

**To Succeed Where Others Have Failed:
Forming and Training the Afghan National Army, 2003¹**

Lieutenant Colonel Kevin W. Farrell

The insolence of the Afghan, however, is not the frustrated insolence of urbanized, dehumanized man in western society, but insolence without arrogance, the insolence of harsh freedoms set against a backdrop of rough mountains and deserts, the insolence of equality felt and practiced (with an occasional touch of superiority), the insolence of bravery past and bravery anticipated.²

—Louis Dupree

The quotation above from the preeminent scholar of Afghanistan is useful because it intimates very well the diverse challenges combatants as well as “nation builders” will encounter in Afghanistan. Beyond simply overcoming the harsh and inaccessible nature of the terrain and devastated national infrastructure, any occupier or would-be ally must address and attempt to understand native Afghans’ character. Without a solid grasp of the unique cultural, religious, and ethnic situation in Afghanistan, an outside power has little hope of making significant and lasting improvements for this troubled nation. To have any chance of being successful, any effort to build and train an indigenous, effective, and legitimate Afghan National Army must consider the unique situation that is Afghanistan today. With a long and turbulent history, the region that comprises the current borders of one of the poorest nations on earth has never been easily pacified internally or externally. This short paper is based on a presentation the author gave that provided an overview of the allied effort to create and train an indigenous Afghan National Army that was current as of mid-2003.

The issue of how best to build an indigenous army that is loyal to the nation of Afghanistan and not bound strictly to a single warlord or ethnic group’s command is challenging indeed. Before the current involvement of the United States and its allies in Afghanistan, two other great powers of the modern era—the United Kingdom and the Soviet Union—tried not only to conquer the nation but also to create for it a national army that was allied with the interests of the invading power. Although a detailed discussion of their efforts is beyond the scope of this paper, it is worth pointing out that what the United States is attempting to do now has been tried before. The British and Soviets sought different political end states for the Afghanistan they attempted to subdue, but it is worth remembering that they also tried to co-opt native forces to support a nation and its government that was amenable to the host nation.

In their three wars in Afghanistan during the 19th and early 20th centuries, the British experienced an astonishingly preindustrial Afghanistan wracked with tribal factionalism.³ The British involvement in the region was based primarily on issues related to protecting and maintaining the British Empire; in particular, the “Jewel in the Crown” of the Empire, India.⁴ Although the relevance of the British experience is difficult for many modern observers to discern and there are different reasons for involvement there, many of the challenges the British faced in Afghanistan remain challenges the United States and its

allies face today. With a finite amount of resources; tenuous logistics support; inhospitable terrain; and an alien, diverse, indigenous population, the British tried repeatedly over a lengthy period to reform Afghanistan and mold it into a nation that would further British goals in the region. In perhaps the most notable exception in British imperial history, Great Britain failed.

Six decades after the last British combat in Afghanistan in May 1919, the Soviets would find themselves mired in a protracted war. Although this was not the first Soviet invasion of its southern neighbor, the size and cost of the 1979 invasion dwarfed the previous incursions, relegating them to relative obscurity.⁵ With surprisingly few casualties, the Soviets secured Kabul and the major Afghan cities within days of launching their Christmas Eve invasion in 1979. In a description that is reminiscent of the current involvement of US and allied forces in Afghanistan today, control of most of the countryside of Afghanistan eluded the Soviets and Afghan allies even at the peak of the Soviet military involvement.⁶ Apart from rocket attacks or seizing key facilities, the struggle for the Soviets in Afghanistan was gaining control of the fiercely independent rural population. Key cities and outposts often had to be resupplied by air because most logistics routes were frequently targeted for ambushes.


The Soviet strategy was to concentrate on securing the key cities of Kabul, Kandahar, Herat, and the highways linking them to the Salang Pass and the Soviet Union. They sought to carry the war to the opponents of the Soviet-backed regime, the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan (DRA).⁷ Although most of the Soviet military effort was focused on these objectives and the fighting that therefore followed occurred in mountainous and remote regions rather than urban areas, there were major exceptions. Most notable was the largest rebel attack of the war in 1985 when more than 5,000 Mujahideen attacked the DRA garrison at Khost and fierce guerilla street fighting in Kandahar, again in 1985.⁸ The Soviet tactic was to remove the opposition from its base of support. This in turn often meant that the civilian population bore the brunt of Soviet operations, either indirectly or on purpose.

The end result of the Soviet strategy was the death of tens of thousands of civilians and the mass exodus of millions, both within Afghanistan and to neighboring Pakistan and Iran. What is telling from the Soviet experience, however, is that similar to the United States' experience in Vietnam, the Soviets developed effective tactics to deal with the Mujahideen. Throughout both superpowers' wars, it proved impossible for the resistance to make concerted and extended stands against its far-better-equipped, better-supplied enemies. Without much difficulty, the Soviets maintained solid control of the key cities of Afghanistan—Kabul, Herat, and Khost—and held them throughout the Soviet-Afghan war of 1979-1988.⁹ The overwhelming majority of combat occurred in what military professionals term “complex terrain,” defiles, mountains, valleys, and urban areas. Very little combat other than terrorist actions occurred in the few actual cities of Afghanistan. Combating the Mujahideen for the Soviets or the remnants of al-Qaeda for the Americans could only be a part of a long-term strategy for creating a new Afghanistan. Finding and killing enemy combatants was and is essential to long-term success. The other, and arguably more essential, challenge was for the Soviet Union and is for the United States to create an indigenous national army capable of executing the will of the Afghan government.

Despite their determined efforts to enable the DRA (after 1987, the Republic of Afghanistan) to become a nationally accepted and legitimate government (regardless of its international standing as a puppet state), the Soviets never succeeded, and most of the country and its population remained outside the control of the Soviet army and the DRA. Military tactics might have worked at the local level, but the Soviet strategy, despite significant effort and improvement throughout the war, failed completely in the end.¹⁰ It remains unclear as of this writing the degree to which the United States and its coalition partners have investigated the recent Soviet experience in Afghanistan. Once the Soviet Union withdrew its forces and the nation itself subsequently ceased to exist, the United States paid little attention to Afghanistan throughout the 1990s. Within a dozen years of the Soviet withdrawal, however, Afghanistan would be the staging area for the deadliest foreign attack on American soil in the history of the United States. The initial justification for deploying American forces into Afghanistan was to destroy the organizations responsible for the attacks of 11 September 2001, the Taliban and al-Qaeda. Over time the basic mission would expand to include the current corollary mission of creating a stable Afghanistan with an internationally recognized, democratically elected government. A key, if not **the** key, implied task to accomplishing this is creating an Afghan army loyal to the national government.


As far as the goal of the United States and its allies to build an Afghan National Army that is genuinely a national, legitimate force composed of professional soldiers that proportionately represent the Afghans' ethnic makeup, it bears pointing out that the Soviet Union attempted to create a force that was similar in many ways. Before the invasion of 1979, the Soviets committed significant numbers of military advisers and many millions of dollars in an attempt to build an effective and stable Afghan army, loyal to the Afghan government and therefore an extension of Soviet interests in the region. This initial attempt failed miserably, and most of the Afghan army "melted away" from an initial estimated strength of 80,000 men to much less than half of that within a year of the Soviet invasion.

Despite initial setbacks, the Soviets rightly recognized that to carry out their long-term political goals in the region—creating and maintaining an effective national army of Afghans that was loyal and responsive to the DRA—would be crucial to their overall success. Addressing issues of equitable pay, promotions based on merit, effective leadership, and realistic training, the Soviets succeeded in expanding the DRA army to more than 40,000 men by the mid-1980s. But in the end, without massive assistance from the Soviet Union, this force could not function independently and did not survive for more than a few years after the Soviets withdrew from Afghanistan in 1988.¹¹ Space here does not allow a detailed investigation of the Soviet attempt to form and train an Afghan National Army, but it is worth remembering that the Soviets understood the crucial importance of an effective Afghan National Army to their overall strategic goals in the region. They dedicated enormous resources to this task and yet, in the end, failed utterly in creating an effective Afghan army. Obviously, many differences exist between the former Soviet and current American situation, so this historical example is only of limited utility. For the United States and its allies to ignore the Soviet and British experiences in this inhospitable region would be a mistake.



The current boundaries and major cities of Afghanistan.

Despite the daunting challenges the United States and its allies face in trying to build Afghanistan and its army, President George W. Bush and key members of his administration have stated publicly and repeatedly that they are determined to build a new Afghanistan that will join the international community, ideally as a functioning democracy but more importantly as a nation that will no longer be a haven to terrorist organizations. It is not the purpose of this paper to question the validity of that decision but instead to explain briefly how it is being conducted and some of the issues related to its execution.



At the end of the Bonn II Summit on 2 December 2002, President Hamid Karzai stated resolutely, "The Afghan National Army shall be established."¹² With the full backing of President Bush and US Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld, an initiative that had been under way furtively and intermittently was now an official goal of the Transitional Islamic State of Afghanistan and its allies.

	Geneva–Lead Nations		
	Germany	Police	
	Italy	Judiciary	
	Japan	DDR	
	United Kingdom	Counternarcotics	
	United States	Afghan National Army	
	Norway	Border Police?	

At a subsequent meeting in Geneva, signatories to the Bonn II agreement assigned five nations primary responsibility for reconstruction missions: Germany, police; Italy, judiciary; Japan, demobilization, deactivation, and reintegration (DDR); UK, counternarcotics; United States, forming and training the Afghan National Army; and Norway, border police. Currently, the United States also has overall responsibility for the border police, but it is planned that eventually Norway is likely, with other Scandinavian countries, to take over this task.



Bonn II Principles



- Four major commands
- Will not exceed 70,000
- Subordinate to the command of legitimate civilian authorities
- Based on individual merit
- Balance among different ethnic groups
- Establishment of trust among all citizens

“The process of building the ANA
–including recruitment, training, and equipping–
will take several years to complete.”


The Bonn II agreement of December 2002 established the fundamental outline for the future Afghan National Army (ANA). Ultimately, Afghanistan would possess an army of four major commands that would not exceed 70,000 troops in its final form. It was also agreed that the armed forces of Afghanistan must be subordinate to the legitimate government and that it would recognize, with the president of Afghanistan as commander in chief of the army, a situation uncommon in the history of Afghanistan. Selection of soldiers at all ranks was to be based on individual merit and not patronage, connection, or ethnicity. Officers, noncommissioned officers (NCOs), and soldiers would be recruited and trained extensively and properly.

As a whole, the army's ethnic makeup had to reflect the ethnic proportions at the national level. The ethnic balance should be represented down to battalion level. This would further another requirement of the Bonn II Agreement, that citizens of Afghanistan of all ethnicities would trust the army and regard it as their own. Frequently, throughout the history of Afghanistan, armies were comprised of members of individual tribes or ethnic groups who would act rapaciously toward civilians who happened to be in the same area.

The participants at the Bonn II Summit also recognized, perhaps with intentional understatement, that “The process . . . will take several years to complete.” This is a key point because despite internal and external political pressures and expectations, building an Afghan army that is professional, robust in structure, ethnically balanced, and loyal to the national government will require a multilayered, multinational process. The fact that this effort is being undertaken in an environment with a nonexistent national infrastructure in a country wracked by crushing poverty and devastated by more than two decades of war makes the challenge great indeed.



Strategic Vision



- Founded upon a coherent national security strategy
- Capable of securing the national government
- Project governmental power and influence throughout the provinces

Over time the agency charged with assisting the Transitional Islamic State of Afghanistan in carrying out the mission of forming and training the Afghan National Army—the Office of Military Cooperation, Afghanistan—refined the strategic vision for the Afghan National Army. To be successful, the Afghan National Army must function as part of an integrated national military and government operating under a coherent national security strategy. The army must be able to defend the national government without assistance from an outside power, and it must be able to exercise the national government's will and power throughout the nation.



Key Principles of ANA Building




- Loyal to the government of Afghanistan
- Disciplined and professional
- Multiyear process
- Ethnically diverse
- Affordable
- Sustainable



From this broad national security strategy, the Office of Military Cooperation, Afghanistan, derived key principles for building the Afghan National Army (ANA). Loyalty to the government is an obvious requirement, but it has proved to be a rarity historically. The other principles are not surprising: the army must be disciplined and professional, it will take years to develop, and ethnic balance must be maintained. Also not immediately obvious is that the ANA must be affordable to US and coalition forces in the short to medium terms and be affordable to the Afghan government. As for sustainability, this means that not only in terms of equipment maintenance and supply that the army can be maintained indefinitely but also that its educational institutions and training facilities must be properly structured and run. Crucial to all of these principles is and always will be recruiting and retaining good quality officers and soldiers.



The Afghan National Army will have three elements. The Ministry of Defense and the General Staff provide, or eventually will provide, the overarching strategy and direction for the military institutions that support, sustain, train, and educate the combat forces and for the combat forces themselves.



Currently, only one of the planned four major commands exists. The Central Corps contains the Afghan National Army's only combat forces. This unit's size fluctuates between 4,000 to 5,000, depending on retention.



Concept of ANA Training



- Use available Eastern Bloc equipment
- Adopt common standards and procedures
- Establish basic skills and discipline
- A battalion graduation every 40 days
- Progressive transfer of training responsibility from coalition to Afghan instructors
- Emphasize quality over quantity

The general concept for training the Afghan National Army (ANA) is to use Eastern bloc military equipment wherever possible due to the native Afghans' familiarity with such equipment. Furthermore, the relative ease of maintenance, simplicity, and ruggedness, not to mention equipment availability, argue for its employment. A consequence of such a policy makes the ANA depend on donor support from foreign powers that possess such equipment and technical support.

Adopting and maintaining common standards and procedures throughout the army is essential to creating a professional army. At all levels advisers and trainers will establish and continue to reinforce basic skills and discipline. The goal is to graduate a battalion every 35 days. A vital aspect of the plan is to place "embedded training teams" of approximately 10 men to remain with each graduated battalion to train, mentor, and advise the command team. This, in turn, will allow standards and unit cohesion to remain at high levels.

The United States and its partners are achieving a progressive transfer of training responsibility from coalition to Afghan instructors. This training occurs at the Kabul Military Training Center with the Basic Training Course. At all times, selection and training strive to maintain quality soldiers and officers, not merely chase numbers. Embedded trainers are therefore a crucial aspect of this process.



Basic Training




- 10-week course
 - 12 weeks for officer candidates
 - NCOs selected at week four
- Common syllabus and standards
- 700 per basic training cycle
- Progressive transfer of training responsibility from coalition to Afghan instructors

Basic training is a 12-week course. Officer candidates report two weeks before enlisted men. Coalition partners use a common approach to ensure one set of standards. The battalions trained have all been infantry battalions, except for the first specialized unit, a T-62-equipped tank battalion. Soldiers in each course beyond the number needed for a specific battalion are distributed to other units in the Central Corps to bring the other units up to full strength. For basic training, the Afghan cadre at the Kabul Military Training City (KMTC) has assumed almost complete responsibility for training.



As of this writing, five countries have participated in Afghan National Army (ANA) training. The British and Turkish armies taught the first two battalions. Currently the US Army provides most of the training. The French army and the German army have contributed significantly to this training mission as well. Other countries will join the process in the months ahead.



As of this presentation, seven of 15 battalions in Central Corps—the seven infantry battalions mentioned—have graduated. On this graphic, the units trained are shaded darker gray. Those in training are lighter gray, while those in white are planned.

The three brigade headquarters are scheduled to begin a combined US-Afghan Staff Training Course after the Afghan Ministry of Defense revises its senior officer selection and command processes. These officers should have finished their course in early June 2003 and assumed operational command of their brigades. Two of the brigade staffs have already completed an Afghan staff course.



Military Institutions



- KMTTC/Individual Training Center
- Officer and NCO Schools
- Major Collective Training Center
- Military High School
- Maintenance Facilities
- Military Academy
- Technical College

As well as training the combat forces, a crucial component of forming the Afghan National Army is rebuilding Afghanistan's military institutions. The institutions listed in the graphic above the line are organizations the United States and its allies are actively rejuvenating. The institutions below the line, which provide the officer corps' long-term educational needs, remain under consideration.



Key Tasks for MOD Reorganization



- Develop a national military strategy
- Develop doctrine and policies
- **Organize, train, equip, and sustain the ANA**

Perhaps the most challenging and most crucial aspect of forming and training the Afghan National Army (ANA) is reforming the organization charged with commanding it—the Afghan Ministry of Defense (MOD). Key tasks for the MOD reorganization are developing the national military strategy, assisting in developing the right doctrine and policies of the new Army, and ensuring the MOD and General Staff are properly structured and manned to progressively take over the functions of running the Army.



MOD/General Staff Program



MOD structural reform and development of—

- Resource management for equipment, facilities, and personnel compensation
- Personnel management that ensures merit-based selection, promotion, and training
- Training and range management oversight
- Logistics and facilities management
- Command, control, and communications at tactical and strategic levels

The program delineated above demonstrates how the Office of Military Cooperation, Afghanistan, intends to carry out the reform of the Ministry of Defense (MOD). This remains the biggest challenge of all.

Notes

1. The information and opinions contained within this paper are solely the opinion of the author and do not reflect the official position of the US government, the US Army or any official organization of the US government. The author was privileged to be attached to the Office of Military Cooperation, Afghanistan (OMC-A) in Kabul, Afghanistan, while assigned to Combined Joint Multinational Task Force 180, headquartered at Bagram Air Base, Afghanistan for several months during spring 2003. Special credit is due to the Chief of the Afghan National Army Design Team, Colonel Timothy R. Reese, under whom I served and from whom I received much of the information contained in this paper. The author presented this to the assembled participants of the first annual TRADOC Military History Symposium held 5-7 August 2003. Any misrepresentations presented here are strictly the author's. The information contained herein was current as of 1 June 2003. It is quite likely that programs and policies addressed will change considerably as the United States' involvement in Afghanistan continues to evolve.
2. Louis Dupree, *Afghanistan* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1973), xvii. Although now some three decades old, Dupree's work remains the single most important volume on the history and culture of Afghanistan and should be the starting point for anyone trying to understand the region.
3. For a superb account of how parts of Afghanistan, especially the capital city of Kabul, did modernize relatively quickly, see Dupree, Part IV, "The Present," 415-666.
4. For a colorful but scholarly analysis of the relationship between expanding Empire and the British Army, see *The Cambridge Illustrated History of the British Empire*, P.J Marshall, ed., (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996). The work also provides a concise explanation of how international politics, competition for colonies, and domestic pressures all interacted with substantive effect on the size and nature of the British Empire.
5. Thomas T. Hammond, *Red Flag Over Afghanistan: The Communist Coup, the Soviet Invasion, and the Consequences* (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1984), 9. The three previous invasions or incursions took place in 1925, 1929, and 1930.
6. David C. Isby, *War in a Distant Country: Afghanistan: Invasion and Resistance* (London: Arms and Armour Press, 1989), 56.
7. Robert F. Bauman, *Russian-Soviet Unconventional Wars in the Caucasus, Central Asia, and Afghanistan*, Leavenworth Paper Number 20 (Fort Leavenworth, KS: Combat Studies Institute, 1993), 136.
8. *Ibid.*, 145.
9. The official Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan began in May 1988, but significant Soviet involvement—and casualties—in Afghanistan began well before the December 1979 invasion and continued well into 1989.
10. A superb and concise analysis of the Soviet-Afghan war can be found in Bauman, chapter 4, "The Soviet-Afghan War," 129-210. This should be required reading for anyone interested in understanding the Soviet experience or involved with current US operations there today.
11. For a concise analysis, see Baumann, "Building the DRA Army and Regime," 165-169.
12. Office of Military Cooperation—Afghanistan.

US Army Center of Military History Occupations: Then and Now



**Dr. Richard W. Stewart
Chief, Histories Division
7 August 2003**

As the planning for Operation IRAQI FREEDOM (OIF) was under way, we at the Center for Military History were asked to draw upon historical examples to develop numerical considerations that might apply to occupation forces. Along the way, some additional questions and considerations arose. The material that follows represents my personal opinion as a historian, derived from appropriate sources and enriched by my colleagues' counsel and advice. It does not represent an official position of either the US Army or the Department of Defense. It is sort of our best advice at the time, late 2002 and early 2003, as to how big a job occupations have been in the past and how big it might be in a country like Iraq. I will also end with some **very** tentative points on the occupation so far in Iraq—how it is playing out.

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Occupation Questions


- What is an occupation force?
- How big should it be?
- What has been our historical experience with occupations?
- How many forces would be needed to occupy Afghanistan? Iraq?
- How long has it taken in the past to restore basic services? A functioning economy? A government? (In other words, when can we leave?)

As we gathered material on occupations, we had to pose some questions to help guide our answers.

- What do we mean by occupation? At what moment in time do we say military operations are over and an occupation has begun? Sometimes this is clear; sometimes not.
- What has our experience been in the past, and how many troops has it taken to run an occupation? What missions are included in the word “occupation”?
- What would it take if we had to occupy Afghanistan? Iraq?
- How long does it take to get a country up on its feet in terms of basic services—food, water, sanitation, electricity—and, longer term, on its economic feet or with a functioning government? Bottom line: How long has it taken us in the past to work ourselves out of a job—always the Army civil affairs (CA) goal?

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Define Occupation Forces



We had to pick a moment in time to say that war is over, now it's an occupation. So occupation forces are the residual that must remain to accomplish national purpose after warfighting has ceased. For the purpose of this study, in most cases, we defined occupation forces as those remaining **six months** after hostilities had ceased. In the case of World War II we allowed ourselves a year since it took so much longer in that case to redeploy huge masses of no longer necessary military manpower back from overseas.

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
How Large Does an Occupation Force Need to Be?

It depends on—

- Scope of mission
- Demographics of country
- Socioeconomic conditions
- Strategic circumstances

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Collateral Missions



Law and Order



External Defense



Occupation Per Se



Humanitarian Relief




Nation Building

The manpower required for an occupation force depends, of course, upon the missions expected of it. Occupation per se is enforcing the instrument that ends hostilities, be it a treaty, an accord, a cease-fire, or some other arrangement. Occupation seldom occurs without some mix of such additional missions as external defense against third parties, enforcing law and order, humanitarian relief, and nation building or rebuilding.


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Demographic Issue



There necessarily is a numerical relationship between the size of an occupation force and the size and nature of the population in the territory to be occupied. Demographics matter, particularly the numbers of young adult males—and the numbers of young adult males who are underemployed. A modern demographic pyramid features low birth rates, low death rates, and relatively equivalent age cohorts through people in their 60s. A traditional demographic pyramid features high birth rates and high death rates, thus much greater proportions of young people. This affects the youthful manpower available for mobilization in wartime and for employment—or unemployment—in peacetime.

US Army Center of Military History 20th-Century US Occupations



Our sample included 16 operations spread broadly through the 20th century. Of these, those depicted above the line were occupations proper, wherein an adversary was defeated in battle and US forces then occupied the territory—in all or part. Those depicted below the line were not quite so clear cut but nevertheless sufficiently resembled occupations to be useful for our purposes here.

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The Philippine Experience (1898-1946): Occupation/Empire



- Population: 7.6 million
- US Forces: 23,000 (.03%) (1903)
- (Total Regular US Army (1903) 75,000)
- Philippine Forces:
 - Constabulary, 1901: 2,000
 - Scouts, 1901: 5,000
 - Army, 1935: 120,000
- Missions:
 - Occupation
 - Law and Order
 - Nation Building
 - External Defense
 - Rebuilding to Independence

Our initial missions were occupation, law and order, and nation building. A relatively small number of US forces were involved due to the rapid buildup of a Philippine force of scouts and constabulary. It was a small number, but given the size of the regular force at that time, it was a huge percentage—almost 30 percent—of the entire Regular Army. (Some of these were volunteer units and not in the regular establishment.) After World War I, the mission for US forces (about 5,000) was almost entirely external defense with most of the law and order duties performed by the constabulary (another 5,000) and the scouts (5,000), despite the population doubling to about 13 million. The mission accelerated after 1935 as we attempted to build a Philippine army to defend the islands, with some US units, against the growing Japanese threat.

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The Japan Experience (1945-52)



Population: 83,199,600

US Forces: 92,538

Military/Population Ratio: 0.1%

Missions:


Occupation 1945-47

External Defense 1950 →

The best experience with respect to manpower required in an occupation setting would be Japan before the Korean war. Japan was a well-organized, homogenous society with a great deal of internal social discipline. External threats seemed minimal, the worst humanitarian crises had passed, the population was dutifully engaged in national reconstruction, and resistance to the American overseers was virtually nonexistent. Emperor Hirohito had directed cooperation with General Douglas MacArthur upon Japan's surrender, and Japan did so. Americans fielded only one soldier per 1,000 Japanese to occupy Japan. But then, except for some higher-level government restructuring, we did very little in the nation-building mission.

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The Middle Ground: Military-to-Population Ratios



The rest of our occupation experiences came in somewhere between the 9.2-percent military-to-population ratio of Vietnam, 1969 and the .1 percent of Japan, 1950. A median seems to be about .5 percent. Thus, if we had to field appreciably more than one soldier per 200 in the occupied population we should probably ask ourselves why we needed so many, and if we had to field appreciably less we would ask why we had to field so few.

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21st-Century Possibilities (Briefed Before Operation IF)


Afghanistan



Tribal . . . With Law
and Order, Nation
Building, and
Humanitarian Relief
Issues

Therefore: 300K(+)

Iraq Proper



National . . . With Robust
Infrastructure, Oil Wealth,
and Modernized, in Part

Therefore: 100K(-) (.5%)

One projects past experiences into the future at great risk. With respect to decision making, historical analysis is only one leg on a three-legged stool, with a second being contemporary analysis or war gaming, and the third detailed appreciations of current capabilities—no one starts with a blank sheet of paper. That having been said, Afghanistan presents difficulties at least as complex as those of the 1902 Philippines, with tribal organization and huge law and order, nation-building, and humanitarian relief issues. An occupation wherein we and our allies directly and effectively steered the course of events would require more than 300,000 soldiers if historical models applied. We have intervened in Afghanistan, but neither we nor our allies seem to have any intention of occupying it. The course of future events in Afghanistan, given our historical models, will be one that we may influence but will not control. Iraq is more properly a nation state with robust infrastructure, oil wealth, a nascent middle class, and appreciable social discipline. A traditional occupation of Iraq would require lower percentages of manpower from the United States and its allies, perhaps 100,000 soldiers over a number of years or about .5 percent. This estimate is low compared with Kosovo or Bosnia but higher than Japan and about on a par with most past occupations.

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Restoration of Basic Services/Economy

	GE	Japan	Korea	Italy	Bosnia
• Public Order	2 yrs	Immed.	1 yr	?	?
• Food	4 yrs	3 yrs	2 yrs	6 mos	1 yr
• Water/Sanitation	1 yr	Immed.	?	8 mos	6 mos
• Electricity	1-3 yrs	Immed.	3 yrs	2-6 mos	spotty
• Local Government	2-4 yrs	2 yrs	3 yrs	2 yrs	?
• Economic Recovery	4 yrs	5 yrs	10 yrs	5 yrs	?

Having determined numbers, crude though they are, we let the project drop a bit until after OIF, when we readdressed occupations from the perspective of how long these things take. We had no sooner occupied Iraq than the world press—whose chorus during the operation was “Are we there yet? Are we there yet?”—took up the hue and cry, “Well, what’s the problem? What’s taking so long to get water and electricity to everybody?” So we decided to look at how long some key events had taken in the past to resolve. Obviously rough, each country had services on line in different places at different times. Look at Italy: southern occupied for years before northern. Water in Rome in three months for some but eight before the city was up to prewar levels. Naples? If you have ever been to Naples I think you will wonder if the sanitation issue was **ever** addressed.

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Occupation of Iraq

- Planning: Garner TF (Orha)
352d CA Command
- Humanitarian Relief
- Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA)
- Public Order
- Water, Electricity, and Fuel
- Civil Administration

Planning: false assumptions. The Office of Reconstruction and Humanitarian Assistance and 352 not really involved in planning civil administration. Humanitarian relief: public order was the conventional force mission—regime collapse and, I believe, an insufficient number of troops on hand led to looting and a collapse of public order that should have been predicted. Water is always a problem. Electricity: Baghdad was always given more power. Thirty percent of the country was without electricity. Guess what? Thirty percent of the country has never had enough electricity! And the locals are stealing wire, and sabotage continues. Fuel: siphoned off by smugglers. Long-term civil administration problem: those who clamor most want to grab power faster before a popular and representative system is in place. And they seem to get the press.

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Conclusions

- Successful occupations take time and resources!
- The most essential task is public security—everything else flows from that.
- Public security starts with numbers on the ground but in the long run relies on establishing local, host nation police and constabulary army.
- Planning for occupation of Iraq seems to have been based on optimistic or wrong assumptions.
- A 200,000 initial occupation force does not seem to be “wildly off the mark,” but 100,000 for long term still seems about right.

Surprise . . . these things take time. The ignorance of the press continues to astound me: “Why haven’t we completely rebuilt the country yet?”

Public security is key. Without it, nothing happens. You are building your house on sand without public order.

See Paul D. Wolfowitz’s apology in the paper last July 2003. Oops! They had been told—willful blindness!

General Eric K. Shinseki looks a whole lot more prescient and intelligent than does the current civilian Department of Defense command group.

“The Small Change of Soldiering” and American Military Experience

Roger Spiller

“Armed diplomacy,” the term this conference used as an organizing theme, defines a class of military operations with certain characteristics. Roughly speaking, these fall under the heading of “the small change of soldiering,” to use John Keegan’s now-famous phrase.¹ Finer-gauged definitions are unnecessary. No doubt soldiers have always understood: when they were charged with a mission that did not look familiar, that diverged from the agreed-upon business of fighting wars, they entered this unorthodox realm of soldiering. This might include interventions and invasions, punitive expeditions, constabulary operations, occupations, peacekeeping, or even colonial or imperial warfare.

The first of the case studies presented here, by Irving Levinson, considers America’s occupation of Mexico as a classic “stability operation.” Next, J.G. Dawson considers the US Army’s role in the Reconstruction of the South after the Civil War as an important early case of “nation building.” For Robert Wooster, the Army’s operations on the frontier after the Civil War amounted to a very different sort of occupation and, in many ways, one of the most complex in American history. The volume concludes with surveys of recent American operations in Somalia, Afghanistan, and Iraq. The scope of these and other cases collected here is vast, reaching across the past century and a half of the American military experience up to the present campaigns in Afghanistan and Iraq. Seen together, these studies contribute to the body of professional knowledge American soldiers are most likely to require in the foreseeable future.

Apart from their unorthodox nature, what all the campaigns considered in this volume have in common is that they were in some way *limited*. None approached, or was intended to approach, the intensity of total war seen in the two world wars of the 20th century. Something a good deal less than the United States’ national survival was at stake. Instead, their limitations determined their fundamental character. In each case study, America’s aims and methods were bounded in some way by the immediate situation, usually by the immediate cause that gave rise to the operation. These less-than-vital circumstances in turn framed the mission of the forces deployed, although hard—and repeated—experience has shown how missions often take on an elastic quality as the shapes and purposes of these struggles evolve. American operations in Somalia, the United Nations Operation in Somalia (UNISOM) II, is a case in point. What began as a humanitarian relief mission metastasized over time into an altogether different kind of operation with a tragic result for American policy, American forces, and not least, the people of Somalia.

Such operations are limited in other respects, too. For instance, they are always confined geographically. A limited mission and a limited operational area both require a fine sense of discrimination about the number and kind of troops that should be employed. Having too many troops or having the wrong kind of troops could be just as bad as not having enough. Too, no matter how small a given area of operations, expeditionary forces are never strong enough to cover it entirely, even if it were desirable to do so. The Army’s pacification campaigns in the Philippines were typical in this respect. The Army

put its formations and detachments where they would challenge the most intractable problems. Troublesome provinces such as Batangas received a large share of attention while others were left to their own devices. Unable to dominate an entire territory or region by physical means, statesmen and commanders are always forced to discriminate, to decide where limited assets could advance their mission, to calculate where politics might substitute for combat power, or to risk dissipating their power and failing altogether.

And American statesmen and commanders did fail. One might be misled to think that because vital national interests are not immediately in danger, a limited operation's failure may be of only limited importance. But the military dimensions of an operation may not be a mirror image of its larger, long-term political importance. The United States' relatively small-scale intervention in the Russian Civil War did much to poison American relations with the USSR during its formative history and for most of the century thereafter. History does not obey a rule of proportionality. Small events may produce great effects. As colonial soldiers have long understood, a politically charged tactical defeat can have strategic consequences.

Next, limited operations do not conduce to a leisurely pace. American political and military authorities have usually set these campaigns in motion with one eye on the clock. The role of the United States is usually *reactive*, and this suffuses the campaign with the sense that American forces must move quickly if they hope to take the initiative and control the situation. Very seldom is the American public consulted beforehand. Provided the cost in lives, treasure, and time does not outrun the American government's justifications, the public's sufferance can be assumed but, warily, not for too long. So, forces engaged in limited operations almost always feel undermanned and out of time. And for troops trained only in orthodox soldiering, mission, enemy, terrain, troops, and time available always feels out of whack in these operations. As one soldier said of his role in stability operations in Panama, "I didn't sign up for this bullshit."²

Nowhere is the departure from "real soldiering" more keenly felt than in the imbalance of combat power between the forces engaged. In limited operations, American forces have rarely faced opponents whose orders of battle approached their own, even—with notable exceptions—in a momentary, tactical sense. The lack of parity between forces works its own important influence on the greater character of the operation. The Americans' abundance of combat power has naturally led to frustration over policies that prevent its wholehearted use. Often, on the other side, the very lack of combat power will drive opponents toward the more inventive, less orthodox methods that have become so familiar in 20th-century warfare. From time to time, in cases of what one might term the "Custer syndrome," the overconfidence bred by such abundant combat power has been met with dramatic and wholly unexpected American defeats.

It is no wonder, then, that soldiers throughout history have never been particularly fond of limited warfare. Given a choice in theory that is never available in practice, soldiers would prefer to meet their own kind in battles where there was no ambiguity about ends, ways, and means. Perhaps it is this preference, or prejudice, that has worked against advancing military theories of unorthodox operations, a deficiency that has extended even to simple doctrines and methods until quite recently. While modern orthodox warfare has given rise to a vast professional literature to guide every facet of strategic planning, cam-

paigned design, and operational execution, the same cannot be said of more limited operations.³

Perhaps that is because these operations are seen as too much affairs of the moment, too much accidents of history than any well-planned, deliberate orthodox operation could be. Thus, so the argument runs, it is impossible for military theory and doctrine to anticipate these operations in any useful way. We must concede the initiative to reality and realize that improvisation is more important than knowledge in such operations.⁴ Of course, this is an argument for ignoring experience—one's own as well as others'.

One might expect such opinions from armies with no experience, seeking to rationalize their ignorance. On the contrary, officers in mature armies with long experience of colonial and expeditionary warfare such as the French were quick to say, "adaptability in the face of each new situation, not the application of some pat formula of the *Ecole de Guerre*, made for success in the colonies."⁵ The ambiguous character of these operations was supposed to create bold, innovative military leaders who could reinvigorate the staid practices of the orthodox army when they finally returned home. The common view among expeditionary soldiers that this kind of soldiering was beyond the reach of codification certainly worked against any but the most informal, ass-in-the-saddle doctrines.⁶

Indeed, only a forgiving definition of doctrine could be applied to the nostrums that were handed down like saddle blankets from soldier to soldier on the American frontier after the Civil War.⁷ And while it is certainly true, as Andrew Birtle has observed, that doctrine in the modern sense did not exist in the 19th-century Army, the differences between the state of the military art as it existed for orthodox operations and the state of the art for unorthodox operations were difficult to ignore.⁸ The difference in the two bodies of knowledge was the sign of a preference being enacted by an increasingly professional officer corps. Choices were being made about what was most important to learn and what could be dealt with informally. The distance between these two bodies of corporate knowledge has persisted throughout the 20th century and into the 21st. As a consequence, the US Army still greets unorthodox campaigning as if it were a new day where improvisation and hoping for the best overrule experience.

Yet, there is no intrinsic reason why this should be so. The US Army's experience alone is sufficient to inform the creation of an "American school" of limited warfare.⁹ Hardly a year has passed in the last two centuries in which American soldiers have not been engaged in such missions, with very little time out for the world wars. And with the advent of the Cold War, not only the frequency of contingencies intensified, so did their scope of consequence. Between 1945 and 1976, arguably the most dangerous period of the Cold War, the United States employed its Armed Forces in support of its foreign policy 215 times.¹⁰ Behind every one of these operations lay the possibility that it might escape its limitations and spin toward a confrontation between the Superpowers. After a period of relative quiescence during the 1980s, the pace of American contingency operations surged again. During the dozen years of the Bush and Clinton administrations, the United States employed its Armed Forces in contingency operations grand and small on more than 1,000 occasions.¹¹ What have we learned from all of this experience?

A collective look at the military operations discussed in this volume suggests we still have much to learn about unorthodox conflict, if only because we have forgotten so

much. Notwithstanding their wide variety of intent, type, scope, and result, certain shortcomings still seem to appear with depressing regularity.

These shortcomings are evident from the very beginning of such operations and do much to set the course for how they will play out. In no case cited in this volume will one see an instance in which the principal actors took heed of the nation's hard-won experience, studied the problem at hand with any discipline, or allowed their actions to be shaped in any way by the body of knowledge available to them. How American policy is framed and how the Army's mission is defined exercise a critical influence over all subsequent action. But the translation of policy into a military mission has always been fraught with difficulty. It has been so difficult that Army leaders often relented in the face of presidential insistence, as Secretary of War Newton Baker did when he received President Woodrow Wilson's less than exact guidance for intervening in the Russian Civil War.¹² All too often, Army generals have adopted a dog-in-the-manger attitude when confronted by a willful president, preferring to comfort themselves with the illusion that their role is only to follow orders so they can be held blameless if the mission goes awry.

The traditional lack of collaboration between American policy makers and soldiers tends to create a false picture of what might be expected from the mission about to be launched. All parties, civil and military, have tended to overestimate how much of any given problem military force can solve. One repeatedly sees the assumption that policy makers and soldiers alike make that exercising sufficient force alone would obviate the need for expertly understanding the problem before them. Experience indicates quite the opposite. If anything, it is possible to hypothesize that the political dimension of these operations is always miscalculated. From the Mexican War to the Philippines, to Russia, Germany, Vietnam, Panama, Bosnia and beyond, missions guiding American action have fallen short on this very score. A misshapen strategy thus passes its deficiency of vision down the echelons until the price is paid in the field.

Yet, armed with even the best-framed mission—one that provides expert, professional guidance for execution—soldiers will be forced to improvise. Missions always change simply because the situations that gave rise to them change. Furthermore, as a kind of military codicil to Werner Heisenberg's principle of uncertainty, one may assume that as soon as American soldiers enter the operational environment, the character of the experiment is unavoidably altered.¹³ This may be the reason another rule seems appropriate for these kinds of operations: *missions never contract*.¹⁴

Uncertain policies, inadequately framed missions, a long-standing professional bias against unconventional operations, all these virtually guarantee that soldiers will be assigned to execute these missions with little doctrine to guide them and less training to protect them. The usual disparity of force evident at the onset of a mission naturally breeds confidence, but the opposition is not required to comply with expectations. In several of the cases discussed here, planning assumed—wrongly—a compliant noncombatant population. A wrong-headed assumption on such a question spells the distance between a short, uneventful operation and an all-out resistance movement.¹⁵

The haste to respond and the focus on immediate action militate against “what happens next” planning. As if the presence of combat power alone will render all other questions moot, intervening forces are usually caught off guard as the operation changes

shape and gradually demilitarizes (or remilitarizes) itself. This is usually the phase when the occupying power learns that the noncombatant population's initial reaction was less approval than grudging acquiescence. Depending on the depth of popular resistance, the opposition to the intervening power may reconstitute itself, as indeed it did during the Philippine Insurrection.¹⁶ If modern military planners are unable to look beyond the first shots, the old problem of enemy reconstitution will seem wholly new. At that point, execution defaults to improvisation that, in fact, is not so much a plan as the absence of a plan.

Ten of the cases collected in this volume show unprepared American soldiers confronted by the complex challenges of occupation duty. Faced with this unattractive prospect, American political and military leaders rarely took their thinking beyond the point of settling old scores and stabilizing the country long enough to depart. Yet, the American experience with occupation operations is so extensive that one can easily discern recurring themes—installing temporary government, controlling the population in general, suppressing residual resistance, resettling displaced noncombatants, rejuvenating supply and distribution systems, repairing infrastructure, and institutional reform. With the one exception of the American occupation of Germany after World War II, in preparation for which the Army had very wisely established a School of Military Government two years earlier, American soldiers have suffered the disadvantages of ignorance time and again, plunging into operations where they were forced to learn as they ran.¹⁷ Abundant knowledge offers no guidance simply by existing. Ideas are like orphans: unless adopted, they will not serve their rightful function.

If the Army will not consult the wisdom of its own experience, the question is why not? If actions are not informed by fact, what remains other than passion, prejudice, or wishful thinking? During the conference's session on irregular warfare, one of the participants spoke with some heat of "an incredible resistance to lessons learned" after the Vietnam war and reminded everyone of the old saying that the war did not really last eight years but one year eight times. The late Douglas Pike, an eminent scholar of the Vietnam war, believed that this resistance to knowledge permeated every level of the American politico-military system. To describe this phenomenon, Pike used a term coined by Aldus Huxley—*vincible ignorance*: a state of mind in which one does not know and understands he does not know *and does not believe it makes any difference*. Pike's characterization of how *vincible ignorance* works in action is worth recounting:

We first committed ourselves to the war and then began to think about it comprehensively. The highest level leadership did not initially sit down and address in detailed and extended fashion its strategic position, did not discuss and analyze enemy strengths, weaknesses, and probable strategies, did not wrangle and argue and finally hammer out a fully articulated strategy.

There was in this behavior a sense of enormous self-confidence, indeed a kind of unconscious arrogance on the part of the Americans.¹⁸

As Pike goes on to explain, this is not to say that no one in the system understood the situation and what answers were required. On the contrary, the United States had experts aplenty willing to put their knowledge to work. "The villain in the piece," he writes, was

not so much particular people but the system itself.¹⁹ The system somehow arrested the necessary translation of knowledge into action.

Certain institutions seem to be especially susceptible to these misfires, as if the institution subordinates all its functions to its own survival. Where an organizational hierarchy manages knowledge by subordinating it to process, the potency of the knowledge the institution possesses is inevitably dissipated. With all operations reduced to routine, knowledge counts for less and less until its acuity—its capacity for effecting change—simply disappears.

We have in two recent tragedies a nonmilitary variant of Pike's vincible ignorance. A comparison of the United States' two space shuttle disasters reveals virtually identical institutional shortcomings. In both cases, accident investigators assigned a greater weight of responsibility to the National Aeronautics and Space Administration's (NASA's) "institutional culture" than the immediate technical reasons for the crashes. The management of expert knowledge, which existed in abundance at all organizational levels, nevertheless worked against its critical influence over the larger policy-level decisions made within the agency.²⁰ After the *Challenger* disaster in 1983, both a presidential commission and a congressional investigation recommended corrective reforms in how NASA managed its critical knowledge. The recently released Columbia Accident Investigation Board report identifies the same deficiencies in the agency's organizational culture—17 years later.²¹

In 1944, British military historian and theorist B.H. Liddell Hart published a brief meditation on his professional life titled *Why Don't We Learn From History?* Considering the experience he and his countrymen were living through at the moment, Liddell Hart's answer was quite optimistic. World War II had reached its apogee when he was writing. The war had grown to truly global proportions. To many at the time, the war seemed the tragic result of civilization's failure to heed the lessons of World War I.

Liddell Hart's optimism was all the more remarkable because he had personal reasons for doubting the value of knowledge as a guiding force in contemporary public action. He had been intimately involved in his nation's debates over foreign and military policy for nearly two decades. Immediately before the war, he had served as an adviser to the Secretary of State for War in the ill-fated Chamberlain government, which had added the word "appeasement" to every politician's lexicon of nightmares. His reputation suffered when the government fell, and he spent the war in a kind of intellectual exile. He claimed his faith in the power of experience to inform reason was undeterred. Liddell Hart was putting on a brave face, however; he surely knew better by then, if not long before. And he seemed to admit as much later, wondering whether there was "a practical way of combining progress toward the attainment of truth [that is, knowledge] with progress toward its acceptance."²² In some modern armies, this process might be manifested as doctrine.

For those who have direct experience of military planning and active service in limited operations—as quite a few of those attending this conference did—Liddell Hart's optimism seems closer to denial than reality. Very likely, every one of them could recount an episode in their own experience in which "prerational" thinking suppressed informed professional judgment.²³ In my own experience, the answer to Liddell Hart's

question comes down to two reasons: ignorance and the kind of arrogance Douglas Pike described so well. The first of these is certainly correctable. The second is, finally and regrettably, as close to a historical constant as anyone is ever likely to isolate. For a modern army with much to do, the only possible corrective is to learn how to learn from itself.

Notes

1. John Keegan, *The Face of Battle* (New York: Viking Press, 1976), 16. "For there is a fundamental difference between the sort of sporadic, small-scale fighting which is the small change of soldiering and the sort we characterize as battle."
2. Author's conference notes. Oral interview with Dr. Lawrence Yates during general discussion on "Intervention and Peacekeeping in Panama and Bosnia."
3. The exceptions are few and important. The classic study of these forms of operation is Colonel C.E. Callwell, *Small Wars: A Tactical Textbook for Imperial Soldiers* (London: Grenhill Books, 1990; orig. London: Her Majesty's Stationery Office, 1899); Frank Kitson, *Low Intensity Operations: Subversion, Insurgency, Peace-Keeping* (Hamden, CT: Archon Books, 1971; orig. London: Faber and Faber Ltd., 1971), to name two.
4. This was exactly the argument posed by France's leading colonial soldiers of the 19th century and no small number of American soldiers. See Douglas Porch's discussion of France's "colonial school" of soldiering in "Bugeaud, Gallieni, Lyautey: The Development of French Colonial Warfare," *The Makers of Modern Strategy From Machiavelli to the Nuclear Age*, Peter Paret, ed. (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1986), especially 403-404. See also Perry Jamieson, *Crossing the Deadly Ground: U. S. Army Tactics, 1865-1899* (Tuscaloosa, AL: University of Alabama Press, 1994), especially 36-53; Robert Wooster, *The Military and United States Indian Policy, 1865-1903* (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1988), 136-41.
5. *Ibid.*, the phrase is Porch's.
6. Jamieson, 37.
7. Attack Indian villages in winter, kill the ponies and the buffalo, use converging columns, use Indian auxiliaries but do not ever trust them, use firepower as a substitute for ingenuity, and so on. See *ibid.*, p. 36 and following.
8. See Andrew Birtle, *US Army Counterinsurgency and Contingency Operations, 1860-1941* (Washington, DC: US Army Center of Military History [CMH], 1998), vii.
9. Add to the American experience that of the French, British, and Russian armies, to name only three of the most prominent modern expeditionary armies, and there is no reason for military theory and doctrine in this field to remain dormant.
10. Barry M. Blechman and Stephen S. Kaplan, *Force Without War: U. S. Armed Forces as a Political Instrument* (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution, 1978), 16.
11. Barry M. Blechman and Tamara Cofman Wittes, "Defining Moment: The Threat and Use of Force in American Foreign Policy," *Political Science Quarterly* (Spring 1999), 2. Accessed at <<http://web8.epnet.com>> 2 September 2003. The criteria used in this account appear to have been a good deal less rigorous than Blechman and Kaplan's earlier accounting. Here, Blechman would include very small-scale missions such as the Army's relatively well-known 55-man "mission training team" deployed to El Salvador in the 1980s.
12. See Major Jeffrey Stamp's essay in this volume, "Lost in the Snow: The US Intervention in Siberia During the Russian Revolution."
13. One may see this phenomenon in virtually every intervention mentioned in this volume.
14. Removing US forces following the "Black Hawk down" disaster in Mogadishu may be taken as a case of mission contraction, but this instance is more correctly seen as mission failure. The same may be said of another case not discussed in this volume, the bombing of the US Marine

barracks in Beirut in 1983. But, again, this tragedy seems to have come about because the marines' mission expanded in the eyes of their enemies. The US Marines' subsequent withdrawal from Lebanon, therefore, could also be seen as the result of mission expansion.

15. In this volume, see especially Irving Levinson, "Occupation and Stability Dilemmas of the Mexican War: Origins and Solutions"; J.G. Dawson, "Reconstruction as Nation Building: The US Army in the South"; Robert Wooster, "The Frontier Army and the Occupation of the West"; and Robert S. Cameron, "US Constabulary Activities in Postwar Germany."

16. See Brian Linn, "The US Army, Nation Building, and Pacification in the Philippines," in this volume. The reconstitution of the German army into pockets of guerrilla resistance was an important early concern in planning for the Allied occupation of Germany. See Robert S. Cameron, "US Constabulary Activities in Postwar Germany," in this volume.

17. The occupation of both Germany and Japan are important exceptions. However, these occupations accomplished something less than their promoters claimed at the time, and a distinct line was drawn between military government and "nation building" as the term is used presently.

18. Douglas Pike, "Conduct of the Vietnam War: Strategic Factors, 1965-1968," *The Second Indochina War: Proceedings of a Symposium Held at Arlie, Virginia, 7-9 November 1984* (Washington, DC: CMH, 1986), 99-116; see especially 110-11.

19. Ibid. Two classic works offer the depth and texture of modern organizational theory to Pike and Huxley's interpretation of "vincible ignorance." See Graham T. Allison, *The Essence of Decision: Explaining the Cuban Missile Crisis* (Boston: Little Brown, 1971); Irving L. Janis, *Victims of Groupthink* (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1982).

20. Diane Vaughan's study of the *Challenger* disaster is more forthright: "routine and taken-for-granted aspects of organizational life . . . created a way of seeing that was simultaneously a way of not seeing." See Diane Vaughan, *The Challenger Launch Decision: Risky Technology, Culture, and Deviance at NASA* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1997), 394.

21. Ibid., 389 and following; *Columbia Accident Investigation Board Report*, vol. 1 (Washington, DC: Columbia Accident Investigation Board Limited First Printing, August 2003), especially 121-70, <www.caib.us/news/report/default.html> accessed 26 August 2003.

22. B.H. Liddell Hart, *Why Don't We Learn From History?* (New York: Hawthorne Books, Inc., 1971; orig. London: Allen & Unwin, 1944): 70.

23. The term is Diane Vaughan's.

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Roger J. Spiller served in the US Air Force from 1962 to 1965. He holds a B.A. in English literature and international relations and an M.A. in history from Southwest Texas State University. He received a Ph.D. in history at Louisiana State University. In 1978, he took a visiting associate professorship in military history at CGSC, where he became one of the founding members of CSI. He is currently the George C. Marshall Professor of History at CGSC. His most recent book is *Sharp Corners: Urban Operations at Century's End*. His first work of fiction, *In War Time*, will be published by Random House. Dr. Spiller is a contributing editor to *American Heritage* magazine and a member of the Board of Trustees of the Society for Military History.

Jeffrey W. Stamp, Major, US Air Force, received a B.S. from the US Air Force Academy in 1992 and an M.A. in military history from the University of Alabama in 1998. He has held a number of active duty postings around the world, from the wing level to the unified command staff. Major Stamp has taught history at the US Air Force Academy since 2001 and specializes in the history of unconventional warfare and the small wars of the late 19th and early 20th centuries.

Richard W. Stewart received a Ph.D. from Yale University. He was previously the command historian, US Army Special Operations Command, Fort Bragg, North Carolina, and historian, Center for Army Lessons Learned, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas. He is a retired colonel in military intelligence in the US Army Reserve with 30 years of commissioned service and a graduate of CGSC. He has deployed to theaters of operations as a combat historian during Operations DESERT STORM; UNOSOM II (Somalia), where he supported Task Force Ranger; MAINTAIN/RESTORE DEMOCRACY (Haiti); JOINT FORCE (Bosnia); and ENDURING FREEDOM (Afghanistan and Uzbekistan), where he was supporting special operations forces. He has conducted more than 600 oral history interviews in garrison and combat environments and has authored extensive publications on military history. Dr. Stewart is currently chief, Histories Division, CMH.

William Stivers earned a Ph.D. in international relations history from the Johns Hopkins University. He has held teaching posts at the University of California, Santa Cruz; the Colorado College; the University of Southern California's international relations graduate program in Germany; and the Martin Luther University in Halle, Sachsen-Anhalt. From 1986-1990, he worked as historian, G5, US Command, Berlin. He came to CMH in 1998 and has just returned from a three-year posting at the George C. Marshall Center in Garmisch, Germany. He has published books and articles dealing with Anglo-American relations in the 1920s, US Middle East policy, and postwar German history. He is currently working on a book dealing with the US occupation of Berlin during the military government period, 1945-1949.

Robert Wooster received his Ph.D. in 1985 from the University of Texas and joined the faculty at Texas A&M University, Corpus Christi the following year. He chaired the Department of Humanities from 1997-2000 and was named a Piper Professor for his distinguished teaching in 1998. His scholarly books on military history include *Soldiers, Sutlers, and Settlers: Garrison Life on the Texas Frontier*, *The Military and United States Indian Policy, 1865-1903*, *Nelson A. Miles and the Twilight of the Frontier Army*, and his forthcoming book *Soldier, Surgeon, Scholar, the Memoirs of William Henry Corbusier, 1844-1930*.

Appendix A. Program

Day 1

Tuesday, 5 August 2003

0630-0730 Breakfast at Conference Center

0745-0800 Opening Remarks

Session 1

0800-0945 *Mid 19th-Century Irregular Warfare, Stability Operations, and Nation Building (Mexican War, Civil War, and Reconstruction)*

“Occupation and Stability Dilemmas of the Mexico War: Origins and Solutions”

Dr. Irving W. Levinson
University of Houston

“General Order 11 and the Politics of War in the Department of the Missouri”

Dr. Donald B. Connelly
University of Houston

“Reconstruction as Nation Building: The U.S. Army in the South”

Prof. Joseph G. Dawson III
Texas A&M University, College Station

Panelist

Dr. James B. Martin
Friends University

Moderator

Dr. Curtis S. King
Combat Studies Institute

Session 2

1000-1145 *Late 19th-Century Irregular Warfare, Stability Operations, and Nation Building (American West and the Philippines)*

“The Frontier Army and the Occupation of the West”

Prof. Robert Wooster
Texas A&M University, Corpus Christi

“The U.S. Army and Nation Building and Pacification in the Philippines”

Prof. Brian McAllister Linn

Texas A&M University, College Station

Panelist

Mr. Richard E. Killblane

U.S. Army Transportation Corps

Moderator

Dr. Lawrence A. Yates

Combat Studies Institute

1200-1300 Lunch at Conference Center

Session 3

1300-1445 *Early 20th-Century Intervention (Russia and China)*

“Lost in the Snow: The U.S. Intervention in Siberia During the Russian Revolution”

MAJ Jeffrey Stamp, U.S. Air Force

U.S. Air Force Academy

“State Department Soldiers: Warlords, Nationalists, and Intervention”

Prof. Katherine K. Reist

University of Pittsburgh

Panelist

Dr. Andrew J. Birtle

U.S. Army Center of Military History

Moderator

Dr. Lawrence A. Yates

Combat Studies Institute

Session 4

1500-1645 *Occupation (Post-World War II Germany)*

“U.S. Constabulary Activities in Postwar Germany”

Dr. Robert S. Cameron

U.S. Army Armor School

“Reconstructing the Civil Administration of Bremen, U.S. Enclave”

Dr. Bianka J. Adams

U.S. Army Center of Military History

“Americans and Berliners in Germany’s *Stunde Null*”

Dr. William Stivers

U.S. Army Center of Military History

Panelist

Dr. Boyd L. Dastrup

U.S. Army Field Artillery Center and Fort Sill

Moderator

Prof. Theodore A. Wilson

University of Kansas

Day 2

Wednesday, 6 August 2003

0645-0745 Breakfast at Conference Center

Session 1

0800-0945 *Modern Irregular Warfare (Korea, Vietnam, and Latin America)*

“Ps, Gs, and UW—Partisan Operations in the Korean War”

Dr. Richard L. Kiper

Kansas City Kansas Community College

“Special Forces: Counterinsurgency Era From Vietnam to El Salvador”

Prof. John Waghelstein

U.S. Naval War College

Panelist

Mr. Cecil Bailey

Consultant

Moderator

Prof. Geoff Babb

U.S. Army Command and General Staff College

Session 2

- 1000-1145 *Intervention and Peacekeeping (Panama and Bosnia)*
- “The Transition From Combat to Nation Building in Panama”
Dr. Lawrence A. Yates
Combat Studies Institute
- “The United States in Bosnia”
Dr. Robert F. Baumann
U.S. Army Command and General Staff College
- Panelist
Dr. Curtis S. King
Combat Studies Institute
- Moderator
LTC Kevin W. Farrell, U.S. Army
Combat Studies Institute

- 1200-1300 Lunch at Conference Center

Session 3

- 1300-1445 *Nation Building (Somalia)*
- “UNOSOM II: Nation Building in Somalia”
LTG Thomas Montgomery
U.S. Army (Retired)
- Panelists
Mr. Thomas Daze
U.S. Army Command and General Staff College
Mr. Brooks Lyles
Contractor
- Moderator
Dr. Robert F. Baumann
U.S. Army Command and General Staff College

Session 4

- 1500-1645 *Historical Tour of Fort Leavenworth*

Tour Guide

Mr. Kelvin Crow

Combined Arms Center Command History Office

Day 3

Thursday, 7 August 2003

0645-0745 Breakfast at Conference Center

Session 1

0800-0945 *Afghanistan and the Global War on Terrorism*

“U.S. Army Special Forces in Afghanistan, October 2001-March 2002”

Dr. Richard W. Stewart

U.S. Army Center of Military History

“To Succeed Where Others Have Failed: Forming and Training the Afghan National Army”

LTC Kevin W. Farrell, U.S. Army

Combat Studies Institute

Panelist

Dr. Charles H. Briscoe

U.S. Army Special Operations Command

Moderator

Dr. Robert F. Baumann

U.S. Army Command and General Staff College

Session 2

1000-1145 *Operation IRAQI FREEDOM*

“Organization for Combat Historical Coverage of Operation IRAQI FREEDOM”

COL Donald W. Warner, U.S. Army

U.S. Army Center of Military History

“Military Operations During Operation IRAQI FREEDOM”

MAJ William Story, U.S. Army

Combined Forces Land Component Command History

“Logistics: Gulf War I and II”

Dr. Gary Trogdon

U.S. Army Center of Military History

“Occupations: Then and Now”

Dr. Richard W. Stewart

U.S. Army Center of Military History

Moderator

COL Donald W. Warner

1200-1300

Lunch at Conference Center

Session 3

1300-1445

Overview and Closing Remarks

Dr. Roger J. Spiller

U.S. Army Command and General Staff College