INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT

ASSESSMENT OF THE BACK – UP FLIGHT SYSTEM

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22 FEBRUARY 1988

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MCDONNELL DOUGLAS ASTRONAUTICS COMPANY -ENGINEERING SERVICES

SPACE TRANSPORTATION SYSTEM ENGINEERING AND OPERATIONS SUPPORT

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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT ASSESSMENT OF THE BACKUP FLIGHT SYSTEM FMEA/CIL

22 FEBRUARY 1988

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Independent Orbiter Assessment Assessment of the Backup Flight System FMEA/CIL

1.0 EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

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The McDonnell Douglas Astronautics Company (MDAC) was selected in June 1986 to perform an Independent Orbiter Assessment (IOA) of the Failure Mode and Effects Analysis (FMEA) and Critical Items List (CIL). Direction was given by the STS Orbiter and GFE Projects Office to perform the hardware analysis using the instructions and ground rules defined in <u>NSTS 22206, Instructions</u> for Preparation of FMEA and CIL, October 10, 1986.


The IOA effort first completed an analysis of the Backup Flight System (BFS) hardware, generating draft failure modes and Potential Critical Items. To preserve independence, this analysis was accomplished without reliance upon the results contained within the NASA FMEA/CIL documentation. The IOA results were then compared to the proposed NASA post 51-L FMEA/CIL baseline. A resolution of each discrepancy from the comparison is provided through additional analysis as required. This report documents the results of that comparison for the Orbiter BFS hardware.

The IOA product for the BFS analysis consisted of 29 failure mode "worksheets" that resulted in 21 Potential Critical Items (PCI) being identified. This product was originally compared with the proposed NASA BFS baseline as of Oct. 1986 and subsequently compared with the applicable (as of Nov. 19, 1987) Data Processing System (DPS), Electrical Power Distribution and Control (EPD&C), and Displays and Controls NASA CIL items. The comparisons determined if there were any results which had been found by the IOA but were not in the NASA baseline.

The original assessment determined there were numerous failure modes and potential critical items in the IOA analysis that were not contained in the NASA BFS baseline. Conversely, the NASA baseline contained three FMEAs (IMU, ADTA, and Air Data Probe) for CIL items that were not identified in the IOA product. The IOA prepared worksheets and agreed with the NASA analysis for the three items. This increased the IOA worksheets from 29 to 32 and the PCIs from 21 to 24 for the original assessment as shown in Figure 1.

The NASA and Rockwell conducted several reviews and completed a substantial rewrite of all CILs between Dec. 1986 and Nov. 1987. This effort included eliminating BFS as a unique subsystem by integrating BFS CILs with primary DPS CILs. The revised NASA baseline contained four more FMEAs for CIL items that were not identified in the original IOA BFS product, deleted the IMU CIL related FMEA mentioned in the previous paragraph, and moved the ADTA and AIR Data Probe CILs also mentioned in the previous paragraph to the GN&C subsystem. Once again, the IOA prepared worksheets and agreed with the NASA analysis of the additional **BFS ASSESSMENT OVERVIEW**

		B	BFS ASS	ASSESSMENT		SUMI	SUMMARY	
	orig	ORIGINAL A	ASSESSMENT *	4T ×		FINAL	FINAL RESOLUTION **	N **
		PO	NASA	ISSUES		IOA	NASA	ISSUES
FM	FMEA	32	16	16	FMEA	33	ı	I
CIL		24	12	12	Ե	25	22	0



COVERED BY INDIVIDUAL NASA FAILURES.

THE IOA TREATED THE GPC AS ONE BLACK BOX. THE ROCKWELL/NASA ANALYSIS CONSIDERED BOTH THE CPU AND IOP.

THE IOA AND NASA/ROCKWELL ANALYSES ADDRESS THE SAME FAILURE MODES BUT DOCUMENT THEM DIFFERENTLY.

THE IMU FAILURE IMPACT ON BES CONTAINED IN THE PROPOSED BASELINE OCT 1986 WAS DELETED FROM THE CIL AND THE ADTA AND PROBE

CILS WERE MOVED TO GNEC IN THE FIMAL NOV. 1987 BASEURE

Figure 1 - BFS FMEA/CIL ASSESSMENT

failures. This increased the IOA worksheets from 32 to 33 and the PCIs from 24 to 25 for the final assessment. The IOA assessment of the final updated baseline (Nov. 19, 1987) results in agreement on all BFS CIL items even though there are differences in number of items and assigned criticalities. Figure 1 presents an overview of the assessment results.

The differences in assigned criticalities are due to different interpretation and application of the FMEA/CIL preparation instructions contained in NSTS 22206. The IOA analyzed BFS hardware failures with the assumption the BFS had been or would be engaged. The NASA analyzed BFS hardware failures as an integral part of the DPS or EPD&C and therefore counted generic PASS failures when assigning criticalities to BFS hardware failure modes. The IOA interpretation neither added to or subtracted from the CIL.

The IOA and NASA analyses differed in level of detail and method of failure mode documentation. As a result, there are some differences in the number of CIL items. Regardless, a complete mapping exists between the IOA and FMEA/CIL items. Multiple IOA failures map into one FMEA for some hardware components and vice versa for other BFS elements.

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2.0 INTRODUCTION

2.1 Purpose

The 51-L Challenger accident prompted the NASA to readdress safety policies, concepts, and rationale being used in the National Space Transportation System (NSTS). The NSTS Office has undertaken the task of reevaluating the FMEA/CIL for the Space Shuttle design. The MDAC is providing an independent assessment of the Orbiter FMEA/CIL reevaluation results for completeness and technical accuracy.

2.2 Scope

The scope of the independent FMEA/CIL assessment activity encompasses those Shuttle Orbiter subsystems and GFE hardware identified in the Space Shuttle Independent FMEA/CIL Assessment Contractor Statement of Work. Each subsystem analysis addresses hardware, functions, internal and external interfaces, and operational requirements for all mission phases.

2.3 Analysis Approach

The independent analysis approach is a top-down analysis utilizing as-built drawings to divide the respective subsystem into components and low-level hardware items. Each hardware item is evaluated for failure mode, effects, and criticality. These data are documented in the respective subsystem analysis report, and are used to assess the proposed post 51-L NASA and Prime Contractor FMEA/CIL. The IOA analysis approach is summarized in the following Steps 1.0 through 3.0. Step 4.0 summarizes the assessment of the NASA and Prime Contractor FMEA/CIL which is documented in this report. .

Step 1.0 Subsystem familiarization

- 1.1 Define subsystem functions
 - 1.2 Define subsystem components
 - 1.3 Define subsystem specific ground rules and assumptions

Step 2.0 Define subsystem analysis diagram

- 2.1 Define subsystem
- 2.2 Define major assemblies
- 2.3 Develop detailed subsystem representations

Step 3.0 Failure events definition

- 3.1 Construct matrix of failure modes
- 3.2 Document IOA analysis results
- Step 4.0 Compare IOA analysis data to NASA FMEA/CIL 4.1 Resolve differences
 - 4.2 Review in-house
 - 4.3 Document assessment issues
 - 4.4 Forward findings to Project Manager

2.4 Ground Rules and Assumptions

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The ground rules and assumptions used in the IOA are presented in Appendix B. The subsystem specific ground rules were defined to limit the analysis to single-failed-parts for each failure mode. A subset of the failure mode keywords were identified for the BFS team. This allowed for commonality in the analysis results.

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3.0 SUBSYSTEM DESCRIPTION

The following sections describe the BFS subsystem hardware. This hardware comprises a GPC, DDUs, BFCs, several switches, status indicators, and circuit protectors. An overview of the system components is shown in Figure 2.

3.1 Design and Function

The Backup Flight System provides the flight crew with a vehicle control capability to be used if the primary system malfunctions. The BFS software resides in one General Purpose Computer, normally GPC 5, during ascent and entry. In the event a generic failure occurs in the Primary Avionics Software System (PASS) or three or more primary GPCs fail, the crew will engage the BFS. During dynamic flight phases (all except onorbit), no capability to return to the primary system is provided once the BFS is engaged.

Hardware elements included in this report are those specific to the BFS. Evaluation of components such as nav aids and flight control sensors that are common to the BFS and the PASS and components such as dedicated instrument displays that are driven by the BFS outputs are excluded from this report. Processing schemes differ between PASS and BFS with the result that some component failures become more critical with BFS engaged. It is beyond the scope of this report to present all the software differences between PASS and BFS or to present a comparison of the failure criticalities for non BFS-unique hardware with or without BFS engaged.

The BFS is limited by definition, for this report, to those unique hardware items that function in response to the action taken by the flight crew to engage or disengage the BFS. A schematic diagram of these hardware items is shown in Figure 3. More specifically, the BFS consists of the following components:

 Two DDUs which supply power to the BFS engage switches on the left and right RHCs and to the Hand Controller Engage Drivers (HCEDs) in the Backup Flight Controller (BFC) modules. Each DDU has three power supplies (A, B and C) redundantly tied through regulators to two of the three Main A, B and C buses.

- 2. Three BFCs, each with identical modules A and B, which receive inputs from crew configured switches and output discrete signals to their respective GPCs. Logic circuits select which GPCs control flight critical buses and drive CRT displays prior and subsequent to BFS engagement.
- 3. One GPC loaded with backup flight software. From a hardware standpoint, a GPC consists of a Central Processing Unit (CPU) and an Input/Output Processor (IOP), each with many subcomponents. Since there is

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



Figure 2 - BFS SUBSYSTEM OVERVIEW



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only one GPC to provide the backup control capability it will be treated as a black box. Regardless of what hardware component fails rendering the GPC inoperable, the criticality is the same as a generic black box failure.

- 4. Twenty crew activated switches (15 GPC, 2 BFS engage, 1 BFS disengage, and 2 CRT) that are used to control GPC operating configuration and CRT interfaces with the BFS GPC.
- 5. Crew interface with the BFS is through the Multifunction CRT Display System (MCDS). During normal flight operations, one of the cathode ray tubes (CRTs) in the forward station will be commanded by the BFS. BFS MCDS selection in the forward station is governed by the BFS CRT switch on panel C3 or the GPC/CRT key on the keyboard. Current preengage BFS procedures call for CRT 3 to be the BFS CRT in the forward station.

The BFS operates in one of two operating states: engaged or disengaged. The BFS is intended to remain in a disengaged state during routine operations allowing the PASS to control the vehicle. Both the engage and disengage states are provided to the GPCs through a set of three hardware modules called Backup Flight Controllers (BFCs). These BFCs provide interface through a series of discrete signals between the GPCs and associated crew station switches. Engage is accomplished by verifying that the BFS GPC output switch is in the backup position and that the DDU power supply breakers are in, and depressing the engage momentary pushbutton on either the right or the left RHC.

When one of the RHC buttons is depressed, three discretes (A, B, C) of ones are sent to the BFS GPC through the BFC modules. The BFS GPC must receive two of three discretes plus a zero discrete from the I/O terminate B before the BFS can be engaged. After the BFS is engaged, control of the vehicle is assumed by the BFS, and the PASS GPCs go to a state of software halt. The BFS then controls the flight critical and payload data buses and specified display keyboard buses. Indications that the BFS is engaged are that BFC eyebrow panel lights on F2 and F4 will be ON, the BFS output talkback (TB) on panel O6 will be gray, and all PASS GPC output TBs on panel 06 will be barberpole.

In the disengaged state, the BFS GPC processes vehicle control parameters in parallel with the PASS GPCs. The BFS maintains knowledge of the vehicle state by listening on the flight critical data buses commanded by the PASS GPCs. The disengaged BFS GPC also performs limited SM and FDA functions during OPS 1, 3, and 6. To disengage the BFS from the engage state, the BFC disengage switch on panel F6 is positioned to DISENGAGE (up position). The engage discretes to the BFS will be reset to zero and the I/O terminate discrete set to one. Control of the FC and PL data buses will be released to the PASS. This is indicated by the BFC light going OFF, the PASS output TBs going gray, and

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BFS output TB going barberpole. The PASS GPCs must be re-Initial Program Loaded (re-IPLed) prior to disengage. Thus the BFS disengage capability is provided only during quiescent vehicle flight.

If BFS is engaged it will drive several dedicated instrument displays in the forward station. This is instrumentation needed to safely fly the vehicle during the final phases of entry and landing. Two of the three Attitude Direction Indicators (ADIs) are driven by the BFS in OPS 1 and OPS 3. The four scales (Alpha, Accel, M/Vel, EAS) of the Alpha/Mach Indicator (AMI) are driven by BFS in OPS major modes 304 and 305. Likewise, the four scales (Alt Accel, Alt Rate, Alt, Rad Alt) of the Altitude/Vertical Velocity Indicator (AVVI) are driven by the engaged BFS in major modes 304 and 305. The Horizontal Situation Indicator (HSI) provides magnetic heading, course, course deviation, glide slope deviation, and primary and secondary bearing, and the Surface Position Indicator (SPI), provides elevons, body flap percent, rudder, aileron, and speedbrake percent. The HSI and SPI are driven by the engaged BFS.

3.2 Interfaces and Locations

The BFS GPC and three BFCs are located in Avionics Bays 1 and 2. All other hardware components are located in the forward flight deck. The BFS interfaces with Orbiter subsystems via the flight critical and payload data buses and flight forward and flight aft MDMs.

3.3 Hierarchy

Figure 2 illustrates the hierarchy of the BFS hardware components.

3.4 BFS Sensitivity to Interfacing Subsystem Operation

An exhaustive comparison of the BFS and PASS is beyond the scope of this report. However, a limited investigation of BFS sensitivity to operation in certain guidance, navigation and control subsystems was performed. References 12 and 13 constituted the BFS capability description for this investigation.

Compared to the PASS, the BFS capability for fault detection is limited due to minimum redundancy management capability. As a result, the BFS is substantially more vulnerable to malfunctions in interfacing subsystems. The specific subsystems investigated included the Inertial Measurement Units (IMUs), Air Data System (ADS), Rate Gyro Assemblies (RGA) and Accelerometer Assemblies (AA), Rotational Hand Controller (RHC), Speedbrake Thrust Controller (SBTC), Rudder Pedal Transducer Assembly (RPTA), and a limited collection of cockpit switches.

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3.4.1 Inertial Measurement Unit (IMU)

The BFS does not use the Built in Test Equipment (BITE) or the ECHO features provided by the IMU hardware. The BFS only faults an IMU when it has detected a Communications Fault (COM FAULT). In nominal operations, the BFS uses a mid value select. If one IMU is COM FAULTED, the lowest numbered IMU which has not been COM FAULTED will be selected. If two IMUs have been COM FAULTED, then data from the remaining IMU will be processed. If all three IMUs are COM FAULTED, the system will then try to reselect the last failed IMU.

This data selection process makes the BFS extremely sensitive and vulnerable to IMU number 1 malfunctions which do not result in a COM FAULT on IMU number 1. Without regard to IMU number 1 performance, a simple COM FAULT on either IMU number 2 or 3 will allow that performance to be immediately propagated throughout the entire GN&C system.

3.4.2 Air Data System (ADS)

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The data from this subsystem is vital to many computations, since several of the items measured by this subsystem are used throughout the GN&C software. The main item of concern is the Nose Landing Gear Uplock Discrete, V51X0300X. This discrete is used by the BFS software to determine if a correction factor is applied in the angle of attack calculation, the corrected static pressure calculation, and the corrected total pressure calculation. These three terms are then used to determine Mach number, pressure altitude, dynamic pressure (Q-Bar), equivalent airspeed (EAS), and estimated true airspeed. The inclusion of the correction factor in the calculation is due to changes in the flow around the ADS when the nose gear is down.

Depending on the size of the correction factor being applied, the corrected static pressure and corrected total pressure values could be changed by a significant amount. Any calculations which use these values in either a first order or second order calculation would be in error, and this error would be factored into the Guidance and Navigation functions. The errors could be large enough to cause a loss of the vehicle.

3.4.3 Rate Gyro Assemblies (RGA) and Accelerometer Assemblies (AA)

The BFS uses three of the four RGAs on the Orbiter and three of four RGAs on the Solid Rocket Boosters (SRB). Similarly, the BFS uses only three of the four AAs. One set of scale factor and bias data is used for the three Orbiter RGAs, another set of scale factor and bias data is used for the RGAs on the SRBs, and another set of scale factor and bias data is used for all AAs. The PASS provides scale factor and bias data for each of the RGAs and AAs.

The use of a single set of scale factor and bias data for a group of RGAs and AAs is acceptable if the LRUs are very consistent.

If however, the performance of the LRUs is inconsistent, the data coming back could have large, over-compensated variations.

3.4.4 Rotational Hand Controller (RHC)

The BFS does not support RHC processing in ascent modes. The BFS does not validate the RHC inputs by using the data good indicator as in the PASS. There is no requirement to process the left RHC data before or after the right RHC data. The lack of a requirement for the order of processing RHC data is different than that found in the PASS. There may be a need to process the Commander's inputs before the Pilot's, as is done in the PASS.

3.4.5 Speedbrake Thrust Controller (SBTC)

The BFS does not have manual throttling capability in ascent as does the primary. The BFS does process both SBTCs.

3.4.6 Rudder Pedal Transducer Assembly (RPTA)

The BFS processes only the Commander's inputs. There is no redundancy when the BFS is engaged.

3.4.7 Cockpit Switches

The following switches are redundant, one set at the Commander's station and another set at the Pilot's station. The BFS processes only those switches at the Commander's station. Therefore, when the BFS is engaged, the PLT switches can not be considered redundant to the CDR switches.

TACAN source for HSI	F6	S4	V72K8587X
MSBLS source for HSI	F6	S4	V72K8589X
Nav source for HSI	F6	S4	V72K8588X
ADI Attitude Ref PB a	F6	S 3	V72K2051X
PB b			V72K2052X
ADI Attitude Inertial	F6	S3	V72K2015X
ADI Attitude LV/LH	F6	S 3	V72K2016X
ADI Attitude reference	F6	S 3	V72K2017X

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4.0 ASSESSMENT RESULTS

The IOA analysis of the BFS hardware initially generated 29 failure mode worksheets and identified 21 Potential Critical Items before starting the assessment process. In order to facilitate comparison, additional worksheets were generated. The analysis results were compared to the proposed NASA Post 51-L baseline. Upon completion of the assessment, there was agreement on all CIL items. The FMEAs for non-CIL items have not yet been revised; therefore, an IOA assessment of non-CIL FMEAs is not included in this report.

A summary of the quantity of NASA CIL items assessed versus the IOA baseline is presented in Table I.

Table I Summary o	E IOA C	IL Asse	essment
Component	NASA	IOA	Issues
DDU BFC GPC Switches Circuit Protectors	4 2 4 5 7	1 9 2 5 8	0 0 0 0 0
Total	22	25	0

The differences in the number of CIL items for a specific component are attributable to differences in the depth of analyses and documentation approach.

Appendix C presents the detailed assessment worksheets for each failure mode identified and assessed. Appendix D highlights the NASA Critical Items and corresponding IOA worksheet ID. Appendix E contains the additional IOA analysis worksheets that were prepared to support the NASA FMEA/CIL assessment. Appendix F provides a cross reference between the NASA FMEA and corresponding IOA worksheets.

Table II presents a summary of the IOA failure criticalities. Further discussion of each of these subdivisions and the applicable failure modes is provided in subsequent paragraphs.

TABLE II Sur	nmary (of IOA	Failur	e Modes	and Cr	itical	ities
Criticality:	1/1	2/1R	2/2	3/1R	3/2R	3/3	TOTAL
DDU BFC GPC SWITCHES CIRC. PROTECT. INDICATORS	- 6 2 4 5 -	1 1 - 1 -	- - - - -	- 1 - 4 -	- 1 - 1 -	- 1 - 3 - 2	1 10 2 9 9 2
TOTAL	17	3	-	5	2	6	33

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Of the failure modes analyzed, twenty-five were determined to be critical items. A summary of the IOA critical items is presented in Table III.

TABLE II	II Sur	nmary o	f IOA (Critica	l Items	
Criticality:	1/1	- 2/1R	2/2	3/1R	3/2R	TOTAL
DDU BFC GPC SWITCHES CIRC. PROTECT. INDICATORS	- 6 2 4 5 -	1 - 1 -		- 1 - 3 -		1 9 2 5 8 -
TOTAL	17	3	-	4	1	25

The scheme for assigning IOA assessment (Appendix C) and analysis (Appendix E) worksheet numbers is shown in Table IV.

TABLE IV IC	DA Worksheet Numbers
Component	IOA ID Number
DDU BFC GPC SWITCHES CIRC. PROTECT. INDICATORS IMU ADS	BFS-101 BFS-201 to BFS-210 BFS-301 to BFS-302 BFS-401 to BFS-409 BFS-501 to BFS-509 BFS-601 to BFS-602 BFS-1001 BFS-2001 to BFS-2002

4.1 Display Driver Unit

The NASA update documented loss of output and partial output for the left and right DDUs as four separate failures. The IOA documented the same failures on one analysis worksheet. The analyses agree that DDU output failure should be a CIL item.

4.2 Backup Flight Controller

The NASA update considered BFCs as black box components of the Data Processing and Software system. Two BFC CIL failure modes were identified: loss/erroneous output (2/1R) and inadvertent engage (3/1R, fails B screen). The IOA recognized the single point failure potential (criticality 1/1) of several functional components within the BFCs and elected to document failures at lower than black box level of detail. The disparity in criticality assignment is attributed to a philosophical difference between the IOA and FMEA. The IOA criticality is based on the effects of a failure occurring to a BFS component after a generic PASS failure, i.e., when the BFS is required. The NASA analysis considers a generic PASS failure as the first failure when assigning criticality to BFS components. As a result, for many component failure modes, the IOA criticality will appear to be more severe than the FMEA criticality.

The specific IOA BFC failures are mapped into the higher level NASA FMEAs in the final assessment. The IOA agrees with the FMEA criticalities if the PASS failure is considered.

In summary, the IOA makes two recommendations:

- 1. FMEAs should be generated for functional components within the BFC.
- 2. Instructions contained in NSTS 22206 should clearly specify whether PASS failures should be considered when assigning criticalities to BFS hardware failure modes.

4.3 General Purpose Computer

The IOA generated two failure mode worksheets for the BFS GPC which correspond to four FMEAs. The IOA treated the GPC as a black box, identified no output and erroneous output as failure modes, and assigned a criticality of 1/1 to each. The NASA update identified the same two failures but treated the GPC as two black boxes i.e., a CPU and an IOP and gave each failure a 2/1R criticality. The analyses agree that GPC output failures should be CIL items. The criticality discrepancy is due to the same philosophical difference discussed in the previous section. The IOA therefore recommends no change to the updated NASA GPC FMEAs.

4.4 Switches

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Except for minor criticality differences, the IOA and FMEA agree on five switch failure CIL items. The IOA analysis originally identified a failed open BFC disengage switch (3/2R, fails B screen) as a sixth CIL candidate. As a result of further review during the assessment task, the IOA believes the crew can readily detect the failure and perform a simple work-around procedure if necessary to disengage the BFS on orbit. Therefore, the IOA concludes the fail open mode for the BFC disengage switch contacts should not be considered as a critical item and recommends the failure be documented in the updated FMEAS for non-CIL items.

4.5 Circuit Protectors

The IOA identified open circuit of fuses F9, F10, F11, and F49 as criticality 1/1 failures and documented them as four separate CIL items. The same four fuses and failure modes are documented as criticality 2/1R in two updated FMEAs. The IOA concludes that since both approaches identify the same components and failure modes as CIL items there are no significant issues.

The NASA update includes two EPD&C-D&C Subsystem FMEAs that identify open circuit failure of circuit breakers CB29, 30, and 32 as 3/1R criticality and includes them as CIL items because they fail the B screen. The IOA initially concluded that all redundancy screens were passed. Upon further review, the IOA agrees with the NASA update

The IOA prepared three supplemental worksheets for failures overlooked in the original analysis. These covered open and short circuit failures in the BFS GPC and BFC main bus isolation diodes and open circuit failure of fuse F28 in the main bus supply line to the BFS BFC power monitor logic. The IOA agrees with the FMEA for these CIL items.

In summary, there are no issues regarding BFS related circuit protectors between the IOA and updated NASA FMEAs.

4.6 Indicators

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There is an exact match between the IOA and the baseline FMEAs for the BFC engage lights. There are no issues.

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5.0 REFERENCES

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Reference documentation available from NASA and Rockwell was used in the analysis. The documentation used included the following:

NSTS 22206 Instructions for Preparation of Failure 1. Modes and Effects Analysis (FMEA) and Critical Items List (CIL), 10 October 1986 2. **JSC 18820** Data Processing System Briefs, Basic, Rev. A, PCN-1, 4-20-85 VS70-971099 3. Rockwell Integrated Systems Schematics, OV-99, 103, 104 GNC & DPS, 3-14-85 Shuttle Flight Operations Manual, Volume 4. **JSC 12770** 5, Data Processing System, 3-21-84 JSC 18219 Flight Procedures Handbook, Post 5. Insertion, Final Revision A, 1-18-85 Flight Procedures Handbook, Deorbit 6. **JSC 18817** Prep, 3-1-83 7. Backup Flight System Software Workbook, **TD123** BFS 2102, 8-10-82 Orbiter Operations and Maintenance 8. **V72 FILE III** Requirements and Specification Document, 6-13-86 9. NSTS 08171 FILE I Operations and Maintenance Requirements and Specifications Document, 7-14-86 JSC 12820 STS Operational Flight Rules, PCN-1, 10. 2-14-86 11. TD198/A198 GNC Overview Workbook, GNC OV 2102, 8-30-83 MG038101 Backup System Service Program 12. Requirement Document, Seq.1, Rev. H, 3 January 1985 13. MG038106 Backup Flight System, Hardware Interface Program and GN&C Interface Program Requirements Document, Rev. E, 3 July 1985

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APPENDIX A ACRONYMS

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ADTA	-	Air Data Transducer Assembly
AOA		Abort Once Around
ATO		Abort to Orbit
BFC		Backup Flight Controller
BFS		Backup Flight System
BSS		Backup System Services
CIL		Critical Items List
CPU	-	Central Processing Unit
CRIT	-	Criticality
CRT	-	Cathode Ray Tube
C&W	-	Caution and Warning System
DDU	-	Display Driver Unit
DEU DPS	-	Display Electronics Unit
DPS	-	Data Processing System
DU	-	Display Unit
EVA	-	Extra Vehicular Activity
DU EVA FA	-	Flight Aft
FF	-	Flight Forward
FM	-	Failure Mode
FMEA	-	Failure Mode and Effects Analysis
GPC	-	General Purpose Computer
GSE		Ground Support Equipment
HCED	-	Hand Controller Engage Driver
 IMU		Inertial Measurement Unit
IOA	-	Independent Orbiter Assessment
IOP		Input/Output Processor
IPL		Initial Program Load
KU		Keyboard Unit
LRU		Line Replaceable Unit
MCDS	-	Multifunction CRT Display System
MDAC	-	McDonnell Douglas Astronautics Company
MDM	-	Multiplexer/Demultiplexer
MM	-	Major Mode
	-	Mass Memory Unit
	-	Not Applicable
NA NASA	-	National Aeronautics and Space Administration
NSTS	-	National Space Transportation System
OMRSD	-	Operational Maintenance Requirements and Specifications
		Document
OMS	-	Orbital Maneuvering System
PAS	_	Primary Avionics System
PASS	-	Primary Avionics Software System
PB	_	Pushbutton
PCI	_	Potential Critical Item
RCS	-	Reaction Control System
RHC	_	Rotational Hand Controller
RI	-	Rockwell International
RM	-	Redundancy Management
RPC	_	Remote Power Controller

ACRONYMS

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RS RTLS SFP SM STS SW	- - - -	Redundant Set Return to Landing Site Single Failure Point Systems Management Space Transportation System Software Switch
TAC TAL TD THC		Tacan Transatlantic Abort Landing Touch Down Translational Hand Controller

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APPENDIX B

DEFINITIONS, GROUND RULES, AND ASSUMPTIONS

B.1 Definitions

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B.2 Project Level Ground Rules and AssumptionsB.3 Subsystem-Specific Ground Rules and Assumptions

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APPENDIX B DEFINITIONS, GROUND RULES, AND ASSUMPTIONS

B.1 Definitions

Definitions contained in <u>NSTS 22206</u>, <u>Instructions For Preparation</u> of <u>FMEA/CIL</u>, <u>10 October 1986</u>, were used with the following amplifications and additions.

INTACT ABORT DEFINITIONS:

<u>RTLS</u> - begins at transition to OPS 6 and ends at transition to OPS 9, post-flight

<u>TAL</u> - begins at declaration of the abort and ends at transition to OPS 9, post-flight

 \underline{AOA} - begins at declaration of the abort and ends at transition to OPS 9, post-flight

<u>ATO</u> - begins at declaration of the abort and ends at transition to OPS 9, post-flight

<u>CREDIBLE (CAUSE)</u> - an event that can be predicted or expected in anticipated operational environmental conditions. Excludes an event where multiple failures must first occur to result in environmental extremes

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<u>CONTINGENCY CREW PROCEDURES</u> - procedures that are utilized beyond the standard malfunction procedures, pocket checklists, and cue cards

EARLY MISSION TERMINATION - termination of onorbit phase prior to planned end of mission

<u>EFFECTS/RATIONALE</u> - description of the case which generated the highest criticality

<u>HIGHEST CRITICALITY</u> - the highest functional criticality determined in the phase-by-phase analysis

<u>MAJOR MODE (MM)</u> - major sub-mode of software operational sequence (OPS)

<u>MC</u> - Memory Configuration of Primary Avionics Software System (PASS)

<u>MISSION</u> - assigned performance of a specific Orbiter flight with payload/objective accomplishments including orbit phasing and altitude (excludes secondary payloads such as GAS cans, middeck P/L, etc.) <u>MULTIPLE ORDER FAILURE</u> - describes the failure due to a single cause or event of all units which perform a necessary (critical) function

<u>OFF-NOMINAL CREW PROCEDURES</u> - procedures that are utilized beyond the standard malfunction procedures, pocket checklists, and cue cards

OPS - software operational sequence

<u>PRIMARY MISSION OBJECTIVES</u> - worst case primary mission objectives are equal to mission objectives

PHASE DEFINITIONS:

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<u>PRELAUNCH PHASE</u> - begins at launch count-down Orbiter power-up and ends at moding to OPS Major Mode 102 (liftoff)

<u>LIFTOFF MISSION PHASE</u> - begins at SRB ignition (MM 102) and ends at transition out of OPS 1 (Synonymous with ASCENT)

<u>ONORBIT PHASE</u> - begins at transition to OPS 2 or OPS 8 and ends at transition out of OPS 2 or OPS 8

<u>DEORBIT PHASE</u> - begins at transition to OPS Major Mode 301 and ends at first main landing gear touchdown

<u>LANDING/SAFING PHASE</u> - begins at first main gear touchdown and ends with the completion of post-landing safing operations

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APPENDIX B DEFINITIONS, GROUND RULES, AND ASSUMPTIONS

B.2 IOA Project Level Ground Rules and Assumptions

The philosophy embodied in <u>NSTS 22206, Instructions for</u> <u>Preparation of FMEA/CIL, 10 October 1986</u>, was employed with the following amplifications and additions.

1. The operational flight software is an accurate implementation of the Flight System Software Requirements (FSSRs).

RATIONALE: Software verification is out-of-scope of this task.

2. After liftoff, any parameter which is monitored by system management (SM) or which drives any part of the Caution and Warning System (C&W) will support passage of Redundancy Screen B for its corresponding hardware item.

> RATIONALE: Analysis of on-board parameter availability and/or the actual monitoring by the crew is beyond the scope of this task.

3. Any data employed with flight software is assumed to be functional for the specific vehicle and specific mission being flown.

RATIONALE: Mission data verification is out-of-scope of this task.

4. All hardware (including firmware) is manufactured and assembled to the design specifications/drawings.

RATIONALE: Acceptance and verification testing is designed to detect and identify problems before the item is approved for use.

5. All Flight Data File crew procedures will be assumed performed as written, and will not include human error in their performance.

RATIONALE: Failures caused by human operational error are out-of-scope of this task.

- 6. All hardware analyses will, as a minimum, be performed at the level of analysis existent within NASA/Prime Contractor Orbiter FMEA/CILs, and will be permitted to go to greater hardware detail levels but not lesser.
 - RATIONALE: Comparison of IOA analysis results with other analyses requires that both analyses be performed to a comparable level of detail.
- 7. Verification that a telemetry parameter is actually monitored during AOS by ground-based personnel is not required.

RATIONALE: Analysis of mission-dependent telemetry availability and/or the actual monitoring of applicable data by ground-based personnel is beyond the scope of this task.

8. The determination of criticalities per phase is based on the worst case effect of a failure for the phase being analyzed. The failure can occur in the phase being analyzed or in any previous phase, whichever produces the worst case effects for the phase of interest.

RATIONALE: Assigning phase criticalities ensures a thorough and complete analysis.

9. Analysis of wire harnesses, cables, and electrical connectors to determine if FMEAs are warranted will not be performed nor FMEAs assessed.

> RATIONALE: Analysis was substantially complete prior to NSTS 22206 ground rule redirection.

10. Analysis of welds or brazed joints that cannot be inspected will not be performed nor FMEAs assessed.

Barat Barat RATIONALE: Analysis was substantially complete prior to NSTS 22206 ground rule redirection.

11. Emergency system or hardware will include burst discs and will exclude the EMU Secondary Oxygen Pack (SOP), pressure relief valves and the landing gear pyrotechnics.

> RATIONALE: Clarify definition of emergency systems to ensure consistency throughout IOA project.

APPENDIX B DEFINITIONS, GROUND RULES, AND ASSUMPTIONS

- B.3 BFS-Specific Ground Rules and Assumptions
 - 1. BFS failures are analyzed assuming that the BFS is (or will be) engaged.

RATIONALE: Failure analysis and criticality determination is done assuming that the BFS must work when called upon to do so.

2. Failures which resulted in BFS engagement are not identified or analyzed.

RATIONALE: Except for the PASS, it is assumed that other subsystems are operating within normal limits.

3. Only BFS-specific components and failure modes are analyzed.

RATIONALE: Failure analysis of PASS/BFS common components is accomplished within the PASS analysis.

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APPENDIX C DETAILED ASSESSMENT

This section contains the IOA assessment worksheets generated during the assessment of this subsystem. The information on these worksheets facilitates the comparison of the NASA FMEA/CIL (pre and post 51-L) to the IOA detailed analysis worksheets included in Appendix E. Each of these worksheets idendtifies the NASA FMEA being assessed, corresponding MDAC Analysis Worksheet ID (Appendix E), hardware item, criticality, redundancy screens, and recommendations. For each failure mode, the highest assessed hardware and functional criticality is compared and discrepancies noted as "N" in the compare row under the column where the discrepancy occurred.

LEGEND FOR IOA ASSESSMENT WORKSHEETS

Hardware Criticalities:

- 1 = Loss of life or vehicle
- 2 = Loss of mission or next failure of any redundant item
 - (like or unlike) could cause loss of life/vehicle
- 3 = All others

Functional Criticalities:

1R = Redundant hardware items (like or unlike) all of which, if failed, could cause loss of life or vehicle

2R = Redundant hardware items (like or unlike) all of which, if failed, could cause loss of mission

Redundancy Screens A, B and C:

- P = Passed Screen
- F = Failed Screen
- NA = Not Applicable

NASA Data:

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Baseline = Pre 51-L FMEA/CIL New = Post 51-L FMEA/CIL (Baseline plus Proposed Changes)

CIL Item:

X = Included in CIL

Compare Row:

N = Non compare for that column (deviation)

APPENDIX C ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: 11/24/87 NASA DATA: BASELINE [] NEW [X] ASSESSMENT ID: BFS-101 NASA FMEA #: 05-3-12200A-1 BACKUP FLIGHT SYSTEM SUBSYSTEM: MDAC ID: 101 POWER SUPPLY A(B,C) TO L(R) RHC ITEM: LEAD ANALYST: L.W.HINSDALE/E.E.PRUST ASSESSMENT: REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL CRITICALITY ITEM FLIGHT C HDW/FUNC Α В [F] [P] NASA [3/1R][P] [P] IOA [2/1R] [X] * [X] COMPARE [N /] [] [N]۲ I

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

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* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable) ADEQUATE [X] INADEQUATE [] REMARKS:

THIS HARDWARE ITEM IS COVERED IN THE NASA D&C ANALYSIS.

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REPORT DATE 02/22/88

APPENDIX C ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: ASSESSMENT ID: NASA FMEA #:	BFS-101A	0A-2	1	NASA DATA: BASELINE NEW			
SUBSYSTEM: MDAC ID: ITEM:	101	IGHT SYST) RHC			
LEAD ANALYST:	L.W.HINSD	ALE/E.E.P	RUST				
ASSESSMENT:							
CRITICAL FLIGH		EDUNDANCY	SCREENS		CIL ITEM		
HDW/FU	NC A	В	(C			
NASA [3 /1R IOA [2 /1R	[] [F) [P] [P] []	F] P]	[X]* [X]		
COMPARE [N /] [] [] []	N]	[]		
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* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable) ADEQUATE [X] INADEQUATE [] REMARKS:							
THIS HARDWARE IT	THIS HARDWARE ITEM IS COVERED IN THE NASA D&C ANALYSIS.						

REPORT DATE 02/22/88

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APPENDIX C ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE ASSESSMENT ID: NASA FMEA #:	BFS-101B	00B-1	NASA DATA: BASELINE [] NEW [X]			
SUBSYSTEM: MDAC ID: ITEM:	BACKUP FI 101 POWER SUP	R) RHC				
LEAD ANALYST:	L.W.HINSD	L.W.HINSDALE/E.E.PRUST				
ASSESSMENT:						
CRITICALITY FLIGHT		Y REDUNDANCY SCREENS				
HDW/F		АВ	С			
NASA [3 /1 IOA [2 /1	R] [P R] [P	P] [P] [P] [P] [F [X] * P [X] *			
COMPARE [N /] [] [] [и] []			
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)						
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* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable) ADEQUATE [X] INADEQUATE []						
REMARKS: THIS HARDWARE ITEM IS COVERED IN THE NASA D&C ANALYSIS.						

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ASSESSMENT DATE: ASSESSMENT ID: NASA FMEA #:	BFS-101C	0B-2		NASA DATA BASELINE NEW	
SUBSYSTEM: MDAC ID: ITEM:	BACKUP FL 101 POWER SUP			L(R) RHC	
LEAD ANALYST:	L.W.HINSD	ALE/E	E. PRUST		
ASSESSMENT:					
FLIGH			ANCY SCRE	ENS C	CIL ITEM
HDW/FU	NC A		D	C	
NASA [3 /1R IOA [2 /1R	[P [] [P]	[P] [P]	[F] [P]	[X]* [X]
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* CIL RETENTION	RATIONALE:	(If a	applicabl	e) ADEQUATE INADEQUATE	
REMARKS: THIS HARDWARE IT	EM IS COVE	RED IN	N THE NAS	A D&C ANALYS	SIS.

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NASA DATA: ASSESSMENT DATE: 11/24/87 BASELINE [] NEW [X] ASSESSMENT ID: BFS-201 NASA FMEA #: 05-5-B30-1-2 BACKUP FLIGHT SYSTEM SUBSYSTEM: MDAC ID: 201 ITEM: HALT RELAY LEAD ANALYST: L.W.HINSDALE/E.E.PRUST ASSESSMENT: CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL FLIGHT ITEM HDW/FUNC A В С

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THE IOA RECOMMENDS THAT A FUNCTIONAL DESCRIPTION OF THE HALT RELAY AND AN EXPLANATION OF THE FAILED CLOSED CONSEQUENCES BE ADDED TO THE FMEA FOR COMPLETENESS.

REPORT DATE 02/22/88

OUTPUT FMEA.

ASSESSMENT DATE: 11/24/87 NASA DATA: ASSESSMENT ID: BFS-202 BASELINE [NEW [X] NASA FMEA #: 05-5-B30-1-2 BACKUP FLIGHT SYSTEM SUBSYSTEM: MDAC ID: 202 HALT RELAY ITEM: LEAD ANALYST: L.W.HINSDALE/E.E.PRUST ASSESSMENT: REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL CRITICALITY ITEM FLIGHT В С HDW/FUNC Α [F] [F] [P] [F] [P] NASA [2/1R][X] * [P] IOA [3 /2R] [] [N] COMPARE [N/N] [N] [] [] **RECOMMENDATIONS:** (If different from NASA) []] (ADD/DELETE) * CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable) ADEQUATE [X] INADEQUATE ſ 1 **REMARKS:** THE IOA IDENTIFIED COMPONENT FAILURES WITHIN A BFC. THE FMEA

THE IOA IDENTIFIED COMPONENT FAILURES WITHIN A BFC. THE FMEA TREATED THE BFC AS A BLACK BOX. THE IOA AGREES THAT FAILURE OF THE HALT RELAY IS COVERED BY THE BFC LOSS OF OUTPUT/ERRONEOUS OUTPUT FMEA. THE IOA RECOMMENDS THAT A FUNCTIONAL DESCRIPTION OF THE HALT RELAY AND AN EXPLANATION OF THE FAILED OPEN CONSEQUENCES BE ADDED TO THE FMEA FOR COMPLETENESS.

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ASSESSMENT DATE:	11/24/87	NASA DATA:
ASSESSMENT ID:	BFS-203	BASELINE []
NASA FMEA #:	05-5-B30-1-2	NEW [X]
SUBSYSTEM: MDAC ID: ITEM:	BACKUP FLIGHT SYSTEM 203 HAND CONTROLLER ENGAGE	DRIVER

LEAD ANALYST: L.W.HINSDALE/E.E.PRUST

ASSESSMENT:

	CR		ICALI LIGHI			REDUNDANCY					SCREENS			CIL ITEM					
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NASA IOA	[[2 2	/1R /1R]]	[[F P]]		[[F F]]	[[P P]			X X		*
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RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

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* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

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REMARKS:

THE IOA IDENTIFIED COMPONENT FAILURES WITHIN A BFC. THE FMEA TREATED THE BFC AS A BLACK BOX. THE IOA AGREES THAT FAILURE OF THE HALT CONTROLLER ENGAGE DRIVER IS COVERED BY THE BFC LOSS OF OUTPUT/ERRONEOUS OUTPUT FMEA.

ASSESSMENT DATE: 11/24/87 NASA DATA: BASELINE [] NEW [X] ASSESSMENT ID: BFS-204 NASA FMEA #: 05-5-B30-1-2 BACKUP FLIGHT SYSTEM SUBSYSTEM: MDAC ID: 204 HAND CONTROLLER ENGAGE DRIVER ITEM: LEAD ANALYST: L.W.HINSDALE/E.E.PRUST ASSESSMENT: CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL FLIGHT ITEM HDW/FUNC A в С [F] [F] [P] [X] * NASA [2/1R][P] [P] [P] [X] IOA $\begin{bmatrix} 1 / 1 \end{bmatrix}$ COMPARE [N /N] [] RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)] F (ADD/DELETE) * CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable) ADEQUATE [X] INADEQUATE [] **REMARKS:**

THE IOA IDENTIFIED COMPONENT FAILURES WITHIN A BFC. THE FMEA TREATED THE BFC AS A BLACK BOX. THE IOA AGREES THAT FAILURE OF THE HALT CONTROLLER ENGAGE DRIVER IS COVERED BY THE BFC LOSS OF OUTPUT/ERRONEOUS OUTPUT FMEA.

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ASSESSMENT DATE: ASSESSMENT ID: NASA FMEA #:	BFS-205		1	NASA DATA: BASELINE NEW	[]
SUBSYSTEM: MDAC ID: ITEM:	205	LIGHT SYSTI				
LEAD ANALYST:	L.W.HINSD	ALE/E.E.PH	RUST			
ASSESSMENT:						
CRITICAL		REDUNDANCY	SCREENS		CIL ITEM	r
FLIGH HDW/FU		В	C	С	IIEP.	L
NASA [2 /1R IOA [1 /1] [F] [P	7] [F >] [F] [1]	P] NA]	[X [X] *]
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TREATED THE BFC AS A BLACK BOX. THE IOA AGREES THAT FAILURE OF THE ENGAGE/DISENGAGE LOGIC IS COVERED BY THE BFC LOSS OF OUTPUT/ERRONEOUS OUTPUT FMEA.

ASSESSME ASSESSME NASA FME	NT ID:	11/24/8 BFS-206			NASA DAT BASELIN NE	E[]
SUBSYSTE MDAC ID: ITEM:	M:	BACKUP 206 CRT SEL				-
LEAD ANA	LYST:	L.W.HIN	SDALE/I	E.E.PRUST		• •
ASSESSME	NT:					
	CRITICAI FLIGH HDW/FU	ſT	REDUNI A	DANCY SCRI B	EENS	CIL ITEM
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THE IOA IDENTIFIED COMPONENT FAILURES WITHIN A BFC. THE NASA ANALYSIS TREATED THE BFC AS A BLACK BOX. IF NASA GENERATES A NON-CIL BFC FMEA, THE IOA SUGGESTS A FUNCTIONAL DESCRIPTION OF THE CRT SELECT LOGIC AND AN EXPLANATION OF THE LOSS OF OUTPUT/ERRONEOUS OUTPUT FAILURE CONSEQUENCES BE INCLUDED FOR COMPLETENESS.

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REPORT DATE 02/22/88

ASSESSMENT DATE: ASSESSMENT ID: NASA FMEA #:	11/24/87 BFS-207 05-5-B30-1-2	NASA DATA: BASELINE [] NEW [X]
SUBSYSTEM: MDAC ID: ITEM:	BACKUP FLIGHT SYSTEM 207 BFC POWER SUPPLY (5 VDC)	.,
LEAD ANALYST:	L.W.HINSDALE/E.E.PRUST	

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT					REDUNDANCY SCREENS								CIL ITEM						
	HDW/FUNC					Α			В			С								
NASA IOA	[[2 1	/1R /1]]		ן נ	F P]]		[[F F]]	[נ		P] NA]		[[X X]]	*
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REMARKS:

THE IOA IDENTIFIED COMPONENT FAILURES WITHIN A BFC. THE FMEA TREATED THE BFC AS A BLACK BOX. THE IOA AGREES THAT FAILURE OF THE 5 VDC BFC POWER SUPPLY IS COVERED BY THE BFC LOSS OF OUTPUT/ERRONEOUS OUTPUT FMEA.

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_	ASSESSMENT DATE: ASSESSMENT ID: NASA FMEA #:		NASA DATA: BASELINE [] NEW [X]
_	SUBSYSTEM: MDAC ID: ITEM:	BACKUP FLIGHT SYSTEM 208 POWER UP/DOWN MONITOR	LOGIC
_	LEAD ANALYST:	L.W.HINSDALE/E.E.PRUS	Г
	ASSESSMENT:		
-	FLIGH		REENS CIL ITEM
	HDW/FU	NC A B	С
	NASA [2 /1R IOA [1 /1	[F] [F] [P] [F]	[P] [X] * [NA] [X]
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		UT/ERRONEOUS OUTPUT FM	

REPORT DATE 02/22/88 C-13

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ASSESSMENT DATE: ASSESSMENT ID: NASA FMEA #:	11/24/87 BFS-209 05-5-B30-1-2	NASA DATA: BASELINE [] NEW [X]
SUBSYSTEM: MDAC ID: ITEM:	BACKUP FLIGHT SYSTEM 209 POWER UP/DOWN MONITOR	LOGIC
		m

LEAD ANALYST: L.W.HINSDALE/E.E.PRUST

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT	REDUN	IDANCY SCR	EENS	CIL ITEM				
	HDW/FUNC	A	B	С	••• «				
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* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

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REMARKS:

THE IOA IDENTIFIED COMPONENT FAILURES WITHIN A BFC. THE FMEA TREATED THE BFC AS A BLACK BOX. THE IOA AGREES THAT LOSS OF OUTPUT FROM THE POWER UP/DOWN MONITOR LOGIC IS COVERED BY THE BFC LOSS OF OUTPUT/ERRONEOUS OUTPUT FMEA.

REPORT DATE 02/22/88

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ASSESSME ASSESSME NASA FME	NT ID:	BFS-2			BASELINE	NASA DATA: BASELINE [] NEW [X]				
SUBSYSTE MDAC ID: ITEM:		210	JP FLIGHT JP FLIGHT		ER - BFC 2					
LEAD ANA	LYST:	L.W.H	HINSDALE							
ASSESSME	NT:									
	CRITICAL FLIGH		REDUN	DANCY SCR	EENS	CIL ITEM				
	HDW/FU		A	В	с	1154				
NASA IOA	[3 /1] [3 /1]	R] R]	[P] [P]	[F] [F]	[P] [P]	[X] * [X]				
COMPARE	[/]	[]	[]	[]	[]]				
		•		nt from N	[]	[] ADD/DELETE)				
REMARKS:				applicab SSESSMENT	·	[X] []				
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ASSESSMENT DATE: ASSESSMENT ID: NASA FMEA #:	BFS-301	1-1		NASA DATA BASELINE NEW						
SUBSYSTEM: MDAC ID: ITEM:	301	CKUP FLIGHT SYSTEM 1 CKUP GPC (USUALLY GPC 5)								
LEAD ANALYST:	L.W.HINSD	L.W.HINSDALE/E.E.PRUST								
ASSESSMENT:										
CRITICAL FLIGH		EDUNDANC	CY SCREE	NS	CIL ITEM					
HDW/FU	NC A		В	С						
NASA [2 /1R IOA [1 /1] [P]] [P] [] [P] F]	[P] [F]	[X]* [X]					
COMPARE [N /N	J (] [N]	[N]	[]					
RECOMMENDATIONS:	(If dif	ferent f	from NAS	A)						
<u> </u>	j t] []	[] (A	[] .DD/DELETE)					
	* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable) ADEQUATE [X] INADEQUATE []									
REMARKS: NASA PREPARED SEPARATE FMEAS FOR THE CPU AND IOP. THE IOA										

TREATED THE GPC AS ONE BLACK BOX. THE FMEA COUNTED PASS FAILURES IN ADDITION TO THE BFS GPC FAILURE WHEN ASSIGNING CRITICALITY. THE IOA ASSIGNED CRITICALITY BASED ON THE ASSUMPTION THE BFS WAS OR WOULD BE ENGAGED. SINCE BOTH ANALYSIS METHODS CONCLUDE THAT GPC (CPU AND OR IOP) LOSS OF OUTPUT IS JUSTIFICATION FOR INCLUSION ON THE CIL, THE IOA RECOMMENDS THE FMEA CRITICALITIES BE RETAINED.

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ASSESSMENT DATE: ASSESSMENT ID: NASA FMEA #:		1-1	NASA DATA: BASELINE [] NEW [X]								
SUBSYSTEM: MDAC ID: ITEM:	301	IGHT SYSTEM C (USUALLY GPC 5)								
LEAD ANALYST:	L.W.HINSDA										
ASSESSMENT:											
CRITICAL FLIGH		DUNDANCY SCREEN		CIL ITEM							
	NC A	В	С	1 I DM							
NASA [2 /1R IOA [1 /1] [P] [P] [P] [] [F] [P] F]	[X]* [X]							
COMPARE [N /N] [] [N] [N]	[]							
RECOMMENDATIONS:	(If diff	ferent from NASA)								
[/] [] [] [[] D/DELETE)							
* CIL RETENTION	RATIONALE:	(If applicable)									
		I	ADEQUATE NADEQUATE	[X] []							
REMARKS: NASA PREPARED SE	PARATE FMEA	AS FOR THE CPU A	ND IOP. TH	E IOA							
TREATED THE GPC A THE FMEA COUNTED			TO THE BES	GPC FAILURE							
WHEN ASSIGNING C	RITICALITY.	THE IOA ASSIG	NED CRITICAL								
ON THE ASSUMPTION	N THE BFS W	AS OR WOULD BE	ENGAGED.								

SINCE BOTH ANALYSIS METHODS CONCLUDE THAT GPC (CPU AND OR IOP) LOSS OF OUTPUT IS JUSTIFICATION FOR INCLUSION ON THE CIL, THE IOA RECOMMENDS THE FMEA CRITICALITIES BE RETAINED.

REPORT DATE 02/22/88 C-17

ASSESSMENT DATE: ASSESSMENT ID: NASA FMEA #:	11/24/87 BFS-302 05-5-B01-1-2	NASA DATA: BASELINE [] NEW [X]
SUBSYSTEM: MDAC ID: ITEM:	BACKUP FLIGHT SYSTEM 302 BACKUP GPC (USUALLY GPC 5)
LEAD ANALYST:	L.W.HINSDALE/E.E.PRUST	

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICA		REDUI	NDANCY SCR	REENS	CIL ITEM			
	HDW/H		A	В	С				
NASA IOA	[1 /] [1 /]	L] L]	[] [P]	[] [F]	[] [F]	[X]* [X]			
COMPARE	[/]	[И]	[N]	[N]	[]			

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

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						1	J		
L		1	L	1	L .	1	L .		L J
-	•		-	-					(ADD/DELETE)
									(ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

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ADEQUATE [X] INADEQUATE []

REMARKS:

NASA PREPARED SEPARATE FMEAS FOR THE CPU AND IOP. THE IOA TREATED THE GPC AS ONE BLACK BOX. THE FMEA COUNTED PASS FAILURES IN ADDITION TO THE BFS GPC FAILURE WHEN ASSIGNING CRITICALITY. THE IOA ASSIGNED CRITICALITY BASED ON THE ASSUMPTION THE BFS WAS OR WOULD BE ENGAGED. SINCE BOTH ANALYSIS METHODS CONCLUDE THAT GPC (CPU AND OR IOP) ERRONEOUS OUTPUT IS JUSTIFICATION FOR INCLUSION ON THE CIL, THE IOA RECOMMENDS THE FMEA CRITICALITIES BE RETAINED.

REPORT DATE 02/22/88

C-18

ASSESSMENT DATE: ASSESSMENT ID: NASA FMEA #:	BFS-302A 05-5-B02-1-2	NASA DATA: BASELINE [] NEW [X]								
SUBSYSTEM: MDAC ID: ITEM:	BACKUP FLIGHT SYSTEM 302 BACKUP GPC (USUALLY GPC 5)									
LEAD ANALYST:	L.W.HINSDALE/E.E.PRUST									
ASSESSMENT:										
	ITY REDUNDANCY SCREEN									
FLIGH HDW/FUI		ITEM C								
NASA [1 /1 IOA [1 /1] [] [] [] [P] [F] [] [X]* F] [X]								
COMPARE [/] [N] [N] [и] []								
RECOMMENDATIONS:	(If different from NASA)								
[/] [] [] [] [] []] [] (ADD/DELETE)								
* CIL RETENTION 1	RATIONALE: (If applicable)	ADEQUATE [X] NADEQUATE []								
TREATED THE GPC	PARATE FMEAS FOR THE CPU A AS ONE BLACK BOX.	ND IOP. THE IOA								
	PASS FAILURES IN ADDITION RITICALITY. THE IOA ASSIG									

ON THE ASSUMPTION THE BFS WAS OR WOULD BE ENGAGED. SINCE BOTH ANALYSIS METHODS CONCLUDE THAT GPC (CPU AND OR IOP) ERRONEOUS OUTPUT IS JUSTIFICATION FOR INCLUSION ON THE CIL, THE IOA RECOMMENDS THE FMEA CRITICALITIES BE RETAINED.

REPORT DATE 02/22/88

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C-19

ASSESSMENT DATE: ASSESSMENT ID: NASA FMEA #:	11/24/87 BFS-401 05-5-B32-1-1		NASA DATA: BASELINE [] NEW [X]				
SUBSYSTEM: MDAC ID: ITEM:	BACKUP FLIGHT S 401 BFS ENGAGE PUSH			1			
LEAD ANALYST:	L.W.HINSDALE/E.	E.PRUST					
ASSESSMENT:							
CRITICAL FLIGH	T	NCY SCREEN	s c	CIL ITEM			
HDW/FU	NC A	В	C				
NASA [3 /1R IOA [2 /1R] [P]] [P]	[F] [[F] [P] P]	[X]* [X]			

COMPARE [N /] [] [] [] []

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

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* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

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ADEQUATE [X] INADEQUATE []

REMARKS:

THE FMEA COUNTED PASS FAILURES IN ADDITION TO BFS ENGAGE SWITCH FAILURES WHEN ASSIGNING CRITICALITY. THE IOA ASSIGNED CRITICALITY BASED ON THE ASSUMPTION THE BFS WOULD BE ENGAGED. SINCE BOTH ANALYSIS METHODS CONCLUDE THAT OPEN CONTACT FAILURE OF THE ENGAGE SWITCH IS JUSTIFICATION FOR INCLUSION ON THE CIL, THE IOA RECOMMENDS THE FMEA CRITICALITY BE RETAINED.

REPORT DATE 02/22/88

ASSESSMENT DATE: ASSESSMENT ID: NASA FMEA #:			NASA DATA BASELINE NEW	[]							
	BACKUP FLIGHT 402 BFS ENGAGE PU										
LEAD ANALYST:	L.W.HINSDALE/E.E.PRUST										
ASSESSMENT:											
CRITICAL FLIGH HDW/FU	Г	IDANCY SCRE	ENS C	CIL ITEM							
NASA [/ IOA [3 /3] []] [P]	[] [P]	[] [NA]	[] * []							
COMPARE [N /N] [N]	[N]	[N]	[]							
RECOMMENDATIONS:	(If differe	ent from NAS	ŜA)	1 12 1 ⁷ - 1							
[3 /3] [P]	[P]	[NA] (A	[] DD/DELETE)							
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable) ADEQUATE [] INADEQUATE []											
REMARKS: THE FAIL CLOSED MODE FOR THE ENGAGE PUSHBUTTON CONTACTS WOULD CAUSE INADVERTENT BFS ENGAGEMENT. THIS ALONE IS NOT JUSTIFICATION FOR INCLUSION ON THE CIL. HOWEVER, THE IOA CONSIDERS THIS TO BE A HIGHLY UNDESIRABLE FAILURE AND RECOMMENDS IT BE COVERED IN THE UPDATED FMEAS FOR NON-CIL ITEMS.											

REPORT DATE 02/22/88 C-21

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ASSESSME	ASSESSMENT DATE: 11/24/8 ASSESSMENT ID: BFS-403 NASA FMEA #:						7						NASA DATA BASELINI NEV	Ε []	
MDAC ID: 403				BACKUP FLIGHT SYSTEM 403 BFC DISENGAGE SWITCH													
LEAD ANALYST: I				L.W	L.W.HINSDALE/E.E.PRUST												
ASSESSMENT:																	
CRITICALITY FLIGHT						REDUNDANCY SCREENS							CIL ITEM				
]	HD	N/FUI	NC			Α			в			C				
NASA IOA	[[3	/ /2R]]		[[P]	[נ	F]	[[] NA]	[[]	*
COMPARE	נ	N	/N]		[N]	[N]	נ	N]	[]	
RECOMMEN	IDA'	FI (ONS:	(If	di	ff	fere	nt	fro	om N	ASA)				
• .	[3	/2R]		[P]	۵	P]	[NA]] ADD	/DE] LE'	TE)
* CIL RE	TE	NT:	ION	RATI	ONA	LE	E :	(If	ар	pl:	icab		ADEQUATE VADEQUATE	[]	
REMARKS:	,													ι		1	

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AS A RESULT OF FURTHER REVIEW, THE IOA CONCLUDES THAT THE B SCREEN FAILURE SHOULD BE CHANGED TO PASS. THE IOA RECOMMENDS THE FAIL OPEN MODE FOR THE BFC DISENGAGE SWITCH BE COVERED IN THE UPDATED FMEA FOR NON-CIL ITEMS. 2. (2) 株式 (1,1) (1,1) (1,1) (2) 株式 (1,1) (1

ASSESSMENT DATE: ASSESSMENT ID: NASA FMEA #:	BFS-404							
SUBSYSTEM: MDAC ID: ITEM:	BACKUP FL 404 BFC DISEN							
LEAD ANALYST:	L.W.HINSD	ALE/E.E.	PRUST					
ASSESSMENT:								
CRITICAL	NS	CIL ITEM						
FLIGH HDW/FU			В	L I CM				
NASA [2 /1R IOA [1 /1] [P]] [P] [] [F] F]	[P] [NA]	[X]* [X]			
COMPARE [N /N] [] []	[N]	[]			
RECOMMENDATIONS:	(If dif	ferent i	from NAS	A)				
[/	ן נ] []	[] (A	[] DD/DELETE)			
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable) ADEQUATE [X] INADEQUATE []								
REMARKS: THE FMEA COUNTED PASS FAILURES IN ADDITION TO BFC DISENGAGE SWITCH CONTACTS BEING FAILED CLOSED WHEN ASSIGNING CRITICALITY. THE IOA ASSIGNED CRITICALITY BASED ON THE ASSUMPTION THE BFS								

WOULD BE ENGAGED. SINCE BOTH ANALYSIS METHODS CONCLUDE THAT THE SWITCH FAILURE MODE IS JUSTIFICATION FOR INCLUSION ON THE CIL, THE IOA RECOMMENDS THE FMEA CRITICALITY BE RETAINED.

REPORT DATE 02/22/88 C-23

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ASSESSMENT DATE: ASSESSMENT ID: NASA FMEA #:	11/24/87 BFS-405			NASA DATA BASELINE NEW	[]		
	405	BACKUP FLIGHT SYSTEM 405 BFC CRT DISPLAY SWITCH						
LEAD ANALYST:	ANALYST: L.W.HINSDALE/E.E.PRUST							
ASSESSMENT:								
CRITICAL FLIGH HDW/FU	Т	DUNDANCY	SCREENS	с.	CIL ITEN	1		
1104710		2	-					
NASA [/ IOA [3 /3] [] [P] [] [P] [] [] NA]	[[] *]		
COMPARE [N /N] [N]] [И] [N]	[]		
RECOMMENDATIONS:	(If diffe	erent fro	om NASA)					
[3 /3] [P]] [P] [NA] (AI	[DD/DE] ELETE)		
* CIL RETENTION	RATIONALE:	(If appli		ADEQUATE IADEQUATE	[[]]		
REMARKS: THE FAIL OPEN MO				SWITCH IS				

IENT FOR INCLUSION ON THE CIL. THE IOA RECOMMENDS IT BE COVERED IN THE UPDATED FMEAS FOR NON-CIL ITEMS.

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REPORT DATE 02/22/88 C-24

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ASSESSMENT DATE: 11/24/87 NASA DATA: BASELINE [ASSESSMENT ID: BFS-406 NEW [NASA FMEA #: 1 BACKUP FLIGHT SYSTEM SUBSYSTEM: MDAC ID: 406 BFC CRT SELECT SWITCH ITEM: LEAD ANALYST: L.W.HINSDALE/E.E.PRUST ASSESSMENT: REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL CRITICALITY ITEM FLIGHT HDW/FUNC Α В С NASA [] [P] [] [P] [] [NA] [IOA [3 /3 1 [N] [N] COMPARE [N /N] [N] ſ 1 RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA) [3/3] [P] [P] [NA] Γ] (ADD/DELETE) * CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable) ADEQUATE Γ] INADEQUATE Γ 1 **REMARKS:** THE FAIL OPEN, FAIL TO SWITCH, AND ERRONEOUS OUTPUT MODES FOR THE

BFC CRT SELECT SWITCH ARE INSUFFICIENT FOR INCLUSION ON THE CIL. THE IOA RECOMMENDS THEY BE COVERED IN THE UPDATED FMEAS FOR NON-CIL ITEMS. 3/3.

C-25

ASSESSMENT DATE: ASSESSMENT ID: NASA FMEA #:	11/24/87 BFS-407 05-6S-BSW7-1	NASA DATA: BASELINE [] NEW [X]
SUBSYSTEM: MDAC ID: ITEM:	BACKUP FLIGHT SYSTEM 407 BFS GPC (USUALLY GPC 5)	POWER SWITCH
LEAD ANALYST:	L.W.HINSDALE/E.E.PRUST	

ASSESSMENT:

	CRITICALITY FLIGHT	REDUN	DANCY SCREENS	CIL ITEM			
	HDW/FUNC	A	B C				
NASA IOA	[2 /1R] [1 /1]	[P] [P]	[P] [P] [P] [F]	[X]* [X]			
COMPARE	[N/N]	[]	[][И]	[]			

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[1]	[]	[]	[]	[]
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* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

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ADEQUATE [X] INADEQUATE []

REMARKS:

THE FMEA COUNTED A GENERIC PASS FAILURE IN ADDITION TO BFS GPC SWITCH FAILURE WHEN ASSIGNING CRITICALITY. THE IOA ASSIGNED CRITICALITY BASED ON THE ASSUMPTION BFS WAS OR WOULD BE ENGAGED. SINCE BOTH ANALYSIS METHODS CONCLUDE THAT GPC POWER SWITCH FAIL OPEN CONTACTS IS SUFFICIENT JUSTIFICATION FOR INCLUSION ON THE CIL, THE IOA RECOMMENDS THE FMEA CRITICALITY BE RETAINED.

REPORT DATE 02/22/88

C-26

ASSESSMENT DATE: ASSESSMENT ID: NASA FMEA #:	11/30/8 BFS-408 05-5-B1		-	NASA DATA: BASELINE [] NEW [X]			
SUBSYSTEM: MDAC ID: ITEM:	BACKUP 408 BFS GPC			OUTPUT SWIT	сн		
LEAD ANALYST: L.W.HINSDALE/E.E.PRUST							
ASSESSMENT:							
CRITICAL FLIGH HDW/FU	T	REDUND	ANCY SCRE	ENS	CIL ITEM		
NASA [2/1R	1 r	וק	רדו	רפו	Г X] *		
IOA [1 /1	j į	P] P]	[F] [P]	[P] [F]	[X]* [X]		
COMPARE [N /N] []	[N]	[N]	[]		
RECOMMENDATIONS:	(If d	ifferen	t from NA	SA)	- · · .		
[/] []	[]	[] (A	[] .DD/DELETE)		
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable) ADEQUATE [X] INADEQUATE []							
REMARKS: THE FMEA COUNTED PASS GENERIC FAILURE IN ADDITION TO BFS GPC OUTPUT SWITCH FAILURE WHEN ASSIGNING CRITICALITY. THE IOA ASSIGNED CRITICALITY BASED ON THE ASSUMPTION THE BFS WOULD BE							

ENGAGED. SINCE BOTH ANALYSIS METHODS CONCLUDE THAT ERRONEOUS OPERATION OF THE GPC OUTPUT SWITCH IS JUSTIFICATION FOR INCLUSION ON THE CIL, THE IOA RECOMMENDS THE FMEA CRITICALITY BE RETAINED.

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C-27

ASSESSMENT DATE: ASSESSMENT ID: NASA FMEA #:	BFS-409	SA DATA: ASELINE [] NEW [X]						
SUBSYSTEM: MDAC ID: ITEM:	409	BACKUP FLIGHT SYSTEM 409 BFS GPC (USUALLY GPC 5) MODE SWITCH						
LEAD ANALYST:	L.W.HINSDALE/E.E.PRUST							
ASSESSMENT:			a an					
CRITICAL FLIGH	Г	ANCY SCREENS	CIL ITEM					
HDW/FU	NC A	B C						
NASA [2 /1R IOA [1 /1] [P]] [P]	[F] [P [P] [F] [X]*] [X]					
COMPARE [N /N] []	[N] [N] []					
RECOMMENDATIONS:	(If differen	t from NASA)						
[/] []	ניז נ] [] (ADD/DELETE)					
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable) ADEQUATE [X] INADEQUATE []								
REMARKS: THE FMEA COUNTED PASS GENERIC FAILURE IN ADDITION TO BFS GPC MODE								
SWITCH FAILURE W CRITICALITY BASE	HEN ASSIGNING C D ON THE ASSUMP	RITICALITY. T TION THE BFS W	HE IOA ASSIGNED					

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SINCE BOTH ANALYSIS METHODS CONCLUDE THAT ERRONEOUS OPERATION OF THE GPC MODE SWITCH IS JUSTIFICATION FOR INCLUSION ON THE CIL, THE IOA RECOMMENDS THE FMEA CRITICALITY BE RETAINED.

REPORT DATE 02/22/88 C-28

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ASSESSMENT DATE: ASSESSMENT ID: NASA FMEA #:	BFS-501	3A-1		NASA DATA BASELINE NEW	
SUBSYSTEM: MDAC ID: ITEM: TO L(R) DDU	501		- MAIN A	(B,C) SUPPLY	
LEAD ANALYST:	L.W.HINSD	ALE/E.E.	PRUST		
ASSESSMENT:					
CRITICAL FLIGH HDW/FU	т		CY SCREEN B	s c	CIL ITEM
NASA [3 /1R IOA [3 /1R] [P] [P] [] [F] [P] [P] P]	[X] * [X]
COMPARE [/] [] [N] []	[]
RECOMMENDATIONS:	(If dif	ferent i	from NASA	.)	
[/] [] [] [[] DD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION REMARKS:			I	ADEQUATE NADEQUATE	

THE IOA BFS ANALYSIS AGREES WITH THE BASELINE FMEA (EPD& D&C SUBSYSTEM).

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ASSESSME ASSESSME NASA FME	NT C NT I A #:	DATE:	11/30 BFS-5 05-60	11/30/87 BFS-501A 05-6Q-2103B-1 BACKUP FLIGHT SYSTEM					NASA E BASEI	INE]]	
SUBSYSTE MDAC ID: ITEM: TO L(R)			501								(B,C) SUPI	PLY
LEAD ANA	LYSI	:	L.W.H	IINSI	DALE/1	E.E.I	PRUSI	2					
ASSESSME	NT:												
	F	'ICAL 'LIGH W/FU		F			CSCF	REENS		1 <u>.</u>	CIL ITE	M	
NASA IOA	[3	/1R /1R]	[I [I)] -	[]	7] 9]	[]]	P] P]		[X [X] *]	
COMPARE	[/]	[]	[]	1]	Γ]		[]	
RECOMMEN	DATI	ons:	(If	dif	fere	nt fi	om N	IASA)					
	נ	/]	[]	נ]	[]	(A] וס / סס] ELETE))
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable) ADEQUATE [X] INADEQUATE []													
REMARKS: THE IOA BFS ANALYSIS AGREES WITH THE BASELINE FMEA (EPD&C- D&C SUBSYSTEM).													

ASSESSMENT DATE: ASSESSMENT ID: NASA FMEA #: SUBSYSTEM:	11/30/87 BFS-502 05-6S-BFUS4-1	: [] 7 [X]						
MDAC ID: ITEM:	502 FUSE F9, 1 AM	ACKUP FLIGHT SYSTEM 02 USE F9, 1 AMP CNTL BUS AB3 SUPP ND BFC MODULES 1A & 1B (HCED & ENG)						
LEAD ANALYST:	L.W.HINSDALE/	E.E.PRUST						
ASSESSMENT:								
FLIGH	ITY REDUN I NC A	DANCY SCRE	ENS C	CIL ITEM				
NASA [2 /1R IOA [1 /1] [P]] [P]	[F] [F]	[P] [F]	[X]* [X]				
COMPARE [N /N] []	[]]	[N]	[]				
RECOMMENDATIONS:	(If differe	nt from NA	SA)					
[/] []	[]	[] (A	[] NDD/DELETE)				
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable) ADEQUATE [X] INADEQUATE []								
REMARKS: ONE FMEA COVERS	FUSES F9, F10,	AND F11.	THE IOA PRE	PARED				

ONE FMEA COVERS FUSES F9, F10, AND F11. THE IOA PREPARED SEPARATE ANALYSIS WORKSHEETS FOR EACH FUSE BECAUSE THE FAILURE EFFECTS ARE DIFFERENT. THE IOA AGREES THAT FAIL OPEN OF FUSE F11 (CIRCUIT PROTECTION FOR CONTROL BUS CA1) RESULTS IN LOSS OF ABILITY TO ENGAGE BFS. IF EITHER F9 OR F10 (CIRCUIT PROTECTION FOR CONTROL BUS AB3) FAILS OPEN, THE ABILITY TO ENGAGE BFS EXISTS BUT THE AUTOMATIC DISENGAGE OF GPCS THAT INTERFACE WITH MODULES A AND B IN BFC 1 (NORMALLY GPCS 1 AND 4) AND MODULE A IN BFC 2 (NORMALLY GPC 2) IS LOST, I.E., A FORCE FIGHT BETWEEN THE BFS GPC AND THREE PASS GPCS COULD DEVELOP. SINCE BOTH ANALYSIS METHODS CONCLUDE THAT OPEN FAILURE OF THE FUSES IS JUSTIFICATION FOR INCLUSION ON THE CIL, THE IOA RECOMMENDS THE FMEA CRITICALITY BE RETAINED.

ASSESSME	NT	I	D:	BFS-5							BASELINI	DATA: LINE [] NEW [X]						
SUBSYSTE MDAC ID: ITEM: DISENGAG				503 FUSE	BACKUP FLIGHT SYSTEM 503 FUSE F10, 1 AMP CNTL BUS AND BFC MODULE 2A - HCED & 1						AB3 SUI ENGAGE I	PPI	JA JA	ч С	.'O			
LEAD ANALYST: L.W.HINSDALE/E.E.PRUST																		
ASSESSMENT:																		
	CR		ICAL	ITY F		RI	EDUND	AN	СХ	SCRE	EN	S					I	
]	HD	W/FUI	NC		A			В			С						
NASA IOA	[[2 1	/1R /1]	[[P P]]	[[F F]]	[[P F]]	((X X]	*
COMPARE	[N	/N]	[]	נ]	[N]	(•]	
RECOMMEN	'DA'	TI	ONS:	(If	đ	if	feren	t	fro	om NA	SA)						
	[/]	[]	[]	[]		5/1			ETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable) ADEQUATE [X]																		

INADEQUATE []

REMARKS:

ONE FMEA COVERS FUSES F9, F10, AND F11. THE IOA PREPARED SEPARATE ANALYSIS WORKSHEETS FOR EACH FUSE BECAUSE THE FAILURE EFFECTS ARE DIFFERENT. THE IOA AGREES THAT FAIL OPEN OF FUSE F11 (CIRCUIT PROTECTION FOR CONTROL BUS CA1) RESULTS IN LOSS OF ABILITY TO ENGAGE BFS. IF EITHER F9 OR F10 (CIRCUIT PROTECTION FOR CONTROL BUS AB3) FAILS OPEN, THE ABILITY TO ENGAGE BFS EXISTS BUT THE AUTOMATIC DISENGAGE OF GPCS THAT INTERFACE WITH MODULES A AND B IN BFC 1 (NORMALLY GPCS 1 AND 4) AND MODULE A IN BFC 2 (NORMALLY GPC 2) IS LOST, I.E., A FORCE FIGHT BETWEEN THE BFS GPC AND THREE PASS GPCS COULD DEVELOP. SINCE BOTH ANALYSIS METHODS CONCLUDE THAT OPEN FAILURE OF THE FUSES IS JUSTIFICATION FOR INCLUSION ON THE CIL, THE IOA RECOMMENDS THE FMEA CRITICALITY BE RETAINED.

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REPORT DATE 02/22/88

ASSESSMENT DATE: ASSESSMENT ID: NASA FMEA #:	11/30/87 BFS-504 05-6S-BFUS4-1	11/30/87 NASA DATA: BFS-504 BASELINE 05-6S-BFUS4-1 NEW						
MDAC ID: ITEM:	BACKUP FLIGHT SYSTEM 504 FUSE F11, 1 AMP CNTL BUS CA1 SUPF SWITCH AND BFC MODULES 2B, 3A, 3B - HCED &							
LEAD ANALYST:	L.W.HINSDALE/E	.E.PRUST						
ASSESSMENT:								
FLIGH	ITY REDUNDA	ANCY SCREENS	CIL ITEM					
HDW/FU	NC A	B C						
NASA [2 /1R IOA [1 /1	[P] [P]	[F] [P] [F] [F]	[X]* [X]					
COMPARE [N /N] []	[][И]	[]					
RECOMMENDATIONS:	(If different	t from NASA)						
[/] []		[] ADD/DELETE)					
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable) ADEQUATE [X] INADEQUATE []								
REMARKS: ONE FMEA COVERS FUSES F9, F10, AND F11. THE IOA PREPARED SEPARATE ANALYSIS WORKSHEETS FOR EACH FUSE BECAUSE THE FAILURE EFFECTS ARE DIFFERENT. THE IOA AGREES THAT FAIL OPEN OF FUSE F11 (CIRCUIT PROTECTION FOR CONTROL BUS CA1) RESULTS IN LOSS OF ABILITY TO ENGAGE BFS. IF EITHER F9 OR F10 (CIRCUIT PROTECTION FOR CONTROL BUS AB3) FAILS OPEN, THE ABILITY TO ENGAGE BFS EXISTS BUT THE AUTOMATIC DISENCACE OF GREE THAT INTERPACE WITH MODULES A								

FOR CONTROL BUS AB3) FAILS OPEN, THE ABILITY TO ENGAGE BFS EXISTS BUT THE AUTOMATIC DISENGAGE OF GPCs THAT INTERFACE WITH MODULES A AND B IN BFC 1 (NORMALLY GPCs 1 AND 4) AND MODULE A IN BFC 2 (NORMALLY GPC 2) IS LOST, I.E., A FORCE FIGHT BETWEEN THE BFS GPC AND THREE PASS GPCS COULD DEVELOP. SINCE BOTH ANALYSIS METHODS CONCLUDE THAT OPEN FAILURE OF THE FUSES IS JUSTIFICATION FOR INCLUSION ON THE CIL, THE IOA RECOMMENDS THE FMEA CRITICALITY BE RETAINED.

REPORT DATE 02/22/88 C-33

ASSESSMENT DATE: ASSESSMENT ID: NASA FMEA #:	//	NASA DATA: BASELINE [] NEW [X]				
MDAC ID: ITEM:	BACKUP FLIGHT SYSTEM 505 FUSE F49, 3 AMP ESS BUS (BACKUP & NORMAL DISCRETES)	3AB SUPPLY TO GPC				
LEAD ANALYST:	L.W.HINSDALE/E.E.PRUST					
ASSESSMENT:						
CRITICALI FLIGHT HDW/FUN		CIL ITEM				
NASA [2 /1R IOA [1 /1] [P] [F] [] [P] [P] [P] [X]* F] [X]				
COMPARE [N /N] [] [И] []	и] []				
RECOMMENDATIONS:	(If different from NASA)					
[/] [] [] [] []] [] (ADD/DELETE)				
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable) ADEQUATE [X] INADEQUATE []						
REMARKS: THE FMEA COUNTED PASS GENERIC FAILURE IN ADDITION TO THE FUSE FAILURE WHEN ASSIGNING CRITICALITY. THE IOA ASSIGNED CRITICALITY BASED ON THE ASSUMPTION THE BFS WAS OR WOULD BE ENGAGED. SINCE BOTH ANALYSIS METHODS CONCLUDE THAT FUSE F49 FAILED OPEN MODE IS JUSTIFICATION FOR INCLUSION ON THE CIL, THE IOA						

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REPORT DATE 02/22/88 C-34

RECOMMENDS THE FMEA CRITICALITY BE RETAINED.

ASSESSMENT ASSESSMENT NASA FMEA	ID:	12/18/ BFS-50							A DATA SELINE NEW]]]
SUBSYSTEM: MDAC ID: ITEM: (USUALLY G		BACKUP 506 FUSE, POWER S	3 A	MP			SUP	PLY	TO BF	'S GI	PC
LEAD ANALY	ST:	L.W.HI	NSD	ALE/E	.E.P	RUST					
ASSESSMENT	':										
	ITICAL FLIGH HDW/FU	r	R: A		ANCY B	SCREI		с		CII ITE	
NASA [IOA [/ 3 /1R]]	[[P]]	[[P]	[[] P]		[[] *]
COMPARE [N /N]	[N]	[N]	[ן א		[]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)											
ſ	3 /1R]	[P]	[P]	[P]	(A] DELETE)
* CIL RETE	NTION 1	RATIONA	LE:	(If	appl	icable	•		QUATE QUATE]]
REMARKS: THE IOA RECOMMENDS A FUNCTIONAL DESCRIPTION OF THE REDUNDANT FUSES AND AN EXPLANATION OF THE FAIL OPEN CONSEQUENCES BE											

FUSES AND AN EXPLANATION OF THE FAIL OPEN CONSEQUENCES BE INCLUDED FOR COMPLETENESS IN THE UPDATED FMEAS FOR NON-CIL ITEMS. THE IOA RECOMMENDS THAT A FMEA BE CREATED FOR THIS FAILURE MODE.

REPORT DATE 02/22/88 C-35

	NT DATE: NT ID: A #:	12/01/87 BFS-507X 05-6S-BD102-1 BACKUP FLIGHT SYSTEM				NASA DATA: BASELINE [] NEW [X]		
SUBSYSTEN MDAC ID: ITEM:	FLIGHT SYSTEM MAIN BUS ISOLATION TO BFS GPC AND BFC							
LEAD ANA	LYST:	L.W.HIN	SDALE					
ASSESSME	NT:							
			REDUNDANCY SCREENS			S	CIL	
	FLIGH HDW/FU		A	В		C	ITEM	
NASA IOA	[3 /1R [3 /1R] [P] P]	[F [F] [] [P] P]	[X]* [X]	
COMPARE	[/] []	C] []	[]	
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)								
	[/] []	[] [.] (A	[] DD/DELETE)	
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)								
ADEQUATE [X] INADEQUATE []								
REMARKS: THE IOA AGREES WITH THE NASA ASSESSMENT OF THIS FAILURE MODE.								

REPORT DATE 02/22/88 C-36

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ASSESSMENT DATE: ASSESSMENT ID: NASA FMEA #:	BFS-508X	BZ	NASA DATA: BASELINE [] NEW [X]					
SUBSYSTEM: MDAC ID: ITEM:	508		SYSTEM S ISOLATION TO BFS GPC AND BFC					
LEAD ANALYST:	L.W.HINSDALE							
ASSESSMENT:								
FLIGH		NDANCY SCREENS B C	CIL ITEM					
NASA [3 /1R IOA [3 /1R] [P]] [P]	[F] [P] [F] [P]	[X]* [X]					
COMPARE [/] []	ניז ני	ן ניז					
RECOMMENDATIONS:	RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)							
[/] []	ניינ	[] (ADD/DELETE)					
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable) ADEQUATE [X] INADEQUATE []								
REMARKS: THE IOA AGREES W	ITH THE NASA	ASSESSMENT OF TH	IS FAILURE MODE.					

REPORT DATE 02/22/88 C-37

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ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/01/87 NASA DATA: BASELINE [] NEW [X] ASSESSMENT ID: BFS-509X NASA FMEA #: 05-6S-BFUS5-1 BACKUP FLIGHT SYSTEM SUBSYSTEM: e chonge de co MDAC ID: 509 FUSE F28, 5 AMP - MAIN BUS SUPPLY TO BFS BFC ITEM: POWER MONITOR LOGIC LEAD ANALYST: L.W.HINSDALE ASSESSMENT: CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL ITEM FLIGHT В C ··· HDW/FUNC A [P] [P] [P] [P] NASA [2 /1R] IOA [1 /1] [X] * Ţ Ţ ſ P Ì [X] [] COMPARE [N /N] RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA) Г (ADD/DELETE) * CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable) ADEQUATE [X] INADEQUATE [] **REMARKS:** THE FMEA COUNTED PASS GENERIC FAILURE IN ADDITION TO THE FUSE --FAILED OPEN MODE WHEN ASSIGNING CRITICALITY. THE IOA ASSIGNED CRITICALITY BASED ON THE ASSUMPTION THE BFS HAS BEEN OR WILL BE ENGAGED.

SINCE BOTH ANALYSIS METHODS CONCLUDE THAT OPEN FAILURE OF THE FUSE IS JUSTFICATION FOR INCLUSION ON THE CIL, THE IOA RECOMMENDS THE FMEA CRITICALITY BE RETAINED.

ASSESSMENT DATE: ASSESSMENT ID: NASA FMEA #:	BFS-601	0-0001		NASA DATA BASELINE NEW	=		
SUBSYSTEM: MDAC ID: ITEM:	BACKUP FLIG 601 BFC ENGAGE		EM				
LEAD ANALYST:	L.W.HINSDA	LE/E.E.PI	RUST		· · ·		
ASSESSMENT:							
CRITICAL FLIGH		DUNDANCY	SCREENS	5	CIL ITEM		
HDW/FU	NC A	В		С			
NASA [3 /3 IOA [3 /3] [P] [P] [P]] [P] [] [P] P]	[] * []		
COMPARE [/] [] [] []	[]		
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)							
[/]. [] [] [) (A	[] DD/DELETE)		
* CIL RETENTION	RATIONALE:	(If appli		ADEQUATE IADEQUATE	[]		
REMARKS: THE NASA AN	ALYSIS AND	THE IOA A	AGREE CO	MPLETELY.			

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ASSESSMENT DATE: ASSESSMENT ID: NASA FMEA #:	12/18/86 BFS-602 05-8-BFS03	10-0002		NASA DATA: BASELINE NEW	[X] []		
SUBSYSTEM: MDAC ID: ITEM:	BACKUP FLI 602 BFC ENGAGI		rem				
LEAD ANALYST:	L.W.HINSDA						
ASSESSMENT:							
CRITICAL FLIGH					CIL ITEM		
HDW/FU	NC A	I	3	C			
NASA [3 /3 IOA [3 /3] [P]] [P]] []	9] [9] [P] P]	[] * []		
COMPARE [/	J [J (] []	[]		
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)							
[/] [] [ז נ] (AI	[] DD/DELETH	E)	
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable) ADEQUATE [] INADEQUATE [] REMARKS:							
THE NASA ANALYSIS AND THE IOA AGREE COMPLETELY.							

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APPENDIX C ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: ASSESSMENT ID: NASA FMEA #:	BFS-1001X	NASA DATA: BASELINE [X] NEW []			
SUBSYSTEM: MDAC ID: ITEM:	BACKUP FLIGHT SYSTEM 1001 INERTIAL MEASUREMENT UNIT	(IMU)			
LEAD ANALYST:	L.W. HINSDALE/E.E. PRUST				
ASSESSMENT:					
CRITICAL FLIGH HDW/FU	T	S CIL ITEM			
nDw/r0		-			
NASA [1 /1 IOA [1 /1] [NA] [NA] [] [NA] [F] [NA] [X]* P] [X]			
COMPARE [/] [] [М] [и] []			
RECOMMENDATIONS:	(If different from NASA)			
[/] [] [] [] []] [] (ADD/DELETE)			
* CIL RETENTION	RATIONALE: (If applicable)	ADEQUATE [X] NADEQUATE []			
REMARKS: THE IOA AGREES WITH THE NASA ASSESSMENT OF THE EFFECT OF					
THIS FAILURE.	E FAILURE MODE ANALYZED IS				

HOWEVER, THE FAILURE MODE ANALYZED IS A SOFTWARE FAILURE, AND IS OUTSIDE THE SCOPE OF A HARDWARE ANALYSIS.

REPORT DATE 02/22/88 C-41

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APPENDIX C ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: ASSESSMENT ID: NASA FMEA #:		NASA DATA: BASELINE [X] NEW []
SUBSYSTEM: MDAC ID: ITEM:	BACKUP FLIG <u>ht</u> system 2001 AIR DATA TRANSDUCER ASSEM	
LEAD ANALYST:	L.W. HINSDALE/E.E. PRUST	

ASSESSMENT:

CRITICALITY FLIGHT		REDUN	REDUNDANCY SCREENS			
	HDW/FUNC	Α	B C C			
NASA IOA	[2 /1R] [1 /1]	[NA] [P]	[NA] [NA] [F] [P]	[X]* [X]		
COMPARE	[N/N]	[N]	[N] [N]	[]		

RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)

[1]	· []	[]	C]	[]
-	-	_							(ADD/DELETE)

* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)

ADEQUATE [X] INADEQUATE [] =

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REMARKS:

THE IOA AGREES WITH THE NASA ASSESSMENT OF THIS FAILURE. THE DIFFERENCE IN CRITICALITY IS DUE TO A DIFFERENCE IN INTERPRETATION OF FMEA/CIL PREPARATION INSTRUCTIONS. HOWEVER, THE IOA BELIEVES THAT THIS HARDWARE IS OUTSIDE THE

SCOPE OF THE BACKUP FLIGHT SYSTEM, AND SHOULD INSTEAD BE DEALT WITH IN THE GN&C SUBSYSTEM FMEAS.

REPORT DATE 02/22/88

APPENDIX C ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET

ASSESSMENT DATE: ASSESSMENT ID: NASA FMEA #:			NASA DATA BASELINE NEW	[X]	
	BACKUP FLIGHT 2002 PROBE (AIR DAT				
LEAD ANALYST:	L.W. HINSDALE,	E.E. PRUST			
ASSESSMENT:					
CRITICAI FLIGH	ITY REDUND T	ANCY SCREENS		CIL ITEM	
HDW/FU	NC A	В	С		
NASA [2 /1R IOA [1 /1] [NA]] [P]	[NA] [[F] [NA] P]	[X]* [X]	
COMPARE [N /N] [N]	[N] [N]	[]]	
RECOMMENDATIONS:	(If differen	t from NASA)		
[[°] /] []	ניז נ] (A	[] DD/DELETE)	
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable) ADEQUATE [X] INADEQUATE []					
REMARKS: THE IOA AGREES WITH THE NASA ASSESSMENT OF THIS FAILURE. THE DIFFERENCE IN CRITICALITY IS DUE TO A DIFFERENCE IN					

INTERPRETATION OF FMEA/CIL PREPARATION INSTRUCTIONS. HOWEVER, THE IOA BELIEVES THAT THIS HARDWARE IS OUTSIDE THE SCOPE OF THE BACKUP FLIGHT SYSTEM, AND SHOULD INSTEAD BE DEALT WITH IN THE GN&C SUBSYSTEM FMEAS.

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APPENDIX D

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CRITICAL ITEMS

APPENDIX D POTENTIAL CRITICAL ITEMS

NASA FMEA	MDAC-ID	FLIGHT	ITEM	FAILURE MODE
05-3-12200A-1	101	2/1R	POWER SUPPLY A(B,C)	LOSS OF OUTPUT, PARTIA1 OUTPUT
05-3-12200A-2	101	2/1R	TO L(R) RHC POWER SUPPLY A(B,C) TO L(R) RHC	LOSS OF OUTPUT,
05-3-12200B-1	101	2/1R	POWER SUPPLY A(B,C) TO L(R) RHC	LOSS OF OUTPUT, PARTIAL OUPUT
05-3-12200B-2	101	2/1R	POWER SUPPLY A(B,C) TO L(R) RHC	LOSS OF OUTPUT, PARTIAL OUTPUT
05-5-B30-1-2	201	1/1	HALT RELAY	INADVERTENT OPERATION, FAILS TO REMAIN OPEN
05-5-B30-1-2	202	3/2R	HALT RELAY	FAILS TO CLOSE
05-5-B30-1-2	203	2/1R	HAND CONTROLLER	LOSS OF DISCRETE
05 5 250 1 2	200	2/ 11	ENGAGE DRIVER	OUTPUT
05-5-B30-1-2	204	1/1	HAND CONTROLLER ENGAGE DRIVER	LOSS OF 28 VDC OUTPUT
05-5-B30-1-2	205	1/1	ENGAGE / DISENGAGE LOGIC	LOSS OF OUTPUT, ERRONEOUS OUTPUT
05-5-B30-1-2	207	1/1	BFC POWER SUPPLY (5 VDC)	LOSS OF OUTPUT, PARTIAL OUTPUT, FAILS OUT OF TOLERANCE
05-5-B30-1-2	208	1/1	POWER UP/DOWN MONITOR LOGIC	INADVERTENT OPERATION
05-5-B30-1-2	209	1/1	POWER UP/DOWN MONITOR LOGIC	LOSS OF OUTPUT
05-5-B30-1-3	210	3/1R	BACKUP FLIGHT CNTL	INADVERTENT ENGAGE 🗮
05-5-B01-1-1	301	1/1	BACKUP GPC (USUALLY GPC 5)	LOSS OF OUTPUT
05-5-B02-1-1	301	1/1	BACKUP GPC (USUALLY GPC 5)	LOSS OF OUTPUT
05-5-B01-1-2	302	1/1	BACKUP GPC (USUALLY GPC 5)	ERRONEOUS OUTPUT
05-5-B02-1-2	302	1/1	BACKUP GPC (USUALLY GPC 5)	ERRONEOUS OUTPUT
05-5-B32-1-1	401	2/1R	BFS ENGAGE PUSHBUTTON	FAILS TO CLOSE
05-5-B31-1-1	404	1/1	BFC DISENGAGE SW	FAILS TO REMAIN OPEN, FAILS TO RE-OPEN ==
05-6S-BSW7-1	407	1/1	BFS GPC (USUALLY GPC 5) POWER SWITCH	FAILS TO CLOSE, FAILS TO REMAIN CLOSED
05-5-B15-1-1	408	1/1	BFS GPC (USUALLY GPC 5) PWR SW	FAILS OUT OF

	NASA FMEA	MDAC-ID	FLIGHT	ITEM	FAILURE MODE
-					
-	05-5-B17-1-1	409	1/1	BFS GPC (USUALLY GPC 5) MODE SW	INADVERTENTLY IN "HALT
	05-6Q-2103A-1	501	3/1R	CIRCUIT BREAKER, 7.5 AMP	OPEN CIRCUIT
-	05-6Q-2103B-1	501	3/1R	CIRCUIT BREAKER, 7.5 AMP	OPEN CIRCUIT
	05-6S-BFUS4-1	502	1/1	FUSE F9, 1 AMP CNTL BUS AB3	OPEN CIRCUIT
	05-6S-BFUS4-1	503	1/1	FUSE F10, 1 AMP CNTL BUS AB3	OPEN CIRCUIT
	05-6S-BFUS4-1	504	1/1	FUSE F11, 1 AMP CNTL BUS AB3	OPEN CIRCUIT
_	05-6S-BFUS3-1	505	1/1	FUSE F49, 3 AMP ESS BUS 3AB	OPEN CIRCUIT
	05-6S-BD102-1	507	3/1R	DIODE, MAIN BUS ISOLATION TO BFS GPC AND BFC	FAILS TO CONDUCT, OPEN, HIGH RESISTANCE
·	05-6S-BD102-3	508	3/1R	DIODE, MAIN BUS ISOLATION TO BFS GPC AND BFC	
	05-6S-BFUS5-1	509	1/1	FUSE F28, 5 AMP - MAIN BUS SUPPLY TO BFS BFC POWER	OPEN
• 1	05-8-BFS003-000	1001	1/1	INERTIAL MEASUREMENT UNIT	ERRONEOUS OUTPUT
	05-8-BFS012-1 05-8-BFS013-1	2001 2002	1/1 1/1		ERRONEOUS OUTPUT ERRONEOUS OUTPUT

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APPENDIX E ANALYSIS WORKSHEETS

This appendix contains the IOA analysis worksheets supplementing previous results reported in STSEOS Working Paper 1.0-WP-VA86001-18, Analysis of the Backup Flight System, (15 December 1986). Prior results were obtained independently and documented before starting the FMEA/CIL assessment activity. Supplemental analysis was performed to address failure modes not previously considered by the IOA. Each sheet identifies the hardware item being analyzed, parent assembly, and function performed. For each failure mode, possible causes are identified, and hardware and functional criticality for each mission phase are determined as described in the <u>Instructions for Preparation of FMEA and CIL,</u> <u>NSTS 22206, 10 October 1986</u>. Finally, effects are entered at the bottom of each sheet, and the worst case criticality is entered at the top.

LEGEND FOR IOA ANALYSIS WORKSHEETS

Hardware Criticalities :

- 1 = Loss of life or vehicle
- 2 = Loss of mission
- 3 = Non loss of life or vehicle or mission

Functional Criticalities :

- 1R = Redundant identical hardware components or redundant functional paths all of which, if failed, could cause loss of life or vehicle.
- 2R = Redundant identical hardware components or redundant functional paths all of which, if failed, could cause loss of mission.

Redundancy Screen A :

- 1 = Is Checked Out PreFlight
- 2 = Is Capable of Check Out PreFlight
- 3 = Not Capable of Check Out PreFlight
- NA = Not Applicable

Redundancy Screens B and C :

- P = Passed Screen
- F = Failed Screen
- NA = Not Applicable

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DATE: 12/03/87 I SUBSYSTEM: BACKUP FLIGHT SYSTEM MDAC ID: 210	HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC FLIGHT: 3/1R ABORT: 3/1R
ITEM: BACKUP FLIGHT CONTROL FAILURE MODE: INADVERTENT ENGAGE	LER - BFC 2
LEAD ANALYST: L.W.HINSDALE SUB	SYS LEAD: J.J.EWELL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY: 1) BACKUP FLIGHT CONTROLLER 2) 3) 4)	
5) 6) 7) 8) 9)	
CRITICALI'	FIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC PRELAUNCH: 3/2R LIFTOFF: 3/1R ONORBIT: 3/1R DEORBIT: 3/1R LANDING/SAFING: 3/1R	RTLS: 3/1R TAL: 3/1R AOA: 3/1R ATO: 3/1R
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [2] B	[F] C[P]
LOCATION: FWD AVIONICS BAY PART NUMBER: MC615-0023-0003	
CAUSES: PIECE PART FAILURE, VIBRATIC	ON, CONTAMINATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE: PREMATURE BFS ENGAGE, POSSIBLE FORCE OUTPUTS ARE NOT DISABLED, POSSIBLE LA VEHICLE AND LOSS OF CREW.	FIGHT IF SOME PASS GPC DSS OF CONTROL - LOSS OF
DEFEDENCES.	

REFERENCES:

REPORT DATE 02/22/88 E-2

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DATE:12/03/87HIGHEST CRITICALITYHDW/FUNCSUBSYSTEM:BACKUP FLIGHT SYSTEMFLIGHT:3/1RMDAC ID:507ABORT:3/1R	
ITEM: DIODE, MAIN BUS ISOLATION TO BFS GPC AND BFC FAILURE MODE: FAILS TO CONDUCT. OPEN, HIGH RESISTANCE	
LEAD ANALYST: L.W.HINSDALE SUBSYS LEAD: J.J.EWELL	
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY: 1) CIRCUIT PROTECTION 2) 3) 4) 5) 6) 7) 8) 9)	
CRITICALITIES	
FLIGHT PHASEHDW/FUNCABORTHDW/FUNCPRELAUNCH:3/3RTLS:3/1RLIFTOFF:3/1RTAL:3/1RONORBIT:3/2RAOA:3/1RDEORBIT:3/1RATO:3/1RLANDING/SAFING:3/1RATO:3/1R	
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [2] B [F] C [P]	
LOCATION: PART NUMBER: JANTX 1N11884	
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, SHOCK, VIBRATION, PIECE PART FAILURE	
EFFECTS/RATIONALE: THE TRIPLE REDUNDANT MAIN BUS POWER PATHS TO EACH IOP, CPU AND BFC ARE ISOLATED BY DIODES. TWO DIODES CAN FAIL WITH NO EFFECT. THE THIRD FAILURE CAUSES LOSS OF THE INTERFACING GPC. THREE FAILURES COULD PREVENT THE BFS FROM BEING ENGAGED. WITH BFS ENGAGED, THREE FAILURES WOULD CAUSE LOSS OF CONTROL, LOSS OF VEHICLE, AND LOSS OF CREW.	
REFERENCES:	
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DATE: SUBSYSTEM: MDAC ID:	12/03/87 BACKUP FLIG 508	HT SYSTEM	HIGHEST C	RITICALITY FLIGHT: ABORT:	HDW/FUNC 3/1R 3/1R	
ITEM: FAILURE MODI	DIODE, MA E: SHORTS, (AIN BUS ISOL CONDUCTS IN	ATION TO E REVERSE DI	FS GPC AND RECTION	BFC	
LEAD ANALYS	r: L.W.HINSD	ALE SU	BSYS LEAD:	J.J.EWELL		
BREAKDOWN HI 1) CIRCUIT 2) 3) 4) 5) 6) 7) 8) 9)	IERARCHY: T PROTECTION					
		CRITICAL	ITIES			
FLIGHT 1	PHASE HI AUNCH: OFF: BIT: BIT:	DW/FUNC	ABORT	HDW/FUN	C	
PREL	AUNCH:	3/3	RTLS	3/1R		
LIFT(OFF:	3/1R	TAL:	3/1R		
ONOR	BIT:	3/2R	AOA:	3/1R		
DEOR	BIT:	3/1R	ATO:	3/1R		
LAND	BIT: BIT: ING/SAFING:	3/1R				
	SCREENS: A		B [F]	С[Р]		
LOCATION: PART NUMBER	: JANTX 1N1	1884				
CAUSES: CO	NTAMINATION,	SHOCK, VIBR	ATION, PIE	CE PART FAI	LURE	
EFFECTS/RATIONALE: THE TRIPLE REDUNDANT MAIN BUS POWER PATHS TO EACH IOP, CPU AND BFC ARE ISOLATED BY DIODES. TWO DIODES CAN FAIL WITH NO EFFECT. THE THIRD FAILURE CAUSES LOSS OF THE INTERFACING GPC. THREE FAILURES COULD PREVENT THE BFS FROM BEING ENGAGED. WITH BFS ENGAGED, THREE FAILURES WOULD CAUSE LOSS OF CONTROL, LOSS OF VEHICLE, AND LOSS OF CREW.						
REFERENCES:						

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DATE:12/03/87HIGHEST CRITICALITYHDW/FUNCSUBSYSTEM:BACKUP FLIGHT SYSTEMFLIGHT:1/1MDAC ID:509ABORT:1/1
ITEM: FUSE F28, 5 AMP - MAIN BUS SUPPLY TO BFS BFC POWER MONITOR LOGIC FAILURE MODE: OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: L.W.HINSDALE SUBSYS LEAD: J.J.EWELL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY: 1) CIRCUIT PROTECTION 2) 3) 4) 5) 6) 7) 8) 9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASEHDW/FUNCABORTHDW/FUNCPRELAUNCH:1/1RTLS:1/1LIFTOFF:1/1TAL:1/1ONORBIT:3/1RAOA:1/1DEORBIT:1/1ATO:1/1LANDING/SAFING:1/11/1
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [2] B [P] C [P]
LOCATION: PART NUMBER: ME451-0018-0500
CAUSES: VIBRATION, SHOCK, STRUCTURAL FAILURE

EFFECTS/RATIONALE: FAILURE PREVENTS BFS FROM BEING ENGAGED. WITH BFS ENGAGED, FAILURE CAUSES LOSS OF CONTROL, LOSS OF VEHICLE AND CREW.

REFERENCES:

REPORT DATE 02/22/88 E-5

DATE: SUBSYSTEM: B MDAC ID: 1	ACKUP FLIGHT SYSTEM	HIGHEST C	RITICALITY FLIGHT: ABORT:	HDW/FUNC 1/1 1/1
ITEM: FAILURE MODE: OF PRIMARY SY	INERTIAL MEASUREMN ERRONEOUS OUTPUT N STEM SOFTWARE	ENT UNIT (IMU FROM PASS DUE) TO GENERIC	FAILURE
LEAD ANALYST: J.J.EWELL	L.W. HINSDALE/E.E.	PRUST	SUBSYS LEAD	:
BREAKDOWN HIE 1) IMU 2) 3) 4) 5) 6) 7) 8) 9)	RARCHY :			
	CRITIC	CALITIES		
PRELAU LIFTOF ONORBI DEORBI	ASE HDW/FUNC NCH: 3/2R F: 1/1	ABORT RTLS	HDW/FUN : 1/1 1/1 1/1 1/1	с
REDUNDANCY SC	REENS: A [NA]	B [F]	C[P]	
LOCATION: PART NUMBER:	MC409-0004-0010			

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CAUSES: ERRONEOUS SOFTWARE TORQUING INPUT OR MODING COMMAND

EFFECTS/RATIONALE: NAVIGATION ERRORS WILL ACCUMULATE CAUSING LOSS OF VEHICLE CONTROL. SUCCESSFUL BFS TAKEOVER IS PRECLUDED.

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REFERENCES:

REPORT DATE 02/22/88 E-6

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12/18/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC DATE: SUBSYSTEM: BACKUP FLIGHT SYSTEM 1/1 FLIGHT: 1/1 MDAC ID: 2001 ABORT: AIR DATA TRANSDUCER ASSEMBLY (ADTA) ITEM: FAILURE MODE: ERRONEOUS OUTPUT LEAD ANALYST: L.W. HINSDALE/E.E. PRUST SUBSYS LEAD: J.J.EWELL BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY: AIR DATA SYSTEM 1) 2) 3) 4) 5) 6) 7) 8) 9) CRITICALITIES HDW/FUNC ABORT FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 1/1 3/3 1/1 LIFTOFF: TAL: 1/1 3/3 AOA: ONORBIT: ATO: 3/3 DEORBIT: 1/1 LANDING/SAFING: 1/1 REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [2] B [F] C [P] LOCATION: PART NUMBER: MC409-0011-0006 CAUSES: HIGH TEMPERATURE, VIBRATION, PIECE PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE EFFECTS/RATIONALE: ERRONEOUS OUTPUT FROM AN ADTA CAN AFFECT CALCULATIONS OF CRITICAL FIGHT CONTROL PARAMETERS. IF UNDETECTED, LOSS OF CONTROL, LOSS OF VEHICLE, AND LOSS OF CREW IS PROBABLE. **REFERENCES:** REPORT DATE 02/22/88 E-7

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DATE: 12/18/86 SUBSYSTEM: BACKUP FLIGHT SYSTEM MDAC ID: 2002	HIGHEST C	RITICALITY FLIGHT: ABORT:	HDW/FUNC 1/1 1/1
ITEM: PROBE (AIR DATA) FAILURE MODE: ERRONEOUS OUTPUT	· 		
LEAD ANALYST: L.W. HINSDALE, E.E. 1 J.J.EWELL	PRUST	SUBSYS LEAI):
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY: 1) AIR DATA SYSTEM 2) 3) 4) 5) 6) 7) 8) 9)			
CRITICA	LITTES		
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC PRELAUNCH: 3/3 LIFTOFF: 3/3 ONORBIT: 3/3 DEORBIT: 1/1 LANDING/SAFING: 1/1		: 1/1 1/1 1/1	2
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [2]	B [F]	С[Р]	
LOCATION: PART NUMBER: MC432-0206			
CAUSES:			
EFFECTS/RATIONALE: FAILURE IN EITHER PROBE (IF UNDETE ENGAGING BFS) WILL CAUSE LOSS OF CO CREW.	CTED BY ADT ONTROL, LOS	A BITE PRION S OF VEHICLN	R TO E AND
REFERENCES:			

REPORT DATE 02/22/88 E-8

APPENDIX F

NASA FMEA TO IOA WORKSHEET CROSS REFERENCE/RECOMMENDATIONS

This section provides a cross reference between the NASA FMEA and corresponding IOA analysis worksheet(s). The worksheets include those from the previous results reported in STSEOS Working Paper 1.0-WP-VA86001-18, Analysis of the Backup Flight System, (15 December 1986) and the supplementary worksheets contained in Appendix E of this report. The Appendix F identifies: NASA FMEA Number, IOA Assessment Number, NASA criticality and redundancy screen data, and IOA recommendations.

Appendix F Resolution/Issue/Rationale Codes

<u>Code</u> <u>Definition</u>

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- 1 IOA and NASA criticalities differ. IOA does not consider PASS as a redundant capability to the BFS. NASA counts PASS failure as the first failure when assigning BFS failure mode criticalities.
- 2 IOA recommends generating a FMEA for the subject failure mode.
- 3 IOA identified failures within an LRU.
- 4 FMEA went one level deeper than the IOA.
- 5 IOA and FMEA document same failure mode differently.
- 6 NASA deleted failure mode impact on BFS from Nov. '87 baseline.
- 7 NASA moved CIL to GN&C subsystem in Nov. '87 baseline.

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APPENDIX F

NASA FMEA TO IDA WORKSHEET CROSS REFERENCE / RECOMMENDATIONS

IDENTIFIERS			II NASA					Н	I IOA RECOMMENDATIONS #					
NASA FMEA NUMBER	: IOA : Assessment numbe	RI		ļ.	A	B	C	;;	HW/F	i A	B		: OTHER : ISSUE ; (SEE LEGEND CODE) ; ;======;	
	; BFS-206	 		1					/				13	
	BFS-402		/	ł					3/3	I P	Ρ	NA	12	
	BFS-403			ł				11		P	Ρ	NA	12	
	BFS-405	11		ł						I P	Ρ	NA	1 2	
	: BFS-406	1		ļ					-	; P	P		1 2 1	
	BFS-506	1		ľ						: P	P	Ρ	1 2	
5-3-12200A-1	: BFS-101		3/1R							;			11,5	
5-3-12200A-2	: BFS-101A	i	3/1R	1	P	Ρ	F			1			; 1, 5	
5-3-12200B-1	; BFS-1018		3/1R	-		Ρ		13		1			11,5	
5-3-12200B-2	: BFS-101C		3/1R					П		;			1,5	
5-5-801-1-1	: BFS-301	ł			Ρ	Ρ	P	11		1			1 1, 4	
5-5-801-1-2	: BFS-302	1						11		l			14	
5-5-802-1-1	: BFS-301A	ł			P	Ρ	P			l			1,4	
5-5-B02-1-2	BFS-302A	ł			_	_	_			1			14	
5-5-B15-1-1	BFS-408	ŀ				_	P	;;		;				
5-5-B17-1-1	BFS-409	ł					P			1				
5-5-B38-1-2	BFS-201	;					P			;			1, 2, 3	
	: BFS-202	ì					P	11		;			1, 2, 3	
~	BFS-203	ł				F	P			1			13	
	1 BFS-204	;				F	P	11					1, 3	
	BFS-205	;				F	P			;			1,3	
	BF5-207	1			-	F	P	11		i			1, 3	
	BFS-208	;			•		P			;			1, 3	
	1 BFS-209	1			•	F	P	11		i			11,3	
15-5-B30-1-3	BFS-210X	1				F	P	11		;			i i	
15-5-B31-1-1	BFS-404	1			•	F	P			1				
15-5-B32-1-1	: BFS-401	;				F	P			í 1			i⊥ i ia i	
15-60-2103A-1	: BFS-501	1				F	P	11		í 1			i 47	
15-60-2103B-1	BFS-501A	1			-	F	P	;;		í 1			1 9 i	
15-65-BD102-1	BFS-507X	1			P	F	٢			\$ 1				
15-65-BD102-3	: BFS-508X		3/1R				P			í 1				
15-65-BFUS3-1	BFS-505		; 2/1R					11		í 1			i i i t v	
15-6S-BFUS4-1	: 8FS-502		1 2/1R							1			1,3	
	1 BFS-503		1 2/1R							1 1			1,3	
E 70 05105 4	8FS-504		2/1R							3 1			1,3	
15-65-BFUS5-1	; BFS-509X		2/1R							1 1				
15-65-BSW7-1	BF5-407		2/1R							1 1				
5-8-8F5003-0001		1								1 1				
5-8-8FS010-0001	; BFS-601	1								1 1				
15-8-8FS010-0002	; BFS-602	1								1 1			1,7	
15-8-8F5012-1 15-8-8F5013-1	: BFS-2001X : BFS-2002X	}	2/1R 2/1R							י 			1 1, 7	

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