

PEACEKEEPING IN THE DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF THE CONGO

HEARING BEFORE THE SUBCOMMITTEE ON AFRICA OF THE COMMITTEE ON INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES ONE HUNDRED SIXTH CONGRESS

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CONTENTS

	Page
WITNESSES	
The Honorable Richard Holbrooke, U.S. Ambassador to the United Nations	9
APPENDIX	
Prepared statements:	
The Honorable Edward R. Royce, a Representative in Congress from California and Chairman, Subcommittee on Africa	30
The Honorable Benjamin A. Gilman, a Representative in Congress from New York and Chairman, Committee on International Relations	32
The Honorable Sam Gejdenson, a Representative in Congress from Connecticut	34
The Honorable Tony Hall, a Representative in Congress from Ohio	35
His Excellency Faida M. Mitifu, Ambassador of the Democratic Republic of the Congo	39
Professor Ernest Wamba dia Wamba, President of the Rally for Congolese Democracy	43
His Excellency Dr. Simbi Mubako, Ambassador of the Republic of Zimbabwe	47
Government of Namibia	53
Embassy of the Republic of Angola	60
Her Excellency Edith G. Ssempala, Ambassador of Uganda	62
His Excellency Dr. Richard Sezibera, Ambassador of Rwanda	68
The Honorable Richard Holbrooke	73
Additional material:	
Questions submitted for the record for the Department of State	79
Response to questions submitted for the record from the Department of State	81

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Tuesday, February 15, 2000,

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,
SUBCOMMITTEE ON AFRICA,
COMMITTEE ON INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS,
Washington, D.C.

The Subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 2:09 p.m., in room 2200, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Edward R. Royce (Chairman of the Subcommittee) presiding.

Present: Representatives Royce, Chabot, Tancredo, Payne, Meeks, and Lee.

Also present: Representatives Gilman, Bereuter, McKinney, Crowley, and Hall.

Mr. ROYCE. [presiding] The hearing of the Subcommittee on Africa will come to order. Before we begin, let me apologize for the tight quarters here today. As you know, the International Relations Committee full hearing room is undergoing renovation and so every effort was made to better accommodate you, but I'm afraid these are our quarters for this particular hearing.

I'd like to welcome back all the Subcommittee Members. This is our first hearing of this Congress' second session and I'm pleased that we have the opportunity today to examine such a critical and timely issue as the proposed second phase of the United Nations peacekeeping mission for the Democratic Republic of Congo.

The Subcommittee has been closely following developments in Congo for several years. I led a congressional delegation to Congo in 1997 and met with President Kabila a few days after he was inaugurated there. The Administration, at this point in time, is now prepared to approve a substantial peacekeeping effort for Congo. This hearing will give Subcommittee Members an opportunity to better understand American options regarding the Congo.

The Great Lakes conflict is a complex and intense one. The level of fear, insecurity, and mistrust in the region is as high as anywhere in the world. How could it be otherwise, given the backdrop of the 1994 genocide? This makes the proposed U.N. peacekeeping operation a great challenge.

While the Administration and the U.N. have a formulated plan, success for this ambitious undertaking is far from assured. To be successful, this operation, built on the fragile Lusaka Peace Agreement will have to have its share of breaks. Any scenario for success should be tested against the UN's large-scale Congo peacekeeping operation, which ended in failure in 1964. A key to success today will be making good on the Lusaka-mandated national dialogue,

designed to bring a democratically based political stability to Congo.

In facing this challenge, there can be no room for revisionism. In 1998, President Kabila did not have his democratic aspirations frustrated by the renewed outbreak of conflict. Before the August 1998 invasion he banned political parties. Before that invasion, he had unduly restricted nongovernmental organizations, harassed leading political figures, including Mr. Tshisekedi, and repressed the vibrant civil society that had struggled under Mobutu. In hindsight, more external democratic pressure should have been brought to bear. Meanwhile, conditions in rebel-held territory have been no better. There are accounts of attacks on religious independence, for example. I make these points to illustrate the extent of the challenge that the U.N. is attempting to tackle.

I also want to suggest that we have some recent experience that should be valuable as the U.S. and U.N. attempt to prod along the national dialogue. Congolese democrats want external pressure, and it's incumbent upon the international community in proceeding with this large commitment to apply that pressure.

Bringing about a successful national dialogue is but one of the many concerns we should all have about this plan. That doesn't mean, though, that the U.N. peacekeeping operation should not proceed. In 1994, the international community sat on the sidelines as nearly 1 million men and women and children were slaughtered in Rwanda. Three years ago, at a subcommittee hearing on the Congo, as the Mobutu regime was literally dying, I said that the U.S. has a role to play in the Congo because we can make a difference and because we have interests in doing so.

It's worth noting that Americans long ago expressed a humanitarian interest in the Congo. The noted journalist and historian George Washington Williams and Mark Twain were central figures in a worldwide movement against slave labor in King Leopold's Congo.

Today's genocide lurks and we have increasingly evident national security interests centered on rogue regime activity in the Congo, which I raised at our last hearing on this crisis. At that hearing, I also quoted a U.S. Institute for Peace study which called the Lusaka Peace Agreement, quote, "A last exit on the region's highway to hell." Now that's strong language and it's strong language that is still valid.

But, as we proceed with this U.N. option in an attempt to make a difference, let's make sure that we give ourselves and the people of the region the best chance of success. That means not band-aiding problems. In addition to prodding a successful national dialogue, there needs to be real disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration in the Congo. Territorial integrity must be respected and nonsignatories to Lusaka must be dealt with.

Moreover, the U.N. needs competent peacekeepers. I share the chairman of the International Relations Committee's recently expressed concern over the incompetence of U.N. peacekeepers in Sierra Leone. High operating standards must be set. While Congress should not put up a stop sign for this peacekeeping operation, rules of the road must be established and must be obeyed.

Finally, it's important that the U.S. doesn't turn this operation over entirely to the United Nations. While the Congo peacekeeping operation will not involve American troops, it must be bolstered by the active diplomatic engagement of the world's superpower. Success, as I've said, will require good luck. The parties to the conflict will have to make good on their Lusaka obligations. I urge them to look toward the future and do so. Success will also require a strong focus and will and a great deal of energy and imagination by the United States. Without this American commitment, failure is assured. I know that Ambassador Holbrooke appreciates this reality.

The stakes for this peacekeeping operation are high. It is no exaggeration to suggest that the lives of thousands of Africans, if not more, are on the line. I will work to maximize this operation's chance for success, for failure is likely to sow devastating consequences.

[The statement of Mr. Royce appears in the appendix.]

Mr. ROYCE. I'd like to now recognize the Ranking Member of the Subcommittee, Mr. Payne of New Jersey, for an opening statement.

Mr. PAYNE. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman, and let me once again commend you for your attention to your position as Chairman of this Subcommittee. I appreciate your calling this very important hearing on peacekeeping in the Democratic Republic of Congo.

This Subcommittee tends to look at the totality of the issue and what comes out of it, we always try to have a fair, a balanced, and a direct approach to the policy. I have to indicate that, on this Subcommittee in particular, bipartisanship is the way that we move forward. I'd also like to recognize Chairman Ben Gilman who is Chairman of the all overall Committee and has shown a strong interest in Africa.

Let me also thank Ambassador Holbrooke for coming before this Subcommittee today. It was his tenacity that brought all of the signatories to the Lusaka accord to New York at the United Nations headquarters. I know it took a lot of persuasion because other meetings were called on the continent of Africa. The Mobutu Conference, for example, where all of the signatories did not attend. So I know it took an extra-special effort to bring all of the participants even five times further than the meeting that was held on the continent. So we really appreciate his tenacity.

The interest that the Security Council, under his leadership, during the month of January, having President Mandela there talking about the Burundi situation; having Vice President Gore there talking about the whole crisis of HIV virus that causes AIDS, which will have to be confronted on a worldwide basis. Of course, persuading seven heads of state to come to the United Nations and let me commend you for that.

As you know, this is our fourth hearing of the Subcommittee during the past 3 years. In each of those four previous meetings, we've had the one who has been there right on the firing line year in and year out as it relates to African affairs, our Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs, Dr. Susan Rice, who not only for the Congo but in the early days of the Ethiopian/Eritrean situation and the problems in Liberia, but wherever there was a conflict on the

continent, it was her skillful negotiations and ability that has brought us this far. It's good to see you here too.

The development in the Congo has drastically changed over the 40 years since Congo gained its independence from Belgium. The conflict in the Congo is described as Africa's first world war, with nearly 12 countries involved.

I hope that everyone will turn their phones off, because it is really distracting. If there's something very important, wait outside and they can get you there.

That the involvement of so many countries really is a move in a direction that we do not like to see. With the three rebel groups getting safe haven for their refugees or for providing troops or providing resources really is a dangerous trend that we have seen over the past few years.

It is ironic that during the Cold War, the U.S. spent more than \$13 trillion on Defense, with Zaire profiting as a major staging ground. So much of the problems that we see there, the disintegration and lack of leadership, is certainly a direct result, as you know, of our world policy of the Cold War. Therefore, in my opinion, we, therefore, since we assisted getting Zaire into the problem that it's in, we have the same responsibility, in my opinion, to help them come out of the problem that's been created by 30 years of Cold War activities.

Despite the vast mineral, agricultural, and water resources and its eminent potential as a country to serve as an economic power house for the whole continent of Africa, Congo has been plundered in nearly 30 years because of the vacuum left by a lack of leadership and, therefore, the potential and the people have suffered dramatically.

I am concerned about the ethnic hatred and the genocidal overtones coming from the Uganda/Congo border. I think that arms embargo must be strongly enforced and possibly extended to countries that provide weapons to ethnic groups inciting genocide. We must strive to dismantle the institutional framework that underlie genocidal hatred.

A key to all of this is a national dialogue which will, hopefully, let us finally begin to talk about disarmament and demobilization and reintegration and resettlement and bringing the people of the Congo into having the determination on their future.

So, in conclusion, let me say that I had the opportunity to glance at the statement made by the Senator from Virginia, Senator Warner, where he stated that he did not want a single dollar going into Africa until we honor our commitments in Europe. I think that this is an unfortunate comment. I hope that he really didn't mean it. I know that he seems to be too intelligent to make a statement like that and, evidently, was misquoted. I know that he doesn't mean that.

We should certainly move forward. I know you'll have an opportunity to clarify this issue. We know it's a big country; much is at stake. But I know that we need to have everyone involved.

Another thing that disturbs me is I hear from some of my good friends on the other side, not on this Subcommittee, but the Full Committee in general, some of the staff members saying that we need to be sure that everything is in place before we move forward.

I just hasten to use as an example of stumbled peace talks, we're in our 42nd year of peace talks in areas and we have never stopped funding because we've had indictments or convictions. We've had politicians go to jail. We've had failed negotiations. We've had people walk out.

But, for example, Fiscal Year 2000, we see another \$1 billion added. 11.3 increase, for example, for the Wye Accord, which I support wholeheartedly and I have supported, for example, aid to Israel as long as I've been in Congress. But I've never heard people talk about let's not do it until everything is right, because we would have stopped it a dozen times, there. Thank you.

Mr. ROYCE. Thank you, Mr. Payne.

I'd like to now turn to the Chairman of the International Relations Committee, Mr. Gilman, who would like to make a statement.

Mr. GILMAN. Thank you.

Mr. ROYCE. Welcome, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. GILMAN. Thank you, Chairman Royce. I want to thank you for arranging this important and timely meeting on this important issue.

We want to welcome Ambassador Holbrooke and Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs Susan Rice to our Committee. We appreciate your efforts to focus the Security Council's attentions on Africa during the month of January. We've been impressed with your personal energy and commitment, Mr. Ambassador, to address some of the world's most intractable conflicts. We're pleased that Chairman Royce was able to accommodate your request for an opening hearing on this important issue.

I read your congressional notification with interest and had a number of questions. In fact, my staff conveyed some 11 modest questions to the State Department last Wednesday and we requested responses to them prior to this hearing. Regrettably, we still don't have any of those responses. We hope you can clarify some of the questions we raised.

Mr. Chairman, with your permission I'd like to submit a copy of the questions that we submitted to the State Department, for the record.

Mr. ROYCE. That will be done.

[The information referred to appears in the appendix.]

Mr. GILMAN. Thank you.

Mr. Ambassador, a few weeks ago Secretary Albright and National Security Advisor Sandy Berger emphasized their desire to conduct a bipartisan foreign policy in close cooperation with the Congress. I know from our many conversations that you share that perspective and we thank you for reaching out to the Congress.

It is therefore distressing that we've experienced so little in the way of forthright cooperation when it came to this important proposed peacekeeping operation. I assume it may be some laxity of the Department. We would welcome your clarifying it.

Ambassador Holbrooke, you have rightly pointed out in the press that Congress recognizes the importance of this conflict in the Congo. However, it's the duty of the legislative branch to ask questions of the executive before we commit hundreds of millions of dollars overseas on any issue. In like manner, we believe it's the duty of the executive branch to provide answers to those questions.

The recent record of peacekeeping in Africa, regrettably, has not been impressive. In Sierra Leone, for example, we just authorized the expansion of the peacekeeping operation to 11,000 troops. To date, there have been at least five separate incidents in which rebel forces there have mugged U.N. peacekeepers and stolen rifles, and ammunition, armored vehicles, fuel, rockets, and cash. We are only 3 months into that peacekeeping operation and it already appears to be bogged down. We hope we're not going to be confronted with similar situations with regard to the Congo.

Your testimony here, of course, is not about Sierra Leone, but about the Congo. Perhaps there is more reason to be hopeful in the Congo, but there are, clearly, some obvious reasons for concern. If Sierra Leone, a small nation with a comparatively good transportation infrastructure, presents such problems to U.N. peacekeepers, we're concerned what could happen in the Congo, a country 33 times that size. I think that that illustrates some of our concern.

Mr. Ambassador, in his famous treatise, Carl Von Clausewitz warned leaders to consider carefully before embarking on war. He wrote, "The first, the supreme, the most far-reaching active judgment that the statesman and commander has to make is to establish the kind of war on which they are embarking, either mistaking it for or trying to turn it into something that's alien to nature."

I believe that if Clausewitz were alive today, he might apply the same dictum to all of our peacekeeping operations. Those of us who support the United Nations, and I include myself, and who believe it has a crucial role to play in Africa are concerned. However, we fear the prospect of peacekeeping operations, like Somalia, are poorly defined, could end badly, and leave in their wake little support for future endeavors.

I look forward, Mr. Ambassador, to your testimony here today and we look forward to reviewing the written answers to questions we asked about prior to approving funds for this peacekeeping mission.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

[The statement of Mr. Gilman appears in the appendix.]

Mr. ROYCE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I also have a statement from the Full Committee's Ranking Member which, without objection, I will enter into the record.

[The statement of Mr. Gejdenson appears in the appendix.]

We've also been joined by the Vice Chairman of the International Relations Committee, Mr. Doug Bereuter of Nebraska.

Mr. Bereuter, do you have a statement you'd like to make at this time?

Mr. BEREUTER. Chairman Royce, thank you for letting me attend today's hearing since I'm not a Member of this Subcommittee. I wanted to hear the testimony. I think the subject of the hearing is very important.

I haven't seen Chairman Gilman's questions. I may have some of those questions myself. But by my presence here today, I wanted to demonstrate my support for the initiative that Ambassador Holbrooke and Secretary Rice will be explaining to us today. Beyond the importance of it and the legitimacy of taking this initiative, I think it also will enhance the American credibility in the

United Nations and make it more likely that some of the reforms we've been pushing for, in fact, are reality.

Thank you very much, Mr. Royce, for letting me sit in with you.

Mr. ROYCE. Thank you, Mr. Bereuter. We've also been joined by Ms. Lee of Oakland, Mr. Chabot of Ohio, Mr. Tancredo of Colorado, Ms. Cynthia McKinney of Georgia, Mr. Crowley of New York, and Mr. Tony Hall of Ohio. All members will have a chance later to ask questions, but if any of you would like to have a brief opening remark at this time, we'll open it up. We've also been joined by Mr. Meeks of New York. Thank you.

Any questions or any opening statement at this time?

Ms. LEE. Mr. Chairman.

Mr. ROYCE. Yes, Congresswoman.

Ms. LEE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Let me just briefly thank you and our Chairman, Mr. Gilman, and our Ranking Member, Mr. Payne, for this hearing. Also Assistant Secretary Susan Rice and our Ambassador for being here.

This is such an important issue for this country and for all of us here. Peace and stability in Africa is critical if we're going to address the HIV/AIDS pandemic and all of the other issues that the continent needs to address and very quickly must address. I want to thank the Ambassador for really helping us focus on the whole AIDS crisis in Africa because certainly none of these issues are separate. They all are interrelated.

So I look forward to your testimony today. I hope that we can hear what the United States is doing in terms of ensuring that the Lusaka Agreement is moved forward and also in terms of peacekeeping. Whatever it takes, I think we must move ahead in that accord.

Thank you.

Mr. ROYCE. Thank you, Congresswoman Lee. We've also been notified that Congressman Hall would like to make a brief statement. I know he's just back from Sierra Leone so Congressman Hall.

Mr. HALL. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I do have a statement for the record. I won't read it. I just have a couple of points I want to make. I, like the other representatives, want to thank you for allowing me to be here. I don't serve on this Subcommittee. I don't serve on the Full Committee. I used to be on it when I was in my first term in the Congress.

It's good to be with Ambassador Holbrooke and Assistant Secretary Rice. You're talking to our best people; our great representatives of our government. They have been at the heart of so many important issues and have performed so well. So I look forward to their testimony.

I'm glad that you're focusing on Africa as well. It fits right in with the fact that 5,000 Americans are coming to Washington from all over the country this week to talk just about Africa and about the issues and about our policies.

I'm troubled about some of the aspects of the proposal that's before us. There are many key points that all of you have mentioned. I think the one key point that I just want to touch on briefly is the fact that I think that, at the heart of this problem, are diamonds. It's an issue that, I hope, that we can address this year. The U.S. estimates that the trade in Congolese diamonds is about \$600 mil-

lion per year. That's cash. News reports say \$20 million worth of Congolese diamonds pour through Rwanda and Uganda every month.

I think diamonds are at the root of wars in three other countries: Sierra Leone, Liberia, and Angola. Capturing diamond-rich regions is one aim of these wars. Frank Wolf and I went to Sierra Leone. We've been all over Africa together. We see what diamonds do when they're used to buy weapons that terrorize people and keep these civil wars going.

In the past 10 years, we have put about \$2 billion on humanitarian aid into these countries but, at the same time, \$10 billion in illicit diamonds has come out of them. Great Britain and Canada are with us on this. As Britain's foreign secretary, Robin Cook, put it, "The diamond market is pretty tight. The places you can sell uncut diamonds are pretty limited. It should not be beyond our wit to devise an international regime in cooperation with the diamond trade that cuts off the flow of these diamonds to use them to buy arms and fuel conflicts."

So far, the diamond industry hasn't done much. They've had a public relations campaign going on. It hasn't really helped very much. They could police themselves. We've introduced a bill to cut-off illicit diamonds, to let Americans know where these diamonds are coming from. As a matter of fact, we buy 65 percent of all the diamonds in the world. We ought to know where they're coming from. The United Nations has the ability to stop this. They can help on Congo right now, by sanctioning Congolese diamonds that are fueling this war.

So, with that, I'd just want to thank you, Mr. Chairman. It's a very important hearing.

[The statement of Mr. Hall appears in the appendix.]

Mr. ROYCE. Thank you, Mr. Hall.

We also have Mr. Meeks of New York who wanted to make an opening statement.

Mr. MEEKS. Yes and I'll be brief.

Mr. ROYCE. Thank you.

Mr. MEEKS. But I just wanted to first thank you, Mr. Chairman, and Ranking Member Payne for conducting this hearing and holding this hearing today. But I particularly want to thank Ambassador Holbrooke and Secretary Rice for your leadership on this matter.

The unprecedented event that took place at the U.N. Security Council earlier surely let all of us in the United States and the world know that Africa is a focus. As I look at that map on the wall, it just reminds me of how small the world has become. What is taking place in Africa will indeed affect us here in the United States of America and those all around the globe, as my colleague has talked about, particularly in reference to the AIDS epidemic. When you talk about the economies of all the world, it affects the economy here. I just think that it is very important for us, at this point, to not, because of what's going on, to not withdraw, but we need to be more affirmative in our actions as to what's taking place in Africa.

When I look at, and I know it's a start, of the 5,000 some-odd troops that we have there and we talk about how to enforce the

Lusaka Agreement, we know that that's nowhere near enough, when we look at the size of that great country and that we need to let all of the countries that are involved know, I mean, and there are several countries that are involved in this, that the world is indeed looking at them. That is what will help force them to do what took place at the U.N. Council: sit down, talk to one another, and work out an agreement and have someone to oversee those agreements so that we could make sure that we could have peace.

Our hands are not clean in this one. I don't think that is clear. Our hands are not clean and the Cold War will testify to that. I think that we just have an obligation to make sure that we do all that we can to have peace in the Congo and on the Continent of Africa.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. ROYCE. Thank you, Mr. Meeks.

Now before we proceed, without objection, I will submit for the record statements presented by several of the countries involved.

[Statements referred to appear in the appendix.]

We're fortunate to have the presence of several Ambassadors, including Ambassador Mitifu of Congo here today. My message, again, to the Ambassadors is that we all need to cooperate now to make this process work. The international community's commitment to Central Africa cannot be taken for granted.

We'll now go to our first panel. Ambassador Richard Holbrooke was confirmed by the Senate as the permanent U.S. representative to the U.N. last August. This was the latest in a diplomatic career that dates to 1962, when the Ambassador began his foreign career fresh out of Brown University. During his distinguished career, Ambassador Holbrooke has been a professional diplomat, a magazine editor, an author, a Peace Corps director, and an investment banker.

Ambassador Holbrooke has taken a particular interest in Africa, for which he should be commended. In December, he made a lengthy tour of the Great Lakes region. In January, building on this trip, he engineered the attendance of seven African heads of state at a special session of the Security Council dedicated to the Congo crisis, which I was able to attend. At that session, these African leaders recommitted to the lagging Lusaka peace process.

We look forward to hearing more about this process and the U.N. and U.S. commitment to the region. Ambassador, we thank you for your appearance. Before we begin, let me mention that the Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs, Susan Rice, is with us also, available for questions. Dr. Rice, we thank you. Ambassador.

STATEMENT OF THE HONORABLE RICHARD HOLBROOKE, U.S. AMBASSADOR TO THE UNITED NATIONS; ACCOMPANIED BY ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF STATE FOR AFRICAN AFFAIRS SUSAN RICE

Ambassador HOLBROOKE. Mr. Chairman, thank you so much for inviting us to testify today. It's a great honor to appear before your Subcommittee for the first time. I am particularly pleased to be joined by Susan Rice, who will answer the tough questions after I deliver the single statement.

The participation of so many members of this Committee in our efforts in New York in the last 8 weeks is a remarkable and extraordinarily important fact. I would like to begin by thanking you, Congressman Payne, Congressman Meeks, Congresswoman Lee, Congressman Crowley, Congresswoman McKinney, Congressman Bereuter, and, of course, Chairman Gilman and Congressman Hall and many others who are not here today for coming to New York; sitting with our delegation; meeting the permanent representatives; in your case, participating on the inner deliberations of the Security Council in an unprecedented way.

I want to stress at the outset that in my 37 years in and out of the government, this was the most intense congressional consultative process I've ever been involved in. I was glad that Chairman Gilman made similar remarks last week at the Woodrow Wilson Center after my speech. I believe that you sent a very important signal to the U.N. membership and this went equally for the Members of the Senate who also visited. I think the U.N. permanent representatives are far more knowledgeable today than they were 3 months ago as to the role of the Congress, both houses, both parties, in the way we make foreign policy.

I reiterate to those of you who haven't yet joined us in New York that we hope you will. Many of you can attest to whether the hospitality is sufficient or not, but we hope it is.

Your continued interest in Africa is essential. We need your support. We cannot forge, in a period in which two different parties in an election year control the two branches of government, a foreign policy for Africa or almost any other part of the world without a bipartisan effort.

We need your support because, as Congressman Meeks and Congresswoman Lee and others, Chairman Royce, have just said, because Africa matters. I'm very struck by the fact that the National Summit on Africa, which Leonard Robinson will begin in a few days and which many of you will participate in, has as its motto, "Africa matters." That has been their motto for some years and we have adopted the same motto in New York in an effort to dispel the pernicious and false argument that the United States follows a double standard in regard to Africa, a point that Congressman Payne addressed very specifically a moment ago.

Last December, we made a trip to 10 nations in Africa, accompanied by Senator Feingold and backed strongly by Chairman Royce and Congressman Payne, neither of whom were able to go but both of whom we consulted in detail before we left and who we talked to as soon as we returned. Susan and I were on that trip together along with Howard Wolpe. We had many items on our agenda, but two dominated: the spread of HIV/AIDS and the crisis in Congo.

We are not here today to discuss AIDS, but I want to echo what Congresswoman Lee has already said. It is a scourge beyond imagination. We must deal with it.

We are proud that the Vice President came to New York to begin the Month of Africa with a significant increase in what the Administration will ask for in regard to dealing with that problem. I've heard that many of you are considering bills which would be even higher than that number. I commend you for your attention. I

know, because I spoke to President Clinton about this just 2 days ago, that he wishes to deal with this problem head-on.

I can report to you today that the Security Council, having broken new ground by dealing with a health issue for the first time in its history, intends to keep it up. The Economic and Social Council will be having meetings on it. We are going to be meeting with businessmen in New York. We're working very closely with the White House. This was not a gimmick or a piece of theater; it was the beginning of an intensification of an issue which we cannot leave alone.

I'd now like to turn to the Congo, Mr. Chairman, because we believe, as you know, that the time has come to take the next steps in the search to bring peace to that explosive area. You are aware, of course, of the fact that on February 7, the State Department notified this Committee and other Members of the Congress that the U.S. intends to support a resolution in the Security Council to expand the U.N. Observer Mission in the DRC, called MONUC for its French initials, M-O-N-U-C. This peacekeeping operation will subsume and expand upon the current U.N. mission in the Congo. It is imperative that we fulfill our responsibility to help.

No Security Council resolution has yet been adopted, but as we speak here in Washington, my colleagues in New York are negotiating with members of the Security Council and other concerned countries, many of whose Ambassadors, I'm glad to say, in Washington, are sitting behind us today. I'm very pleased that you all could attend. We are negotiating with other Security Council members on the resolution, which we expect will be voted on next week and, in any case, no earlier than February 23.

Let me now outline the background to the situation in the Congo and also address the specific concerns that were raised by some of you, particularly Chairman Gilman, Congressman Hall, and others. Let me say at the outset, Mr. Chairman, Congressman Gilman, that I regret that your questions were not answered prior to this hearing. I read them this morning for the first time. I believe we will answer most of them during this hearing, directly or indirectly, and we will be happy, Congressman Gilman, to give to you a more detailed written answer after this hearing.

As you know, we focused on Africa in January in the Security Council. As several of the members have already said, we had seven heads of state and I might add two of the three rebel signatories to Lusaka come to New York at the end of January for the open meeting chaired by Secretary of State Madeleine Albright.

The summit meetings and the follow-up and the private meetings not reported by the press went well. All of the leaders in New York recommitted themselves to the Lusaka Agreement, including, and I stress this, President Kabila, who was making his first trip ever to the United States. We also had in New York former President Masire of Botswana, who outlined his plans on the national dialogue.

This morning I spoke to Ambassador Swing in Kinshasa, who had just concluded a 3-hour meeting with President Masire in Kinshasa, had just met with the U.N. special representative and was waiting to see President Kabila. He reported to us and asked me to report to the committee that President Masire has gotten off

to an excellent start in the national dialogue. In fact, if you want to be precise about it, the national dialogue is not technically supposed to start for another month and a half or so, but President Masire has done a kind of a pre-national-dialogue dialogue, which we are glad is off to a quick start. The United States will do everything it can to support President Masire and the OAU.

But success, as all of you have already said, requires more than just talk. Action is necessary to prevent further conflict and the resurgence of genocide and mass killing in Central Africa. The U.N. can and must play a key role in this process and, in our view, the next step is to deploy the next phase of the process called for by Lusaka, that is a peacekeeping mission or, to be more precise, an observer mission backed up by support and logistics and security forces in the Congo as soon as it is practical to do so.

Allow me, therefore, Mr. Chairman, to review for you the phased approach to peacekeeping in the Congo. I should stress that this plan reflects what the U.S. Government, including the Pentagon, has advocated as the best approach. For many months, the Pentagon-UN relationship—for many years, I should say—was perhaps not as close as it should have been, but, in the last month, the Secretary of Defense William Cohen has come to New York to talk to the leadership of the U.N. Undersecretary of Defense Walt Slocombe has been there twice and has invited his United Nations counterpart, Bernard Miyet, to Washington. Even as we speak, Secretary Cohen is in Pretoria on a swing through Africa.

So I think you can see that the Pentagon involvement with Africa has dramatically increased in the last 6 weeks. I stress this point to you, because I do not think the U.S. Government can operate in these areas without an integrated policy that includes the Pentagon.

After months in which the United States intentionally and publicly dragged its feet on this effort—and I had discussed this with many people in this room. I remember particularly conversations I had with Congresswoman McKinney on this point—we had intentionally dragged our feet because we felt that the U.N. Peacekeeping Office did not have a viable plan and we felt that the Lusaka signatories had not been keeping their part of the bargain. We feel that, after the Month of Africa in New York, after the Pentagon's new hands-on relationship with the United Nations, that it is time to move to the next phase of the process. This approach ties U.N. deployments to concrete progress toward the Lusaka Agreement's objectives, both political and military.

There are three phases to the Lusaka Agreement. The first phase focused on establishing liaison with the parties, their field commanders, and the Joint Military Commission. Phase I was launched in August of last year when the Security Council authorized MONUC to send up to 90 U.N. military liaison officers to the Congo and to the capitals of other African countries involved in this issue.

Implementation during Phase I was imperfect. The cease-fire has been violated intermittently with heavy fighting in the northwest and around the central town of Ikela. The U.N. liaison officers also encountered some setbacks initially in their deployments. But today, 79 of the 90 military liaison officers have deployed to rear

headquarters on both sides in multiple locations. Still they've been barred from some key sites, including those held in government areas.

That being said, the peace process in Congo is moving forward, although slowly. Fighting that was once wide-scale has been contained to a relatively smaller number of areas. The international community is now poised for greater action and the parties have renewed their commitments. In no way, Mr. Chairman, do I wish to suggest by what I've just said that we minimize what is actually going on in the area now or recent reports of refugees in eastern Congo.

As a result of the meeting of the JMC political committee in Harare on January 18 and the Security Council session that many of you attended in New York on January 24, the Lusaka signatories reiterated their commitment to the peace process and to providing full security and access for all U.N. personnel. Significantly, all parties including President Kabila, called for the immediate deployment of the Phase II military observer mission.

The Secretary General's report on January 14 outlined the fundamental structure and mandate for Phase II. It recommended an expansion of the current U.N. mission of 90 military liaison officers to a 500-member observer mission with force protection and support, bringing the total up to 5,537 military personnel. If the Council authorizes this deployment, Phase II deployment of MONUC would begin when and only when key conditions are met, including security, access, and cooperation with U.N. personnel. No United States peacekeeping troops would be on the ground as part of this operation.

The observers would monitor the implementation of the cease-fire on the ground, assist with the disengagement of troops at certain locations, and assist the JMC with developing the mechanisms to implement Lusaka. Phase II operation would not, repeat not, be an interposition force.

Upon the successful completion of Phase II, the U.N. might recommend a Phase III operation to build on the progress of the national dialogue under President Masire and to support full and complete implementation of Lusaka. The precise mission size and functions of such a Phase III U.N. force remain undefined and cannot be defined in any precision at this time.

I think Congressman Payne's point earlier about why you can't have certainty about the final phase before you go into the intermediate phase and his references to the Mid-East resonated with me. That is a very strong evocation of my own views, Mr. Congressman. Although I'd never thought about it that way, when you said it, I was very struck by it.

We have stated repeatedly that the U.N. would not take on enforcement responsibilities, including any potential forcible disarmament of non-state actors. Let me stress, Mr. Chairman, transition to Phase III is not automatic, but would depend on developments during Phase II, including significant progress in the national dialogue. Any movement toward Phase III would require further Security Council action and would involve extensive consultations with you and your Committee at the same level of intensity of early consultations and discussions that has, I believe, character-

ized the relationship Susan and I have had with you and your Committee in the 5 or 6 months since I first got involved in this. I know that Susan has been heavily involved in the consulting with you long before that.

Moving to the U.S. national interest, Mr. Chairman. We have a profound interest in regional stability in Central Africa, in preventing the resurgence of the genocide and mass killing which we saw in Rwanda in 1994. In particular, the former Rwandan Army, referred to as the ex-FAR, and the Interahamwe militia, who were heavily responsible for the genocide of 1994 in Rwanda, are still operating in the region. They contribute significantly to instability. Congo is a contagion of crises. If the conflict there is allowed to fester, efforts to resolve conflicts and promote stability throughout the region in Angola, Rwanda, Uganda, Sudan, and Burundi, will be even more difficult.

Let me at this point, Mr. Chairman, draw your attention to the fact that President Mandela will be in Arusha next week to try to prevent Burundi from exploding. President Clinton, who was invited to attend the Arusha meeting will not be able to attend because of prior commitments, but I can tell you today that, for the first time in history, at least as far as I'm aware, the President of the United States will participate in a negotiation by two-way teleconference and will, from the White House, participate in President Mandela's Arusha meeting. We're very proud of that fact. I know President Mandela is very pleased and he himself will return to New York for the second time in 6 weeks upon completion of the Arusha mission to bring us up to date on his efforts.

So I want to stress that President Clinton is personally involved in the effort in Burundi and is actively following our efforts in the Congo and is following this hearing very closely.

The political and military vacuum in the Congo has drawn in the rogue states I regret to say. Libya, Iran, North Korea, Cuba, and the Sudan are all finding ways to be opportunistic. These states are seeking a foothold in a destabilized Central Africa for weapon sales, political allies, terrorist bases, and access to strategic minerals.

At this point, let me comment briefly on Congressman Hall's comment, although I guess he's left already, we share his concern. We have put \$1 million down to work on this with Sierra Leone. It's part of the agreement that's supposed to bring peace to Sierra Leone. The Lome Agreement. I am profoundly troubled by the diamond problem. I do not, however, know how to get ahold of it in a fundamental way because of the unique and fungible nature of diamonds and the ease with which they can be moved across international borders. For all these and more reasons, Mr. Chairman, the U.S. has a clear national interest to support the U.N. effort in resolving the conflict in the DRC.

For purposes of clarity, let me review for you the key points. This operation will not involve U.S. troops. The observers in Phase II would monitor the cease-fire and verify the redeployment of the party forces to defensive positions as agreed upon in the agreement. Transition to Phase III in the future is not automatic. Movement to Phase III is dependent on the parties observing Lusaka; disengagement of forces along confrontation lines; substantial

progress in the national dialogue; the completion by the parties of a viable plan for dealing with nonsignatory armed groups; further action by the U.N. Security Council; and extensive consultations and notification, if required, to this and other relevant Congressional Committees.

Finally, Mr. Chairman, I want to assure you that the administration is fully aware of the risks of this operation. Any effort toward peace in the Congo will not be easy. However, while there are risks undeniably involved with Phase II deployments by the United Nations, the risk of inaction is far greater. We cannot promise you immediate peace in the Congo. What we can say is that without strong U.N. leadership, there is a high probability, in fact, a near-certainty, of a catastrophic disaster in Central Africa. Inaction risks the resurgence of genocide, as we saw in Rwanda, and the danger that this proxy war will devolve into a direct war between the states already involved.

In conclusion, Mr. Chairman, let me point out that this past year has been a dramatic one for the United Nations in peacekeeping. New missions in Kosovo and East Timor and the expanded mission in Sierra Leone have not only greatly increased the number of U.N. peacekeepers in the field, but have added a new level of complexity to international peacekeeping. Congo is important, but success in these missions is also critical. We will not allow our concern for the Congo to come at the expense of our commitment to fulfilling our other missions, in particular Kosovo. No money will be reprogrammed from Kosovo for this program.

To sustain all of these U.N. peacekeeping efforts, we need the support of other UN-member states, the parties to the various conflicts, and, most importantly, the support of Congress. Without the means to finance our assessed contributions to peacekeeping activities, the U.N. would be unable to fulfill its mandates.

The stakes are high. The challenge is daunting. We cannot expect the U.N. to impose peace on the Congo. But it is imperative that the U.N. do what it can to support the peace process created by the African political leaders themselves. Failure to act could irreparably damage the capability and credibility of U.N. peacekeeping and American policy in Africa.

Mr. Chairman, I thank you for your time. We hope that we will have the support of you and Chairman Gilman and your Committee. Your role is crucial to our success. I thank you again on behalf of Susan, myself, the Secretary of State, and the entire administration for the immense amount of time that you and your colleagues on this podium today have spent in New York in consultations leading up to this important hearing. Thank you.

[The statement of Ambassador Holbrooke appears in the appendix.]

Mr. ROYCE. I thank you, Ambassador Holbrooke. I have two questions, but before I ask them, I'm going to turn to the Full Committee Chairman, Chairman Ben Gilman. He has two questions for you.

Mr. GILMAN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I regret I'm being called to another meeting and I appreciate your allowing me to move ahead on my questions.

Mr. Ambassador, we thank you for your review of where we are with this peacekeeping mission. We recognize it's an important mission and we recognize that it is complex.

Mr. Ambassador, has the United Nations asked the administration to provide support to the proposed expansion to the current monitoring mission in the Democratic Republic of Congo?

Ambassador HOLBROOKE. No.

Mr. GILMAN. Is the Department of Defense currently considering providing strategic airlift to the proposed peacekeeping force?

Ambassador HOLBROOKE. No.

Mr. GILMAN. Will it be asked to provide lift to support the peacekeepers inside the DRC as well?

Ambassador HOLBROOKE. They have not been asked at this point.

Mr. GILMAN. Will the administration seek reimbursement for any formal request from the U.N. for logistical support?

Ambassador HOLBROOKE. I will have to get you a written answer on that because I need to consult the Pentagon whose leader is in Pretoria today I think addressing similar questions.

Mr. GILMAN. Thank you very much.

In an editorial, Mr. Ambassador, in the Washington Post on February 14, yesterday, it was noted that "The Congo plan is being discussed at a time when other major UN-led peacekeeping operations are faltering." While the editorial noted that the crisis in the Congo should not be ignored, it did suggest that the Administration would have a more credible case to make for an expanded mission in that country if you were more fully meeting the commitments you've made elsewhere in other missions, such as those in Kosovo and East Timor. What's your reaction to that editorial?

Ambassador HOLBROOKE. Mr. Chairman, I read that editorial with great interest. It was a very smart editorial, but I would quibble with that last sentence. There is no question that the peacekeeping effort in Kosovo is encountering some very significant difficulties, as we speak, in the town of Mitrovica. They are widely publicized and deserve our undivided attention when we're dealing with the Balkans. Indeed, I participated in as many meetings on Mitrovica as I have on the Congo in the last few days. As for East Timor, East Timor is going quite well, all things considered. I wouldn't say that for the last 20 years, but the last 6 months have been pretty good.

With all due respect to the rest of the editorial, which was very well informed, I would go back to what Congressman Payne, Congressman Meeks, and others said. I do not understand why a great nation, the world's only superpower, at the apogee of its power, cannot deal with the crisis in the Congo simply because we're having a problem in Kosovo.

I underline one point again, Mr. Chairman, no reprogrammed funds away from Kosovo. Nothing we do in Congo will in any way diminish the resources we have to support our men and women on the line at Camp Bonesteel where Congressman Bereuter is about to lead a very important congressional delegation. We have made a firm commitment to you, to the Armed Services Committee, to Senator Warner, and to Chairman Helms as well as yourself. But I simply don't understand how you could follow a policy which says

don't do it in the Congo until you have solved the Kosovo. Because Kosovo is one tough problem.

The United States, without trying to be the world's policeman, without trying to solve every problem on earth, and there are dozens of problems way beyond our reach, should not say that we have to get Kosovo right before we do other things, because it may not be possible. I would also draw your attention to Tim Juda's article in today's New York Times on this same point.

But I appreciate your point. I'm very glad you raised it because it gives us a chance to make clear, on behalf of the entire administration, that Kosovo will not in any way, shape, or form, be diminished by what we're asking from you today.

Mr. GILMAN. Thank you, Mr. Ambassador. Based on your familiarity with the U.N. and with its Department of Peacekeeping Operations, does the U.N. have the capability of handling three or more major missions in Africa, in Asia, and Europe?

Ambassador HOLBROOKE. I don't know, Mr. Chairman. I really don't know.

Mr. GILMAN. We hope they do.

Ambassador HOLBROOKE. If you want me to say yes, I'll say yes. But I—

Mr. GILMAN. I just want your accurate—

Ambassador HOLBROOKE. I know you. I know you were expecting a different answer. But I would be misleading you if I said yes. The DPKO office is headed by an excellent senior French official, Bernard Miyet. He has only 300 people in that office. As you know, because you and I have discussed this before, he's understaffed. Much depends upon his success.

Secretary General Kofi Annan, who I think is one of the finest international civil servants we have ever seen and I believe the best secretary general since Dag Hammarskjöld is concerned about this issue, as you and I are. If the U.N. did not do such a great job in the early 1990's in peacekeeping twice in Africa and once in Europe—Rwanda, Somalia, and Bosnia—they have got to get it right this time. That is one of the reasons I have stressed the role of the Pentagon.

I would draw your attention again to the fact that Secretary Cohen is in South Africa today on a very important trip. South Africa is critically involved in these issues.

We are working overtime to help DPKO without taking over an area which is, after all, an international body. There is no friction between us. There is no national issue. There is no U.S.-French thing. We're working very closely together. But I don't know the answer to your question. Much depends on it. In fact, I have said in my speech that you and I did together a week ago, I have said that I think, overall, not just the Congo, but the future of the U.N. as a peacekeeping organization will depend on it.

Now one last point, Mr. Chairman. When the U.N. was formed by Franklin Roosevelt, Winston Churchill, and the founding fathers, this was what they had in mind: conflict prevention and conflict resolution. This is through the Security Council and through a secretariat which would carry out its mandate. With a few notable exceptions, Namibia, Mozambique, and a few special cases, it's

had a very mixed record. We must work with the U.N. to get it right.

Because if we don't, consider the alternative. This is not an issue the American public or your esteemed body wishes to take over for the U.S. This is not going to fall in the same category as something in the heartland of NATO or where we have a solemn security treaty like Japan. We have to make the U.N. work.

So I'm not prepared to give you a simple yes. All I can tell you is that the entire mission in New York and your direct involvement and support are critical to helping the U.N. get there. I stress again, the secretary general is 100 percent behind this effort. He knows how important it is.

Mr. GILMAN. Mr. Ambassador, we appreciate your candid assessment. We also appreciate the manner in which you're handling these very difficult problems.

Just one last comment. How will a peacekeeping operation address Congo's financial commitments to the rogue states that you mentioned?

Ambassador HOLBROOKE. Congo's financial commitment to the rogue states? I'm not sure I understand the question, sir.

Mr. GILMAN. President Kabila has some debts to pay. How will this peacekeeping operation affect those commitments?

Ambassador HOLBROOKE. You mean, how will this.

Mr. GILMAN. Peacekeeping operation.

Ambassador HOLBROOKE. Do you want to take it? It's a good chance to let Susan get warmed up here.

Mr. GILMAN. Thank you.

Ms. RICE. Thank you, Mr. Ambassador. Mr. Chairman, I think, to be quite plain about it, MONUC itself will not directly address any obligations that Congo may have incurred to rogue states or even to neighboring states that have participated on its behalf in the Congo. That's not its mission. Nevertheless, the involvement of rogue states is a source of major concern to us, as Ambassador Holbrooke noted in his opening statement. We believe the best way to minimize the opportunities and the influence of those rogue states is through a lasting and effective peace in the Congo so there is no vacuum and no opportunity for them to gain a further foothold.

Mr. GILMAN. Thank you. Thank you, Ms. Rice, and thank you, Mr. Chairman, for allowing me.

Ambassador HOLBROOKE. Mr. Chairman, we will give you written answers to the 12 questions. *I apologize profusely* that you didn't have them before this hearing. That was a logistical oversight. You should have. They're very good questions. *They were helpful because we practiced answering them before we got here so we were ready.*

Mr. GILMAN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. ROYCE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you, Ambassador Holbrooke for your commitment to respond in writing to those questions.

Ambassador HOLBROOKE. In writing.

Mr. ROYCE. Yes.

[The answers to the questions appear in the appendix.]

Mr. ROYCE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Now let me go to my two questions, if I could, Ambassador. The first would be this. The congressional notification for this peacekeeping operation notes that the Lusaka Peace Agreement calls on the Joint Military Commission to develop mechanisms for the disarmament and demobilization of non-state-armed groups that are non-signatories of Lusaka. Now that would include the Interahamwe.

As we've discussed before, this is critical, in my view, toward peace. So my first question goes to the question of how has the JMC worked to date? What kind of muscle does it have? How will it undertake this difficult task?

My second question is this: When you sent the notification, in it it warns of "a dangerous security vacuum that has drawn in rogue states which are seeking weapon sales, political allies, and access to strategic minerals," unquote. Now you cite this in your testimony as well.

At our September hearing, when I asked the Administration about press reports of North Korean activity at the Lakasim uranium mines, the response was, and I'm going to paraphrase here, but the response was, yes, we have seen reports of a few hundred North Koreans in the country but we cannot tell you, with any precision, where they are or what they are doing. With this notification, the administration seems to be suggesting that it has a better sense of what the North Koreans are up to and, in fact, last week there were more press reports of North Koreans mining uranium in Congo.

Now on this issue, it is worth noting that over 80 percent of the uranium in the Hiroshima and Nagasaki bombs came from the Congo mines. What, exactly, can you tell us about North Korean and other rogue state activity in Congo? Ambassador, is a U.N. peacekeeping operation the best way to deal with this challenge?

Ambassador HOLBROOKE. On the first part of your question, Mr. Chairman, as all of us who traveled in Southern Africa in the last few months saw—and I know this includes Congressman Payne, the CODEL headed by Congressman Gephardt, Congressman Houghton, myself, Senator Feingold, many of your colleagues, as you know from our discussions—the JMC, the Joint Military Committee got off to a very, very slow start.

It is for this reason that we have been clear, and this is where the Pentagon's role has been so valuable, that the Joint Military Committee and the United Nations must colocate and work together in the closest possible manner. We are not going to vote for the Security Council resolution until we get this right. As we speak, Susan has been sending cables out to her Ambassadors in the region about this. It's a very technical issue at one level. It's a very simple issue at the other. We're not going to move forward until our own military people are satisfied.

On the second issue, I'd like to ask if Susan could address this because she has been heavily involved in this for some time. It was not clear to me who you were quoting earlier. May I just—

Mr. ROYCE. In terms of press reports?

Ambassador HOLBROOKE. No, you quoted somebody from—

Mr. ROYCE. Ambassador Wolpe.

Ambassador HOLBROOKE. Was it Howard Wolpe?

Mr. ROYCE. Yes.

Ambassador HOLBROOKE. That's what I thought. Susan.

Ms. RICE. I'd like to think I haven't been heavily involved with North Koreans over a long period of time.

But, in any case, Mr. Chairman, as you know, we can provide further details on this question in a closed session, some of which would not be appropriate here for an open session. But as, I think, you and others on the Committee know that the North Koreans have had ties for many years to a number of African countries, including Congo, going back to the era of Mobutu.

North Korea, as you know, has its own uranium mines and the quality of their ore is suitable already for military purposes. The Congo mines in Katanga Province in southeastern Congo have not produced uranium for several years and have not received proper maintenance. The mines would require a great deal of capital investment for future exploitation.

So that is what we can share with you in this session. We're happy to provide what details we have further on this subject in a closed session.

Mr. ROYCE. I raised this issue with President Kabila as well. The answer was much the same in terms of the assumption that, because President Mobutu had a North Korean presence, this justified a North Korean presence today. Basically, the position was, we had a contract. I joked at the time, it's a rule of law thing. You've got a contract that you couldn't break.

I think there's a lot that we don't know. In talking with others from the region and from representatives from other states, there's a great deal of concern here. I will be following this up. But I thank you very much for your questions and I'm going to turn to our ranking member, Mr. Payne of New Jersey, for his questions.

Mr. PAYNE. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. Mr. Ambassador, we know that some of the weapons are coming from Russia, Bulgaria, perhaps the Ukraine, some of the Baltic states. Have we tried any kind of negotiation in the region of those capitals to try to meet with their leadership as it relates to trying to get them to cease and desist in the supply of military weapons to the various belligerents in the conflict in the DRC?

Ambassador HOLBROOKE. Efforts have been made. I've talked to several of the countries you've mentioned directly in New York, and our Ambassadors have in capitals. I would be misleading you if I suggested we're satisfied with the responses, even from the countries we have good relations with. Of course, there are some rogue states heavily involved in this operation. It is a very serious aspect of the problem.

I don't believe it can be dealt with, absent progress on the political front. That's just an instinctive feeling on my part. But it is a real problem.

I do not, however, Congressman Payne, despite the importance of it, and I completely agree with what you and Chairman Royce have said about its importance, I do not actually believe it's the critical variable here. I think the critical variable is political will and not simply leverage on arms sales. Here, the immense wealth of the Congo is its greatest tragedy, of course. There's just all this

money going into the wrong hands and being spent for the wrong purposes. Angola as well.

Mr. PAYNE. I had an opportunity to speak to most of the heads of state there at the U.N. I was unable to speak directly with Mr. Kabila, but the question that I would have asked him with the JMC, they are supposed to each work in concert with demobilization, attempting to go and to disarm or to bring the Interahamwe and the ex-FAR out of the Democratic Republic of Congo and re-integrate it back into their countries of Uganda and, primarily, Rwanda.

In your conversations with Mr. Kabila, or maybe Mr. Royce had a chance to see him. He's the chairman and I missed out because I saw him when nobody went out to catch him. Is there willingness on the part of the government to try to separate the Interahamwe from average ex-military Hutus, who are not all Interahamwe or who are not genocidaires but who could be separated and those who are accused sent to the authorities in Arusha or in Rwanda?

Ambassador HOLBROOKE. The starting point for an answer to this rather critical question is quite basic. President Kabila has signed the Lusaka Agreement, which calls for the disarming of the non-state armed forces. One of those armed forces is about as odious a group as the world has seen since the Khmer Rouge were at their height. In fact, they are really the African equivalent of the Khmer Rouge, and that's the group you're referring to. Or at least parts of it.

Now, we have some problems here. We don't really know the exact size. We had several very interesting private meetings in New York between the presidents, some of which I discussed with you and Chairman Royce privately. They argued vehemently about the size of the ex-FAR and Interahamwe; who's supporting them; where they are; how heavily they're armed. Our information is very uneven. So it's very hard for me to give you a clear answer.

However, if President Kabila does not honor his part of the commitment, we would have a serious problem. His response, were he here today, would be let the other side honor its commitments. There are obligations on both sides here. The African parties involved in this fighting have split in a tragic way along lines that are both hostile and supportive of the government in Kinshasa.

I, while the ex-FAR/Interahamwe issue is probably—not probably, it is certainly—one of the two or three critical issues, it cannot be solved unless the other elements of the Lusaka process are also dealt with in parallel processing: disarming other foreign elements; getting the national dialogue moving; and, and this is why we're here today, getting the United Nations to start putting its Phase II observer mission in. If any part of that process breaks down, we're going to be back to square one, notwithstanding all the drama and good words of the Month of Africa in New York.

Mr. PAYNE. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. ROYCE. Thank you, Mr. Payne. We're now going to go to the Vice Chairman of the Full Committee, Mr. Bereuter of Nebraska.

Mr. BEREUTER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Ambassador Holbrooke, thank you very much for your testimony. I would seek comments from you in two areas. Next week the congressional delegation I'll lead will visit with the European NATO countries and

Canada plus European Union personnel, including Javier Solano and Chris Patton. First, what level of cooperation and interest are you getting from the Europeans in moving ahead with Phase II of MONUC?

Second, what kind of benchmarks should we look for—actions accomplished, actions taken on the part of the United Nations to prepare themselves to make sure that Phase II does work and that we find ourselves ready to take on Phase III?

Ambassador HOLBROOKE. On your first question, Congressman, the Europeans are fully supportive, right now, of what is happening. There is a lot of the traditional rivalries of Central Africa, which have such a long history going back into the pre-independence era, have not manifested itself this time around so far. Probably because everybody realizes that, as Secretary Albright has said, we could be on the brink of the first world war of Africa and that would be a tragedy.

So our cooperation with all of the groups you mentioned and, indeed, with Solano himself, with whom I met at length on this. Chris Patton, who also has a role. The British, French, Belgium, and Canadian Ambassadors. The Canadians are very active here and they're looking forward to playing an important role. It's been very good.

There is one area, though, that I'm concerned about. That's the one Congressman Hall raised: diamonds. Diamonds are a whole different issue. They transcend everything else. I don't profess to understand the issue. I doubt anyone in this room really does, but Congressman Hall was very right to single it out.

On your second question, the benchmarks, perhaps we could submit for the record the Harare Declaration of January 18 in which they laid out their own benchmarks. The answer to your question is the Africans have given us the benchmarks. There are a series of very precise dates by which certain things must happen. One of the reasons we dragged our feet earlier, the point I made earlier, was because they were missing their own benchmarks. They hadn't appointed a facilitator. They hadn't started the withdrawals. Under those circumstances, it seemed inappropriate for us to start down the U.N. peacekeeping route.

Mr. BEREUTER. Ambassador, you expect the Security Council would accept or has endorsed those kinds of benchmarks?

Ambassador HOLBROOKE. Yes. The Security Council actually endorsed Lusaka in macro terms when it came out. In the draft resolution we're now negotiating, we will reendorse Lusaka.

That brings us to the benchmarks. I mentioned earlier Mr. Masire. The fact that he is in Kinshasa today for the first time on an agreement that was signed on July 10 is really a—let us not underestimate this. He is in charge of the all-important political dialogue. We've finally gotten him there. I don't think it's a misstatement to say that the United States played a role of which we can all take some pride that he's there. He just spent 3 hours with President Kabila.

So the benchmarks, which we will submit to you in writing, Congressman, are very clear.

Mr. BEREUTER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. ROYCE. Thank you, Mr. Bereuter. We'll go to Ms. Lee of California.

Ambassador HOLBROOKE. Could I just ask you, Congressman, to please convey to the American troops at Camp Bonesteel and to the commanders particularly that there will be no reduction in our support for their efforts because of any other activities in any other part of the world? It's very important, because we are focusing on Africa, but nothing will diminish our support. You will be leading the biggest CODEL, I think, ever to go to Bonesteel. So it would be very helpful to us.

Mr. ROYCE. We'll take that assurance. Thank you.

Ambassador HOLBROOKE. Thank you, sir.

Ms. LEE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Ambassador Holbrooke, I would once again thank you for bringing all the signatories together and the heads of state at the United Nations.

I read and have talked to you a little bit about these discussions that took place. Obviously they were very difficult. I'm wondering, in terms of the reluctance to proceed with Lusaka, where do you see any reluctance among the signatories to the agreement? Or is everyone kind of waiting for the other to move forward?

Ambassador HOLBROOKE. No, I think it's more the latter. This has got to be parallel processing. The way I envisage Lusaka, everyone has their own metaphor, Congresswoman Lee, but the way I envisage it, it's like one of those old-fashioned European train stations where all the trains are lined up at, Victoria Station, together. One is called the national dialogue. That's under President Masire. One is called the ex-Far/Interahamwe. One is called the rebel forces: Bemba, Wamba dia Wamba, and Ilungu who, between them, have 25,000 to 30,000 armed men in the field. One is called the foreign forces under the control of the pro-Kinshasa forces, the so-called "allies." Then there are forces in the field that oppose them.

Each one of those is a track. All of them need to move forward together. If one doesn't move, the others are going to say, I'm not moving. In that sense, it's very similar to what we've tried to do in Bosnia with two major differences. This is far more complicated because there are more actors, more participants. Second, American military power, NATO force of the sort we had available to us in the Balkans is not a clear option.

But in terms of parallel processing, it takes an immense amount of effort. Howard Wolpe's name has been mentioned earlier today, your former colleague. He would be with us today except that Susan has sent him out to the region to work on this issue, pushing those trains forward and, also, to join President Mandela in Arusha.

Ms. LEE. Yes, I was going to ask you. What is our role, then, and how can the United States be helping you in moving these three tracks forward as quickly as possible?

Ambassador HOLBROOKE. With the greatest respect for the sovereignty, independence, and territorial integrity of all the states in Central Africa, the United States should continue to do what it's been doing.

Here I'd like to make a point. I had been told by many people that there would be sensitivity on the part of the African states if

the U.S. was too, "aggressive." All I can tell you is that that was not what Susan and Howard and I found on our trip. I felt that, despite our legacy in a country that used to be called Zaire, which is a very specific, unique historical burden, but what I now think is clearly in the past, after President Kabila's trip to New York, despite that legacy, the African states understand that this is no longer the Cold War; that the U.S. has no live-or-die strategic interest at stake in Africa.

We are there to help them because it is in our long-term interest to do so; because it's the right thing to do; because, as the wealthiest nation of the world and the only superpower, we can do it through the U.N. and that we have no vested interest and we're not taking sides. That all we're doing is trying to help the African leadership implement what Salim Salim, the OAU's secretary general calls, "an African solution to an African problem."

As you well know, because you and I have talked about this, this is my first extended involvement with Africa. Before it, I called on many of you. I spent 2 hours with Congressman Payne, an hour with Chairman Royce, and got your advice. What I found was that the leadership in Africa, and I think that's demonstrated by the quality of the Ambassadors sitting behind us today, welcomed our activities in support of their policy, as long as we don't put forward an American plan. We don't have an American plan, Mr. Chairman. What we have is American support for the African plan, the Lusaka plan, through the U.N.

I have been assured by every African leader, including leaders who are really hostile to each other, that they all want continued American engagement. That specifically includes this Committee.

Mr. ROYCE. Thank you, Ambassador. I know we have just enough time here for a question from Mr. Meeks and one from Mr. Tancredo. Mr. Meeks.

Mr. MEEKS. I just want to echo what you just said. I've found in my conversations with some of the presidents that I had the opportunity to talk to in the United Nations, that they did very much, in fact, want the UN's involvement because they thought that if peace were to happen, it could not happen without the U.N. and the United States.

But, also, I have a number of individuals from the Congo that live in my district. One of the things that seems to emanate from them quite often is what can the U.S. and/or the U.N. do? Whether or not there was anything under the U.N. charter that would help humanitarian causes for the civilians and the hundreds or thousands of civilians that are being killed every day, is there anything that we can do or can the U.N. to enforce, through their charter, so that we can have some kind of mandate with regards to the civilians that are being killed in the Congo?

Ambassador HOLBROOKE. I couldn't agree with you more, Congressman Meeks, about the humanitarian consequences of this. That's why we had the special session on refugees in Africa on January 13 with Mrs. Ogata. In that session, I really took the gloves off and blasted the United Nations, and will gladly repeat it here again today, for an arbitrary distinction between a refugee and an internally displaced person, which leaves somewhere between 2, 3, and 90 percent of the refugees in Africa uncovered by the UNHCR.

I find a lamentable situation. I have talked to the head of the World Food Program, Carolyn Bottini, about it. I have talked to Mrs. Ogata. I do not think we can let these issues slip through the cracks. Mr. Chairman, I would urge that you consider additional hearings on the refugee issue.

But I hope, if you do so, you will help us address what I think lies behind your question. In Angola, for example, 90 percent of the homeless people are not considered refugees under the U.N. definition. Worldwide, including Asia and Central America, two-thirds of the homeless people in the world don't fall under the U.N. definition of refugee. So they get catch-as-catch-can help from the World Food Program and so on.

Now this is, let's be honest with each other, when I talk about this, if we decide to undertake, it may mean some additional money. It's a big decision. But if you go to a refugee camp in Congo or Angola and people say, this isn't a refugee camp, this is an IDP for internally displaced people, it's an acronym, you get very angry. I think that's what your Congolese constituents are reflecting. I share that concern. I spent over 20 years of my life working on refugees in Asia and Africa and Europe. I would urge that you consider a separate hearing on this and bring in the refugee experts.

I know that the secretary general and other people would welcome this kind of public exposure to a bureaucratic anomaly which is increasingly distressing as the African situation continues to cause the problems that Congressman Meeks referred to.

Mr. ROYCE. Thank you, Ambassador. I want to thank the members of this panel for their participation today. We have one last question. I'm going to turn to Congresswoman McKinney of Georgia. Then we'll conclude this hearing.

Ms. MCKINNEY. Great, thank you. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Actually, I have two questions. One is a theoretical question and one is a bit more pragmatic.

We know that this Administration's Africa policy has as its cornerstone forging relationships with key renaissance leaders. Yoweri Museveni of Uganda is one of those leaders and Paul Kagame is another. The United States has a close military relationship with these countries, including lethal JCET training. The U.S. has supported multilateral loans for these countries, despite their having violated international law and invaded the Democratic Republic of Congo.

These countries have invaded the DRC stating security concerns on their border, yet they station troops as far west in the DRC as Boma on the Atlantic Ocean. They are currently supported armed factions that have become known in international parlance as rebel groups. These armed factions, along with the invading troops of Uganda and Rwanda have committed and are committing crimes against humanity. In addition, they are fomenting nationalism, ethnic strife in Congo and the ready availability of weapons makes the situation even more lethal.

I requested a briefing today from the State Department to know what the U.S. has done to emphasize in more than rhetorical terms for our allies that their invasion of Congo is unacceptable, that the United States stands with the rest of Africa and not with them in the de facto partition of Congo. That their continued presence is

creating ethnic hatred heretofore unknown in the Congolese context.

Unfortunately, Mr. Ambassador, I didn't get satisfactory answers to my questions. In fact, I learned instead that we still have a military relationship in IMET with these countries. That we have not yet voiced our concern about the situation with Archbishop of Bukavu, Monsignor Kataliko and that we continue to cover up and make excuses for our successive policy failures with respect to this region.

Mr. Ambassador, can you tell me how your stewardship of the Great Lakes peace will be any different than the failed policies of the past that seemingly have abetted the current climate of ethnic hatred, genocide, revenge genocide, crimes against humanity, and the violation of any national law?

My second question, Mr. Ambassador, is that I believe the U.N. must be the only place on the planet where colossal failures result in promotions. In 3 weeks, the U.N. apologized for its behavior in Rwanda, Srebrenica, in East Timor, and, this week, Kosovo. We have seen the U.N. repeatedly get it wrong and then those very people who got it wrong get promoted to more responsibility.

Could you tell me what safeguards you will make sure get in place that, so that the Congo becomes a place of opportunity for the U.N. to redeem itself, rather than just another opportunity for yet another apology?

Ambassador HOLBROOKE. Can I take the second question first? Who has been promoted as the result of Srebrenica in the U.N. system or Rwanda that shouldn't have been? I quite take your point about the Dutch. I don't understand how Colonel Karden could have been promoted after Srebrenica. But I don't see rewarding in the U.N. system. Do you have someone specific in mind?

Ms. MCKINNEY. I absolutely do have some specifics and we can talk about it afterwards if you like.

Ambassador HOLBROOKE. Because I must say, I thought that the Rwanda and Srebrenica reports were truly courageous on the part of the secretary general insofar as he allowed reports in which he himself took some criticism.

I take it you're not arguing with the substance of these reports. You agree with them. I certainly do. I've spoken out quite strongly on this. But I do want to reiterate my high admiration and support for the secretary general and that includes the fact that he did something that very few politicians in our country or anywhere else have done.

Mr. ROYCE. Ambassador, might I make a suggestion?

Ambassador HOLBROOKE. Yes, sir.

Mr. ROYCE. Because we face a series of votes upon the conclusion of our hearing. I wonder if there would be any objection if your responses are to the record to Congresswoman McKinney and, at the same time, also, we very much appreciate your commitment to respond to the chairman's questions in writing, for the record.

Mr. ROYCE. We want to thank you for your frankness. We want to thank Assistant Secretary Rice for her participation as well. Ambassador, we very much look forward to working with you and thank you so much for this hearing today.

Ambassador HOLBROOKE. Thank you, sir.

Mr. ROYCE. This hearing is adjourned.
[Whereupon, at 3:42 p.m., the Subcommittee was adjourned.]

A P P E N D I X

FEBRUARY 15, 2000

U.S. House of Representatives

Subcommittee on Africa

255 Ford House Office Building, Washington, D.C. 20515

For Immediate Release
February 15, 2000

PRESS contact: Bryan Wilkes
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Statement of Chairman Ed Royce **"Peacekeeping in the Democratic Republic of Congo"**

WASHINGTON, D.C. -- "I'm pleased that we have the opportunity today to examine such a critical and timely issue as the proposed second phase of the United Nations' peacekeeping mission for the Democratic Republic of Congo. The Subcommittee has been closely following developments in Congo for several years. I led a congressional delegation to Congo in 1997, and met with President Kabila a few days after he was inaugurated. The Administration is now prepared to approve a substantial peacekeeping effort there. This hearing will give Subcommittee members an opportunity to better understand American options regarding the Congo.

"The Great Lakes conflict is a complex and intense one. The level of fear, insecurity, and mistrust in this region is as high as anywhere in the world. How could it be otherwise, given the backdrop of the 1994 genocide?

"This makes the proposed U.N. peacekeeping operation a great challenge. While the Administration and the U.N. have a formulated plan, success for this ambitious undertaking is far from assured. To be successful, this operation, built on the fragile Lusaka peace agreement, will have to have its share of breaks. Any scenario for success should be tested against the U.N.'s large-scale Congo peacekeeping operation which ended in failure in 1964.

"A key to success today will be making good on the Lusaka-mandated National Dialogue, designed to bring a democratically-based political stability to Congo. In facing this challenge, there can be no room for revisionism. In 1998, President Kabila did not have his democratic aspirations frustrated by the renewed outbreak of conflict. Before the August 1998 invasion, he had banned political parties, unduly restricted non-governmental organizations, harassed leading political figures, including Etienne Tshisekedi, and repressed the vibrant civil society that had struggled under Mobutu. In hindsight, more external democratic pressure should have been brought to bear. Meanwhile, conditions in rebel-held territory have been no better. There are accounts of attacks on religious independence, for example. I make these points to illustrate the extent of the challenge that the U.N. is attempting to tackle. I also want to suggest that we have some recent experience that should be valuable as the U.S. and the U.N. attempt to prod along the National Dialogue. Congolese democrats want external pressure and it's incumbent upon the international community, in proceeding with this large commitment, to

apply it. Bringing about a successful National Dialogue is but one of the many concerns we should all have about this plan.

"That doesn't mean though that the U.N. peacekeeping operation should not proceed. In 1994, the international community sat on the sidelines as nearly one million men, women and children were slaughtered in Rwanda. Three years ago, at a Subcommittee hearing on the Congo, as the Mobutu regime was literally dying, I said that the U.S. has a role to play in the Congo because we can make a difference --and because we have interests in doing so. It's worth noting that Americans long ago expressed a humanitarian interest in the Congo. The noted journalist and historian George Washington Williams and Mark Twain were central figures in a world-wide movement against slave labor in King Leopold's Congo. Today genocide lurks, and we have increasingly evident national security interests --centered on rogue regime activities in the Congo-which I raised at our last hearing on this crisis. At that hearing, I also quoted a U.S. Institute for Peace study which called the Lusaka peace agreement "a last exit on the region's highway to hell," strong language that is still valid.

"But as we proceed with this U.N. option in an attempt to make a difference, let's make sure that we give ourselves and the people of the region the best chance of success. That means not band-aiding problems. In addition to prodding a successful National Dialogue, there needs to be real disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration in the Congo. Territorial integrity must be respected and non-signatories to Lusaka must be dealt with. Moreover, the U.N. needs competent peacekeepers. I share the Chairman of the International Relations Committee's recently expressed concerns over the incompetence of U.N. peacekeepers in Sierra Leone. High operating standards must be set. While Congress should not put up a stop sign for this peacekeeping operation, rules of the road must be established and assiduously obeyed.

"Finally, it's important that the U.S. doesn't slough this operation off to the United Nations. While the Congo peacekeeping operation will not involve American troops, it must be bolstered by the active diplomatic engagement of the world's superpower. Success, as I've said, will require some good luck. The parties to the conflict will have to make good on their Lusaka obligations. I urge them to look toward the future and do so. Success will also require a strong focus and will, and a great deal of energy and imagination by the United States. Without this American commitment, failure is assured. I know that Ambassador Holbrooke appreciates this reality.

"The stakes for this peacekeeping operation are high. It is no exaggeration to suggest that the lives of thousands of African, if not more, are on the line. I will work to maximize this operation's chance for success, for failure is likely to sow devastating consequences."

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NEWS



International Relations Committee

U.S. House of Representatives * Benjamin A. Gilman, Chairman * 2170 RHOB * Washington, D.C. 20515

DATE: *February 15, 2000*

FOR RELEASE: *Immediate* 200-25

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GILMAN DEMANDS ANSWERS ON CONGO PEACEKEEPING MISSION

WASHINGTON (Feb. 15) – U.S. Rep. Benjamin A. Gilman (20th-NY), Chairman of the House International Relations Committee, made the following statement today at a subcommittee hearing on the proposed peacekeeping mission in the Democratic Republic of Congo:

Ambassador Holbrooke and Assistant Secretary Rice, thank you for meeting with us today. We appreciate your efforts to focus the Security Council's attentions on Africa during the month of January. We have been impressed with your personal energy and commitment to address some of the world's most intractable conflicts. We are very pleased that Chairman Royce was able to accommodate your request for a public hearing on this important matter.

I read the Congressional Notification with interest and had a number of questions. In fact, my staff conveyed those 11 modest questions to the State Department last Wednesday, February 9th. We asked for responses to them by Friday, February 11th, so that we could gain the most value from your appearance today. Regrettably, the answers did not appear on Friday. The answers did not appear on Monday. To my knowledge, we still do not have them. Mr. Chairman, with your permission, I would like to submit a copy of these questions for the record.

Mr. Ambassador, a few weeks ago, Secretary of State Madeleine Albright and National Security Adviser Sandy Berger emphasized their desire to conduct a bipartisan foreign policy in close cooperation with the Congress. I know from our many conversations that you share that perspective. It is therefore disturbing to me that we are experiencing so little in the way of forthright cooperation when it comes to this proposed peacekeeping operation.

You have rightly pointed out in the press that Congress recognizes the importance of this conflict in the Congo. However, it is the duty of the legislative branch to ask questions of the executive branch before we

(more)

commit tens or hundreds of millions of dollars overseas. I believe it is the duty of the executive branch to answer those questions.

The recent record of peacekeeping in Africa has not been impressive. In Sierra Leone, we just authorized the expansion of the peacekeeping operation to 11,000 troops. To date, there have been at least five separate incidents in which rebel forces there have mugged UN peacekeepers and stolen cash, fuel, rifles, rockets, ammunition, and even armored vehicles. We are only three months into that operation, and already it appears to be bogged down.

Your testimony here is not about Sierra Leone, but about Congo. Perhaps there is more reason to be hopeful in Congo, but there are clearly some obvious reasons for concern. If Sierra Leone, a small country with a comparatively good transportation infrastructure presents such problems to UN peacekeepers, what will happen in Congo, a country 33 times its size? This graphic illustrates my point.

Mr. Ambassador, in his famous treatise, Carl von Clausewitz warned leaders to consider carefully before embarking on war. He wrote,

“The first, the supreme, the most far reaching act of judgement that the statesman and commander have to make is to establish...the kind of war on which they are embarking, neither mistaking it for, nor trying to turn it into, something that is alien to its nature.”

I believe that if Clausewitz were alive today, he would apply the same dictum to peacekeeping operations.

Those of us who support the United Nations and who believe it has a crucial role to play in Africa. However, we fear the prospect of peacekeeping operations that, like Somalia in 1993, are poorly defined, could end badly and leave in their wake little support for future endeavors.

Ambassador Holbrooke, I appreciate your testimony here today. I also look forward to reviewing the written answers to questions we've asked prior to releasing the funds for this peacekeeping mission.

Sam Gejdenson

COMMITTEE ON INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS
RANKING DEMOCRATIC MEMBER

U.S. House of Representatives B-360 Rayburn Building Washington, D.C. 20515 (202) 225-6735

GEJDENSON HAILS HOLBROOKE TESTIMONY ON CONGO AS TIMELY AND IMPORTANT

FOR IMMEDIATE RELEASE CONTACT: Mark Clack (202) 225-6735

February 15, 2000, Washington, D.C.—House International Relations Committee Ranking Democrat, Sam Gejdenson (D-CT), said that the testimony of United States Representative to the United Nations, Richard Holbrooke before the House Africa Subcommittee today will help educate the Congress about the UN's peace building plan for the Democratic Republic of Congo and go a long way towards building congressional support for the plan.

"The question on many members' minds is can the Lusaka peace accord be reinforced to bring about safe conditions to deploy UN monitors and is the plan sufficient to foster peace" commented Gejdenson. "Many members are supportive of the renewed diplomacy Mr. Holbrooke has forged to address the Congo question. Today's hearing will offer the Administration the opportunity to explain the national security and political dimensions of the UN peacekeeping efforts in Congo" commented Mr. Gejdenson.

"The situation in the Democratic Republic of Congo has the potential to destabilize East, Central and Southern Africa" stated Rep. Gejdenson. "We must support the Lusaka Peace process as best we can. After all, this is an African sponsored plan to resolve conflict" said Gejdenson.

Mr. Gejdenson further commented that "it is important to remind Congress that for 32 years the United States relied on and supported the corrupt and non-democratic government of former Zairean president and strongman, Mobutu Sese Seko." "A large part of the problem is that Mobutu's excesses and impunity went unchecked. Now the time has come for the United Nations and its member states to help the various factions create lasting peace" Gejdenson commented..

TONY P. HALL
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Opening Statement of
U.S. Representative Tony P. Hall
February 15, 2000

Thank you for allowing me to participate in today's hearing, Mr. Chairman. I look forward to what Ambassador Holbrooke has to say to your subcommittee today, and to learning our colleagues' thoughts on this very complex subject.

I used to serve on this Committee, and so I know your challenges are great. Having visited Africa on several occasions, and worked on the problems of hunger, disease and war that have plagued many of its people, I commend you and other Subcommittee members particularly for your concern and dedication.

As you know, some 5,000 Americans are coming to Washington this week for the National Summit on Africa. One of their aims is to convince the people and leaders here that we need better policies toward Africa's nations and its people.

I believe U.S. support for a U.N. commitment to help bring peace to the Democratic Republic of Congo is a step toward this goal -- although I am troubled by many aspects of the proposal as it stands. For the United Nations' sake as well as for the DRC's, this U.N. mission cannot fail. And yet it appears we may be setting it up to do just that.

There are many precautions we could take to prevent such a disaster. I am confident the Chairman, the Ambassador, and our colleagues in Congress and the Administration probably have some good ideas of what is needed. But I submit to you that if we do not strike at one key root of the DRC's problems, none of these very good people's ideas will make much difference.

U.S. estimates put the trade in Congolese diamonds at more than \$600 million per year -- most of it in cash. News reports say \$20 million worth of Congolese diamonds pour through Rwanda and Uganda *every month*. And a deal announced last month will let Zimbabwe's army mine diamonds and gold in the DRC to offset the \$3 million-plus it spends maintaining troops in the DRC. The presence of those troops violates the Lusaka

Accords. Rebels also continue to violate them. So in the DRC all sides of the conflict depend on this diamond trade to continue fighting -- and to undermine the chance for the Accords to succeed.

Diamonds are at the root of wars in three other countries too: Sierra Leone, Liberia, and Angola. Capturing diamond-rich regions is one aim of those wars. And trading diamonds for weapons is one way soldiers stay in the fight. Until something is done to sever this funding link, this symbol of love and commitment to Americans is likely to mean war and misery to millions of Africans.

In all, \$10 *billion* in diamonds has been diverted from these four African countries over the past decade -- and spent on weapons and narcotics and war. Over the same period, our government has donated \$2 billion in humanitarian aid to try to stanch the flow of misery that resulted.

Together with Britain and Canada, our country is trying to do something about these bloody diamonds. These efforts were endorsed by the G-8 nations last December. They are not only noble; they also are very practical. As Britain's Foreign Secretary, Robin Cook, put it:

"The diamond market is pretty tight. The places you can sell uncut diamonds are pretty limited. It should not be beyond our wit to devise an international regime, in cooperation with the diamond trade, that cuts off that flow of diamonds to those who use them to buy arms and fuel conflicts."

A global regime is a worthy effort -- but I don't think its impact will be felt soon enough. If the diamond industry were doing more than talking about cooperating -- if it really was using its tremendous power to achieve this goal -- that could change. But so far all I've seen is a public-relations campaign to convince us all that this isn't really a problem.

Until that changes, I believe the United States should begin to act unilaterally. Americans buy 65% of the world's diamonds, and their purchasing power could go a long way to convince reputable businesses to wash their hands of those who deal in diamonds, and to put their economic muscle to the job of protecting peace and fighting poverty.

Congressman Frank Wolf and I (with the support of Congressman Chris Smith and Congresswoman Cynthia McKinney of this Committee) have introduced the CARAT Act, HR 3188, to give consumers the information they need to participate in a human-rights campaign now underway, and I hope our colleagues will support it.

But the United Nations could act even faster than the United States. It already has imposed an embargo on diamonds used by Angola's rebels, and it is close to announcing how to improve enforcement of that. The United Nations also should sanction the diamonds of the DRC.

This is more than just a good idea; it is more than a response to Congolese opposition leaders' calls. It is an obligation the UN owes its troops. The diamond trade helps to arm the combatants UN troops will face in the DRC. Deploying them without first doing something to stop this trade would be a breach of the UN's responsibility to support them as best it can.

When we suggested a similar action during our visit to Sierra Leone, we were surprised by the support from the people there. Its peace accord is imperfect, as is the Lusaka Accord – but it does try to direct Sierra Leone's vast resources toward its people, instead of toward their destruction.

We have urged Ambassador Holbrooke to press the UN on an embargo on bloody diamonds from Sierra Leone; today Congressman Wolf and I have written to ask him to cut off the funds that are underwriting the violence that is undermining the Lusaka Accord.

Diamonds – and the other riches in Africa – should be a blessing, but in the DRC, in Sierra Leone, in Liberia and in Angola, they have been a curse.

I am confident that, if anyone can sever the link between diamonds and war -- if anyone can help bring peace to a war-torn country, Ambassador Holbrooke can. I watched him work his magic during the Dayton Peace Accords, and ever since. His leadership at the United Nations is rightfully the source of great hope for a new era for that great institution, and I look forward to hearing his testimony today.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Tony P. Hall and Frank R. Wolf

Diamonds and Dictators (Cont'd)

In recent years, countless Africans have been killed and maimed by weapons purchased with diamond revenues—or by armed thugs trying to clear the land and control the mines. Many of their attackers have been emboldened by heroin and other drugs purchased with diamond revenues, drugs that spill over from the money-laundering opportunities diamonds have always afforded to narcotics traffickers.

In Sierra Leone, this trade transformed a ragtag band of 400 soldiers into a well-armed force 25,000 strong. In Liberia, the Democratic Republic of Congo, and Angola the impact of diamonds has also been significant.

The war for Sierra Leone's diamond mines—a war that killed tens of thousands of civilians and ravaged the country—was ended a few months ago by a peace agreement to be enforced by 6,000 U.N. peacekeepers. No one can estimate its cost, but whatever the United States contributes will be in addition to the humanitarian aid we've sent to this and three other countries torn by diamond wars in the past decade. As that \$2 billion in aid trickled in, \$10 billion earned in trading diamonds poured out of these same countries—and into the machines of war.

In his op-ed piece of Dec. 23, Nicky Oppenheimer, chairman of DeBeers Consolidated Mines, notes that only one-sixth of the world's diamond supply comes from these conflict zones, and just 2 percent from Angola. That fact may be significant to DeBeers, but it is wholly irrelevant to the people of these countries.

Last month we met some of these people—adults and children—who'd had hands or arms hacked off by rebels as punishment for voting in the country's first democratic election. They can't tell you how significant their country's contribution to the world diamond supply is, but their scars illustrate what the damage can be in a place where diamonds are abundant and AK-47s cost just \$10.

Over the past five years, Antwerp's Diamond High Council, through which most African diamonds are funneled, reported that its traders imported 30 million carats of diamonds from Liberia—a country incapable of producing even 2 percent of that amount. Diamond traders knew full well that most of these stones were smuggled by rebels or-



Taking Exception

der to overthrow a democratically elected government in Sierra Leone. They knew too that these rebels were using their earnings to terrorize innocent civilians and battle the peacekeeping forces sent by neighboring countries. Yet, until journalists, policymakers and human rights activists began shining a light on this link a few months ago, most remained unfazed by the bloody business.

As middlemen and retailers, DeBeers and others help provide jobs to Africans. Americans and others, as Oppenheimer notes in his article. At the same time, they also provide enormous profits for themselves.

We believe that American consumers—who purchase some 60 percent of these diamonds—ought to be informed as to where they were mined—much as they are informed about where their car parts, or shoes, or cheese come from. Our Consumer Access to a Responsible Accounting for Trade Act (CARAT) would give them that information. The act provides the information needed to participate in a consumer campaign like the one that helped to end slavery 150 years ago.

Our bill's approach may not be perfect, and we have invited the diamond industry to counter our proposal. Its American component is made up of respected businesses, and we hope they will press their colleagues to suggest more than merely politicking themselves, or temporarily pulling out of countries (such as Angola) when public scrutiny of atrocities becomes unbearable.

A new report on the diamond trade by Partnership Africa Canada, a coalition of Canadian and African nongovernmental organizations, urges Belgium to end its complicity in fueling Africa's wars and take the steps needed to end its attraction for organized crime syndicates. It rightly points out that "by accepting Liberian exports (of diamonds) as legitimate, the international diamond industry actively colludes in crimes committed or permitted by the Liberian government." And it calls on diamond merchants to close the trading offices in Liberia and Ivory Coast that encourage smuggling and make their capitals a magnet for guns, terror, money laundering and diamond smuggling.

Of course, the diamond industry and the governments beholden to it are not the only force capable of helping to change the cycle of African wars. We have called on the United Nations to impose sanctions against illicit Sierra Leone diamonds, as it did in Angola, and on the United States to make this issue a priority. This supply-side tactic should be matched by demand-side approaches, such as requiring disclosure of the origins of diamonds when they enter the U.S. market.

Disclosure of origins would not only warn some of the people responsible for Africa's bloodshed: that their diamonds will have far less value than legitimately mined gems, thus helping head off violence against civilians. It would also protect the citizens of responsible, stable nations such as Botswana from the collateral damage of a general boycott.

No one will benefit if diamonds are made the pariah product that fur has become to some consumers. Africans and others who depend on the jobs this luxury product creates would be among the biggest losers. To avoid that outcome, we agree with DeBeers' chairman that wisdom is needed. But no less important is the industry's commitment to get serious about solving this problem.

U.S. Reps. Tony P. Hall (D-Ohio) and Frank R. Wolf (R-Va.) visited Sierra Leone, Guinea and Benin last month.

Washington Post, 1.25

EMBASSY OF THE DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF THE CONGO
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Hearing on the Conflict in the Democratic Republic of the Congo

Statement to the United States
House of Representatives' International Relations Subcommittee on Africa

By

H.E. Faida M. MITIFU
The Ambassador of the Democratic Republic of the Congo

Tuesday, February 15, 2000

Mr. Chairman:

On behalf of President Kabila and the Government of the Democratic Republic of the Congo, I want to express appreciation to the Subcommittee for holding this hearing. The leadership demonstrated by Ambassador Richard Holbrooke at the United Nations Security Council during the discussions on the Great Lakes crisis January 24-26 has given us renewed hope that the United States can and will play a significant role in the resolution of the conflict. My government also appreciates the UN Security Council Resolution 1234 of June, 1999 which demands that all uninvited foreign forces leave the Congo. Unfortunately, until now the Council has yet to implement this resolution.

Mr. Chairman, February marks the 19th month of the brutal and unforgiving occupation of my country by the armies of Rwanda and Uganda. Our people are suffering immensely. According to the UN, today there are some 960,000 internally displaced persons in eight of the 11 provinces of the Democratic Republic of the Congo and over 300,000 refugees from six of its neighboring countries. Even as the peace process moves forward, some of the most shocking atrocities of the war have taken place only recently – reminding us that each day peace is postponed, more people will die.

At this promising juncture and with so much at stake, the role of the United States is critical. Let me take this opportunity to urge the Administration, the Congress, and this subcommittee, to maintain America's current course of heightened involvement in Central Africa.

As President Kabila stated so forcefully at the UN Security Council, the D.R. Congo was invaded by Rwanda, Uganda and Burundi in an aggressive act against a legitimate state. These governments have cited border security as a justification for their aggression against the D.R. Congo. While their concerns may be legitimate, I must emphasize that at no time since President Kabila came to power have these governments addressed border security problems through diplomacy. They have consistently resorted to military solutions, both inside their countries and in neighboring countries. I would also like to point out that the internal violent conflicts in Rwanda, Uganda and Burundi have not been caused by events in the Congo. On the contrary, the Congo has been the victim of these countries' political and ethnic upheavals spilling over into our eastern provinces for decades.

Mr. Chairman, even more tragic than the actual aggression against the Congo has been the massive repression perpetrated against Congolese citizens in the occupied territories by the invading armies and their Congolese rebel surrogates. The Congolese citizens living in North and South Kivu, Oriental and Katanga provinces continue to suffer atrocities which are virtually invisible because of the absence of media coverage. I assure you, Mr. Chairman, the human rights violations are equal if not worse than what the international community has witnessed in

Kosovo. Innocent people are arrested and kidnaped, subjected to torture, and murdered routinely in these areas. In her speech to the Security Council in January, Secretary of State Albright cited a case of 15 women being buried alive in Rwandan-occupied territory as an example of the war's horrors.

Last September, a UN special rapporteur on human rights, Mr. Roberto Garreton, published a report detailing, in part, human rights practices in the Rwandan-occupied sectors of the Congo. In one chilling section explaining the military *modus operandi* of Rwandan-allied rebels, the report states:

"If, on arrival, the [rebel/Rwandan] reinforcements do not encounter the enemy, they have been known to commit unspeakable massacres on the civilian population. That was more or less what happened at Kasika, Makobola, Kamituga, and Buyankiri, incidents that the [rebel group] now considers 'unfortunate' incidents."

Further on, the special rapporteur describes 1998-1999 attacks by Rwandan-allied rebels against civilian populations in Bashali, Walungu, Mwenga, Mikondero, Kamitunga, Badaha, Burhinyi, Ngweshe, Kigulube, Kibizi, Buyankiri, and Katanga, as "...the cruelest of the war." Thousands of innocents were killed in these villages.

The situation in Ugandan-occupied areas is equally desperate. Only four days after Secretary Albright's speech, news surfaced of major massacres and atrocities taking place in Ugandan-controlled northern Congo. The Christian Blind Mission, a non-governmental organization operating in the area, distributed a videotape containing horrific scenes of killing, maiming, and mutilations among the Lendu and Hema tribes. Some have estimated that as many as 5,000 people have died since June. Mr. Chairman, the Lendu and Hema people are among 300 ethnic groups in the Congo. They have lived in harmony for centuries and have never resorted to armed violence. Uganda and their rebel allies purposefully created ethnic tension to justify their illegal occupation, resulting in hatred, violence, and murder. A local human rights organization, the African Association for the Defense of Human Rights, has confirmed Uganda's direct role in the violence. Rwanda has used similar tactics in areas it occupies in North and South Kivu.

Mr. Chairman, there is a pattern here. Large-scale massacres and human rights abuses are a part of every day life in areas occupied by Rwanda, Uganda, and their rebel allies. Understandably, these forces have no support from the population. Only the legitimate government can restore order and the traditional solidarity of the Congolese people. And this task can not begin until all hostile forces depart the D.R. Congo.

Mr. Chairman, in addition to human atrocities, we are witnessing the massive pillage of the D.R. Congo's natural resources. I urge this Subcommittee and the Congress to carefully consider that a primary rationale for Rwanda's and Uganda's continued occupation of our land is economic booty. It is well known that the occupation is benefitting a small class of businessmen and generals in these countries, who are exploiting diamonds, gold, timber,

and coffee from my country.

I ask that the attached article entitled "Uganda Explains Clash With Rwanda"(Associated Press, August 25, 1999) describing Rwanda's and Uganda's looting of the Congo be included in the record as part of my statement.


The Democratic Republic of the Congo engaged in the Lusaka negotiations in good faith, and signed the final agreement with the full intention of implementing all of its provisions. We continue to hold to that position, and we are ready to proceed. President Kabila informed the UN Security Council that the implementation of the Lusaka accords will require significant assistance from the international community via the United Nations. In our view, the UN will need to provide observer forces with a vigorous mandate designed to keep the peace process moving. My country has an interest in seeing the Lusaka process expedited because it will mean the departure of all uninvited foreign forces. It is uncertain that the latter share this interest because of the lucrative nature of their occupation of the eastern regions. Hence, there will be a need for foreign peace-keepers to hold them to their commitments.

Mr. Chairman, one of the key provisions in the Lusaka Accords is the holding of an intra-Congolese dialogue leading to a democratic transition. President Kabila is in full agreement with these procedures, and looks forward to close cooperation with the official facilitator, President Ketumile Masire. Nevertheless, I ask you, Mr. Chairman, how it could be possible to consult the Congolese people about their wishes and aspirations while such a large swath of our country is under repressive foreign occupation? The Congolese Government would strongly recommend, therefore, that the United States Government insist upon the departure of all uninvited foreign forces as soon as the United Nations forces are in place. In addition, it goes without saying that we recommend and hope that the United States Congress will support the deployment of a UN force so that the Congo can embark upon the road to democracy and reconstruction. In fact, we strongly believe that the Great Lakes region would benefit immensely from democratization and thus urge the United States to pressure Rwanda, Uganda and Burundi to proceed with their own internal dialogue and free elections.

Mr. Chairman, once again I want to commend you, the Subcommittee members and other members of Congress, and the Administration for the positive role the United States is playing to bring peace and stability to the Great Lakes region. Your country has given millions of Congolese citizens hope that one day they too can live in peace and prosperity. For this hope to be realized, however, it is critical that the United States remain highly engaged in the region.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman and members of the Subcommittee, for this opportunity to make a statement, and for your continued interest in the Democratic Republic of the Congo.

REPUBLIQUE DEMOCRATIQUE DU CONGO
RASSEMBLEMENT CONGOLAIS POUR LA DEMOCRATIE
QUARTIER GENERAL / KISANGANI
CABINET DU PRESIDENT



February 8, 2000

THE IMPORTANCE OF THE LUSAKA CEASE-FIRE AGREEMENT

Africans must take responsibility for bringing peace in Africa. We recognize that before others are willing to support us, we must make it clear to everyone that we accept the responsibility to create the conditions for peace.

However, we in the Congo do not live on an island in this world and we know that the US has interests in the Congo that it wants to pursue and we know that our current situation did not happen overnight. The recent rebellions are part of a long history that dates back to slavery right up to the end of the cold war. We also know the US has been involved in the Congo throughout that history right up to providing unconditional support for the Mobutu dictatorship.

US leaders should be supportive of peace in the Congo not out of the goodness of their hearts, but out of a responsibility to right a past wrong in order to wipe the slate clean so that the US can truly have a new policy approach toward Africa. Instead of engaging STRONG MEN, the US needs to find ways to engage AFRICAN PEOPLE.

Without much support from the international community, particularly in comparison to the way resources have been allocated to address conflicts in Northern Ireland, Bosnia, East Timor and Kosovo, African peoples took the responsibility to develop the Lusaka Accords as a framework for peace.

The signing of the Lusaka Cease-fire Agreement is of great importance for the region, the international community, and most importantly, for the Congolese people who have suffered so much for lack of peace, democracy and political stability. The Lusaka Cease-fire Agreement expresses a regional commitment to peace, to security and democracy in Congo and the region.

The Lusaka Cease-fire Agreement has allowed the region to become unified again vis-à-vis Congo, as it was at the time of the overthrow of the Mobutu regime. It has further allowed the region to assert the idea of democratization as the only means of bringing long-term political stability to Congo.

It is important to create a strong pro-peace movement inside and outside the country, to encourage former belligerent enemies to come together to work for peace. The allies of the Kabila government and those of the rebels must work for peace and prevail upon their allies to respect the Lusaka Agreement and work for conditions that will enhance mutual trust and security for all.

The United Nations Security Council initiative held from the 24-25 January 2000 in connection with the situation concerning the Democratic Republic of the Congo attests to the renewed commitment to the Lusaka Cease-fire Agreement and to the search for a durable peace in the Congo and the region.

We believe that the UN initiative is an important positive step because it reaffirms the commitment of the international community to support the Lusaka Cease-fire Agreement materially and financially. This support is key to the effective establishment of a coordinated MONUC/Joint Military Commission (JMC) structure. The coordinated joint structure is a vital phase in enhancing the ability of the UN to support the Lusaka Cease-fire Agreement as well as in assuring accountability in the use of resources contributed by member States and donor organizations.

Most importantly, the RCD/Kisangani believes that UN Security Council has also taken an important positive step in bringing the issue of the Inter-Congolese National Dialogue to the attention of the international community.

The leadership of RCD/Kisangani thinks that the United States of America can play an important role in this process. To this end, we value the opportunity to build strong relationships with its people.

On the basis of our country's historical past relationships with the United States, we believe the US has a huge moral and political obligation not to fail the Congolese people this time. The Mobutu regime, which the United States supported for over thirty years, was responsible for the total destruction of the social, economic and political infrastructure of the Congo.

It is now time to aggressively put an emphasis on the Congolese people by supporting peace, social, economic and political reconstruction for sustainable political stability in the Congo. It is time to build a new partnership for peace, security and democracy with the

Congolese people.

The Congo, which is the size of the United States east of the Mississippi River and shares borders with nine countries, has a continental dimension. The problems in the Congo have regional echoes. There will be no solutions to the crises in Angola, Burundi, Uganda and Rwanda without peace and political stability in the Congo.

Despite the Congo's great size, the UN is proposing to send just 500 observers and 5,000 troops to protect them. We are therefore concerned about the proposed size of the peacekeeping force. We believe the peacekeeping force is important because it constitutes a deterrent to the violations of the Lusaka Cease-fire Agreement. We believe that the less troops in the Congo, the more difficult the protection of the observers, the longer it might take to resolve the crisis in the country, and thus the more expensive it may be. We are in the belief that the more troops (25,000 or more) in Congo, the better the protection of the observers and the shorter the time it might take to resolve the conflict at about the same cost.

In summary, RCD/Kisangani believes that the important milestones accomplished by the UN Security Council under the presidency of the United States during the month of January 2000 will remain ineffective without a concerted commitment by the US government. With this in mind, we make the following recommendations:

First, the US should establish a Lusaka Implementation Office to support the Lusaka Cease-fire Agreement, to monitor and coordinate inter-agency support for peace and peace issues.

Second, the US should create a "Friends of the Congo" initiative to aggressively mobilize resources and give real meaning to the peace process so that the fifty million Congolese can gain confidence in it and make the Lusaka Agreement their own. Such a commitment would involve the rehabilitation of road infrastructures, of health clinics and hospitals, of civic education and responsibility in an effort to build confidence and give a sense of self worth and pride to the Congolese people.

Third, the US policy should not continue to be based on the "strong man" approach. The emphasis should now shift from a policy of supporting the "friendly tyrants" to one of supporting the Congolese people. We believe that in a way the Congolese people were lucky to have had people like Mobutu and Kabila imposed on them because now we know what not to do. We hope that in the same vein, after supporting a tyrant for over thirty years with such devastating political, social and economic effects, the US also now knows what not to do in the Congo.


Fourth, because of the international dimension of our country, if we want to achieve political stability in the region, we must have peace in the Congo. Of the nine countries surrounding the Congo, only three, Tanzania, Zambia and the Central African Republic, have some relative peace, the six others are all confronting war situations. The Congolese people are demanding an end to the war and calling for peace, political stability and democracy, and we value the commitment of the international community to assist Africa in the process of reaching sustainable peace in the Congo. We appeal to the US Congress to at

4

least approve even the proposed UN peacekeeping force of 5,000 troops, although we would prefer a much greater number, and a phased-in approach to augment the strength of the peacekeeping force over time. The opportunity to move ahead with the Lusaka Cease-fire Agreement and the prospects for peace have never been any brighter, especially now that all the belligerents have re-affirmed their commitment to peace. This is indeed a golden opportunity to move this Agreement forward. The US should seize it.

Fifth, the Inter-Congolese National Dialogue is a vital part of the peace process. The regional leaders have clearly re-affirmed their commitment to it, and the selection of a Neutral Facilitator, as well as the international community's commitment to support him materially and financially, is a positive step forward. However, we are still worried about Kabila's attempts to re-open the Agreement and his plan to organize a National Debate, which is not provided for under the Lusaka Cease-fire Agreement. The US should exert its influence over all parties to make sure the Inter-Congolese National Dialogue is organized as provided by the Lusaka Agreement under the direction of the Neutral Facilitator.

Sincerely,

A handwritten signature in black ink, appearing to read 'Ernest Wamba dia Wamba', followed by a stylized flourish.

Prof. Ernest Wamba dia Wamba

President of the Rally for Congolese Democracy/Kisangani (RCD/K)

Member of the Leaders Forum of the Common Front of the Congolese Liberation Movements

UNITED NATIONS PEACEKEEPING MISSION IN THE DEMOCRATIC
REPUBLIC OF THE CONGO

STATEMENT SUBMITTED BY THE GOVERNMENT
OF THE REPUBLIC OF ZIMBABWE TO THE
HOUSE INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS COMMITTEE
TUESDAY, FEBRUARY 15TH 2000

**ZIMBABWE'S STATEMENT ON THE "UNITED NATIONS
PEACEKEEPING MISSION IN THE DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF THE
CONGO"**

Mr Chairman, Representative B. Gilman, Ranking member Mr S. Geidenson and Members of the House International Relations Committee, Zimbabwe is greatly honoured to present its testimony before this very important committee today on the urgent need to end this deadly conflict in , the Democratic Republic of the Congo.

It is indeed heartening that we have now reached the stage when the international community is well focused on ensuring that long lasting peace and stability prevails in the Democratic Republic of Congo and indeed the whole Great Lakes region.

Mr Chairman, before we delve into the current progress and prospects for peace it is important to explain briefly why and how Zimbabwe got involved in this war for the Democratic Republic of the Congo's sovereignty.

BACKGROUND

Zimbabwe's foreign policy objectives are a derivative of its history as a country that fought against racial and other forms of discrimination. Since attaining its independence in 1980, Zimbabwe supported unequivocally the struggles for self-determination of peoples in regions as diverse as the Middle East, Southern Africa, the Pacific and Latin America.

The government of President Laurent Kabila is the legitimate government which was recognised by the countries in the region, the Organisation of African Unity and the United Nations including the United States of America. The invasion of the Democratic Republic of Congo and the continuing occupation of large parts of its territory by foreign hostile troops was and remains a serious violation of two of the sacrosanct tenets of the United Nations Charter, namely, the respect of sovereignty and territorial integrity of member states and non interference in the domestic

affairs of a sovereign nation. Zimbabwe together with other Southern African Development Community (SADC) states namely, Namibia and Angola were therefore compelled, when invited by the legitimate government in the Democratic Republic of Congo, to assist in upholding these most fundamental principles of the Charter. The Committee need not be reminded that it was in pursuit of these same principles that the international community readily went to war in the Gulf only a few years ago when Iraq invaded Kuwait. It is worthy noting that it was Zimbabwe which held the presidency of the United Nations Security Council when that momentous decision, which we fully supported, was taken to assist Kuwait to repel that aggression. We sent our forces into the Democratic Republic of Congo to assist that young country resist aggression.

Zimbabwe seeks peace in the Democratic Republic of Congo in the same way it championed peace efforts in Mozambique, and Lesotho. Zimbabwe assisted the Mozambican government for several years to ensure that peace was attained, and Zimbabwe contributed to the restoration of normalcy together with South Africa and Botswana in Lesotho.

PROGRESS

Mr Chairman, Zimbabwe has on many occasions demonstrated its commitment to peace in the Democratic Republic of the Congo and the sub-region as a whole. The war in the Democratic Republic of the Congo is a terrible tragedy for all in the region and it is a war that should never have taken place.

It is for this reason that Zimbabwe in liaison with other SADC Allied states advocated dialogue as a means of settling the conflict. To advance the peace objective, several Summits were held, beginning with the meetings in Victoria Falls, Harare, Zimbabwe (7 -8 August 1998) and followed by several others held in Pretoria, Durban and again in Victoria Falls culminating in the signing ceremony of the Lusaka Ceasefire Agreement on 10 July, 1999. Even as war intensified in the

Democratic Republic of Congo Zimbabwe never lost sight of the fact that the conflict could not be settled by force of arms alone.

The Lusaka Peace Agreement is a vindication of the collective wisdom of the parties to the conflict in choosing dialogue over arms as the best way to end the conflict. It is heartening to note that it is this search for lasting peace that led the Council in its Resolution 1234[1999] to acknowledge and commit itself to uphold and protect the territorial integrity and sovereignty of the Democratic Republic of Congo.

Zimbabwe together with other countries involved in the conflict were encouraged by the initiative taken by the United States during its Presidency of the United Nations Security Council in January 2000 when a special session was dedicated to discussions on the Democratic Republic of Congo. Zimbabwe, then, called upon the Security Council, as the custodian of peace and security in the World, to assume its duty by immediately sending both observers and peacekeepers to the Democratic Republic of Congo.

It should be noted, that in a situation without observers and monitors, for unspecified periods, troops and their commanders on the battlefields, have tried their utmost to ensure that they are not exposed to sudden attack and are not out maneuvered by the other side. While some movements have led to retaliations, Parties to the Agreement have exercised maximum restraint despite the number of violations that have occurred in the context of the unsupervised and unmonitored ceasefire agreement. Furthermore the agreement has continued to remain broadly in place, in spite of the problem of resources. The Joint Military Commission, established as envisaged by the agreement, has been functioning despite resource constraints. It has developed programmes on such key tasks as the withdrawal of foreign troops, the disarmament of non-State forces, disengagement of forces, release of prisoners, and the provision of humanitarian corridors. The political committee of Ministers, another institution envisaged in the Lusaka Agreement, has

been established and has been meeting often to carry out its important responsibilities of guiding the peace process. In its last meeting in Harare (17 - 18 January 2000) the committee solemnly recommitted all the parties to the Lusaka Agreement to the faithful observance of the provisions of that agreement. The effect of the decision was very crucial in that it made "R" or Restatement date (January 18 2000) the new "D" day for all the remaining tasks under the agreement.

Zimbabwe also applauds the recent appointment of His Excellency, Sir Ketumile Masire, former President of Botswana as facilitator to promote the Congolese national dialogue, a crucial aspect of the Peace Process. These and many other key elements have now been accomplished. Much of what has been achieved was largely due to commitment of resources by the belligerents. Zimbabwe like all other parties involved in the conflict, strongly feel that time is ripe, in fact, overdue for the world body to deploy the much needed and long awaited peacekeeping force in the Congo.

The recent Security Council decision authorising the Secretary General "to take the administrative steps necessary for the equipping of up to 500 United Nations military observers with a view to facilitating future United Nations deployments --" must be implemented without further delays. There seems to have been too much time spent on the diagnosis of the situation when the solution that ought to be implemented is already known. Any continued delays will only enhance the perception that Africa is marginalised and neglected as this delay is contrasted with the haste with which the Western Allies moved to resolve the situation in Kosovo and Bosnia

Mr Chairman, Zimbabwe urges that the United States render full support to the United Nations as prompt action is required for the Security Council to buttress the peace process in the Congo. It should also be remembered that inaction in Rwanda by the international community resulted in a huge loss of human lives. We should all be well advised to learn the lessons of history but never to allow ourselves to be

paralyzed by them into inaction. The level of commitment by all nations involved in this conflict is testimony to their resolve to ensure that peacekeepers are safe and that they can implement their mandate without fear.

The Security Council still has a unique opportunity to redeem itself and restore faith in the United Nations among the people of the Congo in particular and Africa in general.

The people of the Congo await bold decisions to help them drive away the specter of national disintegration. They yearn for the unity of their country so they can banish the hatred that is the handmaiden of civil strife. They look forward to using their independence and freedom in pursuit of the socio-economic goals and ideals of democracy, essential for the development of their nation.

What the people of the Democratic Republic of the Congo now require from the United States and the Security Council is not more talk of sending observers to their country but the urgent dispatch of peacekeepers to keep the peace. The Council has been observing the situation in the Congo from afar for too long, it should now go into the Congo and maintain peace and security which is a precondition for democracy and development. The message honourably members is that peacekeepers should be dispatched now.

Let us agree to send this message of hope to the Congolese people. Zimbabwe assures you of its commitment to playing its part in affording them the opportunity to work for their destiny free from aggression and interference in their domestic affairs.

Thank you.



Dr Simbi Mubako

AMBASSADOR

**NAMIBIA'S VIEWS ON THE UNITED NATIONS PEACEKEEPING
MISSION IN THE DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF THE CONGO**

Introduction:

The unprovoked invasion and the violation of the Democratic Republic of the Congo's sovereignty and territorial integrity by Uganda and Rwanda constitute an act of interference in the internal affairs of the Congo.

Regrettably, the invasion of the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) has plunged that country into a devastating war with grave humanitarian, social and economic consequences. It has also resulted into serious security implications for the region as a whole. Clearly, this aggression is a violation of international law in respect of the following basic principles:

- the right of nations to self-determination;
- the right of self-preservation; and
- the right for a nation to determine its own destiny without coercion from whatever quarter.

It also violates the collective and shared vision embodied in the Organisation of African Unity (OAU) decision of 1964 to accept the boundaries inherited from colonial authorities. What we are seeing in the DRC is a result of expansionist ambitions and this must not be accepted to become the norm in Africa.

SADC Inter-State Defence and Security:

The Inter-State Defense and Security Committee Meeting of SADC held in Cape Town, South Africa in 1995, decided to take collective action in the event of attempts to change legitimate Governments of Member States by military means.

Therefore, the Southern African Development Community (SADC) has a stated obligation of ensuring that a legitimate Government of a fellow SADC member should not be removed by invasion. Namibia adheres to this principle and believes in the non-violability of the territorial integrity and sovereignty of States. These are sacred principles that compelled and made Namibia to intervene in the DRC, at the expressed invitation of President Kabila and his legitimate government.

Furthermore, the SADC Summit held in Mauritius on 13 and 14 September 1998, among others, expressed deep regret at the outbreak of war in the DRC to remove the Government of President Kabila from power. It welcomed the initiatives by SADC and its Member States intended to assist in the restoration of peace, security and stability in the DRC. In that regard, the Summit reaffirmed its call for an immediate cessation of hostilities and commended the Governments of Angola, Namibia and Zimbabwe for timeously providing troops to assist the Government and people of the DRC to defeat the illegal attempt by rebels and their allies to capture the capital city, Kinshasa, and other strategic areas. The Summit emphasised the need

for all political actors in the DRC to commit themselves to orderly and peaceful transition to multi-party democracy, primarily through constructive consultations and negotiations involving all stakeholders.”

The sole purpose of our requested intervention is to prevent the collapse of the state machinery and the violation of the sovereignty and territorial integrity of a fellow SADC member state. The Namibian involvement is for democracy, peace, human rights and regional cooperation.

Furthermore, the decision by the government of the Democratic Republic of the Congo to request for assistance from fellow SADC Member States is in accordance with Article 51 of the Charter of the United Nations, which makes provision for the "inherent right of individual or collective self-defence if an armed attack occurs against a Member of the United Nations".

Our deepest desire is to help create a conducive environment for normal political life in the DRC. The people of the DRC have suffered enough for too many decades under the most brutal and repressive dictatorship. They need space and time to reconstruct their country. As indicated in the communiqué of the Summit meeting of SADC on the DRC held on 23rd August 1998, the reconstruction of the DRC as an independent sovereign, united, peaceful, stable and prosperous country, is critical to the achievement of the same objectives in the region and in the rest of the African continent.

The OAU as well as SADC continue to make their best efforts to bring an end to the conflict in the DRC. At Victoria Falls in September 1998, the Heads of

State/Government made a political commitment to put an end to the fighting and to search for peace collectively. This was followed during the same month by a meeting of Defense Ministers and other senior military personnel in Addis Ababa to work out modalities, timetable, calendar, resources as well as monitoring, verification and the respective troops withdrawal details, in cooperation with the OAU.

The month of Africa:

The month of Africa and especially the week of the DRC arranged during the US Presidency of the Security Council was dedicated to African issues and in search of solutions to them. We appreciate the immense efforts expended by the American Presidency at many levels in bringing the parties together in New York.

The hearts of the suffering men, women and children in the DRC are filled with hopes as a result of the month of Africa, that there will come from the United Nations Security Council a decision to speeding up peace, saving lives and preventing more bloodshed in their country.

UN Peacekeeping Mission:

The situation in the DRC constitutes a threat to international peace and security and it is therefore imperative that collective measures be taken to restore and maintain international peace and security there.

The parties to the conflict painstakingly negotiated the Lusaka Ceasefire Agreement, which they signed in Lusaka on 10 July 1999. In addition, the parties have continued to uphold that Ceasefire Agreement under extremely difficult conditions. Time and again, the Parties recommitted themselves to the implementation of the Ceasefire Agreement as was demonstrated at the Security Council meeting, which was held on 24 January 2000, under the Presidency of the United States. That meeting was attended by over a dozen African Heads of State and Foreign Ministers.

At that meeting, the African leaders called for assistance in the implementation of the Lusaka Ceasefire Agreement and specifically called for a speedy deployment of a United Nations peacekeeping force in the DRC under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations.

More than eight months have passed since the signing of the Lusaka Ceasefire Agreement. That agreement envisages the deployment of a United Nations peacekeeping force in the DRC to assist in its implementation without ignoring the many complexities of the war in the DRC. Clearly, the destabilization of the DRC will do no good but harm to Africa and particularly to the immediate neighbours. On the other hand, comprehensive peace, stability and cooperation will benefit all and restore Africa's dignity. It is the political solution, which the Lusaka Ceasefire Agreement, regardless of the frustrating and needless delays, is all about. Its speedy implementation is the issue.

United Nations peacekeeping can boast successes in some areas and concede failures in others. We can draw lessons from past mistakes but we should not allow failures to negatively influence collective action to strengthen and maintain international peace and security. Rather, past failures should show the way forward and serve as a source of strength and commitment against the forces of doom. It is, therefore, imperative that the international community exercise the necessary political will and assist the parties to implement the Lusaka Ceasefire Agreement to bring about peace to the DRC.

US Role:

The United States, as the only super power, the major contributor to the United Nations budget and a Permanent Member of the Security Council, has a crucial role to play and should take the lead in ensuring that peace returns to the DRC and by extension to the Great Lakes region as a whole.

UN Role:

The United Nations can play a major role in bringing about peace in the DRC. The presence of military liaison officers in the country has allowed the Secretary-General to draw up a concept of operations for the second phase of UN deployment. Among the tasks of the military observers that are proposed to be deployed under Phase II are to develop a plan of action for the implementation of the Agreement, including the ceasefire and the disengagement of forces, and to monitor violations of the Ceasefire Agreement.

The fact that the United Nations Security Council has taken up the question of the DRC in accordance with its Charter obligation of maintaining international peace and security is highly commendable.

However, the Security Council needs to go further. What is required now is for the UN to deploy a peacekeeping mission that would prepare for a larger UN presence commensurate with the problem in the country. In our view, Phase II of the UN presence in the DRC should prepare for the next phase of deployment, which will assist the parties to implement the remaining tasks of the Ceasefire Agreement.

The DRC is a huge country by normal standards: it is about one third of the United States in size. A large number of peacekeepers will thus be required.

Furthermore, the war in the DRC has devastated all spheres of normal life. Hence, at the end of the peacekeeping mandate, efforts need to be concentrated on peacebuilding and economic reconstruction of the country.

Africans are weary of what they see as double standards when it comes to a large and decisive UN force on their continent. Human life and humanitarian needs are indivisible. What is true for Kosovo or East Timor is true for Sierra Leone. And the same should apply for the DRC.



EMBASSY OF THE REPUBLIC OF ANGOLA

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ANGOLAN GOVERNMENT POSITION ON THE SITUATION IN THE DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF THE CONGO

The territorial integrity and stability of the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) are critical to the peace and stability of the entire central and southern African region.

Military Intervention

Angola has been forced to intervene twice in the DRC in order to avoid bloodshed and to contain the threat of an escalation of war on its borders. The first intervention was part of a regional effort, together with Rwanda and Uganda, to support the forces of liberation and democracy in overthrowing the authoritarian regime of President Mobutu. Angola assumed the role of strategic ally in this struggle and in the political process that culminated with the victory of the Congolese people.

Within less than a year, Angola was taken by surprise when a new war erupted in the DRC. Given the chaotic situation the Kabila regime had inherited, it was implicitly understood that the new DRC government would be given a grace period to re-establish peace and restructure the political system and the economy in order to promote national reconciliation. The second war pre-empted this process. Again Angola was faced with a real threat to its own security and the possibility of the disintegration of its large neighbor.

Support for a Negotiated Settlement

Angola's military intervention was limited to countering the threat to its own security and to support the territorial integrity of the DRC. As soon as these goals were achieved, Angola sought immediately to join in the search for a regional, negotiated settlement to the conflict. Since that time Angola has consistently supported regional efforts to resolve the crisis, notably the agreements reached in Pretoria and the principles adopted at the Victoria Falls Summit.

The Lusaka Accords of July/August 1999

While Angola supports efforts to end the conflict peacefully, it is concerned that the principles outlined in Pretoria and Victoria Falls were not fully incorporated into the Lusaka Accords. Angola believes that a key weakness in the Lusaka Accords is that the principle of the legitimacy and authority of the present DRC government and its president

Page 2

are not recognized. By placing the government on the same footing as the rebels, the accords create confusion. The accords also do not adequately address the issue of external aggression against the government. As President dos Santos told the UN Security Council meeting on January 24, "a government that has not been militarily defeated, cannot accept capitulation at the negotiation table."

Next Steps

Given the above concerns and the current situation on the ground, Angola believes that:

- ♦ the United Nations (UN) has the immediate responsibility to interpose itself and separate the warring forces so as to uphold the cease fire and avoid new violations.
- ♦ the UN should send a peacekeeping force and increase logistic and financial support for this force.
- ♦ To establish peace in the DRC, President dos Santos made the following five suggestions to the UN Security Council:
 1. Accelerate the disarmament of the rebel forces and the formation of a single national army.
 2. Recognize the authority of the present government as the government of transition that should lead the country to legislative and presidential elections, to be held under the supervision of the international community.
 3. Establish security guarantees for the installation, in the capital, of the rebel leaders and their integration into the political transition process.
 4. The national debate should be centered on the discussion of the provisional constitution of the republic, the electoral law, mechanisms for voter registration and the law governing the establishment of political parties. The new democratic institutions should start operating after the elections are held.
 5. The elected parliament should play the role of the constituent assembly with authority to approve the final constitution of the republic.
- ♦ Peace in the DRC is integrally linked to the broader issue of the Great Lakes conflict. Therefore Angola also advocates that the UN commit itself to the search for an internal political accord for Rwanda, Uganda and Burundi.

February 11, 2000

STATEMENT BY:

**H.E. EDITH G. SSEMPALA
AMBASSADOR OF UGANDA TO THE UNITED STATES**

**TO THE AFRICA SUB COMMITTEE OF THE HOUSE
INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS COMMITTEE,
US HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES**

ON

**UN PEACE KEEPING IN
THE DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF CONGO**

FEBRUARY 15, 2000

We deeply appreciate the opportunity which Chairman Royce and the distinguished members of International Relations, Sub-Committee on Africa has extended to all the signatories of the Lusaka Cease fire Agreement to explain the importance of this Agreement to the United States of America. This is an important good will gesture towards Africa and an indication of the US Congress's readiness to take African opinion into account as Congress deliberates on an issue that is very crucial to the security of the continent. We also applaud the Clinton administration's tireless efforts in search of peace in the world. Secretary Albright, Ambassador Holbrooke, Assistant Secretary Susan Rice and Gail Smith have been supporting peace initiatives in the Great Lakes region and the Lusaka Peace process in particular.

The Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), formally Zaire, is the second largest country in Africa. It borders with 9 other countries which stretch deep into Eastern, Southern, Central and Northern Africa. The people of the DRC have historical, economic and kinship ties with all these countries. Therefore the legacy of misrule which this country has suffered both during the colonial and post-independence periods has left a deep imprint on the region.

As far back as 1960 Uganda was flooded with refugees from Congo, just as it was flooded with refugees from Rwanda, our southwestern neighbor. Other neighbors received their own share of the spill over of the humanitarian and economic catastrophe that engulfed Congo since that time. The internal situation in the Congo steadily deteriorated over the years until it came to a near breakdown of law and order. This led to the creation of a power vacuum that permitted the use of Congolese territory by armed bandits to stage criminal acts of war against its neighbors.

During the past 3 decades or so, violence, misrule, economic mismanagement and attendant human suffering were to take root among some of the neighboring countries, including Uganda. Some of these were related to what was happening in Congo while some were not. One thing that these countries had in common was that they had undergone a period of colonial rule under which democracy was not permitted. It was therefore relatively easy for dictators to gain control of state power and to use it for their own self-

aggrandizement, leaving the ordinary people in a state of neglect. The weak state structures which were left behind by colonialists steadily degenerated.

However, the people of this region could not submit to oppression and deprivation indefinitely. Discontent led to protest and resistance and the dictators hit back by eliminating opponents of the state. This happened in Uganda, Rwanda, Burundi, DRC (former Zaire) and Sudan. During the 70s and 80s an estimated 800,000 Ugandans died at the hands of ex-dictators Idi Amin and Milton Obote. Between 1959 and 1994 an estimated 1.2 million Rwandans died in pogroms organized by the state. Hundreds of thousands of people have also died in both Burundi and Sudan under similar or parallel circumstances.

During the early 80s, Ugandans organized an armed resistance against this massive victimization. This resistance culminated in the installation of a new pro-people government in the country. At the same time Uganda was careful not to interfere in the internal affairs of its large neighbors including Congo.

In 1994 an armed resistance brought down the government of another dictator in the region. This time it was in Rwanda. The genocide that preceded this change is well known to the world. Nevertheless, the genocidal forces were defeated, leading to an exodus of 1.2 million refugees into Eastern Zaire (now the Democratic Republic of Congo). The entire Rwanda army and the militia that had carried out the genocide crossed en masse and installed themselves in the refugee camps with their command structure intact. They soon started using Zairean territory to launch attacks against the new regime in Rwanda that poses a serious threat of another genocide. At the same time, the government of Zaire put its territory at the disposal of Sudanese sponsored Islamic terrorist groups, pro-Idi Amin and other renegade groups to launch armed attacks on Uganda. The same acts of destabilization were carried out against other governments in the region. This compelled the governments of the region to get together and formed an alliance against Mobutu's regime that was subsequently overthrown.

Unfortunately, the new government which had the good will from the whole region, turned out to be no better than the one we had helped to remove. Faced with this new situation the region failed to generate consensus on how

to deal with the problem. Some regional powers opted to act unilaterally in support of President Kabila while others did not. This disagreement gave rise to the current conflict in the DRC.

The countries of the region recognizing that armed conflicts will not produce a solution for their countries or for the region, negotiated an Agreement known as "the Lusaka Agreement for A Cease fire in the Democratic Republic of Congo." The Agreement comprehensively addresses all the grievances of all former belligerents and has come to be recognized as the best formula for resolving this conflict.

In this Agreement, the signatories,

Reaffirmed Resolution AHG/16/1 adopted by the OAU Assembly of the Heads of State and Government in 1964 in Cairo, Egypt, on territorial integrity and the inviolability of national boundaries, as inherited at independence,

Recalled the Pretoria Summit communique dated 23 August, 1998 reaffirming that all ethnic groups and nationalities whose people and territory constituted what became Congo (now DRC) at independence must enjoy equal rights and protection under the law as citizens,

Were determined to ensure the respect, by all Parties signatory to the Agreement, for the Geneva Conventions of 1949 and the Additional Protocols of 1977, and the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide of 1948, as reiterated at the Entebbe Regional Summit 25 March 1998 with President Bill Clinton.

Were determined further to put to an immediate halt to any assistance, collaboration or giving of sanctuary to negative forces bent on destabilizing neighboring countries.

Emphasized the need to ensure that the principles of good neighborliness and non-interference in the internal affairs of other countries are respected;

Were Cognizant of the fact that addressing the security concerns of the DRC and neighboring countries is central and would contribute to the peace process;

Recognized that the conflict in the DRC has both internal and external dimensions that require intra-Congolese political negotiations and commitment of the Parties to the implementation of the Agreement to resolve;

Took note of the commitment of the Congolese Government, the rebels of the

Rally for Congolese Democracy (RCD), the rebels of the Movement for the Liberation of Congo (MLC) and all other Congolese political and civil organizations to hold an all inclusive National Dialogue aimed at realizing national reconciliation and a new political dispensation in the DRC. The agreement was signed in Lusaka, Zambia, on July 10, 1999.

Unfortunately, there has been a considerable delay in the implementation of this agreement. This is largely because the signatories to the agreement put their trust in the United Nations to take charge of the implementation. They assumed that since the maintenance of world peace and security is the primary duty of the United Nations, the UN would be quick to recognize the dangers to world peace inherent in the Congo conflict and move swiftly to use the opportunity presented by the Lusaka agreement in order to establish peace in the Great Lakes Region and this did not happen. At the negotiations that led to the agreement, many international organizations and countries, were represented. These countries and institutions encouraged and gave us reason to believe that they would lend their support to the implementation process. The USA and the European Union in particular promised firm support. However, the support given so far has been inadequate compared to the challenges we face.

In spite of the delay in the operationalization of the implementation mechanism, the cease fire has by and large held. This is because, despite differences that exist, all the former belligerents remain firmly committed to the Cease fire Agreement. This commitment was firmly reiterated in January this year (2000) when the US Presidency of the Security Council focused on Africa and the DRC conflict in particular.

During the last decade of the century that has just ended, Africa registered commendable progress in economic growth, democratization, fighting the Aids epidemic and the provision of social services to the people. These achievements were made possible by some bold initiatives taken by a number of progressive African leaders with the support of the international community. It was in recognition of these achievements that the United States is considering passage of the African Growth and Opportunity Act in order to improve business links with Africa. We welcome this important step in improving links between the United States and Africa.

For economic, political, cultural and other relations to flourish between the US and Africa, the latter should contain armed conflicts on the continent in order to realize its full potential and play its rightful role in the community of nations. And the key to their containment lies in resolving the conflict in DRC. The imperative for the involvement of the United Nations is therefore overwhelming. Failure of the UN to take up its responsibility could lead to a resumption of fighting between the armies of several countries, with the possibility of more countries joining. The humanitarian catastrophe that could ensue would still be very costly to the region, the UN and to the international community.

We welcome the recent declarations of support by all members of the Security Council to expand the mandate of MONOC and to authorize the deployment of 5537 observers to the DRC. We hope this marks the beginning of a more active involvement by the UN in trying to bring this conflict to an end. We hope that the Security Council will soon address the need for the deployment of a larger peace keeping force with sufficient muscle to handle the situation. This is necessary, particularly in the light of the fact that DRC is host to a number of criminal armed groups which operate across borders and which pose a serious threat to the security of the region.

As a result of the peculiar circumstance of the DRC, the signatories to the Lusaka Agreement decided to offer an olive branch to all the non-state armed groups operating in the country. A mechanism was provided for the rehabilitation of those who voluntarily give up arms to reputable international institutions and wish to return to their countries of origin. The others would be offered political asylum. But the hard core who refuses to lay down their weapons, continue to maintain a military formation and thus pose a threat to revisit genocide on the region, must be forcibly disarmed. This is a key prerequisite to assuring neighbors of their security and for the creation of a conducive atmosphere for the holding of a national dialogue that will lead to a new political dispensation in the DRC. Only the UN has the credibility to play this vital role. The UN therefore needs to invoke Chapter VII of its Charter in order to provide the mandate necessary for fulfilling this task.

**WRITTEN REMARKS BY DR. RICHARD SEZIBERA
AMBASSADOR OF RWANDA TO THE UNITED STATES**

ON

**PEACE KEEPING AND PEACE ENFORCEMENT IN THE
DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF THE CONGO (DRC)**

AT

**THE SUB-COMMITTEE HEARING ON AFRICA:
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 15-02-2000**

**Written Statement to the Sub-Committee on Africa:
House of Representatives 15-02-2000**

**Peace keeping and peace enforcement in the Democratic
Republic of the Congo (DRC):
The Rwandan position**

I would like to thank the United States Congress, for keeping an active interest in matters that affect the African continent. Thank you Mr. Chairman, for holding this hearing, which has at its focus, one of the most troubling conflicts in Africa today.

We would also like to express our appreciation to President Clinton and members of his Administration for continuing to struggle to make sure that Africa, with its potential does not continue its movement to the outer margins of the global village.

We in Rwanda are ready to play our role, and to make sure that our people are given the chance they so desperately need to realize their dreams and allay their nightmares.

Since August 1998, the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) is once again embroiled in a conflict that involves various domestic and external actors.

In July 1999, a cease fire agreement meant to return lasting peace and stability to the DRC and the region was signed in Lusaka, Zambia, by all actors in the conflict. This cease fire agreement in its preamble recognizes that the conflict in the DRC has both internal and external dimensions that require intra-Congolese political negotiations and commitment of the parties to the implementation of the agreement to resolve.

The external cause of the crisis in the DRC, also addressed in the above named agreement, stem from the willingness or incapacity of successive Congolese Governments to stop destabilization of Congo's neighbors from Congolese territory. Rwanda believes that a debate on the Democratic Republic of the Congo is a debate on how the International Community can get its act together to prevent and punish the crimes of genocide, mass murder, war crimes and International terrorism.

When we failed to stop and decisively defeat genocide in Rwanda in 1994, those who committed it got away – into the then Zaire, now DRC. Two subsequent UN investigations established that these criminal elements were utilizing DRC territory to launch attacks on Rwanda and other countries neighboring the DRC, using refugee camps and enjoying protection under international law.

The decision to end that scandal, disarm and separate the genocidal forces from bona fide refugees failed to raise the collective enthusiasm of the International Community. It was later established that these forces – EX-Far/Interahamwe linked up with other negative forces mainly from Uganda and Burundi and set up a crime driven network of

arms suppliers, that wrecked havoc on our countries. This has led to two wars, linked to an attempt by our countries to protect our citizens and indeed to prevent genocide.

Rwanda has consistently appealed to the International community to take over this responsibility, for the obligation to fight genocide is an International one.

Africa has reiterated this obligation through the Lusaka agreement, arrived at after intense negotiations among the actors in the DRC, and as a culmination of numerous summit meetings at Victoria Falls I and II, Pretoria, Durban, Port Louis, Nairobi, Windhoek, and Dodoma, with the close involvement, at all stages, of the OAU and the UN.

Rwanda is fully committed to the Lusaka Agreement and believes that its implementation in its entirety is the only way of ending conflict in the DRC and bringing peace to the Region. All provisions of the agreement must be implemented comprehensively. Picking and choosing provisions to implement while ignoring others can only lead to more pain and suffering in the long term.

What does the Lusaka cease-fire agreement ask the UN. to do for the DRC and the region?

It states that "The United Nations Security Council acting under Chapter 7 of the UN Charter and in collaboration with the OAU, shall be requested to constitute, facilitate and deploy an appropriate peace keeping force in the DRC, to ensure implementation of the Agreement, and taking into account the peculiar situation in the DRC, mandate the peace keeping force to track down all armed groups in the DRC. In this respect the UN Security Council shall provide the requisite mandate for the Peace Keeping Force."

To enhance the security of the DRC and her neighbors, the UN in collaboration with the OAU and the signatories to the Agreement is expected to:

- (a) Track and disarm non-signatory armed groups as enumerated in the agreement.
- (b) Neutralize and disarm armed Congolese who are non-signatory forces and civilians.
- (c) Organize a national army as agreed by the Congolese parties to the agreement.
- (d) Organize the orderly withdrawal of foreign forces from the DRC.

Rwanda believes that this can be done. The International community has the responsibility and the capacity to do it. All that is needed is to muster the moral authority and courage to act.

The Joint Military Commission, a very important organ in the implementation of the Lusaka Agreement has already started working,

Our representatives on the JMC have already made recommendations on a number of issues including:-

- The determination of humanitarian corridors, exchange of prisoners of war and working relations with the International Committee of the Red Cross
- Mechanisms and procedures of disengagement.
- Mechanisms of disarming and tracking perpetrators of crimes against humanity.
- Foreign forces withdrawal plan.

All these will however, remain a dead letter if the Security Council's commitment and force mandate remain vague.

Rwanda believes that the Inter-Congolese political negotiations envisaged in the Agreement, leading to a new political dispensation in the DRC, and re-establishing State control over all DRC territory, and serious commitment by the parties signatory to the agreement and the International community to implementing the provisions dealing with the security of the DRC and that of her neighbors are crucial to the return of lasting peace in the DRC and the region.

We also wish to underline the fact that the failure of the parties to fulfil their obligations under the agreement, and/or failure by the International Community to fulfil the obligations entrusted to it, will have serious consequences for peace and stability in the Great Lakes Region and Africa in general.

The independent inquiry into the actions of the United Nations during the 1994 Genocide in Rwanda, led by Mr. Carlson have confirmed what we have always said. The world missed an opportunity in 1994 to make operational the spirit that animated the adoption of the UN Charter in San Francisco in 1945, and indeed Geneva in 1948 when the convention on the prevention and punishment of the crime of Genocide was adopted.

The spirit was, **NEVER AGAIN SHALL WE LET IT HAPPEN.** Our inaction then and subsequent failure to deal with the Genocidal forces in the refugee camps laid part of the cause of the present crisis in the DRC.

The Lusaka agreement has once again afforded the International Community a window of opportunity to deal with this problem once and for all.

We are concerned that once again, the International Community seems willing to let this opportunity slip through its hands – by acting hesitantly and timidly with the underlying causes of the crisis in the DRC, and clearly delineated by the Lusaka agreement.

Rwanda believes that this is a serious mistake, and for its part, remains prepared to adopt any measure that would expedite a comprehensive implementation of the Agreement.

**Statement for the Record
Subcommittee on Africa, Committee on International Relations
U.S. House of Representatives
February 15, 2000**

**Richard C. Holbrooke
United States Ambassador to the United Nations**

Mr. Chairman, it is an honor to testify today before your subcommittee. I am particularly pleased to be joined by Susan Rice, our Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs, whose efforts have been so critical to the issues we'll discuss today. Mr. Chairman, the participation of you, Congressman Payne, and so many other members of Congress in our deliberations in New York in the last eight weeks has been of immense importance in helping us formulate an American foreign policy. Your continued interest in African peace and security, and the active work of this committee, is critical. In the coming days and weeks, we look forward to working with you on what is today the most urgent near-term crisis in Africa - the conflict in Congo.

Last December, during our delegation's eleven-day mission to ten African countries, two issues were at the top of our agenda: the scourge of HIV/AIDS and the crisis in Congo. On Congo, we met with leaders from every state involved in the conflict. And we returned home convinced that this crisis desperately warrants the attention and efforts of the international community.

Mr. Chairman, the time has come for the UN to take the next steps for peace in Congo. The time has come for the parties to the conflict to realize the full potential of the Lusaka Agreement. And the time has come for the U.S. to lend its support. This committee is aware that on February 7, the State Department notified Congress that the U.S. intends to support a resolution in the UN Security Council to expand the United Nations Observer Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (MONUC). This peacekeeping operation will subsume and expand upon the current United Nations Mission in the Congo. It is imperative that we fulfill our responsibility to help.

No Security Council Resolution expanding the UN's presence in the Democratic Republic of Congo has yet been adopted. We are currently negotiating with other Security Council member states on a resolution, which will be voted upon no earlier than February 23rd.

Today, we would like to outline the background to the situation in the Congo, how the peacekeeping plan is structured, the U.S. national interest in the operation, and how the risks of the operation have been minimized.

Background

As you know, the U.S. used its presidency of the Security Council in January to focus on a number of African issues, including AIDS, refugees, Angola, Burundi and the Congo. The culmination of this focus on Africa was the attendance of seven African heads of state at a summit on the Congo and a special session of the Security Council, chaired by Secretary Albright.

The summit and follow-up meetings went well, and all leaders publicly recommitted themselves to the Lusaka Agreement. Democratic Republic of the Congo President Kabila and other signatories reaffirmed their commitment to the inter-Congolese National Dialogue and former President Masire of Botswana outlined his plans as the neutral facilitator of the process.

But success requires more than just talk. Real progress among the concerned parties deserves international action and support. Action is necessary to prevent further conflict and the resurgence of genocide and mass killing in Central Africa.

The question, then, is how best to help the parties foster peace and stability in the Congo. The UN can and must play a key role in this process, specifically by deploying the next phase of a peacekeeping operation in the country.

Three-Phase Approach

Allow me to review for you the phased approach to peacekeeping in the DROC. I should stress that this plan reflects what the U.S. government, including the Department of Defense, has advocated as the best approach. After months of resisting unrealistic peacekeeping proposals for the Congo, we have succeeded in getting the UN to adopt this three-phase approach—a concept designed in part by U.S. military planners. This approach ties UN deployments to concrete progress on the ground toward the Lusaka Agreement's political and military objectives.

There are three phases to implementation of the Lusaka Agreement. The first phase focused on establishing liaison with the parties, their field commanders and the Joint Military Commission (JMC), and on planning for the deployment of subsequent peacekeeping operations. Phase I was launched August 6, 1999, when the Security Council authorized MONUC, the UN liaison mission of up to 90 UN

military liaison officers to the Congo and to the capitals of other African countries with an interest in the conflict.

Implementation of the cease-fire during Phase I was imperfect. The cease-fire has been violated intermittently, with the heaviest fighting in the northwest and around the central town of Ikela. The UN liaison officers have also encountered some setbacks. While 79 of the 90 UN military liaison officers have been deployed to the rear headquarters of both sides in multiple locations, they have been barred from other key sites, particularly those located in government-held areas.

That being said, the peace process in Congo is moving forward, albeit slowly. Fighting that was once wide-scale has been contained to a few areas. The international community is galvanized for action. And the parties themselves have renewed their commitments and begun to take the necessary steps for a lasting settlement.

As a result of a meeting of the JMC political committee in Harare on January 18 and the open Security Council session in New York on January 24, the parties to Lusaka reiterated their commitment to the peace process and to providing full security and access for all UN personnel. They also reestablished their calendar for implementation. Significantly, all parties, including President Kabila, called for the immediate deployment of the Phase II military observer mission.

The Secretary-General's report of January 14 outlined the fundamental structure and mandate for Phase II of the operation in the DROC. It recommended an expansion of the current UN liaison mission of 90 military liaison officers to a 500-member observer mission with force protection and support, which brings the total up to 5,537 military personnel. Upon authorization by the Council, the Phase II deployment of the UN Observer Mission in the Congo (MONUC) would begin when key conditions are met, including security, access and cooperation with UN personnel. No U.S. peacekeeping troops would be on the ground as a part of this operation.

The observers would monitor the implementation of the cease-fire on the ground, assist with the disengagement of troops at certain locations, and assist the JMC with developing the mechanisms to implement further provisions of the Lusaka Agreement. The Phase II operation would not serve as an interpositional force.

Upon the successful completion of Phase II, the UN may recommend a Phase III operation to build on the progress of the National Dialogue and to

support full and complete implementation of Lusaka. The precise mission, size and function of a possible Phase III UN peacekeeping force remain undefined, since the UN's role and responsibilities in the peace process would be developed through planning and negotiations during Phase II. We have stated repeatedly, though, that the UN would not take on enforcement responsibilities, including any potential forcible disarmament of non-state actors.

Let me reiterate: transition to Phase III is not automatic, but would depend on developments during Phase II, including significant progress in the national dialogue. Any movement to implement Phase III would require further action in the Security Council and would be subject to a new Congressional notification.

U.S. National Interest

The U.S. has an interest in upholding regional stability and in preventing the resurgence of genocide and mass killing in Central Africa. In particular, the former Rwandan Army (ex-FAR) and Interahamwe militia, who are implicated in the 1994 Rwandan genocide are still operating in the region, significantly contributing to instability. More than a half dozen regional states have been involved in the fighting. Congo is a contagion of crisis: if the conflict there is allowed to fester, efforts to resolve conflicts and promote stability throughout the region - in Angola, Burundi, Rwanda, Uganda and Sudan - will even be more difficult.

Additionally, the political and military vacuum in the Congo has drawn in rogue states such as Libya, Iran, North Korea, Cuba and Sudan. These states are seeking a foothold in a destabilized central Africa for weapons sales, political allies, terrorist bases, and access to strategic minerals (including uranium and diamonds).

The fighting further threatens to spark a major humanitarian crisis, with a severe long-term impact on economic growth, investment and trade for the region. The current conflict is the most violent in Africa, with enormous costs to U.S. political and economic interests.

For all of these reasons, the U.S. has a clear national interest to support the UN's efforts in resolving the multi-state conflict in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, and encouraging the evolution of a stable, democratic Congo at peace with its neighbors.

Managed Risks

For purposes of clarity, let me review for you again some key points to keep in mind:

- This operation will not involve U.S. peacekeeping troops.
- The observers in Phase II would monitor the cease-fire and verify the redeployment of the parties' forces to defensive positions as agreed in the agreement.
- To repeat, transition to Phase III in the future-a peacekeeping mission-is *not* automatic. Rather, movement to Phase III is dependent on:
 - The parties' observing the conditions of the Lusaka Accords;
 - Disengagement of forces along confrontation lines;
 - Substantial progress on the National Dialogue;
 - The completion by the parties of a viable plan for dealing with non-signatory armed groups;
 - Further action by the UN Security Council and new Congressional notification

Finally, I want to assure you that we are aware of the risks of this operation. Any effort toward peace in Congo will not be easy. However, while there are risks involved with the deployment of Phase II, the risks of inaction are far, far greater. We cannot promise you immediate peace in the Congo. What I can say is that without strong UN leadership in addressing this situation at this moment, there is a high probability - in fact a near certainty -- of a catastrophic political and humanitarian disaster in central Africa. Inaction risks the resurgence of genocide and the danger that this proxy war will devolve into a direct war between the many states already involved.

Conclusion

In conclusion, let me point out that this past year has been a dramatic one for United Nations peacekeeping. The new missions in Kosovo and East Timor and the expanded mission in Sierra Leone have not only doubled the number of United Nations peacekeepers in the field, but also have added a new level of complexity to our peacekeeping efforts. Congo is important, but success in these missions is just as critical. We will not allow our concern for Congo to come at the expense of our commitment to fulfilling these other missions.

To sustain all of these UN peacekeeping efforts, we will need the support of other UN member states, the parties to the various conflicts, and most importantly,

Members of Congress. Without the means to finance our assessed contributions to peacekeeping activities, the UN will be unable to fulfill the mandates of these missions.

The stakes in the Congo crisis are high, and the challenge is daunting. Although we cannot expect the United Nations to impose peace in Congo (a country as large as Western Europe or the United States east of the Mississippi River), it is imperative that the UN do what it can to support the peace process the Africans themselves created. Failure to act may irreparably damage both the capability and credibility of United Nations peacekeeping. The U.S. has ensured that the UN has managed the risks to the greatest extent possible, but risks still exist.

Mr. Chairman, it is absolutely critical that we have the support of your subcommittee and your colleagues for our efforts in the Congo. Your role is crucial to our success, and I thank you again for the honor of addressing you today.

**Questions to Department of State
pertaining to February 7, 2000
Congressional Notification of US support for
proposed Peacekeeping Mission in Democratic Republic of Congo**

February 10, 2000

*Please respond by 6:00 p.m. EST Friday, February 11, 2000
Please include the text of the question above the response.*

1. Please explain the differences in role and function between a "Military Liaison Officer" (deployed to Congo under Phase I of peacekeeping effort) and a "Military Observer" (as described in Notification describing Phase II).
2. Please share with the Committee a description of the "three phase process initially developed by U.S. military planners" as described on page 2 of the notification. What units and individuals in the Department of Defense were involved in this planning?
3. Please define "interpositional force" as described on page 2 of the notification and how it differs from the mission to "assist with the disengagement of troops" mentioned on the same page.
4. What will constitute the assessment of whether or not Phase II is "completed successfully" as the term is used on page three to determine whether to move to Phase III? What criteria will be used as indicators of continued adherence to the cease fire (how long?), progress on the National Dialogue, disengagement and demobilization of forces, etc.?
5. The notification indicates that, if conditions are right, a Phase III operation might be recommended to "help implement some of the provisions of the Lusaka Agreement in the field." (Page 3, paragraph 1.) Which ones? Which ones would the UN not help implement?
6. The notification states that during Phase I, Military Liaison Officers were "barred from other key sites, particularly those located in government-held areas" but notes that recently all parties, including President Kabila, have called for the deployment of the Phase II military mission. Did President Kabila agree to Phase I? If yes, why do we believe that his assurances are more reliable now?
7. On pages 3 and 4 the Notification succinctly describes a number of US national interests that are threatened by conflict in this region. Please explain in more detail how the peacekeeping operation is likely to address these interests. For example, the Notification

states that “continued fighting in the region has produced a dangerous security vacuum that has drawn in rogue states which are seeking weapons sales, political allies, and access to strategic minerals.” How will the peacekeeping operation address this admittedly serious threat to US national interests? Is there any possible scenario in which a peacekeeping operation could compound this or other threats?

8. On page 4, paragraph 3 of the Notification, the observer force is described as “overseeing” the disengagement of forces. Previously in this document it is described as “assisting with” the disengagement of forces. Which of these terms best describes the anticipated role? To refer again to question 3 above, how does this role differ from being an “interpositional force.”
9. The Notification describes the Phase II force as operating under Chapter VI authority of the UN Charter with a limited Chapter VII authority for “protection, within the mission’s capabilities, of civilians under imminent threat of violence.” The Security Council Resolution says that MONUC may take necessary action “to protect civilians under imminent threat of physical violence *in the immediate vicinity of deployment sites.*” (Emphasis added.) Does this mean that UN force would or would not be expected to take action to prevent mass civilian killings of the kind that occurred in Rwanda in 1994?
10. Please give us some numbers (a range) that would reflect a “potentially a large peacekeeping operation” as mentioned on page 5 of the Notification.
11. No mention in the Notification is made of paragraphs 14 through 20 of the Resolution, which deal with sanctions. Please describe the prior resolutions referred to in paragraph 14 and how these six paragraphs of the resolution relate to the peace keeping operation.
12. The description of the duration and exit strategy of this mission highlights the benchmarks for a successful completion of Phase II. Specifically, what would constitute a failure to complete Phase II, and what will be the response of the United States to that failure?

1. Please explain the differences in role and function between a "Military Liaison Officer" (deployed to Congo under Phase I of peacekeeping effort) and a "Military Observer" (as described in Notification describing Phase II).

Answer:

Consistent with the Secretary-General's plan for Phase I, the UN deployed up to 90 UN military officers to serve mainly as liaison officers to the national capitals and rear military headquarters of the main belligerents. They deployed into Kinshasa and elsewhere in the Congo, Kigali, Kampala, Luanda, Harare, and Windhoek, as well as a liaison cell in Lusaka. These military liaison officers (MLOs) played a limited, but essential role in establishing contacts, conducting liaison, exchanging information, reporting on progress, facilitating planning activities, and coordinating preparations for follow-on UN activities in support of the Lusaka Ceasefire Agreement. During Phase I, these MLOs did not undertake several traditional UN military observer tasks called for in Phase II.

According to the Secretary-General's concept for Phase II, the UN military observers (MILOBs) would deploy into the Congo and work closely with the Joint Military Commission (JMC). In Phase II, the 500 UN MILOBs would undertake expanded tasks to help bring an end to the fighting. These tasks include: establish contacts and maintain continuous liaison; assist in developing modalities for implementation of the Agreement; facilitate, monitor and report on the cessation of hostilities; investigate violations in cooperation with the JMC; supervise and verify disengagement of units; facilitate humanitarian operations; work with the parties to obtain the release of all prisoners of war; and prepare for a possible third phase of the UN deployment.

MONUC's transition to Phase II would integrate the current MLOs into the new UN military observer mission, and all 500 military officers would perform the expanded tasks as MILOBs, as outlined above.

2. Please share with the Committee a description of the "three phase process initially developed by U.S. military planners" as described on page 2 of the Notification. What units and individuals in the Department of Defense were involved in this planning?

Answer:

Phase I, which is now ending, consists of up to 90 military liaison officers. These officers have deployed to the capitals of those countries involved in the Congo conflict, and in the Congolese interior to the rear headquarters of the various forces in the Congo. They have established ties with the parties to the conflict, the Joint Military Commission (JMC) and rear headquarters in the field. They have also helped conduct field assessments, enabling the UN to determine the appropriate force size, composition and logistical support for Phase II.

Phase II, now under consideration by the Security Council, would consist of 500 military observers. Under the Secretary-General's concept, the UN military observers would deploy into the Congo, working closely with the Joint Military Commission (JMC). In Phase II, the UN MILOBs would: establish contacts and maintain continuous liaison; assist in developing modalities for implementation of the Agreement; facilitate, monitor and report on the cessation of hostilities; investigate violations in cooperation with the JMC; supervise and verify disengagement of units; facilitate humanitarian operations; work with the parties to obtain the release of all prisoners of war; and prepare for a possible third phase of the UN deployment. The 5,037 troops and support personnel would provide force protection and logistical support to MONUC.

Phase III would not be automatic. The Security Council would need to approve any new mandate. The Administration would not be prepared to agree to a Phase III operation until the parties have fulfilled their obligations in Phase II. The primary benchmark for the transition to Phase III is making substantial progress in the National Dialogue, a crucial step to achieving a comprehensive peace settlement. The Lusaka Ceasefire Agreement articulates the broad principles of a final comprehensive settlement - disarmament of non-signatory armed groups, withdrawal of all foreign forces, arrival at a "new political disposition" through a Congolese National Dialogue. The details of how to implement these principles in the field, and the UN's role in doing so would have to be developed in Phase II.

Therefore, Phase III, if authorized, would implement a comprehensive peace settlement, largely a product of the National Dialogue and the associated military planning performed with the JMC. The Secretary-General has envisaged that a UN peacekeeping mission for Phase III might consist of an expanded number of troops and military observers, and assist the JMC in implementing a range of peacekeeping tasks. To this end, the Secretary-General has said that a clear political agreement on the part of all concerned is necessary in order to consider Phase III. However, due to the lack of clarity regarding these issues, there is not a consensus about the nature, mission, shape, size or duration of a UN mission that could deploy in Phase III.

At the outset, the Pentagon's (OSD and the Joint Staff) involvement was helpful in shaping the interagency effort to assist the UN Secretariat in its planning to develop a realistic and achievable peacekeeping plan for the Congo. Both Secretary of Defense Cohen and Under Secretary of Defense Slocumbe have visited the UN recently in New York to engage in discussions with the UN's leadership on peacekeeping issues. These visits and others by Defense officials have helped shape the UN's thinking about this phased approach for peacekeeping in the Congo.

3. Please define "interpositional force" as described on page 2 of the Notification and how it differs from the mission to "assist with the disengagement of troops" mentioned on the same page.

Answer: .

The Secretary-General's report states that it should be understood that UN formed units in the Congo would not serve as an interpositional force. A UN interpositional force traditionally conducts armed blue-helmeted patrols in a buffer zone separating the warring parties. This approach is suitable in cases where the battle lines are clearly drawn. An interpositional force in such situations takes action, if necessary, in accordance with established rules of engagement (ROE) and impedes escalation of hostilities among the parties.

In the Congo, the confrontation lines are not well-drawn and the forces are widely dispersed. In such cases, the United Nations typically deploys a credible military observer mission to assist the parties in establishing a cessation of hostilities. Therefore, the Secretary-General's concept calls for a military observer mission to develop modalities for the implementation of the cease-fire in the four dispersed areas of conflict. MONUC's military observers would monitor the cessation of hostilities from behind the forces in contact. From that position, MONUC's military observers would facilitate, monitor and report on the cessation of hostilities and, if necessary, investigate violations in cooperation with the Joint Military Commission. The UN military observers will not enforce the peace; that role belongs to the parties through the JMC. This approach is appropriate for the situation and results in less-demanding manpower requirements, a major consideration given the logistical constraints of the Congo.

4. What will constitute the assessment of whether or not Phase II is "completed successfully" as the term is used on page three to determine whether to move to Phase III? What criteria will be used as indicators of continued adherence to the cease-fire (how long, progress on the National Dialogue, disengagement and demobilization of forces, etc.)?

Answer:

MONUC's mission in Phase II is to implement the Lusaka Ceasefire Agreement, thereby establishing a favorable political and military environment to support the parties as they negotiate a comprehensive peace settlement. Transition to a Phase III peacekeeping operation would not be automatic. It would require further Security Council action. If such action were to be contemplated, Congress would be fully consulted in advance, as they have been thus far.

In considering moving to Phase III, the Council's action will depend on the parties fulfilling their obligations. The most important criteria in determining movement to Phase III are:

- Substantial progress on the National Dialogue;
- Observation by the parties of the conditions of the Lusaka Ceasefire Agreement - this includes not only the lack of fighting, but also a lack of preparations for new fighting such as substantial troop movements or resupply of offensive weapons;
- Disengagement of forces along confrontation lines; and
- Completion by the parties of a viable plan for dealing with non-signatory armed groups.

5. The Notification indicates that, if conditions are right, a Phase III operation might be recommended to "help implement some of the provisions of the Lusaka Agreement in the field" (Page 3, paragraph 1). Which ones? Which ones would the UN not help implement?

Answer:

The Lusaka Peace Agreement articulates general principles for a comprehensive settlement of the Congo conflict, but contains no detailed mechanisms for implementing them in the field. The UN will not get involved in enforcement actions to preserve the peace.

As noted in the answer to Question 2 above, the specific tasks to be accomplished in a possible Phase III operation are yet to be defined. In addition, MONUC's responsibilities as well as those of the JMC are yet to be developed. Much of the UN's concept of operations depends on the planning and negotiating that will occur during Phase II.

6. The Notification states that during Phase I, Military Liaison Officers were "barred from other key sites, particularly those located in government-held areas" but notes that recently all parties, including President Kabila, have called for the deployment of the Phase II military mission. Did President Kabila agree to Phase I? If yes, why do we believe that his assurances are more reliable now?

Answer:

In signing the Lusaka Agreement, and subsequently at the first meeting of the JMC and again at the African heads of state summit in New York, Kabila and his representatives agreed to a cease-fire monitored by the UN and explicitly guaranteed UN personnel access and security.

The phased approach accepted by the UN, however, does not depend on trusting Kabila. It links the international responses to his concrete actions. This means the further UN involvement and international support for the peace process would depend on the Lusaka process advancing and on progress on the National Dialogue.

As proven in Phase I, the UN will not deploy peacekeepers to areas without concrete security and access conditions on the ground for safe deployment. The Secretary General's report is unequivocal in stating the same practice would be followed in Phase II.

7. On pages 3 and 4 the Notification succinctly describes a number of U.S. national interests that are threatened by conflict in this region. Please explain in more detail how the peacekeeping operation is likely to address these interests. For example, the Notification states that "continued fighting in the region has produced a dangerous security vacuum that has drawn in rogue states which are seeking weapons sales, political allies, and access to strategic minerals." How will the peacekeeping operation address this admittedly serious threat to U.S. national interests? Is there any possible scenario in which a peacekeeping operation could compound this or other threats?

Answer:

The political and military vacuum in the Congo has drawn in rogue states such as Libya, Iran, North Korea, Cuba and Sudan. All of these countries have an interest in exploiting the conflict in the Congo to their advantage, economically, strategically, or politically. A successful Congolese peace process would deter rogue state intrusions into central Africa and contain their reach in the region.

MONUC is designed to foster peace and stability in the DROC. A peaceful and stable Congo will be able to guard against foreign control and exploitation of its natural resources. Peace will also prevent rogue states from playing the warring parties against each other for political purposes. Finally, bringing an end to violent conflict in the DROC will also bring an end to the impetus for significant weapon flows from rogue states.

It is extremely unlikely that MONUC would compound the danger of a security vacuum in central Africa conducive to the participation of rogue states. In fact, a dangerous security vacuum already exists, and this is a compelling reason for U.S. support for the implementation of Phase II.

8. On page 4, paragraph 3 of the Notification, the observer force is described as "overseeing" the disengagement of forces. Previously in this document it is described as "assisting with" the disengagement of forces. Which of these terms best describes the anticipated role? To refer again to question 3 above, how does this role differ from being an "interpositional force"?

Answer:

Under the Secretary-General's concept for Phase II, MONUC would engage in several specific tasks regarding disengagement of forces: assist the parties in developing modalities for disengagement; facilitate, monitor, verify, and report on disengagement; and supervise and verify redeployment of the parties' forces to defensive positions or administrative assembly areas. Therefore, in this context, the Congressional Notification attempts to represent succinctly the wide scope of these tasks.

The responsibility for cease-fire compliance remains with the parties. In no circumstance would the UN seek to impose compliance by force of arms. For further information on an "interpositional force," please see Question 3 above.

9. The Notification describes the Phase II force as operating under Chapter VI authority of the UN Charter with a limited Chapter VII authority for "protection, within the mission's capabilities, of civilians under imminent threat of violence." The Security Council Resolution says that MONUC may take necessary action "to protect civilians under imminent threat of physical violence in the *immediate vicinity of deployment sites*" (emphasis added). Does this mean that UN force would or would not be expected to take action to prevent mass civilian killings of the kind that occurred in Rwanda in 1994?

Answer:

The intention of the Security Council is to ensure that MONUC's military personnel would not stand by and observe such abusive acts committed against civilians when they could help, within their military capabilities, to stop such abuses in the vicinity of the deployment sites.

The proposed Phase II MONUC mission would not have the ability, the military capacity or the manpower to prevent widespread mass killings throughout the Congo, given its size.

However, if human rights abuses occur within MONUC's immediate deployment area of operations, it is the Security Council's intention that MONUC's personnel are empowered to take appropriate action, within their capabilities, to halt such abuses against civilians. The decision on capabilities of the force to address the situation would be made by the commander on the ground.

10. Please give us some numbers (a range) that would reflect "potentially a large peacekeeping operation" as mentioned on page 5 of the Notification.

Answer:

Numbers for a Phase III mission would depend upon the outcome of Phase II, including the results of the National Dialogue, and thus no concrete numbers can be estimated. We will continue to work with the UN to develop a workable Phase III concept of operations, as well as a force size that is appropriate to those tasks as progress in the National Dialogue unfolds. Any future increase in personnel above that authorized by Phase II would have to come back through the Security Council and would be subject to Congressional notification.

11. No mention in the Notification is made of paragraphs 14 through 20 of the resolution, which deal with sanctions. Please describe the prior resolutions referred to in paragraph 14 and how these six paragraphs of the resolution relate to the peacekeeping operation.

Answer:

No Security Council resolution expanding the UN's presence in the Democratic Republic of Congo has been adopted at this time. However, in discussions in New York over a U.S.-drafted resolution calling for MONUC's expansion, Security Council member states have discussed language referring to previous Security Council resolutions addressing arms transfers related to Rwandan genocidaires. It is not yet clear whether such language will be included in the resolution.

12. The description of the duration and exit strategy of this mission highlights the benchmarks for a successful completion of Phase II. Specifically, what would constitute a failure to complete Phase II, and what will be the response of the United States to that failure?

Answer:

We have told the parties that our support for Phase II peacekeeping is contingent on their compliance with the terms of the cease-fire as described in the Lusaka Agreement. If the parties should resume large-scale fighting, we would not consider ourselves obligated to renew the initial mandate of the Phase II mission when it expires in August. Should a worst-case scenario develop, the Phase II UN mission is designed to be robust enough to remove UN personnel from harm's way.