

The Limits of Influence: Training the Guardias in Latin America

Richard L. Millett

From 1898 through 1934, the United States created, trained, and equipped five small Latin American military/constabulary forces. The nations involved were Cuba, Panama, Haiti, Dominican Republic, and Nicaragua. In each case the force was expected to provide virtually all aspects of the nation's security, was designed to be apolitical, and to reduce both direct costs and opportunities for corruption. It was further hoped, if not expected, that these forces would provide the stability needed to avoid future armed US interventions.¹

In each case the forces, far from becoming a supporter of democratic stability, spawned predatory dictatorships. In each case the United States ultimately again found itself intervening twice with military force in Haiti, once in the Dominican Republic, conducting one major and several minor interventions in Panama and several limited interventions in Cuba plus the indirect efforts of the Bay of Pigs operation, and indirectly in Nicaragua via the contra project. In all but the Dominican Republic, the forces created by the United States were ultimately totally destroyed, twice by Marxist revolutionaries (Cuba and Nicaragua) and twice by US military intervention (Haiti and Panama). The institution's survival in the Dominican Republic may be due to the US intervention there in 1965.

The sorry history of these efforts provides lessons in a number of areas. It has its most direct application to current and future efforts to develop other nations' security forces, most notably, but by no means exclusively in today's Iraq. It also illustrates the problems of combining police and military functions, the obstacles to reshaping another nation's political and social environment, the dilemma of making policies sustainable and consistent, and the limits on exporting both doctrine and values. In sum, these are classic illustrations of the limits of influence.

Before beginning this analysis, however, it should be noted that while these forces rarely moderated and frequently exacerbated the political/social/economic problems of these small, weak nations, they were by no means the only source of such problems. Replacing military governments with civilian dictatorships, such as that of the Duvaliers in Haiti, or with Marxist authoritarians such as Castro in Cuba or the Sandinistas in Nicaragua, did nothing to provide either security or freedom for these nations. Establishing functioning democratic structures requires much more than good intentions, better-trained militaries, and new constitutions.

The first lesson to be drawn from these experiences is that technology transfers, values don't. It is much easier to teach someone how to fire a weapon than to teach how to know when and against whom to use it. US efforts were relatively successful

in modernizing these forces, in increasing both their combat and internal security capacities. But efforts to implant political-military doctrines were generally futile. Armies quickly adapted the new training and technology to domestic norms and values. Authoritarian systems became more efficient and often more repressive, not more democratic.

Lesson two is that using the military in the role of police is always a bad idea, although sometimes it may be a worse idea not to so use them. In creating these forces it was thought that placing police under central control and incorporating them into the military would serve numerous useful purposes. It would reduce expenses, give the military a continuing, credible mission, and hopefully curb political manipulation and reduce corruption. But what it did was to further centralize authority, eliminating any local controls over or ties with police forces. Indeed, in some cases, individuals were deliberately assigned to areas where they had no local ties to prevent any sympathy with the population. In other cases local leaders formed their own paramilitary forces outside official state control. With both military and police officers graduating from the same institution and belonging to a united officer corps, it was common to assign those of less ability (and at times less moral scruples) to police duty, further undermining police functions. Order took precedence over justice, control was more important than free speech or press, and protecting privilege—not individual rights—was the priority.

Lesson three is that efforts to change a society by altering one institution never produce the desired effect and inevitably produce undesired effects. Trying to change police and other internal security forces without dealing with the massive problems of the broader administration of justice (legal systems, courts, traditional caste and class impunity, and so forth) only exacerbated existing problems. When there is no effective rule of law, the police will not function in a democratic manner; when a society is dominated by family, class, and caste divisions, the security forces will incorporate and maintain these divisions. The greatest change was often creating a new class of privilege and impunity, the officer corps, which exercised power and spawned corruption at hitherto unprecedented levels.

Lesson four is that language skills (or the lack thereof) and racial/ethnic prejudices have a major impact. Knowing not only the grammar, but the nuances and local variations of a language is vital. In Latin America knowing that loyalty and subservience to the state is very different than loyalty and subservience to the government or the people is vital. The Latin tradition is that of the army of the conquistadores, not our militia tradition. Loyalty goes to one's immediate commander and then to the institution, not to the government or constitution. Understanding the lack of words for compromise, or accountability, the meaning of addressing a superior as *mi coronel*, knowing why, in Spanish for example, instead of being

disappointed one is deceived or betrayed, understanding such concepts of *personalismo* (the tendency to give loyalty to an individual rather than an institution) are all keys to knowing both the possibilities and limits of potential influence.

Racial prejudice was both common and generally accepted in the United States in the first third of the 20th century and this had a strong impact in places such as Haiti. It produced paternalism, a willingness to set much lower standards for and accept conduct by nationals of all ranks. The ultimate example was the court-martial by the Marines of a Dominican Lieutenant, Rafael Trujillo, who was accused of multiple rape and extortion. Despite overwhelming evidence against him, not only was he acquitted, but the case had no impact on his future promotions and assignments.² As a result, when the United States withdrew, Trujillo rapidly took over first the army and eventually the entire nation, becoming in the process one of the most brutal and corrupt dictators in Latin American history.

Lesson five is that most influence rarely survives withdrawal. Power and culture overcome ideology, and once foreign trainers lose their direct authority, they also lose much of their influence. To exercise authority effectively usually meant operating as a *caudillo*, a *cacique*, a traditional *jefe*. But once the trainer was no longer in that position, the authority passed to his national successor, who was a product of the traditional, not the imported culture. What were necessary adaptations in the short run to create an effective force often undermined long-range policy goals concerning the nature and political orientation of the institution. The officers assigned to create these forces often understood this and at times attempted to communicate this to Washington but without success.³

Lesson six is that secondary issues in the creation and training process often become major issues once command transfer is made to national authorities. The issue of intelligence is a key example. Under American control intelligence operated largely as a tactical military tool. Focus was on issues of collection and evaluation more than utilization. When American forces withdrew the newly created militaries retained control over all domestic and foreign intelligence and used it to protect the military institution and perpetuate governments in power. Internal dissent rather than foreign threats became the primary focus. Leaving behind a structure where all intelligence, foreign and domestic, was administered by the military made it inevitably an instrument of political control and repression.

Officers assigned to these missions were rarely prepared for the cultural and political obstacles they would encounter. Language skills were often neglected, selection was based more on institutional values than capability for the mission, and technical skills were generally valued above human skills. As a result, those involved frequently saw this as a job to be finished as quickly as possible so they could return

to something better or “more important.” What is remarkable is how well most officers and enlisted men functioned while assigned to these missions. They often developed a strong rapport with the nationals they were training and leading, and while in command, kept abuses of power under relative control. But they were unable to leave behind any structure that would curb these tendencies once they departed.

Finally, in all these cases communication between those making policies in Washington and those trying to carry out these policies in the field was very poor at best. Directives from higher authorities arrived quickly and forcefully; reactions, if transmitted at all, were delayed, re-routed, criticized, and ignored. Those doing the training quickly learned that questioning means and resources, much less objectives, could be career threatening. Under such circumstances “not on my watch” became an operative slogan, along with preparing excuses for ultimate failure such as “to really do the job would require our presence here for at least two generations.”

In summary, there are huge limits of influence when trying to develop a military force in another culture. The more ambitious the goals of such a project, the more radical the transformation envisioned, the more likely it is that the effort will not only fail, but that the ultimate results will be diametrically opposed to those originally sought. Sustainability of effort and resources can never be assumed, common language does not signify common values, ability to transmit technical knowledge does not equate with ability to instill values. Training can provide needed skills that serve both their national interests and ours. It can produce ties and relationships that may prove of future benefit. It can, if done properly, create a core within our own military who understand the military culture and the problems of another society. What it cannot do is transform a society according to preconceived blueprints. Refusal to understand and accept the limits of influence only ensures that the final result of creating military and police institutions in another culture will deviate even further from the original goals envisioned for such forces.

Notes

1. For a history of the Cuban military see Rafael Fermoselle, *The Evolution of the Cuban Military, 1492-1986* (Miami: Ediciones Universal, 1987). For the Dominican Republic see Bruce J. Calder, *The Impact of Intervention: The Dominican Republic during the U.S. Occupation of 1916-1924* (Austin: University of Texas Press, 1984). For Haiti see Hans Schmidt, *The United States Occupation of Haiti, 1915-1934* (New Brunswick, NJ: Rutgers University Press, 1971). For Nicaragua see Richard L. Millett, *Guardians of the Dynasty: A History of the U.S. Created Guardia Nacional de Nicaragua and the Somoza Family* (Maryknoll, NY: Orbis Books, 1977). For Panama see Carlos Guevara Mann, *Panamanian Militarism: A Historical Interpretation* (Athens, OH: Ohio University Center for International Studies, 1996).

2. Richard Millett and Marvin Soloman, "The Court Martial of Lieutenant Rafael L. Trujillo," *Revista/Review Interamericana*, II, No. 3 (Fall, 1972), 396-404.

3. For a Marine Corps officer's appreciation of the situation, see H. C. Reisinger, "La Palabra del Gringo: Leadership in the Nicaraguan National Guard," *United States Naval Institute Proceedings*, LXI (February, 1935), 215-21.

On the Ground: Training Indigenous Forces in Iraq

Aaron D. Boal

The Iraqi Civil Defense Corps (ICDC) was initially set up to assist in keeping the peace, particularly in the cities of Iraq. It fell somewhere between a police force and an army. The force was relatively small and acted to supplement what coalition forces were doing and help put a local face on Iraqi security. The first units were trained in a rather decentralized manner with a one-week basic training (established at the division level) and then soldiers were sent back to their local units, where coalition commanders had leeway to continue to train and implement the force. Our advisory group was small, one officer and one NCO responsible for coordinating supplies and tracking and reporting status of our company-size element as well as training one platoon. The other platoons were divided among the TCBs (troops, companies, and batteries) and trained as squads before being brought together to form platoons. This initial setup lasted a long time and acted as a pilot program for the larger ICDC that was to come, teaching us lessons and helping us identify issues we knew would intensify when larger numbers of soldiers had to be organized, trained, and incorporated.



Figure 1

Iraqi proved to be a dynamic contemporary operation environment (COE), and situations and missions changed quickly. This change had a large effect on ICDC as well. The NIA (New Iraqi Army) was being trained concurrently in a much more structured and thorough environment, but this system was unable to produce large numbers of soldiers in a short period of time. Pressure to get more Iraqi security

forces into service increased, and this mission fell to the coalition line units. Our squadrons requirement jumped from one company-size organization to battalion size. This created numerous problems, from providing adequate personnel and facilities to train and operate to creating effective ways to train and implement this new force. The first steps were to establish a recruiting procedure, including background, medical, and physical conditioning testing, and to deal with the massive crowd-control problems and with force-protection issues that were created due to the large numbers of Iraqis who wanted these jobs. Just getting potential soldiers in the gate proved to be a challenge.



Figure 2

A big problem we encountered was that we were to establish a battalion with the headquarters that came with it, and this battalion was to fall under a higher headquarters. Unfortunately, this higher headquarters was not set up before the establishment of our battalion. Along with this the CMATT (Coalition Military Assistance Training Team) did not have adequate time to establish all the necessary systems and standards. Meanwhile, those of us down on the ground level did not have the luxury to wait for these to be in place, as we needed to train the soldiers and get them on the streets as soon as possible. An initial entry training, so to speak, was set up by our regimental headquarters. It was a six-day program that consisted of a day of in-processing and a day of out-processing, one day at the range shooting a small amount of familiarization fire, and three days actually conducting training on fieldcraft. Obviously this was inadequate to prepare these new soldiers, mostly with no experience, to conduct operations in the environment Iraq presented.



Guidance



- Higher HQ Not Set Up
- CMATT
- Rubber Meets the Road
- Doctrine
- Training Program



Figure 3

To compensate for this, we decided to recruit all of personnel at least four weeks before they were scheduled to report for their basic training. I met with our senior NCO and the other NCOs who had taken part in the initial ICDC effort and came up with the skills each soldier needed to operate and survive in Baghdad. We turned this into a four-week training calendar and developed tasks, conditions, and standards for all the training. This helped us come up with part of the doctrinal way we would operate, kind of gave us an SOP (standing operating procedure) that was not previously developed or provided by higher.



Initial Reality




- Cadre Experience
- Training Facilities & Atmosphere
- “The Green Berets”
- Soldiers Attitudes & Motives




Figure 4

There were more than the obvious problems facing us as we established our ICDC unit. One of the major problems was that no one in our organization was trained to do this kind of work. They were excellent scouts and artillerymen and so forth, but not special forces soldiers who had spent years training and were specialists at this. In addition, training forces in Iraq was certainly not the same as training soldiers in America. US training centers stateside are customized to meet the needs of training units, and the atmosphere is one that supports the successful transition of a civilian to a soldier. In eastern Baghdad we did not have this environment. We had no facilities and little room to conduct training, as well no classroom space. This, combined with the huge communication barrier between the teachers and the students and the requirement for translators who did not themselves understand what we were instructing, made teaching even simple tasks tough.

The model most people have of training indigenous forces is probably one similar to Vietnam, where a base camp in a remote area is established, and local soldiers and US trainers alike live there. This was not the reality in Iraq. Our camp was located in the city with limited area to operate. This area was the soldiers' home, and as we had no way to house all of these men, they went home nightly. This made soldiering a day job for them, and they easily turned the switch off every night. Establishing discipline and building teams were extremely difficult as a result and coupling this with the influences outside the camp and the established pecking order in tribes and neighborhoods made the task even more challenging.






Soldiers



- **Peasants with Rifles**
- **Discipline**
- **Loyalties**
- **Infiltrators**
- **10 %-90 %**
- **Leaders**

IRAQI CIVIL DEFENSE CORPS

NAME: Ali Hussain

HT: 172

RANK: MAJ

WT: 65

DOB: 24 DEC 59

Figure 5

Eventually we were able to relieve some of the pressure on ourselves as we occupied land adjacent to our squadron base camp and established an ICDC base camp. While not spacious, it did give us our own land and enabled us to use it as we saw fit. It also gave us covered space (after tents and eventually buildings were erected) to conduct classes, store items, house a DFAC, and eventually house the staff and provide S&As for the companies. On top of this we had to deal with the reality of why most people were here—they needed money. Not that this is a bad thing, but it shows that most did not really want to be soldiers protecting their neighborhoods and had little interest in learning the trade and the skills associated with it. Rather, they were interested in doing the minimum to get a paycheck at the end of the month.

The quality of soldiers that came to serve in ICDC fell below the quality of the soldier that served in the US Army. This was mostly due to the background the ICDC soldiers came from. They were mostly of little means and had little education. Their critical thinking skills and ability to think tactically were limited due to the lack of education. They were mostly farmers and unskilled laborers who needed work, basically peasants. As most ICDC soldiers came from a chaotic environment that had been ruled for their lifetime by a dictator, most had little discipline and drive to work for their own betterment. Along with the lack of discipline came the question of loyalties, to whom these soldiers were loyal and why. It was a good assumption that many were far more loyal to their tribes and tribal leaders than to us or their chain of command. The fact that loyalty was in question made it difficult for ICDC soldiers to work together, as loyalty to the team and one another is key to any successful military unit. It also brought into question which ICDC soldiers were loyal to organizations that were subversive to the process of rebuilding a free Iraq.

It was accepted by most cadre members that there had to be some infiltrators in the group of ICDC soldiers we worked with, but identifying who they were or which groups they may be providing information to was nearly impossible. Overall I felt we had about 10 percent of the group that was actually interested in being ICDC members and had the capacity to do so successfully. This was combined with the lack of capable leaders that stepped forward. Most who wanted to lead did so only because they knew the leaders were paid more money. On top of this was the fact that many soldiers who had the potential to be good military leaders were not necessarily leaders outside of ICDC in the communities and tribes, making it difficult for them to get the other ICDC soldiers to follow them.

There were a lot of issues facing ICDC and certainly much to be done. Perhaps the most pressing question was where to start focusing our training program. While it was easy to focus on what we did not have, I decided to start with the assets we already had. For instance, we had an excellent group of officers, noncommissioned

officers, and soldiers who supported our operations. All of these men had at least six months of experience in combat operations in Baghdad, so they had a good idea of not only what operations were being done in the city and how to conduct them, but also of the specific environment we were operating in. Along with this, they obviously brought many years of military experience and years of training soldiers.




Figure 6

The task of training ICDC soldiers presented some unique challenges to our cadre, though. To help alleviate this, we turned to another asset, the small group of ICDC members who were capable and willing to help train the ICDC trainees. They knew the language, the culture, and what was effective with the trainees. Another source that provided quick help was US doctrine, which all of the cadre already knew. It gave us a focus for how we wanted to conduct operations and how to train. With these things we knew we had limited time to train and had to take advantage of the extra four weeks we made for ourselves, focusing on the key skills that needed to be learned and cutting out the extraneous. One of the keys to this was keeping our training and operations simple; we had enough problems without adding any more complications.

Like any organization, building a good team was critical to success. Getting the ICDC members to work with one another was a crucial first step. The differences between the soldiers, while not apparent on the surface, were most certainly there and caused a lot of discontent among the soldiers and interrupted training. Selection of the leadership was also crucial to the success of the team. The problem, of course,

was deciding whom to pick. The decisions rested on our shoulders, but what makes a good leader to us does not necessarily make a good leader to the locals. We based our decisions on education, experience, and if we were lucky, what we saw of their leadership skills in action. Trying to select officers proved particularly difficult, as judging the skill set needed for these jobs in the short amount of time available was terribly difficult.




Figure 7


One thing we did know was that once we established our leadership, we had to empower them to make decisions and lead. Along with this we knew we must be willing to see our mistakes in some cases and not be afraid to replace leaders who could not cut it and promote those who could. Trying to build loyalty up and down this thrown-together chain of command proved challenging, as well as establishing a common value set all ICDC soldiers could operate from. While the values are not necessarily identical to those of the US Army, the idea is the same in both cases.

As stated earlier, the process of choosing and developing leaders was essential to our success. So our first step was to try to identify what made a good leader for the ICDC and who possessed these traits. We found it hard to pinpoint what exactly these qualities were in a short period of time, so seeing leaders in action was generally the best way to determine who was good and who was not. Once we selected leaders, training them was imperative. We needed to impart lot of additional information to these new officers and NCOs, yet no additional time was available to do so, and we needed these leaders with their men so they could conduct operations. Therefore, pulling them out of their units was not a good option. Much of what

they learned turned out to be on the job training from platoon and company mentors.



Training a Leader



- **What Makes a Leader**
- **More info., Same Time**
- **Challenges & Decisions**
- **Empower & Support**
- **Key to Success**




Figure 8

Eventually NCO and officer formal courses were developed, and leaders were cycled through so as not to take all of the leaders from a single unit at one time. One big tissue with training leaders was trying to instill some of the basic military leadership skills that would be essential for them to conduct successful operations. The biggest was the ability to make sound and timely decisions. One of the best ways the US Army develops its junior leaders is through field training and forcing leaders to make decisions on a simulated battlefield. Unfortunately, we did not have a lot of land upon which to operate and had only limited time; however, we still developed simulated combat lanes we could use. We basically acted as the opposing forces ourselves and used sticks as weapons and whatever else we could get our hands on while supplies were limited. Any challenges we could give these leaders would serve them well down the road, so we attempted to mentally challenge them and encourage them to take charge and make decisions as often as possible.

As we encouraged them to make decisions, we had to support them. These men would not be able to be leaders if we did not empower them, so we went with their decisions unless we knew they would prove catastrophic, and we encouraged them to make sound decisions through constant advice and mentoring. Sometimes they made bad decisions, but they learned and their men understood they were in charge, and we, as the cadre/adviser group, backed them up.



Establishing a Staff



- Who is Qualified
- What Systems to Use
- Teaching Jobs and Learning Systems
- Outsourcing
- Adapt and Overcome
- Do What Works



Figure 9

Along with establishing companies and platoons, we had the task of establishing a battalion headquarters, so not only did we have to train officers and NCOs to be effective leaders, we had to teach a group how to be staff officers. The obvious first problem with this is who to select to do the job. How were we to decide which personnel were qualified and would do the job well. We conducted interviews and gathered as much information as possible on candidates, which eased the selection. Actually we chose much of the staff from ICDC personnel we were already familiar with and knew were intelligent. In some cases we had good officers who really were not the combat type but had right stuff for staff work. In the case of the battalion S4 (logistics officer), we chose the ICDC soldier who had served as our supply sergeant and showed he had what it took to do the job and lead a staff section.

We decided to base our system basically off of the traditional US Army staff system, as at least all of the cadre members were familiar with it, and historically it proved effective and it was rather simple. Inside of this, we had to develop systems to make our staff operate. We had the promise of computers, but of course we did not know when they would show up, so all work had to be done the old-fashioned way with pens, paper, and filing cabinets. Something as seemingly simple as tracking soldier accountability at training proved challenging, as we built the system from scratch. Dealing with other areas that needed systems in place to support them, such as property accountability, weapons security, maintenance, and signal and radio issues proved a daily battle to establish effectively. More critical issues, such as operations planning, including running missions and conducting training, as well as intelligence gathering and planning, proved to be the focus of most of

our staff training, as they were very difficult.

We of course had the goal of being able to gather actionable intelligence from the line units, have it passed up, analyze it, create an effective plan to act on it, and execute the operation successfully, but making the systems work where this could be done and then work the vertical and lateral communication from the ICDC soldier on the ground through the chain of command and the staff and back down was a long process. The biggest problem for the cadre and advisers as we set this system up and mentored the new staff was that we were not staff officers ourselves and, for the most part, had never been. We had a basic understanding, but no in-depth understanding of how things got done efficiently. To some extent it was the blind leading the blind.

One tool that proved useful to us was our Squadron staff. Some of the officers and NCOs, and in one case a squared away specialist, basically volunteered to help train this new staff. They met at least once a week, often more, to discuss almost all aspects of their respective staff roles. In particular our S2 section (intelligence) made dramatic strides. One of squadron's junior captains helped our new ICDC battalion S2 establish a very effective and thorough system of gathering and handling intelligence, including building their own commander's critical information requirements (CCIRs) from scratch. A lot of what we tried did not work, and some of it did. We quickly established a policy of keeping what works and disposing of, or more common adapting, things that did not. We measured our success in this area based on results instead of by meeting a certain criteria. Bottom line, if it worked we did it.




Figure 10

Logistics proved a great challenge throughout my time working with ICDC. We were responsible for getting our own logistics set up. While we were given some support, such as funding for providing meals during the day, and we had our own water buffalos and 5-ton trucks assigned to us, we were responsible to gather everything ourselves. We established our own ICDC DFAC (dining facility), as our squadron facility could not handle everyone. This ended up being a good step, as ICDC soldiers preferred local food while the squadron DFAC served American food. We also were able to procure MREs for soldiers who were not able to eat at the DFAC. We were also able to secure a ration of bottled water daily for the soldiers, and we had our own water buffalo, but ICDC soldiers went through water like we lived at an oasis. They washed before prayer, which was up to five times a day, and before and after meals, not to mention just to cool off and, of course, to drink.

We filled the water buffalo daily and finally had to get the ICDC leadership to understand they should not waste water, as it would run out and we could not get any more. Transportation was also a major issue, as, for the most part, we used US vehicles (HMMWVs and 5-tons) to move troops around. This meant we had to have US soldiers to operate and gun all of these vehicles as well as conduct maintenance on our 17-vehicle fleet. Along with this, trying to get a lot of soldiers to one place at the same time proved very difficult, and often we had to borrow vehicles.

If we conducted missions at different places and times, juggling cadre, support personnel, and vehicles to meet mission requirements ran our people and equipment ragged. Beyond this almost all other supplies proved challenging to get. The exception was rifles, which were provided by higher headquarters upon the ICDC soldier's completion of his basic training. Eventually we were able to get enough ammunition to run missions, but we had very little to conduct marksmanship training, which the ICDC soldiers desperately needed. We were able to use various methods to procure things such as medical supplies, as our squadron medical officer hunted extra stuff down to provide us with combat lifesavers packs and trained our medics in immediate first aid and combat lifesaver skills. Other equipment such as radios and vehicles were basically nonexistent. We ended up buying hand-held radios for communication needs and used a confiscated SUV for transporting the battalion leadership. We were able to scrounge money from multiple sources to buy supplies and other mission-essential items, such as flashlights, checkpoint equipment, and things as simple as pens and paper. There was little direct financing that came down to us specifically marked for ICDC except the payroll, which we picked up and distributed once a month.

Interaction between the cadre/advisers and the ICDC soldiers was tenuous sometimes. These were two groups of people who came together from very different

backgrounds and often times had little in common yet needed to work together daily. For the most part, both the US and Iraqi personnel had already decided what they thought of the other in generalities from contact they had with each other while the US forces were patrolling their streets. These preconceptions sometimes made it difficult to effectively train or be trained, especially if one let prejudices blind what the reality was. Both sides had to make an effort to relate to where the other was coming from. We particularly stressed this to our cadre/advisers, as we were already the trained professionals and working with these guys was our job. Meanwhile, the ICDC soldiers had comparatively limited education and lacked the military background and discipline our soldiers had.






Figure 11

One major difficulty was teaching operating in an ethical and lawful fashion, following a generated set of ROE (rules of engagement). Of course what we saw as ethical was not always the same view they had, our laws were not the same, and quite frankly they just did not get the concept or the content of the ROE. As I have said, this culture shock issue was a two-way street. The cadre was placed in a foreign environment, in many definitions, away from home, family, and most means of stress reduction and forced to deal with ICDC problems daily. Perhaps the culture shock was greater on the Iraqis, however. They were forced to come into a very American-style institution that sat in the middle of their own country and have foreigners tell them how to act in a military fashion, which in itself is a whole other world. Of course, for mission success, both sides had to figure out how to become comfortable with one another and work together.



Missions



- **Get on the Streets**
- **Legitimize**
- **Protect their Neighborhoods**
- **OJT**
- **Build Confidence & Trust**




Figure 12

The purpose of establishing the ICDC was to run missions, so getting the new ICDC soldiers on the streets was the focal point of our operations. All of our training focused on preparing them for this goal. Initially there were four main goals in the conduct of operations. First was the legitimization of the ICDC force. If locals did not respect its authority and see it as a legitimate, effective security force, the ICDC could not be successful. Second, we were conducting real-world missions and providing security to the neighborhoods. We wanted to start having these forces protect their neighborhoods. This gave them a worthwhile goal in an area they cared about and allowed them to be seen in an area where they would be respected. Third, these first missions were great on-the-job training for the ICDC soldiers. Since we had limited space in the base camp, getting into the city and into what was a very real situation provided great training for the men. Last, these missions built confidence and trust among not only the ICDC soldiers, but also between the ICDC and the US cadre, verifying the training we gave them and giving us credit in the conduct of future training.

Our goal was to be able to conduct a variety of missions that would provide security to the area. These missions included patrols, cordon and search operations, traffic control points and check points, IED sweeps, fixed-site security (particularly of their own base camp and the UN compound), and joint operations with the other security forces operating in the area, including coalition forces, Iraqi police, and the NIA. These missions were generally not complicated or rehearsed before being executed. The forces continued to improve as they conducted more missions.



Missions

- Patrol
- Cordon & Search
- TCPs
- IED Sweeps
- Fixed Site Security
- Joint Operations



Figure 13

There were of course some issues that arose during the planning and conduct of missions with ICDC. While patrolling one's own neighborhood provided some incentive to the ICDC soldiers and helped bring credit to the organization, it also showed that these soldiers had a hard time policing themselves, as they had to go home at the end of the day and live in the same neighborhoods. This meant they had to deal with the criminal element and their families while off-duty, and they had no backup as the other ICDC soldiers were gone and they were not carrying their AK-47s. This made many ICDC soldiers hesitant to do their duty for fear of retribution.



Mission Issues

- Patrolling Home
- Police or Army
- Operating in an Urban Environment
- Safety
- OJT vs. Mission Accomplishment vs. Real World Danger




Figure 14

Another pressing question was understanding exactly what the intended role of the ICDC was. Were they to be more like a police force or like an army or end up like a National Guard? At first it was very unclear of what was expected of the Civil Defense Corps, and what missions they needed to perform. As a group we concluded that they needed to be able to do the same type of operations the coalition forces were conducting, not deal with crime or worry about foreign armies, but rather battle insurgency and civil unrest inside the country. Eventually guidance and a simple mission-essential task list (METL) for the overall purpose of ICDC vs the police and the NIA were handed down and basically confirmed our policies.

On top of all the issues of taking new soldiers out into a real-world environment and the culture and communication gaps and the other problems I have mentioned throughout, we also faced the complex environment a large city offers. Taking soldiers into a more traditional environment would have proved challenging enough, but training these men to operate in perhaps the most complex and dangerous environment that exists complicated missions that much more. Safety was also always an issue as there certainly were real bad guys out there who wanted us to fail. This added to the safety issues that arise with green and relatively undisciplined soldiers walking the streets with loaded assault rifles. Safety always needed to be at the forefront of mission planning and in the mind of the leadership and US advisers during the conduct of operations.

There was a constant balance we tried to achieve while conducting missions. We needed to get training value out of the patrols, as the end goal of all of this was to have the ICDC be able to act independently, with little or no adviser assistance. This weighed against the fact that we needed to get the missions done now, not just train, so there was a lot of pressure to be proficient and effective now and the fact that there was a real threat who could set IEDs or ambush our forces, US and Iraqi, at any time; so we had to always be on our toes, which is difficult while teaching and advising.

There were restrictions we had to deal with as we conducted operations. The biggest, of course, like in any military operation, was politics. What we do as an Army is always in support of a political objective, so we are not always able to operate exactly how we would like. Timelines in particular were rushed as a lot of pressure was applied to get ICDC on the streets and operating. Iraq certainly proved a complex political environment, as a lot of people and groups had to be taken into consideration when conducting any operation. The city itself was also very restrictive, including the number of civilians around. In addition, the heat of the summer and mud of the winter made operations difficult and had to be considered when planning an operation. As I mentioned before, time and resources were limited at best, and this certainly caused some restrictions in our ability to operate how

we wanted.





Figure 15


Other issues that fell beyond our control also caused problems for us. ICDC soldiers were only allowed to work 40 hours a week, obviously not always conducive to military operations. ICDC soldiers did not live in a high-tech environment and reaching them, particularly in a short period of time, was impossible. Very few had phones and ICDC basically had no way to muster, so we were only able to use soldiers as they were scheduled to come in, again not very conducive to a civil defense unit responsible for dealing with emergencies. Planning missions is a key to success in most military organizations, but prior planning was usually not something ICDC could do, as any secret information could not be released because the soldiers could easily go home and compromise our operations by talking about them, again a problem due to lack of discipline. So missions were generally not truly planned until immediately before execution. We also faced a high operations tempo, particularly wearing down our US advisers and limiting training time available to the units. All in all we did not have a great deal of flexibility, which was important to operating in the COE of eastern Baghdad.

Communication between the Iraqis and the US cadre/advisers was a key factor in determining the difference between success and failure. Obviously there was the language barrier that had to be overcome for us to work together. While both the Iraqis and the US soldiers were able to learn some of the other's language, this was not sufficient for the in-depth communication that was required, especially for the technical parts of conducting military operations. In addition to the language

barrier, there was a cultural barrier. This made things very difficult, as neither side really understood the other's culture. This is where hired translators came in. Some were just that; they translated from one language to the other. We were looking for more than that, though. We wanted someone who could actually interpret from one language to the other with consideration to the cultures involved.



Communication



- **Language Barrier**
- **Culture Barrier**
- **Translator vs. Interpreter**
- **Vital on Missions & in Training**
- **Treatment of Soldiers**




Figure 16

These interpreters were able to relate not just what was said, but the meaning behind it. Interpreters were vital to the success of our mission, in training, and in the conduct of operations. Without them the critical gap that lay between “us” and “them” could not be bridged. Another key piece to communicating and understanding the Iraqis was in how we treated them. Just like our own soldiers, they knew and appreciated you looking out for them and would try to communicate as best as possible when they respected you.

Being part of the cadre/adviser group was not an easy task for any of the soldiers who did it. It was incredibly challenging from the highest to the lowest rank. As I have already pointed out, none of the cadre came from a special-forces background and had little experience in what we were doing. Our cadre came from all of the combat arms, and in some of the enlisted men's cases, they came from service and service-support branches as well. They were hand selected from all of the units in the squadron and had no prior notice that they were going to be involved with ICDC and had little chance to study up on what needed to be done. We were lucky as our squadron assigned highly competent soldiers to work on our project.



Cadre



- **Background**
- **Op-tempo**
- **Advising Above Rank**
- **Multi-Tasking**
- **Structure & Politics**
- **4 - 40, Safety & Security**




Figure 17


By the time our group of cadre handed off our ICDC units to our US replacements in eastern Baghdad, most were worn out. The operations tempo was very high and taxing on all of them, as they had so many soldiers to support, including advising leaders, coordinating training, going on missions, and filling in to help other cadre members and to aid the support operations. All of the cadre were advising above what their rank would traditionally have worked with. For example, sergeants first class were responsible for company-size elements, which were run by a captain and a first sergeant. This was true across the board and also in the staff sections. Many had additional duties as well, most helping run the support structure and advising leaders and staff. The job was also fairly dangerous, not only because we were running missions in Baghdad and the ICDC soldiers lacked discipline, but also the fact that there were 40 of them to only a few of us. Another concern was maintaining the safety and security of our US soldiers on missions with Iraqi soldiers whom sometimes we did not know, especially knowing that not all soldiers had the best intentions in being in the ICDC.

Building local security forces in the environment our Army is currently in is critical to our success. We should know Phase IV operations are the key to success of the overall mission, and the establishment of local indigenous forces means fewer US forces are needed. Selection and training of future cadre and advisers should be a top priority. This should be the case even more so when a unit is coming in as a replacement and the organization is already in place. They should come in with an adviser team already set up and trained. It is a difficult task and requires special training. Units should not wait until deployment to identify who the advisers

are going to be; they should be identified ahead of time and given time to train and prepare.



Preparing Future Cadre



- Top Priority
- Replacements
- Difficult Task
- Learn the Language
- Learn the Duties
- Learn the Missions
- Learn from Predecessors






Figure 18

Some key tasks to train should include a better understanding of the culture and a better grasp of the native language. They need to have a good understanding of what their duties will be and how to do them. Also learning all the missions that will be conducted is critical, as they will not necessarily have the luxury of conducting missions with a regular US unit before acting as advisers. If the units are already established, the new adviser group should ensure they learn all they can from their predecessors and maximize battle handover, including right seat-left seat rides.



Recommendations



- Preparation Time
- Resource
- Train Cadre
- Isolate
- Selection of Leaders
- Write Doctrine
- Key Decision Makers



Figure 19

Overall recommendations for conducting future operations of this type include giving units and advisers maximum preparation time. We know this is key part of Phase IV operations, so we need to start planning for them in Phase III. While preparing this we should ensure this critical mission is properly resourced, not thrown together at the last minute with soldiers on the ground scrounging for what they can get their hands on. We should take the time and establish a standard for training the cadre/advisers so they are prepared to accomplish their mission and are not trying to figure things out on the fly.

We should attempt to isolate the trainees and soldiers as much as possible to limit outside influence and allow for maximum training and team building. Those responsible for selecting the leadership of the local unit should allocate maximum effort to selecting capable leaders for the unit, as these leaders will help alleviate many of the problems that face US cadre and deal with the problems themselves. Doctrine should not only be written or pulled out of retirement, but also made readily available for the advisers/cadre who will need them. There is no reason to reinvent the wheel since we are not the first people to conduct these operations. Last, key decision makers in establishing and running adviser groups and local units need to spend a lot of time on the ground with these units. Working with these units is a unique experience, different from commanding standard US units, which cannot be understood unless one is down in the mud with them.

CSI Conference Roundtable Discussion

Moderator (Colonel Kevin Benson)

These are officers of distinction who I know have met that challenge, who crossed the line of departure, who faced fire and all other manners of uncomfortable times and high adventure, and the guys are going to introduce themselves and give a little opening remark and then we'll open it up for questions. And the reason I'm moderating is because I'm a colonel, and, if it gets too tough, I get to interpose my body in between the spears. Gentlemen.

Major Jeffrey Madison

My name is Major Jeff Madison. I am, or I was, the executive officer for the 8th Finance Battalion. We provide direct support to 1st Armored Division. We deployed from Germany, I came from Baumholder myself, and several locations, in fact, from Germany and ended up supporting 1st Armored Division as well as the other task forces attached to them in the Baghdad area. We arrived in Baghdad after the major combat operations had ceased. We had been in the plan for participating in that if it had continued on. After we arrived here this afternoon, I haven't been here for the rest of the conference so we've kind of been comparing notes on what's been discussed. So I'm going to jump around a little bit here so I'm not overly redundant on some of the things you've already heard.

One of the questions I always ask whenever I get an opportunity to talk to people is, fact or fiction, do you need finance on the battlefield? And it's a constant mission of ours to try and sell ourselves to the Army for some reason, even though every after-action review that I've ever read says, "Man, we should have had finance with us there at the very beginning. Finance, comptroller, contracting, that whole team." So it is a myth. In fact, I have a quote here, you've probably all heard it a dozen times in this conference. But, "Money is the best ammo I have in this war." General Petraeus said that while he was over there and it just kind of reiterates. So it is a myth. You do first need finance on the battlefield, and fortunately 1st Armored Division recognized that and worked us into their plan from the very beginning to include putting myself on their torch party their first 17 people in there along with the comptroller. So two financial managers in the team of 17, the first people to hit the ground, and an additional five in the next 200 that hit the ground.

I was going to talk about some of the normal finance support that we provide, but it sounds like we're going to go a little different direction than that and I'll review what they are, but I won't go into them. Of course, paying you if you're an Army military person, paying you is one of the things we do. But on the battlefield, it's about third in the order of priority. Our most important missions are contracting

support and commercial vendor service support. Third, of course, is paying you. Armed Forces Entertainment (AFE) support, all that money they take in from you buying cases of Coke, we collect that in for them. We take in all that captured currency that people are supposed to turn in, but I was talking with some of the panel members up here; we've heard stories that perhaps not everybody was doing that. But putting the money to good use. And then there are some other programs that I do believe some have been touched on in the conference. And that's hopefully some of the questions that will come in those areas.

We don't create those programs; we help execute them, we help provide the cash for them, we help provide training for people who aren't used to being held pecuniary liable for having funds from the US Treasury or other types of funds. So we help do that.

Some numbers real quick. The amount of cash that my battalion disbursed over the 15 months we were in theater, and I came back a little early, but close to \$200 million in cash was going through the hands of my soldiers into other people's hands. So those aren't checks or EFTs (Electronic Funds Transfers), that's dollars. Sometimes five and 10 dollar bills going through. So somewhere close to 500,000 transactions over that period. It's incredible.

The other programs—I'm just going to hit the names of them and if you want to go into deeper questions about them, then we'll do that after everybody else has introduced themselves. When I first arrived, it was called ORHA (Office of Reconstruction and Humanitarian Assistance). They were making payments to municipal workers. Like one-time payments of \$20-25 to teachers, policemen, firemen, through the ORHA system, using funds that had been seized at some other point, not using our own funds. So there is one. Later they turned to the Office of Coalition Provisional Authority (OCPA). We, in turn, coined them ORHA payments for lack of a better term and then CPA payments. Very in line with the way we do things in the Army.

Then came the Brigade Commander's Discretionary Fund. It started out with a whopping \$25,000 in discretionary funds for a brigade commander to use at his discretion, you know, to make a huge impact on what was going on. And we can get into that a little bit more.

Then the Commander's Emergency Response Program, or CERP as we called it, kind of took the Brigade Commander's Discretionary Fund and upped the ante quite a bit, allowing the division commander to have due projects or have a fund up to \$500,000 in projects up to \$100,000 each. And the brigade commander's \$200,000—\$50,000 per project.

Then another one I was talking about with the lieutenant over here, that we

called DFI (Divested Funds Iraq). That's what we used to pay dinars to the Iraqi soldiers that he was training and we set up a program and the training to facilitate that process as well.

There were many other small things going on. We called them CREST payments. They were real estate payments that we made, for example at the convoy support centers along the various MSRs (Main Supply Routes), we were paying Iraqis for those and numerous other things. We were buying safes for everybody in the theater it seemed like because we found a vendor. When I say everybody, that includes the POW camps, where Tariq Aziz was held at Baghdad International Airport where I was located. When you capture somebody and they have money or valuables on them, that money has to be secured and as the number of prisoners goes up, of course, the amount of storage space you need exceeds the field safe you brought. Many other things going on. So I'll leave it right there and keep it open. My point essentially is that we train for a certain type of standard mission that we do in every contingency or combat operations, which were some of those early things that I mentioned. Everything in those other programs I hadn't heard of until I got on the ground. So these were things that we're developing, helping turn victory into success, that people were using and I have some personal opinions on how to make those better or how they could have been done sooner, but we'll do that after the others introduce themselves.

Captain Edwin Werkheiser

My name is Captain Ed Werkheiser. I commanded H Company of 2d Squadron, 3d ACR, which is a tank company in an ACR squadron for those of you that know something about the organization. It's a stepchild kind of in the squadron. It's not a cavalry troop. Probably only second in redheadedness to the attached howitzer battery. So it's a little different. I was in two different places for the most part. The squadron was based between Fallujah and Ramadi. My little piece of the squadron was this town called Habanayah, which is halfway between Fallujah and Ramadi, great real estate obviously. I was there from 28 April through 25 September with a couple of fits and starts. We were relieved for about a month and a half, two months by 2d Brigade of the 3d Infantry Division, at which time we moved the squadron to Ramadi.

And then I moved out west to Rupah which is out close, in relative terms, to the Jordanian border. The squadron was then responsible for much of the Saudi Arabian border, the Jordanian border, and part of the Syrian border. And, for those of you who know anything about doctrinal distances, that's a little bit farther than any squadron is responsible for normally. It's about 600 or 800 kilometers of border there. There's nothing out there, but it's a lot of border.

So that's two very different perspectives on what I got to do there. The main

missions that my company was responsible for—we did security missions, which would be of ourselves, our base camp, different sites. On one occasion early in May, I got sent to go to these two supposed chemical weapons sites to go secure them for awhile so we could exploit them, sites such as that. Ammo dumps, obviously, I don't know if we've covered that earlier in the conference, but there was a 2 kilometer by 1 kilometer-long ammunition dump that we were responsible for securing, which we did to varying degrees of success. Convoys, either securing our own convoys or if a convoy was hit on the route, we would go, since those people usually didn't have our radio frequency, we would go follow the plume of smoke and assume it was probably an American convoy and we would try to go rescue them. And then different events. If you were going to have the CA (civil affairs) people come down and they wanted to talk to some local leader or if you were going to hand out some reconstruction or some of this massive \$25,000 in funds, you would need to secure that event. If you were going to recruit some police force or ICDC (Iraq Civil Defense Corps, now the Iraqi National Guard) guys, you would need to secure that event. So those are the type of security missions you had, all obviously very different.

You had reconnaissance missions and that's the standard real world, real Army, I suppose, reconnaissance missions that learn whether this bridge can take your vehicles or whether this or that route works. But what we found more important was what I'll call human or cultural reconnaissance, which involved going out and determining who the leaders were, be they civil or religious or cultural leaders, tribal leaders. You figure out where the tribes are, draw that map however you may. You would figure out what government and administrative structure is still there. You may come into a town that has absolutely no governmental structure whatsoever. You'd have to find that out because they're not going to tell you. You may come in and find that there are police there already who are wearing the olive drab uniform, the Saddam pickle suit, and those guys may or may not be effective. You need to find that out. Then you need to figure out if there are any people who have specialties, people who speak English, obviously very important, because you're going to need to hire those guys to be your translators if you can get the money. Because they are Iraqis, they're not going to work for free.

People who have other skills—engineers, teachers, things like that, people who would be important for you in the area. And also like I said, what are the different boundaries. So you'd know if an incident happened in a certain area, you could go to this sheik to find out. And so on several occasions we just got all the people who we thought may be leaders and then we just put out a call to say if you're a leader, come by. And we'd get these people all in a room and we'd put a map up, which is kind of funny because most Iraqis don't know much about maps, and we would say where are your people? And then you'd get them all debating

on where their people are. But it gives us some idea of who's responsible for what areas. If you have a problem there, you try to go to that guy or try to have him come to you, whichever way. So that sort of standard reconnaissance mission goes on all the time.

We also did raids, and obviously that is on actionable and non-actionable intelligence sometimes, and I think that was pretty self-explanatory. That's a tactical mission that, although we were not initially comfortable with, since we are tankers and having never trained for it, that's something that you can train at the tactical level that people know about. Or they can be proficient at it.

And then the final thing is civil interaction, which would be things where you would coordinate for the delivery or the establishment of some sort of reconstruction aid. You need to figure out what kind of projects are going to go on there, what these people need, prioritize their needs for them because they're going to tell you that everything is equally important. And, as you know, you need to advise the government. In my first town, I created the government. Going back on the experience and the training I had from eighth grade civics to establish the government for them, whether it worked or not is open to debate. You also need to interact, like Lieutenant Boal was talking about with the security forces and the government agencies of the area. And, finally, you would need to interact with the locals to find bad guys, they would be intel sources. So those are the main missions that we were involved with on the tactical end, what we found out, and we had trained for absolutely—well, I wouldn't say absolutely—but we trained for just about none of that stuff. So we kind of ended up finding it out on the way.

What I thought I'd do to generate some discussion is I could sit up here and tell stories, but I don't know what you all really want to know. So I really came with five major AR points, lessons learned that I think we need to look for in the future. The first one would be we need to figure out how to translate what we call stable and secure there. That was our big mission. We wanted to create a stable and secure environment. We need to figure out how to translate stable and secure into a leadership or operational plan. And what I mean by that is we need to integrate or have a dialogue between the political objectives and then the execution. And my example that I'll give is at the local level, you know you can get security relatively fast by giving some local power to a strong man, say, for instance. And he could probably use some muscle and get security there pretty easily. On the other hand, that probably does not set us up very well in the future for what we're trying to do. So, and obviously, to establish some sort of representative or some sort of permanently stable government is going to require more resources at all levels.

So when you're telling me at the tactical level what we want to do, I need to

know what the level of support for that is. And we don't do a very good job of having that dialogue between the tactical-level guy, maybe the squadron or brigade level, and the people who are establishing what they want the place to look like. So we never really knew exactly what it was the endstate was supposed to look like. And that's obviously going to change depending on the situation on the ground. So that, I think, we need to do better.

At the tactical level, we need to train specialists to do a lot of these civil affairs type missions. In the armored corps, we have master gunners, and we have master drivers, and you send a guy to air load school and you send a guy to rail load school and you send a guy to NBC school, and these are all a couple of weeks long. And we don't have any guys who know anything about contracting. We don't have any guys who know anything about civil engineering projects. These Iraqis would bring me projects that they wanted to get done with these engineering layouts of we're going to put culverts here and all that, and I don't know anything about that really. I don't know if I'm getting ripped off or not. I don't know if it's going to work. And that doesn't mean that I need somebody who's a certified engineer, I just need a guy who understands a little bit about the cultural things that Lieutenant Boal was talking about. Instead of sending a guy to NBC school for three weeks, send him to some sort of civil police training school where he goes and works with the police guys in the local area, like Leesville, so that they have some idea of how police work, how they function. So that way, in my company, I've got not just me who's trying to do everything, I've got 76 or 77 or some lieutenant who may not be an expert, but at least he has a direction of some place to go with this stuff.

Third, I would say we need to restructure the tactical forces to create true combined arms formations. I had a tank company, I didn't have anything else, I didn't have any Humvees, I didn't have any infantry guys, I didn't have any MPs, really nothing of that sort, and what I saw was I would like to have light infantry with me. I would like to have MPs with me. I would like to have some sort of intel guy with me. And I know in the units that we did transitions with, they would like to have some sort of armored support with them. So really I think we have kind of five armies right now—an institutional army, kind of like this one, a special operations type of army, a combat support and service support army, and then we have a heavy and a light army. And really I could make justification for four of those perhaps, based on functionality, but there really is no need for five of them. The heavy and the light army, I don't see why we have two different ones. We need to get rid of that. That requires a lot of different things. But we need to integrate that better.

The fourth is a simple one, that the Humvee is not a combat vehicle. We have somehow got this opinion that the Humvee is a great solution for everything, it is functionally just not good. It doesn't protect you very well. You've got the one guy

up on the top who's not very well protected and he's doing a lot. He's fighting the vehicle, essentially. He's got the best situational awareness. He's employing the weapons system and he's not protected. I don't know why...and I read in the latest edition of *Armor* magazine that we're equipping our scouts now with Humvees again. And the people who are going to be running into the first line of the enemy, they're driving around in the least protected vehicle. I don't know why we're going to ever build another non-armored Humvee because even our service support and admin type vehicles need that protection because I think that's the one thing we found here is that's our most vulnerable asset out there. The enemy is not going to come looking after me in an Abrams tank, he's going to come looking after Major Madison in his finance Humvee. So I don't know why we should ever build another non-armored Humvee and we need to develop that it is not a combat vehicle.

The final thing is training. We need to figure out our training is going to need to change in a couple of ways. We need to figure out how to better train ethics and law of land war. And I don't mean just a class. We just need to figure out how to integrate it better into what we can do. It doesn't need to be a set of principles or a set of just kind of boring laws. It needs to be, exactly, case studies. This is what you can do. Right. The prisoners, I had never trained how to deal with prisoners before and I ended up, obviously, dealing with quite a few. We need realistic training for things such as gunnery and field problems. We're never going to really find, I don't think, a battlefield without civilians on it, yet we never train for that type of thing. With the tanks, our tabloid is set up where you're shooting the closest engagement I think is like 200 meters with a machine gun, and really the farthest engagement I had out there was about 500 meters. So need to change that around. I think we're making steps there.

And then finally our CTCs (combat Training Centers); they can't train for some of the stuff we're going to find in conflicts like this, which is they can't really train complacency. Because when you're going there, you're only going there for a month and you may be in the box for three weeks at the most and they're trying to give you a slice of everything you're going to see out there. So you never do the same mission for a month. You never have that guy who's guarding or securing stuff for a month where he gets complacent. Because you don't really...I guess you need to train to be complacent, but the leaders need to know how to rotate the people through and they try to compress the civil interaction piece. It's kind of a cookie cutter approach where I go talk to tribal sheik A and he gives me the information and the intel and then we go execute it. Well, it really is going to take you probably several weeks, a month, maybe your entire rotation to develop this guy. And it simplifies the problem. I don't know how to fix that. But that's going to be a problem if there are CTCs that are designed for short duration, high intensity type of things. And I've taken up way too much time.

Lieutenant Aaron Boal

I'm Lieutenant Aaron Boal, and we've met before. I also come from a cavalry regiment but I didn't come from the 3d ACR; I come from the 2d ACR, which for those of you who are familiar with that is somewhat of an anomaly as we only have the Humvees, which we can talk about later. I think it's a wonderful vehicle.

I already talked quite a bit. I'll tell you a little bit about what else I did over there. I came over, as part of B Troop of 1st Squadron, 2d Cavalry as a scout platoon leader. Scout platoon is made up of eight trucks, about 24 guys ended up with the mortar section. So I had an infantry section attached to me and ended up with approximately 30 guys. We rolled over there. We ran full-spectrum operations. Some of the things we did, mostly I spent most of my time in Eastern Baghdad. As you saw on the map, I put it before Tisan Essan, which was Salbon Essan, before we got there, which is 7 April, named after Saddam came to power, and they changed it to Nine Essan for 9 April after the liberation. We conducted...it's a very poor area. I spoke of it before. We did conduct some operations in Sadr City, went out between Baghdad and Fallujah with the 1st Brigade, 1st Armored Division. Conducted some operations out there to prevent the bringing in of weapons and terrorism that would funnel from the west in Syria through Fallujah to Baghdad. Moved over, did an ICDC after that. Did that for about six months. Was getting ready to go home, was attached to 1st Armored Division and we got the call to get extended and went south. I spent most of my time in al-Kut, operated as a FOO (Field Ordering Officer), establishing the new base camp that needed to get built. We moved on to an old air field down there. We kind of had gone through it before when we first got to Camp Oriole in Baghdad, but it had to be all redone. We fixed airplane hangars that were in less than stellar condition. I did that during the day. At night, I worked with the IP (Iraqi police) station as a liaison trying to tie the IPs in a little closer to what we were doing. The IPs were actually pretty good down there. And then I moved over and became a battle captain for 1st Squadron, or as my sergeant major liked to call me the "Battle Lieutenant" for 1st Squadron.

A couple other things I did in Baghdad, we guarded the UN compound. We did that for probably three months. They continued to do that after I had left the unit. Also, working with the police station, guarding that. As I said, we did full-spectrum operations. So just about any other mission that would come up, I think most units over there did it.

Moderator

Like I said, the guys are at the point end of the spear. So we'll entertain questions for these soldiers.

Question: A couple of questions, one for Major Madison and one for Captain

Werkheiser. Major Madison, you mentioned the programs you hadn't heard of and adjustments you had to make and recommendations. If you could get into that. And then Captain Werkheiser, we had talked before when we met several months ago about interacting with the Iraqi people and your observation of they think differently. If you could elaborate on that. And Lieutenant Boal, if you had interaction as well with the Iraqi people aside from what you were talking about earlier, your observations as well. So Major Madison?

Major Jeff Madison

The reason I'm here today is I went to Dr. Yates' office. I was possibly going to pursue an MMAS in History. And one of the things I wanted to write about, which I later determined I don't have the time for—I already had my master's—this is supposed to be the greatest year of my life. Yeah, I'm off to a great start.

I very vividly remember sending my wife an e-mail sometime in May. I tried to find it real quick last night, just to nail it down. The announcement was made, we're disbanding the Iraqi army and we're not going to pay them these ORHA OCPA payments, these one-time payments like we're paying everybody else. And I remember shooting my wife that e-mail, going, "This is going to be a problem. This is going to come back and haunt us." I wasn't, I'm not a diplomat or anything like that. It just seemed like that number of people, putting them out on the street, with the things I had seen up to that point. We were talking about paying interpreters \$4 a week; \$20 would make a big difference to them. And so trying to find alternate things for them to do, if the government's not going to pay them, they're going to have to sustain themselves somehow and perhaps crime is what they're doing. So as some of these programs started coming out, I was encouraged to see that we were taking steps to do more things, but I really didn't see how they impacted this group. And I think maybe later on, they made the decision to pay these individuals more along what Lieutenant Boal talked about, but the immediate part of last summer or summer of 2003, I think, was a defining point of which way they were going to go. Were they going to be friendlies or were they going to become supporters of the insurgency. And my recommendation, the line of thinking I was going along with, my grandfather proudly served in the Civilian Conservation Corps and I had studied a long, long time ago, maybe ninth grade history, American history, the Work Projects Administration and I just thought maybe somehow when we—you know, other places we'd gone we haven't really defeated an army as such and turned them loose.

Those armies have stayed intact. They continued to get sustained and I'm talking recent history. So I don't think we had to deal with this on the scale that we have, with the forethought of what are we going to do with these people. Perhaps could have been a little more in-depth. And even if it was only \$20 a week, those

first several months for any number of projects, I could probably list off several right off the top of my head, but it wouldn't really matter what they were doing. It might have made a significant difference on which side they decided to go with in the long run.

When you look at the programs we did institute, I jokingly said an incredible \$25,000 for the brigade commander's discretionary fund. As soon as I saw the first FRAGO (fragmentary order) on that, we just kind of sat around and laughed because when you're trying to make an impact on a city that's in the, or a country that's in the shape that country was in, it just seemed like that was just dust in the wind compared to what was needed. Yeah, it did give the brigade commander the ability to go and say, "In my zone that I'm responsible for, here's some projects that need immediate attention that don't have to go through the OCPA process of getting racked and stacked in an order of merit. I can take this money and apply it immediately." And I'm sure the brigade commanders used it wisely, but I know immediately the outcry was we need a whole lot more than \$25,000. And I think the reaction from that was the CERP (Commanders Emergency Response Program), which came shortly, maybe two weeks later. Some of the units hadn't even drawn their \$25,000 because they hadn't figured out how to do it. And this new program was announced.

Other commanders were coming to us and the comptrollers for the third time so they could get more than just \$25,000 but they could only have \$25,000 at a time. And so much for project on that first go around. So those were good ideas, I just think they needed more cash pushed behind them. And, yeah, it can get expensive when you count the number of brigades and divisions in the zone, but when you consider the amount of money that was approved, and the amount of money that had been seized or captured and the value of those programs is a drop in the bucket. And we'll probably spend ten times that much—or not ten times—ten million times that much trying to fix what we didn't fix initially.

The divested funds Iraq is just we established a payroll system for their soldiers—the soldiers that the lieutenant helped train. We hadn't met before today, but he got to meet people from my battalion in developing this. For those of you that have been in the Army longer than I have, I've always got my pay through electronic funds transfer. But I know some of you were in the service when the Class A agent came to finance, picked up a big chunk of money and came to the unit and made the payments. Well, that's basically the system we devised for paying the Iraqi soldiers. To finance soldiers today, that's a big deal. Look what we made up. But in reality, we just kind of dusted off some old procedures that we had used and, from the eighth grade, maybe sooner or maybe earlier than the eighth grade. So there are things we've done in the past out there that are worth looking at again

for you historians looking at financial management from other wars and lessons learned from that. I don't know that we as a financial management community do a good job of that. We rely so much on technology, we forget about these other things like military payment certificates (MPCs). I've never seen them, but they were in our SOPs forever until recently; we finally dropped them and decided we'll always use money rather than scrip. But I know there are other nuggets of knowledge out there that are valuable in these types of situations.

Appendix A: Conference Program

Day 1

Tuesday, 14 September 2004

0645 – 0745 Breakfast at Conference Center

0800 – 0815 Opening Remarks

Session 1

0815 – 0945 Keynote Presentation

Turning Battlefield Victory Into Strategic Success

Dr. Conrad C. Crane

US Army Military History Institute

Moderator

Colonel Thomas T. Smith

Combat Studies Institute

Session 2

1000 – 1145 The Broader Context

War and Aftermath

Prof. Frederick W. Kagan

US Military Academy

What War Should Be, What War Is

Prof. John A. Lynn

University of Illinois at Urbana-
Champaign

Moderator

Dr. Robert F. Baumann

US Army Command and General Staff
College

1200 – 1300 Lunch at Conference Center

Session 3

1300 – 1445 The Cultural Dimension

The Critical Role of Cultural Orientation in International Relations—and in War

Ambassador Edward L. Peck

Chief of Mission in Iraq, 1977-1980

Session 4

1500 – 1645 Early US “Stability Operations”

Leonard Wood, John J. Pershing, and Pacifying the Moros in the Philippines: Americans in a Muslim Land

Dr. Charles A. Byler

Carroll College

A Tactical Loaf Gained and a Strategic Slice Garnered: The United States and the Mexican Revolution

Dr. Irving W. Levinson

University of Tennessee

Moderator

Colonel Jeffrey D. Jore

US Army, US Defense Attaché Office

Day 2

Wednesday, 15 September 2004

0645 – 0745 Breakfast at Conference Center

Session 1

0800 – 0945 Cold War “Stability Operations”

Success Without a Plan: The Dominican Intervention, 1965-1966

Dr. Lawrence A. Yates
Combat Studies Institute

Vietnamization An Incomplete Exit Strategy

Dr. James H. Willbanks
US Army Command and General Staff
School

Moderator
Prof. Theodore A. Wilson
University of Kansas

Session 2

1000 – 1145

Planning for Success

Planning for Operation PROMOTE LIBERTY in Panama

Dr. John T. Fishel
National Defense University

Planning Phase IV for Operation IRAQI FREEDOM

Colonel Kevin C.M. Benson
US Army School of Advanced Military
Studies

Moderator
Dr. Richard W. Stewart
US Army Center of Military History

1200 – 1300

Lunch at Conference Center

Session 3

1300 – 1445

Military Threats to Success: Terrorism and Insurgency

Terrorism Revisited

Prof. Felix Moos
University of Kansas

*The Challenges of Countering Insurgency in the Context of a
Global Insurgency*

Lieutenant Colonel Robert M. Cassidy
US Army, Europe

Moderator

Dr. Andrew J. Birtle
US Army Center of Military History

Session 4

1500 – 1645

Historical Tour of Leavenworth and Fort Leavenworth
Mr. Kelvin D. Crow
Assistant Command Historian
Combined Arms Center

Day 3

Thursday, 16 September 2004

0645 – 0745

Breakfast at Conference Center

Session 1

0800 – 0945

Victory Into Success?

My Experience in Iraq

Lieutenant General Jay M. Garner
US Army, Retired

Moderator

Dr. Gordon W. Rudd
USMC Command and Staff College

Session 2

1000 – 1145

Training Indigenous Militaries

*The Limits of Influence: Training Constabularies in Latin
America*

Dr. Richard L. Millett, Prof. Emeritus
Southern Illinois University at
Edwardsville

Moderator
Dr. Donald P. Wright
Combat Studies Institute

1200 – 1300 Lunch at Conference Center

Session 3

1300 – 1445 On the Ground in Iraq

On the Ground: Training Indigenous Forces in Iraq
Captain Aaron D. Boal

Roundtable and General Discussion

1500 Adjournment

About the Presenters

Kevin C.M. Benson, Colonel, US Army, is a 1977 graduate of the United States Military Academy. Colonel Benson graduated from the Armor Officer Basic Course, US Marine Corps Amphibious Warfare School, US Army Command and General Staff College, and the School of Advanced Military Studies. He attended Massachusetts Institute of Technology Security Studies Program as a War College Fellow in 2001. He has written essays for *Armor*, *Infantry*, and *Special Operations* magazines, *Military Review*, the *African Armed Forces Journal*, *Army* magazine and *Parameters*. He has served in Armor and Cavalry units in the United States and Germany, and held planning staff positions in XVIII Airborne Corps and Third US Army. Most recently, Colonel Benson served as the Assistant Chief of Staff, C5 (Plans), Combined Forces Land Component Command and Third US Army from June 2002 to July 2003 during Operation IRAQI FREEDOM/Operation COBRA II. Colonel Benson currently serves as the Director, School of Advanced Military Studies, (SAMS).

Aaron D. Boal is a First Lieutenant and a native of Kansas who graduated from the University of Kansas in 2001. Commissioned through ROTC into the Armor Branch, he joined the 2d Armored Cavalry Regiment at Fort Polk following completion of the Basic Course at Fort Knox. He also completed both the Scout Leaders course and the Cavalry Leaders course. In the 2d ACR, Lieutenant Boal served as a platoon leader of two platoons and as a battalion assistant operations officer. He deployed with his squadron to Iraq and entered that country during Operation IRAQI FREEDOM in April 2003. Among other duties during his year in theater, Lieutenant Boal served as the operations officer for a US Army cadre team that trained Iraqi Civil Defense Corps (ICDC) forces. Lieutenant Boal recently graduated from the Armor Officer Captains Career Course.

Charles Byler is an associate professor of history at Carroll College in Waukesha, Wisconsin. Born in Oregon, he received a B.A. from Whitman College and his Ph.D. from Yale University. His area of specialization is 20th-century American political and military history. He is currently writing a book on civil-military relations in the United States between the Civil War and World War I (forthcoming, Praeger).

Robert M. Cassidy, Lieutenant Colonel, US Army, is a special assistant in the US Army Europe Commanding General's Initiatives Group where he conducts strategic research and analysis on land-force issues within the EUCOM area of operations. He is a graduate of the French Joint Defense College (*Collège Interarmées de Défense*) and has a Ph.D. in International Security Studies from the Fletcher School

of Law and Diplomacy. Previously, he was an assistant professor of international relations at the United States Military Academy. He has previously served as the aviation brigade operations officer in the 4th Infantry Division during Operation IRAQI FREEDOM and as Squadron executive officer in 1-10 Cavalry of the same division. He has published articles in *Parameters* and *Military Review* on the topics of asymmetric conflict, military culture, and counterinsurgency. He is author of *Peacekeeping in the Abyss: British and American Peacekeeping Doctrine and Practice after the Cold War*.

Conrad C. Crane became the Director of the US Army Military History Institute on 1 February 2003. Before accepting that position, Dr. Crane served with the Strategic Studies Institute (SSI) at the US Army War College from September 2000 to January 2003, where he held the General Douglas MacArthur Chair of Research. He joined SSI after his retirement from active military service, a 26-year military career that concluded with nine years as Professor of History at the US Military Academy. He holds a B.S. from the US Military Academy and an M.A. and Ph.D. from Stanford University. He is also a graduate of the US Army Command and General Staff College and the US Army War College. He has authored or edited books on the Civil War, World War I, World War II, and Korea, and has written or lectured widely on air-power and land-power issues. Before leaving SSI he coauthored a prewar study on reconstructing Iraq that influenced Army planners and has attracted much attention from the media.

John T. Fishel is professor of National Security Policy at the Center for Hemispheric Defense Studies of the National Defense University, having assumed that position on 8 December 1997. He has specialized in Latin American affairs throughout his career, focusing on issues of national development and security policy. He has written extensively on civil military operations and peacekeeping and is the author of *Civil Military Operations in the New World* (1997) and the editor and coauthor of *"The Savage Wars of Peace: Toward a New Paradigm of Peace Operations"* (1998). He is a past president of the Midwest Association for Latin American Studies (MALAS) and a former president of the North Central Council of Latin Americanists (NCCLA). Dr. Fishel served as a member of the Board of Visitors of the US Army School of the Americas. While on active duty as a lieutenant colonel in the US Army he served in the US Southern Command where he was, successively, Chief of the Civic Action Branch of the Directorate of Policy, Strategy, and Plans (J5), Chief of Research and Assessments of the Small Wars Operations Research Directorate (SWORD), Chief of the Policy and Strategy Division of the J5, and Deputy Chief of the US Forces Liaison Group. Concurrent with the latter position he served as Special Assistant to the Commander, US Military Support Group-Panama and to the Commander, US Army-South.

Jay M. Garner, Lieutenant General, US Army (Retired), was appointed as the Director of the Office of Reconstruction and Humanitarian Assistance in January 2003 and served in that assignment until Ambassador L. Paul Bremer III was named Presidential Envoy to Iraq and Administrator of the Coalition Provisional Authority on May 6, 2003. Before this appointment, Lieutenant General Garner served as President of SY Technology, Inc. since September 1, 1997. He was a member of the Army Science Board in 1998-1999 and was appointed by Congress as a member of the Commission to Assess US National Security Space Management and Organization in 2000-2001. He currently serves on the USSTRATCOM Strategic Advisory Board. Lieutenant General Garner served as Commanding General of the US Army Space and Strategic Defense Command (USASSDC), headquartered in Arlington, Virginia. He also served as the Assistant Deputy Chief of Staff for Force Development, Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations and Plans, Washington DC, and Deputy Commanding General, V Corps, Frankfurt, Germany. In 1991 he was Commanding General, Joint Task Force Bravo—Operation PROVIDE COMFORT in northern Iraq. He also served as Deputy Commanding General, US Army Air Defense School. He commanded at brigade and battalion levels in VII Corps in Europe. He served two tours in Vietnam, 1967-1968 and 1971-1972. His last assignment was as the Assistant Vice Chief of Staff of the Army (AVCSA). He received a B.A. from Florida State University in history and a Ph.D. from Shippensburg State University, Pennsylvania, in public administration.

Frederick W. Kagan is an associate professor of military history at the US Military Academy. He is the author of *The Military Reforms of Nicholas I: The Origins of the Modern Russian Army*, coauthor of *While America Sleeps: Self-Delusion, Military Weakness, and the Threat to Peace Today*, and coeditor of *The Military History of Tsarist Russia* and *The Military History of the Soviet Union*. He is currently engaged in writing a three-volume history of the Napoleonic Wars in central Europe. He has written extensively on current American military and security doctrine and policy, and on American grand strategy and foreign policy, including “War and Aftermath” in *Policy Review* and “The Art of War” in *The New Criterion*. His articles have also appeared in *Parameters*, *Commentary*, *The Wall Street Journal*, *The Weekly Standard*, *The Los Angeles Times*, *The Washington Post*, *Joint Forces Quarterly*, and elsewhere. At West Point he has directed and taught courses on the history of the military art, grand strategy, revolutionary warfare, diplomatic history, and others.

Irving Levinson received a B.A. from Northern Illinois University, an M.B.A. from Temple University in 1977, an M.A. from the University of Houston in Latin American history in 1997, and a Ph.D. from the University of Houston in Latin American history in 2003. Before beginning his new career as a historian, he

worked for 17 years in human resources management. Dr. Levinson taught Latin American history at the University of Tennessee at Knoxville in fall 2004 and spring 2005, Latin American and Mexican history at the University of Texas at Austin in spring 2004, and US history at the University of Houston, spring and fall 2002, and at Houston Community College, spring 2000 and spring 2002. He also taught the history of Texas as a guest lecturer at the Universidad de Veracruz School, Xalapa, Veracruz, México, March, 2001, and was a teaching assistant at the University of Houston, 1997-2000 and fall 2001. Dr. Levinson wrote the forthcoming book, *Wars Within War: Mexican Guerrillas, Domestic Elites, and the Americans, 1846-1848* (Fort Worth, Texas, Texas Christian University Press, 2005).

Richard L. Millett received his B.A. with honors from Harvard and his M.A. and Ph.D. from the University of New Mexico. He did postdoctoral work at Ohio State University and is a graduate of the Air War College. Dr. Millett taught at Southern Illinois University from 1966 through 1999. He has also taught at the University of Miami, St. Louis University, the Air War College, and four universities in Colombia. He has published over one hundred items, including *Colombia's Conflicts: The Spillover Effects of a Wider War* (2002), *Beyond Praetorianism: The Latin American Military in Transition* (1996), and *Searching for Panama* (1993). His articles have appeared in *Foreign Policy*, *The Wilson Quarterly*, *Journal of Inter-American Studies*, *Current History*, *The New Republic*, and numerous other journals. Dr. Millett has testified before Congress on 19 occasions, appeared on every major national TV network, including the PBS News Hour and Crossfire. He is also Senior Adviser for Latin America to Political Risk Services and a Research Associate of the Center for International Studies, University of Missouri-St. Louis. In 1993 he held the Chair of Military Affairs and in 2000 and 2001 held the Oppenheimer Chair of Warfighting Strategy at the Marine Corps University.

Ambassador Edward L. Peck is a frequent commentator for television and radio networks in the United States and abroad. Ambassador Peck lectures and teaches internationally on Middle East and other international issues for governments, educational institutions, civic organizations, and businesses. During a 32-year diplomatic career, he was Chief of Mission in Iraq and Mauritania, and an embassy officer in Sweden, Morocco, Tunisia, Algeria, and Egypt. He speaks Arabic, French, Spanish, and Swedish. In the Reagan White House, he served as Deputy Director of the Cabinet Task Force on Terrorism. At the Department of State he was Deputy Coordinator, Covert Intelligence Programs, JCS Liaison Officer, Special Assistant, Under Secretary for Political Affairs, and Director, Office of Egyptian Affairs. He was also a Capstone Fellow, Institute for Higher Defense Studies, National Defense University. Ambassador Peck had two tours of active duty in Army airborne units, serving from private to first lieutenant, and lectures extensively at Department

of Defense schools and training programs. He holds a B.S. from UCLA, and an M.B.A. from George Washington University. In retirement, Ambassador Peck was Executive Secretary of the American Academy of Diplomacy, and Chairman, Political Tradecraft Programs, National Foreign Affairs Training Center. He is a Distinguished Visitor, National War College; Visiting Fellow, Woodrow Wilson Foundation; and Senior Fellow, Joint Forces Staff College.

James H. Willbanks, Lieutenant Colonel, US Army (Retired), is a supervisory professor and teaching team leader in the Department of Military History at the US Army Command and General Staff College, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas. Dr. Willbanks has 23 years of service as an Infantry officer in various assignments, to include a tour as an adviser in Vietnam. He is a graduate of the Command and General Staff College and the School of Advanced Military Studies. He holds a B.A. from Texas A&M University and a Ph.D. from the University of Kansas in US Military and Diplomatic History. Dr. Willbanks is the author of *Abandoning Vietnam* (University Press of Kansas, 2004) and *The Battle of An Loc* (forthcoming, Indiana University Press).

Lawrence A. Yates is a teacher and researcher on the Research and Publications Team, Combat Studies Institute, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas. He received a B.A. and an M.A. in history from the University of Missouri, Kansas City, and a Ph.D. in history from the University of Kansas. He is the author of several articles on US contingency operations since World War II, has written a monograph on the US intervention in the Dominican Republic in 1965, is coeditor and a contributor to a book on urban operations, and is completing book-length studies of US military operations in the Panama crisis, 1987-1990 and Somalia, 1992-1994.