[Joint House and Senate Hearing, 109 Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
THE CHINA-DALAI LAMA DIALOGUE:
PROSPECTS FOR PROGRESS
=======================================================================
ROUNDTABLE
before the
CONGRESSIONAL-EXECUTIVE COMMISSION ON CHINA
ONE HUNDRED NINTH CONGRESS
SECOND SESSION
__________
MARCH 13, 2006
__________
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CONGRESSIONAL-EXECUTIVE COMMISSION ON CHINA
LEGISLATIVE BRANCH COMMISSIONERS
Senate
House
CHUCK HAGEL, Nebraska, Chairman
SAM BROWNBACK, Kansas
GORDON SMITH, Oregon
JIM DeMINT, South Carolina
MEL MARTINEZ, Florida
MAX BAUCUS, Montana
CARL LEVIN, Michigan
DIANNE FEINSTEIN, California
BYRON DORGAN, North Dakota
JAMES A. LEACH, Iowa, Co-Chairman
DAVID DREIER, California
FRANK R. WOLF, Virginia
JOSEPH R. PITTS, Pennsylvania
ROBERT B. ADERHOLT, Alabama
SANDER LEVIN, Michigan
MARCY KAPTUR, Ohio
SHERROD BROWN, Ohio
MICHAEL M. HONDA, California
EXECUTIVE BRANCH COMMISSIONERS
STEVEN J. LAW, Department of Labor
PAULA DOBRIANSKY, Department of State
David Dorman, Staff Director (Chairman)
John Foarde, Staff Director (Co-Chairman)
(ii)
C O N T E N T S
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Page
STATEMENTS
Wangdi, Tashi, Representative of His Holiness the Dalai Lama to
the Americas, Office of Tibet, New York, NY.................... 2
Wangdu, Sonam, United States Tibet Committee, New York, NY....... 6
Wangchuk, Tseten, Voice of America, senior broadcaster, Tibetan
Language Service, Washington, DC............................... 10
APPENDIX
Prepared Statements
Wangdi, Tashi.................................................... 24
Wangdu, Sonam.................................................... 26
Wangchuk, Tseten................................................. 28
Submissions for the Record
Statement by Special Envoy Lodi Gyari, head of the delegation
sent by His Holiness the Dalai Lama to China, Saturday, Feb.
25, 2006, submitted by Tashi Wangdi............................ 32
Statement of His Holiness the Dalai Lama on the 47th Anniversary
of the Tibetan National Uprising Day, March 10, 2006, submitted
by Tashi Wangdi................................................ 32
Statement of the Kashag on the 47th Anniversary of the Tibetan
People's Uprising Day, March 10, 2006, submitted by Tashi
Wangdi......................................................... 34
THE CHINA-DALAI LAMA DIALOGUE: PROSPECTS FOR PROGRESS
----------
MONDAY, MARCH 13, 2006
Congressional-Executive
Commission on China,
Washington, DC.
The Roundtable was convened, pursuant to notice, at 2 p.m.,
in room 2200, Rayburn House Office Building, David Dorman
(Senate Staff Director) presiding.
Also present: John Foarde, House Staff Director; Carl
Minzner, Senior Counsel; William A. Farris, Senior Counsel;
Kara Abramson, Counsel; and Steve Marshall, Senior Advisor.
Mr. Dorman. Before we get started, I would like to point
out to everyone that copies of the Commission's 2005 Annual
Report, and I believe copies of all our panelists' written
statements, are on the table outside the door. So please feel
free to take a copy if you would like. Now would be the time to
do that, as we will begin in just a few seconds.
Let us get started. On behalf of our Chairman, Chuck Hagel,
and our Co-Chairman, Representative Jim Leach, I would like to
welcome our very distinguished group of panelists today to this
Issues Roundtable on the China-Dalai Lama Dialogue: Prospects
for Progress. As has been the procedure since we began these
roundtables in 2002, I will begin with a short opening
statement. Then we will move into an introductory period, where
I will introduce each of our panelists, and then give each, in
turn, an opportunity to make an opening statement. Once each
panelist has had an opportunity to make an opening statement,
we will begin a period of questions and answers.
Each person on the dais will have five minutes to ask a
question and hear an answer, and we will continue to ask
questions and hear answers until our 90 minutes are used up.
Generally, that 90 minutes disappears very quickly during what
are always very interesting conversations. We are looking
forward to this roundtable today.
First, a brief opening statement.
Tension between the Chinese Government and Tibetans living
in China persists as a feature of regional, political,
cultural, and religious life. The U.S. State Department's third
annual ``Report on Tibetan Negotiations'' noted the gravity of
the issue, saying, ``The lack of resolution of these problems
leads to greater tensions inside China and will be a stumbling
block to fuller political and economic engagement with the
United States and other nations.'' The Dalai Lama, now in his
early 70s, has said that he does not seek independence and
aims, instead, for a solution based on Tibetan autonomy within
China. He has sent his envoys to meet with Chinese leaders five
times, starting in 2002. Their most recent trip concluded on
February 23, 2006. So far, Chinese leaders do not seem to
recognize the benefits of moving forward in the dialogue with
the Dalai Lama or his envoys.
In the Commission's 2005 Annual Report, the Commission made
the following statement and recommendation: ``The future of
Tibetans and their religion, language, and culture depends on
fair and equitable decisions about future policies that can
only be achieved through dialogue. The Dalai Lama is essential
to this dialogue. To help the parties build on visits and
dialogue held in 2003, 2004, and 2005, the President and the
Congress should urge the Chinese Government to move the current
dialogue toward deeper substantive discussions with the Dalai
Lama or his representatives, and encourage direct contact
between the Dalai Lama and the Chinese leadership.''
With that, I would like to introduce our first very
distinguished panelist, Mr. Tashi Wangdi. Mr. Wangdi is
Representative of His Holiness the Dalai Lama to the Americas,
Office of Tibet, New York. Mr. Wangdi, a senior official of the
Tibetan government-in-exile, began service in the Tibetan
government-in-exile as a junior officer in 1966, and has held
several positions as a Kalon. He headed the departments of
Religion and Culture, Home Affairs, Education, Information and
International Relations, Security, and Health, and for many
years was the Dalai Lama's representative in New Delhi. In
1988, the Dalai Lama appointed Mr. Wangdi as the potential head
of a delegation that could be entrusted with conducting
dialogue with the Chinese leadership about the future of the
Tibetan people. It proved to be a role that went unfulfilled,
but today Mr. Wangdi is a member of the Task Force set up to
assist the Dalai Lama's envoys, Lodi Gyari and Kelsang
Gyaltsen, who are actively engaged in dialogue with the Chinese
leadership.
Mr. Wangdi, welcome. You have 10 minutes for an opening
statement, please.
STATEMENT OF TASHI WANGDI, REPRESENTATIVE OF HIS
HOLINESS THE DALAI LAMA TO THE AMERICAS, OFFICE OF TIBET, NEW
YORK, NY
Mr. Wangdi. Thank you very much, Mr. Dorman, ladies and
gentlemen.
May I, first of all, express my deep appreciation and
gratitude for inviting me to be here, and for organizing this
Roundtable to discuss the issue of China-Dalai Lama Dialogue:
Prospects for Progress.
I would also like to thank the Commission for its excellent
Annual Report. I think it is a very well-researched, very
comprehensive, very balanced, objective report, and I would
like to thank you for that.
I would like to say that the first direct contact between
the Tibetan government-in-exile and the Chinese Government was
established in 1979, when the elder brother of His Holiness the
Dalai Lama was invited to Beijing by the Chinese Government.
When he was contacted in Hong Kong by Chinese officials, His
Holiness gave him permission to go for a visit to China. He had
very good meetings with very senior Chinese leaders at that
time, including Mr. Deng Xiaoping, who very explicitly told Mr.
Gyalo Thondup that all issues relating to Tibet can be
resolved, except the question of independence.
Now, this stand was very much in line with the position
taken by His Holiness and the Tibetan leadership in exile. It
was a position taken some years before that that contact was
established. As His Holiness has stated in his March 10
statement this year, which I would like to quote, the position
taken by the leadership was to seek a solution for genuine
autonomy and not for complete independence. As His Holiness
stated in this March 10 statement, and I would like to quote
that particular portion of the statement, ``Some time in 1974,
we formulated the basic principles of the Middle Way Approach
for resolving the issue of Tibet, trusting that the time must
surely come when we would have the opportunity to engage in
talks with the Chinese leadership. In 1979, we were able to
interact directly with the leadership in Beijing. At that time,
Deng Xiaoping said that, except for independence, all issues
would be resolved through negotiations. Since then, I have
pursued the Middle Way Approach with consistency and
sincerity.''
Therefore, when Mr. Gyalo Thondup came back with that
message from Mr. Deng Xiaoping, His Holiness immediately
responded to that and a number of high-level delegations were
sent to China, and also for fact-finding delegations for Tibet.
Unfortunately, the early relationship, which gave a lot of
encouragement and hope for an early breakthrough, did not
materialize. The relations often had gone through a difficult
period. When members of our delegations have met with Chinese
officials again and relations are reestablished, they also
describe the spirit through which we have gone as ``through
many turns and twists,'' so it did not lead to a negotiated
settlement.
But I think it will not be useful for me to go into those
reasons, because that would not serve any purpose. We will
leave it, as I said in my written statement. Future historians
will be the best judge of this aspect. However, I have said in
my statement that if the policies stated by Mr. Deng Xiaoping
to Mr. Gyalo Thondup, and subsequently we felt these were being
implemented to a large extent, especially when Mr. Hu Yaobang
was the Party Secretary, would have been carried through, we
have a sense that the problem may have been resolved by now.
But, unfortunately, Mr. Hu Yaobang himself fell from his
position, and after that the relations became very difficult.
There was imposition of martial law. The policies of the
Chinese Government toward Tibet and Tibetans have hardened.
But despite this reversal, His Holiness Dalai Lama
continues to seek a peaceful resolution to the problem through
dialogue on the basis of what Mr. Deng Xiaoping said and his
own Middle Way
Approach. His Holiness made the position clear to the Chinese
leadership through communications directly addressed to them.
Many letters were directly addressed to the Chinese leaders,
explaining His Holiness' intentions and policies. Also through
well-intentioned mutual friends, there were many people who
were close to Chinese leaders and also known to His Holiness.
He also used these methods to convey his views to the Chinese
Government.
His Holiness, of course, expressed his willingness to meet
Chinese leaders. Many times he said, ``Anywhere, any time.''
When then-Chinese Premier Li Peng visited India, it was again
suggested that during that visit it may be a good idea for His
Holiness and the Premier to meet. But, unfortunately, this
initiative, these suggestions, were not responded to in a
positive manner.
In the meantime, His Holiness, apart from trying very
strenuously, also appointed two senior officials with the
responsibility of trying to reestablish contact with the
Chinese Government. In 2002, the two envoys were able to make
contact and were able to make a visit to Beijing, with two
senior aides. Their task was to reestablish contact, to create
a conducive atmosphere for dialogue, and eventually
negotiations, and to explain His Holiness' positions, his
policies to the Chinese leaders. So far, there have been five
meetings of His Holiness' representatives and their Chinese
counterparts. In the last nearly four years, the progress
toward a meaningful dialogue has been almost non-existent. It
has been a very frustrating and slow process, and basically
one-sided.
But at the same time, we believe that there has been some
movement forward in terms of the responsibilities given to the
two senior officials. That is to say, to reestablish direct
contact and to try to explain His Holiness' position. Of
course, the relations now have been reestablished. Contact has
been reestablished and stabilized. This has also been stated by
the Chinese officials in their fourth meeting, when they said
that the contact has been stabilized and that it has become an
established practice. So that is an encouraging development.
Second, it also has been possible, through these meetings,
to be able to have an opportunity to explain His Holiness'
policies and his positions. Then there has also been some
change in the format and the content of discussions also, and
frequency of the meetings. The fourth meeting, as you know, was
outside of China, at the Chinese Embassy in Switzerland. The
gap between the fourth and fifth meetings has also been the
shortest in the last four years.
The discussions from the fifth round onward had shifted
from restatement of general principles and unspecified
allegations to more specific issues, mainly explaining the
reasons why there is still a lack of trust, and certain
misconceptions and misunderstandings about His Holiness'
positions, his statements, and so on.
Our representatives found these discussions very helpful.
When the more specific points are made, it is easier for us to
respond to them. We have, of course, taken the points raised in
all these meetings very seriously, and explanations and
clarifications were given fully and truthfully, in writing, in
the last two meetings.
We believe that this is the only way to remove all mistrust
and suspicion, which seem to plague our present relationship
and hinder efforts to enter into serious and meaningful
negotiations. We believe that one of the biggest problems at
this point is lack of trust. Unless we are able to remove this
problem and make some breakthrough, it will be very difficult
to start meaningful, substantive negotiations.
Of course, as stated by His Holiness' representatives in
their latest press statement, and of course the other
statements on the occasion of March 10, that is, the statement
of His Holiness, which I have quoted from; the statement of the
cabinet which also has bearing on this topic we are discussing
today; and the statement issued by the delegation after it
returned from the fifth round of meetings, I would like to
place them in the record.
[The statements appear in the appendix.]
Mr. Wangdi. As the delegation has stated in their press
statement on their return, they have very clearly, very
candidly said that there are still big differences, including
some fundamental differences. But the encouraging thing, the
good thing, the positive development, is that even after the
last round of meetings, that both sides have reconfirmed their
commitment to continue this process of dialogue.
Also, in the last meeting it was possible to identify more
clearly issues of differences in substance, which again is very
helpful for us so that we are able to address these issues in a
head-on way rather than trying to guess about what are the
obstacles and difficulties in our dialogue.
We also feel that we have suggested to the Chinese
Government that, in order to take the process forward, first to
remove the trust and misunderstanding and so on, that it would
be very important to increase the frequency of meetings.
To a fault, there has almost been an annual meeting.
Between the fourth and fifth, as I said, there was a shorter
period, and we hope that there will be occasion for the
delegations to meet again soon. But we have suggested to the
Chinese Government that the frequency of these meetings should
be increased so that there would be an opportunity to have a
much more intensive, vigorous exchange of views.
We feel, and have stated it many times, that if we remove
the mistrust and misunderstandings, the fundamental differences
that still exist are not that insurmountable. The basic concern
of the Chinese Government is the unity, territorial integrity,
and economic development of the country. We very sincerely
believe that the Middle Way Approach adopted by His Holiness
will not in any way undermine this Chinese Government priority.
In fact, if it is understood in this proper context and with
the sincere motivation behind it, it will help to remove this
unfounded mistrust, suspicion, and fear.
But, as I said repeatedly, true, substantive, meaningful
negotiations can only take place when there is sufficient
mutual
confidence, mutual trust. The best way, of course, apart from
the delegations meeting more frequently and intensifying the
discussions, the single most important thing, in our view, is
personal contact at the highest level. Therefore, His Holiness
has said many times in the past particularly that he is
prepared to meet Chinese leaders at any time. When they visit
foreign countries, there are occasions. We have suggested to
them that this would be a good opportunity to meet.
So now we have suggested to the Chinese Government, and His
Holiness has suggested to his envoys, that he would like to
visit China on a pilgrimage. He has proposed this step before,
and we have again taken it up. So, we hope that this suggestion
will be taken up by the Chinese Government, and the Chinese
leadership would have the necessary vision, courage, and self-
confidence to receive His Holiness.
Of course, there may be some fear that such a visit may
create disturbances and may create problems, confusions, and
that such a visit may be misused, if I may say so. But I can
say confidently that His Holiness would use such a visit to
build a better understanding, to develop closer contacts, and
to build a more harmonious relationship. Therefore, we hope
that the Chinese Government would respond to this suggestion
very positively. This will be a very important development in
our efforts to break the present deadlock.
As I said, we believe that differences, although they may
sound fundamental, but in the positions taken by His Holiness
and the Chinese leadership, these differences are not that
insurmountable. We still feel that there can be a breakthrough
in our relations.
Thank you.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Wangdi appears in the
appendix.]
Mr. Dorman. Good. Thank you very much, Mr. Wangdi. The
statements that you referenced will be placed in the roundtable
record.
Our next panelist is Mr. Sonam Wangdu. Mr. Wangdu is
Chairman of the United States Tibet Committee [USTC]. Mr.
Wangdu has been a member of the board of directors of the USTC,
a New York-based Tibet support group, since the 1980s, and an
active figure in the Tibetan advocacy movement since 1973. He
was one of the founding members of the Tibetan Association of
New York and New Jersey in 1977, and served as its president
from 1978 to 1982. He is a member of the Committee of 100 for
Tibet, a group that advocates self-determination for Tibetans,
and is an advisory board member of the International Campaign
for Tibet. Mr. Wangdu served on the board of directors of the
Tibet Resettlement Project, a 1991 undertaking to settle 1,000
Tibetan refugees in the United States, and as interim board
director for the Students for a Free Tibet. He held positions
in the Tibetan government-in-exile in India and the Office of
Tibet in New York from 1960 to 1973. In New York, he worked in
the banking and import-export sectors until he retired.
Mr. Wangdu, welcome. You have 10 minutes for an opening
statement.
STATEMENT OF SONAM WANGDU, CHAIRMAN, U.S. TIBET COMMITTEE, NEW
YORK, NY
Mr. Wangdu. Thank you very much, Mr. Dorman. I am grateful
to the Congressional-Executive Commission on China for the
opportunity to appear before you. I have been involved in the
Tibet issue, first as an employee of the Tibetan Government-in-
Exile from 1960 to 1973, and as an advocate, volunteering my
time, in the free Tibet movement since then. I am currently the
chair of the U.S. Tibet Committee in New York City, the oldest
Tibet support group in North America.
I was born in Kham, Tibet, in 1942. My mother was forced to
send me away to my uncles in central Tibet in fear for my
safety because it was rumored that young Tibetan boys were
being shipped off to China for indoctrination. I was a child of
eight years when I left my home. My eldest sister accompanied
me across the country. My sister returned to Kham, and the next
time we met again was after 36 years, in Nepal. In 1954, my
uncles brought me to India where I was enrolled in English-
medium schools. I never returned home nor saw my mother again.
For 42 years, I have lived in the United States. I have
raised my children here and this country has been a host and a
home to me, as well as an inspiration. I press on for
independence for Tibet because I believe it can be achieved,
and because that is the only way to preserve real freedom for
Tibetans. I came to this country in 1964 and never left. I was
deeply affected by the Presidential elections taking place at
that time. I watched with much excitement and even envy at the
freedom that the citizens of this great country enjoyed in
choosing their leaders and deciding their destinies. I read
about the American Revolution and was moved by the country's
early leaders, in particular, Patrick Henry, whose call, ``Give
me liberty or give me death,'' rang so true to my ears because
my own countrymen were also laying down their lives for many of
the same ideals upon which this country was founded. I was
equally touched by President Kennedy's pledge in his inaugural
address that the United States ``shall pay any price, bear any
burden, meet any hardship, support any friend, oppose any foe
in order to assure the survival and the success of liberty.''
It was not the hawkish stance that I admired in them, but the
firm commitment to liberty that is so essential for us Tibetans
to reclaim our country.
The official policy of His Holiness the Dalai Lama and the
Tibetan Government-in-Exile is to achieve a ``genuine autonomy
for all Tibetans living in the three traditional provinces of
Tibet within the framework of the People's Republic of China.''
However, I believe the vast majority of Tibetans desire
independence for our country because of reports from inside
Tibet and also because of the continuing arrests and
imprisonment of Tibetans for even mentioning the name of the
Dalai Lama. An independent Tibet is
fundamental to protecting the rights of the Tibetan people and
bringing peace in the region. The Middle Way Approach is a
concession to enter into dialogue with China. And to date, the
policy has not led to meaningful dialogue. It has succeeded
only in encouraging the PRC to demand further concessions.
Those who support the Middle Way Approach do so out of the
highest regard for His Holiness the Dalai Lama. Those of us who
dissent also do so out of the highest regard for His Holiness
the Dalai Lama, a leader who has given us a lifetime of care
and service characterized by extraordinary wisdom and
compassion.
I would like to clarify or reiterate that a dissenting
opinion of this policy does not in any way indicate an
opposition to either the Dalai Lama or the Tibetan Government-
in-Exile. On the contrary, I believe that these are
institutions we must have--the role of the Dalai Lama for us
Tibetans has been vital to our cultural survival.
It has been 57 years since China invaded Tibet; a long time
in the span of human life, but only a skipped beat in the
history of a 2,133-year-old nation. In all these years, the
hope that Tibet will be free again has not diminished. Most of
the senior government officials from all segments of our
society, as well as many of my friends, family members, and
colleagues have now passed away, but the shared hope for
freedom is still very much alive.
I was a child when Tibet became an occupied nation, but the
generation that followed mine has grown up never having known
an independent Tibet. They are truly the children of exile and
occupation, yet, they are tougher, better educated, and more
skeptical than us older Tibetans. They are the future of the
movement. Figures such as Tenzin Tsundue, who was recently
profiled in the New York Times magazine; Jamyang Norbu, author;
and Lhabsang Tsering; or the leaders of GuChuSum, an
organization of former political prisoners now in exile; the
Tibetan Youth Congress; or U.S.-based organizations such as the
United States Tibet Committee, the Students for a Free Tibet,
and the International Tibet Independence Movement, to name a
few, approach the Tibet-China situation with greater media
literacy, technical savvy, and an unwillingness to settle for
anything less than total freedom for the country of their
forbearers. These are Tibetans, but they are also citizens of
the world, with passports that reflect a United Nations-worthy
diversity.
I am a firm believer in peaceful conflict resolution; and
in the case of Tibet, it is imperative that both Tibet and
China be earnest and sincere in searching for an acceptable
resolution. But as the situation is now, the Middle Way
Approach has not brought us any closer to the resolution of the
Tibet issue.
Contact with China in the new millennium has not shown any
tangible progress apart from the Chinese leaders using these
meetings to wage a public relations campaign to deflect
criticism. Although the Chinese have entertained His Holiness
the Dalai Lama's envoys four times in China and once in Bern,
Switzerland, they have refused to recognize their official
purpose or who they represent. Even as the Chinese host these
delegations, they continue to imprison Tibetans loyal to the
Dalai Lama, and combined with the lack of improvement in human
rights, they have shown they have no interest in loosening
their grip on Tibet.
China is using these ``talks'' to lower the pressure from
the United States and the European Union, who have been pushing
for these talks for many years. It seems clear that the Chinese
leaders are just going through the motions without showing any
real interest in providing ``genuine autonomy'' for the people
of Tibet. Yet the Tibetan Government-in-Exile, to create a
``conducive environment'' for the dialogues, continues to
discourage her people and supporters from demonstrating against
Chinese leaders during their visits overseas, and for the first
time the officials of the New York-based Office of Tibet have
been instructed not to participate in the March 10
demonstration this year. Concessions, be they voluntary or on
demand, without reciprocity, are not inducements for serious
talk. Despite these overtures and concessions by the Tibetan
Government-in-Exile, China still maintains a hard line on
Tibet, and the protests continue against China by exiled
Tibetans. Tibetans are now even taking their fight into the
heart of China where Wangpo Tethong, a Swiss Tibetan, on March
8 displayed a banner that read, ``Hu: You Can't Stop Us! 2008-
Free Tibet.org'' in Tiananmen Square. With all eyes on Beijing
for the upcoming 2008 Olympic Games and the construction of the
new railroad connecting China with Lhasa, the capital of Tibet,
to promote tourism, this is the time and opportunity for the
Tibetan Government-in-Exile and supporters to bring attention
to Tibet's real situation.
If the United States abides by Kalon Tripa--Prime Minister
Samdhong Rinpoche's misperception of progress of these talks,
the danger exists that China will continue to forestall
negotiations in the hopes for a post-Dalai Lama scenario where
the issue will die with him.
Rather than the issue dying away, there is a greater
likelihood that the issue will destabilize Tibet, that future
generations of very frustrated Tibetans will resort to other
means to bring freedom to Tibet. The role and the position of
the Dalai Lama has been a great stabilizer for the Tibetan
community, the Free Tibet Movement, and even the world. The
world has grown smaller, and the issue of Tibet cannot be
treated as an isolated case that affects the people of Tibet
only. This issue is now not simply a Tibetan issue, nor a
nationalist issue, nor a human rights issue. The Tibet issue
has now evolved into a global security and environmental issue.
It requires international attention to keep peace in the
region.
India's national security is at far greater risk now than
ever before. We all saw this in the 1962 Chinese invasion of
India from occupied Tibet. The dynamic has not changed;
however, the destructive potential of a Sino-Indian conflict in
modern times has the ability to go beyond the borders of the
two most populous nations. Such a conflict would provide
another dangerous rallying point for the world's clashing
ideologies. It seems too clear that to allow Tibet to exist as
an independent and neutral state is in humanity's best
interest.
Tibet is located in a region of the world that is
environmentally sensitive. Tibetans have for centuries learned
to live in harmony with nature. However, following the Chinese
occupation of Tibet, widespread environmental destruction from
massive and unplanned deforestation, farming, and mining have
had a profound effect on wildlife, soil erosion, and global
weather patterns. I am not an expert in this area, but
scientists have observed a direct link between natural
vegetation on the Tibetan plateau and the stability of
monsoons, which are indispensable to the breadbasket of south
Asia. They have also shown that the environment of the Tibetan
plateau affects jet streams, which are related to the course of
Pacific typhoons and the El Nino phenomenon. Based on these
expert opinions, preserving Tibetan's environment is just not
in the interest of protecting an ancient and unique culture,
but it is also in the interest of the whole human race.
In our own lifetime we have seen the emergence of former
colonies as independent states, and the inconceivable events of
the fall of the Soviet Union and of the Berlin Wall. I believe
Tibetans can have their national flag fly in the capitals of
many nations and at the United Nations. This goal is not easy
to achieve, but it is not impossible. We Tibetans must depend
on our resolve, our commitment, our confidence to continue our
just cause. My generation
inherited a torn, ravaged, and occupied Tibet. But for the sake
of future generations of Tibetans, we have a duty to work hard
to free Tibet.
I am grateful to the U.S. Congress for its support for
Tibet. I request that the U.S. Government continue to urge the
leaders of the People's Republic of China to publicly recognize
the Tibetan delegations and to sincerely engage in meaningful
dialogue with the Tibetan Government-in-Exile. I request that
the U.S. Government continue pressuring China to improve the
human rights situation in Tibet, including the right to self-
determination. I request that the U.S. Government influence her
allies to also urge the Chinese leaders to dialogue with the
Tibetan delegations in their official capacity as
representatives of His Holiness the Dalai Lama and the Tibetan
Government-in-Exile. It is extremely important to keep the
pressure on the Chinese leaders and to show that they are under
your watch. Your voice and support are crucial to the Tibetan
people. Thank you.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Wangdu appears in the
appendix.]
Mr. Dorman. Mr. Wangdu, thanks very much.
Our next witness is Tseten Wangchuk, who is a senior
broadcaster of the Voice of America Tibetan language service.
Mr. Wangchuk joined VOA as a journalist in 1993. He co-authored
the 2004 East-West Center policy study, ``Sino-Tibetan Dialogue
in the Post-Mao Era: Lessons and Prospects,'' along with Tashi
Rabgey, a Ph.D. candidate at Harvard University. Mr. Wangchuk
was born in Lhasa in 1961, before the Chinese Government
established the Tibetan Autonomous Region. He was a researcher
at the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences in Beijing, and
participated in CASS field research in both the Tibetan
Autonomous Region and other Tibetan autonomous areas outside
the autonomous region.
Mr. Wangchuk, thank you very much for coming today. You
have 10 minutes for an opening statement.
STATEMENT OF TSETEN WANGCHUK, SENIOR BROADCASTER, VOICE OF
AMERICA, TIBETAN LANGUAGE SERVICE, WASHINGTON, DC
Mr. Wangchuk. Thank you for the opportunity. For my
statement, I would like to just make clear that whatever I say
here is representing my own views, not representing Voice of
America, although I work for VOA.
Mr. Dorman. Understood, thank you.
Mr. Wangchuk. Kasur Tashi Wangdi and Sonam Wangdu already
gave you a very good look at the brief history of the contact
between the Dalai Lama and the Chinese Government, and the
sentiment of a lot of the Tibetans, I think, I would say
probably the majority of Tibetans, on how they look at this
thing. So I would like to just take this time to give you some
brief analytical perspective on why China has this kind of
policy right now. It is because in the 1980s, when the Chinese
Government tried to stop contact with the Dalai Lama, and in
the 1990s they firmly decided that they could isolate the Dalai
Lama and they could leave the Dalai Lama outside of the
political process in Tibet. Yet, at the end of the 1990s, they
shifted the policy a little bit.
As we know now, since then the Dalai Lama sent
representatives to visit China and the Chinese Government had
contact with them quite recently. I do not think any outside
people know exactly what is going on with the Chinese
Government, but I would like to give some perspective on this
question. I think that most outside analysts see this change in
policy as a result of international pressure. I think there is
no question that international pressure has a very important
role. As you can see, when the Chinese Government shifted this
policy a little bit in the early 1990s, there was a really firm
policy saying, ``We are not going to talk to the Dalai Lama, we
do not need the Dalai Lama in order to manage Tibet.'' But in
1997 or 1998, it started shifting a little bit more. It has
really coincided with Jiang Zemin's, who was then the Chinese
president, foreign policy. It has shifted a little bit and the
U.S.-China policy is becoming the most important footing for
the Chinese for foreign policy. With President Clinton's visit,
and a lot of European countries' Prime Ministers and Presidents
meeting with Jiang Zemin, really all of them addressed this
very issue and urged the Chinese Government to talk to the
Dalai Lama. There was no question that international pressure
is very important in this political and policy shift.
But I do not think this is only as a result of
international pressure. There are many elements of why China
has shifted their policy a little bit so they will at least
engage with the Dalai Lama. There are many such elements, but I
would just like to address just a few of them. One of them, of
course, which is very important, is the internal politics of
China. They have this economic development inside Tibet. In the
mid-1990s, they had really gained in confidence. This economic
development was going really fast, and it seemed as though
Tibet was not like in the 1980s, it was really apparent; no
demonstrations happened or anything like that. So this is the
source of the confidence that they do not need the Dalai Lama.
This is becoming a turning point, and the Chinese
Government is seeing that their policies through the 1990s, in
some ways are not working as they hoped, and for some of them,
they see the sustainability is being questioned.
At the same time, within the Chinese political policy
circle, there are people who really always thought about it.
They think, ``Maybe we should not exclude the Dalai Lama
completely. We should leave some kind of space. Maybe we have
to engage.'' So these people finally got another chance and
they are starting to bring out different ideas.
I think, for example, six or seven years ago in Beijing
that very few people even had space to even have doubts about
this hardline policy. Nobody was even willing to take the risk
and say, ``Maybe we should talk to the Dalai Lama. Maybe we
should have some kind of contact with the Dalai Lama.'' But now
they do. There are a lot of them. That coincides with the whole
thing.
It is not just in Tibet, but it is the whole change that
took place in China. In China today, they are not like what we
are used to. There are a lot of semi-independent think tanks,
and at the universities, the scholars have become much more
independent.
So I think opinions on Tibet have really diversified in the
past couple of years. There are, of course, these predominant
sorts of hardline policies that remain. But at the same time,
there are government meetings and there are different opinions
always coming in.
Institutional change also has really played a very
important role. Tibet used to be pretty much managed by the
Communist Party. But the Tibetan profile is becoming important
internationally. The Chinese Foreign Minister is becoming very
active in engaging on this issue, because they have to deal
with this Tibet issue all the time with foreign counterparts.
The Chinese military intelligence, Chinese national security
department, and so many universities and think tanks outside of
the control of the United Front now bring a very different,
diverse set of ideas.
A lot of the people who are very interested in Chinese
international strategies, what these people are pointing to are
very
different. They have fresh ideas about it. They say, ``Maybe if
we contact the Dalai Lama, it may bring an advantage to the
Chinese Government. At the same time, maybe there is a chance
we can solve the Tibetan problem itself.'' So, these, I think,
are the pressures that are brought in.
In addition, you have this change within the Tibetan
leadership, there are some very senior Tibetan cadres,
Communist cadres, that for a long time could not have any real
voice. These are people who are now just retired and are
seniors. They are starting also to write memos and bringing up
this idea about talking to the Dalai Lama. I think these
buildup a kind of internal pressure in China to sort of make
that political shift.
Also, Mr. Wangdi mentioned the regional sort of power
changes, particularly the Chinese relationship with India. I
mean, India is becoming very important regionally. Most Chinese
scholars now see that Sino-Indian relations are going to be
very important in the next 10 to 20 years. Right now, nobody
knows what that relationship is going to be. Some people think
that India is going to be aligned with the United States, going
to become the containment force of the Chinese Government. And
some people think China and India together can confront the
United States. Anyway, it does not matter where that
relationship is heading. In either one of them, the Tibetan
issue is important.
I think that a lot of Chinese people who are addressing the
government are saying, ``We have to look at the Tibetan issue
very carefully because this is going to be a part of that
puzzle, how China is going to relate to India.'' So, that also
brings a lot of pressure on China to re-think the Tibet issue,
think again about how to manage Tibet.
Inside Tibet, although if you look at the statistics it
seems very rosy, every year, the Tibet Autonomous Region's
[TAR] GDP is going up 12 or 13 percent, but this GDP growth is
really an artificial bubble that basically is only happening in
urban areas. This is not really a solid economic sort of
prosperity, but rather a bubble that is artificially created.
All over China, they have a gap between the rich and poor that
is causing a lot of problems. But in Tibet, the gap is the
worst.
There was a study done by a Chinese economist from the
Chinese Academy of Social Sciences. He studied the rich and
poor, urban and rural areas. He found that in China, the income
gap ratio is like 3:1 between urban and rural areas, but the
TAR had the highest gap. In just pure monetary terms, it would
probably be 1:5. If you look at everything, it would be like
8:1, something like that. Not even the sub-Saharan countries
are so low. So the policy right now is not really sustainable.
I think these are some of the elements that are in play in
China.
So let me conclude with this idea. I came to my
assessment--I mean, I could be completely wrong, because we
really do not know what is happening inside China in the
leadership's minds, how they are operating. Regarding a policy
toward the Dalai Lama, China is at a crossroads. When I say
``crossroads,'' I do not mean whether or not they want to give
the Dalai Lama the things that he is asking for, general
autonomy and an all-unified Tibetan area. I do not mean that. I
mean a ``crossroads'' in the sense that whether or not they
want to continue the hardline policy or whether they want to
choose, or at least consider, an alternatively managed way in
which their policy may include a role for the Dalai Lama in
some way. I believe there can be this kind of crossroads.
That is why I think you can see all kinds of mixed signals
from the Chinese Government. The Chinese Government is very
reluctant to even acknowledge the Dalai Lama there, but
recently the TAR Deputy Communist Party Secretary acknowledged
him. They have had contact five times. Not only that, I think
the most significant one was that the Party Secretary's
comments were published in Wenhui Bao, the Hong Kong newspaper,
which is not run by the Chinese Government but is a very pro-
Beijing newspaper. Let me conclude with that.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Wangchuk appears in the
appendix.]
Mr. Dorman. Good. Well, thank you very much.
I have to say, and I think everybody on the dais will
agree, that that was very useful, interesting, and thought-
provoking testimony, so I look forward to our conversation for
about the next 45 minutes.
I will start with a question. Mr. Wangchuk just brought up
the issue of the Dalai Lama's envoys' recent trip to China, and
the fact that Wenhui Bao and the vice chairman of the TAR
actually acknowledged that visit, and I think said that--and of
course I am not quoting, but something along the lines of--
these were not substantive negotiations, but they were
discussions. Something that Mr. Marshall pointed out to me--and
I think all of you know him, he is the person who looks at
these issues for our Commissioners--that the Foreign Ministry
spokesman said something quite different.
How should we interpret these two differing statements? Is
this an indication of less suspicion on the part of at least
some within the Chinese Government or is it simply mixed
signals? Could each of you comment on how you would interpret
these messages or non-messages?
Mr. Wangchuk. As some of my friends in Beijing often remind
me, just because I lived in Beijing throughout the 1980s and
think I know it, they say that China has changed. Do not read
too much between the lines. Now there are different opinions,
people willing to say different things, so it may not be
completely an indication of a government policy shift. But I
think at this time the atmosphere is favorable.
The day after he said this, another Tibetan high-ranking
cadre said similar things. These people do not historically
tend to express their opinions, particularly on this issue.
Therefore, I think the Foreign Ministry spokesman's remark on
that is a little early, so these statements by Tibetan cadre
are the most recent comments. So I would tend to think there
may be a little change.
Not only that, but also I think that last year, even at the
outset, they continued to not acknowledge His Holiness. But I
think within the Chinese Government, in internal meetings, they
are starting to refer to this delegation as the Dalai Lama's
representatives. So, I think maybe there is a chance. Maybe
this is a little shift.
Mr. Dorman. Mr. Wangdi, Mr. Wangdu, would you like to
comment on that?
Mr. Wangdi. Yes. I think we also noted the recent
statements made by the two senior Tibetan officials, and then
also I think some time ago in one of the meetings of a Chinese
delegation in Australia, they again acknowledged this contact
between the officials and the Chinese Government. I think they
are making it more public, right from the first meeting. Of
course, I think they did indicate to our delegation that they
are being received officially, and officials were meeting them.
They had instructions from the highest levels to meet with
them, and so on. But in terms of public statements, I think
they are now coming out more clearly.
Mr. Dorman. The public statements themselves. Were those
designed for consumption outside of China or inside China?
Mr. Wangchuk. I think right now, it could be for domestic
as well as foreign audiences. I think a couple of years ago, it
could have been exclusively for the outside. But I think with
the Internet, and I am sure the Chinese Government is aware,
this is for consumption by a much larger audience.
Mr. Dorman. Mr. Wangdu, I suspect that you may----
Mr. Wangdu. I think primarily those comments are
strategically directed to an audience outside of China. The
Chinese Government has ignored plenty of opportunities to
recognize visiting Tibetan delegations since they resumed
contact with them in 2002. I think we can't read too much into
this one remark. I do not believe these are officials in high
enough positions to make a difference at the decisionmaking
level.
Perhaps it is a hopeful sign. But I think we have to make
sure this progresses from here. What is most important is that
as a start the Chinese Government must recognize the Tibetan
delegations as representatives of His Holiness the Dalai Lama
and the Tibetan Government-in-Exile. The Foreign Minister of
China must acknowledge their visits and meetings. President Hu
Jintao must publicly acknowledge the delegations, both at home
in China, and when he comes to the West, for instance to meet
with President Bush. These are the things that will make a
difference. Having remarks made by low-level officials to show
some degree of recognition does not make for any changes within
Tibet.
Mr. Dorman. Good. Thank you very much. I have two minutes
left. One thing all of our Commissioners are very concerned
about, and of course look very carefully at, is the issue of
the dialogue. Mr. Marshall, again, to my left, is looking very
carefully at this issue in preparation for the Commission's
Annual Report this year.
Official reports and other analyses have varyingly used the
term ``dialogue'' as well as ``discussion'' or ``meetings'' to
describe the ongoing interaction between the Chinese Government
and the Dalai Lama's representatives. I noticed that Mr.
Wangchuk, in his written statement, used the phrase: an
``ongoing experimentation with dialogue.'' I wondered if Mr.
Wangdi and Mr. Wangdu could comment on whether you would agree
with that characterization. Are these ``ongoing experimentation
with dialogue'' rather than true dialogue or discussion?
Mr. Wangdi. I think we have stated quite clearly that there
is contact and dialogue. We normally describe it as a mutual
confidence-building measure at this point. Over the last five
meetings, it was basically to try to explain each other's
positions. The problem, as far as we can see--we cannot be 100
percent sure--is the lack of confidence and the presence of
fear. However many times His Holiness has said, and as a
Buddhist, we have Buddhist recitations, mantras, he is always
saying, ``I am not seeking independence, I am not seeking
independence.'' But the Chinese Government continues to allege
that he is seeking independence, he is a splittist, he is a
separatist, and so on. I know there is something missing there.
The only thing we feel at this point is the lack of trust
and confidence. So the whole exercise until now has been to try
to explain. The more specific they become in their statements
and their views, the more we need to be more specific in
allaying these fears and misunderstandings.
I think Sonam Wangdu was quite right when he said that the
negotiations have not started. There are not negotiations, they
are dialogues. I think actually he is stating the correct
position. We also said that it is just contact.
Mr. Dorman. Thank you.
Mr. Wangdu, would you like to comment?
Mr. Wangdu. I think he is correct. Negotiations have not
started. The talks have not started. I think China is just
going through the motions. It is only a public relations
gesture to give the indication that they are making efforts;
that they are meeting with Tibetans to talk about the Tibet
issue, but in reality they have not engaged in any meaningful
dialogue. They have not said anything to indicate that we are
moving in a good direction The only thing they have done is
call these meetings and say, ``Oh, yes, we are talking. We will
continue to talk.'' But if there are no results, no outcome
except to convince the U.S. Government or the E.U. nations to
relieve pressure, then these ``talks'' are worse than
meaningless. They are intentionally counterproductive.
``Talk'' itself does not save people. The Chinese
Government is still breaking every code of the Human Rights
Treaty. Tibetans are still dying; they are still being
imprisoned. So what does ``talk'' really mean? We need
substance, to which we can chart movement and progress. This is
what is missing. We need to try and find a way where, if they
say they are talking, well, fine, let us see some results.
Since 2002 we have not seen any progress. We can even go
back to the 1970s, the 1980s when the first Tibetan delegations
went on fact-finding missions to Tibet. All these things
happened, but have not amounted to any improvement in the
situation in Tibet.
The State Department's reports on human rights conditions
always state that the conditions in Tibet are bad. Tibetan
refugees who escape from Tibet consistently say the situation
is bad. So clearly the situation has not improved. And any
semblance of talks that has taken place is really just talk for
the sake of talk and does not meet the requirements or the
spirit of real dialogue. There has to be a goal. This is where
I think Congress can play such an important role. You can put
pressure on the Chinese Government to engage in timely and
focused negotiations. Anything else would be beside the point.
Mr. Dorman. Well, good. Thank you very much.
I would like to turn the questioning over, next, to my
colleague, John Foarde, who serves as Staff Director for our
Commission Co-Chairman, Representative Jim Leach. John.
Mr. Foarde. Thank you, Dave. And thanks to our three
panelists for sharing your time and your views with us this
afternoon.
We have heard, both in the presentation by Mr. Wangdi, and
also Mr. Wangdu's statements just now, that there is a slight
shift in the request for just dialogue to substantive dialogue.
You have touched on this a little bit, but I wonder if we can
get a more specific idea of the topics that the Tibetan side is
most keen to discuss in substantive dialogue with the Chinese
side. Do you think the Tibetans will be able to convince
Chinese leaders that it is in China's best interests to
actually discuss them? This question is for any of you.
Mr. Wangdu. I think, as I said in my statement, that the
Tibet issue is not an issue that concerns Tibet alone. I think
it is an international issue, to which the world community must
pay keen attention. If conflict between India and China were to
take place today, such a conflict would most definitely not be
on the small scale of the one back in 1962, when China invaded
India from occupied Tibet. Today we are talking about two
nuclear powers. So I think there is a valid argument to be made
to China that it is in her own long-term interest to preserve
Tibet as a neutral territory between her and India. By
eliminating direct exposure between these two nations, we
reduce the possibility of conflict as well. This perspective on
the Tibet situation is very important for the international
community to consider. Even if what is happening to the Tibetan
people is not a motivating factor for them, surely they will be
moved by the idea of the two most populous nuclear powers in
the world on a collision course with each other. So, I think
when you regard it like that, the Tibet issue has considerable
relevance to peace in the region. The same thing is true with
the environment. We are all concerned about the global warming
effect. Well, where does it begin? When we destroy nature, that
is how it happens. This is what is happening in Tibet. Again,
it is an international issue. It is not an issue that concerns
just the Tibetans. It is important for the international
community to understand this. It is important for China to
understand this as well.
Mr. Foarde. Do either of the other panelists have specific
issues, substantive issues, that you think the Tibetan side
would like to talk with China about?
Mr. Wangdi. Well, I think there is a whole range of issues,
issues concerning the very serious problem of demographic
changes, environment, culture, preservation of culture,
spiritual tradition, language, economic development. I think
all these issues are for discussion. We have stated very
clearly that we are prepared to discuss this all within the
context of the Chinese Constitution. It would have in mind the
employment interests of all the people in that region. We are
open to any suggestions. But these are the basic problems that
need to be discussed. When the actual negotiations and actual
discussions take place, these will be issues which will have to
be addressed. At the moment, we are not able to enter into that
arena of discussions. We are just talking about the political
concerns.
Mr. Foarde. Thank you.
Mr. Dorman. Thank you, John. I will turn the questioning
over to Steve Marshall, who is a Commission Senior Advisor.
Steve.
Mr. Marshall. I would like to address this question first
to Tseten Wangchuk. I am absolutely sure that Kasur Tashi
Wangdi and Mr. Sonam Wangdu would like to say something about
it.
The Chinese Government so far has emphatically rejected the
suggestion by some Tibetans, including the Dalai Lama and the
exiled Tibetan government, that all of the areas of Tibetan
autonomy, which span five provinces--or six provinces,
according to some maps--could be consolidated to a single area
of Tibetan autonomy, and that this could be done consistently
with the Chinese Constitution. Tibetans and Chinese both have
very strong views on this matter. My question: Is this a make-
or-break issue? Tseten Wangchuk, do you foresee any innovative
approaches to handling something that is so fundamental, yet so
difficult?
Mr. Wangchuk. Yes. It is very fundamental and it is
difficult. The difficulty is, either way, what the Dalai Lama
is asking is in some ways very reasonable. Of course, Tibet
wants autonomy, it wants to unify this area. But in another
way, looking at the Chinese political structure, it is a very
difficult route. It is not just the question about issues
facing Tibet, but in a way it is about the redistribution of
power and restructuring the political system. These are the
fundamental questions that the Chinese Communists are facing.
Anything that they move forward on this front to change, and I
think the Chinese are probably having the conversation, in a
way this is about Chinese political reform. Yet, this is the
most risky thing to do. So, I think it is bigger than Tibet.
In that sense, I think it is really difficult to see, in
the short term, that there is anything concrete that the
Chinese will take a risk to move forward on this issue. I think
may be part of the reason that we are not seeing anything
concrete during this dialogue. And I will not expect that
anything is going to come concretely in the future, for a
little while, at least.
But at the same time, I think these issues are very
fundamental. The reason they are fundamental is that for Tibet,
the idea of unifying those areas sometimes sounds unreasonable.
But in other terms, if you look at it from the Chinese
Government's managing perspective, this is really something
they have to look at. The Chinese Government and the Dalai
Lama's representatives signed a 17-point agreement in 1951.
They had a kind of a ``One Country, Two Systems'' scheme set up
in the Tibet Autonomous Region. In 1959, this arrangement was
completely down the drain. There are many reasons, but the
fundamental reason is because that 17-point agreement was only
implemented in the TAR, but not in other parts of Tibet. In
another part of Tibet, this ``democratic reform'' or Chinese
political tampering is still going on. When there is a problem
in another part of Tibet, the problem does not stop at
artificially drawn political boundaries. This is culturally a
continuous area and any problems immediately cross these
boundaries. Therefore, I think that any solution--I do not have
any particular suggestions that would work--has to address all
the Tibetan areas in order to be sustainable. If you address
only one area, it is not going to be sustainable. In that
sense, I think they have to address it. I do not know how it is
going to be. But I think in terms of whether or not to have
innovation, both sides should not get stuck on the issues when
both sides cannot make concessions on that point. But if they
can find some interim sort of goal to maybe move forward, sort
of leave these things without agreeing on anything just for a
little while.
One of the issues is His Holiness' visit to China. I think
this is a really great idea. Without making any agreement, let
us see if we can make this kind of step. It is something that
we can do.
Mr. Wangdu. I think, from the Tibetan perspective, the idea
of dividing up the country and letting one part of it go will
not serve the cause of all Tibetans. So I think it is important
to make the Chinese people understand that the annexation of
Tibetan territory is not historical. This is relatively recent.
It happened in our lifetimes. They created the notion that
Tibet is historically part of China. So if they can create it,
they can dismantle it. I think it is quite simple. From the
Chinese perspective, it is very complex, I suppose, because
they have to give up something. The idea of giving up anything
is not a very welcome one for anyone. But then, in this case,
it is something that does not belong to them.
Hopefully, with the democratization or changes that seem to
be taking place in China, people will become a little bit more
reasonable and abide by the rule of law, that they cannot hold
onto things that do not belong to them, that they have to give
them back. We can create conditions where we are able to live
together in harmony as neighbors, as good neighbors. I think it
is a complex issue for China and it certainly needs a lot of
thinking on both sides. But it will not do for them to give up
only portions of Tibet. To give only part of Tibet back to the
Tibetans will create instability. In such a situation, it would
be no surprise if the regions of Tibet that remained under
Chinese control would become rife with fervent pro-independence
activities. Tibetans in occupied Tibet would most definitely
not relent until they enjoyed the same freedom.
Mr. Wangdi. Yes. It is a very important issue, and a
difficult issue. But I would like you to look at the statement
of the Kashag. I think the entire statement addresses that
issue, how it can be dissolved within the context of the
Chinese Constitution, within the context of the principles of
nationality, within the promises they have made.
When the 17-point agreement that my friend referred to was
being signed, one of the issues on which there was an initial
stalemate was on this definition of Tibet. The Tibet delegation
asked for the whole of Tibet, and the draft agreement was on
the autonomous region, which is less than half the area of
Tibet.
Now, it is on the record, and I am not saying it just for
the sake of argument. But just on the record, at that time that
Zhou Enlai, the Chinese Premier, told the delegation that the
negotiation was stuck on that issue. Zhou Enlai told the
delegation that this is something that can be discussed later.
It is on the record, and not something that they are bringing
up at this point.
But, again, I would say that there could be fear in the
mind of the Chinese Government, or the leaders' minds, that if
all of this vast area was reunited, then it is the border area.
Then there is the likelihood of secession.
But we have made it very clear. We have requested that they
look at the statement this year. Secession is not our
intention. It will not happen in that way. But if Tibetans are
to live as a race, maintain our own culture, our own
traditions, and then there is the question of administrative
difficulties. Of course, these Tibetan areas now are attached
to huge Chinese provinces. There may be some resemblance, but
also I am looking at the practical side. But in China itself
there have been areas where borders have been drawn up.
In the case of India, one big state was divided into four
big states in India about 10 years ago. Those states were
divided. Of course, initially there was a lot of resistance
from the state governments and the people. There was a huge
political reaction--but for reasons I explained, when steps are
taken to reassure people, it happened. So, I think it is
possible. It is very important for the Tibetans if we want to
maintain our own identity. We have shown the Chinese Government
that it is possible administratively, and we have tried to
assuage their feelings of fear of any kind of secession based
upon the unification.
Mr. Marshall. We will put the Kashag's statement in the
record.
[The prepared statement of the Kashag appears in the
appendix.]
Mr. Dorman. I would like to turn the questioning now over
to Kara Abramson, a counsel on the Commission staff. Kara.
Ms. Abramson. Thank you.
My question is for Mr. Wangdu. I am interested in your
perspective on the likelihood and results of direct contact
between the Dalai Lama and Chinese leaders.
Mr. Wangdu. I am sorry. Could you repeat?
Ms. Abramson. I will speak a little more loudly. I am
interested in your perspective on the likelihood and results of
contact between the Dalai Lama and Chinese leaders.
Mr. Wangdu. Let me just give you a little historical
background so you can see where I am coming from. In 1979, when
His Holiness first came to the United States, I was in a
meeting with a few other people where His Holiness posed the
question whether or not we should establish contact with China.
My immediate reaction was, yes, we must establish contact with
the Chinese because they are the ones that we have to deal
with. If we do not talk with them, there is no way we can reach
any kind of agreement. So I said, ``Yes, we need to talk.'' The
establishment of contact and building a relationship is
important. But at that time, I assumed this would bring about
some kind of change. I still believe contact is important. But
having not seen any progress, I am skeptical of it happening
while using the current approach. It is time to add some meat
to it so we can chew on it. Just a bone itself is bad for the
teeth.
Ms. Abramson. Thank you.
Mr. Dorman. Unfortunately, we are down to just about four
minutes left. This is how our Roundtables generally turn out;
we run out of time before we run out of questions. So, I am
going to ask the forgiveness of my colleagues on the dais who
have not had the opportunity to ask a question and go ahead and
give Mr. Marshall what might amount to the last question,
unless he can finish two questions in four minutes. Steve.
Mr. Marshall. First, I have got to apologize to my
colleagues because I would have really enjoyed hearing their
questions. I have got one here.
I want to go back a little bit more to the prospects for
the Dalai Lama traveling to China. Both of the statements last
Friday, the Dalai Lama's statement and the Kashag's statement,
which will both be put into the record, focused 100 percent on
the issue of dialogue. I have never seen anything like that
before. They stressed that it could be resolved within the
framework of the Chinese Constitution, and the Dalai Lama
specifically said that he would like to travel to China as a
Buddhist pilgrim, visit some of the holy sites, and to see how
China has changed. He did not make any requests beyond that.
Tashi Wangdi, first, if you could give us a little more
insight into what is the likelihood--and the timeframe--that we
might hope to see the Dalai Lama visit China as a pilgrim, on a
``see-with-his-own-eyes'' basis.
Mr. Wangdi. Well, we honestly hope that there will be a
positive response to this idea. But at the same time, I am not
too sure it is going to happen in the very near future. I hope
it will. The issue has been under discussion in the last
several meetings. There are certain concerns or issues which
have been linked with this visit. Again, we think that this is
because of a sense of uncertainty, or feeling of uncertainty
and fear. We are now trying to address those concerns, and
hopefully, if there are a few more meetings, that we may be
able to work on this proposal. Then it is more likely that the
visit would then come to pass.
Mr. Marshall. Following on a little bit more from that, the
biggest impediment that you have mentioned, and that all of you
have mentioned, is the wariness, the lack of trust between the
two sides. Do you think that if the Dalai Lama visited China
and actually had direct contact with Chinese leaders and
experts, this might be one of the most effective ways to
dissolve some of that atmosphere of distrust?
Mr. Wangdi. Certainly, this is our hope and our
expectation. As I said in my statement, this will be the most
important development in terms of a breakthrough. We are quite
sure, and that is why we have said many times very confidently
that there should be a meeting.
As was mentioned, when Li Peng came to India, even about a
year back when the Chinese Premier came again, we had made this
suggestion. We are making this suggestion with the confidence
that, if there is a personal meeting, meeting face-to-face and
exchanging views, then whatever concerns, fears, apprehensions
they have can be dispelled. Restating the position taken by His
Holiness in a face-to-face meeting would clearly then amount to
having no major obstacles in the fundamentals.
Mr. Dorman. That was a very quick 90 minutes, I have to
admit. Unfortunately, I think we are going to have to call this
Roundtable to an end. We can only keep the room for so long,
and we have committed to our panelists that we would only keep
them for 90 minutes.
Generally, the time of our Roundtables is too short, and 90
minutes has never been enough, but this is one example of a
conversation that could have probably gone on for perhaps twice
as long.
So, to each of you, thank you for coming today. On behalf
of our Chairman and Co-Chairman, thank you for sharing your
views, insights, knowledge, and experience on this very
important issue.
With that, I will call the Roundtable to an end. Thank you.
[Whereupon, at 3:30 p.m. the Roundtable was concluded.]
A P P E N D I X
=======================================================================
Prepared Statements
----------
Prepared Statement of Tashi Wangdi
march 13, 2006
Mr. Chairman, Ladies and Gentlemen, I would first of all like to
thank the Congressional-Executive Commission on China for inviting me
to this Roundtable with my two other colleagues to address the issue of
``The China-Dalai Lama Dialogue: Prospects for Progress.''
The first direct contact between the Tibetan leadership in exile
and the new Chinese leadership in Beijing was established in 1979 after
a gap of nearly 20 years when the Chinese government contacted Mr.
Gyalo Thondup, the elder brother of His Holiness the Dalai Lama who
normally lives in Hong Kong. This was soon after the fall of the Gang
of Four and gradual opening up of China to the outside world. Mr. Gyalo
Thondup went to Beijing with the permission of His Holiness and met
with all the top Chinese leaders including Mr. Deng Xiaoping who said
to him among other things that all issues concerning Tibet, except the
question of independence, can be discussed and resolved.
This stand was very much in line with the policy decision of
seeking genuine autonomy and not independence taken by the Tibetan
leadership in exile some years before. His Holiness the Dalai Lama had
therefore responded to it immediately as he had stated in his March
10th Statement this year. I would like to place on record this
Statement along with the Statement of the Kashag (Cabinet) on this
occasion as well as the press statement issued by Mr. Lodi Gyari, head
of the delegation for contact and dialogue with the Chinese government
on his return from the 5th round of meeting middle of last month.
To highlight the point I would also like to quote the relevant part
of His Holiness' statement:
Sometime in 1974, we formulated the basic principles of our
Middle Way Approach for resolving the issue of Tibet, trusting
that a time must surely come when we would have the opportunity
to engage in talks with the Chinese leadership. In 1979, we
were able to interact directly with the leadership in Beijing.
At that time, Deng Xiaoping said that except for independence,
all issues could be resolved through negotiations. Since then,
I have pursued the Middle Way approach with consistency and
sincerity.
There was, therefore, a broad convergence of views and a window of
opportunity for finding a mutually acceptable and beneficial solution.
Unfortunately these high hopes and expectations lasted only for a
brief period. The relations went from bad to worse and through many
twists and turns as the Chinese side had described it. It came to a
total break down towards the end of the eighties. However, I believe no
useful purpose will be served by going into the reasons why this had
happened at this point of time. Each side will have its own
explanations and this blame game will not lead us any further. Future
historians will be able the best judge when all facts are known.
However it will not be unreasonable to assume that if the policies
stated by Mr. Deng Xiaoping and implemented by Mr. Hu Yaobang before
his own down fall were carried through earnestly the problem of Tibet
would have been resolved. But this was not to be. The relations turned
for the worse with the hardening of Chinese government's policies and
eventual imposition of Martial Law in Tibet.
Despite this reversal His Holiness the Dalai Lama continued to seek
a peaceful resolution to the problem through dialogue on the basis of
what Mr. Deng Xiaoping said and his own Middle Way Approach . His
Holiness made this position clear to the Chinese leadership through
communications directly addressed to them and also through well
intentioned mutual friends. He also expressed his willingness to meet
with Chinese leaders at any place and time of their convenience to move
the process forward.
It took nearly 10 years for direct relations to be resumed when the
Chinese government agreed to receive His Holiness's two envoys charged
with the responsibilities of renewing contact and dialogue with the
Chinese leadership.
In September 2002 the two envoys with two senior assistants were
able to visit Beijing. Their two tasks were firstly, to reestablish
direct contact with the leadership in Beijing and create a conducive
atmosphere for direct face-to-face talks and second to explain His
Holiness the Dalai Lama's Middle Way Approach to assuage distrust and
suspicions in the minds of the Chinese leaders.
Since this resumption of direct contact and dialogue there have
been five meetings between the representatives of His Holiness and
their Chinese counterparts. In fact the fifth round of meeting took
place recently from February 15 to 23.
Although the progress has been frustratingly slow and basically one
sided I believe the two envoys were able to achieve some progress in
the tasks given to them.
Direct contact was not only established but it has been sustained
and stabilized as stated by Vice minister Zhu in the fourth round of
meeting last June. He said that the direct contact had become stable
and an ``established practice.'' Recently high Chinese and Tibetan
officials in Tibet have publicly acknowledged for the first time that
these contacts are taking place. We have also noted marked changes in
the atmosphere of these meetings and the frankness and depth of
exchange of views which we feel are very important for better
understanding of each other's position and thus better trust and
confidence in each other which is very essential if we are to make any
head way in substantive negotiations.
There has also been some change in the format, content and
frequency of meetings. The fourth meeting was held outside of China for
the first time in the Chinese Embassy in Switzerland. The time gap
between the fourth and fifth meetings is the shortest so far.
The discussions from the third round onward shifted from
restatement of broad principles and allegations to more specific
concerns of the Chinese government concerning His Holiness's policies
and stand. In the fifth round of meetings both sides were able to
clearly identify reasons for the present lack real progress toward
actual negotiations.
His Holiness's representatives found such candid discussions and
exchange of views very helpful. It gave them the opportunity to respond
in full to the points raised. More specific are the concerns expressed
by the Chinese side, easier it is for us to try to remove their
misconceptions, misunderstandings, and unfounded fears.
We have taken very serious note of all their concerns and made
sincere efforts to give explanations and clarifications fully and
truthfully in writing. We strongly believe that this is the only way to
remove all the distrusts and suspicions which seem to plague our
present relationship and hinder efforts to enter into serious and
meaningful negotiations.
Despite the frustrating and at times disappointing experiences at
the lack of reciprocal goodwill gestures from the Chinese government's
side we are still very steadfast in our commitment and effort to
convince the Chinese leadership about His Holiness the Dalai Lama's
sincerity in wanting to find a mutually acceptable solution within the
framework of the constitution of the People's Republic of China
ensuring the unity, stability and territorial integrity of the People's
Republic of China.
As the representatives of His Holiness had stated in their recent
press statement on their return from the latest round of meetings major
differences including some very fundamental still continue to exist.
Nevertheless the encouraging thing is that both the sides have
reiterated their willingness and commitment to continue the process of
contact and dialogue. As Churchill once said jaw jaw is better than war
war.
It is our hope that the Chinese government will agree to our
suggestions to increase the frequency of meetings for more vigorous and
intensive exchange of views to narrow down the differences which in our
view are not totally insurmountable. The basic concern of the Chinese
government like any other government is the unity, territorial
integrity and economic health of the country. The Middle Way Approach
adopted by His Holiness will in fact reinforce and strengthen all this.
It will not in any way weaken or undermine them if it is understood in
its proper context unobscured by unfounded distrust, suspicion and
fear.
A truly fruitful and substantive negotiation can take place only in
an atmosphere of genuine mutual trust and confidence. When we reach
such a stage in our contact I believe that the harsh and unreasonable
preconditions set by the Chinese government for the start of real
negotiations will become both unnecessary and irrelevant.
One of the most effective ways of creating the right atmosphere is
through personal contact and face to face meetings. It is with this in
mind His Holiness the Dalai Lama had conveyed to the Chinese government
through his envoys his wish to visit some of the holy Buddhist
pilgrimage sites in China. It is our hope that the present Chinese
leaders representing a new generation will have the necessary vision,
courage and self-confidence to welcome the visit.
One can empathize with the Chinese leaders on the need to have
caution when dealing with the problems of such a huge country
undergoing many changes but the proposed visit by His Holiness is a win
win situation. The Chinese leaders should have no fear as to what might
happen if such a visit is allowed. His Holiness will use the visit to
bring about better understanding, harmony and friendship. It will have
a calming effect on the situation inside Tibet. We have no doubt the
whole world will welcome such a move and China will win many friends
all over the world.
In conclusion I would like to say that we are still hopeful of a
break through and of finding a mutually acceptable and beneficial
solution.
______
Prepared Statement of Sonam Wangdu
march 13, 2006
I am grateful to the Congressional-Executive Commission on China
for the opportunity to appear before you. I have been involved in the
Tibet issue first as an employee of the Tibetan Government-in-Exile
from 1960 to 1973 and as an advocate, volunteering my time, in the free
Tibet movement since then. I am currently the chair of the U.S. Tibet
Committee in New York City, the oldest Tibet support group in North
America.
I was born in Kham, Tibet in 1942. My mother was forced to send me
away to my uncles in central Tibet, in fear for my safety because it
was rumored that young Tibetans boys were being shipped off to China
for indoctrination. I was a child of 8 years old when I left my home.
My eldest sister accompanied me across the country. My sister returned
to Kham, and the next time we met again was after 36 years in Nepal. In
1954, my uncles brought me to India where I was enrolled in English-
medium schools. I never returned home nor saw my Mother again.
For 42 years, I have lived in the United States. I have raised my
children here, and this country has been a host and a home to me, as
well as an inspiration. I press on for independence for Tibet because I
believe it can be achieved, and because that it is the only way to
preserve real freedom for Tibetans.
I came to this country in 1964, and never left. I was deeply
impacted by the Presidential elections taking place at that time. I
watched with much excitement and even envy at the freedom that the
citizens of this great country enjoyed in choosing their leaders and
deciding their destinies. I read about the American Revolution, and was
moved by the country's early leaders, in particular Patrick Henry,
whose call ``give me Liberty or give me Death'' rang so true to my ears
because my own countrymen were also laying down their lives for many of
the same ideals upon which this country was founded. I was equally
touched by President Kennedy's pledge in his inaugural address that the
United States ``shall pay any price, bear any burden, meet any
hardship, support any friend, oppose any foe, in order to assure the
survival and the success of liberty.'' It was not the hawkish stance
that I admired in them but the firm commitment to liberty that is so
essential for us Tibetans to reclaim our country.
The official policy of His Holiness the Dalai Lama and the Tibetan
Government-in-Exile is to achieve a ``genuine autonomy for all Tibetans
living in the three traditional provinces of Tibet within the framework
of the People's Republic of China.'' However, I believe the vast
majority of Tibetans desire independence for our country because of
reports from inside Tibet, and also because of the continuing arrests
and imprisonment of Tibetans for even mentioning the name of the Dalai
Lama.
An independent Tibet is fundamental to protecting the rights of the
Tibetan people and bringing peace in the region. The Middle Way
Approach is a concession to entreat dialogue with China. And to date,
this policy has not led to meaningful dialogue. It has succeeded only
in encouraging the PRC to demand further concessions. Those who support
the Middle Way Approach do so out of the highest regard for His
Holiness the Dalai Lama. Those of us who dissent also do so out of the
highest regard for His Holiness the Dalai Lama, a leader who has given
us a lifetime of care and service characterized by extraordinary wisdom
and compassion.
I would like to clarify that a dissenting opinion of this policy
does not in any way indicate an opposition to either the Dalai Lama or
the Tibetan Government-in-Exile. On the contrary, I believe that these
are institutions we must have--the role of the Dalai Lama for us
Tibetans has been vital to our cultural survival.
It has been 57 years since China invaded Tibet; a long time in the
span of a human life, but only a skipped beat in the history of a
2,133-year-old nation. In all these years the hope that Tibet will be
free again has not diminished. Most of those senior government
officials from all segments of our society, as well as many of my
friends, family members and colleagues have now passed away, but the
shared hope for freedom is still very much alive.
I was a child when Tibet became an occupied nation, but the
generation that followed mine has grown up never having known an
independent Tibet. They are truly the children of exile and occupation,
yet they are tougher, better educated and more skeptical than us older
Tibetans. They are the future of the movement. Figures like Tenzin
Tsundue, who was recently profiled in the New York Times Magazine,
Jamyang Norbu, author, and Lhasang Tsering, or the leaders of GuChuSum,
an organization of former political prisoners now in exile, the Tibetan
Youth Congress, or U.S.-based organizations such as the U.S. Tibet
Committee, the Students for a Free Tibet and the International Tibet
Independence Movement, to name a few, approach the Tibet-China
situation with greater media literacy, technical savvy and an
unwillingness to settle for anything less than total freedom for the
country of their forebears. These are Tibetans, but they are also
citizens of the world, with passports that reflect a United Nations-
worthy diversity.
I am a firm believer in peaceful conflict resolution; and in the
case of Tibet, it is imperative that both Tibet and China be earnest
and sincere in searching for an acceptable resolution. But as the
situation is now, the Middle Way Approach has not brought us any closer
to a resolution of the Tibet issue:
Contact with China in the new millennium has not shown any
tangible progress apart from the Chinese leaders using these meetings
to wage a public relations campaign to deflect criticism.
Although the Chinese have entertained His Holiness the
Dalai Lama's envoys, 4 times in China and once in Bern, Switzerland,
they have refused to recognize their official purpose or who they
represent.
Even as the Chinese host these delegations, they continue
to imprison Tibetans loyal to the Dalai Lama, and combined with the
lack of improvement in human rights, they have shown they have no
interest in loosening their grip on Tibet.
China is using these ``talks'' to lower the pressure from the
United States and the EU who have been pushing for these talks for many
years. It seems clear that the Chinese leaders are just going through
the motions without showing any real interest in providing ``genuine
autonomy'' for the people of Tibet. Yet the Tibetan Government-in-
Exile, to create a ``conducive environment'' for the dialogues,
continues to discourage her people and supporters from demonstrating
against Chinese leaders during their visits overseas, and for the first
time the officials of the New York-based Office of Tibet have been
instructed not to participate in the March 10 demonstration this year.
Concessions, be it voluntary or on demand, without reciprocity, are not
inducements for serious talk. Despite these overtures and concessions
by the Tibetan Government-in-Exile, China still maintains a hard line
on Tibet, and the protests against China by exiled Tibetans continues.
Tibetans are now even taking their fight into the heart of China where
Wongpo Tethong, a Swiss Tibetan, on March 8, displayed a banner which
read, ``Hu, you can't stop us! 2008-Free Tibet.org'' in Tiananmen
Square. With all eyes on Beijing for the upcoming 2008 Olympics Games
and the construction of the new railroad connecting China with Lhasa,
the capital of Tibet, to promote tourism, this is the time and
opportunity for the Tibetan Government-in-Exile and supporters to bring
attention to Tibet's real situation.
If the United States abides by Kalon Tripa/Prime Minister Samdhong
Rinpoche's misperception of the progress of these talks, the danger
exists that China will continue to forestall negotiations in the hopes
for a post-Dalai Lama scenario where the issue will die with Him.
Rather than the issue dying away, there is a greater likelihood
that the issue will destabilize, with future generations of very
frustrated Tibetans resorting to other means to bring freedom to Tibet.
The role and the position of the Dalai Lama has been a great stabilizer
for the Tibetan community, the Free Tibet Movement, and even the world.
The world has grown smaller, and the issue of Tibet cannot be
treated as an isolated case that affects the people of Tibet only. This
issue is now not simply a Tibetan issue, nor a nationalist issue, nor a
human rights issue. The Tibet issue has now evolved into a global
security and environmental issue.
It requires international attention to keep peace in the region.
India's national security is at far greater risk now than ever before.
We all saw this in the 1962 Chinese invasion of India from occupied
Tibet. The dynamic hasn't changed; however, the destructive potential
of a Sino-Indian conflict in modern times has the ability to go beyond
the borders of these two most populous nations. Such a conflict would
provide another dangerous rallying point for the world's clashing
ideologies. It seems too clear that to allow Tibet to exist as an
independent and neutral state is in humanity's best interest.
Tibet is located in a region of the world that is environmentally
sensitive. Tibetans have for centuries learnt to live in harmony with
nature. However, following the Chinese occupation of Tibet, widespread
environmental destruction from massive and unplanned deforestation,
farming and mining have had a profound effect on wildlife, soil erosion
and global weather patterns. I am not an expert in this area but
scientists have observed a direct link between natural vegetation on
the Tibetan plateau and the stability of the monsoons, which is
indispensable to the breadbasket of south Asia. They have also shown
that the environment of the Tibetan plateau affects jet-steams which
are related to the course of pacific typhoons and the el Nino
phenomenon. Based on these expert opinions, preserving Tibet's
environment is just not in the interest of protecting an ancient and a
unique culture, but it is also in the interest of the whole human race.
In our own life time we have seen the emergence of former colonies
as independent states, and the inconceivable events of the fall of the
Soviet Union and of the Berlin Wall. I believe Tibetans can have their
national flag fly in the capitals of many nations and at the United
Nations. The goal is not easy to achieve but it is not impossible. We
Tibetans must depend on our resolve, our commitment, our confidence to
continue our just cause. My generation inherited a torn, ravaged and
occupied Tibet, and for the sake of the future generations of Tibetans
we have a duty to work hard to free Tibet.
I am grateful to the U.S. Congress for its support for Tibet. I
request the U.S. Government to continue to urge the leaders of the
People's Republic of China to publicly recognize the Tibetan
delegations and to sincerely engage in meaningful dialogue with the
Tibetan Government-in-Exile. I request the U.S. Government to continue
pressuring China to improve the human rights situation in Tibet,
including the right to self-determination. I request the U.S.
Government to influence her allies to also urge the Chinese leaders to
dialogue with the Tibetan delegation in their official capacity as
representatives of His Holiness the Dalai Lama and the Tibetan
Government-in-Exile. It is extremely important to keep the pressure on
the Chinese leaders and to show that they are under your watch. Your
voice and support are crucial to the Tibetan people.
Thank you
______
Prepared Statement of Tseten Wangchuk
march 13, 2006
In this statement, I provide a brief assessment of the current
conditions for dialogue between Beijing and the Dalai Lama.\1\ While I
have been a broadcast journalist in the Tibetan service of the Voice of
America since 1993, the comments I make today represent my personal
opinion and do not reflect the views of the VOA.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ For a more detailed assessment, see Tashi Rabgey and Tseten
Wangchuk Sharlho, Sino-
Tibetan Dialogue in the Post-Mao Era: Lessons and Prospects (Washington
D.C.: East West Center, 2004).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
background
The current round of talks has ended a decade of protracted
stalemate. After Tiananmen, China maintained a hardline policy on
Tibet, a position exacerbated in part by the exiled Tibetan
leadership's uneven commitment to engagement. However, as Beijing's
political environment shifted through the 1990s and Sino-U.S.
relations moved to the center of China's foreign policy, there was high
level reconsideration the official policy of isolating the Dalai Lama
from its broader strategy on Tibet. By early 1997, channels between
Dharamsala and the Chinese leadership were quietly re-opened and three
rounds of informal meetings laid the groundwork for Jiang Zemin's
public acknowledgment in 1998 of the renewal of contacts.
While this initial foray into experimentation with contacts was
abortive--due likely to institutional resistance to the policy of
engagement and political rivalry within the elite leadership itself--
the impetus to reverse the 1989 decision to isolate the Dalai Lama had
nonetheless gained momentum. In the wake of the highly visible
departures of Arjia Rinpoche and the young Karmapa--both key figures in
China's national Tibetan elite--the official policy of excluding the
Dalai Lama was formally overturned in 2001 at the Fourth Work Forum on
Tibet. Within months of this decision, direct contacts were again re-
established and the groundwork was laid for the current round of talks.
The ongoing experimentation with dialogue remains exploratory.
Following the most recent visit in February of this year, Special Envoy
Lodi Gyari acknowledged ``major differences even in the approach in
addressing the issue,'' but described the proceedings as having
resulted in ``better and deeper understanding'' of their mutual
positions. While Dharamsala has maintained a cautiously optimistic
stance toward the process, Beijing has sent mixed signals. Until
recently, Chinese officials have been reticent to acknowledge the
ongoing meetings at all. However, TAR deputy party secretary Jampa
Phuntsog's recent public acknowledgement of the five rounds of talks
with the Dalai Lama's envoys--as reported in the pro-Beijing Hong Kong
publication Wenhui Bao and elsewhere--could indicate a shift in
approach. Phuntsog commented that the atmosphere was favorable (qifen
bucuo), and noted that while these contacts have not yet resulted in
substantive negotiations, the door was open for more dialogue.
In light of this public ambivalence, how should the China's stance
on the dialogue process be assessed? While prospects for a negotiated
resolution to the Sino-Tibetan dispute remain remote, the current
political and socio-economic conditions suggest that Beijing is likely
to remain cautiously committed to the policy of engagement.
current conditions
There is no doubt that the international factor has played a key
role in shaping the recent dynamics in the relationship between Beijing
and the Dalai Lama. Since the exiled Tibetan leadership turned to the
international community for support in 1987, foreign diplomatic and
political opprobrium have been an important factor in altering Chinese
perception of the dispute. However, it is doubtful that international
pressure alone could have altered China's policy. A survey of the
factors conditioning Beijing's policy choices and political behavior in
handling the so-called Tibet issue indicates that pressure to renew
contacts with the Dalai Lama has come not only externally from the
international arena, but also from domestic sources as well.
Chinese analysts and scholars of foreign affairs and international
studies have in recent years begun pointing out the benefits of
renewing contacts with the Dalai Lama from the standpoint of China's
long-term strategic interests. In particular, it has been argued that
Tibet constitutes a weak link in China's political system that will
remain vulnerable to manipulation by hostile forces until resolved.
Constructive engagement with the Dalai Lama, it is argued, would serve
the dual purpose of removing an irritant in China's foreign relations
while opening the door to the possibility of resolving the issue
itself. The willingness of Chinese scholars and strategic analysts, in
particular, to criticize hardline policies suggests that the internal
pressure corresponds not to short-term political goals but rather to a
reasoned and sober consideration of China's long-term interests.
This moderate position is in turn tied to growing concerns about
the longer-term effects of the accelerated economic development
program. Contrary to expectations, rapid economic expansion appears to
be giving rise to widening disparities in wealth and a heightened sense
of ethnic cleavage and dispossession among Tibetans. These socio-
economic transformations raise questions about the sustainability of
current conditions inside Tibet itself. The stability of the Tibetan
region has been secured at an extraordinarily high cost and it is
unclear what complex set of social and economic forces have been
unleashed by this political driven investment.
The short run impact of this rapid economic growth has been to
increase inequalities throughout the region. In particular, the
startling increase in expenditure on the bureaucracy and administration
has given rise to unprecedented affluence among Tibetan cadres,
administrators, and other salaried government workers. But the dramatic
rise in living standards among these elite, predominantly urban
Tibetans, has only underscored the impoverishment of the overwhelming
majority of Tibetans who remain rural, illiterate, and without access
to rudimentary healthcare or primary education. The growing sense of
dispossession engendered by the widening disparities in wealth is
exacerbated by the continuing influx of Chinese
migrants into Tibetan areas.
In addition to these key factors, a number of other structural
changes could also potentially play a significant role in shaping
Beijing's attitude toward talks with the Dalai Lama. One important
development has been China's shifting global position. Fueled by rapid
economic development, China's rise in international status could
potentially cause Beijing to become increasingly impervious to
international opprobrium. At the same time, however, China's growing
confidence could also lead to a shift in the dominant Chinese framing
of the Tibet issue. In fact, China's growing international stature has
already prompted calls from Chinese strategists and public figures to
abandon the narrative of victimhood that has long served as the filter
for viewing China's place in the world, and to embrace instead a
``great power mentality.'' The prevailing narrative of Chinese
victimization has, until now, impaired the Chinese ability to view the
Tibet issue objectively on its own terms. It is possible that a
transformation in Chinese attitude could potentially create a political
climate more conducive to constructive dialogue.
Another important structural change has been the ongoing shifts in
regional strategic balance. In particular, India's growing prominence
in south Asia is likely to affect China's strategic calculation in its
strategy on Tibet. Regardless of whether India becomes an ally with the
United States ``in the cause of democracy'' in opposition to China's
regional power, or whether India and China form their own de facto
geostrategic alliance to counterbalance the West, it is clear that the
changing dynamics in the relationship between the two regional
competitors will take center stage in the coming decade. In the
process, Beijing's incentive to find a long-term resolution to the
Tibet issue is likely to increase.
A third and striking development has been Beijing's institutional
restructuring of its decisionmaking process in managing the Tibet
issue. The management of the Tibet issue has become increasingly
complex and institutionalized over the past twenty years. Many more
stakeholders are now involved in the process of determining China's
Tibet policy. The decisionmaking process includes a broad range of
institutions, including the military, the foreign ministry, the
Ministry of National Security, and the State Council Information
Office. Through the involvement of these various institutions, there is
now a more comprehensive information gathering system in place.
Consequently, the Chinese leadership's access to information about the
Dalai Lama and the Tibet issue in general has increased exponentially.
There has also been a diversification of the sources of policy analysis
from outside the government, as new research centers and thinktanks
have begun to provide specialized opinions on Tibet. The effect of this
increasing complexity is that the decisionmaking process is now more
decentralized and plural. As this process has become more diffuse and a
broader range of interests is represented, Chinese perspectives on the
Dalai Lama and the Tibet issue have become more varied and competing
interests have emerged.
At a bureaucratic level, the United Front's infrastructure for
managing Tibetan affairs has become significantly more complex. As the
Party organ formally charged with the task of establishing broad
alliances with non-Party organizations and interest groups, the United
Front is responsible for managing the affairs of all national
minorities. Despite this formal mission, Tibetan affairs are being
accorded an extraordinary share of the United Front's institutional
resources. Above the United Front, a ``leading small group'' has been
established to coordinate high-level management of Tibetan affairs. The
creation of this high-level interagency coordinating body points to the
policy importance of Tibetan affairs for the Chinese leadership.\2\ In
2003, the foreign minister was also added to the membership of the
group, a move that underlined the significance of the Tibet issue to
China's foreign policy. The establishment of the leading small group
indicates not only that Tibet is now regarded as a key policy issue, it
also suggests that the senior leadership intends to manage the issue
through an institutionalized process of broad and formal consultation.
As with the expansion of the United Front's bureaucratic structure for
handling Tibetan affairs, it is possible that this new form of high-
level coordination will allow for less flexibility in the
decisionmaking process on dialogue with the Dalai Lama, as Beijing's
institutional management of the Tibet issue becomes increasingly more
complex and considerably less predictable. Regardless of how this
coordination proceeds, institutional factors will play a major role in
shaping the process of dialogue to come.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\2\ Leading small groups have also been established for Taiwan,
Hong Kong and Macao, as well as for national security. See Medeiros and
Fravel (2003).
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assessment
Cumulatively, these disparate variables have had the effect of
creating conditions more favorable to a strategy of engagement for
Beijing. But while it seems likely that China will, for the time being,
continue to pursue talks with the Dalai Lama, it seems equally unlikely
that the two parties can expect to begin discussing matters of
substance under present circumstances. For more than two decades of
intermittent talks, Beijing and Dharamsala have remained in fundamental
disagreement about the substance of what is--or should be--in dispute
between them. The exiled Tibetan leadership has consistently raised two
key issues in their efforts to open talks with Beijing: the need to
find a solution for all Tibetan-inhabited areas (the ``unification,''
or ``consolidation'' issue) and ``genuine autonomy.'' For their part,
the Chinese have been publicly adamant that there is no ``Tibet issue''
for discussion. Rather, they have characterized the dispute as solely a
matter of the Dalai Lama's personal return.
Thus, while there is momentum on both sides to continue simply to
talk about talks, the question now for Beijing is whether its deferral
of substantive negotiations risks forgoing an historic opportunity to
reach a lasting solution on the dispute over Tibet. Current political
realities in Beijing militate against acceding to Dharamsala's demands
for meaningful autonomy. Unless the Tibet issue should erupt as a
violent conflict, the factors pushing Beijing to negotiate are likely
to be regarded as insufficiently compelling to justify the risks
entailed. On the other hand, if the current talks break off, Beijing
will be going it alone as it manages the chronic threat of
ethnonationalist discontent.
Submissions for the Record
----------
Statement by Special Envoy Lodi Gyari, Head of the Delegation Sent by
His Holiness the Dalai Lama to China, Saturday, 25 February 2006;
Submitted by Tashi Wangdi
1. In continuation of the process started with the re-establishment
of direct contact with the Chinese leadership in September 2002, my
colleague envoy Kelsang Gyaltsen and I, accompanied by two members of
the Task Force, Sonam N. Dagpo and Bhuchung K. Tsering, visited China
from February 15 to 23, 2006.
2. We had a day-long meeting with the Executive Vice Minister of
the United Front Work Department, Zhu Weiqun, on February 22, 2006, in
Guilin City during which we dealt with substantive issues.
3. As a result, today there is a better and deeper understanding of
each other's position and the fundamental differences that continue to
exist in the position held by the two parties.
4. This round of discussion also made it clear that there is a
major difference even in the approach in addressing the issue. However,
we remain committed to the dialogue process and are hopeful that
progress will be possible by continuing the engagement. Our Chinese
counterparts made clear their interest in continuing the present
process and their firm belief that the obstacles can be overcome
through more discussions and engagements.
5. As we had expressed an interest in looking at the situation of
the different autonomous regions during our previous meetings,
considering the time and the season, a trip was arranged this time to
the Guangxi Zhuang Autonomous Region. We found the visit useful.
We have reported to His Holiness the Dalai Lama today on our
discussion along with Kalon Tripa Samdhong Rinpoche.
6. Our host for this visit was the United Front Work Department of
the Chinese Communist Party. Many other authorities, including the
government of Guangdong and Guangxi, particularly Guilin City, have
been involved in organizing our visit. We wish to express our sincere
appreciation to the officials at various levels for their hospitality
and assistance.
Dharamsala, February 25, 2006
______
Statement of His Holiness the Dalai Lama on the 47th Anniversary of the
Tibetan National Uprising Day, 10 March 2006; Submitted by Tashi Wangdi
Today, as we commemorate the 47th anniversary of the Tibetan
National Uprising Day, I extend my warm greetings to my fellow Tibetans
in Tibet and in exile, as well as to our friends around the world. I
also pay homage to the brave men and women of Tibet who have sacrificed
their lives, and who continue to suffer, for the cause of Tibetan
people.
From around 1949, Tibet had witnessed a series of unprecedented
events, marking the beginning of a new era in its history. As stated in
the documents, the issue of Tibet was purportedly decided in 1951
through an agreement between the central and local governments, taking
into consideration the special status of Tibet and the prevailing
reality. Since then, I have made every possible effort to secure
implementation of the policy to allow self-rule and genuine autonomy to
Tibetans within the framework of the People's Republic of China, thus
helping to create conditions for our people to coexist in harmony and
unity as a member of the big family of the Chinese nation.
In 1954-55, I visited Beijing as a representative of the Tibetan
people. I took the opportunity of that visit to discuss the future of
the Tibetan people with Chairman Mao Zedong and senior leaders of the
party, government and military. These discussions gave me a lot of hope
and reassurances. So I returned to Tibet with optimism and confidence.
However, from late 1955 ultra-leftist excesses began to assail parts of
Tibet. By 1959, the whole of Tibet was plunged in deep crisis. As a
result, I and over a hundred thousand Tibetans were compelled to go
into exile. We have been in exile for 46 years now.
Sometime in 1974, we formulated the basic principles of our Middle-
Way Approach for resolving the issue of Tibet, trusting that a time
must surely come when we would have the opportunity to engage in talks
with the Chinese leadership. In 1979, we were able to interact directly
with the leadership in Beijing. At that time, Deng Xiaoping said that
``except for independence, all issues could be resolved through
negotiations''. Since then, I have pursued the Middle-Way Approach with
consistency and sincerity.
I have of course made criticisms whenever I saw unbearably sad
developments in China, Tibet and the world over. But my criticisms were
confined to addressing the reality of each individual case. I have
never departed from my commitment to the Middle-Way Approach at any
time and in any given circumstances. This is clear to the world.
Unfortunately, Beijing still seems unable to overcome doubts and
suspicions regarding my intention; it continues to criticise me of
nursing a hidden agenda of separatism and engaging in conspiracy to
achieve this.
Since the re-establishment of direct contact between us and the
People's Republic of China in 2002, my envoys and the Chinese
counterparts were able to engage in a series of frank and extensive
discussions during which they were able to explain each other's
position. This kind of discussion, I hope, will help to clear the
doubts and suspicions of the People's Republic of China so that we can
move on to settle the differences in our views and positions, and
thereby find a mutually acceptable solution to the issue of Tibet. More
particularly, in the fifth round of talks held a few weeks ago, the two
sides were able to clearly identify the areas of major differences and
the reasons thereof. They were also able to get a sense of the
conditions necessary for resolving the differences. In addition, my
envoys reiterated my wish to visit China on a pilgrimage. As a country
with a long history of Buddhism, China has many sacred pilgrim sites.
As well as visiting the pilgrim sites, I hope to be able to see for
myself the changes and developments in the People's Republic of China.
Over the past decades, China has seen spectacular economic and
social development. This is commendable. The Tibetan areas have
likewise seen some infrastructural development, which I have always
considered positive.
Looking back at the past five decades of China's history, one sees
that the country saw a great many movements based on the principles of
Marxism-Leninism. That was during Mao's era. Then Deng Xiaoping,
through seeking truth from facts, introduced socialist market economy
and brought huge economic progress. Following this, based on his theory
of the ``Three Represents'', Jiang Zemin expanded the scope of the
Communist Party of China to include not just the peasants and workers,
but also three other elements, namely the advanced productive forces,
the progressive course of China's advanced culture, and the fundamental
interests of the majority. Today, President Hu Jintao's theory of
``Three Harmonies'' envisages peaceful coexistence and harmony within
China, as well as with her neighbours and the international community.
All these initiatives were undertaken in accordance with the changing
times. As a result, the transition of political power and the
development of the country have continued unabated. And today China is
emerging as one of the major powers in the world, which she deserves
considering her long history and huge population.
However, the fundamental issue that must be addressed is that in
tandem with the political power and economic development, China must
also follow the modern trend in terms of developing a more open
society, free press and policy transparency. This, as every sensible
person can see, is the foundation of genuine peace, harmony and
stability.
Tibetans--as one of the larger groups of China's 55 minority
nationalities--are distinct in terms of their land, history, language,
culture, religion, customs and traditions. This distinctiveness is not
only clear to the world, but was also recognised by a number of senior
Chinese leaders in the past. I have only one demand: self-rule and
genuine autonomy for all Tibetans, i.e., the Tibetan nationality in its
entirety. This demand is in keeping with the provisions of the Chinese
constitution, which means it can be met. It is a legitimate, just and
reasonable demand that reflects the aspirations of Tibetans, both in
and outside Tibet. This demand is based on the logic of seeing future
as more important than the past; it is based on the ground realities of
the present and the interests of the future.
The long history of the past does not lend itself to a simple black
and white interpretation. As such, it is not easy to derive a solution
from the past history. This being the case, I have stated time and
again that I do not wish to seek Tibet's separation from China, but
that I will seek its future within the framework of the Chinese
constitution. Anyone who has heard this statement would realise, unless
his or her view of reality is clouded by suspicion, that my demand for
genuine self-rule does not amount to a demand for separation. The
convergence of this fact with a gradual progress in freedom, openness
and media will create conditions, I hope, for resolving Sino-Tibetan
problem through negotiations. Therefore, I am making every effort to
perpetuate the present contacts and thus create a conducive atmosphere.
The Kashag of the Central Tibetan Administration has made a number
of appeals to Tibetans and our international supporters to work toward
the creation of a conducive environment for negotiations. Today, I
would like to emphasise that we leave no stone unturned to help the
present process of dialogue for the resolution of the Sino-Tibetan
problem. I urge all Tibetans to take note of this on the basis of the
Kashag's appeal. I make the same request to Tibet supporters and those
sympathetic to the Tibetan people.
By the same token, I would like to tell the People's Republic of
China that if it sees benefit in sincerely pursuing dialogue through
the present contact, it must make clear gesture to this effect. I urge
the Chinese leadership to give a serious thought to this. A positive
atmosphere cannot be created by one side alone. As an ancient Tibetan
saying goes, one hand is not enough to create the sound of a clap.
Finally, I would like to take this opportunity to express my
appreciation and gratitude to the international community for their
consistent support to us. I would also like to express once again the
Tibetan people's appreciation and immense gratitude to the people and
the Government of India for their unwavering and unparalleled
generosity and support to us.
With my thoughts on the situation and feelings of the Tibetans
inside Tibet, I pray for all of them. I also pray for the wellbeing of
all sentient beings.
The Dalai Lama, March 10, 2006
______
Statement of the Kashag on the 47th Anniversary of the Tibetan People's
Uprising Day, 10 March 2006; Submitted by Tashi Wangdi
Today is the 47th anniversary of the Tibetan people's peaceful
uprising for freedom in Lhasa, the capital of Tibet. On this momentous
occasion, the Kashag of the Central Tibetan Administration pays tribute
to the heroic men and women of Tibet who have sacrificed their lives
for our spiritual, political and people's cause. The Kashag also
expresses its solidarity with the Tibetans who continue to suffer
oppression in Tibet.
In the past 10 March statements of the 12th Kashag since it assumed
office in 2001, we have taken stock of and reviewed the positive and
negative aspects of past developments. In these statements we explained
our policy on the implementation of His Holiness the Dalai Lama's
Middle-Way Approach for resolving the issue of Tibet through
negotiations, empowering the Tibetan people, and the recent
reestablishment of Sino-Tibetan contacts and the creation of a
conducive environment by the exiled Tibetan community for negotiations.
Apart from these, we have also explained the Middle-Way Approach, which
was specifically meant for the leadership of the People's Republic of
China. Moreover, we have made necessary clarifications on the past
visits to China by the envoys of His Holiness the Dalai Lama. In these
statements we have also articulated the aspirations of the Tibetan
people.
This is the last 10 March statement of the present Kashag.
Therefore, we will not repeat here what has already been said in the
past statements. We will, instead, present a brief account of the
status of the process of Sino-Tibetan dialogue concerning the future of
the Tibetan people in and outside Tibet, and our future plans.
Under the wise guidance of His Holiness the Dalai Lama, we have
been making every possible effort to find a negotiated solution to the
Tibetan problem. This process was formulated under the guidance of His
Holiness the Dalai Lama in accordance with the inspiration of the
Tibetans in and outside Tibet and was unanimously supported through a
democratic process by Assembly of Tibetan People's Deputies. In the
process, the envoys of His Holiness the Dalai Lama have already
conducted five rounds of serious talks with the leaders of the People's
Republic of China. They have also reiterated His Holiness the Dalai
Lama's desire to visit sacred pilgrim sites in China. The Kashag,
therefore, considers that the time has come when we need to work more
than ever before on the Sino-Tibetan contacts and the current dialogue
process.
Recently the envoys of His Holiness the Dalai Lama returned from
their fourth visit to China between 15-23 February 2006 and the fifth
round of talks. In the latest round of talks, both sides were able to
further identify the differences in their views and thinking and the
reasons for these differences and the means to resolve them.
His Holiness the Dalai Lama has adopted and pursued the Middle-Way
policy in which he does not seek independence for Tibet. This is in
accordance with Deng Xiaoping's assurance that except for independence
all issues could be resolved through negotiations. Therefore, we
believe that the fundamental differences between the two sides have
already been resolved. Thus the present differences in views and
perspectives are not fundamental issues. They are rather details
regarding how to implement and carry forward our efforts. If the
People's Republic of China still sees any differences in the
fundamental issue and implementation, it is contrary to reality. The
People's Republic of China must review this.
The Middle-Way Approach is a flexible and mutually beneficial
policy and the two sides can discuss this based on the situation and
the needs of the people. As mentioned in last year's statement, we
reiterate that the essence of the Middle-Way Approach should be
understood and grasped. One side remaining rigid by attaching too much
importance to a few words in background documents is similar to holding
on to branches and offshoots rather than the root and is a means of
finding excuse.
In essence, we have always said that the need to have genuine
autonomy for the three provinces of Tibet or the entire Tibetan people
is the basic principle. We cannot compromise on this principle. This
has also been clearly understood by the leaders of the People's
Republic of China. Therefore, it is important to make sure that both
sides are not deceived by a few who try to distort things for their
personal gain.
According to Marxism and Leninism, the nationality issue is the
foundation of strength and stability. It is also regarded as an
important principle for the progress of socialism. Therefore, Marx and
Lenin formulated a new ideology that calls for the equality and unity
of nationalities. This should be achieved, according to them, by
completely eradicating the chauvinism of the majority nationality and
local nationalism so that the system of suppressing nationalities
practised under imperialism could be prevented. Based on this ideology,
the constitution of the People's Republic of China has inserted a
provision that grants to all minority nationalities the status of
national regional autonomy. The only aim of this provision is to
protect the unique characteristics of the minority nationalities,
including their language and culture. Tibetans are also one of China's
55 minority nationalities. Moreover, before 1951 they all lived
together in small, compact groups in a contiguous chain throughout
Tibet. As a result, today they are either scattered or live in these
areas with a majority nationality. Therefore, should they are reduced
to minority in their own areas, it is not possible to protect their
unique characteristics. Moreover, the complete eradication of
chauvinism of the majority nationality and local nationalism will not
be possible under such circumstances. Therefore, if things go in this
direction it would be nothing but similar to the system of ''divide and
rule'' practised under imperialism. Because of these reasons, we have
proposed the need to have unification of all the Tibetans, with the
status of genuine autonomy. This demand is in accordance with Marxist
and Leninist principles and the provisions of the Chinese constitution.
Therefore, this demand can be met. Moreover this has the possibility to
establish a strong base on which genuine equality and unity of
nationalities can be achieved, proving it the best way to prevent
separatism.
We have been able to sustain Sino-Tibetan relations for the past
four years. The continuing round of talks has given us the opportunity
to clear up a lot of issues and gradually identify the differences that
exist between the two sides. Needless to say these are the results of
contacts and discussions held between the two sides.
At present it is extremely important for both sides to put more
efforts to resolve the Sino-Tibetan problem as soon as possible by
strengthening and improving the present contacts. This is also
necessary to realise the wish of His Holiness the Dalai Lama to visit
China for pilgrimage in the near future. Therefore, in order to achieve
this, the Kashag once again urges Tibetans in and outside Tibet and
Tibet supporters not to undermine the atmosphere.
This is well known to all that as long as we are committed to the
Middle-Way policy there is no other way by which we can achieve our
future goals, except through the dialogue process.
It is but natural that contacts and discussions can take place only
through cooperation and harmony and not in an atmosphere of enmity and
confrontation, and we would like to emphasise once again that this must
be understood by all.
Finally, we pray for the long life of His Holiness the Dalai Lama
and the fulfillment of all his wishes. We also pray that the truth of
the Tibetan issue prevails soon.
The Kashag, 10 March 2006