alliance
(NDA), an umbrella group of southern rebels and northern
opponents of the regime in Khartoum.
With the NIF regime in Khartoum weakened by internal
turmoil and distracted by mounting international pressure to
resolve the North-South conflict, which already had lasted over
two decades and claimed more than two million lives, the SLA
and JEM exacted a string of victories throughout the spring of
2003. By mid-2003, the GoS had significantly increased its
presence in Darfur by arming government-supported militias,
collectively known as Janjaweed, and by deploying the Popular
Defense Forces (PDF). The Janjaweed, under the direction of
regular government forces, unleashed a campaign of terror
against civilians reportedly in an effort to forcefully expel
non-Arab ethnic groups.\4\ In mid-February 2004, President
Bashir declared that the security forces had crushed the SLA
and JEM. Despite this claim, the conflict continues.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\4\ United Nations Commission on Human Rights (UNCHO). Report of
UNCHO Mission to Chad, April 2004.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
According to officials from the United States Government
and the United Nations (UN), the situation in the Darfur region
of western Sudan continues to be one of the greatest
humanitarian crises in the world. Out of an estimated pre-
conflict population of seven million in Darfur, anywhere
between 180,000 and 400,000 already have died and over two
million have been displaced.\5\ Reports by refugees and
internally displaced persons (IDPs) detail a systematic pattern
of attacks against civilians by the Janjaweed, who have
employed scorched earth tactics backed by air and land strikes
by GoS forces. Entire villages have been razed, crops burned,
and wells and irrigation systems destroyed. There are
widespread reports of arbitrary killings, abductions, looting,
torture, and rape.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\5\ Reports on the numbers of deaths resulting both directly by
violence and indirectly by disease and malnutrition vary widely. The
United Nations reports 180,000 deaths, while groups such as the
International Crisis Group (ICG) and the Coalition for International
Justice (CIJ) place the figure between 300,000 and 400,000.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
On April 2, 2004, UN Under Secretary-General for
Humanitarian Affairs and Emergency Relief Coordinator Jan
Egeland characterized the situation in Darfur as ``ethnic
cleansing.'' \6\ On April 7, 2004, during a speech reflecting
upon the Rwandan genocide before the UN Commission on Human
Rights, UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan stated that reports
from the region had left him with ``a deep sense of
foreboding,'' and asserted, ``The international community must
be prepared to take swift and appropriate action.'' \7\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\6\ See UN, ``Press Briefing on Humanitarian Crisis in Darfur,
Sudan,'' 2 April 2004.
\7\ See UN, ``Secretary-General's Address to the Commission on
Human Rights (As Delivered),'' 7 April 2004.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The United States Congress declared that the atrocities in
Darfur constitute genocide with the passage of H. Con. Res. 467
and S. Con. Res. 133 on July 22, 2004. In testimony before the
Senate Committee on Foreign Relations in September 2004, former
U.S. Secretary of State Colin Powell affirmed the position of
Congress and publicly acknowledged that genocide had occurred
in Darfur and may still be occurring. On September 9, 2004, the
State Department released a report which concluded that the GoS
``promoted systematic killings based on race and ethnic
origin,'' and that these acts constitute genocide. The report,
and the Administration's subsequent determination of genocide,
drew upon information collected by an ``Atrocities
Documentation Team,'' which conducted 1,136 interviews of
Sudanese refugees in August of 2004.
Initially, the African Union (AU) was slow to respond to
the crisis in Darfur. In late March 2004, the AU sent a team to
participate in ceasefire negotiations between the GoS, the SLA,
and the JEM in Chad. Under the terms of the April 2004
N'Djamena Ceasefire Agreement, the AU was tasked with creating
a Ceasefire Commission and subsequently deployed ceasefire
monitors under the African Mission in Sudan (AMIS). The
deployment of AMIS, albeit small, took more than four months
after the signing of the agreement. In late September 2004, the
GoS and the AU finally agreed to expand AMIS, several weeks
after the UN Security Council endorsed such an expansion and
threatened sanctions if the GoS failed to cooperate. In May
2005, the AU announced that AMIS would expand to 7,700
personnel. With assistance provided by the United States, the
European Union, and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization,
deployment of these additional troops began in July 2005.
Currently, there are over 6,000 African Union forces and
monitors on the ground in Darfur.
Though forces and observers deployed under AMIS have
performed well to date, the limited size and mandate of the AU
mission, as well as logistical and financial troubles of the
organization, have severely hampered the work of AMIS in
Darfur. The mission is dependent upon funding and logistical
support from donors--particularly the United States and the
European Union--who have given generously but now face
difficulty in sustaining contributions. Further, the mandate
does not provide for civilian protection and contains no
enforcement mechanisms, aside from reporting the violations to
a Joint Commission. Since the signing of the ceasefire
agreement and the deployment of AMIS, there have been countless
violations by all parties with no apparent consequences.
These constraints have prompted discussion of a United
Nations takeover of AMIS. The United States Permanent
Representative to the United Nations, Ambassador John Bolton,
used the occasion of the United States' presidency of the
Security Council during February 2006 to press for a resolution
formally authorizing the ``re-hatting'' of AMIS. On February 3,
2005, a Statement by the President of the Security Council was
issued which authorized the Secretary-General ``to initiate
contingency planning without delay . . . on a range of options
for a possible transition from AMIS to a United Nations
operation.'' A draft resolution then was circulated by the
United States delegation to formalize the proposed UN takeover
of AMIS, but was stalled by other Council Members who insisted
that the African Union must first make a formal request for
AMIS to be taken over by a UN mission, and that the Sudanese
Government would have to agree to any such proposal in advance.
To date, the United Nations has approved six United Nations
Security Council Resolutions (UNSCR) relating to the situation
in Darfur. Pursuant to UNSCR 1564 of September 18, 2004, an
International Commission of Inquiry was created to investigate
violations of international humanitarian and human rights laws
in Darfur. While the report of the Commission of Inquiry, which
was submitted to the UN Secretary General on January 25, 2005,
effectively dodged the question of genocide, it did assert,
``the Government of the Sudan and the Janjaweed are responsible
for serious violations of international human rights and
humanitarian law amounting to crimes under international law,''
and that Sudanese officials and other individuals may have
acted with ``genocidal intent.'' The report also noted that a
sealed file containing information on individuals responsible
for war crimes and crimes against humanity had been delivered
to the Secretary-General for the purposes of possible future
prosecution by the International Criminal Court (ICC). By UNSCR
1593 (March 31, 2005), the UN formally referred the situation
in Darfur to the prosecutor of the ICC.
On March 29, 2005, the Security Council passed UNSCR 1591,
extending the military embargo established pursuant to UNSCR
1556 (July 30, 2004) to all the parties to the N'Djamena
Ceasefire Agreement, calling for an asset freeze and travel ban
against those who impede the peace process, constitute a threat
to stability in Darfur, commit violations of international
humanitarian or human rights law or other atrocities, are
responsible for offensive military over-flights or violate the
military embargo, and establishing a Committee of the Security
Council and a Panel of Experts to assist in monitoring
compliance with UNSCRs 1556 and 1591. Though a list of names of
such violators has been submitted to the Security Council, the
UN has yet to impose any sanctions.
The inability of the United Nations to enforce resolutions
of the Security Council calling for sanctions against Sudan,
and the apparent inability to get a resolution passed which
would immediately enable the United Nations to take over the
AMIS mission in Darfur, largely is attributed to China and
Russia--two permanent Members of the Security Council with veto
power which have significant interests at stake in Sudan. The
GoS also reportedly has begun a diplomatic campaign to persuade
other nations to oppose any peacekeeping mission in Sudan other
than AMIS.
On January 9, 2005, the Government of Sudan and the Sudan
People's Liberation Movement/Army (SPLM/A) signed a
Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) in Nairobi, Kenya,
ostensibly ending 21 years of civil war between the government
in the North and rebels in the South. Pursuant to the CPA, a
Government of National Unity (GONU) has been formed in Khartoum
which includes both members of the former National Congress
Party-controlled government and members of the SPLM.
Simultaneously, a regional government was formed in Southern
Sudan which has been tasked with preparing the region for a
referendum on the question of independence.
Though it was hoped that the conclusion of the CPA would
contribute to a political settlement in Darfur, such a
resolution remains elusive and the crisis continues. Thus, the
United States Government currently faces at least two critical
challenges in Sudan: the confrontation of genocide in Darfur
and the consolidation of peace in Southern Sudan. Already, the
formation of this new Government of National Unity has prompted
Sudan watchers to reconsider the appropriateness of imposing
new sanctions against the Government of Sudan in general,
versus imposing sanctions against individual perpetrators of
genocide, war crimes, or crimes against humanity. In addition,
the United States Government now must consider lifting,
modifying, or waiving existing sanctions against Sudan in an
effort to contribute to reconstruction and recovery efforts in
Southern Sudan without inadvertently rewarding members of a
genocidal government in Khartoum. Thus, while H.R. 3127
specifically is intended to promote peace and accountability in
Darfur, it also attempts to address several of the challenges
presented by conclusion of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement
and formation of the Government of National Unity.
The Honorable Henry J. Hyde, Chairman of the House
Committee on International Relations, accompanied by Reps.
Payne, Smith of New Jersey, Lantos, Royce, Tancredo, Wolf,
Jackson-Lee and Capuano, introduced H.R. 3127 on June 30, 2005.
The substitute amendment, which was ordered adopted and
favorably reported by the Committee on March 8, 2006,
represents the product of eight months of bipartisan
negotiations among Members from the House and Senate, with
significant input from the Administration, academics, non-
governmental organizations, advocacy groups, and other
concerned groups. The United States Senate passed a similar
bill, S. 1462, on November 18, 2005.
Hearings
The Committee's Subcommittee on Africa, Global Human Rights
and International Operations held four hearing on issues
relating to Darfur and H.R. 3127 (March 11, 2004, April 22,
2004, June 24, 2004, and November 1, 2005). During the March
11, 2004, hearing, testimony was received from five witnesses,
representing the U.S. Department of State, the United States
Agency for International Development (USAID), the Center for
Strategic and International Studies, Smith College, and Safe
Harbor International Relief. During the April 22, 2004,
hearing, testimony was received from four witnesses, with one
former UN official testifying in a private capacity and others
representing Harvard University, Remembering Rwanda, and Human
Rights Watch. During the June 24, 2004, hearing, testimony was
received from three witnesses, representing the U.S. Department
of State, Good Works International, and Human Rights Watch.
During the November 1, 2005, hearing, testimony was received
from a witness representing the U.S. Department of State.
The Committee on International Relations held two hearings
on issues relating to Darfur and H.R. 3127 on March 6, 2004,
and June 22, 2005, respectively. During the March 2, 2004
hearing, testimony was received from five witnesses,
representing the U.S. Department of State, USAID, the
International Crisis Group, Save the Children, and Darfur Peace
and Development, with additional materials submitted by one
Member of Congress and the United States Conference of Catholic
Bishops. During the June 22, 2005, hearing, testimony was
received from a witness representing the U.S. Department of
State, with additional material submitted by Survivors United
to Save the Women of Darfur.
Committee Consideration
On July 21, 2005, the Subcommittee on Africa, Global Human
Rights and International Operations met in open session and
ordered favorably reported to the Full Committee the bill H.R.
3127, as amended, by voice vote, a quorum being present. On
February 8, 2006, the Committee met in open session and ordered
favorably reported the bill H.R. 3127 with an amendment in the
nature of a substitute by voice vote, a quorum being present.
Votes of the Committee
Clause (3)(b) of rule XIII of the Rules of the House of
Representatives requires that the results of each record vote
on an amendment or motion to report, together with the names of
those voting for or against, be printed in the Committee
Report.
Committee Oversight Findings
In compliance with clause 3(c)(1) of rule XIII of the Rules
of the House of Representatives, the Committee reports that the
findings and recommendations of the Committee, based on
oversight activities under clause 2(b)(1) of rule X of the
Rules of the House of Representatives, are incorporated in the
descriptive portions of this report.
New Budget Authority and Tax Expenditures
Clause 3(c)(2) of House Rule XIII is inapplicable because
this legislation does not provide new budgetary authority or
increased tax expenditures.
Committee Cost Estimate
The Committee estimates there will be no cost.
Performance Goals and Objectives
The goals and objectives of H.R. 3127 are to promote peace
and accountability in the Darfur region of western Sudan by
authorizing expanded support for the African Union Mission in
Sudan and imposing targeted sanctions against those determined
to be responsible for genocide, war crimes, or crimes against
humanity.
Constitutional Authority Statement
Pursuant to clause 3(d)(1) of rule XIII of the Rules of the
House of Representatives, the Committee finds the authority for
this legislation in article 1, section 8, clause 18 of the
Constitution.
Section-by-Section Analysis and Discussion
Section 1. Short Title; Table of Contents.
Section 1 contains a short title and a table of contents.
Section 2. Definitions.
Section 2 updates the definition of the Government of Sudan
(GoS), while clarifying that sanctions previously imposed
against ``officials of the Government of Sudan'' will not apply
to individuals who were not party to the government prior to
July 1, 2005, or to the regional Government of Southern Sudan.
Unlike the Sudan Peace Act of 2002 or the Comprehensive
Peace Act of 2004, the focus of sanctions in this bill is not
on the Government of Sudan in general, but on individuals who
are responsible for acts of genocide, war crimes, or crimes
against humanity, regardless of their affiliation. This shift
was necessitated by the fact that since the signing of the
Comprehensive Peace Agreement in January 2005, the Government
of Sudan now includes members of the Sudan People's Liberation
Movement (SPLM) and other opposition groups who are not
necessarily associated with the former government's genocidal
acts. Thus, the Committee sought to avoid punishing the new
coalition government across the board, and alternatively
focused on individual accountability.
Section 3. Findings.
Section 3 provides updates on developments in the country
and actions taken by the United Nations with regard to the
crisis in Darfur, including the passage of six Security Council
Resolutions, the submission of the Report of the International
Commission of Inquiry on Darfur, the referral of the situation
in Darfur to the Prosecutor of the International Criminal
Court, the death of Dr. John Garang, Vice President of Sudan
and leader of the Sudan People's Liberation Movement/Army
(SPLM/A), and the 1993 determination by the Secretary of State
that Sudan is a State Sponsor of Terrorism.
Section 4. Sense of Congress.
Section 4 expresses the sense of Congress that:
LThe Secretary of State should designate the
Janjaweed militia as a Foreign Terrorist Organization;
LAll parties to the conflict in Darfur
continue to violate the N'Djamena Ceasefire Agreement
of April 8, 2004, and attacks against aid workers and
AU personnel are increasing;
LThe African Union (AU) should rapidly expand
the size and amend the mandate of the AU Mission in
Sudan (AMIS), to authorize such action as may be
necessary to protect civilians and deter violence in
Darfur;
LThe international community, including the
UN, EU, and NATO, should immediately mobilize
sufficient political, military, and financial resources
to support an expanded AU mission and consider
additional measures should the expanded AU mission fail
to stop genocide in Darfur;
LThe GoS's membership in the UN should be
suspended until such time as the GoS has honored
pledges to cease attacks on civilians, demobilize the
Janjaweed and associated militias, grant unfettered
access for deliveries of humanitarian assistance, and
allow for the safe and voluntary return of refugees and
IDPs;
LThe United States should not provide any
assistance to the GoS, other than for implementation of
the Comprehensive Peace Agreement, for marginalized
areas, or for humanitarian purposes, until the GoS has
honored the pledges described above;
LThe UN should impose sanctions against Sudan
pursuant to UNSCR 1591;
LThe President should establish a student loan
forgiveness program for members of the Sudanese
Diaspora in the United States who commit to return to
Southern Sudan for at least five years so they may
contribute to reconstruction efforts;
LThe President should appoint a Special Envoy
for Sudan and northern Uganda;
LThe international community should strongly
condemn attacks against humanitarian workers and AU
monitors in Sudan;
LThe United States should support and urge
rapid implementation of the Comprehensive Peace
Agreement for Sudan;
LThe SPLM should transform itself into an
inclusive, transparent, and democratic political body
and reconfirm its commitment to seek peace in Southern
Sudan, Darfur, eastern Sudan, and northern Uganda.
Section 5. Sanctions in Support of Peace in Darfur.
Section 5(a) amends Section 6 of the Comprehensive Peace in
Sudan Act of 2004 to block the assets and restrict the travel
of any individual whom the President has determined is
responsible for acts of genocide, war crimes, or crimes against
humanity in the Darfur region. As the Comprehensive Peace in
Sudan Act currently only imposes sanctions against senior
officials in the government, this section reflects the
Committee's resolve to hold individuals accountable for
genocidal acts rather than punishing the new coalition
government in general.
Section 5(b) provides a national interest waiver for the
imposition of sanctions against such individuals, provided that
the President notifies Congress in advance.
Section 5(c) calls on the President to immediately consider
imposing sanctions against Janjaweed commanders and
coordinators identified by the former U.S. Ambassador-at-Large
for War Crimes during an Africa Subcommittee hearing on June
24, 2004.
Section 6. Additional Authorities to Deter and Suppress Genocide in
Darfur.
Section 6(a) amends the Comprehensive Peace in Sudan Act to
authorize the President, notwithstanding any other provision of
law, to provide assistance, in consultation with Congress, to
reinforce the deployment and operations of an expanded AU
mission in Darfur with the mandate, size, strength, and
capacity to protect civilians and humanitarian operations,
stabilize Darfur, and deter air attacks directed against
civilians and humanitarian operations. The Committee notes that
the President already has committed significant resources
toward this end, including by providing more than $190 million
to date to support AMIS (not including the costs associated
with air transport of AMIS personnel from Rwanda and Nigeria or
additional funds which shall be made available following
Congressional approval of an emergency supplemental budget
request for Fiscal Year 2006) and pressing for greater UN and
NATO involvement. Therefore, the Committee asserts that this
language is consistent with current United States policy and
only strengthens the President's ability to take quick and
decisive action to support AMIS, particularly in preparation
for an eventual takeover of the mission by the United Nations.
Section 6(b) recommends that the US Permanent
Representative to NATO use the voice, vote, and influence of
the United States at NATO to advocate for NATO reinforcement of
the AU mission, upon the request of the AU. Again, the
Committee notes that the President and the US Permanent
Representative to NATO already have undertaken to encourage
greater NATO support for AMIS, but notes that much more could
be done to help bridge the gap in capabilities while the United
Nations prepares for an eventual takeover of the AMIS mission.
Section 6(c) asserts that the President should take all
necessary and appropriate steps to deny the GoS access to oil
revenues, including by prohibiting access to United States
ports to cargo ships or oil tankers engaged in business or
trade activities in Sudan's oil sector or arms industry, until
such time as the GoS honors commitments to cease attacks on
civilians, disarm and demobilize the Janjaweed and associated
militias, grant unfettered access for deliveries of
humanitarian assistance, and allow for the safe and voluntary
return of refuges and IDPs. This language is consistent with
long-standing efforts to prevent the Government of Sudan from
financing genocide with oil revenues. However, the Committee
does not intend to punish the regional government of Sudan--
which is entitled to a 50% share of oil revenues generated in
the region--or to inadvertently undermine implementation of the
Comprehensive Peace Agreement. Thus, an exemption specifically
has been provided for cargo ships or oil tankers involved in
internationally-recognized demobilization programs or
deliveries of non-lethal assistance necessary to carry out
elements of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement.
Section 6(d) prohibits the provision of non-humanitarian
U.S. assistance to countries which violate the military and
arms embargo imposed pursuant to UN Security Council
Resolutions 1556 and 1591. This language is intended to
encourage governments, particularly those of neighboring
countries which have a stake in the conflict, to behave
responsibly, adhere to UN resolutions, and cut off the
seemingly endless supply of weapons being provided to both to
the Government of Sudan and to the rebel movements in Darfur.
Section 7. Multilateral Efforts.
Section 7 directs the U.S. Permanent Representative to the
UN to use the voice, vote and influence of the United States at
the UN to urge the adoption of a resolution which supports the
expansion of AMIS, reinforces efforts to negotiate peace talks,
calls upon all parties to honor obligations under the N'Djamena
Ceasefire Agreement, demands an end to attacks against
civilians and humanitarian operations; imposes sanctions
against the GoS; and expands the military embargo imposed
pursuant to UNSCRs 1556 and 1591 to include all arms
transactions other that for use in an internationally
recognized demobilization program or for non-lethal assistance
necessary to carry out elements of the Comprehensive Peace
Agreement.
The Committee recognizes that the U.S. Permanent
Representative to the UN, Ambassador John Bolton, has pressed
for greater UN action with regard to Darfur but has been met
with strong opposition from other Member States. Such
resistance became particularly evident during February 2006, as
Ambassador Bolton attempted to use the occasion of the United
States' presidency of the Security Council to push for a
resolution which would authorize a United Nations peacekeeping
mission to take over for AMIS in Darfur. The Committee
encourages the U.S. Permanent Representative to continue to
pursue these efforts, particularly with regard to the
imposition of sanctions and the introduction of UN
peacekeepers, despite opposition from other Members of the
Security Council.
Section 8. Continuation of Restrictions.
Section 8 prohibits the lifting of restrictions against the
GoS imposed pursuant to Executive Order 13067, title III and
sections 508, 512, 527, and 569 of the Foreign Operations,
Export Financing and Related Programs Act of 2006, or any
similar provision of law, until the President can certify that
the GoS is acting in good faith to: (1) peacefully resolve the
crisis in Darfur; (2) disarm and demobilize the Janjaweed and
associated militias; (3) adhere to UN Security Council
Resolutions; (4) negotiate a peaceful resolution to the crisis
in eastern Sudan; (5) cooperate with efforts to disarm,
demobilize and deny safe haven the Lord's Resistance Army; and
(6) fully implement the Comprehensive Peace Agreement for Sudan
without manipulation or delay. This section includes a national
interest waiver.
While sympathetic to the challenges which the existing
sanctions regime against Sudan presents to the Administration,
particularly as the United States seeks to provide greater
support for reconstruction and recovery efforts in Southern
Sudan, there is a strong, bipartisan consensus among Committee
Members that it would be inappropriate to lift sanctions across
the board and thereby ``reward'' a genocidal government and a
state sponsor of terrorism. Thus, while legislative relief from
existing sanctions may be forthcoming, the Committee asserts
that such relief would be carefully considered and targeted in
nature.
Section 9. Assistance Efforts in Sudan.
Section 9 amends the International Malaria Control Act to
authorize the President to provide assistance to Southern
Sudan, Southern Kordofan/Nuba Mountains State, Blue Nile State,
and Abyei, provided that Congress is notified pursuant to
Section 634A of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961. This
section further amends the Malaria Act to expand existing
exceptions to prohibitions imposed against Sudan pursuant to
Executive or 13067 to include ``such activities or related
transactions'' that would directly benefit the economic
recovery and development of Southern Sudan, Southern Kordofan/
Nuba Mountains State, Blue Nile State, and Abyei.
The Malaria Act currently authorizes the President to
provide certain forms of assistance to areas of Sudan ``outside
the control of the Government of Sudan.'' However, with the
signing of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement and subsequent
formation of the Government of National Unity, all parts of
Sudan presumably are ``under the control of the Government.''
Thus, this language provides a specific exemption from the
sanctions for Southern Sudan and other marginalized areas.
Further, it expands the existing exemption for exports from
areas formerly defined as being ``outside the control of the
Government'' to include both imports to and exports from
Southern Sudan and other marginalized areas.
Section 10. Reports.
Section 10 amends the reporting requirements in the Sudan
Peace Act of 2002 to include sections on U.S. and NATO efforts
to support the deployment of an expanded AU mission in Darfur,
the performance of AMIS in Darfur, and the status of the
imposition of sanctions pursuant to the Darfur Peace and
Accountability Act. Cognizant of the fact that the U.S.
Department of State already is overburdened with onerous and
often overlapping reporting requirements, the Committee has
opted to incorporate these new requirements within existing
annual reports, rather than mandating the issuance of entirely
new reports.
Section 11. Rule of Construction.
Section 11 provides that nothing in this Act shall be
construed to preempt State laws which prohibit investment of
State pension funds in Sudan.
New Advisory Committees
H.R. 3127 does not establish or authorize any new advisory
committees.
Congressional Accountability Act
H.R. 3127 does not apply to the legislative branch.
Federal Mandates
H.R. 3127 provides no Federal mandates.
Changes in Existing Law Made by the Bill, as Reported
In compliance with clause 3(e) of rule XIII of the Rules of
the House of Representatives, changes in existing law made by
the bill, as reported, are shown as follows (existing law
proposed to be omitted is enclosed in black brackets, new
matter is printed in italics, existing law in which no change
is proposed is shown in roman):
COMPREHENSIVE PEACE IN SUDAN ACT OF 2004
* * * * * * *
SEC. 6. SANCTIONS IN SUPPORT OF PEACE IN DARFUR.
(a) * * *
(b) Blocking of Assets of Appropriate Senior Officials of the
Sudanese Government.--Beginning on the date that is 30 days
after the date of enactment of this Act, the President shall,
consistent with the authorities granted in the International
Emergency Economic Powers Act (50 U.S.C. 1701 et seq.), block
the assets of appropriate senior officials of the Government of
Sudan.
(c) Blocking of Assets and Restriction on Visas of Certain
Individuals Identified by the President.--
(1) Blocking of assets.--Beginning on the date that
is 30 days after the date of the enactment of the
Darfur Peace and Accountability Act of 2006, and in the
interest of contributing to peace in Sudan, the
President shall, consistent with the authorities
granted in the International Emergency Economic Powers
Act (50 U.S.C. 1701 et seq.), block the assets of any
individual who the President determines is complicit
in, or responsible for, acts of genocide, war crimes,
or crimes against humanity in Darfur, including the
family members or any associates of such individual to
whom assets or property of such individual was
transferred on or after July 1, 2002.
(2) Restriction on visas.--Beginning on the date that
is 30 days after the date of the enactment of the
Darfur Peace and Accountability Act of 2006, and in the
interest of contributing to peace in Sudan, the
President shall deny visas and entry to any individual
who the President determines is complicit in, or
responsible for, acts of genocide, war crimes, or
crimes against humanity in Darfur, including the family
members or any associates of such individual to whom
assets or property of such individual was transferred
on or after July 1, 2002.
[(c)] (d) Waiver.--The President may waive the application of
subsection (a) or (b) if the President determines and certifies
to the appropriate congressional committees that such a waiver
is in the national interest of the United States. The President
may waive the application of paragraph (1) or (2) of subsection
(c) with respect to an individual if the President determines
that such a waiver is in the national interests of the United
States and, prior to exercising the waiver, transmits to the
appropriate congressional committees a notification which
includes the name of the individual and the reasons for the
waiver.
[(d)] (e) Continuation of Restrictions.--Restrictions against
the Government of Sudan that were imposed pursuant to title III
and sections 508, 512, and 527 of the Foreign Operations,
Export Financing, and Related Programs Act, 2004 (division D of
Public Law 108-199; 118 Stat. 143), or any other similar
provision of law, shall remain in effect against the Government
of Sudan and may not be lifted pursuant to such provisions of
law unless the President transmits a certification to the
appropriate congressional committees in accordance with
paragraph (2) of section 12(a) of the Sudan Peace Act (as added
by section 5(a)(1) of this Act).
[(e)] (f) Determination.--Notwithstanding subsection (a) of
this section, the President shall continue to transmit the
determination required under section 6(b)(1)(A) of the Sudan
Peace Act (50 U.S.C. 1701 note).
SEC. 7. ADDITIONAL AUTHORITIES.
[Notwithstanding] (a) General Assistance.--Notwithstanding
any other provision of law, the President is authorized to
provide assistance, other than military assistance, to areas
that were outside of the control of the Government of Sudan on
April 8, 2004, including to provide assistance for emergency
relief, development and governance, or to implement any program
in support of any viable peace agreement at the local,
regional, or national level in Sudan.
(b) Assistance to Support AMIS.--Notwithstanding any other
provision of law, the President is authorized to provide
assistance, on such terms and conditions as the President may
determine and in consultation with the appropriate
congressional committees, to reinforce the deployment and
operations of an expanded African Union Mission in Sudan (AMIS)
with the mandate, size, strength, and capacity to protect
civilians and humanitarian operations, stabilize the Darfur
region of Sudan and dissuade and deter air attacks directed
against civilians and humanitarian workers, including but not
limited to providing assistance in the areas of logistics,
transport, communications, materiel support, technical
assistance, training, command and control, aerial surveillance,
and intelligence.
* * * * * * *
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SECTION 501 OF THE ASSISTANCE FOR INTERNATIONAL MALARIA CONTROL ACT
SEC. 501. ASSISTANCE EFFORTS IN SUDAN.
(a) Additional Authorities.--[Notwithstanding any other
provision of law]
(1) In general.--Notwithstanding any other provision
of law, the President is authorized to undertake
appropriate programs using Federal agencies,
contractual arrangements, or direct support of
indigenous groups, civil administrations, agencies, or
organizations in [areas outside of control of the
Government of Sudan] southern Sudan, southern Kordofan/
Nuba Mountains State, Blue Nile State, and Abyei in an
effort to provide emergency relief, promote economic
self-sufficiency, build civil authority, provide
education, enhance rule of law and the development of
judicial and legal frameworks, support people-to-people
reconciliation efforts, or implement any program in
support of any viable peace agreement at the local,
regional, or national level in Sudan, including the
Comprehensive Peace Agreement for Sudan.
(2) Congressional notification.--
(A) In general.--Assistance may not be
obligated under this subsection until 15 days
after the date on which the President has
provided notice thereof to the congressional
committees specified in section 634A of the
Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 (22 U.S.C. 2394-
1) in accordance with the procedures applicable
to reprogramming notifications under such
section.
(B) Rule of construction.--The notification
requirement of subparagraph (A) shall not apply
in the case of assistance subject to
notification in accordance with section 634A of
the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 pursuant to
any provision of an Act making appropriations
for foreign operations, export financing, and
related programs.
(b) Exception to [Export Prohibitions] Prohibitions in
Executive Order No. 13067.--Notwithstanding any other provision
of law, the prohibitions set forth with respect to Sudan in
Executive Order No. 13067 of November 3, 1997 (62 Fed. Register
59989) shall not apply to [any export from an area in Sudan
outside of control of the Government of Sudan, or to any
necessary transaction directly related to that export]
activities or related transactions with respect to southern
Sudan, southern Kordofan/Nuba Mountains State, Blue Nile State,
or Abyei, if the President determines that [the export or
related transaction, as the case may be, would directly benefit
the economic development of that area and its people.] such
activities or related transactions would directly benefit the
economic recovery and development of those areas and people.
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SECTION 8 OF THE SUDAN PEACE ACT
SEC. 8. REPORTING REQUIREMENTS.
(a) * * *
* * * * * * *
(c) Report on African Union Mission in Sudan (AMIS).--In
conjunction with reports required under subsections (a) and (b)
of this section, the Secretary of State shall submit to the
appropriate congressional committees a report, to be prepared
in conjunction with the Secretary of Defense, on--
(1) efforts to fully deploy the African Union Mission
in Sudan (AMIS) with the size, strength, and capacity
necessary to stabilize the Darfur region of Sudan and
protect civilians and humanitarian operations;
(2) the needs of AMIS to ensure success, including in
the areas of housing, transport, communications,
equipment, technical assistance, training, command and
control, intelligence, and such assistance as is
necessary to dissuade and deter attacks, including by
air, directed against civilians and humanitarian
operations;
(3) the current level of United States assistance and
other assistance provided to AMIS, and a request for
additional United States assistance, if necessary;
(4) the status of North Atlantic Treaty Organization
(NATO) plans and assistance to support AMIS; and
(5) the performance of AMIS in carrying out its
mission in the Darfur region.
(d) Report on Sanctions in Support of Peace in Darfur.--In
conjunction with reports required under subsections (a), (b),
and (c) of this section, the Secretary of State shall submit to
the appropriate congressional committees a report regarding
sanctions imposed under subsections (a) through (d) of section
6 of the Comprehensive Peace in Sudan Act of 2004, including--
(1) a description of each sanction imposed under such
provisions of law; and
(2) the name of the individual or entity subject to
the sanction, if applicable.
[(c)] (e) Disclosure to the Public.--The Secretary of State
shall publish or otherwise make available to the public each
unclassified report, or portion of a report that is
unclassified, submitted under subsection (a) or (b).