[House Report 109-411]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
109th Congress Report
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
2d Session 109-411
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INTELLIGENCE AUTHORIZATION ACT FOR FISCAL YEAR 2007
_______
April 6, 2006.--Committed to the Committee of the Whole House on the
State of the Union and ordered to be printed
_______
Mr. Hoekstra, from the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence,
submitted the following
R E P O R T
together with
MINORITY VIEWS
[To accompany H.R. 5020]
[Including cost estimate of the Congressional Budget Office]
The Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, to whom was
referred the bill (H.R. 5020) to authorize appropriations for
fiscal year 2007 for intelligence and intelligence-related
activities of the United States Government, the Community
Management Account, and the Central Intelligence Agency
Retirement and Disability System, and for other purposes,
having considered the same, report favorably thereon with an
amendment and recommend that the bill as amended do pass.
The amendment is as follows:
Strike all after the enacting clause and insert the
following:
SEC. 1. SHORT TITLE; TABLE OF CONTENTS.
(a) Short Title.--This Act may be cited as the ``Intelligence
Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2007''.
(b) Table of Contents.--The table of contents for this Act is as
follows:
Sec. 1. Short title; table of contents.
TITLE I--INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES
Sec. 101. Authorization of appropriations.
Sec. 102. Classified Schedule of Authorizations.
Sec. 103. Personnel ceiling adjustments.
Sec. 104. Intelligence Community Management Account.
Sec. 105. Incorporation of reporting requirements.
TITLE II--CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY RETIREMENT AND DISABILITY SYSTEM
Sec. 201. Authorization of appropriations.
TITLE III--INTELLIGENCE AND GENERAL INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY MATTERS
Sec. 301. Increase in employee compensation and benefits authorized by
law.
Sec. 302. Restriction on conduct of intelligence Activities.
Sec. 303. Clarification of definition of Intelligence Community under
the National Security Act of 1947.
Sec. 304. Delegation of authority for travel on common carriers for
intelligence collection personnel.
Sec. 305. Retention and use of amounts paid as debts to Elements of the
Intelligence Community.
Sec. 306. Availability of funds for travel and transportation of
personal effects, household goods, and automobiles.
Sec. 307. Purchases by elements of the intelligence community of
products of federal prison industries.
TITLE IV--MATTERS RELATING TO ELEMENTS OF THE INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY
Subtitle A--Office of the Director of National Intelligence
Sec. 401. Clarification of delegation of transfer or reprogramming
authority.
Sec. 402. Clarification of limitation on co-location of the Office of
the Director of National Intelligence.
Sec. 403. Additional duties of the Director of Science and Technology
of the Office of the Director of National Intelligence.
Sec. 404. Appointment and title of Chief Information Officer of the
Intelligence Community.
Sec. 405. Leadership and location of certain offices and officials.
Sec. 406. Eligibility for incentive awards of personnel assigned to the
Office of the Director of National Intelligence.
Sec. 407. Repeal of certain authorities relating to the Office of the
national counterintelligence Executive.
Sec. 408. Membership of the Director of National Intelligence on the
transportation security oversight Board.
Sec. 409. Temporary inapplicability to the Office of the Director of
National Intelligence of certain financial reporting requirements.
Sec. 410. Comprehensive inventory of special access programs.
Sec. 411. Sense of Congress on multi-level security clearances.
Sec. 412. Access to information by staff and members of the
congressional intelligence committees.
Sec. 413. Study on revoking pensions of persons who commit unauthorized
disclosures of classified information.
Subtitle B--Central Intelligence Agency
Sec. 421. Enhanced protection of Central Intelligence Agency
intelligence sources and methods from unauthorized disclosure.
Sec. 422. Additional exception to foreign language proficiency
requirement for certain senior level positions in the Central
Intelligence Agency.
Sec. 423. Additional functions and authorities for protective personnel
of the central intelligence agency.
Sec. 424. Protective services for former officials of the intelligence
community.
Sec. 425. Strategic review process.
Subtitle C--Defense Intelligence Components
Sec. 431. Enhancements of National Security Agency training Program.
Sec. 432. Codification of authorities of national security agency
protective personnel.
Subtitle D--Other Elements
Sec. 441. Clarification of inclusion of Coast Guard and Drug
Enforcement Administration elements in the Intelligence Community.
Sec. 442. Clarifying amendments relating to Section 105 of the
Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2004.
TITLE V--OTHER MATTERS
Sec. 501. Aerial reconnaissance platforms.
Sec. 502. Elimination of certain reporting requirements.
Sec. 503. Technical amendments to the National Security Act of 1947.
Sec. 504. Technical clarification of certain references to joint
military intelligence Program and tactical intelligence and related
Activities.
Sec. 505. Technical amendments to the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism
Prevention Act of 2004.
Sec. 506. Technical amendment to the Central Intelligence Agency Act of
1949.
Sec. 507. Technical amendments relating to the multiyear National
Intelligence Program.
Sec. 508. Technical amendments to the Executive Schedule.
Sec. 509. Technical amendments relating to redesignation of the
National Imagery and Mapping Agency as the national Geospatial-
Intelligence Agency.
TITLE I--INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES
SEC. 101. AUTHORIZATION OF APPROPRIATIONS.
Funds are hereby authorized to be appropriated for fiscal year 2007
for the conduct of the intelligence and intelligence-related activities
of the following elements of the United States Government:
(1) The Office of the Director of National Intelligence.
(2) The Central Intelligence Agency.
(3) The Department of Defense.
(4) The Defense Intelligence Agency.
(5) The National Security Agency.
(6) The Department of the Army, the Department of the Navy,
and the Department of the Air Force.
(7) The Department of State.
(8) The Department of the Treasury.
(9) The Department of Energy.
(10) The Department of Justice.
(11) The Federal Bureau of Investigation.
(12) The National Reconnaissance Office.
(13) The National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency.
(14) The Coast Guard.
(15) The Department of Homeland Security.
(16) The Drug Enforcement Administration.
SEC. 102. CLASSIFIED SCHEDULE OF AUTHORIZATIONS.
(a) Specifications of Amounts and Personnel Ceilings.--The amounts
authorized to be appropriated under section 101, and the authorized
personnel ceilings as of September 30, 2007, for the conduct of the
intelligence and intelligence-related activities of the elements listed
in such section, are those specified in the classified Schedule of
Authorizations prepared to accompany the conference report on the bill
H.R. 5020 of the One Hundred Ninth Congress.
(b) Availability of Classified Schedule of Authorizations.--The
Schedule of Authorizations shall be made available to the Committees on
Appropriations of the Senate and House of Representatives and to the
President. The President shall provide for suitable distribution of the
Schedule, or of appropriate portions of the Schedule, within the
executive branch.
SEC. 103. PERSONNEL CEILING ADJUSTMENTS.
(a) Authority for Adjustments.--With the approval of the Director of
the Office of Management and Budget, the Director of National
Intelligence may authorize employment of civilian personnel in excess
of the number authorized for fiscal year 2007 under section 102 when
the Director of National Intelligence determines that such action is
necessary to the performance of important intelligence functions,
except that the number of personnel employed in excess of the number
authorized under such section may not, for any element of the
intelligence community, exceed 2 percent of the number of civilian
personnel authorized under such section for such element.
(b) Notice to Intelligence Committees.--The Director of National
Intelligence shall promptly notify the Select Committee on Intelligence
of the Senate and the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence of the
House of Representatives whenever the Director exercises the authority
granted by this section.
SEC. 104. INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY MANAGEMENT ACCOUNT.
(a) Authorization of Appropriations.--There is authorized to be
appropriated for the Intelligence Community Management Account of the
Director of National Intelligence for fiscal year 2007 the sum of
$990,000,000. Within such amount, funds identified in the classified
Schedule of Authorizations referred to in section 102(a) for advanced
research and development shall remain available until September 30,
2008.
(b) Authorized Personnel Levels.--The elements within the
Intelligence Community Management Account of the Director of National
Intelligence are authorized 1,539 full-time personnel as of September
30, 2007. Personnel serving in such elements may be permanent employees
of the Intelligence Community Management Account or personnel detailed
from other elements of the United States Government.
(c) Classified Authorizations.--
(1) Authorization of appropriations.--In addition to amounts
authorized to be appropriated for the Intelligence Community
Management Account by subsection (a), there are also authorized
to be appropriated for the Intelligence Community Management
Account for fiscal year 2007 such additional amounts as are
specified in the classified Schedule of Authorizations referred
to in section 102(a). Such additional amounts for research and
development shall remain available until September 30, 2007.
(2) Authorization of personnel.--In addition to the personnel
authorized by subsection (b) for elements of the Intelligence
Community Management Account as of September 30, 2007, there
are also authorized such additional personnel for such elements
as of that date as are specified in the classified Schedule of
Authorizations.
(d) Reimbursement.--Except as provided in section 113 of the National
Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 404h), during fiscal year 2007 any
officer or employee of the United States or a member of the Armed
Forces who is detailed to the staff of the Intelligence Community
Management Account from another element of the United States Government
shall be detailed on a reimbursable basis, except that any such
officer, employee, or member may be detailed on a nonreimbursable basis
for a period of less than one year as the Director of National
Intelligence considers necessary.
SEC. 105. INCORPORATION OF REPORTING REQUIREMENTS.
(a) In General.--Each requirement to submit a report to the
congressional intelligence committees that is included in the joint
explanatory statement to accompany the conference report on the bill
H.R. 5020 of the One Hundred Ninth Congress, or in the classified annex
to this Act, is hereby incorporated into this Act, and is hereby made a
requirement in law.
(b) Congressional Intelligence Committees Defined.--In this section,
the term ``congressional intelligence committees'' means--
(1) the Select Committee on Intelligence of the Senate; and
(2) the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence of the
House of Representatives.
TITLE II--CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY RETIREMENT AND DISABILITY SYSTEM
SEC. 201. AUTHORIZATION OF APPROPRIATIONS.
There is authorized to be appropriated for the Central Intelligence
Agency Retirement and Disability Fund for fiscal year 2007 the sum of
$256,400,000.
TITLE III--INTELLIGENCE AND GENERAL INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY MATTERS
SEC. 301. INCREASE IN EMPLOYEE COMPENSATION AND BENEFITS AUTHORIZED BY
LAW.
Appropriations authorized by this Act for salary, pay, retirement,
and other benefits for Federal employees may be increased by such
additional or supplemental amounts as may be necessary for increases in
such compensation or benefits authorized by law.
SEC. 302. RESTRICTION ON CONDUCT OF INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES.
The authorization of appropriations by this Act shall not be deemed
to constitute authority for the conduct of any intelligence activity
which is not otherwise authorized by the Constitution or the laws of
the United States.
SEC. 303. CLARIFICATION OF DEFINITION OF INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY UNDER
THE NATIONAL SECURITY ACT OF 1947.
Subparagraph (L) of section 3(4) of the National Security Act of 1947
(50 U.S.C. 401a(4)) is amended by striking ``other'' the second place
it appears.
SEC. 304. DELEGATION OF AUTHORITY FOR TRAVEL ON COMMON CARRIERS FOR
INTELLIGENCE COLLECTION PERSONNEL.
(a) Delegation of Authority.--Section 116(b) of the National Security
Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 404k(b)) is amended--
(1) by inserting ``(1)'' before ``The Director'';
(2) in paragraph (1), by striking ``may only delegate'' and
all that follows and inserting ``may delegate the authority in
subsection (a) to the head of any other element of the
intelligence community.''; and
(3) by adding at the end the following new paragraph:
``(2) The head of an element of the intelligence community to whom
the authority in subsection (a) is delegated pursuant to paragraph (1)
may further delegate such authority to such senior officials of such
element as are specified in guidelines prescribed by the Director of
National Intelligence for purposes of this paragraph.''.
(b) Submittal of Guidelines to Congress.--Not later than six months
after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Director of National
Intelligence shall prescribe and submit to the congressional
intelligence committees the guidelines referred to in paragraph (2) of
section 116(b) of the National Security Act of 1947, as added by
subsection (a).
(c) Congressional Intelligence Committees Defined.--In this section,
the term ``congressional intelligence committees'' means--
(1) the Select Committee on Intelligence of the Senate; and
(2) the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence of the
House of Representatives.
SEC. 305. RETENTION AND USE OF AMOUNTS PAID AS DEBTS TO ELEMENTS OF THE
INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY.
(a) In General.--Title XI of the National Security Act of 1947 (50
U.S.C. 442 et seq.) is amended by adding at the end the following new
section:
``retention and use of amounts paid as debts to elements of the
intelligence community
``Sec. 1103. (a) Authority to Retain Amounts Paid.--Notwithstanding
section 3302 of title 31, United States Code, or any other provision of
law, the head of an element of the intelligence community may retain
amounts paid or reimbursed to the United States, including amounts paid
by an employee of the Federal Government from personal funds, for
repayment of a debt owed to the element of the intelligence community.
``(b) Crediting of Amounts Retained.--(1) Amounts retained under
subsection (a) shall be credited to the current appropriation or
account from which such funds were derived or whose expenditure formed
the basis for the underlying activity from which the debt concerned
arose.
``(2) Amounts credited to an appropriation or account under paragraph
(1) shall be merged with amounts in such appropriation or account, and
shall be available in accordance with subsection (c).
``(c) Availability of Amounts.--Amounts credited to an appropriation
or account under subsection (b) with respect to a debt owed to an
element of the intelligence community shall be available to the head of
such element, for such time as is applicable to amounts in such
appropriation or account, or such longer time as may be provided by
law, for purposes as follows:
``(1) In the case of a debt arising from lost or damaged
property of such element, the repair of such property or the
replacement of such property with alternative property that
will perform the same or similar functions as such property.
``(2) The funding of any other activities authorized to be
funded by such appropriation or account.
``(d) Debt Owed to an Element of the Intelligence Community
Defined.--In this section, the term `debt owed to an element of the
intelligence community' means any of the following:
``(1) A debt owed to an element of the intelligence community
by an employee or former employee of such element for the
negligent or willful loss of or damage to property of such
element that was procured by such element using appropriated
funds.
``(2) A debt owed to an element of the intelligence community
by an employee or former employee of such element as repayment
for default on the terms and conditions associated with a
scholarship, fellowship, or other educational assistance
provided to such individual by such element, whether in
exchange for future services or otherwise, using appropriated
funds.
``(3) Any other debt or repayment owed to an element of the
intelligence community by a private person or entity by reason
of the negligent or willful action of such person or entity, as
determined by a court of competent jurisdiction or in a lawful
administrative proceeding.''.
(b) Clerical Amendment.--The table of contents in the first section
of that Act is amended by adding at the end the following new item:
``Sec. 1103. Retention and use of amounts paid as debts to elements of
the intelligence community.''.
SEC. 306. AVAILABILITY OF FUNDS FOR TRAVEL AND TRANSPORTATION OF
PERSONAL EFFECTS, HOUSEHOLD GOODS, AND AUTOMOBILES.
(a) Funds of Office of Director of National Intelligence.--Funds
appropriated to the Office of the Director of National Intelligence and
available for travel and transportation expenses shall be available for
such expenses when any part of the travel or transportation concerned
begins in a fiscal year pursuant to travel orders issued in such fiscal
year, notwithstanding that such travel or transportation is or may not
be completed during such fiscal year.
(b) Funds of Central Intelligence Agency.--Funds appropriated to the
Central Intelligence Agency and available for travel and transportation
expenses shall be available for such expenses when any part of the
travel or transportation concerned begins in a fiscal year pursuant to
travel orders issued in such fiscal year, notwithstanding that such
travel or transportation is or may not be completed during such fiscal
year.
(c) Travel and Transportation Expenses Defined.--In this section, the
term ``travel and transportation expenses'' means the following:
(1) Expenses in connection with travel of personnel,
including travel of dependents.
(2) Expenses in connection with transportation of personal
effects, household goods, or automobiles of personnel.
SEC. 307. PURCHASES BY ELEMENTS OF THE INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY OF
PRODUCTS OF FEDERAL PRISON INDUSTRIES.
Section 404 of the Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year
2004 (Public Law 108-177; 117 Stat. 2632) is amended--
(1) by striking ``by the Central Intelligence Agency'' and
inserting ``by an element of the intelligence community (as
defined in section 3(4) of the National Security Act of 1947
(50 U.S.C. 401a(4)))''; and
(2) by striking ``the Director of the Central Intelligence
Agency determines that the product or service'' and inserting
``the head of that element determines that the product or
service (including a surveying or mapping service)''.
TITLE IV--MATTERS RELATING TO ELEMENTS OF THE INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY
Subtitle A--Office of the Director of National Intelligence
SEC. 401. CLARIFICATION OF DELEGATION OF TRANSFER OR REPROGRAMMING
AUTHORITY.
Section 102A(d)(5)(B) of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C.
403-1(d)(5)(B)), as added by section 1011(a) of the National Security
Intelligence Reform Act of 2004 (title I of Public Law 108-458; 118
Stat. 3643), is amended in the second sentence by striking ``or agency
involved'' and inserting ``involved or the Director of the Central
Intelligence Agency (in the case of the Central Intelligence Agency)''.
SEC. 402. CLARIFICATION OF LIMITATION ON CO-LOCATION OF THE OFFICE OF
THE DIRECTOR OF NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE.
Section 103(e) of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 403-
3(e)) is amended--
(1) in the heading, by striking ``With'' and inserting ``of
Headquarters With Headquarters Of'' ;
(2) by inserting ``the headquarters of'' before ``the
Office''; and
(3) by striking ``any other element'' and inserting ``the
headquarters of any other element''.
SEC. 403. ADDITIONAL DUTIES OF THE DIRECTOR OF SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY
OF THE OFFICE OF THE DIRECTOR OF NATIONAL
INTELLIGENCE.
(a) Coordination and Prioritization of Research Conducted by Elements
of Intelligence Community.--Subsection (d) of section 103E of the
National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 403-3e) is amended--
(1) in paragraph (3)(A), by inserting ``and prioritize''
after ``coordinate''; and
(2) by adding at the end the following new paragraph:
``(4) In carrying out paragraph (3)(A), the Committee shall identify
basic, advanced, and applied research programs to be carried out by
elements of the intelligence community.''.
(b) Development of Technology Goals.--Such section is further
amended--
(1) in subsection (c)--
(A) in paragraph (4), by striking ``and'' at the end;
(B) by redesignating paragraph (5) as paragraph (6);
and
(C) by inserting after paragraph (4) the following
new paragraph:
``(5) assist the Director in establishing goals for the
elements of the intelligence community to meet the technology
needs of the intelligence community; and''; and
(2) by adding at the end the following new subsection:
``(e) Goals for Technology Needs of Intelligence Community.--In
carrying out subsection (c)(5), the Director of Science and Technology
shall--
``(1) systematically identify and assess the most significant
intelligence challenges that require technical solutions; and
``(2) examine options to enhance the responsiveness of
research and design programs of elements of the intelligence
community to meet the requirements of the intelligence
community for timely support.''.
(c) Report.--(1) Not later than June 30, 2007, the Director of
National Intelligence shall submit to Congress a report containing a
strategy for the development and use of technology in the intelligence
community through 2021.
(2) The report shall include--
(A) an assessment of the highest priority intelligence gaps
across the intelligence community that may be resolved by the
use of technology;
(B) goals for advanced research and development and a
strategy to achieve such goals;
(C) an explanation of how each advanced research and
development project funded under the National Intelligence
Program addresses an identified intelligence gap;
(D) a list of all current and projected research and
development projects by research type (basic, advanced, or
applied) with estimated funding levels, estimated initiation
dates, and estimated completion dates; and
(E) a plan to incorporate technology from research and
development projects into National Intelligence Program
acquisition programs.
(3) The report may be submitted in classified form.
SEC. 404. APPOINTMENT AND TITLE OF CHIEF INFORMATION OFFICER OF THE
INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY.
(a) Appointment.--
(1) In general.--Subsection (a) of section 103G of the
National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 403-3g) is amended by
striking ``the President, by and with the advice and consent of
the Senate'' and inserting ``the Director of National
Intelligence''.
(2) Applicability.--The amendment made by paragraph (1) shall
take effect on the date of the enactment of this Act, and shall
apply with respect to any nomination of an individual as Chief
Information Officer of the Intelligence Community that is made
on or after that date.
(b) Title.--Such section is further amended--
(1) in subsection (a), by inserting ``of the Intelligence
Community'' after ``Chief Information Officer'';
(2) in subsection (b), by inserting ``of the Intelligence
Community'' after ``Chief Information Officer'';
(3) in subsection (c), by inserting ``of the Intelligence
Community'' after ``Chief Information Officer''; and
(4) in subsection (d), by inserting ``of the Intelligence
Community'' after ``Chief Information Officer''.
SEC. 405. LEADERSHIP AND LOCATION OF CERTAIN OFFICES AND OFFICIALS.
(a) National Counter Proliferation Center.--Section 119A(a) of the
National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 404o-1(a)) is amended--
(1) by striking ``Establishment.--Not later than 18 months
after the date of the enactment of the National Security
Intelligence Reform Act of 2004, the'' and inserting ``(1)
Establishment.--The''; and
(2) by adding at the end the following new paragraphs:
``(2) Director.--The head of the National Counter Proliferation
Center shall be the Director of the National Counter Proliferation
Center, who shall be appointed by the Director of National
Intelligence.
``(3) Location.--The National Counter Proliferation Center shall be
located within the Office of the Director of National Intelligence.''.
(b) Officers.--Section 103(c) of that Act (50 U.S.C. 403-3(c)) is
amended--
(1) by redesignating paragraph (9) as paragraph (13); and
(2) by inserting after paragraph (8) the following new
paragraphs:
``(9) The Chief Information Officer of the intelligence
community.
``(10) The Inspector General of the intelligence community.
``(11) The Director of the National Counterterrorism Center.
``(12) The Director of the National Counter Proliferation
Center.''.
SEC. 406. ELIGIBILITY FOR INCENTIVE AWARDS OF PERSONNEL ASSIGNED TO THE
OFFICE OF THE DIRECTOR OF NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE.
(a) In General.--Subsection (a) of section 402 of the Intelligence
Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1984 (50 U.S.C. 403e-1) is amended to
read as follows:
``(a) Authority for Payment of Awards.--(1) The Director of National
Intelligence may exercise the authority granted in section 4503 of
title 5, United States Code, with respect to Federal employees and
members of the Armed Forces detailed or assigned to the Office of the
Director of National Intelligence in the same manner as such authority
may be exercised with respect to personnel of the Office.
``(2) The Director of the Central Intelligence Agency may exercise
the authority granted in section 4503 of title 5, United States Code,
with respect to Federal employees and members of the Armed Forces
detailed or assigned to the Central Intelligence Agency in the same
manner as such authority may be exercised with respect to personnel of
the Agency.''.
(b) Repeal of Obsolete Authority.--Such section is further amended--
(1) by striking subsection (c); and
(2) by redesignating subsection (d) as subsection (c).
(c) Conforming Amendments.--Such section is further amended--
(1) in subsection (b), by striking ``to the Central
Intelligence Agency or to the Intelligence Community Staff''
and inserting ``to the Office of the Director of National
Intelligence or to the Central Intelligence Agency''; and
(2) in subsection (c), as redesignated by subsection (b)(2)
of this section, by striking ``Director of Central
Intelligence'' and inserting ``Director of National
Intelligence or Director of the Central Intelligence Agency''.
(d) Technical and Stylistic Amendments.--That section is further
amended--
(1) in subsection (b)--
(A) by inserting ``Personnel Eligible for Awards.--''
after ``(b)'';
(B) by striking ``subsection (a) of this section''
and inserting ``subsection (a)''; and
(C) by striking ``a date five years before the date
of enactment of this section'' and inserting ``December
9, 1978''; and
(2) in subsection (c), as so redesignated, by inserting
``Payment and Acceptance of Awards.--'' after ``(c)''.
SEC. 407. REPEAL OF CERTAIN AUTHORITIES RELATING TO THE OFFICE OF THE
NATIONAL COUNTERINTELLIGENCE EXECUTIVE.
(a) Repeal of Certain Authorities.--Section 904 of the
Counterintelligence Enhancement Act of 2002 (title IX of Public Law
107-306; 50 U.S.C. 402c) is amended--
(1) by striking subsections (d), (g), (h), (i), and (j); and
(2) by redesignating subsections (e), (f), (k), (l), and (m)
as subsections (d), (e), (f), (g), and (h), respectively.
(b) Conforming Amendments.--That section is further amended--
(1) in subsection (d), as redesignated by subsection (a)(2)
of this section, by striking ``subsection (f)'' each place it
appears in paragraphs (1) and (2) and inserting ``subsection
(e)''; and
(2) in subsection (e)(2), as so redesignated, by striking
``subsection (e)(2)'' and inserting ``subsection (d)(2)''.
SEC. 408. MEMBERSHIP OF THE DIRECTOR OF NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE ON THE
TRANSPORTATION SECURITY OVERSIGHT BOARD.
Subparagraph (F) of section 115(b)(1) of title 49, United States
Code, is amended to read as follows:
``(F) The Director of National Intelligence, or the
Director's designee.''.
SEC. 409. TEMPORARY INAPPLICABILITY TO THE OFFICE OF THE DIRECTOR OF
NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE OF CERTAIN FINANCIAL
REPORTING REQUIREMENTS.
The Director of National Intelligence shall not be required to submit
an audited financial statement under section 3515 of title 31, United
States Code, for the Office of the Director of National Intelligence
with respect to fiscal year 2005 or 2006.
SEC. 410. COMPREHENSIVE INVENTORY OF SPECIAL ACCESS PROGRAMS.
Not later than January 15, 2007, the Director of National
Intelligence shall submit to the congressional intelligence committees
(as defined in section 3(7) of the National Security Act of 1947 (50
U.S.C. 401a(7))) a classified report providing a comprehensive
inventory of all special access programs under the National
Intelligence Program (as defined in section 3(6) of the National
Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 401a(6))).
SEC. 411. SENSE OF CONGRESS ON MULTI-LEVEL SECURITY CLEARANCES.
It is the sense of Congress that the Director of National
Intelligence should promptly establish and oversee the implementation
of a multi-level security clearance system across the intelligence
community to leverage the cultural and linguistic skills of subject
matter experts and individuals proficient in foreign languages critical
to national security.
SEC. 412. ACCESS TO INFORMATION BY STAFF AND MEMBERS OF THE
CONGRESSIONAL INTELLIGENCE COMMITTEES.
Not later than 180 days after the date of the enactment of this Act,
the Director of National Intelligence shall provide to the members and
staff of the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence of the House of
Representatives and the Select Committee on Intelligence of the Senate
accounts for and access to the Intelink System (or any successor
system) through the Joint Worldwide Intelligence Communications System
(or any successor system). Such access shall include access up to and
including the level of sensitive compartmented information and shall be
provided in the sensitive compartmented information facilities of each
Committee.
SEC. 413. STUDY ON REVOKING PENSIONS OF PERSONS WHO COMMIT UNAUTHORIZED
DISCLOSURES OF CLASSIFIED INFORMATION.
(a) Study.--The Director of National Intelligence shall conduct a
study on the feasibility of revoking the pensions of personnel in the
intelligence community (as defined in section 3(4) of the National
Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 401a(4))) who commit unauthorized
disclosures of classified information, including whether revoking such
pensions is feasible under existing law or under the administrative
authority of the Director of National Intelligence or any other head of
an element of the intelligence community.
(b) Report.--Not later than 90 days after the date of the enactment
of this Act, the Director of National Intelligence shall submit to the
Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence of the House of
Representatives and the Select Committee on Intelligence of the Senate
a report containing the results of the study conducted under subsection
(a).
Subtitle B--Central Intelligence Agency
SEC. 421. ENHANCED PROTECTION OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
INTELLIGENCE SOURCES AND METHODS FROM UNAUTHORIZED
DISCLOSURE.
(a) Responsibility of Director of Central Intelligence Agency Under
National Security Act of 1947.--Subsection (d) of section 104A of the
National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 403-4a) is amended--
(1) in paragraph (3), by striking ``and'' at the end;
(2) by redesignating paragraph (4) as paragraph (5); and
(3) by inserting after paragraph (3) the following new
paragraph:
``(4) protect intelligence sources and methods of the Central
Intelligence Agency from unauthorized disclosure, consistent
with any direction issued by the President or the Director of
National Intelligence; and''.
(b) Protection Under Central Intelligence Agency Act of 1949.--
Section 6 of the Central Intelligence Agency Act of 1949 (50 U.S.C.
403g) is amended by striking ``section 102A(i)'' and all that follows
through ``unauthorized disclosure'' and inserting ``sections 102A(i)
and 104A(d)(4) of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 403-
1(i), 403-4a(d)(4))''.
(c) Construction With Exemption From Requirement for Disclosure of
Information to Public.--Section 104A(d)(4) of the National Security Act
of 1947, as amended by subsection (a), and section 6 of the Central
Intelligence Agency Act of 1949, as amended by subsection (b), shall be
treated as statutes that specifically exempt from disclosure the
matters specified in such sections for purposes of section 552(b)(3) of
title 5, United States Code.
(d) Technical Amendments to Central Intelligence Agency Retirement
Act.--Section 201(c) of the Central Intelligence Agency Retirement Act
(50 U.S.C. 2011(c)) is amended--
(1) in the subsection heading, by striking ``of DCI'';
(2) by striking ``section 102A(i)'' and inserting ``sections
102A(i) and 104A(d)(4)'';
(3) by striking ``of National Intelligence''; and
(4) by inserting ``of the Central Intelligence Agency'' after
``methods''.
SEC. 422. ADDITIONAL EXCEPTION TO FOREIGN LANGUAGE PROFICIENCY
REQUIREMENT FOR CERTAIN SENIOR LEVEL POSITIONS IN
THE CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY.
(a) Additional Exception.--Subsection (g) of section 104A of the
National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 403-4a) is amended--
(1) in paragraph (1), by striking ``paragraph (2)'' and
inserting ``paragraphs (2) and (3)'';
(2) in paragraph (2), by striking ``position or category of
positions'' each place it appears and inserting ``individual,
individuals, position, or category of positions''; and
(3) by adding at the end the following new paragraph:
``(3) Paragraph (1) shall not apply to any individual in the
Directorate of Intelligence or the Directorate of Operations of the
Central Intelligence Agency who is serving in a Senior Intelligence
Service position as of December 23, 2005, regardless of whether such
individual is a member of the Senior Intelligence Service.''.
(b) Report on Waivers.--Section 611(c) of the Intelligence
Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2005 (Public Law 108-487; 118 Stat.
3955) is amended--
(1) in the first sentence, by inserting ``individuals or''
before ``positions''; and
(2) in the second sentence, by striking ``position or
category of positions'' and inserting ``individual,
individuals, position, or category of positions''.
SEC. 423. ADDITIONAL FUNCTIONS AND AUTHORITIES FOR PROTECTIVE PERSONNEL
OF THE CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY.
(a) Protection of Certain Persons.--Section 5(a)(4) of the Central
Intelligence Agency Act of 1949 (50 U.S.C. 403f(a)(4)) is amended--
(1) by striking ``and the protection'' and inserting ``the
protection''; and
(2) by striking the semicolon and inserting ``, and the
protection of the Director of National Intelligence and such
personnel of the Office of the Director of National
Intelligence as the Director of National Intelligence may
designate;''.
(b) Authority to Arrest.--
(1) Chapter 203 of title 18, United States Code, is amended
by adding at the end the following:
``Sec. 3065. Powers of authorized personnel in the Central Intelligence
Agency
``(a) The Director of the Central Intelligence Agency may issue
regulations to allow personnel designated to carry out protective
functions for the Central Intelligence Agency under section 5(a)(4) of
the Central Intelligence Agency Act of 1949 (50 U.S.C. 403f) to, while
engaged in such protective functions, make arrests without a warrant
for any offense against the United States committed in the presence of
such personnel, or for any felony cognizable under the laws of the
United States, if such personnel have probable cause to believe that
the person to be arrested has committed or is committing that felony
offense.
``(b) The powers granted under subsection (a) may be exercised only
in accordance with guidelines approved by the Attorney General.''.
(2) The table of sections at the beginning of chapter 203 of
title 18, United States Code, is amended by adding at the end
the following:
``3065. Powers of authorized personnel in the Central Intelligence
Agency.''.
SEC. 424. PROTECTIVE SERVICES FOR FORMER OFFICIALS OF THE INTELLIGENCE
COMMUNITY.
(a) In General.--Title III of the National Security Act of 1947 (50
U.S.C. 409a et seq.) is amended by inserting after section 303 the
following new section:
``protective services for former officials of the intelligence
community
``Sec. 304. (a) In General.--Subject to subsection (b), the head of
an element of the intelligence community may not provide personnel for
the protection of a former official of an element of the intelligence
community unless--
``(1) there is a specific and credible threat to such former official
arising from the service of such former official to the United States;
and
``(2) such head of an element of the intelligence community submits
to the Director of National Intelligence notice of the intention to
provide such personnel and an assessment of--
``(A) the threat to such former official; and
``(B) the level of protective services necessary to protect
such former official based on such threat.
``(b) Exception for Recent Termination of Employment.--The head of an
element of the intelligence community may provide personnel for the
protection of a former official of an element of the intelligence
community without a specific and credible threat to such former
official for not more than one year after the termination of the
employment of such former official if such former official requests
such protection.
``(c) Threat Assessment Updates.--Not later than 180 days after the
date on which the head of an element of the intelligence community
begins providing personnel for the protection of a former official of
an element of the intelligence community, and at least every 180 days
thereafter until such head of an element of the intelligence community
determines that there is no longer a threat to such former official,
such head of an element of the intelligence community shall submit to
the Director of National Intelligence an updated assessment of the
threat to such former official and the level of protective services
necessary to protect such former official based on such threat.
``(d) Termination of Protective Services.--If the head of an element
of the intelligence community that is providing personnel for the
protection of a former official of an element of the intelligence
community pursuant to subsection (a) determines that there is no longer
a threat to such former official, such head of an element of the
intelligence community shall cease providing personnel for the
protection of such former official not later than 30 days after
determining such threat no longer exists.
``(e) Report.--Not later than 7 days after the date on which the head
of an element of the intelligence community begins providing personnel
for the protection of a former official of an element of the
intelligence community, the Director of National Intelligence shall
submit to the congressional intelligence committees notice of the
provision of personnel for the protection of such former official.''.
(b) Table of Contents.--The table of contents of such Act is amended
by--
(1) striking the second item relating to section 301;
(2) striking the second item relating to section 302;
(3) striking the items relating to sections 304, 305, and
306; and
(4) inserting after the item relating to section 303 the
following new item:
``Sec. 304. Protective services for former officials of the
intelligence community.''.
SEC. 425. STRATEGIC REVIEW PROCESS.
Section 102A(f) of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 403-
1(f)) is amended by adding at the end the following new paragraph:
``(9) Not later than September 30, 2007, and every four years
thereafter, the Director of National Intelligence shall, in
consultation with the heads of the elements of the intelligence
community, manage and oversee the conduct of a strategic review of the
intelligence community to develop intelligence capabilities required to
address threats to national security. Such review shall analyze near-
term, mid-term, and future threats to national security and shall
include estimates of the allocation of resources and structural change
that should be reflected in future budget requests.''.
Subtitle C--Defense Intelligence Components
SEC. 431. ENHANCEMENTS OF NATIONAL SECURITY AGENCY TRAINING PROGRAM.
(a) Termination of Employees.--Subsection (d)(1)(C) of section 16 of
the National Security Agency Act of 1959 (50 U.S.C. 402 note) is
amended by striking ``terminated either by'' and all that follows and
inserting ``terminated--
``(i) by the Agency due to misconduct by the
employee;
``(ii) by the employee voluntarily; or
``(iii) by the Agency for the failure of the employee
to maintain such level of academic standing in the
educational course of training as the Director of the
National Security Agency shall have specified in the
agreement of the employee under this subsection; and''.
(b) Authority to Withhold Disclosure of Affiliation With NSA.--
Subsection (e) of such section is amended by striking ``(1) When an
employee'' and all that follows through ``(2) Agency efforts'' and
inserting ``Agency efforts''.
SEC. 432. CODIFICATION OF AUTHORITIES OF NATIONAL SECURITY AGENCY
PROTECTIVE PERSONNEL.
(a) Protection of Certain Persons.--The National Security Agency Act
of 1959 (50 U.S.C. 402 note) is amended by adding at the end the
following new section:
``Sec. 20. (a) The Director is authorized to designate personnel of
the Agency to perform protective functions for the Director and for any
personnel of the Agency designated by the Director.
``(b) Nothing in this section shall be construed to impair or
otherwise affect any authority under any other provision of law
relating to the performance of protective functions.''.
(b) Authority to Arrest.--
(1) Chapter 203 of title 18, United States Code, as amended
by section 423 of this Act, is amended by adding at the end the
following:
``Sec. 3066. Powers of authorized personnel in the National Security
Agency
``(a) The Director of the National Security Agency may issue
regulations to allow personnel designated to carry out protective
functions for the Agency to--
``(1) carry firearms; and
``(2) make arrests without warrant for any offense against
the United States committed in the presence of such personnel,
or for any felony cognizable under the laws of the United
States, if such personnel have probable cause to believe that
the person to be arrested has committed or is committing that
felony offense.
``(b) The powers granted under subsection (a) may be exercised only
in accordance with guidelines approved by the Attorney General.''.
(2) Clerical amendment.--The table of sections at the
beginning of chapter 203 of title 18, United States Code, as
amended by section 423 of this Act, is amended by adding at the
end the following:
``3066. Powers of authorized personnel in the National Security
Agency.''.
Subtitle D--Other Elements
SEC. 441. CLARIFICATION OF INCLUSION OF COAST GUARD AND DRUG
ENFORCEMENT ADMINISTRATION ELEMENTS IN THE
INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY.
Section 3(4) of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 401a(4))
is amended--
(1) in subparagraph (H)--
(A) by inserting ``the Coast Guard,'' after ``the
Marine Corps,''; and
(B) by inserting ``the Drug Enforcement
Administration,'' after ``the Federal Bureau of
Investigation,''; and
(2) in subparagraph (K), by striking ``, including the Office
of Intelligence of the Coast Guard''.
SEC. 442. CLARIFYING AMENDMENTS RELATING TO SECTION 105 OF THE
INTELLIGENCE AUTHORIZATION ACT FOR FISCAL YEAR
2004.
Section 105(b) of the Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year
2004 (Public Law 108-177; 117 Stat. 2603; 31 U.S.C. 311 note) is
amended--
(1) by striking ``Director of Central Intelligence'' and
inserting ``Director of National Intelligence''; and
(2) by inserting ``or in section 313 of such title,'' after
``subsection (a)),''.
TITLE V--OTHER MATTERS
SEC. 501. AERIAL RECONNAISSANCE PLATFORMS.
(a) Limitation on Termination of U-2 Aircraft Program.--The Secretary
of Defense may not begin the process to terminate the U-2 aircraft
program until the Secretary certifies in accordance with subsection (b)
that there would be no loss of national or Department of Defense
intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) capabilities in
transitioning from the U-2 aircraft program to the Global Hawk RQ-4
unmanned aerial vehicle platform.
(b) Report and Certification.--
(1) Study.--The Secretary of Defense shall conduct a study of
aerial reconnaissance platforms to determine whether the Global
Hawk RQ-4 unmanned aerial vehicle has reached mission
capability and has attained collection capabilities on a par
with the collection capabilities of the U-2 Block 20 aircraft
program as of April 1, 2006.
(2) Report.--The Secretary shall submit to the congressional
committees specified in subsection (c) a report containing the
results of the study. The Secretary shall include in the report
the Secretary's determination as to whether the Global Hawk RQ-
4 unmanned aerial vehicle--
(A) has reached mission capability; and
(B) has attained collection capabilities on a par
with the collection capabilities of the U-2 Block 20
aircraft program as of April 1, 2006.
(3) Certification.--The Secretary shall include with the
report the Secretary's certification, based on the results of
the study, as to whether or not there would be a loss of
national or Department of Defense intelligence, surveillance,
and reconnaissance capabilities with a transition from the U-2
aircraft program to the Global Hawk RQ-4 unmanned aerial
vehicle platform.
(c) Specified Committees.--The congressional committees specified in
this subsection are the following:
(1) The Committee on Armed Services and the Select Committee
on Intelligence of the Senate.
(2) The Committee on Armed Services and the Permanent Select
Committee on Intelligence of the House of Representatives.
SEC. 502. ELIMINATION OF CERTAIN REPORTING REQUIREMENTS.
(a) Intelligence Sharing With UN.--Section 112 of the National
Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 404g) is amended by striking subsection
(b).
(b) Improvement of Financial Statements for Auditing Purposes.--The
National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 401 et seq.) is amended--
(1) by striking section 114A; and
(2) in the table of contents in the first section, by
striking the item relating to section 114A.
(c) Financial Intelligence on Terrorist Assets.--The National
Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 401 et seq.) is amended--
(1) by striking section 118; and
(2) in the table of contents in the first section, by
striking the item relating to section 118.
(d) Counterdrug Intelligence.--The Intelligence Authorization Act for
Fiscal Year 2003 (Public Law 107-306) is amended--
(1) by striking section 826; and
(2) in the table of contents in section 1(b), by striking the
item relating to section 826.
SEC. 503. TECHNICAL AMENDMENTS TO THE NATIONAL SECURITY ACT OF 1947.
The National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 401 et seq.) is amended
as follows:
(1) In section 102A (50 U.S.C. 403-1)--
(A) in subsection (c)(7)(A), by striking ``section''
and inserting ``subsection'';
(B) in subsection (d)--
(i) in paragraph (3), by striking
``subparagraph (A)'' in the matter preceding
subparagraph (A) and inserting ``paragraph
(1)(A)''; and
(ii) in paragraph (5)(A), by striking ``or
personnel'' in the matter preceding clause (i);
and
(C) in subsection (l)(2)(B), by striking ``section''
and inserting ``paragraph''.
(2) In section 119(c)(2)(B) (50 U.S.C. 404o(c)(2)(B)), by
striking ``subsection (h)'' and inserting ``subsection (i)''.
SEC. 504. TECHNICAL CLARIFICATION OF CERTAIN REFERENCES TO JOINT
MILITARY INTELLIGENCE PROGRAM AND TACTICAL
INTELLIGENCE AND RELATED ACTIVITIES.
Section 102A of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 403-1)
is amended--
(1) in subsection (c)(3)(A), by striking ``annual budgets for
the Joint Military Intelligence Program and for Tactical
Intelligence and Related Activities'' and inserting ``annual
budget for the Military Intelligence Program or any successor
program or programs''; and
(2) in subsection (d)(1)(B), by striking ``Joint Military
Intelligence Program'' and inserting ``Military Intelligence
Program or any successor program or programs''.
SEC. 505. TECHNICAL AMENDMENTS TO THE INTELLIGENCE REFORM AND TERRORISM
PREVENTION ACT OF 2004.
(a) Amendments to National Security Intelligence Reform Act of
2004.--The National Security Intelligence Reform Act of 2004 (title I
of Public Law 108-458) is amended as follows:
(1) In section 1016(e)(10)(B) (6 U.S.C. 458(e)(10)(B)), by
striking ``Attorney General'' the second place it appears and
inserting ``Department of Justice''.
(2) In section 1061 (5 U.S.C. 601 note)--
(A) in subsection (d)(4)(A), by striking ``National
Intelligence Director'' and inserting ``Director of
National Intelligence''; and
(B) in subsection (h), by striking ``National
Intelligence Director'' and inserting ``Director of
National Intelligence''.
(3) In section 1071(e), by striking ``(1)''.
(4) In section 1072(b), by inserting ``Agency'' after
``Intelligence''.
(b) Other Amendments to Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention
Act of 2004.--The Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of
2004 (Public Law 108-458) is amended as follows:
(1) In section 2001 (28 U.S.C. 532 note)--
(A) in subsection (c)(1), by inserting ``of'' before
``an institutional culture'';
(B) in subsection (e)(2), by striking ``the National
Intelligence Director in a manner consistent with
section 112(e)'' and inserting ``the Director of
National Intelligence in a manner consistent with
applicable law''; and
(C) in subsection (f), by striking ``shall,'' in the
matter preceding paragraph (1) and inserting ``shall''.
(2) In section 2006 (28 U.S.C. 509 note)--
(A) in paragraph (2), by striking ``the Federal'' and
inserting ``Federal''; and
(B) in paragraph (3), by striking ``the specific''
and inserting ``specific''.
SEC. 506. TECHNICAL AMENDMENT TO THE CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY ACT OF
1949.
Section 5(a)(1) of the Central Intelligence Agency Act of 1949 (50
U.S.C. 403f(a)(1)) is amended by striking ``authorized under paragraphs
(2) and (3) of section 102(a), subsections (c)(7) and (d) of section
103, subsections (a) and (g) of section 104, and section 303 of the
National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 403(a)(2), (3), 403-3(c)(7),
(d), 403-4(a), (g), and 405)'' and inserting ``authorized under
subsections (c), (d), (e), and (f) of section 104A of the National
Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 403-4a)''.
SEC. 507. TECHNICAL AMENDMENTS RELATING TO THE MULTIYEAR NATIONAL
INTELLIGENCE PROGRAM.
(a) In General.--Subsection (a) of section 1403 of the National
Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1991 (50 U.S.C. 404b) is
amended--
(1) in the subsection heading, by striking ``Foreign''; and
(2) by striking ``foreign'' each place it appears.
(b) Responsibility of DNI.--That section is further amended--
(1) in subsections (a) and (c), by striking ``Director of
Central Intelligence'' and inserting ``Director of National
Intelligence''; and
(2) in subsection (b), by inserting ``of National
Intelligence'' after ``Director''.
(c) Conforming Amendment.--The heading of that section is amended to
read as follows:
``SEC. 1403. MULTIYEAR NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE PROGRAM.''.
SEC. 508. TECHNICAL AMENDMENTS TO THE EXECUTIVE SCHEDULE.
(a) Executive Schedule Level II.--Section 5313 of title 5, United
States Code, is amended by striking the item relating to the Director
of Central Intelligence and inserting the following new item:
``Director of the Central Intelligence Agency.''.
(b) Executive Schedule Level IV.--Section 5315 of title 5, United
States Code, is amended by striking the item relating to the General
Counsel of the Office of the National Intelligence Director and
inserting the following new item:
``General Counsel of the Office of the Director of
National Intelligence.''.
Sec. 509. Technical amendments relating to redesignation of the
National Imagery and Mapping Agency as the national
Geospatial-Intelligence Agency
(a) Title 5, United States Code.--(1) Title 5, United States Code, is
amended by striking ``National Imagery and Mapping Agency'' each place
it appears in a provision as follows and inserting ``National
Geospatial-Intelligence Agency'':
(A) Section 2302(a)(2)(C)(ii).
(B) Section 3132(a)(1)(B).
(C) Section 4301(1) (in clause (ii)).
(D) Section 4701(a)(1)(B).
(E) Section 5102(a)(1) (in clause (x)).
(F) Section 5342(a)(1) (in clause (K)).
(G) Section 6339(a)(1)(E).
(H) Section 7323(b)(2)(B)(i)(XIII).
(2) Section 6339(a)(2)(E) of such title is amended by striking
``National Imagery and Mapping Agency, the Director of the National
Imagery and Mapping Agency'' and inserting ``National Geospatial-
Intelligence Agency, the Director of the National Geospatial-
Intelligence Agency''.
(b) Title 44, United States Code.--(1)(A) Section 1336 of title 44,
United States Code, is amended by striking ``National Imagery and
Mapping Agency'' both places it appears and inserting ``National
Geospatial-Intelligence Agency''.
(B) The heading of such section is amended to read as follows:
``Sec. 1336. National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency: special
publications''.
(2) The table of sections at the beginning of chapter 13 of such
title is amended by striking the item relating to section 1336 and
inserting the following new item:
``1336. National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency: special
publications.''.
(c) Homeland Security Act of 2002.--Section 201(f)(2)(E) of the
Homeland Security Act of 2002 (6 U.S.C. 121(f)(2)(E)) is amended by
striking ``National Imagery and Mapping Agency'' and inserting
``National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency''.
(d) Inspector General Act of 1978.--Section 8H of the Inspector
General Act of 1978 (5 U.S.C. App.) is amended by striking ``National
Imagery and Mapping Agency'' each place it appears and inserting
``National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency''.
(e) Ethics in Government Act of 1978.--Section 105(a)(1) of the
Ethics in Government Act of 1978 (5 U.S.C. App.) is amended by striking
``National Imagery and Mapping Agency'' and inserting ``National
Geospatial-Intelligence Agency''.
(f) Other Acts.--(1) Section 7(b)(2)(A)(i) of the Employee Polygraph
Protection Act of 1988 (29 U.S.C. 2006(b)(2)(A)(i)) is amended by
striking ``National Imagery and Mapping Agency'' and inserting
``National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency''.
(2) Section 207(a)(2)(B) of the Legislative Branch Appropriations
Act, 1993 (44 U.S.C. 501 note) is amended by striking ``National
Imagery and Mapping Agency'' and inserting ``National Geospatial-
Intelligence Agency''.
Purpose
The purpose of H.R. 5020 is to authorize the intelligence
and intelligence-related activities of the United States
Government for Fiscal Year 2007 in order to enhance the
national security of the United States, to support and assist
the armed forces of the United States, and to support the
President in the execution of the foreign policy of the United
States. The bill also clarifies certain Intelligence Community
authorities and makes technical corrections flowing from the
Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Protection Act.
Classified Annex and Committee Intent
The classified annex to this report includes the classified
Schedule of Authorizations and its associated explanatory
language. The Committee views the classified annex as an
integral part of this legislation. The classified annex
contains a thorough discussion of the issues considered by the
Committee underlying the funding authorizations found in the
classified Schedule of Authorizations. The Committee intends
that all intelligence programs discussed in the classified
annex to this report be conducted in accordance with the
guidance and limitations set forth as associated language
therein. The classified Schedule of Authorizations is
incorporated directly into this legislation by virtue of
section 102 of the bill. The classified annex is available for
review by all Members of the House of Representatives, subject
to the requirements of clause 13 of rule XXIII of the Rules of
the House of Representatives, and rule 14 of the Rules of
Procedure for the House Permanent Select Committee on
Intelligence. In addition, Section 105 of the bill incorporates
reporting requirements of the Classified Annex and any Joint
Explanatory Statement into the Act.
Scope of Committee Review
The bill authorizes U.S. intelligence and intelligence-
related activities under the jurisdiction of the Committee,
including the National Intelligence Program (NIP), and the
Military Intelligence Program (MIP), formerly the Joint
Military Intelligence Program and the Tactical Intelligence and
Related Activities. The NIP consists of all activities of the
Office of the Director of National Intelligence, as well as
those national foreign intelligence, intelligence-related, and/
or counterintelligence activities conducted by: (1) the Central
Intelligence Agency; (2) the Department of Defense; (3) the
Defense Intelligence Agency; (4) the National Security Agency;
(5) the National Reconnaissance Office; (6) the National
Geospatial-Intelligence Agency; (7) the Departments of the
Army, Navy, and Air Force; (8) the Department of State; (9) the
Department of the Treasury; (10) the Department of Energy; (11)
the Department of Justice; (12) the Federal Bureau of
Investigation; (13) the U.S. Coast Guard; (14) the Department
of Homeland Security; and (15) the Drug Enforcement
Administration. The Committee has exclusive legislative,
authorizing and oversight jurisdiction of these programs.
Committee Statement and Views
A. THE COMMITTEE REVIEW
The Committee completed its review of the President's
fiscal year 2007 budget request, carrying out its annual
responsibility to prepare an authorization based on close
examination of the U.S. government's intelligence programs and
proposed expenditures. In a deliberate departure from past
practice, the Committee decided to mark up the budget request
much earlier in the calendar year than normal. This required
that the Committee's focus be more strategic in nature. Instead
of many budget-related hearings with witnesses from each
intelligence program, the Committee held only three, two of
which had the new Director of National Intelligence (DNI) as
the primary witness, and one with the Under Secretary of
Defense for Intelligence. Despite the limited number of formal
hearings, Members and Staff took dozens of briefings covering
all major intelligence programs within the National
Intelligence Program (NIP) and the Military Intelligence
Program (MIP). This review covered all functional capabilities,
such as human intelligence, signals intelligence, imagery
intelligence, open source intelligence, analysis,
counterintelligence, counternarcotics, and counterterrorism.
As always, the Committee's legislative and budgetary
actions are based on more than these budget-specific hearings
and briefings. The actions taken in this bill are the result of
the Committee's ongoing, rigorous oversight of the U.S.
Intelligence Community. This oversight activity includes the
scores of Committee and subcommittee hearings and briefings,
site visits, and fact-finding trips, and studies of
intelligence capabilities, strategies, plans, and challenges
throughout the year.
Director of National Intelligence
As was the case for its fiscal year 2006 review, the
Committee notes the time and attention it has devoted to the
creation of an empowered, capable and agile U.S. Intelligence
Community for the 21st Century. Since the end of calendar year
2004 when it passed sweeping legislation reforming the U.S.
Intelligence Community, the Congress, and particularly this
committee, has continued to oversee, assist in, comment on, and
as necessary, criticize the Administration's effort to realize
the goals and vision of that legislation. This oversight has
focused on, but not been limited to, the standup of the Office
of the Director of National Intelligence (ODNI). With the
Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act, the Congress
intended to create a responsible authority that would oversee
and orchestrate a coordinated effort by the entire Community.
The Committee has concern that the DNI is pursuing a path that
will make the ODNI less an intended ``orchestration
mechanism,'' and more another layer of large, unintended and
unnecessary bureaucracy. Despite this concern, the Committee is
committed to supporting all efforts that will make the DNI
successful in better integrating the disparate members of the
Intelligence Community and creating the best possible
intelligence capabilities for America. In that respect, the
Committee notes, with pleasure, that this year's budget request
was the first that was fully determined by the DNI, and that
effort by the DNI to create an Intelligence Community that is
greater than the sum of its parts is beginning to bear fruit.
The war on terrorism and the Terrorist Surveillance Program
There is no question about the respect and admiration that
this Committee has for the intelligence professionals that
serve all of us in quiet, unheralded service, often in
dangerous places and situations around the world. In the
conduct of its oversight responsibilities, the Committee has
had the opportunity to meet and work with intelligence
professionals throughout the Community. The work that our
intelligence personnel do is truly the first line of defense
for all Americans. We owe them a great deal of gratitude, and
we owe them every effort to give them the tools, resources, and
authorities necessary to protect our nation.
Unfortunately, these honorable men and women have been
poorly served by a small few who have taken it upon themselves
to, for political or other motives, recklessly and illegally
disclose America's necessary secrets and national security
information. The issue of unauthorized disclosures of
classified information has been extremely troubling and a focus
of a major work effort for the Committee. The Committee has
written to the President expressing its concern that there
appears to be no reasonable expectation of consequences for
those who harm America's national security by leaking
classified information. Each of these perpetrators, whether
they provide information to the media or to sworn enemies, is
committing a crime and violating an oath to which they have
sworn. Further, the Committee finds reprehensible the
irresponsible reporting of extremely sensitive national
security information. Such reporting does not serve well the
national interests, costs untold millions of dollars in lost
intelligence collection capabilities funded by U.S. taxpayers,
literally puts lives in jeopardy, and makes the work by the
honorable people of our Intelligence Community far more
difficult. Instead of chastising this Community for its lawful
and protective efforts, we should be fully supporting them with
all remedies possible to stop these unauthorized disclosures.
The Committee's work plan for this fiscal year includes
reviewing all legal avenues to bring to justice those who
violate the law, including those who knowingly receive, what is
essentially, stolen classified information.
One of the most damaging leaks of national security
information was the revelation of the National Security
Agency's Terrorist Surveillance Program. As a direct result of
this illegal compromise of classified information, the ability
of the United States to protect itself from terrorists has been
compromised. It can be argued that what factually correct
information was disclosed in the press was done so for profit
and to inflict political harm. However, beyond disclosure of
the classified facts, false and reprehensible claims of
improper or illegal activities are even more troubling. For
example, the Minority, in its views accompanying this report,
state that the President has violated the law by failing to
``keep the Committee `fully and currently' informed of all
intelligence activities of the United States.'' In point of
fact, leaders in Congress had been briefed more than a dozen
times on the authorization and related activities. Further, the
Attorney General and the Principal Deputy Director of National
Intelligence briefed the full Committee at length on the legal
issues and certain operational details. What the Minority
further continues to omit in the public version of its position
is that the National Security Act of 1947 clearly provides that
``the President and the congressional intelligence committees
shall each establish such procedures as may be necessary to
carry out the provisions of this title'' and that the
requirement to keep the committees ``fully and currently''
informed is to be done ``to the extent consistent with due
regard for the protection from unauthorized disclosure of
classified information relating to sensitive intelligence
sources and methods or other exceptionally sensitive matters.''
In full accordance with those two provisions of the law, the
Committee has determined that the extraordinary sensitivities
of the operational aspects of this program would be limited to
select Members and Staff of the Committee. That procedure has
allowed the Committee to get full and current briefings on this
program to monitor the communications of known terrorists.
Therefore, it is the Committee position that the President of
the United States has in no way violated the law with respect
to notifying the Congress on these activities.
With respect to the Terrorist Surveillance Program, the
Committee is fully supportive of this defensive measure to
understand efforts by known Al Qaeda or its affiliates to
attack America or its allies. The Committee's position is taken
with the full understanding that we are a nation at war. This
is a global war on terrorism: a war that is not being fought
primarily by conventional military forces on the traditional
field of battle and governed by time-tested rules of land
warfare. This is a war of asymmetry: a war to attack the hearts
and minds of civilized nations; and a war, the battlefield of
which, includes the homeland, something not seen in more than
100 years. To combat the elusive, smart, and agile enemy,
America must think differently, act differently, and be more
flexible. America's major weapon in this war is the ability to
create knowledge about the enemy. The primary responsibility to
``man this weapon'' rests on the Intelligence Community. We, as
a nation, must not tie the hands of those who are charged with
defending us, and we must at the same time, and as a culture,
protect the civil liberties we hold dear. The Terrorist
Surveillance Program is critical to our national security, and
the Committee believes firmly that the National Security Agency
program provides the proper balance between the two.
Accordingly, the Committee's Republican Majority rejected an
effort by the Democratic Minority to withhold twenty percent of
the funding for the overall operation of the National Security
Agency until the Executive Branch provided cost data on this
single, extremely small, program. The Majority found that it
would be completely irresponsible in a time of war to withhold
funding from an Intelligence Community agency that is providing
real-time information on terrorists and other foreign
intelligence targets in a time of war.
Continuing Intelligence Community reform
In the unclassified report accompanying the fiscal year
2006 legislation, the Committee commented extensively on the
need for change within the Intelligence Community. Those
comments focused on the need to respond positively to the
criticisms and ``failures'' of intelligence that prompted
reviews by the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon
the United States (9/11 Commission) and the Commission on the
Intelligence Capabilities of the United States Regarding
Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD Commission). The Committee
agreed with many of the recommendations of those commissions,
stating that some of the needed changes will require cultural
change and, moreover, a real need for the Intelligence
Community to adopt a more receptive attitude to change.
Ultimately, such will be necessary to improve the Community's
overall product--knowledge. The Committee continues to believe
that a number of systemic and focus area changes need to occur,
and has, once again, in this legislation attempted to put
emphasis on those areas of most concern: human intelligence,
intelligence analysis, community infrastructure, and counter-
intelligence.
The Committee notes that the President's budget makes good
progress in improving human intelligence capabilities--
delivering a plan to increase the number of core collectors and
analysts by fifty percent. The Committee further notes that the
DNI has had some good success in improving long-standing
analytic process and tradecraft problems. The Committee's
funding recommendations further enhances both the human
intelligence and analytic areas by attempting to drive improved
changes. With respect to infrastructure issues, the Committee
is very concerned about the state of basic facilities and, in
some cases, services throughout the Community. These include
the relatively mundane, but extraordinarily important, things
such as power and water utilities, the capacity of training
facilities and instructors, and support to field operations.
All of these supporting infrastructure functions are critical
to collection, analysis and information dissemination, and have
captured the long-term interest of the Committee. Finally, the
Committee has focused attention on the issue of
counterintelligence. There appears to be an alarming increase
by nation-state and non-nation-state actors to conduct
intelligence operations against the United States. The
Committee notes that certain nations are conducting espionage
efforts against this country at a level not seen since before
the end of the Cold War. It is nearly inherent that when a
country is, as we are, at war and focused on that war, its
enemies will increase their intelligence efforts against it. We
should expect this to continue as we pursue the Global War on
Terrorism. This is an alarming situation, and the Committee
believes that the Intelligence Community must refocus, and
moreover, reemphasize its counter-intelligence capabilities and
methodologies.
Lastly, the Committee finds that the Intelligence Community
must embrace more fully unconventional and open sources of
information. Many estimate that large percentages of
information needs can be satisfied by open source materials,
and the Committee believes that the growth of the internet and
mass media has dramatically altered the amount of information
available through open and unconventional sources. To ignore
the value of such information is dangerous. The Committee is,
therefore, pleased that the DNI has moved quickly to make the
use of open source (unclassified) materials an institutional
imperative throughout the analytic community. However, it will
take a dramatic change in cultural philosophy to trust and use
open source materials that weren't collected or discovered by
``secret means.'' Conversely, theCommittee is not pleased by
the reticence of the Community, including the DNI, to more fully
embrace the notion of unconventional sources of information. For
example, and to its credit, the ODNI recently began releasing to the
general public unclassified documents captured during Operation Iraqi
Freedom. This project will allow the world community to help understand
the Iraqi positions prior to the start of the war. Already this project
has brought to light many of the intentions and efforts by the Saddam
regime to hide materials from the United Nations inspectors and its
ties with terrorists. However, the Committee's effort to get these
unconventionally collected materials released was not supported by the
DNI until forced to do so. Additionally, the Community all too often
appears to be less-than-enthusiastic in following up on information
brought to it by people outside the Community, including former
government officials, experts in particular fields, or even authors who
have more expertise on specific issues than anyone within the
Intelligence Community. The Committee finds that opportunities are lost
and information leads on things such as possible weapons of mass
destruction locations are not properly followed. This is not the
hallmark of a flexible and agile-thinking intelligence function that
was envisioned in the intelligence reform legislation. The Committee
intends to monitor closely the efforts to improve the use of these open
source and unconventional sources of information.
The Intelligence Community today is one of transition.
There is a continuing mission transition from old mindsets of a
bipolar world to one of a network-based world. There is a
philosophical transition from a DCI-centric community of
disparate agencies to a more corporate-centric community
orchestrated by the DNI. And, there is a need to recognize that
transition ``back to the basics'' of good human intelligence to
act as a basis for our unparalleled technical intelligence
capabilities is critical. As we continue these transitions, we
must recognize that there are gaps in capabilities,
particularly in our ability to persistently stare at targets,
which must be corrected. And, we must fully recognize that the
need to focus on the issue of terrorism cannot be an excuse for
not producing intelligence on the ``traditional'' foreign
intelligence targets like Iran and North Korea, as well as the
transnational problem sets, such as illegal narcotics and human
smuggling. Some of these issues are specifically addressed in
the `Areas of Special Interest/General Provisions' section
immediately following. A complete discussion of the Committee's
oversight findings and recommendations is contained in the
classified annex to this report.
B. LEGISLATION
The bill and accompanying classified Schedule of
Authorizations includes the Committee's recommended
authorizations for the President's Fiscal Year 2007 budget
request. This includes an authorization for the intelligence
portion of the funding for the Global War on Terrorism (GWOT)
and operations in Iraq and Afghanistan. The Committee views
these funds as an integral part of the Fiscal Year 2007 budget
and has decided to specifically authorize these activities for
the full year in this legislation at this time.
H.R. 5020 provides strategic and substantial enhancements
in funding for critical world-wide intelligence capabilities.
The Committee believes there is a need to improve certain
intelligence capabilities, including human intelligence,
counterintelligence, analysis, and infrastructure. For a number
of reasons fully explained in the classified annex, the
Committee has made some specific and major recommendations to
realign funding. These changes include:
Improved U.S. human intelligence (HUMINT)
activities, including training, infrastructure, and
global capabilities;
Increased investment in analytic tools; and
Increases to U.S. counterintelligence
programs and personnel.
In addition to authorization for intelligence and
intelligence-related activities, the bill includes provisions
intended to clarify certain authorities of the DNI. These
provisions are intended to further refine and strengthen the
authorities provided to the DNI to oversee, coordinate, and
manage Intelligence Community activities.
Finally, just as in last year's bill, the Committee has
focused on the Nation's overhead imagery architecture. Last
year, a decision was made to terminate a part of the Future
Imagery Architecture program. Although this tough decision had
certain positive aspects, one disadvantage is that it is
essential to ensure that there are no future gaps in
capability. In this bill, the Committee vigorously urge the
Intelligence Community toward one of a very limited number of
options, so that the Nation will have the imagery capability it
needs in the future. The Committee's action in this area will
begin a process of fundamental change for the Future Imagery
Architecture program. Although the Committee expects some
discomfort within the Intelligence Community with this and
other provisions, it continues to agree with outside observers
that the Intelligence Community appears incapable of meaningful
change without significant outside assistance. The Intelligence
Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2007 is intended to provide
such assistance.
C. AREAS OF SPECIAL INTEREST
In this section, the Committee highlights areas of concern
that it believes must be addressed as a high priority by the
Director of National Intelligence in leading the Intelligence
Community into the future.
Strategic review process
The Committee believes that achieving the necessary reforms
of the Intelligence Community will only occur through a
strategic planning process. Accordingly, Section 425 of the
bill requires the Director of National Intelligence to, in
consultation with the heads of the Intelligence Community
elements, manage and oversee the conduct of a strategic review
to develop intelligence capabilities required to address
threats to national security.
A formalized, periodic, and structured review, much like
the Quadrennial Defense Review process used by the Department
of Defense, is intended to identify the breadth and depth of
national security threats, the capabilities existing and needed
to combat those threats, and better identify the alignment of
resources, authorities, and personnel needed to support those
required capabilities. Such a review will enable the
Intelligence Community to more readily make and accept change,
infuse flexibility into its management and operational
structures, and enable the DNI to gain better insight on
intelligence and intelligence-related activities throughout the
U.S. Government. The review also is expected to influence the
National IntelligenceStrategy by examining requirements
necessary to address national priorities and objectives, determine
which intelligence disciplines can provide the best support, and
properly identify budget resources should be allocated to those
priorities and objectives.
The Committee requests that the DNI provide the Committee
with his plan for initiating and conducting this review.
Reporting regarding Iran and North Korea
The development by Iran and North Korea of nuclear,
chemical, biological or radiological weapons and the missiles
capable of delivering them are among the most significant
potential threats to the United States. The Committee believes
that it is imperative that the Intelligence Community continue
to improve its collection and analysis of intelligence
information on Iran and North Korea.
This point was highlighted by the bipartisan WMD
Commission. The Commission's 2005 report stated: ``Across the
board, the Intelligence Community knows disturbingly little
about the nuclear programs of the world's most dangerous
actors. In some cases, it knows less now than it did five or
ten years ago.'' This statement aptly describes the challenge
faced by U.S. policymakers with regard to Iran and North
Korea's nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons programs.
If the President and Congress are to develop effective
policies to counter Iran's and North Korea's weapons programs,
such policies must be based on accurate and timely
intelligence. The Committee has conducted regular and ongoing
oversight of these efforts, and expects the DNI to ensure that
the Intelligence Community continues to provide timely,
detailed, and frequent reporting on the current intentions and
capabilities on Iran and North Korea's nuclear, chemical,
biological, radiological, and missile programs, as well as the
Intelligence Community's capabilities to understand and
evaluate these programs.
In particular, the Committee is interested in receiving on
an ongoing basis: (1) current assessments of Iran's and North
Korea's nuclear, chemical, biological weapons, and missile
programs; (2) information on new intelligence developed,
including intelligence collected from both open and clandestine
sources; and (3) full discussion of any gaps in knowledge,
dissents, caveats, or other information that would tend to
reduce confidence in the overall assessment.
The Committee believes that these reports will provide
timely information to help better inform Congress as it is
asked to make decisions regarding U.S. policy towards Iran and
North Korea.
Risk-taking and discouragement of risk averse culture
Intelligence is an art, not a science, and therefore
imperfect, and it takes significant time to hone the
operational skills necessary to conduct effective intelligence
operations. The Committee recognizes that setbacks and
shortcomings are inevitable while developing and conducting
operations, especially against extremely difficult targets.
However, fear of setbacks or ``failures'' should never be a
deterrent to conducting high risk, essential intelligence
operations.
As the Intelligence Community increases operations in
exceptionally dangerous circumstances and against unpredictable
targets, mistakes may occur. However, the Committee believes it
is more realistic to measure success in the effort and
initiative exhibited and not necessarily in the interim result.
Lessons learned from failed operations should highlight
shortcomings, and changes should be made. Only in this way can
mission success be achieved. Although the Committee supports
the notion ``failure is not an option,'' strict adherence to
such a view may contribute to the development of a risk adverse
culture in which certain operations are not conducted because
of a fear of answering for failure. Although the Committee is
responsible for investigating intelligence failures, it
understands that honest mistakes will be made in highly fluid
and complex operational environments. Our Intelligence
Community must constantly strive for the ``perfect,'' but be
willing to accept and take responsibility for failure; we must
not foster a risk averse society.
The men and women of the Intelligence Community are among
the bravest in the country, readily accepting the extreme
personal risks inherent in their chosen profession. The
Committee honors the sacrifices they make daily in their
professional and personal lives and commits to the notion that
honest failure is a price we must pay for being bold and
proactive.
Unauthorized disclosures of classified information
As previously stated, the Committee remains gravely
concerned with the problem of unauthorized disclosures of
classified information, which harms national security, places
American citizens and intelligence community personnel at
increased risk, and inevitably results in substantial
consequences to the United States--both tangible and
intangible.
The Committee continues to address this important issue
through two separate endeavors. It is continuing a legislative
review, including hearings, to examine relevant issues and what
changes to the law may be desirable. Those efforts have clearly
established that prosecution under current laws relating to
unauthorized disclosure has not been an effective deterrent
tool, although it remains unclear whether this lack of
effectiveness requires changes in the law or is due to other
factors. In either event, the Committee believes that
additional and more creative steps to deter unauthorized
disclosures are warranted. Section 413 of the bill is a first
step, requiring the DNI to review whether current law or
administrative authorities enable the revocation of pensions of
intelligence community personnel who commit unauthorized
disclosures of classified information.
In addition, the Committee has initiated a review of
certain specific potential unauthorized disclosures of
classified information at the request of the Speaker of the
House. That review primarily is concentrating on an
investigation of four cases to develop a better understanding
of the related facts and circumstances. The investigation is in
turn expected to better enable the Committee to understand how
and why unauthorized disclosures occur, and how the protection
of classified information is perceived in practice.
It is important to emphasize that the Committee's concern
is in no way intended to limit or reduce proper oversight of
intelligence community activities or of activities with
heightened potential to affect civil liberties. As one of the
primary bodies intended to conduct oversight of intelligence
activities on behalf of the American people, we are mindful of
the need for ongoing and thorough review of such activities.
However, the delicate balance between protecting national
security and safeguarding civil liberties must be carried out
in a manner that fully protects both interests, through
mechanisms such as regular reporting to the congressional
intelligence committees and the use of the Intelligence
Community Whistleblower Protection Act. By definition, no
individual--whether a journalist, government official, or
intelligence community employee--can or should singlehandedly
presume to determine what information ``deserves'' to be
withheld from disclosure in order to protect national security,
especially without full knowledge of the surrounding context.
Prosecution of espionage
Investigators, analysts, inspectors, and prosecutors from
the Departments of Justice, Defense, and Homeland Security are
working together in an effort to combat espionage. The
Committee is pleased to note that since 2005, their combined
efforts have resulted in the arrest of at least ten individuals
in the United States accused of spying on behalf of a number of
foreign countries.
The Committee is concerned, however, that these individuals
will face relatively light sentences if found guilty. All of
them are charged under 18 U.S.C. Sec. 793 (gathering,
transferring, or losing defense information) or 18 U.S.C.
Sec. 951 (agents of foreign governments), which carry penalties
of no more than ten years imprisonment. The Committee notes
that most, if not all, were not charged under 18 U.S.C.
Sec. 794 (gathering or delivering defense information to aid
foreign governments), which carries penalties ranging from life
imprisonment to death. The Committee also notes that some of
these individuals stand accused of stealing defense-related
trade secrets from U.S. companies. However, none of these
suspects were charged with violating 18 U.S.C. Sec. 1831
(economic espionage), which carries a maximum penalty of 15
years imprisonment for stealing trade secrets to benefit a
foreign government.
The Committee believes that the penalties facing these
accused spies are not an effective deterrent to espionage.
Americans tempted to spy on behalf of a foreign power should
understand clearly that doing so will have extremely negative
consequences, resulting in their arrest, conviction, and long-
term imprisonment.
The Committee notes the effective work of Justice
Department prosecutors, but encourages the Attorney General to
review the Department's counterespionage strategies. The review
should address the following questions: Is the current strategy
an effective deterrent to espionage? Are those convicted of
espionage and related charges receiving the punishment they
deserve? Why are more spies not charged under 18 U.S.C.
Sec. 794 and Sec. 1831? Would stricter penalties for violating
18 U.S.C. Sec. 793 act as a better deterrent to espionage? The
Committee expects the Attorney General to update it
periodically on the status of such a review.
Counterintelligence field activity
The Committee remains concerned about improper instances of
maintaining information regarding U.S. persons at the
Counterintelligence Field Activity (CIFA) within the Department
of Defense, and believes it is important to highlight the
incident as well as the corrective actions promptly taken by
the Department to address those practices.
CIFA was established to bring leadership to
counterintelligence efforts within the Department. The
counterintelligence mission involves the identification and
neutralization of the pervasive foreign intelligence and
terrorism threat directed globally against the Department of
Defense and the U.S. Government. CIFA is responsible for
overseeing counterintelligence investigations, operations, and
services within the Department; overseeing and conducting joint
CI advanced training and analyzing counterintelligence
information to identify and target the threat in our
increasingly complex and asymmetrical world.
In the course of gathering information believed to relate
to force protection, CIFA improperly collected and retained
information on U.S. persons engaged in constitutionally-
protected protests at the University of California. In response
to a congressional inquiry, the Department of Defense
acknowledged that CIFA failed to follow policies regarding the
collection and retention of information about U.S. persons.
These failures were especially troubling in light of CIFA's
important mission to set the standards while protecting the
Constitutional rights of American citizens.
The Department of Defense subsequently has assessed that
approximately 260 records out of 13,000 records in a classified
CIFA database, or two percent of the total, improperly
contained information relating to U.S. persons. Department
leadership has responded to this assessment and directed that
the database should be used only to report information
regarding possible international terrorist activity, required
supervisors to review all reports before inclusion in the
database, and provided for refresher training for Department
personnel on what information properly may be included in the
database.
The Committee understands that the Department of Defense
Inspector General is in the process of preparing a report
addressing at least some of these issues. The Committee
requests that the Inspector General submit no later than
February 1, 2007 a report which includes the results of any
audits relating to CIFA including but not limited to the
collection, retention, and dissemination of information
relating to U.S. persons. In addition, the Department of
Defense shall submit no later than February 1, 2007, a report
containing the results of any internal department review or
investigation of policies, guidelines, and practices of CIFA
related to the collection, retention, and dissemination of
information relating to U.S. persons, as well as a description
of remedial actions taken to address the findings and
recommendations of the Inspector General and any other internal
review.
Intelligence support for transformational diplomacy strategy
The Secretary of State has launched a major initiative to
reposition U.S. diplomatic personnel across the world. This
includes moving hundreds of positions to critical emerging
areas in Africa, South Asia, East Asia, and the Middle East
over the next several years. Thisyear alone, the Department
will move approximately 100 positions out of Washington and European
capitals. Enhancements to the Department's ability to monitor Iran--
through the establishment of a new Office of Iranian Affairs and the
creation of Iran ``watcher'' positions in Dubai, London, Frankfurt, and
other capitals--represent perhaps the most dramatic, and most critical,
elements of this transformation.
Such a major realignment of strategic priorities and of
diplomats working on the ``front lines'' may require a
significant shift in intelligence support provided to
Department policymakers by the Bureau of Intelligence and
Research (INR). To its credit, INR analysts have worked on
their areas of expertise longer, on average, than many of their
colleagues in other agencies, and INR has one of the lowest
personnel turnover rates in the Intelligence Community.
However, the long tenure and low turnover of INR analysts may
make it difficult for the Bureau to adjust to changing
priorities.
This Committee has previously urged the Department to
increase the resources provided to INR, which has remained
relatively constant in recent years. Given the proposed
transformations to the Department's overall strategy, the
Committee strongly encourages the Secretary of State to examine
INR's current allocation of human and financial resources to
ensure that INR will be able to adequately support the
Department's new strategic priorities.
Director of National Intelligence Office of the Inspector General
Section 1078 of the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism
Prevention Act of 2004 provided the Director of National
Intelligence with the authority to establish an Office of the
Inspector General. On September 7, 2005, the DNI established
such an office, ``charged with detecting fraud, waste, and
abuse; evaluating performance; and making recommendations to
promote economy, efficiency, and effectiveness in the ODNI and
the Intelligence Community.'' Although the Committee supports
the DNI's desire to have an Office of the Inspector General, it
is concerned that it is currently chartered in a way that does
not ensure the maximum utility of that office to act as a
coordinating organization for all Intelligence Community
Inspector Generals, specifically with regard to keeping the
Committee informed of its activities and findings.
As an example, the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism
Prevention Act provided that any Office of the Inspector
General created by the DNI would have the duties,
responsibilities, and authorities contained in the Inspector
General Act of 1978. That law requires each Inspector General
to prepare semi-annual reports summarizing the activities of
the office during the preceding six month period, which are to
be forwarded to the agency head and transmitted to the
appropriate committees of Congress. The DNI instruction calls
for only an annual report, and makes no reference to a copy
being provided to Congress.
The Inspector General Act also requires those offices to
keep Congress and the appropriate Committees fully and
currently informed about problems and deficiencies it discovers
as well as the necessity for and progress of corrective action.
The Committee is concerned that the structure for congressional
interaction with the DNI Inspector General outlined in the
September 2005 Instruction is overly restrictive of the flow of
information to the Committee. The Instruction states:
The Inspector General shall notify the DNI and the
Director, Office of Legislative Affairs, of any request
from the intelligence committees or any other committee
or subcommittee of the Congress for any report or
findings and recommendations of any inspection,
investigation, audit, or other inquiry conducted by the
Inspector General, and after consultation with the DNI,
prepare an appropriate response to any such request.
It is unclear what role the Office of Legislative Affairs plays
in these transactions, and the Committee envisions scenarios
where it may be appropriate for direct interaction between the
Committee and the Inspector General, as currently practiced
with the Inspectors General from the Central Intelligence
Agency and others.
Another area of Committee concern deals with the DNI's
authority to direct the Inspector General not to initiate,
carry out, or complete any review without notification to
Congress. While other Inspectors General within the
Intelligence Community operate subject to similar authority,
there is also the requirement for a notification to Congress on
the use of such authority. That requirement calls for
statements to be submitted by both the affected Inspector
General and the official who exercised the authority. The DNI's
September 2005 Instruction has no such provision for
Congressional notification.
One final area of concern relates to the reporting of
``urgent concerns'' from whistleblowers, and ``particularly
serious or flagrant'' issues. In 1998, Congress created special
whistleblower protections and procedures applicable within the
Intelligence Community. The September 2005 Instruction makes
reference to the DNI's Inspector General conducting reviews
based on information from employees or contractors of the ODNI
or any element of the intelligence community and states that
they should ``be subject to, and in accordance with, DNI policy
and regulations concerning whistleblower protection.'' However,
it is unclear that these policies and regulations conform to
existing law governing whistleblower protection and
notification to Congress.
The Committee notes also that the CIA's Inspector General
is required to report immediately to the Director of that
agency ``whenever he becomes aware of particularly serious or
flagrant problems, abuses, or deficiencies relating to the
administration of programs and operations.'' The Director is to
transfer such reports to the Committee within seven calendar
days. The Committee believes that similarly prompt reporting of
issues identified by the DNI Inspector General is necessary.
In order to strengthen the foundation on which the DNI
Office of Inspector General was created and to ensure that the
appropriate oversight committees receive the maximum utility
from its efforts, the Committee requests that within 180 days
of enactment of this legislation the DNI issue an updated
notification that incorporates elements of the Inspector
General Act and the Central Intelligence Agency Act of 1949
that relate to Congressional notification and whistleblower
protections.
Enterprise architecture
The Committee continues to believe that well-formed and
successfully executed Enterprise Architecture (EA) frameworks
in individual intelligence agencies and across the Intelligence
Community will ensure more reliable Information Technology (IT)
financial management and planning. These EA structures guide
the IT budget and decisionmaking processes, which in turn
should facilitate informed strategic investments and unified
controls. This belief led in large part to the inclusion of
responsibilities relating to EA for the Intelligence Community
Chief Information Officer (CIO) and other responsible officials
in the Intelligence and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004.
In 2005, the Committee noted its view that ``the IC would
benefit greatly by undertaking a formal IC-wide EA effort, as
this process would take these `linkages' and fuse them together
across the community in the form of standard business,
performance, data and information, service component, and
technical models.'' H. Rept. 108-558, at 35. The Committee also
directed that the Intelligence Community CIO in conjunction
with the agency level CIOs to ``draft the implementation plan
for an IC-wide EA, which will conform the agencies' EAs to the
broader IC strategy. * * *'' The Committee understands that the
creation and implementation of these EA frameworks is ongoing
and urges the DNI to continue to work collaboratively with the
Intelligence Community agencies to ensure that these are
completed within the timeframe prescribed. The Committee
directs that the fiscal year 2008 National Intelligence Program
and Military Intelligence Program budgets tie all IT spending
to their respective EA frameworks at both the agency-level and
Intelligence Community-wide.
Space acquisition programs--personnel
There is a general acknowledgement that the U.S. space
acquisition programs at the National Reconnaissance Office and
the Space and Missile Systems Center are in trouble. Simply
put, expensive and complex acquisition endeavors always take
longer, and therefore end up costing more than the initial
estimates. Unanticipated delays can cause budgetary problems
for other Intelligence Community programs, particularly when
competition for resources leaves very little reserve to absorb
unplanned cost overruns.
The Committee is interested in promoting greater continuity
of personnel assigned to intelligence-related acquisition
programs. It is not uncommon for space acquisition programs to
take ten years, beginning with concept exploration, then
developing an acquisition strategy, performing the source
selection, and ultimately developing, launching, initializing,
and operating the system (which can last decades). A seasoned
acquisition professional will experience the interdependencies
of all of these phases, and more importantly, gains an
understanding of how the consequences of decisions made in any
one phase ultimately affect the following phases. The Committee
notes that previous personnel policies allowed uniformed
military officers to remain assigned to NRO programs for the
entire duration of an acquisition--in fact many Air Force
officers made an entire career in the NRO. These extended
assignments contributed to a sense of ownership, dedication,
and commitment that is immeasurable and invaluable.
As anecdotally suggested, today's two-year rotational
assignments do not provide an effective environment for
successful space acquisitions. The Committee understands the
military's desire to develop future leaders that have a breadth
of experience, including experience focused in space related
assignments. However, the Committee believes the mission to
provide effective space acquisition professionals and to
deliver these critical systems to the country far outweigh the
need to develop well-rounded senior officers who are
generalists.
Simply put, complex space systems acquisition requires
extraordinarily specialized knowledge, skills, and dedicated
effort overtime. This specialty deserves a focused, protected,
long-term career status. The Committee believes that recreating
a protected career field that focuses on acquisition of space
systems is a key to fixing the underlying problems with our
space developments.
Further, the Committee believes that current personnel
assignment policies should be improved to allow space
acquisition professionals to obtain greater experience and
technical depth. Today's policies place a high degree of
importance on rotational assignments to obtain broad
experience. This model leads to high turnover rate in personnel
and impedes military officers from developing the technical
expertise required to manage complex space programs. In
contrast, civilian acquisition personnel career progression is
rooted in specific program management experience and a high
degree of relevant continuing education. The Committee believes
that such longer-term assignments for military officers would
provide the acquisition professionals with more experience,
with better judgment, and result in more personal commitment to
success, than the current short rotational assignments.
Therefore, the Committee directs the Secretary of Defense,
in cooperation with the Director of National Reconnaissance
Office and the Secretary of the Air Force, to commission a
study to determine the value and feasibility of establishing a
protected career service for space acquisition professionals
(similar to the JAG or Medical Corps) and how such a policy can
be implemented. The Committee directs that the report be
delivered to the congressional intelligence committees no later
than 120 days after enactment of this legislation.
D. CONGRESSIONAL OVERSIGHT REFORM
Many of the studies and reports that have emphasized the
need for reform within various federal departments and agencies
have also highlighted the need to modernize congressional
oversight. The Final Report of the National Commission on
Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States (``9/11 Commission'')
labeled congressional oversight of intelligence
``dysfunctional'' (p. 420). Many of the criticisms can be
summarized by stating that ``Congress is engaged in too much of
the wrong kind of oversight--too few national debates on major
issues and far too much time and energy being spent on
relatively minor and parochial issues.'' (Center for Strategic
and International Studies, Beyond Goldwater-Nichols: Defense
Reform for a New Strategic Era, March 2004.)
Specific recommendations of the Commission on the
Intelligence Capabilities of the United States Regarding
Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD Commission) to improve
congressional oversight include:
Both the House and the Senate intelligence committees have
indicated their intention to establish oversight subcommittees.
But these subcommittees will not improve intelligence if they
simply demand additional testimony from top intelligence
officials on the crisis or scandal of the day. We suggest that,
if created, the oversight subcommittees limit their activities
to ``strategic oversight,'' meaning they would set an agenda at
the start of the year or session of Congress, based on top
priorities such as information sharing, and stick to that
agenda. (p. 338).
Encourage more informal discussions and collaboration
between the Intelligence Community and its congressional
overseers. (p. 340).
The Committee takes such recommendations seriously and is
determined to improve congressional oversight for the benefit
of our national goals. At the beginning of the 109th Congress,
the Committee created the Subcommittee on Oversight, which is
specifically charged with conducting strategic oversight. Among
the subject areas assigned to the Subcommittee are the
responsibility for overseeing implementation of the
Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act, including the
creation of the office of DNI, and specific oversight emphasis
items, such as information sharing, unauthorized disclosures of
classified information, intelligence analysis, and information
assurance. This subcommittee has taken a number of steps to
improve congressional oversight, including developing
performance criteria to measure Intelligence Community progress
and studying the practice of Congressionally Directed Actions.
Metrics within the intelligence community
To facilitate increased oversight, the Committee has placed
special attention on the development of objective oversight
metrics. Few organizations outside of government do not use
objective measurements as a tool to gauge success and to track
progress. Many government organizations, even without the
profit motive, have found effective ways to measure progress
and improvement through objective measurements. For example,
some agencies have developed measurements to track use of their
products and modify them when customers aren't using them.
Logically, every intelligence agency should use some set of
metrics as a management tool. Correspondingly, the Committee in
its oversight role needs to have a useful set of metrics,
likely somewhat different than those used by program managers,
to evaluate the productivity of the Community. The standards
should not be too different, however, because all branches of
the U.S. Government should be working toward the same goal.
The Director of the National Quality Program at the
National Institute of Standards and Technology observed that
``We generally measure the easy, rather than the important. The
challenge is to define the important.'' The Committee seeks to
work in partnership with the Intelligence Community to jointly
identify and understand what is important--or at least that
which points to the important. A former Speaker of the House
has noted that ``It's what you inspect, not what you expect''
that drives what agencies do in response to oversight. The
Committee is not interested in receiving reporting merely for
the sake of reporting or in creating data for its own end.
Any effective measurements should be tied to clear goals
and objectives. As illustrated by the observation ``if you
don't know where you're going, any road will get you there,''
it will be hard to measure progress without understanding what
the Intelligence Community needs to achieve and where it needs
to go. Once the Community and Congress clearly understand those
objectives they can determine how to measure and understand
what is aiding or hindering progress on important issues. The
Committee seeks to work closely with leaders of the
Intelligence Community and develop meaningful metrics to
measure the progress in reforming intelligence and improving
important processes within the Intelligence Community.
The Subcommittee on Oversight has conducted an intensive
review with outside experts. In particular, the Committee has
reviewed the Baldridge review process and notes that
significant improvements have taken place in companies and
government agencies that have participated in the process. The
Committee encourages the DNI to review this process and
determine how it could be adapted and implemented within the
Intelligence Community.
Congressionally directed actions
Historically, the Committee has included congressionally
directed actions (CDAs) as part of the report language of
yearly Intelligence Authorization Acts as a way to direct
specific actions or to formally obtain information that could
not be obtained through other means. CDAs also spark debate on
key issues or gaps that, in the Committee's opinion, are not
receiving the required attention of Intelligence Community
agencies, leadership, and management. However, the Committee
believes that responses to CDAs often do not satisfy the intent
of the request, do not include a sufficient level of detail,
and may not be properly used when received.
In the recent past, neither the Intelligence Community nor
the Committee have had consistent processes in place to track,
review or provide feedback on congressionally directed actions.
Now is the time to improve the quality of both CDA tasking and
their responses. It is the Committee's intent to move CDA
reporting from the insufficient, resource draining exercise it
has often been to the worthwhile information exchange it was
intended to be. The Committee hopes to increase the quality of
CDA responses from the Intelligence Community and decrease
duplication or unnecessary reporting requirements tasked to the
Intelligence Community.
The Committee notes that some CDAs are the result of
internal congressional compromises or carry annual reporting
requirements without sunset provisions, resulting in a growing
list of required reports that may have lost relevance. For
instance, in the Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year
2000, the President is required to submit annual reports on the
Public Identification of Significant Foreign Narcotics
Traffickers. The Committee is at a loss as to why it currently
needs specific reporting of the names of convicted narcotics
traffickers, especially when other processes are in place to
ensure proper efforts are undertaken against such traffickers.
More broadly, the Intelligence Community currently must answer
72 annual CDAs, in addition to those newly assigned each year.
Many contain useful information needed to perform the
Committee's oversight responsibilities. Fiscal Year 2005 marked
a high point for CDA tasking in the past ten years, with the
Intelligence Community answering 248, while in Fiscal Year 2006
the Intelligence Community was tasked with 197 CDAs.
In the spirit of congressional oversight reform, the
Committee would like to establish uniform procedures with
respect to CDAs. For example, the Committee may agree that a
briefing would satisfy certain CDA requests where that format
is most conductive to the exchange of information. In addition,
the Subcommittee on Oversight is conducting a thorough review
of all annual reporting requirements to assess the usefulness
and the cost to prepare the other reports now required. As a
result of an initial review, the Committee-reported bill
repeals provisions of law requiring several of these annual
reports. It is a good beginning.
The Committee would like to acknowledge the work put into
CDA responses by the Intelligence Community workforce, and by
the ODNI to ensure that all CDAs are answered in a timely,
worthwhile manner. Going forward, it is in the best interest of
our national security to minimize duplication and waste in all
areas, and the Committee sees the clarification and
restructuring of CDAs as a perfect opportunity.
Committee Consideration and Rollcall Votes
On March 30, 2006, the Committee met in open and closed
session and ordered the bill H.R. 5020 favorably reported, as
amended.
OPEN SESSION
In open session, the Committee considered the text of the
bill H.R. 5020.
Chairman Hoekstra offered an amendment in the nature of a
substitute to H.R. 5020. The contents of the amendment in the
nature of a substitute are described in the Section-by-Section
analysis and the Explanation of Amendment. The Committee
considered the following amendments to the amendment in the
nature of a substitute:
Mr. Hastings offered an amendment to require the President
to submit a separate statement of the proposed budget for the
Privacy and Civil Liberties Oversight Board and to authorize
appropriations. It was not agreed to by a record vote of 8 ayes
to 10 noes:
Voting aye: Ms. Harman, Mr. Hastings, Mr. Reyes, Mr.
Boswell, Mr. Cramer, Ms. Eshoo, Mr. Holt, Mr. Tierney.
Voting no: Mr. Hoekstra (Chairman), Mr. LaHood, Mr.
Everett, Ms. Wilson, Ms. Davis, Mr. Thornberry, Mr.
McHugh, Mr. Tiahrt, Mr. Rogers, Mr. Renzi.
Mr. Everett offered an amendment to limit termination of
the U-2 aircraft program. It was agreed to by voice vote.
CLOSED SESSION
Ms. Harman then moved to close the meeting because national
security would be endangered if the matters to be considered
were disclosed. The motion was agreed to by a record vote of 15
ayes to 0 noes:
Voting aye: Mr. Hoekstra (Chairman), Mr. LaHood, Ms.
Wilson, Ms. Davis, Mr. Thornberry, Mr. McHugh, Mr.
Tiahrt, Mr. Renzi, Ms. Harman, Mr. Reyes, Mr. Boswell,
Mr. Cramer, Ms. Eshoo, Mr. Holt, Mr. Tierney.
Voting no: None
Ms. Eshoo offered an amendment to provide that not more
than 80 percent of the funds specified for a program in the
classified Schedule of Authorizations shall be authorized until
the President submits a report on the cost of the program
described in the weekly radio address of the President on
December 17, 2005.
OPEN SESSION
After debate, the Committee returned to open session by
unanimous consent. The amendment was not agreed to by a record
vote of 8 ayes to 10 noes:
Voting aye: Ms. Wilson, Ms. Harman, Mr. Hastings, Mr.
Reyes, Mr. Boswell, Ms. Eshoo, Mr. Holt, Mr. Tierney.
Voting no: Mr. Hoekstra (Chairman), Mr. LaHood, Mr.
Everett, Mr. Gallegly, Ms. Davis, Mr. Thornberry, Mr.
McHugh, Mr. Tiahrt, Mr. Rogers, Mr. Renzi.
The Committee then adopted the amendment in the nature of a
substitute by voice vote.
CLOSED SESSION
Ms. Harman then moved to close the meeting because national
security would be endangered if the matters to be considered
were disclosed. The motion was agreed to by a record vote of 15
ayes to 0 noes:
Voting aye: Mr. Hoekstra (Chairman), Mr. Everett, Ms.
Wilson, Ms. Davis, Mr. Thornberry, Mr. McHugh, Mr.
Tiahrt, Mr. Rogers, Ms. Harman, Mr. Hastings, Mr.
Boswell, Mr. Cramer, Ms. Eshoo, Mr. Holt, Mr. Tierney.
Voting no: None
Ms. Eshoo offered an amendment to modify the funding level
for a program contained in the classified Schedule of
Authorizations. In lieu of the amendment, the Schedule of
Authorizations was modified by unanimous consent.
Mr. Boswell offered an amendment to modify the funding
levels for programs contained in the classified Schedule of
Authorizations. It was not agreed to by a record vote of 7 ayes
to 10 noes:
Voting aye: Ms. Harman, Mr. Hastings, Mr. Reyes, Mr.
Boswell, Ms. Eshoo, Mr. Holt, Mr. Tierney.
Voting no: Mr. Hoekstra (Chairman), Mr. Everett, Ms.
Wilson, Mr. Gallegly, Ms. Davis, Mr. Thornberry, Mr.
McHugh, Mr. Tiahrt, Mr. Rogers, Mr. Renzi.
The Committee then adopted the classified Schedule of
Authorizations by voice vote.
OPEN SESSION
By unanimous consent, the Committee returned to open
session.
By voice vote, the Committee adopted a motion by the
Chairman to favorably report the bill H.R. 5020 to the House,
as amended.
Section-by-Section Analysis and Explanation of the Amendment
Section 1--Short title and table of contents
Section 1 contains the short title for the bill and the
Table of Contents.
TITLE I--INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES
Section 101--Authorization of appropriations
Section 101 of the bill authorizes appropriations for the
intelligence and intelligence-related activities of these
elements of the United States Government: The Office of the
Director of National Intelligence, the Central Intelligence
Agency, the Department of Defense, the Defense Intelligence
Agency, the National Security Agency, the Departments of the
Army, Navy and Air Force, the Department of State, the
Department of the Treasury, the Department of Justice, the
Federal Bureau of Investigation, the National Reconnaissance
Office, the National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency, the Coast
Guard, the Department of Homeland Security, and the Drug
Enforcement Administration.
Section 102--Classified schedule of authorizations
Section 102 provides that the amounts and personnel
ceilings authorized under Section 101 shall be specified in the
accompanying classified Schedule of Authorizations, which shall
be made available to the Committee on Appropriations and to the
President.
Section 103--Personnel ceiling adjustments
Section 103 permits the Director of National Intelligence
(DNI) to authorize employment of civilian personnel in excess
of the authorized number when the DNI determines that it is
necessary to the performance of important intelligence
functions and promptly notifies the congressional intelligence
committees.
Section 104--Intelligence community management account
Section 104 authorizes specified funds, as well as
classified amounts, for the Intelligence Community Management
Account and provides that personnel detailed to that staff from
other agencies are detailed on a reimbursable basis.
Section 105--Incorporation of reporting requirements
Section 105 provides that each requirement to submit a
report to the congressional intelligence committees included in
the joint explanatory statement to accompany the conference
report on the bill is incorporated into the Act and made a
requirement in law.
TITLE II--CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY RETIREMENT AND DISABILITY SYSTEM
Section 201--Authorization of appropriations
Section 201 authorizes funds for the CIA Retirement and
Disability System.
TITLE III--GENERAL PROVISIONS
Section 301--Increase in employee compensation and benefits authorized
by law
Section 301 permits the authorized amounts to be increased
to provide increases in compensation and benefits authorized by
law.
Section 302--Restriction on conduct of intelligence activities
Section 302 provides that the authorization of funds in
this act does not constitute authority for the conduct of any
intelligence activity not otherwise authorized by the
Constitution or laws of the United States.
Section 303--Clarification of definition of intelligence community
under the National Security Act of 1947
Section 303 provides a technical clarification with respect
to designation of members of the Intelligence Community.
Section 304--Delegation of authority for travel on common carriers for
intelligence collection personnel
Section 304 permits the DNI to delegate authority to
approve certain travel on common carriers to the heads of
individual Intelligence Community elements.
Section 305--Retention and use of amounts paid as debts to elements of
the intelligence community
Section 305 authorizes intelligence community elements to
accept, retain, and use certain amounts received from private
parties as repayment of debts arising from negligent or willful
damage or misconduct, or repayment for default on the terms of
educational assistance.
Section 306--Availability of funds for travel and transportation of
personal effects, household goods, and automobiles
Section 306 permits DNI and CIA travel expenses to be
charged to the fiscal year in which travel begins, even if not
concluded in that year.
Section 307--Purchases by elements of the intelligence community of
products of Federal Prison Industries
Section 307 provides that intelligence community elements
must determine that a product or service to be purchased from
Federal Prison Industries best meets the needs of the Agency.
TITLE IV--MATTERS RELATING TO ELEMENTS OF THE INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY
Subtitle A--Office of the Director of National Intelligence
Section 401--Clarification of delegation of transfer or reprogramming
authority
Section 401 makes a technical clarification to the
Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act.
Section 402--Clarification of limitation of co-location of the Office
of the Director of National Intelligence
Section 402 clarifies that the prohibition on the co-
location of the DNI with any other intelligence community
element applies only to the co-location of the headquarters of
each.
Section 403--Additional duties for the DNI Director of Science and
Technology
Section 403 provides that the DNI Science and Technology
Committee shall prioritize research and development related to
intelligence (in addition to coordinating such research and
development), including identification of basic, applied, and
advanced research programs to be carried out by the
intelligence community. The DNI's Director of Science and
Technology is also directed to assist the DNI in establishing
goals for the elements of the intelligence community to meet
its technology needs. Section 403 further provides for a report
to Congress by the DNI containing a strategy for the
development and use of technology in the intelligence community
through 2021.
Section 404--Appointment and title of Chief Information Officer of the
Intelligence Community
Section 404 clarifies that the Chief Information Officer
for the DNI acts as the Chief Information Officer for the
Intelligence Community, and provides that the position shall be
directly appointed by the DNI.
Section 405--Leadership and location of certain offices and officials
Section 405 includes the Director of the National
Counterproliferation Center and the Director of the National
Counterterrorism Center in the list of officers within the
ODNI, and provides that the NCPC Director shall be appointed by
the DNI.
Section 406--Eligibility for incentive awards of personnel assigned to
the Office of the Director of National Intelligence
Section 406 permits the DNI to provide incentive awards to
federal employees and military personnel assigned to the Office
of the DNI.
Section 407--Repeal of certain authorities relating to the Office of
the National Counterintelligence Executive
Section 407 makes conforming changes to incorporate the
Office of the National Counterintelligence Executive into the
Office of the DNI.
Section 408--Membership of the Director of National Intelligence on the
Transportation Security Oversight Board
Section 408 adds the Director of National Intelligence to
the Transportation Security Oversight Board.
Section 409--Temporary inapplicability to the Office of the Director of
National Intelligence of certain financial reporting
requirements
Section 409 exempts the DNI from the legal requirement to
submit an audited financial statement for Fiscal Year 2005 or
2006 to facilitate transition to the DNI.
Section 410--Comprehensive inventory of special access programs
Section 410 requires the DNI to submit to the congressional
intelligence committees, by January 15, 2007, a classified
comprehensive inventory of special access programs conducted
within the National Intelligence Program.
Section 411--Sense of Congress on multi-level security clearances
Section 411 expresses the Sense of Congress that the DNI
should promptly examine the need for establishing and
overseeing the implementation of a multi-level security
clearance system across the intelligence community to leverage
the cultural and linguistic skills of subject matter experts
and individuals proficient in foreign languages critical to
national security.
Section 412--Access to information by staff and members of the
Congressional Intelligence Committees
Section 412 requires the DNI to provide members and staff
of the Congressional Intelligence Committees with access to the
JWICS computer network no later than 180 days after the date of
enactment.
Section 413--Study on revoking pensions of persons who commit
unauthorized disclosures of classified information
Section 412 requires the DNI to review whether current law
or administrative authorities enable the revocation of pensions
of persons who commit unauthorized disclosures of classified
information.
Subtitle B--Central Intelligence Agency
Section 421--Enhanced protection of Central Intelligence Agency sources
and methods from unauthorized disclosure
Section 421 restores the independent authority to the
Director of the CIA to protect intelligence sources and
methods.
Section 422--Additional exception to foreign language proficiency
requirement for certain senior level positions in the Central
Intelligence Agency
Section 422 ``grandfathers'' current Senior Intelligence
Service personnel from certain new language proficiency
requirements and permits waivers for individuals.
Section 423--Additional functions and authorities for protective
personnel of the Central Intelligence Agency
Section 423 permits the CIA to provide a protective detail
for the DNI and clarifies the arrest authorities of CIA
protective personnel.
Section 424--Protective services for former officials of the
intelligence community
Section 424 requires showing of a specific and credible
threat to continue protective services to former senior
intelligence community officials beginning one year after
departure from the government.
Section 425--Strategic review process
Section 425 provides that not later than September 30,
2007, the DNI shall, in consultation with the heads of the
elements of the intelligence community, manage and oversee the
conduct of a strategic review of the intelligence community to
develop intelligence capabilities required to address threats
to national security and shall include estimates of the
allocation of resources and structural change that should be
reflected in future budget requests.
Subtitle C--Defense Intelligence Components
Section 431--Enhancements of National Security Agency training program
Section 431 clarifies that employees failing to maintain
satisfactory academic performance in a contractually provided
educational course of training shall be liable for repayment in
lieu of any service obligation.
Section 432--Codification of authorities of National Security Agency
protective personnel
Section 432 clarifies the arrest authorities of NSA
protective personnel.
Subtitle D--Other Elements
Section 441--Clarification of inclusion of Coast Guard and Drug
Enforcement Administration elements in the Intelligence
Community
Section 441 formally includes the Coast Guard and Drug
Enforcement Administration in the list of Intelligence
Community agencies included in the National Security Act.
Section 442--Clarifying amendments relating to section 105 of the
Intelligence Authorization Act for fiscal year 2004
Section 442 makes a technical correction relating to the
DNI's authorities regarding intelligence activities at the
Department of the Treasury.
Title V--OTHER MATTERS
Section 501--Aerial reconnaissance platforms
Section 501 provides that the Secretary of Defense shall
conduct a study and certify the mission capability of the
Global Hawk RQ-4 platform prior to termination of the U-2
platform program.
Section 502--Elimination of certain reporting requirements
Section 502 eliminates certain reporting requirements that
are encompassed in other reports or no longer necessary.
Section 503--Technical amendments to the National Security Act of 1947
Section 503 makes technical amendments to the National
Security Act of 1947.
Section 504--Technical clarification of certain references to Joint
Military Intelligence Program and Tactical Intelligence and
Related Activities
Section 504 makes technical amendments clarifying
transition from the Joint Military Intelligence Program and
Tactical Intelligence and Related Activities to the Military
Intelligence Program.
Section 505--Technical amendments to the Intelligence Reform and
Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004
Section 505 makes technical amendments to the Intelligence
Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004.
Section 506--Technical amendments to the Central Intelligence Agency
Act of 1949
Section 506 makes technical amendments to the Central
Intelligence Agency Act of 1949.
Section 507--Technical amendments relating to the Multiyear National
Intelligence Program
Section 507 makes technical amendments to the Multiyear
National Intelligence Program.
Section 508--Technical amendments relating to the Executive Schedule
Section 508 makes technical amendments to the Executive
Schedule.
Section 509--Technical amendments relating to Redesignation of the
National Imagery and Mapping Agency as the National Geospatial-
Intelligence Agency
Section 509 makes technical amendments relating to
redesignation of the National Imagery and Mapping Agency as the
National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency.
Oversight Findings and Recommendations
With respect to clause 3(c)(1) of rule XIII of the Rules of
the House of Representatives, the Committee held three hearings
on the classified budgetary issues raised by H.R. 5020.
Testimony was taken from the Director of National Intelligence
and the Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence. Such
testimony related to the activities and plans of the
Intelligence Community covered by the provisions and
authorizations, both classified and unclassified, of the
`Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2007.' The
bill, as reported by the Committee, reflects conclusions
reached by the Committee in light of this oversight activity.
General Performance Goals and Objectives
In accordance with Clause (3)(c) of House rule XIII, the
Committee's performance goals and objectives are reflected in
the descriptive portions of this report.
Constitutional Authority Statement
The intelligence and intelligence-related activities of the
United States government are carried out to support the
national security interests of the United States, to support
and assist the armed forces of the United States, and to
support the President in the execution of the foreign policy of
the United States.
Article 1, section 8 of the Constitution of the United
States provides, in pertinent part, that ``Congress shall have
power * * * to pay the debts and provide for the common defence
and general welfare of the United States; * * *''; ``to raise
and support Armies, * * *'' ``to provide and maintain a Navy; *
* *'' and ``to make all laws which shall be necessary and
proper for carrying into execution * * * all other powers
vested by this Constitution in the Government of the United
States, or in any Department or Officer thereof.''
Unfunded Mandate Statement
Section 423 of the Congressional Budget and Impoundment
Control Act (as amended by Section 101(a)(2) of the Unfunded
Mandates Reform Act, P.L. 104-4) requires a statement of
whether the provisions of the reported bill include unfunded
mandates. In compliance with this requirement, the Committee
has received a letter from the Congressional Budget Office
included herein.
Budget Authority and Congressional Budget Office Cost Estimate
With respect to the requirements of clause 3(c)(2) of rule
XIII of the House of Representatives and section 308(a) of the
Congressional Budget Act of 1974 and with respect to
requirements of 3(c)(3) of rule XIII of the House of
Representatives and section 402 of the Congressional Budget Act
of 1974, the Committee has received the following cost estimate
for H.R. 5020 from the Director of the Congressional Budget
Office:
U.S. Congress,
Congressional Budget Office,
Washington, DC, April 6, 2006.
Hon. Peter Hoekstra,
Chairman, Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence,
House of Representatives, Washington, DC.
Dear Mr. Chairman: The Congressional Budget Office has
prepared the enclosed cost estimate for H.R. 5020, the
Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2007.
If you wish further details on this estimate, we will be
pleased to provide them. The CBO staff contact is Jason
Wheelock.
Sincerely,
Donald B. Marron,
Acting Director.
Enclosure.
H.R. 5020--Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2007
H.R. 5020 would authorize appropriations for fiscal year
2007 for intelligence activities of the U.S. government, the
Intelligence Community Management Account, and the Central
Intelligence Agency Retirement and Disability System (CIARDS).
This estimate addresses only the unclassified portion of
the bill. On that limited basis, CBO estimates that
implementing certain provisions of the bill would cost $550
million in 2007 and just under $1 billion over the 2007-2011
period, assuming appropriation of the necessary funds, as shown
in the following table.
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
By fiscal year, in millions of dollars--
--------------------------------------------
2007 2008 2009 2010 2011
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
CHANGES IN SPENDING SUBJECT TO APPROPRIATIONS \1\
Intelligence Community Management Account:
Authorization Level............................................ 990 0 0 0 0
Estimated Outlays.............................................. 545 347 69 20 9
CIARDS: \2\
Estimated Authorization Level.................................. 5 0 0 0 0
Estimated Outlays.............................................. 5 0 0 0 0
Total Changes:
Estimated Authorization Level.................................. 995 0 0 0 0
Estimated Outlays.............................................. 550 347 69 20 0
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ In addition to effects on spending subject to appropriation, H.R. 5020 would affect direct spending.
However, CBO cannot estimate those effects because the data needed to prepare an estimate are classified.
\2\ CBO's March 2006 baseline assumes a mandatory appropriation of $251 million in 2007 for CIARDS. H.R. 5020
would provide an authorization of $256 million for that year.
Section 104 would authorize the appropriation of $990
million for the Intelligence Community Management Account,
which provides the principal source of funding for the Office
of the Director of National Intelligence and provides resources
for coordination of programs, budget oversight, and management
of the intelligence agencies. CBO estimates that implementing
this provision would cost $545 million in 2007 and $980 million
over the 2007-2011 period, assuming appropriation of the
specified amounts.
Section 201 would authorize a mandatory appropriation of
$256 million to CIARDS to cover retirement costs attributable
to military service and various unfunded liabilities. This
authorization is above CBO's March 2006 baseline and would
increase outlays by $5 million in 2007 over that baseline,
assuming appropriation of the authorized amount.
Section 305 would authorize elements of the Intelligence
Community to accept and spend reimbursements from private
parties and employees of the Intelligence Community who damage
equipment purchased through appropriated funds or default on
the terms of any form of education assistance provided by such
elements. Since these reimbursements would otherwise be
returned to the Treasury, this section would affect direct
spending. However, CBO cannot provide an estimate as the data
necessary to estimate the impact of this provision are
classified.
The unclassified sections of this bill contain no
intergovernmental or private-sector mandates as defined in the
Unfunded Mandates Reform Act and would not affect the budgets
of state, local, or tribal governments.
The CBO staff contact for this estimate is Jason Wheelock.
This estimate was approved by Peter H. Fontaine, Deputy
Assistant Director for Budget Analysis.
Changes in Existing Law Made by the Bill, as Reported
In compliance with clause 3(e) of rule XIII of the Rules of
the House of Representatives, changes in existing law made by
the bill, as reported, are shown as follows (existing law
proposed to be omitted is enclosed in black brackets, new
matter is printed in italic, existing law in which no change is
proposed is shown in roman):
NATIONAL SECURITY ACT OF 1947
Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of
the United States of America in Congress assembled,
short title
That this Act may be cited as the ``National Security Act of
1947''.
TABLE OF CONTENTS
Sec. 2. Declaration of policy.
Title I--Coordination for National Security
* * * * * * *
[Sec. 114A. Annual report on improvement of financial statements for
auditing purposes.]
* * * * * * *
[Sec. 118. Semiannual report on financial intelligence on terrorist
assets.]
* * * * * * *
Title III--Miscellaneous
Sec. 301. National Security Agency voluntary separation.
[Sec. 301. Compensation of Secretaries.]
* * * * * * *
[Sec. 302. Under Secretaries and Assistant Secretaries.]
* * * * * * *
[Sec. 304. Status of transferred civilian personnel.
[Sec. 305. Saving provisions.
[Sec. 306. Transfer of funds.]
Sec. 304. Protective services for former officials of the intelligence
community.
* * * * * * *
TITLE XI--OTHER PROVISIONS
Sec. 1101. Applicability to United States intelligence activities of
Federal laws implementing international treaties and
agreements.
* * * * * * *
Sec. 1103. Retention and use of amounts paid as debts to elements of the
intelligence community.
* * * * * * *
DEFINITIONS
Sec. 3. As used in this Act:
(1) * * *
* * * * * * *
(4) The term ``intelligence community'' includes the
following:
(A) * * *
* * * * * * *
(H) The intelligence elements of the Army,
the Navy, the Air Force, the Marine Corps, the
Coast Guard, the Federal Bureau of
Investigation, the Drug Enforcement
Administration, and the Department of Energy.
* * * * * * *
(K) The elements of the Department of
Homeland Security concerned with the analysis
of intelligence information[, including the
Office of Intelligence of the Coast Guard].
(L) Such other elements of any [other]
department or agency as may be designated by
the President, or designated jointly by the
Director of National Intelligence and the head
of the department or agency concerned, as an
element of the intelligence community.
* * * * * * *
TITLE I--COORDINATION FOR NATIONAL SECURITY
* * * * * * *
RESPONSIBILITIES AND AUTHORITIES OF THE DIRECTOR OF NATIONAL
INTELLIGENCE
Sec. 102A. (a) * * *
* * * * * * *
(c) Budget Authorities.--(1) * * *
* * * * * * *
(3)(A) The Director of National Intelligence shall
participate in the development by the Secretary of Defense of
the [annual budgets for the Joint Military Intelligence Program
and for Tactical Intelligence and Related Activities] annual
budget for the Military Intelligence Program or any successor
program or programs.
* * * * * * *
(7)(A) The Director of National Intelligence shall provide a
semi-annual report, beginning April 1, 2005, and ending April
1, 2007, to the President and the Congress regarding
implementation of this [section] subsection.
* * * * * * *
(d) Role of Director of National Intelligence in Transfer and
Reprogramming of Funds.--(1)(A) * * *
(B) The Secretary of Defense shall consult with the Director
of National Intelligence before transferring or reprogramming
funds made available under the [Joint Military Intelligence
Program] Military Intelligence Program or any successor program
or programs.
* * * * * * *
(3) The Director of National Intelligence may only transfer
or reprogram funds referred to in [subparagraph (A)] paragraph
(1)(A)--
(A) * * *
* * * * * * *
(5)(A) A transfer or reprogramming of funds [or personnel]
may be made under this subsection only if--
(i) * * *
* * * * * * *
(B) A transfer or reprogramming may be made without regard to
a limitation set forth in clause (iv) or (v) of subparagraph
(A) if the transfer has the concurrence of the head of the
department involved or the Director of the Central Intelligence
Agency (in the case of the Central Intelligence Agency). The
authority to provide such concurrence may only be delegated by
the head of the department [or agency involved] involved or the
Director of the Central Intelligence Agency (in the case of the
Central Intelligence Agency) to the deputy of such officer.
* * * * * * *
(f) Tasking and Other Authorities.--(1) * * *
* * * * * * *
(9) Not later than September 30, 2007, and every four years
thereafter, the Director of National Intelligence shall, in
consultation with the heads of the elements of the intelligence
community, manage and oversee the conduct of a strategic review
of the intelligence community to develop intelligence
capabilities required to address threats to national security.
Such review shall analyze near-term, mid-term, and future
threats to national security and shall include estimates of the
allocation of resources and structural change that should be
reflected in future budget requests.
* * * * * * *
(l) Enhanced Personnel Management.--(1) * * *
(2)(A) * * *
(B) The Director may prescribe regulations to carry out this
[section] paragraph.
* * * * * * *
OFFICE OF THE DIRECTOR OF NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE
Sec. 103. (a) * * *
* * * * * * *
(c) Composition.--The Office of the Director of National
Intelligence is composed of the following:
(1) * * *
* * * * * * *
(9) The Chief Information Officer of the intelligence
community.
(10) The Inspector General of the intelligence
community.
(11) The Director of the National Counterterrorism
Center.
(12) The Director of the National Counter
Proliferation Center.
[(9)] (13) Such other offices and officials as may be
established by law or the Director may establish or
designate in the Office, including national
intelligence centers.
* * * * * * *
(e) Limitation on Co-Location [With] of Headquarters With
Headquarters of Other Elements of Intelligence Community.--
Commencing as of October 1, 2008, the headquarters of the
Office of the Director of National Intelligence may not be co-
located with [any other element] the headquarters of any other
element of the intelligence community.
* * * * * * *
DIRECTOR OF SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY
Sec. 103E. (a) * * *
* * * * * * *
(c) Duties.--The Director of Science and Technology shall--
(1) * * *
* * * * * * *
(4) assist the Director on the science and technology
elements of the budget of the Office of the Director of
National Intelligence; [and]
(5) assist the Director in establishing goals for the
elements of the intelligence community to meet the
technology needs of the intelligence community; and
[(5)] (6) perform other such duties as may be
prescribed by the Director of National Intelligence or
specified by law.
(d) Director of National Intelligence Science and Technology
Committee.--(1) * * *
* * * * * * *
(3) The Committee shall--
(A) coordinate and prioritize advances in research
and development related to intelligence; and
* * * * * * *
(4) In carrying out paragraph (3)(A), the Committee shall
identify basic, advanced, and applied research programs to be
carried out by elements of the intelligence community.
* * * * * * *
(e) Goals for Technology Needs of Intelligence Community.--In
carrying out subsection (c)(5), the Director of Science and
Technology shall--
(1) systematically identify and assess the most
significant intelligence challenges that require
technical solutions; and
(2) examine options to enhance the responsiveness of
research and design programs of elements of the
intelligence community to meet the requirements of the
intelligence community for timely support.
* * * * * * *
CHIEF INFORMATION OFFICER
Sec. 103G. (a) Chief Information Officer.--To assist the
Director of National Intelligence in carrying out the
responsibilities of the Director under this Act and other
applicable provisions of law, there shall be within the Office
of the Director of National Intelligence a Chief Information
Officer of the Intelligence Community who shall be appointed by
[the President, by and with the advice and consent of the
Senate] the Director of National Intelligence.
(b) Chief Information Officer of Intelligence Community.--The
Chief Information Officer of the Intelligence Community shall
serve as the chief information officer of the intelligence
community.
(c) Duties and Responsibilities.--Subject to the direction of
the Director of National Intelligence, the Chief Information
Officer of the Intelligence Community shall--
(1) * * *
* * * * * * *
(d) Prohibition on Simultaneous Service as Other Chief
Information Officer.--An individual serving in the position of
Chief Information Officer of the Intelligence Community may
not, while so serving, serve as the chief information officer
of any other department or agency, or component thereof, of the
United States Government.
* * * * * * *
DIRECTOR OF THE CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
Sec. 104A. (a) * * *
* * * * * * *
(d) Responsibilities.--The Director of the Central
Intelligence Agency shall--
(1) * * *
* * * * * * *
(3) provide overall direction for and coordination of
the collection of national intelligence outside the
United States through human sources by elements of the
intelligence community authorized to undertake such
collection and, in coordination with other departments,
agencies, or elements of the United States Government
which are authorized to undertake such collection,
ensure that the most effective use is made of resources
and that appropriate account is taken of the risks to
the United States and those involved in such
collection; [and]
(4) protect intelligence sources and methods of the
Central Intelligence Agency from unauthorized
disclosure, consistent with any direction issued by the
President or the Director of National Intelligence; and
[(4)] (5) perform such other functions and duties
related to intelligence affecting the national security
as the President or the Director of National
Intelligence may direct.
* * * * * * *
(g) Foreign Language Proficiency for Certain Senior Level
Positions in Central Intelligence Agency.--(1) Except as
provided pursuant to [paragraph (2)] paragraphs (2) and (3), an
individual may not be appointed to a position in the Senior
Intelligence Service in the Directorate of Intelligence or the
Directorate of Operations of the Central Intelligence Agency
unless the Director of the Central Intelligence Agency
determines that the individual--
(A) * * *
* * * * * * *
(2) The Director of the Central Intelligence Agency may, in
the discretion of the Director, waive the application of
paragraph (1) to any [position or category of positions]
individual, individuals, position, or category of positions
otherwise covered by that paragraph if the Director determines
that foreign language proficiency is not necessary for the
successful performance of the duties and responsibilities of
such [position or category of positions] individual,
individuals, position, or category of positions.
(3) Paragraph (1) shall not apply to any individual in the
Directorate of Intelligence or the Directorate of Operations of
the Central Intelligence Agency who is serving in a Senior
Intelligence Service position as of December 23, 2005,
regardless of whether such individual is a member of the Senior
Intelligence Service.
* * * * * * *
RESTRICTIONS ON INTELLIGENCE SHARING WITH THE UNITED NATIONS
Sec. 112. (a) * * *
[(b) Annual and Special Reports.--(1) The President shall
report annually to the appropriate committees of Congress on
the types and volume of intelligence provided to the United
Nations and the purposes for which it was provided during the
period covered by the report. The President shall also report
to the appropriate committees of Congress within 15 days after
it has become known to the United States Government that there
has been an unauthorized disclosure of intelligence provided by
the United States to the United Nations.
[(2) The requirement for periodic reports under the first
sentence of paragraph (1) shall not apply to the provision of
intelligence that is provided only to, and for the use of,
appropriately cleared United States Government personnel
serving with the United Nations.
[(3) In the case of the annual reports required to be
submitted under the first sentence of paragraph (1) to the
congressional intelligence committees, the submittal dates for
such reports shall be as provided in section 507.]
* * * * * * *
[ANNUAL REPORT ON IMPROVEMENT OF FINANCIAL STATEMENTS FOR AUDITING
PURPOSES
[Sec. 114A. Not later each year than the date provided in
section 507, the Director of National Intelligence, the
Director of the Central Intelligence Agency, the Director of
the National Security Agency, the Director of the Defense
Intelligence Agency, and the Director of the National Imagery
and Mapping Agency shall each submit to the congressional
intelligence committees a report describing the activities
being undertaken by such official to ensure that the financial
statements of such agency can be audited in accordance with
applicable law and requirements of the Office of Management and
Budget.]
* * * * * * *
TRAVEL ON ANY COMMON CARRIER FOR CERTAIN INTELLIGENCE COLLECTION
PERSONNEL
Sec. 116. (a) * * *
(b) Authorized Delegation of Duty.--(1) The Director of
National Intelligence [may only delegate the authority granted
by this section to the Principal Deputy Director of National
Intelligence, or with respect to employees of the Central
Intelligence Agency, to the Director of the Central
Intelligence Agency.] may delegate the authority in subsection
(a) to the head of any other element of the intelligence
community.
(2) The head of an element of the intelligence community to
whom the authority in subsection (a) is delegated pursuant to
paragraph (1) may further delegate such authority to such
senior officials of such element as are specified in guidelines
prescribed by the Director of National Intelligence for
purposes of this paragraph.
* * * * * * *
[SEMIANNUAL REPORT ON FINANCIAL INTELLIGENCE ON TERRORIST ASSETS
[Sec. 118. (a) Semiannual Report.--On a semiannual basis, the
Secretary of the Treasury (acting through the head of the
Office of Intelligence Support) shall submit a report to the
appropriate congressional committees that fully informs the
committees concerning operations against terrorist financial
networks. Each such report shall include with respect to the
preceding six-month period--
[(1) the total number of asset seizures,
designations, and other actions against individuals or
entities found to have engaged in financial support of
terrorism;
[(2) the total number of applications for asset
seizure and designations of individuals or entities
suspected of having engaged in financial support of
terrorist activities that were granted, modified, or
denied;
[(3) the total number of physical searches of
offices, residences, or financial records of
individuals or entities suspected of having engaged in
financial support for terrorist activity; and
[(4) whether the financial intelligence information
seized in these cases has been shared on a full and
timely basis with the all departments, agencies, and
other entities of the United States Government involved
in intelligence activities participating in the Foreign
Terrorist Asset Tracking Center.
[(b) Immediate Notification for Emergency Designation.--In
the case of a designation of an individual or entity, or the
assets of an individual or entity, as having been found to have
engaged in terrorist activities, the Secretary of the Treasury
shall report such designation within 24 hours of such a
designation to the appropriate congressional committees.
[(c) Submittal Date of Reports to Congressional Intelligence
Committees.--In the case of the reports required to be
submitted under subsection (a) to the congressional
intelligence committees, the submittal dates for such reports
shall be as provided in section 507.
[(d) Appropriate Congressional Committees Defined.--In this
section, the term ``appropriate congressional committees''
means the following:
[(1) The Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence,
the Committee on Appropriations, and the Committee on
Financial Services of the House of Representatives.
[(2) The Select Committee on Intelligence, the
Committee on Appropriations, and the Committee on
Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs of the Senate.]
NATIONAL COUNTERTERRORISM CENTER
Sec. 119. (a) * * *
* * * * * * *
(c) Reporting.--(1) * * *
(2) The matters described in this paragraph are as follows:
(A) * * *
(B) The activities of the Directorate of Intelligence
of the National Counterterrorism Center under
subsection [(h)] (i).
* * * * * * *
NATIONAL COUNTER PROLIFERATION CENTER
Sec. 119A. (a) [Establishment.--Not later than 18 months
after the date of the enactment of the National Security
Intelligence Reform Act of 2004, the] (1) Establishment.--The
President shall establish a National Counter Proliferation
Center, taking into account all appropriate government tools to
prevent and halt the proliferation of weapons of mass
destruction, their delivery systems, and related materials and
technologies.
(2) Director.--The head of the National Counter Proliferation
Center shall be the Director of the National Counter
Proliferation Center, who shall be appointed by the Director of
National Intelligence.
(3) Location.--The National Counter Proliferation Center
shall be located within the Office of the Director of National
Intelligence.
* * * * * * *
TITLE III--MISCELLANEOUS
* * * * * * *
PROTECTIVE SERVICES FOR FORMER OFFICIALS OF THE INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY
Sec. 304. (a) In General.--Subject to subsection (b), the
head of an element of the intelligence community may not
provide personnel for the protection of a former official of an
element of the intelligence community unless--
(1) there is a specific and credible threat to such former
official arising from the service of such former official to
the United States; and
(2) such head of an element of the intelligence community
submits to the Director of National Intelligence notice of the
intention to provide such personnel and an assessment of--
(A) the threat to such former official; and
(B) the level of protective services necessary to
protect such former official based on such threat.
(b) Exception for Recent Termination of Employment.--The head
of an element of the intelligence community may provide
personnel for the protection of a former official of an element
of the intelligence community without a specific and credible
threat to such former official for not more than one year after
the termination of the employment of such former official if
such former official requests such protection.
(c) Threat Assessment Updates.--Not later than 180 days after
the date on which the head of an element of the intelligence
community begins providing personnel for the protection of a
former official of an element of the intelligence community,
and at least every 180 days thereafter until such head of an
element of the intelligence community determines that there is
no longer a threat to such former official, such head of an
element of the intelligence community shall submit to the
Director of National Intelligence an updated assessment of the
threat to such former official and the level of protective
services necessary to protect such former official based on
such threat.
(d) Termination of Protective Services.--If the head of an
element of the intelligence community that is providing
personnel for the protection of a former official of an element
of the intelligence community pursuant to subsection (a)
determines that there is no longer a threat to such former
official, such head of an element of the intelligence community
shall cease providing personnel for the protection of such
former official not later than 30 days after determining such
threat no longer exists.
(e) Report.--Not later than 7 days after the date on which
the head of an element of the intelligence community begins
providing personnel for the protection of a former official of
an element of the intelligence community, the Director of
National Intelligence shall submit to the congressional
intelligence committees notice of the provision of personnel
for the protection of such former official.
* * * * * * *
TITLE XI--ADDITIONAL MISCELLANEOUS PROVISIONS
* * * * * * *
RETENTION AND USE OF AMOUNTS PAID AS DEBTS TO ELEMENTS OF THE
INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY
Sec. 1103. (a) Authority to Retain Amounts Paid.--
Notwithstanding section 3302 of title 31, United States Code,
or any other provision of law, the head of an element of the
intelligence community may retain amounts paid or reimbursed to
the United States, including amounts paid by an employee of the
Federal Government from personal funds, for repayment of a debt
owed to the element of the intelligence community.
(b) Crediting of Amounts Retained.--(1) Amounts retained
under subsection (a) shall be credited to the current
appropriation or account from which such funds were derived or
whose expenditure formed the basis for the underlying activity
from which the debt concerned arose.
(2) Amounts credited to an appropriation or account under
paragraph (1) shall be merged with amounts in such
appropriation or account, and shall be available in accordance
with subsection (c).
(c) Availability of Amounts.--Amounts credited to an
appropriation or account under subsection (b) with respect to a
debt owed to an element of the intelligence community shall be
available to the head of such element, for such time as is
applicable to amounts in such appropriation or account, or such
longer time as may be provided by law, for purposes as follows:
(1) In the case of a debt arising from lost or
damaged property of such element, the repair of such
property or the replacement of such property with
alternative property that will perform the same or
similar functions as such property.
(2) The funding of any other activities authorized to
be funded by such appropriation or account.
(d) Debt Owed to an Element of the Intelligence Community
Defined.--In this section, the term ``debt owed to an element
of the intelligence community'' means any of the following:
(1) A debt owed to an element of the intelligence
community by an employee or former employee of such
element for the negligent or willful loss of or damage
to property of such element that was procured by such
element using appropriated funds.
(2) A debt owed to an element of the intelligence
community by an employee or former employee of such
element as repayment for default on the terms and
conditions associated with a scholarship, fellowship,
or other educational assistance provided to such
individual by such element, whether in exchange for
future services or otherwise, using appropriated funds.
(3) Any other debt or repayment owed to an element of
the intelligence community by a private person or
entity by reason of the negligent or willful action of
such person or entity, as determined by a court of
competent jurisdiction or in a lawful administrative
proceeding.
* * * * * * *
----------
INTELLIGENCE AUTHORIZATION ACT OF FISCAL YEAR 2004
* * * * * * *
TITLE I--INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES
* * * * * * *
SEC. 105. OFFICE OF INTELLIGENCE AND ANALYSIS OF THE DEPARTMENT OF THE
TREASURY.
(a) * * *
(b) Construction of Authority.--Nothing in section 311 of
title 31, United States Code (as amended by subsection (a)), or
in section 313 of such title, shall be construed to alter the
authorities and responsibilities of the [Director of Central
Intelligence] Director of National Intelligence with respect to
the Office of Intelligence and Analysis of the Department of
the Treasury as an element of the intelligence community.
* * * * * * *
TITLE IV--CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
* * * * * * *
SEC. 404. PURCHASES BY CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY OF PRODUCTS OF
FEDERAL PRISON INDUSTRIES.
Notwithstanding section 4124 of title 18, United States Code,
purchases [by the Central Intelligence Agency] by an element of
the intelligence community (as defined in section 3(4) of the
National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 401a(4))) from Federal
Prison Industries shall be made only if [the Director of the
Central Intelligence Agency determines that the product or
service] the head of that element determines that the product
or service (including a surveying or mapping service) to be
purchased from Federal Prison Industries best meets the needs
of the Agency.
* * * * * * *
----------
SECTION 402 OF THE INTELLIGENCE AUTHORIZATION ACT FOR FISCAL YEAR 1984
eligibility for incentive awards
Sec. 402. [(a) The Director of Central Intelligence may
exercise the authority granted in section 4503 of title 5,
United States Code, with respect to Federal employees and
members of the Armed Forces detailed or assigned to the Central
Intelligence Agency or to the Intelligence Community Staff, in
the same manner as such authority may be exercised with respect
to the personnel of the Central Intelligence Agency and the
Intelligence Community Staff.]
(a) Authority for Payment of Awards.--(1) The Director of
National Intelligence may exercise the authority granted in
section 4503 of title 5, United States Code, with respect to
Federal employees and members of the Armed Forces detailed or
assigned to the Office of the Director of National Intelligence
in the same manner as such authority may be exercised with
respect to personnel of the Office.
(2) The Director of the Central Intelligence Agency may
exercise the authority granted in section 4503 of title 5,
United States Code, with respect to Federal employees and
members of the Armed Forces detailed or assigned to the Central
Intelligence Agency in the same manner as such authority may be
exercised with respect to personnel of the Agency.
(b) Personnel Eligible for Awards.--The authority granted by
[subsection (a) of this section] subsection (a) may be
exercised with respect to Federal employees or members of the
Armed Forces detailed or assigned [to the Central Intelligence
Agency or to the Intelligence Community Staff] to the Office of
the Director of National Intelligence or to the Central
Intelligence Agency on or after [a date five years before the
date of enactment of this section] December 9, 1978.
[(c) During fiscal year 1987, the Director of Central
Intelligence may exercise the authority granted in section
4503(2) of title 5, United States Code, with respect to members
of the Armed Forces who are assigned to foreign intelligence
duties at the time of the conduct which gives rise to the
exercise of such authority.]
[(d)] (c) Payment and Acceptance of Awards.--An award made by
the [Director of Central Intelligence] Director of National
Intelligence or Director of the Central Intelligence Agency to
an employee or member of the Armed Forces under the authority
of section 4503 of title 5, United States Code, or this section
may be paid and accepted notwithstanding--
(1) * * *
* * * * * * *
----------
SECTION 904 OF THE COUNTERINTELLIGENCE ENHANCEMENT ACT OF 2002
SEC. 904. OFFICE OF THE NATIONAL COUNTERINTELLIGENCE EXECUTIVE.
(a) * * *
* * * * * * *
[(d) General Counsel.--(1) There shall be in the Office of
the National Counterintelligence Executive a general counsel
who shall serve as principal legal advisor to the National
Counterintelligence Executive.
[(2) The general counsel shall--
[(A) provide legal advice and counsel to the
Executive on matters relating to functions of the
Office;
[(B) ensure that the Office complies with all
applicable laws, regulations, Executive orders, and
guidelines; and
[(C) carry out such other duties as the Executive may
specify.]
[(e)] (d) Functions.--Subject to the direction and control of
the National Counterintelligence Executive, the functions of
the Office of the National Counterintelligence Executive shall
be as follows:
(1) National threat identification and prioritization
assessment.--Subject to subsection [(f)] (e), in
consultation with appropriate department and agencies
of the United States Government, and private sector
entities, to produce on an annual basis a strategic
planning assessment of the counterintelligence
requirements of the United States to be known as the
National Threat Identification and Prioritization
Assessment.
(2) National counterintelligence strategy.--Subject
to subsection [(f)] (e), in consultation with
appropriate department and agencies of the United
States Government, and private sector entities, and
based on the most current National Threat
Identification and Prioritization Assessment under
paragraph (1), to produce on an annual basis a strategy
for the counterintelligence programs and activities of
the United States Government to be known as the
National Counterintelligence Strategy.
* * * * * * *
[(f)] (e) Additional Requirements Regarding National Threat
Identification and Prioritization Assessment and National
Counterintelligence Strategy.--(1) * * *
(2) A National Counterintelligence Strategy under subsection
[(e)(2)] (d)(2), and any modification of such strategy, shall
not go into effect until approved by the President.
* * * * * * *
[(g) Personnel.--(1) Personnel of the Office of the National
Counterintelligence Executive may consist of personnel employed
by the Office or personnel on detail from any other department,
agency, or element of the Federal Government. Any such detail
may be on a reimbursable or nonreimbursable basis, at the
election of the head of the agency detailing such personnel.
[(2) Notwithstanding section 104(d) or any other provision of
law limiting the period of the detail of personnel on a
nonreimbursable basis, the detail of an officer or employee of
United States or a member of the Armed Forces under paragraph
(1) on a nonreimbursable basis may be for any period in excess
of one year that the National Counterintelligence Executive and
the head of the department, agency, or element concerned
consider appropriate.
[(3) The employment of personnel by the Office, including the
appointment, compensation and benefits, management, and
separation of such personnel, shall be governed by the
provisions of law on such matters with respect to the personnel
of the Central Intelligence Agency, except that, for purposes
of the applicability of such provisions of law to personnel of
the Office, the National Counterintelligence Executive shall be
treated as the head of the Office.
[(4) Positions in the Office shall be excepted service
positions for purposes of title 5, United States Code.
[(h) Support.--(1) The Attorney General, Secretary of
Defense, and Director of National Intelligence may each provide
the Office of the National Counterintelligence Executive such
support as may be necessary to permit the Office to carry out
its functions under this section.
[(2) Subject to any terms and conditions specified by the
Director of National Intelligence, the Director may provide
administrative and contract support to the Office as if the
Office were an element of the Central Intelligence Agency.
[(3) Support provided under this subsection may be provided
on a reimbursable or nonreimbursable basis, at the election of
the official providing such support.
[(i) Availability of Funds for Reimbursement.--The National
Counterintelligence Executive may, from amounts available for
the Office, transfer to a department or agency detailing
personnel under subsection (g), or providing support under
subsection (h), on a reimbursable basis amounts appropriate to
reimburse such department or agency for the detail of such
personnel or the provision of such support, as the case may be.
[(j) Contracts.--(1) Subject to paragraph (2), the National
Counterintelligence Executive may enter into any contract,
lease, cooperative agreement, or other transaction that the
Executive considers appropriate to carry out the functions of
the Office of the National Counterintelligence Executive under
this section.
[(2) The authority under paragraph (1) to enter into
contracts, leases, cooperative agreements, and other
transactions shall be subject to any terms, conditions, and
limitations applicable to the Central Intelligence Agency under
law with respect to similar contracts, leases, cooperative
agreements, and other transactions.]
[(k)] (f) Treatment of Activities Under Certain
Administrative Laws.--The files of the Office shall be treated
as operational files of the Central Intelligence Agency for
purposes of section 701 of the National Security Act of 1947
(50 U.S.C. 431) to the extent such files meet criteria under
subsection (b) of that section for treatment of files as
operational files of an element of the Agency.
[(l)] (g) Oversight by Congress.--The location of the Office
of the National Counterintelligence Executive within the Office
of the Director of National Intelligence shall not be construed
as affecting access by Congress, or any committee of Congress,
to--
(1) * * *
* * * * * * *
[(m)] (h) Construction.--Nothing in this section shall be
construed as affecting the authority of the Director of
National Intelligence, the Secretary of Defense, the Secretary
of State, the Attorney General, or the Director of the Federal
Bureau of Investigation as provided or specified under the
National Security Act of 1947 or under other provisions of law.
----------
SECTION 115 OF TITLE 49, UNITED STATES CODE
Sec. 115. Transportation Security Oversight Board
(a) * * *
(b) Membership.--
(1) Number and appointment.--The Board shall be
composed of 7 members as follows:
(A) * * *
* * * * * * *
[(F) The Director of the Central Intelligence
Agency, or the Director's designee.]
(F) The Director of National Intelligence, or
the Director's designee.
* * * * * * *
----------
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY ACT OF 1949
* * * * * * *
general authorities
Sec. 5. (a) In General.--In the performance of its functions,
the Central Intelligence Agency is authorized to--
(1) Transfer to and receive from other Government agencies
such sums as may be approved by the Office of Management and
Budget, for the performance of any of the functions or
activities [authorized under paragraphs (2) and (3) of section
102(a), subsections (c)(7) and (d) of section 103, subsections
(a) and (g) of section 104, and section 303 of the National
Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 403(a)(2), (3), 403-3(c)(7),
(d), 403-4(a), (g), and 405)] authorized under subsections (c),
(d), (e), and (f) of section 104A of the National Security Act
of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 403-4a), and any other Government agency is
authorized to transfer to or receive from the Agency such sums
without regard to any provisions of law limiting or prohibiting
transfers between appropriations. Sums transferred to the
Agency in accordance with this paragraph may be expended for
the purposes and under the authority of this Act without regard
to limitations of appropriations from which transferred;
* * * * * * *
(4) Authorize personnel designated by the Director to carry
firearms to the extent necessary for the performance of the
Agency's authorized functions, except that, within the United
States, such authority shall be limited to the purposes of
protection of classified materials and information, the
training of Agency personnel and other authorized persons in
the use of firearms, the protection of Agency installations and
property, [and the protection] the protection of current and
former Agency personnel and their immediate families, defectors
and their immediate families, and other persons in the United
States under Agency auspices[;], and the protection of the
Director of National Intelligence and such personnel of the
Office of the Director of National Intelligence as the Director
of National Intelligence may designate;
* * * * * * *
Sec. 6. In the interests of the security of the foreign
intelligence activities of the United States and in order
further to implement [section 102A(i) of the National Security
Act of 1947 that the Director of National Intelligence shall be
responsible for protecting intelligence sources and methods
from unauthorized disclosure] sections 102A(i) and 104A(d)(4)
of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 403-1(i), 403-
4a(d)(4)), the Agency shall be exempted from the provisions of
sections 1 and 2, chapter 795 of the Act of August 28, 1935 (49
Stat. 956, 957; 5 U.S.C. 654), and the provisions of any other
laws which require the publication or disclosure of the
organization, functions, names, official titles, salaries, or
numbers of personnel employed by the Agency: Provided, That in
furtherance of this section, the Director of the Office of
Management and Budget shall make no reports to the Congress in
connection with the Agency under section 607, title VI, chapter
212 of the Act of June 30, 1945, as amended (5 U.S.C. 947(b)).
* * * * * * *
----------
SECTION 201 OF THE CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY RETIREMENT ACT
SEC. 201. THE CIARDS SYSTEM.
(a) * * *
* * * * * * *
(c) Finality of Decisions [of DCI].--In the interests of the
security of the foreign intelligence activities of the United
States and in order further to implement [section 102A(i)]
sections 102A(i) and 104A(d)(4) of the National Security Act of
1947 (50 U.S.C. 403-3(c)(1)) that the Director [of National
Intelligence] shall be responsible for protecting intelligence
sources and methods of the Central Intelligence Agency from
unauthorized disclosure, and notwithstanding the provisions of
chapter 7 of title 5, United States Code, or any other
provision of law (except section 305(b) of this Act), any
determination by the Director authorized by this Act shall be
final and conclusive and shall not be subject to review by any
court.
----------
SECTION 611 OF THE INTELLIGENCE AUTHORIZATION ACT FOR FISCAL YEAR 2005
SEC. 611. FOREIGN LANGUAGE PROFICIENCY FOR CERTAIN SENIOR LEVEL
POSITIONS IN THE CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY.
(a) * * *
* * * * * * *
(c) Report on Waivers.--The Director of the Central
Intelligence Agency shall submit to Congress a report that
identifies individuals or positions within the Senior
Intelligence Service in the Directorate of Intelligence or the
Directorate of Operations of the Central Intelligence Agency
that are determined by the Director to require waiver from the
requirements of section 104A(g) of the National Security Act of
1947, as added by subsection (a). The report shall include a
rationale for any waiver granted under section 104A(g)(2), as
so added, for each [position or category of positions]
individual, individuals, position, or category of positions so
identified.
----------
CHAPTER 203 OF TITLE 18, UNITED STATES CODE
CHAPTER 203--ARREST AND COMMITMENT
Sec.
3041. Power of courts and magistrates.
* * * * * * *
3064. Powers of Federal Motor Carrier Safety Administration.
3065. Powers of authorized personnel in the Central Intelligence
Agency.
3066. Powers of authorized personnel in the National Security Agency.
* * * * * * *
Sec. 3065. Powers of authorized personnel in the Central Intelligence
Agency
(a) The Director of the Central Intelligence Agency may issue
regulations to allow personnel designated to carry out
protective functions for the Central Intelligence Agency under
section 5(a)(4) of the Central Intelligence Agency Act of 1949
(50 U.S.C. 403f) to, while engaged in such protective
functions, make arrests without a warrant for any offense
against the United States committed in the presence of such
personnel, or for any felony cognizable under the laws of the
United States, if such personnel have probable cause to believe
that the person to be arrested has committed or is committing
that felony offense.
(b) The powers granted under subsection (a) may be exercised
only in accordance with guidelines approved by the Attorney
General.
Sec. 3066. Powers of authorized personnel in the National Security
Agency
(a) The Director of the National Security Agency may issue
regulations to allow personnel designated to carry out
protective functions for the Agency to--
(1) carry firearms; and
(2) make arrests without warrant for any offense
against the United States committed in the presence of
such personnel, or for any felony cognizable under the
laws of the United States, if such personnel have
probable cause to believe that the person to be
arrested has committed or is committing that felony
offense.
(b) The powers granted under subsection (a) may be exercised
only in accordance with guidelines approved by the Attorney
General.
----------
NATIONAL SECURITY AGENCY ACT OF 1959
* * * * * * *
Sec. 16. (a) * * *
* * * * * * *
(d)(1) To be eligible for assignment under subsection (b), an
employee of the Agency must agree in writing--
(A) * * *
* * * * * * *
(C) to reimburse the United States for the total cost
of education (excluding the employee's pay and
allowances) provided under this section to the employee
if, prior to the employee's completing the educational
course of training for which the employee is assigned,
the assignment or the employee's employment with the
Agency is [terminated either by the Agency due to
misconduct by the employee or by the employee
voluntarily; and] terminated--
(i) by the Agency due to misconduct by the
employee;
(ii) by the employee voluntarily; or
(iii) by the Agency for the failure of the
employee to maintain such level of academic
standing in the educational course of training
as the Director of the National Security Agency
shall have specified in the agreement of the
employee under this subsection; and
* * * * * * *
(e)[(1) When an employee is assigned under this section to an
institution, the Agency shall disclose to the institution to
which the employee is assigned that the Agency employs the
employee and that the Agency funds the employee's education.]
[(2) Agency efforts] Agency efforts to recruit individuals at
educational institutions for participation in the undergraduate
training program established by this section shall be made
openly and according to the common practices of universities
and employers recruiting at such institutions.
* * * * * * *
Sec. 20. (a) The Director is authorized to designate
personnel of the Agency to perform protective functions for the
Director and for any personnel of the Agency designated by the
Director.
(b) Nothing in this section shall be construed to impair or
otherwise affect any authority under any other provision of law
relating to the performance of protective functions.
----------
INTELLIGENCE AUTHORIZATION ACT FOR FISCAL YEAR 2003
SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE; TABLE OF CONTENTS.
(a) Short Title.--This Act may be cited as the ``Intelligence
Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2003''.
(b) Table of Contents.--The table of contents for this Act is
as follows:
Sec. 1. Short title; table of contents.
TITLE VIII--REPORTING REQUIREMENTS
* * * * * * *
Subtitle C--Recurring Annual Reports
Sec. 821. Annual report on threat of attack on the United States using
weapons of mass destruction.
* * * * * * *
[Sec. 826. Annual report on counterdrug intelligence matters.]
* * * * * * *
TITLE VIII--REPORTING REQUIREMENTS
* * * * * * *
Subtitle C--Recurring Annual Reports
* * * * * * *
[SEC. 826. ANNUAL REPORT ON COUNTERDRUG INTELLIGENCE MATTERS.
[(a) Annual Report.--The Counterdrug Intelligence
Coordinating Group shall submit to the appropriate committees
of Congress each year a report on current counterdrug
intelligence matters. The report shall include the
recommendations of the Counterdrug Intelligence Coordinating
Group on the appropriate number of permanent staff, and of
detailed personnel, for the staff of the Counterdrug
Intelligence Executive Secretariat.
[(b) Submittal Date.--The date of the submittal each year of
the report required by subsection (a) shall be the date
provided in section 507 of the National Security Act of 1947,
as added by section 811 of this Act.
[(c) Appropriate Committees of Congress Defined.--In this
section, the term ``appropriate committees of Congress''
means--
[(1) the Committees on Appropriations of the Senate
and House of Representatives; and
[(2) the congressional intelligence committees (as
defined in section 3 of the National Security Act of
1947 (50 U.S.C. 401a)).]
* * * * * * *
----------
INTELLIGENCE REFORM AND TERRORISM PREVENTION ACT OF 2004
* * * * * * *
TITLE I--REFORM OF THE INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY
* * * * * * *
Subtitle A--Establishment of Director of National Intelligence
* * * * * * *
SEC. 1016. INFORMATION SHARING.
(a) * * *
* * * * * * *
(e) Implementation Plan Report.--Not later than one year
after the date of the enactment of this Act, the President
shall, with the assistance of the program manager, submit to
Congress a report containing an implementation plan for the
ISE. The report shall include the following:
(1) * * *
* * * * * * *
(10) A delineation of the roles of the Federal
departments and agencies that will participate in the
ISE, including an identification of the agencies that
will deliver the infrastructure needed to operate and
manage the ISE (as distinct from individual department
or agency components that are part of the ISE), with
such delineation of roles to be consistent with--
(A) * * *
(B) the authority of the Secretary of
Homeland Security and the Attorney General, and
the role of the Department of Homeland Security
and the [Attorney General] Department of
Justice, in coordinating with State, local, and
tribal officials and the private sector.
* * * * * * *
Subtitle F--Privacy and Civil Liberties
SEC. 1061. PRIVACY AND CIVIL LIBERTIES OVERSIGHT BOARD.
(a) * * *
* * * * * * *
(d) Access to Information.--
(1) * * *
* * * * * * *
(4) Exceptions for national security.--
(A) In general.--If the [National
Intelligence Director] Director of National
Intelligence, in consultation with the Attorney
General, determines that it is necessary to
withhold information requested under paragraph
(3) to protect the national security interests
of the United States, the head of the
department or agency concerned shall not
furnish such information to the Board.
* * * * * * *
(h) Security Clearances.--The appropriate departments and
agencies of the executive branch shall cooperate with the Board
to expeditiously provide Board members and staff with
appropriate security clearances to the extent possible under
applicable procedures and requirements. Promptly upon
commencing its work, the Board shall adopt, after consultation
with the Secretary of Defense, the Attorney General, and the
[National Intelligence Director] Director of National
Intelligence, rules and procedures of the Board for physical,
communications, computer, document, personnel, and other
security in relation to the work of the Board.
* * * * * * *
Subtitle G--Conforming and Other Amendments
* * * * * * *
SEC. 1071. CONFORMING AMENDMENTS RELATING TO ROLES OF DIRECTOR OF
NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE AND DIRECTOR OF THE CENTRAL
INTELLIGENCE AGENCY.
(a) * * *
* * * * * * *
(e) Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978.--[(1)] The
Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978 (50 U.S.C. 1801
et seq.) is amended by striking ``Director of Central
Intelligence'' each place it appears and inserting ``Director
of National Intelligence''.
* * * * * * *
SEC. 1072. OTHER CONFORMING AMENDMENTS
(a) * * *
(b) Central Intelligence Agency Act of 1949.--Section 6 of
the Central Intelligence Agency Act of 1949 (50 U.S.C. 403g) is
amended by striking ``section 103(c)(7) of the National
Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 403-3(c)(7))'' and inserting
``section 102A(i) of the National Security Act of 1947''.
* * * * * * *
----------
INTELLIGENCE REFORM AND TERRORISM PREVENTION ACT OF 2004
* * * * * * *
TITLE II--FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
SEC. 2001. IMPROVEMENT OF INTELLIGENCE CAPABILITIES OF THE FEDERAL
BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION.
(a) * * *
* * * * * * *
(c) National Intelligence Workforce.--(1) In developing and
maintaining a national intelligence workforce under subsection
(b), the Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation shall,
develop and maintain a specialized and integrated national
intelligence workforce consisting of agents, analysts,
linguists, and surveillance specialists who are recruited,
trained, and rewarded in a manner which ensures the existence
within the Federal Bureau of Investigation of an institutional
culture with substantial expertise in, and commitment to, the
intelligence mission of the Bureau.
* * * * * * *
(e) Discharge of Improvements.--(1) * * *
(2) The Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation shall
carry out subsections (b) through (d) under the joint guidance
of the Attorney General and [the National Intelligence Director
in a manner consistent with section 112(e)] the Director of
National Intelligence in a manner consistent with applicable
law.
(f) Budget Matters.--The Director of the Federal Bureau of
Investigation [shall,] shall establish a budget structure of
the Federal Bureau of Investigation to reflect the four
principal missions of the Bureau as follows:
(1) * * *
* * * * * * *
SEC. 2006. FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION USE OF TRANSLATORS.
Not later than 30 days after the date of the enactment of
this Act, and annually thereafter, the Attorney General of the
United States shall submit to the Committee on the Judiciary of
the Senate and the Committee on the Judiciary of the House of
Representatives a report that contains, with respect to each
preceding 12-month period--
(1) * * *
(2) any legal or practical impediments to using
translators employed by [the] Federal, State, or local
agencies on a full-time, part-time, or shared basis;
(3) the needs of the Federal Bureau of Investigation
for [the] specific translation services in certain
languages, and recommendations for meeting those needs;
* * * * * * *
----------
SECTION 1403 OF THE NATIONAL DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION ACT OF FISCAL YEAR
1991
[SEC. 1403. MULTIYEAR NATIONAL FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE PROGRAM]
SEC. 1403. MULTIYEAR NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE PROGRAM.
(a) Annual Submission of Multiyear National [Foreign]
Intelligence Program.--The [Director of Central Intelligence]
Director of National Intelligence shall submit to the
congressional committees specified in subsection (d) each year
a multiyear national [foreign] intelligence program plan
reflecting the estimated expenditures and proposed
appropriations required to support that program. Any such
multiyear national [foreign] intelligence program plan shall
cover the fiscal year with respect to which the budget is
submitted and at least four succeeding fiscal years.
(b) Time of Submission.--The Director of National
Intelligence shall submit the report required by subsection (a)
each year at or about the same time that the budget is
submitted to Congress pursuant to section 1105(a) of title 31,
United States Code.
(c) Consistency With Budget Estimates.--The [Director of
Central Intelligence] Director of National Intelligence and the
Secretary of Defense shall ensure that the estimates referred
to in subsection (a) are consistent with the budget estimates
submitted to Congress pursuant to section 1105(a) of title 31,
United States Code, for the fiscal year concerned and with the
estimated expenditures and proposed appropriations for the
multiyear defense program submitted pursuant to section 114a of
title 10, United States Code.
* * * * * * *
----------
TITLE 5, UNITED STATES CODE
* * * * * * *
PART III--EMPLOYEES
* * * * * * *
SUBPART A--GENERAL PROVISIONS
* * * * * * *
CHAPTER 23--MERIT SYSTEM PRINCIPLES
* * * * * * *
Sec. 2302. Prohibited personnel practices
(a)(1) For the purpose of this title, ``prohibited personnel
practice'' means any action described in subsection (b).
(2) For the purpose of this section--
(A) * * *
* * * * * * *
(C) ``agency'' means an Executive agency and the
Government Printing Office, but does not include--
(i) * * *
(ii) the Federal Bureau of Investigation, the
Central Intelligence Agency, the Defense
Intelligence Agency, the [National Imagery and
Mapping Agency] National Geospatial-
Intelligence Agency, the National Security
Agency, and, as determined by the President,
any Executive agency or unit thereof the
principal function of which is the conduct of
foreign intelligence or counterintelligence
activities; or
* * * * * * *
SUBPART B--EMPLOYMENT AND RETENTION
* * * * * * *
CHAPTER 31--AUTHORITY FOR EMPLOYMENT
* * * * * * *
SUBCHAPTER II--THE SENIOR EXECUTIVE SERVICE
* * * * * * *
Sec. 3132. Definitions and exclusions
(a) For the purpose of this subchapter--
(1) ``agency'' means an Executive agency, except a
Government corporation and the Government
Accountability Office, but does not include--
(A) * * *
(B) the Federal Bureau of Investigation, the
Drug Enforcement Administration, the Central
Intelligence Agency, the Defense Intelligence
Agency, the [National Imagery and Mapping
Agency] National Geospatial-Intelligence
Agency, the National Security Agency,
Department of Defense intelligence activities
the civilian employees of which are subject to
section 1590 of title 10, and, as determined by
the President, an Executive agency, or unit
thereof, whose principal function is the
conduct of foreign intelligence or
counterintelligence activities;
* * * * * * *
SUBPART C--EMPLOYEE PERFORMANCE
* * * * * * *
CHAPTER 43--PERFORMANCE APPRAISAL
* * * * * * *
SUBCHAPTER I--GENERAL PROVISIONS
Sec. 4301. Definitions
For the purpose of this subchapter--
(1) ``agency'' means--
(A) an Executive agency; and
(B) the Government Printing Office;
but does not include--
(i) a Government corporation;
(ii) the Central Intelligence Agency, the
Defense Intelligence Agency, the [National
Imagery and Mapping Agency] National
Geospatial-Intelligence Agency, the National
Security Agency, or any Executive agency or
unit thereof which is designated by the
President and the principal function of which
is the conduct of foreign intelligence or
counterintelligence activities; or
* * * * * * *
CHAPTER 47--PERSONNEL RESEARCH PROGRAMS AND DEMONSTRATION PROJECTS
* * * * * * *
Sec. 4701. Definitions
(a) For the purpose of this chapter--
(1) ``agency'' means an Executive agency and the
Government Printing Office, but does not include--
(A) a Government corporation;
(B) the Federal Bureau of Investigation, the
Central Intelligence Agency, the Defense
Intelligence Agency, the [National Imagery and
Mapping Agency] National Geospatial-
Intelligence Agency, the National Security
Agency, and, as determined by the President,
any Executive agency or unit thereof which is
designated by the President and which has as
its principal function the conduct of foreign
intelligence or counterintelligence activities;
or
* * * * * * *
SUBPART D--PAY AND ALLOWANCES
CHAPTER 51--CLASSIFICATION
* * * * * * *
Sec. 5102. Definitions; application
(a) For the purpose of this chapter--
(1) ``agency'' means--
(A) * * *
* * * * * * *
but does not include--
(i) * * *
* * * * * * *
(x) the [National Imagery and Mapping Agency]
National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency,
Department of Defense.
* * * * * * *
CHAPTER 53--PAY RATES AND SYSTEMS
* * * * * * *
SUBCHAPTER II--EXECUTIVE SCHEDULE PAY RATES
* * * * * * *
Sec. 5313. Positions at level II
Level II of the Executive Schedule applies to the following
positions, for which the annual rate of basic pay shall be the
rate determined with respect to such level under chapter 11 of
title 2, as adjusted by section 5318 of this title:
Deputy Secretary of Defense.
* * * * * * *
[Director of Central Intelligence.]
Director of the Central Intelligence Agency.
* * * * * * *
Sec. 5315. Positions at level IV
Level IV of the Executive Schedule applies to the following
positions, for which the annual rate of basic pay shall be the
rate determined with respect to such level under chapter 11 of
title 2, as adjusted by section 5318 of this title:
Deputy Administrator of General Services.
* * * * * * *
[General Counsel of the Office of the National
Intelligence Director.]
General Counsel of the Office of the Director of
National Intelligence.
* * * * * * *
SUBCHAPTER IV--PREVAILING RATE SYSTEMS
* * * * * * *
Sec. 5342. Definitions; application
(a) For the purpose of this subchapter--
(1) ``agency'' means an Executive agency; but does
not include--
(A) * * *
* * * * * * *
(K) the [National Imagery and Mapping Agency]
National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency,
Department of Defense;
* * * * * * *
SUBPART E--ATTENDANCE AND LEAVE
* * * * * * *
CHAPTER 63--LEAVE
* * * * * * *
SUBCHAPTER III--VOLUNTARY TRANSFERS OF LEAVE
* * * * * * *
Sec. 6339. Additional leave transfer programs
(a) For the purpose of this section--
(1) the term ``excepted agency'' means--
(A) * * *
* * * * * * *
(E) the [National Imagery and Mapping Agency]
National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency; and
* * * * * * *
(2) the term ``head of an excepted agency'' means--
(A) * * *
* * * * * * *
(E) with respect to the [National Imagery and
Mapping Agency, the Director of the National
Imagery and Mapping Agency] National
Geospatial-Intelligence Agency, the Director of
the National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency;
and
* * * * * * *
SUBPART F--LABOR-MANAGEMENT AND EMPLOYEE RELATIONS
* * * * * * *
CHAPTER 73--SUITABILITY, SECURITY, AND CONDUCT
* * * * * * *
SUBCHAPTER III--POLITICAL ACTIVITIES
* * * * * * *
Sec. 7323. Political activity authorized; prohibitions
(a) * * *
(b)(1) * * *
(2)(A) * * *
(B) The provisions of subparagraph (A) shall apply to--
(i) an employee of--
(I) * * *
* * * * * * *
(XIII) the [National Imagery and Mapping
Agency] National Geospatial-Intelligence
Agency; or
* * * * * * *
----------
CHAPTER 13 OF TITLE 44, UNITED STATES CODE
CHAPTER 13--PARTICULAR REPORTS AND DOCUMENTS
Sec.
1301. Agriculture, Department of: report of Secretary.
* * * * * * *
[1336. National Imagery and Mapping Agency: special publications.]
1336. National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency: special publications.
* * * * * * *
[Sec. 1336. National Imagery and Mapping Agency: special publications]
Sec. 1336. National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency: special
publications
The Director of the [National Imagery and Mapping Agency]
National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency may authorize the
printing of notices to mariners, light lists, sailing
directions, bulletins, and other special publications of the
[National Imagery and Mapping Agency] National Geospatial-
Intelligence Agency in editions the interests of the Government
and of the public may require.
* * * * * * *
----------
SECTION 201 OF THE HOMELAND SECURITY ACT OF 2002
SEC. 201. DIRECTORATE FOR INFORMATION ANALYSIS AND INFRASTRUCTURE
PROTECTION.
(a) * * *
* * * * * * *
(f) Detail of Personnel.--
(1) * * *
(2) Covered agencies.--The agencies referred to in
this paragraph are as follows:
(A) * * *
* * * * * * *
(E) The [National Imagery and Mapping Agency]
National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency.
* * * * * * *
----------
SECTION 8H INSPECTOR GENERAL ACT OF 1978
Sec. 8H. (a)(1)(A) An employee of the Defense Intelligence
Agency, the [National Imagery and Mapping Agency] National
Geospatial-Intelligence Agency, the National Reconnaissance
Office, or the National Security Agency, or of a contractor of
any of those Agencies, who intends to report to Congress a
complaint or information with respect to an urgent concern may
report the complaint or information to the Inspector General of
the Department of Defense (or designee).
* * * * * * *
(g)(1) The Inspector General of the Defense Intelligence
Agency, the [National Imagery and Mapping Agency] National
Geospatial-Intelligence Agency, the National Reconnaissance
Office, and the National Security Agency shall each submit to
the congressional intelligence committees each year a report
that sets forth the following:
(A) * * *
* * * * * * *
----------
SECTION 105 OF THE ETHICS IN GOVERNMENT ACT OF 1978
CUSTODY OF AND PUBLIC ACCESS TO REPORTS
Sec. 105. (a) Each agency, each supervising ethics office in
the executive or judicial branch, the Clerk of the House of
Representatives, and the Secretary of the Senate shall make
available to the public, in accordance with subsection (b),
each report filed under this title with such agency or office
or with the Clerk or the Secretary of the Senate, except that--
(1) this section does not require public availability
of a report filed by any individual in the Office of
the Director of National Intelligence, the Central
Intelligence Agency, the Defense Intelligence Agency,
the [National Imagery and Mapping Agency] National
Geospatial-Intelligence Agency, or the National
Security Agency, or any individual engaged in
intelligence activities in any agency of the United
States, if the President finds or has found that, due
to the nature of the office or position occupied by
such individual, public disclosure of such report
would, be revealing the identity of the individual or
other sensitive information, compromise the national
interest of the United States; and such individuals may
be authorized, notwithstanding section 104(a), to file
such additional reports as are necessary to protect
their identity from public disclosure if the President
first finds or has found that such filing is necessary
in the national interest; and
(2) any report filed by an independent counsel whose
identity has not been disclosed by the division of the
court under chapter 40 of title 28, United States Code,
and any report filed by any person appointed by that
independent counsel under such chapter, shall not be
made available to the public under this title.
* * * * * * *
----------
SECTION 7 OF THE EMPLOYEE POLYGRAPH PROTECTION ACT 1988
SEC. 7. EXEMPTIONS.
(a) * * *
(b) National Defense and Security Exemption.--
(1) * * *
(2) Security.--Nothing in this Act shall be construed
toprohibit the administration, by the Federal
Government, in theperformance of any intelligence or
counterintelligence function,of any lie detector test
to--
(A)(i) any individual employed by, assigned
to, or detailedto, the National Security
Agency, the Defense IntelligenceAgency, the
[National Imagery and Mapping Agency] National
Geospatial-Intelligence Agency, or the Central
Intelligence Agency,
* * * * * * *
----------
SECTION 207 OF THE LEGISLATIVE BRANCH APPROPRIATIONS ACT, 1993
Sec. 207. (a)(1) * * *
(2) Paragraph (1) does not apply to (A) individual printing
orders costing not more than $1,000, if the work is not of a
continuing or repetitive nature, and, as certified by the
Public Printer, if the work is included in a class of work
which cannot be provided more economically through the
Government Printing Office, (B) printing for the Central
Intelligence Agency, the Defense Intelligence Agency, [National
Imagery and Mapping Agency] National Geospatial-Intelligence
Agency, or the National Security Agency, or (C) printing from
other sources that is specifically authorized by law.
* * * * * * *
MINORITY VIEWS
In considering the Intelligence Authorization for fiscal
year 2007, we are mindful of the bravery and sacrifice of the
women and men who serve in U.S. intelligence agencies, often
under-cover and usually in some of the most dangerous corners
of the world. We have visited those dangerous corners, and
appreciate the risks that these professionals take for our
freedom.
Because the budget authorized by HR 5020 is classified--and
therefore shielded from public scrutiny--four Committee's
oversight must be all-the-more rigorous.
Certain features in the bill are worthy of special
emphasis.
First, HR 5020 contained a provision to limit the overhead
growth of the Office of the DNI (ODNI) absent a strategy from
the DNI on how its requirements for additional funds and
personnel would bring value to the management of the
intelligence community. We want the ODNI to become a joint
commander of the 16 intelligence agencies, not another
bureaucracy, seeking more billets and buildings.
Second, the bill provides full-funding for
counterterrorism. The President's budget had only requested 78%
of what the intelligence community says it will need for
counterterrorism operations in fiscal year 2007. That request
was inadequate--and dangerous. Relying on supplemental funding
for counterterrorism prevents operations in the field from
planning operations, and it virtually eliminates this
Committee's ability to conduct oversight over those funds. For
years since 9-11, we have underscored the need to fully fund
counterterrorism. This Authorization bill now does that.
Third, we are also pleased the Chairman has agreed to
include, in the report to accompany HR 5020, enhanced reporting
requirements on a number of key topics. This includes the
domestic surveillance activities of the Department of Defense
Counter Intelligence Field Activity (CIFA), as well as
intelligence assessments on the WMD capabilities and intentions
of Iran and North Korea--two countries where we must get it
right.
Despite these attributes, the bill would have been stronger
if it included three Amendments offered by Democratic members.
Representatives Hastings, Reyes and Holt offered an
amendment to require a dedicated funding line for the Privacy
and Civil Liberties Oversight Board in the President's annual
budget submission to Congress, and to authorize $3 million
annually for the Board's activities.
The Board was created by the Intelligence Reform and
Terrorism Prevention Act, which was signed into law in December
2004. This Board was designed to serve as a civil liberties
``watchdog'' as the American people grow increasingly concerned
about the potential erosion of Constitutional rights in the
post-911 era. Fifteen months later, the Board is barely up and
running. The President did not nominate the members of the
Board for 9 months, and the Senate took five months to confirm
the Chair and Vice Chair. In addition, the Administration
budget request did not include a request for funds for the
Board in fiscal year 2007.
The Hastings/Reyes/Holt Amendment would have sent an
unmistakable signal that this Board deserves dedicated
resources to carry out its vital mission. Unfortunately, the
amendment was voted down on a party-line vote (10-8).
Representative Eshoo offered an amendment to fence, or
withhold, 20% of the NSA's budget until the Executive Branch
provides the Committee with the total cost of the President's
NSA surveillance program.
The Eshoo Amendment was a modest, narrowly-tailored
amendment. It would not have required the Administration to
provide the full Committee with operational details about the
program (although we believe the President is required to do
so.) Nor would the Amendment have passed judgment on the
legality of the program. The amendment simply asked for
financial data, so that members casting a vote to authorize the
budget would know how much money was dedicated to the program.
The Eshoo Amendment was defeated 10 to 8, with all Minority
members and one Majority member voting for it. By defeating
this amendment, the Majority members refused to employ a common
oversight tool (a fence of funds) employed 14 other times in
the bill's Annex--to require the President to tell the
Committee how much this program has and will cost the American
taxpayer. We strongly urge the full Committee to continue to
seek this information.
Third, Representatives Tierney, Boswell and Holt offered an
amendment to prevent the DNI from transferring budget and
personnel related to national intelligence functions out of the
National Intelligence Program (NIP) to the Military
Intelligence Program (MIP). We believe these transfers are
demonstrative of a lack of strong community leadership further
compounded by a culture of resistance to change. If left
unchecked, this could render DNI ineffectual and powerless to
integrate intelligence efforts to respond to emerging crises.
The Tierney/Boswell/Holt Amendment was defeated 10 to 7. In
defeating this Amendment, the Committee missed an opportunity
to prevent the dismantling of statutory authorities of the DNI
and the ceding of key budget authorities over large numbers of
intelligence personnel and resources to the Pentagon.
Throughout the mark-up, Members expressed their views on a
variety of topics of relating to the intelligence community.
Perhaps no topic received more attention than the President's
NSA surveillance program.
We strongly support intercepting the communications of Al
Qaeda into and out of the United States. This capability is
vital. However, we have become deeply concerned that the
Executive Branch is engaging in two violations of law with
respect to the NSA program.
First, in failing to brief the entire Committee on the
operational details of the Program, the President is violating
the National Security Act--which requires that the President
shall keep the Committee ``currently and fully'' informed of
all intelligence activities of the United States. Failure to
brief the full Committee compromises our oversight and is a
violation of law.
Second, eavesdropping on U.S. persons must fully comply
with Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA). Nobody has
yet persuaded us why FISA, as currently drafted, cannot cover
the entire Program. The law is unambiguous--all eavesdropping
on Americans in America must comply with FISA.
Allowing the NSA surveillance program to proceed without
fully complying with the law threatens to undermine our entire
Constitutional order--our system of checks and balances. As
Justice O'Connor wrote in the Hamdi case, ``We have long since
made clear that a state of war is not a blank check for the
President when it comes to the rights of the Nation's
citizens.''
In authorizing the activities of the U.S. intelligence
community today, we are mindful of the words of Justice
O'Connor and the solemn duty our Committee has to uphold the
rule of law and the values we cherish as a nation--for that is
ultimately what our brave intelligence professionals are
fighting so hard to defend.
Jane Harman.
Alcee L. Hastings.
Silvestre Reyes.
Leonard L. Boswell.
Bud Cramer.
Anna G. Eshoo.
Rush Holt.
C.A. Dutch Ruppersberger.
John F. Tierney.
Note: Mr. Ruppersberger was unable to attend the mark-up
due to the death of his father earlier in the week. We send him
and his family our deepest sympathies.